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Third Party Intervention in Peace Agreements: Making or Keeping the Peace?

Evaluating the Impact of Single-State Non-Military Intervention on the Outcomes for Long-Lasting Peace and Stability in Post-war States

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Abstract

Third party intervention has become increasingly important in modern-day conflict resolution. It has occurred in 70 percent of all conflicts since 1945 and conflict is six times more likely to be resolved when a third-party is involved. The claim that mediation plays a central role in modern-day conflict resolution is also reflected in a rapidly expanding body of literature. The number of studies published on international mediation has increased progressively since the early 1960s. Regardless, a big problem remains with respect to the outcomes of third party non-military intervention. While scholars are beginning to learn why it is more difficult to ensure long-run peace in relation to third party intervention, there is not yet a good understanding of what can be done to avoid the reoccurrence of violence, the break of an agreement, and intervention failure.

The main goal of this paper is to highlight the possible ways in which single-state intervention in peace negotiations after civil war can negatively affect the outcome for long-lasting peace and stability. It will assess whether this type of intervention is necessary and whether there is a more practical solution to help secure successful implementation of peace negotiations and long-lasting peace in these conflict states. This paper will do so by examining the trends for success and failure of intervention from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset and will use a case study to exemplify the findings from the dataset analysis.

The paper will conclude that the analysis and case study demonstrate that single-state intervention in peace negotiations does not adequately enable a conflict state into sustaining long-term peace and stability. These interventions are not associated with long-term peace and stability in a war-torn state. Their reason for failure is mostly rooted in the mediator's inability to be impartial. The more effective and appropriate policy solution would be to let the conflict come to an end naturally with one decisive victor.

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Introduction

On 22 June 2011, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution which reaffirmed the landmark resolution entitled "Strengthening the role of mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution". It recognizes the international community's commitment to increase the role of international mediation in conflict prevention and resolution.¹ Since mediation is already explicitly mentioned in Article 33 of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, this resolution was an acknowledgment of the central role mediation, more generally non-military intervention, plays in modern-day conflict resolution.^{2 3}

There is a substantial amount of evidence which supports the claim that mediation has become increasingly important in modern-day conflict resolution. Mediation has occurred in 64 percent of all international crises from 1990-1996. This is compared to 34 percent from 1963 to 1989 and 20 percent from 1945 to 1962.⁴ Overall, mediation has occurred in 70 percent of all conflicts since 1945 and conflict is six time more likely to be resolved when a third-party is involved.⁵ The claim that mediation plays a central role in modern-day conflict resolution is also reflected in a rapidly expanding body of literature. The number of studies published on international mediation has increased progressively since the early 1960s.⁶ Regardless, a big problem remains related to the outcomes of third party non-military intervention.

¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution*, 65/283, General Assembly, United Nations, July 28, 2011.

² United Nations, *United Nations Charter: Chapter VI, Article 33*, United Nations.

³ United Nations, "The General Assembly & Mediation," UN Peacemaker.

⁴ Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), "International Crisis Behavior Project," *University of Maryland* (July 2010).

⁵ Allard Duursma, "A Current Literature Review of International Mediation," *International Journal of Conflict Management* 25, no. 1 (2014): 81.

⁶ *Ibid.*

While scholars are beginning to learn why it is more difficult to ensure long lasting peace with regard third party intervention, there is not yet a good understanding of what can be done to avoid the reoccurrence of violence, the break of an agreement, and intervention failure. Existing works have only loosely addressed whether third party intervention is effective after the conflict has come to an end. This paper aims to specify the ways in which single-state non-military intervention in peace agreements effects long-term peace, security and stability in a post-war state. It will do so by offering an examination of a UCDP dataset on the outcomes of peace agreements and will reinforce the data's findings with a case study. The scope of this paper is limited to single-state non-military intervention since, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, this type of intervention results in more cases of failure than other types of intervention even though it occurs as frequently as non-intervention and coalition interventions.

Research Question and Hypothesis

Given the problem briefly outlined above, the paper's research question—as a three part question—is the following: A) What impact does third party intervention have on the outcome of long-term peace and stability in a post-war state? B) Is third party intervention necessary? C) Is there a more effective approach to helping a post-war state transition into a period of long-lasting peace and stability?

Asserting the negative, this paper holds as its hypothesis that single-state non-military interventions are more likely to fail than other forms of non-military intervention. They are associated with unsuccessful outcomes: termination of the peace agreement, no long-term peace and stability in the post-war state and ultimately, a failed intervention. These unsuccessful outcomes are created due to the mediator's inability to remain impartial throughout the peace process. Policy options will be presented in the final chapter of this research essay to address the

above questions. The policy options will explain if and how non-military intervention can be successful in promoting long-lasting peace and stability in a post-war state.

Outline of the Chapters

This research essay is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter will present important concepts relating to international mediation. The second chapter will present a thematic literature review that answers the following question; how and under what conditions does single-state non-military intervention impact the outcome of peace negotiations in armed conflict? The information provided in this chapter will help develop the argument of the research paper by presenting the many factors that impact the outcome of non-military third party intervention. The third chapter, *Defining Success for Third Party Intervention*, outlines the overwhelming number of definitions for success of third party intervention. This chapter aims to select one definition that will be carried forward into the analysis of data for the trends in the outcome of third party intervention.

The fourth chapter, *Data Analysis: Success Rates for Third Party Intervention*, provides an in-depth analysis of the data currently available on the outcomes of international intervention. This chapter aims to demonstrate how frequent third party intervention is and how often it leads to unsuccessful outcomes. Chapter 5, *Reasons for Failure of Single-State Intervention* extends the findings from the preceding chapter by determining sources of failure for each of the single-state cases from the UCDP dataset and provides a case study example to further exemplify the dataset's findings. In determining that third party intervention is unlikely to help implement long-lasting peace and stability in a post-war state, Chapter 6 outlines alternatives to third party intervention. Chapter 7, *Conclusions*, suggests the most appropriate strategy to policymakers—the one that is more likely achieve implementing long-term peace and stability in a post-war state—and summarizes the research findings and the evidence applied to the hypothesis.

Chapter 1 - Defining Key Concepts

Conflicts are dealt with in many different ways. Bercovitch outlines three methods in which warring parties deal with their conflict; through both physical and psychological violence and coercion, direct or indirect negotiation and binding or non-binding third party intervention.⁷ For the purposes of this paper, and literature review, we will focus on the studies that highlight non-binding intervention of a third party, hereinafter referred to as non-military intervention. Non-military intervention is understood as “a party that is involved in either helping the warring parties to regulate the incompatibility or the level of the violence and works as an intermediary between the two parties.”⁸ The focus is on the fact that these actors are intervening on a non-violent and solely mediatory fashion.

Bercovitch describes mediation as “a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their basic differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”⁹ This means that third parties will involve themselves in the conflict by either attending a peace conference, hosting negotiations, or monitoring a peace or ceasefire agreements.¹⁰ Negotiations in this context refers to when a third party monitors the “talks that are held between at least two of the warring parties in a state-based conflict.” Peace agreements have been defined as “a formal agreement between warring parties, which addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility.”¹¹ Additionally, ceasefire agreements are

⁷ Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement: Evaluating the Conditions for Successful Mediation," *Negotiation Journal*, January 1991, 17.

⁸ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "UCDP Definitions," Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

⁹ Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement," 18.

¹⁰ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "UCDP Definitions."

¹¹ *Ibid.*

understood as “an agreement that regulates the conflict behaviour of warring parties in a state-based conflict, but which does not address the incompatibility.”¹² When the agreement does address the incompatibility, it is then classified as a peace agreement. It is important to highlight that a third party may intervene militarily by providing military backing to one of the warring parties but, this is beyond the scope of this paper.¹³

¹² Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "UCDP Definitions."

¹³ Ibid.

Chapter 2 -Thematic Literature Review

The literature review will outline how foreign intervention may—positively or negatively— affect the durability of long-lasting peace and stability in a post-war state. It will attempt to answer the following question: How and under what conditions does non-military third party intervention impact the outcome of armed conflict?

There are two categories that separate the characteristics that affect the outcome of armed conflict: the context and the process. The context addresses the conditions that are necessary for intervention to occur. It outlines two key variables that could affect the outcome of intervention in armed conflict: the nature of the conflict and the dynamic between warring parties. The process highlights what governs the third party's choice in intervention strategy.¹⁴ It also outlines two key variables that could affect the outcome of intervention in armed conflict: the characteristics of the third party and elements of the mediation.

1. The Context

1.1 The Nature of the Conflict

The nature of the conflict greatly affects the outcome of a third party intervention into an armed conflict. These factors are not directly tied to the third party. However, they can make the task assigned to the third party much more difficult than expected.

First, scholars have focus on the level of intensity of the conflict. Kleiboer explains that in a high intensity conflict, the disputants are less likely to resolve their conflict through compromise because there are higher losses and they will instead try to win at all costs and reject all mediation efforts.¹⁵ However, he continues to explain that other scholars argue that when the intensity is

¹⁴ Duursma, "A Current Literature Review of International Mediation," 82.

¹⁵ Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40, no. 2 (June 1966): 364.

higher, that mediation would more likely be successful because it will help minimize the losses for both parties.¹⁶ This means that conflicts should not be ruled out for third party intervention solely based on their intensity because a high level intensity conflict can either do good or harm to the mediation and intervention process.

Second, scholars have focused on the effects of the number of parties involved in conflict: how complex the conflict is. This condition relates to the first since conflicts that become more intense generally tend to increase in complexity as they draw in more disputing actors. More often than not, these additional parties are often neighboring countries or new rebel groups that have formed a separate faction from the old group.¹⁷ As the number of actors involved increases, the greater the number of issues involved in the conflict and the greater the number of actors to involve in negotiations. Therefore, the greater the number of parties involved, the lower the success of a negotiation.¹⁸

When third parties attempt to intervene in conflict with underlying issues relating to vital [security] interests—issues of sovereignty, territorial disputes and ideology—they will most likely not have much of an impact. Scholars, such as Randle, believe that a third party mediator will not have sway in trying to change the dramatically different perception of the dyads to persuade them to agree on making considerable concessions during negotiations.¹⁹ Similarly Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild state the following hypothesis: “Negotiated settlements are more likely to prove stable when the issue at stake in the conflict is politico-economic rather than identity based.”²⁰ The

¹⁶ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 364.

¹⁷ Richard Jackson, "Successful Negotiation in International," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (May 2000): 332.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement," 23.

²⁰ Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 190.

stakes in a conflict based in identity issues are higher and less divisible when compared to the stake in conflicts based in politico-economic issues.²¹ This is also because the issues that relate to identity and beliefs are less tangible than others. However, contradictory to what Bercovitch states, Jackson explains that issues such as territory are “more amenable to success since it is a tangible issue.”²² What can be drawn from the literature then is that third parties should avoid intervening in issues grounded in vital interests.

1.2 The Dynamic between Warring Parties

The dynamic between the warring parties is understood in two categories. The first category outlines what the relationship between the parties prior to the dispute was like prior to the dispute. Deutsch states that when the warring parties have previously been in a dispute and have had an ongoing relationship, mediation is more likely to occur, but less likely to be successful. This is because there would be residual tension from the previous conflict.²³ He further explains that if there was a previous friendship among the warring parties, they will be more inclined to approach the conflict in hopes of maintaining some level of friendship and cooperation.²⁴ A clear distinction needs to be made. These arguments do not suggest that a previous relationship will have a complete impact on the outcome. Like Deutsch suggests, mediation may be achieved, but it does not mean it will be successfully implemented. This means that “the parties’ previous relationship can influence the *course* of a dispute but had only a slight impact in its *outcome*” (italics in original).²⁵

²¹ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War", 189.

²² Jackson, "Successful Negotiation in International," 333.

²³ Morton Deutsch, *The resolution of conflict: Constructive and destructive process* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 5.

²⁴ Jackson, "Successful Negotiation in International," 336.

²⁵ Jacob Bercovitch, "International Dispute Mediation: A Comparative Empirical Analysis," in *Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention*, by K. Kressel, D. G. Pruitt et al, eds., (San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass, 1989), 290.

The second category that describes three factors driving the outcomes when the adversaries are in conflict. The first describes the power disparity between the warring parties. Ott and Young both suggest that when there is a smaller power difference between the actors, outcomes are more likely to be successful.²⁶ When there is a bigger imbalance of power between the warring parties during the negotiation process, the stronger adversary may not be interested in making any sort of concession for peace. Moreover, a greater power disparity allows the stronger party to use the mediator in a way to force the other side to surrender prematurely. All of this means that the weaker adversary will be at the mercy of the stronger and that the stronger power could easily hinder the role of the mediator.²⁷ The final agreement runs the risk of collapsing since this situation leaves one group feeling like they are being disadvantaged by the final concessions.²⁸

On the other hand, other scholars believe that when there is power parity, there is an increased chance of conflict escalation and a showdown of force in order for one party to gain power over another to be advantaged in negotiations.²⁹ These scholars suggest instead, that success is brought on when the weaker disputant acknowledges its status in the conflict. Deutsch elaborates stating that having “mutual recognition of differential power” makes it easier for the weaker party to make realistic expectations to satisfy the conflict.³⁰

Second, is whether or not adversaries are seen as the “legitimate spokesmen” for their parties. When there is disunity within a particular adversarial group, it is a sign that there are a number of domestic constituencies within one of the parties. Internal disunity makes it more difficult for the mediator to identify the warring parties and make it harder to coordinate

²⁶ Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement," 21.

²⁷ David Quinn et al., "Power Play: Mediation in Symmetric and," *International Interactions* 32 (2006): 446.

²⁸ Jackson, "Successful Negotiation in International," 335.

²⁹ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 368.

³⁰ Quinn et al., "Power Play," 447.

concessions with all of the constituencies.³¹ Ultimately, mediation is more likely to be unsuccessful.³²

Third is how the warring parties perceive the third party mediator as the last factor in this category. If they believe that the third party will be able to help produce a more favourable outcome for them, they will be inclined to accept mediation. This is amplified if they believe that the third party is able to protect their domestic and international reputation if they are forced to make concessions that would otherwise hurt them.³³

2. The Process

2.1 The Characteristics of the Third Party

The characteristics and the behaviour of the intervening party are central to understanding the outcomes of third party intervention. The literature in this section identifies four factors: the ability of a third party intervention to be impartial, their motive, status on the world stage and access to resources.

A third party must be perceived as “reasonable, acceptable, knowledgeable, and able to secure the trust and cooperation of the disputants” to be accepted by the warring parties.³⁴ Essentially, the mediator’s attitude towards the warring parties should be impartial. Kleiboer and others explain that for a third party to be of any use in the conflict and be able to help negotiate and implement a successful agreement, they will need to remain independent and credible. The disputants will not want to participate in the mediation process if the third party is found to be favoring their adversary.³⁵ An opposite view contends that partiality in conflict may in fact

³¹ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 365.

³² Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement," 21.

³³ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 367.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 369.

positively impact the outcome of the conflict. Touval and Zartman discuss how a mediator's bias towards the stronger party, there is a better chance it will have control over a successful outcome in the mediation process. Although the third party may be partial to the stronger party, the weaker party will expect that the third party will use its influence over the stronger party to balance out the concessions.³⁶

A third party can also be partial in their approach to mediating the conflict. Third parties often wish to influence the outcome of a conflict and negotiated settlements to ensure that they benefit directly or indirectly. This not only relates to their ability to be unbiased, but to their motive for intervening as well. Zartman and Touval outline the ways in which third party mediators may approach their intervention with self-interested motives. They differentiate between third parties who intervene with defensive motives and those with expansionist motives. A third party enters into a conflict with defensive motives when the dispute is threatening the interests of the third party, such as upsetting the regional power balance.³⁷ Alternatively, a third party may engage in the conflict if it seems the opportunity to increase and extend its resources, influence and power. This would be intervening on expansionist motives, which is what is more often the case.³⁸ The issue with these factors is that when a third party intervenes with these motives, the mediation efforts are no longer solely about enabling long-run peace, but about satisfying their secret needs as well. Additionally, if and when the warring parties discover the third party's real intentions, there is a chance that they could be perceived as being biased. This, as mentioned above, will impact the outcome of the intervention.

³⁶Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 370.

³⁷ Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in theory," In *International mediation in theory and practice*, edited by Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985) 9.

³⁸ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 370.

The ability of a third party to be impartial and the reasons they have for intervening describe how a third party acts and how that could impact the outcome of a conflict. In addition to these factors, the literature also considers who the intervening party is and how their status may impact the outcome. Jackson is quick to point out that when there are mediation situations that are in a deadlock, it helps to have a negotiating party that is in a senior official position. He explains that they would be most likely to help restart negotiations amongst the warring parties.³⁹ However, scholars are more concerned with who the mediators are and how that may impact the outcome of the conflict.

2.2 The Elements of Mediation

Scholars have focused on highlighting what type of conflict environment is conducive to successful outcomes and when it is most appropriate to intervene. First, the literature outlines that it is necessary to have a neutral environment when it is time to conduct negotiations. A neutral environment means that the negotiations take place in a location that is free from external pressures, which reduces tensions and fear between the adversaries, and is distanced from the media. This is done to avoid favoring one party over another and reducing the risk of spoilers.⁴⁰

Second, and by far the most significant factor within the literature, relates to the specific timing intervention for mediation. Zartman explains that the intervention should occur at the ‘ripe’ moment. The ripe moment for conflict management is when the adversaries have reached a point in the conflict where mediation is used to alleviate the pressure from a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’.⁴¹ A mutually hurting stalemate is described as “a situation where disputants feel they are trapped in a costly conflict from which they cannot escape through victory”.⁴² Faced with a

³⁹ Jackson, "Successful Negotiation in International," 338.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 337.

⁴¹ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 363.

⁴² Duursma, "A Current Literature Review of International Mediation," 83.

feeling of emergency by being unable to reach consensus and continuously suffering for it, both parties would be more inclined to moderate their intransigence and revise their expectations regarding the conflict and an agreement.⁴³ It is important for third parties to understand exactly when this ripe moment occurs to increase the chances for the third party to prevent the deterioration of the relationship between the rivals.⁴⁴

Some scholars have taken the time to identify the ripe moment through the phases of a conflict. Bercovitch's six phases of conflict, in which mediation might take place, begins with the dispute onset and ends with the settlement phase. The phases in between are identified as active fighting phases and are quickly disregarded. Therefore, the first and last phases of conflict generate an environment that encourages parties to resolve their issues through mediation.⁴⁵

It is suggested that intervening at the beginning of a conflict produces more successful negotiations since the adversaries have endured heavy losses and negotiations are being held prior to the most intense point in the conflict.⁴⁶ Additionally, at this point, parties will not have become too entrenched in the conflict or too inflexible in their attitudes.⁴⁷ On the other hand, Regan and Stam suggest that the best point to implement a mediation strategy is a middle-end point in the conflict, right after there has been a "test of strength" between the parties." The test of strength is identified as at least 12-36 months after the most intense part of the conflict when there has been a stalemate, or mutual exhaustion between the warring parties.⁴⁸

⁴³ Jackson, "Successful Negotiation in International," 337.

⁴⁴ J. Michael Greig, "Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 6 (December 2001): 692.

⁴⁵ Patrick M. Regan and Allan C. Stam, "In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000): 244.

⁴⁶ Marieke Kleiboer and Paul T'Hart, "Time to Talk? Multiple Perspectives on Timing of International Mediation," *Cooperation and Conflict* 30, no. 4 (1995).

⁴⁷ Frank Edmead, *Analysis and prediction in international mediation*, (London, UK: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1971).

⁴⁸ Regan and Stam, "In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000): 239.

Gaps, Disagreement and Methodological Weaknesses

All of the literature is constructed and written in the context of debates. Almost all of the conditions are formulated to force one scholar's argument versus the other. As Duursma explains, by creating all of these debates, scholars are attempting to "find a golden formula on how to mediate".⁴⁹ However, it seems unlikely that within the existing and rapidly increasing literature, that scholars will be able to agree on the conditions that set in motion a perfect intervention strategy. These outcome conditions create great confusion for policymakers who are attempting to develop policy strategies regarding intervention.

In addition to the literature being littered with debates, there are also a few methodological weaknesses. The literature blurs the line between conjecture and evidence based arguments. A part of the literature was produced starting in the 1980s and it was not until the turn of the century when scholars really began to examine the conditions through statistical analysis.⁵⁰ Therefore, it is not surprising to find that many arguments are based on single case studies. Unfortunately, having one case study derive and test a hypothesis weakens the overall argument and does not help advance the field of research to generalizing arguments for a large majority of cases. There is a lot of reliance on single cases, but this may be warranted to some extent because the cases are so different.

There are three gaps in the literature that have formed partly as a consequence of the methodological weaknesses. First, the literature has shown that there are an overwhelming number of prerequisites for determining the outcome of the intervention. The literature has yet to clearly determine which factor(s) have more of an impact and why this might be, or even if it is a combination of conditions that are needed to a specific outcome.

⁴⁹ Duursma, "A Current Literature Review of International Mediation," 95.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 83.

Second, the literature groups all forms of non-military intervention together. This is problematic considering that the types of intervention are just as complex as the conditions affecting the outcome of a peace agreement. By not differentiating between the types of intervention, the literature is ignoring additional particular conditions that could affect the outcome of the situation, such as considering things like complications with coordination for coalition interventions.

Third, and most importantly, is that the literature is heavily biased. Many scholars, like Bercovitch, highlight a specific set of factors that need to be in place in order to make intervention more likely. However, the literature ignores what happens if these preconditions are not met and immediately begin discussing the intervention outcomes.⁵¹ Moreover, there is a deep selection bias running through the literature, which ignores questions that evaluate whether or not the actors invited to intervene want to accept the offer. As Terris and Maoz clearly state, the literature provides little information about “the conditions under which mediation may be offered or accepted” by the third party.⁵² This means that the studies based in the literature are selected without a proper baseline to differentiate between situations where requests for intervention and mediation are made but were rejected by the third party.

By exploring the literature on the relationship between third party intervention and the outcome of peace negotiations in armed conflict, it can be concluded that a significant amount of research has been dedicated to understanding the theoretical logic in this topic area. It is clear that there is an extreme amount of disagreement at the micro level, when exploring the impact of the conditions throughout the phases of an intervention, methodological weaknesses and gaps in the

⁵¹ Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement," 17.

⁵² Lesley G. Terris and Zeev Maoz, "Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test," *Journal of Peace Research* 2, no. 5 (2005): 565.

literature that stem from those weaknesses. Moreover, the literature does not offer a convincing explanation of how particular types of intervention result in success or failure—in the case of this paper, single-state interventions. The function of the analyses and case study provided throughout this paper will be to search for such explanation.

What has been drawn from the literature review is that it is crucial for researchers to continue to elaborate on how these theories play into practice. Most of the conditions cannot be measured in a way to forecast the ideal time, location, and method of the intervention. It may be the case that this is impossible to do considering the uniqueness of every possible intervention cases. Overall, there needs to be a significant amount of improvement in terms of deepening and widening the research regarding the particularities during an intervention or narrowing the literature to focus in on particular types of intervention. This body of literature is rapidly expanding and will continue to influence the decisions policymakers take in order to resolve armed conflict and prevent the resurgence of violence in the future.

Chapter 3 - Understanding Success in Third Party Intervention

Before asking and trying to answer the questions of whether or not third party intervention is more likely to succeed or fail, it is crucial to have a common understanding as to what defines success or failure in these types of situations. The difficulty with devising a single definition for successful third party intervention outcomes is due to the fact that these outcomes are complicated, contentious and are entirely relative.⁵³ This is because scholars and analysts have constructed their own definition of success.

Constructing the Definition of “Success”

As Kleiboer explains, analysts and scholars are more likely to generate their own criteria for success.⁵⁴ Some scholars provide a simple and specific definition that makes the concept of success clearly distinguishable, and measurable by empirical observation. These scholars use the outcomes of mediation as the unit of analysis to measure success. This means that they recognize success when there is the signing of a document, a cease-fire or the resolution of the conflict's core issues. Bercovitch and Simpson classify these units of analysis as subjective criteria.^{55 56} Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille define success as an outcome that produces a ceasefire, partial or full settlement.⁵⁷ Other scholars use the level of violence as the unit of analysis to measure success, which are classified by Bercovitch and Simpson as on the ground objective conditions.⁵⁸

⁵³ Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, "Making Peace Settlements Work," *Foreign Policy* 104 (Autumn 1996): 62.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Regan and Stam, "In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000): 243.

⁵⁶ Bercovitch and Simpson, "International Mediation and The Question of Failed Peace Agreements," 69.

⁵⁷ Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 1, no. 28 (February 1991): 8.

⁵⁸ Bercovitch and Simpson, "International Mediation and The Question of Failed Peace Agreements," 69.

Fen Osler Hampson state that “Peace settlements have proved durable and have succeeded when they have brought an end to military hostilities and violence.”⁵⁹

Rather than generalize all possible successful outcomes, some scholars identify the different possible outcomes to peace agreements having separate degrees of success. In his article Richard Jackson outlines Haa’s success index explaining:

The negotiation event was considered unsuccessful when no agreements were acknowledged and there was no discernible or reported impact on the dispute or the parties’ behaviour. It was considered to be limited success when it achieved a ceasefire agreement and/or an actual cessation of hostilities. It was considered to be partially successful when it resulted in agreement on side-issues or portions of the major issues. ... Lastly, the negotiation was considered fully successful when agreement was reached on the majority of the major issues in dispute.⁶⁰

Some scholars, like those mentioned above, highlight the final outcome as the point where success is made, but there are others who identify success at another point in the process. For example, Frei identifies success prior to the final outcome of the situation and defines it as “a situation in which both parties to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator and a meditative attempt within five days after the first attempt.”⁶¹

Similarly, there are scholars that define success beyond the initial outcome of the conflict and signing of the peace agreement. They acknowledge that there are preconditions to long-term peace and that the analysis of success should be completed over multiple phases of the conflict. Citing other scholars, Fen Osler Hampson made the comment that “Linking the notion success to different phases of the peace process avoids the problem of defining the concept in terms of an

⁵⁹ Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 6.

⁶⁰ Jackson, "Successful Negotiation in International," 330.

⁶¹ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 361.

unrealized and possibly unattained point.”⁶² However, this line of thinking is important to consider once the implementation of the agreement begins, which can be considered as one of the mediator’s key responsibilities post-signing of the peace agreement.

Sheppard was the first to suggest that the research in this field should identify success in two very distinct phases throughout the intervention; the process and the outcome. The process refers to the negotiation and concession being made at the table with all parties present and the outcome is what comes as a result from the process—what is or is not achieved from the process.⁶³ Bercovitch explains the interaction within these different phases with the potential for a successful outcome in the following way:

Success in mediation is thus a quality that may be applicable to the process or the outcome of mediation. In other words, success may be achieved if the parties in conflict feel empowered or feel that their concerns were addressed respectfully. There may be no successful outcome (in any sense of the word), but the parties still feel they have achieved success in the process.⁶⁴

Some of the above definitions regarding measuring success in distinct phases hint to another important unit of analysis: time. Sigmund, Gartner and Bercovitch explain that time as a unit of analysis is important, but unfortunately underused. They state that “Most scholars assume that mediation is successful with the signing of a settlement or the abatement or cessation of violence. Little attention is paid to how long the settlement lasts.”⁶⁵ Duration of the peace agreement is significant since short-term measures of success would stop their analysis of the outcome once the peace treaty is initially signed. Even though it is important to consider, it is

⁶² Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, 9.

⁶³ Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediation Success or Failure: The Search for the Elusive Criteria," in *Theory and Practice of International Mediation: Selected Essays* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 94.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Scott Sigmund Gartner and Jacob Bercovitch, "Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements," *International Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 50 (2006): 835.

difficult to measure. When scholars add the factor of time into their definitions, they end up becoming too vague. For example, Fen Osler Hampson explains that “The conflict termination process must produce some set of arrangements that lasts for generations or stands some other test of time, demonstrating robustness and permanence (success).”⁶⁶ Similarly, Stedman says that successful outcomes occur when “conflict was brought to an end through the efforts of a third party” and when “the conflict is terminated on a self-implementing basis that will allow that third party to withdraw from the process without fear of renewed war.”⁶⁷

Alternatively, these definitions can become too complex and idealistic. Fen Osler Hampson also that “our definition of success begins with the ending of civil violence and armed confrontation. But, success, in this sense is only partial. For a peace settlement to be durable, institutions and support structures must be put in place so that parties are discouraged from taking up arms again.”⁶⁸ Likewise, former Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali, defines success in many phases to try to more clearly depict the growth towards long-term peace. He outlined his view in his report, *Agenda for Peace*:

Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, 9.

⁶⁷ Bercovitch and Simpson, "International Mediation and The Question of Failed Peace Agreements," 73.

⁶⁸ Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, 10.

⁶⁹ United Nations, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace," UN Documents, June 17, 1992. <http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm>.

Again, these definitions help to distinguish between long and short term intervention outcomes, but they are either too broad or too narrow that they become idealistic.

Selecting a Definition for “Success”

For practical reasons, this paper will adopt the definition of success from the codebook for the UCDP dataset on peace agreements. It explains that failure occurs when the peace agreement ends and succeeds when the peace agreement remains intact.⁷⁰ More specifically, the peace agreement has ended when the following occurs:

The peace agreement is no longer considered fully implemented if the validity of the agreement is contested by one or more of the warring parties that signed. A peace agreement cannot, from the UCDP perspective, survive if the primary parties are no longer party to it. If a party officially withdraws from a peace agreement, it is considered to have ended.⁷¹

When analyzing the reasons for failure, the definition for failure will need to take into consideration the role of the mediator post-signing of the peace agreement. This is because some cases will be found to fail because the mediator does not fulfill their core responsibilities by abandoning the intervention at the implementation phase. Therefore, the definitions provided by Fen Osler Hampson and the former Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which outline success in many phases and by a number of key responsibilities, should be taken into consideration.⁷² These definitions do not help differentiate between success and failure, but should be used to understand the reason for failure.

In summary, success and a successful outcome have been defined by many scholars in the field in a variety of ways. In cases where definitions are provided, they range from describing a

⁷⁰ Högladh, *Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook*, 5.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, 10.

general improvement or avoidance of the previous conflict, to focusing on very specific aspects of the intervention that must be achieved in order to qualify for success. The literature has highlighted that the issues with defining this concept are not an easy task as it involves assessing complicated, and at times, very unique situations. As Crocker and Osler Hampson explain “The short answer to the question of what connotes success is...it depends.”⁷³ This is why the paper has adopted the above mentioned definition for success and has highlighted other definitions that will be important to consider when analyzing cases’ the reasons for intervention failure. The following chapter will analyze the data from a UCDP dataset on peace agreements to be able to explore the association between single-state non-military intervention and the outcome of that intervention. It will assess whether or not third party intervention does more to help or harm the durability of the peace agreement and long-term peace and stability in a post-war state.


⁷³ Crocker and Osler Hampson, "Making Peace Settlements Work," 62.

Chapter 4 - Data Analysis: Trends for Third Party Intervention

This chapter will highlight which outcome—success or failure—is more frequent based on the analysis of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. Before the analysis begins, it is important to understand why an analysis of third party intervention is relevant.

Generally, third party intervention has become a more frequent. Figure 1 shows the number of international crises that occurred per year from 1918 to 2001 compared to the number of crises that were mediated by a third party.⁷⁴ This timeline only covers a portion of the data provided in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. However, from the 1990s, the option for a third party to mediate in the peace agreement process has become more frequent.⁷⁵ This is demonstrated within Figure 1 with a decreasing ratio between the total number of conflicts and the number crises mediated within almost the whole 20th century.⁷⁶

Figure 1: Crises and Mediation Counts



(Source: Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas and Wilkenfeld, "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes," p. 60)

⁷⁴ Beardsley et al., "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes," 60.

⁷⁵ Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, "Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (March 2014): 317, accessed November 22, 2018.

⁷⁶ Kyle C. Beardsley et al., "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 1 (February 2006): 59.

UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset

This paper uses the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset to identify 216 cases of peace agreements from 1975 to 2011. To be included in the dataset, the cases needed to have occurred from a conflict between 1989-2005 and needed to be signed between two warring parties. Additionally, the peace agreement needs to outline a process for how to solve the warring parties' incompatibility.⁷⁷ The dataset accumulated information on the name of the conflict and peace agreement, the date of the conflict and the date that the peace agreement was signed, who the signatories and third parties of the agreement were. Moreover, the dataset contains information on the details of the peace agreements and variables concerned with the termination of the conflict and violence.⁷⁸

Selected Variables

The paper uses variables from the dataset to help identify if third party interventions in peace agreements are more likely to end in success or failure.

- 1) **Third party/parties of peace agreement** (pa_3rd): This category describes why third party(ies) were involved in the peace agreement.⁷⁹ No third party intervention is coded 1, if the third party was conducted by a single country it is coded 2, by the United Nations only it is coded 3, by a single regional group or international organization it is coded 4, by a coalition of countries is coded 5, by an individual is coded 6, by multiple people is coded 7 and by a mix of actors is coded 8.

- 2) **Comment on third party/parties of peace agreement** (c_3rd): This variable explains "the third party/parties' role in the process and in the agreement is commented on." It stipulates about the third party's role in the process mediation. It does so by outlining whether it was, for example, part of commissions, if there were other states that came

⁷⁷ Högladh, *Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook*.

⁷⁸ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset," Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2011.

⁷⁹ Högladh, *Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook*, 5.

to help with the negotiations, whether or not they acted beyond their capacity as a mediator, and more.⁸⁰

- 3) **Agreement ended** (ended): This variable was used to determine if the peace agreement ended. As mentioned in the previous chapter. The UCDP dataset defines an end to the agreement occurring when it “is no longer considered fully implemented if the validity of the agreement is contested by one or more of the warring parties that signed.... If a party officially withdraws from a peace agreement, it is considered to have ended.”⁸¹ If the peace agreement ended, it is coded 1 and if it did not end it is coded 0.
- 4) **Comment on agreement duration** (c_duration): This variable was used to understand in more detail how and/or why the agreement ended. For example, this variable would include information on “what party started using violence again and/or verbally denounced the validity of the agreement”. This field sometimes include information on the implementation of an ongoing agreement.⁸²

Analysis

The result from the UCDP dataset for the outcomes of peace agreements are reported in Figure 2 and Table 1. The hypothesis anticipates that third party support will decrease the likelihood of a long-term successful outcome for peace agreements. The data that this paper chose to analyze indicates that third party mediation tends to be associated with more failure than success when compared to non-intervention. This is especially the case when comparing non-intervention to interventions led by one country. As is demonstrated in the figure below, this analysis only looks at on interventions led only one country. The effect a third party has on the outcome of a peace agreement. This is done only by comparing cases which involve a third party against those that include the specific third party that this paper is interested in.

⁸⁰ Högladh, *Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook*, 5.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

Figure 2: Trends for Success & Failure of Third Party Intervention in Peace Agreements




Table 1: Trends for Success & Failure of Third Party Intervention in Peace Agreements

	No Third Party	Single-state	United Nations	One Regional Group or IO	An Individual	Multiple Countries	Multiple Individuals	Mix of IOs, countries and individuals (Other)
Success	30	21	19	4	13	10	11	31
Failure	14	22	2	5	4	5	5	20

The summary statistics is as follows. Out of the 216 peace agreement cases identified by UCDP:

- 44 cases did not involve a third party intervention (20.37%); and
- 172 cases did involve third party intervention (79.63%).⁸³

From the 172 cases that included a third party intervention,

- 43 were mediated by a single-state (25%);
- 21 cases of intervention were run by the only the United Nations (UN) (12.21%);
- 9 cases of intervention were run by an international organization or regional group (5.23%);

⁸³ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

- 17 cases had an individual mediate the negotiation process (9.88%);
- 15 cases were operated by a coalition of countries (8.72%);
- 16 cases were mediated by a group of individuals (9.30%); and
- the remaining 51 cases were mediated by a mixture of different actors, such as regional groups and countries, the UN and countries, multiple regional groups and IOs (29.65%).⁸⁴

This means that third party intervention by one country makes up 19.91% from the total amount of cases. This is compared to the 20.37% of cases that do not include a third party intervention.

From the total number of cases, each type of third party intervention produced the following outcome results:

- 30 cases of success and 14 failures for non-intervention;
- 21 successes and 22 failures for cases involving a third party intervention by a country;
- 19 cases of success and 2 failures for interventions operated by the UN;
- 4 successes and 5 failures when a regional group or IO mediated the negotiation process;
- 13 successes and 4 failures when an individual is responsible for the intervention;
- 10 cases of success and 5 failures when a coalition of countries led the intervention;
- 11 successes and 5 failures for third parties comprised of multiple individuals; and
- 31 successes and 20 failures when a mix of international actors were involved in the peace agreement process.⁸⁵

From the total 139 successful outcomes, single-state intervention only produces 15.11% of the successful outcomes. This is compared to 21.58% successful cases for when there is no third party intervention. This means that based on the information provided by the dataset, third party interventions in peace agreements mediated by one country have a success rate of 48.84% and a failure rate of 51.16%.⁸⁶ Single-state third party interventions in peace agreements is associated

⁸⁴ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

with unsuccessful outcomes: the termination of the peace agreement, recurrence of violence, persistent instability and insecurity. Peace agreements without a third party are likely to succeed by 68.18% (more likely to succeed by approximately 19%) and likely to fail by 31.82% of the time (less likely to fail by approximately 19%).⁸⁷

Other variables can provide further insight into the effect of third parties on peace agreements, specifically the variables that provided comments on who the third party was, why the peace agreement came to an end and on the agreement's duration. With regard to the comments on the third party of the peace agreement, most of the cases did not provide information to make a definite conclusion nor as to how the third party may have affected the peace agreement outcome. Rather, they described who signed the peace agreement and where. For example, the comment on the third party for the 1992 Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law, only commented that Tanzania was the facilitator.⁸⁸

Through this variable, there was only one case of single-state intervention in the dataset that provided enough insight into the way the third party directly affected the outcome of the peace agreement. Fortunately, this case did help advance the association highlighted in the data for whether or not the peace agreement ended in success or failure. The 1988 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) Sudan Peace Agreement highlighted how the third party intervention, Egypt, was partly responsible for the outcome of the peace agreement.⁸⁹ The dataset provided the following comments with regard to the third party actor:

⁸⁷ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

Even though Egypt was biased in the conflict by supplying the Sudanese government with military assistance they managed to open up contacts between Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and SPLM/A in the mid-1988. Some observers also suggest the involvement of Ethiopia in getting the actors together.⁹⁰

Similarly, the comments on the agreement's duration did provided more information as to why the agreement failed but was unable to link it to the actions taken by a mediator. For example, the 1999 Reconciliation Agreement signed between the Chadian government and the MDD rebel group, which was mediated by Sudan, failed because "Some MDD representatives rejected the agreement."⁹¹ Based on the information provided by these variables, no direct association can be made between intervention failure and single-state intervention.

Overall, the data's mixed and inconclusive results muddled the overall results of the analysis. The analysis from these descriptive variables was not able to provide a consensus about why a third party may have negatively or positively affected the outcome of a peace agreement, nor provide consensus for why the peace agreement ended. However, the data outlining the trends for intervention did provide clearer insight into how third party intervention led by one country is associated with unsuccessful outcomes. In the next section, this paper will highlight *how* these third parties end up contributing to the failure of a peace agreement.

⁹⁰ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

⁹¹ Ibid.

Chapter 5 – Reasons for Failure of Single-State Intervention

UCDP Cases of Single-State Intervention: Reasons for Failure

It is clear, from the data analysis provided in the previous chapter, that a strong association between single-state intervention in peace agreements and long-term peace and stability in a post-war state does not exist. What is still missing is an explanation as to why specifically these cases of intervention are more likely to fail.

Appendix C provides a detailed outline of the 22 single-state intervention cases and their reason for failing. It is important to note that some of the cases had more than one reason for failing. Additionally, four of the cases were not included in the analysis because the agreement and the intervention were incorrectly coded as a failure in the dataset. For example, the agreements signed in Rwanda in August 1992, January 1993 and June 1993 which were mediated by Tanzania were coded as a failure. These agreements were incorporated into the final Arusha Accords, which was the intervention that really failed. The three previous peace agreements were agreed upon and remained intact until the final agreement. The Arusha Accords were not included as a part of the 22 cases for single-state intervention since the final agreement was mediated by the United Nations.⁹² The summary of the findings is as follows. Out of the 22 cases identified by the UCDP there were:

- 13 counts of the third party impartiality;
- 6 counts of abandoned implementation;
- 4 counts of the third party unable fulfilling its core responsibilities (i.e. excluding parties in the negotiations);
- 2 counts of a lack of internal cohesion for a rebel group;
- 1 count the third party mediator becoming too heavily involved;
- 1 count of poor timing to start negotiations; and

⁹² UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

- 1 count negotiations occurring in a non-neutral environment.⁹³

Table 2: UCDP Cases of Single-State Intervention, Reason for Failure

Cases of Failed Single-State Intervention	Reason for Failure
Algiers Accord	- Impartiality - Abandoned implementation
Tehran Protocol	- Impartiality - Abandoned implementation
Record between Iran, Algeria and Iraq dated 20 April 1975	- Impartiality - Abandoned implementation
Record between Iran, Algeria and Iraq dated 20 May 1975	- Impartiality - Abandoned implementation
Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations	- Impartiality - Abandoned implementation
Khartoum Agreement	- Impartiality (x2)
Basic Charter	- Impartiality (x2)
Nkomati Accord	- Impartiality (x2) - Too heavily Involved
DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement	- Impartiality (x2)
Tamanrasset Accord	- Poor Timing
Pacte National	- Lack of internal cohesion within a rebel group
El Geneina agreement	- Unable to fulfilling its core responsibilities
The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law	n/a
The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government	n/a
The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons	n/a
Paris Accord	- Lack of internal cohesion within a rebel group
Honiara Commitments to Peace	- Unable to fulfilling its core responsibilities
Akosombo Peace Agreement	n/a
The Cairo Declaration on Somalia	- Impartiality
Reconciliation agreement	- Unable to fulfilling its core responsibilities
Tripoli 2 agreement	- Unable to fulfilling its core responsibilities - Abandoned implementation
Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine et les Mouvements politico-militaires centrafricains	- Unable to fulfilling its core responsibilities - negotiations occurring in a non-neutral environment

⁹³ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

The following is a sample of explanations about to how some of the UCDP cases ended in failure and how their reason for failure relates to the arguments presented within the literature review. The full list of single-state intervention cases, their reasons for failure and the link to the literature are provided within Appendix C.

The Cairo Declaration on Somalia exemplifies how the third party, Egypt, used impartiality in the form of defensive motives to influence the outcome of the conflict, which led to the failure of the intervention. The literature review identified the ways in which third party mediators may approach their intervention with self-interested motives. A third party enters into a conflict with defensive motives when the dispute is threatening the interests of the third party.⁹⁴ In this case, the agreement's negotiation process was influenced by the conflict over the Nile between Ethiopia and Egypt. Egypt faced a security dilemma since the Nile is its main waterway, but the section in dispute was under Ethiopian control. Egypt hoped to influence Somalia helping pressure Ethiopia into sharing the water source with Egypt. However, Ethiopia's closest ally in Somalia—one of the main disputants in the war, faction leader Abdullahi Yussuf—withdraw from the conference by Ethiopian request. The agreement was never finalized nor implemented for this reason.⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ The results of the conflict did not favor Egypt's cause. This regional rivalry became integrated into the intervention strategy when Egypt should have been prioritizing stability and peace for Somalia.

The Nkomati Accord illustrates when a third party is biased towards one of the warring parties, it could lead to the failure of the intervention. The literature review highlighted that for a third party to be of any use in the conflict and be able to help implement a successful agreement,

⁹⁴ Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in theory," In *International mediation in theory and practice*, edited by Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985) 9.

⁹⁵ Stig J. Hansen, "Warlords and Peace Strategies: The Case of Somalia," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003).

⁹⁶ Warsan Cismaan Saalax and Abdulaziz Ali Ibrahim, "Somali Peace Agreements: Fuelling Factionalism," no. 21 (2010): 3.

they must remain independent and credible.⁹⁷ The South African intervention in Mozambique was not independent at all. The civil war in Mozambique “threatened the white regimes” in South Africa since the new government in Mozambique openly supported South Africa’s African National Congress party.⁹⁸ South African mediation supported the rebel group Renamo in Mozambique throughout the negotiations and encouraged them to create of economic and political damage in Mozambique.⁹⁹ The agreement collapsed because the disputants did not want to participate in a mediation process where the third party is found to be favoring their adversary.¹⁰⁰

Overall, the analysis from these cases highlighted that the third party can have a direct effect on the outcome of the intervention in peace agreements. The cases of single-state failure suggests that there are a number of ways in which the third party can contribute to the failure of its intervention. However, it is important to note that the majority of the cases were corrupted in some degree by the bias and hidden motives of the third party. They prioritized their gain over the peace and stability of the post-war state. All things equal, it can be said that there is an association between intervention failure and the hidden motives and impartiality of the third party mediating in the peace agreement. There is also an association between intervention failure and the other reasons for failure, but it has shown to be a weaker association. Next, this paper will analyze a case study to further exemplify the conclusions from the data analysis and provide more in depth detail as to how single-state intervention ends in failure.

⁹⁷ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 369.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Mozambique: Government," UCDP.

¹⁰⁰ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 369.

Case Study: The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement

This peace agreement came about at the end of the lengthy and complicated Sri Lankan civil war. The conflict and violent riots that ended with the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement began in the early 1980s. This conflict was rooted in deep seeded ethnic tension between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority population. The Sinhalese majority, who also controlled the government, passed several discriminatory legislations against the Sri Lankan Tamils.¹⁰¹ Bercovitch and Simpson state that “Failed peace agreements are an integral part of the Sri Lankan conflict.”¹⁰² Sahadevan adds “The history of the peace process is as old as the outbreak of the conflict; a total failure of the former has gradually added greater intensity and complexity to the latter.”¹⁰³ In order to understanding why the conflict, and its peace agreements, ended in such failure, we need to highlight the third party involvement.

India was the third party involved in the Sri Lankan conflict. Their involvement in the conflict could be interpreted negatively since the Indian Tamils have had long historical links with the Sri Lankan Tamils, but more so because India was focused on implementing peace to suit its own security concerns.^{104 105} As mentioned within the literature review, when a third party enters into a conflict to safeguard their interests it could negatively affect the outcome of the intervention.¹⁰⁶ In this case, India clearly had a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict to protect its national and regional security; it did not want the conflict to spill over into its own territory and run the risk of Indian Tamils copying what was happening in Sri Lanka.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ Bercovitch and Simpson, "International Mediation and The Question of Failed Peace Agreements," 85.

¹⁰² Ibid., 86.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 88.

¹⁰⁶ Touval and Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in theory," In *International mediation in theory and practice*, 9.

¹⁰⁷ Bercovitch and Simpson, "International Mediation and The Question of Failed Peace Agreements," 86.

In 1987, at the peak of the conflict, India was forced to threaten to invade Sri Lanka. The pressure from India persuaded the Sinhalese government to reopen negotiations, which eventually led to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in late July 1987.¹⁰⁸ Unfortunately, India was unable to fulfill its basic responsibilities as a mediator as it did not bring both disputants to the negotiation table to sign the final peace agreement. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was never signed by the Tamils.¹⁰⁹

India overstepped the boundaries as a third party mediator because it not only allowed negotiations to occur while the Tamils were not present, but it also began acting as a negotiator on behalf of the Tamils. The agreement was essentially negotiated between the governments of India and Sri Lanka without substantive involvement of the Tamil movement and without consideration of their needs.¹¹⁰ As highlighted in the literature review, some scholars believe that for a third party to be of any use in the conflict and be able to help implement a successful agreement, the third party will need to remain independent and credible. The disputants will not want to participate in the mediation process if the third party is favoring one warring party over the other.¹¹¹ This was the case with the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

Initially after the signing of the agreement, all signs pointed to it being a successfully implemented agreement; a cease-fire was established, government forces withdrew from Sri Lanka, and peacekeeping forces were in place to help implement the details of the agreement. However, the Tamils refused to disarm and renewed the fighting since their needs were not met. Moreover, the Tamils forced the Indian government to withdraw from the conflict altogether.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸Bercovitch and Simpson, "International Mediation and The Question of Failed Peace Agreements," 87.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 88.

¹¹¹ Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," 369.

¹¹² Bercovitch and Simpson, "International Mediation and The Question of Failed Peace Agreements," 87.

Ultimately, India's partiality is associated with the failed intervention in the peace agreement. First, this case demonstrated that the third party prioritized its needs and wants over the establishment of conditions for stable peace in Sri Lanka. Second, the outcome of this conflict does not come as a surprise seeing as the third party did not fulfill the basic requirements for success set by the selected definition of success outlined in the previous chapter. Recalling the definition of success adopted in the previous chapter, a successful outcome occurs when the peace agreement stays intact. If the peace agreement ended—if the validity of the agreement is contested by one or more of the warring parties that signed, if the parties are no longer party to the agreement or if a party officially withdraws from a peace agreement—it would qualify as a failure.¹¹³ This mediation effort cannot be described as a success since the Tamils refused to disarm and renewed the fighting knowing that they had been shortchanged.¹¹⁴

Other Patterns in the Dataset

It is important to consider how the dataset provides additional insight to why single-state intervention may, more often than not, lead to failure. The dataset can be used to determine if there is a pattern for which countries usually intervene and which interveners most often fail. Based on the UCDP data summarized in the table below, there appears to be no clear pattern between which countries are more likely to intervene and if their intervention most often leads to failure. The three most frequent interveners, Algeria and Kenya and Sudan, are all from the same region. However, the results of the outcome of their interventions are very different: Algerian intervention failed 87.5% of the time (7/8 cases), Kenyan intervention succeeded 100% of the time (5/5 cases) and Sudanese intervention failed 80% (4/5 cases).¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Högladh, *Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook*, 5.

¹¹⁴ Bercovitch and Simpson, "International Mediation and The Question of Failed Peace Agreements," 87.

¹¹⁵ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

Table 3: Frequent Intervening Countries and Their Outcome Trends

	Agreement ended	Agreement did not end	Total
Algeria	7	1	8
Chad	0	1	1
Egypt	2	2	4
France	1	0	1
Gabon	1	0	1
Ghana	1	0	1
India	0	1	1
Kenya	0	5	5
Kuwait	0	1	1
Libya	1	1	2
Norway	0	3	3
Qatar	0	1	1
Solomon Islands	1	0	1
South Africa	1	2	3
Sudan	4	1	5
Tanzania	3	0	3
United States	0	2	2

When Algeria, France, Gabon, Ghana, Solomon Islands, Sudan or Tanzania intervenes, the outcome is most often failure.¹¹⁶ This statement shows that intervention failure can occur among mediators from various regions. However, it also reiterates that there is no clear pattern between countries that intervene and their intervention outcome. These interveners are associated with failure, but it suggests that their interventions are likely to fail at the same rate when they do not. Algeria has failed 7 times, whereas Solomon Islands has only failed once. The UCDP dataset findings recognize Algerian intervention failed 87.5% of the time, while Solomon Islands intervention failed 100% of the time.

There may potentially be an association if the analysis widens its scope on the intervening countries, such as if the data was categorized by whether or not the interveners are from a

¹¹⁶ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

neighbouring country. As the table below demonstrates, there appears to be an association between single-state intervention and the termination of the agreement if the intervening party is a neighbouring country. There is an association with more positive outcomes—the implementation of a durable agreement, peace and stability in the post-war state—when the intervening party is not a neighbouring country. The UCDP dataset found that 12 out of 18 cases of single-state intervention (85.7%) ending in success were not intervened by a neighbouring state and 17 out of 22 cases (77.3%) ending in failure were intervened by a neighbouring state.¹¹⁷

Table 4: Comparison Single-state Non-military Intervention by Trends for Success and Failure Against if the Intervention was led by Neighbouring States

	Agreement Ended with Neighbouring Country	Agreement Ended not Neighbouring Country	Agreement did not end and Neighbouring Country	Agreement did not end and not a Neighbouring Country	Total
Algeria	5	2	1	0	8
Chad	0	0	0	1	1
Egypt	2	0	2	0	4
France	0	1	0	0	1
Gabon	0	1	0	0	1
Ghana	0	1	0	0	1
India	0	0	1	0	1
Kenya	0	0	0	5	5
Kuwait	0	0	0	1	1
Libya	1	0	1	0	2
Norway	0	0	0	3	3
Qatar	0	0	1	0	1
Solomon Islands	1	0	0	0	1
South Africa	1	0	0	2	3
Sudan	4	0	1	0	5
Tanzania	3	0	0	0	3

¹¹⁷ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

There is no proven association between the two major findings of this section's analysis—that single-state intervention failure is associated with the mediator's ability to remain impartial and whether or not the mediator is from a neighbouring state. However, there is a logical explanation that connects the two findings. A neighbouring state may have more stake in the conflict outcome, which could lead them to be partial towards a party impose their needs to be able to benefit from the conflict's conclusion, ultimately enabling intervention failure. Alternatively, a non-neighbouring state is less likely to feel directly threatened by the outcome of the conflict and may not have a stake in the conflict, which could lead them to remain impartial and could help ensure a successful outcome.

What About the Successful Cases?

As it was highlighted above, there are a number of different ways single-state mediation could lead to intervention failure. Similarly, there are a number of ways in which single-state intervention could possibly succeed. The aim of this chapter was to highlight if there was a pattern among cases of failure and try to address the source(s) of failure. It was not meant to provide a blueprint for success since, as previously mentioned, just as one case could have failed for multiple reasons, a case can succeed for a number of reasons. The analysis cannot and should not be used to assume that if third party intervention is impartial or conducted by a non-neighbouring state, it will succeed.

In an effort to begin answering the central research question of this paper, this chapter analyzed single-state non-military interventions' reasons for failure. The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset cases provided a clearer understanding as to how the actions taken by a third party impact the intervention and the outcome of armed conflict. The analysis revealed that one of the more prominent causes of the failure is the inability of the mediator to remain impartial. It highlighted

that there was no distinct pattern between which countries usually intervene and which interveners most often fail. The analysis also highlighted that cases of failure were more often than not mediated by a neighbouring state, whereas cases of success were not.

All things considered, if third party interventions are not the most promising policy decision, then what can international actors do to help facilitate long-term peace and stability in a country at civil war? The following chapter will explore alternatives that are more likely to succeed and are potentially less harmful to the durability of a given peace agreement.

Chapter 6 - Evaluating the Necessity of Third Party Intervention

If third party intervention does not produce desirable results, then what strategy should policymakers adopt? The literature on the outcomes of civil wars has begun to examine what makes peace easier or harder to achieve and maintain. For example, Maoz and Hensel's analysis concludes that decisive victories tend to be more stable than stalemates.¹¹⁸ Toft's analysis also concludes that rebel victories ensure more long-term peace and stability in a post-war state.¹¹⁹ Is peace easier to achieve and maintain through a decisive victory, an agreement or the assurances of a third party? This chapter aims to examine alternatives to third party intervention that can more easily guarantee a successful long-term outcome to the civil conflict.

Alternative Types of War Termination

Up to this point, this research paper has only been discussing the possibility of civil wars coming to an end through the negotiation of a settlement. In reality, a civil war can conclude in one of three different ways: a decisive victory by one of the disputants, a negotiated settlement, and by reaching a stalemate. Alternatively, there could be a continuation of the conflict. Toft describes a decisive victory as "an ideal-type of war termination" whereby one of the disputants surrenders and recognizes defeat by the other side.¹²⁰ A negotiated settlement, as previously defined, occurs when neither party admits defeat, the violence ends and concession are made between the two parties on how to govern the post-war state.¹²¹ Similar to a negotiated settlement, a stalemate occurs when there is only an agreement to end the violence since both parties recognize

¹¹⁸ Virginia Page Fortna, "Security: Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," *International Organization*, no. 57 (Spring 2003): 338, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808760.023.

¹¹⁹ Monica Duffy Toft, "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?" *International Security* 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010), accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40784560>.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

that they are at an impasse but are unwilling to make concessions.¹²² Finally the continuation of conflict would suggest that there was no success in terminating the war.

After outlining the possible alternative endings to a civil war, there are a few questions that remain. Do these strategies work? Which is the most effective? The paper has analyzed the trends for the outcomes of third party intervention. Therefore, it is only fair that the types of war termination receive a similar analysis to determine which is most appropriate to pursue in order to enable long-term peace and stability in a post-war state.

Comparing the Types of Civil War Termination

In her analysis of types of civil war termination, Toft provided a breakdown of the percentage of wars ending by each type of war termination from 1940 to 2000. The largest number of civil wars that ended throughout this period was in the 1990s with 27 conflicts ending during this decade alone. From 1940 to 2000, 70 percent of the wars ended in a decisive victory, 19 percent ended by negotiated settlement and 11 percent ended in a stalemate. Through the 1980s, a decisive victory by either party occurred in 75 to 100 percent of the wars, making it the dominant war termination type of that decade.¹²³ The 1990s marked a stark difference from the results of previous decades as shown in the figure below. During this decade, decisive victory and negotiated settlements each ended 41 percent of civil wars and stalemates occurred 18 percent of the conflicts.¹²⁴

Toft explains that the sudden outbreak of peace occurred for two reasons. First, at the end of the Cold war, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union no longer wanted to support the


¹²² Toft, "Ending Civil Wars," 11.

¹²³ Ibid., 13.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

proxy wars by providing arms to the combatants. These conflicts eventually faded.¹²⁵ Second, as the single superpower, the US felt it was morally responsible to intervene and end the ongoing civil wars. Especially when it had the economic, diplomatic and military power to do so and when the conflicts threatened the US national interests.¹²⁶

Figure 3: Percentage of Civil Wars Ended, by Termination Type, 1940-2000



(Source: Toft, "Ending Civil Wars" p. 14)

This data re-confirms the importance of analyzing the effects of third party intervention. Now that there is a greater chance of third parties intervening into a conflict to help implement a negotiated settlement, we need to figure out whether or not, when compared to other types of war termination, if negotiated settlements provide better outcomes for the future of the post-war state. Are negotiated settlements more likely to produce long-term stability and peace? Or are alternative

¹²⁵ Toft, "Ending Civil Wars," 14.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 15.

types of civil war settlement (i.e. decisive victory or stalemate) more likely to ensure long-term peace and stability?

In the previous chapter, it was discovered that the success of third party mediation in a negotiated settlement is not very high. In order to move beyond understanding that negotiated settlements have a poor track record in and of themselves, we need to compare their durability against ending civil conflict in a decisive victory and in stalemate. Both Toft and Fortna derive conclusions about the durability of war termination types in their analysis of civil conflicts. Fortna states that ceasefire agreements and peace negotiations, with the help of a third party, are not effective dispute resolution tools since they are more likely to break down quickly.¹²⁷ Toft explains that her analysis supports the conclusion that decisive victories are the most durable war termination type. The recurrence of wars from 1940 to 2000 ending in stalemates was 31 percent, 22 percent for negotiated settlements and 12 percent for decisive victories. Wars ending through negotiated settlements and stalemates were at least twice as likely to reignite compared to wars ending in decisive victories.¹²⁸

This is the case because, as Werner and Yuen highlight, ceasefire agreements resulting from stalemates and negotiated settlements are more often than not “an “unnatural” consequence of third party pressure.”¹²⁹ This means that third parties have pressured the disputants into a fabricated peace, where uncertainty and distrust remains, which could easily spoil the attempt at peace. The disputants sign these agreements since they are afraid of the penalties that the third party may impose for standing in the way of peace. The fear and uncertainty disappear, and the

¹²⁷ Fortna, "Security: Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," 359.

¹²⁸ Toft, "Ending Civil Wars," 16.

¹²⁹ Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, "Making and Keeping Peace," *International Organization* 59 (Spring 2005): 262.

distrusts mounts between the two disputants once the third party has left, rendering the agreement obsolete.¹³⁰ None of this exists when the conflict comes to a natural conclusion with one victor.

In addition to durability, the types of war termination should be compared based on the level of violence and number of deaths they produce. It is important to note which type produces the less overall violence, as less violence could act as a conduit to ensuring post-war peace and stability.¹³¹ Toft compared the level of violence against each type of war termination and the result of her findings showed that civil wars that end through negotiated settlements resulted in a significantly greater number of deaths before the signing of the agreement than those ending in decisive victory.¹³² Moreover, she found that wars that have reignited from a failed negotiated settlement are approximately 50 percent more violent than they were prior to the signing.¹³³ This means that there is more death and violence, and less peace and stability associated with negotiated settlements than decisive victories both before and after the signing of the agreement. If the resumption of war is associated with an increased number of deaths and the escalation of violence, then negotiated settlements appear to be more costly for the long-term peace and stability of a post-war state than a decisive victory.

The next point of comparison analyzes the effect each type of war termination may have on the conditions of the post war state. In measuring the way each type of war termination implements a level of democracy, policymakers will have a better idea as to which is the most successful in promoting a stable and peaceful future.


¹³⁰ Werner and Yuen, "Making and Keeping Peace," 270.

¹³¹ Toft, "Ending Civil Wars," 19.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 20.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

Figure 4: Change in Polity Score before & after Civil War, by Termination Type, 1946-2002



(Source: Toft, "Ending Civil Wars" p. 26)

In order to assess whether the level of democratization increases or decreases within a post-war state, it is necessary to analyze the change in polity scores after the end of a civil war. Figure 4 compares the average polity scores 5 years before the conflict to 20 years after the conflict. It assesses the link between the type of war termination and the degree of political liberty that survivors enjoy in the years following the cessation of the conflict.¹³⁴ As the polity score transitions from the negative authoritarian range to the positive democratic range, repression eases and there are increased levels of peace and stability.¹³⁵ As the figure demonstrates, negotiated settlements are linked to higher levels of authoritarianism overtime, while conflicts ending in decisive victories are linked to higher levels of democratization. Although, negotiated settlements experience an

¹³⁴ Toft, "Ending Civil Wars," 26.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 25.

initial boost to their polity score, they quickly thereafter descend into rising levels of authoritarianism. A victory by one of the disputants remains relatively unchanged from the beginning of the conflict to 20 years after and the most improvement results from conflicts ending with a rebel victory.¹³⁶ The analysis provided by Toft, which highlights the relationship between polity scores and civil war settlement types, provides further evidence that negotiated settlements may not be the best way to ensure long-term peace and stability. As she stated, “more democratic processes do not necessarily lead to more democratic outcomes.”¹³⁷

This chapter explored how each war termination type effects the following criteria which help determine the quality of the post war state: the agreement’s durability, the level of violence it produces and the level of democratization. The results from these criteria helped determine that letting a war come to a decisive victory is the type of war termination strategy that should be adopted by policymakers in order to ensure long-term peace and stability in the post-war state. This chapter further supported the idea that pursuing a negotiated settlement, with or without the help of a mediator, does not ensure the same degree of success as other type of war termination.

¹³⁶ Toft, "Ending Civil Wars," 24.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 25.

Chapter 7 - Conclusion

Evidence Summary

All of the analyses came to a similar conclusion; that a peace agreement, especially one that is being mediated by a single-state intervention, is associated with failure. Meaning, that there is a collapse of the peace agreement and that there is a resumption of violence. The case study was used in addition to these analyses to help identify, from the factors described in the literature review, what is to blame for the failure of these third party interventions. The analysis on the reasons for failure and the case study revealed that one of the more prominent causes of the failure is the mediator's partiality.¹³⁸ Their self-interest obstructs what naturally needs to occur through the negotiations in order to create a durable peace agreement. It also demonstrated that cases of failure were more often than not mediated by a neighbouring state, whereas cases of success were not.¹³⁹

In addition, the analysis comparing the types of war termination produced three main findings. First, civil wars ending in decisive victories are less likely to recur and those ending in negotiated settlements are much more likely to recur. Second, negotiated settlements have proven to produce lengthier and more violent conflicts compared to other types of war settlement. Third, when a war ends in a decisive victory, specifically won by a rebel group, the post-war state is more likely to reach a higher level of democracy. When a war ends with a negotiated settlement, it is more likely to end with a lower level of democratization, and as a result a lower level of peace and persistent repression.

¹³⁸ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

¹³⁹ Ibid.

The Appropriate Policy

In line with the paper's central hypothesis, negotiated settlements, especially when third party mediation is involved, have consistently proven to be precarious. This is true not only when evaluating the rates of success and failure just for the settlement of a peace agreement, but when compared to other types of civil war settlement. Overall, negotiated settlements are likely to result in a resumption of violence, are associated with high levels of overall violence, lower levels of economic prosperity and increased authoritarianism. The abovementioned findings suggest that letting a conflict end naturally with a decisive victory may be a better solution. Simply put, negotiated settlements, especially those mediated by single-state actors, are not necessary. Letting a conflict develop a natural victor should be the preferred policy for any outsider considering intervention. If policy makers are eager to continue intervening irrespective of these findings, given the very high success rate outlined in chapter 4, they should do so as part of a United Nations coalition.¹⁴⁰

All things considered, the recommended ideal course of action for future policymakers is to avoid single-state non-military intervention. It is important for decision makers to understand that less invasive approaches are more likely to produce the desired outcome of long-lasting peace and stability. Above all, the recommendation being made to policymakers is to explore all options prior to fully committing to intervention and being cautious of all the potential consequences. The analysis and recommendation should not suggest that intervention always results in failure. There are also a number of scholars that suggest specific measures, such as using military force if disputants are non-cooperative, that can be used assure the success of third party mediation in conflict.¹⁴¹ Regardless, these simple recommendations are presented to have policymakers

¹⁴⁰ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

¹⁴¹ Fortna, "Security: Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," 343.

recognize the complexities attached to intervening unilaterally in a conflict and to pursue options that can, with a greater degree of certainty, guarantee success in the form of long-term peace, prosperity, and stability in a post-war state.

The job of mediating peace is harder in some cases than in others. The track record for third-party intervention is sufficiently complex and, at times, is drowning in controversy. Great care must be taken in drawing lessons from specific cases, generalizing from data and prescribing policy recommendations. Too often, past cases are ransacked for evidence either in support of or against doing things policymakers already have decided upon. It is extremely important to continue reminding decision makers that “We should not be stampeded into a fatalistic, one-dimensional mantra about intervention peace agreements.”¹⁴² We should not assume that every case of third party intervention is doomed to fail, nor that every case is bound to end in immense success. Rather, airing on the side of caution and approaching all possible solutions for the best chance at success is the way forward. External actors should attempt to *keep* peace and not try to *make* peace.

¹⁴² Crocker and Osler Hampson, *"Making Peace Settlements Work,"* 56.

Appendices

Appendix A - Exclusion and Inclusion Criteria

Item	Included	Excluded
Article Types	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Peer-reviewed Scholarly Journals ● Government publications ● Books, ● Magazines ● Reports 	Web pages Blogs Videos
Methodology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Qualitative studies ● Quantitative studies 	
Language	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● English 	

Appendix B - Basic Search Strategy

Date of Search	Database Used	Search Terms <i>(Details in Excel Search Strategy doc)</i>	Total # Articles
2018-10-28	PAIS Index	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Third party intervention ● Peace settlement/ negotiation ● Long-run peace and stability, failure or success 	407
2018-11-04	Econ Lit		421
	Worldwide Political Science Abstracts		27
	JSTOR		473
2018-11-09	Political Science Database		3015
	Politics Collection	105	

Appendix C – Reason for Failure of Single-State Intervention

Basic Info (Where, name of PA and Date)	Third Party	Reason for failure	Link to Literature Review
Iran-Iraq March 6 1975		Algiers Accord	
Iran – Iraq Mar 17, 1975		Tehran Protocol	
Iran – Iraq April 20, 1975		Record between Iran, Algeria and Iraq dated 20 April 1975	
Iran – Iraq May 20, 1975		Record between Iran, Algeria and Iraq dated 20 May 1975	
Iran-Iraq June 13, 1975 Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations	Algeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Algeria hoped that Iran and Iraq would support its economic ambitions (oil) if it helped mediate and resolve the conflict.¹⁴³ To make matters worse, the signing and negotiation process were conducted at the meeting of OPEC in Algeria.¹⁴⁴ - Algeria arranged for a representative to be there during the negotiations and when the deliberations for the mixed commission began. However, no one was there to ensure the implementation of the other provisions.¹⁴⁵ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impartiality: Influencing the outcome of the conflict through expansionist motives - Did not extend their implementation to ensure maximum stability (definition for success section)
Chad: government Jan 22, 1978		Khartoum Agreement	
Chad: government Aug 25, 1978 Basic Charter (Fundamental Charter)	Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sudan backed groups that were sympathetic to their own policies (FNT). They also supported the rebels and was housing them in their territory throughout the conflict and the negotiations.¹⁴⁶ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impartiality: favouring one party - Impartiality: Playing a negative mediator role (providing sanctuary and political support for a warring party) that undermines the success of the intervention and the agreement

¹⁴³ The United States of America, Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, *The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement*, by OCI, May 1, 1975, 11.

¹⁴⁴ Hussein Sirriyeh, "Development of the Iraqi-Iranian Dispute, 1847-1975," *Journal of Contemporary History* 20, no. 3 (July 1985): 489

¹⁴⁵ J.G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, 4th ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 42.

¹⁴⁶ Uppsala Conflict Data Program. "Chad: Government." UCDP.

<p>Mozambique: government Oct 3, 1984 Joint Declaration on a Cessation of Armed Activity and Conflict (Nkomati Accord)</p>	<p>South Africa</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The civil war for Mozambique's independence "threatened the white regimes" in South Africa since the new government in Mozambique openly supported South Africa's ANC party. To stop this, SA supported the Renamo in Mozambique and utilized them to create the most amount of economic and political damage as possible within Mozambique.¹⁴⁷ - Once signed, SA agreed to stop supporting Renamo in return for restrictions on ANC activities in Mozambique (to slow down or stop the apartheid process in SA). SA did not honour the agreement as arms and other support continued to flow to Renamo. Later, SA sponsored another round of negotiations and peace talks on outstanding issues, but the process collapsed, and the war continued.¹⁴⁸ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impartiality: Influencing the outcome of a conflict for defensive motives - Impartiality: Playing a negative role (political support for a warring party) that undermines the success of the intervention and the agreement - Too heavily involved (Similar to Sri Lanka case). It crossed the line between mediator and signatory by making concessions in the final agreement.
<p>Sudan: government Nov 16, 1988 DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement</p>	<p>Egypt</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Egypt needed to make sure that the conflict would end in a way to favor the water project in the Nile that the government had previously promised them.¹⁴⁹ - Egypt was also supplying the Sudanese government with military assistance.¹⁵⁰ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impartiality: Influencing the outcome of the conflict for expansionist motives - Impartiality: Playing a negative role (providing military support to one side) that undermines the success of the intervention and the agreement
<p>Mali: Azawad Jan 6, 1991 Tamanrasset Accord</p>	<p>Algeria</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The rebel and militia groups continued fighting each other and the Malian army while negotiations occurred. This is because many of the northerners felt that the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Timing: The negotiations occurred during an active fighting phase

¹⁴⁷ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Mozambique: Government," UCDP.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, "Sudan's Addis Ababa Peace Treaty: Why It Failed," *Northeast African Studies* 12, no. 2/3 (1990): 24.

¹⁵⁰ Girma Kebede, "Sudan: The North-South Conflict in Historical Perspective," *Contributions in Black Studies*: 15, no. 1 (1997): 27.

		agreement was favouring the other side, which motivated them not to cooperate. ¹⁵¹	
Mali: Azawad April 11, 1992 Pacte National	Algeria	- There were new divisions in the north rebel groups. This, in combination with the slow pace of political and economic reform, reignited the conflict. ¹⁵²	- When there is a lack of internal cohesion, it makes it more difficult for the third party to identify the warring parties and makes it harder to coordinate concessions
Chad: government Oct 31, 1992 El Geneina agreement	Sudan	<i>Not a lot of data available. UCDP reports the following:</i> - That the negotiation process was not inclusive as 5 parties were excluded: National Council for Recovery (CNR), Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD), Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), and the Islamic Legion. ¹⁵³ - "It is only known that there was renewed fighting in late 1993. The immediate cause of the fighting is not known." ¹⁵⁴	- This is one of the mediator's core responsibilities: ensuring that the primary parties are party to the agreement (definition of success section).
Rwanda: government Aug 18, 1992 The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law			
Rwanda: government Jan 9, 1993 The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government			

¹⁵¹ Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, *RAND Corporation*, report, RAND Corporation, 2015, 13.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁵³ Chelsea Blake Johnson, *Rebels with a Cause: Power Sharing, Negotiated Settlements, And the Logic of Preemptive Defection*, Master's thesis, University of California, 2015 (ProQuest, 2015), 256.

¹⁵⁴ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

Rwanda: government Jun 9, 1993 The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons	Tanzania	<i>The failure of this agreement was based on the agreement in 1993 which was negotiated during the intervention by the UN, not Tanzania. All the agreements leading up to the final Arusha Accords were agreed upon and remained stable until the final agreement. This case (and the two subsequent) should not be included in the analysis since their failure was the result of another type of intervention.</i> ¹⁵⁵	n/a
Niger: government June 10, 1993 Paris accord	France	- There was internal division among the rebels once the agreement was signed. The division of one group (FLAA into FLT and FLAA) resulted in one supporting and one denouncing faction. ¹⁵⁶	- When there is a lack of internal cohesion, it makes it more difficult for the third party to identify the warring parties and makes it harder to coordinate concessions - Newly created factions of rebel groups often become a source of the failure of the agreement because they are not ready to negotiate a peace or feel spoiling the process will increase their bargaining power.
Papua New Guinea: Bougainville Sep 3, 1994 Honiara Commitments to Peace	Solomon Islands	- Lack of appropriate security guarantees: one group did not want to attend the conference for fear of arrest. ^{157 158}	- These are some of the mediator's core responsibilities: ensuring that the primary parties are party to the agreement and providing basic security guarantees for mutual trust throughout the negotiations (definition of success section).

¹⁵⁵ UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ University of Maryland, "Chronology for Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea," Center for International Development and Conflict Management: Minorities at Risk Project, July 16, 2010.

¹⁵⁸ Sean Lees, Marilyn Havini, and Janet Murdock, *Bougainville Peace Agreement: The Burnham I and II Dialogues*, report, ed. Jennifer Namgyal, Pacific Peace Community, United Nations Development Programme, 6.

<p>Liberia: government Sep 12, 1994 Akosombo Peace Agreement</p>	<p>Ghana</p>	<p><i>The failure of this agreement was based on the intervention led by ECOWAS. Ghana was only the sponsor of the meetings. The negotiations were held in Ghana and the President of Ghana (the facilitator) at the time was the Chair of ECOWAS. This case should not be included in the analysis since the failure was the result of another type intervention.</i>¹⁵⁹</p>	<p>n/a</p>
<p>Somalia: government Dec 22, 1997 The Cairo Declaration on Somalia</p>	<p>Egypt</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regional quarrels have unnecessarily increased the difficulty of the peace process. The Cairo conference was influenced by the conflict over the Nile between Ethiopia and Egypt. Egypt faced a security dilemma since the Nile sources their main waterway, but this section in dispute was under Ethiopian control.¹⁶⁰ - The two rivals decided to face off in Somalia as Ethiopia's closest ally in Somalia (one of the main disputants in the war; faction leader Abdullahi Yussuf) withdrew from the conference. The agreement was never fully agreed upon and implemented for this reason.¹⁶¹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impartiality: Influencing the outcome of a conflict for defensive motives - Distracted by its own feud outside of the conflict.
<p>Chad: government Jul 3, 1999 Reconciliation agreement</p>	<p>Sudan</p>	<p><i>Not a lot of data available. UCDP reports the following:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The failure was due to some of the representatives from the MDD group rejected the agreement.¹⁶² 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - These are some of the mediator's core responsibilities: ensuring that the primary parties are party to the agreement (definition of success section).

¹⁵⁹ George Klay Kieh, Jr., "Peace Agreements and the Termination of Civil Wars: Lessons from Liberia," ACCORD, August 19, 2011.

¹⁶⁰ Hansen, "Warlords and Peace Strategies."

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² UCDP, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset."

<p>Chad: government Jan 7, 2002 Tripoli 2 agreement</p>	<p>Libya</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The negotiation process was not inclusive as there were 5 groups excluded from the process: CDR, MUR, RAFAD, and remnants of FRNT and FARF.¹⁶³ - It was not clear whether all the signatories were in full support of the agreement during the negotiations and once it was signed. Immediately after the signing, one of the major parties was attacked by the other. The violence continued, and each side blamed the other for violating the peace accord.¹⁶⁴ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - These are some of the mediator's core responsibilities: ensuring that the primary parties are party to the agreement and providing basic security guarantees for mutual trust throughout the negotiations (definition of success section). - Did not extend their implementation to ensure maximum stability (definition for success section)
<p>Central African Republic: government Jun 21, 2008 Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la Republique Centrafricaine et les Mouvements politico- militaires centrafricains</p>	<p>Gabon</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The peace process was not inclusive as it brought the heads of regional states together to negotiate rather than the warring parties themselves. The third most important group FDPC did not sign the agreement.¹⁶⁵ - Francois Bozize (CAR government) had a reputation of renegeing on peace agreements.¹⁶⁶ - The general atmosphere between the disputants was major distrust and threats.¹⁶⁷ - The cease-fire was broken by the rebels since the agreement was deemed to be disadvantageous for them.¹⁶⁸ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - These are some of the mediator's core responsibilities: ensuring that the primary parties are party to the agreement (definition of success section). - Could not produce a neutral environment for the negotiations.

¹⁶³ Johnson, *Rebels with a Cause*, 263.

¹⁶⁴ Andrew G. Reiter, *Fighting Over Peace: Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and the Strategic Use of Violence* (South Hadley, MA: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 87.

¹⁶⁵ Lesley Anne Warner, "Flawed Peace Process Leads to Greater Unrest in the Central African Republic," *World Politics Review*, March 26, 2013.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ Siân Herbert, Nathalia Dukhan, and Marielle Debos, GSDRC International Development Department, report, European Commission's Instrument for Stability, European Union, July 2013, 10.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Appendix D – List of Third Party Intervention in Peace Agreements (UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset)

Full detailed [UCDP Peace Agreements List](#) and [Dataset Codebook](#).

Date of Peace Agreement	Dyads	Name of Peace Agreement	Coded (Third Party Intervention)	Third Party Intervention	Did the Peace Agreement End?
1975-03-06	Government of Iran (Persia) - Government of Iraq	Joint Iranian-Iraqi Communiqué (“Algiers Agreement”)	2	Algeria	Yes
1975-03-17	" "	Protocol to the Joint Iranian-Iraqi Communiqué (“Tehran Protocol”)	2	Algeria	Yes
1975-04-20	" "	Record between Iran, Algeria and Iraq dated 20 April 1975	2	Algeria	Yes
1975-05-20	" "	Record between Iran, Algeria and Iraq dated 20 May 1975	2	Algeria	Yes
1975-06-13	" "	Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations	2	Algeria	Yes
1975-12-01	Government of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) - ZAPU	Declaration of intent	1	None	Yes
1975-12-21	Government of Iran (Persia) - Government of Iraq	Annex I to the Protocol concerning the Redemarcation of the Land Frontier between Iran and Iraq	1	None	Yes
1975-12-26	" "	Addendum to Treaty concerning the State Frontier and neighbourly Relations between Iran and Iraq	1	None	Yes
1975-12-26	" "	Agreement between Iran and Iraq concerning Frontier Commissioners	1	None	Yes
1975-12-26	" "	Agreement between Iran and Iraq concerning the	1	None	Yes

Rules governing Navigation on the Shatt Al'Arab					
1975-12-26	" "	Record no. 2 between Iran and Iraq dated 26 December 1975	1	None	Yes
1975-12-26	" "	Record no. 1 between Iran and Iraq dated 26 December 1975	1	None	Yes
1975-12-26	" "	Agreement concerning the Use of Frontier Watercourses	1	None	Yes
1976-12-23	Government of Philippines - MNLF	Tripoli Agreement	5	Libya, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, OIC	Yes
1978-01-22	Government of Chad - FAN	Khartoum Agreement	2	Sudan	Yes
1978-07-12	Government of South Africa - SWAPO	Western Contact Group (WCG) Settlement Proposal	8	Western Contact Group (WCG), United Nations (UN)	Yes
1978-08-25	Government of Chad - FAN	Basic Charter (Fundamental Charter)	2	Sudan	Yes
1979-03-15	Government of Chad - FAN, Government of Chad - FAP	Kano Accord	5	Niger, Libya, Sudan, Cameroon and Nigeria	Yes
1979-03-30	Government of Yemen (North Yemen) - Government of South Yemen	Kuwait agreement	2	Kuwait	No
1979-08-05	Government of Mauritania - POLISARI	Algiers Agreement	2	Algeria	No
1979-12-21	Government of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) - PF	Lancaster House Agreement	6	UK/Lord Carrington	No

1983-07-11	Government of Chad - Government of Nigeria	Chad-Nigeria Agreement	1	None	No
1984-10-03	Government of Mozambique - Renamo	Joint Declaration on a Cessation of Armed Activity and Conflict	2	South Africa	Yes
1985-12-17	Government of Uganda - NRA	Nairobi Peace Agreement	6	Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi	Yes
1987-01-04	Government of Philippines - MNLF	Jeddah Accord	4	OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)	Yes
1988-06-03	Government of Uganda - UPDA	Gulu Peace Accord (Pece Peace Agreement)	6	Vincent Olanya	No
1988-08-12	Government of India - TNV	Memorandum of Understanding with TNV	1	None	No
1988-11-16	Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement	2	Egypt	Yes
1989-06-22	Government of Angola - UNITA	The Gbadolite declaration on Angola	6	President Mobutu Seso Seke of Zaire	Yes
1989-08-31	Government of Chad - Government of Libya	Algiers Agreement	8	OAU, Algeria	No
1990-03-30	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Oslo Accord	2	Norway	No
1990-04-04	Government of El Salvador - FMLN	Geneva Agreement	3	UN	No
1990-05-04	Government of South Africa - ANC	Groote Schuur Minute	1	None	No
1990-05-21	Government of El Salvador - FMLN	General Agenda and Timetable for the Comprehensive Negotiating Process	3	UN	No
1990-07-26	Government of El Salvador - FMLN	Agreement on Human Rights	3	UN	No

1990-08-06	Government of South Africa - ANC	Pretoria Minute	1	None	No
1990-10-24	Government of Liberia - INPFL	Banjul III Agreement	8	Gambia, ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee	No
1990-11-28	Government of Liberia - INPFL, Government of Liberia - NPFL	Bamako Ceasefire Agreement	4	ECOWAS	Yes
1990-12-21	Government of Liberia - INPFL, Government of Liberia - NPFL	Banjul IV Agreement	4	ECOWAS	Yes
1991-01-06	Government of Mali - MPA	Tamanrasset Accord	2	Algeria	Yes
1991-01-21	Government of Papua New Guinea - BRA	The Honiara Declaration	8	Solomon Islands Government SPCC (South Pacific Council of Churches) SICA (Solomon Islands Christian Association)	Yes
1991-02-13	Government of Liberia - INPFL, Government of Liberia - NPFL	Lomé Agreement	8	ECOWAS; ECOMOG	Yes
1991-02-15	Government of Colombia - EPL	Acuerdo final Gobierno Nacional-Ejército Popular De Liberación	1	None	No
1991-03-29	Government of Rwanda - FPR	The N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement	8	Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Senegal and OAU. Tanzania was the facilitator.	Yes
1991-04-26	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Mexico Accord	8	Mexico, UN	No
1991-04-27	Government of El Salvador - FMLN	Mexico Agreements	3	UN	No
1991-05-28	Government of Mozambique - Renamo	The Protocol on the Agreed Agenda	8	The Roman Catholic community of Saint Egidio, the Archbishop of Beira and the Italian government.	No
1991-05-31	Government of Angola - UNITA	The Bicesse Agreement	8	Portugal, the USSR, the USA and the UN	Yes

1991-07-12	Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - Republic of Slovenia	Brioni Agreement	7	EC representatives: the foreign ministers of Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy, European observers.	No
1991-07-25	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Querétaro Agreement	8	Mexico, UN	No
1991-09-25	Government of El Salvador - FMLN	New York Agreement	3	UN	No
1991-09-25	Government of El Salvador - FMLN	The Compressed Negotiations	3	UN	No
1991-10-18	Government of Mozambique - Renamo	Basic Principles	8	The Roman Catholic community of Saint Egidio, the Archbishop of Beira and the Italian government.	No
1991-10-23	Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KR, Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KPNLF, Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - FUNCINPEC	Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement"	5	UN Secretary-General; the Governments of Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, USSR, United Kingdom, USA, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.	No
1991-10-30	Government of Liberia - INPFL, Government of Liberia - NPFL	Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement	8	ECOWAS; President Houphouet Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire; the Atlanta-based International Negotiations Network (INN) led by former US President Jimmy Carter.	Yes
1991-11-13	Government of Mozambique - Renamo	Agreement on Establishment and Recognition of Political Parties	8	The Roman Catholic community of Saint Egidio, the Archbishop of Beira and the Italian government.	No
1991-12-20	Government of South Africa - ANC	CODESA Declaration of Intent	1	None	No
1991-12-31	Government of El Salvador - FMLN	New York Act	3	UN	No
1992-01-16	" "	New York Act II	3	UN	No

1992-01-16	" "	The Chapultepec Peace Agreement	3	UN	No
1992-03-12	Government of Mozambique - Renamo	Agreement on Principles of the Electoral Act	8	The Roman Catholic community of Saint Egidio, the Archbishop of Beira and the Italian government.	No
1992-04-11	Government of Mali - MPA	Pacte National	2	Algeria, Ahmed Baba Miske (from Mauritania) and Edgar Pisani (France)	Yes
1992-08-18	Government of Rwanda - FPR	The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law	2	Tanzania	Yes
1992-09-26	Government of South Africa - ANC	Record of Understanding	1	None	No
1992-10-04	Government of Mozambique - Renamo	The Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP)	8	The Roman Catholic community of Saint Egidio, the Archbishop of Beira and the Italian government.	No
1992-10-31	Government of Chad - FNT	El Geneina agreement	2	Sudan	Yes
1993-01-09	Government of Rwanda - FPR	The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government	2	Tanzania	Yes
1993-02-20	Government of India - ABSU	Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993	1	None	No
1993-03-07	Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat, Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Islamabad accord	5	The accord was brokered by Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and Iran were joint sponsors and guarantors of the agreement.	Yes
1993-03-27	Government of Somalia - USC/SNA	Addis Ababa Agreement	3	United Nations	Yes
1993-05-20	Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i	Jalalabad agreement	1	None	No

Islami-yi Afghanistan					
1993-06-09	Government of Rwanda - FPR	The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons	2	Tanzania	Yes
1993-06-10	Government of Niger - FLAA	Paris Accord	2	France	Yes
1993-07-03	Government of Haiti - Military faction (Forces of Raoul Cédras)	The Governor's Island agreement	8	UN, OAS	Yes
1993-07-25	Government of Liberia - NPFL	Cotonou Peace Agreement	8	UN, ECOWAS and OAU	Yes
1993-08-03	Government of Rwanda - FPR	The Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the integration of Armed Forces and The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions	8	Tanzania, UN, OAU	Yes
1993-08-04	Government of Rwanda - FPR	Arusha Accords	8	Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the OAU/GOM, the UNOMUR (Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda), the UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda), Uganda, Burundi, UN Special Representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh and OAU Special Representative Djou Felly.	Yes
1993-08-23	Government of India - ATTF	Memorandum of Settlement - 23 August 1993	1	None	Yes
1993-09-13	Government of Israel - Fatah	Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements/ Oslo Agreement	2	Norway, President Clinton and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kosirev.	No
1993-10-16	Government of Chad - CNR	Tripoli 1 Agreement	5	Libya and Sudan	Yes

1993-11-18	Government of South Africa - ANC	Interim Constitution	1	None	No
1994-01-10	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Framework Agreement for the Resumption of Negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity	8	UN, Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the US and Venezuela and a broad Civil Society Assembly (ASC).	No
1994-03-01	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	The Washington Agreement	7	Charles Redman (US Special Envoy) and Peter Galbraith (US Ambassador to Croatia)	No
1994-03-24	Government of Somalia - USC/SNA	Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation	3	UN	Yes
1994-03-29	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations on a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala	8	Mexico, UN	No
1994-03-29	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights	8	UN, the Catholic Church	No
1994-04-04	Government of Chad - Government of Libya	Agreement between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of Chad concerning the practical modalities for the implementation of the Judgment delivered by the International Court of Justice on 3 February 1994	1	None	No
1994-04-04	Government of Georgia - Republic of Abkhazia	Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict	8	United Nations, Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (previously Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE), Russian Federation	No
1994-05-04	Government of Israel - Fatah	Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area	5	Egypt, USA and Russia	No
1994-06-17	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict	8	Norway, UN	No

1994-06-23	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer	2	Norway	No
1994-08-10	Government of Chad - CSNPD	Bangui-2 Agreement	8	Central African Republic, France, Gabon, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Yes
1994-08-29	Government of Israel - Fatah	Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO	1	None	No
1994-09-03	Government of Papua New Guinea - BRA	Honiara Commitments to Peace	2	Solomon Islands	Yes
1994-09-12	Government of Liberia - NPFL	Akosombo Peace Agreement	2	Ghana	Yes
1994-10-09	Government of Niger - CRA	Ouagadougou Accord	5	Algeria, Burkina Faso (represented by President Blaise Compaore) and France	No
1994-10-12	Government of Chad - FNT	Abeche agreement	1	None	No
1994-11-20	Government of Angola - UNITA	The Lusaka Protocol	8	The UN, Portugal, Russia and the USA	Yes
1994-12-26	Government of Djibouti - FRUD	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale	1	No	No
1995-03-31	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples	3	UN (MINUGUA)	No
1995-04-15	Government of Niger - CRA	Accord e´tablissant une paix définitive entre le gouvernement de la republique du Niger et lórganisation de la résistance armée	5	Algeria, France and Burkina Faso	No
1995-08-17	Government of Tajikistan - UTO	Protocol on the Fundamental Principles of Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan	3	UN	No
1995-08-19	Government of Liberia	Abuja Peace Agreement	8	ECOWAS, Nigeria, OAU, UN	Yes

	- NPFL				
1995-09-28	Government of Israel - Fatah	Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip/ Oslo B	5	USA, Egypt	No
1995-10-13	Government of Philippines - Military faction (forces of Honasan, Abenina & Zumel)	GRP-RAM/SFP/YOU General Agreement for Peace	1	None	No
1995-11-12	Government of Croatia - Serbian Republic of Krajina, Government of Croatia - Serbian irregulars	The Erdut Agreement	7	US ambassador Peter Galbraith and UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg, UNTAES (United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem)	No
1995-11-22	Government of Chad - MDD	The Dougia Accord	1	None	Yes
1995-12-14	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian irregulars, Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement)	8	The Contact Group, the US, Russia, NATO Peace Implementation Force (IFOR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Peace Implementation Council, Carl Bildt (EU envoy to the peace negotiations in the Geneva forum)	No
1996-02-16	Government of Mexico - EZLN	The San Andrés Accords	1	None	Yes
1996-05-06	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation	8	Mexico, UN	No
1996-05-24	Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Mahipar agreement	1	None	Yes
1996-08-17	Government of Liberia - NPFL	Abuja II Peace Agreement	4	ECOWAS	No

1996-09-02	Government of Philippines - MNLF	Mindanao Final Agreement	1	None	No
1996-09-19	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society	8	Mexico, UN	No
1996-11-30	Government of Sierra Leone - RUF	Abidjan Peace Agreement	8	Cote d'Ivoire; the United Nations; the Organization of African Unity (OAU); the Commonwealth Organization.	Yes
1996-12-04	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on a Definitive Ceasefire	3	UN	No
1996-12-07	" "	The Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime	1	None	No
1996-12-12	" "	The Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the URNG	8	Spain, UN	No
1996-12-23	Government of Tajikistan - UTO	Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E.S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik-Opposition, S.A. Huri, on the results of the meeting held in Moscow 23 December 1996	3	UN	No
1996-12-29	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace	3	Sweden, UN	No
1996-12-29	Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements	8	UN	No
1997-01-15	Government of Israel - Fatah	Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron	2	USA	No
1997-02-21	Government of Tajikistan - UTO	Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation	3	UN	No
1997-05-08	Government of Moldova - PMR	Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria	8	Russia, Ukraine and OSCE.	No

1997-05-18	Government of Tajikistan - UTO	Protocol on political issues	3	UN	No
1997-06-27	" "	The Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan	3	United Nations	No
1997-10-03	Government of Chad - FNT	National reconciliation agreement	2	Sudan	No
1997-12-02	Government of Bangladesh - JSS/SB	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord	2	India	No
1997-12-22	Government of Somalia - USC/SNA	The Cairo Declaration on Somalia	2	Egypt	Yes
1998-04-10	Government of United Kingdom - IRA	The Good Friday Agreement	7	The US President Bill Clinton, Ireland, George Mitchell, IICD (Independent International Commission on Decommissioning)	No
1998-05-07	Government of Chad - FARF	Donya agreement	1	None	No
1998-10-23	Government of Israel - Fatah, Government of Israel - PNA	The Wye River Memorandum	5	USA, Jordan	Yes
1998-10-26	Government of Ecuador - Government of Peru	Acta Presidencial de Brasilia	5	Argentina, Brazil, Chile and US	No
1998-11-01	Government of Guinea Bissau - Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	Abuja Peace Agreement	4	ECOWAS	Yes
1999-05-06	Government of Colombia - FARC	Common Agenda for the Path to a New Colombia	1	None	No
1999-06-03	Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) -	Kosovo peace agreement 1	8	Marti Ahtisaari (EU Special Envoy/President of Finland), Viktor Chernomyrdin (Russian Special Envoy), G8, the UN, the Contact	No

	UCK				Group (representatives from the US, the UK, Germany, France, Russia), KFOR	
1999-07-03	Government of Chad - MDD	Reconciliation agreement	2		Sudan	Yes
1999-07-07	Government of Sierra Leone - RUF	Lomé Peace Agreement	8		Lomé Agreement: under the auspices of the current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema. Signatories: ECOWAS, Togo, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, OAU, UN, the Commonwealth of Nations.	Yes
1999-07-10	Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD, Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Lusaka Accord	8		Zambia, the UN, the OAU, Zambian President and SADC chairman Chiluba.	Yes
1999-09-04	Government of Israel - Fatah, Government of Israel - PNA	The Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II	5		USA, Egypt, Jordan.	No
1999-12-29	Government of Congo - Ninjas, Government of Congo - Cocoyes, Government of Congo - Ntsiloulous	Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités	7		Omar Bongo, President of Gabon and A. Mboumbou-Miyakou, Gabonese Interior-, Defence-, and Decentralisation minister	No
2000-02-07	Government of Djibouti - FRUD – AD	Accord Cadre de Reforme et de Concorde Civile	1		None	No
2000-08-26	Government of the Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan	The Famboni Declaration	1		None	Yes
2000-08-28	Government of Burundi - Palipehutu, Government of Burundi - CNDD, Government of Burundi - Frolina	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi	7		Former South African President Nelson Mandela, Ugandan President Yoweri Museweni, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, EU representative Charles Josselin, Executive Director of the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation Joseph Waryoba Butiku, the Implementation	No

Monitoring Commissions

2000-11-10	Government of Sierra Leone - RUF	Abuja Ceasefire Agreement	4	ECOWAS	No
2000-12-12	Government of Eritrea - Government of Ethiopia	Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	7	UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and a EU representative, Rino Serri, signed the agreement as witnesses. Furthermore, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, Togolese President and OAU chairman Gnassingbe Eyedema, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and US President Clinton's envoy, Anthony Lake, attended the signing.	No
2001-02-09	Government of Colombia - FARC	Los Pozos Agreement	1	None	No
2001-02-17	Government of the Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan	The Famboni II Agreement	8	Third party signatories of the \"Fambini II Agreement\" were the OAU special envoy Francisco Madeira, the International organisation of Francophonie (OIF) special envoy, Fr Andre Salifou, and the French ambassador on behalf of the EU, as guarantors. The deal was brokered by the OAU and the OIF.	No
2001-05-04	Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD, Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Declaration of Fundamental Principles for the Inter-Congolese dialogue	7	Zambia, Ketumile Masire	No
2001-05-12	Government of Djibouti - FRUD – AD	Accord de reforme et concorde civile	1	None	No
2001-06-22	Government of Philippines - MILF	Agreement on Peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front	1	None	No
2001-08-13	Government of Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) - UCK	The Ohrid Agreement	4	NATO	No

2001-08-30	Government of Papua New Guinea - BRA	Bougainville Peace Agreement	5	The Agreement was witnessed by New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville, Peace Monitoring Group	No
2002-01-07	Government of Chad - MDJT	Tripoli 2 agreement	2	Libya; COMESSA	Yes
2002-01-20	Government of Colombia - FARC	Los Pozos Accord	8	UN and the Catholic Church	Yes
2002-04-04	Government of Angola - UNITA	Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Intent	7	Ibrahim Gambari as undersecretary of the UN and Special Adviser on Africa; Christoffer William Dell as Ambassador of the US in Angola; Andreev Serguei Vadimovich as Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Angola; Fernando Menonca d'Oliveira Neves as Ambassador of the Portuguese Republic in Angolas.	No
2002-04-16	Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Political agreement on consensual management of the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1	None	No
2002-07-20	Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Machakos Protocol	2	Kenya	No
2002-12-02	Government of Burundi - CNDD–FDD	Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil national pour la défense de ladémocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie.	8	Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda and the UN	No
2002-12-09	Government of Indonesia - GAM	Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement	4	Henry Dunant Centre for Human Dialogue	No
2002-12-16	Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD, Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo	7	Ketumile Masire was the neutral facilitator of the Inter Congolese Dialouge. Sydney Mufambi for M. Thabo Mbeki and M. Moustapha Niasse signed the agreement as third parties.	No
2002-12-24	Government of Uganda - UNRF II	Yumbe Peace Agreement	1	None	No
2003-01-23	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPIGO,	Linan-Marcoussis Peace Accords	8	France, UN, African heads of states	Yes

	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MJP, Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPC				
2003-03-07	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPIGO, Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MJP, Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPC	Accra II	8	ECOWAS, Ghana	No
2003-04-02	Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD, Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act	8	African Union, United Nations	No
2003-06-17	Government of Liberia - MODEL, Government of Liberia - LURD	Accra Ceasefire Agreement	8	ECOWAS/ The International Crisis Group on Liberia (ICGL); The Inter-Religious Council (IRC); Mediator General Abdulsalami Abubakar (former Head of State of Nigeria); ECOMIL.	No
2003-08-18	" "	Accra Peace Agreement	8	ECOWAS/ The International Crisis Group on Liberia (ICGL); The Inter-Religious Council (IRC); Mediator General Abdulsalami Abubakar (former Head of State of Nigeria); ECOMIL; and UNMIL.	No
2003-09-25	Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period	2	Kenya	No
2003-10-08	Government of Burundi - CNDD-FDD	The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi	2	South Africa	No
2003-11-02	" "	The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi	2	South Africa	No
2003-11-16	" "	The Global Ceasefire agreement between Transitional Government and the Forces pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Mr.	6	Jacob Zuma, Deputy president of the Republic of South Africa	No

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2003-12-20	Government of the Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan	Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros	8	AU, South Africa, Madagascar, Tanzania, Mauritius and Mozambique, France, UN	No
2004-01-07	Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Framework on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period	2	Kenya	No
2004-05-26	" "	Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on Power Sharing	1	Kenya	No
2004-05-26	" "	The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States	2	Kenya	No
2004-05-26	" "	The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area	2	None	No
2004-07-30	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Accra III	8	African Union, ECOWAS, UN	Yes
2004-12-30	Government of Senegal - MFDC	Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la republique du Senegal et le Mouvement des forces democratique de la Casamace (MFDC)	1	None	No
2005-01-09	Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement	5	Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Italy	No
2005-01-16	Government of Sudan - NDA	Cairo Framework Agreement between the GoS and the NDA	2	Egypt	No
2005-04-06	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire	6	The South African president, Thabo Mbeki,	No
2005-06-18	Government of Sudan - NDA	Agreement between the GoS and the NDA (Cairo Agreement)	2	Egypt	No

2005-08-15	Government of Indonesia - GAM	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement	8	Crisis Management Initiative, EU and ASEAN	No
2005-08-18	Government of Chad - MDJT	Yebibou agreement 2005	6	A representative of the French Embassy in N'djamena attended the signing ceremony at the invitation of the two parties.	No
2006-05-05	Government of Sudan - SLM/A (MM)	Darfur Peace Agreement	8	AU, AMIS, UN	Yes
2006-05-25	Government of Nepal - CPN-M	Ceasefire Code of Conduct	1	None	No
2006-06-12	Government of Cameroon - Government of Nigeria	The Greentree agreement	8	United Nations, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	No
2006-06-16	Government of Nepal - CPN-M	The Eight-point SPA-Maoist Agreement	1	None	No
2006-06-18	Government of Burundi - Palipehutu-FNL	Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability	5	South Africa, Tanzania (Regional Initiative on Burundi)	No
2006-08-01	Government of Angola - FLEC-R	Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in Cabinda province	6	African Union Chairman and President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguessou	No
2006-09-07	Government of Burundi - Palipehutu-FNL	Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL	8	UN (BINUB), AU, Tanzania, South Africa (Regional Initiative on Burundi)	No
2006-11-08	Government of Nepal - CPN-M	Decisions of the Summit Meeting of the Seven-Party Alliance and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	1	None	No
2006-11-21	Government of Nepal - CPN-M	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006	3	United Nations (UN)	No
2006-12-24	Government of Chad - FUCD	Tripoli accord	2	Libya	No

2007-03-04	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Ouagadougou Political Agreement	6	Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso and head of ECOWAS	No
2007-03-27	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	First Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	6	Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso and head of ECOWAS	No
2007-04-13	Government of Central African Republic - UFDR	Birao Agreement	3	UN	No
2007-05-02	Government of Uganda - LRA	Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and Lord's Resistance Army/Movement	6	H.E. Dr. Samson L. Kwaje, Minister for Information and Broadcasting in the Government of Southern Sudan and Acting Mediator of the Peace Talks.	Yes
2007-06-29	" "	Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement	6	H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Mediator of the Government of Uganda - Lord's Resistance Army/Movement Peace Talks; H.E Japheth R Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya and; H.E Ali I Siwa for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania	Yes
2007-11-27	Government of Israel - Fatah	Israeli-Palestinian Joint Understanding on Negotiations	2	US	No
2007-11-28	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Second Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	6	Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso and head of ECOWAS	No
2007-11-28	" "	Third Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	6	Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso and head of ECOWAS	No
2008-02-19	Government of Uganda - LRA	Annex to the accountability and reconciliation protocol	1	None	Yes

2008-02-22	" "	Implementation protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions	7	H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks; H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas; H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania; Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa; H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway; Ms Anna Sundtröm, Political Advisor to the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, for the European Union; H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada; Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America	Yes
2008-02-23	" "		7	" "	Yes
2008-02-28	" "	Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	7	H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks; H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas; H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania; Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa; H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway; Mr Roeland van de Geer, EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region; H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada; Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America	Yes
2008-02-29	" "	Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms	7	" "	Yes
2008-06-21	Government of Central African Republic - UFDR	Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la Republique Centrafricaine et les Mouvements politico-militaires centrafricains designes ci-apres: APRD, FDPC, UFDR	2	Gabon	Yes

2008-08-19	Government of Somalia - ARS/UIC	Djibouti Agreement	6	United Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, mediated the negotiations, which were hosted by the Government of Djibouti.	No
2008-11-26	Government of Somalia - ARS/UIC	Decision of the High Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement	6	United Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, mediated the negotiations, which were hosted by the Government of Djibouti.	No
2008-12-04	Government of Burundi - Palipehutu-FNL	Declaration of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Great Lakes region on the Burundi Peace Process	7	The Regional Initiative chaired by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, South African Facilitation led by Minister Charles Nqakula	No
2008-12-22	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Fourth Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	6	Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso and head of ECOWAS	No
2009-03-23	Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - CNDP	23 March 2009 Agreement	7	former Nigerian leader Olusegun Obasanjo for the UN and Benjamin William Mkapa for the AU and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region	Yes
2010-02-23	Government of Sudan - JEM	Doha Agreement	2	Chad	No
2010-06-06	Government of Djibouti - Government of Eritrea	Agreement between the State of Eritrea and the Republic of Djibouti	2	Qatar	No
2011-06-28	Government of Sudan - SPLM/A-North	Addis Ababa Agreement	4	African Union	Yes

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