Economic Expertise in Postcapitalist Democratic Economic Planning

Abstract

Postcapitalist democratic economic planning (DEP) seeks to democratize economic decision-making. In response to the failures of central planning, DEP is vigilant lest the emergence of some new elite subvert its democratic and egalitarian aspirations. This article considers the possibility that economic expertise intended to support DEP may be means through which new elites are covertly encouraged. DEP advocates seek to safeguard DEP processes from elite control by proposing institutional oversight structures combined with enhanced subjective oversight capacities. In the case of economic expertise, we contend that these responses mitigate the possibility that economists’ analyses will have preferential implications but do not resolve this antidemocratic possibility. Economic expertise poses a problem of democratic accountability because its technical opacity impedes democratic oversight, thus enabling the covert design of economic analysis in ways that favour some groups over others. We conclude by arguing that reconsidering economic expertise in postcapitalism can attenuate this tension.