Fiorello, Alessandro2025-01-212025-01-212025-01-21http://hdl.handle.net/10393/50124https://doi.org/10.20381/ruor-30882This doctoral dissertation articulates a libertarian theory of free will and moral responsibility alongside a narrative view of personal identity. In this dissertation, I build upon and expand Robert Kane’s libertarian theory to create a mitigation strategy for dealing with a perennial problem for libertarian theories of freedom and moral responsibility: the problem of luck. I argue that Kane’s basic idea of self-forming actions or SFAs can be built upon to show how the luck objection can be undercut. I argue that SFAs take place within a larger narrative structure and that when we make SFAs we are also engaged in what Kane calls value experiments. I construct a theory of narrative personal identity and put it to work to show how the problem of luck is mitigated and that SFAs are not just a matter of luck.enAttribution 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/LibertarianismFree WillMoral ResponsibilityRobert KanePersonal IdentityLuck ObjectionThesis