O'Neill, Katelyn2024-01-312024-01-312023http://hdl.handle.net/10393/45904https://doi.org/10.20381/ruor-30108The disparity between the actions of the global arms trade and reporting of international human rights groups is well established. In 2018, when the Government of Canada launched a review of all existing arms export permits to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and placed a moratorium on the issuance of new export permits it seemed as if Canada was headed towards a more meaningful consideration of human rights in its arms trading. However, in 2020, when the findings of the review were published, the moratorium lifted, and a reaffirmation of the LAV deal was confirmed, it was clear that this was not the case. This analysis argues that a “permissive technology” embedded into Canada’s arms export risk assessment process enabled the findings of the review that facilitated a resumption of arms transfers to KSA and produced a disparity between related United Nations reporting.enRisk as a ‘Permissive Technology’: An Analysis of Canada’s “Robust” Arms Export Risk Assessment ProcessResearch Paper