Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information
| dc.contributor.author | Halushka, Mariya | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-04-26T13:42:14Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-04-26T13:42:14Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.description.abstract | I consider settings with rich private information – an agent's type may include private information other than just his preferences. In such settings, I identify a necessary condition for obviously strategy-proof implementation of social choice rules. I consider applications to strict preferences, matching and object allocation. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10393/42041 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.20381/ruor-26263 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.subject | 2104E | en_US |
| dc.subject | Obvious strategy-proofness | en_US |
| dc.subject | Mechanism design | en_US |
| dc.title | Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information | en_US |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
