Plotinus on the soul as substance and act: A study on the possibility of a scientific knowledge of sensible reality.

Abstract

The thesis argues for the admission of the scientific knowledge of the sensible reality in the Plotinian philosophy. As such, the thesis is a study in the metaphysics of knowledge. The thesis is constructed in three parts. The first part is dialectical in nature; that is, it is a reasoning which starts from a given, commonly held position in order to elucidate the relative strengths and weaknesses thereof. The point of departure is the test of Enneads V,1 (10),3 on the acts and passions of Soul. The second part is demonstrative in nature; that is, it is a reasoning which is meant to be conclusive of the thesis based upon rational and exegetical deductions. This part of the thesis is based on a study of the test of Enneads III,5 (50). Proceeding, the thesis identifies the mythological figure of Divine Aphrodite with Divine Soul and studies the nature of a priori knowledge. Following, the thesis identifies the mythological figure of Worldly Aphrodite with Mixed Soul and studies the nature of a posteriori knowledge. This section of the thesis includes five steps. The first step introduces the notions of knowledge of the particular and knowledge of the universal common to Aristotle and Neoplatonism. The second step situates the nature of reason to be potential within the historical context of Alexander of Aphrodisias, an Aristotelian well known to Plotinus. The third step posits the difference between potential or implicit knowledge and actual or explicit knowledge consequent to the application of the universal to the particular. The fourth step concerns the teaching on genus and species. Finally the fifth step concerns the subsumptive knowledge of Mixed Soul and the role of the abstract universal in Plotinian philosophy. The third part is apologetic in nature; that is, a defence of the thesis against forseeable objections. A first objection concerns the status of opinative knowledge in the Plotinian philosophy. The second objection concerns the Soul's knowledge in contradistinction to Intellect's knowledge.