Naval gunfire support for the Dieppe raid.

Abstract

Many participants, observers and later historians have commented on the insufficiency of fire support provided for the disastrous raid on the French channel port of Dieppe in August of 1942. This seemingly facile consensus raises a number of questions: (1) What type of additional fire support was needed? (2) What might the effects of this fire support have been given the technology of the time? and (3) Is the requirement for more firepower the product of retrospective speculation or were there contemporary standards for amphibious operations that would have indicated the need for more fire support? The need for additional naval fire support during the amphibious assault on Dieppe is explored, the most efficient form of fire is identified and the possible effects on the battle are evaluated in this study. The principal conclusions are that the need for more fire support was laid down in prior amphibious doctrine, the means for providing this fire support were available, and the effect of increased heavy gunfire support might have substantially improved the results of the landing component of the raid. The decision and planning process, particularly with respect to naval fire support, seems to strongly indicate a breakdown in rational bureaucratic decision making.