Hegel's answer to the Aristotelian aporia of the chorismos of nous in the "De Anima" III.4--5 and "Metaphysics" Lambda.6--9.

Abstract

The author of this thesis is concerned with the cwrismo &d12;v (separate) status of nou&d4;v (Thought) in Aristotle's De Anima III.4--5 and Metaphysics Λ.6--9, and Hegel's answer to this a ,pori&d12; a (aporia) in his Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie. For Aristotle, nou&d4;v is a pure actuality ( 3 ,n 3&d12;rgei a ) and final cause that cannot directly influence the wide array of Nature's particular determinations. For Hegel, however, Aristotle's nou&d4;v is not purely actual, if actuality refers to a static and separate substance, but is a dynamic activity (Tatigkeit), in which nou&d4;v ' self-referential nature is extended to include the diverse determinations of the Scala Naturae. This absolute character of nou&d4;v ensures the interrelation of all thought-determinations, since these determinations are the manifestation of the ubiquitous activity of Denken's inner self-differentiation. Only by coalescing final and formal causality in Denken can Hegel claim to have overcome the Aristotelian a ,pori&d12; a of the cwrismo &d12;v of nou&d4;v .