Discourse on Emptiness: A Cognitive Model of the Two Truths Distinction in the Madhyamaka Philosophy of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti

Abstract

I treat the two truths distinction of the Madhyamaka school of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism as a hermeneutic device for interpreting the philosophy of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti: I use the distinction to decipher what in their texts is conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) and what is ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Accordingly, the thesis I argue is that the two truths distinction correlates to a cognitive divide: I apply a cognitive reading to each of the two truths wherein each corresponds to a different mode of cognitive experience, and I formally differentiate the two through the criterion of the presence and absence of language and conceptuality therein. Candrakīrti defines a “conventional truth” and an “ultimate truth” each in terms of being an “object”. How each object is “seen” I correlate with distinct cognitions. The conventional truth (defined as comprising the objects of the valid cognition of ordinary experience) correlates with a conceptual, dualistic form of cognition; the ultimate truth (defined as comprising the “object(s)” of the valid cognition of extra-ordinary experience), correlates with a non-conceptual, non-dualistic form of cognition. Regarding its application, the formal differentiation corresponds to a twofold soteriologization. There is an interdependence between the cognitive reading of the two truths and their respective soteriological functions insofar as the cognitive distinction should be predicated by a twofold soteriologization. That is, beyond their formal differences, a difference in soteriological application distinguishes two modes of cognition. Each “truth” or form of cognition functions in its respective way as a soteriological device for attaining liberation and awakening. This cognitive-qua-soteriological distinction is significant for only through the realization of the ultimate is liberation attained. The conventional truth is insufficient to attain the soteriological goal; nonetheless, it is the means to achieving the ultimate and, therefore, that goal. This instantiates a specific relation between the two truths as one of means and goal. Any comprehensive model of the two truths must explain this progression in not only philosophical but soteriological terms.