Bitter harvest: A case study of allied operational intelligence for Operation Spring Normandy, July 25, 1944.
|Title:||Bitter harvest: A case study of allied operational intelligence for Operation Spring Normandy, July 25, 1944.|
|Authors:||O'Keefe, David R.|
|Abstract:||Spring was designed by 2nd Canadian Corps commander Lt. Gen. Guy Simonds as a three-phase plan to capture the high ground south of the Verrieres Ridge and if the opportunity presented itself, to exploit towards Falaise. As darkness descended over Normandy on July 25, 1944, the uncomfortable results of operation "Spring" were revealed. Over 500 Canadian soldiers lay dead and 1000 had been wounded or captured in their attempt to wrestle Verrieres Ridge away from its German defenders. What remains as a common thread throughout the contemporary literature is Simonds' palatable concept that Spring was victimized by poor and incomplete operational intelligence. However, what Simonds failed to acknowledge, and historians have overlooked is the existence of evidence from intelligence sources which cast new light on Simonds' palatable concept. By tracing the development of intelligence in the Canadian army and its relationship to high command, a picture begins to emerge in the days leading up to Spring which indicates that not only was Simonds well aware of a significant enemy reinforcement, but that this intelligence impacted on his planning for the operations well before "the eleventh hour." (Abstract shortened by UMI.)|
|Collection||Thèses, 1910 - 2010 // Theses, 1910 - 2010|