

SHAFTESBURY'S AESTHETIC THEORY REVISITED

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Abstract

This thesis examines Shaftesbury's *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711), and revisits his concepts of aesthetics and ethics by providing a key to understanding his controversial methodology and definitions of terms. I argue that his main purpose in writing *Characteristics* is to defend the concept of innate ideas of beauty and moral goodness against the views of Hobbes and Locke. Not only is *Characteristics* a significant work of moral and aesthetic theory, but it is Shaftesbury's attempt to act on his theory and put it into practice. Through describing the place of actual life experiences, he intends to show that the various aspects of the concepts he discusses contribute to the whole or the end of the universe, to realize ultimate beauty. I argue that his challenging use of terminology – in which words have many definitions – may be understood in light of his teleological and dualistic view of humanity. His view of dualism and the dialectic categorization of each term, showing the two opposed or distinct characters of each term and the integrated character of the two, reveals either a partial or an integrated human condition. Thus, he changes the meaning of his terms depending on which level he is discussing. I argue that his concept of an innate moral and aesthetic sense is found in the third character of terms such as the third manner (miscellaneous manner) which is the integrated state of both poetical manner and methodical manner, the third truth (moral truth) which is the integrated state of both poetical manner and historical manner, and the third affection (natural affection) which is the integrated state of self-affection and public-affection. It is only this integrated self which reveals the innate moral sense, in which one can experience and create true beauty, virtue, and enthusiasm, resulting in a state of happiness where one is able to serve both the self and the public good.

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
List of Tables	vii
List of Illustrations	viii
Introduction.....	ix
Chapter 1: Background.....	1
1. General Criticisms concerning the Style of Writing	1
2. Previous Work in the Field.....	7
3. Editions of <i>Characteristics</i>	12
4. Illustrations of <i>Characteristics</i>	15
5. Shaftesbury's Predecessors	20
Chapter 2: Shifting Point of Moral Philosophy	29
1. Theme of <i>Characteristics</i>	29
2. Against Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke.....	33
3. Shaftesbury's Method.....	40
Chapter 3: Shaftesbury's Influence on Moral Philosophy.....	46
1. Berkeley	48
1.1 Berkeley's Criticism of Shaftesbury	48
1.2 Natural Affection.....	50
1.3 God.....	52
1.4 Honour.....	55
2. Hutcheson.....	58
2.1 Natural Affection.....	59
2.2 Moral Sense.....	61
2.3 Categories of Beauty.....	64
2.4 Honour.....	65
2.5 Religion.....	67
3. Hume.....	69
3.1 Reason and Sentiment.....	69

3.2 Standard of Taste.....	70
3.3 Mind.....	73
3.4 Sympathy.....	74
3.5 Self-love.....	76
3.6 Convention.....	77
4. Kant.....	78
4.1 Aesthetic Judgment.....	80
4.2 Moral Judgment.....	83
4.3 Enthusiasm.....	85
Chapter 4: Teleological and Holistic Concepts	88
1. Multiple-Meaning Words	88
2. Imagination and Reason	96
3. Three Levels of Truth.....	104
4. Three Levels of Manners	114
5. Outward and Inward Beauty	131
6. Inward and Outward of <i>Characteristics</i>	139
7. Three Levels of Personalities	147
8. Three Levels of Soliloquy.....	152
9. Three Levels of View.....	155
10. Judgment of Hercules.....	158
11. Shaftesbury's Typography	165
Chapter 5: The Three Orders of Beauty	171
1. The First Order of Beauty	172
2. The Second Order of Beauty	175
3. The Third Order of Beauty	178
4. Original Beauty	180
5. Parent Mind.....	181
6. Beauty is Hidden	187
7. Beauty and Enthusiasm.....	190
8. Inconsistency in the Description of Hierarchical Beauty.....	194
9. Works of Art	197
Chapter 6: Moral Sense.....	203
1. Natural Affections	203
2. The Definitions of Three Kinds of Natural Affections.....	207

3. Moral Sense	208
4. Innate or Acquired?	210
5. Passion or Reflection?	214
6. Immediate Moral Conduct	216
7. Rational Affection and Sensible Affection.....	219
8. What is Natural Affection?.....	221
9. What is Unnatural Affection?.....	225
10. Inner State.....	228
11. Three Levels of Pleasure.....	229
12. Three Levels of Mind.....	230
13. Three Levels of Beauty.....	233
14. Natural Affection and Enthusiasm.....	234
15. Dialectical End	235
16. Common Sense.....	236
17. State of Nature.....	239
Chapter 7: Manners.....	244
1. Wit and Humour.....	244
2. Good Humour.....	246
3. Freedom and Wit.....	248
4. Ridicule under the First Order of Beauty.....	250
5. Ridicule under the Second Order of Beauty.....	251
6. Ridicule under the Third Order of Beauty.....	252
7. Innate or Acquired?.....	254
8. Wit and Enthusiasm.....	255
9. Ridicule as a Test of Truth.....	258
10. Enthusiasm.....	266
11. The First Level of Enthusiasm	269
12. The Second Level of Enthusiasm.....	272
13. The Third Level of Enthusiasm and Gentlemen.....	275
14. Good Breeding.....	278
15. Nobleness.....	280
16. Gentlemen of Fashion.....	281
17. Wit and Sublime	283
18. Practical and Contemplative Reason	293
Conclusion.....	298
Bibliography.....	305

List of Tables

Table 1	Shaftesbury's Aesthetic/ Moral Terms	94
Table 2	Creative Process	103
Table 3	Three Levels of Truth in Works of Art	113
Table 4	Theory of Miscellaneous Manner	129
Table 5	Two Kinds of Appearances	144
Table 6	Three Levels of Magical Glass	157
Table 7	Hercules' Choice	165
Table 8	Shaftesbury's Aesthetic Concept	192
Table 9	Three Orders of Beauty.....	194
Table 10	The Three Orders of Beauty from Various Points of View.....	197
Table 11	Works of Art	201
Table 12	Natural Affections	242
Table 13	Three Levels of Wit/Humour	257
Table 14	Three Levels of Seriousness	266
Table 15	Three Levels of Enthusiasm	282
Table 16	Succession of Father–Poet	292
Table 17	Succession of Father–Philosopher	292
Table 18	Succession of Wit/Humour	293
Table 19	True Reason and Disinterestedness	298

List of Illustrations

Front Piece of <i>Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit</i>	17
Front Piece of <i>Soliloquy, or Advice to Author</i>	18
Front Piece of <i>A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm</i>	19
Title Page Emblem of <i>Alciphron</i>	49
Title Page Emblem of <i>Characteristics</i>	141

Introduction

No sooner the Eye opens upon *Figures*, the Ear to *Sounds*, than straight *the Beautiful* results and *Grace* and *Harmony* are known and acknowledg'd. No sooner are Actions view'd, no sooner the *human Affections* and *Passions* discerned (and they are most of 'em as soon discern'd as felt) than straight *an inward Eye* distinguishes and sees *the Fair* and *Shapely*, *the Amiable* and *Admirable*, apart from *the Deform'd*, *the Foul*, *the Odious* or *the Despicable*. How is it possible therefore not to own, "That as these *Distinctions* have their Foundation *in Nature*, the Discernment itself is *natural*, and from Nature *alone*?"

(Characteristics II 231)

When Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, penned the above lines in 1709¹, indicating his concept of beauty and morality, he was responding to Locke's statement that there is no innate knowledge in humans. In *Characteristics*, he engages with contemporary philosophical issues regarding the theories of Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke. Against Locke, who holds that the mind is in a state of *tabula rasa*, where all knowledge comes from experience through sense perception, Shaftesbury claims that humans have innate ideas of beauty and goodness. Against Descartes, Shaftesbury claims that emotion cannot be analysed as the product of physical mechanisms while disregarding the practical use of emotion. Against Hobbs, who states that human nature lacks morality, Shaftesbury claims that humans are born good with a moral nature.

Characteristics has not been widely acknowledged as a philosophical work due to its complexity and apparent lack of systematic style. Rather than as a philosophical work, it has been often regarded as a work of literary criticism. In this thesis, however, I argue that Shaftesbury is a philosopher who engages with philosophical concepts by means of a

¹ The first edition of *Characteristics* was published in 1711. However *the Moralists* which I quoted above was previously published in 1709.

systematic methodology, and participates in contemporary philosophical debate. To support this view, I present the following points in this thesis.

1. Debates with Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke.

Shaftesbury response to what he saw as wrong with the views of contemporary thinkers was a vigorous one. In *Characteristics*, he states that he is presenting a new theory and new methodology of aesthetics and ethics. He is, for example, dismissive of Descartes' style of philosophy. For Shaftesbury, philosophy must contribute to everyday life. Philosophy is meant to be, not a subject which wastes time and paper analysing metaphysical concepts, but more of a study of ethics; it should be studied as an aid to understanding the self; it should be studied in order to know how to live well.

Turning to Hobbes and Locke, Shaftesbury argues that there is innate knowledge of moral goodness and beauty. Humans are originally good, beautiful, and true in their nature. His argument is that there is a clear system of the universe. The nature of things, which is designed by a divine mind, allows for conflicts, but is also designed to assist us in overcoming obstacles to reach the final state of Goodness, Truth, Beauty, Enthusiasm, and Happiness. All parts of the system, either positive or negative, contribute to form the beauty of the wholeness in the universe. In this regard, Shaftesbury painstakingly shows the opposed characteristics of each concept and term, and also shows the final stage, the integrated state of the terms.

Against Hobbes, Shaftesbury holds that though we sometimes look vicious and selfish, our nature is innately moral, since we have an innate sense to judge what is good and beautiful. He does not deny the negativity of humanity; rather, he makes clear how seemingly hopeless we are, but he also shows the answer and the ultimate hope - the

highest character of each term such as truth, goodness, and beauty, perceptible by what he regards as our inner eye. Beauty in the genuine sense for Shaftesbury is seen by this inner eye, which is the innate ability to recognize the moral character of the object in question. I trace how he presents his views, and how he defends his theory and method of exploring the innate knowledge of beauty and goodness.

2. Three Levels of Nature of Things

I argue that in Shaftesbury's system there are three levels of moral Goodness, Enthusiasm, Truth, and Beauty. The first one is emotion/sense-based while the second is reason-based. They have conflicts since they are different, but in the third stage they are integrated. This third stage or level is where we find true human Nature, true Beauty, true Virtue, true works of Art, and the true Manner of humanity. He contends that his readers will truly understand when they go through his various riddles, signs, and hints to discover the answers. The readers need to be assertive to think carefully and playfully, to have fun and enjoy the journey, and so discover truly useful knowledge they can apply in their daily lives.

Upon first reading *Characteristics*, we are confronted with seemingly contradictory statements and terms; humanity is good but ill, hopeful but hopeless, noble but miserable, selfish but selfless, and rational but irrational. Such an approach may easily frustrate readers who see it as disorganization; for this reason many researchers have regarded him as a minor philosopher at best, or a mere essayist. In this thesis, however, I defend the view that Shaftesbury is a philosopher who attempts to present a systematic view of humanity's nature, problems, and solutions, through a dialectical method. He often describes two kinds or two levels (which are often opposites) of the nature of things, as a first and second

characteristic, and the third, which is the mixture of the first and the second. The third character is humanity's end, where one finally realizes beauty, goodness, and truth in a genuine sense. The third character is one's true personality, where one is most natural and is able to find his vocation, and the meaning of his life.

I analyze and trace some convincing evidence which supports the view that his theory and method may be understood as systematic (though not presented in a concise writing style) and dialectic in light of his Neo-Platonic terms, that is to say, his dualistic approach to humanity. In each word, he sees more than one kind of element, character, tendency, desire, and cause, and he deals with the validity of each. Just as Shaftesbury sees humans as a combination of mind and body, he regards the world as a combination of form and matter, or reason and passion. He further applies this holistic approach to aesthetic and moral principles.

As *Characteristics* is composed of several treatises expounding Shaftesbury's dialectical view on the nature of things, and as each theme is scattered throughout *Characteristics* because of its discursive style, it is not possible to find the complete definition of *beauty*, *moral*, *good*, or *manners* in one particular treatise, though each of them has a theme as I detail below.

A Letter concerning Enthusiasm deals with three kinds of enthusiasm, emphasizing the third one (true Enthusiasm) as the experience of true beauty; *Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom and Wit* deals with three kinds of Wit, emphasizing the third one (true Wit) as the experience of true beauty; *Soliloquy: or Advice to an Author* deals with the mental serenity necessary to see the true appearance of beauty, dealing with what Shaftesbury calls a Magical Glass, used to see three levels of the self; *An Inquiry*

concerning Virtue and Merit deals with three levels of natural affection and moral conduct; *The Moralists; a Philosophical Rhapsody* deals with his theory of aesthetics – showing three kinds of beauty in relation with other concepts such as virtue, freedom, and the arts; *Miscellaneous Reflections* is a sort of a guide or annotation at the end of *Characteristics*, revealing the theme of the work hidden under the informal style of writing; *The Judgement of Hercules* is about the journey of the hero who is seeking his true nature by overcoming his dual character to realize ideal beauty; additionally, *A letter concerning the Art, or Science of Design* is about liberal education, which will develop one's aesthetic taste, but more importantly will guide moral and political conduct.

3. Shaftesbury's Aesthetic Manner

I argue that the reason Shaftesbury does not engage in the conventional style of philosophical argument but employs his own method is that he is attempting to demonstrate an aesthetic method, following his own aesthetic theory. He claims that there are three represented manners of writing; what he calls Poetical Manners expresses the imagination and passion; Methodical Manners expresses speculative thought; Miscellaneous Manners expresses both Poetical Manners and Methodical Manners, and I deal with them in Chapter 4. Shaftesbury holds that philosophical works should be written using the Miscellaneous Manners, which appeals to both the readers' imagination and reason; thus, his writings embody the miscellaneous style, including poems, parables, soliloquy, great lengths of footnotes, and frequent digressions hiding speculative thought underneath. As an example of this manner, he claims that *Moralists* - one of his treatises in *Characteristics*, is “not only at the bottom, as *systematical*, *didactick* and *perceptive*, as that other Piece of formal Structure [*An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit*]; but it assumes ... more fashionable

Turns of Wit.... It aspires to *Dialogue*...” and employs “poetick Features” (III. 175). Such Miscellaneous style of writing presents his readers with a challenge and the opportunity to find where the author’s theme really is. It is a way to let the readers think, feel, and explore as if they are in a labyrinth.²

For Shaftesbury, a philosophical work should be a work of art, and authors should give pleasure while “they secretly advise” (I. 98) their readers, not bore them. An interesting point regarding his aesthetic writing is that he himself, as an author, is participating in his drama, an actor in his own narrations. He has shifting personae through *Characteristics* - as if he is acting multiple roles, so he can be flexible in expressing various levels of humanity. The author may speak falsehoods to show truth, due to his intention to be a mirror for his readers. For Shaftesbury, the author character needs to be somewhat illusive, for educational purpose. An author should not reveal his personality or opinions directly, but should do so only through his created characters, as he writes: “[the author] describes no Qualiitiys or Virtues; censures no Manners: makes no Encominums, nor gives Characters himself; but brings his Actors still in view. ‘Tis they who show themselves’ (I. 123).

For Shaftesbury, beauty is often hidden, and can be very difficult to recognize. He holds that a common judgment of taste exists, however; first of all, only the superficial beauty can be recognized easily. To know true beauty, which is both moral and beautiful, one needs to be educated in observation as Shaftesbury claims: “Now the Variety of Nature is such as to distinguish every thing she forms, by a *peculiar* original Character; which, if

² He writes: “MY READER doubtless, by this time, must begin to wonder thro’ what Labyrinth of Speculation, and odd Texture of capricious Reflections, I am offering to conduct him” (III. 148).

strictly observ'd, will make the Subject appear unlike to any thing extant in the World besides" (I. 90).

The problem is that we cannot be certain of the true definition of beauty, good, truth, nature, and happiness, and that it is quite difficult to agree upon such truths since we have various opinions, feelings, imaginations, which are often in conflict with each other. Reason is supposed to conquer this dispute, and put all under its governance. However, even the form of reason itself is involved in a dispute with various passions, and we are not sure if our reason is truly reason or not. Only when reason reflects the state of mind can one start to recover his or her nature, the true personality which is good and beautiful.

In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I discuss some background of Shaftesbury's writing regarding how he has been evaluated, and how his thought was succeeded by later philosophers. Also, I briefly discuss how his predecessors could have influenced him, with reference to previous works by researchers. In Chapter 2, I discuss Shaftesbury's aim in *Characteristics* to debate Hobbes and Locke, as mentioned. In Chapter 3, I discuss Shaftesbury's influence on moral and aesthetic philosophy, focusing on Berkeley, Hutcheson, Hume, and Kant. In Chapter 4, I argue that his terms have multiple meanings – firstly, either false or true, but also involving three levels or characters of each term such as Truth, Manners, Beauty, and Personality. In Chapter 5, I argue that his concept of the three levels of beauty corresponds to such other terms as well. In Chapter 6, I argue that his concepts of moral sense and natural affection are not expressed through contradicted definitions, but rather they are coordinated under the Three Orders of Beauty and other terms with dialectical categorization. In Chapter 7, I argue that his views on manners such as Wit/Humour, Ridicule, Enthusiasm, and Comedy/Tragedy also show three levels of

categorization like the terms mentioned.

Chapter 1 Background

1. General Criticisms concerning the Style of Writing

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, published *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* in 1711, a work which made him one of the most-read authors of his century. His writings had a profound influence on eighteenth-century aesthetics and moral theory in Britain, France, and Germany. French and German translations of *Characteristics* went through numerous editions through the century. His thought influenced English thinkers such as Berkeley, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Butler, Burke, and Thomas Reid, regarding moral and aesthetic theory. In France, deists and Enlightenment philosophers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau were greatly influenced. In Germany, his influence was noted among thinkers and philosophers such as Winckelmann, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Wieland,¹ Goethe, Herder, Kant, Schiller²,

¹ According to Elson, “Shaftesbury was one of the most important teachers of Germany in the 18th century” (p.1), and was studied there even more than in England. He notes strikingly close resemblances between Wieland and Shaftesbury regarding the concepts of morality and aesthetics, including virtue, nature, beauty, and morality itself. For Wieland, developing Shaftesburian concepts was his life’s work. Since Wieland influenced contemporary thinkers such as Kant and Schiller, this shows the great influence of Shaftesbury on German philosophy. Charles Elson. *Wieland and Shaftesbury*. New York: AMS Press, 1966. (Reproduced from 1913 edition).

² Regarding how Shaftesbury’s *internal sense* influenced the German concept of *bildung*, see Oelkers - “The Origin of the Concept of ‘Allgemeinbildung’” *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 18 (1999), Horlacher - “Bildung – A Construction of a History of Philosophy of Education” *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 23 (2004), and Boyer - “Schleiermacher, Shaftesbury, and the German Enlightenment” *The Harvard Theological Review*, 96 (2003). Boyer provides information of Shaftesbury’s significant influence on Germans in the eighteenth century. He points out that one of the reasons that Shaftesbury’s influence was not as significant in England as in Germany is that he uses the term *enthusiasm* in a positive way, in the sense of inspiration, as his core of philosophy, while in England the word carried a negative connotation, suggesting religious fanaticism. Shaftesbury distinguishes positive enthusiasm as true or noble enthusiasm, the base of morality, the root of religious feeling and aesthetic creativity (discussed in *The Moralists*), and differentiates it from fanaticism (discussed in *Letter Concerning Enthusiasm*). However, since his view of fanatics and atheists was tolerant, he was regarded as anti-Christian or an atheist, and his term *enthusiasm* was not paid much attention to. According to Boyer, as well as other German thinkers of the eighteenth century, Schleiermacher was clearly influenced by Shaftesbury regarding positive enthusiasm as inspiration and feeling as the root of religion.

Also, there are numerous similarities between Schiller and Shaftesbury. Not only *Aesthetic Education of Man*, but Schiller’s other writings, such as *The Philosophical Letters*, contain striking similarities to Shaftesbury’s *Moralists*. See Carter - “Schiller and Shaftesbury” *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol.31, No.2 (Jan., 1921) and William Witte - “The Legacy of Shaftesbury” in *Schiller* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1949). Schiller was indirectly influenced through Shaftesbury’s admirers such as Adam Ferguson, Harder, and Wieland (See *Wieland and Shaftesbury* by Charles Elson, reprinted by AMS Press, New York, 1966), and directly influenced from the German translation of *Characteristics* (translated into German numerous times in the eighteenth century). Witte’s conclusion that Schiller never read Shaftesbury is wrong; Schiller writes

and others.³

However, after the eighteenth century, Shaftesbury has been regarded as a minor philosopher and critic of moral and literary theory.⁴ John McAteer observes that the reason Shaftesbury's popularity declined in the twentieth century is "primarily due to the rise of analytic philosophy which defined philosophy such that Shaftesbury's work seemed more like literature or rhetoric than proper philosophy."⁵

The theme of *Characteristics* is not easy to grasp because of its great length - three volumes with ten essays (*A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, Sensus Communis, Soliloquy, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, The Moralists, Miscellany I-V*). Further, because of a unique style, it often has been regarded as a collection of works without a coherent and integrated focus and subject. The work covers a wide range of topics regarding religion, politics, aesthetics, morality, and culture, and employs various writing styles such as

in a letter that he is planning to read Shaftesbury (see Robert E. Norton. *The Beautiful Soul* p 228. 1995, Cornell UP). The parallels between Schiller and Shaftesbury are understandable when one realizes the great influence of Shaftesbury on his German admirers. For example, Schiller's concept of *play* (*spiel*) as the solution of one's inner conflict - expanded further than Kant's concept, seems not to have been influenced by contemporary German philosophers, but was likely influenced by Shaftesbury's concept of the *je-ne-sçai-quoi* of *Wit*, in the sense of a playful and sublimated mental state after reason/sense conflicts have vanished, as I deal with in Chapter 5. In my M.A. thesis, *The Quest for Wholeness: Schiller's Concept of Alienation Revisited* (VDM Verlag), I explore the concept of alienation in Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, key to understanding his controversial rhetoric. I argue that his terminology - in which words have multiple meanings - may be understood as systematic in light of Schiller's dualistic approach to humanity.

³ Leibniz highly evaluated Shaftesbury. Alderman points out there is striking "similarity between the doctrines of Leibniz's *Theodicee* (1710) and *The Moralists* (1709)." William E. Alderman, "The Significance of Shaftesbury in English Speculation." *PMLA*, 38 (1923) pp. 176. Leibniz himself writes that after reading *the Moralists* "I found in it almost all of my *Theodicy* before it saw the light of day... If I had seen this work before my *Theodicy* was published, I should have profited as I ought and should have borrowed its great passages." G. W. Leibniz, *Remarks on the ...Characteristics*" *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. Leroy Loemker, Chicago: Chicago UP, 1956, II, p.1030 quoted by Stanley Grean. *Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics*. New York: Ohio UP, 1967. p. ix.

⁴ Shaftesbury was influential, but attracted more opponents than admirers after the publication of *Characteristics* in England compared to continental European countries such as France and Germany, where he was often welcomed and well researched, as Ernest Boyer points out in "Schleiermacher, Shaftesbury, and the German Enlightenment" (*The Harvard Theological Review*, 96, 2003, pp.181-204.) Though written in English, *Characteristics* was almost forgotten in England after the 18th century, due mainly to hostility over his attacks on religious dogmatism and fanaticism. (Shaftesbury was unafraid to criticize the Anglican Church. He, as an Anglican, was not interested in predictable attacks on only the Roman church.) Thus *Characteristics* was regarded as an ideological book, and Berkeley criticizes the work as dangerous to society. It seems because of such attitudes, *Characteristics* was unpublished through most of the 19th and 20th centuries.

⁵ John McAteer. *The Third Earl of Shaftesbury*, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://www.iep.utm.edu/shaftes/>

discourse, debate, treatises, poetic prose, letters, and fables - with occasional digressions.

Shaftsbury expresses his distrust of the style of systematic writing usually seen in philosophy which does not reach one's heart, as well as one's reason, and which does not show how to realize what he regards as humanity's ultimate purpose - happiness in daily life. He calls his work "a multifarious, complex, and desultory kind of Reading" (III. 61), and states that he replaces "the Gravity of strict Argument" with "the ways of chat" (III. 62). Numerous scholars have therefore regarded this body of work as non-philosophical, and have approached it in a selective manner due to his negligence of the kind of technical language usually seen in works of philosophy, with systematic definition of words and concepts. *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit* has been considered his only systematic writing, though it never received high praise. Fowler writes that Shaftesbury's "falsetto note" style is "often irritating to the reader".⁶ Brett states that "there is no coherent or comprehensive system in his writings" but this is not due to inconsistency; rather, "he drops hints without bothering to press them home, or to make them sufficiently precise".⁷ Reverse writes, "No one could deny that it was complex, and that it required considerable effort on the part of the reader who wished to determine Shaftesbury's meaning."⁸

This kind of criticism was already common in Shaftesbury's time and through the eighteenth century, indicating that Shaftesbury was always seen as a peculiar kind of philosopher. Berkeley attacks Shaftesbury in *Alciphron* (1732), claiming that Shaftesbury's

⁶ Thomas Fowler. *Shaftesbury and Hutcheson*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1998 (reprinted from the 1882 edition). p.61.

⁷ R. L. Brett. *The Third Earl of Shaftesbury: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Literary Theory*. London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1951. p.59.

⁸ Elizabeth Reverse. *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment. Vol. II*. Cambridge UP, 2000. p.99.

sentimental ground of aesthetic perception lacks rational judgement, and he writes in *Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained*: “it be not always easy to fix a determinate sense on such a loose and incoherent writer.”⁹ Like Berkeley, Philip Skelton in *Deism Revealed* (1751) comments that Shaftesbury writes “without any rule at all” and his “method (if we can call it so) may be termed, the obscure, or the desultory method, the patch-work, the ruff-raff, the hotch-potch, of the *Belles Lettres*.”¹⁰ John Brown, in *Essays on the Characteristics* (1751), writes that Shaftesbury “has mingled Beauties and Blots, Faults and Excellence, with a liberal and unsparing Hand,” and points out the lack of logical debate as “the noble Writer applies here to *Eloquence*, rather than *Argument*; and puts us off with a *Metapher* instead of a *Reason*”,¹¹ while George Campbell, in *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1850), calls Shaftesbury’s writing “the sublime of nonsense.”¹²

On the other hand, some researchers have appreciated Shaftesbury’s system and coherency. Alderman correctly observes that Shaftesbury is

dealing with ideas that are profound, and cannot, therefore, write with the simplicity of one who is aiming merely at amusement. Shaftesbury gives every evidence of wanting to be understood, even though he does sometimes have to labour to accomplish his ends. ¹³

Also, Bernstein addresses Shaftesbury’s terminology in an attempt to better understand his views on morality and aesthetics, which hold that both the good and the beautiful are objective and may be identified through reason and intuition.¹⁴ Shaftesbury provides many

⁹ George Berkeley. *Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained*. London: Dent, 1975. p. 232.

¹⁰ Philip Skelton. *Ophiomaches: or, Deism Revealed*. (1751). Eighteenth Century Collections Online. p. 256.

¹¹ John Brown. *Essays on the Characteristics of the Earl of Shaftesbury*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1969. (Reproduced from the 1751 edition) p. 179.

¹² George Campbell. *Philosophy of Rhetoric*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1850. p. 269.

¹³ William E. Alderman “The Style of Shaftesbury.” *Modern Language Notes*, 38 (1923) pp. 211.

¹⁴ John Andrew Bernstein, “Shaftesbury’s Identification of the Good with the Beautiful.” *American Society for Eighteenth Century Studies*, 10 (1977) pp. 304-325.

parallels between the beautiful and the good, and optimistically attempts to prove their unity. For example, he sees a divine mind as the creator of a universe in harmony, and Bernstein regards this as theistic enthusiasm or emotionalism intended to promote virtue, goodness, and happiness, commenting that “Shaftesbury’s moralizing sometimes interfered with his psychology”¹⁵. For Shaftesbury, moral self-consciousness and regard for others leads to good taste and virtue, leading to good done for its own sake by a beautiful, that is, a harmonious soul. Bernstein concludes that Shaftesbury’s attempts to combine too many ideas lead ultimately to confusion.

Shaftesbury’s strategy of making Socratic dialogue reveal opposed opinions has been discussed by researchers such as Prostoco, Rivers, and Hyman¹⁶, and the lack of a specific authorial voice, by which Shaftesbury represents multiple author characters, has been discussed by Marshall and Redding.¹⁷ Also, a few researchers, such as Price and Marsh,¹⁸ have commented on Shaftesbury’s dialectical view, and how it is reflected in his writing. Unfortunately, those researches often limit themselves to a short article or part of an article or book, and have not discussed the issues in depth, to analyze fully the details of Shaftesbury’s word usage.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 317 footnote

¹⁶ Jack Prostoco. “Natural Conversation Set in View: Shaftesbury and moral Speech.” *Eighteenth-Century Studies*. 23, 1989, pp. 42-61. Isabel Rivers. *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780. Vol. II: Shaftesbury to Hume*. Cambridge UP, 2000. Chapter 2. pp 85 – 152. John G. Hayman. “Shaftesbury and the Search for a Persona.” *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*.10, Restoration and Eighteenth Century. Summer, 1970, pp. 41-504.

¹⁷ David Marshall. *The Figure of Theatre: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot*. Columbia UP, 1986. Paul Redding. “Spectatorship, Sympathy and the Self. The Importance and Fragility of Dialogue in the Works of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury.” *Literature and Aesthetics: The Journal of the Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics*. 2. 1992. pp. 82-95.

¹⁸ Robert Marsh. *Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry*. University of Chicago Press, 1965. Chapter 2. “Shaftesbury’s Theory of Poetry: The Importance of the ‘Inward Colloquy.’” *ELH*, 28, 1961, pp. 54-69. Martin Price. *To the Palace of Wisdom: Studies in Order and Energy from Dryden to Blake*. Doubleday & Company, 1964. Chapter 3.

I argue that Shaftesbury's ideas may be understood as systematic (though not presented in a concise writing style) and dialectical in light of his Neo-Platonic terms, that is to say, his dualistic approach to humanity. I observe that Shaftesbury's definitions of three kinds of beauty correspond to his multiple-meaning words with dialectic aspects. He tends to see not two or four, but *three* kinds of the nature of things, and those three levels correspond to the three levels of the human psyche. Not always - it is true, but quite often, he almost obsessively differentiates three kinds of principles, characters, nature, truth, art, and appearance throughout *Characteristics*, as when he states:

For were there in Nature *Two* or more Principles, either they must agree, or not. If they agree not, all must be Confusion, till one be predominant. If they agree, there must be some natural Reason for their Agreement; and this natural Reason cannot be from *Chance*, but from some particular *Design, Contrivance, or Thought*: which brings us up again to One Principle, and makes the other *two* to be subordinate. . . . That in *Three* Opinions, *One* of which must necessarily be true, *Two* being plainly absurd, the *Third* must be the Truth.

(II. 204-205)

As Aldridge points out,¹⁹ and as I contend, it is inappropriate to define any term based on only limited parts; each term or concept needs to be understood as a part of his systematic view of human nature. For example, we find relatively clear definitions of the Three Orders of Beauty near the end of *Moralists* (II. Sec. 3, Pt. 2), but, since there are connections between Beauty and other terms such as Good, Truth, and Enthusiasm, it is

¹⁹ Aldridge, Alfred Owen. "Lord Shaftesbury's Literary Theories." *Philological Quarterly*. 24 (1945) pp. 46-64. Aldridge notes that one has to search the entire part of *Characteristicks* to find a complete picture of Shaftesbury's views on literary criticism. Although Shaftesbury holds up unity as a necessary hallmark of good writing, his own writing, with the exception of *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit*, is notably lacking in this regard. This does not mean inconsistency, since Shaftesbury is intentionally representing his theory of morality – that all parts are united and contributing to assist the highest morality or intellect in the universe, and the various parts are actually connected to constitute wholeness. Besides, Shaftesbury chooses to entertain his readers rather than bore them with a more orthodox way of systematic writing, as in his contemporaries who "lack manners, morals, restraint and correctness" (p. 61). Aldridge's observation about the inconsistency between Shaftesbury's literary theory and his writing is convincing and very informative.

necessary to go through other parts of the work to see the system Shaftesbury has in mind.

2. Previous Work in the Field

Regarding Shaftesbury's systematic concepts, Libby (1901)²⁰ discusses Shaftesbury's dialectical terms regarding higher and lower levels, such as true or false enthusiasm. Unfortunately, he does not develop the details of this insightful observation, and concludes that Shaftesbury leaves the conflicts of the higher and lower without a solution. Alderman (1923)²¹ writes that Shaftesbury's inconsistency in writing comes from his literary theory – that the opposed parts are harmonized from the view of wholeness, as he intentionally lines up the contradictions of the objects or concepts, to lead his readers to truth. Marsh (1961)²² claims that Shaftesbury's words have many meanings to express the complexity of human nature, such as higher as related to the whole, and lower as related to the parts, or such as nature and art. Unfortunately, he does not develop this insight further - it is just mentioned in a footnote. Also, Price (1964)²³ sees Shaftesbury's Socratic dialogue as a necessity to represent dialectical concepts to find the solution - and this could be what makes *Characteristics* difficult to read, as sometimes Shaftesbury presents opposed opinions without making clear which side the author is agreeing with; unfortunately, he does not go into the details. Grean (1967)²⁴ also points out Shaftesbury's consistency on the opposed characters – falsity and truth, parts and the whole, or nature and the arts with informative

²⁰ M. F. Libby. "Influence of the Ideas of Aesthetic Proportion on the Ethics of Shaftesbury." *The American Journal of Psychology*, 12 (1901) pp. 458-491.

²¹ William E. Alderman, "The Style of Shaftesbury." *Modern Language Notes*, 38 (1923) pp. 209-215.

²² Robert Marsh. *Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry*. University of Chicago Press, 1965. "Shaftesbury's Theory of Poetry: The Importance of the 'Inward Colloquy.'" *ELH*, 28, 1961, pp. 54-69.

²³ Martin Price. *To the Palace of Wisdom: Studies in Order and Energy from Dryden to Blake*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964.

²⁴ Stanley Grean. *Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics*. New York: Ohio UP, 1967.

insights.

Rogers (1972)²⁵ writes that Shaftesbury's use of the term 'Philosophical Rhapsody' as the subtitle of *The Moralists* could indicate the contradicted 'loosely-knit method', as he may have intended to show that the opposed parts are harmonized as the whole. McIntosh (1998)²⁶ admits there could be a serious intent behind Shaftesbury's vague and circular style, but does not develop this assumption further. Rivers (2000)²⁷ claims that Shaftesbury's philosophical terms carry his own meaning – different from those of contemporary philosophers, and this caused much confusion among readers. Chaves (2008)²⁸ also observes that Shaftesbury's use of multiple persons expressing various opinions comes from his Socratic method, and is intended to show the opposed sides of reality. Chaves' discussion of three levels of 'politeness' is informative, but he does not deal with other terms.

²⁵ Rogers examines Shaftesbury's use of 'Rhapsody' in the title of *The Moralist; a Philosophical Rhapsody*. At that time, the word could mean three things (p. 247): 1. Epic recitation of the classics; 2. A miscellany put together without integrity; 3. Effusive expression of passion or sentiment - still used today. When modern readers read *Moralists*, they tend to understand 'rhapsody' in the sense of the third meaning; thus even researchers have commented that *Moralists*'s poetic expression (Theocles' praise of nature and its beauty especially) is certainly 'rhapsodic' as the title indicates. However, Rogers points out that 'rhapsody' was more likely intended in a derogatory way, since the second meaning - loosely gathered without unity- was common at that time. Also, philosophy could mean, at that time, 'logic' 'method' or 'science'. Thus, Rogers points out that Shaftesbury could have intended to surprise his readers. For eighteenth-century readers of *Moralists*, 'Philosophical Rhapsody' could mean 'Loosely-knit Method', 'Disjunctive Logic', or 'Disorganized Science'. Shaftesbury chose such a title, Rogers states, because first, it was his intention to discuss his view on the organic wholeness of the universe - while every part looks separate and disorganized, from the point of oneness, they are all connected and contribute to a harmonious relationship of unity. Second, it was his clear intent through a new philosophical writing style, a "precise style of rhetorical innovation" (p. 255), to explain philosophy with the form of literature. The word 'rhapsody' could have carried other meanings which were new at that time, such as a sentimental expression as in modern usage, and indeed it also suited the nature of the work. I think it is significant that Rogers points out that Shaftesbury is clearly aware of what he is writing and how he is writing. He proudly names his work with a title which could invoke scorn, but he also knows he is doing breakthrough work in the history of philosophical writing.

Pat Rogers. "Shaftesbury and the Aesthetics of Rhapsody." *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 12 (1972) pp. 244-257.

²⁶ Carey McIntosh. *The Evolution of English Prose, 1700-1800: Style, Politeness, and Print Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.

²⁷ Isabel Rivers. *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780. Vol. II: Shaftesbury to Hume*. Cambridge UP, 2000. Chapter 2. pp. 85-152.

²⁸ Chaves, Joseph. "Philosophy and Politeness, Moral Autonomy and Malleability in Shaftesbury's Characteristics." *Theory and Practice in the Eighteenth Century: Writing between Philosophy and Literature*. Ed. Dick, Alexander and Christina Lupton. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2008.

Regarding Shaftesbury's definition of beauty, Uphaus (1969)²⁹ comments that Shaftesbury's three levels of beauty represent the artist's creative mind, rather than created objects; thus, Shaftesbury comments that humans can elevate themselves from the Second to the Third Order of Beauty through forming their minds, but not from dealing with objects. Uphaus also comments that Shaftesbury's word 'nature' has many meanings, but he does not develop this most significant observation. Glauser (2002)³⁰ sees hierarchical orders of beauty which correspond to hierarchical orders of love, and states that Shaftesbury's disinterested pleasure leads one to move from lower beauty to higher beauty. He also sees a hierarchical relationship between higher and lower pleasure – one is disinterested pleasure experienced on beholding beautiful objects, and the other is interested pleasure, with the awareness of one's true interest – an aesthetic/ moral pleasure. Glauser is one of the few researchers who details the dialectical order in Shaftesbury's words, and his comments are helpful regarding the disinterested pleasure of beauty. However, his focus is only on disinterested pleasure and love, and he does not mention the relationship between those and other terms. Besides those researchers, Cassirer (1932, 1953)³¹, Stolnitz (1961)³², White

²⁹ Robert W. Uphaus. "Shaftesbury on Art: The Rhapsodic Aesthetic." *The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism*, 27 (1969) pp. 341-348.

³⁰ Richard Glauser. "Aesthetic Experience in Shaftesbury I." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 76 (2002) pp. 25-54.

³¹ Ernst Cassirer. *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*. Trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979. (Original German edition was published in 1932) Ernest Cassirer. *The Platonic Renaissance in England*. Trans. James P. Pettegrove. New York: Gordian, 1970. (Originally published in 1953.)

³² Jerome Stolnitz. "On the Origins of esthetic Disinterestedness." *Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism*, 20 (1961) pp. 131-143.

"On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic Theory." *Philosophical Quarterly*, 2 (1961) pp. 97-113.

(1973)³³, Bernstein (1980)³⁴, Townsend (1982)³⁵, Paulson (1996)³⁶, Rind (2002)³⁷, and others have informative comments on Shaftesbury's aesthetic concepts; however, those researches are not directly dealing with my area of interest - Shaftesbury's concept of *beauty* and the relationships of other concepts and terms.

Regarding the inconsistency and disorder of Shaftesbury's writings, Marshall (1986)³⁸ and Redding (1992)³⁹ point out that Shaftesbury's author character is fictitious – he often writes in the third person, as a director of a play on the stage. Also, regarding Shaftesbury's dialogue style, Prostoco (1989)⁴⁰ observes that Shaftesbury's dissembling writing style comes from his tendency to write Socratic conversation in the form of soliloquy. He also comments that the frequently changing author character in *Characteristics* does not necessarily represent Shaftesbury himself. Hyman (1970)⁴¹ also

³³ David A. White. "The Metaphysics of Disinterestedness: Shaftesbury and Kant." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 32 (1973) pp. 239-248.

³⁴ John Andrew Bernstein. "Shaftesbury's Optimism and Eighteenth-Century Social Thought." *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany*. Ed. Alan Charles Kors and Paul J. Korshin. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987.

³⁵ Dabney Townsend. "Shaftesbury's Aesthetic Theory." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 41 (1982), pp. 205-213.

³⁶ Ronald Paulson. *The Beautiful, Novel and Strange: Aesthetics and Heterodoxy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1996.

³⁷ Miles Rind. "The Concept of Disinterestedness in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics." *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 40 (2002) pp. 67-87.

³⁸ David Marshall. *The Figure of Theater: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot*. New York: Columbia UP, 1986.

³⁹ Paul Redding. "Spectatorship, Sympathy and the Self. The Importance and Fragility of Dialogue in the Work of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury." *Literature and Aesthetics: The Journal of the Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics*, 2 (1992) pp. 82-95.

⁴⁰ Prostoco, Jack. "Natural Conversation Set in View: Shaftesbury and Moral Speech." *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 23 (1989) pp. 42-61.

⁴¹ John G. Hayman, "Shaftesbury and the Search for a Persona." *Studies in English Literature, 1500 – 1900*, 10 (1970) pp. 491-504. Hayman addresses the ways in which Shaftesbury uses a persona in his writing, both as an example of the type of Socratic character he proposes and as a technique to present his view. His usage of a persona employs an urbane tone to discuss serious subject matter (p. 494); similarly, his usage of self-analysis serves as an example for his readers to follow and as a technique for the development of his message. Shaftesbury's literary *persona* is a fictional character, but it is necessary for his intention of criticism to aid in observing our inner complexity. Hayman sees similarities between Shaftesbury and Swift, in *A Tale of a Tub*, in their use of third-person commentary and their criticism of religious enthusiasm, but points out that while Swift allows his persona to digress widely, Shaftesbury keeps his persona on topic, with the result that his work has greater coherence and consistency. Hayman regards Shaftesbury as attempting to use

addresses how Shaftesbury presents his persona through Socratic characters to assist his readers' self-analysis. Prince (1996)⁴² observes Shaftesbury as a Janus-faced being or a split figure – who presents Socratic dialogue to show human duality, and as a synthesis, develops the concept of beauty. Griffin (1990)⁴³ notes that Shaftesbury's art of soliloquy is intended to lead his readers to develop the way of self-examination, as in the Socratic Method.

Rivers (2000)⁴⁴ points out that Shaftesbury's Socratic dialogue reveals the author's intention to show his lower or false self and higher or true self; thus, the author may very well make contradictory statements. Rivers correctly points out that Shaftesbury targets particular readers – well-bred gentlemen who can understand his witticisms and the hidden messages scattered in his texts, indexes, and footnotes, but unfortunately she does not give the details of the definitions of his words. According to Rivers, Shaftesbury intends a Socratic dialogue between the wise, true self, and the lower, false self. Thus, the same person (or even the author himself) could make conflicted statements. She also points out how his terminology - traditional terms in philosophy such as nature and mind, and his polite terms such as taste and charm - confuses readers (115)⁴⁵. However, Rivers does not appear to understand why Shaftesbury uses terms the way he does, as she comments, "His looseness may be attributable partly to his temperamental and rhetorical reluctance to write too scholastically and dogmatically, partly to the genuine difficulty he found in defining his

persona, a common strategy of satirists of his time, as a more flexible technique to contribute to the social good.

⁴² Michael Prince. *Philosophical dialogue in the British Enlightenment: Theology, aesthetics, and the novel*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

⁴³ Susan Griffin. "The Development of Rhetorical Authority." *Rhetorical Review*, 9 (1990) pp. 94-106.

⁴⁴ Isabel Rivers. *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780. Vol. II: Shaftesbury to Hume*. Cambridge UP, 2000. Chapter 2. pp. 85-152.

⁴⁵ Isabel Rivers. *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780. Vol. II: Shaftesbury to Hume*. Cambridge UP, 2000. Chapter 2. p. 115.

concept” (124).⁴⁶

Those researchers see varying degrees of consistency and coherence in Shaftesbury’s writings since his strategy is to represent opposed opinions via the Socratic method, while also showing human nature’s complexity. In this thesis, I intend to follow up on those previous researchers’ observations by more detailed analyses with reference to Shaftesbury’s multiple-meaning words.

3. Editions of *Characteristics*

Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was published in 1711, and the second edition was edited by Shaftesbury and published posthumously in 1714. Although the 1714 second edition has been considered the standard, I use the Liberty Fund edition of *Characteristics* (2001, edited by Douglas Den Uyl) which is based on the 1732 edition. This edition is almost the same as the 1714 edition, except for the inclusion of *Letter concerning Design*, which concerns *Judgement of Hercules*. Shaftesbury intended to publish *Judgement of Hercules* and *Letter concerning Design* as parts of *Second Characters or The Language of Forms*, focusing on the theory of aesthetics judgement, but he died in 1713 without realizing this plan. *Judgement of Hercules* (and *Letters concerning Design* in some copies of the 1714 and all the 1732 editions) was added by Shaftesbury’s publisher John Darby Jr. and editor Thomas Micklethwayte in the 1714 edition, though this work was intended to be part of *Second Characters* which was not published until 1914, by Benjamin Rand. This contains four essays - *A Letter Concerning Design*, *Judgement of Hercules*, *The Picture of Cebes*,

⁴⁶ I do not agree with Rivers when she sees Shaftesbury’s lack of university education as one possible reason for his want of academic style, comparing him with Locke - who had an Oxford education (91). Rather, it would be appropriate to regard him as a successor of Renaissance humanists like Erasmus and Rabelais (both had university educations, but tend to view scholastic style as a tool of sophistry; they wrote their satires in a non-academic style).

and *Plastics*. For *Judgement of Hercules*, and *Letter concerning Design*, I quote from the Liberty Fund version since this edition keeps the original typography and emblematic images. For *The Picture of Cebes* and *Plastics*, I quote from *Second Characters*.

The Liberty Fund version keeps the original forms of capitalization, spelling, punctuation, italics, and the original page numbers corresponding to the index Shaftesbury himself made. Since Shaftesbury was very precise about those typographical details, I consider this edition the best. It is very clear that the multiple meanings of words are emphasized when he uses different typography for the words. He was clearly aware that he is implying multiple meaning for certain words, and thus he uses various fonts, etc., to make it easy for his readers to follow; for example, he uses italics for nouns such as *good, health, truth, thought, manner, philosophy, nature, beauty, opinions, liberty, wit, humor, love, pleasure, taste*, and so on. He also uses italics to distinguish the authenticity of adjectives such as *true, pure, just, good, genuine, natural, ill, unnatural, unjust*, as in, for example, *true Liberty* or *ill Liberty*. It would be difficult to recognize where he distinguishes different meanings for words in a typographically modernized version, such as the John M. Robertson edition (1900, two volumes, reprinted in 1963), the most often-used edition (the only English edition published between 1814 and 1999; I do not count the 1870 one-volume edition) in the twentieth-century. This edition is based on the 1714 edition - though Robertson omits *Judgement of Hercules*. The Cambridge University Press edition (1999, one volume), is also based on the 1714 edition, edited by Lawrence E. Klein (this edition also omits *Judgement of Hercules*). This edition is a typographically modernized version, though it has helpful comments for modern readers. Both the Robertson and Klein editions omit the marginal headings of Volume II (*An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit* and *The*

Moralists), though the headings reveal the author's theme clearly.

There is one more modern edition from Clarendon press, edited by Philip Ayres (two volumes, 1999). This is a copy-text of the first edition (1711) which Shaftesbury proof-read before publishing. I contend that Ayres made some questionable decisions concerning this edition. As Isabel Rivers ⁴⁷ and Michael B. Prince ⁴⁸ point out, there are various changes in the texts between the 1711 and 1714 editions. Though Shaftesbury could not hand-correct the 1714 edition due to his death, it seems the 1714 edition is more authentic than the 1711 edition. The emblematic images in the 1711 edition are not completed; there are only a few images, roughly printed compared with the 1714 edition, so this also undermines Ayres' claim to authenticity.

On the other hand, the Liberty Fund edition is the first (since 1814) exact copy of the original edition of three volumes with the emblematic engravings in the appropriate places, just as Shaftesbury planned. For him, those engravings were not mere supplements; they were part of the subject matter, and he eagerly sent letters from Italy to England until his death, with detailed instructions regarding how the artist Gribelin needed to design each engraving ⁴⁹. Those engravings graphically symbolize the main points of each essay, but

⁴⁷ Isabel Rivers. "Review [Untitled]" *The Review of English Studies*, 51 (2000) pp. 617-621. Rivers Reviews *Characteristics* edited by Philip Ayres (1999, Clarendon Press).

⁴⁸ Michael Prince. "Editing Shaftesbury's *Characteristicks*." *Essays in Criticism*, 54 (2004) pp. 38-59.

⁴⁹ Felix Panknadel. "Shaftesbury's Illustrations of *Characteristics*." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 37 (1974) pp. 290-312. Panknadel's research is extensive – informing the symbolic meaning of every details of the most of the objects in the emblems. Panknadel details the engravings which accompany the second edition of *Characteristics*, pointing out ways in which the images were meticulously designed to reinforce the message of the text, with its "thoughts of virtue and honesty, and the love of liberty and mankind" (p.290). Drawing on Shaftesbury's letters, diary, and written instructions, Panknadel traces the chronology of the designs, based on Italian and French artists and those found in the classical period, and executed by Gribelin the engraver. Panknadel points out that although Shaftesbury was obsessed with ensuring that the illustrations show his theme in *Characteristics* - "universal harmony and mutual dependence of things," no record survives of any critic paying them any attention at all, and by as early as 1733, they were being dropped from subsequent editions (pp. 311-312). He comments that although philosophy and art are not usually combined, it would be a loss, given our present usage of images in general, to ignore the images Shaftesbury spent his final days on.

they all have a common concept - his dualistic view of humanity. Considering the above, I use the Liberty Fund edition for citations.

4. Illustrations of Characteristics

Shaftesbury's letters from Napoli to the artist Gribelin in England, written in his later years and with their precise instructions of how the illustrations or emblems of *Characteristics* should be visualized, reveal that he was applying the aesthetic method he claimed in *Judgement of Hercules* and *The Picture of Cebes*, and I must admit that Gribelin did quite well in following such (almost impossibly detailed) instructions.⁵⁰ (Shaftesbury tended to give several specific instructions regarding the details of each object among numerous other objects, persons, animals, and ornaments depicted in tiny images). Shaftesbury adds 13 illustrations as visual aids for readers.⁵¹ According to Paknadel "these illustrations were not for him mere ornaments. They were to convey in another medium the main points of his written work.... They were an 'underplot' working in perfect harmony with the main plot."⁵² Most graphic emblems attached to *Characteristics* display a symmetrical composition - first and second images as opposing characters, and the centre is the key figure of the subject to indicate the theme of the emblem; some of them show a


⁵⁰ Regarding his letters from Naples, see "Shaftesbury Manuscripts". *Lord Shaftesbury in Naples: 1711-1713*. Ed. Sheila O'Connell. pp. 158-219. The Walpole Society, 1988. Also regarding his emblems, see Felix Paknadel. "Shaftesbury's Illustrations of Characteristics." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 37 (1974) pp. 290-312.

⁵¹ Schlegel reviews the symbolism of the intricate engravings which were meticulously designed by Shaftesbury for the 1714 edition of *Characteristics*. She notes how he insisted that the details be executed according to his exact instructions, indicating that those engravings had great importance for him. The symbols fall into three broad categories, alchemical, Rosicrucian, and Masonic. Generally, the images depict "conflicts of one sort or another between religionists and philosophers" (p. 1132), and while Schlegel offers no opinion on whether Shaftesbury was a member of a secret society, she writes that the symbols he chose to accompany the second edition of *Characteristics* support his view that reason must replace fallacies such as fanaticism in religion and superstition. Dorothy B. Schlegel, "Shaftesbury's Hermetic Symbolism." *Proceedings of the IVth Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association*. Ed. Francois Jost The Hague: Mouton, 1966.

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 290.

dialectical composition – the centre shows the mixture or integration of the left and the right images, implying the culmination of the process he has in mind, as in the emblems below. Page numbers attached to each illustration reference the appropriate sections of the book, further aiding readers in the interpretation of each image. However, due to the passage of time (300 years) it may be difficult for modern readers to understand. I mainly follow Paknadel’s helpful research in this section.⁵³


⁵³ Felix Paknadel, “Shaftesbury’s Illustrations of Characteristics.” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 37 (1974) pp. 290-312.



Front piece of *Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit*

This illustration presents two kinds of religious beliefs – one is Daemonism, Polytheism, and Atheism represented by the right-hand picture, and the other is orthodox Theism represented by the left-hand picture (II. 7-8). According to Paknadel,⁵⁴ the woman in the centre represents human duality, either a fear and superstition-based view, or a reason-based view. On one of the pages in which he references the emblem, he writes about how people could make mistakes regarding the use of their affections. It seems his intent is to portray that there are wrong ways to worship God, and a virtuous way to worship God (II. 20). This emblem shows the opposite characteristics or sides of Enthusiasm (true/pleasant or false/melancholic).

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 308.




Front piece of *Soliloquy, or Advice to Author*

Regarding *Soliloquy*, which is in the third treatise, Shaftesbury describes the Magical Glass which has “the principal Character, the *Under-Parts* or *second Characters* shew’d human Nature more distinctly, and the Life” (I. 122). He holds that we need to have the “*speculative Habit*” (ibid.) to see the self by the Glass. The centre of the picture is the Magical Glass as a means of self-examination. Socrates and Plato’s portraits (philosophers who taught how to examine self) are positioned above the mirror.

According to Paknadel,⁵⁵ the Magical Glass, however, is in a dark room, indicating that some people do not want to look at the glass. The right-hand boy does not want to see himself in the mirror since his character is “ill,” but the left-hand boy wants to examine himself since his character is good. Above both boys, there are “harpies flying” symbolizing Fancy; the right-hand boy is annoyed by them, while the left-hand boy is not annoyed because of his self-examination. According to Paknadel, the boy on the left represents a

⁵⁵ Felix Paknadel, “Shaftesbury’s Illustrations of Characteristics.” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 37 (1974), p. 307.

good conscience, and the boy on the right represents an evil conscience.⁵⁶



Front piece of *A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm*

In the reference pages from *A Letter concerning Enthusiasm*, Shaftesbury writes about “the melancholy way of treating Religion” and “Superstition” (I. 20) which is “so tragical” (ibid.) because in this way, it is impossible to contemplate or ‘examine the Temper of our own Mind and Passions’” (I. 21). Instead of a melancholic fear of God, he recommends that we should “not only be in ordinary good Humour, but in the best of Humours, and in the sweetest, kindest Disposition of our Lives, to understand well what *true Goodness* is...” (ibid.). Otherwise, “...we are afraid to use our Reason freely” (ibid.).

According to Paknadel, in this graphic image, “the central picture [shows] ill-humour, and the two side pictures its opposite, good humour.”⁵⁷ There is a melancholic

⁵⁶ Ibid. p.307.

⁵⁷ Felix Paknadel, “Shaftesbury’s Illustrations of Characteristics.” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 37 (1974), p. 305.

woman's face at the top, indicating ill humour or false Enthusiasm (fanatic or dogmatic). In the centre, one boy does not want to see the truth, and the other boy does not want to hear the truth represented by the goddess Pallas's wit and humour. On the other hand, the right and left hand boys are showing that they are able to see truth with a delightful attitude.

Those emblems show what is important for Shaftesbury - humanity's dual character and either the false or true side of the nature of things. In almost every sentence, every paragraph, on every page, Shaftesbury talks about true or false Ridicule, Enthusiasm, Love, Reason, Passion, and Truth. He seems to feel that if a point is made only once readers will not remember, but if it is reinforced repeatedly for every concept, value, term, and subject, reader may remember and may put his principles into practice. Thus, he adds illustrations which visually model or resemble the manner of writing of *Charcteristics* - parts in opposition, but which can be represented as oneness (Magical Glass, Soliloquy, Wit/Humour, etc.). Those images offer readers another route to the meaning of his writing.

5. Shaftesbury's Predecessors

Shaftesbury was not alone at the time in viewing humanity's character as dualistic – a combination of matter and form, sense and reason, nature and art - under a holistic overview; he saw harmonious concord in the universe where parts and the whole, or all opposed matters, are ultimately in agreement. He was well-educated in classic antiquary, and a teleological view inherited from Platonism. Like other Augustan writers, he frequently quotes Aristotle (especially *Poetics*), Horace, Persius, Juvenal, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Epicurus, Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ According to *A General Dictionary*, vol. 9. London: James Bettenham, 1734, "Among the writers that he admired, and carried always with him, were the moral works of Xenophon, Horace, the Commentaries of Enchiridion of Epictetus as

Also, we see Plotinus's influence on him regarding the three kinds of beauty – beauty in the realm of sense, intellect, and virtue (Plotinus 45)⁵⁹, and his concept of the way of judging beauty – which is not only by the physical senses but most importantly by the inner eye - with enthusiastic joy, which reminds us of Plotinus' statement that one sees beauty by “the Soul's sight” (49) with “love and a trembling that is all delight” (ibid.). Additionally, works by Pseudo-Dionysius may quite possibly have influenced Shaftesbury.⁶⁰ As Shaftesbury does, Pseudo-Dionysius applies a three-level hierarchical approach to various subjects to symbolize Divine Beauty. ⁶¹ Although such a hierarchical view was already common in Platonism and Neoplatonism, Pseudo-Dionysius did so in a more precise and exhaustive way.

There was already a rich environment of aesthetic thought in England and Europe before Shaftesbury. He was influenced strongly by Cambridge Platonists – who maintained the ancient holistic view with the intention of explaining God's creation with harmony, order, and beauty, and the concept of humanity's innate faculty to be moral, by which to

published by Arrian, and Marcus Anthoninus. These authors are now extant in his library, filled throughout with marginal notes, reference, and explanations, all written with his own hand” p. 186.

⁵⁹ Plotinus. *The Enneads*. Trans. Stephen MacKenna, London: Penguin Books, 1991.

⁶⁰ Uphaus comments that the similarities between Plato, Plotinus, and Shaftesbury, is the link between beauty and love which has dialectical order. In Plato, useful objects are of a higher order than works of art, which are not practical, or the artist himself who is merely imitating the appearances of the objects. Unlike Plato, who defined works of art as imitation and artists as imitators, Shaftesbury's definition of three orders of beauty indicates that he focuses on an artist's mind as “the operation of mind within the larger context of the divine mind” (p. 344). In his orders of beauty, the dead form is objects created, and the second is the forms which form beauty such as an artist, and the third is the ultimate beauty which forms the first and the second beauty. In addition, Shaftesbury comments that humans can elevate themselves from the second to the third order of beauty through forming, not objects, but their minds, as he writes in *Moralists*: “... but that which fashions even Minds themselves, contains in it-self all the Beautys fashion'd by those Minds; and is consequently the Principle, Source, and Fountain of all *Beauty*” (II. 228). Uphaus comments that Shaftesbury had great influence on German romanticism because of his concept of “the act of poetic creation with subjective feeling” (p. 344). He also indicates that the definition of ‘nature’ in Shaftesbury is complex since meanings are varied throughout. However, though it is a quite correct and significant observation, he does not pursue the matter further. Robert W. Uphaus, “Shaftesbury on Art: The Rhapsodic Aesthetic.” *The Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism*, 27 (1969) pp. 341-348.

⁶¹ Pseudo-Dionysius, the Aeropagite. *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*. Transl. Colm Luibheid. Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1987.

oppose Hobbes, and the strong belief regarding the maintenance of virtue by the use of reason. Among those Cambridge Platonists, Shaftesbury was especially influenced by Benjamin Whichcote – Shaftesbury wrote a preface for his *Sermons*.⁶² He was also influenced by Ralph Cudworth, and by Henry More.⁶³

Also, Robertson points out similarities between *De Legibus Naturae* by the Cambridge Platonist, Cumberland (1672) who has “Striking similarities” with Cudworth and *Characteristics*; he refers to Cumberland “who like Shaftesbury oppugned Hobbes; some (with other favourite ideals of Shaftesbury’s such as that of the beauty of virtue) in the ethic of the ancients – Platonic, Stoic, and Epicurean, - and others like to those in Charron and Locke.”⁶⁴, and Robertson notes that it is possible to see some influence from Spinoza through Cumberland.⁶⁵

In addition, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, by his holistic, deistic, and aesthetic statements in *De Veritate* (1624),⁶⁶ influenced the Cambridge Platonists, and thus directly

⁶² “Preface to the Selected Sermons of Benjamin Whichcote”. *Select sermons of Dr. Whichcote*. In two parts. With an excellent Recommendatory Epistle by the late Rev. and Learned Dr. Wishart. Third edition, 1773. pp. 20-34. (Originally published in 1698). Eighteenth Century Collections Online.

⁶³ Kivy provides the background of moral and aesthetics theory before Hutcheson, including various influences on Shaftesbury’s thought. Those who influenced Shaftesbury were Cambridge Platonists who, like Shaftesbury, objected to Hobbes’s view of humanity’s immoral nature, Plotinus - whose teleological view on hierarchical beauty clearly echoes in Shaftesbury’s three degrees of beauty, critics of Christian dogmatism such as Benjamin Whichcote and Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More who wrote moral and aesthetical works, and French and English writers who wrote regarding the definition of ‘taste’. Peter Kivy, *The Seventh Sense: Frances Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics*. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.

⁶⁴ John M. Robertson. *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.* Vol. 1, Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1963. (Reproduced from the 1900 edition), p. xxxii.

⁶⁵ Regarding the historical background of Shaftesbury’s deistic comments, see Alfred Owen Aldridge. “Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto.” *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, 41 (1951) pp. 297-382.

Also, Toole claims that Shaftesbury was neither a deist who believed in a transcendental God nor a theist who believed in revelation from God, such as miracles and inspiration, but a pantheist (or a Spinozist). Toole speculates that Shaftesbury was familiar with Spinoza’s thought through his Dutch stay with his philosophical circle, including Byle. God and nature, or order in the universe, is identical in Shaftesbury, as he never regards God as a transcendental figure. The order of the universe is a rational mind which created all things, and there is goodness, beauty, and perfection in the whole. Shaftesbury seems a deist, according to Toole, because he is careful not to reveal that he is a pantheist, more sensational than a deist, and uses *double meaning* writings which mask the author’s true intention. Robert Toole, “Shaftesbury on God and His Relationship to the World.” *International Studies in Philosophy*, 8 (1976) pp. 81-100.

⁶⁶ Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, *De Veritate*. Trans. Meyrick H. Carré. Bristol: F.W. Arrowsmith, 1937.

and indirectly could have influenced Shaftesbury regarding the concept of *natural instinct* (*natural affection* in Shaftesbury), *common notion* (*common sense* in Shaftesbury), and *the three kinds of truth* - object, mind, and both object and mind as phenomena (*three levels of beauty* in Shaftesbury). According to Herbert, everyone has a *natural instinct* to be moral; thus, truth can be recognized by *common notions* – man’s innate ability to judge truth, beauty, and virtue. Like Shaftesbury, he holds that there are what we might call micro level and macro level correspondences in the universe. For example, body and mind, or sense and reason coincide with the system of the universe with harmony and order.

Looking at its title and the superficial appearance of the writing style, we recognize Shaftesbury’s *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* as belonging to one of the popular writing styles of his time – *character writing* or *character sketches*.⁶⁷ By description of various social and moral characteristics, such writing aims to amend people’s manners, and was originally influenced by Theophrastus’s *Characters*. In England, there were numerous works of this kind, such as Sir Thomas Overbury’s *Characters; Or, Witty Descriptions Of The Properties Of Sundry Persons* (1614), Joseph Hall’s *Characters of Vices and Virtues* (1608) which was translated into French in 1625, and other works by character writers such as Nicholas Breton, John Cleveland, Richard Flecknoe, and Samuel Butler.⁶⁸ In France, the most famous of this type of work was La Bruyère’s *The Characters or Manners of the Ages* (1688)⁶⁹ which was translated into English numerous times.

⁶⁷ Regarding character writing, see Wendell Clausen “The Beginnings of English Character-Writing in the Early Seventeenth Century.” *Philological Quarterly*. 25. (1946) pp. 32-45. Also see J.W. Smeed. *The Theophrastan “character”: The History of a Literary Genre*. Clarendon, 1985.

⁶⁸ For works of character writing, see *Character Writings of the Seventeenth Century*. Edited by Henry Moreley. Kessinger, 2007. (Originally published in 1891).

⁶⁹ Jean de La Bruyere. *The “Characters” of Jean de La Bruyère*. Trans. Henri Van Laun. London: John C. Nimmo, 1885.

Shaftesbury clearly read La Bruyère's *Characters* with interest, and he makes mention of the work.⁷⁰ In those books, as well as Shaftesbury's writings, it was quite common to find terms such as *good-breed* and *polite manner*. Character writing books were sold in pocket-book size, and were very popular among citizens because of their tendency to describe or criticize stereotypes; they were fun and easy to read, somewhat like modern tabloid magazines. When Shaftesbury titled his work *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, it is clear that he wished the work to be regarded as a book of this sort, not a philosophy book. As well as character writings, the style of Shaftesbury's *Characteristics* is based on the observations of stereotypes such as the grave gentlemen, young courtiers, dogmatists, enthusiasts, and sceptics. The readers of *Characteristics* would be attracted by the title and the style of the work, and by the many attractive engravings which require some time to decipher. And such was Shaftesbury's intention, to invite readers with a light and fun approach. Readers could carry the book anywhere – courts, pubs, markets, and the streets - in their pockets; Shaftesbury refers to the work as a *pocket mirror*, and intends readers to learn philosophy without noticing that they are reading a book dealing with metaphysics.

What differences are there between Shaftesbury's writing and those of other character writers? Besides the appearance of his writings, with the descriptions of characters and manners of people, Shaftesbury applies his judgement based on his aesthetic and moral theory. In the works by character writers, unlike Shaftesbury, there is no theory or rule

⁷⁰ "Plastics or The Original Progress and Power of Designatory Art" p. 99 in *Second Characters or The Language of Forms*. Ed. Benjamin Rand. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969. (Reproduced from the 1914 edition).

represented through the descriptions of various characters/manners. In Shaftesbury's work, by contrast, those who are regarded as fashionable, gentlemanly, of good-breeding, philosophical, or beautiful need to be observed deeply, in a *below the surface* examination. Continuing with possible influences on Shaftesbury, the mysterious and ineffable character of beauty - what he calls the *je ne sais quoi* and *beauty of wit* (*Le bel esprit*), or the relation between *wit and common sense* - may have been influenced by Bouhours, whose *La Manière de bien penser dans les ouvrages d'esprit* (1687) and *Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugène* (1671) had been reprinted numerous times in Europe. *La Manière de bien penser sur les ouvrages d'esprit* (1687) appeared in London in 1705 under the title, *The Art of Criticism* - though it did not matter for Shaftesbury who was fluent in French. There are literary similarities between Bouhours and Shaftesbury. *Les Entretiens* includes six conversations between good friends, whose names mean "well-born" in Greek and Latin, about aesthetic manners, much as Theocles and Philocles do in *Moralists*. However, Bouhours and Shaftesbury have different views on this *je ne sais quoi*. For Bouhours, beauty is something mysterious which is experienced, not by reason, but by feeling alone; for Shaftesbury, beauty is not a mysterious experience at all. Though he uses the expression *je ne sais quoi*, for him beauty is explainable. Experiencing beauty is a result of one's inner state - the combination of reason and imagination, as I will discuss later.⁷¹

⁷¹ Du Bos (1670-1742) like Bouhours, states that aesthetic pleasure is feeling, but without sentimentalism, and comes from a physical process. Possibly Du Bos was influenced by Shaftesbury, but not the opposite, since *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture* was published in 1719 (Shaftesbury died in 1713).

Also, there are some interesting similarities between Shaftesbury and Crousaz (1663-1750) such as regarding the duality of humanity, and its harmonious relation as an aesthetic state, the important role of reason in aesthetic experience, and the rejection of scholastic logic. However, though Crousaz was eight years older than Shaftesbury, his *The Art of Thinking* (*Système de réflexions*, English translation 1724) was published in 1712 after the first edition of *Characteristics* (1711), and his *Treatise on Beauty* (*Traité du beau*, 1714) was published after Shaftesbury died. Crousaz may have been influenced by Shaftesbury since a French translation of *A Letter concerning Enthusiasm* (1709) and *Sensus Communis* (1710) had been published.

Je ne sais quoi as an indefinable character of beauty, however, had already been discussed before Bouhours. Some Italian writers of the sixteenth century - such as Firenzuola, in *Della Bellezza delle Donne* (1541), state the character of beauty as *non so che* – the Italian version of *je ne sais quoi* (Monk 140)⁷², and the Spanish writer Baltasar Gracián (1601-1658), whose aesthetic concepts greatly influenced Bouhours⁷³ and other European writers, quite possibly including Shaftesbury, discusses the indefinable character of beauty.

Gracián's *The Mind's Wit and Art* (*Arte de ingenio* - published in 1642, revised as *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* in 1648) is an essay on aesthetics, specifically wit.⁷⁴ In numerous works such as *The Hero* (*El héroe*, 1639), *The Discretion* (*El discreto*, 1646), and *The Pocket Oracle and Art of Prudence* (*El oráculo manual y arte de prudencia*, 1647), Gracián discusses early stages of the aesthetic concepts which were developed in the latter half of the century - beauty in relation to moral life, and the problem of describing beauty (*je ne sais quoi*), as in the following:

This certain, indefinable grace – the soul of any gift, the life of any perfection, the brisk dispatch of deeds, the charm of words, and the bewitchment of all good taste – beguiles the intelligence and flees from explanation. It is a mysterious formal beauty, the highest quality of any quality.... For the most part, it is innate, and it borrows

⁷² For details of the concept of beauty and grace before Shaftesbury, see Monk "A Grace Beyond the Reach of Art" *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 5 (1944), pp. 131-150.

⁷³ Regarding Gracián's influence on Bouhours re. *beauty of wit*, see Woods, M. J. "On Pondering la ponderación in Gracián's Treatise on Wit." *The Modern Language Review*, 88 (1993) pp. 639-643, and regarding Gracián's theory of wit, see Ruiz, Arturo Zárate. "Gracián, Wit, and the Baroque Age." Peter Lang. New York: 1996. According to Ruiz, Bouhours attempted to translate Gracián's *The Mind's Wit and Art* (*Arte de ingenio*) to French though the task was problematic due to the complexity of the terminology in the original Spanish. Probably because of this difficulty, Bouhours states that he does not find witty writing skill in Gracián, who wrote *Arte de ingenio* (Arts of Wit) "... Gracián is one of these incomprehensible geniuses; but most of the time the reader doesn't know what he means as perhaps he doesn't know himself.... However, there ought to be neither obscurity nor confusion in what comes from a *bel esprit*" (166). "The Conversations of Aristo and Eugene." (translation of selected passages) Trans. Donald Schier. *The Continental Model: Selected French Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, in English Translation*. Ed. Scott Elledge and Donald Schier. New York: Cornell UP, 1970.

⁷⁴ Baltasar Gracián. *Baltasar Gracian's The Mind's Wit and Art*. Trans. Leland Hugh Chambers. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962.

little from observation. Until now it has never submitted to rules, being superior to any art.... It goes far beyond an easy manner, and is superior to flair and to style.... Without it, even the slightest action is dead, and the greatest perfection unpleasant. It is something essential, not accidental; no mere ornament, but the foundation of the most important things in life. Being the soul of beauty, it is also the spirit of prudence; and being the breath of elegance, it is the very life of bravery. ⁷⁵

For Gracián, artistic wit can be applied not only to literature, but to every aspect of life in the pursuit of virtue, since it is an important means to reflect who we are. As Shaftesbury does, he uses the metaphor of a *pocket mirror* to remind readers of who they are, and he emphasizes that appearance - how to be looked at, how to behave and not only how to think, is important for moral life. He writes, “Heaven told me both to be and show. What good would one be without the other? What use is reality without appearance? ... To know, and to show you know, are double knowledge”.⁷⁶ Gracián, as Shaftesbury, states the importance of practicing theory in daily life: “To know things but not practice them is to be not a philosopher but a grammarian.”⁷⁷ Like Shaftesbury, Gracián states that taste can be cultivated by the help of reason, and writes “A good manner is one of the subtle gifts of merit. Because it can be acquired, it is inexcusable to lack it ... when both art and nature combine, they produce an agreeable successful person.”⁷⁸

After those predecessors, it was Shaftesbury who systematized (in his own way) major aesthetic concepts of the eighteenth century. Unfortunately, because of his unique and irregular writings, it has not been well known or recognized that many of major aesthetic

⁷⁵ Baltasar Gracián. “The Hero”. *A Pocket Mirror for Heroes*. Trans. Christopher Maurer. New York: Doubleday, 1996. p. 40-41.

⁷⁶ Baltasar Gracián. “The Better Parts of Discretion”. *A Pocket Mirror for Heroes*. Trans. Christopher Maurer. New York: Doubleday, 1996. p. 149.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* p.178.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p.179.

questions in the eighteenth-century had been already asked and partly answered by him, as I will discuss later. I explore his aesthetic thought, which I hold is far more systematic than has been acknowledged. It was Shaftesbury who related the three levels of beauty to humanity's dual character and the human destiny of finding an agreeable state as the third or true nature, with his aesthetic method and practice.

Chapter 2 Shifting Point of Moral Philosophy

1. Theme of *Characteristics*

In this section, I point out how one of Shaftesbury's important aims in writing *Characteristics* is to debate the theories of Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke, just as other researchers have observed. He criticizes them throughout the work, in places with great emphasis, and there are clear statements indicating that opposition is one of the chief objects of the work. In *Characteristics*, Shaftesbury presents what he considers a new method of philosophical writing, specifically on the topic of ethics, in contrast to Descartes who wrote about metaphysical subjects more systematically in Shaftesbury's view. In addition, he aims to defend the concept of an innate idea of beauty and virtue against Hobbes and Locke.⁷⁹ Alderman states that "Deferring for the present any elaborate discussion of Shaftesbury's doctrines, we can hint at his ethical moment by epitomizing the salient points of the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke."⁸⁰ Since those philosophers reject what Shaftesbury regards as a fundamental ground of moral philosophy - innate moral ideas and a final end of the nature of things, his intent for writing *Characteristics* is understandable.

Shaftesbury's first published work is the preface for an edition of sermons by

⁷⁹ Regarding Shaftesbury's role in the development of ethics in the eighteenth century, Darwall writes that Shaftesbury held that sanctions do not motivate true virtue, but that people behave virtuously because of innate motivations; virtuous behavior, and indeed the notion of a practical *self*, depends on the person having an authoritative and obligating internal standpoint of his life, an *ought*. Darwall sees Shaftesbury's project as an attempt to inspire people to find this internal standpoint, so as to realize an integral self. Shaftesbury regards the natural as synonymous with the good, and virtue as the result of self-reflection and harmony within the whole natural system of the world. Shaftesbury holds that we should lead virtuous, moral lives, lives which show concern for others as well as ourselves, not because of laws or punishments, but because the virtuous life is in our own interest and will lead to our own good. We can achieve this obligation to virtue through self-reflection or self-analysis, an inner dialogue or soliloquy. An internal, "better self" guides the person to self-regulation; we are obliged to act according to what this better self thinks we ought to do. Darwall calls this a "normative theory of the will" (206); we act virtuously because we are accountable to the inner authority. Stephen Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal 'ought': 1640-1740*. New York: Cambridge UP, 1995.

⁸⁰ William E. Alderman "The Significance of Shaftesbury in English Speculation." *PMLA*, 38 (1923) p. 177.

Benjamin Whichcote in 1698.⁸¹ In this preface, Shaftesbury opposes Hobbes' egoistic view of humanity. In the same year, he published *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue* in which he aims to prove the innate moral sense, against Hobbes' view and Locke's rejection of innate moral nature. The first edition of *Inquiry* shows that Shaftesbury had worked out the main theme of his thought concerning moral sense well before the publication of *Characteristics* (1711). Klein writes that despite some revisions, "the main argument remained the same when [the Inquiry] was incorporated into *Characteristicks* thirteen years later. Thus, Shaftesbury had reached some of his basic theological and ethical positions by the time he was twenty-seven years old."⁸²

Also, in this section, I further examine the way in which Shaftesbury participates in the debate with those philosophers, observing that his method of proving innate ideas involves somewhat circular arguments, as some researchers have correctly pointed out. However, I hold that although such an approach is regarded as a defect in philosophical debate, from Shaftesbury's point of view, it is the best method of argument to exhibit his theory of an innate moral nature.

There is, according to Shaftesbury, a "*Connexion and Union of the Subject*" in his treatises in *Characteristics*, or what he calls "*Joint-Tracts*" (III. 115). Although the treatises were originally published separately, *Characteristics* is not a mere collection of his works, but one work with an integrated theme. In *Miscellaneous Reflections*, which is the last treatise of *Characteristics*, Shaftesbury admits that he has not clearly presented his theme,

⁸¹ "Preface to the Selected Sermons of Benjamin Whichcote". *Select sermons of Dr. Whichcote. In two parts. With an excellent Recommendatory Epistle by the late Rev. and Learned Dr. Wishart.* Third edition, 1773. pp. 20-34. (Originally published in 1698). Eighteenth Century Collections Online.

⁸² Lawrence E. Klein. *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 16.

but has employed “very slender Hints” (III. 83). Referring to himself in the third person, he writes,

He has given only some few, and very slender Hints of going further, or attempting to erect any Scheme or Model, which may discover his Pretence to a real *Architect-Capacity* ... and what he offers by way of *Project* or *Hypothesis*, is very faint, hardly spoken aloud; but mutter'd to himself, in a kind of dubious Whisper, or feign'd SOLILOQUY. What he discovers of *Form* and *Method*, is indeed so accompany'd with the random *Miscellaneous Air*, that it may pass for Raillery, rather than good Earnest.

(III. 83-84)

A footnote on this same page (III. 83) regarding the term “Hints” in the paragraph above refers readers to particular pages to discover what his project in *Characteristics* is. In the footnote, he adds a summarized version of the content of those pages to aid readers. He writes that those pages deal with “*previous Knowledge*,” in the sense of innate knowledge of beauty and virtue, and that other pages deal with “the System and Genealogy of the *Affections* previously treated ... for the *examining Practice*, and seeming Pedantry of the Method” (III. 83. fn). The phrase “Pedantry of the Method” is meant to describe the relatively organized approach to presenting his views concerning natural affection which he uses in *An Inquiry concerning Virtue*, and the phrase “the examining Practice” refers to the method of examining our human affections, which can tell us what is good or ill, before we go on to discuss how to praise God.

When we go to those pages (I. 26-35), concerning the hints as to the aim of *Characteristics*, we find a discussion about true Enthusiasm which is “wholly free of *Melancholy*” and the “Panick” (I. 28) of false Enthusiasm which is superstitious and fanatical. Shaftesbury refers to True Enthusiasm as “noble ENTHUSIASM” (I. 35) or “Divine ENTHUSIASM” (I. 34) which is also “Passion, in the nobler and higher sense” (I. 35 fn). To

judge whether the Enthusiasm is false or genuine, we need to examine our mental state. He writes,

For to judge the Spirits whether they are of God, we must antecedently judge our own Spirit; whether it be of Reason and sound Sense; whether it be fit to judge at all, by being sedate, cool, and impartial; free of every biasing Passion, every giddy Vapor, or melancholy Fume. This is the first Knowledge and previous Judgment: “to understand *our-selves* and to know *what Spirit we are of.*” (I.35)

After we find suitable affections which can tell us what is good or bad, only then we are in a position to consider God’s characteristics:

When we had once look’d into our-selves, and distinguish’d well the nature of our own Affections, we shou’d probably be fitter Judges of the Divineness of a Character, and discern better what Affections were suitable or unsuitable to a perfect Being. (I. 26)

After we refer to those pages of hints, we are better able to articulate the main theme of *Characteristics*, which is that our innate moral sense is more than enough to be truly Enthusiastic, Good, Beautiful, and Religious.

However, at nearly the end of *Characteristics*, he kindly summarizes his theory (some readers may have already gone to the trouble of such laborious page-turning, since the hints are mentioned before the summary). He writes,

IT HAS been the main Scope and principle End of these Volumes, “To assert the Reality of a BEAUTY and CHARM in *moral* as well as *natural* Subjects; and to demonstrate the Reasonableness of a *proportionate* TASTE, and *determinate* CHOICE, in *Life* and *Manners.*” The STANDARD of this kind, and the noted Character of *Moral TRUTH* appear so firmly establish’d in Nature it-self, and so widely display’d thro’ the intelligent World, that there is no Genius, Mind, or *thinking Principle*, which (if I may say so) is not really *conscious* in the case. Even the most refractory and obstinate Understandings are by certain *Reprises* or *Returns* of Thought, on every occasion, convinc’d of this Existence, and necessitated, in common with others, to acknowledg the actual RIGHT and WRONG.

(III. 185, underlines added)

That is to say, in summary, he holds that Moral Truth is known innately, and that everyone

must admit to this fact since it is seen in every human activity. Thus, I conclude that defending the concept of an innate sense of beauty and virtue is the most important theme in *Characteristics*.

2. Against Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke

Descartes

Shaftesbury holds that even if we understand philosophical ideas, we still may not be sure about who we are, or how to live; knowledge alone does not contribute to everyday life. He claims that something more is needed to guide us through the challenges and the changes we experience every day. He writes,

To-day things have succeeded well with me; consequently my Ideas are rais'd: “ ’Tis a fine World! All is glorious! Every thing delightful and entertaining! Mankind, Conversation, Company, Society; What can be more desirable?” *To-morrow* comes Disappointment, Crosses, Disgrace ... Philosopher! where are thy *Ideas*? Where is *Truth, Certainty, Evidence*, so much talk'd of?

(I. 185-186)

In praise of what he sees as the benefits of philosophy, he adds,

Let me philosophize in this manner [of metaphysics]; if this be indeed the way I am to grow *wise*. Let me examine my *Ideas* of *Space* and *Substance*: Let me look well into *Matter* and its *Modes*; if this be looking into MY-SELF; If this be to improve my *Understanding*, and enlarge my MIND.

(I. 185)

Shaftesbury is not necessarily dissatisfied with the quality of Descartes' argument as he understands it, but he disagrees with what he sees as Descartes' approach – engaging the subject of metaphysics without contributing to real-life matters. Philosophy for Shaftesbury is a subject to contribute to the quality of one's daily life. He writes,

As for *Metaphysicks*, and that which in the Schools is taught for *Logick* or for *Ethicks*; I shall willingly allow it to pass for *Philosophy*, when by any real effects it is prov'd capable to refine our Spirits, improve our Understandings, or mend our Manners. But if the defining *material* and *immaterial Substances*, and distinguishing

their *Propertys* and *Modes*, is recommended to us, as the right manner of proceeding in the Discovery of our own Natures, I shall be apt to suspect a Study as the more delusive and infatuating, on account of its magnificent Pretension.

(I. 179)

Also, Shaftesbury criticizes what he sees as the lack of a teleological view in Descartes. For him, the universe is divinely-designed, and a divinely-based order prevails throughout all things in the universe, including the human psyche, society, and politics. On the other hand, for Descartes, there is no final end to explain natural phenomena. Such a stance, for Shaftesbury, means there are no innate moral principles which everyone is meant to follow. For similar reasons (lack of a practical end) Shaftesbury regards Descartes' investigation of passions from a physiological perspective as aimless and pointless. He writes,

The Passion of *Fear* (as a modern Philosopher informs me) determines the Spirits to the Muscles of the Knees ... Excellent Mechanism! ... In this whole Subject of Inquiry I shall find nothing of the least *Self-concernment*. And I may depend upon it, that by the most refin'd Speculation of this kind, I shall neither learn to diminish my Fears, or raise my Courage....

(I. 182)

Shaftesbury holds that it is "the Nature of Fear, as well as of other Passions, to have its Increase and Decrease, as it is fed by *Opinion*, and influenc'd by Custom and Practice" (ibid.). He holds that examining fears and passions without finding out how to use them is the same as examining a watch without finding "what the real Use was of such as Instrument; or by what Movements its *End*" (I. 181). Studying human affection should aim to gain "the Knowledge of *human Nature*, and of MY-SELF. This is the *Philosophy*, which, by Nature, has the Pre-eminence above all other Science or Knowledge" (I. 183).

Hobbes

In his first published work, the preface for *Select sermons of Dr. Whichcote* (1698),

we already see Shaftesbury's defence of innate moral idea. In this preface, he claims that Hobbes "has done ... very ill service in the moral world"⁸³ (xxiii) since he "forgot to mention kindness, friendship, sociableness, love of company and converse, natural affection, or any thing of this kind ... this author has substituted only one master-passion, *fear*"⁸⁴(xxiv), and holds that it is not self-interest which motivate us, but "*natural affection*, as having ground and foundation in meer *NATURE*"⁸⁵ (xxv).

Shaftesbury rejects Hobbes' concept of the social contract.⁸⁶ He holds that what he calls an "imaginary *State of Nature*" (II. 179), where selfish humans are constantly fighting, is not a realistic view of humanity. Rather, humans are sociable, and so society is not born by contract, but is a natural state for humanity. He writes,

In short, if Generation be *natural*, if natural Affection and the Care and Nurture of the Offspring be *natural*, Things standing as they do with Man and the Creature being of that Form and Constitution he now is, it follows that *Society* must be also *natural to him* and that out of Society and Community he never *did*, nor ever *can*, subsist.

(II. 179)

He claims that if we follow Hobbes, our world view would be cynical and distrustful, and we would live in a world where "Civility, Hospitality, Humanity towards Strangers or People in distress, is only *a more deliberate Selfishness*. An honest Heart is only a more cunning one..." (I. 74). Not only self-interest, but many other factors and states of mind, such as "*Passion, Humour, Caprice, Zeal, Faction*, and a thousand other Springs, which are

⁸³ "Preface to the Selected Sermons of Benjamin Whichcote". *Select sermons of Dr. Whichcote. In two parts. With an excellent Recommendatory Epistle by the late Rev. and Learned Dr. Wishart*. Third edition, 1773. pp. 20-34. (Originally published in 1698). Eighteenth Century Collections Online. p. xxiii.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p. xxiv.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. xxv.

⁸⁶ Regarding Hobbes' State of Nature, see chapter 4.

counter to *Self-Interest*" (I. 72), are at play in the world. Thus, Shaftesbury contends that selfishness is not representative of human nature; instead, he argues that "a social Feeling or *Sense of Partnership*" (I. 67) is more natural to people.

He argues that if human nature is as immoral as Hobbes suggests, it would be quite difficult to keep the social contract, which would require not only that people be sincere regarding their "Promise" but that they have the characteristics of decent individuals, such as "Faith, Justice, Honesty, and Virtue," attributes which "The Civil Union, or Confederacy, cou'd never make *Right or Wrong*" (I. 69). Regarding Hobbes' view of ethical egoism, Shaftesbury argues that if a person does virtuous deeds motivated by selfishness, he or she is not virtuous. For Shaftesbury, true virtue is not motivated by self-interest, but by benevolence. He writes that, "If the Love of doing good, be not, of it-self, a *good and right Inclination*; I know not how there can possibly be such a thing as Goodness or Virtue" (I. 62). If there is an individual, considered "a saint," who does good because of self-interest or because of fear of punishment, he is "a knave" (I. 80).

Locke

Shaftesbury had a life-long friendship with Locke, since his grandfather, the first Earl, was Locke's patron; Locke supervised Shaftesbury's education from birth, and guided him as a mentor or father figure, even living in the same household.⁸⁷ Locke applied his educational principles, abstracted in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693)⁸⁸, to the

⁸⁷ For Shaftesbury's early education by Locke, see Robett Voitle. *The Third Earl of Shaftesbury 1671-173*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1984, chapter 1.

⁸⁸ John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, Amazon digital service, Kindle edition, originally published in 1693 in London. In this treatise, Locke discusses how to form moral character, which he calls *good nature*, in a child more than the section on academic education, which he addresses in the last section. A good mentor needs to guide children so that good nature develops in them "into an habit, and they take pleasure, and pique themselves in being kind, liberal and civil, to others" (Part VII, section 110). A mentor or parent may plant "unnatural cruelty" or "more natural temper of

young boy destined to be a statesman as was his grandfather, the founder of the Whig party.

Locke published *Essay concerning Human Understanding* in 1790 when Shaftesbury was 19 years old. In this treatise, Locke rejects the idea of innate moral principles; for Locke, cultural diversity helps explain that there is no innate sense of morality. He holds that morality and religion are inseparable, in that moral behavior is subject to the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment.⁸⁹

However, Shaftesbury quite disagrees with Locke's philosophy. Carey holds that "Shaftesbury resisted Lock's moral philosophy because it resolved everything into diversity. In the absence of innate ideas, Locke had nothing to offer aside from opinion or fashion to regulate morals."⁹⁰ Also, Klein points out, "... establishing a philosophic identity distinct from Locke and from the sort of philosophizing Locke represented became a theme of Shaftesbury's career."⁹¹ Shaftesbury criticizes Locke's views regarding the foundation of moral ideas. He writes,

'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of these (which are the same as those of God) *unnatural*, and without foundation in our minds. *Innate* is a word he poorly plays upon; the right word, though less used, in *connatural* ... The question is not about the time the *ideas* entered ... but ... the idea and sense of order, administration, and a God, will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him. ⁹²

benignity and compassion" (part VII, section 116) in them. A child should be encouraged to have compassion toward others and animals, "Be sure to keep up in him the principles of good nature and kindness; make them as habitual as you can..." (part IV, section 67)

⁸⁹ For Locke's theory, see Daniel Carey. *Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006.

Also, Voitle reviews the influences on Shaftesbury, and details the fundamentals of his theistic or pantheistic beliefs, his distance from orthodox Christianity – he never refers to "God," and the ways in which his writing and terminology were influenced by John Locke's *Essay*, as for example, when he calls the mental activity by which actions are morally judged an *internal sense*. Robert Voitle, *The Third Earl of Shaftesbury 1671-173*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1984. Chapter 4 "The Patterns of Shaftesbury's Earlier Thought."

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 135.

⁹¹ Lawrence E. Klein. *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 28.

⁹² "Letters to Michael Ainsworth," *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*. Ed. Benjamin Rand. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1900, p. 403.

For Shaftesbury, Locke's view of morality is as egoistic as Hobbes's. He holds that denying innate moral ideas results in moral relativism, and people will be moral merely because of fear of punishment and the expectation of reward in an afterlife. As Locke claims, if morality is achieved by social sanctions only, without self-discipline, morality would be regarded as a mere tool to satisfy one's self-interest. Shaftesbury writes,

... virtue, according to Mr. Locke, has no other measure, law, or rule, than fashion and custom; morality, justice, equity, depends only on law and will, and God indeed is a perfect free agent in his sense'; that is, free to anything, that is however ill: for if He wills it, it will be made good; virtue may be vice, and vice virtue in its turn, if he pleases.⁹³

Locke's view on humanity's unsociable character is seen by Shaftesbury as dangerously relativistic. Unlike Hobbes, who claims that pleasure motivates one to act morally, and unlike Locke who claims that public opinion and fear of punishment in an afterlife motivates one to act morally, for Shaftesbury, because virtue in the genuine sense is disinterested, moral conduct is the reward in itself.

As Shaftesbury opposes the religious authority of priests, miracles, and revealed religion, he separates morality from religion. He claims that a man capable of judging moral actions will possess "a Sense of Right and Wrong, before such time as he may have any settled Notion of A GOD" (II. 31), unlike Locke who holds that religion is necessary for morality. Thus, he rejects reliance on the interpretation of Scripture when discussing moral ground as Locke does, rejects dogmatic interpretation, champions freethinking, and holds that the best response to religious enthusiasm is toleration and open ridicule.⁹⁴

⁹³ Letters to Michael Ainsworth," *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*. Ed. Benjamin Rand. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1900, p. 404.

⁹⁴ According to Carey, "The purpose of Locke's critique [on innate idea] was not to introduce scepticism but rather to eradicate a false foundation for knowledge and to make way for something more reliable." *Ibid*, p. 136.

Locke uses examples of cultural diversity to illustrate lack of innate moral principles, while Shaftesbury, also using examples of diversity, supports the idea of innate moral principles. He claims that even in different cultures and customs, there are universally shared moral principles. The diversity shows that there are various levels of culture and individuals, that is to say, how civilized the culture or the person is. Even if moral character is innate, however, this does not guarantee that people will actually behave accordingly; rather, we are often imperfect due to the negative effects of education, environment, culture, or an individual's state of mind. We often have an excess of either passion or self-interest; therefore, while an innate moral sense may be difficult to observe, it is innate nevertheless and needs to be cultivated. ⁹⁵

Carey holds that this notion of Shaftesbury's innate moral sense with acquired skill comes from a stoic theory of 'preconception' (*prolepsis*), which is an innate tendency or disposition to think a certain way, a sort of primary impulse. He writes that there is

a natural 'anticipation' or inclination which made it possible to recognize certain ideas or to hold certain beliefs. Effectively, it was an innate idea or common notion. But Shaftesbury emphasized some important differences which freed prolepses from Locke's critique. Prolepses were natural and yet they did not guarantee moral knowledge *per se*. They supplied criteria, but they required some cultivation and development. Furthermore, prolepses could be misapplied. ⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Billig sees Shaftesbury as a psychological thinker, and traces the influence, which he regards as largely neglected, of Shaftesbury's writing on the history of psychology, including recent trends in critical psychology. While Locke's views align more with modern cognitive psychology, Shaftesbury chose a wider, historical and social approach to his discussions of thinking, an approach close to those of post-modern thinkers. Billig regards Shaftesbury's writings, including his promotion of a variety of opinions, as a long-hidden influence on Mikhail Bakhtin's "heteroglossia," for example, and regards his views on "common sense" as anticipating Speech Act Theory (p. 5). He also sees Shaftesbury's holistic views of nature as anticipating Gestalt theories. Billig details how Shaftesbury differs from Locke with regard to their theories of human nature, noting how Shaftesbury turns to classical stoics for guidance, while Locke claims to start afresh. Shaftesbury resisted the relativism of Locke's view, and argued that an atomistic approach trivializes the "discoveries" claimed by thinkers such as Locke. Billig also discusses Shaftesbury's view that humans are born with an innate moral sense, pointing out several problems with the theory, such as the different moral values held by different cultures or peoples. Billig regards Shaftesbury's promotion of dialogue, irony, and humour, and his rejection of systems and dogmatic authority as an early Post-Modern approach to both philosophy and psychology. Michael Billig, *The Hidden Roots of Critical Psychology: Understanding the Impact of Locke, Shaftesbury and Reid*. London: SAGE, 2008.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 9.

Shaftesbury uses ‘pre-conception’ interchangeably with ‘innate ideas’ (II. 229 etc.), which is close to ‘instinct’ or ‘impulse’. He holds that just as animals take care of each other and generally live peacefully in the herd, so too do humans possess a ‘pre-conception’ of moral good which is somewhat like this instinct, something which Shaftesbury feels no one can deny. Using the term *instinct* to further describe this *innate* sense of beauty and good, he writes,

Therefore if you dislike the word *Innate*, let us change it, if you will, for INSTINCT; and call *Instinct*, that which Nature teaches, exclusive of *Art, Culture, or Discipline*.... The Impression, or *Instinct*, is so strong in the Case, that ’twou’d be absurdity not to think it *natural*, as well in our own Species, as in other Creatures: amongst whom ... not only the mere engendering of the Young, but the various and almost infinite Means and Methods of providing for them, are all foreknown. For thus much we may indeed discern in the preparatory labours and Arts of these wild Creatures; which demonstrate their anticipating *Fancys, Pre-conceptions, or Pre-sensations*....

(II. 230)

Although he refers to innate sense as *instinct*, this instinct is not the same as that displayed by animals. The difference is one of degree, and he argues that “the same *Pre-Conceptions*, of a higher degree, have place in human Kind” (ibid.). In Shaftesbury’s writings, pre-conception of the moral good is interchangeable with “Pre-conceptions of Fair and Beautiful” (ibid.), since Beauty in the highest sense means moral beauty for Shaftesbury.

3. Shaftesbury’s Method

One may ask why Shaftesbury is so motivated to write a work of such great length in order to demonstrate the authenticity of innate moral ideas. Clearly, the subject of innate ideas is quite important for him. For Shaftesbury, philosophy - especially ancient philosophy such as that of the Stoics, is the remedy to everyday problems, and rejecting innate ideas is the same as the denial of applied ethics, which he relies on to explain hope and meaning for

humanity. His view of Hobbes and Locke's theories makes him feel that philosophy is in danger of losing its moral guide, leaving humans as mere strangers in the universe, without any end or purpose. According to Klein, "The trouble was that philosophy as Shaftesbury confronted it in the years around 1700 was becoming unsuitable for the moral formation of anyone. For a variety of reasons, which Shaftesbury observed, philosophy was of diminishing moral force."⁹⁷ He highly regards concepts and terms (which I discuss in the following chapters) such as Affection, Truth, Manners, Enthusiasm, Common Sense, and Beauty because those are especially meaningful when considered in their highest degree, and for him the highest means original, natural, innate, and universal.

Shaftesbury employs a wordy, playful, digressive style - with numerous repetitions, when writing *Characteristics* because it is what he considers an aesthetic method of writing, which I discuss further in Chapter 4 regarding the three levels of Manners. He claims that the style of philosophical writing should be a combination of the poetical manner, with an expression of the imagination and passion, and the methodical manner as seen in conventional philosophical works, with the expression of speculative thought. However, he proclaims that we need a revolutionary method – what he calls a miscellaneous manner of writing, to save a version of philosophy which has become a subject for academics only, but has failed to be useful in solving the problems of daily life.

For Shaftesbury, the miscellaneous manner of writing may include any kind or style of writing, as the name indicates; it can be in the form of a poem, a riddle with hints, an emblem, a novel, a romance, a soliloquy, a conversation, a parable, or great numbers and

⁹⁷ Lawrence E. Klein. *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 21.

lengths of footnotes which hide his philosophical theme beneath, and force readers to work to discover just what the author is talking about.

Additionally, I hold that Shaftesbury uses a circular and repeating style in *Characteristics* partly because he needs to discuss multiple levels of each concept and term in order to exhibit his theme - we are in various stages of development to reach our innate, original nature through a process of cultivation. The history of nations, cultures, and individuals shows these various levels of perfection or imperfection.

It can be argued that Shaftesbury is viewing the world through the spectacles of his own teleological approach. To prove that there is a final end or to support any statement he claims is true, he argues that everyone can observe such facts. He makes this line of thinking clear when he writes, for example, that the “Character of *Moral* TRUTH appear[s] so firmly establish’d in Nature it-self, and so widely display’d thro’ the intelligent World, that there is no Genius, Mind, or *thinking* Principle... which is not really *conscious* in the case” (III. 185). He states that Moral Truth exists because no one can deny it, and unfortunately often uses this style of reasoning to support the authenticity of his views.

Voitle also correctly points out the difficulties of understanding Shaftesbury’s *moral sense* in *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, and draws particular attention to the problem of understanding his terminology. Voitle observes that Shaftesbury’s concept of good (expressed by terms such as Moral Sense, Natural Affection, Common Sense, and Virtue) with higher or lower levels has a logical weakness; he writes,

There exists a seemingly impassable gulf, then, between absolute good and relative good, the concept which Shaftesbury uses as a basis for his definition of virtue. We call a man virtuous if he acts for the good of the human system of which he is a part, if he is benevolent; and we term him vicious if his acts relative to this system are harmful. ... So effectively did Shaftesbury isolate these standards of human virtue

from absolute good that involved himself in a painful dilemma. If we cannot measure human conduct by any absolute standard; if virtue is relative only to a small part of that whole which tends to some ulterior good, how can Shaftesbury assume, as he does, that he is expounding a morality immutable, eternal, and independent of religion? ⁹⁸

It is not only his logical development which shows circular reasoning, but his style of writing is often circular or repeating, as mentioned - showing the same pattern for every term.⁹⁹ This approach, however, results from his dialectical view of the nature of things, which he relies on to prove that order, symmetry, and harmony cooperate in the creation of beauty and goodness, and to prove that humans are also destined to progress through various stages of development to reach their true nature of moral goodness.

However, although he claims we possess an innate moral sense, readers notice that he is often busy pointing out humanity's ills, rather than its benevolent character, as Marsh observes,

The widespread conception of Shaftesbury as the systematic originator or, or catalytic agent for, the tradition of natural intuitionist benevolism in British ethical theory is inadequate and misleading; for the natural human benevolence which Shaftesbury espoused is a kind naturally subject to abortion, atrophy, and especially corruption, unless it is properly developed and regulated according to a higher order of things. Taken all together, his writings reveal an awareness of actual human weakness and 'illness'...¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Robert Voitle, "Shaftesbury's Moral Sense." *Studies in Philology*, 52 (1955) pp. 17-38.

⁹⁹ McIntosh examines Shaftesbury's intentional writing style, and accurately and points out that his writing style was mainly oral, modelled on conversation and soliloquy. He writes, "the basic texture of Shaftesbury's prose is oral, colloquial: a speaking voice, one person talking to another, with many of the informalities and some of the casual syntax that belonged to orality in 1710" (p. 71). It is unusual to use the form of letters, miscellany, and soliloquy with "homely colloquialisms" (p. 70) for philosophical thought, and McIntosh views Shaftesbury's vagueness and circular style as philosophical writings possibly intended to mask his serious meaning. McIntosh points out that Shaftesbury begins some sentences with *and, nor but, for, for that, notwithstanding*, - subordinating conjunctions unusual in the eighteenth century. McIntosh also records Shaftesbury's "keeping track of prose rhythms and the end of paragraphs" in *Characteristics*, indicating he was conscious about how those would sound in reading aloud. Carey McIntosh, *The Evolution of English Prose, 1700-1800: Style, Politeness, and Print Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Marsh. *Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry*. University of Chicago Press, 1965. "Shaftesbury's Theory of Poetry: The Importance of the 'Inward Colloquy.'" *ELH*, 28, 1961, p. 20-21.

Shaftesbury takes many pages to describe his observations of reality in order to prove his teleological view of the nature of things. For him, the multiple levels of beauty, truth, manners, and enthusiasm exist because they are observable, as he argues in his writings, explaining the multiple levels of each term to show the human journey which nature planned. Thus, we see descriptions of Enthusiasm of a lower kind and a higher kind, or of Beauty of a lower and a higher kind, and so on.

His method is to show all kinds of humanity's strengths and weaknesses, and present the solution to our problems, which he sees as the combination of the first and the second characteristics. Thus, regarding Shaftesbury's contradictory statements, I hold that they indeed make sense for him. Shaftesbury's view is that there is good and ill, virtue and vice, deformity and beauty, falsity and truth, and he describes human vice throughout *Characteristics*, but he also views humans as beautiful, good, and true in our third character.

For example, he sees the mind as riotous when enjoying the sense-based pleasures of beauty, but he holds that we have virtuous minds capable of enjoying reason-based pleasures of beauty. Those characteristics cannot be cancelled in humanity, as both sense and reason allow us to see true beauty. He writes,

For as the *riotous* MIND, captive to Sense, can never enter in competition, or contend for Beauty with the *virtuous* MIND of Reason's Culture; so neither can the Objects which allure the former, compare with those which attract and charm the latter. And when each gratifies itself in the Enjoyment and Possession of its Object; how evidently fairer are the Acts which join the latter Pair, and give a Soul the Enjoyment of what is generous and good?

(II. 237)

For example, Manners can be either false or true, but Manners also can be categorized into three kinds – Poetical Manners, Methodical Manners, and Miscellaneous Manners, as I will discuss in Chapter 4. Since the highest Manners are the compound or

integration of the first two, he needs to explain the lower two to explain the highest. Also, since his aim is to teach readers how to distinguish the false or true nature of things, he needs to show what is false. Though he believes that innately we are moral, this does not mean we see moral and benevolent people everywhere at all times; rather, he is pessimistic about humanity in real life since his criteria of Truth, Beauty, Good, and Moral Personality in the genuine sense are so high and difficult to attain without constant self-examination. Indeed, he could see more ills if he did not have the highest trust in human nature.

When the opposite characters reach agreement, that is to say, the cooperate relation between sense and reason, or passion and opinion, we attain the third state of mind. He holds that the first and the second characteristics such as virtue and vice are necessities to the process of reaching our ultimate goal of self-knowledge. He writes, "... even from this Misery of ILL of *Man*, there was undoubtedly some GOOD arising; something which overbalanc'd all, and made full amends" (II. 116). He contends that there is an ordering of the parts, an integration at the end. Shaftesbury discusses the multiple levels of humanity to cultivate his readers, to lead them to what he views as the real definitions of terms, and ultimately to the third character or stage which is innate and universally shared.

For Shaftesbury, the third character of beauty, truth, good, personality, manners, natural affections, and enthusiasm assures us that humans are created with the care of a divine mind, to be innately good, true, loving, enthusiastic, joyful, and happy. No matter from which country, educational background, or culture, all humans universally share the same criteria to experience the sense of beauty and goodness. He holds that the key to happiness is participating as a part of the universe to glorify this beauty and goodness.

Chapter 3 Shaftesbury's Influence on Moral Philosophy

In this section, I discuss how Shaftesbury's concept of an innate moral sense was developed by British moral philosophers - particularly Berkeley, Hutcheson, Hume, and by Kant, philosophers who made important contributions to the history of aesthetic and moral theory in the eighteenth century.¹⁰¹ Though Berkeley opposes Shaftesbury's thought rather than inheriting it, his *Alciphoron* – in which he attacks Shaftesbury, reveals just how large Shaftesbury's influence was at that time. Shaftesbury's influence in that century was considerable, not only in Britain, but in France and Germany as well – and not only in moral and aesthetic theory, but in deistic movements, Enlightenment thought generally, and in literature such as German classicism and romanticism. However, my focus here is on how Shaftesbury defends his views on the innate idea of beauty and virtue against those of previous moral philosophers – Hobbes and Locke in particular. His aim is to shift the contemporary inclination of British moral theory, which he regards as egoistical and immoral, and which had been triggered by Hobbes and completed by Locke who, he contends, “struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world”¹⁰².

Employing the Miscellaneous Manner of writing, Shaftesbury uses a war metaphor when discussing his defence of “the noted Character of *Moral TRUTH*” which he regards as

¹⁰¹ Kivy explains Shaftesbury's “inherent indeterminateness” (16) regarding the definition of sense and reason, and points out that Shaftesbury's *sense* means *feeling*, but also *sense* means faculties of rational and perceptual judgement as in the term *common sense*, or *sense* as *literary sense* to be critical of readings - synonyms for moral sense in certain paragraphs since Shaftesbury uses analogies to discuss many subjects when defining *sense*. Kivy also comments on Shaftesbury's *taste*, a term also occasionally confusing as it could mean *sense of beauty*, and concludes that for Shaftesbury, sense and taste are interchangeable, but this depends on the essay or section of Characteristics being considered (20). Peter Kivy, *The Seventh Sense: Frances Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.*

Also, regarding helpful information on how Shaftesbury is located in the middle of such thinkers as Locke, Hutcheson, Berkeley and Hume, see Robert E. Norton, *The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995.

¹⁰² “Letters to Michael Ainsworth,” *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*. Ed. Benjamin Rand. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1900, p. 403.

“firmly establish’d in Nature it-self” (III. 185). He implies that he has overthrown the previous philosophy (Hobbes and Locke’s) and conventional style of philosophical writing; he contends,

‘Tis certain that in matters of Learning and Philosophy, the practice of *pulling down* is far pleasanter ... than that of *building* and *setting up*. . . . And tho Compassion in *real* War may make the ruinous Practice less delightful, ’tis certain that in the *literate* warring-World, the springing of Mines, the blowing up of Towers, Bastions, and Ramparts of PHILOSOPHY, “with *Systems, Hypotheses, Opinions, and Doctrines* into the Air, is a Spectacle of all other, the most naturally rejoicing.
(III. 83)¹⁰³

Whether he is able to demolish what Locke had established with regard to moral relativism is debatable, but it is certain that he greatly influences Hutcheson and Hume. Considering the fact that those philosophers influenced Kant, who developed the concept of an innate moral and aesthetic sense, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a connection between Shaftesbury’s contributions regarding the history of moral theory and those of Kant.

I see Shaftesbury as a shifting point between Hobbes and Locke on the one hand, and Hutcheson and Hume on the other, regarding the history of the concept of moral sense. For example, his aim in writing *Characteristics* is to defend the concept of an innate moral and aesthetic idea against Hobbes and Locke, and given Shaftesbury’s attack on Locke’s views regarding the innate moral idea, the challenge for Hutcheson, who admired both Shaftesbury and Locke’s theory, was how to integrate both.¹⁰⁴ Hutcheson sees the moral sense as an acquired but also universally shared potential attribute.

¹⁰³ This paragraph appears to imply an attack on conventional writing style only. However, just after this paragraph, he gives a hint indicating what he has blown up is not only the style of writing, but the previous philosophers’ theories as well.

¹⁰⁴ According to Carey, “The challenge facing Shaftesbury and Hutcheson was to undo the damage of Locke’s argument. They attend to rescue some sense of consistency in moral judgments and practices, and to restore unifying norms in the territory of ethics and religion. Locke’s contribution and the response it inspired from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson continued to preoccupy philosophers through the eighteenth century, most notably in the context of the Scottish Enlightenment.” Daniel Carey. *Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. p. 2.

While the influence of Shaftesbury's theory may be seen in Hutcheson, Hume, and Kant, they did not adopt his aesthetic methodology, by which Shaftesbury practices the Miscellaneous Manner of writing to invite readers to explore many layers of appearance, interpretation, and meaning before reaching what he intends regarding beauty, virtue, and truth. Although Shaftesbury's writings stimulated later philosophers, most of them, including Hutcheson - usually regarded as a strong supporter of Shaftesbury, did not accept his views in the way Shaftesbury would have planned or wished. Each philosopher criticized, clarified, and developed Shaftesbury's theory in his own way.

However, although Kant analyses and discusses his terms precisely, in a manner opposite to Shaftesbury's playful style of writing, there are indications that he followed and grasped some of Shaftesbury's intent. Shaftesbury explains and gives hints, but does not explain much at once. This could be one reason Kant does not evaluate Shaftesbury highly. As Shaftesbury admits, his readers need to go through entire sections of *Characteristics* to see what the author means. Kant may have read Shaftesbury in this way, or perhaps he was influenced by others who may or may not have understood Shaftesbury well. The observations presented here are admittedly based on quite limited research, and are far from comprehensive; more detailed and extensive research will be a future project.

1. Berkeley


1.1. Berkeley's Criticism of Shaftesbury

In *Alciphron* (published in 1732, 19 years after Shaftesbury's death), Berkeley attempts to reveal what he sees as the shallowness of Shaftesbury's theory by highlighting its weakness, inconsistency, and lack of explanation. Berkeley is clearly not fond of, and does not comprehend, Shaftesbury's manner of writing. Euphranor, who represents Berkeley,

asks Alciphron to “Define [the beauty of virtue], explain it, make me to understand your meaning, that so [sic] we may argue about the same thing, without which we can never come to a conclusion” (*Alciphron*, 119).¹⁰⁵

The frontispiece of *Characteristics* is a beautifully designed ornamental picture,¹⁰⁶ which Berkeley seems to copy or mock on *Alciphron*’s title page, with a crude illustration and with quotes from the Bible and Cicero,¹⁰⁷ attacking heretics and minute philosophers. Shaftesbury’s image features an ornate cistern or water container, while Berkeley’s cistern is crooked and broken, and incapable of holding water, as below:

Title Page Emblem of *Alciphron*



Berkeley’s motivation in *Alciphron* is to defend Christianity as the ground of morality, and

¹⁰⁵ George Berkeley. “Alciphron or The Minute Philosopher.” *The Works of George Berkeley. Volume Three*. London: Nelson, 1967. In this section I abbreviate as *AL*.

¹⁰⁶ For the illustration on the title page of *Characteristics*, see page 141 of this thesis.

¹⁰⁷ Berkeley quotes the Bible; “They have forsaken me the Fountain of living waters, and hewed them out cisterns, broken cisterns that can hold no water” (Jer. 2:13), and Cicero; “But if when dead I will be without sensation, as some minute philosophers think, then I have no fear that these seers, when they are dead, will have the laugh on me” *De Senectute* 85. *George Berkeley - Alciphron in Focus*. Ed. David Berman. London: Routledge, 1993. iii.

he regards Shaftesbury's moral theory as self-centered, irrational, and immoral. For Berkeley, it is unacceptable that the moral sense is not related to religion. Since he is apparently unaware of Shaftesbury's multiple-meaning words, he misrepresents terms such as *Natural affection*, *Moral Sense*, *Men of Fashion*, *Gentlemen*, *Ridicule*, *Honour*, and *Beauty*.

Berkeley tends to deform Shaftesbury's moral theory into mere 'sentiment' which does not deal with reason at all, despite the fact that Shaftesbury repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of reason in beauty and virtue. Indeed, Berkeley tends to position Shaftesbury opposite reason, setting up a straw-man argument. To illustrate how incorrect this approach is, I will discuss several terms which have different meanings in the mouth of Alciphron - who is supposed to represent Shaftesbury - as compared with the views expressed by Shaftesbury himself.

1.2. Natural Affection

Alciphron declines to define *moral beauty* since it is "of so peculiar and abstracted a nature, something so subtle, fine, and fugacious, that it will not bear being handled and inspected, like every gross and common subject" (AL 119), and he regards it as an "indefinite sense" (ibid.). However, Shaftesbury clearly states that beauty is capable of definition; it is not mysterious. He writes, for example, "...whatever is commonly said of the unexpressible, the unintelligible, the *I-know-not-what* of Beauty; there can lie no Mystery here, but what plainly belongs either to *Figure*, *Colour*, *Motion* or *Sound*" (II. 231). For Shaftesbury, the domain of beauty is under the Mind which is governed by reason.

Alciphron states that "Beauty is, to speak properly, perceivd only by the eye" (AL 123), to which Euphranor objects, and argues that both the parts and the whole of an object

need to be recognized by “the works of reason” (124). Thus, beauty is formed in the mind “only by reason through the means of sight” (ibid.). That is, beauty is perceived by the mind, not only by the five senses. Here Berkeley spends a generous amount of space employing Socratic dialogue to defeat Alciphron’s theory that beauty is appreciated through sense perception only.

However, Berkeley is trying to claim exactly what Shaftesbury is claiming. For Shaftesbury, beauty is indeed a mental experience - which animals do not have, but which only humans with reason can experience. Beauty does not exist in the object, but in the mind - just as Euphranor states when he tries to persuade Alciphron that beauty is “an object, not of the eye, but of the mind” (ibid.).

Berkeley interprets Shaftesbury’s moral sense as mere ‘sense’ and has Alciphron declare that “an idea of Beauty natural to the mind of man” is “purely from an instinct of nature” (AL 117). Similarly, Berkeley understands Alciphron’s *moral sense*, as in the domain of ‘sense’ - “the passions, sentiments, and qualities of the soul” (123), as being unrelated to reason; Alciphron states: “[beauty] strikes at first sight, and attracts without a reason” (117). He further states that “there is no need that mankind should be preached [at], or reasoned [with]” (118) to be moral. Against this, Euphranor claims that beauty cannot be judged by sense and passion alone; it needs to be judged by reason which understands design, symmetry, and how the parts are connected to the whole of the object. Euphranor claims that Alciphron is overlooking the role of reason, and thus is not being practical.

However, Shaftesbury’s moral sense is not mere sense; it is a combination of sense and reason. It is Hutcheson who claims that moral sense is ‘sense’ apart from reason. One of the main points of *Characteristics* is to attack opinions which contaminate sensuous

judgement .We should note that Shaftesbury often uses ‘Sense’ (when he uses the word with an initial capital letter) in the sense of ‘rational judgement ’ – as, for example, in the places where he explains why humans fall into vice. For Shaftesbury, natural affection is the origin of moral sense, but because of the complexity of natural affection - as I deal with in Chapter 4, it needs to be cultivated by reason. There are, he contends, so many ill-things, such as ill natural affection, ill moral sense, ill men of fashion, ill gentlemen, ill ridicule, ill honour, and ill beauty, that he believes we need to reform ourselves by the help of reason. He states “All is Opinion” (II. 233), which controls passion and possibly leads it in a wrong way. Without opinion, sense cannot be applied to reality. Without opinion, there is no motivation to apply natural affection in practice.

In Shaftesbury, as mentioned in Chapter 4, there are three levels of natural affection - sensible natural affection based on the First Order of Beauty, rational natural affection based on the Second Order of Beauty, and natural affection in a genuine sense based on the Third Order of Beauty. It seems Berkeley is focusing on the sensible natural affection which is sense/feeling/appetite-oriented. But when Shaftesbury writes of natural affection as in the moral sense, he is indicating the true natural affection which is the combination of sense and reason. Shaftesbury understands that natural (sensible) affection alone does not have the autonomous power to maintain virtue, since there are various appetites, emotions, and selfish desires which will be stronger than sensible natural affection – just as Berkeley points out. Thus, like Berkeley, Shaftesbury states that we should follow Reason (passion plus reason), but not solely passion.

1.3. God

Berkeley claims that virtue cannot be established without a universal source and

purpose (God). However, Shaftesbury's view is not so far from Berkeley's. According to Shaftesbury, God does not oppose the *moral sense*, since it comes from God. However, there are many wrong views regarding God which cancel natural affection and make humans hate and do harm to each other. He states:

... as the *Ill Character* of a GOD does injury to the Affections of Men, and disturbs and impairs that natural Sense of Right and Wrong; so, on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right Apprehensions, and a sound judgement of Sense of Right and Wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, and highest Goodness and Worth.

(II. 29)

Both Shaftesbury and Alciphron state that concern about heaven is meaningless, but their reasons are different. For Shaftesbury it is because such fear and concerns come from worry about the future, not devotion to God. For Alciphron, on the other hand, it is because there are "no proofs of the being of God" (AL 143). Alciphron, unlike Shaftesbury, is an atheist and materialist who believes only things he can *perceive with his senses* as his "rule of faith" (AL 144). Alciphron does not believe in innate ideas or intuitive knowledge of God's existence; God does not speak to man, and there is "no inward speech, no holy instincts, or suggestions of light or spirit" (AL 149). In response to Alciphron, Euphranor asks,

... is there not in natural productions and effects a visible unity of counsel and design? ... Is there not also a connexion or relation between animals and vegetables, between both and the elements, between the elements and heavenly bodies; so that, from their mutual respects, influences, subordinations, and uses, they may be collected to be parts of one whole, conspiring to one and the same end, and fulfilling the same design? ... Will it not then follow that this vastly great or infinite power and wisdom must be supposed in one and the same Agent, Spirit, or Mind...

(AL 146-147)

However, this is quite similar to Shaftesbury's teleological view of the universe. Here Berkeley is not making a caricature of Shaftesbury at all, but seems to be targeting Locke's

theory of ideas.

Unlike Alciphron, Shaftesbury never denies God; he merely attacks the smugness of those people who are sure that they are the best people through knowing God. The existence of God does not need proof for Shaftesbury, since it is obviously in man's natural character to please something good and beautiful. Indeed, he states: "the Perfection and Height of VIRTUE must be owing to *the Belief of a GOD*" (II. 44). For him, God is the system of the universe, and does not have to be the Christian God, or any particular established concept of God, since there have been so many misunderstandings about the idea of God. He does not recognize a God who orders humans to be dogmatic and fanatic. To avoid this kind of confusion, he tends to use terms such as 'the Order,' 'the Wholeness,' or 'the Nature' instead of 'God.'¹⁰⁸

Alciphron claims that "all the ends of society are secured without religion" (AL 118) because of natural affection. However, Shaftesbury does not deny religion. He states that "pure religion" has value in encouraging people to act morally. What Shaftesbury attacks is not *religion* but *the lack of genuine reason in religion*, displayed by such people as passionate and dogmatic enthusiasts. We need to use our original nature – reason - to address this problem. To be moral, one does not need authorized religious belief, but one needs to be *truly religious*, since virtuous behavior arises from a *truly* pious attitude toward God.

Euphranor states that if people use rational judgement, then duty and virtue will be

¹⁰⁸ Note that he prefaces the terms with the definite article 'the' and uses all capital letters to indicate Divinity. For example, the meaning of 'order' (one-sided) is quite different from 'the ORDER' in his writing.

better acted upon; if people balance their pleasures, and if they compare vice to virtue regarding which is in their best interest, then ‘beauty and virtue are in a fairer way of being practiced’ (AL 120). Once again, however, this is what Shaftesbury is saying. One difference is Berkeley’s claim that “comparing present losses with future gains” in the after-life will encourage people to act morally; Shaftesbury, on the other hand, regards caring about any future reward as not a virtuous motivation, since it is based on *self-interest* and/or *fear*.

Alciphron regards religion as something attended by “the evils” (AL 112), though Shaftesbury never uses such language. For Shaftesbury, evils are not religions, but arise from superstitions and from fanatics who declare that they are the most wise and pious of individuals, who will be saved by God exclusively. Such intolerant and self-oriented beliefs can lead to evils (I. 13). On the other hand, he declares that “Good Humour is not only the best Security against *Enthusiasm*, but the best Foundation of *Piety* and *true Religion*” (I. 15). It is an evil person who, because of self-centered beliefs, calls others evil, and declares that if others do not agree with his principles and version of truth, they will not be eternally saved. Such persons are intolerant, tend to punish others under the name of God, act as if they are the most pious servants of God, and forget the most important virtues, such as love and benevolence. Moreover, evils can exist in atheists too, according to Shaftesbury, if they are fanatic or dogmatic.

1.4. Honour

Berkeley has Alciphron praise *honour* as the origin of virtue. He states:

Honour is a noble unpolluted source of virtue, without the least mixture of fear, interest, or superstition. It hath all the advantages without the evils which attend religion. It is the mark of a great and fine soul, and is to be found among persons of

rank and breeding. It affects the court, the senate, and the camp, and in general every rendezvous of people of fashion.

(AL 112, underlines added)

Here we discover more misconceptions regarding Shaftesbury's views, as represented by Alciphron. The first underlined phrase above states that "Honour is a noble unpolluted source of virtue," but Shaftesbury uses the word 'honour' almost always in a negative sense throughout *Characteristics*. For him, honour is often a disguise for vanity and vice. This is seen, for example, in people at court who believe their possessions, titles, and fame constitute their honour, and who exhibit "Jealousy in point of Honour or Power" (I. 24), or in religious fanatics who believe that their martyrdom or "the Honour of a Persecution" (I. 18) would be for the honour of God. Also, Shaftesbury sees vice and vanity in grave dogmatists who regard themselves with honour, yet "are unable to discern what is *praiseworthy* or *excellent* in their own kind" (I. 26), or in enslaved citizens wrongly educated to sacrifice themselves for the honour of a tyrannical state. Honour here is seen as opposite of human nature and the beautiful soul, since people are misguided, seeing only the surface or outer state of affairs, but not by their inner state. Such honour is not "unpolluted" at all; it is thoroughly polluted, and thus Shaftesbury uses the word to indicate lack of virtue. Hutcheson, on the other hand, uses the word '*honour*' more often than Shaftesbury in a positive sense; honour can be a great motivation to act on virtue. It seems Berkeley regards Hutcheson and Shaftesbury as being on the same side in this instance, though their views are quite different - as I argue in the section on Hutcheson.

Alciphron states that virtue is found "among persons of rank and breeding" (112).

Alciphron and Nicander - another minute philosopher/free thinker, are determined to defend "men of honour" (AL 114) who Meneclis - introduced as a Christian - contends may

nevertheless “ruin tradesmen, break faith to one’s own wife, corrupt another man’s, take bribes, cheat the public, cut a man’s throat for a word” all the while not breaking with this “principle of honour” (ibid.). Nicander admits that “It cannot be denied that we are men of gallantry, men of fire, men who know the world, and all that” (ibid.) – men who may indeed commit such crimes. To this Meneclis concludes “that honour among infidels is like honesty among pirates...” (AL 115).

As negative as that may sound, Shaftesbury’s opinion of human moral character (apart from its original nature) could be even more pessimistic than Berkeley’s view of humanity. Shaftesbury almost always uses “rank” and “breeding” to criticize those who have high rank in society and are of good–breeding, but are lacking in virtue. Though Alciphron states that the “high sense of honour which distinguished the fine gentleman” (114) is the origin of virtue, Shaftesbury hardly uses the words ‘honour’ or ‘gentlemen’ to refer to anyone *virtuous*.

Alciphron states: “It [honour] affects the court, the senate, and the camp, and in general every rendezvous of people of fashion” (112). This is also completely opposite of Shaftesbury’s use; he often regards “men of fashion” and people in the court as persons morally corrupt, since they tend to disregard their souls but care deeply about outer things such as fame, money, and *honour*.

Crito, who represents Berkeley, has his own concept of honour, distinct from Alciphron’s outrageous definition. For Crito, honour is “an empty name” unless it is based on conscience, religion, reason, and virtue. If people do not have those things, any virtue they seem to have is merely “owing to fashion (being of the reputable kind)” (115). This is what Shaftesbury means when he criticizes those of *honour* and *gentlemen of fashion* –

persons who live with contradictions and inconsistencies:

By *Gentlemen of Fashion*, I understand those to whom a natural good Genius, or the Force of good Education, has given a *Sense* of what is *naturally graceful* and *becoming*. Some by mere Nature, others by Art and Practice, are Masters of an Ear in Musick, an Eye in Painting, a Fancy in the ordinary things of Ornament and Grace.... Let such Gentlemen as these be as extravagant as they please, or as irregular in their Morals; they must as the same time discover their Inconsistency, live at variance with themselves, and in contradiction to that Principle, on which they ground their highest Pleasure and Entertainment.

(I. 84-85)

Berkeley, on the other hand, interprets ‘gentlemen’ and ‘people of fashion’ as people with virtue, an opinion which is most unlikely to be found in *Characteristics*.

Ironically, the opinions which Berkeley has Euphranor and Crito express in *Alciphron* often overlap with the views Shaftesbury truly holds. Berkeley, as Shaftesbury does, attacks those “ill-things.” Then, who is Alciphron in these dialogues? Certainly he is not Shaftesbury in any genuine sense, but a caricature of Shaftesbury as an imprudent and dangerous freethinker who regards Christianity as evil. Berkeley did not contribute to the movement of aesthetic theory as did Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume. However, by reading *Alciphron*, it is possible to discover what kind of aesthetic concept he could have held. Ironically, Berkeley may have aesthetic views close to Shaftesbury’s, although this does not mean he was influenced by Shaftesbury. Apparently, Berkeley did not read Shaftesbury and Hutcheson carefully, and did not value them - as *Alciphron* clearly shows.

2. Hutcheson

Under the influence of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson regards the aesthetic sense as synonymous with the moral sense, and he uses Shaftesbury’s concepts such as *natural affection*, *disinterestedness*, and *universality of aesthetic/moral sense*. In addition, he follows Shaftesbury’s teleological view – that humans have as their end the desire to return

to their true nature, and that all things are parts of the whole in the system of the universe under the divine good and beauty. ¹⁰⁹

However, Hutcheson applies Locke's theory of ideas which Shaftesbury strongly opposes. According to Locke, all knowledge comes from ideas of *sensation* (sense perception), and ideas of *reflection* (operations in the mind such as thinking) and there is nothing innate, no principle of concepts, neither ideas nor knowledge. If there is any universally acknowledged idea such as virtue or taste of beauty, it has come from shared experience. For Shaftesbury, Locke's negation of human innate ideas/knowledge is corrupted philosophy. Thus, while Shaftesbury and Hutcheson share terms, they have some distinct differences regarding their views of moral/aesthetic theory.

2.1. Natural Affection

Hutcheson published *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (including Treatise I and II) in 1725, 12 years after Shaftesbury's death. Hutcheson's intent is to defend Shaftesbury against Mandeville's attack on Shaftesbury's view of natural/social affection. Shaftesbury regards *natural* Affection as "Affection of Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Generosity, Pity, Succour, or whatever else is of a social or friendly sort" (II. 59) and *unnatural* Affection as unsociable emotions such as malice and hatred. Following this, Hutcheson distinguishes the Affection of Love (subdivided as "Love of Complacence or

¹⁰⁹ Glauser holds that Shaftesbury "is often taken to be less Systematic than he is in fact" (p.26), and holds that Shaftesbury's concept of a universal sense which recognizes beauty does not imply an extra sense, but it is ordinary sense, unlike in Hutcheson, who regards the sense of beauty as a special inner sense - as in a sixth sense. Glauser states that Shaftesbury's strategy is to use the natural disposition to experience beauty to introduce the natural disposition of moral beauty, as Hutcheson followed. The apprehension of beauty, which is innate or instinctive, is the result of a collaboration of normal cognitive functions. Though it is called a natural disposition, it is a potential ability, and it is necessary to exercise and cultivate the sense of beauty through experience. Richard Glauser, "Aesthetic Experience in Shaftesbury I." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 76 (2002) pp. 25-54.

Esteem, and Love of Benevolence”) and the Affection of Hatred (subdivided as “Hatred of Displience [sic] or Contempt, and Hatred of Malice”) (*IB* 102).¹¹⁰ For both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, selfish actions come from selfish affections or passions, while amiable actions come from benevolent affections or passions (*IB* 133).

As Shaftesbury does, Hutcheson states that it is in human nature to cooperate with the system of the universe, as parts and the whole are meant to have a harmonious relationship. Hutcheson states that our benevolent affection corresponds to “universal Benevolence” (*IB* 127), as in the following:

All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of Beauty, unless when the Good of the Whole requires a stricter Attachment to a Part, as in natural Affection, or virtuous Friendships; or when some Parts are so eminently useful to the Whole, that even universal Benevolence would determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests.

(*IB* 126-127)

For both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, natural/social affection is a ground of moral sense; humans are naturally sociable and amicable. Hutcheson, as does Shaftesbury, disagrees with Hobbes’s view of human nature as egotistical; for both of them, the state of nature does not exist.

Both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are aware of the fact that natural affection has various forms. For Shaftesbury, natural affection in a genuine sense is not mere emotion; it always needs a *reflective sense* to avoid conflict, that is, to avoid being disturbed by “another kind of Affection towards those very Affections” (II. 16). Thus, his *natural affection* is in the sense of *rational natural affection* apart from *sensible natural affection*.

¹¹⁰ Hutcheson, Francis. *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. (Treatise I & II) Ed. Wolfgang Leidhold. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004. In this section I abbreviate the title as *IB*.

Rational affection for Shaftesbury is “a real Affection or Love towards *Equity* and *Right* for its own sake” (II. 25), which employs Will and Reason to act virtuously, while determined to eliminate disturbances from sense/opinion/feeling. Following Shaftesbury, Hutcheson also divides natural affection into “*calm Desire* or *Affection* which employs our *Reason* freely” and affection of “Desires or Aversions” (*Passions and Affections* 67).¹¹¹ However, in Hutcheson’s case, affection is emotion. His *calm affection* is not reason, but is able to cooperate with reason.

As does Shaftesbury, Hutcheson regards genuine love as benevolence, and since benevolent natural affection is our nature, we act *disinterestedly* when acting morally; he states: “Wherever then Benevolence is suppos’d, there it is imagin’d disinterested, and design’d for the Good of others” (*IB* 103-104). Because of “a disinterested ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others” (*IB* 229), we are motivated to perform virtuous actions. Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury, also states that disinterestedness is “the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the Beauty” (*IB* 38), and so one acts morally *immediately* without reflection or hesitation.

2.2. Moral Sense

Unlike Locke, who contends that “any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight, which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love,” and so regards ‘love’ as a form of pleasure which does not play a part in moral sense (*Essay* part 1, 216)¹¹², Hutcheson gives the superior character to ‘love’ and ‘benevolence’ as

¹¹¹ *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*. Ed. Aaron Garrett. Indianapolis. Liberty Fund: 2002

¹¹² Locke, John. “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Part 1.” *The Works of John Locke*, (London: Rivington, 1824 12th ed.). Vol. 1

the character of moral/aesthetic sense, as Shaftesbury does. Hutcheson regards moral sense as a synonym of aesthetic sense following Shaftesbury, who holds that there is “Beauty and Deformity as well in Actions, Minds, and Tempers, as in Figures, Sounds, or Colours” (II. 25).

To explain the process of receiving beauty, Hutcheson distinguishes *internal sense* and *external sense*, following Shaftesbury’s *inward eye* and *outward eye*. For both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, the *inward eye* or *internal sense* is a necessity to experience beauty. By sense perception only (for example, by physical eyes), the mind cannot experience beauty.

It seems Hutcheson’s dilemma is that he applies Locke’s empirical approach to knowledge while keeping the Platonic concept of the divine beauty which is supposed to be imprinted in us.¹¹³ Following Locke, Hutcheson contends that all ideas (including beauty and virtue) are not innate, but come from perception. However, since Hutcheson also follows Shaftesbury’s views of the *innate* inward eye, he defines his moral sense as a *sense*, not an *idea*. Thus, he can argue that his moral sense is *innate*, as in physical perceptions. His moral sense, however, is a *special sense* beyond the five senses. It is a *perception to perceive aesthetic and moral ideas* through experience. Hutcheson states that “this very moral Sense, implanted in rational Agents ... is one of the strongest Evidences of Goodness in the Author of Nature” (IB 198). His moral sense is not the idea of beauty or good, but it has the “Power of Perceiving the Ideas of Beauty” (IB 24) under the domain of “Instincts, or

¹¹³ There are some inconsistencies in Hutcheson regarding the nature of moral sense. Though he clearly states that moral sense is acquired, he acknowledges that the principles of virtue, our “natural instinct,” are “implanted in us” (IB 244 textual note)

Passions” (*IB* 133), and the “External Senses are not much concern’d” (*ibid.*). Thus, for Hutcheson, the aesthetic/moral *sense* is *innate*, but the aesthetic/moral *idea* is *acquired*. For Shaftesbury, on the other hand, the *moral sense* is not *sense* perception, but an assimilated inner state in which mind and reason cooperate. For him, the idea of beauty is the shadow of an original or divine beauty which has been innately imprinted in the human mind.

Unlike Locke, who denies an innate idea of moral/aesthetic principles which can be shared universally (thus humans originally do not possess the idea of virtue or beauty), Hutcheson, following Shaftesbury, holds that moral sense is prior to custom, education, or rational speculation since it is our pure nature. As in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson’s moral sense is *common sense*, that is to say, a sense of beauty but also a sense of good which everyone shares.

As in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson states that there is a universal ground in our internal sense to accept certain qualities of beauty: “Men have different Fancies of Beauty, and yet Uniformity be the universal Foundation of our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as Beautiful” (*IB* 66). The quality of beauty is based on the degree of “Uniformity amidst Variety” (*IB* 29), and this quality delights our *internal sense* (*inward eye* or *internal idea* in Shaftesbury). Thus, aesthetic taste can be shared with others. Likewise, we cannot avoid having natural affection, which will arise whether we wish it or not. Hutcheson describes children’s sentiments and agreement toward “Kindness and Humanity” in the stories they hear, and disagreement toward the “Cruel, the Covetous, the Selfish, or the Treacherous” as proof of “The Universality of this moral Sense” (*IB* 147).

2.3. Categories of Beauty

Shaftesbury distinguishes Three Orders of Beauty in a hierarchy, and Hutcheson's beauty also has a hierarchy, though a simpler one than Shaftesbury's. Hutcheson divides the main category of beauty in two. The superior kind of beauty is *original or absolute beauty*, and "not ... any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it" (*IB* 27). Natural objects such as the earth, plants, and animals, along with mathematics and the harmony of music are in this category. Compared to works of art, objects in nature produce an absolute beauty and pleasure. Uniformity is more clearly found in such absolute beauty. Hutcheson's second kind of beauty is *comparative or relative beauty*, which is imitative beauty such as may be experienced in painting or poetry. It "is that which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as Imitations or Resemblances of something else" (*ibid.*). This is the beauty seen in a work of art, a resemblance of the original, natural object.

On the other hand, Shaftesbury views the universe as having two opposed characteristics (two parts) and an integrated characteristic (unity or wholeness). For him, the superior beauty – the Third Order of Beauty - is found in the combination of nature and the arts, or material and ideas. In addition, there is an ultimately superior beauty (the original beauty) beyond this earthly world, which Hutcheson also acknowledges. In Shaftesbury, objects in nature are referred to as *dead form* and categorized under the First Order of Beauty. Shaftesbury regards works of art as superior to objects in nature. For Hutcheson, on the other hand, objects in nature are not works of art created by humans, mere imitations of other things, and thus they are superior to art. For Hutcheson, there is no Third Order of Beauty.

In addition to the two kinds of beauty mentioned, Hutcheson sees beauty in *harmony* (*music*), *design* (*fitness of a means for an end*), *grandeur* (*the sublime*), *novelty* (*surprise and delight*) and *humor*. Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury, contends that those produce beauty through the integration of the parts into a whole - *unity amidst variety*. From Shaftesbury's point of view, however, those categories seem to be qualities, conditions, or characteristics of beauty, and not categories of beauty.

Rather than focusing on Ideas of Beauty as Shaftesbury does, Hutcheson tends to focus on "what Quality in Objects excites these Ideas" (*IB* 28); thus, his definitions of beauty are not about *ideas* of beauty, but the *quality* of beauty which excites Ideas of Beauty. He needs to do so since simple ideas such as design and grandeur form a complex idea, an aesthetic sense. It seems Hutcheson attempts to follow Locke's concept of the simple idea, as those concepts should be counted as one simple idea even when viewed as a whole – as, for example, in a painting, a musical composition, or a poem. Since there are many *ideas* of beauty, there are many *categories* of beauty for Hutcheson.

2.4. Honour

As does Shaftesbury, Hutcheson views human nature as originally good, but fears that natural affection alone might not be successful against various passions/senses. Both men recommend inner reflection – soliloquy, from a third person point of view. Since there is an affection of love and an affection of hatred, reason needs to determine if the affection is genuinely benevolent toward others, and if it is disinterested. In a state of reflection, one needs to determine if the affection is accompanied by serenity or a violent attitude. If it is calm, it has the possibility of being good affection.

Hutcheson takes Shaftesbury's concept of *appearance* and the *Magical Glass* and

expands it as *Spectator*; looking at the appearance of the self is not as effective as being looked at in public by others, to improve the true appearance of the person. For both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, a man can observe his nature by means of soliloquy or contemplation, but also by the force of public *ridicule* for Shaftesbury, and being *honoured* rather than ridiculed for Hutcheson, who seems to have been clearly influenced by Locke's views concerning reliance on social preferences for motivation concerning moral conduct. In Hutcheson, in public, a person can be his own spectator - as if he is a third person, when he is *honoured* by others. For example, if he avoids doing good all his life, he will ultimately be regarded a villain, but if he pretends to be good, society will encourage him to do more good, and as a result he will contribute to the lives of others (spectators) and himself (his own spectator). He will develop *calm affection* which allows reflection and helps him to see himself in a genuine sense. Thus, honour is a Magical Glass for Hutcheson, held up to the self to reflect one's nature, beauty, and virtue, and a tool to examine one's reputation, as Hutcheson states:

Honour ... is the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum'd to be apply'd that way; for Abilitys constantly apply'd to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now, it is certain, that Ambition, or Love of Honour is really selfish; but then this Determination to love Honour, presupposes a Sense of moral Virtue, both in the Persons who confer the Honour and in him who pursues it.

(IB 152)

For Shaftesbury, it is vice if a man does a virtuous action because he expects a reward from God, while actually having a vicious mind, or if he does so because he is encouraged by the desire for honour and the praise of others. Hutcheson, though basically denying reward and punishment as a ground of moral conduct, suggests that acting because of expectation of a reward from God, or because of the wish to be honoured by others,

should not be discouraged. Not everyone can easily put themselves in a disinterested state of mind. He recognizes the role pain and pleasure play in our actions, as well as the sum of goodness and evil resulting from the consequences of our actions - for both the person and society. Applying his pre-Benthamian utilitarian view, he states that "Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers" (*IB* 115), and he claims that one needs to act for the positive outcome. The choice is whether to be vicious and harm others, or to be virtuous (even if only on the surface) and do good for others. Though he may not be virtuous in a genuine sense, a man's virtuous action is usually rewarded by positive affection from others, as gratitude, and seeing this affection and gratitude will excite his inner moral sense, whether or not he likes it. As a result, his inner sense will improve even if he is not aware of it.

2.5. Religion

Hutcheson seems impressed with Shaftesbury's poetic style, especially the description of the universe and nature - as in *Moralists*, and we see similar expressions in Hutcheson's writing. However, though he appreciates the beauty of Shaftesbury's writings, Hutcheson - a clergyman, fears that people would be attracted by Shaftesbury's "Noble Sentiment of Virtue and Honour, which he has placed in so lovely a Light!" (*IB* 12), and that people who are looking for arguments against Christianity might be encouraged by Shaftesbury. For Hutcheson, Shaftesbury's defect is "some Prejudices he had receiv'd against Christianity; a Religion which gives us the truest Idea of Virtue, and recommends the Love of God, and of Mankind, as the Sum of all true Religion" (*ibid.*).

Shaftesbury is religious (though not particularly Christian), with a somewhat pantheistic view of nature and the universe, and he often refers to the system and beauty of

the universe as the product of a Divine Beauty or Sovereign MIND. This is the probable reason that Hutcheson seems uninterested in Shaftesbury's concept of Enthusiasm, since when Shaftesbury uses the word in a genuine sense, he seems to be describing religious ecstasy, though his faith is apparently not toward the Christian God. Aesthetic and moral sense for Shaftesbury is independent of Christianity, while for Hutcheson, Christianity is the result of an aesthetic and moral sense. Rather than using *enthusiasm* to criticize his own religion, Hutcheson prefers to use *sublime* for his internal sense, such as when he refers to "[compared to an animal's senses] these sublimer Powers of Perception here call'd Internal Senses" (*IB* 203) or "sublime Virtue" (*IB* 243).

To regard Hutcheson as Shaftesbury's successor is generally correct, since Hutcheson uses Shaftesbury's terms and concepts. However, it could be more accurate to say that he was *stimulated* by Shaftesbury's aesthetic and moral concepts, and *interpreted* or *developed* them in his own way, with a more systematic and more easily understood style of writing when compared to Shaftesbury. Thus, it is understandable that Hutcheson, not Shaftesbury, had more influence on moral philosophy, as Hutcheson gained more respect from Kant. Nevertheless, to regard him as representative of Shaftesbury's thought is incorrect. Indeed, it was Hutcheson's theory which Berkeley targeted in *Alciphron* for attack as Shaftesbury's.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ According to Berman, "some of Berkeley's criticism would be closer to the mark if aimed against Hutcheson rather than Shaftesbury. Hence it seems plausible that Berkeley had Hutcheson at least partly in mind – a conclusion which is supported by verbal similarities in Hutcheson's *Inquiry and Dialogue III*" (Introduction, p.4). David Berman, "Introduction" *George Berkeley Alciphron in Focus*. Ed. David Berman. London: Routledge, 1993. p. 4.

According to Kivy, "Berkeley chose Shaftesbury rather than Hutcheson as the representative of "sentimental" value theory" in *Alciphron*, however "Shaftesbury was far more of a rationalist than Berkeley thought." Peter Kivy, *The Seventh Sense: Frances Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics*. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. P. 134.

Also, Klein discusses the differences between Berkeley and Shaftesbury concerning 'politeness', as expressed in *Alciphron* and *Characteristics*. Klein explains that the term, based on "a combination of learning with sociability," was used to refer not only to conversation, but to any activity conducted with "ease, freedom, naturalness, pliancy, open-

3. Hume

3.1. Reason and Sentiment

Hume was born the year the first edition of *Characteristics* was published (1711), and Hutcheson published *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725) when Hume was a fourteen-year-old student at university in Edinburgh. Hume read Shaftesbury and seems interested in his theory, as he credits Shaftesbury in *An Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals*.¹¹⁵ Hume also read and was interested in Hutcheson's thought, and he had correspondence with Hutcheson. Consequently, we may see influence from both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in his writing, as I briefly discuss below.¹¹⁶

Shaftesbury values reason as well as emotion, and recommends we listen to both. He argues that reason is necessary for the experience of beauty and virtue. On the other hand, for Hume, as well as Hutcheson, reason is not the origin of aesthetic and moral sense. It is passion which distinguishes the beautiful from the ugly, and virtue from vice. For Hume, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any

mindedness, and humour" (p. 59). Shaftesbury intended to merge such a concept with philosophy in writing *Characteristics*. Berkeley wrote *Alciphron* to parody and, by exaggeration, attack Shaftesbury's conception of politeness. In his work, Berkeley - while not attacking politeness as such - associates the politeness of the Shaftesburian freethinkers Alciphron and Lysicles with weak thinking, intellectual pretensions "and Aevasiveness" (pp. 62-63), on the one hand, and with impoliteness on the other. As reported by Klein, Berkeley argued that Shaftesbury "was mired in bad faith" (p. 64). Lawrence E. Klein, "Berkeley, Shaftesbury, and the Meaning of Politeness." *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture*. Ed. O.M. Brack, Jr. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986.

¹¹⁵ *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. A Critical Edition. (sec.1) Ed. Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998.

¹¹⁶ Townsend examines Shaftesbury's concept of sentiment in comparison with Hume and Locke. He observes the important theoretical position of Shaftesbury's concept of affection regarding the two kinds of affection (natural and unnatural), and its relation to reason. He also correctly points out how Berkeley misunderstood Shaftesbury's concept of taste as a dishonest attack on Christianity. Townsend, Dabney Townsend, *Hume's Aesthetic Theory: Taste and Sentiment*. London: Routledge, 2001.

other office than to serve and obey them” (HN 2.3.3)¹¹⁷; thus, there is no “combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason” (ibid.). Reason “instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and *humanity* makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial” (PM Appendix I). First of all, we are motivated with regard to will, conduct, and decisions by passion, not by “pure REASON and reflection” (PM 6.1). Beauty is under the domain of sentiment; therefore, the role of reason is not as important - though we need reason to examine, analyse, and compare, as in the world of art.

Hume states that his hypothesis “defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary” (PM Appendix I). He claims that it is sentiment which “marks a certain conformity of relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind” (Taste 136) to discern beauty. There is no right or wrong regarding sentiments. Sentiments and opinions are different. Opinion is the “determination of the understanding” (ibid.) which could be right or wrong, but sentiment is emotion – and every individual perceives beauty in a different way.

3.2. Standard of Taste

For Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, the problem between the subjective and objective character of beauty is solved by a teleological and holistic view, something they relied on to explain various matters, as both men define beauty as a sense of discerning *Uniformity amidst Variety*. Like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume states that beauty exists in the mind: “Beauty

¹¹⁷ In the following, I abbreviate the titles of Hume’s works as:

HN: *A Treatise of Human Nature*,

HU: *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*

PM: *An Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals*,

Taste: *Of Standard of Taste*

is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them” (ibid.). For Hume, as well as Shaftesbury, motivation is the criterion of moral action, and to see moral character, we need to see the person’s inner state.

For Hume, however, the idea of beauty comes from mere *passion*, not from an inward eye or a rational and emotional mental capacity (Shaftesbury), not from an internal sense with some special function (Hutcheson), nor from a particular quality or ability to recognize specific forms of order, harmony, design, shape, and colour (Shaftesbury and Hutcheson).

Like Hutcheson, Hume uses terms such as ‘internal sense’ and ‘external sense’ to indicate aesthetic and moral sense. However, it seems Hume is not much interested in defining those terms, which are very important for Hutcheson. Hume uses ‘internal sense’ without defining it, as for example in the following: “... beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external...” (Taste 141), or when discussing things not felt “either by our external or internal senses” (HU 7.1). It seems he views *internal sense* in terms of ‘mind’ and *external sense* in terms of the ‘five senses,’ since he also states that sentiment integrates the “relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind” (Taste 136). Hume’s internal sense is closer to emotion than a ‘sense’ or ‘faculty.’

Hume, as an empiricist, does not regard the appreciation of beauty as Shaftesbury does, something based on the universality of taste and an innate, internal sense. He also disagrees with Hutcheson, who sees universality of taste in an internal sense which has the tendency to be excited to see *Uniformity amidst Variety*. Hume views universality of beauty in *common sense* - shared feeling among people. Although sentiment is felt by individuals

differently, there is universality of judgement of beauty and virtue because of “the common sentiments of human nature” (*Taste* 138). For Hume, the standard of taste is the *common sense of taste*, which is considered right judgement of both objects of beauty and of moral conduct.

Hume’s view of common sense may have been influenced by Shaftesbury’s *sensus communis* - aesthetic and moral common sense in society. Shaftesbury regards *sensus communis* as a synonym of shared natural affection (social affection) and a benevolent attitude to others; similarly, Hume views common sense as shared sentiment and sympathy (including natural affection and benevolent). Like Shaftesbury, Hume acknowledges that common sense is rare to find, and is often misunderstood. Hume is closer to Shaftesbury than Hutcheson, who uses terms such as *common good* or *public interest* instead of *common sense* – indicating rather political reform. For Shaftesbury and Hume, true common sense is moral and aesthetic sense, based on a benevolent attitude, with awareness of one’s true self and interests. However, for Shaftesbury, unlike Hume, *sensus communis* is not mere feeling but reason and sense united in an inward state. As do Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume acknowledges the universality of aesthetic and moral taste – in which the majority of people share the same judgement, because there are “similar sentiments in all men” (*Taste* 135). However, he is also aware that it is rare to find genuinely right judgement of taste even among critics, since many of them - when criticizing works of art – are influenced by their emotions, which are “very tender and delicate, and require the concurrence of many favourable circumstances” (*Taste* 138). To improve our judgement of beauty, he states, we need to practice the skill.

He argues that the concept of beauty is not innate; we need to learn and improve through effort with the use of reason. He writes that “...all the general rules of art are founded

only on experience and on the observation of the common sentiments of human nature” (ibid.). Although Hume contends that all knowledge and ideas come from experience; he adds an original or an innate condition to his concept of *common sense*, as Shaftesbury ascribes innateness to his *sensus communis*, and Hutcheson ascribes innateness to his moral/aesthetic sense toward *Uniformity amidst Variety*. Hume states that passion is originally capable of recognizing and sharing some degree of beauty and virtue as common sense. He states that “... no passion, when well represented, can be entirely indifferent to us; because there is none, of which every man has not, within him, at least the seeds and first principles” (PM 5.2). Regarding this, it seems Hume is making an adjustment between Locke (acquired ideas of beauty/virtue) and Shaftesbury (innate ideas of beauty/virtue) in his theory, much as Hutcheson does.

3.3. Mind

For Hume, as for Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, taste is refined by *serenity of the inner state*. It is emotion, but calm emotion, not passionate, as Hume states:

A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circumstances be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious ... the relation, which nature has placed between the form and the sentiment, will at least be more obscure; and it will require greater accuracy to trace and discern it.

(Taste 139)

With calm minds, we are able to develop true morality and aesthetic taste, not only through soliloquy but also through interaction with others.

Hume argues for the mind’s ability to sense other people’s feeling or circumstances, and feel sympathy for them, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson observe in their natural affection.

Shaftesbury states:

The Mind, which is Spectator or Auditor of *other Minds*, cannot be without its *Eye*,

and *Ear*; so as to discern Proportion, distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment or Thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its Censure. It feels the Soft and Harsh, the Agreeable and Disagreeable, in the Affections;

(II. 17)

For Shaftesbury, Mind is a synonym of emotion with reflection, able to discern both moral and aesthetic beauty. For Hume (and Hutcheson), Mind is a synonym of sentiment which recognizes things as practical, sympathetic, and agreeable. Hume writes that a mental state which is “useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others, communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is admitted under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit” (PM 9.1).

Following Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume claims that by Mind we can *immediately* differentiate vice from virtue, beauty from deformity, and the agreeable from the disagreeable, since vice is associated with displeasure and virtue with pleasure. For all three men, the moral ground is from sentiment – by which we recognize ill or good actions, virtue or vice. They differ in that Shaftesbury’s *sentiment* does not stand alone, as his natural affection should be rational affection (emotion + reflection by reason). For Hutcheson and Hume, sentiment is emotion only, but since they are aware that we need some reflective mind with the emotion (since, for example, passion alone tends to make mistakes in judging moral conduct), both Hutcheson and Hume hold that sentiment or sympathy with serenity will lead us to judge correctly.

3.4. Sympathy

Both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson claim that the origin of moral sense is natural affection, and it is our nature to be benevolent – it is natural to wish others happiness. On the

other hand, Hume - who seems to be closer to Hobbes/Mandeville's egoistic human nature theory, argues that humans are naturally selfish:

Men being naturally selfish, or endow'd only with a confin'd generosity, they are not easily induc'd to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a performance.

(HN 3.2.2)

Benevolence towards others is actually "the most narrow selfishness" (ibid.), since people love themselves, and if they seem to love or do good for others, in most cases, such actions are based on their self-interests. Although he sees selfishness as an unchangeable part of human nature, Hume views Hobbes' *state of nature* as unrealistic. This is because there is an effective tendency in the nature of humanity to be sociable and peaceful, which he calls the *principle of sympathy* (HN 3.3.1) – our ability to sympathize with others. Though humans are selfish, because of the *principle of sympathy*, they can promote not only their self-interest but social interest as well:

No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclination and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own.

(HN 2.1.11)

Sympathy promotes the sense to judge what is morally correct, and it is because humans are selfish that they need to be moral for the sake of themselves and others. Hume states:

The social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence immediately by a direct tendency or instinct, which chiefly keeps in view the simple object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any scheme or system, nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others.

(PM Appendix 3)

We *immediately* judge which is virtuous or which is beautiful because the feeling associated with virtue/beauty is pleasure, while vice/ugliness leads to displeasure. This sense of pleasure or displeasure, useful to approve or disapprove of a particular moral conduct or object, has “a considerable dependence on the principle of *sympathy*” (HN 3.3.1).

3.5. Self-love

For Hume, *self-love* means affection towards the self, and is close to selfishness; this is distinct from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson’s *self-love*, by which they mean affection toward self and society. According to Hume, in addition to the principles of sympathy and utility, self-love (and self-interest consequently arising from self-love) is part of the motivation for establishing a moral ground. He writes, “Self-love is a principle in human nature of such extensive energy, and the interest of each individual is, in general, so closely connected with that of the community....” (PM 5.2). Because of self-love, we have concepts such as *enemy*, *rival*, or *antagonist* - terms which are part of “the language of self-love” (PM 9.1), and because we live with others in society, we have concepts of the *vicious*, the *odious*, and the *depraved*. Because of the principles of sympathy and utility, one needs to “depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame....” (PM 9.1). Hume contends that humans “are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the happiness of society, and consequently to virtue above its opposite” (PM 5.2). He argues that an absolutely vicious person does not exist, though malice tends to erode “all the sentiments of morals, as well as the feeling of humanity” (ibid.). Morality is a tool of utility. Because of morality, we can keep our possessions, and can live comfortable and peaceful lives. Self-love is the source of moral virtues such as justice, benevolence,

mercy, generosity, and honour.

3.6. Convention

According to Hume, what he calls convention - a general sense of common interest, happens when we observe and feel common-interest in public affairs because of the principle of sympathy. Convention is agreement regarding moral and aesthetic conduct in society. It is “a sense of common interest” (PM Appendix 3) which “all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules” (HN 3.2.2). Convention is different from promise, Hume contends, in that it establishes principles of justice, and he argues against the idea that justice “proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent, or combination of mankind” (PM Appendix 3). It seems Hume’s concept of convention was influenced by Shaftesbury’s public interest which is motivated by natural affection.

Because of convention, we can have security of our personal possessions in a peaceful society by controlling selfishness: “Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society: Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation” (PM 3.1). Therefore, the concept of just or unjust actions is established by *convention*. Respect for others and their property is based on necessity and experience. It is a necessity to share one’s sentiment with others; he writes that the “utility and advantage of any quality to ourselves is a source of virtue as well as its agreeableness to others” (HN 3.3.2). Social justice is a necessity for the “well-being of mankind,” and the result is not from individual action, but “arises from the whole scheme or system concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of the society” (PM Appendix 3). The social system is made not by reason, a divine mind, nor the noble ideas of liberty and justice, but by the

desire for possessions. Each person desires respect for her possessions, and knows that respecting others' possessions benefits her secure ownership as well.

Hume, following Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, believes in the moral and aesthetic nature of humanity, such as seen in benevolence and sympathy. When Hume discusses the beautiful nature of humanity, as in the following quote, he echoes Shaftesbury and Hutcheson:

Are not justice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed solely on account of their tendency to promote the good of society? Is not that tendency inseparable from humanity, benevolence, lenity, generosity, gratitude, moderation, tenderness, friendship, and all the other social virtues?

(PM 9.1)

However, Hume's concept of the motivation to be good and beautiful is very different from that of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who regard *rational natural affection* (Shaftesbury) or *calm affection* (Hutcheson) toward others and society as a motivation of moral conduct. For Hume, because of our self-love and self-interest, ironically, we cannot avoid pursuing a moral life. He is, regarding the motivation to be virtuous, closer to Hutcheson - who acknowledges humanity's weak rationality and the necessity of social enforcement to encourage moral conduct. Hume is also close to Hobbes, who acknowledges human selfishness and the necessity of social contracts.

4. Kant

By the time Kant published *Critique of Judgement* (1790), several German translations of Shaftesbury's work had already been published.¹¹⁸ Kant clearly read

¹¹⁸ Gracyk observes that the primary British sources for Kant were Addison, Hutcheson, Gerard, and Kames, rather than Shaftesbury, Hume, and Burke, who are regarded as opponents of Kant's thought (p. 215). Theodore A. Gracyk, "Kant's Shifting Debt to British Aesthetics." *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 26 (1986) pp. 204-217.

Shaftesbury, since he mentions Shaftesbury in several of his works, such as *Dissertation* (1770)¹¹⁹, in which he criticizes “Shaftesbury and his adherents” (55) who regard morality as mere feeling.¹²⁰ Also, in *M. Immanuel Kant's Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the Winter Semester, 1765–1766* (1765), he states: “The attempts of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, although incomplete and defective, have nonetheless penetrated furthest in the search for the fundamental principles of all morality” (258).¹²¹ Kant mentions Hutcheson and Hume more frequently however, and seems not to have high respect for Shaftesbury. Nevertheless, there are concepts that Kant could have developed from Shaftesbury, either directly, or indirectly from other thinkers such as Hutcheson, Hume, Burke, Addison, and Kames.¹²² Here I will quite briefly discuss a few concepts mainly in *Critique of Judgement* which may have been influenced by Shaftesbury.¹²³

Kant, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson do, applies a teleological and holistic view regarding aesthetics and ethics. They hold that there is a purpose in nature and the universe,

¹¹⁹ *Inaugural Dissertation of 1770*. Trans. William J. Eckoff. New York: Columbia College, 1894.

¹²⁰ Bernstein, in *Shaftesbury, Rousseau, and Kant*, discusses a relation between Shaftesbury and Rousseau regarding their views on religion, and between Rousseau and Kant. Bernstein, John Andrew. *Shaftesbury, Rousseau, and Kant: An Introduction to the Conflict between Aesthetic and Moral Values in Modern Thought*. Cranbury: Associated UP, 1980.

¹²¹ “M. Immanuel Kant's Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–1766” (1765) pp. 249-260 *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Other Writings*. Trans. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.

¹²² For details of which moral-sense philosophers could have influenced Kant's particular concepts, see Theodore A. Gracyk. “Kant's Shifting Debt to British Aesthetics.” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 26 (1986) pp.204-217.

Also Guyer wrote informative chapters regarding the influence of British moral philosophers on Kant. Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

¹²³ Townsend discusses Shaftesbury's aesthetic concept in comparison to that of Lock, Hutcheson, Gerard, Hume, and Kant. According to him, the similarities between Shaftesbury and Kant are 1. The relationship between aesthetics and the moral; 2. Disinterestedness, though Kant does not use this concept except as “symbolic” in the area of morality, as does Shaftesbury; 3. Sensus Communis (subjective + Objective), though Kant observes this from the point of epistemological ‘ought’, unlike Shaftesbury who represented Sensus Communis as a result of his observations from everyday life. Dabney Townsend, “From Shaftesbury to Kant: The Development of the Concept of Aesthetic Experience.” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 48 (1987) pp. 287-305.

Also, White points out the similarities between Shaftesbury and Kant's concept of two kinds of form -the object and the subject in aesthetic experience - though Shaftesbury's concept of form is closer to Platonic Forms than Kant's. He observes “the striking parallel between Shaftesbury and Kant” (246). David A. White, “The Metaphysics of Disinterestedness: Shaftesbury and Kant.” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 32 (1973) pp. 239-248.

and parts contribute to the whole in representing beauty, goodness, and truth. They believe that the design, order, and purpose in the universe correspond to human character/actions. Everything has an end, and is often divided into external/internal, rational/sensual, mental/physical, or matter/form following Platonic metaphysics. As Shaftesbury does, Kant states that the judgement of taste is based on an a priori and universal rule, not an empirical approach. In this notion, Kant is closer to Shaftesbury, compared to Hutcheson and Hume.

Further, some key features of Kant's aesthetic judgement, such as disinterestedness,¹²⁴ universality, and common sense could have been influenced by Shaftesbury, again in most case, probably indirectly through others such as Hutcheson and Hume, as I briefly discuss below.

4.1. Aesthetic Judgement

For Kant, as well as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, pure aesthetic judgement is essentially subjective, since it is based on a feeling of delight conceived independently; thus, it excludes the use of determined concepts to define the object, as objective judgement does. Kant states: "The judgement of taste ... is not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical, but is aesthetic – which means that it is one whose determining ground *cannot be other than subjective*" (*CJ* §1. 203)¹²⁵. However, though aesthetic judgement is based on feeling, we demand the same judgements from others as if we are depending on the objective validity of

¹²⁴ Stolnitz regards Shaftesbury as a significant figure in the development of the modern concept in aesthetics known as aesthetic disinterestedness. He discusses principles such as intrinsic and autonomous qualities, and the expanded range of objects which may be regarded as aesthetic objects – objects which may be seen as more than beautiful and which include the sublime, the expressive, and even the ugly. Stolnitz identifies Shaftesbury as the first to analyze aesthetic disinterestedness, noting that he uses the word "disinterested" to refer to the attitudes or moral judgments by moral agents regarding the beauty and harmony of natural objects (p.105). Harmony is not a quality discernable by the five physical senses, but only by a metaphysical, inner sense.

Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic Theory." *Philosophical Quarterly*, 2 (1961) pp. 97-113.

¹²⁵ *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. In the following, I abbreviate it as *CJ*.

what constitutes beauty. This is because of the united and harmonious relation between feeling and reason - for Shaftesbury, or because of an internal sense which has an innate tendency to perceive beauty - for Hutcheson, or because of commonly shared sentiments - for Hume.

For Kant, pure beauty has universal validity because of the representation of the object by the interplay of the mental power for cognitive judgements - imagination and understanding which everyone shares. As well as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who state that the internal sense receives *uniformity amidst variety*, Kant states that after sense receives the object, imagination synthesizes the manifold of intuition, and lets the understanding “work in unifying the manifold under concepts” of beauty (*CJ* §21.238). Also, he claims that the state of free play has “universal communication” (*CJ* §9.217). In this regard, Kant is close to Shaftesbury, who sees a cooperative relationship between imagination and the reflective faculty. As in the three philosophers who discuss the *immediateness* of aesthetic experience, Kant holds that aesthetic experience “combines delight or aversion immediately with the bare *contemplation* of the object irrespective of its use or of any end” (*CJ* §22.242). Thus Kant, as well as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, claims there is *purposiveness without an end* (§12, 222) in aesthetic pleasure.

Kant’s concept of *disinterestedness* may well have been influenced by Shaftesbury through Hutcheson, as he was aware of Hutcheson’s comments on this subject (*Herder* 264).¹²⁶ Kant states that because of the *free play* of imagination and understanding, which dissolves any interest and purpose regarding the object, we attain a *disinterested* mental

¹²⁶ “Herder’s Notes from Kant’s Lectures on Ethics (1762-1764)” pp. 263-304. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Other Writings*. Trans. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.

state. Regarding Kant's disinterestedness, the harmonious mutual relationship between the two faculties is similar to Shaftesbury concept (though not Hutcheson or Hume's, who do not see much of a role for reason in beauty), although Shaftesbury uses 'delight', 'harmony' or 'enthusiasm'¹²⁷ instead of 'free play'.

Also, following Shaftesbury and Hume (but not Hutcheson, who did not use the phrase *common sense* particularly in that way - although his *moral sense* could be regarded as the equivalent of aesthetic/moral common sense), Kant distinguishes common sense (common understanding) and aesthetic common sense (*sensus communis*), which is "the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition" (*CJ* §20.238). According to Kant, we have "*Taste as a kind of sensus communis*" (*CJ* §40.293) in the sense of a commonly shared feeling to judge beauty. He states "... by the name *sensus communis* is to be understood the idea of a *public* sense. i.e. a faculty of judging which in its reflective act takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of everyone else...." (*ibid.*).

As for Shaftesbury and Hume, *sensus communis* for Kant is an innate and subjective principle of aesthetic judgement everyone commonly shares. If it is acquired, it cannot be pure aesthetic judgement. It is true that not everyone agrees with the judgement of beauty, but we understand that there must be common validity regarding the judgement of beauty, and different opinions indicate judgement is being applied incorrectly.

Shaftesbury emphasizes the *feeling of pleasure* in the judgement of beauty and good (though his sentiment is in his own definition of feeling - cooperating with reflection by reason). And probably under the influence of Hutcheson and Hume, who made their views

¹²⁷ As well as Shaftesbury, Kant views *enthusiasm* as characteristic of *disinterestedness*. I will deal with it in a later section (4.3. Enthusiasm). It is possible to see the influence of Shaftesbury's enthusiasm in Kant's 'free play'.

on taste more feeling based, Kant also claims that aesthetic experience is “the feeling of pleasure or displeasure” (*CJ* §1.203). For Kant, as in Hutcheson and Hume, there is no cognitive idea of beauty, since it is presented individually *by the imagination*. An idea of beauty commonly shared is “a mere ideal norm” (*CJ* §22.239) which cannot be explained as a concept.

However, for Kant, as for Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, aesthetic pleasure is different from other sensual pleasures such as the judgement of the agreeable, which depends only on an individual’s sense, as the taste of wine depends on the person. As in Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and likewise for Kant, although beauty is a pleasure, if the object has sensory stimulation such as the colour in a painting, but not form or design, it is also not pure beauty. As Shaftesbury and his contemporaries engaged in the debate of the superiority of sensual or rational pleasure of the object, Kant follows a rationalistic view - as Shaftesbury does. In the fine arts, though colours charm viewers by their brilliancy, “the design is what is essential. Here it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form, that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste” (*CJ* §14.225). However, unlike Hutcheson and Kant, who see superior beauty in nature but not in works of art, Shaftesbury sees the highest beauty in works of art, ornaments, architecture, or whatever is made by humans; beauty comes not from the object, but it is “*the Art* is that which beautifies” (II. 226).

4.2. Moral Judgement

Although Kant appears to have been influenced by British thinkers such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, there are some clear differences to be noted. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume regard aesthetic sense as a synonym of moral

judgement. Therefore, they employ aesthetic terms such as natural affection, sentiment, and disinterestedness to explain moral terms. Kant, on the other hand, states “the beautiful is the symbol of morally good” (*CJ* §59.353), not a synonym, and clearly distinguishes aesthetic and moral judgement, though he observes similarities between them. For him, aesthetic pleasure is subjective and contemplative, while moral pleasure (pleasure in the sense of cognitive satisfaction) is objective and practical (*CJ* §12.222).

Kant does not use *disinterestedness* in his moral theory though he has a similar concept; an agent cannot be self-interested in his motivation to do good. This is because for Kant, aesthetic pleasure (subjective, feeling based) is *disinterested* in having any end, but moral pleasure (objective, goodwill based) is *interested* in having a positive outcome of moral conduct.

Also, unlike the three thinkers, Kant does not use *common sense* or *sensus communis* in his moral theory, though he acknowledges a universally shared mental state to do good. He uses *sensus communis* for aesthetic feeling or sentiment as in Hume; therefore, Kant cannot use the word in his moral theory, since his internal moral sense is not sense, but a categorical imperative - internal principle regarding one’s duty to do good. Kant is quite apart from Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume since there is no free play, sentiment, or disinterested state in the ground of moral judgement, but it is good will from reason. For Kant, as well as Shaftesbury, but not Hutcheson and Hume, the intention of the action is more important than the outcome. For Shaftesbury and Kant, if a person is not motivated by the internal moral principle, it is not truly moral conduct, even if she could behave benevolently.

As well as disinterestedness, Kant’s concept of genius is limited to genius in fine art,

and does not include genius in moral conduct. For Shaftesbury however, *genius* means someone who has excellence in both artistic and moral manners. Genius, for him, is a synonym of *virtuoso*, *gentleman in fashion*, *well-bred*, and *man of polite manners*.

4.3. Enthusiasm

It seems Kant is influenced by Shaftesbury directly regarding the concept of enthusiasm. At least he appears not to be influenced by Hutcheson and Hume, since neither of them is particularly interested in this term.¹²⁸ As well as Shaftesbury, not only in *Critique of Judgement*, but since his early works, Kant distinguishes *ill enthusiasm* as in religious fanatics: “the melancholic is a fantast with respect to life’s ills” (*Maladies* 213)¹²⁹ and genuine enthusiasm: “whether ... by the maxim of patriotic virtue, or of friendship, or of religion, without involving the illusion of a supernatural community” (*Observation* 62)¹³⁰ or “The passion of the sublime is enthusiasm. In love, virtuous, Friendship, Beautiful ideal” (*Remarks* 95).¹³¹ Here he appears to be following Shaftesbury’s definition of enthusiasm.

In his *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* (1764), Kant criticizes fanatics and dogmatists as Shaftesbury does, and the style of the writing and the terms used - such as *ill*, *ridicule*, *wit*, *enthusiasm*, and *fanatic*, look quite similar to Shaftesbury’s *A Letter concerning Enthusiasm* and *Sensus Communis; An Essay on the Freedom of Wit*, which Kant seems to analyse in his *Notes on metaphysics*, regarding the definition of enthusiasm as

¹²⁸ Hume writes about enthusiasm in *On Superstition and Enthusiasm*, in which he regards enthusiasm as religious fanaticism only. It seems he is, unlike Shaftesbury, not interested in enthusiasm regarding a moral/aesthetic sense.

¹²⁹ “Essay on the Maladies of the Head (1764)” *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Other Writings*. Trans. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.

¹³⁰ *Observation on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Other Writings*. Trans. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.

¹³¹ “Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764-1765)” *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Other Writings*. Trans. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.

he states:

The highest degree of enthusiasm is that we are ourselves in God and feel or intuit our existence in Him. The second: that we intuit all things in accordance with their true nature only in God as their cause and in his ideas as archetypes. The third: that we do not intuit them at all, but rather derive them from the concepts of things directly to the existence of God, in which alone they can have objective reality.

(Notes 329)¹³²

As does Shaftesbury, Kant describes three levels of enthusiasm, a highest and two lower levels – either we intuitively receive Divinity or rationally analyse Divinity. Kant continues this kind of view in his *Critique of Judgement* in which he compares fanaticism and genuine enthusiasm:

If enthusiasm is comparable to *delirium*, fanaticism may be compared to *mania*. Of these the latter is least of all compatible with the sublime, for it is *profoundly* ridiculous. In enthusiasm, as an affect, the imagination is unbridled; in fanaticism, as a deep-seated, brooding passion, it is uncontrolled. The first is a transitory state to which the healthiest understanding is liable to become a times the victim; the second is an undermining disease.

(§29.275)

For Shaftesbury, wit, sublime, enthusiasm in the genuine sense, and disinterestedness are under the highest order of beauty, in harmonious relationship with our dual nature. Kant's view connecting disinterestedness, sublime, and enthusiasm in the positive notion of aesthetic/moral sense is also quite close to Shaftesbury's view. Kant, like Shaftesbury, sees an aesthetic quality in wit and laughter, with their free play of imagination and the understanding (*CJ* §54.332). It is possible that Kant may have been interested in the relation between beauty and wit/ridicule in Shaftesbury.

As Shaftesbury does, Kant defines the true sublime (neither religious fanatics nor

¹³² "Notes on Metaphysics". *Notes and Fragments*. Trans. Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer and Frederick Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010.

dogmatists) as the affect under the moral idea, as he states:

The idea of the good connected with affect is enthusiasm. This state of mind appears to be sublime.... But now every affect is blind.... On this account it cannot merit any delight on the part of reason. Yet from an aesthetic point of view, enthusiasm is sublime, because it is an effort of one's powers called forth by ideas which give to the mind an impetus of far stronger and more enduring efficacy than the stimulus afforded by sensible representations.

(*CJ* §29.272)

Shaftesbury describes enthusiasm as a sublime feeling close to religious devotion, though he clearly separates the sublime feelings of religious enthusiasts from those of true enthusiasts.

As well as Shaftesbury, Kant distinguishes two kinds of sublime enthusiasm – fanatic enthusiasm “which is a delusion that would will some VISION beyond all the bounds of sensibility; i.e. would dream according to principles (rational raving)” (*CJ* §29.275) and genuine sublime enthusiasm, which he also regards as ‘free play’ (*delight* in Shaftesbury) of the two faculties - passionate, but also rational; without an end, but able to reach the end; contemplative but also practical; playful, but also serious. It is possible to assume that Kant had a keen eye to read Shaftesbury, to grasp the importance of three levels of Enthusiasm in relation with the sublime and disinterestedness.

Chapter 4: Teleological and Holistic Concepts

1. Multiple-Meaning Words

In this chapter, I argue that Shaftesbury categorizes the two opposed characters of the nature of things, and the integrated character of the both to show his teleological view of humanity and the universe. His terms such as Good Breeding, Gentlemen, and Good Company, reveal deeper meanings than their appearance might suggest. Shaftesbury knew how ignorant and unintelligent noblemen could be; he knew that education, titles, and possessions do not reflect one's intellect or virtue, but may affect one negatively, or conceal a lack of intellect and virtue. Not all *well-bred* people know themselves, as he states: "Justness of Thought and Style, Refinement in Manners, good Breeding, and Politeness of every kind, can come only from the Trial and Experience of what is best" (I. 7). For him, *gentlemen*, and *good breeding* indicate people well-educated and sophisticated enough to sustain genuine happiness through self-examination, and he distinguishes *true* gentlemen and *truly* good breeding. Thus, there are indeed gentlemen with good breeding in a *literal sense* but hardly so in reality.

Shaftesbury tends to subdivide the meanings of words into two (false or true) or three (the first, the second, and the third) categories based on the complexity of the *opinion* on which the meanings of the words depend, or even to subdivide those words already subdivided. This exhaustive manner of giving multiple definitions for words makes his writing appear inconsistent, and, ironically, the tendency to think deeply on the meaning of words makes his writing look as if he is not thinking deeply at all. It could be said that his inconsistency comes from his consistency in attempting to be accurate in the meanings of words. His writings, as mentioned, often reveal that he is clearly aware of the complexity of

human nature; words can be understood depending on the character of the person speaking and his or her view on the subject. At times, misconceptions arise from words which have lost their true meaning. For Shaftesbury, humans hold a wrong opinion or view when they depend on only one side – either matter or form, the rational or the sensuous side. For example, *reason* can be a disguise for *emotion*, or truth can be a disguise for *false*. Thus, he tends to use words with complex meanings depending on whose point of view or which states (either an integrated ideal state or an estranged partial state) he is dealing with.¹³³

A few researchers such as Price and Marsh have commented on Shaftesbury's dialectical view of the nature of things. According to Price, "Shaftesbury's 'moral sense,' ... shifts between spontaneous sentiment and dull obedience to objective law. They are the pulsation of a dialectical process that tries at once to do justice to the puzzles of experience and the inadequacy of our categories."¹³⁴, however, he does not develop this insightful observation further.

Marsh ¹³⁵ also points out how Shaftesbury's dialectical theme could have been influenced by Plato and Aristotle, and by Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy, and his work

¹³³ Redding addresses Shaftesbury's philosophical writings in the context of his culture and society, detailing such rhetorical strategies as the letter form, dramatic dialogue, and referring to himself in the third person. In particular, Redding focuses on how significant such "theatricalizations" were to Shaftesbury's role as writer and critic in "his contemporary religious and political culture" (p. 84). Shaftesbury sees the world holistically or pantheistically, regards man as a part of a larger system, and holds that one's mind participates in a divine mind, "the system of all living minds" (p. 87). He rejects the notion of a spectator deity, who regards the world from some external viewpoint. Human affection and harmony depend on communication between members of society, when through *sympathy*, we consider the good of others (p. 89). Hence, in *Sensus Communis*, Shaftesbury highlights the role of dialogue in philosophy, and extends the effect to monologue in *A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm*, where the monologue is addressed to an imagined correspondent, but is, of course, intended for publication (p. 91). He warns of the dangers to communication, such as "playing up to" the readers, introduced by ambition or egotism. Redding notes how dialogue is used in *The Moralists* to promote Shaftesbury's pantheistic views, especially through the character of Theocles, who holds that nature is perfect, balanced, and good (p. 94). Paul Redding, "Spectatorship, Sympathy and the Self. The Importance and Fragility of Dialogue in the Work of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury." *Literature and Aesthetics: The Journal of the Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics*, 2 (1992) pp. 82–95.

¹³⁴ Martin Price. *To the Palace of Wisdom: Studies in Order and Energy from Dryden to Blake*. Doubleday & Company, 1964. p. 104.

¹³⁵ Robert Marsh. *Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

provides some of the most informative research regarding this subject. He holds that Shaftesbury's writing, intended to improve moral conduct, contains outstanding examples of the dialectical theme, particularly with regard to his method of presenting mental struggles as inner soliloquy. He explains the 'dialectical' style engages

primarily by means of broad analogies, and he [a dialectician] does so within the context of a controlling a priori disjunction or opposition between two realms or conceptions of the whole of things – the higher or better ultimate reality and the lower “sublunary,” “merely human,” or “common” world. . . . The dialectical theorist, in other words, invokes transcendent or comprehensive values, patterns, and ideals for poetry that are said to reside in God himself, or to exist in a providential emanating system of spiritual essences, or to be embodied in nature, mind, language, or history – or some kind of combination or fusion of these. And, methodologically, he justifies the application of such criteria by his characteristic dialectical habit of perceiving the patterns of similitude, congeniality, or continuity between the “ultimate” and the “common”.¹³⁶

Marsh points out that Shaftesbury's aim is not to maintain our good nature, but to recover a corrupt nature¹³⁷. The aim of the flexible and playful writing style of Socratic conversation is to contrast both sides of humanity, to lead readers to find answers beyond the opposed relations of their nature. Marsh turns to the particulars of Shaftesbury's views of the duality of human souls, which fits the dialectical method well, and his view that while the extremes of religious enthusiasm are to be avoided, there is a true or genuine form of enthusiasm based on goodness and wisdom¹³⁸. He identifies Shaftesbury's view that humans participate in the task of forming their *better nature*, and an inner colloquy is an instrument of his dialectic method of finding what is best in life. According to Marsh, it is not only in Shaftesbury that we find a dialectical theme, but in others such as “Mark

¹³⁶ Ibid. p. 11-12.

¹³⁷ Ibid. p. 21

¹³⁸ Ibid. p. 34

Akenside, David Harley, and James Harris [who] offer unusually instructive instances of dialectical theory in English neoclassical criticism....”¹³⁹

As Carey correctly points out, Shaftesbury’s argument has “inevitable circularity”¹⁴⁰, as he repeatedly shows the same pattern of the nature of things - either higher or lower, partial or integrated, or three levels or stages (two opposed characters and the integrated character of the both). However, I hold that this circularity is the method he intentionally chose, instead of syllogistic reasoning which could be far more wasteful of time, as Marsh points out:

It is a dialectical method, and Shaftesbury’s writings, even at their most methodic, proceed discursively less by systematic syllogistic induction or deduction than by a process of relating, opposing, expanding, and purifying the meanings of key terms and ideas which is, as it were, an imitation of the basic process of self-examination he so strongly emphasizes. It is never possible to confine him to systematic and consistent use of single, univocal meanings of terms because the development of his arguments always depends upon the range of those possible meanings available in common life and thought that can be incorporated, related, and properly controlled in reflection, conversation, or debate.¹⁴¹

As in Socratic dialogue, in which Socrates repeats the same subject or matter to aid the understanding of the person in the dialogue, Shaftesbury chooses a repeating pattern of argument concerning the nature of concepts such as manners, truth, beauty, affection, enthusiasm, and humour.

Philosophy for Shaftesbury is “*the Study of inward Numbers and Proportions*” to find “BEAUTY of Harmony” (III. 112-113). The task of philosophy is to exhibit the “SYMMETRY” of beauty in the universe and the nature of things. Thus he sees two (false or

¹³⁹ Robert Marsh. *Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. p. 13.

¹⁴⁰ Daniel Carey. *Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. p. 110.

¹⁴¹ Robert Marsh. *Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. p. 26.

true) and three (sense-based, reason-based, and the integrated condition) kinds of things in almost all terms. He makes every effort to categorize each level of each term to show there is divine order in the universe. In this regard, he acknowledges that he “strives to erect” the Three Orders of Beauty “by distinguishing, sorting, and dividing into Things animate, inanimate, and mixt” (III. 112. fn).

For were there in Nature *Two* or more Principles, either they must agree, or not. If they agree not, all must be Confusion, till one be predominant. If they agree, there must be some natural Reason for their Agreement; and this natural Reason cannot be from *Chance*, but from some particular *Design*, *Contrivance*, or *Thought*: which brings us up again to One Principle, and makes the other *two* to be subordinate.... That in *Three* Opinions, *One* of which must necessarily be true, *Two* being plainly absurd, the *Third* must be the Truth.

(II. 204-205)

Because of his love for the order and symmetry which he discerns in the universe, which is under the rule of a hidden system of numbers and beauty, the meaning of the term changes depending on which level he is dealing with. Beauty is often hidden and readers are required to discover proportion, symmetry, numbers, in parts and wholeness. His declaration concerning the three levels is the claim that the third one is the answer or completeness, and the other two are subordinate of the third.

He views that the whole and parts of the universe are represented by the human mind: “For whatever is possible *in the Whole*, the Nature or Mind of the Whole will put in execution for *the Whole’s Good*” (II. 204). Alderman states that “His theology and his ethics are so closely interwoven and interdependent...it is difficult to discuss the one without trespassing upon the order.”¹⁴²

¹⁴² William E. Alderman “The Significance of Shaftesbury in English Speculation.” PMLA, 38 (1923) p. 180.

Shaftesbury's method of judging what is beautiful, true, and good - by observing two opposed characteristics and the reciprocal relation of both as the third character - is based on the three levels of beauty, as I discuss in Chapter 5, sense-centered (the first order), reason-centered (the second order), and the mixture of sense and reason as the highest (the third order). Other concepts also have three levels under the three levels of beauty, such as three levels of *personality* (the first, the second, and the third personality, which I discuss in Chapter 4), three levels of *truth* (poetical, historical, and moral truth, which I discuss in Chapter 4), three levels of *manners* (poetical, methodical, and miscellaneous manners, which I discuss in Chapter 4), three levels of *good* (sensuous, rational, and sensuous/rational affection, which I discuss in Chapter 6), three levels of *wit/humour* (sensible, rational, and genuine wit/humour, which I discuss in Chapter 7), and three levels of *enthusiasm* (fanatical, dogmatic, and genuine enthusiasm, which I discuss in Chapter 7). Not only those terms, but other terms such as *gentlemen* (one who knows what is truth, beauty, and good, which I discuss in Chapter 7) have three levels corresponding with other levels in a dialectical process, as I attempt to demonstrate in this thesis.

It may be his attempt at aesthetic perfection which leads him to use such a writing style to cultivate his readers. As stated, he tends to change the meaning of words in accordance with the context of the discussion, as I detail in the table below.

Table 1 Shaftesbury's Aesthetic/Moral Terms ¹⁴³

<u>A: (Matter or Sensible side)</u>	<u>B: (Form or Rational side)</u>	<u>C: (Both sides/Authentic status)</u>
1. First Order of Beauty	Second Order of Beauty	Third Order of Beauty ¹⁴⁴
2. First Personality	Second Personality	Third Personality ¹⁴⁵
3. Imagination	Reason	Works of Art ¹⁴⁶
4. Poetical Truth	Historical Truth	Moral Truth ¹⁴⁷
5. Poetical Manners	Methodical Manners	Miscellaneous Manners ¹⁴⁸
6. Self-Affection	Public Affection	Natural Affection ¹⁴⁹
7. Wit/Humor	Wit/Humor	Wit/Humor ¹⁵⁰
8. Enthusiasm	Enthusiasm	Enthusiasm ¹⁵¹

Despite the unsystematic appearance, he is almost always successful in presenting the multiple meanings of concepts or words depending on the context, or how we look at them.

If he is dealing with the ultimate meanings of a word, which indicates the reciprocal and harmonious cooperation of the two aspects, then words in A and B become the mixture in the final stage (C). This means each word carries three meanings. For example, in row 1, *beauty* in material life in A and mental life in B is not true beauty. When the material and mental sides cooperate, *true beauty* results, as in C. Readers of *Characteristics* frequently see expressions such as “real *Beauty and Truth*” (III. 238), “*real and genuine SELF*” (I. 175), “*true Goodness*” (I. 21), “ill Nature, and ill Breeding” (II. 95), “*ill Design*” (II. 7), “*ill Humour*” (III. 66), and “false Reason” (I. 161), which is Shaftesbury's way of expressing the result of transcending the material/body/sensuous world to the form/mind/rational world,

¹⁴³ My methodology for constructing this table will be discussed in following chapters.

¹⁴⁴ For the three levels of beauty, see chapter 5.

¹⁴⁵ For the three levels of personality, see chapter 4.6.

¹⁴⁶ For the Imagination and Reason, see chapter 4.2.

¹⁴⁷ For the three levels of Truth, see chapter 4.3.

¹⁴⁸ For the three levels of Manners, see chapter 4.4.

¹⁴⁹ For the three levels of Affections, see chapter 6.

¹⁵⁰ For the three levels of Wit/Humor, see chapter 7.

¹⁵¹ For the concept of Enthusiasm, see chapter 7.

while keeping the former.

Also, there are three kinds of Enthusiasm (row 8) - which I discuss in chapter 7. Enthusiasm (religious zeal) with too much emotion (A), and Enthusiasm (dogmatism) with too much reason (B), appear serious and enthusiastic, but such believers lack true Enthusiasm and truly pious minds. With the true Enthusiasm in C, one will be generous, and will not feel offended by false Enthusiasts, but treat them generously with Wit and Humor, since they do not know themselves yet.

Also, truth in row 4 has three meanings, Poetical Truth based on imagination (A), Historical Truth based on the intellect only, disregarding emotion or the material side (B), and Moral Truth as the mixture of the former two. Shaftesbury might not say clearly which *truth* or *beauty* he is talking about, yet he usually uses the right meaning in the right place throughout *Characteristics*, and the usage is understandable from the context, especially if we are aware that he is always pointing out either one or the other side of the dualistic character of the world of matter and form, or sense and reason, or the fragmented and integrated condition.

The First Order of Beauty, Poetical Truth, and Self-Affection are sense-centred, and the Second Order of Beauty, Historical Truth, and Public Affection, are reason-centred, and so both sides can be criticized since they are not in a perfect condition yet; the Third Order of Beauty, Moral Truth, Natural Affection, is regarded as a perfect condition.

Thus, it is necessary to take a close look at his terms to understand what he means. In the next section, I argue that his seemingly contradicted statements on *reason* and *imagination* are based on this systematic approach.

2. Imagination and Reason

One problem in Shaftesbury is that while he may criticize one side of the opposing terms in one section, he may praise the term elsewhere. I hold that this approach is not due to a lack of careful or consistent thought, but because all aspects have a degree of imperfection unless and until they reach the third stage, the stage of agreement and cooperation, to create ideal beauty (as ideal as is possible on the earth, since ideal beauty in the genuine, ultimate sense cannot be realized). Shaftesbury uses Imagination as feeling based on sense; he writes of this “IMAGINATION or SENSE” (III. 120), which is

... natural and common to all Men, irresistible, or original Growth in the Mind, the Guide of our Affections, and the Ground of our *Admiration, Contempt, Shame, Honour, Disdain* and other natural and unavoidable Impressions... (ibid.)

Shaftesbury often emphasizes the power of reason in aesthetic and moral judgement. This rational ability to judge truth, beauty, and goodness is innate, but needs to be cultivated by one's intentional effort with the help of reason and the arts. Shaftesbury quotes Horace: “I will play the part of a whetstone” (III. 155), and therefore offers to sharpen his readers' innate ability to see true beauty under the outer appearance. Imagination can be regarded as inferior to Reason in one place, but in a different place, Reason is regarded as inferior to Imagination. I claim that Shaftesbury envisions three levels of view in the process of Imagination (sense-based, with imperfection), Reason (reason-based, with imperfection), and Imagination/Reason (the mixture of both sense/reason based, with perfection). The Third Order of Beauty is perceived by the imagination; however, this imagination is a higher kind, and Shaftesbury states that imagination is busy to form “beauteous Shapes and Images of this rational kind”, while “other Passions of a lower Species were employ'd another way”

(I. 86)

Shaftesbury emphasizes the role of both Reason and Imagination in the judgement of beauty and goodness in both works of art and moral conduct. Imagination is a necessity in the experience of beauty, since Imagination forms the “beauteous Shapes” (ibid.) just mentioned. But if it forms merely the sense-based desire to possess the objects in question, Imagination cannot contribute to ideal beauty. In this case, Imagination opposes Reason. If one enjoys viewing certain trees because of the appetite for their fruits, or if a man enjoys viewing beautiful women because of sexual desire, those experiences of beauty “inspire nothing of a *studious* or *contemplative* kind” (ibid.). On the other hand, if imagination forms a *rational kind* of beauty, then the disinterested pleasure experienced in seeing beauty is a “refin’d Contemplation of *Beauty*” (II. 222). Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that Shaftesbury’s Reason does not exclude Imagination.

In some passages, Shaftesbury dismisses Imagination in comparison to Reason, but praises it in other places; this may appear to be a contradiction. For example, he states: “the only *Poison* to Reason, is *Passion*. For false Reasoning is soon redress’d, where *Passion* is remov’d” (I. 58), and some people are prone to trust “the greatest Deceivers in the World, *their own Passions*” (II. 131). However, he praises passion in enthusiasm in the genuine sense, which is neither the enthusiasm of fanatics nor of dogmatism: “The Transports of *Poets*, the Sublime of *Orators*, the Rapture of *Musicians*, the high Strains of the *Virtuosi*; all mere ENTHUSIASM! Even *Learning* it-self, the Love of *Arts* and Curiositys, the Spirit of Travellers and Adventures; Gallantry, War, Heroism; All, all ENTHUSIASM! (II. 224).¹⁵²

¹⁵² For the definitions of the three levels of Enthusiasm, see Chapter 7.

When he praises the “extasy” of enthusiasm, he clearly states it is “reasonable *Extasy*” or “poetick Extasys” (II. 223) found in “a fair and plausible Enthusiasm” (II. 224).

Shaftesbury converted the definition from religious Enthusiasm in the first and the second Enthusiasm to aesthetic and moral Enthusiasm in the third Enthusiasm. Enthusiasm has the same composition – sense-centred (fanaticism), reason-centred (dogmatism), and the mixture of sense/reason as the highest (genuine Enthusiasm in an aesthetic and moral sense). As he warns of the excess of Imagination/Passion possibly leading to a state of madness, he laments the condition of fanatic Enthusiasts as lacking reason and characterized by panic; in such people he sees “the Evidence of the Senses lost, as in a Dream; and the Imagination so inflam’d, as in a moment to have burnt up every Particle of Judgment and Reason” (I. 28).

On the other hand, in the positive and genuine sense of Enthusiasm, imagination and passion have a main role in forming beauty as well as the aesthetic experience. Whether the imagination is genuine or not depends on the situation. Imagination can serve religious fanaticism, dogmatism, and sense-based desire; however, there is no ideal beauty there.

Imagination is a necessity to create works of art, and Shaftesbury praises “raving” in poets and philosophers: “Composing and Raving must necessarily, we see, bear a resemblance. And for those Composers who deal in Systems, and airy Speculations, they have vulgarly passed for a sort of *Prose-Poets*” (I. 102). The inspiration poets receive is not possible without imagination: “No *Poet*... can do any thing great in his own way, without the Imagination or Supposition of a *Divine Presence*, which may raise him to some degree of this Passion we are speaking of” (I. 33).

While Shaftesbury emphasizes the superior status of Reason over fancy/imagination/feeling, he also cautions readers concerning Reason itself, since there are

“*Shadows of Reason*” (III. 183) or “false Reason” (I. 161) which is not true Reason, but the disguised figure of sense/appetite/passion. This false form of Reason has an emotional cause, such as “*Fear of any kind*” (ibid.). He warns of the excess of Reason in the state of the second Enthusiasm (dogmatism of religious scholars and speculative philosophers), as they lack imagination/passion to describe the nature of humanity. Regarding dogmatic Enthusiasts, he writes that some “had left so little of Zeal, Affection, or Warmth, in what they call their *Rational Religion*, as to make them much suspected of their Sincerity in any” (II. 153) with “a Belief as that of a *future Reward and Punishment*” (ibid.).

He dismisses “super-speculative Philosophy” which does not engage real life problems - such as knowing the self, judging moral conduct, or contemplating the meaning of life, and he recommends philosophy of a “more practical sort, which relates chiefly to our Acquaintance, Friendship, and good Correspondence with *our-selves*” (I. 181). Speculative thought has its place though, and Shaftesbury advocates the “*speculative Habit*” (I. 122) of self-examination. The key theme in *Characteristics* is that humans need to recover their nature - true Reason, by using Reason itself and Mind (compounds of various feelings, interchangeably used with heart/soul, which I discuss in Chapter 3).

Also, *cool or dry Reason*, tends to submit “to mere *Command*” (III. 183) or tends to lean too much on the critical analysis of details, and oppresses sense/passion. It is “dangerous for us to be over-*rational*, or too much Masters of our-selves, in what we draw, by just Conclusions, from *Reason only*” (III. 187). When scientific reason loses itself by analyzing an object, including the human mind, from the mechanical point of view as if it were a machine, as he believes Descartes does, Shaftesbury is quite skeptical: “...by the most refin’d Speculation of this kind, I shall neither learn to diminish my Fears, or raise my

Courage” (I. 182). Reason which disregards the purpose of contributing to happiness is not Reason. He argues, “If PHILOSOPHY be, as we take it, *the Study of Happiness*; must not everyone, in some manner or other, either skillfully or unskillfully *philosophize?*” (II. 244). Applying a mechanical approach or system to the human mind is not only wrong but impractical; thus, he concludes that “The most ingenious way of becoming foolish, is *by a System*” (I. 180).

On the other hand, the true Reason, as well as the Third Order of Beauty and the third Enthusiasm, represents the realization of a difficult task – the reduction of conflict in the dual character and the resolution of the demands from both sides at once, creating oneness in both the inner and outer states of a person. The transition from speculative Reason to true REASON is possible when the human psyche is united and able to be observed in one’s inner state. Such an inner state of serenity (disinterestedness) is not merely a concept, since it is the result of uniting one’s dual nature. True Reason has space to listen to the voice of passion, but still can hold the authentic status of rationality, as Shaftesbury states, “To help one’s-self to be convinc’d, is to prevent Reason, and bespeak Error and Delusion. But upon fair Conviction, to give our heart up to the evident side, and reinforce the Impression, this is *to help Reason heartily*” (II. 232-233).

While one is occupied by his imagination, fancy, passion or appetites, there is no space for reason to make rational decisions. Opinions which come from reason decide actions. Emotions such as “*Love and Hatred*” (III. 120) come from opinions, which can be right or wrong, such as,

...the AFFECTIONS of *Love and Hatred, Liking and Dislike*, on which the Happiness or Prosperity of the Person so much depends, being influenc’d and govern’d by OPINION; the highest *Good or Happiness* must depend on *right Opinion*, and the

highest Misery be deriv'd from *wrong*.

(III. 120)

While he contrasts *imagination/fancy* and *opinion* which is rational function, he uses them elsewhere interchangeably such as “*Fancy or Opinion of GOOD or ILL*” (III. 122), “*Imagination or Opinion*” (ibid.). However I do not think such usage demonstrates a lack of organized thinking; rather, I view it as his expression of reality. This pattern is seen not only with imagination and opinion, but with other terms too, such as in the case of imagination/fancy and reason. In the third stage, imagination/fancy and reason, or opinion become “mixt” – a harmonious oneness. One may believe that his opinion is rational, though it may be mere imagination’s disguise, so the degree of rationality depends on the person and his or her circumstances - whether they are using fancy or opinion, emotion or reason.

Reason, when it cooperates with imagination is, however, not a mere thinking or analysing ability; Shaftesbury calls it “perfect Mind” (II. 203) - it stops thinking or analysing and puts imagination under its domain. Shaftesbury states:

That there is a Power in Numbers, Harmony, Proportion, and Beauty of every kind, which naturally captivates the Heart, and raises the Imagination to an Opinion or Conceit of something *majestick* and *divine*. Whatever this Subject may be *in it-self*; we cannot help being transported with the thought of it. It inspires us with something more than ordinary, and raises us above our-selves. Without this Imagination or Conceit, *the World* wou'd be but a dull Circumstance, and *Life* a sorry Pass-time. Scarce cou'd we be said *to live*.

(III. 20)

Only when one uses her heart (feeling) and reason (opinion), that is to say *true reason*, does she know what is beautiful and good. Shaftesbury argues that “’Tis our own *Thought* which must restrain our Thinking.” He further holds that the correctness of “*the restraining Thought*” must be examined “*freely*, and out of all constraint” (III. 183).

Grean correctly holds that Shaftesbury's Reason is a unique kind: "Enthusiasm is the fulfillment of our higher potentialities as rational being – the extension of powers of reason to their highest limits. However "reason" is understood here in its broadest sense: it includes but is more than the processes of the discursive intellect. It comprehends that whole realm of common concepts that arise out of the shared life and experience of the human community."¹⁵³

There are two kinds of 'reason' - one is 'Reason' in a false sense which is affected by fancy or imagination, and the other is 'REASON' in a genuine sense which can correct the false Reason. He writes, "*Shadows of Reason rise up against REASON it-self. But if Men have once heartily espous'd the reasoning or thinking Habit; they will not easily be induc'd to lay the Practice down...*" (III. 183).

Nevertheless, I argue that there is no contradiction in his statements. There is clear evidence that he opposes Imagination and passion only in the case where Imagination and passion form an interested desire to possess the object of beauty. In cases where Imagination and passion form disinterested pleasure regarding the object, he praises Imagination as well as Reason. Shaftesbury's criterion for judging true or false, beautiful or ugly, imaginative or fanatic, rational or irrational, is based on whether or not the object or idea comes from the inner eye – that is to say, the innate knowledge to judge beauty with a contemplative and a disinterested mental state. The key is not the object, but how the person looks at the object. One person judges the object as beautiful because of interest in using the object, but another person judges the same object as beautiful because of disinterestedness regarding the object,

¹⁵³ Stanley Grean, *Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics*. New York: Ohio UP, 1967 p. 259.

and in this case only the latter knows beauty in the genuine sense.

The highest level of terms such as Beauty, Natural Affection, and Enthusiasm, is not only the realization of the genuine state of each, but also in the realization of a disinterested mental state, in the experience of beauty, or in society when helping others, or through the realization of one's dreams and hopes without self-interest, because one finds a vocation to enjoy ideal beauty and good.

Truly beautiful works of art are the result of a reciprocal relation between the material and an artist's idea. Beauty in Appearance is not limited to works of art, but may be found in a person's life, politics, or philosophical writing. Indeed, Shaftesbury applies this aesthetic theory in his own writing since, for him, the content of *Characteristics* is dealing with how to create beauty; it is crucial to realize the appearance of beauty in the work too.

In conclusion, it is possible to see a systematical approach to the terms imagination and reason. As in the table below, Imagination and Reason are necessities when considering Works of Art (row 1). Enthusiasm (fanatical based on emotion) and Enthusiasm (dogmatic based on reason) are converted into genuine enthusiasm (row 2). Fancy and Opinion are a true rational faculty (row 3).

Table 2 Creative Process

<u>A: Sense</u>	<u>B: Reason</u>	<u>C: Sense/Reason</u>
1. Imagination (Raving)	Reason (Speculating)	Works of Art
2. Enthusiasm	Enthusiasm	Enthusiasm
3. Fancy	Opinion	Reason

Next, I demonstrate that Shaftesbury's definitions of Reason and Imagination are based on his dialectical view of three levels of Truth.

3. Three Levels of Truth

In this section, I defend my view that Shaftesbury's three levels of truth are closely connected to define Imagination and Reason as part of a dialectical approach to reach ideal beauty in a creative process of works of art and philosophy.¹⁵⁴ This connection holds because there are parallel relationships between Historical Truth and Reason, Poetical Truth and Imagination/Passion, and Moral Truth and the mixture of Reason/Imagination.¹⁵⁵

Regarding truth, Shaftesbury claims that there are three levels of truth, namely poetical, historical, and moral truth, which are important criteria of beauty in works of art and philosophy. For him, Truth in works of art means Beauty in the genuine sense:

For all Beauty is TRUTH. *True* Feature make the Beauty of a Face; and true Proportions the Beauty of Architecture; as *true* Measures that of Harmony and Musick. In Poetry, which is all Fable, Truth still is the Perfection.

(I. 89)

For creating works of art, both poetical truth and historical truth are required.

Poetical truth represents the emotional or imaginative side of humanity in works of art,

¹⁵⁴ He claims philosophical writing needs the element of poetry based on passion and imagination, as he states: "poetry (is the shrine of the most august philosophy) is the close companion of the most serious philosophy" (I. 216 fn, quoted from Isaac Casaubon in the preface on Persius' *Satires* 1605, Paris).

¹⁵⁵ Marsh claims that Shaftesbury's writing shows his dialectical view of the universe - the relation between the wholeness (Nature as divine order - unchanging and eternal) and the parts (such as Humanity - changing and temporal), and reviews Shaftesbury's theory of poetry. For Shaftesbury, philosophers and poets have the same purpose - to reveal the truth of human nature and the order of the universe, to pursue happiness. Therefore, the theory of poetry can be applied to the theory of philosophical writing. Philosophical writing needs Socratic dialogue style, assisting readers in knowing their dual nature, and such dialogue needs a poetic form, such as dramatic representation; it can be a soliloquy, or an address to others regarding our dual character - higher and lower as in virtue and vice or reason and passion. Marsh rejects the traditional view which regards Shaftesbury as an origin of sentimental benevolism in the genealogy of British moralists. This is because Shaftesbury regards the human soul as more complex - the two characteristics are separated and conflicting deeply, and emphasises that compassion is useless unless reason motivates it. I think Marsh is quite right to point out that Shaftesbury's words have many meanings due to humanity's complex character, as in 'nature' which can be "a mixture of soul and body to 'nature' as animating soul or better form, from 'nature' as the imperfect actual state of human existence to 'nature' as the just standard for controlling our basic instincts" (62). Unfortunately, he does not discuss this crucial matter in depth, but mentions it in a footnote. Robert Marsh, "Shaftesbury's Theory of Poetry: The Importance of the 'Inward Colloquy'". *ELH*, 28 (1961) pp. 54-69.

historical truth represents the rational or speculative side, and moral truth represents both the imaginative and rational sides of humanity with moral character, that is to say, “the Truth of Characters, and Nature of Mankind” (I. 91), in the works of art.

Shaftesbury claims that it is possible to have both poetical truth (imagination) and historical truth (reason) as moral truth (imagination + reason) without contradiction. He applies the same view to not only works of art, but also to ourselves, as in his concept of genuine Enthusiasm, when one realizes beauty in both the inner state and the outer world, that is to say, a man sees beauty surrounding him, but he himself is also beautiful, good, and true to his nature.¹⁵⁶

Shaftesbury defines historical truth as an event or fact described in an analytical manner. However, strictly copying facts, much as historians have tended to do, does not make a work of art beautiful or true, since an artist needs “not to bring *All Nature* into his Piece, but *a Part* only” (I. 89). In his index, as in Aristotle, he refers as “Truth, *Historical*, to give way to *Poetick* or *Probable* in *Painting*. iii.372, 3, 5” (III. 290. Index) claiming that historical truth needs to adopt the poetical method as “being govern’d not so much by *Reality*, as by *Probability*, or *plausible Appearance*, So that a Painter, who uses his Privilege or Prerogative in this respect, ought however to do it cautiously, and with discretion” (III. 228). Following Aristotle’s approach, ‘unity of action’ in *Poetics*, he claims that an artist who is painting a picture based on historical facts or actual events needs to understand the “*Whole* and *Parts*” (III. 238) of the theme of the work; this is accomplished by applying:

¹⁵⁶ There are three levels of Enthusiasm - fanatical Enthusiasm based on passion and imagination, dogmatic Enthusiasm based on rational analysis, and true Enthusiasm based on passion/imagination and reason, in which one is able to find his ultimate nature and the purpose of his life. Those three levels of Enthusiasm also correspond to the three levels of truth, three levels of good, and the three levels of beauty, as I discuss in Chapter 7.

...the Study of *moral* and *poetick Truth*: that by this means the Thoughts, Sentiments, or *Manners*, which hold the first rank in his historical Work, might appear suitable to the higher and nobler Species of Humanity in which he practis'd, to the Genius of the Age which he describ'd, and to the principle or main Action which he chose to represent.

(III. 238-239)

On the other hand, the artist should not overly emphasize passion but should highlight “the just *Simplicity*, and *Unity*, essential in a PIECE” (III. 239). If the artist cannot show the whole view of a particular event, his work is not a great historical work. Since historical truth (as well as poetical truth) is “a part of *moral Truth*” (I. 91), it describes “how Mankind, who are become so deeply interested in the Subject, have suffer'd by the want of Clearness in it” (ibid.).

As he quotes from Aristotle's *Poetics* (Ch. 9, 1451b): “Poetry is both a more philosophic and a more real (weightier) thing than history; for poetry tells rather the universal, history the particular” (I. 91), Shaftesbury regards poetry as closer to philosophy than history, following Horace's *Art of Poetry*:

The Philosophical Writings, to which our Poet in his *Art of Poetry* refers, were in themselves a kind of *Poetry*... They were either real *Dialogues*, or Recitals of such *personated Discourses*; where the Persons themselves had their Characters preserv'd thro'out; their Manners, Humours, and distinct Turns of Temper and Understanding maintain'd, according to the most exact *poetical Truth*.”

(I. 121)

There are many Truths to support Historical Truth, such as *critical Truth* or “a *Matter of nice Speculation*,” in the sense of “the Judgment and Determination of what Commentators, Translators ... and others have, on this occasion, deliver'd to us” (I. 92):

... many previous Truths are to be examin'd, and understood, in order to judg rightly of *historical Truth* ... Some *moral and philosophical Truths* there are withal so evident in themselves, that 'twou'd be easier to imagine half Mankind to have run mad, and join'd precisely in one and the same Species of Folly, than to admit any thing as *Truth*, which shou'd be advanc'd against such *natural Knowledg*,

fundamental Reason, and common Sense.”

(ibid.)

Shaftesbury defines Poetical Truth as Passion, Enthusiasm, or Imagination evidenced in works of art. Following Aristotle’s *Poetics*, he states that Truth is not limited to describing what happened, as in factual history, but *truth in the genuine sense* describes what could happen using the imagination. Though poetry is not based on fact, there is still the truth of the theme of the work: “Truth is the most powerful thing in the World, since every Fiction it-self must be govern’d by it” (I. 4). In his index, he refers as “Truth, *Poetick*, presupposes *Prognostication*. iii.354” (III. 289. Index) claiming that though willing to follow Aristotle’s “*Unity of Time and Action*” (III. 217), and even though there is no historical record that Hercules killed a lion with his own hands, he holds that “this Representation of him wou’d nevertheless be intirely conformable to *poetick Truth*; which not only admits, but necessarily presuppose *Prophecy or Prognostication*, with regard to the Actions, and Lives of Heroes and Great Men” (III. 217).

In a work of history, if one merely concentrates on what happened, moral truth or the truth of humanity would be lacking, so the historian needs to show a moral theme while describing the event or story. Likewise, in poetry, merely concentrating on feelings would produce an excess of imagination; the work also may lose historical truth in the speculative description of facts, so one needs a moral theme describing the passion, dreams, and the imagination. In the index, the author provides examples of the Poetical, as below:

Poetical Enthusiasm. i. 21. *Poetical Genius*. i. 161 *Poetical Imitation*. i. 193, &c.
Poetical Truth. See Truth.

(III. 281. Index)

Poetical Enthusiasm in the quoted part is praised in comparison to the fanatic or dogmatic Enthusiasm of his time. In particular, ancient poets with “Fancy and Humour of Versification; but in particular that most extravagant Passion of Love ... in its Heathenish Dress of VENUS’ and CUPID” are more acceptable to Shaftesbury. He suggests that “We shou’d have Field-Conventicles of Lovers and Poets: Forests wou’d be fill’d with romantick Shepherds and Shepherdesses; and Rocks resound with Echoes of Hymns and Praises offer’d to the Powers of Love” (I. 14).

Poetical Genius refers to great poets who gain inspiration from nature (I. 101), and *Poetical Imitation* in philosophy should exhibit the “Rules of Art” such as *Mimes* describing “*Dramatical Imitation*” (I. 121). And in *Poetical Truth*, the author directs readers to go to ‘Truth’ - the various truths I discussed in the previous section. All these examples indicate that Shaftesbury uses ‘Poetical’ in the sense of the creative power of works of art. Shaftesbury claims that as well as poetry, philosophical writings should follow ‘particular Rules of Art’ (ibid.), that is to say, the “*Art of Poetry*” (ibid.); he advocates following poetical truth by a Socratic dialogue style or soliloquy which shows truth, or which teaches “us to know *Our-selves*” (ibid.), in a dramatic setting with various personae, as Socrates often speaks as though he is an actor, to guide others to self-awareness. Regarding Plato’s works, he states:

’Twas not enough that these Pieces treated fundamentally or *Morals*, and in consequence pointed our *real Characters* and *Manners*: They exhibited ’em *alive*, and set the Countenances and Complexions of Men plainly in view. And by this means they not only taught Us to know *Others*; but what was principal and of highest virtue in ’em, they taught us to know *Our-selves*.

(ibid.)

In *Moralists*, he follows “his own Rules,” by which he means following poetical truth based

on imagination, with dialogues and soliloquys. On the other hand, he applies the term “Methodick” with some hint of regret to describe *Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit* (III. 175), concerning historical truth based on speculative and analytical writing style, as in conventional philosophy writings.

Imagination is necessary for not only creating works of art or writing philosophy, but also for cultivating the self. Besides Socratic conversations, Shaftesbury recommends soliloquy (since he feels there are at least two people in each individual ¹⁵⁷) in nature by which the person “carrys on the business of *Self-dissection*” between “two distinct Persons” (I. 100).

Specifically, he suggests we “retire into some thick Wood, or rather take the Point of some high Hill” (I. 101). He explores this practice in his writings, following his concept of poetical truth, which can be practiced in the form of dialogue or soliloquy.¹⁵⁸ However, he is aware that just as a person who is talking to himself may be regarded as mad, an author who is talking to himself in his work may likewise be regarded as mad. Nevertheless, Shaftesbury calls himself a “MONOLOGIST, or *self-discoursing* Author” (III. 113. fn).

WHILST I am thus penning a *Soliloquy* in form, I can’t forbear reflecting on my Work. And when I view the Manner of it with a familiar Eye; I am readier, I find, to make my-self on this occasion, than to suppose I am in good earnest about a Work of consequence. ‘What! Am I to be thus fantastical? ... ‘What! Talk to my-self like some *Madman*, in different Persons, and under different Characters?’ ‘Undoubtedly; or ’twill be soon seen who is a *real Madman*, and change *Character* in earnest, without knowing how to help it.’

(I. 198)

Artists need some level of fantasy, and Shaftesbury claims “Poets are Fanaticks too”

¹⁵⁷ For his theory of first and second characters in individuals, see chapter 2.1 Three Levels of Magical Glass.

¹⁵⁸ For his concept of soliloquy, see chapter 2.1 Three Levels of Magic Glass.

(I. 32); however, an excess of imagination or fancy (Shaftesbury uses the two words interchangeably (I. 117)) may lead the person to become mad or a fanatic.¹⁵⁹ Fanatics or panicked enthusiasts ¹⁶⁰ may have an excess of imagination which is “so inflam’d, as in a moment to have burnt up every Particle of Judgement and Reason” (I. 28). Thus, Imagination or Fancys need to be controlled by reason at some level, as he states:

...as long as we enjoy a MIND, as long as we have *Appetites* and *Sense*, the *Fancys* of all kinds will be hard at work ... The Question is, Whether [the Fancys] shall have [the field] wholly to themselves; or whether they shall acknowledge some *Controuler* or *Manager*. If none; ’tis this, I fear, which leads to *Madness*. ’Tis this, and nothing else, which can be call’d *Madness*, or *Loss of Reason*. For if FANCY be left judg of any thing, she must be Judg of all. Every-thing is right, if anything be so, because *I fancy it*.

(I. 198)

A work of art is beautiful if it presents the unity of the objects to the whole. Artists gain inspiration from nature, and when they paint they imitate it to represent the harmonious relation between parts and the whole, as he states:

A Painter, if he has any Genius, understands the *Truth* and Unity of Design; and knows he is even then unnatural, when he follows Nature too close, and strictly copyes *Life*. For his Art allows him not to bring *All Nature* into his Piece, but a *Part* only. However, his Piece, if it be beautiful, and carrys *Truth*, must be a *Whole*, by itself, compleat, independent, and withal as *great* and comprehensive as he can make it. So that Particulars, on this occasion, must yield to the general Design; and all things be subservient to that which is principal: in order to form a certain *Easiness of Sight*; a simple, clear, and *united View*, which wou’d be broken and disturb’d by the Expressions of any thing peculiar of distinct.

(I. 89)

Shaftesbury states that artists should represent natural forms, taken from “real life,” in such

¹⁵⁹ Imagination in a genuine sense, which contributes to creating beauty, good, and truth in works of art is “just imagination” (I. 210) or “high imaginations” (I. 224). On the other hand, Imagination in a false sense is “ridiculous Imagination” (I. 82) or “vulgar imagination” (I. 204).

¹⁶⁰ For various enthusiasts, see Chapter 5.3 Enthusiasm

a way as to make their works natural, true, and beautiful:

Of all other Beautys which *Virtuosos* pursue, *Poets* celebrate, *Musicians* sing, and *Architects* or *Artists*, of whatever kind, describe or form; the most delightful, the most engaging and pathetick, is that which is drawn from real *Life*, and drawn from the *Passions*. Nothing affects the Heart like that which is purely *from it-self*, and of *its own nature*; such as *the Beauty of Sentiments, the Grace of Actions, the Turn of Characters, and the Proportions and Features of a human Mind.*

(I. 85)

For him, imitating Nature does not mean copying it exactly as it is; the painter, for example, needs to express the truth of the subject by showing the entire view of the painting through the cooperating parts, and this is representation of beauty, good, and truth in a work of art. Shaftesbury sees *Characteristics* as containing moral truth, with a combination of poetical truth - as in his writing style, and historical truth - as in his philosophical concepts based on reason, though they are described in the form of poetical truth. However, Poetical Truth is more important than Historical Truth in works of art, including philosophical writings. He states that the author needs to “understand *Poetical* and *Moral* TRUTH” (I. 207).

He distinguishes himself from religious fanatics or mad persons because his intent is to help readers who may not know themselves, through applying dialogue and soliloquy as a form of self-cultivation. *Characteristics* is a book to show the three levels of truth - imagination or fancies in the character of poetry (poetical truth), speculative and minute description of the nature of things (historical truth) following his own aesthetic theory, and beauty with moral conduct appealing both to his readers’ imagination and reason.

Poetical/Historical truth is a necessity to reach Moral or Philosophical Truth because philosophy should include poetry (imagination) plus history (fact), a combination which reveals truths about humanity. Shaftesbury recognizes a need to appeal to both sides of humanity- imagination and reason, or fancies and speculation; thus, truth in a work of art

needs to be both poetical, based on imagination, and historical, based on fact.

Shaftesbury defines moral truth as right moral conduct resulting from the combination of poetical and historical truth, or Reason and Imagination achieving their roles without excess. Moral Truth and Beauty are often used interchangeably: “the most natural Beauty in the World is Honesty, and moral Truth” (I. 89). Truth needs to be morally good, beautiful, and natural. A great poet is a great historian, and a great historian is a great poet, since they are able to appeal to both the imagination and reason of readers. A real poet or a real philosopher must be able to describe the facts or the story, but should not attempt too many things at once; one message at a time is enough for readers. Shaftesbury regards the visual artist as more restricted than the poet in representing only one theme. As he states, with regard to

a real History-Painter, the same Knowledge, the same Study, and Views, are requir'd, as in a real *Poet*. Never can the *Poet*, whilst he justly holds that name, become a *Relator*, or *Historian* at large. He is allow'd only to describe a single Action; not the Actions of a single Man, or People. The Painter is a Historian at the same rate....

(III. 237)

In Shaftesbury's view, the characteristics of Poetical Truth are Imagination-centered, and involve Raving and Enthusiasm (Fanatics); the characteristics of Historical Truth are Reason-entered, and involve Speculating and Enthusiasm (Dogmatists); and the characteristics of Moral Truth are Imagination/Reason-centered, and involve both Raving and Speculating, and Enthusiasm in a genuine sense.

Because of this structure, I claim that Shaftesbury's Imagination and Reason do not contradict in their important roles in appreciating and creating beauty. He is not a mere dilettante, but a philosopher, as evidenced through his presenting and defending the three

levels of aesthetic and moral truth, a process minutely connected with his concept of Imagination, Reason, and Reason in the genuine sense. My conclusion for this section may be summarized in the following table:

Table 3 Three Levels of Truth in Works of Art

A: Poetical Truth	B: Historical Truth	C: Moral Truth
1. Imagination	Reason	REASON
2. Raving	Speculating	Works of Art
3. Enthusiasts (Fanatics)	Enthusiasts (Dogmatists)	Enthusiasts ¹⁶¹

Poetical Truth is characterized as Imagination, Raving, or Fanatics in the case of the excess of each, as in column A. Historical Truth is characterized as Reason, Speculating, or Dogmatists in the case of the excess of each, as in column B. Moral Truth is characterized as Reason in the genuine sense, Works of Art, and Enthusiasts in the genuine sense, which contain both poetical (imagination) and historical (reason) truth, as in column C. Reason in the genuine is experienced by Imagination and Reason in the sense of speculative thought (row 1), and Raving is a necessity for the Works of Art (row 2). However, Raving or Imagination can lead to the madness of fanatics too (row 3).

Enthusiasm is applicable to the three levels of truth, as fanatic Enthusiasm is based on passion/imagination, dogmatic Enthusiasm is based on reason, and genuine Enthusiasm is based on both passion/imagination and reason without conflict, as in the disinterested mental state. Reason, which could be natural or negatively viewed as lacking proper judgement, is described as *dry* or *cool* reason¹⁶² in the sense of the analytic tendency,

¹⁶¹ There are three levels of Enthusiasts - Fanatics, Dogmatists, and Enthusiasts in a genuine sense who experience beauty, good, and truth in their lives. For the details, see Chapter 7.

¹⁶² Speculative thought is described as “dry and rigid” (I. 160), “dry sober Reason” (II. 132), and “cool Reason” (II. 203).

compared to REASON which puts imagination under its supervision in a cooperative relationship - possibly leading to the mistakes of dogmatic enthusiasts.¹⁶³ In the state of genuine Enthusiasm, one is full of passion and imagination under rational pleasure, not based on body/sense/physical desire, but based on an innate ideal of beauty and the good.

As well as three levels of truth, there are three levels of natural affection; sensual affection, rational affection, and sensuous/rational affection, which motivate moral conduct, as I detail in Chapter 6. Sensual affection is based on Passion/Imagination; Rational affection is based on Reason; when both affections cooperate well, they result in Natural affection in a genuine sense. Also, regarding beauty, as I detail in Chapter 5, there are three levels of beauty; the first order of beauty based on sense/passion/imagination; the second order of beauty based on reason; and the third order or the highest beauty on the earth which results when the first and the second orders of beauty cooperate well.

In the following section, I further argue that Shaftesbury's *Characteristics* is not a mere fanciful essay, but a philosophical work, by systematically examining his three levels of manners.

4. Three Levels of Manners

Regarding Manners ¹⁶⁴ of philosophical writings, Shaftesbury claims that there are three levels of Manners - Poetical, Methodical, and Miscellaneous. In this section, I defend my view that the three levels of Truth, which I previously analysed, are closely connected to

¹⁶³ For the dogmatic enthusiasts, see Chapter 7.

¹⁶⁴ 'Manners' for Shaftesbury is Manners of life, of how to live well, as he when he supports, "an *invariable, agreeable, and just* TASTE in Life and Manners" (III. 114). However, in this section I will deal with manners of writings.

define the three levels of Manners of writings. To defend this view, in this section, I demonstrate that Poetical Manners represents the emotional or imaginative side of humanity as well as Poetical Truth, Methodical Manner represents the rational or speculative side of humanity as well as Historical Truth, and Miscellaneous Manner which is the mixture of both Poetical and Methodical Manners represents both the imaginative and rational side of humanity as well as Moral Truth.

Methodical Manners

I argue that Historical Truth is interchangeable with Methodic Manners. This is because both Historical Truth and Methodic Manners are defined as formal, learned, speculative, and descriptive. Methodic Manners does not have the exact same meaning as Historical Truth, since the latter indicates the importance of fact; however, Shaftesbury uses the term Historical Truth in the sense of the method of any statement the author believes to be factual or true, and not limited to historical events. As well as Historical Truth, Methodic Manner is “the *learned, the formal, or methodick*” (III. 15), contrary to Poetical Manners which is “the *simple Style*” (ibid.). Shaftesbury laments that modern Europeans have lost “Simplicity of Manners, and Innocence of Behaviour” (I. 217), so that their behavior has become corrupt, and displays “Deviation from Nature” (ibid.). This involves not only manners in society, but manner of writing, as he also laments the conventional philosophical writing which lacks Simple or Poetical Manners and Truth: “It has been observ’d of this *methodick or scholastic Manner*, that it naturally befitted an Author, who tho endow’d with a comprehensive and strong Genius, was not in himself of a refin’d Temper, bless’d by the Graces, or favour’d by any Muse...” (I. 159).

The Methodic Manner also existed in the ancients among sophists: “For ... the

SOPHISTS of elder time had treated many subjects *methodically*, and *in form*” (ibid.).

However, the ancients used more Poetic Manner than the moderns do. The moderns are more “effeminate” (II. 106) than the ancients, who were rational in the genuine sense. It is, Shaftesbury holds,

... a real Disadvantage of our modern Conversations; that by such as scrupulous Nicety they lose those masculine Helps of Learning and sound Reason.... And whatever *Politeness* we may pretend to, ‘tis more a Disfigurement than any real Refinement of Discourse, to render in thus delicate.

(II.106)

He laments: “why we Moderns, who abound so much in *Treatises* and *Essays*, are so sparing in the way of DIALOGUE; which heretofore was found the politest and best way of managing even the graver Subjects” (II. 106).

*Politeness*¹⁶⁵ in a genuine sense is not a mere ceremonial manner. It needs to be “Politeness in the higher Arts” (I. 148) to realize true beauty and true goodness. A polite manner means a moral or virtuous manner, which is not easy to attain since it is not merely outer behavior, but comes from the inner beauty and goodness of the person. Shaftesbury writes, “Politeness of every kind, can come only from the Trial and Experience of what is best” (I. 7). There are, he claims, three levels of politeness - *effeminate* politeness which is gentle and sensible, *masculine* politeness with “natural Roughness” and “sound Reason” (II. 106), and “true Politeness” (ibid.). False politeness which tends to have an excess of either

¹⁶⁵ According to Klein, *politeness* represents Shaftesbury’s ideological thought (critiques of contemporary politics, church, court, philosophy) as the core of Shaftesbury’s socio-political thought, formed for the Whig politics at that time. The ‘politeness’, which means cultivated conversation style, is used by Shaftesbury not only to refer to ‘polite conversation’ but also ‘polite art’, ‘polite behaviour’, ‘polite learning’, ‘polite reading’, ‘polite writing’, and ‘polite age’. Generally, a cultivated person’s behaviour and thought is ‘polite’. Shaftesbury often uses ‘politeness’ and ‘moral’ interchangeably. Politeness leads people to gain freedom of speech, criticism, and form a religiously and politically tolerant society on the foundation of moral philosophy. Lawrence E. Klein. *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 4-5.

effeminate or masculine politeness causes ‘the Corruption or wrong Use of Pleasantry and Humour’ (I. 46). Thus, in addition to beauty and goodness, politeness is an expression of one’s nature, goodness, and beauty in a genuine sense, but politeness which lacks moral goodness is lacking liberty: “All Politeness is owing to Liberty” (I. 42), and “...want of Liberty may account for want of a true Politeness” (I. 46). Only real politeness is morally good and beautiful.

An excess of methodical manner can lead to an effeminate polite manner. Though methodical manner is reason-based manner, if it is too strong it is not “sound Reason” but the disguise of fancy, imagination, or sense. Real politeness means showing the true self, but, Shaftesbury claims, moderns are afraid of showing themselves because they know they are not beautiful and good.

Poetical Manners

I hold that the term Poetical Manners represents the emotional or imaginative side of humanity as well as Poetical Truth, and that Poetical Manners and Poetical Truth are interchangeable. The Poetical Manner is a simple or innocent manner, and is unceremonious. It asks questions directly in philosophical writing, especially as seen in ancient times when philosophers like Socrates were able to ask philosophical questions on the street to persons of high rank:

... a poor Philosopher, of a mean figure, accosts one of the powerfulest, wittiest, handsomest, and richest Noblemen of the time, as he is walking leisurely towards the Temple. “You are going then ... to pay your Devotions yonder at the Temple?” “I am so.” “But with an Air methinks, as if some thought perplex’d you” “What is there in the Case which shou’d perplex one?” “The Thought perhaps of your Petitions, and the Consideration what Vows you had best offer to the Deity.” “Is that so difficult? Can any one be so foolish as to ask of Heaven what is not his *Good*?” ... Whilst I am copying this, (for ’tis no more indeed than a borrow’d Sketch from one of those Originals...) I see a thousand Ridicules arising from the Manner, the Circumstances

and Action it-self, compar'd with modern Breeding and Civility. (I. 126)

The birth of poetry is also the birth of philosophy, since philosophy was born with the style of poetry - dialogue with dramatic characters: “ ’TIS PLEASANT enough to consider how exact the resemblance was between the Lineage of *Philosophy* and that of *Poetry*” (I. 157). Shaftesbury praises Plato ¹⁶⁶ as “*the grand poetick SIRE*” whose “Dialogues were real POEMS” (I. 158), presenting Poetical Truth or Poetical Manners which reach readers’ hearts.

However, he comments that there is, in his own time, a “plain Dilemma against that antient manner of Writing, which we can neither well imitate, nor translate” (I. 127), because politeness is such an important part of contemporary culture. He comments,

If we avoid Ceremony, we are unnatural: if we use it, and appear as we naturally are, as we salute and meet, and treat one another, we hate the Sight – What’s this but *hating our own Faces*? Is it the *Painter’s Fault*? Shou’d he paint falsly, or affectedly; mix Modern with Antient, join Shapes preposterously, and betray his Art? If not; what Medium is there? ... THUS Dialogue is at an end. The Antients cou’d see their own Faces; but we can’t Our commerce and manner of Conversation, which we think the politest imaginable, is such, it seems, as we our-selves can’t endure to see represented to the Life. (I. 127)

Shaftesbury notes that his contemporaries tend to avoid the dialogue style of self-reflection, and even when they do employ such an approach, it is not as effective as the Ancients’ way. The Moderns value a *polite manner* which tends to avoid asking questions without preliminaries, and they tend to avoid talking candidly. Therefore, they have difficulty searching for and revealing their true nature. As well as Poetical Truth, he

¹⁶⁶ Though Plato defines poetry as mere imitation in *the Republic*, Shaftesbury holds that Plato did not deny the power of poetry since Plato himself was a great poet: “the man who vilified others in general, who while in his *Republic* he rejected Homer and imitative poetry, himself wrote dialogues in imitative style” (I. 158. fn).

recommends soliloquy to examine the self by Poetical Manners; however, soliloquy in public, like Socratic dialogue, is unacceptable to conventional, Methodical Manners. Thus, he recommends going into nature where no one is listening to us.

In Shaftesbury's view, the Moderns tend to explain the complexity of thought systematically and logically, but at the expense of simplicity, and the result does not reach one's feeling or sentiment; thus, philosophy became a mere subject to study at school, something unrelated to daily life. Shaftesbury rejects this way of writing, and chooses a third way – neither the Ancients' nor the Moderns' way, but an aesthetic way (which he regards as a truly philosophical way) or the “MISCELLANEOUS *Manner* of the polite Antients” (III. 15).

The debate at his time regarding the superiority of ancients or moderns represents humanity's dual character. For example, Dryden in *Of Dramatic Poesy* (1668)¹⁶⁷ compares the ancients - represented by the French with the use of rhyme, and the moderns - represented by the English with blank verse. The Ancients, Shaftesbury contends, had a naïve and simple character and manner in expressing whatever they wanted to say. While Shaftesbury regards Socratic dialogue as an ideal form of philosophical quest, he admits that the frank and simple manner of the Ancients would be difficult to imitate for the Moderns, who are familiar with more refined manners (I. 126). He understands that the Moderns cannot return to the Ancients' way without being rude or incomprehensible. The Moderns need an artful skill to express their feelings. In modern times, therefore, to express ourselves takes more time and requires more words than was the case for the Ancients.

¹⁶⁷ Dryden, John. *Of Dramatic Poetry and Other Critical Essays*. Vol. I & II. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1967.

Shaftesbury calls true reason ‘strong Reason’ (II. 106) which is not overpowered by sense - characteristic of the Ancients, but something the Moderns have lost. It is not possible to go back to the ancient way exactly, but it is possible to have strong reason by means of an artistic manner, that is to say, by improving moral and aesthetic taste.

The Moderns with their polite manner avoid the dialogue style of writing to reflect themselves because they do not want to see their true faces. As mentioned above,

Shaftesbury states:

The Antients cou’d see their own Faces; but we can’t. And why this? Why, but because we have less Beauty: for so our Looking-Glass can inform us. – Ugly Instrument! And for this reason to be hated. – Our Commerce and manner of Conversation, which we think the politest imaginable, is such, it seems, as we ourselves can’t endure to see represented to the Life.

(I. 127)

Modern writers, using description, tend to fail in revealing their characters, according to Shaftesbury. Lacking adequate explanation, their dramatis personae do not show who they truly are, while the authors maintain a polite manner regarding those figures. A painter may create a painting in which viewers can recognize and distinguish persons, “so in the same manner that Writer, whoever he be, among us Moderns, who shall venture to bring his Fellow-Moderns into *Dialogue*, must introduce ‘em in their proper Manners, Genius, Behaviour and Humour. And this is the *Mirrou* or *Looking-Glass* above described” (I. 126). The Glass can tell if the person is *beautifying* on either the material side (physical pleasure, physical appearance, fame, status, money, and possessions) or the mental side (mental pleasure, philosophy, or knowledge without action), or both sides. It is by the practice of self-examination that one sees one’s beauty.

Since Truth to create Beauty is the same as Manners to create Beauty, Shaftesbury

uses *Truth* and *Manners* interchangeably in *Characteristics*, and it is clear that he is very conscious of the use of *Manners* and *Truth*, as can be seen in his index; in the section on ‘*Manners*’ he writes:

Manners: Poetic Manners and Truth. iii. 260, &c. *See Poet, Truth.*
(III. 274 Index).

When we follow the first reference to page iii. 260, we find “the Knowledge of what is call’d POETICK MANNERS, and TRUTH” (III. 160-161) - important elements writers need to have. Following his note in the index “See Poet”, readers discover:

Poet: Character of a Poet and Poetry Strabo. i. 208, 252. *Poet, second Maker.* i. 207.
Poet, Herald of Fame. i. 225. *Ill Poets worse than ill Painters.* i. 225, 6
(III. 281 Index)

In those references, he is dealing with *Manners* of the poet; he quotes from Strabo, saying that poetry is not mere imitation since the subject is not “senseless Stone or Timber, without Life, Dignity, or Beauty: whilst the poet’s Art turning principally on Men and *Manners*, he has his Virtue and Excellence” (I. 129 fn), that is to say, the poet’s personality and his action (in this case his manners of writing) make him not only a great poet, but a morally just person.

In the same index, readers are suggested to reference “*Poet, second Maker.* i. 207” (ibid.), where he is also discussing the importance of the *Manners* of a real poet, who “can describe both *Men* and *Manners*, and give to an Action its just Body and Proportions.... Such a Poet is indeed a second Maker; a just PROMETHEUS....” (I. 129). The next note in the index “*Poet, Herald of Fame.* i. 225” is likewise dealing with a great poet or “the signal *Poet, or Herald of Fame*” who is most suitable to record “the Achievements of its *Civil* and

Military Heroes” (I. 138) more than the “disinterested *Historian*” (ibid.). The last note in the index of ‘Poet’ is “Ill Poets worse than ill Painters. i. 225,6” – where he discusses the danger that a bad poet may “disgrace the Subject” (I. 140). By such references, the author is indicating the importance of a poet’s moral manner and truth, which affects not only individuals, but whole nations.

The appearance of beauty needs to be natural although it is artfully made; works of art which imitate Nature should hide any artificial characteristics of their appearance. The end of art is *naturalness in appearance*, as he states:

The Simple Manner, which being the strictest Imitation of Nature, shou’d of right be the completest, in the Distribution of its Parts, and Symmetry of its Whole, is yet so far from making any ostentation of Method, that it conceals the Artifice as much as possible: endeavouring only to express the effect of Art, under the appearance of the greatest Ease and Negligence. And even when it assumes the censuring or reproving part, it does it in the most conceal’d and gentle way.

(I. 160)

The appearance of the object is what an artist/writer makes, but it is also something which a viewer/reader makes. In Shaftesbury, *appearance* is not the first thing which comes to us - it is the last thing, whatever is left after we perceive and judge the object.

Thus, I conclude that Shaftesbury uses Poetical Manners and Poetical Truth interchangeably. Because the moderns do not want to see their genuine personalities, instead of a Poetical Manner they prefer a Methodical Manner, which is speculative and formal, as discussed in the next section.

Miscellaneous Manners

I claim that Moral Truth is interchangeable with Miscellaneous Manners. This is because, for Shaftesbury, Moral Truth is the combination of Historical and Poetical Truth - using both without conflict, and Miscellaneous Manners is the result of combination of

Methodical and Poetical Manners - using both without conflict.¹⁶⁸ How can we apply Poetical Manners from Imagination and Methodical Manners from Reason? His answer is Miscellaneous Manners, in which he shows speculative or philosophical concepts through Poetical Manners, that is to say, the style of dialogues and soliloquy with dramatic characters, as he himself does in *Characteristics*.¹⁶⁹

For Shaftesbury, Manner and Truth must be applied or practiced not only in works of art, but in philosophical writings, aesthetics, and ethics. As a sculptor shapes an object according to his theory, a philosopher needs to show his philosophical concepts in his

¹⁶⁸ Terry questions Pat Rogers' definition of 'rhapsody' in the title of *The Moralists: a Philosophical Rhapsody*. Rogers emphasises one of the meanings of the word - 'a miscellany put together without integrity' and claims that Shaftesbury could intend the contradicted meaning of 'Philosophical Rhapsody'. However, Terry states that Rogers "puts down Shaftesbury's seemingly novel endorsement of the poetic ordonnance of rhapsody to the organicist views expanded elsewhere in *The Moralists*" (p. 275), choosing too narrow a definition. Rather, Terry would choose 'Effusive expression of passion or sentiment' for the word in the title of *The Moralists*. Terry gives three reasons (pp. 275-276): 1. The former title of *the Moralists* was *Social Enthusiast: A Philosophical Adventure*. 'Sociable Enthusiast' which is also oxymoronic as in 'Philosophical Rhapsody' seems to indicate that the interchangeable meanings of 'Enthusiast' and 'Rhapsody' as Shaftesbury uses 'enthusiasm', 'passion' and 'romance' as the opposite of 'philosophy' in *the Moralists*. 2. It is very clear that the climax of *the Moralists* is Theocles' sentimental comments on nature's beauty, which is 'rhapsodic'. 3. In *Miscellaneous Reflections*, Shaftesbury describes formless work which lacks unity: "T'is a mere rhapsody, not a work" (II. 160 fn). However, I think Rogers' view is correct, not Terry's. This is because 1. Shaftesbury often intends two meanings for the words, and when he chose 'Philosophical Rhapsody' he could well be aware of the positive (sentimental expression) and negative (made miscellaneous) meanings of the word. 2. Terry ignores Rogers' comment on 'rhapsody' which could change the meaning at the time, depending on if it is used as a root noun as 'rhapsody' (often means negative- a planless work put together) or derivatives such as 'rhapsodic' or 'rhapsodical' (often with a positive meaning - as sentimental effusion). When Shaftesbury states that the lack of unity indicates a work is "a mere rhapsody, not a work"- 'rhapsody' is a root noun and he is indeed implying a negative meaning, as in a disorganised work. 3. Unlike Rogers, Terry does not see the connection between Shaftesbury's words and his systematic view of the universe as a unity of conflicted parts. Terry, Richard. "The Rhapsodical Manner in the Eighteenth Century." *The Modern Language Review*, 87 (1992) pp. 273-285.

¹⁶⁹ Prince sees Shaftesbury as "a Janus-faced being" (p. 25) or "a split figure, torn between emancipation and control" (p. 28); on one hand, Shaftesbury regards the classical writers, their rules, and models of unity as his standard, while on the other hand he advocates skepticism, comic ridicule, tolerance, and a variety of genres when dealing with current issues. According to Prince, first, he intended to show Socratic dialogue to contrast both opinions, and second, he sought the answer to reconcile the duality of human nature into the area of aesthetics – based on the classical concept of beauty. Shaftesbury's response is to develop a concept of the aesthetics and ordered forms of the plastic arts, and connect this to ethics. Prince notes that in *The Moralists*, Shaftesbury wrote a dialogue about how philosophical dialogue should be presented, a mirror of a utopian world, in which nature, coherence, and unity is praised. Dialogue mirrors and synthesizes nature and the self – through private soliloquy or inner dialogue. Prince sees Shaftesbury's use of the letter form and its combination with dialogic writing as a precursor for early novelists. Michael Prince, *Philosophical dialogue in the British Enlightenment: Theology, aesthetics, and the novel*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

writing itself, with regard to the theory of beauty and good. Philosophical writing should have moral character, that is to say, have a more practical end, with an educational purpose to reveal the readers' selves, persuading both reason and feeling, answering to demands of readers both for learning and play. Philosophy must be a pleasurable means to assist in living morally; thus, Shaftesbury goes against the academic style of writing in philosophy:

In reality, how specious a Study, how solemn an Amusement is rais'd from what we call *Philosophical Speculations!* – *The Formation of Ideas!* – their *Compositions, Comparisons, Agreement, and Disagreement!* – What can have a better Appearance, or bid fairer for *genuine* and *true* PHILOSOPHY?

(I. 185)

In Shaftesbury's view, the great ancient philosophers applied their literary criticism to their own writing, and he has in mind such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle, "whose *critical* Pieces lie intermixt with their profound *philosophical* Works, and other politer Tracts ornamentally writ, for publick use" (III. 172). Likewise, Shaftesbury notes that some modern writers such as Boileau and Corneille "apply'd their *Criticism* with just Severity, even to their own Works" (III. 239). However, it is difficult, he contends, to find such writers - who apply critical theory to their own writings - among contemporary English authors, since if they did they "wou'd discover 'em to be wholly deform'd and disproportionable" (ibid.). Shaftesbury is ambitious enough to be regarded as such a "critical Genius" (ibid.) to guide people to learn Taste by his writings, and brave enough to apply the theory of Taste itself.

There are always twofold structures in *Characteristics* – regarding the theory of Beauty and the Moral, and application, in which he practices the theory at the same time. However, the practice of his theory is accomplished by his un-orthodox style of writing. As Socrates did, Shaftesbury intends to help readers criticize and judge what he writes, and

therefore he does not mind criticism. Shaftesbury claims “*Order and Method*” (III. 82) in his writings, and defends his writings by referring to himself in the third person in *Miscellaneous Reflections*, as when he writes that “... he has something of his own still in reserve, and holds a certain *Plan* or System peculiar to him-self, or such, at least, in which he has at present but few Companions or Followers” (ibid.). There are some clear indications in his writing implying what his true intention is. For example, he writes – in reference to himself: “He has given only some few, and very slender Hints of going further, or attempting to erect any Scheme or Model, which may discover his Pretence to a real *Architect-Capacity*” (ibid.).

As a solution to the difficulty of applying the Poetical Manner in an era of Methodical Manner, he claims that in his writings “the author” (Shaftesbury himself) intends to “carry the refin’d Manner and accurate SIMPLICITY of the Antients ... attempt to unite his Philosophy in one solid and uniform Body, nor carry on his Argument in one continu’d Chain or Thred. Here our Author’s Timorousness is visible...” (III. 176).

Shaftesbury, again referring to himself in the third person, acknowledges that *Letter Concerning Enthusiasm*, *Sensus Communis*, and *Soliloquy* do not clearly reveal his true intention and opinion: “...what he offers by way of Project or Hypothesis, is very faint, hardly spoken aloud; but mutter’d to himself, in a kind of dubious Whisper...” (III. 83). He acknowledges that in the three treatises, “What he discovers of Form and Method, is indeed so accompany’d with the random *Miscellaneous Air*, that it may pass for Raillery, rather than good Earnest” (III. 84). However, he calls himself “a plain *Dogmatist*, a *Formalist*, and *Man of Method*; with his Hypotheses tack’d to him, and his Opinions so close-sticking, as wou’d force one to call to mind the Figure of some precise and strait-lace’d Professor in a

University” (ibid.) regarding his *Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit*. Indeed, he disliked *Virtue and Merit* because of its relatively clear order and method.

Thus, Shaftesbury proposes a Miscellaneous Manner - an aesthetic “Revolution in Letters” (III. 5), which he writes would be as fruitful as a well-cultivated garden (III. 4). The Miscellaneous Manner, true to the name, is a “*complex* manner of Performance” (III. 6), but also shows “Simplicity and Conformity of Design” (III. 5) as a fabric is made of colour, a “*Patch-work* is substituted. *Cuttings* and *Shreds* of Learning, with various *Fragments*, and *Points* of Wit, are drawn together, and tack’d in any fantastic form” (ibid.), and it is “neither Top nor Bottom, Beginning nor End” (III. 7).

Although he has employed this Miscellaneous metaphor through other treatises, his naming the last five treatises *Miscellaneous Reflections* (the longest work – one third of *Characteristics*) is a declaration which clearly reveals the manner of his writing. Otherwise, the content of *Reflections* is quite similar to that of his other essays regarding his aesthetical and moral theory as applied to various subjects. Shaftesbury states that “*miscellaneous Taste*” (III. 7) has been applied by craftsmen, poets, and dramatists. For example, as various stiches are put together to make a patch-work, or a farce inserted between the main scenes of a tragedy on the stage results in theatrical refreshment, he intends to pursue “the Ingenious way of MISCELLAENOUS Writing” (III. 3) - the most effective way to show beauty and grace in his writing. Here we should note that this Miscellaneous manner is not only participating as manner, but it is participating as an important component or concept in his three levels of truth.

Shaftesbury holds that his Miscellaneous Manner has Moral Truth, and applies his aesthetic theory to his writings in a deliberate way. He does not write in what he would

regard as a *false* aesthetic way, where the parts are precisely described in an orderly manner but without agreement with the whole, but writes in a *genuine* aesthetic way, where the parts are described in agreement with the entire theme, i.e., a poetical way to describe truth. If poets or critics do not practice their theory of art it is a contradiction, not a mere mistake, and they must be aware that what they are doing is wrong. The problem is not that they lack wit, but quite possibly they lack “*plain HONESTY, MANNERS, and a Sense of that MORAL TRUTH*” (III. 173). It is poetical, but also historical since *Characteristics* has a certain method and system; thus, the work has moral truth.

Shaftesbury crafted his writing as if parts were not intentionally put together, but when viewed as a whole, they may be seen as natural and harmonious. He thus claims *the artfulness of philosophy*; that is to say, philosophy needs to be treated as art, as every aspect of moral life should be, and a philosopher needs to be a *writing-artist* who practices his theory in his actions, including his writings, in order to create beauty in daily life.

Shaftesbury is keenly aware of the manner of aesthetic representation when he is engaging with his aesthetic theory, which he applies in his writing as if he were an artist or the director of a theatre.¹⁷⁰ By what he regards as a *truly philosophical* approach, he attempts to represent beauty in a coherent way. He emphasizes the unity of the whole and the parts, which represents harmony, beauty, and truth. Regarded individually, the parts may look

¹⁷⁰ Marshall sees Shaftesbury's texts as revealing theatrical representations of a director or actor (Shaftesbury) and an audience (readers). Shaftesbury tends to address his readers in the form of letters, or in many places, he addresses his readers as if he is on the stage. This theatrical figure is Shaftesbury's way of philosophical discourse; his subject is the self - including himself, but he guides his readers to think about themselves. Marshall raises the possibility that Shaftesbury's self does not represent his true self, but a possible self - an actor on the stage - in philosophical conversation with his readers. This point of view is helpful when dealing with some inconsistencies in *Characteristics*; in this regard, his sexism may thereby be seen as representative of a particular role of an actor. David Marshall, *The Figure of Theater: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot*. New York: Columbia UP, 1986.

separated and unconnected, but as one cannot judge an entire picture by looking at only the parts, one cannot see truth and beauty disconnected. Looking closely at a large canvas makes it difficult to recognize the entire painting, but when we see the whole or unity, we realize for the first time how beautiful, organized, and coherent the work of art is.

He regards his Miscellaneous Manner as moral because of its moral/educational purpose. Most of *Characteristics* is written in the style of conversation or soliloquy except *An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit*. The free style of philosophical discourse is one of main aesthetic concepts in Shaftesbury. Ironically, because he applies this concept to his philosophical writing and chooses not to use the more conventional/systematic way of writing, he has been misunderstood, as if he does not have logical thought. However, in Shaftesbury's view, his style is more philosophical than the conventional style. He is simply applying his aesthetic theory to educate his readers' feeling and reason through *Characteristics*.

Shaftesbury writes that he applies his theory in *Characteristics* with precise attention to deliberately conceal his intent to educate his readers artfully. In this regard, he states that "the *natural* and *simple* Manner which *conceals* and *covers* ART, is the most truly *artful*, and of the genteelest, truest, and best-study'd Taste" (III. 88). He practices this theory in Miscellaneous Manner, in which his readers learn without noticing that they are learning; its core is the principle of three levels of beauty as well as three levels of manner. Shaftesbury is aware that "It may be necessary, as well now as heretofore, for wise Men to speak in *Parables*, and with a double Meaning, that the Enemy may be amus'd, and they only *who have Ears to hear, may hear*" (I. 41). Indeed, it may be thought unusual that an author masked as a Fool can say anything wise about the laws of the universe, and so he

communicates in an indirect manner.

Ironically, this teaching method, which he regards as *revolutionary*, was perhaps too successful, in that few readers see the systematic design of the book. Almost no one realizes that he had a plan, calculation, or clear awareness of his subject. Shaftesbury was abundantly skillful in practicing his theory, so that his book hardly appears philosophical at all, and thus - unfortunately, *Characteristics* has been seen as a mere critique or an example of *character writings* by a dilettante, but not as a philosophical work.

There is beauty (from the author’s point of view) in the consistency between his theoretical concepts and the practical application on his writings. Without understanding both theory and practice, one would have difficulty understanding and may overlook his rules, principles, and systems, as expressed in his writings. Those who could not see his aesthetic appearance dismissed it, and those who could see it admired *Characteristics*.

In conclusion, for the reasons detailed above, I believe that Shaftesbury’s manner of writing is based on his aesthetic theory, in conjunction with his theory of Imagination and Reason, and Raving and Speculation, or three levels of Truth, as detailed in Table 2 in the previous section. His theory of Miscellaneous manner can be viewed as in the following table:

Table 4 Theory of Miscellaneous Manner (Art of Writing)

<u>A: Beauty (the first)</u>	<u>B: Beauty (the second)</u>	<u>C: Beauty (the third)</u>
1. Poetical Truth	Historical Truth	Moral Truth
2. Imagination	Reason	BEAUTY (Third)
3. Raving	Speculating	WORKS OF ART
4. Enthusiasts (Fanatics)	Enthusiasts (Dogmatists)	ENTHUSIASTS
5. Poetical Manner	Methodical Manner	Miscellaneous Manner
6. Ancients	Moderns	Ancients/Moderns

As detailed in columns A, B, and C, there are three levels of Beauty – the first, the

second, and the third.¹⁷¹ In row 1, there are three levels of truth, as I discussed in the previous section - Poetical, Historical, and Moral Truth. Under Poetical Truth, there are Imagination, Raving, Enthusiasm (Fanatics), and Poetical Manner represented by the Ancients. Under Historical Truth, there are Reason, Speculating, Enthusiasm (Dogmatists), and Methodical Manner represented by the Moderns. Under Moral Truth, there are Beauty (third order), Works of Art, Enthusiasm in the genuine sense, and Miscellaneous Manner represented by the writers who combine the ancient and the modern approach, as Shaftesbury does.

Each term under the Third Order of Beauty (C) represents the most genuine beauty, good, and truth; thus the terms could be understood as being preceded by the adjective *true*, such as true beauty, true works of art, true Enthusiasts, and true manners. Column C is the integration of columns A and B - after the integration of Poetical and Historical Truth, we gain Moral Truth (row 1). After the integration of Imagination and Reason, we gain Beauty (row 2). After the integration of Raving and Speculation, we gain Works of Art in genuine sense (row 3). After the integration of Fanatics from Imagination and Dogmatists from Speculative Thought, we gain genuine Enthusiasm (row 4). After the integration of Poetical Manner and Methodical Manners, we gain Miscellaneous Manners (row 5). After the integration of Ancients and Moderns, we gain both ways to practice (row 6).

In the next section, I argue that Shaftesbury's concept of Disinterestedness, which

¹⁷¹ For the three levels of beauty, see Chapter 5. The First Order of Beauty expresses matter such as the objects in nature - stone, minerals, (III. 112 fn), including living organisms such as the human body. The Second Order of Beauty expresses intellectual behavior by animals and humans (ibid.). And the Third Order of Beauty expresses a combination "Mixt" of the first and the second - expressions of rational and moral conduct in society (ibid.).

has been widely researched by numerous scholars, can be connected with his footnote for the title page emblem of *Characteristics*, indicating the importance of aesthetic judgement which can show viewers multiple layers of beauty, depending on one's mental state and opinion.

5. Outward and Inward Beauty

For Shaftesbury, it takes time and trials to see the true beauty which is often hidden under the first appearance. Beauty is often found after Trials; he writes,

How long ere a true *Taste* is gain'd! How many things shocking, how many offensive at first, which after wards are known and acknowledg'd the highest *Beautys*! For 'tis not instantly we acquire the *Sense* by which these *Beautys* are discoverable. *Labour* and *Pains* are requir'd, and *Time* to cultivate a natural *Genius*, ever so apt or forward.

(II. 224)

Why is discovering beauty difficult? Shaftesbury argues that beauty in the genuine sense is seen through the inner eye. The inner eye is a disinterested mental function or ability to see beauty in what is good and true. He uses the inward or outward terminology in various aesthetic/moral concepts, such as 'inward/outward beauty', 'inward/outward freedom', and 'inward/outward character' throughout *Characteristics*. In this section, I discuss how the inward or outward view is integral to Shaftesbury's aesthetic and moral theory:

1. The Inward/Outward view helps in understanding his concept of appearance; that is to say, beauty depends on our state of mind. Thus, the appearance of an object may be beautiful to some, but may not be for others.

2. The Inward/Outward view helps in understanding his style of writing - which he calls miscellaneous, since he applies the theory of appearances in his writing style.

3. The Inward/Outward view helps in understanding his concept of disinterestedness.¹⁷²

Inward beauty is disinterested, moral, and true. Inwardness is important in judging true beauty (the Third Order of Beauty).¹⁷³

In Shaftesbury there are two ways to perceive beauty – by an inward and an outward approach, I claim that this inward/outward view greatly assists in the understanding of

¹⁷² Glauser holds that Shaftesbury describes a hierarchy of degrees of beauty, culminating in the infinite form or God, and disinterested love is more important in the aesthetic experience of being a morally good person, since disinterested pleasure leads to the experience of higher beauty (higher love) toward any object or God. Beauty parallels morality for Shaftesbury, and the discernment of virtue follows the pattern for discerning beauty; both the intellect and emotions are involved when the consciousness reflects on issues of beauty or morality with disinterested love or (positive) enthusiasm (p. 47) of any beautiful object or God, a process which leads us to become more virtuous persons. Glauser holds that an aesthetic experience means contemplating disinterested love toward beautiful objects, and the innate sense needs to be cultivated (as some people who are not trained to see genuine beauty would experience pleasure on beholding only objects of lower beauty). He also sees hierarchical relationships between two kinds of (higher or lower) pleasures – one is disinterested contemplation of beauty, and the other is the interested pleasure of being disinterested – the joy of being aware that having the first order or pleasure is in one's genuine self-interest (p. 52). Glauser concludes that for Shaftesbury, when one is able to elevate his disinterested pleasure to the interested pleasure of reflection, one is able to experience from lower to higher beauty. Thus, one is motivated to be a virtuous person (p. 54). Richard Glauser, "Aesthetic Experience in Shaftesbury I." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 76 (2002) pp. 25-54.

¹⁷³ I would like to emphasize that for Shaftesbury, 'appearance' has multiple layers. Shaftesbury provides an index at the end of *Characteristics* which gives insight of how he thinks about "Appearance." In this index, under "Appearance," he directs readers to "See Species" (III. 255), and then in "Species," we read:

Species: Interest of a Species. ii. 16. *A Whole Species, subservient to some other.* ii. 18. *Species of Fair.* i. 139, 41. (See Fair, Beauty, Decorum.) *Moral Species or Appearances, overbearing all others.* i.60. iii.299

In *Interest of Species* (ii.16. original page number), virtue and interest are differently interpreted depending on the interests of the individual, species, or the end of the wholeness.

In *A Whole Species, subservient to some other* (ii. 18), the author emphasizes that one species is connected to another species so "the Creatures are both of 'em to be consider'd as Parts of another System" (II. 10); thus, ill or good depends on how we look at the role of the parts in the entire wholeness.

In *Species of Fair* (i. 139, 41), he claims that people's aesthetic and moral judgments seem to be innate, but there are differences depending on what kind of pleasure (inner - based on reason, or outer - based on objects) the person is interested in. He claims that "The *Species of Fair, Noble, Handsom*" (I. 87) can be seen in every occasion or subject. Regarding men who take pleasure in false beauty, Shaftesbury states "They who refuse to give [beauty] scope in the nobler Subjects of a rational and moral kind, will find its Prevalency elsewhere, in an inferior Order of Things" (ibid.) and they "admire the Thing it-self, tho not the Means" (ibid.). On the other hand, men of pleasure in the genuine sense know a superior order of beauty and good, and judge wrong or right based on Reason.

In *Moral Species or Appearances, overbearing all others.* (i.60. iii. 299), Shaftesbury claims that there is outer and inner enjoyment. Someone may think he knows pleasure, happiness, and beauty in a genuine sense, but the truth is that he is depending on mere Sense.

All of those references regarding "Appearance" under "Species" are dealing with how we look at and judge objects and things, and the attached difficulties and complexities, so that we might not know true pleasure, happiness, or beauty, and therefore might misjudge things. In those statements, it is clear that though he believes that we have an innate ability to know beauty and the good, he also holds that the criteria of judging those can vary depending on the person's state of mind and opinion; thus, the concept of inward and outward matters in the judgment of beauty.

Shaftesbury's concept of appearance (multiple layers of beauty of the object); that is to say, beauty depends on our state of mind because either reason-based ¹⁷⁴ or sense-based judgements of the object are the criteria of beauty. The object, for example a tree, a person, or a painting, is a mere object, but the viewer's state of mind allows for various interpretations of the same object.

Elsewhere in *Characteristics*, we see many applications of this 'inward' or 'outward' approach, such as: "A BEAUTY in *outward Manners and Deportment*" (III. 109) indicating superficial beauty, and "a *Beauty in inward Sentiments and Principles*" (ibid.) indicating genuine beauty with sentiment under the control of reason.

Inward beauty means inward goodness, truth, and nature. Shaftesbury writes that "*inward Worth and Beauty*" is not only beautiful but morally good, exemplified by such things as "*Honesty, Faith, Integrity, Friendship, [and] Honour*" (III. 122). Thus, inward beauty is moral beauty for Shaftesbury, a true beauty without any material benefit, but only a mental benefit – that of enjoying the beauty. He comments,

Who can admire the *outward* Beautys, and not recur instantly to the inward, which are the outward Beautys, and not recur instantly to the *inward*, which are the most real and essential, the most naturally affecting, and of the highest Pleasure, as well as Profit and Advantage?

(III. 114)

Since he equates beauty with moral goodness, Shaftesbury modifies various nouns by the terms inward and outward, such as "*inward Freedom*" (III. 107) when discussing acting correctly in a moral sense, to serve others, or "*inward OEconomy*" (III. 123) in the

¹⁷⁴ Shaftesbury uses 'reason' or 'rational' regarding inward beauty in the sense of state of mind where reason is in control of imagination or passion. When reason is subordinate to imagination or passion, the mind can be easily deceived and cannot see inward beauty based on disinterestedness.

sense of acting well for one's own nation and people.

According to Shaftesbury, appreciating or experiencing outward beauty means that we are looking at the outward subject or superficial features only, of things we may possibly lose, such as money, status, political power, fame, and possessions. People are motivated to gain such things by "*Avarice, Pride, Vanity, or Ambition*" which does not bring "real satisfaction" (III. 121). Our "Opinion of the *false Good*" which values things we can lose comes from 'wrong Appetite (as either *Debauch, Malice, or Revenge*)' (III. 122). However if our motivation comes from inward value, it will bring true joy which will be never lost.

Shaftesbury writes,

... if instead of placing WORTH or EXCELLENCE in these outward Subjects, we place it, where it is truest, in *the Affections or Sentiments*, in the *governing Part* and *inward Character*; we have then the full Enjoyment of it within our power.... Here therefore arises Work and Employment for us *Within*....

(III. 121)

To look at inward beauty or inward goodness, one needs an inward eye, which Shaftesbury regards as part of "the inward Resources of a human Heart" (I. 180). One who depends on a sense-based judgement of beauty needs "inward Revolutions of *the Passions*" (I. 182), since passion affects our opinions greatly, and opinions motivate us to see either inward or outward beauty. He states, "Men must acquire a very peculiar and strong Habit of turning their Eye inwards, in order to explore the *interior Regions* and *Recesses* of the MIND" (III. 128). What he calls 'Opinion of Ill' (even if one might misunderstand it as 'Opinion of Good') does not bring joy which lasts, but Opinion of Good in a genuine sense brings joy which lasts:

Now, if I join the *Opinion of Good* to the Possessions of the MIND; if it be in *the Affections* themselves that I place my highest Joy, and in those Objects, whatever they are, of *inward Worth and Beauty*, (such as *Honesty, Faith, Integrity, Friendship*,

Honour) 'tis evident I can never possibly, in this respect, rejoice amiss, or indulge myself too far in the Enjoyment.

(III. 122)

As in the above, Shaftesbury uses inward, in the sense of moral, and outward in the sense of lack of moral mind. Inward or outward indicates the viewer's mental state, but also indicates the mental state of the person who creates works of art, or who is viewed by others. For example, Socrates may not look beautiful; his outward features do not fully express his inward beauty, but someone who has the inner eye to see inward beauty can see Socrates' beauty. Such a person is capable of discerning that the "outward Features" have "a mysterious Expression, and a kind of Shadow of something inward in the Temper" with "a majestic Air" (I. 86).

Shaftesbury uses 'inward' in the sense of "the Mind" which is moral and rational, and uses 'outward' in the sense of "the Body" which is immoral and irrational state of mind, but often the first is deceived by the latter; therefore; there can be Minds but not MINDS which are rational and moral.

We who were rational, and had Minds, methought, shou'd place it rather in those MINDS; which indeed abus'd, and cheated of their real *Good*, when drawn to seek absurdly the Enjoyment of it in the Objects of *Sense*, and not in those Objects they might properly call *their own*: in which kind, as I remember, we comprehended all which was truly *Fair, Generous, or Good*.

(II. 223)

Inward beauty represents true beauty, which is the "rational and refin'd Contemplation of Beauty" (II. 222), while outward beauty, based on the "Joys of *Sense*" and the intent of using the object, is not true beauty. The judgment of inward or true beauty comes from the "inward way ... foundations as are taken from our very *Perceptions, Fancys, Appearances, Affections, and Opinions* themselves, without regard to any things of *an exterior* WORLD, and

even on the supposition that there is *no such World in being*” (III. 129). Inward beauty or “the *Force of Devine BEAUTY*” is “form’d in our-selves an *Object* capable and worthy of real *Enjoyment*” (II. 223). Thus, beauty is most importantly an inner experience, quite possibly apart from sense experience – this means even a blind person *can see* the beauty (in the sense of moral beauty) with his inner eye when he experiences love, kindness, and harmony since beauty and good are “*one and the same*” (ibid.). In painting, however, artists need to show both inward and outward; in that case inward needs to be emphasized. Shaftesbury states that “where a real Character is mark’d and *the inward Form* peculiarly describ’d, ’tis necessary *the outward* shou’d give place (III. 225).

For Shaftesbury, beauty is twofold if he is indicating genuine or inward beauty - since beauty means moral good, and lack of beauty means lack of moral good. He writes, “That what is BEAUTIFUL is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable, is TRUE; and what is at once both *beautiful* and *true*, is, of consequence, *agreeable* and GOOD?” (III. 111).

A person can be deceived and believe something is truly beautiful, but it might not be. His Fancy or Imagination can be taken or impressed by the outward beauty of objects, and he may overlook inward beauty:

The Elegance of his Fancy in outward things, may have made him overlook the Worth of *inward Character and Proportion*: And the Love of Grandure and Magnificence, wrong turn’d, may have possess’d his Imagination over-strongly with such things as ...*trim Valets in party-colour’d Clothes*; and others in *Gentlemens Apparel*.

(III. 106)

There are “*Suitors of Power*, and *Traffickers* of *inward WORTH* and *LIBERTY* for outward Gain” (III. 107) who “devote themselves to any Prince of Ministry, whose Ends were wholly tyrannical, and irreconcilable with the true Interest of their Nation” (ibid.) therefore lacking

moral consideration. People who cannot see their true selves likewise cannot see an object's true nature. We humans are afraid of looking at the truth and the motivation behind our judgments and actions; we tend to deceive ourselves, choosing only the good-looking self, which can merely be the first appearance of the self. This is the reason Shaftesbury offers *Characteristics* as a mirror to reflect our inner state, a mirror by which we are able to judge the beauty and good qualities of the book itself.¹⁷⁵ He claims,

That in the very nature of Things there must of necessity be the Foundation of a right and wrong TASTE, as well in respect of inward Characters and Features, as of outward Person, Behaviour, and Action"; we shou'd be far more asham'd of Ignorance and wrong Judgement in the former, than in the latter of these Subjects. Even in the Arts, which are mere Imitations of that outward Grace and Beauty, we not only confess *a Taste*; but make it a part of refin'd Breeding, to discover, amidst the many false Manners and ill Styles, the true and natural one, which represents the real *Beauty* and VENUS of the kind.

(I. 207)

Concerning 'VENUS' in the above paragraph, he adds a footnote as follows: "Supra, p.130, &c. and VOL. III. p. 182, 3, 4, 5, 6. In the Notes" (I. 207. fn). In the first part ("Supra, p. 130"), he claims that physical desire alone never makes people happy (I. 130). A man of Good-Breeding, however, who "acts from his Nature, in a manner necessarily, and without Reflection, (I. 181) has "*a Freedom of Mind*, and be truly Possessor of himself" (ibid.). And in pages ("VOL.III.p.182,3,4,6."), he talks about inward and outward beauty:

Who can admire the *outward* Beautys, and not recur instantly to the *inward*, which are the most real and essential, the most naturally affecting, and of the highest Pleasure, as well as Profit and Advantage? In so short a compass does that Learning and Knowledge lie, on which *Manners* and *Life* depend. 'Tis *We our-selves* create and form our TASTE.'

(III. 114)

When we see the trace of Shaftesbury's thought – he guides his readers to connect the

¹⁷⁵ For his concept of *Characteristics* as a mirror to reflect our state of mind to judge beauty and good, see chapter 4.

concept of physical desire, 'Venus,' in relation to inward and outward beauty, it is clear that for him outward is sense-based, and inward is reason-based.

One is not only struck by the outer appearance of the person, but that outer appearance reminds the viewer that there is something beautiful in the person's mind. In this regard, Shaftesbury writes, "'Tis certain that the Order and Symmetry of this *inward Part* is, in it-self, no less real and exact, than that of the *Body*" (II. 48). For him, experiencing true beauty is rational because while this is happening the Imagination is "being busy'd in forming beauteous Shape and Images of this rational kind...." (I. 86). While a man's Imagination is seeking the shadow of ideal beauty in a woman, he is "struck with a majestic Air, a sprightly Look, an Amazon bold Grace, or a contrary *soft* and gentle one" (ibid.). He sees "a kind of Shadow of something inward in the Temper" (ibid.) of such a woman, and Shaftesbury contends that this appreciation adds an extra dimension, something moral, to romance. He writes,

The Admirers of Beauty in the Fair Sex wou'd laugh, perhaps, to hear of a *moral Part* in their Amours. Yet, what a stir is made about a *Heart!* What curious search of *Sentiments*, and *tender Thought!* What praises of a Humour, a Sense, a je-ne-sçai-quoi of Wit, and all those Graces of a Mind which these Virtuoso-Lovers delight to celebrate! ...They must allow still, there is a Beauty of *the Mind*; and such as is essential in the Case.

(I. 86)

Shaftesbury holds that a beautiful person in the genuine sense has an inward beauty. He claims that a man falls in love with a woman not merely for her outward beauty, but because what he most admires is the "Beauty of the Mind" (ibid.). On the other hand, he argues, the realization that she lacks inner beauty spoils the love he might have felt for the woman. He asks, "Why else is the very *Air of Foolishness* enough to cloy a Lover, at first sight? Why does an *Idiot-Look* and *Manner* destroy the Effect of all those outward Charms, and rob the

Fair-One of her Power; tho regularly arm'd, in all the Exactness of Features and Complexion?" (ibid.).¹⁷⁶

6. Inward and Outward of *Characteristics*

For Shaftesbury, then, the task of philosophy is to teach people what is inward or outward in order to define beauty, good, and truth in a genuine sense. For him, philosophy is “*the Study of inward Numbers and Proportions*” (III. 113), and I hold that Shaftesbury intentionally makes his style of writing complex to present inward features of *Characteristics* somewhat hidden under the outward features of the work.

The reason I interpret his writing so is that he is evidently aware that readers could lose their way in such a book. He writes: “MY READER doubtless, by this time, must begin to wonder thro’ what Labyrinth of Speculation, and odd Texture of capricious Reflections, I am offering to conduct him” (III. 148). Around the time he was writing this passage in *Miscellaneous Reflection*, he was receiving numerous criticisms pointing out his disorganized writing style in other essays individually published before *Characteristics*, such as *A Letter concerning Enthusiasm* and *Sensus Communis*. Thus, in *Miscellaneous Reflections*, the last part of *Characteristics*, he spends a considerable number of pages defending his methodology. He finally has to give readers (since plainly they haven’t had

¹⁷⁶ Cowan discusses Shaftesbury’s sexist terminology - often seen in *Characteristics* and his private writings. Shaftesbury attacks libertinism and passionate love as unnatural and effeminate, and praises manliness for all its positive characteristics of humanity. The philosopher who follows reason and virtue to serve others is not feminine, but manly. However, he uses libertine language to describe philosophical pleasure - mainly having intimate and passionate friendship with intellectual males. Though he despises women, or regards romantic relations with women as a necessary vice to produce offspring, he enthusiastically praises homoerotic relations with his own sex, and frequently uses romantic terms as if they are homosexual. Cowan rightly points out Shaftesbury’s paradox: “There is a central paradox in Shaftesbury’s treatment of philosophical *eros*: he consistently opposes it to the *eros* of sexual desire, yet he just as consistently describes it in sexual charged terms” (130). Brian Cowan, “Reasonable Ecstasies: Shaftesbury and the Language of Libertinism.” *The Journal of British Studies*, 37 (1998) pp. 111-138.

the inner eye to see the author's hidden messages or the inward beauty of the work) his intention clearly, addressing himself as a third person:

My Endeavour ... has been to shew [my reader] his just Prerogative in this respect, and to give him the sharpest Eye over his *Author*, invite him to criticize honestly, without favour or affection, and with the utmost Bent of his Parts and Judgement That shou'd I have the good fortune to raise the masterly Spirit of *just* CRITICISM in my *Readers*, and exalt them ever so little above the lazy, timorous, over-modest, or resign'd State, in which the generality of them remain; tho by this very Spirit, I *my-self* might possibly meet my Doom: I shou'd however abundantly congratulate with my-self on these my low Flights, be proud of having plum'd the Arrows of better *Wits*, and furnish'd Artillery, or Ammunition of any kind, to those Powers, to which I *my-self* had fall'n a Victim.

(III. 155)

Shaftesbury does not give clear definitions in an organized way - there are definitions indeed, but scattered throughout the work, so unless we see the entire book as a whole, it is hard to determine what he means by each word or phrase. He sometimes jumps from subject to subject within a paragraph. It seems he expects us to see what is literally beneath his writings. He is not, however, a pitiless teacher, so he adds marginal notes – which often state the theme of the paragraph quite clearly - besides the body of the text. Also, Shaftesbury often puts important information not in the body of the text but in footnotes, making his books a sort of labyrinth for readers. Those detailed footnotes indicate where we should look to know more about the word or expression in question, though this often means that readers need to move, for instance, from volume II, section III of *The Moralists* to volume I, section II of *Soliloquy*, and then move to volume III, chapter II of *Miscellaneous Reflection* IV, and so on.

His intention is to “challenge my *Reader* to a Trial of his keenest Wit” (III. 155) by giving freedom to judge his aesthetic and moral writing because of what he sees as his “*Loyalty* to [the] READER” (ibid.). Truth is often hidden beneath appearances, so that our

initial judgement can be wrong. Sense perceptions, such as seeing and hearing, may not reveal truth and may actually deceive us. Shaftesbury's intention is to give his readers aesthetic training in seeing truth in all aspects of life through reading his aesthetic book. Thus, I observe that the second appearance or inner beauty of *Characteristics* can be revealed by our inner eye (our ability to discern hidden moral good) through examining his hints to indicate the theme of inward and outward beauty, or the first and second appearance of beauty elsewhere in *Characteristics*.

One of the first hints that Shaftesbury adds for discerning readers is the round illustration or emblem on the frontispiece or title page of the book.

Title Page Emblem of *Characteristics*



Shaftesbury's illustration shows the Sun reflecting its light in the water of a water dish.¹⁷⁷

Behind this, there is a harbour with ships. Regarding this emblem, there are two references, one to Marcus Aurelius and the other to Epictetus, in the footnote of *Miscellaneous Reflections*, written originally in Greek. The quotation from Marcus Aurelius (*Meditations* 12. 22) is:

What view you take is everything, and your view is in your power. Remove it then when you choose, and then, as if you had rounded the cape, come calm serenity, a waveless bay.

(III. 121, fn, underlines added)

The second quotation, from Epictetus (*Discourses* 3.3.20-22), is:

As is the water-dish, so is the soul; as is the ray which falls on the water, so are the appearances. When then the water is moved the ray too seems to be moved, yet is not. And when, accordingly, a man is giddy, it is not the arts and the virtues which are thrown into confusion, but the spirit to which they belong; and when he is recovered so are they.

(ibid.)

I observe that in those quotations there are two important words - *serenity* and *appearance* - key words to understand the *state of disinterestedness* in ideal beauty. In the *Moralists*, Theocles explains the contemplation of beauty through the observation of the sea:

Imagine then, good PHILOCLES, if being taken with the Beauty of the Ocean which you see yonder at a distance,... you will own the Enjoyment of this kind to be very different from that which wou'd naturally follow from the Contemplation of the Ocean's Beauty.

(II. 221)

¹⁷⁷ Den Uyl claims the importance of the frontispiece since it "serves as the image for the entire *Characteristicks*" (p. x). "The image then, with the interpretative help given to us by Shaftesbury, can not only offer us some insight into the text, but also serve as a way of reminding us of the text in significant themes. And, in a manner reminiscent of the emblem books of the preceding century, in which didactic messages are reinforced with visual imagery, these images encourage the sort of reflection that Shaftesbury more fully elicits from the reader (xi). Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*. Vol. I-III. Ed. Douglas Den Uyl. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001.

Beauty experienced by a disinterested mind is seen by the inward eye with a moral character. On the other hand, beauty experienced with an interested mind is seen by the outward eye with a sense-natured character.

The footnotes from Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus above are referenced by the word ‘OPINION’ (as I underline below) in the section where Shaftesbury is dealing with opinion which is often disturbed by passion and fancy/imagination, and without mental calmness (serenity); the mind cannot see true appearance or inner beauty (moral beauty), but only outer beauty (superficial appearance). The goal is,

To regulate FANCY, and rectify OPINION, on which all depends. For if our *Loves, Desires, Hatreds* and *Aversions* are left to themselves; we are necessarily expos'd to endless Vexation and Calamity: but if these are found capable of Amendment, or in any measure flexible or variable by *Opinion*; we ought, methinks, to make trial, at least, how far we might by this means acquire Felicity and Content.

(III. 121-122)

This sentence is located among paragraphs dealing with “*the Opinion of GOOD*”, which is in “*the Affections or Sentiments, in the governing Part and inward Character*; we have then the full Enjoyment of it within our power,” as compared to “*the Opinion of the false Good*” such as “*Avarice, Pride, Vanity, or Ambition*” based on “*outward Subject*” (III. 121-122). Thus, it seems clear that the author intends to emphasize the theme - what we see depends on our state of mind - either using the inward eye to see moral character beneath the object or the outward eye to see only the superficial character of the object.

In the emblem, the ray (appearance of beauty) seems to be moved when the water (soul) is moved. If the mind is disturbed, one cannot see the appearance of beauty; however, one could see it if there was *serenity* (disinterestedness) in the mind. The nature of the object is not changed, but the appearance of beauty can be changed depending on one’s inward

state. How one looks at an object depends on one's approach; "the *Force of Divine BEAUTY*" ensures there is "form'd in our-selves an Object capable and worthy of *real Enjoyment*" (II. 223).

For Shaftesbury, the same object can be seen as beautiful or not beautiful depending on the person's inner state - the combination of how we think and how we feel. This means the object is *not showing* beauty, but *the mind is seeing* beauty. In the emblem of the title page we believe we see the appearance of water, but this actually shows our mental state (sun-light) reflecting from the water. It is possible, of course, that the appearance of the object to the artist and the appearance of the object to the viewer could be interpreted in different ways.

In conclusion, the following table shows how Shaftesbury sees the concepts of outward and inward. Outward beauty includes both first and second appearance. This is because the second appearance is not yet showing ideal nature - it is mere rational mind, possibly lacking moral conduct.

Table 5 Three of Levels of Appearances

<u>A: Outward beauty</u>		<u>B: Inward beauty</u>
<u>First Appearance</u>	<u>Second Appearance</u>	<u>Third Appearance</u>
1. Beauty (first)	Beauty (second)	Beauty (third)
2. Poetical Manners	Methodical Manners	Miscellaneous Manners
3. Interestedness	Interestedness	Disinterestedness

I claim that there are three levels of beauty under the three levels of appearance. This is because the first appearance (also called outward beauty) is the appearance perceived by the senses, as well as the First Order of Beauty – a sense-based experience of the mere matter; second appearance (also called outward beauty) is the appearance perceived by

reason/intellect, as well as the Second Order of Beauty – a reason-based activity. And the third appearance (also called inward beauty) is the appearance perceived by both sense/reason-based Reason in a genuine sense. This Reason is self-governed, well-maintained Reason which can watch itself.¹⁷⁸

Regarding row 1, I claim that the First and the Second Order of Beauty belong to outward beauty. This is because the First Order of Beauty is mere object, and the Second Order of Beauty comes from an intelligent mind ¹⁷⁹. I position the Second Order of Beauty under outward beauty because the outward beauty is not only sense-based pleasure to see beauty, but reason-based pleasure to see beauty, since outward beauty includes intelligence-based actions in social life, such as seeking power, fame, status, and money. I position the Third Order of Beauty under inward beauty because Shaftesbury defines inward beauty as genuine beauty with moral good, as I have discussed in this section, as he likewise defines the Third Order of Beauty as genuine beauty with moral good. ¹⁸⁰

Regarding row 2, there are three levels of manners – Poetical, Methodical, and Miscellaneous manners, as I discussed in the previous section. Poetical Manners is sense/imagination-based, and Methodical Manners is based on reason, and Miscellaneous Manners is based on both Imagination and Reason, and thus is moral. Outward beauty represents both sense-based and reason-based activity, and so both poetical and methodical

¹⁷⁸ There are two kinds of Reason in Shaftesbury. For details, see chapter 4.

¹⁷⁹ The First Order of Beauty is mere objects which “have no forming Power, no Action, or Intelligence” (II. 227), and the Second Order of Beauty has “Intelligence, Action, and Operation” which is “*the Forms which form*” to perceive and create beauty, that is to say “both the Form (the *Effect* of Mind) and Mind itself” (II. 227). The Second Order of Beauty is intelligent but not morally motivated. It is the mind before it creates works of art, or before it conducts moral action.

¹⁸⁰ The Third Order of Beauty is the “*last Order of Supreme and Sovereign Beauty*” (II. 228) with representation of moral characters such as “the Union and Harmony” of a person, or “the Friendship, Love, or whatever other Affection is form’d on such an Object” (III. 112. fn).

manners locate under outward beauty. It does not mean poetical manners always reflect the First Order of Beauty, and methodical manners always reflect the Second Order of Beauty, but because Shaftesbury tends to divide concepts under the sense-based, reason-based, and sense/reason-based categories, I arrange those three levels of manners to illustrate his dialectical style of writing. Whether or not the reader's mind is disturbed by the first impression of *Characteristics* (disorganized, fragmented, or complex), there are other qualities of the book to be discovered (organized, united, and simple).

Regarding row 3, there are three levels of mental state involved in the appreciation of beauty – interestedness based on sense, interestedness based on reason, and disinterestedness free from both sense and reason-based desires. The first interestedness comes from the desire of the senses, such as looking at fruit and feeling it is beautiful because one wants to eat it (II. 222), as well as the outward beauty which is sought by such desire. The second interestedness comes from the desire of reason, such as seeking money and position in society, as exemplified by what Shaftesbury calls the “*Suitors of Power*, and *Traffickers of inward WORTH and LIBERTY for outward Gain*” (III. 107). Disinterestedness is the lack of both sense-based and reason-based desire to use the object of beauty; thus, it represents inward beauty.

Therefore, I conclude that Shaftesbury's concepts of outward and inward beauty, the three orders of beauty, three levels of manners, and disinterestedness are all related, and help to explain his dialectical view to see three levels of the nature of things: sense-based, reason-based, and both sense/reason-based. In the next section, I show how Shaftesbury's typography in the original edition expresses more precisely what the author means by the multiple-meaning terms.

7. Three Levels of Personalities

In this section, I discuss how Shaftesbury applies his dialectical view - in the concepts of the Magical Mirror and the Doctrine of Two Persons - a method to reveal three levels of the self and three levels of approach when looking at the nature of things. In soliloquy, which is a Pocket Mirror of self-examination, there are three levels - madness as in fanatics, dogmatism as in the clergy, and enthusiasm as in Socratic dialogue.

First and Second Personalities

In both the Magical Glass and the Doctrine of Two Persons, Shaftesbury sees two characters in a person, characters which need to have Socratic conversation to achieve self-examination because, in his view, most people have lost their identity. A man does not know himself until he examines his inner state. Most of the time we have no “Uniformity of Opinion which is necessary to hold us to *one Will*, and preserve us in the same mind, from one day to another” (I. 116). One’s opinion of one’s self can be a mere fancy or feeling, and opinion can be changed often:

Fancy and Opinion stand pretty much upon the same bottom. So that if there be no certain Inspector or Auditor establish’d within us, to take account of these Opinions and Fancys in due form, and minutely to animadvert upon their several Growths and Habits, we are as little like to continue a Day in the same Will....

(I. 115)

There is no freedom for the person who has lost his or her true personality: “...his *Independency and Freedom* were mere Glosses, and Resolution a Nose of Wax” (ibid.) since even WILL which looks free can be “often chang’d we know not how, without asking our consent, or giving us any account” (ibid.).

Shaftesbury recommends using the Magical Glass - which means self-inspection through Socratic dialogue, to know the true self in the form of soliloquy. As Socrates guides

his fellows to reflect their natures, conversation is an ideal method in philosophy to examine the self. If one gains such a “peculiar *speculative Habit*” (I. 122) to inspect the self by having a conversation between the two characters of his own soul, it is the same as carrying “a sort of *Pocket-Mirroure*, always ready, and in use” (ibid.).

In the Magical Glass, there are “Two Faces which wou’d naturally present themselves to our view” (ibid.). Shaftesbury writes,

... if once we had acquir’d the habit of this *Mirroure*; we shou’d, by virtue of the double Reflection, distinguish our-selves into two different Partys. And in this *Dramatick Method*, the Work of *Self-Inspection* wou’d proceed with admirable Success.

(I. 122)

The first character is a master figure – what Shaftesbury calls “wholly Master” (I. 115), and the second character is a servant figure who has “nothing in him besides what was base and *servile*, [and] wou’d be contented to follow and obey” the master (I. 106). Shaftesbury writes,

The Question therefore is the same here, as in a Family, or Household, when ‘tis ask’d, “*Who rules? or Who is Master?*” Learn by the Voices. Observe who speaks aloud, in a commanding Tone: Who talks, who questions; or who is talk’d with, and who questions’d. For if the Servants take the former part; they are the Masters....

(I. 199)

The master is dominant, and is like a “commanding Genius, the Leader and Chief” (I. 122), and the slave figure is “like that rude, undisciplin’d and headstrong Creature, whom we our-selves in our natural Capacity most exactly resembled” (ibid.). The slave figure, or the second character is more representative of the true nature of the individual, in Shaftesbury’s view, than the dominating figure. This is a tormented, hidden second person under the active, master person; Shaftesbury contends that,

... notwithstanding the Oddness or Mysteriousness of the principal Character, the *Under-parts* or *second Characters* shew'd human Nature more distinctly, and to the Life. We might here, therefore, as in a *Looking-Glass*, discover our-selves, and see our minutest Features nicely delineated, and suted to our own Apprehension and Cognizance. No-one who was ever so little a-while an Inspector, cou'd fail of becoming acquainted with his own Heart.

(I. 121-122)

Moreover, since what we see in the mirror is two persons, Shaftesbury also refers to his concept of the Magical Mirror as *the Doctrine of Two Persons* (I. 115). He writes,

I have in reality within me *two distinct separate Souls*... For 'tis impossible to believe, that having one and the same Soul, it shou'd be actually both Good and Bad, passionate for Virtue and Vice desirous of Contrarys. No. There must of necessity be *Two*: and when *the Good* prevails, 'tis then we act handsomely; when *the Ill*, then basely and villainously. Such was my Case. For lately *the Ill* Soul was wholly Master. But now *the Good* prevails, by your assistance; and I am plainly a new Creature, with quite another *Apprehension*, another *Reason* another WILL.

(ibid.)

Shaftesbury also holds that *The Doctrine of Two Persons* is “The Chief Principle of Philosophy” (ibid.), as the conflict between the two persons is also a key to lead us to the solution, or gaining a harmonious relation between the two characters.

Shaftesbury claims that there are two parties engaging in soliloquy - one is Opinion or “the Party of REASON and *good Sense*” (I. 117), and the other is “the Imagination or Fancys” (ibid.). I observe that the master figure or Ill person is representing the imagination or fancy, and the slave figure or good person is representing reason. Opinion or Fancy alone tends to make mistakes without reflection. Ideally, Fancy needs to be supervised by Reason without being suppressed. This is made possible by True Soliloquy, since it is the “*Regimen* or *Discipline of the Fancys*” (I. 116), as well as a disinterested mental state in which imagination or fancy is put under the supervision of Reason.

The Magical Glass could be in the form of writings. As Plato wrote his treatises in the manner of dialogue, Shaftesbury encourages *Mirror-Writing* (I. 124) for honest writers who benefit their readers by showing humanity's true nature in their writing. He states that a writer "who shall venture to bring his Fellow-Moderns into *Dialogue*, must introduce 'em in their proper Manner, Genius, Behaviour and Humour. And this is the *Mirroure* or *Looking-Glass...*" (I. 126). Shaftesbury is doing this Mirror-Writing himself by engaging in a dialogue with his reader; however, his style is different from Plato's naive and plain way of expressing opinions, due to the modern readers' *polite* character. When Shaftesbury's audience read a book which lampooned certain human characteristics, they were entertained by the peculiarities of stereotypes, but they never imagined themselves as one of those types; if they could imagine such a thing, reading would not be fun at all. Shaftesbury, as a modern author, would be polite in not directly stating his opinion - he might say that *well-bred people show politeness by their manner*, which his readers recognize as common sense, and apply to themselves as *well-bred* persons.

Third Personality

Based on Shaftesbury's model, I hold that after we overcome the conflict of the first and the second characters, a third character is revealed. Both the concept of the Magical Glass and of the Two Persons supports the realization of this third character after the previous two characters reach agreement.

For Shaftesbury, every person has two persons, or "two distinct separate Souls" (I. 115), but ultimately it is possible to gain the third person or the true self, that is to say "one and the same Person" (I. 116) with one's nature, virtue, and beauty in a genuine sense, after the person unites the first and the second persons. The true self is able to attain the

“Uniformity of Opinion which is necessary to hold us to *one Will*, and preserve us in the same mind, from one day to another...” (ibid.).

Shaftesbury refers to *Characteristics* using a medical metaphor, as an “Operation” (ibid.), and his reader as “our *Patient* (for such we naturally suppose our *Reader*)” in need of a compassionate surgeon who employs “*a Tenderness of Hand*,” but not “*a very rough-one*” (I. 99). The purpose of such surgery is

... to gain [the patient] *a Will*, and insure him *a certain Resolution*; by which he shall know where to find himself; be sure of his own Meaning and Design; and as to all his Desires, Opinions, and Inclinations, be warranted *one and the same Person* to day as yesterday, and tomorrow as to day.

(I. 116)

Shaftesbury refers to this “one and the same person” as the “real and genuine SELF” (ibid.). Most people do not know their true self, so it is “No wonder if the *better* and *nobler* SELF was left as a Mystery to a People, who of all human kind were the most grossly *selfish*, crooked and perverse” (ibid.)

When we are separated into two persons or characters, we are unable to keep “*the same Self*” (I. 177); perhaps one’s interest, opinion, views, passion, and reason can be quite different in the evening compared to the morning. It is the task of philosophy to teach people how to recover their identities; Shaftesbury holds that,

But whatever may be the proper Effect or Operation of Religion, ’tis the known Province of Philosophy to teach us *our-selves*, keep us the *self-same* Persons, and so regulate our governing Fancies, Passions, and Humours, as to make us comprehensive to our selves... For ’tis not certainly by virtue of our Face merely, that we are *our-selves*. ’Tis not WE who change, when our Complexion or Shape changes. But there is *that*, which being wholly metamorphos’d and converted, WE are thereby in reality transform’d and lost.

(I. 176)

The third self, that is to say, the “*genuine, true and native SELF*” (I. 174), knows what is

beautiful, good, and true. It reveals “the *natural* Affection of all mankind towards moral Beauty and Perfection“ (ibid.)¹⁸¹. On the other hand, in the case of lost identity, “... *the moral Appearances* are in many places preserv’d without Alteration, according to vulgar Prejudice, and the general Conception of *Interest* and *Self-good*” (I. 175).

Shaftesbury also refers to the third personality (true self) as the “Parent-Mind” (II. 228) or “the *virtuous* MIND of Reason’s Culture” (II. 237). In contrast, he refers to the second personality, which is reason-based but abused by sense, as “the *riotous* MIND, captive to *Sense*” (ibid.), as I detail in chapter 2.

To gain the genuine self, one needs to “*self-converse*” (I. 178). The return to the true self is the result of “a Revolution” of character “when the Passion or Humour of a known Person changes remarkably from what it once was; ’tis to *Philosophy* we then appeal...” (I. 176). He uses character in the sense of personality, but also in the sense of characters of art. Shaftesbury holds that a designer who lacks a sense of proportion and perfections of the subject,

... will never be found able to describe a *perfect Character*; or, what is more according to Art, “express the Effect and Force of this Perfection, from the Result of various and mixt Characters of Life.” And thus the Sense of inward Numbers, the Knowledge and Practice of the *social* Virtues, and the Familiarity and Favour of the *moral* GRACES, are essential to the Character of a deserving Artists, and just Favourite of the MUSES.

(I. 207)

8. Three Levels of Soliloquy

Here I observe that there are three levels of soliloquy in Shaftesbury, closely connected to his three levels of characters of a person. Since everyone could have at least

¹⁸¹ Regarding ‘natural affection’, see chapter 6.

two personalities, rather than having silent, internal conversation, he suggests soliloquy which is “*self-conversant Practice*” (I. 181) as “a kind of *vocal Looking-Glass*, [with which to] draw Sound out of our Breast, and instruct us to personate our-selves, in the plainest manner” (I. 108).¹⁸² By soliloquy, a vocal conversation between one’s two characters, even one does not have a philosophy teacher in actual life, he or she can participate in a dialogue to examine the self.

To reach the inner state of serenity, where we find true beauty, humour, and the self, we need to distinguish two persons in the self. Shaftesbury writes that some may ask, “who can thus multiply himself into *two Persons*, and be *his own Subject*? Who can properly laugh at *himself*, or find in his heart to be either merry or severe on such an occasion?” (I. 99). His reply is to advise such persons to

Go to the *Poets*, and they will present you with many Instances. Nothing is more common with them, than this sort of SOLILOQUY.... By virtue of SOLILOQUY [the person of introspection] becomes two distinct Persons. He is Pupil and Preceptor. (I. 99-100)

By soliloquy, one will realize that there is “quite another *Apprehension*, another *Reason*, another WILL” (I. 115) in his inner state. Soliloquy is called an “Exercise of *Self-*

¹⁸² Griffin highlights Shaftesbury’s art of soliloquy, self-examination based on the Platonic model, intended to establish authorship based on sound ideas. Griffin states Shaftesbury regarded this self-examination as a necessary prerequisite to writing because the writer must be certain his ideas are of value for the readers, and because the writer should not pander to such readers. The writer should not set out to merely please his readership, but needs to challenge his own assumptions and discover truths by means of an inner process of self-conscious reflection and dialogue. Griffin also notes that Shaftesbury equates good character with effective rhetoric, and considers it the job of the author to correct the taste of readers who are deficient. She briefly discusses three areas, the nature of the self, the role of common sense, and the ethical obligation of the author, which play a part in Shaftesbury’s philosophy. Susan Griffin, “The Development of Rhetorical Authority.” *Rhetorical Review*, 9 (1990) pp. 94-106.

Converse” (I. 104) or “*Art of Surgery*” (I. 99) to catch the imagination or fancy, to be observed by reason. Shaftesbury states:

And here it is that our Sovereign Remedy and *Gymnasitck* Method of SOLILOQUY takes its rise: when by a certain powerful Figure of inward Rhetorick, the Mind *apostrophizes* its own FANCYS, raises ’em in their proper *Shapes* and *personages*, and addresses ’em familiarly, without the least Ceremony or Respect. By this means it will soon happen, that TWO form’d *Partys* will erect themselves *within*. For the Imaginations of Fancys being thus roundly treated, are forc’d to declare themselves, and take party.

(I. 117)

Though Shaftesbury here mentions *Two* Persons, recognizing the duality of the self leads to the awareness of a Third Person through the conversation between the First Person and the Second Person.

Not all soliloquy reveals who we are. Two kinds of soliloquy are criticized by the author. There is Soliloquy with an excess of Fancy, as in fanatic believers who express only their passion. Such a fanatic or “a real madman” (I. 198) who has lost “every Particle of Judgement of Reason” (I. 28) may produce soliloquy, but this is not the kind of self-discourse Shaftesbury is talking about. In soliloquy as philosophical practice, the rational mind needs to be “*Controuler* and *Corrector* of Fancy” (I. 199).

The other kind of soliloquy which Shaftesbury criticizes has an excess of opinion, as in religious writers who preach dogma yet lack heart. Some clergymen may use soliloquy, but it may be that of fanatics, or may lack “close Retirement and inward Recess” (I. 109). Those religious academics produce “the grand Artifice of *Villany* and *Leudness*, as well as of *Superstition* and *Begotry* ... and evade our proving Method of SOLILOQUY” (ibid.).

These may be term’d a sort of *Pseudo-Asceticks*, who can have no real *Converse* either with themselves, or with Heaven; whilst they look thus a squint upon the World, and carry *Titles* and *Editions* along with ’em in their Meditations.

(I. 104)

Such soliloquy lacks heart, and so those people “can have no real converse either with themselves, or with Heaven...” (ibid.). As they are aware of the two persons in themselves, they never attempt soliloquy between the first and second persons. They are “*Formalists*” who are lacking “in the way of Honesty and good Sense” (I. 109).

On the other hand, the third or true soliloquy engages with both the imagination and reason. In this state of mind, imagination is under the supervision of reason, and does not run to madness or a fanatic state, as I discuss in chapter 4 Three Levels of Truth.

There is a close connection between Shaftesbury’s concepts of Soliloquy, Enthusiasm, and Disinterestedness, since the process of soliloquy is described in the same terms used to explain enthusiasm (fanatics, dogmatism, and the genuine one), as I discuss in Chapter 7, and the disinterested state (interested by the imagination/sense, interested by the rational but selfish mind, disinterested in both of them), as I discuss in Chapter 4. As in the state of disinterestedness, in which imagination or fancy is governed by Reason, so in the state of soliloquy too, the enjoyment of beauty can occur naturally as the state of disinterestedness, as I discuss later.

9. Three Levels of View

Here, I note that Shaftesbury has three dialectical views of ill and good – both ill and good, and their conflicts are resolved, and a unity achieved, in the third stage. There are three levels of looking at the nature of things in Shaftesbury, and they correspond with his views on the three levels of human character. For him, the third way of looking at the nature of things reveals the absolute and whole state, as he writes, “... viewing things thro’ a kind of Magical Glass, I am to see the worst of *Ills* transform’d to Good, and admire equally

whatever comes from one and the same perfect Hand” (II. 202). This seems to indicate that the Magical Glass has three levels to show one’s self; the First character (master figure); Second character; and the Third character in which the negative aspects are transformed to good.

‘ILL’ is the word Shaftesbury frequently uses to modify terms – such as *ill-nature’d*, *ill receiv’d*, *ill-acquir’d*, *ill-dispos’d*, *ill-deserving*, *ill-constituted*, *ill-favour’d*, and *ill-tim’d*, to indicate lack of goodness, beauty, and nature. Nevertheless, he holds that real ill does not exist since the universe has the best order and system. He argues that “...we cannot say of any Being, that it is *wholly* and *absolutely ill*, unless we can positively shew and ascertain, that what we call ILL is no where Good besides, in any System, or with respect to any other Order or Economy whatsoever” (II. 12).

If we look at things from the perspective of the whole, even ill can be seen as good. Nothing is ultimately bad, ugly, or ill; “Whatsoever in the Order of the World can be call’d ILL, must imply a possibility in the nature of the thing to have been better contriv’d, or order’d” (II. 5). Then all Ill is ill in appearance only, in that which we observe and judge as Ill. It is ill-appearance when it is seen as a part, out of context of the entire picture, as Shaftesbury states that due to the limitations of our human minds, we “*can see nothing fully; and must therefore frequently see that as imperfect, which in it-self is really perfect*” (II. 203).

Since unhappiness comes from “a wrong Estimation and Measure of *Good* and *Ill*” (III. 123), there is a paradoxical and dialectical solution; the imperfection, part of the perfection in the broader view of the universe, will lead us to move from outward appearance to inward appearance.

In conclusion, in the following table, Mirrors 1, 2, and 3 are represented by the First, Second, and Third Persons (row 1). The First Person is a master, dominating the self, and the Second Person is a slave of the first. Because the slave personality has been suppressed, often one does not know her true personality, which is more decent and virtuous. The dynamics of *the Doctrine of Two Persons* lies between B and C in the table. B is the state of feeling suppressed and alienated, and I deal with the details in the chapter on Mind. At the level of B, one knows there are two persons or two faces, and realizes she is not truly herself. She is distanced from her own nature, and is suffering and seeking a solution, but does not yet act to resolve the situation. One can attain the state of the third person or true self after a “Revolution” (I. 176) of personality occurs, and the person become “one and the same person”- no more two characters, no more an uncertain, moody Will.

Table 6 Three Levels of Magical Glass (The Doctrine of Two Persons)

Outward Beauty	←→	Inward Beauty
A: Mirror 1 (Part)	B: Mirror 2 (Part)	→ C: Mirror 3 (Whole)
1. First Character (Master)	Second Character (Slave)	Third Character (True Self)
2. Soliloquy	Soliloquy	Soliloquy
3. Ill	Good	GOOD
4. Interest	Interest	Disinterest
5. Enthusiasm	Enthusiasm	ENTHUSIASM

There are three kinds of soliloquy (row 2) - fanatic or mad soliloquy based on imagination, dogmatic soliloquy based on reason, and genuine philosophical soliloquy based on reason which is supervising imagination.

Shaftesbury applies his holistic views to the nature of things - each part contributes to the goodness and beauty of whole universe. Thus, Ill-reason can lead us to true reason, ill-humor can lead us to true humor, and ill-nature can lead us to true nature (row 3).

Regarding, row 4, there are three levels of looking at beauty on the objects – interested by sense, interested by calculated reason, and disinterestedness, free from both restriction of sense and reason.

Also there are three levels of enthusiasm, fanatic, dogmatic, and a genuine one cooperating with the three levels of interestedness, soliloquy, characters, and the view to look at ill and good.

As in the table, there are triple meanings for each term, based on three levels of appearances in the Magical Glass. Most of the time, when Shaftesbury writes *true* or *ill*, he is not referencing the third appearance (Mirror 3), but intends the first and the second (Mirrors 1 and 2), not yet in the state represented by column C, since they lack self-examination. Such a person cannot separate herself into two Persons; she cannot gain the mental serenity to ridicule herself. This means she is not able to see herself as the Third Person and so is not able to examine her opinions.

10. Judgement of Hercules

On one level, *The Judgement of Hercules* is Shaftesbury's instruction for a painter who is going to paint the piece, and he instructs in how to represent beauty in this painting; however, it is not merely an essay on visual art. I hold that Shaftesbury clearly shows the mutual relation between his views of the three levels of truth, three levels of manners, three levels of characters, and three levels of beauty in this theory of painting. I defend my view that as well as truth, manners, and characters, Shaftesbury added a detailed interpretation of a definition of great works of art - which is the third truth (moral truth), third manner (miscellaneous manners), and third character (true self). To be a great work the painting must have a dual nature - poetical truth to appeal to our imagination, and historical truth to

appeal to our reason, to attain not only artistic, but philosophical and moral value as well.

For Shaftesbury, beauty cannot be separated from the representation of truth; he writes,

... the *Truth* or *Beauty* of every Figure or Statue is measur'd from the Perfection of Nature... Thus *Beauty* and *Truth* are plainly join'd with the Notion of *Utility* and *Convenience*, even in the Apprehension of every ingenious Artist, the *Architect*, the *Statuary*, or the *Painter*.

(III. 110)

Thus, in *The Judgement of Hercules*, he practices his theory of poetical, historical, and moral truth alongside his theory of beauty, manners, and character. In the painting, Hercules is making a choice between the goddesses Virtue and Pleasure. The question Shaftesbury deals with here is how to present the highest beauty while keeping both poetical and historical truth, to realize moral truth. As the highest beauty is the mixture of both the First Order of Beauty (material/sense-based pleasure) and the Second Order of Beauty (reason-based pleasure), the highest truth is the mixture of both the first truth (poetical truth) and the second truth (historical truth), and clearly the author is aware of realizing both truth, beauty, manners, and character in a great work of art.

Shaftesbury views the painting of Hercules as a philosophical work representing the freedom which Hercules is going to gain after the conflict between virtue and pleasure, or reason and sense, is resolved. As indicated by his second title for this work, "*The Education, as the Choice or Judgement of HERCULES*" (III. 215), Shaftesbury highlights Hercules' struggle to choose either virtue or pleasure, and he represents the battle between reason and the sense within humanity itself. Shaftesbury draws attention to "the Choice [Hercules] actually made of a Life full of Toil and Hardship, under the conduct of Virtue, for the deliverance of Mankind from Tyranny and Oppression.... this Fable is wholly *philosophical*

and moral” (III. 215-216).¹⁸³

He views the painting as a “Historical Sketch” (III. 213) or a “subject of the great piece of history” (*Regimen*, 473)¹⁸⁴, since it is dealing with what happens in history or the fable, and this needs to be accurately described to show “a just Conformity with *historical Truth*, and with the *Unity of Time and Action*” (III. 217). Historical truth requires a methodical manner, which I previously discussed. Artists need to follow certain rules to present the unity of the work, as in the harmony between parts and the whole, and agreement of time and place.

However, for Shaftesbury, *Hercules* is not only historical, but also poetical. He holds that in works of art, artists need to be both poetical and historical: “That in a real History-Painter, the same Knowledge, the same Study, and Views, are requir’d, as in a real *Poet*. Never can the Poet, whilst he justly holds that name, become a Relator, or Historian at large” (III. 237). Shaftesbury emphasizes that great works of art need to have both imagination and reason, that is to say, both poetical and historical, or poetical manner and methodical manner, and this is especially so for philosophical works, including *Hercules*. Only such works can reach moral truth in the sense of the highest truth, and the highest

¹⁸³ Price discusses Shaftesbury’s concepts of liberty, which means knowing the true self and participating in and contributing the goodness in the world where order and harmony exist. Shaftesbury uses the Socratic method in which an opponent’s point of view or unreflective behaviour is introduced first, and then by humour and ridicule, readers are lead to explore the author’s more insightful opinion. Liberty comes from the unity of art and nature since man’s vocation is in society, not in the wilderness, living as hermits. Price also points out that Shaftesbury’s moral sense means using reason with disciplined feeling. It is not the sense of ‘ought’ to do good, but as in aesthetic experience; humans need to cultivate their correct feeling and correct judgement to see what is right or beautiful in life. Thus, Shaftesbury’s moral sense is closely connected to his aesthetic judgement. In *Judgement of Hercules*, Shaftesbury uses the method of theatrical production - detailed design, figure, and gestures, in order to reveal human liberty, to be gained through conflict. Art is imitation, and needs to imitate truth in the sense of genuine human liberty. Price insightfully points out Shaftesbury’s dialectical movement - art, nature, and the union of both as the final purpose of humanity. Martin Price, *To the Palace of Wisdom: Studies in Order and Energy from Dryden to Blake*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964.

¹⁸⁴ *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*. Ed. Benjamin Rand. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1900.

beauty: “The *merely natural* must pay homage to the *historical* or *moral*. Every Beauty, every Grace must be sacrific’d to the *real Beauty of this first and highest Order*” (III. 233). Here he sees the highest beauty in the sense of highest truth. His concept of highest beauty (Third Order of Beauty) require moral conduct in society as the mixture of mere beauty of the material and the beauty of rationality. As well as the First Order of Beauty, which is merely material, poetical truth represents sense/body-based character, and as well as the Second Order of Beauty, historical truth represent reason-based, speculative character. As well as the Third Order of Beauty which is a mixture of the First and the Second Orders of Beauty, moral truth represents moral character as the mixture of poetical and historical truth.

For Shaftesbury, Hercules needs to be represented as poetical truth since the theme concerns the entire human history of overcoming our dual nature. As well as Hercules who “agonizes, and with all his Strength of Reason endeavours to overcome himself...” (III. 215), we humans are suffering the incomplete realization of our true nature and freedom, but Shaftesbury sees human nobility in this suffering. The perfect individual does not qualify to be described in works of poetical truth because such a being has nothing with which to reach our heart, which is seeking hope from life’s misery and distress:

For such indeed is the *truly virtuous Man*; whose ART, tho ever so *natural* in it-self, or justly founded in *Reason* and *Nature*, is an Improvement far beyond the common Stamp, or known Character of Human Kind. And thus the compleatly virtuous and perfect Character is *unpoetical* and *false*.

(III. 160 fn.)

Since great works of art can be created through “the Study of *moral* and *poetick Truth*” (III. 238), the painting does not have to follow the time sequence strictly, but can be allowed to show the past too by representing symbolic objects. For example, Hercules killed a lion when he was *younger*: “This Representation of him wou’d nevertheless be entirely

conformable to *poetick Truth*...“ (III. 217) to show his strength. Shaftesbury writes,

... when our Humour turns us to cultivate these designing Arts, our Genius, I am persuaded, will naturally carry us over the slighter Amusements, and lead us to that higher, more serious, and noble Part of *Imitation*, which relates to *History, Human Nature, and the chief Degree or Order of BEAUTY*; I mean that of the rational Life, distinct from the merely vegetable and sensible, as in Animals, or Plants....

(III. 245)

It is poetical, but also moral. This means poetical truth (imagination) should not be excessive, or ignore historical truth (reason). Thus, Shaftesbury disagrees with emphasizing vivid colors; there should not be any intention “to make *a shew* of Colours, or from their mixture, to raise a *separate* and *flattering* Pleasure to the SENSE“ (III. 239).

Real Truth

Shaftesbury refers to what he terms “*real Truth*” (III. 214) in an attempt to distinguish “truth from falsity” (III. 131. fn), and so he contends that what we ordinarily call truth is not always true. Art is mere copying from nature, he contends, following Aristotle. However, it is possible to aim for the representation of *real truth* through an appearance or “seeming Truth” (III. 238). In historical painting, as well as poetical painting, “not only *Men*, but *Manners*, and human Passions are represented” (III. 214). As well as poetical painting which aims to show poetical truth, historical painting which aims to show historical truth should attempt “real truth,” that is to say, truth in appearance; Shaftesbury writes that, “*the Unity of Design* must ... be preserv’d, according to the just Rules of poetick Art,” so that “the *real Truth* of Art” be presented (ibid.).

There is such a thing as “*real Beauty and Truth*” (III. 238), by which Shaftesbury means the highest beauty (the Third Order of Beauty) and highest truth (moral truth). Real beauty or Real truth do not involve “*affected Graces, exaggerated Passions, hyperbolical*

and *prodigious Forms*; which, equally with the mere *capricious* and *grotesque*, destroy the just *Simplicity*, and *Unity*, essential in a PIECE” (III. 238-239)

While Shaftesbury agrees with Aristotle that works of art merely copy from nature, real truth or beauty shows naturalness, as if the artwork was not intentionally made.

However, he claims that though all works of art such as paintings, sculptures, or poems are imitations of truth, by the attempt to combine the material and the artist’s mind, a work can represent truth in appearance.

Truth is Naturalness

For Shaftesbury, freedom means realizing the true self, knowing who we are, making right choices between sense and reason, pleasure and virtue, or ill and good, and at the end overcoming the first and the second characters of the nature of things, and attaining the third character – a genuine personality. The dominating character is imagination/fancy-based, and the slave character is reason-based, but abused by the first, as I discussed in the previous section. While one is occupied with his double personality (first character/master and second character/slave), one’s state of mind is not free. We are free after we overcome the conflict between the first truth, manners, and characters, and the second truth, manners, and characters, and gain the third truth, manners, and characters. An individual needs to realize this inner freedom before outer or political freedom take on their full value.

Shaftesbury sees a lack of freedom in every aspect of life. We must reconcile the gaps and conflicts between poetical truth and historical truth (we need both in moderation), between poetical manners and methodical manner, between the first characters and the second characters. He regards creating great works of art as one way of gaining freedom, after the artists overcome the differences between material and mental concepts, and unite

them with harmonious cooperation.

Shaftesbury sees naturalness in works of art as the realization of the mixture of the first and the second characters of truth, manners, and beauty. When he instructs artists, sculptors, or painters, he discusses the subtle expression and motion of each character, how they hold their tools, their costumes, the directions they look - as if he is the director of a play, all to realize the Third Order of Beauty in which art and nature, matter and form, body and mind, passion and reason are united to represent true beauty. For Shaftesbury, Hercules, who would gain true pleasure and true freedom by choosing either the material or the ideal, passion or reason, represents every human who is in the process of reaching ultimate happiness by knowing the true self and true self-interest. Shaftesbury emphasizes that a painter needs to draw Hercules as if there is no intentional expression or gesture. Even though Hercules is suffering, he should not act *theatrically* with exaggerated unnaturalness. In works of art, naturalness in artfulness is the way to reach beauty, and Shaftesbury contends that artfulness or purpose should not be emphasized, but rather hidden under naturalness or apparent lack of purpose.

If either historical truth or poetical truth is emphasized exclusively in works of art, Shaftesbury holds that truth is not being represented; art needs to have both characteristics; it needs to be poetical but speculative, imaginative but rational. In *The Judgement of Hercules*, Pleasure represents sensuous/material demands, Virtue represents rational/ideal demands, and Hercules himself represents humanity's difficult journey to a moral/aesthetic life through the uniting of his opposed characteristics. It is true that humans are sensuous beings, but it is also true that they are rational beings. The way to be noble and beautiful is to unify the gap between the two characteristics, by representing beauty/goodness in

appearance, as great artists do in their works. Truth does not have to be what Shaftesbury would term *truly real Truth* since it is not possible to represent it on the earth; the artist's task is to represent the object as if it were true, and likewise for poets.

In conclusion, I believe that Shaftesbury has a parallel view regarding his notions of the three levels of truth, three levels of manners, and three levels of beauty, as I detail in the table below:

Table 7 Hercules' Choice

A: First Order of Beauty (Sense-based)	B: Second Order of Beauty (Reason-based)	C: Third Order of Beauty (Sense/Reason-based)
1. First Character	Second Character	Third Character (true self)
2. Poetical Truth	Historical Truth	Moral Truth
3. Poetical Manner	Methodical Manner	Third Manner
4. Pleasure	Virtue	Freedom

I previously discussed the relation between the three levels of truth and the three levels of manners (Shaftesbury holds that the realization of truth means the realization of manner).

There are similar relationships between the first truth/manner (poetical truth/poetical manner), the second truth/manner (historical truth/methodical manners), and the third truth/manners (moral truth/miscellaneous manner). To realize political truth, artists need the poetical manner to appeal to the imagination and to passion. To realize historical truth, artists need the methodical manner to appeal to reason. To realize moral truth, artists need the miscellaneous manner which appeals to both the imagination and to reason.

11. Shaftesbury's Typography

In this section, I detail how Shaftesbury intentionally and carefully employs visual or typographical effects as an important means by which to communicate with his readers. He does not acknowledge someone as a philosopher who merely uses language, who writes

thoughts on paper in standard prose, but he acknowledges as a philosopher someone who acts on his theory in daily life, with real objects, and in his case it includes writing aesthetic theory with aesthetic *appearance*. For him, ‘*Appearance*’ is as important as content when expressing beauty and goodness in aesthetic writing. Thus, the appearance of the typography matters. Because of his aesthetic theory, in which objects correspond to the hierarchy of three levels of beauty, he selects different typographical features according to certain rules throughout *Characteristics*. Unfortunately, it is difficult if not impossible to recognize where he distinguishes different meanings for words in a typographically-modernized version, such as the John M. Robertson edition (1900, two volumes, reprinted in 1963), the most often-used edition (the only English edition published between 1814 to 1999, not counting the one-volume 1870 edition) in the twentieth-century.

Though the rules are not absolutely strictly followed, it is clear from the intended typography that the author is aware of his key words and expressions when he makes complex statements using multiple meanings of a word. *Characteristics* could have the subtitle – *How to look at every word, concept, and element from various points of view*. Shaftesbury applies the concept of two (false or true / parts or whole) and three (corresponding to the Three Orders of Beauty) kinds of meanings to important words with different printing styles - such as Nature, Beauty, Enthusiasm, and Good in the relation of true and false. Shaftesbury saw the unity in all such terms throughout *Characteristics*, as he made these typographical decisions with certain rules, as in the following:

1. All Capital Letters

Shaftesbury uses all capital letters (the first letter is largest, and followed by smaller capital letters, such as DIVINITY or GENIUS) for a word, often to indicate its authentic status,

in the sense of true meaning, besides the names of persons or places, as below (underlines added to highlight contrasting usage):

--“That ’tis a *real Self*, drawn out, and copy’d from another principal and *original SELF* The *Great-one* of the World)” (II. 201)

Here, there are two kinds of self - ‘*Self*’ as materialized self, and ‘*SELF*’ as an immaterial self.

--- “...if *Nature* her-self be not for *MAN*, but *Man* for *NATURE*...” (II. 170)

Here, there are two kinds of nature and two kinds of man. In the first part, *Nature* is subordinated under *MAN*, and in the next part, *NATURE* is ruling *Man*. In the modern typography (from the Cambridge UP edition ¹⁸⁵) below, Shaftesbury’s intention to make his concept clear is defeated:

--- “...that it is a real self drawn out and copied from another principal and original self, the great one of the world” (304)

--- “...if nature herself be not for man but man for nature...” (280)

2. Italic Letters

Shaftesbury uses italics where he intends to emphasize or denote key words. For example, to indicate opposite sides or false and genuine sides such as:

--- *good/ill, beautiful/ugly, in particular/in general, selfish/noble, unnatural/natural, ill/true, a part/whole, self-interest/Sociableness, the Lion/the Man or true Liberty or ill Liberty.*

---“That in our *newer* Plays as well as in our *older*...” (III. 157)

---“Think not of such a thing *for ever*,” said the Prince, “but trust me: if you retire only *for a while*” (I. 114)

¹⁸⁵ *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions*, Times. Ed. Lawrence E. Klein. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999.

Also, he uses this kind of typography for the focus of a sentence or paragraph, such as:

---“...in Comedy as well as Tragedy...” (III. 157)

---“...as well as in my Author's behalf, who can thus, as it were, challenge my Reader to a Trial of his keenest Wit” (III. 155)

---“Narrative, or historical Truth, must needs be estimable....’Tis it-self a part of moral Truth” (I. 91)

---“...with respect to the Health and Vigour of the Body; ...The Injury it does the Mind...” (II. 88)

---“... that of a virtuous Course which and that of a vitious Course which ...” (II. 88)

When Shaftesbury indicates a concept of false or ill Nature, which has been violated by civilization and has lost its authentic status, as in the passage below, it is typed as ‘Nature’ or ‘*Nature*’:

--- “Shou’d we dare to make such *Empiricks* of the Gods, and such a *Patient* of Poor Nature? ‘Was this a reason for Nature's Sickliness?” (II. 117)

--- “I am already got over my Qualm, and begin better than ever to fancy such a Nature as you speak of...” (II. 201)

On the other hand, if he wants to indicate a true or positive notion or integrated condition of Nature, he often – though not strictly, writes ‘NATURE’ (Starting with a capital, followed by smaller capital letters) or ‘NATURE’ as below:

--- “If therefore every *particular Nature* be thus constantly and unerringly *true* to it-self, and certain to produce only what is good for it-self, and conducing to its own right State; shall not the *general-one*, The NATURE of the Whole, do full as much?” (II.202)

--- “That as these *Distinctions* have their Foundation *in Nature*, the Discernment it-self is *natural*, and from NATURE alone?” (II. 231)

--- “I have never dreamt of such Master-pieces in NATURE” (II. 224)

--- “...who wou’d refute Nature and *Common Sense*. But NATURE will be able to

still to shift her-self..." (III.131 fn.)

As with the word 'NATURE,' he would type 'BEAUTY' or 'BEAUTY' to indicate its genuine character:

--- "Is BEAUTY founded then in Body only; and not in Action, Life, or Operation?" (II. 225)

--- "And for the *Sovereign* BEAUTY...And is there nothing which answers to this, in The WHOLE?" (II. 224)

--- "We then had pro'ved the *Force of Divine* BEAUTY..." (II. 223)

--- "Is Study, Science, or Learning necessary to understand all Beautys *else*? And for the *Sovereign* BEAUTY, is there no Skill or Science required?" (II. 224)

--- "...all *intrinsick* and *real* BEAUTY and WORTH..." (III. 113-114 fn.)

As elsewhere, in the sections where Shaftesbury intends the word Reason to have multiple meanings, he uses particular forms of typography in combination with certain wording, and attention to this usage visually aids the reader's understanding of what he means:

Specters may come a-cross; and *Shadows* of Reason rise up against REASON *it-self*.
But if Men have once heartily espous'd the reasoning or *thinking Habit*; they will not easily be induc'd to lay the Practice down....

(III. 183, underlines added)

As mentioned, compared to an original edition with correct typography, a modern edition with uniform typography has much less clarity, as in the following example, where all instances of Reason are presented as 'reason', making it unclear which is false reason and which is true/authentic reason. If we restore Shaftesbury's original typography, as above, then matters become clearer.

Specters may come across, and shadows of reason rise up against reason itself. But if men have once heartily espoused the reasoning or thinking habit, they will not easily be induced to lay the practice down....

He repeats this theme of ‘reason saved by Reason’ in other places such as:

...if they reason ill, ’tis Reason still must teach ’em to do better. Justness of Thought and Style, Refinement in Manners, good Breeding, and Politeness of every kind, can come only from the Trial and Experience of what is best”

(I. 7).

Typographical features distinguishing the level of authenticity of concepts show that the author is quite aware and careful to indicate which meaning he intends for his multiple-meaning words. Those various forms of typography represent various appearances of each word or concept, as well as beauty with multiple appearances, as I discuss in the next chapter.

¹⁸⁶ *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions*, Times. Ed. Lawrence E. Klein. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999.

Chapter 5: Three Orders of Beauty

In this chapter, I argue that the concept of the three levels of Beauty is part of Shaftesbury's dialectical view of the nature of things and is interconnected with his other terminology. I argue that the First Order of Beauty locates one of the first characteristics of the nature of things because the First Order of Beauty is sense-based (categorized as “in-animate” or of the “body”) (III. 112. fn), as in the first Truth (poetical truth), the first Manners (poetical manners), and the first character of a Person (sense/feeling based), the first Enthusiasm (fanatics), the first way to perceive Beauty (interestedness by sense). The Second Order of Beauty is reason-based (categorized as “animate” or of the “mind”) (ibid.), as in the second Truth (historical truth), the second Manner (methodical manner), the second character of a Person (reason-based), the second Enthusiasm (dogmatic), the first way to perceive beauty (interested by reason). The third order of Beauty is sense/reason-based, what Shaftesbury calls “MIXT” (ibid.), as in the third Truth (moral truth), the third Manner (miscellaneous manner), the third character of a Person (sense/reason mixed), the third way to perceive Beauty (disinterested in the object, though both reason and sense are active).

First of all, I will examine how he defines the Three Orders of Beauty, and defend my view that his definition of beauty is not inconsistent but rather dialectical, as he states that he “strives to erect; by distinguishing, sorting, and dividing into Things *animate*, *in-animate*, and *mixt*” (III. 112. fn) in the concepts of “*Three Degrees or Orders of Beauty*” (II. 227) or a “*Scale of BEAUTY*” (III. 112. fn). In his definition of beauty, Shaftesbury applies two views to each kind of beauty - what kind of objects or activity is under consideration, and what kind of people experience such beauty.

In the First Order of Beauty, Shaftesbury is concerned with the more material

concepts of objects which can be experienced. Materials from nature which bring simple pleasure without involving the rational mind can exemplify this beauty, but not works of art which need to be understood by the rational mind. This beauty is experienced by children, animals, and adults who tend to enjoy sense-based pleasure. This beauty is different from an ideal “*First Beauty*” which is something that might exist in the celestial world, and which here on earth may only be traced by its “faint Shadow” (II. 221) or which may be glimpsed by a “faint and distant View of *the sovereign GENIUS and first Beauty*” (II. 139).

Shaftesbury’s Second Order of Beauty relates more to the human mind, and especially rational and intellectual objects and activities, such as activities and structures in communities and in society. This beauty is experienced mainly by adults, though Shaftesbury includes animal activity based on instinct, since he holds such activity to be calculated and rational behaviour.

Shaftesbury’s Third Order of Beauty is both sense and reason-based, and while it does not suppress the imagination, reason has a superior status. It does not only relate to works of art, but to any kind of object and activity in society.

1. The First Order of Beauty

Regarding the Three Orders of Beauty, I maintain that Shaftesbury applies the three-level model not only to truth, manners, and character, but to beauty as well. Generally, he sees three aspects of the nature of things; sense-based, reason-based, sense/reason-based. Regarding the First Order of Beauty, I observe that this expresses the sense-based character of humanity as well as poetical truth, poetical manner, and the first character of a person. Its pleasure is the interested pleasure of the senses because the First Order of Beauty is either a mere object or sense-based pleasure, compared, for example, to the Second Order of Beauty

(reason-based) or the Third Order of Beauty (reason/sense with moral conduct-based).

In an aesthetic experience, the First Order of Beauty is the simple pleasure or joy of beauty, without involving the rational and moral state of mind. It is the lowest beauty, experienced mainly by the senses. Shaftesbury refers to the material of such beauty, physical things such as metals, baubles, or the simple sounds enjoyed by children and some adults whose joy is sense-based, as “Dead Form” (III 112. fn). This beauty can be experienced by even “mere animals” (II. 129). The objects of such beauty are typically “in-animate and passive” (III.112. fn); he writes,

In the IN-ANIMATE; beginning from those *regular Figures* and *Symmetrys* with which Children are delighted; and proceeding gradually to the Proportions of *Architecture* and the other *Arts*. – The same in respect of *Sounds* and MUSICK. From beautiful Stones, Rocks, *Minerals*; to Vegetables, Woods, aggregate Parts of the World, Seas, Rivers, Mountains, Vales. – The Globe. – Celestial Bodys, and their Order. The higher *Architecture* of Nature. – NATURE her-self, consider'd as *inanimate* and *passive*.

(III. 112.fn).

The objects under consideration of the First Order of Beauty in nature, such as trees, rivers, and mountains, can be regarded as beautiful, but they do not have beauty in them unless “the *Effect* of Mind” (II. 227) occurs. Those objects are not made by an artful mind; they exist in nature already, whether or not humans experience them. The enjoyment experienced under the First Order of Beauty is material-based and experienced by sense-based minds, but the matter itself does not have the power to create beauty. Shaftesbury states that this beauty has no “forming Power, no Action, or Intelligence” (II. 227). Those objects are mere matter and passive, and the people who enjoy the objects with sense-based pleasure do not engage the rational mind. Shaftesbury holds that this kind of beauty does not satisfy rational minds, and does not bring happiness in a genuine sense, which is made

possible by moral conduct in society. He writes,

For as highly *pleas'd* as Children are with Baubles, or with whatever affects their tender Senses; we cannot in our hearts sincerely admire their *Enjoyment*, or imagine 'em Possessors of any extraordinary *Good*. Yet are their Senses, we know, as keen and susceptible of *Pleasure* as our own. The same Reflection is of force as to mere Animals, who in respect of the Liveliness and Delicacy of Sensation, have many of 'em the advantage of us. And as for some low and sordid Pleasures of human Kind; shou'd they be ever so lastingly enjoy'd, and in the highest credit with their Enjoyers; I shou'd never afford 'em the name of *Happiness* or *Good*.

(II. 128-129)

The level or order of beauty experienced depends on who is doing the experiencing and how the objects are experienced. If the viewer sees a rock and experiences sense-based pleasure, with a desire to use it, or just simply feels - without being in a rational state of mind, that the rock is beautiful, it is the First Order of Beauty. If the viewer sees a rock with an intellectual (but not virtuous) mind, it is beautiful in the sense of the Second Order of Beauty. If the viewer sees a rock with a rational, moral, and disinterested mind, it is beautiful in the sense of the Third Order of Beauty.

As I discuss later, although Shaftesbury characterizes the “in-animate” under the First Order of Beauty, the object of this beauty can be the human body, in contrast to the mind, since he views the First Order of Beauty as material/body/sense-based objects and experiences.

In conclusion, I claim that for Shaftesbury, the First Order of Beauty locates the first characteristics of humanity – those which are sense-based, among his dialectical view of sense-based, reason-based, and sense/reason-based with moral conduct, just as he locates three levels of truth, three levels of manners, three levels of character of a person, three levels of interestedness/disinterestedness (the first beauty is sense-based interestedness), and

three levels of enthusiasm (fanatics representing sense-based enthusiasm). He is not implying that the First Order of Beauty is the first truth (poetical truth), the first manner (poetical manner), or the first character (sense/feeling-based personality), but it is his method to categorize the nature of things into three, in which the first and the second are opposed, and the conflict can be resolved by the cooperation of both, without negating, by adding the moral element as the third character.

2. The Second Order of Beauty

I claim that Shaftesbury's Second Order of Beauty concerns reason-based human nature; thus, it represents the second characteristic of humanity as the second truth (historical truth), the second manners (methodical manners), and the second character of a person (rational character), the second enthusiasm (dogmatic mind), and the second interestedness (intellectual interest). This beauty is characterize as "intelligent" and "animate" (III. 112. fn). Any kind of intellectual (including instinctive) behaviour by animals and humans is regarded as the Second Order of Beauty:

In the ANIMATE; from *Animals*, and their several Kinds, Tempers, Sagacitys, to *Men*. – And from single *Persons* of Men, their private *Characters*, Understandings, *Genius's*, Dispositions, Manners; to Publick Societys, *Communitys*, or *Commonwealths*. – From Flocks, Herds, and other natural *Assemblages* or *Groups* of living Creatures, to human Intelligencys and Correspondencys, or whatever is higher in the kind. The Correspondence, Union and Harmony of NATURE her-self, consider'd as *animate* and intelligent.

(III. 112. fn)

The Second Order of Beauty expresses the rational or mental level – what Shaftesbury calls "Living Form" (II. 226), by which he means the human mind experiencing a rational and intellectual pleasure of the beauty found in objects or actions. They are living beings with "Flesh and Blood" (ibid.) which have the power of transforming mere dead

forms into artistic forms. This beauty is involved in the expression of creative minds, “the Forms which form” or “*the forming Forms*” (II. 226), with “intelligence, Action, and Operation” (ibid.). Shaftesbury calls it variously a “double Beauty” (II. 227), “*the human Form,*” or “the original *living Forms*” (ibid.)

The Second Order of Beauty is superior to the First Order of Beauty since it has the “power of making other Forms themselves” (II. 236), and in the experience of beauty, this beauty exists in both *the object* – through the “*Effect of Mind*” (II. 227), and in the *mind itself*, which needs to be beautiful enough to recognize the beauty.

The second kind of forms, Shaftesbury writes,

have Intelligence, Action, and Operation.... Here therefore is double Beauty. For here is both the Form (the *Effect of Mind*) and *Mind* itself: The first kind low and despicable in respect of this other; from whence the dead Form receives its Lustre and Force of Beauty. For what is mere *Body*, tho a human one, and ever so exactly fashion'd, if *inward Form* be wanting, and the *Mind* be monstrous or imperfect, as in *an Idiot, or Savage?*

(II. 227)

Shaftesbury claims that apart from the Second Order of Beauty, that is to say, the human mind which perceives beauty in the object, there is no beauty at all: “Tis *Mind* alone which forms. All which is void of *Mind* is horrid: and Matter formless is *Deformity it-self*” (II. 226). The Principle of Beauty is MIND which governs, regulates, and intends to create beauty. Shaftesbury contends that “*the Beautiful, the Fair, the Comely*, were never in the *Matter*, but in the *Art and Design*; never in *Body* it-self, but in the *Form or forming Power*” (ibid.).

Although from an aesthetic point of view, the Second Order of Beauty is the human mind - which has the potential to make the dead forms beautiful, this is not yet ultimate beauty. The weakness of the Second Order of Beauty is that it does not have perfect

harmony between sense and reason, or imagination and reason. This would not be a problem if an artist lived in a celestial world, a world in which he does not deal with matter. Because we are alive with bodies as *living form*, and have to deal with matter, there is great difficulty expressing what we imagine, plan, or think in a shape or a manner others can see. The Second Order of Beauty tends to run into the mere pleasure of activities of the intellect or “*dry sober Reason*” (ibid.) which does not bring virtue and happiness in a genuine sense. The Second Order can be described as “Pleasure of *a more substantial kind*” (II. 132) or “the Idea of such a *sensible solid* Good, can have but a slender Fancy for the mere *spiritual* and *intellectual* sort” (ibid.) by philosophers and scholars. Those scholars might counter that it is not pleasure they are having, but “*Reason and Virtue*” (ibid.) What they are seeking is “what is mentally good or excellent,” but such pleasure will “slide down again into its own genuine and vulgar Sense; whence they rais’d it only to serve a turn” (ibid.). Those who fall into the world of theory and dogma tend to lose sight of the kind of moral mind which contributes to society.

The Second Order of Beauty is a concept of the rational mind; however it is not the highest beauty since it tends not to appeal to the imagination. It needs to be sublimated to the Third Order of Beauty to gain moral truth. Having good intentions to make something beautiful, or to help others, but without putting such thoughts into practice, is not realizing beauty or virtue. This beauty is intellectual, but not rational enough to have the self-reflection necessary to see the nature of truth. To obtain the ideal beauty - the Third Order of Beauty, one needs to harmonize reason and sense; until that harmonization occurs, we do not yet know the true character of the self as in the third character, what is true, moral truth, or what is beautiful as in the Third Order of Beauty.

3. The Third Order of Beauty

In this section, I argue that Shaftesbury locates the Third Order of Beauty in the third characteristic of the nature of things, just as he did with the first (sense-based), the second (reason-based), and the third (sense/reason-based as a mixture) ordering of other terms. In other words, I hold that the Third Order of Beauty represents the third truth (moral truth), the third manner (miscellaneous manner), the third character of a person (true personality), the third enthusiasm (aesthetic enthusiasm), and the third way to appreciate beauty (through disinterestedness).

The Third Order of Beauty is whatever expresses an agreeable or unified relationship between the First and the Second Orders of Beauty, and Shaftesbury refers to this as *Mixt* (III. 112 fn), what he defines as “the Union and Harmony of” (ibid.) body and mind, to attain the real (or the third) personality. Regarding this mixture, he writes,

In the MIXT; as in a *single Person*, (a Body and a Mind) the Union and Harmony of this kind, which constitutes the real Person: and the Friendship, Love, or whatever other Affection is form'd on such an Object. A *Household*, a *City*, or *Nation*, with certain Lands, Buildings, and other Appendices, or local Ornaments, which jointly form that agreeable Idea of *Home*, *Family*, *Country*.

(III. 112. fn)

The Third Order of Beauty is the union of the First Order of Beauty (body/sense) and the Second Order of Beauty (mind/reason). This beauty or “The Species of *Fair*, *Noble*, *Handsom*” (I. 87) can be seen not only in works of art but “on a thousand Occasions, and in a thousand Subjects” (ibid.), representing the beauty of human nature through such things as “the Plans of Gardens, and their Compartments . . . and a thousand other Symmetry, [which] will succeed in the room of that happier and higher Symmetry and Order of a Mind” (ibid.). The Third Order of Beauty is “in *Action*, *Life*, or *Operation*” (III. 225) including “the real

Person: and the Friendship, Love” (III. 112. fn).

Creating great beauty comes from a mind which is in the harmonious state of reason/sense. The harmonious mental state creates the special experience only for humans, who have both sense and reason; neither animals (operating on sense only, though Shaftesbury terms “rational” animal behaviour resulting from instinct) nor angels (which he regards as operating on reason alone) can experience it. Shaftesbury writes,

If BRUTES ... be incapable of knowing and enjoying Beauty, as being Brutes, and having SENCE only (the brutish part) for their own share; it follows, “That neither can MAN by the same Sense or brutish Part, conceive or enjoy Beauty: But all the Beauty and Good he enjoys, is in a nobler way, and by the help of what is noblest, his MIND and REASON.” Here lies his Dignity and highest Interest: Here his Capacity toward Good and Happiness. His Ability or Incompetency, his Power of Enjoyment, or his Impotence, is founded in this alone. As this is sound, fair, noble, worthy; so are its Subjects, Acts and Employments.

(II. 237)

This beauty is moral and rational. He writes that “there is nothing so divine as BEAUTY: which belong[s] not to *Body*, nor having any Principle or Existence except in MIND and REASON” (II. 238), and those who see true beauty are “more generous, [and] endeavour to keep measures with Honesty; and understanding Pleasure better, are for bringing it under some Rule” (I. 88). On the other hand, those who do not have such a mind, experience a lower order of beauty; he writes,

They who refuse to give [beauty] scope in the nobler Subjects of a rational and moral kind, will find its Prevalency elsewhere, in an inferior Order of Things. They who overlook the *main Springs* of Action, and despite the Thought of Numbers and Proportion in a *Life at large*, will in the mean *Particulars* of it, be not less taken up, and engag’d; as either in the Study of common Arts, or in the Care and Culture of mere mechanic Beautys.

(I. 87)

Shaftesbury contends that beauty is a universally-shared experience because we have

a “*Pre-conception of [the] Fair and [the] Beautiful*” (II. 230). In the case of the First Order of Beauty, which is experienced by children and sense-based adults, particular figures are preferable to others, and Shaftesbury claims that we know what makes certain figures or objects pleasurable. Thus, the mysterious characteristics of beauty, the *‘Je ne sais quoi’* is not a mystery, as he states:

... whatever is commonly said of the unexpressible, the unintelligible, the *I-know-not-what* of Beauty; there can lie no Mystery here, but what plainly belongs either to *Figure, Colour, Motion or Sound ...*’Tis enough if we consider the simplest of Figures; as either a round *Ball*, a *Cube*, or *Dye*. Why is even an Infant pleas’d with the first View of these Proportions? ... there is in certain Figures a natural Beauty, which the Eye finds as soon as the Object is presented to it.

(II. 231)

In the Second and the Third Order of Beauty, as in the First Order, beauty is a sensuous but more importantly a rational experience. When we see objects, they first impress upon the eyes, and the Imagination with the help of reason shapes beautiful objects as rational, and this entertains the mind. He states that the experience involves “... our imagination being busy’d in forming beauteous Shapes and Images of this rational kind, which entertain’d the Mind, and held it in admiration...” (I. 86). However, in the Second Order of Beauty, reason may have difficulty in cooperating with the imagination. In works of art, there might be an object which does not stimulate our imagination, though it appeals to the intellectual side of humanity, and this can be the Second Order of Beauty. In the case of the Third Order of Beauty, Reason cooperates well with the imagination and this cooperation can appeal to both sides of humanity.

4. Original beauty

Besides the Three Orders of Beauty, Shaftesbury claims that there is one more state which exists, though only in theory, a first or original beauty, a true ideal/ultimate state in

Platonic terms. Even the Third Order of Beauty pursues “only the faint Shadow of that *First Beauty*” – as an imperfect beauty (II. 220). This is an *original* beauty of a celestial world which only a spiritual or heavenly being can experience in the beyond. Shaftesbury refers the Third Order of Beauty as a “*Representative-BEAUTY*,” of the “*Original*,” and thus considers it to be genuine (II. 221).

Since the original beauty does not exist in reality, though we are able to trace the ideal beauty through the Third Order of Beauty’s representation, Shaftesbury also refers to the Third Order of Beauty as an “original Kind” (III. 113 fn). The highest beauty is the human mind itself (original), which in artistic minds creates beautiful objects, actions, and relationships. The origin of artistic power (artistic mind) is the Third Order of Beauty (mind), which forms true beauty, true good, and true truth which are based on nature, symmetry, and order with practicality and convenience. Shaftesbury holds that “*Beauty and Truth are plainly join’d with the Notion of Utility and Convenience, even in the Apprehension of every ingenious Artist, the Architect, the Statuary, or the Painter*” (III. 110). The Third Order of Beauty is “*intire, perfect, absolute*” unlike the lower beauties which are “*broken, imperfect, short*” (II. 225). It is the noblest and most perfect beauty which humans can experience in life.

5. Parent Mind

The First Order of Beauty (dead forms) relates to mere materials, the Second Order of Beauty (forms which form) concerns the creative mind, and the Third Order of Beauty is the highest beauty “which forms not only such as we call mere Forms, but even *the Forms which form*” (II. 228), implying that this beauty is dealing with not only forming dead forms into works of art as in the Second Order of Beauty, but also dealing with forming humanity

itself, such as found in the artistic mind. Shaftesbury writes,

For we our-selves are notable Architects in Matter, and can shew lifeless Bodys brought into Form, and fashion'd by our own hands: but that which fashions even Minds themselves, contains in it-self all the Beautys fashion'd by those Minds; and is consequently the Principle, Source, and Fountain of all *Beauty*....Therefore whatever Beauty appears in our second Order of Forms, or whatever is deriv'd or produced from thence, all this is eminently, principally, and originally in this last Order of Supreme and Sovereign Beauty.

(II. 228)

Shaftesbury holds that there is a genuine and a false beauty, truth, manner, and personality, and that we need to refuse “to be captivated by any thing less than the *superior, original, and genuine Kind*” (III. 113. fn); He regards this as the true truth (moral truth), true manner (miscellaneous manner), true personality (the third character), and the Third Order of Beauty. The Third Order of Beauty forms ‘the Forms’ (human mind) which create works of art. Shaftesbury emphasizes the importance of Mind and Reason through *Characteristics* - which he often types as “MIND and REASON” (II. 237) using a large capital followed by smaller capitals - as quoted below, since he is clearly indicating the highest level of Mind and Reason. He writes with reference to

... a MIND or Reason well compos'd and easy within if-self; upon what account this Happiness may be thought owing to *natural Affection*, we may possibly resolve ourselves, after this manner. It will be acknowledg'd that a Creature, such as a Man, who from several degrees of Reflection has risen to that Capacity which we call Reason and Understanding; must in the very use of this his reasoning Faculty, be forc'd to receive Reflections back into his Mind of what passes in it-self, as well as in the Affections, or Will; in short, of whatsoever relates to his Character, Conduct, or Behaviour amidst his Fellow-Creatures, and in Society.

(II. 68 underlines added)

Shaftesbury considers that the Mind is divided into two when it is in either a state of wholeness or genuineness, which he calls the “*Mind of the Whole*” (II. 199) or “a *Universal MIND*” (II. 164), and which he holds is a “happier and higher Symmetry and Order of a

Mind” (I. 87) than “*Particular Minds*” (II. 199), which are incomplete because of conflicts among other partial minds, resulting in a person having two personalities. On occasion, he refers to the “Universal MIND” as a “*general MIND*” (II. 201), such as when he writes,

I consider, That as there is *one* general Mass, *one* Body of the Whole; so to this Body there is an Order, to this Order a MIND: That to this *general MIND* each *particular-one* must have relation; as being of like Substance, ... alike active upon Body, original to Motion and Order; alike simple, uncompounded, individual; of like Energy, Effect, and Operation; and more like still, if it co-operates with it to general Good, and strives *to will* according to the best of *Wills*. So that it cannot surely but seem natural, ‘That the *particular MIND* shou’d seek its Happiness in conformity with the *general-one*, and endeavour to resemble it in its highest Simplicity and Excellence’.

(II. 201)

There are many minds, various feelings, passions, intellectual thoughts, and opinions etc. – but if we look at those minds from the point of view of wholeness, each part functions to contribute to form “a *Universal MIND*” (II.164) which is an ideal state of mind, but also the ideal and genuine personality of a person. He regards the *Universal MIND* as complete because from the point of view of this mind, beauty, goodness, and truth can be recognized by everyone; “Every-one is a *Virtuoso*, of a higher or lower degree: Every-one pursues a GRACE...” (I. 87), though many of us are not aware of this perfect mind.

This perfect mind is also called “Parent-Mind” (II. 228), a source of beauty, goodness, and truth in the genuine sense compared to other imperfect minds. Such “a perfect Mind” (II. 203), in a contemplative state where reason and feeling have a reciprocal relationship, is able to view beauty. The artistic power of a mind which makes mere matter into beautiful form is true beauty: “...the Beautifying, not the Beautify’d, is the *really Beautiful*” (II. 226). With this mind or this beauty, one finally attains his or her true personality after resolving the two person problem. The Third Order of Beauty is not mere

mind as in the First Order of Beauty (sense/imagination), nor the Second Order of Beauty (reason/speculation), but it is a “*Parent-MIND*” which is “immediately *your own*, and is solely in, and from your-self” (II. 228). Specifically, Shaftesbury intends such things as,

your *Sentiments*, your *Resolutions*, *Principles*, *Determinations*, *Actions*; whatever is handsom and noble in the kind; whatever flows from your good *Understanding*, *Sense*, *Knowledge* and *Will*; whatever is ingender’d in your *Heart*, ...or derives itself from your *Parent-MIND*, which, unlike to other *Parents*, is never spent or exhausted, but gains Strength and Vigor by producing. So *you*, my Friend! Have prov’d it, by many a Work: not suffering that fertile *Part* to remain idle and unactive. Hence those good Parts, which from a natural Genius you have rais’d by due Improvement. And here, as I cannot but admire that pregnant Genius, and *Parent-Beauty*; so am I satisfy’d of the *Offspring*, that it is and will be ever beautiful.
(II. 228-229)

To know the Third Order of Beauty, we need to “know Our-selves” with “real Self-Interest” (II. 238). “*Parent-Beauty*” which is made by the “*Parent-MIND*”, that is to say the *true self* - is the Third Order of Beauty. For Shaftesbury, “pursuing BEAUTY” is the same as “adding ... more Lustre, and Value to our own *Person*; we grow, our real *Character* and truer SELF” (III. 114. fn). Experiencing true beauty means having true personality or the third character of a person. In the state of the First Order of Beauty in which a person is sense/feeling-based, and in the state of the Second Order of Beauty in which a person is reason-based, one does not attain his or her real personality. In the First and the Second Order of Beauty, one’s mind is mere mind - segments of feelings without unity.

Shaftesbury also refers to the ‘Parent-Mind’ as “the *virtuous MIND* of Reason’s Culture” (II. 237) which is well-cultivated feeling cooperating with reason. On the other hand, “the *riotous MIND*, captive to *Sense*” (ibid.), (in this case the ‘Parent-Mind’ is subject to and abused by sense), is incapable of a harmonious relation with reason, and loses its natural ability to function properly. Regarding the source of what we hold good, Theocles in

Moralists states,

We who were rational, and had Minds, methought, shou'd place it rather in those MINDS; which were indeed abus'd, and cheated of their real *Good*, when drawn to seek absurdly the Enjoyment of it in the Objects of *Sense*, and not in those Objects they might properly call *their own*: in which kind, as I remember, we comprehended all which was truly *Fair, Generous, or Good*.

(II. 223 underline added) ¹⁸⁷

Since Mind is a compound of feeling, passions, and appetites, it tends to have internal disagreements, and may easily fall to a *riotous* Mind. He states there is evidence for

the united Structure and Fabrick of the Mind and of those Passions which constitute *the Temper*, or Soul; and on which its Happiness or Misery so immediately depend. It has been shewn, That in *this Constitution*, the impairing of any one Part must instantly tend to the disorder and ruin of other Parts, and of the Whole it-self; thro' the necessary *Connexion* and *Balance* of the Affections....

(II. 99)

When minds are distanced from the unity of the entire Mind, from one's true nature, true reason, true beauty, and from society, it is difficult to gain happiness, as one is "corrupted and abus'd" (II. 165). Shaftesbury states,

Tis thus, at last, that A MIND becomes *a Wilderness*; where all is laid waste, every thing *fair* and *goodly* remov'd, and nothing extant beside what is savage and deform'd. Now if Banishment from one's Country, Removal to a foreign Place, or any thing which looks like Solitude or Desertion, be so heavy to endure; what must it be to feel this *inward Banishment*, this real *Estrangement* from human Commerce; and to be after this manner in a Desart, and in the horridest of Solitudes, even when in the midst of Society? What must it be to live in this *Disagreement* with every thing, *Irreconcilableness* and *Opposition* to the Order and Government of the Universe?

(II. 98) ¹⁸⁸

Without the 'Parent-Mind' or "virtuous Mind", but with a segmented mind, the individual

¹⁸⁷ Here, as with other terms, Shaftesbury distinguishes 'Minds' in the commonly used sense and 'MINDS' in a genuine sense by different typography.

¹⁸⁸ In Shaftesbury's concept of *estrangement*, where an individual is distanced from his own psyche and society, we may find the beginnings of the concept of *alienation or estrangement* later developed by Schiller, Hegel, and Marx.

feels alone because his Mind has lost the “Unity of Design and Order” (II. 164), in contrast with the unity and order found in society (Mass Mind), and he cannot find agreement between the whole and the parts. In the micro view, regarding the Mind of the individual, the parts (various passions) need to maintain order and harmony, serving the aim of the whole Mind to realize beauty and virtue. The individual Mind needs to reflect the order and harmony of the general Mind/Mass Mind (group psyche).

Shaftesbury holds that the Mind can improve its state by the help of Reason, to gain “uniformity of Mind” (II. 44) and end such abuse and isolation. The experience of real beauty/goodness (contemplative state of mind) does not come from the sensuous enjoyment of nature (for example, from food), but comes from truly rational enjoyment, a combination of Mind (Heart) and Reason, of the object. The beauty of this higher Mind is *visible as appearance* - it exists not only as an inner state, but as an outer state - as moral conduct such as in politics and manners, or in any creation such as buildings, gardens, and works of art. All such things work “in the room of that happier and higher Symmetry and Order of a Mind” (I. 87). In the stage of the Third Order of Beauty, Mind in an ultimate sense knows itself. Though it is feeling/passion, it knows its nature and aim, as Shaftesbury states,

Thus at last a MIND, by knowing *it-self*, and its own proper Powers and Virtues, becomes *free*, and independent. It sees its Hindrances and Obstructions, and finds they are wholly from *it-self*, and from *Opinions wrong-conceiv'd*. The more it conquers in this respect, (be it in the least particular) the more it is its own *Master*, feels its own *natural LIBERTY*, and congratulates with it-self on its own *Advancement* and *Prosperity*.

(III. 125)

The Highest Mind, which overcomes its enslaved condition to be its own master, is no more a compound of various feelings, but is uncompounded and united since all parts coexist harmoniously. With this Mind, one’s inner state is truly beautiful and truly natural.

6. Beauty is hidden

Shaftesbury is not primarily interested in works of art, but rather, his main focus is moral conduct in society. He sees parallel analogies between beautiful works of art and beautiful human minds. As a great painter moves the viewer's heart, gentlemen move the hearts of others by their "*Manners, and the moral Part*" (I. 85), that is, their beautiful minds acting upon what is moral, honest, and true. On this point, he writes,

For this [moving others] is the Effect, and this the Beauty of their Art; "in vocal Measures of Syllables, and Sounds, to express the Harmony and Numbers of an inward kind; and represent the Beautys of a human Soul, by proper Foils, and Contarietys, which serve as Graces in this Limning, and render this Musick of the Passions more power and enchanting.

(I. 85-86)

For Shaftesbury, seeing beauty is as difficult as creating beauty, or almost the same degree. The Third Order of Beauty is often hidden compared to the First Order of Beauty (simple pleasure to enjoy matter without rational mind), and the Second Order of Beauty (rational pleasure to enjoy beauty), both of which are easy to recognize. Without the creative and artistic sides, the moral mind cannot find true beauty which is often hidden under the first and the second characters. The First Order of Beauty would be admired by men of "sordid Pleasures for Baseness and Corruption of every sort" (I. 87), and the Second Order of Beauty would be admired by "The Men of Pleasure," of a speculative mind who find pleasure in constructing theorized worlds - who view beauty in terms of "justice" and "order," but as something "impracticable" (ibid.) in real life. Reason in the Second Order of Beauty is not true Reason, as "the Men of cooler Passions" (I. 86) are inclined to exclude feeling or tend to be taken by false concepts of beauty.

They tend not to acknowledge beauty as an important subject, but even those people

of “cool thought” (I. 87) cannot resist the force of beauty, though this can possibly be *false beauty* such as “Dreams of Grandure, Titles, Honours, and a false Magnificence and Beauty; to which we are ready to sacrifice our highest Pleasure and ease” (ibid.) at court, for example, and become “the merest Drudges, and most abject Slaves” (ibid.). Referring to the power of beauty, Shaftesbury comments,

They who refuse to give it scope in the nobler Subjects of a rational and moral kind, will find its prevalence elsewhere, in an inferior Order of Things. They who overlook the *main Springs of Action*, and despise the Thought of Numbers and Proportion in a *Life at large*, will in the mean *Particulars* of it, be no less taken up, and engag'd; as either in the Study of common Arts, or in the Care and Culture of mere mechanic Beautys.

(I. 87)

They are not truly well-bred gentlemen who “wou’d chuse to sacrifice their own Pleasures to those which arise from a generous Behaviour, a Regularity of Conduct, and Consistency of Life and Manners” (I. 88).

Shaftesbury specifically laments the “*Corruption of Taste in some noble Youth*” (I. 106). They may be courtiers of high rank and good breeding, but they do not see the *Manners* of the beauty; they look at the object *it-self* as if beauty exists in it. They see beauty in their possessions, such as gardens, buildings, and clothing, but their luxurious lives lack honesty – beautiful minds; Shaftesbury states that “... if possible, they wou’d so order it, as to make Probity and Luxury agree. But the Rules of Harmony will not permit it. The Dissonancys are too strong” (I. 87).

The Mind in the third beauty creates the artistic and moral mind to create beauty and good conduct. Only one who has gained the third personality, the third truth, and the third manner with a disinterested mind, can appreciate the highest beauty. Discovering the Third Order of Beauty is not easy. This “*original and comprehensive*” beauty is often hidden,

Shaftesbury states, and is not easily recognized at first sight; he writes,

I perceive I am now oblig'd to go far in the pursuit of *Beauty*; which lies very absconded and deep: And if so, I am well assur'd that my *Enjoyments* hitherto have been very shallow. I have dwelt, it seems, all this while upon the Surface, and enjoy'd only a kind of slight superficial Beautys; having never gone in search of Beauty it-self, but of what I fancy'd such.

(II. 225)

Beauty depends on the viewer's state of mind: "For whate'er is void of Mind, is *Void* and *Darkness* to the *Mind's EYE*" (II. 238). We see the same object through our eyes that others see through theirs; however, how we interpret that object depends on the mind. If the viewer is interested in the object because of reason, she could experience the Second Order of Beauty, or possibly the Third Order of Beauty.

The Third Order of Beauty is the mixture of the First and Second Orders of Beauty, in which perception and reason, or feeling and intellect, or the object and one's inner state are in a reciprocal relation and no obstacle prevents one seeing what is behind the object. Shaftesbury regards the Third Order Beauty as the stage of infinite view, in which ill become good, and subjective character become objective character.

In this case, the viewer who is looking at a statue is looking at the sculptor's mind (aesthetic concept) and manner (the way he made the stature) from outside. Or the viewer who is looking at a beautiful person is looking at the person's mind and manner from outside. The Three Orders of Beauty can be the level of beauty in the objects or person, but also can be the level of the person who is judging the beautiful object or person.¹⁸⁹ For

¹⁸⁹ Aldridge correctly points out that Shaftesbury's *mind* and *reason* is defined as not only the perceiver of beautiful object but also the beautiful object to be perceived. "Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto." *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, 41 (1951) pp. 338.

example, one whose aesthetic judgment is sense/passion-based (the First Order of Beauty) may misjudge the genuine beauty of the object.

For Shaftesbury, holding an ideal dream for humanity is not virtuous unless one puts intention or will into action. Having a kind heart is not virtuous unless one acts out of the benevolence, and such a virtuous manner is recognized universally. As Shaftesbury claims, to be “the *Architect of his own Life and Fortune*” (II. 238), a person can make his mind and manner beautiful, as an artist, when he overcomes his dual nature.

7. Beauty and Enthusiasm

The Third Order of Beauty involves a *disinterested* attitude towards the object of beauty, “the only Object worthy of it-self” (II. 238). One has lost all interest except the pure pleasure of the beauty of the object and “the contemplation of Beauty” itself (II. 221). The Third Order of Beauty brings higher Enthusiasm “from those *secondly* and *scanty* Objects, to this *original* and *comprehensive* One” (II. 224). It is “a fair and plausible *Enthusiasm*, a reasonable *Extasy* and *Transport* allow’s to other Subjects, such as Architicutre, Painting, Musick” with “higher Perfection and Grace” (ibid.). In the “last Order” of enthusiasm, “all the Enthusiasms of other kinds resolve themselves” (II. 228) as the mixture of human nature.

Shaftesbury also refers to the Third Order of Beauty as “the *Force of Divine BEAUTY*” (II. 223) which is “formed in our-selves and [an] *Object* capable and worthy of *real Enjoyment*” (ibid.) with “real GOOD” (II. 130). It is neither the first kind of enthusiasm (fanatics) nor the second kind of enthusiasm (dogmatists), but the “rational and refin’d Contemplation of *Beauty*” (II. 222). The beauty of the object is first perceived by the senses, but then, if it is genuine beauty, it can be enjoyed by the rational mind without supressing imagination and passion. He writes,

So that every *real* Love depending on *the Mind*, and being only *the Contemplation of Beauty*, either as it really is *in it-self*, or as it appears imperfectly in the objects which strike the Sense; how can the rational Mind rest *here*, or be satisfy'd with the absurd *Enjoyment* which reaches the *Sense alone*?

(II. 220-221)

Disinterestedness means we do not value the object as an end, and do not desire to possess the object - since we simply want to feel joy from beauty, and do not demand utility from the object. If we are interested in how the object can serve us, we are biased against the object, and thus it is not pure aesthetic judgement. A disinterested mental state is caused by reflective contemplation, resulting from the balanced integration of sense and reason, which dissolves any interest and purpose regarding the object. Regarding this state, he holds that,

[The Mind] languishes and grows dim, whene'er detain'd on foreign subjects; but thrives and attains its natural Vigour, when employ'd in Contemplation of what is like it -self. 'Tis *improving* MIND, slightly surveying other Objects, and passing over Bodys, and the common Forms, (where only a Shadow of Beauty rests) ambitiously presses onward to its *Source*, and views *the Original* of Form and Order in that which is intelligent.

(II. 238)

Disinterestedness is the combination of a harmonious relation between sense and reason. It is neither feeling nor thinking, neither sense nor reason, but both in harmonious concord, that is to say, a sublimated state of mind. In the state of disinterestedness, the observer is able to transcend the conflict of his dual nature and environment, and realize the appearance of beauty in himself. It is in the Third Order of Beauty that one can realize the "highest Pleasure and Ease" (II. 221) with true Manners and true Reason. True Reason exists in the Third Order of Beauty, and this Reason does not exclude passion/feeling, the ability to see true beauty and virtue, and the true nature of things.

In conclusion, I hold that for Shaftesbury, there are three levels of beauty, aligned with the three levels of human characteristics, which I have detailed in the table below: the

First Order of Beauty, which is sense-based (column A); the Second Order of Beauty, which is reason-based (column B); and the Third Order of Beauty, which is reason/sense-based (column AB).

Table 8 Shaftesbury's Aesthetic Concepts

A: The First Order of Beauty	B: The Second Order of Beauty	C: The Third Order of Beauty
1. In-Animate	Animate ¹⁹⁰	Mixt (In-Animate/Animate)
2. Dead Forms ¹⁹¹	Living Forms (Mind)	Work of Arts
3. Animals	Reason	Human
4. Body	Mind	Humanity
5. Interestedness (Sense)	Interestedness (Intellect)	Disinterestedness
6. Enthusiasm (Fanaticism)	Enthusiasm (Melancholy)	True Enthusiasm
7. Poetical Truth	Historical Truth	Moral Truth
8. Poetical Manners	Methodical Manners	Miscellaneous Manner
9. First Character	Second Character	Third Character

In column A (sense-based characters), the First Order of Beauty is defined as In-Animate (row 1), Dead Forms (row 2), and Animals (row 3). Also, the First Order of Beauty can be seen people who motivated to be interested in the object by sense-based desire (row 5). This beauty can be represented by Enthusiasm (fanatic) (row 6), which is based on the passionate mind. Poetical truth (row 7) and Poetical Manners (row 8), do represent the First Order of Beauty, but since they are sense /imagination-based as opposed to reason-based characters, parallel relations of three levels of dialectical styles can be recognized. Also, the first character of a person (row 9) is defined as mainly sense-based, as well as other terms of row A.

The First Order of Beauty is a sense/passion-based experience as well as the first

¹⁹⁰ *Animate* means Intelligence, including the instinct of animals and humans to form groups, herds, or societies (III. 112 fn).

¹⁹¹ Dead Form is a mere object which does not have power to form beauty, and Forming Power. The crucial matter in *Forms which form* (II. 227) in the first row is that beauty be presented as an appearance in the outer world. A/B shows all appearances of beauty represented as a phenomenon resulting from *Forming Power* (II. 227).

truth (poetical truth), the first manners (poetical manners), the first character (sense/imagination-based self), and experiencing beauty by the senses, and in this level it is mere material, not expressed as works of art. It is also equated with virtue, freedom, and pleasure in the sense-based understanding.

In column B (reason-based characters), the Second Order of Beauty is defined as Animate (row 1), Living Form (Artistic Mind) (row 2), and Reason (row 3). Also, the Second Order of Beauty can be seen in people who are motivated to be interested in the object by reason-based desire (row 5). This beauty is represented by Enthusiasm (dogmatic) (row 6) which is based on the speculative mind. Historical Truth (row 6) and Methodical Manners (row 7) do not represent the Second Order of Beauty, but since they are reason-based as opposed to sense/imagination-based characters, parallel relations with the three levels of dialectical styles can be recognized. Also the second character of a person (row 9) is defined as mainly rational, as well as the other terms of row B.

The Second Order of Beauty is described as the second truth (historical truth), the second manners (methodical manners), the second character (reason-based self), and experiencing beauty by reason. In this level we find works of art, but works which lack the harmonious relation of reason and sense. It is also phrased as virtue, freedom, and pleasure in the reason-based sense.

In column AB, (sense and reason based characters), the Third Order of Beauty is defined as Mixt (row 1), Works of Art (row 2), and only for Humans (row 3). The Third Order of Beauty can be seen in people who are disinterested in the object by the harmonious relation of reason and sense (row 5). This beauty is represented by Enthusiasm in the genuine sense (row 6) based on the harmonious relation of reason and imagination. Only

one who has regained his third character, one who is able to see the third truth, and apply the third manners in his daily life, is able to have enthusiasm in the genuine sense, with a disinterested mind, and can see and can create true beauty. Moral Truth (row 7) and Miscellaneous Manners (row 8) are defined as the highest artistic style in works of arts. Also the third character of a person (row 9) is defined as imaginative, but also rational, as well as the other terms of row AB.

The Third Order of Beauty is described as the third truth (moral truth), the third manners (miscellaneous manners), the third character (true self), and the highest works of art. True beauty is described as goodness and truth; therefore, the Third Order of Beauty (AB) means true beauty, true manners, true virtue, true pleasure, and true self. This beauty is the answer or bridge to compensate for or unite the gap between humanity’s dual characters, and move to benefit society by moral conduct.

8. Inconsistency in the Description of Hierarchical Beauty

I note that there seems to be some inconsistency in Shaftesbury’s terminology regarding the hierarchy of beauty, as I detail in the table below:

Table 9 Three Orders of Beauty (First half of the previous table)

<u>A: The First Order of Beauty</u>	<u>B: The Second Order of Beauty</u>	<u>C: The Third Order of Beauty</u>
1. In-Animate	Animate	Mixt
2. Dead Forms	Living Forms (Mind)	Work of Arts
3. Animals	Reason	Human
4. Body	Mind	Humanity

The First Order of Beauty (A) is ‘In-Animate’ (III. 112.fn), and ‘Dead Forms’ (II. 227) as in rows 1 and 2, but it does not mean that the First Order of Beauty indicates only objects, since in one place Shaftesbury categorizes ‘Animals’ (II. 237) with the First Order

of Beauty as in row 3 since they are “SENSE only” (ibid.) in comparison with humans’ unique ability to enjoy beauty by “MIND and REASON” (ibid.), and in this paragraph it seems he puts ‘Reason’ (ibid.) – as in the human aesthetic capacity - in the Second Order of Beauty. Also, as in row 4, this beauty can be ‘human body’ as he states that the “Mixt” means, as “a *single Person*,” the mixture of “a Body and a Mind” (III. 112. fn).

The Second Order of Beauty (B) is ‘Animate’ as in row 1; Shaftesbury refers to animal and human activity, as in the tendency to make “Flocks, Herds” (III. 112. fn) or “Public Societys, *Communitys*, or *Common-wealths*” (ibid.) together as “intelligent” activity (ibid.). However, the Second Order of Beauty, most of the time, relates only to humans, as Shaftesbury includes ‘Living Forms’ (human mind), as in row 2. This beauty is regarded as ‘Reason’ (II. 237) as in row 3, but also ‘Mind’ (III. 112. fn) in a comparison to the first which is ‘a Body’ (ibid.).

In summary, as detailed in the above table, the First Order of Beauty can refer to dead forms, animals, the human body, while the Second Order of Beauty can refer to animals and humans, or human society, as well as animal herds, or the human rational ability, and the human mind.

Was Shaftesbury in error? I do not think so. I hold that the flexibility of his definitions is part of his dialectical view of the systems in the universe. As I have discussed so far, in Shaftesbury’s writings, almost every important word (truth, manners, characters, enthusiasm, etc.) has incomplete states (either sense-based or reason-based) with lack of integration, and its truly genuine state with the integration of both sides; for example, moral truth is achieved after poetic and historical truth are integrated, or the third character of a person is achieved after the first character (sense-based) and the second character (reason-

based) are integrated.

He demonstrates a persistent habit of examining the true nature of everything as one third of his *Philosophical Regimen*; his private writing is occupied with this approach. The nature of things has multiple characteristics. He would ask, for example, Is it in-animate or animate? If it is animate, is it leaning to the material side or the rational side? Is it matter or form? If it is matter, is it a dead-form or a living form, or a work of art? Is it body or mind? If it is body, is it a mere animal or is it human? It is in servitude or at liberty? If it is in servitude, is it leaning to the material side? Shaftesbury tends to categorize almost everything into two (opposite sides - the first and the second characters) or three (when he adds the third character).

His categorization of the First Order of Beauty expresses the passive or material aspects of beings and objects. On the other hand, under the column of the Second Order of Beauty is “whatever is higher in the kind” (III. 112), such as animals, individuals, communities, flocks and herds - the active or intellectual aspects of being and objects. The Third Order of Beauty is that which expresses the unity of the First and the Second Orders of Beauty - the harmonious nature of matter and form, united as an individual or work of art expressing ideal beauty, where one’s concept of virtue and beauty is well-materialized or conducted. Since he views all things in the universe as either sense-based or reason-based, animals can be sense-based, as lacking intellect, and so could be found under the First Order of Beauty, or reason-based in having an intellect to form herds to survive, and can be found under the Second Order of Beauty; likewise, the human can be regarded as sense-based, as having a body, and so can be put in the First Order of Beauty, or reason-based as a rational being, and can be put in the Second Order of Beauty.

Therefore, in Shaftesbury, I argue that the Three Orders of Beauty can be applied to various points of view, as detailed in the table below:

Table 10 The Three Orders of Beauty from Various Points of View

	A: The First Order of Beauty	B: The Second Order of Beauty	C: The Third Order of Beauty
1. Beauty in Nature	In-Animate	Animate	Mixt
2. Beauty in Art	Dead Form	Living Forms (Mind)	Works of Art
3. Beauty in Humanity	Animal	Reason	Human
4. Beauty in a Person	Body	Mind	Humanity

In the above table, in row 1, from the point of view of Beauty in Nature, the Second Order of Beauty includes animal activity as in herds or flocks, as well as human activity in society or community, in which nature shows its harmonious intelligence. But from the point of view of Beauty in Art (row 2), or from the point of view of Beauty in Humanity (row 3), the Second Order of Beauty does not include animals, since those rows are dealing with aesthetic experience.

The object or concept of each order of beauty depends on which point of view is taken. Shaftesbury was quite precise when viewing and applying every concept, word, or object with the Three Orders of Beauty; yet, ironically his exhaustive manner of analyzing every element sometimes gives readers the impression that he does not define his concept of beauty carefully.

9. Works of Art

Shaftesbury applies his Three Orders of Beauty as a way to judge the quality of works of art. The character of works of art is categorized into three – sense-based character, reason-based character, and the mixture of the two, just as in the Three Orders of Beauty.

Figures and symmetries are categorized as the First Order of Beauty: “*regular Figures* and

*Symmetry*s with which Children are delighted” (III. 112. fn). The Second Order of Beauty concerns “the Proportions of Architecture and the other Arts. – The same in respect of Sounds and MUSICK” (III. 112. fn). Here it is clear that he regards the character of objects which appeal to the senses first of all, that is to say, figures/symmetries are of lower beauty than proportion which gives the theme of the works of art - in the visual arts, and sound in the case of music. Thus, “Stones, Rocks, Minerals” are mere material though they could be beautiful, but as they are not formed into a sculpture yet, they lack the theme of the entire proportion as a work of art. They are the mere segments, parts, lines, and shapes, and lacking the expression of the meaning, and do not yet appeal to reason.

Great works of art need to be recognized by reason. Sensuous recognition through the eyes is necessary, of course, in order for such to be picked up by our imagination, but after that the work should reach one’s rational side. A painting should have a moral aim; therefore, it should be qualified by the criteria of our rational judgement of taste, as Shaftesbury states:

Whatsoever is drawn from Nature, with the intention of raising in us the Imagination of the natural Species or Object, according to real *Beauty* and *Truth*, shou’d be compriz’d in certain complete Portions or Districts, which represent the Correspondency or Union of each part of Nature, with intire NATURE her-self.¹⁹² And ‘tis this natural Apprehension, or anticipating Sense of *Unity*, which makes us give even to the Works of our inferior Artizans, the name of *Pieces* by way of Excellence, and as denoting the *Justness* and *Truth* of Work.
(III. 238 underline added)

At that time Shaftesbury was writing, there was much debate in France regarding

¹⁹² As in the underlined, when discussing parts, he tends to type “Nature,” but when discussing nature as a whole, he tends to type “NATURE” or “NATURE”.

painting, over the superiority of either colour, which appeals to our sense, or shape, which appeals to our reason. Regarding this subject, Shaftesbury comments,

That tho [*imitative Art*] borrows help indeed from Colours, and uses them ... to execute its Designs; It has nothing ... more wide of its real Aim, or more remote from its Intention, than to make a *shew* of Colours, or from their mixture, to raise a *separate* and *flattering* Pleasure to the SENSE.

(III. 239)

For Shaftesbury, color appeals to sense, and shape or design appeals to reason. In painting, it is necessary to create details which “must yield to the general Design; and all things be subservient to that which is principal: in order to form a certain *Easiness of Sight*; a simple, clear, and *united View*” (I. 89). He seems close to the opinions of the *Poussinists*, who claimed the superior character of design because it appeals to reason. If the object before our eyes appeals only to our sensuous side, by means of its colour, texture, and the material, it is mere “*false Relish*” without the “reflection [which] pleases the Mind, and satisfies the Thought and Reason” (III. 239).

The experience of colour is a sensuous experience, and if the colour strikes our senses, and disturbs our reflection on the object’s beauty, then it is overpowering, as colour in paintings should be subservient to the aesthetic and moral purpose. If not, Shaftesbury argues, it merely gives pleasure to the senses, as he states:

The Pleasure is plainly foreign and separate, as having no concern of share in the proper Delight or Entertainment which naturally arises from the subject, and Workmanship it-self. For the Subject, in respect of Pleasure, as well as Science, is absolutely completed, when the Design is executed, and the propos’d Imitation once accomplish’d.

(III. 239, fn)

The character which appeals mainly to the senses, or mainly to reason, is not beautiful, not moral, not reflective of true works of art. If the work disturbs the harmony of

sense/imagination and reason, it is not moral since there are “false and corrupt” or “dishonest” (II. 17) elements to the entire theme of the work. If the work has this tendency to disturb our dual state of mind, imagination and reason cannot cooperate in creating a harmonious mental state.

Works of art need both characters - imagination and reason, or poetic manner and methodical manner, to realize the truth of art - which is planned, but seems natural, created or copied but seems true. For example, the French Garden with well-calculated geometric design is regarded as lacking naturalness, and not truly beautiful, but in the English Garden,¹⁹³ with its natural-looking landscape, naturalness is realized because it appears to lack an end or intention, and it may be called truly beautiful. Lack of freedom is the same as lack of beauty.¹⁹⁴ If there are too many rules or regulations suppressing what the artist wants to express, there is lack of freedom; Shaftesbury uses the analogy of a French garden, where, he holds, the geometrical rules spoil the beauty in appearance by creating an unnatural artfulness as he states:

¹⁹³ Regarding the possible influence of Shaftesbury’s garden theory on Schiller, see Sheila Margaret Benn. “Friedrich Schiller and the English Garden: Uber den Gartenkalender auf das Jahr 1795.” *Garden History*, 19 (1991) pp. 28-46. According to Benn, the English garden is related to the core of Schiller’s aesthetic view. For Schiller, the French garden (rational, geometrically well designed) fails as a work of art to express and appeal to human sense/feeling. On the other hand, the English garden represents the sensuous/nature. And German garden represents the ideal garden, showing both sensuous/nature and rational/civilization. Regarding the ideal landscape as restricted but free, or ordered but natural, is similar to Shaftesbury’s view on the garden. True harmony and beauty comes from a united psyche for both Shaftesbury and Schiller. Though Benn does not deal with the relation between English and German thinkers here, the influences are obvious.

¹⁹⁴ Mowl highlights Shaftesbury’s aesthetic view in the development of English Palladian garden in the middle of the eighteenth century. In *Moralist* (II. 220), Shaftesbury objected to the Franco-Dutch style garden (with geometrical shapes and lines) and gave theocratical importance to the “*natural* kind” of landscape which blossomed as the English garden, after his death. Though Shaftesbury did not like the architectural style of the era, built by his political rivals the Tories, his view of nature and gardens influenced eighteenth century philosophers and gardeners such as William Kent, who was well acquainted with Shaftesbury. Mowl points out that Shaftesbury saw “gardens as a revelation of the dark and light sides of the human spirit” (p. 39), as displayed in the illustrations in *Characteristics*. Also, Mowl notes Shaftesbury’s role as a forerunner of the concept of the sublime before Edmund Burke. Timothy Mowl, “Directions from the Grave: The Problem with Lord Shaftesbury.” *Garden History*, 32 (2004) pp. 35-48.

I shall no longer resist the Passion growing in me for Things of a *natural* kind; where neither *Art*, nor *Conceit* or *Caprice* of Man has spoil'd their *genuine Order*, by breaking in upon that *primitive State*. Even the rude *Rocks*, the mossy *Caverns*, the irregular unwrought *Grotto* 's, and broken *Falls* of Waters, with all the horrid Graces of the *Wilderness* it-self, as representing NATURE more, will be the more engaging, and appear with a Magnificence beyond the formal Mockery of princely Gardens.

(II.220)

195

Naturalness in works of art is possible by expressing the unity of the sense-based and reason-based characters with a disinterested state of mind, which is not seeking any end, but realizing the truth, beauty, and good. Shaftesbury writes that the viewer "...in all disinterested Cases, must approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove what is dishonest and corrupt" (II. 17).

In conclusion, beauty in painting, music, sculpture and architecture are the mixture of the first and the second characters, as I detail in the table below:

Table 11 Works of Art

A: The First Order of Beauty	B: The Second Order of Beauty	C: The Third Order of Beauty
1. Color	Shape/Design	Beauty in Painting
2. Sound	Composition	Beauty in Music
3. Material	Proportion	Beauty in Sculpture
4. Figures/Symmetries	Proportion	Beauty in Architecture

As in rows 1 to 4 in column A (the First Order of Beauty, sense-based), if the colour in a painting, sound in music, material in sculpture, or figures/symmetries in architecture are

¹⁹⁵ Regarding Shaftesbury's garden theory, see Leatherbarrow, David. "Character, Geometry and Perspective: the Third Earl of Shaftesbury's Principles of Garden Design." *Journal of Garden History*, 4. (1984) pp. 332-358. Leatherbarrow makes a concise summary of Shaftesbury's gardening theory here from scattered sentences on nature in *Characteristics*. This is worth reading since Shaftesbury's gardening theory is related to the core of his aesthetic view, but has rarely been dealt with. Shaftesbury's view of nature is that parts should be proportionate to the whole, and figure (appearance) must cooperate with force (inner character), as in the harmonious relation of body and mind. He applied this view to gardening and landscape, which represent a middle ground between nature and cultivation. For example, natural objects such as trees in the landscape need to show nature, but so do also cultivated figures in a garden.

over-emphasized, and suppressing the shape/design in the painting, the composition in the music, or the proportion in the sculpture and architecture - rows 1 to 4 in column B (the Second Order of Beauty, reason-based), it is not a great work of art because such works are 'dishonest.' Those parts need to contribute to create harmony, as a whole or the entire theme of the work.

Shaftesbury sometimes uses moral beauty (beautiful action), and artistic beauty (beautiful objects) interchangeably. There is harmony with "Symmetry and Proportion" in Nature (I. 218), as in works of art and in life. Since beautiful means moral for Shaftesbury, an aesthetically correct manner means a morally correct manner. In great works of art, there is "*moral Magick*" (I. 85). It is magic because of its "double charm" – one is the artist's passion, that is to say, "the Love of Numbers, Decency and Proportion" (ibid.). It is *magic* also because those works inspire and move us by their passion, which appeals to our senses, and then in the next stage by their *moral manners* which appeal to our Reason.

Chapter 6: Moral Sense

1. Natural Affections

In this section, I content that Shaftesbury, as with the other terms so far discussed, has a coherent and systematic approach to what he calls ‘natural affections’ – again with an integrated and dialectical method. His theory is that the conflicts between self-affection and natural affection (public affection) are solved in the state of *natural affection in the genuine sense* (the mixture of natural self-affection and natural public affection, just as conflicts between the First and the Second Order of Beauty are resolved in the Third Order of Beauty (the mixture of the First and the Second), conflicts between imagination and speculation are resolved in works of art (mixture of imagination and reason), conflicts between the first personality and the second personality are resolved in the third personality (mixture of the first and the second), conflicts between poetic truth and historical truth are resolved in moral truth (mixture of poetic and historical truth), and conflicts between poetical manners and methodical manners are resolved in miscellaneous manners (the mixture of poetical and methodical manners).

Shaftesbury refers to natural affection throughout *Characteristics*, but especially in *Concerning Virtue or Merit*, which is focusing on the subject with a more organized and definitive style compared to other works. Here he is more direct, and does not employ fable or soliloquy, or quote poetry, and does not jump from one subject to another. However, some critics have pointed out that there are inconsistencies in Shaftesbury’s definition of *natural affection* as a foundation of moral nature and conduct. In some places, he states that natural affection is based on a feeling/sense which is innate, while in other places he defines it as a rational faculty which is gained or acquired. Thus Aldridge comments that

Shaftesbury's concept of morality based on natural affection is "the weakest part of his system" since it is "nowhere clearly defined or explained. In some sections of the *Characteristics* it is not to be distinguished from reason, and in others it is almost equivalent to innate ideas" (Aldridge 302).¹⁹⁶

Does Shaftesbury hold that moral character is formed by natural affection, while also taking account of reason? My answer is yes; moral sense consists of natural affection, and this is not mere passion or feeling. It is what Shaftesbury calls *rational natural affection* - affection under the control of reason without contradictions. I hold that for Shaftesbury, *affections* (as well as beauty) have hidden characters beneath the surface.

I agree with Aldridge's comment that *natural affection* is the "weakest" (ibid.) theory in Shaftesbury's writings, not only because of the loose definitions, but because he seems to be adding too many different terms for natural affections - such as self-affections/public affections, natural/unnatural affections, rational/sensitive affections, partial/entire affections, and virtuous/vicious affections. However, I contend that this is not due to lack of speculative thought. Rather, there is a system, an integrated thought, based on his dialectical view of the three levels of the nature of things regarding the three levels of beauty, and he applies this approach to *natural affections*.

If we scatter the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, it is quite difficult to figure out the entire picture. We are able to see that there is appropriate meaning, design, and order in the puzzle only after we correctly arrange the pieces of the puzzle. What Shaftesbury is doing when

¹⁹⁶ Alfred Owen Aldridge. Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto. *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1951), pp. 297-382

defining *natural affection*, as well as other terms in *Characteristics*, may be compared to scattering the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. If he did so intentionally, he is quite successful in making his writing a “Labyrinth of Speculation” (III. 148), challenging readers’ ability to follow his theory of beauty and the good.

In this section, I argue that Shaftesbury is a philosopher who states his theory of natural affection with a systematic view because, in my observation, he not only arranges various affections into three categories – based on the three levels of the nature of things (the first sense-based, the second reason-based, and the third a mixture of the previous two), but also into two categories – based on their being either natural or unnatural.¹⁹⁷ Understandably, this causes some degree of confusion for readers.

Shaftesbury applies the three levels of characters to his concepts of *affections* - sensible nature, rational nature, and a rational nature in the genuine sense which is the mixture of the previous two. This approach to the categorization of *natural affection* follows his way of categorization of the three levels of beauty, truth, manners, and enthusiasm.

He states that there are three affections - natural affections (public affections), self-affections, and unnatural affections. However, he states that both natural affection (public affection) and self-affection can be either natural or unnatural (though elsewhere they are both regarded as *natural affections* in the sense of innate affections), and unnatural affection

¹⁹⁷ Aldridge suggests, regarding one of Shaftesbury’s incoherent or unsystematic passages which presents a sensual view of moral sense/taste (as our innate character comes from natural affection) and a rational view of moral sense/taste (as our conscious exercise to form the intellectual opinion to be good), that *Philosophical Regimen* (Shaftesbury’s private notebook) can serve as a supplement to show that there are two levels of natural affection; they are true and false affection (p. 337). This is a stimulating comment for my thesis, though Aldridge seems unaware that not only *Philosophical Regimen*, but entire parts of *Characteristics* reveal dual-meaning terms as essential to Shaftesbury’s *system*. Alfred Owen Aldridge. Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto. *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1951), pp. 297-382

which is the unnatural condition of the previous two when they are ill and vicious. This means he is counting at least four states of affections - natural self-affections, unnatural self-affections, natural public affections (or *natural* natural affections, since he refers to public affection as natural affections), and unnatural public affections (in this case, I do not count 'unnatural affections' since this is overlapping with the unnatural self-affections and unnatural public affections).

Besides the three levels of natural affections, he applies the criteria of either natural (in the sense of perfect) or unnatural (in the sense of imperfect). This means natural affection (which he defines as *public affection* - affections used to maintain social interest) can be either natural or unnatural, and self-affection (which he defines as affections used to maintain self-interests) which he also refers to as natural affection (in the sense of innate affection), can be natural or unnatural, and all this certainly can look confusing to readers.

In addition to evaluating affections as either natural or unnatural, Shaftesbury applies concepts such as virtuous/vicious, rational/sensitive, good/ill, and partial/entire when referring to affections. For example, *Natural* natural affection (in the sense of genuine natural affection) is described as virtuous, good, entire, rational, and benevolent. On the other hand, *Unnatural* natural affection (in the sense of imperfect natural affection) is described as vicious, ill, partial, sensible, and selfish. Such usage further complicates his definitions of *natural affections*.

Moreover, he gives multiple meanings not only to natural affections, but to unnatural affections as well. Though he states that unnatural affections are ill and vicious, and he criticizes religious fanatics as displaying unnatural affections, he also states that no one can be completely ill and vicious. This means there are at least two levels of unnatural affections

- unnatural in the outward or first appearance, and unnatural in the inward or ultimate appearance. I hold, however, that he makes such distinctions because he is conscious of which level of the nature of things he is discussing.

2. The Definitions of Three Kinds of Affections

Shaftesbury states that there are three kinds of “Affections or Passions which must influence and govern the Animal” (II. 50):

1. THE *natural Affections*, which lead to the Good of THE PUBLIC.
 2. OR the *Self-affections*, which lead only to the Good of THE PRIVATE.
 3. OR such are neither of these; nor tending either to any Good of THE PUBLIC or PRIVATE; but contrary-wise: and which may therefore be justly styl'd *unnatural Affections*.
- So that according as these Affections stand, a Creature must be virtuous or vitious, *good or ill*.

(ibid.)

Self-Affection is affection directed toward “*the private Nature, or Self-system*” (II. 46). This affection is for the sake of “Self-Good” and a man “cannot really be good and natural in respect of his Society or Publick, without being ill and unnatural toward himself (II. 13). Shaftesbury cautions, however, that an “immoderate degree of” self-affection results in “SELFISHNESS” (ibid.). For example, religious fanatics have “the Principle of Self-love” (II. 34) merely for the sake of their private good. He also refers to Self-affections as *self-passions* (II. 87), including “Love to the Offspring” (II. 51), “*Amours*” (II. 87), and social affection in a narrow sense (directed toward a limited circle of persons).

Public affection (which he also calls social affection) is affection towards “*the common Nature, or System of the Kind*” (II. 46). Shaftesbury describes it as “some gentle Feeling of the social and friendly kind; some enlivening Motion of Kindness, Fellowship, Complacency” (II. 67), or “*social Love, and common Affection, which is natural to*

Mankind” (I. 72). He regards public affection as one of the “better and more enlarg’d Affections” (I. 73), when compared to self-affections. It is described as “the very Principle of Virtue, viz. *natural and kind Affection*” (II. 41). Public affection as *social passion* is termed “Social Love” (II. 53) and “social Pleasure” (II. 59).

Shaftesbury regards public affection as *natural affection* because he sees this affection as the most appropriate and most natural affection. He states,

It has been already shewn, that in the Passions and Affections of particular Creatures, there is a constant relation to the Interest of *a Species*, or *common Nature*. This has been demonstrated in the case of *natural Affection*, parental Kindness, Zeal for Posterity, Concern for the Propagation and Nurture of the Young, Love of Fellowship and Company, Compassion, mutual Succour, and the rest of this kind, Nor will any-one deny that this Affection of a Creature towards the Good of the Species or common Nature, is as *proper and natural* to him....

(II. 45)

Natural affection is variously described as related to the “CONSCIENCE, or *natural Sense of the Odiousness of Crime and Injustice*” (II. 70), the “natural Conscience” (II. 72), “*social Love*” (II. 63), “*natural and kind affection*” (II. 41), and “moral affection” (II. 40, II. 63).

3. Moral Sense

Since the sense of right is composed of “a real Affection” which he also calls *natural affection*, Shaftesbury rephrases *moral sense* as *natural affection*, as in the phrase, “this sort of SENSE [moral sense] or good Affection” (II. 30).¹⁹⁸ It seems he regards moral sense as a kind of affection useful to judge moral virtue, or what Alderman views as an “instinctive

¹⁹⁸ Kivy explains Shaftesbury’s “inherent indeterminateness” (16) regarding the definition of sense and reason, and points out that Shaftesbury’s *sense* means *feeling*, but also means faculties of rational and perceptual judgement as in the term *common sense*, or *sense* as *literary sense* to be critical of texts - synonyms for moral sense in certain paragraphs since Shaftesbury uses analogies to discuss many subjects when defining *sense*. Kivy also comments on Shaftesbury’s *taste*, a term also occasionally confusing, as it could mean *sense of beauty*, and concludes that for Shaftesbury, sense and taste are interchangeable, but this depends on the essay or section of *Characteristics* being considered (20). Peter Kivy, *The Seventh Sense: Frances Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.*

and immediate approbation or disapprobation”¹⁹⁹ as he states,

... nothing can assist, or advance the Principle of Virtue, except what *either* in some manner nourishes and promotes a Sense of Right and Wrong; *or* preserves it genuine and uncorrupt; *or* causes it, when such, to be obey'd, by subduing and subjecting the other Affection to it.

(II. 23 underlines added)

Furthermore, he rephrases “the *natural* and *just* Sense of Right and Wrong” (II. 23) as “proportionable Affection of a rational Creature towards the moral Objects of Right and Wrong” (II. 23). *Natural* in this sense is the same as ‘moral sense’ which he views “as natural to us as *natural Affection* itself, and being a first Principle in our Constitution and Make” (II. 26). As well as natural affections, *moral sense* is an innate “Sense of Right and Wrong” (II. 24), which “even the wickedest Creature living must have” (ibid.) because it is a “NATURAL SENSE” (ibid.)²⁰⁰ which everyone with reason possesses.²⁰¹

Moral sense is, for Shaftesbury, often regarded as aesthetic sense since true beauty means true virtue. Alderman comments: “the perception of moral truth and of aesthetic beauty is not due to the operation of separate faculties, for beauty and good are the same.”²⁰² Shaftesbury categorizes moral sense, as he does with as natural affection, as either sense-based moral sense or reason-based moral sense. There exist “natural sense” (II. 95), “natural *moral sense*” (II. 27), or “high moral Sense, *the Friend of Mankind*” (II. 136), based on reason, and unnatural moral sense based on sense or passion. The moral sense of wrong

¹⁹⁹ William E. Alderman “Shaftesbury and the Doctrine of Moral Sense in the Eighteenth Century.”PMLA, 46 (1931) p.1088.

²⁰⁰ Shaftesbury uses “natural” in the sense of “innate” here; however, it can be “original” or “ideal” in different places.

²⁰¹ Norton regards Shaftesbury not as a moral sentimentalist, but as one who emphasises the role of reason to reflect and test sentiments. Shaftesbury’s moral sense is not mere ‘sense’ but as always accompanied by reason. Robert E. Norton, *The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995.

²⁰² William E. Alderman “Shaftesbury and the Doctrine of Moral Sense in the Eighteenth Century.”PMLA, 46 (1931) p. 1087.

consists of “a real Antipathy of Aversion to Injustice or Wrong”, and the moral sense of right consists of “a real Affection or Love towards *Equity* and *Right*, for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural Beauty and Worth” (II. 25).

Affection can be interchangeable with not only *sense*, but with *imagination* too. As a footnote of the phrase the “*Imagination* of something BEAUTIFUL, GREAT, and BECOMING in Things” (III. 120), Shaftesbury notes:

Of the necessary Being and Prevalency of some such IMAGINATION or SENSE (natural and common to all Men, irresistible, of original Growth in the Mind, the Guide of our Affections, and the Ground of our *Admiration*, *Contempt*, *Shame*, *Honour*, *Disdain*, and other natural and unavoidable Impressions)... [here he lists several references]

(III. 120. fn)

There are two levels of moral sense; one is *natural moral sense* (II. 7) by which Shaftesbury intends a genuine moral sense, and the other is unnatural moral sense, in the sense of a false moral sense. Though it is innate, “Corruption of Moral Sense” (II. 26) may occur: “For notwithstanding a Man may thro’ Custom, or by licentiousness of Practice, favour’d by Atheism, come in time to lose much of his natural *moral Sense*” (II. 27). He adds “natural” as in “*natural moral Sense*” (ibid.) because he uses “natural” in a positive notion, in the sense of perfect, good, or genuine. For example, natural affection (public affection) is praised above self-affection (private affection). While the definitions of sense, affection, and imagination appear to be somewhat interchangeable, this does not mean he is careless; rather, I argue, it is based on his view to categorize those terms with the first character (sense-based).

4. Innate or Acquired?

For Shaftesbury, humans have an innate aesthetic/moral sense. Wishing to see

beauty and act upon goodness comes from “Pre-conceptions of [the] *Fair and Beautiful*,” or the “*inward Eye*” (II. 231). Shaftesbury states,

Now, if I join the *Opinion of Good* to the Possessions of the MIND; if it be in *the Affections* themselves that I place my highest Joy, and in those Objects, whatever they Are, of *inward* Worth and Beauty, (such as *Honesty, Faith, Integrity, Friendship, Honour*) ’tis evident I can never possibly, in this respect, rejoice amiss, or indulge my-self too far in the Enjoyment.

(III. 122)

As soon as our *outward eye* (physical senses) sees the figure, colour, and motion of the object, our *inward eye* (psychological sense) recognizes beauty. Likewise, when we listen to music, we recognize inward beauty (the sound attracts our pre-conceptions or aesthetic criteria) beneath the outward beauty (the sound we hear) because the music expresses “the Harmony and Numbers of inward kind; and represent the Beautys of a human Soul” (I. 86).

The same may be said of moral conduct. As we recognize beauty in objects immediately, we recognize moral beauty by our *inward eye* - our innate moral sense. Shaftesbury states,

Is there ... a natural Beauty of *Figures*? And is there not as natural a one of ACTIONS? No sooner the Eye opens upon *Figures*, the Ear to *Sounds*, than straight *the Beautiful* results, and *Grace* and *Harmony* are known and acknowledg’d. No sooner are ACTIONS view’d, no sooner the *human Affections* and *Passions* discern’d ... than straight an *inward EYE* distinguishes, and sees *the Fair* and *Shapely*, *the Amiable* and *Admirable*, apart from *the Deform’d*, *the Foul*, *the Odious*, or *the Despicable*. How is it possible therefore not to own, “That as these *Distinctions* have their Foundation *in Nature*, the Discernment it-self is *natural*, and from NATURE *alone*?”

(II. 231)

Unlike Locke who claims that all knowledge is acquired, with nothing innate, Shaftesbury believes that moral knowledge is universal since we all have innate knowledge of beauty and the good. He argues that because the sense of right and wrong is, like *natural Affection*, innate and basic to our human nature,

... there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion or Belief, which is capable

immediately or *directly* to exclude or destroy it. That which is of original and pure Nature, nothing beside contrary Habit and Custom (as second Nature) is able to displace.

(II. 25)

For Shaftesbury, vice or virtue cannot depend on “FASHON, LAW, or arbitrary DECREE” (I. 217) but depend on the “implanted *natural Affection*” (II. 46).

However, he also states that natural affections need to be cultivated. He claims that “sound and well-establish’d Reason, which alone can constitute a *just Affection*...” (II. 22), and “WORTH and VIRTUE depend on a knowledge of *Right* and *Wrong*, and on a use of Reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the Affections...” (II. 20). Regarding *natural Affection*, he stresses the important role of *opinion*, which is the opposite of *affection*, *passion*, and *imagination*. This view raises an apparent contradiction:

... the AFFECTIONS of *Love* and *Hatred*, *Liking* and *Dislike*, on which the Happiness or Prosperity of the Person so much depends, being influenc’d and govern’d by OPINION; the highest *Good* or *Happiness* must depend on *right Opinion*, and the highest Misery be deriv’d from *wrong*.

(III. 120)

According to Shaftesbury, *opinions* come from natural affections: “The chief Ground and Support ... of this Opinion of *Happiness in Virtue* ... arise from the powerful feeling of this generous moral Affection, and the knowledge of its Power and Strength” (II. 40). On the other hand, he states that opinion (from reason) makes beauty and good, acknowledging the relative character of aesthetic and moral judgement (since opinion depends on place, custom, and education), which he opposes strongly. Hence there appears the seeming contradiction to his theory of innate moral and aesthetic sense.

All is Opinion: ‘Tis Opinion which makes Beauty, and unmakes it. The Graceful or Ungraceful in things, the Decorum and its Contrary, the Amiable and Un-amiable, Vice, Virtue, Honour, Shame, all this is founded in *Opinion* only. OPINION is the *Law* and *Measure*. Nor has *Opinion* any Rule besides mere CHANCE; which varies it,

as *Custom* varies: and makes now this, now that, to be thought worthy, according to the Reign of *Fashion*, and the ascendent Power of *Education*.

(II. 233)

Does Shaftesbury mean that moral sense (sense of right and wrong) or natural affection occurs from rational and reflective thought, although it is regarded as an innate passion? I claim that the contradiction is only apparent because natural affection is corruptible, and might be inactive or not fully active due to the environment, education, custom, and religion.

For Shaftesbury, *nature* does not imply living in the wilderness, but it means appropriately living in a cultivated state with reason. He states that as the parts of the body such as limbs need to be used, natural affection needs to be used or exercised:

Now if what we have advand'd concerning an *inward Constitution* be real and just; if it be true that Nature works by a just Order and Regulation as well in the Passions and Affections, as in the Limbs and Organs which she forms; if it appears withal, that she has so constituted this *inward Part*, that nothing is so essential to it as *Exercise*; and no Exercise so essential as that of *social* or *natural Affection*...

(II. 77)

True Natural Affection is 'innate' but also 'acquired', since this affection comes from one's effort to unite his innate nature (to be a sensible but rational being) with the help of reason (to discover, cultivate, and put into practice his innate nature). As a seed needs appropriate soil, sun, and water, innate moral nature needs to be taken care of or it will die in the harsh environment of daily life. Shaftesbury asks,

Who wou'd not endeavour to *force* NATURE as well in this respect, as in what relates to a *Taste* or *Judgement* in other Arts and Sciences? For in each place the *Force on* NATURE is us'd only for its Redress. If a natural *good* TASTE be not already form'd in us; why shou'd not we endeavour to form it, and become *natural*?

(I. 208)

5. Passion or Reflection?

Shaftesbury states that “to have a Liking or Dislike of moral Actions, and consequently a Sense of Right and Wrong” (II. 30), one needs to develop the habit of “using Reflection” (ibid.). Without rational reflection, it is impossible to solve the disturbance in temper; he writes,

...when the Mind, upon reflection, resolves at any time to suppress this Disturbance already risen in the Temper ... it can no otherwise accomplish the Undertaking, than by introducing into the affectionate Part some gentle Feeling of the social and friendly kind; some enlivening Motion of Kindness, Fellowship, Complacency, or Love, to allay and convert that contrary Motion of Impatience and Discontent.
(II. 66-67)

Also, just after he criticizes morally corrupt people who are also religious fanatics, he writes that we need to consider “how the Opinions concerning *a Deity* can influence one way or another” (II. 30), and in order to examine “the Subject of GOD’s Existence” (II. 31), we need “several degrees of Reason and Reflection “or “Speculations” (ibid.). Shaftesbury states that only “well-establish’d Reason ... can constitute *a just Affection*” (II. 22), and we “can attain the Speculation or Science of what is morally good or ill” (II. 18), emphasizing the rational ability to judge moral goodness. On the other hand, he regards passion as the enemy of reason: “The only *Poison* to Reason, is *Passion*. For false Reasoning soon redress’d, where *Passion* is remov’d. (I. 58)

However, he also rephrases *affections* as *passions* or *feelings*, as evidenced by phrasing such as “Affections or Passions” (II. 50) or when he describes affection as “some gentle Feeling of the social and friendly kind” (II. 67). He uses *self-affection* and *self-passions* interchangeably (II. 92). Does he mean natural affection is both a kind of passion and also a rational faculty? If people act unjustly, he writes, they have “a perplex’d, and

contradictory kind” of moral sense (II. 71). Such persons may believe they are well-bred gentlemen, but they actually pursue “an inconsistent Notion, idolize some *false species* of Virtue; and affect as noble, gallant, or worthy, that which is irrational and absurd” (II. 71). Shaftesbury holds that in the case of “corrupt Religion, or SUPERSTITION” (II. 27), people can act as if they have lost this moral sense, resulting in the “most horridly unnatural and inhuman” conduct, all the while believing that they are “excellent, good, and laudable” (ibid.). In those cases, he claims that moral sense or natural affection is potentiality dormant, and must be aroused by cultivation, such as reflection.

When one’s mind “is Spectator or Auditor of *other Minds*, [it] cannot be without its *Eye and Ear*” (II. 17), that is to say, we would feel others’ suffering, and would feel sympathy, and Shaftesbury describes a mental process by which new affections are born from such observations. This kind of affection he calls a “Reflex Affection” (II. 16).

In a Creature capable of forming general Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of the Affection; but the very *Actions* themselves, and the *Affections* of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike.

(II. 16 underlines added)

Natural affection cannot be realized if one has only sensible affection or passion, - reason is necessary because reason allows one to reflect. He writes that a man who uses reflection to achieve Reason and Understanding,

... must in the very use of this his reasoning Faculty, be forc’d to receive Reflections back into his Mind of what passes in it-self, as well as in the Affections, or Will; in short, of whatsoever relates to his Character, Conduct, or Behaviour amidst his Fellow-Creatures, and in Society.

(II. 68)

According to Shaftesbury, we are capable of making new affections, born from our mental reflections, which are not mere affections or feelings, but *rational* affections, which I deal with in a later section. Shaftesbury rephrases *rational* affections as *opinions*. Rational reflection is necessary; we need both sensible affection (emotion) and rational affection (reflective thought). It is not enough to be have sensible affections (feeling) only, but it is likewise not enough to be moral without reflective (or rational) affections (II. 18). Affection associated only with emotion or sense could be wrong in Shaftesbury's view, but the second affection occurs after the first one - the affection with reflection which brings "another kind of Affection." It might join with the previous affection, or might oppose the previous one and take over its position.

His *reflective thought* seems not mere speculative thought (he attacks mere speculative thought as imperfect and partial to the side of reason, as I discussed regarding *methodical manners* in Chapter 1.4), but in its higher stage, it is more like a meditative state of mind, in which both reason and the imagination are in a harmonious condition (as I discussed in Chapter 1.2) to appreciate beauty, good, and truth. This higher stage does not mean mere thinking or mere feeling, but is somewhere between them, just as he claims for the third character of the nature of things such as the Third Order of Beauty – which is the product of imagination and reason, and which allows one to have true enthusiasm (the third enthusiasm which I discuss in Chapter 5.3) with disinterestedness.

6. Immediate Moral Conduct

Although he recommends reflective affection as a means to attain genuine natural affection, Shaftesbury also states that a morally good person is "led by some immediate Affection, directly, and not accidentally, to Good, and against Ill" (II. 15). In the definitions

of natural affection, why does he connect rational reflection with immediate, impulsive actions? I claim this is due to Shaftesbury's view of human nature which has the potential to restore true nature (the third personality), to be morally good by the integrated mental condition of both passion and reason, poetical manners and methodical manners, and self-affection and public affection.

He holds "That there are certain moral *Species* or *Appearances* so striking, and of such force over our Natures, that when they present themselves, they bear down all contrary Opinion or Conceit, all opposite Passion, Sensation, or mere bodily Affection" (III. 22). He goes on to state, "Of this kind [an individual] makes VIRTUE it-self to be the chief: since of all Views or Contemplations, this ... is the most naturally and strongly affecting. The exalted part of *Love* is only borrow'd hence. That of pure *Friendship* is its immediate Self" (ibid.).

In this harmonious inner state of disinterestedness, one is concerned with nothing except enjoying beauty, goodness, and truth. One's natural affection to love others becomes affection for one's self. In such a mental state, one does not hesitate to act, and such actions come from one's true nature. Shaftesbury writes, "A good Creature is such a one as by the natural Temper of Bent of his affections is carry'd *primarily and immediately*, and not *secondarily and accidentally*, to Good, and against Ill" (II. 15). As a great painter unites his materials and his mind through the appearance of his painting, equally a great person unites sense and reason or self-affection and public affection through the appearance of his moral conduct. In the contemplative state, in the experience of beauty and goodness, one cannot hide his action, or attitude - as he is himself in his nature. Since "the CHARM of kind Affection is superior to all other Pleasure" (II. 60), it is difficult to behave any other way.

As I discussed regarding the three levels of manners – poetical manners, methodical manners, and miscellaneous manners in Chapter 4, in poetical manners, one expresses his passion freely without hesitation, in methodical manners one has speculative thought, while in miscellaneous manners one is passionate, but also is able to have rational reflection. As well as those manners, passion and reason are united as natural affection in a genuine sense, enabling one to be truly moral; one is able to act without hesitation, but with rational judgement too. Such a mental state is possible when one is disinterested. Even if his kindness brings him into danger, if his motivation for moral conduct comes from true natural affection, he is courageous to act since his mind is serene. He is in a disinterested state in which he can rest in the domain of Reason supervising Passion.

On the other hand, Anger cannot support serenity of mind since it is only Passion dominating the mind. Shaftesbury states that *true Courage*,

... has so little to do with *Anger*, that there lies always the strongest Suspicion against it, where this Passion is highest. The *true Courage* is the cool and calm. The bravest of Men have the least of a brutal bullying Insolence; and in the very time of Danger are found the most serene, pleasant, and free.

(I. 75, underlines added)

If a man is experiencing true beauty and true virtue, he will be calm and free from anything which might disturb him. His actions are simple and honest, and others can see his beautiful inner state in the appearance of his actions, as Shaftesbury states:

The real *honest Man*, however plain or simple he appears, has that highest Species, *Honesty* it-self, in view; and instead of *outward* Forms or Symmetrys, is struck with that of *inward* Character, the Harmony and Numbers of the Heart, and Beauty of the Affections, which form the Manners and Conduct of a truly *social* Life.

(III. 22-25)

When one is able to combine mind and action, self-good and public good, passion and reflection, then he is able to be truly moral.

7. Rational Affection and Sensible Affection

The apparent contradiction of defining natural affection as rational but also passion makes sense if we look at Shaftesbury's concept of rational and sensible affections.

Following his view of humanity's dual character, he categorizes affections as sensible affection, rational affection, and natural affection.

Sensible affection is moved by "sensible Objects" (II. 21), that is to say, feeling, emotion, and imagination based on the body and senses, and here Shaftesbury includes "Pity, Love, Kindness, or social Affection" (II. 25). Though this affection can deal with social affection, it is quite limited compared to public affection. It is often affection directed toward a narrow circle of family, friends, or people who can give some sort of reward to the person. This affection consists of self-affection, and can be either "good or vitious" (ibid.); it is often imperfect when it is unnatural sensible affection. Such affection would not benefit society because of its "SELFISHNESS" (II. 13).

Sensible nature in an imperfect state also leads to fanaticism and madness in religious matters. On the other hand, sensible nature in the perfect state is good and natural because one is able to love not only the self, but exhibit fraternal love toward humanity. In this positive notion of sensible affection, as well as the positive notion of self-affection, we find the unity of public affection which consists of natural affection in the genuine sense.

With regard to creative poetry, Shaftesbury holds that the positive notion of sensible affection (poetic truth and poetic manners, and enthusiasm in the genuine sense toward the Third Order of Beauty) is a necessity. Theocles describes his enthusiasm regarding beauty in nature to Philocles by asking, "How have I appear'd to you in my Fit? Seem'd it a sensible kind of Madness, like those Transports which are permitted to our *Poets*? Or was it

downright Raving?” (II. 195). On the other hand, rational affection is moved by “rational objects” or “moral objects” (II. 21). It consists of public affection - rational thought on moral issues such as “the Images of Representations of Justice, Generosity, Gratitude, or other Virtue” (II. 25). When “ill Passions or Affections are seated” (ibid.), rational affections or “the Affections toward moral Good” (II. 22) can “master those Attempts of their Antagonists” (ibid.). When rational affection overcomes sensible affection, one can have true rational affection in the cooperation of both affections, as he states:

For in [a person able to discern *rational Objects* of moral Good], shou'd the *sensible Affections* stand ever so much amiss; yet if they prevail not, because of those *other rational Affections* spoken of; 'Tis evident, the Temper still holds good in the main; and the Person is with justice esteem'd virtuous by all Men.

(II. 21)

As public affection is possible only “in a rational Creature, being the only means which can procure him a constant Series or Succession of the mental Enjoyment, they are the only means which can procure him a certain and solid *Happiness*” (II. 58), Rational affection is possible for rational creatures only, and brings mental enjoyment only.

However, it is “no less active and incumbent on the Mind, at all Seasons, and even when the real Objects themselves are absent” (II. 17). Shaftesbury regards natural affections as “the Affection of Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Generosity, Pity, Succour or whatever else is of a social or friendly sort” (II. 59), and sees them, like rational affection, as supportive of moral good, including virtues such as “Kindness, Gratitude, Bounty or Compassion” (II. 22). What he terms reflex affection (II. 16) and considers “the *Affections* of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into Mind by Reflection” (ibid.) seem likewise part of rational affection and natural affection.

8. What is Natural Affection?

I observe that Shaftesbury uses *natural affection* with different connotations, since he views “natural” or “nature” in various levels. First of all, he considers natural affection as ‘innate’ affections. Second, he regards natural affection as ‘public affection’ which can be either natural (perfect) or unnatural (imperfect). Third, he views natural affection as ‘genuine natural affection’ – in an ideal sense of public affections, as discussed below.

1. *Natural affection* in the sense of ‘generally observable emotion’

Natural affection in this sense is the same as ‘passion,’ and in this regard Shaftesbury uses phrases such as “the *human Affections and Passions*” (II. 231), “Affections or Passions” (II. 50), or “Appetites, Passions, or Affections” (II. 9), or “ill Passions or Affections” (II. 22). As in the underlined part, “any other natural Affection,” in the paragraph below, Shaftesbury uses ‘natural’ in the sense of innate, as he writes “the want of any other natural affection” (II. 14) or “all natural Affection” (II. 242) to indicate various innate affections, either negative or positive.

For if the want of such an Affection [Self Affection] as that towards Self-preservation, be injurious to the Species; a Creature is ill and unnatural as well thro’ this Defect, as thro’ the want of any other natural Affection.

(II. 14 underline added)

This general sense of natural affection includes various kinds of affections, including public and self-affections, and Shaftesbury regards it as a “*common Affection*, which is natural to Mankind” (I. 72); in another place he refers to self-affection as “*implanted natural Affection*” (II. 46), using “natural” in the sense of an innate inclination or ability, including the preserving of offspring (ibid.), which he calls the “self-interested Passions” (ibid.). He states that his “Scheme” in discussing the concept of ‘natural’ is “To inquire what is truly

natural to each Creature: And Whether that which is *natural* to each, and is its *Perfection*, be not withal its *Happiness*, or *Good*” (III. 130). He further declares that natural involves participating as a part of the “Order of Things” (ibid.) with “the SENSE of *inward Proportion and Regularity of Affections* (III. 132).

Some of this natural affection can become negative or unnatural depending on the degree of each affection. Natural affection in this sense includes both rational and sensible affections; Shaftesbury states that pleasures of the body consist of natural affection, and he refers to “*Pleasures of the SENSE Dependent also on natural Affection*” (II. 73). This indicates that he regards self-affection as an innate natural affection.

2. Natural affection in the sense of ‘public affection’

This natural affection is “public affection” (II. 50), and as Shaftesbury states that “*natural Affection or social Love* is perfect, or imperfect” (II. 63), he does not mean this affection is always perfect; natural affections (public affections) and self-affections “may be vitious or virtuous, according to their degree” (II. 50). Thus, for Shaftesbury, it is possible that there are two levels of natural affections. He regards public affection as *natural* affection because of what he sees as “right Affections” (II. 15) in the sense of perfect natural affection, and there is *unnatural* natural affection, in the sense of an imperfect one.

Sensible affections such as fear and hatred, are not innate in his opinion, but often they exist in excess amounts, and disturb good affections. Shaftesbury writes that while

... there may be implanted in the Heart a real Sense of Right and Wrong, a real good Affection towards the Species or Society; yet by the violence of Rage, Lust, or any other counterworking Passion, this good Affection may frequently be controul’d and overcome.

(II. 35)

3. *Natural affection in the sense of public affection with a perfect condition*

Natural in this *natural affection* means genuine or perfect. Shaftesbury also refers to genuine natural affection as “a real Affection” (II. 25) or a “*just Affection*” (II. 22). This natural affection in the genuine sense uses “*an inward EYE*” which “sees *the Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable*, apart from *the Deform’d, the Foul, the Odious, or the Despicable*” (II. 231).

Natural affection in the genuine sense is true rational affection - the mixture of sensible and rational affections, or the mixture of self-affection and public affections. In this stage of the mixture of the opposed characters, as in other terms, self-affection is not regarded by Shaftesbury as negative or ill, since it cannot be ignored or suppressed. Rather, it is a positive and necessary character, which leads humans to overcome the challenge and reach the third character (true natural affection). This affection is a truly natural emotion with rational reflection. This natural affection does not negate self-affection, but includes self-affection in a harmonious state – the private good contributes to the public good since they do not conflict; Shaftesbury writes, “Affections towards private Good become necessary and essential to Goodness” (II. 52), and perfect natural affection consists of a “*natural moral sense*” (II. 27).

For Shaftesbury, *natural* in this sense means Good, Entire, and Virtuous. Whether an affection is natural or unnatural depends on the “*inward Order*” (II. 78) or “*Balance of the Affections*” (ibid.). When one’s “*inward Fabrick*” (ibid.) is not well-adjusted or balanced, Shaftesbury cautions, one experiences “the ordinary Case of Phrenzy, and Distraction; when the Mind ... sinks under the weight of it, and proves what the necessity is, of a due *Balance*, and Counterpoise in the Affections” (II. 78). Thus *natural* means maintaining “a right

BALANCE” within the mind (II. 55), and unnatural means losing the right balance when “*natural Affection* may, in particular Cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree...” (II. 51). This perfect balance is a necessity for affection to be truly natural affection. Private affections should not be “too strong” (II. 14); an excess of self-affection negatively influences the public affection, and public affection become unnatural public affection. However, Shaftesbury does not mean to imply that one’s mind is wholly given over to either self-affection or public affection since “Vice and Virtue are found variously mix’d, and alternately prevalent in the several Characters of Mankind” (II. 22).

For Shaftesbury, true Natural Affection means good, artful, beautiful, and true, and is the result of a sublimated state, the combination of body/mind, sense/reason, and self/society. Thus, Natural Affection in the ultimate sense means an innate ability to live in a cultivated state; this affection has the rational character to deal with various matters not only regarding the individual and the family, but the larger community, state, and politics as well, in which both reason and sense are harmonized to form the true character as is fitting for true Nature. It is this public affection to which people of what Shaftesbury calls truly Good-breeding belong. In *Moralists*, Philocles fears that he may not be able to love strangers; Theocles asks him,

Can you then out of *Good-breeding* merely, and from a Temper natural to you, rejoice to shew Civility, Courteousness, Obligingness, seek Objects of Compassion, and be pleas’d with every Occurrence where you have power to do some service even to People unknown?

(II. 137)

First of all, any normal individual will have the concept of self-good - caring about the self and family and friends; in the second level, he would act out of the “publick Good in *one* Community of Men”; in the third state, he would have a “nobler” concept of the public

good – “*the Good of Mankind*” through an “enlarg’d Affection” (II. 120). This latter is the noblest and highest affection, that it to say, *natural affection* (ideal public affection).

Explaining this third affection, Shaftesbury writes,

It [enlarg’d Affection] dwells with Pleasure amidst that Reason, and those Orders on which this fair Correspondence and goodly Interest is establish’d. Laws, Constitutions, civil and religious Rites; whatever civilizes or polishes rude Mankind; the Sciences and Arts, Philosophy, Morals, Virtue; the flourishing State of human Affairs, and the Perfection of human Nature; these are its delightful Prospects, and this the Charm of Beauty which attracts it.

(II. 120)

In this “flourishing State of human Affairs,” one would strive to improve not only one’s community and nation, but the world in which one lives. It is a state which “seeks the Good of All, and affects the Interest and Prosperity of *the Whole*” (II. 120). Unlike sensible affection or self-affection which tend to have “a plain natural Love” toward “a good *Friend* or *Lover*” (II. 137), in this expression of public affection in a genuine sense we see “Affection towards Mankind” (II. 4), and “the Extent and Power of *Good-nature*, and to what an heroic pitch a Soul may rise” (II. 137). The state of natural affection in the genuine sense is the state in which “the generous Mind labours to discover that *healing Cause* by which the Interest of *the Whole* is securely establish’d, the Beauty of Things, and the universal Order happily sustain’d ” (II. 121) as, Shaftesbury writes, a “*universal Mind*” or “GOD” (ibid.) carefully planned for humanity’s development.

9. What is Unnatural Affection?

Shaftesbury holds that there exists an affection which does not contribute “to any Good of THE PUBLIC or PRIVATE; but contrary-wise: and which may therefore be justly styl’d *unnatural Affections*” (II. 50). It is an imperfect self-affection or public affection. For Shaftesbury, *unnaturalness* occurs when there is an excess of one of the affections in a

person, and he writes “That natural Affection may, in particular Cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree” (II. 51). Self-affection is unnatural if one follows unnatural self-good (a form of “ill-good”), that is to say, selfishness (II. 14). On the other hand, self-affection is natural if one follows natural self-good which contributes to the public good. He writes that “... the Affection towards Self-good, may be a good Affection, or an ill-one. For if this private Affection be too strong ... then is it undoubtedly vitious” (ibid.).

He claims that people lose moral sense when they follow only feeling/passion or fear. Such a sense-based nature does not have space to listen to the rational mind. In this case, one falls into an unnatural moral sense as when, “*Religious Affection*” (II. 67) such as “*Fear of future Punishment, and Hope of future Reward*” (II. 35), for example, is “*worse than the Disease*” (II. 67).

Shaftesbury refers to unnatural affection as a “narrow or *partial* Affection” (II. 65) in the sense of imperfect public affection (II. 64) which is an “inferior Degree of natural Affection, or an *imperfect Partial* Regards of this sort” (II. 63). The person who has natural self-affection and natural public affection, as in the harmonious mixed state of mind, has an “*intire, sincere, and truly moral* [kind of affection]” (ibid.) which Shaftesbury sees as the “Original” nature of humanity (II. 65). He writes that to have this genuine natural affection, this “INTIRE AFFECTION OR INTEGRITY of Mind, is to live according to Nature” (ibid.).

For Shaftesbury, unnatural affection is *vicious* while natural affection is *virtuous*, and he writes that affections “may be vitious or virtuous, according to their degree” (II. 50). *Vicious* (or ill, unnatural, inferior, and partial) affection is “superfluous, and detracting from the Force of other requisite and good Affections ... even in respect of the private Interest or Happiness of the Creature” (II. 13). He does not mean that self-affection is necessarily

vicious, but in excess it can be:

... the Affection towards Self-good, may be a good Affection, or an ill-one. For if this private Affection be too strong, (as when the *excessive Love of Life* unfits a Creature for any generous Act) then is it undoubtedly vitious.

(II. 14)

He holds that since private (self) good is often “inconsistent with the publick Good; this may indeed be call’d still a vitious Affection” (II. 13). In this kind of state, the person “cannot really be good and natural in respect of his Society or Publick, without being ill and unnatural toward himself” (ibid.) And *virtuous* (or good, natural, perfect, and entire) affection is described as public affection; he writes, “...we call any Creature *worthy* or *virtuous*, when it can have the Notion of a publick Interest” (II. 18).

Shaftesbury views as unnatural an affection characterized by “the immoderate degree of the Affection” (II. 13) combined with “SELFISH PASSIONS” (II. 93). This unnaturalness is evidenced by people who take “INHUMAN DELIGHT in beholding Torments, and in viewing Distress, Calamity, Blood, Massacre and Destruction, with a peculiar Joy and Pleasure” (ibid.). Unnatural affections include “*Envy, Malice, Frowardness*, or other such hateful Passions” (II. 16) and if it is “immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is undoubtedly vitious” (ibid.).

Shaftesbury opposes unnatural as ill, to natural as good, as when he declares, “our business will be, to examine which are the *good* and *natural*, and which the *ill* and *unnatural* Affections” (II. 12). Elsewhere, he refers to unnatural as “moral Deformity” or “Insensibility towards moral Good or Ill” (II. 73). He holds that such unnaturalness often comes from an excess of self-affection or sensible affection which opposes public affection and rational affection; he writes,

That in Creatures who by their particular OEconomy are fitted to *the strictest Society* and Rule of *common Good*, the most *unnatural* of all Affections are those which separate from this Community; and the most *truly natural*, generous and noble, are those which tend towards *Publick Service*, and the Interest of the SOCIETY *at large*.
(III. 136)

10. Inner State

For Shaftesbury, whether or not a person has natural affection in the genuine sense depends on the person's state of mind, for he holds that the moral state is always related to the mental state. Even if an individual's actions are good, if "his true and genuine *Nature* or *natural Temper* [are vicious], the Creature is still as *ill* as ever" (II. 15). However, such a case does not mean one "has wholly lost the Sense of Right and Wrong" (II. 24), but there has been some kind of misjudgment caused by "narrowly confin'd Self-good" (*ibid.*), since – Shaftesbury holds - no one can be "originally so ill-constituted, and unnatural" (II. 25). He claims that humans are born with good nature, and vicious characters occur because of the wrong environment, education, customs, and culture. Shaftesbury holds that "*it is as hard to find a Man wholly Ill, as wholly Good*" (II. 23). Even a 'selfish' person, who pities only herself, has the potential of a caring mind which can be directed to others if she could reach a correct 'opinion' which could control her sensible nature. Thus, Shaftesbury criticizes Hobbes' negative view of human nature which, he claims, "deny'd every natural and social Affection" (I. 56) and contains nothing to oppose "a stedy and deliberate Pursuit of the most narrowly confin'd *Self-interest*" (II. 46). In Hobbes's view, Shaftesbury states, "Civility, Hospitality, Humanity towards Strangers or People in distress, is *only a more deliberate Selfishness* ... *Love of one's Country*, and *Love of Mankind*, must also be *Self-Love*" (I. 74).

For Shaftesbury, everyone has some degree of social affection, though the amount

varies depending on the person. It is almost impossible to find someone who has no trace of virtue, such as kindness and gratitude, and he holds that if “there is still something of *Virtue* left ... the Creature is not wholly vitious and unnatural” (II. 22).

11. Three Levels of Pleasure

Shaftesbury spends much time discussing two levels of pleasure - sensible pleasure and rational pleasure. Sensible pleasure is accordingly “*a Pleasure of Sense*” (II. 87) which, he claims, includes passions “join’d with” this pleasure, while “all other Social affections are join’d only with a mental Pleasure, and founded in mere Kindness and Love” (ibid.). Sensible pleasure is accompanied by self-affection or sensible affection. It is based on sense desires, including “*Luxury, Riot, and Debauch*” which are “contrary to real Interest, and to the true Enjoyment of Life” (ibid.). It is a necessary form of pleasure for humans, though it tends to be merely “Pleasures of THE BODY, and the Satisfactions belonging to *mere SENSE*” (II. 73). Shaftesbury holds that such “*Unnatural Pleasure*” (II. 96) cannot achieve “*social and natural Affections*” (II. 73).

On the other hand, a rational pleasure is “*of the mind*” (II. 57). It is “founded in mere Kindness and Love” (II. 87) accompanied by social affection or rational affection. This genuine pleasure is rational and moral, and comes from “natural and good Affection” (II. 73). Indeed, Shaftesbury writes that “*the mental Enjoyments are actually the very natural Affections themselves*” (II. 62). He also refers to rational pleasure as social pleasure since it is “Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Generosity, Pity, Succour, or whatever else is of a social or friendly sort” (II. 59). Such pleasure of the mind is “more intense, clear, and undisturb’d Pleasure” than sensible pleasure (II. 59).

Shaftesbury holds that pleasure occurs because of appetite. However, if one has an

excess of appetite he will also suffer “a Craving or Eagerness of Stomach,” which is a “*false* and *unnatural*” appetite (II. 85). On the other hand, “*natural* and *unnatural Appetite*” (II. 87) is experienced to a moderate degree.

When “The Pleasures of the Mind” are “superior, to those of the Body” (II. 58), one is able to have the highest pleasure, which is disinterested pleasure, possible only in the state of natural affection in a genuine sense. In this disinterested pleasure, both sensible and rational pleasures do not conflict.

12. Three Levels of Mind

I observe that Shaftesbury likewise takes a dialectical and integrated approach to his concept of natural affection (self-affection, public affection, and the mixture of both as true natural affection) and mind (sense-based personality, reason-based personality, and the mixture of both as true personality as I discussed in Chapter 4).

For Shaftesbury, the third mind (or the third personality) which is the ideal self with a united psyche, is the state of natural affection in the genuine sense. He states that “*the united Structure and Fabrick of the Mind*” is necessary to have this natural affection (in the genuine sense) (II. 100). Mind is the compound of various affections and passions; thus, mind has the capacity to lose integrity, and then natural affection in the genuine sense cannot be found. Shaftesbury claims that a harmonious mind needs to have “Order and Symmetry” (II. 48). He writes,

The Parts and Proportions of *the Mind*, their mutual Relation and Dependency, the Connexion and Frame of those Passions which constitute the Soul or Temper, may easily be understood by any-one who thinks it worth his while to study this inward Anatomy. 'Tis certain that the Order or Symmetry of this *inward Part* is, in it-self, no less real and exact, than that of the Body.

(II. 48)

The person of natural affection in the genuine sense has a “natural temper” (II. 15) and the person without it has an “unnatural temper” (ibid.). Regarding this natural temper,

Shaftesbury writes that it is

An easy Temper, free of Harshness, Bitterness, or Distaste; and in A Mind or Reason well compos'd, quiet, easy within it-self, and such as can freely bear its own Inspection and Review. Now such A MIND, and such A TEMPER, which fit and qualify for the Enjoyment of the Pleasures mention'd, but of necessity be owing to the natural and good Affections.

(II. 66)

I argue that Shaftesbury's conception of the ideal mind (the third mind) corresponds to his concept of natural affection (the third natural affection). I hold this view because the united mind, in the sense of a mind which overcomes the two-persons conflict I discussed in Chapter 1.6 regarding the three levels of the self, is capable of having natural affection in the genuine sense, and this third mind or the ideal self is the state where reason dominates without suppressing the conflicts between sense and reason. In this regard, Shaftesbury writes that it is, “a MIND or Reason well compos'd and easy within it-self; upon what account this Happiness may be thought owing to *natural Affection...*” (II. 68).

It is difficult to have natural affection in the genuine sense because of “Disturbance ... in the Temper” (II. 66), but “when the Mind, upon reflection, resolves at any time to suppress” such disturbance, and “sets about this reforming Work with heartiness” (ibid.), one is able to have true natural affection. Gaining true natural affection means both reason and passion cooperate as well, as in experiencing beauty with the cooperation of imagination and reason.

This genuine natural affection can occur when “The Parts and Proportions of *the Mind*” (II. 48) are well balanced, and gain “Uniformity of Mind” (II. 44), a condition in

which one is capable of experiencing enthusiasm and enjoying the contemplation of beauty, goodness, and truth with a disinterestedness of mind.

Having natural affection in the genuine sense (rational public affection) makes a person moral with what Shaftesbury calls “A good MIND” in the sense of the third ideal Mind, a mind, as I previously discussed, which has overcome the conflict between the two personalities, and regained “the same self.” In this genuine Mind, Reason is able to supervise Sense/imagination, and experience what Shaftesbury calls “*Orderly Affections, generous Thoughts, and a commanding REASON*” (II. 245). Although Reason in this ideal Mind is commanding Sense, it does not mean Sense is suppressed; rather, Mind and Sense have a harmonious relationship.

I hold that Shaftesbury’s idea of the enlarged self corresponds to his concept of the third mind, the third self, and the third natural affection. Public affection in the genuine sense (natural affection in the genuine sense) is capable of expanding one’s moral sense beyond a narrow concern for the self and close friends. One who is joyful with beauty and goodness is thinking beyond the limited self. For Shaftesbury, only such a united state of mind can perform good and beautiful actions.

The same view regarding the expanded self may be seen in the state of enthusiasm in the Third Order of Beauty. Theocles tells Philocles that after experiencing enthusiastic joy on observing the beauty of nature, he returns to his narrow self. Shaftesbury writes that after, “sally[ing] forth into the wide *Expanse*, when I return again within *my-self*, struck with the Sense of this so narrow Being, and of the Fulness of that Immense-one; I dare no more behold the amazing Depths, nor sound the Abyss of DEITY” (II. 194).

13. Three Levels of Beauty

I observe that natural affection in the genuine sense corresponds to the state of the Third Order of Beauty since this beauty focusses on the realization of moral conduct in society. Shaftesbury uses moral good, beauty, and truth (moral truth, as I discussed in Chapter 1.3) interchangeably. He writes,

the most natural Beauty in the World is *Honesty*, and *moral Truth*. For all *Beauty* is TRUTH. *True* Features make the Beauty of a Face; and true Proportions the Beauty of Architecture' as *true* Measures that of Harmony and Musick. In Poetry, which is all Fable, Truth still is the Perfection.

(I. 89)

As in beauty, "The same *Numbers, Harmony, and Proportion* will have place in MORALS" (I. 218). Just as one could have true and false taste, one could have "the same regard to *a right TASTE* in Life and Manners" (I. 208). For Shaftesbury, because people can enter *ill natural* and *ill moral* states, we tend to fail in the process of "pursuing the supreme Beauty" (II. 121), and instead pursue what he sees as lower beauty, such as the First Order or the Second Order of Beauty. He writes that virtue is

no other than the Love of Order and Beauty in Society. In the meanest Subjects of the World, the Appearance of *Order* gains upon the Mind, and draws the Affections toward it. But if *the Order of the World it-self* appears just and beautiful; the Admiration and Esteem of *Order* must run higher, and the elegant Passion or Love of Beauty, which is so advantageous to Virtue, must be the more improv'd by its Exercise in so ample and magnificent a Subject.

(II. 43)

Because of this connection of virtue and beauty, he frequently uses 'beauty' and 'deformity' in his statements on moral sense and affections; "Sense of *Deformity*" means "*ill-deserving and unnatural*" regarding moral good (II. 70), and sense of beauty means good and natural. Beauty has '*moral Magick*' or "a double portion of this Charm" (I.85). Regarding poets, Shaftesbury comments,

For in the first place, the very Passion which inspires 'em, is it-self *the Love of Numbers, Decency and Proportion*; and this too, not in a narrow sense, or after a *selfish way* ... but in a friendly social View; for the Pleasure and Good of others ... And in the next place, 'tis evident in these Performers, that their chief Theme and Subject ... is purely *Manners*, and the *moral Part*. For this is the Effect, and this the Beauty of their Art.

(I. 86)

14. Natural Affection and Enthusiasm

For Shaftesbury, by natural affection in the genuine sense one experiences true enthusiasm (the third level of enthusiasm ²⁰³), which is a joyful state of mind achieved through appreciating beauty, goodness, and truth. Like the state of enthusiasm, natural affection is disinterested, but pleasurable mentally, and it brings happiness. He writes, “*That to have the natural Affections, is to have the chief Means and Power of Self-enjoyment, the highest Possession and Happiness of Life*” (II. 73). If one looks at “the Love of Order and Beauty in Society” (II. 43) with natural affection, Shaftesbury states, it is “impossible that such as Divine Order shou'd be contemplated without Extasy and Rapture” (ibid.).

Thus natural affection is the state of contemplative delight or disinterestedness.

Shaftesbury states,

When we have thorowly search'd into the nature of this contemplative Delight, we shall find it of a kind which relates not in the least to any private Interest of the Creature, nor has for its Object any *Self-good* or Advantage of the private System. The Admiration, Joy, or Love, turns wholly upon what is exterior, and foreign to our-selves. And tho the reflected Joy or Pleasure, which arises from the notice of this Pleasure once perceiv'd, may be interpreted a *Self-passion*, or *interested Regard*: yet the original Satisfaction can be no other than what results from the Love of Truth, Proportion, Order and Symmetry, in the Things without. If this be the Case, the Passion ought in reality to be rank'd with *natural affection*.

(II. 60)

In this special state of mind, one is motivated to act on beauty and goodness without

²⁰³ Regarding the three levels of enthusiasm, see Chapter 5.3 Enthusiasm.

hesitation, just as in the state of natural affection. Shaftesbury states that “A good Creature is such a one as by the natural Temper or Bent of his Affections is carry’d *primarily and immediately*, and not *secondarily and accidentally*, to Good, and against Ill” (II. 15).

There is no longer a contradiction between sense/feeling and reason in true natural affection (as is the case also for the third personality and the third enthusiasm) which is beyond narrow self-interest (II. 39) and strives for “the pursuit of a high Advantage and Self-Interest” (ibid.). Enthusiasm with a disinterested state of mind is rational but sensible, interested but disinterested in self-good in the narrow sense; it is innately original but corruptible when our dual characters are in dispute, and thus needs to be cultivated to regain the natural affection of the good and beautiful. Such an enthusiastic person cannot stop being beautiful and doing beautiful actions when reason and passion, sensible affection and rational affection, and the first and the second persons, are united in the pursuit of a common goal. Without hesitation, one’s heart will strive to help others and contribute to the improvement of one’s society, nation, and the world.

15. Dialectical End

Though he criticizes unnatural affection which is ill and vicious, Shaftesbury also states that no one can be totally unnatural, ill, and vicious. He holds this view, I claim, because he is focusing on different stages of human developments. At the end of the human journey, he feels, a man is going to attain his true self, true manners, true truth, true goodness, and true beauty. In this original or ‘natural’ state of humanity, nothing can be ill or vicious. Along the way, when there is ill and good, vicious and virtuous, and a natural and unnatural nature of things, those “Contrarietys” (II. 121) are meant to achieve the good result after the conflicts are resolved. In the highest level of human nature, disagreements

arising from the dual nature turn into agreement, Shaftesbury holds, as the parts of the universe contribute to create beauty and harmony. He writes that when it appears to men that nature has made a mistake, in reality she has not, and

...when she [Nature] seems most ignorant or perverse in her Productions, I assert her even then a wise and provident, as in her goodliest, Works. For 'tis not then that Men complain of the World's Order, or abhor the Face of things, when they see various Interest mix'd and interfering' Natures subordinate, or different kinds, oppos'd one to another, and in their different Operations submitted, the higher to the lower. 'Tis on the contrary, from this Order of inferior and superior Things, that we admire the World's Beauty, founded thus *on Contrariety*: whilst from such various and disagreeing Principles, *a universal Concord* is establish'd.

(II. 121)

Humanity's journey to reach the highest beauty, goodness, truth, and nature is what nature planned, in Shaftesbury's view. He sees a cooperative pattern in the way nature has arranged things generally, and writes, "Thus in the several Orders of terrestrial Forms, *a Resignation* is requir'd, a Sacrifice and mutual yielding of Natures one to another" (ibid.). In the human realm, self-good and public good can be accommodated in the final stages of humanity's development; this can be at the level of the individual, but as individuals make up society it will eventually encompass the mass of humanity.

16. Common Sense

Shaftesbury's concept of *moral sense*, as found in *Concerning Virtue or Merit* (published first in 1699), acquired a different name – *common sense* in *sensus communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour* (published first in 1709). Because his moral sense contains natural affection (public affection), which he also calls *common affection* (II. 180, I. 67), he sometimes uses the terms interchangeably, as below:

A publick Spirit can come only from a social Feeling or *Sense of Partnership* with human Kind. Now there are none so far from being *Partners* in this *Sense*, or *Sharers* in this *common Affection*, as they who scarcely know *an Equal*, nor consider

themselves as subject to any Law of *Fellowship* or *Community*. And thus Morality and good Government go together. There is no real Love of Virtue, without the knowledge of *Publick Good*. And where absolute Power is, there is no PUBLICK.

(I. 67)

Shaftesbury seems to prefer the phrase *common sense* instead of *moral sense*, indicating its innateness and universality, and in this section I claim that there are three levels of common sense.

Shaftesbury states that finding common sense is rare, though the majority of people wrongly believe that they know what common sense means. Such are people “who without Sense of Manners, or common Society, without the least respect or deference to others, press rudely upon their Friends, and upon all Company in general, without regard to Time of Place, or any thing besides their selfish and brutish Humour” (I. 66 fn). He contends that those who regard themselves as possessing common sense tend to be interested in only their own benefit, and use others selfishly.

I observe that *Sensus communis* belongs with the Third Order of Beauty (moral beauty), and natural affection (moral affection) in the true sense. This is because he categorizes three levels of *common sense* - common sensibility (ibid.), common understanding (ibid.), and *sensus communis* (ibid.); this usage shows three levels of the nature of things, just as he does with other terms and concepts. Common sensibility is feeling or passion commonly shared, and common understanding is rational thought commonly shared. Neither of them implies a pure moral sense. For Shaftesbury, moral sense does not mean moral sentiment, or moral knowledge. Sense in the phrase *moral sense* means reason and sense, or understanding and feeling, or theory and practice. If one element is lacking, it cannot be genuine. The third one, *sensus communis* is *common sense* universally

accepted - “in which ‘twas suppos’d [all mankind] agreed, and had the same Thoughts in common” (I. 51).

Because of widespread misconceptions regarding common sense, Shaftesbury prefers to use *sensus communis*, which is close to the original Latin meaning of *moral sense* in community. He regards this as the definition of true common sense, and summarizes the way such ancient writers as Juvenal, Seneca, and Horace used the term (I. 65 - 66 fn). He commends critics who

make this *Common Sense* of the Poet ... signify *Sense of Public Weal*, and of the *Common Interest*; Love of the *Community* or *Society*, natural Affection, Humanity, Obligingness, or that sort of *Civility* which rises from a just *Sense* of the *common Rights* of Mankind and the *natural Equality* there is among those of the same Species.

(I. 66)

True common sense, sensus communis, is an innate “*Sense in Morals*” (I. 68); that is to say, it is “the *natural Ideas*, and the *Pre-conceptions* or *Pre-sensations* of this kind” (III. 130 fn). Shaftesbury praises service to one’s community based on a pre-conception of beauty as experienced by the inner eye, as well as an innate aesthetic sense, since he conceives of virtue as beauty. *Sensus communis* is the moral ground of “*the Love of Mankind*” (I. 77), which is the “*peculiar Relation* which is form’d by a Consent and Harmony of Minds, by mutual Esteem, and reciprocal Tenderness and Affection and which we emphatically call a FRIENDSHIP” (I. 62 fn). Thus, it seems *sensus communis* is a synonym of natural affection (or public affection) in the genuine sense, which he also calls “*common Affection*” (I. 67). A person with *sensus comunis* is not preoccupied with private interests, but with “pure Loves, regarding to do good more than to receive it” (I. 63 fn). By this common sense, one can gain “the *Taste* of LIBERTY” (III. 123) with one’s “*true SELF* and

INTEREST” (ibid.).

Sensus communis is the ultimate moral sense beyond the conflict between the private good and the common good. It is universal since everyone shares this sense to do good. As well as the experience of beauty with inner serenity and disinterestedness, *sensus communis* is at a higher level than the mere Common Sense widely and wrongly interpreted under the name of selfishness.

People who live under the absolute power of tyrants are typically unable to act for the public good, since the motive to benefit society is replaced by the self-interest of the ruler - who does not practice *sensus communis* (I. 68). In reference to contemporary politics, Shaftesbury argues that genuine *sensus communis* or “COMMON SENSE” (ibid.) in public life “must of necessity lead us to understand a like *Sense* in Morals; which is the Foundation [of British politics]” (ibid.). In this regard, he further argues that the credibility of such common sense can and should be examined by ridicule, humour, and wit, which I discuss in Chapter 7.

17. State of Nature

Since *sensus communis* is innate, Shaftesbury regards Hobbes’ State of Nature as unrealistic (I. 69). For him, the first state of humanity is located in civilization since it is human nature to form groups, communities, and commonwealths with laws and manners.

He contends

...that which cou’d make a *Promise* obligatory in *the State of Nature*, must make *all* other Acts of Humanity as much our real Duty, and natural Part. *Thus Faith, Justice, Honesty, and Virtue*, must have been as early as the State of Nature, or they cou’d never have been *at all*. The Civil Union, or Confederacy, cou’d never make *Right* or *Wrong*; if they subsisted not before.

(ibid.)

For him, it is hard to imagine that there is a State of Nature in which humans make contracts

to establish a political state in order to avoid violent conflicts; even animals have the ability to form flocks and herds with certain order or discipline to promote survival. He concludes, “That if any thing be natural, in any Creature, or any Kind; ‘tis that which is preservative of the Kind it-self, and conducting to its Welfare and Support” (ibid.). For Hobbes, the state of Nature means the state of war. In the beginning there was constant conflict between individuals because of their different opinion and desire, therefore the authority with political power became necessary.

There is no space for *the state of nature* before the establishment of civilization and commonwealths in Shaftesbury’s view. He observes that contemporary England is, so far, improving and approaching *sensus communis*, gaining more power for parliament above the monarch, and philosophy above the church. Klein writes that “Shaftesbury was fundamentally a Whig who, in opposition to the classic commitments of the Tories, wished to see the power of both Church and Monarch reduced.”²⁰⁴ He writes that “Our increasing Knowledge shews us every day, more and more, what COMMON SENSE is in Politicks” (I. 68), and argues that Britons “can reason justly the *Balance of Power and Property*” (ibid.) and “have a better *Sense* of Government deliver’d to us from our Ancestors. We have the Notion of A PUBLICK, AND A CONSTITUTION” (ibid.).²⁰⁵

I claim that his view of the political state corresponds with his concept of the Three Orders of Beauty because he sees a connection between the political development of the

²⁰⁴ Lawrence E. Klein. *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 21.

²⁰⁵ In consideration of Shaftesbury’s childhood (before the Glorious Revolution of 1688), in which he rarely could see his grandfather, the First Earl of Shaftesbury, a founder of the Whig party, or his mentor Locke, both of whom were often either in prison or in exile because of their rebellious opposition to Charles II, it is understandable that he might not be disinterested in *Sensus Communis* in his own time.

state and the development of the aesthetic sense in his definitions of beauty. The First Order of Beauty is “NATURE her-self,” but this means those passive parts which represent lifeless objects (III. 112, fn), or any being without reason. Therefore, this represents a pre-civilization stage.

The Second Order of Beauty concerns “The Correspondence, Union and Harmony of NATURE her-self” (ibid.), referring to the active parts of Nature - all animate beings who possess an intellect. This is the state of civilization. The Third Order of Beauty represents the “Union and Harmony of Humans” (ibid.); there is no tyranny or absolute state power, but true common sense (*sensus communis*) at the foundation of the political state which supports its citizens’ freedom with equality.

In conclusion, I hold that for Shaftesbury there are three levels of natural affection (in the sense of innate affection) - self-affection, public affection, and natural affection in the genuine sense, as in row 3 in the table below. Self-affection is often regarded as tending to be negative when compared to public affection; however, this does not mean self-affection itself is ill and vicious. All depends on the balance of self-affection and public affection. Self-affection can be either natural (in the sense of perfect) or unnatural (in the sense of imperfect) self -affection. Public affection also can be either natural or unnatural public affection.

Table 12 Natural Affections

A: First Order of Beauty		B: The Second Order of Beauty		C: The Third Order of Beauty	
Physical		Psychological		Phenomenological	
Natural	Unnatural	Natural	Unnatural	Natural	
1. Nature herself		Union and Harmony of Nature herself		Union and Harmony of Humans	
2. No State		State of Civilization		State of Liberty	
3. Self-Affection		Public Affection		NATURAL AFFECTION	
4. Sensible Affection		Rational Affection		Rational Affection	
5. Common Sense (Sensibility)		Common Sense (Understanding)		<i>Sensus Communis</i>	
6. Imagination		Reason		Works of Art	
7. Poetical Truth		Historical Truth		Moral Truth	
8. The First Personality		The Second Personality		The Third Personality	
9. Enthusiasm		Enthusiasm		Enthusiasm	
10. Humour		Humour		Humour	

As well as three levels of affections, there is a dialectical approach to the Three Orders of Beauty (A, B, and C). Under the First Order of Beauty (A), the human sense/body/feeling is emphasized; Shaftesbury refers to this beauty as “NATURE her-self” (III. 112. fn). In this state, there is no civilization yet (row 2). Under this column, Self-Affection (row 3), Sensible Affection (row 4), Common Sensibility (row 5), Imagination (row 6), Poetical Truth (row 7), The First Personality (row 8), the first level of Enthusiasm (row 9), and the first level of Humour (row 10) are realized and share the same nature - sense/body/feeling-based nature.

Under the Second Order of Beauty (B), human reason/understanding is emphasized; Shaftesbury refers to this beauty as the “Union and Harmony of NATURE her-self” (III. 112. fn), as in row 1. In this state, animals and humans use their intellect to form groups and societies. Nature planned them to live harmoniously with others, so there is civilization (row 3). Under this column, Public Affection (row 3), Sensible Affection (row 4), Common Understanding (row 5), Reason (row 6), Historical Truth (row 8), The Second Personality

(row 8), the first level of Enthusiasm (row 9), and the first level of Humour (row 10, as I discuss in Chapter 4) are realized and they share the same nature – reason/intellect-based nature.

Under the Third Order of Beauty (C), both aspects of the human character are integrated harmoniously; Shaftesbury refers to this beauty as the “Union and Harmony of Humans” (III. 112. fn), as in row 1. In this state, humans apply their moral sense to realize political liberty (row 2). Under this column, Natural Affection in the genuine sense (row 3), Rational Affection in the genuine sense (row 4), Sensus Communis (row 5), Works of Art (row 6), Moral Truth (row 7), The Third Personality (row 8), the third level of Enthusiasm (row 9), and the third level of Humour (row 10, as I discuss in Chapter 7) are realized and they share the same nature - integrated nature; therefore, not only the beautiful but the good and the true are achieved.

Sensible Common Sense and Rational Common Sense are integrated as *sensus communis* (row 5). Imagination and Reason are integrated as Works of Art to realize Beauty and Good (row 6). Poetical Truth and Historical Truth are integrated as Moral Truth to realize Beauty and Good (row 7). The First (sense-based) and the Second Personality (reason-based) are integrated as the Third Personality (true self) to realize Beauty and Good (row 8). The First Enthusiasm (Fanatic) and the Second Enthusiasm (Dogmatic) are integrated with Moderation as the Genuine Enthusiasm to realize Beauty and Good (row 9) which I discuss in Chapter 7. Also, the First Humour (sense/emotion-based) and the Second Humour (reason-based) are integrated as a True Humour (row 10) to realize Beauty and Good as I discuss in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7 Manners

1. Wit and Humour

In this section, I maintain that Shaftesbury envisions three levels of wit, humour, and ridicule as well as the three levels of beauty, truth, natural affections, and common sense which I have discussed. He holds that wit, humour, and ridicule are not only tools used to maintain a healthy and liberal society, but are also necessary tools to regain one's nature and moral goodness.

The third level or character of wit/humour, just like the third level of the other concepts, contains the hope of finding the solution to human dualism. Accordingly, the first, the second, and the third character of wit/humour correspond to the first, the second, and the third character of terms which are sense/passion-based. The second character of ridicule corresponds to the second character of other terms which are reason-based. The third character of ridicule corresponds to the third character of the other terms which are integrations of the first and the second.

Humour/Wit does not belong to the First Order of Beauty. Neither does it belong to Passion which is dominant - as in religious fanatics, nor to the Second Order of Beauty. It does not belong to Speculative thought with "strict *Laws* and *Rules* of Composition" (III. 4) as in dogmatists; rather, it is under the domain of delight, imagination, and wisdom, that is to say, the Third Order of Beauty. Shaftesbury writes,

The *Wild* and *Whimsical*, under the name of the *Odd* and *Pretty*, succeed in the room of the *Graceful* and the *Beautiful*. Justness and Accuracy of Thought are set aside, as too constraining, and of too painful an aspect, to be endur'd in the agreeable and more easy Commerce of *Gallantry*, and modern *Wit*.

(III. 6)

At first glance, Wit and Wisdom may look opposed. Wit often seems pleasant, somewhat wild, capricious, often grotesque, complex, and at times even incoherent. On the other hand, Wisdom is regarded as pragmatic, graceful, beautiful, simple, contemplative, and always coherent. Though Wit seems to represent the opposite of Wisdom, Wit has a different attribute under the first appearance, which reveals that there is gracefulness under the wildness, usefulness under the playfulness, and beauty under the grotesqueness. Thus wit and wisdom can be integrated without opposing in the third character of the terms.

I argue that for Shaftesbury, ill humour and good humour correspond to his definitions of unnatural and natural affection. He writes that the highest level of Humour is moral, and without natural affection this highest level cannot be reached. In this regard, he states, “the only sound Opposite to ILL HUMOUR, is *natural* and *kind Affection*” (II. 66).

There are three levels of natural affection – self affection, public affection, and public affection in the genuine sense, as I discussed in Chapter 6. However, there seems to be a contradiction in his statements on Humour/Wit. As there are apparent contradictions regarding the definitions of natural affection - stated as arising from both passion and rational reflection, discussed in Chapter 6 - there are apparent contradictions regarding the definitions of Humour; Shaftesbury connects it with both passion and rational reflection. Similar to natural affection, humour is sometimes rephrased as *passion*; he writes, for example, of “*Humour*, or ... *Passion*” (II.19). However, elsewhere it is defined as rational, or something which assists reason: “For without Wit and Humour, *Reason* can hardly have its proof, or be distinguish’d” (I. 47). Does he mean Humour/Wit is passion? Or does he mean it is Reason?

I argue this usage does not indicate a contradiction, but it comes from his dialectic

way of categorizing the nature of Humour/Wit; he follows the same method when discussing the nature of natural affection. Shaftesbury distinguishes Humour/Wit as comprising a range, from lower to higher degree, and it seems each degree of Humour/Wit is either passion-based, reason-based, or both passion/reason-based as ideal Humour/Wit, just as natural affection is distinguished as either self-affection which is passion-based, public affection which is reason-based, and true natural affection which integrates both self and public affection without conflict.

Shaftesbury intends, I claim, that Humour is passion-based on the first level, such as seen in buffoonery; it is reason-based on the second level, such as seen in satire, which he says may be “*ridiculous, when half-way, lame or leaning to one side* (III. 284. Index). However such half passion and half reason is not true Humour/Wit because passion at this second level of Humour is “solemn” (I. 52 etc.) and of an “ill Mood” (III. 68), and aims to offend one’s opponent. It insists on its own truth as best, without letting others examine or question its genuine character, as if it is a sacred truth no one can deny. It is the third level of Humour which is moral, beautiful - which Shaftesbury refers to as the “*Je-ne-sçai-quoi* of Wit” (I. 86), and true.

2. Good Humour

For Shaftesbury, good humour is connected with good or ill natural affections. The good humour comes from an integrated mind, one characterized by “*natural and kind Affection*” (II. 66). In this regard, he writes that if “*Religious Affection or Devotion*” in the genuine sense is “the pleasant and cheerful sort, ’tis of the very kind of *natural Affection* itself” (II. 67). Good Humour in this genuine sense is invaluable, Shaftesbury contends, as we should be in “the best of Humours, and in the sweetest, kindest Disposition of our Lives, to

understand well that *true Goodness* is, and what those *Attributes* imply,” a state which he says we ascribe to God (I. 21). Religion in the genuine sense should be “A *witty and good-humour’d Religion*” (III. 62). He holds “That GOOD HUMOUR is a chief Cause of Compliance, or Acquiescence in matters of Faith” (III. 68), and is supportive and a “promotive of *true Faith*” (III. 62).

On the other hand, for Shaftesbury, ill humour comes from a disoriented mind. This usually occurs, he argues, when one’s mind is occupied with an aggressive, combative passion to defeat or even harm others; even if there is speculative thought, it becomes half-ridicule and rather grim. Shaftesbury cautions that if religious affection arises because of fear, and “if it brings along with it any Affection opposite to Manhood, Generosity, Courage, or Free-thought; there will be nothing gain’d by this Application” (II. 67), and it is not true religious affection.

He writes about “the melancholy way of treating Religion” (I. 20) or “Superstition” (I. 21) which is “so tragical” (ibid.) because in this way, it is impossible to contemplate or “examine the Temper of our own Mind and Passions” (ibid.). In debate, “he who had the better of the Argument, wou’d be *easy and well-humour’d*: But he who was unable to support his Cause by Reason, wou’d naturally lose his Temper, and grow *violent*” (III. 67). Under such a temper, we see

Wrath, and Fury, and Revenge, and Terrors *in the DEITY*; when we are full of Disturbances and Fears *within*, and have, by Sufferance and Anxiety, lost so much of the natural Calm and Easiness of our Temper.

(I. 21)

Instead of a melancholic fear of God, he recommends “the sweetest, kindest Disposition of our Lives” to have the ability to know the things of God (ibid.). Otherwise, “... we are afraid

to use our Reason freely” (ibid.). Wit is recommended as a tool to counter religious “Heresy and Infidelity” (III. 178). However, Shaftesbury writes that orthodox Christians may use humour to their advantage as well in the struggle with heresy; he asks, “For what reason is there to suppose that Orthodoxy shou’d not be able to laugh as agreeably, and with as much Refinedness, as Heresy or Infidelity?” (III. 179).

I argue that we may categorize Ill humour under the first and the second orders of ridicule because Ill humour is passion-based as buffoonery (first level of ridicule) or reason-based as in dogmatic religious writers (second level of in ridicule). Good humour belongs with the Third Order of Beauty, in which both reason and passion are integrated in the best condition to pursue beauty and moral goodness in society.

3. Freedom and Wit

For Shaftesbury, raillery needs “*Freedom of Censure*” (I. 7) to be effective, but this does not mean the freedom to cause offence. Any religious or philosophical book aiming to search for truth needs to participate in the debate without accusations or anger. He argues that restraining Humour is the same as the “destroying of Civility, Good Breeding, and even Charity it-self, under pretence of maintaining it” (I. 42). Wit cannot flourish under censorship or severe rules which restrict citizens’ freedom. If wit/humour is restricted, citizens are barely able to express even the lowest forms of wit/humour, such as buffoonery. Shaftesbury contends that

...the natural free Spirits of ingenious Men, if imprison’d and controul’d, will find out other ways of Motion to relieve themselves in their *Constraint*: and whether it be in Burlesque, Mimickry or Buffoonery, they will be glad at any rate to vent themselves, and be reveng’d on their *Constrainers*.

(I. 46)

Wit/humour needs to be expressed freely, not only in everyday life, but in works of art and literature too.

The Notion of a *genuine Work*, a *legitimate* and *just Piece*, has certainly been the Occasion of great Timidity and Backwardness among the Adventurers in Wit: And the Imposition of such strict *Laws* and *Rules* of Composition, has set heavy on the free Spirits and forward Genius's of Mankind.... In effect, the invidious Distinctions of *Bastardy* and *Legitimacy* being at length remov'd; the natural and lawful Issue of the Brain comes with like advantage into the World: And *Wit* (*mere WIT*) is well receiv'd; without examination of *the Kind*, or censure of *the Form*.

(III. 4)

For example, following the classic concept of drama - unity of action, place, and time from Aristotle's *Poetics*, would certainly give authenticity to a play as "a *legitimate* and *just Piece*" (III. 4), but there is no space here for Wit. Regarding Manners, the conventional writing style in philosophy, with its "*Regularity* and *Order*" (ibid.), likewise leaves no space for Wit.

In contrast, Shaftesbury praises Miscellaneous writing as a witty manner of writing which "has disclos'd those various seeds of Wit, which lay suppress'd in many a Bosom" (ibid.). According to him, the miscellaneous manner which he practices in *Characteristics* "has [been] happily effected" by wit (ibid.):

[The Miscellaneous *Manner* of writing] has render'd almost every Soil productive. It has ... rear'd numberless *Conceits* and curious *Fancys*, which the natural Rudeness and Asperity of their native Soil wou'd have with-held, or at least not have permitted to rise above the ground. Form every *Field*, from every *Hedge* or *Hillock*, we now gather as delicious Fruits and fragrant Flowers, as of old from the richest and best-cultivated *Gardens*.

(III. 4)

He indicates that many examples of wit in *Characteristics* may be regarded as hidden "Seeds" since they are somewhat "suppress'd" (ibid.). Shaftesbury wrote this paragraph in *Miscellaneous Reflections*, the last part of *Characteristics*, after he had received negative

comments regarding preceding works, including *A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm*; he received much criticism, for example, for the statement that any belief which claims to be truth needs to be subject to “the *Test of Ridicule*” (I. 8), a point which I will now discuss.

4. Ridicule under the First Order of Beauty

I observe that there are three levels of ridicule: sense-based, reason-based, and sense/reason-based. The lowest one Shaftesbury calls “mere Drollery or Buffoonery” (I. 8). Ridicule as Buffoonery corresponds to farce – which is based on sense/passion, and lacks the rational character of wit. Shaftesbury regards this, the “lowest” (I. 81) form of ridicule, as arising from “base passions” (III. 296. Index). Mentioning that there are various levels of Wit, he writes:

... indeed there is as much difference between one sort and another, and between Fair-dealing and Hypocrisy; or between the genteelest Wit, and the most scurrilous Buffoonery. But by Freedom of Conversation this illiberal kind of Wit will lose its Credit. (I. 42)

It is a necessity, he claims, to have the freedom and ability to question anything with wit/humour:

A Freedom of Raillery, a Liberty in decent Language to question every thing, and an Allowance of unravelling or refuting any Argument, without offence to the Arguer, are the only Terms which can render such speculative Conversations any way agreeable. (I. 45).

Looking around Europe for suitable examples, Shaftesbury observes that in Italy “the very Italian Buffoons” have developed their skill to criticize society. Because that nation had a long history of suppression and tyranny, its citizens needed to develop buffoonery, the only form of wit acceptable to the rulers. He argues that it was a successful ploy, as by “their lowest and most scurrilous ways of Wit, there was nothing so successfully to be play’d

upon, as the Passions of Cowardice and Avarice” (I. 81).

The second order of Humour, Satire, is a higher level than Buffoonery, though it is not completely rational because of its bitter and harsh approach toward opponents.

Shaftesbury argues that what he considers vulgar people will accept “any sordid Jest, any mere Drollery or Buffoonery” (I. 8), but goes on to indicate that there is yet another, “finer and truer Wit which takes with the Men of Sense and Breeding” (ibid.).

5. Ridicule under the Second Order of Beauty

The second ridicule is satire which is speculative, reason-based wit/humour, but Shaftesbury cautions that this often falls into “Hypocrisy” (I. 42) or “*Pedantry and Bigotry*” (I. 43). Describing the connection between Satire and Buffoonery, he states: “The greater the Weight is, the bitterer will be the Satire. The higher the Slavery, the more exquisite the Buffoonery” (I. 47). Critics of religious matters could well be speculative and have a “*sceptical Spirit*” (III. 68); however, they are often “inquisitive and *ill-humour’d*” (ibid.) towards their opponents in debate. They are often “splenetick ... tho all Criticks perhaps are not necessarily splenetick” and they “question every thing” (ibid.) to discover faults in their opponents’ arguments:

The Spirit of Satir rises with the ill Mood: and the chief Passion of Men thus diseas’d and thrown out of Good Humour, is to find fault, censure, unravel, confound, and leave nothing without exception and controversy.

(III. 68)

As with appreciating true natural affection, true common sense, and true beauty, realizing true wit is quite difficult to imitate. The forms of false Wit so obviously lack playfulness or seriousness that they hardly disguise themselves. Many writers who produce satire are often motivated by passion and self-interest though they think they are rational and acting in the

public interest. Shaftesbury states that ridicule itself is “*ridiculous, when half-way, lame or leaning to one side* (III. 284. Index) since such writers “are no more Masters of Gravity, than they are of Good Humour. The first always runs into harsh Severity, and the latter into an aukard Buffoonery” (I. 43). He comments,

The fault is, we carry the Laugh but *half-way*. The false Earnest is ridicul’d, but the *false Jest* passes secure, and becomes as errant Deceit as the other. Our Diversions, our Plays, our Amusements become *solemn*. ... Whilst only one Face of Folly appears ridiculous, the other grows more solemn and deceiving.

(I. 52)

He ridicules what he calls the “JANUS-Face of Writers, who with one Countenance force a Smile, and with another show nothing beside Rage and Fury” (I. 43). Even when such “Tragical Gentlemen, with the grim Aspect and Mein of true *Inquisitors*,” attempt to change their approach and be pleasant with an opponent, they “have but an ill Grace” (ibid.).

6. Ridicule under the Third Order of Beauty

The third level of wit/humour is “jocular Wit” (III. 73) which is pleasant, easy, light, and quiet. Shaftesbury states that the effect is obvious and positive for society. He writes, “When Men are *easy* in themselves, they let others remain so; and can readily comply with what seems *plausible*, and is thought conducing to *the Quiet or good Correspondence of Mankind*” (III. 68). He claims that men of wit employ “*general Scepticism*” in order to “better deal with the dogmatical Spirit which prevails in some *particular Subjects*” (I. 60) – by which he means religious debates. Religion with ill humour is ill religion for Shaftesbury; he advocates “a witty and good-humour’d *RELIGION*” (III. 81) with natural affection and a friendly, easy temper.

Regarding the third order of wit, Shaftesbury describes it as “*a Humour, a Sense, a je-ne-sçai-quoi of Wit*, and all those *Graces of a Mind* which these Virtuoso-Lovers delight

to celebrate!” (I. 86). Although the concept of a *je-ne-sçai-quoi* could be applied to the highest beauty of anything, Shaftesbury uses this expression especially for Wit. I contend that this exclusive usage reflects the fact that he sees an important but peculiar characteristic of wit/humour/ridicule. Wit is something that only serene people can appreciate, enjoy, and understand. Because of wit, only genuine truth will remain after the false has departed. False gravity, false seriousness, false passion, or false reason will be revealed by wit. No one can bear the ridicule often associated with wit without the calmness of mind which comes from disinterestedness. Ridicule in this sense does not mean offensive insults; it is a polite and rational way to assist someone by pointing out different views, opinions, and beliefs. The purpose of Ridicule is to promote true Taste, to observe every kind of appearance with mental distance, and the intent is to reveal and remove falsehoods.

The *je-ne-sçai-quoi* of Wit is the serenity and playfulness one experiences through the ideal beauty of Wit. It is *mere* Wit with playfulness; however, this playfulness is based on sincerity, delight, and bliss. Quoting Plutarch’s *Moralia* (1101D-F), Shaftesbury presents the view that a truly religious and pious mind would appreciate playfulness, including “GOOD HUMOUR” (III. 79). In regard to this connection, he writes,

... where the *Divinity* is esteem’d the *nearest*, and most *immediately present*, there Horrors and Amazements are the furthest banish’d; there the Heart, we find, gives freest way to Pleasure, to Entertainment, to Play, Mirth, Humour, and Diversion; and this even to an Excess.

(III. 80 fn)

As if a Greek god or goddess is guiding us through life’s journey, we feel there is something hidden behind the *Wit* which might tell us that we are capable of experiencing the original beauty, which is supposed to be beyond the earthly world. Though it is *mere Wit*, it is the key to achieve humanity’s end. Thus, I claim that for Shaftesbury, when mere wit/humour

becomes beautiful and good, what he terms the *je-ne-sçai-quoi* of Wit rises to the domain of the Third Order of Beauty.

7. Innate or Acquired?

Wit/humour is part of human nature for Shaftesbury; he writes that “Nature has given us” humour (I. 80). However, it needs to be cultivated. Humour/Wit needs to be polished and improved “by severe Usage and rigorous Prescriptions” (I. 42), in order to make it even more beautiful and polite. Is this a contradiction? I argue that it is not a contradiction because to produce or appreciate the highest level of wit/humour, one needs effort to educate oneself. To produce or appreciate the lower forms of wit/humour does not require much effort. Shaftesbury states that humour cultivates humans and enables us to reach the highest order of beauty:

... when our Humour turns us to cultivate these designing Arts, our Genius, I am persuaded, will naturally carry us over the slighter Amusements, and lead us to that higher, more serious, and noble Part of *Imitation*, which relates to *History*, *Human Nature*, and *the chief Degree or Order of BEAUTY*.”

(III. 245)

According to Shaftesbury, the ancient Greeks reached their greatest realization of the Third Order of Beauty not only in politics but also in the “polite Arts and Sciences” (III. 85), as he states:

As this Intelligence in Life and Manners grew greater in that experienc’d People, so the Relish of Wit and Humour wou’d naturally in proportion be more refin’d. Thus GREECE in general grew more and more polite; and as it advanc’d in this respect, was more averse to the obscene buffooning manner. The ATHENIANS still went before the rest, and led the way in Elegance of every kind. For even their first Comedy was a Refinement upon some irregular Attempts which had been made in that dramattick way.

(I. 155)

The Greeks developed their politics and culture by “the real Reform of *Taste* and *Humour* in the Commonwealth of Government it-self” (ibid.) and thus increased the liberty, prosperity, and safety of the state and its citizens.

8. Wit and Enthusiasm

Enthusiasm and Wit are strongly connected, and I observe that there are parallels in the dialectical structure of the three levels of enthusiasm and three levels of wit/humour. The first level of Enthusiasts is passion-based (fanatics or superstitious), just as the second level of Humour is passion-based (buffoonery). Shaftesbury characterizes the first level of enthusiasm (fanatical) as exhibiting “*a Panick*” and “Horrors of a superstitious kind” (I. 10) based on ill “Passion” (I. 11).

The second level of Enthusiasm is reason-based (found among dogmatic and hypocritical religious writers), just as the second level of Humour is reason-based (hypocritical satire by religious writers). Persons who display this Enthusiasm have speculative thought, as do writers who display the second level of wit/humour. They are intolerant toward others because of their ill humour and lack of natural affection in the genuine sense. Such ill-humoured religious teachers are hypocrites who hide truth. Shaftesbury is critical of “Zealot-Writers in religious Controversy” (I. 44), who by means of “ridiculous Solemnity” (I. 47) and “sour Humour” (III. 62) inspire a fear which can “corrupt [religion’s] best Affections” (III. 79 fn). Though they may regard themselves as rational and speculative, their religious beliefs are grounded in fear. Shaftesbury refers to the first and second kinds of Enthusiasm as “dark ENTHUSIASM” (III. 72) and refers to “*devout Melancholy or Enthusiasm*” (I. 14). He regards such as lacking moral goodness, truth, and beauty.

The third level of Enthusiasm, like the third level of Humour, is reason/sense-based with harmony and moral goodness. The highest humour brings genuine joy to life, with what Shaftesbury describes as “any Extasy of *Joy* or playsom *Humour*” (III. 73). Likewise, disinterested joy arises from appreciating beauty and goodness when we reach the third level of enthusiasm (genuine enthusiasm). People who possess the highest humour are “humorous and pleasant in them-selves” (III. 81) and are concerned with only the “*highest Interest*” (III. 64), that is to say, the realization of goodness and beauty in society. Religious zealots are not motivated by natural affection, but by passion based on fear and self-interest, and they are not tolerant of outsiders or those who display disinterest in their religion (I. 62).

Shaftesbury states that good Humour is the “Remedy against Vice, and a kind of Specifick against Superstition and melancholy Delusion” (I. 80). Lower Enthusiasts know only lower Humours; it is “the Force of Wit and Raillery” (I. 12) which guides them in life. He writes,

Good Humour is not only the best Security against *Enthusiasm*, but the best Foundation of *Piety* and *true Religion*: For if right Thoughts and worthy Apprehensions of the Supreme Being, are fundamental to all true Worship and Adoration; ’tis more than probable, that we shall never miscarry in this respect, except thro’ ill Humour only.

(I. 15)

Shaftesbury advocates kindness when encountering ill-humoured people who are offensive toward others, however. We should display good humour, and should not persecute them in any way. He writes that although a person may be wrong or confused in his beliefs, “he can never be *forc’d* in what relates to his *Opinion* or *Assent*” (III. 67). We should be respectful and wise in how we approach and try to help such individuals.

In conclusion, as detailed in the table below, I claim that in Shaftesbury’s

philosophy, there is dialectical categorization under the three levels of the nature of things; there is either a sense/passion-based state or level, a reason-based state or level, and an integrated, genuine state or level. Columns A to C show this system of categorization – sense/passion, reason, and the integrated ideal state.

This organization sometimes corresponds exactly with that of the three levels of wit/humour and the three levels of Enthusiasm, but sometimes there are differences. For example, Self-Affection does not mean Poetical Truth although they are the under the First Order of Beauty; Ridicule (Satire) does not mean Historical Truth although they are under the Second Order of Beauty. However, if we look at those terms under each level of beauty, each term of each row represents one side of humanity which is either body/sense/passion-based, reason-based, or based on the integration of both. True Ridicule is neither farce nor an exclusivist attitude toward others; True Wit/Humour, as well as Manners, Truth, and Personality, is the third stage under the Third Order of Beauty, as I have discussed.

I claim, as illustrated, that for Shaftesbury the three levels of beauty correspond with the three levels of wit/humour.

Table 13 Three Levels of Wit /Humour

<u>A: Beauty (The First)</u>	<u>B: Beauty (The Second)</u>	<u>C: Beauty (The Third)</u>
1. Wit/Humour (Fanatic)	Wit/Humour (Dogmatic)	WIT/HUMOUR
2. Ridicule (Buffoonery)	Ridicule (Satire)	RIDICULE
3. Self-Affection	Public Affection	NATURAL AFFECTION
4. Enthusiasm (Fanatic)	Enthusiasm (Dogmatic)	ENTHUSIASM
5. Poetical Truth	Historical Truth	Moral Truth
6. Poetical Manners	Methodical Manners	Miscellaneous Manners
7. Interestedness	Interestedness	DISINTERESTEDNESS
8. The First Personality	The Second Personality	The Third Personality

The first level, as mentioned, is evidenced by fanatics, the second by hypocrites, while the

third is genuine wit/humour (row 1). Similarly, there are three levels of Ridicule; the first is Buffoonery, the second is Satire, the third is genuine Ridicule. Those three levels of Ridicule come from the three levels of Affection; the first is Self-Affection, the second is Public Affection, and the third is Natural Affection in the genuine sense (row 3).

There are three levels of Enthusiasm (row 4), Manners (row 5), and Truth (row 6). Also, there are three levels of interestedness in the experience of beauty and goodness; the first is interested by sense/passion, the second is interested by reason, and the third is a disinterested mental state where both passion and reason unite to produce a state of joy. The latter is the state in which one is able to immerse oneself in the joy of beauty and goodness.

There are three levels of personality; the first is sense/passion-based, the second is reason-based, and the third is an integrated mental state, which Shaftesbury considers the true self (row 7). He contends that the first and the second personality do not represent the true self, just as the first and the second Enthusiasm do not arise from the true self. He holds that the third Personality is the true self, which is good and beautiful, and that the third Enthusiasm is the one in which one finds his or her vocation and meaning in life.

9. Ridicule as a Test of Truth

Shaftesbury's support for Ridicule as a test of truth was quite negatively received, and resulted in much criticism, mainly since ridicule was regarded as *not a serious enough* method by which to deal with Truth. However, Shaftesbury's point is that indeed we are *not serious enough* in the genuine sense when dealing with Truth; sadly, an excess of shallow seriousness has caused farcical, buffoonish behaviour – or worse results, such as religious persecution under the name of benevolence and love. He argues that grave religious fanatics

and dogmatists need to examine how they react to the miscellaneous manner of writing, which ridicules such people. He writes that “since this happy Method [Miscellaneous writing] was establish’d, the Harvest of *Wit* has been more plentiful” (III. 3-4), and that the fanatics need to consider why they take offense at such humour

In this section, I hold that there are three levels of seriousness. The first is the sort to produce panic, seen in persons who are superstitious or fanatical; the second is seen in people who obey rules and maintain order – perhaps in speculative writing, such as seen in dogmatists; the third allows for the examination of truth through the application of humour. The first and the second seriousness is seen in the lower Enthusiasms, while the third is seen in genuine Enthusiasm. I claim that those meanings of seriousness are part of Shaftesbury’s dialectical view of the three levels of beauty, as well as other concepts I have discussed.

Shaftesbury supports applying “the Test of Ridicule” mainly toward Seriousness (I. 8), but he does not hold that “Ridicule is the test of truth.” It was Berkeley who first interpreted Shaftesbury’s point as “Ridicule is the test of Truth.”²⁰⁶ Berkeley overlooked Shaftesbury’s multiple meanings regarding the concept of *Ridicule*. He has Alciphron, representing Shaftesbury, state that ridicule is the test of truth, as when he says “... for men of rank and politeness, we have the finest and wittiest *railleurs* in the world, whose ridicule is the sure test of truth.”²⁰⁷

Shaftesbury’s intention is that readers see themselves as objects of ridicule if they

²⁰⁶ According to Aldridge, “Shaftesbury began the debate over ridicule by discussing its social utility, and the discussion was continued by Anthony Collins, Berkeley, Warburton, Akenside, John Brown, Allan Ramsay, and Lord Kames. The first of the group to refer to ridicule as a test of truth was Berkeley, and after his use of the phrase, nearly every eighteenth-century writer on ridicule took it up” (129). Aldridge. *Shaftesbury and the Test of Truth*. PMLA 60 (1945) 129-156.

²⁰⁷ George Berkeley. *Alciphron or The Minute Philosopher*. p. 137-138. Ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. The Works of George Berkeley. Volume Three. London: Nelson, 1967. p. 137.

get angry at his statements on genuine Truth. He challenges the wit of his readers, to determine if they understand the meaning of *truth* in the genuine sense or not. He would hold that ridicule can only stand when the person ridiculing others can apply ridicule to himself, as he states that the way of distinguishing the serious from the ridiculous is “by applying *the Ridicule*, to see whether it will bear a serious Examination” (I. 8)

Concerning the application of ridicule, Brown (1751) added to or embellished what Shaftesbury wrote.

For, not content with establishing the free Exercise of Reason, and the Way of Cheerfulness, in treating the Subject of Religion and Morals, he ... appeals to a new *Test, the Test of Ridicule*. This, in his two first Treatises, he attempts to establish as a surer Method of Conviction: And that *Ridicule*, which had hitherto been employed in *disgracing known Falsehood*, he inform us, may be successfully applied to the *Investigation of unknown Truth*.

(Brown 6, underline added) ²⁰⁸

Note that although Shaftesbury does not state that ridicule “may be successfully applied to the Investigation of unknown Truth” (ibid.), Brown’s statement became the standard interpretation of Shaftesbury’s concept of Ridicule and Truth.

Shaftesbury uses the terms *seriousness*, *gravity*, *solemnity*, *melancholy*, and *zeal* (they are interchangeably used) with the distinction of being either “false” or “real” – such as “real Gravity” (I. 218), “false Gravity or Solemnity” (I. 152) and “false *Zeal*” (I. 48) - mainly when discussing religious teachers’ writings which have “the ridiculous Solemnity and sour Humour of our *Pedagogues*” (I. 47). He is quite critical of such false solemnity, linking it with hypocrisy, and writes, “*Gravity* is of the very Essence of Imposture. It does

²⁰⁸ Brown, John. *Essays on the Characteristics of the Earl of Shaftesbury*. P.6. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1969. (Reproduced from the 1751 edition.)

not only make us mistake other things, but is apt perpetually almost to mistake it-self” (I. 8). The appearance of Gravity is a mere tool to cover up the truth, or to present falsity as if it were genuine truth.

There is a false seriousness which may be seen in all of those lower Enthusiasms, but true Love or True Religion as exists with true Enthusiasm has *true seriousness*, that is to say, such an individual is serious enough to examine truth with a harmonious or free mind.

Regarding such a balanced and free mind, Shaftesbury writes,

There is a *Melancholy* which accompanys all Enthusiasm. Be it *Love* or *Religion* (for there are Enthusiasm in both) nothing can put a stop to the growing mischief of either, till the Melancholy be remov'd, and the Mind at liberty to hear what can be said against the Ridiculousness of an Extreme in either way.

(I. 9)

To combat such false seriousness, Shaftesbury states that we need to fearlessly examine all issues. What we initially believe to be a taboo or an untouchable subject may not actually be so. He writes,

How comes it to pass then, that we appear such Cowards in reasoning, and are so afraid to stand the *Test* of Ridicule? – O! say we, the Subjects are too grave. – Perhaps so: but let us see first whether they are really grave or no: for in the manner we may conceive 'em, they may peradventure be very grave and weighty in our Imagination; but ridiculous and impertinent in their own nature.

(I. 8)

Shaftesbury recommends Ridicule especially for Gravity in religion. Those who have a formal, serious attitude tend to avoid ridicule, since they are serious people dealing with serious matters. However, because they are protected or insulated from ridicule, they cannot determine if they are serious enough in a genuine sense. Only humour can show the truth in such cases, and he commends the example of the “admirable use to explode the *false Sublime*” accomplished by Greek comedy, where “Every thing which might be imposing, by

a false Gravity or Solemnity, was forc'd to endure the Trial of this Touchstone. Manners and Characters, as well as Speech and Writings, were discussed with the greatest freedom" (I. 152, underline added).

To examine any belief or so-called Truth, such as the "Truth by the cunning Formalist of the Age," humour is a necessity:

The main Point [of Ridicule] is to know always true Gravity from the false: and this can only be, by carrying the Rule constantly with us, and freely applying it not only to the Things about us, but to our-selves.

(I. 8 underline added)

His point is that people of ill humour and ill truth will react with anger and take offence at any ridicule. Shaftesbury holds that the people who are angry at him and who find his writing offensive are perfect examples of what he regards as grave religious teachers who cannot bear with ridicule. Shaftesbury claims that he has clearly displayed true seriousness to attempting to praise humour:

I have been sufficiently *grave* and *serious*, in defence of what is directly contrary to Seriousness and Gravity. I have very *solemnly* pleaded for *Gaiety* and GOOD HUMOUR: I have declaim'd against *Pedantry* in learned Language, and oppos'd *Formality* in Form. I now find my-self somewhat impatient to get loose from the Constraint of *Method...*"

(III. 80)

Regarding the controversy on the subject of Ridicule and Truth, he comments that unlike the ancients, his contemporaries are ignorant of the value of humour, and do not know how to interpret his humour. He indicates that almost no one noticed the wit in his statements regarding Ridicule and Truth:

Mankind perhaps were heated at that time, when first those Matters were debated: But they are now cool again. They laugh'd: They carry'd on the Humour: They blew the Coals: They teaz'd, and set on, maliciously, and to create themselves diversion. But the *Jest* is now over. No-one so much as inquires Where the Wit was; or Where possibly the *Sting* shou'd lie of those notable Reflections and satirical Hints, which

were once found so pungent, and gave the Readers such high Delight.

(III. 11)

For Shaftesbury, Ridicule is part of freedom of speech, and necessary to examine political, religious, and moral truth. However, there is one more meaning at play here - regarding Ridicule's correspondence to Beauty. Ridicule, for Shaftesbury, is a psychological test to see one's inner beauty and degree of mental serenity.

It is one of his Magical Mirrors used to see the true self, but in a more radical and possibly more effective way than by means of *soliloquy*. When a person acts morally, when she stops time because of beauty, does she care about how she would be regarded by others? Does she care about her interests rather than the beauty? If she does, her inner state is still incapable of seeing beauty, virtue, enthusiasm, and reason in an ultimate sense. Shaftesbury states: "We can never be fit to contemplate any thing above us, When we are in no condition to look into ourselves, and calmly examine the Temper of our own Mind and Passions" (I. 21). Ridicule is a test to see truth, a test to see if the person has a *calm mind* to contemplate what she is believing, defending, attacking, or sacrificing. Taste in a genuine sense means the ability to observe the self as a unity, a oneness - both subjective/objective, passion/reason, or body/mind united. Without calmness, she certainly does not have TASTE to see true beauty or Truth. Shaftesbury comments, "Truth, 'tis suppos'd, may bear *all* Lights" (I. 40).

In one of his favourite metaphors, Shaftesbury states that we all need to regard ourselves as patients who need medical treatment to examine the self, as he states, "... we had each of us a Patient in *our-self*; that we then became properly our own Subjects of Practice...." (I. 106). He sees himself as the physician and regards his readers as his

patients. Writing from the third person point of view, he states, “We hope also that our *Patient* (for such we naturally suppose our *Reader*) will consider duly with himself, that what he endures in this Operation is for no inconsiderable End...” (I. 116). Shaftesbury does not necessarily regard his readers as Gentlemen or men of Good-breeding in a genuine sense, but politely enough, he never discusses the matter straightforwardly, and instead takes his readers to the “Labyrinth of Speculation” (III. 148). This aesthetic operation on a person, or “the great Work of reforming his TASTE” (I. 218), is also likened to going into battle, a mental struggle where the mind resists change. Nevertheless, the reader should apply himself to

the wholesome Practice recommended in this Treatise. He shou’d set afoot the powerfulest Facultys of his Mind, and assemble the best Forces of his Wit and Judgement, in order to make a formal Descent on the Territorys of *the Heart*: resolving to decline no Combat, nor hearken to any Terms, til he had pierc’d into its inmost Provinces, and reach’d the Seat of Empire.

(I. 219, underline added)

Shaftesbury is well aware that the light-hearted or dismissive style of writing in *Characteristics* may disturb some of his readers, and that is the author’s point. Can readers see what is beneath of the style of writing, that is to say, behind the first appearance in the *Magical Mirror*? If readers initially get upset because of the author’s offensive manner, or feel as if their truth is being distorted by mere Ridicule, then it is not truth they are defending.

By a fable of an Ethiopian visitor to Europe, Shaftesbury implies that those who judge *Characteristics* as ridiculous may well be more ridiculous than his “ridiculous” writings. The Ethiopian visits a European city during Carnival and laughs at the masked Europeans and at their strange behavior (I. 53). The Europeans may laugh at him because of

his naiveté, but in this instance they are the more ridiculous since they might not be aware of how funny their masks are. When the Europeans remove their masks, the Ethiopian laughs again, this time mistaking “*Nature* for mere *Art*, and . . . perhaps a Man of Sobriety and Sense for one of those ridiculous *Mumers*” (ibid.). Now the joke is on the Ethiopian. In each case, Shaftesbury contends “[that] he who laughs, and is himself ridiculous, bears a double share of Ridicule” (ibid.).

When we are prejudiced or ignorant through fear, superstition, or dogmatic views, and cannot see true appearances, we experience the “universal Confusion of Characters and Persons” (ibid.). Ancients tended to show their original personalities through their actions and manner, but Moderns try to hide their personalities, so their actions and manners do not agree with their nature: “Every [ancient] took the Air and Look which was natural to him. But in process of time, it was thought decent to mend Mens Countenances, and render their intellectual Complexions uniform and of a sort” (I. 53). Shaftesbury cautions against blindly following current fashions and trends; we should “Judge whether Mens Countenances were not like to grow constrain’d, and the natural Visage of Mankind, by this Habit, distorted, convuls’d, and render’d hardly knowable” (I. 54).

Rather than pretending to possess genuine Wit, since it is almost impossible, individuals possessing false Wit based on passion tend to accuse Wit of being too serious or intellectual, as in fanatic Enthusiasm. On the other hand, persons who possess Wit based on the intellect regard Wit as too playful, as in dogmatic Enthusiasm. Only true Wit has honesty, delight, and playfulness, and only someone who has a calm mind receives it as the Third Order of Beauty; therefore, Shaftesbury regards Ridicule as an effective test of truth.

In conclusion, as I illustrate by the table below, I claim that there are three levels of seriousness; the first is passion-based, the second is reason-based, and the third is a harmonious integrated seriousness as in row 1. As well as seriousness, there are three levels of Wit/Humour, Ridicule, Enthusiasm, Manners, and Interestedness.

Table 14 Three Levels of Seriousness

<u>A: Beauty (The First)</u>	<u>B: Beauty (The Second)</u>	<u>C: Beauty (The Third)</u>
1. Seriousness	Seriousness	Seriousness
2. Wit/Humour (Fanatic)	Wit/Humour (Dogmatic)	WIT/HUMOUR
3. Ridicule (Buffoonery)	Ridicule (Satire)	RIDICULE
4. Enthusiasm (Fanatic)	Enthusiasm (Dogmatic)	ENTHUSIASM
5. Poetical Manners	Methodical Manners	Miscellaneous Manners
6. Interestedness	Interestedness	DISINTERESTEDNESS

For Shaftesbury, the borderline between the first Seriousness and the second Seriousness (row 1) is often vague, as is the distinction between the first Wit/Humour (Fanatic) and the second Wit/Humour (Dogmatic) (row 2), between the first Ridicule (Buffoonery) and the second Ridicule (Satire) (row 3), and between the first Enthusiasm (Fanatic) and the second Enthusiasm (Dogmatic). The distinctions are clear enough when the levels are examined individually, but confusion may arise when Shaftesbury groups the first and the second characters together, in comparison to the higher character (the third character). Also, with regard to the first and the second, lower Enthusiasts could be both fanatics and dogmatics, or dogmatics attempting to disguise fear and superstition. Or, as in the case of religious teachers' Wit, Buffoonery can be mixed with Satire.

10. Enthusiasm

In this section, I maintain that there are three levels of Enthusiasm which correspond with the three levels of the other terms, but Shaftesbury's concept of Enthusiasm is most

closely linked to his idea of Wit/Humour and Gentlemen, since all Enthusiasm, Wit/Humour, and Gentlemen relate to the same subject - religious zeal. The first and the second level of Enthusiasm (fanaticism and dogmatism) are expressed by the first and the second level of Gentlemen (fanatics and dogmatists), and their expression of Wit/Humour corresponds with the first and the second level (Buffoonery and harsh Satire). The third level of Enthusiasm (true Enthusiasm) is expressed by the third level of Gentlemen (true Gentlemen), and their expression of Wit/Humour reaches the third level (true Ridicule or Shaftesbury's *je ne sais quoi* of Wit).

Grean writes that Shaftesbury was not the first person who used the concepts of higher or lower Enthusiasm, since "it can be found in such writers as Meric Casaubon, Ralph Cudworth, More,²⁰⁹ and John Dennis" while "Locke and Whichcote had stressed the dangers of enthusiasm." He holds the view that probably Shaftesbury was "the main influence leading to the modern positive use of the term."²¹⁰

I observe that Enthusiasm has three levels; fanatical Enthusiasm as the first level, dogmatic Enthusiasm as the second level, and true Enthusiasm as the third level. Shaftesbury considers the first and the second levels as false Enthusiasm, and the third as true Enthusiasm. The judgment of False or True is based on the authenticity of Seriousness, which needs to be examined by Ridicule (this is in the genuine sense of Ridicule, not

²⁰⁹ Grean writes: "Shaftesbury was particularly influenced by Henry More's *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus; or a Brief Discourse of the Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure of Enthusiasm* (1656). Though More paved the way for a new understanding of the significance of enthusiasm, the emphasis in his discourse also still lay on the *triphantus* – the conquest of false enthusiasm – and it was only at the end of it that he gave some attention to true enthusiasm, insisting that he had no intention of criticizing it." Stanley Grean, *Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics*. New York: Ohio UP, 1967. p. 23.

²¹⁰ Ibid. p. 23.

Buffoonery or Satire, but friendly Ridicule, much as Socrates' method with his opponents).

Concerning the role of Ridicule, Shaftesbury writes,

The main Point is to know always *true* Gravity from the *false*: and this can only be, by carrying the Rule constantly with us, and freely applying it not only to the Things about us, but to our-selves.... And how can this be done, unless by applying *the Ridicule*, to see whether it will bear?"

(I. 8)

True Ridicule comes from true Reason, which brings clarity to observe ourselves as we truly are. Shaftesbury writes that "to know [true Enthusiasm] as we shou'd do ... is the great Work, and by this means alone we can hope to avoid Delusion" (I. 35).

Seriousness likewise has three levels; serious to be passionate, serious to be rational, and serious to be moral - as I discussed in the Wit/Humour section. When Shaftesbury writes "some Gentlemen there are so full of the Spirit of Bigotry, and false Zeal" (I. 48) indicating the false Gentlemen or the false Enthusiasts, he is focusing on 'Zeal' in the genuine sense since Seriousness depends on the person's view, which in turn determines which level of Enthusiasm he is operating from; Zeal can have an authentic meaning, in the sense of true Seriousness in true Enthusiasm.

False Enthusiasm comes from commonly used notions of his time. There were Enthusiasts of various denominations - Catholic, Presbyterian, Quaker, Puritan, and French Prophets, besides Anglican, and at the time Shaftesbury wrote, the term Enthusiasm was used for political and religious activity causing problems in society. It was considered an insult if someone was labeled an Enthusiast. *Characteristics* was written not long after the Glorious Revolution (1688, when Shaftesbury was 17 years old), and when people were still mindful of the atrocities of the Civil War (1642-1651). Consequently, an attitude of Enthusiasm in matters of religion and politics was frowned upon. On the other hand,

Shaftesbury praises what he considers to be true Enthusiasm in the sense of true, good, and beautiful passion. He recommend that we need wit and humour to treat those religious Enthusiasts, namely French Prophets; Alderman points out that the two treatises *The Letter concerning Enthusiasm* and *the Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour* which are focusing on Enthusiasts were “directed against the actual practices of the French Prophets.”²¹¹

As well as Enthusiasm, Shaftesbury’s conception of Gentlemen has three levels; fanatical Enthusiasts as the first level, dogmatic Enthusiasts as the second level, and true Enthusiasts as the third level. He considers gentlemen at the first and the second levels as false Gentlemen, and those at the third as true Gentlemen.

11. First Level of Enthusiasm

This lowest Enthusiasm is passion-based, and Shaftesbury considers it to be “mere ENTHUSIASM, or the extatick manner of Devotion” (III. 59). In this Enthusiasm, one’s mind is occupied with tyrannical passion, and reason is enslaved: “all Passion ... arises: And *the Mind* ... approves the Riot, and justifies the wild *Effects*” (III. 26). In such a state, as I discussed in Chapter 1.5, there is no original self, but only the master and slave personality; Shaftesbury writes that,

... above all enslaving Vices, and Restrainers of *Reason* and *just Thought*, the most evidently ruinous and fatal to the Understanding is that of SUPERSTITION, BIGORY, and *vulgar* ENTHUSIASM. This Passion, not contented like other Vices to deceive, and tacitly supplant our Reason, professes open War, holds up their intended Chains and Fetters, and declares its Resolution *to enslave*.

(III. 186)

²¹¹ William E. Alderman “The Significance of Shaftesbury in English Speculation.” PMLA, 38 (1923) pp. 176.

This fanatic Enthusiasm “works *by Fear*” (III. 24) and is based on “many monstrous and horrible Superstitions” (ibid.), unlike the true Enthusiasm which “works *by Love*” (ibid.). Persons who promote such a fanatical Enthusiasm believe that “FREEDOM *of Mind*, a MASTER *of Sense*, and a LIBERTY in *Thought* and *Action*, imply Debauch, Corruption, and Depravity” (III. 186-187).

Shaftesbury laments that, unlike the ancient classical writers and poets who pleasantly used their Enthusiasm for inspiration in creating beauty in their poetry, the moderns’ Enthusiasm is directed toward melancholic religious zeal. He asks readers to consider “why that Air of Enthusiasm, which fits so gracefully with an Antient, shou’d be so spiritless and aukard in a Modern” (I. 4). There was truth (Poetic Truth) in the classical poets’ imagination to create beauty, he argues, but he doubts if there is any Truth in Modern Enthusiasm. Shaftesbury holds that the ancient poets’ Imagination may have allowed them to believe in invisible things, while the Modern Enthusiasts’ Imagination permits them to believe almost any nonsense imaginable:

Even a good Christian, who wou’d needs be over-good, and thinks he can never believe enough, may, by a small Inclination well improv’d, extend his Faith so largely, as to comprehend in it not only all Scriptural and Traditional Miracles, but a solid System of Old-Wives Storys.

(I. 5)

He writes that “nothing can put a stop to the growing mischief of either [romantic love or religion], till the Melancholy be remov’d, and the Mind at liberty to hear what can be said against the Ridiculousness of an Extreme in either way” (I. 9). Shaftesbury claims that all (false) Enthusiasms have a melancholic character. Regarding this negative component of Enthusiasm, he writes,

There are many Branches indeed more vulgar, as that of FEAR, MELANCHOLY,

CONSTAERNATION, SUSPICION, DESPAIR. And when the Passion turns more towards *the astonishing and frightful*, than the *amiable and delightful* side, it creates rather what we call SUPERSTITION than ENTHUSIASM”

(III. 25)

This Enthusiasm is experienced, in common, by every Worshiper of the *Zealot-kind*” (III. 26). The mind is devoted to religious worship and regards the self as a martyr, and perhaps an authority. It does not matter what Enthusiasts worship, or if they worship anything at all. Shaftesbury argues that even atheists are “not wholly exempt from *Enthusiasm*; That there have been in reality *Enthusiastical* Atheists; and That even the Spirit of *Martyrdom* cou’d, upon occasion, exert it-self as well in *this* Cause, as in any *other*” (III. 42).

The fanatic Enthusiasm shares the passion-based character, as well as other attributes, of the other terms at the first level of Shaftesbury’s structure. It is Serious enough to follow passion and imagination like the first level of Seriousness; it is Self-interested like the first level of Affection (Self-affection); it is open to express passion and imagination like the first level of Manners (Poetical Manners), and to find truth in passion and imagination like the first level of Truth (Poetical Truth), and it can be seen in passion-based Ridicule (Buffoonery).

In addition, Shaftesbury considers the first classification of Gentlemen who practice the first level of Enthusiasm, and he calls them “*Zealot-Gentlemen*” (III. 204) or “vulgar Enthusiasts” (I. 43). Those enthusiastic Gentlemen’s reason is controlled by passion-based Enthusiasm, and so he holds that they are not truly themselves:

Those Zealots are “no longer self-govern’d, but set adrift to the wide Sea of Passion ... and *abhor* furiously; curse, bless, sing, mourn, exult, tremble, caress, assassinate, *inflict* and *suffer* MARTYRDOM, with a thousand other the most vehement Effects of variable and contrary Affection”

12. The Second Level of Enthusiasm

There is what Shaftesbury calls “a sort of *philosophical* ENTHUSIASM overspread the World” (III. 41) since the time of classical antiquity, a time when religion and philosophy were integrated and mystical religion was born. Shaftesbury considers this second, dogmatic Enthusiasm a product of “the cunning *Formalists* of the Age” (I. 9). It is characterized by rational and speculative thought, with the strong belief that rules and principles lead us to truth. However, this dogmatic Enthusiasm originated from fanatical Enthusiasm. He holds that when philosophy was introduced to religion, it “inflame[ed] this *Zeal*” (III. 40); thus, because such a dogmatic Enthusiasm is aggressive, it is worse than the original.

[after the philosophical Enthusiasm] BIGOTRY (a Species of *Superstition* hardly known before) took place in Mens Affections ... Barbarous Terms and Idioms were every day introduc'd ... So that the ENTHUSIASM or ZEAL, which was usually shewn by Mankind in behalf of their particular Worships, and which for the most part had been hitherto *defensive* only, grew now to be universally of the *offensive* kind.

(III. 53)

Regarding this narrow-minded approach which he believes has taken root since classical times, Shaftesbury details what he sees as its negative effects on the freedom of the mind to think, or on the freedom to examine truth; he writes,

That which was naturally the Subject of profound Speculation and Inquiry, was made the necessary Subject of a strict and absolute Assent. The *allegorical, mythological* Account of Sacred Things, was wholly inverted: Liberty of Judgement and Exposition taken away: No Ground left for Inquiry, Search, or Meditation: No Refuge from the dogmatical Spirit let loose. Every Quarter was taken up; every Portion prepossess'd. All was reduc'd *Article* and *Proposition*.

(III. 52)

Enthusiasts at this second level may strongly believe in the credibility of a pious and serious or grave attitude, such as seen in public displays of religious piety. Shaftesbury condemns

such a “vulgar Species of ENTHUSIASM . . . mov’d chiefly by *Shew* and *Ceremony*, and wrought upon by Chalice and Candles, Robes, and figur’d Dances” (III. 58). Though this mode of religious display originated from superstition, in Shaftesbury’s view, its origin has not been recognized as such; he comments,

Yet this, we may believe, was lookt upon as no slight Ingredient of *Devotion* in those Days; since at this hour, the Manner is found to be of considerable Efficacy with some of the Devout amongst our-selves, who pass the least for *superstitious*, and are reckon’d in the Number of the polite World.

(III. 58)

As well as the second level of Enthusiasm, there is a second level of Gentlemen, those who act with dogmatic Enthusiasm. Shaftesbury views them as grave and fanatical Gentlemen, and they include some of his “devout and zealous *Readers*” (III. 69), who are eager to defend their religious affiliations (as mentioned, he received much criticism regarding his attack on religion). The seriousness and sadness they exhibit is problematic, Shaftesbury contends, and may only be corrected by a deliberate attempt at cheerfulness. He writes,

They know very well, that as Modes and Fashions, so *Opinions*, tho ever so ridiculous, are kept up by Solemnity: and that those formal Notions which grew up probably in an ill Mood, and have been conceiv’d in sober Sadness, are never to be remov’d but in a sober kind of Chearfulness, and by a more easy and pleasant of Thought.

(I. 9)

He spends considerable space describing and criticizing the attributes of men at this stage; for example, they are “Tragical Gentlemen, with the grim Aspect and Mein of true *Inquisitors*, [who] have but an ill Grace” (I. 43). They have “Half-Thoughts and raw Imaginations of Interest, and worldly Affairs; that they are still disabled in the rational Pursuit of Happiness and Good” (III. 185). They tend to look “with jealousy on every

unconformable Opinion” (III. 69), but they lack moral character since their passion is “not from pure ZEAL, but *private* INTEREST, and *worldly* EMULATION” (III. 70). They have speculative minds, he claims, yet they are negatively affected by their imagination and passion, and have not yet regained their original personality. They do not know the value of possessing a “FREEDOM of *Mind*, a MASTERY of *Sense*, and a LIBERTY in *Thought* and *Action*” (III. 186-187), and he argues that even a thoughtless “*Rake*” has “more of Worth, Virtue, and Merit, than such grave Plodders, and *thoughtful* Gentlemen as these” (ibid.).

Going further, Shaftesbury writes that these “raw, heedless, unthinking” persons are “*Pretenders to Wit*” (III. 183), but such wit is harsh satire mixed with Buffoonery. He criticizes them as “self-admiring Wits” (III. 184) who have “*under-thought, or reason'd short*” (ibid.). They are hypocrites who “pursue what they call their *Interest*,” and seek “*Self-enjoyment*” (ibid.). He writes that although “these graver ... Gentlemen, have, *for their Soul's sake*” followed a form of religion, their efforts have not improved their life or morality (III. 185). Those Gentlemen are “mature Dogmatists” (III. 184) who ignore “the *chief Enjoyments of Life*, which are founded in *Honesty* and a good *Mind*” (ibid.), but value the trappings of “*mere Life*,” such as “Public Distinction, Fame, Power, an Estate, or Title” (ibid.). Shaftesbury holds that such people focus on the wrong things, things which, unfortunately, too many people pursue. He writes,

... these *selfish* Computers of Happiness and private Good; whose Pursuits of Interest, whether for this World or another, are attended with the same stiddy Vein of cunning and low Thought ... and false Relishes of *Life* and *Manners*.
(III. 184)

The distinction which Shaftesbury makes between the fanatic and the dogmatic Enthusiasms could be unclear since they share a sense of gravity, melancholy, and narrow-

mindedness. Both fanatic and dogmatic gentlemen come from the same origin – fear based on superstition. Their Ridicule is Buffoonery and Satire mixed; their interested in self-oriented; their truth is based on fear, passion, or false reason lacking moral goodness; their sense of beauty is far from the true beauty he associates with the love of humanity.

13. The Third Level of Enthusiasm and Gentlemen

For Shaftesbury, the third Enthusiasm is “real *Enchantment*” (III. 19) or a form of “*Magick*” which “works *by Love*” (III. 24), providing the motivation to create beauty and goodness. Without this passion, there is no true beauty, nor true moral conduct. He considers this true Enthusiasm as “the most *natural*, and its Object as the *justest* in the World” (III. 22). It is characterized by a disinterestedness and an inner serenity, combined with passion to act upon beauty and goodness, and represents the Third Order of Beauty as one’s soul. He considers it the original human nature which is revealed in the experience of beauty, goodness, and truth. Regarding the value of this level of Enthusiasm, Shaftesbury writes,

It [enthusiasm] inspires us with something more than ordinary, and raises us above our-selves. Without this Imagination or Conceit, *the World* wou’d be but a dull Circumstance, and *Life* a sorry Pass-time. Scarce cou’d we be said *to live*. The animal Functions might in their course be carry’d on; but nothing further sought for, or regarded. The gallant Sentiments, the elegant Fancys, the *Belle-passions*, which have, all of them, this BEAUTY in view, wou’d be set aside, and leave us probably no other Employment than that of satisfying our coarsest Appetites at the cheapest rate; in order to the attainment of a supine State of Indolence and Inactivity.

(III. 20)

True Enthusiasm is, for Shaftesbury, “a very natural *honest* Passion; and has properly nothing for its Object but what is *Good* and *Honest*” (III. 264. Index), and “noble *Enthusiasm* justly directed, and regulated by that high Standard which [Shaftesbury himself] supposes in the Nature of Things” (III. 22). It is an inspiration and is “justly call’d Divine

ENTHUSIASM” (I. 34)²¹² which Shaftesbury also regards as something “sublime in human passions” (ibid.). True Enthusiasm is “the original and comprehensive One” compared to lower forms of Enthusiasm which are “secondary and scanty Objects” (II. 224). It is a state of mental freedom in which all conflicts of reason/sense, or mind/reason, mind/mind (one could have more than one thought in a Mind) are resolved, and only sublimated passion and reason exist; thus, there are no more two personalities but the integrated, original self.

Those who have the third Enthusiasm Shaftesbury regards as true Enthusiasts or true Gentlemen - the third level of Gentlemen. They have

Zeal, or Passion, moving strongly upon the *Species* or *View* of the DECORUM, and SUBLIME of Actions.... The real *honest Man* ... has that highest *Species*, *Honesty* it-self, in view; and instead of *outward* Forms or Symmetrys, is struck with that of *inward* Character, the Harmony and Numbers of the Heart, and Beauty of the Affections, which form the Manners and Conduct of a truly *social* Life.

(III. 22-23)

This Enthusiasm is not limited to religion, for Shaftesbury holds that there are “so many different *Enthusiasts*” (III. 22) of this kind – such a hero of a nation, a politician, a lover, a philosopher, or a poet. Humans are innately artists, Shaftesbury contends, and have an innate ability to create beauty and thus rejoice in their souls. Accordingly, true Enthusiasm is experienced by everyone; he writes that “almost all of us know something of this Principle” (I. 35). When one feels he is on the right path to be truly himself, he is enthusiastic and an artist of his soul. Concerning the relationship between enthusiasm and art, and life itself, he writes,

If there be any seeming Extravagance in the case, I must comfort myself the best I can, and consider that all sound *Love* and *Admiration* is ENTHUSIASM: “The

²¹² On this page, he uses ‘Enthusiasm’ to indicate negative Enthusiasm, and on the same page, uses ‘ENTHUSIASM’ to indicate higher Enthusiasm.

Transports of *Poets*, the Sublime of *Orators*, the Rapture of *Musicians*, the high Strains of the *Virtuosi*; all mere ENTHUSIASM! Even *Learning* it-self, the Love of *Arts* and Curiositys, the Spirit of Travellers and Adventures; Gallantry, War, Heroism; All, all ENTHUSIASM!”

(II. 223-224)

True Enthusiasm is Passion, which is a necessity to experience Beauty seen not only in beautiful objects such as works of art, but in nature and everyday life. Shaftesbury writes that people would have little enjoyment

... if in the Beautys which they admire, and passionately pursue, there were no reference or regard to any higher *Majesty* or *Grandure*, than what simply results from the particular Objects of their pursuit. I know not, in reality, what we shou'd do to find a seasoning to most of our Pleasure in Life, were it not for the Taste or Relish, which is owing to this particular Passion, and the Conceit or Imagination which supports it. Without this, we cou'd not so much as admire a *Poem*, or *Picture*; a *Garden*, or a *Palace*; a charming *Shape*, or a *fair Face*.

(III. 21)

True Enthusiasm is not only a taste of aesthetic judgement, but it is a taste of moral judgement. It is not only wonder at works of work, but wonder at the divine beauty in the universe. It is not only being an artist, but being artist in daily life. It is a passion but “the nobler and higher sense” of passion (I. 35 fn), and thus he calls it “noble ENTHUSIASM” (I. 35). Control is required, and he writes that, “this high and noble Affection [Enthusiasm], which raises Man to Action, and is his Guide in Business as well as Pleasure, requires a steady Rein and strict Hand over it” (III. 24). It is a form of Passion characterized by a mental state of serenity where one’s Reason/Passion becomes united without conflict. Passion becomes rational, and Reason becomes passionate.

For Shaftesbury, true Gentlemen are capable of conduct at the third level of the other concepts. They act on Moral Truth and display True Ridicule toward others - but especially toward themselves since they have a reflective mental state; they experience the Third Order

of Beauty, the third Personality, and Natural Affection since their Enthusiasm allows for the “exalted part of *Love*” and “pure *Friendship*” (III. 22).

14. Good Breeding

Shaftesbury admits that defining true *Raillery* and *Good Breeding* is difficult, since many people believe that they practice true *Raillery* as truly well-bred men (I. 42). However, he contends that those Gentlemen actually lack the true Wit which is the mark of “men of Sense and Breeding” (I. 8). They do not notice that they look ridiculous in the Magical-Glass (such as *Characteristics*) when they laugh at comments such as “Ridicule is the test of Truth,” not realizing that they are actually laughing at themselves. Shaftesbury comments:

For if *real Gentlemen*, seduc'd, as you pretend, and made erroneous in their Religion or Philosophy, discover not the least Feature of their real Faces in your Looking-glass, not know themselves, in the least, by your Description; they will hardly be apt to think they are refuted. How wittily soever your Comedy may be wrought up, they will scarce apprehend any of that Wit to fall upon themselves. They may laugh indeed at the Diversion you are pleas'd to give 'em: But *the Laugh* perhaps may be different from what you intend. They may smile secretly to see themselves thus encounter'd; when they find, at last, your Authority laid by, and your *scholastick* Weapons quitted, in favour of this weak Attempt, *To master them by their own Arms, and proper Ability*.

(III. 181)

For Shaftesbury, the standards for Men of Breeding in the genuine sense are quite high. They are “truly well-bred” are characterized chiefly by honesty (I. 81). Such a man has “the thought of *Manliness, Resolution, Friendship, Merit, and a Character with himself and others*” (I. 82). Genuine Men of Breeding are people who have attained the third level of various concepts - such as the third level of personality (true self) and the third level of affection (natural affection). To further describe the virtuous character of such a person, he writes,

A man of thorow *Good-Breeding*, whatever else he be, is incapable of doing a rude

or brutal Action. He never *deliberates* in this case, or considers of the matter by prudential Rules of Self-Interest and Advantage. He acts from his Nature, in a manner necessarily, and without Reflection: and if he did not, it were impossible for him to answer his Character, or be found that truly well-bred Man, on every occasion. 'Tis the same as the *honest Man*. . . . He who woul'd enjoy a Freedom of Mind and be truly *Possessor of himself*, must be above the thought of stooping to what is villainous or base.

(I. 81, underlines added)

It is important to stress the idea that a Man of Breeding acts morally “without Reflection” and has “*a Freedom of Mind* and [is] truly *Possessor of himself*” (ibid.), since his inward state is calm and harmonious after overcoming his dual nature. Such men use true Reason, appreciate true Beauty, express the Delight of true Enthusiasm - but never Grave Enthusiasm, and know what is right or good Humour.

Gravity and Solemnity are not negative concepts only, however; they have their positive sides. For example, there is true gravity and ill gravity. To those people who caution that some topics are taboo, or too serious to be the object of wit, Shaftesbury suggests this view may well be a misconception.

... let us see first whether [certain subjects] are really grave or no: for in the manner we may conceive 'em, they may peradventure be very grave and weighty in our Imagination; but very ridiculous and impertinent in their own nature.... The main Point is to know always *true Gravity* from the *false*....

(I. 8)

We do not know true Gravity unless we apply the method of Ridicule “to see whether it will bear,” and overcome “the imposture of Formality” (ibid.). Humour is a tool to be used against grave and ill-humoured gentlemen. As well as the Magical Glass, Ridicule reveals the figure we might rather not want to see. Lack of good humour is the same as lack of serenity or what supports “*the Quiet or good Correspondence of Mankind*” (III. 68).

Regarding people who are over-sensitive about being ridiculed, Shaftesbury asks: “For what

Ridicule can lie against Reason? Or how can any one of the least Justness of Thought endure Ridicule wrong plac'd? Nothing is more ridiculous than this it-self" (I. 8).

Shaftesbury asks why society needs seriousness to such a degree that people may be executed in the name of religion and truth. He questions whether or not such actions could be considered pious-minded, tolerant, and witty, and he argues that those who are "Cowards in reasoning, and are so afraid to stand the *Test of Ridicule*" (I. 8) need less seriousness and less gravity. In this regard, he states that among the performing arts, comedy is superior to other forms since it corresponds to his concepts regarding the playful manner necessary to see beauty, goodness, and truth.

15. Nobleness

Shaftesbury uses the word '*noble*' through his writing not for a higher rank or class, but a *higher rank of Beauty*; likewise, he uses terms such as '*Well-Bred*', '*Gentlemen*', and '*Politeness*', corresponding with other concepts such as Wit and Enthusiasm, to indicate aesthetic/moral levels. From the point of view of ordinary citizens, his frequent use of those words may seem to result from arrogance, since in his society the author would be regarded as a well-bred nobleman.

For Shaftesbury, however, True Nobleness as well as True Enthusiasm, represents "a nobler Self" (I. 174) or "the nobler Spirit of Mankind" (I. 166). In this true Nobleness, one is motivated to see beauty and virtue without interest. One can deal with "the nobler Subjects of a rational and moral kind" (I. 87), since the person represents beauty in both his inner and outer states (action) in true Enthusiasm, which Shaftesbury calls "noble ENTHUSIASM" (I. 35), "*sublime ENTHUSIASM*" (III. 142), and true Delight. In this state, pleasure is of "the nobler Pleasures" (I. 194) and Affection is "noble Affection" (I. 95).

16. Gentleman of Fashion

It is not only in the field of religion that we see the lower level of Gentlemen, but in the field of aesthetic taste as well. Shaftesbury contends that *Gentlemen of Fashion* who have “a general good Taste” regarding the fine arts, such as “Masters of an Ear in Musick, an Eye in Painting, a Fancy in the ordinary things of Ornament and Grace, a Judgment in Proportions of all kinds” (I. 84), could nevertheless be “irregular in their Morals ... in contradiction to that Principle, on which they ground their highest Pleasure and Entertainment” (I. 85). They are not true gentlemen since they do not apply their knowledge to the “most delightful” beauty which comes from “real *Life, and from the Passions*” and from the heart, “such as the *Beauty of Sentiments, the Grace of Actions, the Turn of Characters, and the Proportions and Features of a human Mind*” (ibid. underline added). Like Passion in the highest Enthusiasm, *Passions* in this paragraph refers to the higher Passions which one is able to have when his or her mind is integrated in a harmonious self, that is to say, when one’s mind is beautiful and good; thus, his or her natural affection is genuine Natural Affection which motivates one to act morally. Describing the genuine Passion of true Gentlemen, Shaftesbury states:

For in the first place, the very Passion which inspire ’em, is it-self *the Love of Numbers, Decency and Proportion*; and this too, not in a narrow sense, of after a *selfish* way ... but in a friendly social View; for the Pleasure and Good of others; And in the next place, ’tis evident in these Performers, that their chief Theme and Subject, that which raises their Genius the most, and by which they so effectually move others, is purely *Manners, and The moral Part*. For this is the Effect, and this the Beauty of their Art; “in vocal Measures of Syllables, and Sounds, to express the Harmony and Numbers of an inward kind; and represent the Beauty of a human Soul, by proper Foils, and Contrarietys, which serve as Graces in this Limning, and render this Musick of the Passions more powerful and enchanting.

(I. 85)

In conclusion, there are three level of Enthusiasm - fanatic, dogmatic, and genuine

Enthusiasm. The first level of Enthusiasm is sense/passion-based; it is concerned with Self-interest with false Seriousness, is limited to maintaining the first level of Personality (sense/passion-based), and at this level Ridicule is mere Buffoonery. Persons at this level are Melancholic and not true Gentlemen, not the result of Good-Breeding, and do not have true Nobleness, as I have illustrated in the terms under column A in the following table.

Table 15 Three Levels of Enthusiasm

<u>A: Subjective</u>	<u>B: Objective</u>	<u>C: Subjective + Objective</u>
1. Enthusiasm (Fanatic)	Enthusiasm (Dogmatic)	ENTHUSIASM
2. Self-Interest	Public Interest	NATURAL AFFECTION
3. Seriousness (false)	Seriousness (false)	SERIOUSNESS
4. First Personality	Second Personality	Third Personality
5. Ridicule (Buffoonery)	Ridicule (Satire)	RIDICULE
6. Melancholy	Melancholy	Cheerful
7. Gentlemen	Gentlemen	GENTLEMEN
8. Good-Breeding	Good-Breeding	GOOD-BREEDING
9. Nobleness	Nobleness	NOBLENESS

The second level of Enthusiasm is reason-based, and it is concerned with the Public Interest with false Seriousness, and is limited to maintaining the second level of Personality (reason-based). At this level Ridicule is harsh Satire; persons at this level are Melancholic and not true Gentlemen, not the result of Good Breeding, and do not have true Nobleness, as in the terms under column B in the table.

The third level of Enthusiasm is harmonious reason/passion-based, and motivated by Natural Affection in the genuine sense with genuine Seriousness. Persons at this level have the third Personality (true Self); they are Cheerful and true Gentlemen, the result of Good-Breeding, and have true Nobleness, as in the terms under column C in the table.

The term Enthusiasm is important for Shaftesbury since it is connected to the problem which occurs when an excess of Passion and Imagination takes over one's rational

judgement. For the same reason, the other concepts such as Truth, Beauty, Manners, Personality, and Affections are important for him. The first order (sense/passion-based) of those concepts - Poetical Truth, the First Order of Beauty, Poetical Manners, the First Personality, and Self-Affections have the potential to overpower the second level (reason-based) of those terms - Methodical Truth, the Second Order of Beauty, Historical Manner, the Second Personality, and Public Affections. The excess of the first level of human nature prevents humans from reaching the third level, which is true, good, and beautiful - Moral Truth, the Third Order of Beauty, Miscellaneous Manners, the Third Personality, and Natural Affections.

17. Wit and Sublime

Succession of Father-Poet

In this section, I note that Shaftesbury's view on the succession of wit/humour in ancient Greece, which he calls "The real *Lineage* and SUCCESSION of *Wit*" (III. 85), is dialectic, just as it is with the other concepts he discusses, such as Manners, Truth, and Beauty. This is because the development of poetry and philosophy which he describes in the succession of wit has three stages; after the first character (tragedy or sublime philosophy) established its perfection, the second character (comedy or comical philosophy) was born to be a form of "*Counter-Pedagogue*" (I. 157) against the sublime character of the former; the third character (genuine comedy or genuine philosophy) comes at the end, in which the former two characters are integrated in a "natural and *simple*" style (I. 159) to realize ideal beauty, goodness, and the truth of humanity.

Shaftesbury uses the noun *Sublime* mainly in two way; one is the feelings of

“*astonish[ment]*” (I. 149), amazement, admiration, or fear which arise when one is struck with wonder or horror by the greatness of nature. This can be experienced as a delight in Enthusiasm,²¹³ what he calls “divine *Inspiration*, or *sublime* ENTHUSIASM” (III. 142). Sublime in the positive sense involves “Admiration and contemplative Delight” (III. 24). Regarding Admiration, Shaftesbury refers to it as that which is “*founded in the natural and necessary Imagination of a sublime and beautiful in things*” (III. 253. Index). He intends this meaning in such phrases as “the Beauty of Sentiments, *the Sublime* of Characters” (I. 206), “sublime in human passions” (I. 34), or “the Sublime of *Orators*” (II. 223).

However, Sublime in Enthusiasm can be related to Fear instead of Delight, that which “raises a certain Tremor or Horror” (III. 23) and turns one to fanaticism or superstition. Indeed, Shaftesbury regards “all [lower] ENTHUSIASM and *religious Extasy* as the Product or mere Effect of FEAR” (III. 23). Describing ‘the *Sublime*’ (II. 218) mental state experienced when one is in nature, in “the vast Wood” (*ibid.*), he writes,

Here *Space* astonishes. *Silence* it-self seems pregnant; whilst an unknown Force works on the Mind, and dubious Objects move the wakeful Sense. Mysterious *Voices* are either heard or fancy’d: and various Forms of *Deity* seem to present themselves....

(II. 218)

We admire the beauty of nature, but we are also somewhat afraid of nature when we feel we are totally away from civilization. Since humans cannot live in the wilderness like animals,

²¹³ Regarding the concept of the Sublime, Shaftesbury is quite possibly influenced by Longinus’ *On the Sublime*. Both regard the Sublime in the genuine sense as a delightful and enthusiastic mental state excluding Fear. Carey also points out that the concept of the sublime is “not Burke’s later version, but a traditional account of it, closer to Longinus, as something heightened and transcendent.” (p. 149) Daniel Carey, *Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006.

our Sublime feeling toward nature can easily become overwhelming fear. In *Moralists*, after Theocles “resolv’d to take his leave of *the Sublime*” (II. 219), that is to say, after his expression of sublime Enthusiasm concerning nature’s beauty, he tells Philocles that

we had better leave these unsociable Places, whether our Fancy has transported us, and return to our–selves here again, in our more conversable Woods, and temperate Climates. Here no fierce Heats nor Colds annoy us, no *Precipices* nor *Cataracts* amaze us. Nor need we here be afraid of our own Voices....

(II. 219)

Philocles tells Theocles that he prefers “our familiar Home-*Nymphs*” to “foreign *Nymphs*” in “those miraculous Woods” because the latter has “much too awful Beautys to please” him, whereas the first has “a great deal more to my humour” (II. 219). This exchange indicates that for Shaftesbury Enthusiasm associated with delight and wit/humour is more agreeable than Enthusiasm associated with Fear; likewise, he holds that the Sublime associated with delight and with wit/humour is more agreeable than the Sublime associated with Fear.

If a vast wood overwhelms us because of its sublime character, its “much too awful Beautys” (ibid.), then where can we find rest? For Shaftesbury, a garden is the preferred location, although much depends on the style of garden. In that regard, he has praise for the more primitive sort, and writes,

Even the rude *Rocks*, the mossy *Caverns*, the irregular unwrought *Grotto*’s, and broken *Falls* of Waters, with all the horrid Graces of the *Wildness* it-self, as representing NATURE more, will be the more engaging, and appear with a Magnificence beyond the formal Mockery of princely Gardens.

(II. 220)

By the phrase “the formal Mockery of princely Gardens” (ibid.), Shaftesbury seems to indicate a more formal, French-style garden, while “the Wilderness,” including “the irregular unwrought *Grotto*’s,” indicates a English-style garden. The French style, with its geometrical design, gives us rational pleasure because of its order, simplicity, and unity.

However, true Beauty is not found there because of the lack of naturalness and its rigid and formal style. For Shaftesbury, true Beauty is found in the wilderness, or any garden presenting a more primitive or natural appearance, such as in an English-style garden which unites both Wilderness and Art without conflict, and shows the appearance of Nature.

Shaftesbury also uses Sublime in connection with ‘solemn’ or ‘seriousness,’ as when he writes phrases such as “*solemn and sublime*” (I. 150), “Raillery inermex’d with the Sublime” (I. 123), “the *false Tender*, or the *false Sublime*” (I. 205. fn), “sublime philosopher” (I. 157), or when he discusses what he calls ‘sublime poetry.’ He intends a style or manner used to emphasize seriousness and formality, as, for example, in the character of religious Enthusiasm. For Shaftesbury, ‘sublime’ often implies ‘methodical’ as opposed to ‘poetical’ or imaginative,’ because of its speculative character. When he categorizes Aristotle as a sublime philosopher because of what he regards as the serious and formalistic style of his writing, Shaftesbury means that Aristotle’s style has a “*methodick or scholastic Manner*” (I. 159), lacking “a refin’d Temper, bless’d by the Graces, or favour’d by any Muse” (I. 160). He holds that Aristotle had “a fruitful Imagination, but rather dry and rigid; yet withal acute and piercing, accurate and distinct” (ibid.); thus, he is often clearly critical of the “sublime” style. He writes,

As for *the* SUBLIME, tho it be often the Subject of Criticism; it can never be the Manner, or afford the Means. The Way of *Form* and METHOD, the *didactive* or *perceptive* Manner, as it has been usually practis’d amongst us, and our Ears have been long accusom’d, has so little force towards the winning our Attention, that it is apter to tire us, than the Metre of an old Ballad. We no sooner hear the *Theme* propounded, the Subject divided and subdivided, (with *first of the first*, and so forth, as *Order* requires) than instantly we begin a Strife with *Nature*, who otherwise might surprize us in the soft Fetters of Sleep; to the great Disgrace of the Orator, and Scandal of the Audience.

(I. 160-161)

The opposite of Sublime, Shaftesbury contends, is a comical, witty, and pleasant style; he commends a “justly-admired Piece of Comick Wit” as “the most effectual and entertaining Method of exposing Folly, Pedantry, false Reason, and ill Writing” (I. 161). He states that,

The only Manner left [after Sublime which is not acceptable], in which Criticism can have its just Force amongst us, is the antient COMICK; of which kind were the first *Roman Miscellanys*, or *Satirick Pieces*: a sort of original Writing of their own, refin'd afterwards by the best Genius, and politest Poet of that Nation; who, notwithstanding, owns the Manner to have been taken from the *Greek Comedy*....
(I. 161)

Sublime in the ultimate sense is, paradoxically, not present in Tragedy but in Comedy, the most serious and most sublime form in the sense of true Pleasure as the highest Enthusiasm, in which we feel that there is a Divine force in the experience of beauty.

Shaftesbury regards comedy and comical philosophy as more serious forms of the sublime (in the true sense) than tragedy or sublime philosophy; he argues that tragedy or sublime philosophy can be examples of the “*false sublime*” (I. 152), and that comedy or comical philosophy can be seen as truly sublime. He holds that the sublime character may often hide pedantry, false Reason, and false Truth. True sublime or seriousness comes when one reaches the third character of the nature of things which is genuine, natural, good, and beautiful, not only in the case of poetry (perfected in the third stage of comedy by Menander) and philosophy (perfected in the third stage of comical philosophy by Xenophon), but in Truth (perfected in the third Truth-Moral Truth), in Personality, (perfected in the third Personality which is the genuine self), in Manners (perfected in the third Manners - Miscellaneous Manners), in Enthusiasm (perfected in the third Enthusiasm – Genuine Enthusiasm), in Natural Affection (perfected in the third Affection - genuine Natural Affection), and in Wit/Humour (perfected in the third Ridicule which is moral and

beautiful) in the genuine sense.

He holds that there was a certain succession of the forms of drama in ancient Greece which developed in the order of tragedy, comedy, and genuine comedy, and in this regard he refers to Marcus Aurelius and Strabo (I. 157). First of all, under the poetic lineage of Homer, who Shaftesbury calls the “Father-Poet” (I. 150), tragedy was developed and reached its perfection in a short time. He writes that according to Aurelius, “TRAGEDY came first: and took what was most *solemn* and *sublime*” (I. 150). Shaftesbury writes that tragedy is “rais’d to its height by SOPHOCLES and EURIPIDES, and no room left for further Excellence of Emulation” (I. 151. fn), and he contrasts this with comedy which needs to be developed gradually because of its complexity.

The first kind of comedy, which was farce characterized by a “Scheme of *ludicrous* Wit” (I. 157), was produced “upon the neck of the SUBLIME ... as a sort of *Counter-Pedagogue*, against the Pomp and Formality of the more solemn Writers” (ibid.). However, this first kind of comedy is not actually comedy, in Shaftesbury’s opinion, but a rather parody; “The PARODYS were very antient: but they were in reality no other than mere Burlesque or Farce” (I. 152. fn).

Shaftesbury claims that a second, more sophisticated form of comedy was born at the time of Aristophanes; he writes that this level of comedy, while borrowing from “*Burlesque* or *Farce*,” was not “rais’d to any Form or Shape of Art ... till about the time of ARISTOPHANES, who was of the first model, and a Beginner of the kind” (I. 152.fn). Aristophanes and others like him created works “fertile in all the Varietys and Turns of Humour,” but their works, which contain harsh satire and farcical manners, still needed to be developed since “the Truth of Characters, the Beauty of Order, and the simple Imitation

of Nature, were in a manner wholly unknown to 'em" (I. 152). It was Menander who realized those qualities in his comedy and who became "our grand Master of Art" (ibid.). His comedy is a genuine sense of Comedy, Shaftesbury claims, and while including a tragic element still gives delight and beauty to the audience.

Shaftesbury has high praise for Homer, who is the origin of poets in his view - "the *grand poetic SIRE* (I. 158), and he sees the perfection of integrated character in his works. Shaftesbury argues that Homer, as the originator, was "allow'd [by the consent of all Antiquity] to have furnish'd Subject both to the *Tragick*, the *Comick*, and every other kind of genuine Poetry" (ibid.). His successors chose either sublime or witty manners, but eventually the lost integrated manner will return - in the case of poetry, it returned with Menander. Shaftesbury regards the development of wit/humour throughout history as a circulating or repeating movement, and he points out a similar pattern regarding Socrates/Plato and the origin of philosophy, which he argues contained an integration of both the sublime and the comic.

Succession of Father-Philosopher

Shaftesbury claims that there is a "resemblance" between "the Lineage of *Philosophy* and that of *Poetry*; as deriv'd from their two chief Founders or Patriarchs" (I. 157) – Homer and Socrates/Plato.²¹⁴ He writes that,

... what is highly remarkable, our Author [Aurelius] shews us, that in Philosophy it-
self there happen'd, almost at the very same time, a like *Succession* of Wit and

²¹⁴ Marsh points out that Shaftesbury's observations on the development of poetry (the development of comedy) and philosophy (the development from a sublime to a joyful style as in the case of Enthusiasm), which coincide, represents Shaftesbury's typical method: "An analogy between social criticism or satire and the philosophic process of self-criticism informs the bulk of Shaftesbury's writings, and it is particularly significant in his discussion of the nature and value of poetry." Robert Marsh. *Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. p. 27.

Humour; when in opposition to the sublime Philosopher ... there arose a *Comick* Philosophy ... set in direct opposition to the former: not as differing in Opinions or Maxims, but in their Style and Manners; in the Turn of Humour, and method of Instruction.

(I. 157)

He holds that the succession of poetry happened where and when it did because of necessity:

“‘T WAS not by chance that this *Succession* happen’d in GREECE ... but rather thro’ Necessity, and from the Reason and Nature of Things” (I. 153), and he argues that the historical role of wit/humour acted as a “*Counter-Pedagogue*” (I. 157) against the sublime, serious, formal, and methodical manner in not only poetry and philosophy, but in all areas of life, including art, customs, and culture. He praises what he considers the beneficial effects on society, claiming that,

Every thing which might be imposing, by a false Gravity or Solemnity, was forc’d to endure the Trial of this Touchstone. Manners and Characters, as well as Speech and Writings, were discuss’d with the greatest freedom. Nothing cou’d be better fitted than this Genius of Wit, to unmark the face of things, and remove those *Larvae* naturally form’d from the *Tragick* Manner, and pompous Style, which had preceded.

(I. 152)

After Socrates and Plato, Shaftesbury names four distinguished successors; first there was Aristotle, “who aspir’d to Poetry and Rhetorick, [and] took the *Sublime* part” (I. 158); Antisthenes, “whose Constitution as well as Condition inclin’d him most to the way we call *Satirick*, took the reprovng part” (ibid.); Diogenes the Cynic who was “better-humour’d ... turn’d [the satiric kind] into the *Comick* kind” (ibid.); and Xenophon “whose Genius was towards Action” (I. 159), integrated sublime, satirical, and comical characters in his philosophy.

However, just like Homer in poetry, Plato, who Shaftesbury considers the original philosophical genius - “the philosophical PATRICARCH” (I. 158), already had the concept of

the integration of the both the sublime and the comical, or the methodical and poetical. Plato combined speculative thought and witty descriptions of Socratic dialogues; thus, for Shaftesbury his works already had reached the perfection of philosophical style. According to Shaftesbury, though Plato may have negatively evaluated poetry, he had a great sense of poetry, as evidenced in his description of Socrates:

The Philosophical *Hero* of these Poems ... was in himself *a perfect Character*; yet, in some respects, so veil'd, and in a Cloud, that to the unattentive Surveyor he seem'd often to be very different from what he really was.... So that in this Genius of writing, there appear'd both *the heroick* and *the simple, the tragick, and the comick Vein*.

(I. 121)

Plato's successors went through the stages of development to get back to the origin of philosophy - sublime philosophy first, witty philosophy second, and genuine witty philosophy third. For Shaftesbury, we are meant to go through various philosophical styles to go back to the origin of philosophy which is good, true, beautiful, and natural.

In conclusion, I claim that Shaftesbury's view on the lineage of poetry, which developed in order of Tragedy, Parody, Comedy, and genuine Comedy, shows a dialectic development of the Sublime, the Comical (parody and comedy), and the Genuine Sublime/Comical character. He holds that Tragedy, which reached the level of perfection with Sophocles and Euripides (I. 151. fn), invited a counter movement by Parody which was farce or Buffoonery, and was developed into Comedy with Wit and Humour by Aristophanes; finally, Shaftesbury claims, Comedy reached its perfection with Menander, who integrated sublime and comical characters, and realized beauty, moral goodness, and the polite manner, with a natural and simple style. I illustrate Shaftesbury's view in the table below.

Table 16 Succession of Father-Poet (Homer)

<u>Tragedy</u>	→	<u>Parody</u>	→	<u>Comedy</u>	→	<u>Genuine Comedy</u>
Sophocles etc.		Farce/Buffoonery		Aristophanes		Menander

I also claim that Shaftesbury's view on the lineage of philosophy, which developed in order of Sublime Philosophy, Satiric Philosophy, Comical Philosophy, and Genuine Philosophy, shows the dialectic development of the Sublime, Comical (Satiric and Comical), and Genuine Sublime and Comical character. Sublime philosophy, which for Shaftesbury reached perfection with Aristotle, invited a counter-movement in Satirical philosophy, represented by Antisthenes, and in Comical Philosophy represented by Diogenes the Cynic; finally, philosophy reached its perfection with Xenophon, who integrated sublime and comical characters, and realized beauty, moral goodness, polite manner, with a natural and simple style. I illustrate Shaftesbury's view in the table below:

Table 17 Succession of Father-Philosopher (Socrates/Plato) ²¹⁵

<u>Sublime Philosophy</u>	→	<u>Satiric Philosophy</u>	→	<u>Comical Philosophy</u>	→	<u>Genuine Philosophy</u>
Aristotle		Antisthenes		Diogenes the Cynic		Xenophon

I also observe that the pattern of the succession of poetry and philosophy Shaftesbury presents coincides with his view of Wit/Humour (as I discussed in the previous section), which developed in order of Sublime Enthusiasm, Farcical Ridicule, Satiric Ridicule, and Genuine Ridicule, and shows the dialectic development of Sublime, Comical

²¹⁵ Since Aristotle (384 BC-322 BC) followed Antisthenes (445 BC-365 BC), Diogenes the Cynic (412 BC-323 BC), and Xenophon (430 BC-354 BC) - they are of the generation of Plato (427 BC-347 BC), it is difficult to see them in chorological succession. Rather, he possibly means the interaction between the sublime and comical/witty styles can occur simultaneously.

(Farce and Satire), and Genuine Sublime and Comical character. Sublime Enthusiasm, as in fanaticism and dogmatism, invited a counter-movement by Ridicule, which Shaftesbury sees as Farce or Buffoonery represented and developed by such as “the very Italian Buffoons” (I. 81), since the Italians had been suppressed under a tyrannical state. Sublime Enthusiasm also invited the counter-movement of Satiric Ridicule; it is, however, often harsh Satire mixed with the Buffoonery, and this Ridicule is imitated by the Religious Enthusiasts themselves to attack their opponents. And finally, for Shaftesbury, Wit/Humour reaches its perfection in genuine Ridicule, which integrates both the sublime and witty characters, and is friendly, pleasant, good, and beautiful, as I illustrate in the table below:

Table 18 Succession of Wit/Humour

<u>Sublime/Solemnity</u>	→	Ridicule	→	Ridicule	→	<u>Genuine Ridicule</u>
Religious Enthusiasm		Farce/Buffoonery		Satire		<i>je ne sais quoi</i> of Wit

18. Practical and Contemplative Reason

I hold that for Shaftesbury, Reason has both practical and contemplative characteristics without contradiction. Due to his dialectical view of the nature of humanity, he tends to use multiple levels of the same concepts, such as three levels of truth, three levels of manners, three levels of personalities, and three levels of enthusiasm, as I have discussed previously. His method of overcoming the two opposing characters is found in the third character of the nature of humanity - the mixture of the opposed ideas which are united in a harmonious relationship. When this harmony is achieved, one is able to contribute to improve one’s community, society, and nation. For Shaftesbury, Reason is not opposed to Imagination; the rational Mind is not opposed to the emotional Mind; Art is not opposed to

Nature. They are all integrated in the third character.

In this section, I argue that Shaftesbury's 'Reason', in the sense of genuine Reason, is practical, but also theoretical (contemplative) without contradiction. As mentioned, because of Shaftesbury's "unsystematic" style (though systematic on deeper examination), numerous inconsistencies in his writings have been pointed out; Grean states, regarding Shaftesbury's concept of Reason:

There is an unresolved tension in Shaftesbury's philosophy ... between practical and theoretical reason. While he contends that science and philosophy must have practical effectiveness, he also advocates a pure, (not practical) disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake.

(Grean 13, underline added)²¹⁶

In the paragraph above, Grean uses 'practical reason' in the sense of participation in the improvement of society through agreeable action, just as Shaftesbury would. Grean uses 'theoretical reason' in the sense of the product of a contemplative mind. Here Grean is pointing out the conflict or contradiction in Shaftesbury's conception of Reason; it needs to be practical in society, but it also needs to be contemplative.

Indeed, as Grean correctly points out, Shaftesbury's Reason is *practical* in the sense of motivating morally agreeable actions in society. Shaftesbury laments that philosophy has become merely a subject for academics only; he writes, "In reality, how specious a Study, how solemn an Amusement is rais'd from what we call *Philosophical Speculations!* ... What can have a better Appearance, or bid fairer for *genuine* and *true* PHILOSOPHY?" (I. 185). He holds that speculative philosophy is often not practical in educating people to be moral. Philosophy and science need to be practical; for Shaftesbury, neither should end as theory

²¹⁶ Grean, Stanley. Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics. New York: Ohio UP, 1967.

only.

Also, as Grean correctly points out, Shaftesbury's concept of Reason can be regarded as *theoretical* since the disinterested state of mind is highly praised. Indeed, in several places he praises the disinterested pleasure of beauty as genuine and rational beauty, truth, and goodness. The state of disinterestedness means one is disinterested in the object of beauty, but also indicates that one loses the concept of "narrow Being" in the delight of viewing beauty. In *Moralists*, Shaftesbury has Theocles address nature:

Thy Being boundless, unsearchable, impenetrable. In thy immensity all Thought is lost; Fancy gives o'er its Flight: and weary'd Imagination spends it-self in vain; finding no Coast nor Limit of this Ocean, nor in the widest Tract thro' which it soars, one Point yet nearer the Circumference than the first Center whence it parted. – Thus having oft essay'd, thus sally'd forth into the wide *Expanse*, when I return again within my-self, struck with the Sense of this so narrow Being, and of the Fulness of that Immense-one; I dare no more behold the amazing Depths, nor sound the Abyss of DEITY.

(II. 194 underlines added)

One caught up in such pleasure of beauty loses his fancy, imagination, thoughts, and himself. For Shaftesbury, appealing to both sense/imagination and reason is the best way to reflect the self in the pursuit of knowing true personality. This is the reason he recommends *Miscellaneous Manners* for works of arts and philosophical writings, as I previously discussed. Experiencing beauty also brings such an effect to reason and sense - both faculties lose their boundaries; fancy "gives o'er its Flight" (*ibid.*), while imagination "spends it-self in vain" and "all Thought is lost" (*ibid.*). This is the moment when one recognizes who he or she is. Losing the sense of self as experienced in ordinary life through the experience of beauty, Shaftesbury claims, comes from one's inner soul, or what he terms the universal Mind or the Parent-Mind. He writes,

Yet since by Thee (O *sovereign* MIND!) I have been form'd such as I am, intelligent

and rational; since the peculiar Dignity of my Nature is to know and contemplate Thee; permit that with due freedom I exert those Facultys with which thou hast adorn'd me.

(II. 194)

Shaftesbury occasionally uses Nature and God interchangeably. Though he was attacked because of an apparent lack of belief in Christianity, ironically, it could be said that the core of *Characteristics* is how to return to God (or Nature, Good, Beauty, Wholeness, Universe, and the System – terms which are sometimes used interchangeably with God). Nature is beautiful because each object shows the unity of the whole, that is to say, *Divine Beauty*. He writes that there is “a SYSTEM of all Things, and a Universal Nature” (II. 11). Under the system, each part is divided to represent wholeness. Nature is one, a wholeness from the macro point of view, while it can be regarded as a collection of individual parts from the micro point of view. Nature is the End for the separation of two opposed characters. If an individual (a part) is following his end in the universe (whole), he is doing Good for himself and others, as Shaftesbury states:

We know that there is in reality a right and a wrong State of every Creature; and that his right-one is by Nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every Creature a certain *Interest or Good*; there must be also a certain END, to which every thing in his Constitution must *naturally* refer.

(II. 9)

In the beauty of nature, one recognizes that all the parts, such as trees, rivers, animals, and so on, have “*one common End*” (II. 196), so that all parts - including himself - constitute a “*Oneness or Sameness*” (II. 195) with all the other parts of nature.

Such reflective contemplation seems totally different from activity in society.

However, I argue that Grean has missed an important point regarding Shaftesbury's notion of *reason*. What Grean calls “practical and theoretical reason” – though opposed, coexist in

the Third Order of Beauty without contradiction.

I claim that those outward (society) and inward (individual) characteristics are not in conflict for Shaftesbury. This is because, in his view, it is not possible to act virtuously for others without a reflective mind. For him, only the third personality who knows his real personality can act morally. He holds that to know the self is the same as knowing the meaning of one's life, pleasure, truth, and manners.

To be practical in an ultimate sense, that is to say, to gain moral character, Reason needs to be theoretical (contemplative) in order for a person to know the self. Thus, moral conduct and serenity of mind are not opposed; rather, they are necessary elements to reach the end of humanity – the third character, as well as both imaginative and rational, both poetical and historical. For Shaftesbury, practical involves morally agreeable conduct in society; this is possible for a person of the third character, one with knowledge of the true self, since only such a person can realize moral truth.

Moreover, disinterestedness is not only the product of *Mind*, but shows the *Manners* at the same time, as the result of the artistic Mind. For Shaftesbury, the word *Manners* has several meanings, besides what he sees as “A BEAUTY in outward Manners and Deportment” (III. 109). There are artistic *Manners which mean appearance*, which an artist shows by the appearance of his works of art; there are Manners which a person shows by the appearance of benevolent action; there are Manners which a philosopher shows by the appearance of his writings, since philosophy is “*the Study of inward Numbers and Proportions*” (III. 113).

In conclusion, I claim that Shaftesbury's conception of practical reason and contemplative reason exist in the Third Order of Beauty. As I illustrate in the table below,

the First Order of Beauty is sense-based, the Second Order of Beauty is reason (only speculative thought)-based, and the Third Order of Beauty is true reason, including imagination under its control or in cooperation; it is the reason which is necessary to realize the Third Order of Beauty as well as other concepts under the Third Order of Beauty (row 2 to row 6) as disinterestedness, enthusiasm in genuine sense, moral truth, miscellaneous manners, and the third personality.

Table 19 True Reason and Disinterestedness

A: The First Order of Beauty	B: The Second Order of Beauty	C: The Third Order of Beauty
1. Sense	Reason	<u>True REASON (Practical)</u>
2. Interestedness (Theoretical)	Interestedness	<u>Disinterestedness</u>
3. Enthusiasm (Fanatic)	Enthusiasm (Dogmatic)	ENTHUSIASM (true)
4. Poetical Truth	Historical Truth	Moral Truth
5. Poetical Manners	Methodical Manners	Miscellaneous Manners
6. The First Personality	The Second Personality	The Third Personality

True Reason is practical because it is both reason and sense-based, as in the third truth, manners, personality, and enthusiasm - all indicating the potential for moral action in society.

Conclusion

I have argued that Shaftesbury's aim in publishing *Characteristics* was to defend the concept of an innate idea of beauty and virtue against Hobbes and Locke, applying his aesthetic and moral theory in his style of writing with a dialectical approach to the nature of things. Not only is *Characteristics* a significant work of moral and aesthetic theory, but it is Shaftesbury's attempt to act on his theory and put it into practice. Through describing the place of actual life experiences, he intends to show that the various aspects of the concepts

he discusses contribute to the whole or the end of the universe, to realize ultimate beauty.

I argue that his view of dualism and the dialectic categorization of each term, through showing the two opposed or distinct characters of each term, reveals either a partial or an integrated human condition, and therefore he changes the meaning of his terms depending on which level he is discussing, a practice which has caused some controversy. I hold that there are four characteristics of this method of writing, his strategy to defend the concept of an innate moral and aesthetic sense, as outlined below.

Dialectical View in Terms

First, I hold that Shaftesbury applies a dialectical view to what he sees as the human journey to regain a true self. He holds that we have opposite or distinct characteristics, and need to integrate them in our psyche to regain innate ideas, such as Enthusiasm, Truth, Beauty, Natural Affection, and Common Sense in the genuine sense - ideas forgotten due to the effects of culture, education, and experience. Further, he sees three levels of the nature of things; the first two are in conflict, and the third is the end and hope of humanity. The journey of humanity is one to find the third level of Beauty, Good, Truth, and Self. *Characteristics* is a guide to those readers who have lost their true identity and need to seek the third beauty, third Truth, third Enthusiasm, third Manners, third Affection through finding their third Character or the third Self. As a consequence of his overall vision, each term he uses has either a partial or an integrated meaning; for example, there is Poetical Truth used to express imagination and passion, and Historical Truth used to express reason and speculative thought. The Third Truth (Moral Truth), however, is part of our innate ability to perform beautiful and good actions for ourselves and society.

Miscellaneous Manner of Writing

Second, I hold that Shaftesbury applies his aesthetic method to his writing style. He claims that philosophy needs to be applied in daily life. It should not be mere theory, but theory in action. To support this view, he applies his aesthetic method to his writing style. There are three levels of Manner of writing, he contends; one is a Poetical Manner, which expresses imagination and passion as seen in poetry; the second one is a Methodical Manner which expresses speculative and analytical thoughts as seen in philosophical writings. However, Shaftesbury sees incompleteness in both. He regards the Third Manner as the best way to write philosophy; he calls it Miscellaneous Manner, and it includes various types of writing such as poetry, novels, soliloquy, and debates, with occasional digressions. Thus, his unique method of writing is the result of his aesthetic and moral theory, intended to show the ideal Manner of writing which is practical, easily stimulates readers' curiosity, and contains the theory of the dialectical progress of humanity hidden underneath. His argument appears to be contradicted because of this apparent lack of conventional organization. In his view, Truth, Good, and Beauty can be grasped through trials, and he intentionally leads readers on many detours in pursuit of his meaning. I show his contradictions first, and then present evidence that he is actually carefully manipulating words to describe which side (rational or sensuous, inward or outward, disinterested or interested, contemplative or distracted, and so on) of the term he is dealing with.

Dialectical Solution to Gain a Dialectical Result

Third, I note that Shaftesbury's view of humanity (two opposed characters and the integration of both) is reflected in his dialectical method (in the sense of conversation in which two people engage to seek the truth). He holds that applying philosophy in life is vital

in overcoming the estranged self, that by self-examination to consciously divide the self into two to engage in inner conversation, we may reach a state of synthesis or unity. The expected result is the attainment of the original nature of humanity, which contains what is beautiful, virtuous, true, and happy. He claims that most people do not know the true self, as a master figure, passion, enslaves reason, and disguises itself as reason. This means a person is divided into three characteristics - Passion (master), Reasons (Slave), and ultimately genuine Reason (True Self) which integrates Passion.²¹⁷ Engaging the conversation (in the form of Soliloquy) between the first person and the second person will lead us to our innate moral personality.

Circular Style of Debate

Fourth, I hold that Shaftesbury's circular argumentation (not logically convincing, I admit) and his repetitions (which frustrate readers) in *Characteristics* are, from his point of view – a teleological view of the universe and humanity, part of a strategy to defend his concept of an innate moral and aesthetic sense. Because he depends on a teleological view in which all conflicts and oppositions will be resolved in the integrated state, Shaftesbury tends to end his debate regarding the authenticity of innate ideas with statements claiming that this truth is observable by every rational being. However, this does not resolve the issue for people who disagree with his concept (such as Locke who denies innate ideas), and remain unconvinced.

Nevertheless, this is his aesthetic and moral method, and he applies it not only in segments of the writing concerning such debates, but throughout *Characteristics*. He repeats

²¹⁷ The Master figure is often Passion, but could be Reason too, as Shaftesbury claims that it is “dangerous for us to be over-rational, or too much Masters of our-selves, in what we draw, by just Conclusions, from Reason only” (III. 187).

points again and again to reinforce what he sees as nature's plan to bring humans to their ultimate end – their innate nature of beauty and goodness. He repeats the distinctions and definitions of the nature of things - either false or true, but also either the first, the second, or the third level, regarding various concepts, people, tempers, and moral conduct. If he had been more direct and succinct, if he made clear statements and conclusions – such as there are three levels of the nature of things, and to regain our nature we need an integrated psyche, then *Characteristics* could be a thin book indeed.

I also hold that the seeming contradictions in his definitions of an innate moral/aesthetic sense are not contradictions, but a result of his dualistic and dialectical view of the nature of things, as he sees Reason and Passion, or Innateness and Acquired in his concept of an innate sense. I claim that his innate moral and aesthetic sense is located in the third character of other terms under the Three Orders of Beauty, the criteria of moral character, rather than the criteria of works of art only. It is only this integrated self (the third Personality) which reveals the innate moral sense, in which one can experience and create true Beauty, Virtue, with Enthusiasm – a state of happiness, to serve both self-good and the public good. Thus, all of the highest characteristics such as Enthusiasm, Beauty, Natural Affection, and Truth in the third level are part of innate ideas, and we see the same claim by the author regarding other innate ideas – they are all innate, but also acquired; they are under the domain of Reason, but also Passion.

Reason and Passion

I note that his innate moral and aesthetic sense involves not only Reason but Passion as well. There seems to be some contraction regarding his definitions of innate ideas, as well as Natural Affection, which he states is reason-based while at the same time referring to it as

instinct or passion. This usage is not due to inconsistency, but, as mentioned, because he sees dual aspects in the character of human innate ideas. It is Reason, but a special kind of Reason, which means rational Passion - Passion supervised by Reason; this genuine Reason does not exclude Passion, but gives rational ideas to Passion so that we do not have an excess of Passion.

Innate Character and Acquired Character

I also claim that his statements that the moral and aesthetic sense is innate but also acquired is not a contradiction. Shaftesbury states that innate aspects of the human character need to be educated; this innateness is a kind of potential which is only entirely revealed through education. It is a characteristic in need of cultivation – based on a concept of preception (*prolepsis*), which he may have inherited from Stoic philosophy. It is an instinct, but as instinct can be weakened by the environment, it is often not at the conscious level.

Though he may appear pessimistic, since he identifies the vicious side of humanity, I hold that Shaftesbury is optimistic in expecting that everyone has the potentiality to reach the third character. I hold this view because of the great effort he makes to explain his point, that we are able to overcome the differences and oppositions between the two Truths (Poetical and Historical), the two Manners (Poetical and Methodical), the two characters of a Person (sense-based and reason-based personality), the two Enthusiasms (fanatic and dogmatic), and the two orders of Beauty (the First and the Second Order), and reach a solution as the third Truth or characteristic of the terms, which he holds is humanity's most natural state.

Shaftesbury's view is that we have become separated from God, Nature, Truth, and

the Good; to find our way back to our nature, to be part of the universe and contribute to the beauty of the whole, we need to conquer our dual natures, that is to say, our estranged characters. Indeed we are the product of contradictions - we are separated into self and others, body and mind, reason and sense, restriction and freedom, love and hatred, and reality and ideal. However, at the final goal, all conflict, ills, and falsehoods will contribute to the realization of the highest beauty which is humanity's ultimate end.

Characteristics is an ambitious attempt to let readers know that the appearance of a work can be changed, as an observer changes the way of looking at an object. Just as finding true beauty and virtue in life is a difficult task, finding true beauty and virtue in *Characteristics* is difficult, since the author wishes his readers to struggle somewhat to understand what is meant. It is his aim to give the experience of twists and turns as in a labyrinth. Whether we see true or false beauty depends on our opinion of the *appearance* of *Characteristics*. If the terms and system of Shaftesbury's theory which I have discussed are successful in realizing Beauty, Good, and Truth in the appearance of his writing, as well as in the overall theory itself, we may conclude that he is successful in representing his concept of an innate sense of beauty and virtue through his work.

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