Approaches to Practical Quantum Cryptography
| dc.contributor.author | Yuen, Peter | |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Broadbent, Anne Lise | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-07-07T19:54:18Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-07-07T19:54:18Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-07-07 | |
| dc.description.abstract | There are various practical obstacles in quantum cryptography. These include the problems that arise in implementing quantum cryptographic protocols with current and near-term technology, and those that come with the development and security analysis of new protocols. In this work, we examine a few of these obstacles and, for each one, we highlight an approach that aims to mitigate it. We start by examining the setting of device-independence, with oblivious transfer in the bounded-quantum-storage-model as the primitive of interest. The typical approach to enabling device-independence is the use of a Bell-inequality violation, which requires a strict non-communication assumption that is practically difficult to enforce. We develop and analyze the security of a device-independent oblivious transfer protocol that replaces the Bell-inequality violation approach with a computational assumption, thereby relaxing the non-communication assumption. Our second topic examines the problem of noise in a quantum money scheme. We show how to achieve noise-tolerance in the public-key setting. Our scheme can be seen as a generalization of the [AC12] scheme: a valid banknote is now a subspace state possibly affected by noise, and verification is performed by using classical oracles to check for membership in "larger spaces." Additionally, a banknote in our scheme is minted by preparing conjugate coding states and applying a unitary. For our last topic, we consider the general task of proving security against a specious adversary, which is the quantum analogue of the classical semi-honest adversary. A useful feature of specious adversaries is that security against them can guarantee security against stronger adversaries [DNS12]. This motivates the search for a canonical specious adversary, where proving security against such an adversary guarantees security against the entire class of specious adversaries. Within a restricted setting, we define a particular specious adversary and show that it satisfies our definition of canonical. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10393/50622 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.20381/ruor-31224 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa | |
| dc.rights | Attribution 4.0 International | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Cryptography | |
| dc.subject | Quantum information | |
| dc.title | Approaches to Practical Quantum Cryptography | |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Sciences / Science | |
| thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | |
| thesis.degree.name | PhD | |
| uottawa.department | Mathématiques et statistique / Mathematics and Statistics |
