Immanuel Kant's theory of experience.

dc.contributor.advisor	Hunter, Graeme,
dc.contributor.author	Bosley, Aneurin.
dc.date.accessioned	2009-03-25T19:45:24Z
dc.date.available	2009-03-25T19:45:24Z
dc.date.created	1996
dc.date.issued	1996
dc.degree.level	Masters
dc.degree.name	M.A.
dc.description.abstract	The goal of this thesis are, firstly, to critically explicate the role of the understanding in making experience possible (where experience is defined as 'empirical knowledge of objects'), and, secondly, to argue that Kant's conclusion regarding the possibility of experience is not tenable. My argument is essentially that the schematism of the pure concepts does not succeed in bridging the gap between sensibility and understanding. I suggest that not only does the schematism not succeed in providing the pure concepts with sensible content, but that nothing could provide them with such content.
dc.format.extent	104 p.
dc.identifier.citation	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 35-06, page: 1618.
dc.identifier.isbn	9780612199316
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9545
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.20381/ruor-7849
dc.publisher	University of Ottawa (Canada)
dc.subject.classification	Philosophy.
dc.title	Immanuel Kant's theory of experience.
dc.type	Thesis

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