The Assessment of Corporate Criminal Liability on the Basis of Corporate Identity: An Analysi

Abstract

Current theories of corporate criminal liability in Canada and the U.K. focus upon the individuals who make-up an organization. However this approach, called the identification doctrine, has its limitations, especially when employed in the context of large, decentralized organizations. The present article examines a different basis for liability, proposed by some scholars, which concentrates on the organization itself. It is believed that this form of liability could enhance both the effectiveness and the fairness of the current system. The article is divided into two parts. In the first part, the author provides a synthesis of the work of some of the main advocates of a "corporate" criminal liability. From this overview, she argues that it is conceptually possible and philosophically justifiable to treat organizations as subjects of criminal law. Drawing on the contributions of scholars, the author identifies the characteristics which enable organizations to be viewed as intentional actors, accountable for their actions. She concludes by examining some of the justifications for recourse to a organizationallydefined basis of liability. The second part of the article takes the concept of a "corporate" intentional actor and applies it to the traditional analysis of the conditions required for the imposing of criminal liability. The author retains the traditional division of an offence into actus reus and mens rea elements because any novel concept of corporate liability will nonetheless be incorporated into the existing body of offences. In addition, examining how it functions within the current system serves to demonstrate the proposed concept's strengths and weaknesses. The author ultimately concludes that because "corporate" liability reflects aspects of corporate culture not captured by the current system, its inclusion would contribute to the development of corporate criminal law. Les theories actuelles de la responsabilit6 criminelle des personnes morales s'attardent, au Canada comme au Royaume-Uni, aux individus qui forment l'organisation. Toutefbis, ce e approche appele la drtine d'identification a ses limites, surtout dans le cas de grandes organisations d6centralis~es. Cet article examine les diffrrentes bases de responsabilit6 avanedes par certains auteurs se concentrant sur l'organisation comme telle. I1 semble qu'une telle forme de responsabilit6 pourrait augmenter tant l'efficacit6 que l'6quit6 du syst~me actuel. L'article se divise en deux parties. Dans la premiere, l'auteure prsente une synth~se de l'oeuvre des principaux tenants d'une responsabilit6 criminelle des personnes morales. Ce survol permet 4 l'auteure de difendre conceptuellement et philosophiquement l'identification de personnes morales comme sujets de droit criminel. A partir des travaux de certains chercheurs, l'auteure identifie les traits permettant de voir les organisations comme des acteurs capables d'intentions et responsables de leurs actions. Elle examine certaines justifications pour un recours b une responsabilite d~finie sur des bases organisationnelles. La deuxi~me partie de l'article applique le concept de personne morale capable d'intentions et l'applique h l'analyse traditionnelle des conditions de responsabilit6 criminelle. L'auteure retient la division traditionnelle de l'infraction en éléments, actus reus et mens rea, puisque tout nouveau module de responsabilité criminelle devra etre incorpor au systme actuel. L'examen de cette nouvelle responsabilit6 dans le cadre actuel permet d'dvaluer les forces et faiblesss du concept propos6. L'auteure conclut que le fait de refl~ter des aspects de la culture organisationnelle jusqu'ici n6glig~s permet au module de responsabilit6 de contribuer au d6veloppement du droit criminel des personnes morales.