“The Best Possible Time for War?” The USS Panay and American Far Eastern Policy During the Roosevelt Presidency

Abstract

This thesis examines American Far Eastern policy from the beginning of the Franklin Roosevelt presidency through the early months of 1938. This study is chiefly concerned with the attack by Japanese aircraft on the USS Panay and its effect on the course of U.S. foreign policy. Particular attention is paid to the Anglo-American dialogue which occurred throughout the Far Eastern Crisis. Prior to the end of 1938, the U.S. administration’s position in Asia was dictated both by policies inherited from preceding administrations and by the extreme isolationism of the American people. This foundation effectively inhibited any cooperation with foreign powers. Relying on a reactive policy in the Far East, Washington remained aloof from entanglement as the President sought a plan which would permit U.S. involvement without inviting isolationist wrath. This paper traces an evolution in American Far Eastern policy, highlighting the Panay incident as a distinctly identifiable turning point whereby isolationism gave way to internationalism.