Russell's Epistemology and its Ontological Implications: His Evolving Stance on Neutral Monism Considering the Problem of our Knowledge of the External World

Abstract

This thesis argues that Bertrand Russell's engagement with neutral monism does not stem from an intrinsic commitment to the theory itself but rather emerges as an epistemological necessity - a byproduct of his attempt to resolve the problem of reconciliation of subjective sense-data with the objective physical world (the RSP problem). This problem, central to his theory of knowledge, concerns the reconciliation of subjective sense-data with the objective physical world. By examining Russell's shift from initially rejecting neutral monism - due to his commitment to the cognitive theory of acquaintance - to later embracing it, I demonstrate that his methodological turn toward logical construction necessitated a revision of his epistemological framework. This revision ultimately compelled him to abandon subject-object dualism, thereby aligning with neutral monism. Russell's methodological commitments, particularly his reliance on logical construction, inevitably align his position with the core tenets of neutral monism, even though his primary motivation remains epistemological rather than ontological. This convergence between Russell's epistemology and ontology, evidenced in works such as his Theory of Knowledge, The Problems of Philosophy, Our Knowledge of the External World, The Analysis of Mind, and The Analysis of Matter, reveals a progression in which Russell adopts a partial neutral monism as a more effective approach to the demands of his theory of knowledge. Through a critical analysis of his works, I argue that Russell's neutral monism, rather than simply advancing scientific realism or refining ontological positions, represents a profound philosophical synthesis of epistemology and ontology in his pursuit of a comprehensive theory of the world.