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The Hollow Ring of Donor Commitment: Country Concentration and the Decoupling of Aid-Effectiveness Norms from Donor Practice

dc.contributor.authorBrown, Stephen
dc.contributor.authorSwiss, Liam
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-21T15:24:41Z
dc.date.available2013-10-21T15:24:41Z
dc.date.created2013
dc.date.issued2013-10-21
dc.description.abstractThe fragmentation of a donor's foreign aid across too many recipient countries is widely believed to be detrimental to aid effectiveness. This article explores the origins of a new norm – recipient concentration – and assesses the extent to which it can be expected to improve aid effectiveness. It also examines 23 donors' actual record of country concentration, and finds that, though there are some potential explanations for donors' behaviour, their collective failure to implement country concentration has very little consequence in theory or in practice.
dc.description.sponsorshipSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
dc.identifier.citationBrown, Stephen and Liam Swiss. “The Hollow Ring of Donor Commitment: Country Concentration and the Decoupling of Aid Effectiveness Norms from Donor Practice”. Development Policy Review, vol. 31, no. 6 (November 2013), pp 737-55.
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/dpr.12033
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10393/26253
dc.identifier.urihttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12033/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectAid
dc.subjectdonors
dc.subjectconcentration
dc.subjectfragmentation
dc.subjectdecoupling
dc.subjectnorms
dc.titleThe Hollow Ring of Donor Commitment: Country Concentration and the Decoupling of Aid-Effectiveness Norms from Donor Practice
dc.typeArticle

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