Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Light of the Afghan Experience Between 2005 and 2011: How Did We Get Here, How Have We Done and Where Are We Headed?
|Title:||Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Light of the Afghan Experience Between 2005 and 2011: How Did We Get Here, How Have We Done and Where Are We Headed?|
|Authors:||Schneider, Krista M.|
|Abstract:||This thesis provides a thorough investigation into the American and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrines in light of the counterinsurgency experience in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2011. The major finding of this thesis is that counterinsurgency doctrine holds many assumptions that necessitate a re-evaluation of counterinsurgency. The assumptions have been overlooked because of a tailored historical record of counterinsurgency that attributed success to superior methods but ignored beneficial contextual factors. Since the historical record of British counterinsurgency in Malaysia has been subject to recent revisions by several academics, the common belief that counterinsurgency can be successful through minimal force may change. The necessity of force raises ethical and political considerations for counterinsurgency in the 21st century. Counterinsurgency doctrine will be re-evaluated in light of the experience in Afghanistan for it highlights that the amount of blood and treasure required in counterinsurgency operations cannot be wagered on a doctrine built on assumptions.|
|Collection||Thèses Saint-Paul // Saint Paul Theses|