Akhtemova, Liliya2017-08-092017-08-092017-08-09http://hdl.handle.net/10393/36490https://doi.org/10.20381/ruor-20770Since the end of the World War II, the Korean Peninsula attracted a particular attention of the world. From the division of Korea and formation of two independent states to the development of ideologically, politically and economically different countries, from obtaining nuclear weapons and isolation of the North to modernization and opening of the South, the Korean people have experienced all the complications of the Cold War. Until now, the Peninsula is yet unified. The situation in the region is much more problematical than it was 70 years ago. The unpredictable and intractable behavior of North Korea always poses nuclear threats to regional and global security. The clash of interests of main actors in the Korean problem constrains the resolution process of this issue. The crisis on the Korean Peninsula has been scrutinized since its occurrence. A great number of theoretical frameworks and approaches have presented this problem from different angles. However, the complexity of the issue cannot be expressed solely by a particular theory. The purpose of this study is to examine the rationale of interactions between the DPRK and the main regional players in order to justify that the status-quo is the “best” situation for the North Korean leadership as well as for the states involved in the crisis for the time being. To achieve this aim, this paper looks at the history of relations between the DPRK and regional players, the interests of the countries and the rationale of their interactions. Historically, geographically and according to the empirical evidence, North Korea has been influenced by the USA, China, the Republic of Korea, Russia and Japan. There are two frameworks of interaction among them – currently not functioning political one in the form of Six-Party Talks and quite inefficient economic one represented by the sanctions. These states have formed a net with the DPRK in the centre. Pyongyang clearly knows its exchange value for all regional actors, it is also aware of boundaries it should not overpass for the sake of its own survival. This paper also presents a number of assumptions, which can upset the regional balance, as well as possible consequences in the case of drastic changes. It concludes that unwillingness of the main actors to step back and/or create favourable conditions for reconciliation, give reasons to suggest that the maintenance of status-quo is the optimal situation in the region.enSoftware