Answering meaning scepticism: Judgement-dependence and interpretationism

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to provide an answer to the problem of meaning scepticism as presented by Kripke by appealing to facets of a person's mental history. Following Wright's strategy, the sceptic's demand for a fact that determines meaning is placated by appealing to intentions. The focus of the problem becomes the need for a satisfactory account of first-person authority that also answers Kripke's argument from 'queerness'. Two approaches are presented, one from the traditional first-person perspective, and the other from Davidson's standpoint of the interdependence of self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds and knowledge of the external world. It will be shown that Davidson's approach is preferable because it answers Kripke's three problems. An interesting corollary of this research exposes similarities between Wright's judgement-dependence and Davidson's views on the theory of interpretation.