Reason and language in Charles Taylor

Abstract

Charles Taylor's commitment to cultural integrity is at the base of his idealization of an inclusionary discursive community, which recognizes particular expressions of the good but also asks that agents participate in the articulation of universal ethical standards centering on the dignity and autonomy of each person. This thesis examines the extent to which Taylor's 'Best Account principle' is able to reconcile the two related demands of situated freedom, as presented by Hegel: those of expressive unity with nature and rational autonomy. It evaluates the 'Best Account principle' as a hermeneutic principle of rational justification by comparing it to the rival theories of procedural liberalism, naturalism, and relativism. It then examines how the expressive theory of language effectively elucidates the intersubjective powers of Taylor's principle, before assessing how Taylor's hermeneutics, inspired by Gadamer, might meet the challenges of political recognition and incommensurability.