Risk as a ‘Permissive Technology’: An Analysis of Canada’s “Robust” Arms Export Risk Assessment Process

Abstract

The disparity between the actions of the global arms trade and reporting of international human rights groups is well established. In 2018, when the Government of Canada launched a review of all existing arms export permits to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and placed a moratorium on the issuance of new export permits it seemed as if Canada was headed towards a more meaningful consideration of human rights in its arms trading. However, in 2020, when the findings of the review were published, the moratorium lifted, and a reaffirmation of the LAV deal was confirmed, it was clear that this was not the case. This analysis argues that a “permissive technology” embedded into Canada’s arms export risk assessment process enabled the findings of the review that facilitated a resumption of arms transfers to KSA and produced a disparity between related United Nations reporting.