Naturalism and nonsense: Quine and Wittgenstein on ethics.

Abstract

W. V. Quine's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's (early) ethical views are compared. The aim of the comparison is to show that despite many similarities between the two philosophers' views, their approaches to the subject are fundamentally different. Underlying the points of affinity are two fundamentally different philosophical temperaments. Both put forward complete philosophical structures with which their ethical views are remarkably consistent; both see everything from their own philosophical standpoint. Accordingly, Quine's naturalistic stance and Wittgenstein's transcendental stance are explored in order to expose the deep differences between their ethical views, despite many seeming similarities. Further, it is shown that their ethical views can only be understood when placed within the context of their respective philosophical frameworks. A comparison of Quine and Wittgenstein on ethics, then, reveals many components of the general philosophical positions of two of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, while clarifying their respective ethical views and the deep differences between them.