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
UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA - ÉCOLE DES GRADUÉS

M.A. (History)

The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire: The Study
of the Political Clauses of the Treaty of
Sèvres, August 10, 1920

by

Charles James Booth



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Title of Thesis: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire:
The Study of the Political Clauses of
the Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920

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Degree and Date: Masters of Arts, History, 1968

Thesis and Abstract Approved: _____



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PREFACE

The Treaty of Sèvres which legally ended the state of war with the Ottoman Empire was signed on August 10, 1920. This was the fifty and last peace treaty imposed by the Entente Powers on the defeated states of the Central Alliance following World War I. The Turkish treaty has the added ignominious distinction among these peace treaties of being the only one forcibly revoked, Turkey alone of all the states in the Central Alliance was able to repudiate the terms imposed by the Allies to a point where she herself negotiated a new peace at Lausanne three years later.

Due to the failure of the Treaty of Sèvres, historians have either neglected or ignored this document as a point of interest for investigation. Several historians have concentrated their efforts on postwar Allied diplomacy in the Near East but none of them have made more than just a passing reference to the clauses of the Turkish treaty; and too often even these brief references are erroneous. This has been unfortunate since the clauses of the Turkish treaty, and the political clauses in particular, retain importance in illustrating Allied intentions in the Near East; intentions which were the natural outcome of Europe's attitude towards the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. The Treaty of Sèvres illustrates more than anything the British,

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and to a lesser extent, the French panacea to the old Eastern Question.

The political clauses were by far the most important in the treaty. A sound study of these clauses cannot be possible without the minutes of the meetings of the London and San Remo Conferences of 1920. These minutes were published by the British Foreign Office in 1958.

Acknowledgment is gratefully made to the director Professor Julian Gwyn, B.Litt.(Oxford), for his interest and unstinted help and patience in the writing of the thesis. Appreciation is also due to Professor Paul C. Helmreich, Ph.D.(Harvard), for kindly consenting to allow me to read his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation entitled "The Negotiations of the Treaty of Sèvres, January, 1919 - August, 1920".

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CHAPTER I

TOWARDS THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Porte had for centuries regarded Russia as her traditional foe. In 1914 this attitude had not changed. In the midst of the July crisis incited by the Austrian ultimatum to Belgrade, the Turks proposed to the Germans a military alliance against Russia. It was concluded on August 2, just one day after the German declaration of war against Russia.¹ As this alliance remained a secret, even to some members of the Turkish chamber, Turkey was able to present a façade of neutrality which inspired Entente promises of preserving her independence and territorial integrity for a guarantee of neutrality.²

The views however, of the pro-German triumvirate of Enver, Talaat and Djemal Pashas predominated. On October 29, with visions of regaining territories lost during the Balkan Wars, Enver, the Minister of War, ordered the German

1 Ahmed Djemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman: 1913-1919, George H. Doran, New York, 1922, p. 107.

2 Grey, Sir Edward, Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916, II, Frederick A. Stokes, New York, 1925, pp. 172-173.

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admiral commanding the Turkish fleet to attack the Russian Black Sea Coast.³ The war in the near East had begun and with it Turkey had staked her whole Empire upon a German victory.

A. The Secret Agreements

France, Britain, Russia and Italy planned among themselves the partition of most of the Ottoman Empire in four secret agreements during the years 1915-1917. The areas staked by each country were not determined exclusively by economic factors or by prewar investments.⁴ Elements such as strategic importance, prestige, and to a lesser extent, cultural influence also played an important part. In truth, the emphasis on each of these factors varied with the country concerned.

3 Ulrich Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities", Journal of Modern History, XXIV(1962), p. 371. Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy 1918-1948, Franco-Suisse, Ambilly-Annemasse, 1950, p. 12.

4 For the Entente's prewar investments and interests in the Ottoman Empire see Appendix I.

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Russia for example, had little investment in the Ottoman Empire; her concern was primarily to gain possession of the Straits—the putative key to her backdoor. Possession of Constantinople was simply a romantic dream nurtured by generations of Russian rulers and by the Russian Orthodox Church. For Britain, the principal concern was the protection of her commerce in the eastern Mediterranean and the protection of her imperial communications via the Suez Canal to India. The latter factor induced Britain to stake out her claim solely in the Arab provinces; areas which had the added lure of huge oil deposits. France on the other hand, had the greatest capital investment in the Ottoman Empire yet she did not claim Constantinople—the focal point and control area of her investments. France considered Syria, where numerous French schools and French religious missions existed, more of a French preserve than any other area of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, an unhampered control of Syrian ports offered France greater opportunities to compete with Britain in the commerce of the Near East. The last of the Entente powers, Italy, was a comparative newcomer to the Ottoman lands. Imbued with neo-Venetian visions, Italy was out to get what she could in order to enhance herself as a great maritime power in the Mediterranean.

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In drawing the boundaries of their claims it was preferable for these countries to include their most important economic concessions into their own zone, but it was not essential; the secret agreements recognized and protected all Allied concessions and investments as they existed before the war. If boundaries were extended to include a railway junction, branch, or even a mine, it was done because these concessions belonged to German, Austrian or even Turkish investors. But the one motivating factor which pushed Russia for example, into claiming Turkish Armenia, or France into claiming a part of Anatolia, was the need to strike a balance in the division of the spoils. All four countries considered themselves as 'Great Powers', and it was not in their individual interest to allow the other to gain the upper hand in such a prospect as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

The Constantinople Agreement. On March 4, 1915, Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, announced to Britain and France "que la question de Constantinople et des Détroits doit être résolue définitivement, selon les aspirations séculaires de la Russie."⁵ The demand was made for the

⁵ Russian Aide-Mémoire, 3/14/15, E.L. Woodward & Rohan Butler (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-1939, First Series, IV, HMSO, London, 1952, p. 635. Hereafter cited as DBFP.

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annexation of the following areas: the city of Constantinople; the European shores of the Straits up to the Enos-Midia line; the Sea of Marmora; the Ismid peninsula; and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos at the mouth of the Dardanelles.⁶ Though France proved less willing than Britain, both agreed to the Russian terms subject to the successful conclusion of the war and the realization of their own desiderata in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere.⁷

Theoretically at least, the Constantinople Agreement resolved Russia's 'age-long aspirations' to Tsargrad and the Straits. As Sazonov had admitted, such a settlement could only have been possible in connection with a European war.⁸ Agreement with the Russian demands was for Britain and France a matter of expediency; both countries knew full well the value of Russia's continued contribution to the war effort.

6 Ibid., pp. 635-636.

7 British Aide-Mémoire, 3/12/15, ibid., p. 636. Paléogue to Sazonov, 4/12/15, ibid., p. 638.

8 Serge Sazonov, Fateful Years: 1909-1916, Jonathan Cape, London, 1928, pp. 248, 251.

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The London Agreement. The price paid by the Entente for Italy's intervention in the war against her former allies was disclosed in the London Agreement signed on April 26, 1915. Of the four articles dealing with the Ottoman territories, three were actually just minor concessions: Italy was to receive full sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands under her occupation since 1912; the remnants of the Sultan's rights and privileges in Libya were to be transferred to Italy giving her in effect full sovereignty over the area; and the third was not a concession but obligated Italy to join with the Entente in declaring the inviolacy of Arabia and the Moslem Holy Places. The one major concession was Article 9; the Entente recognized Italy's interest in the balance of power in the Mediterranean and "in the event of the total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, she ought to obtain a share...adjacent to the province of Adalia."⁹ This Italian share was to be 'delimited' later with the added right to occupy the zone on condition other

⁹ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1920. "Agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy. Signed at London, April 26, 1915." Cmd. 671, London, 1920, p. 5.

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Entente powers occupied areas in Anatolia during the course of the war. The interests of Italy were also to be considered in case the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was maintained or if alterations were made in the zones of interests of the other Entente powers.¹⁰

The general vagueness of the allotted zone was in sharp contrast to the precision defining the Entente's concessions to Italy in Tyrol, Istria and Dalmatia. It was obvious that France and Britain resented the intrusion by this upstart and attempted to keep the promises to Italy as vague and general as possible, particularly as their own desires in the Empire had not yet been formulated. This attitude of resentment was further pronounced by their wishes to keep the Constantinople Agreement a secret from the Italians.¹¹ In effect, Article 9 proved to be nothing more than an ineludible concession to help bring Italy into the war.

10 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

11 René Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, Columbia University Press, New York, 1938, p. 203.

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The Sykes-Picot Agreement. A definition of the Anglo-French desiderata in the Ottoman Empire had been pending ever since the Constantinople Agreement. From October 1915 to February 1916, Sir Mark Sykes and Charles François Georges Picot, British and French Middle East specialists, formulated a scheme for the division of the Ottoman Arab provinces. By May 16 the scheme was officially accepted. A prerequisite for any Anglo-French agreement was Russian approval, and as was expected, Russian approval was only forthcoming at a price. Russia's further claims were recognized by May 23. For convenience both these accords were grouped under the Sykes-Picot Agreement; an arrangement which was nothing less than a tripartition of most of the Ottoman Empire.

The French and the British divided the Arab provinces and a part of Anatolia into five distinct zones. Each country was to receive both a zone of direct control and a zone of influence. The fifth zone, Palestine, south of Haifa to Gaza, was to be made into an area of international administration.¹²

¹² Classified as brown area. Grey to Cambon 5/16/16, DBFP., IV, p. 246.

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France's zone of direct control stretched north along the coastal region of Syria, excluding the towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo in the hinterland, into the vilayet of Adana, Cilicia and into central Anatolia just past the town of Sivas. Britain's zone of direct control comprised southern Mesopotamia, the vilayet of Baghdad and a small enclave containing the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine. The French zone of influence included all of the Syrian hinterland and the vilayet of Mosul; the British received the rest.¹³ In all four zones, Britain and France recognized each others existing economic concessions and investments.¹⁴

It was within the two zones of influence that Britain and France declared their willingness

13 Zones of direct control classified as blue (France) and red (Britain). Zones of influence classified as 'A' (France) and 'B' (Britain). *ibid.*, pp. 245-246. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1962, pp. 70-72.

14 Cambon to Grey, 5/15/16, DBFP., IV, pp. 244-245.

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"to recognise and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States...under the suzerainty of an Arab chief."¹⁵ This Arab independence was nevertheless only to be granted in a mutative form. In their respective zones, Britain and France would have priority of right of enterprise and of local loans, as well as the right to alone supply any needed advisors or foreign functionaries.¹⁶ It was considered a certainty that advisors would be needed, and by advisor, Britain and France undoubtedly meant an advisor whose advice had to be followed.

Russia's share in the Sykes-Picot Agreement was the right to annex two connected areas in eastern Anatolia. The first area included the regions of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis; the area known as Turkish Armenia. The second area included the northern part of Kurdistan; south of Van and Bitlis to the vilayet of Mosul.¹⁷

15 Grey to Cambon, 5/16/16, ibid., p. 245. At French request the British agreed to change the word 'protect' to 'uphold'. Crewe to Cambon, 8/30/16, ibid., p. 249.

16 Grey to Cambon, 5/16/16, ibid., p. 245.

17 Grey to Benckendorff, 5/23/16, ibid., p. 248.

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The Sykes-Picot Agreement was the most important of the secret agreements and, at least as far as the Anglo-French arrangement was concerned, remained very influential in the future peace negotiations. In its totality, the agreement merely represented a traditional European solution for the expected dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. All three countries had an interest in the Ottoman Empire and under the stress of war it was expedient for them as Allies to mark out their claims and solve their differences there.

The Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement. According to Article 9 of the London Agreement the Sykes-Picot Agreement raised the question of Italian claims in Anatolia. What was true of the Constantinople Agreement was also true of this arrangement—Italy was not informed. When rumours of these two Agreements began circulating in the Quirinal, Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, pressed for the clarification of Italian claims in Anatolia. After considerable stalling, Italy's Allies finally agreed to hold exploratory talks in London in early 1917. These talks failed to produce a satisfactory modus vivendi due to Italian claims to Mersina, Adana—areas already assigned to France—and to Smyrna.¹⁸ A solution was at last left

14. 18 Allied Conversations, 1/29/17, ibid., pp. 24-25n.

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up to the Premiers of Britain, France and Italy meeting at Saint-Jean de Maurienne on April 19. On the basis of these last talks a formal agreement was later signed incorporating the Italian claims in a broadened Sykes-Picot formula.¹⁹

Analogous to their own assigned zones in the Ottoman territories, Britain and France consented to cede Italy a zone of direct control and a zone of influence.²⁰ Her first zone comprised the southern part of Anatolia bounded in the north by a line running due east from the city of Smyrna to the French zone. Her second zone extended north of this line to the Gulf of Edremid and west of the towns of Afium Karahissar and Kutaya. France retained her rights to Adana and Mersina but the latter was to be made a free port for Italian goods and an area of free rail transit to and from the Italian zone. On her side, Italy agreed to make Smyrna a free port for French and British goods and recognized all the Anglo-French desiderata as formulated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement.²¹

¹⁹ See Anglo-French-Italian Conference, 4/19/17, ibid., pp. 638-639.

²⁰ Classified as 'green' and 'C' zones respectively. Balfour to Imperiali, 8/18/17, ibid., p. 640.

²¹ Albrecht-Carrié, Italy, p. 206. Balfour to Imperiali, 8/18/17, DBFP., IV, pp. 640-641.

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With this Agreement, Italy seemed to have achieved her ambition of being recognized as a great power in the Mediterranean. However, her aspirations were again frustrated. The Agreement contained a short preamble stating "sous réserve de l'assentiment russe"²² and Russia never did consent to the Agreement. By the time the Premiers had met at Saint-Jean de Maurienne, the Tsarist regime had given way to the Provisional government, and by May 19, the new Russian government formally declared its policy of a victory without annexations.²³ For the British and the French this omission of Russian consent provided a convenient though weak loophole to claim the invalidity of the Agreement.

B. The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence

One of the most important events to emerge in the Near East during the war years was the British negotiations with the Arab national movement and the subsequent Arab revolt. From the movement's first intellectual development

22 Ibid., p. 640.

23 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations, Constable, London, 1922, p. 48n.

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in the mid-nineteenth century, it had transformed itself by 1914 into a somewhat diverse instrument of insurrection against Turkish domination.²⁴ As the British carried the principal burden of the war in the Near East, it became an important feature of British diplomacy to attempt to harness this ready-made opposition in the war effort.

This policy found expression primarily in the establishment of relations by the British Foreign Office with Hussein ibn Ali of the Hashimi clan, the Grand Sherif of Mecca and later King of the Hedjaz. For Arab participation in the war, Hussein wanted definite pledges from the British. These were undertaken in a series of secret letters exchanged between Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner for Egypt, over a nine month period from July 14, 1915 to March 10, 1916.

Acting as the spokesman for the Arab nationalists, Hussein bargained for Arab independence as the price for Arab intervention. Following the Damascus Protocol,²⁵

24 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, Capricorn Books, New York, 1965, pp. 52ff.

25 Full text in ibid., pp. 157-158.

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formulated previously by two secret Syrian societies, Hussein claimed Arab independence for the territory bounded by the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. In the north, the Arab frontier was to follow a line from Mersina and Adana to the 37° of latitude and along this latitude to the Persian border. Only Aden was excluded from this territorial claim. In addition to the Protocol, Hussein asked Britain to agree to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam. In return, both the Protocol and Hussein promised to declare war on Turkey and to grant Britain economic preference in the territory marked out for Arab independence.²⁶

In his letter of October 24, McMahon stated that he was authorized by the British government to agree to the Arab demands subject to the following modifications and stipulations: the districts containing Mersina, Adana and Alexandretta, plus the coastal region of Syria lying to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, were to be excluded from the limits of Arab independence; for any necessary foreign advisors or officials, the Arabs would have recourse

²⁶ Sherif of Mecca to McMahon, 7/14/15, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1939, "Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916," Cmd. 5957, London, 1939, pp. 3-4.

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to Britain only; and in view of Britain's special interests in the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, a special regime would be devised there. This latter stipulation in fact implied British control in that part of the 'independent' Arab state. Subject to these terms and without prejudice either to existing treaties with Arab chiefs or to the interests of her ally France, Great Britain pledged to recognize and support Arab independence within the limits demanded.²⁷

This letter proved to be the most important in the whole correspondence for it sufficed to bring the Arabs into the war even though an important difference remained unsettled. Hussein refused to omit the Syrian coastal region from any future Arab state.²⁸ When he was told that Britain could not comply since the interests of France were involved,²⁹ Hussein reluctantly proposed to postpone a decision until the end of the war, but added the definite warning that "it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France...a span of land in those regions."³⁰ Hussein was undoubtedly

27 McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, 10/24/15, ibid., pp. 7-9.

28 Sherif of Mecca to McMahon, 11/5/15, ibid., pp. 9-10.

29 McMahon to the Sherif of Mecca, 12/14/15, ibid., pp. 11-12.

30 Sherif of Mecca to McMahon, 1/1/16, ibid., p. 13.

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confident that Britain would ultimately agree to his terms; like many Ottoman Arabs of his time he had a profound belief in British integrity and sense of fair play.³¹

However, this profound belief in the British could be nothing less than a portent for disillusionment. Even before Hussein proclaimed the Arab revolt on June 10, 1916, the Sykes-Picot draft for the division of the Arab provinces had been given final form in letters exchanged between London and Paris. That Mark Sykes knew the tenor of the McMahon-Hussein exchanges and worked in this knowledge has been established.³² Nevertheless, the obligations entered by the British both to the Arabs and the French were obviously inconsistent despite the stand taken by the British Foreign Office that they were not.³³ Hussein had been given to think that the Syrian hinterland and the vilayet of Mosul

31 Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 174.

32 Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921, Bowes & Bowes, London, 1956, pp. 36-38. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East: 1914-1956, Chatto & Windus, London, 1963, p. 32.

33 See for example, Curzon to the Emir Feisal, 10/9/19, DBFP., IV, p. 446. Foreign Office Memorandum, 11/29/20, ibid., XIII, pp. 397-400.

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would be wholly independent, while the French assumed that they would be the sole suppliers of 'advisors or foreign ⁿfunctionaries' and have a measure of supervision over the area. In Palestine too, Hussein was lead to believe that the area would be wholly independent while the Sykes-Picot formula arranged for an internatioal zone plus a small British enclave containing Acre and Haifa.³⁴ The inconsistencies in the British commitments were to cause a great deal of enmity, not only towards themselves, but more in particular, between the French and the Sherifian supporters since both sought the application of their respective agreements once the war ended.

C. Public Declarations

Even before the conclusion of the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement in August 1917, the inter-Allied agreements had become in part obsolete. Not only had the Russian Provisional government renounced the Tsarist claims in Turkey but America's entrance into the war on April 6,

³⁴ Monroe, Britain's Moment, p. 33. Antonius, Arab Awakening, pp. 177-79.

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complicated even further the neat Allied arrangements. President Woodrow Wilson had been informed of the secret agreements,³⁵ and though he was in favour of extinguishing the Ottoman Empire, he was far from approving its partition among the victors. Wilson's attitude and the ultimate publication of these agreements by the Bolsheviks in November 1917, brought disgrace to the Entente. Both the Turks and the Germans made great use of these disclosures particularly to the Arabs.³⁶ Yet, despite all pretenses to the contrary, these secret agreements remained to form the important basis of the negotiations once the war was over.

In the last two years of the war, the basis of the negotiations was further supplemented by a number of public statements. Each of these pronouncements emitted an

³⁵ Balfour had personally informed Wilson on April 29, 1917. Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World War, Archon Books, Hamden, 1964, p. 268. Copies of the agreements were sent to Wilson on May 28, 1917. Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965, p. 56.

³⁶ See Kedourie, England and Middle East, pp. 107-108.

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idealistic motivation for pursuing the war and as such, except for the Balfour Declaration, they were more often than not ignored at the peace tables.

Balfour Declaration. On November 2, 1917, Arthur Balfour, then British Foreign Secretary, issued his public letter to Lord Rothschild adding another commitment for Britain in the Near East—this time to the Zionists. This letter known as the Balfour Declaration stated that

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.³⁷

On the surface, the Declaration did not seem to alter the Sykes-Picot plan for an international administration in Palestine, since France also expressed her sympathy

37 Balfour Declaration, 11/2/17, J.C. Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 11, Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1956, p. 26. Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, Harper & Bros., New York, 1949, p. 208.

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for the Zionist cause,³⁸ and it appeared feasible that both France and Britain would cooperate to guarantee a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Originally, the British had done well enough to get the French to consent to an international administration; of the two countries, France could claim the dominant influence there as the protector of the Holy Places for the Catholic Church. But the object of British policy, at least as far as Lloyd George was concerned, was to eliminate completely French participation in the area due to its proximity to the Suez Canal.³⁹ As the Zionist leaders, Weizmann and Sokolow, backed Britain and not France to help guide and protect the new Palestine,⁴⁰ Lloyd George saw the opportunity of using Zionism as a convenient instrument for strengthening the British case for a British Palestine. After the Declaration and once Britain was in military possession of Palestine, France could do little but abandon her claims there.

38 Cambon to Sokolow, 6/4/17, Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy, II, p. 26.

39 See his conversation with C.P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian in the spring of 1917 recorded by Monroe, Britain's Moment, p. 38.

40 Weizmann, Trial, p. 188.

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Lloyd George's Statement on British War Aims. On January 5, 1918, Lloyd George initiated the first of a series of Allied pronouncements proclaiming—contrary to the spirit of the inter-Allied agreements—the promise of an equitable solution on the basis of nationality for the proposed extinguishment of the Ottoman Empire. Britain, he said, was not fighting

to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race...while we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race, with its capital at Constantinople... Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.⁴¹

The only special stipulation he included for Britain's own interest was the internationalization and neutralization of the Straits.⁴²

The reference to maintaining the Turks in Constantinople and Thrace was in sharp contrast to the joint Allied note delivered to the United States a year earlier. It had

⁴¹ H.M.V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, VI, Frowde, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1924, p. 23.

⁴² Ibid.

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called for "the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, as being decidedly foreign to Western civilization."⁴³ The motive behind these new pronouncements was not only an attempt to allay the damaging acrimony caused by the revelation of the secret agreements but, as it was later revealed, the concessions to the Turks were a supposed inducement to draw them out of the war.⁴⁴ The inducement failed but the Turks could at least put forth a minimal claim later that they too, along with the Arabs, had gained the right for a separate existence on the basis of nationality. Lloyd George however, never felt committed even to this minimal right let alone giving the Turks the city of Constantinople.

Wilson's 'Point Twelve'. Three days after Lloyd George's statement, Woodrow Wilson announced his scheme for the future peace of the world in his Fourteen Points.

⁴³ Quoted in Francesco Nitti, The Wreck of Europe, Christian Gauss (tr.), Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1922, p. 26. Temperley (ed.), History of Peace Conference, I, p. 190.

⁴⁴ Memorandum by Curzon, 1/4/20, DBFP., IV, p. 995.

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"Point Twelve" dealing with the Ottoman Empire stated—

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.⁴⁵

The one obvious incongruity here was the conflict between the Anglo-French intentions to divide the Arab provinces and Wilson's principle of self-determination for the subject nationalities. But at no time during the Allied confrontation with the Fourteen Points in the autumn of 1918, were there any grievances raised over 'Point Twelve'.⁴⁶ Colonel House, then American representative to the Supreme War Council, in his attempts to get Allied acceptance of the Wilsonian programme had arranged for an interpretation of each of the Fourteen Points, and 'Point Twelve' read along with its interpretation had satisfied the Allies.

The interpretation applied the mandate principle to the lands that were to be severed from the Ottoman Empire.

⁴⁵ Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, III, Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1960, p. 44.

⁴⁶ See Seymour, American Diplomacy, pp. 373-381.

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For the sake of illustration, it suggested that Britain might be named as the trustee or mandatory power for Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia under the proposed League of Nations, while France was suggested for Syria.⁴⁷ With the acceptance of this principle, Britain and France overcame the first Wilsonian hurdle for the application of the Sykes-Picot formula.

Assurances to the Arabs. Both the Balfour Declaration and the disclosure of the Sykes-Picot Agreement caused a great deal of concern among the Entente supporters of the Arab world. To calm these apprehensions and prevent a possible collapse of the Revolt, it became expedient to issue a number of assurances to the Arabs.

Of the three important assurances issued to the Arabs, two were made by Britain alone. The first, known as the Hogarth Message and delivered to King Hussein January 4, 1918, declared that while Britain was determined to see the fulfilment of their pledge to the Zionists, it was

⁴⁷ Evans, United States Policy, p. 79.

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really only possible in so far as it was compatible with the economic and political freedom of the existing population.⁴⁸ This declaration represented a fundamental departure from the Balfour Declaration which only guaranteed the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish populations. With this new pledge and as the Arabs outnumbered the Jews six to one in Palestine,⁴⁹ Hussein and his supporters could reasonably assume that the Arabs would control Palestine. The second assurance, known as the Declaration to the Seven, was delivered to a group of Arabs domiciled in Cairo on June 16. Here, Britain pledged that the establishment of all future governments in the territories liberated and occupied by Allied forces would be based on the principle of the consent of the governed.⁵⁰

48 Hogarth Message, 1/4/18, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1939, "Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during the year 1918 in regard to the future status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire", Cmd. 5964, London, 1939, p. 3.

49 Palestine's population at the time was estimated to be 802,000 comprising 615,000 Arabs, 104,000 Jews, and 75,000 Christians. Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1931, p. 319.

50 Declaration to the Seven, 6/16/18, Cmd. 5964, pp. 5-6. Antonius, Arab Awakening, pp. 433-434.

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The third assurance, issued on November 7, was the most significant for the Arabs since France now joined with Britain in a joint declaration. Together they pledged to recognize all effectively established native governments or administrations in the liberated territories, and claimed only for themselves the right

to secure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by promoting and encouraging local initiative; to foster the spread of education; and to put an end to the dissensions which Turkish policy has for so long exploited.⁵¹

These pronouncements stressing the purity of their motives in the Near East occasioned tireless Arab references to them later during the peace negotiations. But the joint declaration, just like the other assurances, remained of little consequence when it finally came time to determine the future of the Arab provinces.

51 Anglo-French Declaration, 11/7/18, ibid., p. 436. Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy, II, p. 30.

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D. The Armistice.

With the capitulation of the Bulgarian forces on September 30, 1918, Turkey's own surrender became imminent. The advantages accrued from Britain's overwhelming military preponderance among the Allies in the Ottoman theatre of the war were immediate. After two weeks of preliminaries, Turkish representatives, accredited to Britain only, arrived at Mudros on October 26 in order to negotiate an armistice with a British admiral. A French attempt to work in conjunction with the British official met his firm refusal.⁵² Four days later, an armistice was signed to take affect the next day.

Compared to the other armistices of the First World War, there was nothing extraordinary about the Turkish armistice terms. As could be expected, the Turks were obliged to open the Straits and to relinquish control of the Straits' fortifications. Other stipulations included the immediate demobilization of the bulk of the army, the

⁵² Henry H. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East: The Decline of French Influence, Oxford University Press, London, 1938, p. 54.

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repatriation of Allied prisoners, the Allied right to occupy any strategic points if deemed necessary, and the severance of all relations with the Central powers.⁵³

On November 12, the Allied fleet under a British admiral entered the Dardanelles and anchored off Constantinople. Two days later the first British troops landed in the capital and established themselves in the choice Pera sector and occupied the forts of the Bosphorus. On November 21, the first French soldiers arrived in the city and were followed by Italian and Greek forces. Technically at least, the Allies did not occupy the city since the Turkish government retained its political and administrative rights,⁵⁴ but since an Allied military administration was set up and since a strict Allied control was established over the port, tramways, defences, gendarmerie and police, it was truly an occupation in all but name.

⁵³ Armistice Convention with Turkey, 10/30/18, Sir Frederick Maurice, The Armistices of 1918, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1943, pp. 85-87, Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy, II, pp. 36-37.

⁵⁴ Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation, Weidenfield & Nicolson, London, 1964, p. 135.

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In the rest of Turkey, British forces of occupation again predominated among the Allies. France had managed to establish herself at Mersina and Adana but further extensions of her control were hampered by the British occupation of the Cilician towns of Marash, Aintab, Urfah and the Taurus tunnel system; regions which had all been promised to France. British troops had also landed at Samsun on the Black Sea coast and at Batum and Baku in the Caucasus. Italian troops did not make an appearance until the following spring when they landed at Adalia.

From the beginning, the Allies, and Britain in particular, suffered from a serious misconception; this was the belief that Turkey had been decisively beaten, and that control of the capital city and a few peripheries would suffice to bring the Turkish interior into line. The Turks however, had tasted defeat only in the Arab provinces. Their strength in the interior, aided as it was by the rugged nature of the huge Anatolian plateau, was yet to be broken or even tested. More important was the fact that the Turkish government itself, exercised little effective control in Anatolia, and what control it did have there was being progressively weakened by the increasing disorders

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a problem greatly accentuated by the disbanded soldiers many of whom returned home with their rifles.⁵⁵ It was evident, that without large-scale occupations in Anatolia itself, the Allied control of Turkey was far from complete.

Though control of Turkey was incomplete, Britain had at least established her primacy among the Allies at Constantinople and the Straits. This primacy was even more apparent and far more complete in the Arab provinces. Soon after the armistice, British forces continued to push northwards until the whole vilayet of Mosul was in their hands.⁵⁶

This meant that only a few points on the Syrian coast, occupied by France, were not under the control of the British forces. Britain appeared ready to squeeze France out of her share of the Arab territories. This was particularly true in the Syrian hinterland where the British had installed the Emir Feisal, the son of King Hussein and commander of the Arab forces during the war, as military governor, and who in turn, was busy establishing an Arab

55 Evans, United States Policy, p. 171.

56 Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 17.

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government at Damascus under British supervision.⁵⁷ The obstacle to French pretensions in the Arab world was proving once again to be the British.

While in London in early December 1918, Clemenceau took the opportunity to meet privately with Lloyd George in an attempt to reaffirm the French claims in the Near East. As Clemenceau's primary concern was to get British backing for a more favourable European settlement, he proved willing to modify the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Lloyd George secured Clemenceau's verbal agreement first, to the transfer of Mosul from the French to the British sphere of influence, and second, that Palestine should come under British, instead of international administration.⁵⁸ Just what Clemenceau was promised in return for these concessions, remained unclear and became a sore point between the two.⁵⁹

57 Evans, United States Policy, p. 114, Howard, Partition of Turkey, p. 317.

58 Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry, p. 59. Howard Partition of Turkey, p. 228.

59 Conseil des Quatres, 5/21/19, Paul Mantoux, Les Délibérations Du Conseil Des Quatre (24 Mars-28 Juin 1919), II, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1955, pp. 137-143. Clemenceau's Reply to British Memorandum, 9/9/19, DBFP. IV, pp. 452-454. Lloyd George to Clemenceau, 9/18/19, ibid., p. 483.

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It appeared certain however, that Lloyd George had at least promised France a share in the oil of Mosul and had confirmed the French claims to Syria and Cilicia.⁶⁰ But Britain was in no hurry to complete her part of the bargain. Such was the situation when the Ottoman question came up for liquidation in early 1919.

⁶⁰ Monroe, Britain's Moment, p. 51. Lenczowski, Middle East, p. 73.

CHAPTER II

AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

At the Paris Peace Conference, which was formally opened on January 18, 1919, the Allied Supreme Council was confronted with a herculean task. Not only was it necessary to negotiate five separate peace treaties, each full of complexities, but at Wilson's insistence, a constitution for the proposed League of Nations was to be worked out and incorporated in the treaties.¹ Various committees were organized to study the multitude of details though all decisions rested with the leaders of Britain, France, the United States, Italy and sometimes a representative from Japan in the Supreme Council. In addition, the Supreme Council was faced with a profusion of extraneous problems of varying importance, ranging from the counter-revolutionary wars in Russia to trying to get the Kaiser extradited from Holland. Despite these time consuming interferences the Paris Peace Conference managed to negotiate four of the five peace treaties; the treaty not negotiated was the one with Turkey. In fact, when the Supreme Council in its various

¹ Conseil des Quatre, 3/25/19, Mantoux, Les Délibérations, I, pp. 14-15.

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forms ended its main session on January 21, 1920, a Turkish peace was no closer at hand than it had been a year earlier.

This chapter will deal with the reasons why a Turkish peace was not negotiated and will relate some of the serious effects resulting from this delay. Firstly, the claims of the various subject delegations will be considered.

A. Veniselos and the Greek Claims.

One of the most striking personalities to make an appearance at the Peace Conference was that most loyal supporter of the Entente Alliance, the Greek Premier, Eleutherios Veniselos. From the beginning of the war, Veniselos had made himself the champion of the Entente in opposition to Constantine the Greek King and his military advisors who all advocated neutrality.² At the cost of dividing his country into two bitter factions—Veniselists and Royalists—Veniselos led a revolutionary government at Salonika and entered the war late in November 1916. Later under Allied coercion, Constantine was forced to abdicate

² Greek White Book, American Hellenic Society, Nos. 5,9, New York, 1919, passim.

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and Veniselos, being installed in Athens, formally brought all of Greece into the war on the Allied side. Veniselos' steadfast fidelity to the Allies was a debt which Clemenceau was unable to forget and Lloyd George was eager to reward.

The Greek claims by Veniselos were submitted in a memorandum on December 30, 1918. Just what he would claim could be reasonably determined beforehand. Before the war, Greece's only rival claimant to the vilayet of Adrianople or Eastern Thrace had been Bulgaria. Bulgaria was eliminated as soon as she entered the war on the side of the Central Alliance and stood to lose Western Thrace which she had held since the Balkan Wars. Veniselos' case for laying claim to the whole of Thrace could not be based on the argument that there was a Greek majority. In Eastern Thrace, where most of the Greeks lived, Veniselos could only claim 366,363 Greeks as opposed to 508,311 Turks.³ Instead he invoked the argument that if any of the Thracian coast was left to Turkey or Bulgaria, either country could establish

³ Eleutherios Venizelos, Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919: A Memorandum Dealing with the Rights of Greece, American Hellenic Society, No. 7, New York, p. 35.

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submarine bases and attack the coast of Greece.⁴ What was really implied here was that all merchant shipping would run the risk of submarine attack on entering or leaving the Straits.

As expected, Veniselos also claimed those islands of the Aegean still not in Greece's possession including the Dodecanese, Rhodes and Castellorizo.⁵ The islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Imbros and Tenedos had in fact been assigned to Greece by a decision of the Conference at London on August 1, 1913, but Turkey had refused to comply.⁶ Veniselos' contention that these islands were inhabited by almost purely Greek populations could not be disputed.

Veniselos' third and last claim was to a section of western Turkey. As early as 1915 the Entente, before the addition of Italy, had twice offered Greece important territorial concessions on the coast of Turkey, defined as

4 Ibid., p. 11.

5 Ibid., pp. 21, 26.

6 A.A. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture - and After, Methuen, London, 1937, p. 13.

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the vilayet of Aidin containing Smyrna, on condition Greece made certain territorial concessions to Bulgaria.⁷ Both times Constantine remained unmoved. What the Allies had offered twice Veniselos had no hesitation in asking for the first time. He lay claim to most of the vilayet of Aidin plus the western portions of the vilayet of Brusa.⁸

According to Veniselos' figures this area contained 818,231 Greeks.⁹ In order to strengthen the Greek racial claims Veniselos argued, basing his authority on a German geographer named Philippson, that the islands off the coast from Imbros to Castellorizo formed with western Turkey a geographic unit apart from the interior, and thus, for statistical purposes, the islands should be considered as a part of western Turkey. With this manipulation, he added an additional 370,128 Greeks to those claimed on the mainland for a total of 1,188,359 Greeks. As this figure compared

⁷ Edouard Driault & Michel Lhéritier, Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours, V, Les Presses Universitaires, Paris, 1926, p. 176. David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, II, Victor Gollancz, London, 1938, pp. 1210-1212.

⁸ Venizelos, Greece Before the Peace Congress, p. 21.

⁹ Veniselos' authority for his figures in Asia Minor was Leon Maccas, a Greek Professor at Athens, who in turn had based his statistics on the Turkish census of 1912. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 227.

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favourably to the 1,042,050 Moslems he assigned to the same area, Veniselos concluded that on the basis of Greece's racial claims the adjudging to Greece of a part of western Turkey was justified.¹⁰

Veniselos' inclusion of the island population to his claim in western Turkey signified clearly that the Greeks could not claim a racial majority on the mainland. It was likely that the Greeks could not claim a clear majority outside the sandjak of Smyrna and even here it could be disputed.¹¹ That there was a substantial number of Greeks living in Turkey could not be denied but they stretched along the coast from the Pontus to Alexandretta with few areas of compact settlement. Once past the coastal regions, the areas became almost purely Turkish. What made it particularly difficult to prove or disprove the accuracy of Veniselos' figures was the fact that no reliable statistics existed for the Ottoman Empire. What figures existed could be easily manipulated to suit the purposes of the user.

¹⁰ Veniselos, Greece Before the Peace Congress, pp. 21-22.

¹¹ A bitter critic of Greek expansion claimed there were 218,000 Greeks as compared to 377,000 Moslems in the sandjak. Gaston Gaillard, The Turks and Europe, Thomas Murby, London, 1921, p. 200.

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On February 3, Veniselos appeared before the Supreme Council to defend the Greek claims. He chose rather to humour the Council with anecdotes about Greek life and by paying compliments to all including the Italians.¹² He made an excellent impression. The next day, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson startled the Italian Premier Orlando by agreeing to establish a committee of experts to study the Greek claims.¹³ This was the last thing the Italians wanted since these claims cut across Italian ambitions.

The committee met for three weeks but failed to achieve unanimity. The French and British experts, with a few modifications, recommended acceptance of the Greek claims. The Americans accepted the Greek claims to most of Thrace but opposed those to western Turkey. The Italians were willing to concede the islands but nothing else, refusing even to discuss western Turkey.¹⁴ As a result the whole

¹² Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, Constable, London, 1944, pp. 255-256.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 256-257.

¹⁴ Report of Committee on Greek Territorial Claims, 3/6/19, David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents, X, Appeal, New York, 1928, pp. 283-310, Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 277.

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problem of Greek claims was returned to the Council.

The Italians had temporarily succeeded in overcoming the Greek pretensions to western Turkey and in the process had seemed to be supported by the American experts. The Americans however, were far from accepting the Italians as a substitute for the Greeks; they wanted western Turkey left to the Turks. Yet it was the Italians themselves who precipitated a decision in the Supreme Council to send Greek troops to Smyrna; a decision which amounted to the sanctioning of Greek claims to western Turkey.

1. The Greek Landing at Smyrna

In the latter part of April, Orlando's demand for north Dalmatia and the city of Fiume occasioned a bitter feud between him and President Wilson. North Dalmatia had been allotted to Italy by the Agreement of London but Fiume at the same time, had been assigned to the Croats. Both Clemenceau and Lloyd George backed Wilson in denying Fiume to the Italians but as their country's were signatories to the Agreement of London they were willing to see north Dalmatia go to Italy.¹⁵ As Orlando would not relent in his

¹⁵ Conseil des Quatre, 4/19/19, Mantoux, Les Délibérations, I, pp. 287-290.

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claim to Fiume an impasse was created and in this situation he withdrew his delegation from the Conference.

Faced with the prospect of being forced to relinquish her claims to both the Adriatic and western Turkey, Italy implemented the policy of securing actual representation in these areas. Within ten days, reports were submitted by Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George disclosing unauthorized Italian troop landings in Fiume and on points in southwest Turkey, and as seven Italian warships were stationed outside Smyrna a landing there seemed imminent.¹⁶ In addition, reports were received of Italian brutality in the Dodecanese and Rhodes, and of Italian officials inciting the Bulgarians and Turks against the Serbs and Greeks.¹⁷ This intractable attitude was most injurious to Italy's already weak position in the Supreme Council. Wilson threatened to send America's biggest warship to Fiume or Smyrna and added:

¹⁶ Conseil des Quatre, 4/26/19 - 5/5/19, ibid., pp. 384, 422, 456, 485, 486.

¹⁷ Conseil des Quatre, 5/2/19, 5/5/19, ibid., pp. 455, 485.

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Si je le fais, cela peut produire un résultat - et loin de moi le désir que ce résultat soit la guerre. Mais l'attitude de l'Italie est indubitablement agressive; elle crée une menace à la paix, au milieu même de la Conférence de la paix.¹⁸

Lloyd George was more concerned with the Italian designs in Turkey and his primary aim was to forestall any Italian disembarkation at Smyrna. He first suggested that all three powers send warships to Smyrna.¹⁹ When nothing came of this he initiated the drive to send Greek troops there before the Italians landed, otherwise, he warned: "Nous nous apercevrons un de ces jours qu'ils ont occupé la moitié de l'Anatolie... Nous allons nous trouver en présence d'un fait accompli."²⁰ In the succeeding meeting, when notification was received that the Italians would return to the Conference the next day, Lloyd George reiterated the proposal to send Greek troops and both Clemenceau and Wilson consented without objections.²¹

18 Conseil des Quatre, 5/2/19, ibid., p. 455.

19 Ibid., p. 456.

20 Conseil des Quatre, 5/5/19, ibid., pp. 485-486.

21 Conseil des Quatre, 5/6/19, ibid., pp. 497-499.

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This was a personal victory for Lloyd George in his policy of supporting Veniselos' claims. What particularly enhanced the Greek leader's influence with Lloyd George was that while all the victorious powers were rapidly demobilizing their forces, the Greek army alone was kept fully intact and in fact reinforced by two more divisions.²² Since the Greeks and British were on the best of terms, Lloyd George considered Greek troops in Turkey as the next best thing to British troops. That dependable troops were needed in Anatolia was obvious, and Lloyd George could at least expect that in the area of Greek occupation the Turks would be controlled.

Clemenceau's support was in keeping with his usual axiom of assent in the Near East, as long as French interests were not too compromised, for the sake of a united front in Europe against Germany. A united front at this time was particularly essential, since France was negotiating with Britain and the United States for a treaty of alliance providing for assistance in case of attack by Germany.

²² Doros Alastos, Venizelos: Patriot - Statesman - Revolutionary, Percy Lund Humphries, London, 1942, p. 189.

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Wilson's easy consent undoubtedly surprised Lloyd George. Wilson was known to have sympathy for the Anatolian Greeks, but the key factor which made him overrule the recommendations of his experts was his desire to strike back at Italy's intransigence at the Peace Conference. With the Greek troops in Smyrna, the Italian pretensions to the city, based as they were on the unrecognized St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, would be wiped out for good.

The Italians returned to the Conference on May 7 but the preparations for the Smyrna landing were carried out with Veniselos in Orlando's absence. It was not until May 12, that Clemenceau informed Orlando of the Council's decision, explaining that it was not a matter of distributing territory but only to protect the Greek populations against massacres.²³ As there was little Orlando could do he accepted the decision.

Late in the night of May 14, a division of Greek troops comprising 16,000 men began disembarking at Smyrna under the protection of British, French and Greek warships.

²³ Conseil des Quatre, 5/12/19, Mantoux, Les Délibérations, II, p. 49.

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With some outbreaks of violence the troops brought the city and its suburbs under control. Greece after two millenniums was once again astride the Aegean; their hold survived only three years and ended disasterously.

B. The Near Eastern Claimants

In the first two months of the Conference the representatives of the Armenians, Kurds, Arabs and Zionists had both submitted memoranda of their claims and, except for the Kurds, had appeared before the Supreme Council to support their cases. In addition, the Turks were permitted in June to present their own case before the Council. The adoption of this method of procedure gave the Council an aura of judicial detachment but in the last resort what was said before the Council was of little importance.

The Armenian case was presented jointly by Boghos Nubar Pasha, representing the Turkish Armenians, and by Avetis Aharonian, representing the year old Armenian republic of Transcaucasia. Both men called for a union of the Armenians into one state under the protection of the League of Nations with some power as mandatory.²⁴ In Turkey,

²⁴ Supreme Council, 2/26/19, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919, IV, Washington, 1943, pp. 150, 155, 156.

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Nubar Pasha claimed the traditional six Armenian vilayets of the east: Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharput and Sivas plus part of the vilayet of Trebizond giving access to the Black Sea. Access to the Mediterranean was also desired so a claim was made to the towns of Adana and Alexandretta, and to most of Cilicia.²⁵

The one basic weakness with Nubar Pasha's case was the scarcity of Armenians in the large area claimed. The traditional Armenian vilayets of the east had ceased to be Armenian a long time before, and during the war, the systematic deportations and massacres of the Armenians, conservatively estimated at 800,000 dead,²⁶ left only a possible 270,000 survivors in this area.²⁷ One could sympathize with Nubar Pasha's appeal that for statistical purposes the dead should be counted with the living, but it was obvious that

25 Ibid., p. 153. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921), Philosophical Library, New York, 1951, p. 256.

26 Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 57.

27 A figure estimated by the American Harbord Mission to Armenia. Harry N. Howard, An American Inquiry in the Middle East: The King-Crane Commission, Khayats, Beirut, 1963, p. 272.

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the Armenians could not defend themselves against the Kurds or the Turks. A future Armenian state was conceivable only if some major power would undertake to protect and finance it, otherwise a new Armenia had no chance of survival.

A claim made on behalf of the Kurds overlapped with much of the Armenian claim. Cherif Pasha, who posed as a representative of the Kurds but was never acknowledged as such by the Council, proposed an independent Kurdistan formed from the vilayets of Diarbekir, Kharput, Bitlis, plus Mosul and the sandjak of Urfa in Cilicia.²⁸ Of the estimated 2,500,000 Kurds in Turkey,²⁹ the greater part lived about the headwaters of the Tigris just where Cherif Pasha centered his claim. Nevertheless, the majority of Kurds showed little enthusiasm for independence from the Turks, and as in the past, the Kurds were more inclined to side with the Turks than to fight them. The Council however, worked on the assumption that it was safer, particularly for the Armenians, to separate the two rather than leave the Kurds under continued Turkish rule.

²⁸ Mémoire sur les Revendications des Kurdes, 2/6/19, Miller, My Diary, V, p. 137.

²⁹ Isaiah Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography, World Book, New York, 1921, p. 444.

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While men like Nubar Pasha and Cherif Pasha might contemplate the acquisition of Turkish territory for their respective nationalities, the Arab provinces had already been separated de facto. The Emir Feisal, who formally headed the Hedjaz delegation and claimed to speak for all Arabs, was concerned only with the fulfillment of the wartime pledges made to the Arabs. Before the Council, he reiterated the Arab right to complete self-determination from the line Alexandretta - Diarbekir southward to the Indian Ocean.³⁰ In the opinion of Feisal and his father, King Hussein, the greatest possible obstacle to a future Arab confederation was if France obtained a mandate over Syria. To counter this French aspiration, Feisal stated that the inhabitants of the various Arab provinces should be allowed to indicate their choice of a mandatory power and suggested that an international inquiry be made in the areas to determine the wishes of the people.³¹ The implication here was obvious: Feisal was confident that the Syrians would never select the French as their trustee.

30 Supreme Council, 2/6/19, Miller, My Diary, XIV, p. 227.

31 Ibid., p. 230.

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Not to be outdone by the pro-British delegation from the Hedjaz, France attempted to influence President Wilson by sponsoring two pro-French delegations to the Conference. The first, alleging to represent a great number of Syrians, claimed that the Syrians were not Arabs and should be separated from the Arabs and put under a French mandate.³² The second delegation, the Lebanese, was more convincing. Among the Maronites of Lebanon, France's prestige and influence was unexcelled; they were, in reality, France's only true sympathizers in the Arab provinces. The delegation called for a French mandate over their area and declared their willingness to reunite with Syria providing France received the mandate there also.³³

Whereas a decision relative to Syria was remote, a solution for Palestine seemed deceptively near at hand. When Sokolow asked for the recognition of the historic right of the Jews to a national home in Palestine,³⁴ he was treading over old ground. Ever since the Balfour Declaration,

32 Supreme Council, 2/13/19, ibid., pp. 404-405, 411.

33 Supreme Council, 2/15/19, ibid., pp. 430-431.

34 Supreme Council, 2/27/19, ibid., XV, pp. 104-108.

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all of the major powers of the Entente had joined England in expressing some form of sympathy for the Zionist cause. Even Feisal offered to leave Palestine open to discussion by all interested parties.³⁵ This offer was a direct result of an agreement signed between Weizmann and Feisal, wherein, Feisal agreed to allow large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine in return for Weizmann's promise of Zionist economic aid to the future Arab state.³⁶

Nevertheless, a national home for the Jews in an area overwhelmingly Arab in population and tradition could not but give rise to serious complications. It was doubtful that Feisal was actually willing to give up the Arab claims to Palestine. More likely, and as he had suggested earlier to the Council, he was willing to concede a special administrative organization for Palestine;³⁷ an administration which would not prevent Palestine from at least joining in a loose federation with the future Arab state.

35 Supreme Council, 2/6/19, ibid., XIV, p. 230.

36 Feisal-Weizmann Agreement, 1/3/19, ibid., III, pp. 188-189, Weizmann, Trial and Error, pp. 246-247.

37 Memorandum by Feisal, 1/1/19, Miller, My Diary, IV, pp. 298-299.

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Only after the Supreme Council had listened to all the talk of a large Armenia, of a Kurdistan, of an independent Arabia, of even a Constantinopolitan state, and had sanctioned the Greek landing in Smyrna, only then were the Turks allowed to state their case. The task fell to Damad Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier and brother-in-law to the Sultan. In his appearance before the Council on June 17, Ferid warned the Allies against passing an unjust judgment on the Ottoman Empire. He argued that the guilt for Turkey's entrance into the war and for all crimes perpetrated against the Christians rested not with the Sultan or the Turkish people, but with the Committee of Union and Progress, a Young Turk organization which had forcibly taken over the reins of government in 1913. Since the Committee no longer existed and since the people were not responsible for the Committee's crimes, he asked for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the status quo ante bellum.³⁸ A few days later, the Turks also asked for the restoration of Western Thrace and all the islands off the Turkish coast lost in previous wars.³⁹ At a time when it was

38 Supreme Council, 6/17/19, ibid., XVI, pp. 419-421.

39 Memorandum by the Ottoman Delegation, 6/23/19, ibid., pp. 481-482.

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essential for the Turks to vie for the good will of the Council members they chose to speak as victors and not victims of the war. As a result, those Allied officials who for a variety of reasons were prepared to listen with some sympathy to the Turkish case, became in fact indignant over these extravagant demands. The Council replied the next day with a remarkable display of intolerance; it stated that

there is no case to be found, either in Europe or Asia or Africa, in which the establishment of Turkish rule in any country has not been followed by a diminution of material prosperity, and a fall in the level of culture; nor is there any case to be found in which the withdrawal of Turkish rule has not been followed by a growth in material prosperity, and a rise in the level of culture.⁴⁰

It was certain that as long as such an attitude prevailed in the Council the Turks could not hope for an equitable solution in any peace treaty.

⁴⁰ Answer to the Turkish Delegates, 6/24/19, ibid., pp. 476-477.

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C. Postponement of the Turkish Peace Negotiations

It was generally agreed at the Conference that it was desirable for all concerned if the United States committed herself in some active way in Asia Minor. Of all the victorious states, she alone, was in a position to nurture genuine trust among the Turks; she had not been at war with Turkey and had been absent from the European rivalries of the past which had threatened the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Lloyd George and Clemenceau considered an American mandate over Constantinople and the Straits as the best solution safeguarding the interests of all concerned. In Armenia, both leaders were anxious to rid themselves of a potential burden and America's interest in the Armenians presented an opportunity for a good solution.

Wilson, at one time or another, had expressed confidence that the United States would decide to assume both these mandates ⁴¹ but he could not commit his country without the prior sanction of the Senate. On June 27,

⁴¹ Conseil des Quatre, 5/21/19, 6/26/19, Mantoux, Les Délibérations, II, pp. 142, 532.

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just two days before Wilson left for the United States, the Supreme Council agreed to postpone further consideration of the Turkish settlement until such time as the Senate could definitely state whether a mandate over a portion of Turkey was acceptable to them.⁴² The decision was only forthcoming late in October, and to no one's surprise, the Senate refused to shoulder any responsibilities in Turkey.

This suspension of the Turkish negotiations over the summer and autumn of 1919 was not solely due to America's procrastination in making up her mind, as Lloyd George contended.⁴³ There were too many signs pointing to the improbability of American acceptance for the Allies to be hopeful. Even before Wilson came to the Peace Conference, the midterm Congressional elections had shown that the American people were deserting Wilson and his Democrats. By March of 1919, the American delegates at the Peace Conference were noting the increasing reluctance of their

⁴² Supreme Council, 6/27/19, DBFP., IV, p. 652.

⁴³ Lloyd George, Truth, II, pp. 1260, 1268, 1301.

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people to enter external entanglements.⁴⁴ Soon, general opposition to the use of American troops abroad, or other foreign obligations, were being strongly voiced in the American press, and as could be expected, the reports from British officials in Washington were pessimistic and gave only the remotest chance for Senate acceptance.⁴⁵ It was quite unlikely that the Allies would have waited for an answer that long when all indications pointed to a negative verdict.

The improbability of American acceptance of mandates suggests that there was a more basic reason for the long delay in the Turkish negotiations. Just when the signing of the German Treaty became imminent, Clemenceau made it clear for the first time that he was not willing to precede with the Turkish negotiations until the one outstanding issue between Britain and France in the Near East had been

⁴⁴ Stephen Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1946, p. 193.

⁴⁵ Lindsay to Curzon, 8/16/19, DBFP., IV, p. 730, Grey to Curzon, 10/7/19, 10/10/19, ibid., pp. 797, 797-798, n. 3.

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solved.⁴⁶ The issue was Syria, where, despite Lloyd George's confirmation of French objectives the December before, the British showed no sign of evacuating their troops. Quite understandably, it was for Clemenceau simply bad politics if France entered the Turkish negotiations without actually controlling the areas that were to be claimed, particularly as these claims were both disputed by the Arabs and disliked by Wilson. As the British were, for certain reasons, not ready to relinquish their control of Syria, the question of American acceptance of mandates provided an opportune intermission in the Turkish negotiations for Clemenceau to try and get satisfaction from the British.

Despite the ambiguous and conflicting commitments made to the Arabs and the French, the British position in Syria was clear and definite. British policy, as directed by Lloyd George, was based on two simple concepts: the need to strengthen British pre-eminence in the Arab provinces as much as possible and the equal need of reducing France's competitive position to the lowest possible level. While

⁴⁶ Conseil des Quatre, 6/26/19, Mantoux, Les Délibérations, II, p. 531.

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the French Foreign Minister, Pichon, had talked of France's intentions of treating all of Syria as one unit under their mandate,⁴⁷ Britain had already installed an Arab government under Feisal, in the area once designated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement as the zone of French influence. The main objective was to continue modifying the Sykes-Picot formula until France was left with only a minor role in the eastern Mediterranean; preferably in the role of mere technical advisors west of the Aleppo-to-Damascus line.

The success of this policy was contingent upon Britain holding her military advantage in Syria until a peace was negotiated. Until this occurred, Lloyd George could justify keeping the French out of Syria simply on the grounds that if French troops relieved the British garrisons, the Arabs would fight, and he always had Allenby, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Arab provinces, to support this argument.⁴⁸ The apparent British solicitude for the Arabs was for the French government simply a plot

⁴⁷ Supreme Council, 3/20/19, Baker, Woodrow Wilson, III, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 14-16. Conseil des Quatre, 5/31/19, Mantoux, Les Délibérations, II, p. 263.

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to render precarious a French mandate for Syria, and the longer the British stayed in Syria, the longer the British would have to rally anti-French sentiment among the Arabs. These fears were greatly substantiated when Feisal's Syrian Congress declared, among other things, that France was not wanted in any capacity in any part of Syria.⁴⁹

The ensuing French pressure on the British government was not however, the cause for the collapse of Lloyd George's Arab policy in Syria. It was essential first of all, that an early peace be negotiated, and Lloyd George's attempts on June 25 to do just that, failed to get Clemenceau's consent, even when the British leader reiterated officially that his government would not take a mandate over Syria under any circumstances.⁵⁰ Once the preparation of a Turkish peace became indefinite, it became progressively harder for Lloyd George to justify his government's expenditures in Syria to the British Parliament

⁴⁹ Resolution of the General Syrian Congress, 7/2/19, Hurewitz, (ed.), Diplomacy, II, p. 63.

⁵⁰ Conseil des Quatre, 6/25/19, Mantoux, Les Délibérations, II, pp. 516-518.

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particularly as the public was aware of the announced disinterest in the area.⁵¹ Secondly, as long as the United States appeared ready to share in the new postwar responsibilities, Britain could risk a dispute with France. But the American Senate's negative attitude to the Treaty of Versailles and to the League's Covenant made it likely that she would again revert to her accustomed isolation from European affairs. This meant that Britain and France alone would carry the brunt of these new responsibilities, and as Lloyd George could well understand, such a situation necessitated harmonious relations between the two governments.

These were the factors which forced Lloyd George to submit to French desires. In mid-September, he announced that the evacuation of British forces from Syria and Cilicia would commence on November 1. Responsibility for garrisoning the evacuated Syrian districts would be divided between the French and the Arabs; the French west of the Aleppo-to-Damascus line and Arabs along this line and east of it.⁵²

51 Toynbee, The Western Question, p. 86.

52 Lloyd George's Aide-Mémoire, 9/13/19, DBFP., I, p. 700.

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This division followed the Sykes-Picot arrangement but bitterness and not gratitude could be expected from the French since the British had taken exactly one year to fulfill a basic wartime commitment. In the same period, Britain had falsely raised the hopes of the Sherifian party, that the French would not be allowed in Syria, only to let them down. Feisal's position in particular, became extremely vulnerable; his promise of a united Syria had been destroyed. How long the French would remain west of the Aleppo-to-Damascus line depended not on him but on the French. It was obvious that British policy in Syria had satisfied neither the French nor the Arabs.

Nevertheless, once the replacement of British troops by the French began, arrangements were made for the reopening of the Turkish negotiations. As arranged this was completed by December 10 and on the very next day private Anglo-French talks relative to the Turkish peace were resumed in London.

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D. The Effects of Delay: The Turkish Nationalist Movement.

The suspension of the Turkish negotiations had lasted a little less than six months. It was an interval which proved to be crucial both to Allied relations, and to the possibility of ever imposing the anticipated peace terms without the use of military force. This was all the outcome of a remarkable development in Anatolia: the Turkish national movement emerged as a force that had to be reckoned with.

The pattern for national resistance had been set almost immediately following the armistice. Resistance movements first appeared in Adrianople and Smyrna; others followed in Erzerum, Elazig, and elsewhere in Anatolia.⁵³ Though small and largely ineffectual, these organizations provided the basis for a united nationalist revival which was eventually to thwart all the Allied plans in Turkey. Credit for the success of this revival was attributable to the brilliant and energetic leadership of one man—Mustapha Kemal.

⁵³ Mustapha Kemal, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal: President of the Turkish Republic, Koehler Leipzig, 1929, p. 10. Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 23-24.

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Mustapha Kemal had been one of the few Turkish generals to emerge from the war with a reputable military record. He had first gained national attention in 1915 for his role in the defence of Gallipoli, and later, in Turkish Armenia and the Caucasus, he was credited with several victories over the Russians. In the last few months of the war, Kemal commanded the Seventh army in Syria; the only Turkish force to remain intact and to display some form of military efficiency during Allenby's rapid thrust from Jerusalem to Aleppo. On the day of the armistice, Kemal succeeded the German general, Liman Von Sanders, as commander of the Turkish forces on the Arab front.⁵⁴

Even at this early date, it was evident that Kemal was concerned with the future safety of Turkey. British encroachments into Mosul and Cilicia prompted him to send officers into the interior to organize guerilla groups while military equipment was stored in places of safety.⁵⁵ Once his troops were disbanded, Kemal was summoned to

⁵⁴ Liman Von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, 1928, p. 319.

⁵⁵ Kinross, Ataturk, pp. 130-131.

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Constantinople, and here he communicated with other Turkish officers interested in resisting the Entente, among them Ali Fuad, who had commanded the 20th division and in time became the commander of the nationalist forces in western Anatolia. Together they drew up a programme of national resistance "to create a New Turkish State, the sovereignty and independence of which would be unreservedly recognised by the whole world."⁵⁶ This was to be the keynote of the Kemalist programme during the next few years.

For the Sultan and his sympathizers, nationalist activity in the capital caused alarm; any such movement, they felt, threatened not only the Entente invader but the existing order as well. In order to get him out of the capital, Kemal was appointed on April 30, 1919, as Inspector-General of the Ninth Army based at Samsun. His instructions were to restore order, disarm the population and the remaining Turkish forces, and settle disputes between Christians

⁵⁶ Kemal, Speech, p. 17.

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and Moslems.⁵⁷ Instead, on arriving in Samsun on May 19, Kemal immediately began the task of linking the existing resistance groups, forming new ones, organizing the cadres of a national army, and in short, preparing for a war of liberation.

Kemal's arrival in Anatolia just a few days after the Greek landing at Smyrna was mere coincidence. The Greek landing did not precipitate the nationalist movement as sometimes stated, but if Kemal needed to justify the existence of his movement to potential recruits, there was no better justification than the Greek landing. The Greeks, like the Armenians, were despised and considered inferior by the Turks, and to suddenly have Greece, a former territory of the Ottoman Empire, participating in the partition of their homeland was insultingly unbearable. The Greek landing ensured that Kemal's organizational efforts in Anatolia would get off to a good start.

One of his first aims was to establish a clear and comprehensive political programme. To formulate this

⁵⁷ Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1966, p. 241.

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programme the nationalists held two congresses: the first in Erzerum beginning on July 23, and the second in Sivas beginning on September 4. Among the initial declarations of each of these congresses was the affirmation of loyalty to the Sultan.⁵⁸ It was obvious that Kemal was not willing to chance an open rebellion against the legitimate ruler and Caliph of the Turks; instead, the blame for all the ills beseting the country was placed upon the Grand Vizier—Damad Ferid. The most important achievement of these congresses was the drafting of a programme which was eventually to emerge and be known as the National Pact—a document dedicated to the defence of Turkey's political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This document listed six articles representing the maximum conditions the nationalists were willing to accept in any peace treaty. It stipulated: Turkish acceptance of the principle of self-determination for the Arabs; a plebiscite for Western Thrace; a plebiscite for the sandjaks of Batum, Kars and Ardahan; Constantinople to remain the

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 243-244.

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Turkish capital and a Straits' regime to be determined jointly by the Turkish government and other governments concerned; Turkish guarantee of the rights of minorities providing these rights reciprocated to Moslem minorities in neighbouring countries; and lastly, the complete elimination of all restrictions inimical to Turkey's political, judicial and economic development.⁵⁹

Whereas the first article renounced Turkish sovereignty over the Arab majorities, it was evident that the National Pact still claimed for Turkey all the other subject nationalities. This meant that the nationalists not only refused to cede territory to the Kurds, Armenians or Greeks, but in fact laid claim to the vilayet of Mosul where non-Arab Moslems were in a majority.⁶⁰ What the nationalists were asking for, in effect, was the 1914 Ottoman Empire short of her Arab populations and territories.

⁵⁹ Printed in full Toynbee, The Western Question, pp. 209-210. Hurewitz, (ed.), Diplomacy, II, pp. 74-75.

⁶⁰ In spite of the Arab character of the capital city, the population of the vilayet of Mosul was predominantly Kurdish. Arnold J. Toynbee & Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey, Ernest Benn, London, 1926, p. 278.

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but with the reannexations of Western Thrace and the three former Russian districts of Batum, Kars and Ardahan. A Turkey with these boundaries would embrace all existant large segments of Turkish populations. The one other significant demand was the last article. In the proposed Turkish state, all extraterritorial rights in matters of justice, taxation and economic exploitations, as foreigners had enjoyed and abused in the so-called Capitulations, would be abolished. Nothing short of a completely independent and sovereign Turkey would be accepted by the nationalists. It was evident that Turkish nationalism was at once a revolt against western domination and an acceptance of the western idea of nationhood.⁶¹

The first to suffer from the rise of nationalist power in Anatolia was the Turkish central government. From the conclusion of the war, the government's authority and control in the interior had been unquestionably weak. There was little chance of improvement since the armistice conditions deprived the government of needed revenues from Allied occupied territories and prevented it from sending

61 Toynbee, The Western Question, p. 322.

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adequate troops into the interior to quell disturbances and maintain order. Without order it was difficult to collect taxes in many of the distant provinces. The failure to negotiate an early peace meant the forced prolongation of these harmful conditions, and this factor, coupled with the rapid extension of nationalists control over several Anatolian provinces, occasioned a warning from Damad Ferid of the impending bankruptcy and disintegration of all governmental administration.⁶²

Though the British and French governments were united in their support of the Turkish government, they were willing neither to give financial assistance, as their High Commissions in Constantinople had strongly recommended,⁶³ nor to permit Ferid to raise an army to fight the nationalists. As a consequence, the nationalists steadily extended their control until by the end of September 1919, the central government exercised no effective authority in Anatolia except for a few areas in the proximity of the capital.⁶⁴

62 Grand Vizier to Clemenceau, 8/24/19, DBFP., IV, p. 740.

63 Robeck to Curzon, 9/23/19, ibid., p. 780.

64 Controlled only an area within the perimeter of Ada Bazar, Eski Shehr and Panderma. Robeck (Webb) to Curzon, 10/10/19, ibid., p. 804.

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Accompanying this rapid increase of Kemalist jurisdiction was the demand for new elections to the Ottoman legislature which had been in a state of dissolution since the previous December. The elections were set for October, and as could have been expected, the nationalists and their sympathizers returned a decided majority. On January 28, 1920, just a fortnight after its convening, the Turkish legislature officially adopted the National Pact as the Turkish programme for peace.

The Turkish national revival was undoubtedly the most serious effect of the delay in negotiating the Turkish peace. The growth of this movement, coming as it did while the Allies were in a process of reducing their own forces in Turkey, made the situation particularly unfavourable for ever implementing the anticipated peace terms. The two chief British officials in Turkey, Admiral Sir J. de Robeck, the High Commissioner in Constantinople, and General Sir George F. Milne, the Commander of Allied Forces in Asiatic Turkey, dutifully recorded for their superiors in England the altered circumstances in Turkey during the summer and autumn of 1919, and were in unison in recommending peace terms lenient enough not to require extensive employment of

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military forces for enforcement.⁶⁵ It was evident, however, that any peace requiring only minimal military enforcement would have to satisfy the nationalists, and the nationalists could only be satisfied with the terms of the National Pact, terms which were still highly unacceptable to the Allied negotiators.

Yet, by the end of 1919, the Anglo-French solidarity in supporting the Turkish central government against nationalists was already beginning to disintegrate. The acrimony over Syria had done irreparable harm to Anglo-French relations. Criticism of Clemenceau's handling of French affairs and interests in the Levant had built up not only among French financial circles, the press, and the French colonial party but among members of his own government.⁶⁶ French influence, these critics felt, was being compromised by the meddling tactics of the British, and what was needed was a more active and more independent French policy in order to block the growing British preponderance both in Turkey and in the Arab provinces.

⁶⁵ Robeck to Curzon, 11/18/19, 12/23/19, ibid., pp. 895, 970-972. Milne to War Office, 10/20/19, ibid., pp. 998-999 n.14.

⁶⁶ Toynbee & Kirkwood, Turkey, p. 119, Evans, United States Policy, p. 115.

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The first specific indication of the toughening of French policy came in late November. The British Foreign Office was informed that Georges Picot, who had just been relieved as High Commissioner in Syria, accompanied by two French officers had arranged to meet Kemal before returning to France.⁶⁷ This act not only implied recognition of the nationalist movement by an Allied force, but was a precursory move indicating France's later willingness to come to terms with the nationalists, both to protect French interests in Turkey and to use the nationalists to hinder British influence and interests. Before the real implementation of this policy however, the peace terms were negotiated and the treaty signed.

⁶⁷ Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 11/29/19, DBFP., IV, p. 560.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL CLAUSES: THE TURKISH TERRITORIES.I.

Though private Anglo-French talks were resumed in December 1919, it was not until the Conference of London, beginning on February 12, 1920, that formal negotiations relative to the Turkish peace were reopened by the Supreme Council. Of the original principal negotiators only Lloyd George was left—Francesco Nitti had replaced Orlando, Alexandre Millerand had replaced Clemenceau, and President Wilson and his delegation had altogether abandoned the peace negotiations. With the elimination of American opposition and with the settlement of the Anglo-French dispute over Syria, the major obstacles hindering the Turkish negotiations had been removed. The new negotiations progressed quickly; by the end of the London Conference on April 10, the bulk of the terms had been negotiated, and after the Conference of San Remo, April 18 to 26, the treaty was ready for signing. The peace, awaited by the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire for over eighteen months, was thus finally negotiated in a short ten weeks.

The next three chapters will deal with the political clauses which emerged from these two Conferences. The present chapter will be concerned only with those clauses

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pertaining to Constantinople, the Straits, Smyrna and Eastern Thrace.

A. Constantinople

During the first two weeks of the London Conference, the Supreme Council considered the whole range of topics relating to the Turkish treaty. While most questions were referred to special committees for further study and for drafting of articles, two general principles were reached immediately by the Supreme Council: the Sultan and the Turkish government were to remain in Constantinople and an international regime was to be set up for the Straits.¹

Ever since the withdrawal of Russian claims, the future of Constantinople had been a subject of concern among the Allied leaders. Though Lloyd George had declared publicly in January 1918 that the British intention was to leave the city to the Turks, he hoped for an American mandate over the city, and when this failed, he favoured depriving the Turks of their capital and placing it under Allied control. As far as he was concerned, the 'unspeakable'

¹ Allied Conference at London, 2/14/20, DBFP., Vii, pp. 44-47.

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Turks were an untrustworthy and decadent race and as long as the Sultan continued to reside at the gates of the Bosphorus, the complete safety and control of the Straits could never be assured.² Thus, rather than preserve a potential source of trouble, Lloyd George considered it better to rid Europe of the Turks once and for all while the circumstances were opportune.

Clemenceau on the other hand, had expressed his hopes of leaving Constantinople to the Turks; he had suggested that this would leave a measure of prestige essential for the new Turkish state.³ More likely, Clemenceau felt that French interests in the city would fare much better under the Sultan, than under an inter-Allied control dominated by the British fleet. Nevertheless, under the combined efforts of Lloyd George and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, the French leader was persuaded to agree to the British proposal.⁴

2 Lloyd George, The Truth, II, pp. 1271-1272, 1355-1357. Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of The Peace Conference and After: 1918-1923, Victor Gollancz, London, 1933, p. 208.

3 Anglo-French Meeting, 12/11/19, DBFP., II, p. 728.

4 Ibid., pp. 728-730, 731.

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Though Clemenceau had been persuaded, Lloyd George failed to convince his own Cabinet. Apart from Curzon and Balfour, the British leader had little other support. The War Office and the Admiralty had both indicated early in 1919 that they favoured a Turkish Constantinople,⁵ but the most active and consistent proponent of this policy was Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India. Renewed nationalists agitation in India made the India Office particularly sensitive and fearful of the effects of any affront to the Turks on the Indian Moslems.⁶ When Lloyd George had Orlando and Clemenceau enthused over plans for the total partition of Anatolia back in May 1919, Montagu led a delegation of Indian Moslems—including the Aga Khan—to the Supreme Council. The delegation demanded Turkish territorial integrity and cautioned the Council against any decision which would violate the Sultan's position as Caliph in Constantinople, the capital of Islam, otherwise they warned, Moslem reaction could be expected throughout

⁵ At a Meeting of the British Peace Delegation, 1/30/19. Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 253.

⁶ In 1921 it was estimated that there were 66,000,000 Moslems in India out of a population of 325,000,000. Bowman, The New World, p. 55.

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the eastern world.⁷ The partition scheme was dropped, but Montagu found it expedient to continue his campaign for a Turkish Constantinople among his Cabinet colleagues since the main resistance against this policy was coming from Lloyd George and the Foreign Office. After the Lloyd George-Clemenceau decision to eject the Turks, Montagu intensified his campaign and Curzon found himself compelled to answer Montagu's charges and to justify the position taken by the Foreign Office.⁸ His efforts proved futile for two days later, on January 6, 1920, the Cabinet defeated the proposal to eject the Turks from Constantinople.⁹

It was a disappointed Lloyd George who announced the change in British policy at the London Conference. Nevertheless, since it was known that both Nitti and Millerand favoured the retention of the Turks in Constantinople, Lloyd George made the most of the occasion by giving

7 Conseil des Quatre, 5/17/19, Les Délibérations, II, pp. 98-104.

8 Curzon's Memorandum on the Future of Constantinople, 1/4/20, DBFP., IV, pp. 992-1000.

9 Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, III, Ernest Benn, London, 1928, p. 270.

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the impression that the change in policy was made in order to harmonize the views of the Allies.¹⁰ Either way, Nitti and Millerand considered the decision a fine start to the negotiations and it was made public immediately.

For Veniselos however, the decision was a setback. Veniselos had not claimed Constantinople but it was no secret that the Greeks coveted the city. If the Turks lost possession, Veniselos could reasonably assume that in the event of any future withdrawal of Allied control, Greece stood a very good chance of acquiring the city. These hopes were dashed by the Cabinet's decision of January 7. It appears likely that Lloyd George informed Veniselos of this decision, for on January 14, Veniselos submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office suggesting that Turkey's retention of Constantinople should be made contingent upon her faithful adherence to the terms of the treaty and on her protection of minorities.¹¹ In Veniselos' opinion such a proposal, if adopted, would

¹⁰ Allied Conference at London, 2/14/20, DBFP., VII, p. 46.

¹¹ Venizelos' Supplementary Memorandum, 1/14/20, ibid., IV., p. 1061

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provide an effective restraint on Turkish misconduct in the future; unmentioned was the fact that it would also allow the Greeks a glimmer of hope that Constantinople could still become theirs if Turkey proved recalcitrant. Under the circumstances it was the best Veniselos could do to salvage some Greek hope for the city.

The Veniselos proposal, won over the negotiators. It was incorporated in the treaty, along with the Sultan's right to reside and maintain his government in Constantinople, with one alteration; whereas Veniselos had given the League the right to dispossess Turkey of her capital, the treaty gave the prerogative only to the signatories of the treaty.¹² Its value as a measure of enforcement however, was proven worthless long before the treaty was ever signed.

Shortly after the Council publicized in Turkey its decision for a Turkish Constantinople, reports were received of nationalists forces massacring Armenians in the Marash area of Cilicia. Lloyd George was infuriated and demanded that the Allies make a show of force in Turkey,

12. Ibid. Article 36; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923, II, New York, 1924, p. 799. Hereafter cited as Treaty.

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preferably by a military occupation of Constantinople.¹³

To all but the uninitiated, Constantinople was already under occupation, but Lloyd George's intention was to bring the Turkish War Office, where Kemalist sentiment was strong, under Allied control. The French and the Italian representatives were opposed but Lloyd George persisted and the operation was set for March 16. On that day, British forces began the operation and the French and Italians only reluctantly joined the British at the last moment. By the end of the day, the Turkish War Office and the Ministry of Marine had been seized and all their facilities brought under Allied control. In addition, some eighty-five deputies of the recently elected legislature were arrested.¹⁴

An official communique announced that the occupation was temporary but warned emphatically, that the decision to leave Constantinople in Turkish hands would be altered if unrest and persecution persisted in Anatolia.¹⁵

¹³ Allied Conference at London, 3/3/20, DBFP., VII, pp. 362, 363.

¹⁴ Kinross, Ataturk, p. 207.

¹⁵ Kemal, Speech, p. 359. Howard, Partition of Turkey, pp. 256-257.

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Kemal's answer to this threat came three days later; he issued a proclamation calling for elections to a Grand National Assembly to be convened at Angora the following month.¹⁶ The action of March 16 had shown that Allied power in Constantinople was unlimited, yet as Winston Churchill, then Secretary of War, had forewarned, "whatever action might be taken at Constantinople, the same would never result in compliance by Turkey as a whole."¹⁷ Constantinople had truly become a capital without a country.

B. The Straits

Unlike Constantinople, there was no question of allowing the Turks to retain the Straits. Since Russia's withdrawal, the only alternative to organizing an international administration for the Straits was to encourage the United States to assume full responsibility, and once this failed the decision for the remaining option was both expected and welcomed in all Allied quarters. It remained for the Council simply to work out the details of the regime. Those differences that arose here, were ironed out quite amicably.

¹⁶ Printed in Kemal, Speech, pp. 364-366.

¹⁷ Allied Conference at London, 3/3/20, DBFP., VII, p. 364.

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Basically, the Allies sought to establish the principle of 'freedom of the Straits'; the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus were to be opened to all ships of all nations both in peace and war, and only the Council of the League of Nations could temporarily alter this freedom.¹⁸ Such a policy was in sharp contrast to what Britain had consistently practised during the nineteenth century, yet it was clear why Britain, as well as France and Italy, would adopt the 'freedom of the Straits' principle. These countries along with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia comprised the six major powers dominant in the prewar shipping and commerce of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea areas.¹⁹ Three of these powers had not only lost their warships for an indefinite period but also their merchant marine, and the Allied powers, and especially Britain among them, could now enjoy an unrivaled preponderance at the Straits. Anything short of an unconditional 'open Straits' policy would only tend to hinder the Allies' own supremacy. In addition, this

18 Article 37, Treaty, p. 799.

19 See tables in British Observations, 12/12/19, DBFP., IV, p. 943. Bowman, The New World, p. 416.

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policy assured Britain and France of unlimited access to the Black Sea either to continue their aid to the anti-Bolsheviks operating in southern Russia or to pose their warships, if need arose, to Russia's vulnerable flank. The one allowance made to the League's Council to alter the policy of the Straits, was of negligible risk to the European Allies, since they, along with Japan, comprised four of the five permanent seats of this body.

To administer this 'open Straits' policy, Turkey was to delegate full control to a Commission of the Straits. This Commission was initially restricted to Britain, France and Italy, but provision was made for the participation of the United States and Russia.²⁰ Before the actual signing of the treaty, this body was to be enlarged several times: at British insistence, Roumania and Greece were admitted, and also Bulgaria, if and when she became a member of the League;²¹ then Japan shocked her European Allies by demanding membership, which was granted;²² and finally, Turkey

20 Straits Draft, Article 4, DBFP., VII, p. 322.

21 Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/1/20, ibid., pp. 314-317. This body was constituted in order to examine the draft articles prepared for the Supreme Council at the London Conference. Technically it remained the Supreme Council.

22 Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/4/20, 4/7/20, ibid., pp. 393-399, 719-721.

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protested her exclusion and it was decided to admit her on the same condition as provided for Bulgaria.²³ The minor powers were each to be 'one vote' members while the others, including Japan, Russia and the United States, were to be 'two vote' members.²⁴ As it was stipulated that only a 'two vote' member could hold the chairmanship,²⁵ and as the immediate participation of the United States and Russia was unlikely, the Commission threatened to be just another inter-Allied affair.

Though the Commission could not technically claim sovereignty over the Straits, its power would be almost complete. Its authority extended not only over the waters of the Straits and Sea of Marmora, but also along the shores which were to be demilitarized for the added safety of the 'open Straits'.²⁶ It would control everything relating to the Straits, right from the supervision of the rules of

23 Allied Conference at Spa, 7/7/20, ibid., VIII, pp. 443, 444.

24 Article 40, Treaty, p. 800.

25 Point 1, Annex, Part III, Section II, ibid., p. 806.

26 Articles 39, 177, 178; ibid., pp. 800, 841-842.

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navigation and the levying of dues to the control of quarantine and sanitation.²⁷ One of the principal objectives of British policy was to make the Commission as completely independent and self-sufficient as possible. There was no hesitation in agreeing that the Commission have its own police force,²⁸ but Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to Britain, objected to having the Commission control its own finances. He wanted the Commission's financial matters placed entirely under the proposed Financial Commission;²⁹ an agency instituted to provide the superstructure of the stringent financial control which the Allies intended to exercise over the new Turkish state. Since the French had the greatest share of the capital investments in Turkey, she could expect to have a dominating influence in the Financial Commission, and if this agency controlled the purse strings of the Straits Commission, the threat of British domination of the Straits Commission would be lessened considerably. The British viewpoint triumphed; there were

27 Articles 43, 46, 53, ibid., pp. 801-802, 803.

28 Article 48, ibid., p. 802.

29 Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/1/20, DBFP., VII, pp. 317-318.

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already the precedents of the Danube and Congo Commissions possessing financial independence, and as the Italians on this rare occasion supported the British, the French relented.³⁰ It was agreed that the Straits Commission would have control of its own budget plus the right to arrange loans on the security of the dues it was to collect at the Straits.³¹

The one area where the Commission's power would be incomplete was in matters of enforcement. Originally, the draft articles called for special judicial officers under the Commission to look after encroachments of the Straits' regulations.³² At the suggestion of Imperiali, the Italian Ambassador to Britain, it was agreed to make infringements justifiable only before the consular courts in the case of offending nationals of capitulatory nations, or as it was later added, before competent Turkish courts in the case of either offending Turkish nationals or nationals of non-capitulatory nations.³³ The resurrection of this

30 Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/1/20, 4/7/20, ibid., pp. 319, 717.

31 Articles 42, 45, Treaty, pp. 800-801, 801.

32 Straits Draft, Articles 13, 14, DBFP., VII, p. 323.

33 Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/2/20, ibid., pp. 355-356. Articles 49, 50, Treaty, pp. 802-803.

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segment of the Capitulation system was in fact only to be temporary. Provision was made for the complete reform of the Turkish judicial system by Allied experts at sometime in the future,³⁴ and until that time, the Commission was obliged to hand over all offenders to the proper judicial authorities. This alteration to the Commission's power was really just a precautionary move to eliminate the risk of friction if a national of one great power was tried by judicial officers of another.

It was also a precautionary measure which prompted the Council to modify the Commission's right to requisition any necessary military aid from the Allied in the zone of the Straits. To ensure the freedom of the Straits, the treaty called for an Allied force of occupation to be stationed in the 'demilitarized' zone,³⁵ and it was previously arranged in private that Britain, France and Italy would each contribute 10,000 troops to this end.³⁶ The

34 Article 136, ibid., p. 826.

35 Article 178, ibid., p. 842.

36 Proceedings of the Inter-Allied Naval and Military Representatives, 2/18/20, DBFP., VII, p. 124. Allied Conference at London, 2/18/20, ibid., p. 122.

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Allied military experts however, feared that as the Straits Commission could potentially contain nine states, or even ten with Turkey, Britain, France and Italy could be outvoted in the Commission, and as the guarantying powers, they would risk having their own troops requisitioned.³⁷ The safeguard to this possibility was provided by Curzon; the Straits Commission was to ask the Allied representatives at Constantinople providing the occupying forces to authorize any necessary employment of these troops.³⁸ Through this procedure, the guarantying powers assured themselves against any obstruction of their power at the Straits even though their superiority, within the Commission, was itself assured for at least a good number of years.

The Straits regime provided by the Allies was humiliating to the Turks, but it was made even more so by the inadequate protection it gave to Turkey if she became involved in a war. On the recommendation of the Allied naval advisers, the Council accepted the provision that if Turkey became involved in a war, only a League's decision

³⁷ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/22/20, ibid., VIII, pp. 95, 96.

³⁸. Ibid., p. 96.

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could alter the liberal regulations of the Straits governing the passage of war materials or contraband which could be destined to Turkey's enemies, or the privilege of revictualing, taking in stores or carrying out repairs by enemy ships.³⁹ It was considered that such a provision would protect Turkey sufficiently if she became a victim of aggression but she could expect no advantages in a war in which she might be the aggressor. Nevertheless, even if Turkey became a victim of aggression, and the League decided to alter the liberal regulations of the Straits for Turkey's protection, an enemy warship could still use the Straits and threaten the Turkish capital with her guns. Only a blockade of the Straits would suffice to protect her capital adequately, and such a decision could only be made by the Council of the League;⁴⁰ a body already under Allied domination. The Allies thus felt assured that Turkey would never risk another involvement in a war in which she lacked the support of the Allied powers.

39 Ibid., p. 98. Article 57, paragraph 4, Treaty, p. 805.

40 Article 37, ibid., p. 799.

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C. Smyrna

The prospect that the Supreme Council would grant the Greek claims to Smyrna and Eastern Thrace was never a certainty. In fact, a growing opposition to the Greek claims had developed between the resumption of the Anglo-French talks and the opening of the Conference of London. Throughout this period, Veniselos remained tactful but determined, and his persistence was soon justified; the Conference of London granted both Smyrna and Eastern Thrace to Greece. The success of the Greek claims was due solely to the unflinching support of one man—Lloyd George.

The first serious attempt to reduce the Greek claims was made at the Anglo-French talks. Clemenceau stated that he thought a mistake had been made in allowing the Greeks to go to Smyrna, and he hoped that Veniselos could be persuaded to abandon his claim there.⁴¹ Despite Lloyd George's avowal of support for Veniselos,⁴² Curzon and Berthelot, the French Chief Secretary of Political and Commercial Affairs, both of whom had been designated to

41 Anglo-French Meeting, 12/11/19, DBFP., II, p. 733.

42 Ibid.

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prepare an outline of the Turkish settlement on the basis of the conversations, devised a scheme by which Greece would abandon Smyrna and in her stead a special regime would be established for the Greek population under Turkish sovereignty. This regime would apply mutatis mutandis to a Turkish populated area of Adrianople in Eastern Thrace which would be attributed to Greece.⁴³ The scheme came to nothing though it clearly indicated a serious division in British official views between Curzon and Lloyd George.

Curzon's own formula aimed at turning the Turks out of Europe but treating them with magnanimity in Asia Minor. He found support from Montagu, his bitter critic over the future status of Constantinople. Both men submitted almost identical memoranda on the Greek claims for the consideration of the Cabinet. Montagu's proposals, prepared by military experts and members of the India Office within the British Peace Delegation, offered the Cabinet the choice of two possibilities: the recommended choice was ceding Eastern Thrace down to the Enos-Midia line to Greece while maintaining Turkish sovereignty in

⁴³ Curzon-Berthelot Meeting, 12/22/19, ibid., IV, pp. 962-963, 964-165.

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Smyrna with special privileges for the Greek inhabitants; the lesser choice was ceding Smyrna to Greece while maintaining the prewar frontier in Eastern Thrace,⁴⁴ Curzon's proposals reiterated much of the scheme developed with Berthelot; in compensation for giving up Smyrna, Greece should receive the whole Eastern Thrace except for a little territory in the vicinity of Constantinople east of Chatalja, and special regimes should be established for the Greeks in Smyrna and for the Turks in Adrianople.⁴⁵ Though Curzon could not claim the full support of the Foreign Office—Sir Eyre Crowe, the Assistant Under-Secretary and a Plenipotentiary of the British Peace Delegation, fully supported the Greek claim to Smyrna—he nevertheless⁴⁶ felt assured, that with the support of Montagu's similar recommendation, the Cabinet could be persuaded to curb what he considered to be the excessive philhellenism of Lloyd George.

44 Draft by Montagu, 1/12/20, ibid., pp. 1039, 1041.

45 Draft by Curzon, 1/16/20, ibid., p. 1057.

46 See Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 253. Crowe to Kidston, 12/1/19, DBFP., IV, pp. 913-914.

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There is no evidence that the Montagu or Curzon recommendations were ever considered by the Cabinet. Already bound by a Cabinet decision to keep the Turks in Constantinople, Lloyd George would have certainly attempted to avoid any further restraints on his policies. It appears likely therefore, that Lloyd George, who at this time could still count on the support of influential Cabinet members such as Bonar Law, Balfour and Lord Birkenhead,⁴⁷ was able to prevent the proposals from appearing before the Cabinet. In any event, the British Premier had a free hand to deal with the Greek claims when it came time for the Conference of London.

As expected at the Conference, Millerand again stated France's opposition to a Greek Smyrna. He alluded to the altered conditions in Anatolia since the armistice and declared that an enduring peace could not be expected unless the Greeks left the area.⁴⁸ It was common knowledge to all the members of the Council that since the Greek landing at Smyrna, there had been a great increase in

⁴⁷ Lord Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, Collins, London, 1963, pp. 161, 164-165.

⁴⁸ Allied Conference at London, 2/14/20, DBFP., VII, p. 54.

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animosity between Greek and Turk and that frequent skirmishes had occurred between Greek troops and the nationalists. Lloyd George remained confident that the Greek army could handle the situation and maintained his position that Smyrna ought to go to Greece. To provide a narrower basis of discussion, Lloyd George conceded that a scheme could be devised in which a nominal Turkish sovereignty could be maintained like allowing the Turks the privilege to show their flag.⁴⁹ Though the implication was clear that Greece would enjoy the benefits of sovereignty, Millerand proved receptive to the proposal. Nitti, who had been content to follow the French lead up till now, was obviously made uncomfortable by Millerand's conciliatory attitude, but as there was little he could do, he continued to follow French policy on the matter.

On the basis of Lloyd George's proposal, the Council made rapid progress on the Smyrna question. Within a few days, a committee was appointed to draw the boundaries of the region with specific instructions that Veniselos be heard on the subject.⁵⁰ On February 24, Millerand and

49 Ibid., p. 56.

50 Allied Conference at London, 2/17/20, ibid., pp. 86-87, 98.

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Nitti expressed their acceptance of the nominal Turkish suzerainty condition and also stipulated that a local parliament be set up for the area.⁵¹ Lloyd George on the other hand, favoured Smyrna's direct representation in the Greek Parliament but as the retention of even a nominal Turkish suzerainty would cause complications, he made a last effort to persuade the two to his original policy of ceding Smyrna outright to Greece. Only when this failed did Lloyd George present a scheme, prepared by a dutiful Curzon, which provided an immediate compromise on the Smyrna question. The proposals of the scheme were: the use of the Turkish flag as the only evidence of Turkish suzerainty; Greece would administer the area and keep a garrison there; a local parliament would be established representing both Greek and Turk; after two years, the local government could apply to the League for incorporation into Greece; and the League in this event, would have the additional right to insist on a plebiscite if deemed necessary.⁵²

51 Allied Conference at London, 2/24/20, ibid., pp. 230-231. The word 'suzerainty' was used interchangeably with 'sovereignty' with no apparent difference. In the treaty 'sovereignty' was used.

52 Ibid., p. 233.

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The next day, Veniselos was brought before the Council to express his views on the proposals. This unusual procedure was again indicative of the prestige that the Greek Premier held with the Allied leaders. He expressed disappointment with the two year waiting period but did not press his point. He accepted the proposals with the hope that the Council would change its decision over the two year waiting period, and only asked for one slight addition; that the Turkish flag be flown in a fort outside the city of Smyrna in order to prevent possible incidents against it.⁵³ Turkish nominal suzerainty could hardly be made less nominal, still the Council readily accepted the request, and also decided to keep their decisions relative to Smyrna from the public until the whole treaty was ready for presentation.⁵⁴

The zone finally allotted to Greek administration was considerably smaller than what Veniselos had originally asked for in Paris. Still, it included some 20,000 square kilometres of territory extending along the coast² short of the ports of Edremid in the north and Skalanova in the south,

⁵³ Allied Conference at London, 2/25/20, ibid., pp. 238-239.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 239, 244.

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and bounded in the east and southeast by a line short of the towns of Kirkagach, Alashehr and Aidin.⁵⁵ The ethnical statistics used in this allocation of territory, were considered by the drafting committee to be the most impartial and up-to-date figures available for Turkey for the 1914 period; they had been prepared by Professor Magie while a technical expert with the American Peace Delegation in Paris. Based on his figures, the sandjak of Smyrna, which comprised the bulk of the allotted zone, contained 375,000 Greeks, 325,000 Moslems, 18,000 Armenians and 40,000 Jews, while the total allotted zone contained 509,000 Greeks, 470,000 Moslems and 78,000 others.⁵⁶ Just how reliable Professor Magie's figures were has never been determined but as the drafting committee considered these figures the best available, they felt justified in detaching from Turkey a zone which could claim a majority of over 100,000 non-Moslems.

⁵⁵ Recommendations of Smyrna Committee, 2/21/20, ibid., p. 247 n.5. Article 66, Treaty, pp. 808-809.

⁵⁶ Recommendations of Smyrna Committee, 2/21/20, DBFP., VII, p. 246 n.5. Temperley (ed.), History of Peace Conference, VI, p. 39. Temperley also includes Greek and Turkish calculations for the same zone. Turkish figures for 1914 were 300,000 Greeks, 540,000 Moslems and 44,000 others. Greek figures based on 1912 were 553,500 Greeks, 310,000 Turks and 91,000 others. Ibid.

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Though these figures may have been reasonably accurate for 1914, they certainly were not for 1920. The Greeks too, like the Armenians, had suffered massacres and deportations during the war. The Council's attitude however, was that Turkey should not benefit from her atrocities, and so for statistical purposes, populations were calculated on a prewar basis, even if majorities which once existed no longer existed after the war.

In compliance with the Council's decisions, Greece's political power in the enclave and the means of enforcing it would be complete. The only remnant of Turkish sovereignty was to be a flag; Greece received the full responsibilities of administration and was entitled to maintain an unlimited military force in the area.⁵⁷ In addition, unless the Greek government assigned responsibilities to the local parliament, this body would remain politically powerless. The parliament's only specified function was to address, if its majority so desired, the Council of the League for incorporation into Greece when the provisory period ended.⁵⁸

57 Articles 69, 70, 71, Treaty, p. 810.

58 Article 83, ibid., p. 813.

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In an attempt to protect the important function, Greece was obligated to devise, within a set period, an electoral system granting proportional representation to all racial, linguistic and religious minorities, and this system could only come into effect when sanctioned by the Council of the League.⁵⁹ Even if the Greek population was in a minority, this obligation posed no real problem; a scheme fulfilling the required conditions could easily be devised but no enforcing agency was provided to supervise the application of the system in any election. The Council of the League however, could still ask for a plebiscite when it came time to decide the enclave's final status.⁶⁰

To the Greek government, the provisory status of the enclave was more of an irritation than a threat that the Council of the League would prevent her from incorporating the area after the waiting period. The provisory condition was merely designed to placate Turkish amour-propre and Veniselos had expressed his hope that the Council would decide to remove the waiting period. Instead, at Curzon's

59 Article 72, ibid., p. 810.

60 Article 83, ibid., p. 813.

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instigation, the waiting period was increased from two to five years.⁶¹ Whether it was two or five years made little difference to the Turks, they would still lose Smyrna if the treaty succeeded.

D. Eastern Thrace

Compared with Smyrna, the future of Eastern Thrace proved easier to negotiate. The Conferences at London and San Remo did not dispute ceding the area to Greece; what was contested was whether Greece should receive Eastern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line or the Chatalja line. The Enos-Midia line would keep Greece out of the Straits zone, while the Chatalja line, would bring both the Gallipoli Peninsula and the shore of the Sea of Marmora under Greek sovereignty.

Early in the London Conference, the Council heard Veniselos on this subject. The Greek leader as usual came armed with statistics to support his case. He claimed there were some 260,000 people between the two lines consisting of 145,000 Greeks, 86,000 Moslems, 18,000 Armenians and 3,000 Bulgarians.⁶² These figures had been prepared by

⁶¹ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/22/20, DBFP., VII, p. 583. Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/23/20, ibid., VIII, pp. 124-125. Article 83, Treaty, p. 81.

⁶² Allied Conference at London, 2/16/20, DBFP., VII, p. 64.

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the Greeks themselves, and according to Veniselos, they compared favourably with an official Turkish document of 1894.⁶³ Since 1894, there had occurred a Graeco-Turkish War, the two Balkan Wars and the Great War, but no one questioned Veniselos about the toll these wars had taken on these Greek populations. Two days later, without further discussion, the Greek claim for Eastern Thrace to the Chatalja line was provisionally accepted.⁶⁴

Until the Conference of San Remo, the question on the future of Eastern Thrace rose only once more. On March 12, President Wilson, stricken with paralysis since the autumn before, was informed of the outline of the treaty in preparation. He proved most critical of the Council's decision over Eastern Thrace; he fully supported ceding the southern part to the Chatalja line to Greece, but declared that the northern cities of Kirk Killise, Adrianople and their surrounding areas, were clearly Bulgarian and should in justice form part of Bulgaria.⁶⁵ As far as the Council was

63 Ibid.

64 Allied Conference at London, 2/18/20, ibid., p. 122.

65 Wilson's Letter, 3/24/20, printed in Lloyd George Truth, II, pp. 1294-1300.

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concerned, the claim could not be substantiated; all available figures gave the Turks a clear majority in this region.⁶⁶

By the Allies' declared principle of the right of nationality, the northern part of Eastern Thrace should have been left to Turkey, but as Greece received Western Thrace in the Bulgarian peace treaty, it was considered strategically undesirable to leave the Turks on the Greek flank.⁶⁷ Moreover, as the intervening territory between this predominantly Turkish region and Constantinople was likely to go to Greece, it was considered most impractical to leave a territory under Turkish sovereignty disconnected from Turkey, Greece therefore, was to receive the region.

No one in the Council raised doubt over this expediency, but when it came time to confirm the Chatalja line decision, Nitti voiced strong opposition. From the provisional acceptance of this frontier line until the reconvening of the Council at San Remo, the bulk of the provisions of the Turkish settlement had been negotiated, and the evident product was not to Nitti's liking. Over Smyrna

⁶⁶ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/30/20, DBFP., VII, p. 680.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

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for example, he had relied on the French to lead the attack on the Greek claims, but Millerand's position on the matter had proven deceptive. Now the Council proposed to give the Greeks and Chatalja frontier. In his view, instead of giving acceptable frontiers to Turkey, the Council was offering provocation, and as a result "Greece would be plunged into a formidable war. He doubted whether Greece would be equal to the struggle or able to survive it."⁶⁸ His utterance proved prophetic; yet, for the time being, he only sought a reversal of the Council's stand from the Chatalja to the Enos-Midia line, though the implication was clear, that he considered Greece's abandonment of Smyrna as a necessary prerequisite for Turkish acceptance of the treaty.

Lloyd George parried the attack, and in doing so he expressed his profound faith in the future of the Greek people as opposed to the Turks. With eloquent optimism, Lloyd George declared that —

⁶⁸ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/21/20, ibid., VIII, p. 90.

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With the additional territory to be acquired, the Greek nation would, ere long, number from 15 to 20 million. It would then be stronger, and its difficulties might be regarded as transient. If these territories were to be given to Greece they would flourish under a progressive and industrious people, and contribute to the promotion of civilization. This would be the reward of the council's decision.⁶⁹

Expressions of this sort could not impress Nitti; the prospect of Greece becoming a strong power in the Mediterranean was, if anything, a threat to Italian interests. The French too, undoubtedly remained unimpressed; Millerand was prepared to support the Chatalja line only because he was not anxious to see Turkish territory extended too much beyond Constantinople.

Unable to budge the French into making even a comment on the subject, Nitti's efforts failed miserably. The Smyrna solution was not reexamined and the Chatalja line was confirmed as the European boundary of Turkey.⁷⁰ One consolation for Nitti, was that both Gallipoli and the region about the shore of the Sea of Marmora were to be subjected to the same provisions of the Straits as the Turkish side;

69 Ibid., p. 92.

70 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/22/20, ibid., p. 117. Articles 27, 84, Treaty, pp. 794, 813.

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they would be demilitarized and placed under the jurisdiction of the Straits Commission.⁷¹

Venizelos had again succeeded in getting his way. The provisions providing for a separate treaty, wherein Greece would guarantee the protection of minorities as well as the freedom of commerce and transit both in Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, had been readily agreed to by Venizelos beforehand.⁷² In Eastern Thrace, this separate treaty was to allow the Turks both municipal rights and control over their Holy Places in Adrianople. The only real rebuff suffered by Venizelos was that his request for Greek ownership of the islands of the Sea of Marmora was denied. On the recommendations of the Allied naval advisors, the islands were to be demilitarized and left under Turkish sovereignty.⁷³

This refusal was trivial when compared to Greece's overall aggrandizement at Turkish expense. The acceptance of the Greek claims was a victory for Lloyd George; his

71 Articles 38, 84, ibid., pp. 800, 813-814.

72 Articles 75, 86, ibid., pp. 811, 814.

73 Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 4/7/20, DBFP., VII, pp. 716-717. Article 84, Treaty, pp. 813-814.

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viewpoint had dominated the Council's decisions in granting Smyrna and Eastern Thrace to the Chatalja line to Greece. For his service, the Greeks would be forever indebted to the British leader—providing they could hang onto the new territories. At the time, the prospects were good; Greece had ten divisions on a war footing, six of which were already in Smyrna.⁷⁴ Though the time element favoured the Turkish nationalists, their forces were still inferior in every way—in training, numbers, arms and equipment. According to Marshall Foch, past Commander of Allied Forces in France and the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Military Committee at Versailles, the Greek forces in Smyrna were "fully competent to withstand any Turkish attacks so long as they were not required to undertake expeditions into the interior."⁷⁵ This advice, along with Allied cooperation in presenting a united front against the nationalists, were indispensable prerequisites if the Greeks were to succeed. But the advice was not followed and Allied cooperation proved a myth.

74 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/20/20, DBFP., VIII, p. 55.

75 Ibid., p. 57.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL CLAUSES: THE TURKISH TERRITORIES.II.

Once past the Straits, the Council was confronted with the problem of enforcing its decisions. In Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, Greece was prepared to undertake this task. In the Turkish interior, and particularly in the eastern section where the nationalists had their stronghold, the question of enforcement presented a formidable problem. The problem was not faced realistically; the Allies still allowed for a separate Armenia and Kurdistan even though they displayed an unequivocal aversion to undertake any form of military responsibility in these two areas. In the rest of Anatolia, which was to form the new Turkish state, the Allies proposed to exercise a strict control particularly in financial matters, and though they were willing to undertake these responsibilities, their willingness eventually proved to fall short of enforcement if this enforcement necessitated military measures on their part. As a result, the clauses for Anatolia remained simply a series of bungled intentions.

This chapter will deal with the Council's decisions relating to Armenia and Kurdistan. A brief survey will also be made of some of the important controls which the Allies hoped to exercise in the new Turkish state.

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A. Armenia

Of all the Council's territorial terms for the defunct Ottoman Empire, the solution for Armenia proved to be the most difficult to arrange and the weakest. At Paris, the Armenians had asked for possession of the territories stretching from their existing republic in Transcaucasia across to the Black Sea and through Cilicia to the eastern Mediterranean. The claim in short, was for eastern and parts of central Anatolia; an exorbitant claim considering the overwhelming Moslem population in this area and it was unlikely that such a claim would be granted in its entirety. The one blow to the Armenians was the decision of the United States not to assume any responsibilities in Turkey, and with the subsequent withdrawal of the American Peace Delegation, the Armenians lost the services of President Wilson their best friend at the negotiations. The Armenians however still had active press agents and organizations in the western world, and both groups succeeded in making the Armenians long plight against the Turks well known.¹

¹ Kazemzadeh, Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 264. Simon Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, James G. Mandalian (tr.), Hairenik, Boston, 1943, pp. 78-82.

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Western opinion therefore seemed to expect that the Council would make some arrangement for the Turkish Armenians.

Wartime pronouncements and Wilson's communications to the Council were additional factors favouring the Armenians. As a result, though the Allies did not feel compelled to create an Armenia from sea to sea, they at least felt compelled to delimit some Turkish territory for the new state, but this did not mean they were willing to protect and finance it.

The attitude of the Allied leaders was reflected by Clemenceau at the December Anglo-French talks. His views were that

the Armenians were a dangerous people to get mixed up with. They required a great deal of money, and gave very little satisfaction. He was in favour of letting them have a republic, or whatever else they wanted. France was² unwilling to spend any money in Armenia.

That Armenia³ would require a great deal of money was a foregone conclusion. Armenia's misuse of the printing press had forced the value of her rouble to drop from fifty-one cents to just one cent by November 1919, and inflation

2 Anglo-French Meeting, 12/11/19, DBFP., II, p. 734.

3 On May 28, 1919, the government of the Armenian republic of Transcaucasia proclaimed the annexation of an undefined Turkish Armenia.

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continued rapidly till by March 1920, it took one thousand roubles to buy one American dollar.⁴ It was also estimated that there were 800,000 destitute in the area, and despite considerable American relief work the results were still negligible.⁵ Faced with complete bankruptcy and a poverty stricken population, Armenia simply could not cope with her difficulties alone. An American mission sent to Armenia in the autumn of 1919, estimated that 757 million dollars would be needed over a five year period to make Armenia reasonably self-supporting.⁶ Even if exaggerated, no one European Ally could contribute even half the sum without feeling a serious strain on their own inflated deficits brought on by the war.

Nevertheless, Clemenceau's comment that the Armenians 'gave very little satisfaction' referred more to the Armenians' seeming inability to help themselves, than to their probable inability to repay the required financial aid within a reasonable period. Both in their administration

4 Supreme Council, 11/14/19, DBFP., II, p. 322. Kazemzadeh, Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 212.

5 Supreme Council, 11/14/19, DBFP., II, p. 322.

6 Brief summary of missions' report printed in Lindsay to Curzon, 4/5/20, ibid., XIII, p. 60.

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and military organization, the Armenians were proving to be totally inadequate. While insecurity and disorder reigned in their regions, the Armenian leaders were expending their energies in petty frontier disputes with their neighbour republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan.⁷ Without administrative control, the process of recovery would be postponed indefinitely. An integral part of implementing such control was the need for an adequate military organization, both to protect the area from its enemies and to enforce the law since a gendarmerie was nonexistent. The Armenians' poor military organization was not entirely their fault; they needed foreign officers to train a national army and were dependent upon the Allies for arms, equipment and munitions. Neither the officers nor the military supplies were forthcoming. What surplus supplies were available were being sent to General Denikin and his White Russian forces, and though these forces were keeping the Bolshevik army out of Transcaucasia, the Armenians were still left with the problems of bringing law and order to their area and defending themselves against the Turkish nationalists.

7 Supreme Council, 11/14/19, ibid., II, p. 321.

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When the Conference of London convened, it was apparent that the Allied leaders would do their utmost not to get involved in Armenia. To lessen the chances for involvement, the Council readily agreed that the treaty should provide for only a small Armenian state.⁸ Its frontiers were to be confined to the existing republic with the addition of certain portions of Turkish Armenia. With this guideline, the drafting committee proposed that the regions of Mush, Bitlis, Van and the town of Erzerum be allotted to the republic.⁹ This proposal greatly reduced the original Armenian claims but the Armenian leaders would not be disappointed; the allotted territory was still considerable, and they easily found solace in the provision providing for a demilitarized corridor on Turkish territory stretching from the vicinity of the port of Trebizond south past the town of Erzinjan.¹⁰ If enforced, the demilitarized corridor would at least ensure the security of Armenia's western frontier.

⁸ Allied Conference at London, 2/16/20, ibid., VII, pp. 81-86.

⁹ Armenia Draft Proposals, Article 2, ibid., pp. 644-645.

¹⁰ Armenia Draft Proposals, Article 5, ibid., p. 646.

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Though dependent on the goodwill of the Lazes and the Georgians, the proposed Armenia was not left landlocked. At Curzon's suggestion, Lazistan, the eastern half of the vilayet of Trebizond, was allotted to Armenia even though he admitted that she would probably never control this non-Turkish but exclusively Moslem region.¹¹ It was assumed however, that Armenia would not interfere with these people as long as she had the use of the roads to the Black Sea. Additional facilities were also provided at Batum. The drafting committee placed Batum, which was to be made a free international port, under Georgian sovereignty on the condition that Georgia granted Armenia the right of overland access to the port in a separate agreement.¹²

In the drafting committee's allocation of Turkish territories to Armenia, no mention was made of racial statistics. It can reasonably be assumed that for the year 1920, the Turkish Armenians were hopelessly outnumbered. When Boghos Nubar Pasha was asked at San Remo how the Armenians could prevent further massacres in their designated

¹¹ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 2/27/20, ibid., p. 282.

¹² Armenia Draft Proposals, Preface, p. 643.

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area, he confessed that "there were really no Armenians left to massacre."¹³ Though Turkey was not to profit from her atrocities during the war, it still left the proposed Armenian state in a very untenable position. It was already assumed that the Armenians would not be able to control Lazistan, yet other regions also allotted to Armenia were still under Turkish domination; the Lake Van region was occupied by nationalist troops as was the fortress in the town of Erzerum. The task which lay ahead for Armenia was to force the Turkish troops from the assigned territory, and if her past capabilities were any indication, Armenia would be unequal to the struggle. The committee was aware of this problem and their decisions were based on the assumption that some power or powers would assist in the protection of the new state.¹⁴ Only subject to be fulfillment of this condition, could the committee feel confident that the control of the areas were potentially within Armenia's capabilities.

¹³ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/22/20, ibid., VIII, p. 119.

¹⁴ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 2/27/20, ibid., VII, p. 283. Armenia Draft Proposals, Preface, ibid., p. 642.

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The question of possible assistance was under deliberation by the Allied Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers. A plan first suggested by Curzon and Berthelot at the December Anglo-French talks, that the League be asked to help Armenia with troops and money was revived.¹⁵ Curzon felt that this plan had the best chance of success and his optimism was shared by his confreres. At his request, he was authorized to inform the League's Council of the proposals for Armenia and to invite the League to assume the protection of the new state.¹⁶ The answer was prompt, and if anything, unencouraging; it merely expressed surprise in the proposition and asked for more information.¹⁷ Undeterred, Curzon proceeded to send all available information and until the League's decision was known, further talk on assistance for Armenia was postponed.

By the third day of the San Remo Conference, the League's Council had made a decision and Curzon related the unhappy news to the Allied leaders. Basically, the League

¹⁵ Curzon-Berthelot Meeting, 12/22/19, ibid., IV, p. 962. Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 2/27/20, ibid., VII, pp. 284-285.

¹⁶ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/12/20, ibid., pp. 477-479, 479 n.4.

¹⁷ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/16/20, ibid., p. 507.

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refused to accept any responsibility; it suggested that some power be found willing to accept the mandate and promised to appeal to its members to guarantee a loan to Armenia, in the meantime, it asked whether the Allies would assume the obligations of defense and finance for the new state.¹⁸ Curzon remained optimistic that a settlement along these lines could be arranged; he emphasized the temporary nature of the financial obligations to be assumed by the Allies and declared that there was hope that Norway would assume the mandate.¹⁹ For Nitti, Millerand and Lloyd George, the League had simply dumped the burden back into their laps. Each reiterated in turn that their governments could spare neither the money nor the troops even on a temporary basis.²⁰ Lloyd George added that the Allies could possibly supply arms, equipment and training, if the Armenians were in a position to defend their proposed frontiers, but as to the large sum of money needed

¹⁸ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/20/20, ibid., VIII, pp. 46-48.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 48-49.

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Who was prepared to advance such a sum? America, he was told, could easily find it. Why did the League of Nations not appeal to America? Why did they refer their difficulties to the Supreme Council, which was already overburdened by its own tasks? The League of Nations did not discharge its whole duty by making pious speeches. He believed an appeal from the League of Nations to America would be successful. At least it might have the effect of estopping President Wilson from addressing any further notes to the Supreme Council.²¹

Despite the suggestion to ask the League to appeal to the United States for money, the correspondence between the League and the Supreme Council had for all purposes ended over the question of assistance for Armenia.

The one apparent alternative left by Lloyd George, which the Council proceeded to explore immediately, was the possibility that the Armenians could defend themselves with the help of Allied training and military supplies, while the United States provided the financing for the new state. At a meeting later the same day, General Foch expressed doubt whether the Armenians were capable of anything without the four Allied divisions his experts deemed necessary for the area.²² These four divisions were considered the minimum requirement since the Armenians faced

21 Ibid., p. 50.

22 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/20/20 at 4 p.m., ibid., pp. 58, 60.

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not only hostile Turks, but hostile Kurds, Georgians and Azerbaijanis, and by April 23, the list of enemies had grown; the Bolshevik army had succeeded in penetrating the Caucasus area and were approaching Batum.²³ Yet the Council's main concern remained whether the Armenians had the capacity to handle the Turks.

Nitti had from the beginning of the London Conference favoured leaving Erzerum to the Turks and he reaffirmed his position at San Remo.²⁴ Compared to his Allied colleagues, Nitti seemed to be the only one supplied with information about the Turkish nationalists. He stated that in eastern Anatolia, Kemal had about 13,000 or 14,000 well-armed troops and as the nationalists were strongly fortified at Erzerum, it would be necessary for the Allies to wage a war there to enforce such a provision.²⁵ As his figures and opinion were later corroborated by General Foch,²⁶ Lloyd George

²³ Meeting of the Inter-Allied Military Committee, 4/22/20, ibid., p. 131.

²⁴ Allied Conference at London, 2/16/20, ibid., VII, p. 85, Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/20/20, ibid., VIII, p. 48.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/20/22, at 4 p.m., ibid., p. 60.

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joined Nitti in advocating for a reduction of the proposed Armenian frontiers, at least to the extent of excluding Erzerum. In Lloyd George's view, it was foolish for the Allies to provide for something that they could not enforce and on which they had no intention of enforcing.²⁷ Both leaders encountered stiff opposition from Curzon and Berthelot, who declared that Erzerum constituted a strategically powerful fortress, which, if left to the Turks would cut off Armenia from the sea and make her independence impossible.²⁸ As Millerand supported assigning Erzerum to Armenia, the Council reached a deadlock.

Whereas Lloyd George had provided the principal support for the Greek cause, Curzon now provided the main support for the Armenian cause. His close contact with the Armenian representatives at the Conference, had persuaded him that the Armenians were perfectly prepared to take all risks and to defend their proposed territory without the support of Allied troops. For Curzon, the threat to the Armenian cause at the Conference was not Nitti but his own leader; Lloyd George's influence was such that he could make

27 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/22/20, ibid., p. 111.

28 Ibid., pp. 109-110, 113-114.

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or break the plans for the proposed state. In an effort to allay Lloyd George's doubts on the military capacity of the Armenians, Curzon had earlier arranged for the Armenian representatives to appear before the Council. The first to appear was Boghos Nubar Pasha, and as expected, he emitted complete confidence that the Armenians could handle the situation even without Allied troops. He stated they had an army of 15,000 and 40,000 more could be mobilized if the Allies supplied them with officers and equipment. A claim was made that there were 5,000 to 10,000 American volunteers ready to start for Armenia at a moments notice. Lastly, he assured the Council that Armenia was fully capable of driving the Turks out of Erzerum since the Kemalist forces were both inferior in fighting value and in the numbers that Armenia could put into the field.²⁹ Curzon's faith in a statement like this spurred Lloyd George's later comment that "For a man who knew the Orient well, he displayed the most amazing credulity."³⁰

The next day, the Inter-Allied Military Committee was admitted into the Council to hear Avetis Aharonian.

29 Ibid., pp. 117-119.

30 Lloyd George, Truth, II, p. 1317.

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Like his colleague, Aharonian expressed the same confidence in his people's ability to drive the nationalists out of the proposed territories if the Allies supplied them with the needed officers and supplies.³¹ Foch and his experts remained unimpressed; they submitted a report declaring that it would take too long to organize an Armenian army, and without Allied troops, Armenia could not control her territories or still less capture Erzerum.³² Nitti and Lloyd George were confirmed in their position but the deadlock continued.

Throughout the San Remo debate over Armenia's frontiers, the United States was mentioned with increasing frequency as a necessary participant for a good Armenian solution. The Council had already agreed to Lloyd George's suggestion that the United States be asked to assume financial responsibility. Curzon in turn, wanted the Council to invite the United States to assume the mandate over Armenia; he declared that this offer had never been made and the United States had not been given the opportunity to

³¹ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/23/20, DBFP., VIII, pp. 120-121.

³² Notes des Conseillers militaires sur la Question arménienne, 4/23/20, ibid., p. 131.

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definitely accept or refuse the mandate.³³ Technically this was true, yet when Wilson had attempted to get the Senate's approval for assuming American responsibilities in Turkey in the summer and autumn of 1919, the question of American responsibility over Armenia had been foremost in his request. Berthelot held little prospect for Curzon's suggestion declaring that it was certain the American reply would be negative, and his view was supported by Nitti and Lloyd George.³⁴ Despite this expressed doubt, once the Council was confronted with a deadlock, the Allies reverted completely to the possibility of American acceptance of full responsibilities in Armenia. As far as they were concerned, it was the only possible alternative providing for a good solution and the one means of immediately breaking the deadlock.

To this effect, Lloyd George proposed that the Council state clearly to Wilson that if his country assumed complete responsibility in Armenia, the territories as provided by the London Conference would be attributed to the

33 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/20/20, ibid., p. 62.

34 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

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new state, otherwise due to the already heavy commitments undertaken by the Allies elsewhere, the Council would be forced to limit the Armenian territory to the existing republic in Transcaucasia.³⁵ Under this proposal, even if the American decision was negative, the Council would still escape from all obligations to the Turkish Armenians and would be above criticism for not accommodating these people since their fate was dependent upon the American verdict. To an Armenian enthusiast like Curzon, the prospect of an Armenia limited to the existing republic was undoubtedly startling. The proposal however, was never discussed in the Council for the very next day, Millerand provided the final compromise and the basis of the Council's solution for the Armenian question. In a private meeting with the British Premier, Millerand suggested that the United States be asked to assume the mandate, and if she refused, then she should arbitrate on whether Erzerum would be allotted to Armenia or neutralized.³⁶ Lloyd George responded immediately to the proposal, and before the Council he enlarged the suggest so that Wilson would arbitrate all of Armenia's

³⁵ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/23/20, ibid., p. 140.

³⁶ Lloyd George - Millerand Meeting, San Remo, 4/24/20, ibid., p. 145.

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frontiers in Turkish territory within a set limit. Such a proposal he declared would force the United States "to take a definite interest in Armenia's future."³⁷ Despite the protests of Curzon that the frontiers of Armenia should be at least hypothetically defined in the treaty,³⁸ the Council decided to redraft the Armenian articles to fit the latest proposal. Two days later, on the last meeting of the Council at San Remo, the redrafted articles were accepted.

To anyone unaware of the serious difficulties confronting the Armenians, it would seem that the treaty had at last fulfilled these peoples' long aspirations for nationhood. Their old oppressor the Turk was called upon to recognize a free and independent Armenia.³⁹ Their borders in Turkey were to be delineated by their friend President Wilson, with the provision that whatever boundary he might draw in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Biltis would be accepted ahead of time by the Turks, Armenians and the Allies.⁴⁰ In addition, Wilson could prescribe what access Armenia needed to the Black Sea and

37 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/24/20, ibid., p. 157.

38 Ibid.

39 Article 88, Treaty, p. 814.

40 Article 89, ibid., p. 815.

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could provide for a Turkish demilitarized zone adjacent to the new State.⁴¹ The only obligations entered by the Allies were: the right to arbitrate the frontier disputes between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan if these states proved unable to reach an agreement among themselves within a set period, and to see that Armenia signed a separate treaty protecting 'minority' rights of non-Armenians.⁴²

On paper the Armenian state had been created and what substance this state would have depended solely upon the American decision to accept or refuse the mandate. Despite Lloyd George's confidence that the United States would be forced to take a definite interest, an unmistakable catastasis was in the making. The Council was well aware of Wilson's predilection for a larger Armenia than had been arranged by the London Conference.⁴³ That he would be tempted to enlarge these frontiers was a certainty, but the Council chanced this possibility in the hope that the United States would feel absolutely free in arranging the the size of a state that they would be willing to protect and finance. The Americans were not tempted; on June 1, 1920,

41 Ibid.

42 Articles 92, 93, ibid., pp. 815-816.

43 He wanted the port of Trebizond included in the new Armenia. Wilson's Letter 3/24/20, Lloyd George, Truth, II, p. 1299. Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/23/20, DBFP., VIII, p. 139.

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the Senate, by a vote of fifty-two to twenty-three, rejected their President's request for the power to accept the mandate over Armenia.⁴⁴ The Council's plan had failed, and though disappointed, it was of little concern to the Allies; they had washed their hands of Armenia at San Remo.

As prescribed in the treaty, Wilson proceeded to draw the boundaries of the new state. His decision was published on November 22, and to no one's surprise he included Erzerum and the Trebizond-Erzinjan line in Armenia.⁴⁵ The Armenians had little reason to be jubilant; by this time the nationalists had overrun most of Turkish Armenia and the Bolshevik army was consolidating its control in the Armenian republic. By December 3, the nationalists considered the Armenian question solved. On that day the nationalists signed a treaty with the Bolshevik government of Erivan, which not only wiped out Turkish Armenia but returned to Turkey the districts of Kars and Ardahan originally ceded to Russia back in 1878.⁴⁶ The land

⁴⁴ Kazemzadeh, Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 263. Howard, Partition of Turkey, p. 243.

⁴⁵ Kazemzadeh, Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 265.

⁴⁶ Kemal, Speech, p. 418. Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne", Gordon A. Craig & Felix Gilbert (eds.) The Diplomats: 1919-1939, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1953, p. 187.

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junction between the Bolsheviks and nationalists was soon to provide the necessary connection for the conveyance of war supplies and money to the nationalists. Despite Allied fears of the spread of Bolshevism in Turkey, the only affinity between these two outlaw regimes proved to be a mutual interest to oppose the 'European robbers'.

The Council's solution of the Armenian question had ended in an unmitigated fiasco. Of the original Entente powers only Tsarist Russia had shown more than just a humanitarian interest in Turkish Armenia. With Russia's ultimate defection, none of the remaining Allies ever intended to get involved in Armenia despite their pious pronouncements on the future security and independence of the Armenian race. When finally faced with the necessity of making a decision, the European Allies coldly and ruthlessly pushed aside the Armenians and attempted to solve their conscience by dumping the onus on the Americans. Basically, Armenia lacked certain prerequisites apart from the dearth of Turkish Armenians; she could serve no special commercial or imperial interests for the Allies, and without these essential prerequisites, solemn promises suddenly became worthless.

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B. Kurdistan

Compared with Armenia, Kurdistan presented a very different set of problems for the Supreme Council. Though the area of Kurdistan was always left undefined, the Kurds inhabited both sides of the Turco-Persian frontier; in Turkey, Kurdish populations extended as far north as Mount Ararat in Turkish Armenia, south deep into the vilayet of Mosul, and eastwards across the Euphrates into Cilicia and the confines of Syria.⁴⁷ Their main concentration was along the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris, and this was the territory referred to as Kurdistan by the Council. Both the French and the British were interested in the territory; the French for economic exploitation and the British for assuring the safety of their northern Arab boundary.⁴⁸ The Sykes-Picot Agreement had assigned most of this territory to the French but the transference of Mosul to the British after the war altered this plan. In turn, the British had extended their occupation into the area immediately north of Mosul,

⁴⁷ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1920, "Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia". Cmd. 651 London, 1920, p. 57.

⁴⁸ Allied Conference at London, 2/26/20, DBFP., VII, pp. 257-258. British High Commission in Constantinople to Foreign Office, 8/27/19, ibid., IV, p. 743.

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and it appeared likely at first that the French and British would cooperate in a joint supervision of an independent Kurdistan. Nevertheless, as the French could always negotiate economic rights with the Turkish government, the British were more anxious than the French that this territory be detached from Turkey. By the Council's principle of the rights of nationality, the British felt completely justified in pursuing this policy. The one great difficulty was to persuade the Kurds themselves.

Apart from the towns, the population of Kurdistan was composed mainly of semi-nomadic tribes; a condition which made it most adverse for the formation of a unified state. Except for a few years before the war, the Turks had left these people pretty much to themselves and the Kurds seemed content to maintain the status quo. Efforts by the British to bring certain Kurdish districts under their control met with stiff resistance, and in the summer of 1919, their High Commissioner in Constantinople decided to send a British officer, Major Edward Noel, accompanied by a leading Kurdish family, the Bedrhans, on a fact-finding mission to Kurdistan and for the purpose of impressing the tribes to maintain order.⁴⁹ Instead, Noel, described as

⁴⁹ Calthorpe to Curzon, 7/10/19, ibid., pp. 678-680.

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a fanatic apostle of the Kurds,⁵⁰ engaged in violent anti-Turkish and pro-Kurdish propaganda, with the result that both the Sultan's government and the nationalists regarded the mission as a mere pretext to stir the Kurds against the Turks, with the ultimate aim of severing the territory from Turkey.⁵¹ This was only partially true; the British were most reluctant to see any further disturbances in an already uneasy Anatolia, and Noel was recalled.⁵² The Noel mission however, had increased the unrest among the Kurds and this unrest was not necessarily directed towards the Turks. By early December 1919, the British had withdrawn their troops to Mosul and had abandoned any hope of supervision over Kurdistan.

At the subsequent Anglo-French talks, Curzon provided an outline of the policy to be followed by the French and British in Kurdistan. The scheme, accepted by Berthelot, recommended: that there be no mandate over Kurdistan; that no Turkish rule even nominal should remain; that the Kurds

50 Hohler to Tilley, 7/21/19, ibid., p. 693. T.B. Hohler was a Political Officer of the British High Commission in Constantinople and J. Tilley was an Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office.

51 Memorandum by Ryan, 11/27/19, ibid., pp. 921-924. Kemal, Speech, pp. 101-123.

52 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 9/27/19, DBFP., IV, p. 782.

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should decide whether they wanted a single state or a loose federation of states; and if possible, the French and British to guarantee the Kurds against Turkish aggression.⁵³

Obviously, the British felt that if they were not to control part of the area neither should the French.

The question of Kurdistan's future was not raised again until the Conference at San Remo, and by that time, the British had found it necessary to modify their position on Kurdish independence. The British were faced with the dilemma of not being able to find a spokesman for the Kurds who represented something more than just his own views or the views of his particular tribe. Cherif Pasha, who had submitted the Kurdish claims at Paris, was considered such a case as were the various members of the Kurdish Club located in Constantinople. The British quest for such a representative was impractical; Kurdish public opinion on the matter of nationhood was simply nonexistent as the British High Commissioner pointed out.⁵⁴ If this lack of national aspiration was not reason enough to deter the British from

⁵³ Curzon-Berthelot Meeting, 12/23/19, ibid., pp. 966-967.

⁵⁴ Robeck to Curzon, 3/29/20, ibid., XIII, p. 49.

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'imposing' independence on the Kurds, the problem of enforcing this decision was. Abdul Kadir, the President of the Kurdish Club, had informed the British that the Kurds could probably not maintain their independence unless the Allies were prepared to overawe the Turks.⁵⁵ The implication was clear that unless the Allies were willing to militarily guarantee an independent Kurdistan, it was just as well to leave the Kurds under the Turkish rule which they had become accustomed to. The British position however, was not modified to this extent.

Curzon's final draft proposals provided for Kurdish local autonomy in the area east of the Euphrates to the Persian border, with the option that if the majority of Kurds wished it, the territory could become independent within one year of the treaty's enforcement.⁵⁶ Thus, unless Kurdistan became independent, which was unlikely, the territory would remain under Turkey's protection but not her rule. With little discussion in the Council, Berthelot accepted the scheme for France on the understanding that there would be no restrictions of France's economic rights

55 Memorandum by Hohler, 12/8/19, ibid., IV, p. 927.

56 Kurdistan Draft Articles 1, 3, ibid., VIII, pp. 44-45.

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in the territory west of the Tigris.⁵⁷ As the question of Kurdistan was simply an Anglo-French matter, Nitti remained silent, and if he had objections to the scheme he chose not to mention them.

Italy however, was to enjoy equal participation with her Allies in all of Curzon's proposals which necessitated future decisions relative to Kurdistan. Together, they would appoint a commission to arrange a scheme of local autonomy appropriate for the Kurds with safeguards for such minorities as the Assyro-Chaldeans.⁵⁸ According to Curzon some 100,000 of these Christians, whose homes were normally on the Turco-Persian frontier, had become refugees in Mesopotamia.⁵⁹ With the object of repatriating these people and securing their future safety, provision was made for another Allied commission, with the inclusion of Persian and Kurdish representatives, to decide on what border changes were necessary to accommodate these people in Kurdistan.⁶⁰

57 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/21/20, ibid., p. 77.

58 Kurdistan Draft Article 1, ibid., p. 44. Article 62, Treaty, p. 807.

59 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/19/20, DBFP., VIII, pp. 43-44.

60 Kurdistan Draft Article 1, ibid., p. 44. Article 62, Treaty, p. 807.

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Lastly, in the event the Kurds decided to opt for their independence, Turkey was obligated to renounce all title to Kurdistan in a separate agreement with the Allies; responsibility however, in deciding whether the Kurds were capable of independence or even desired by the majority of the population, was left to the Council of the League.⁶¹ Under such a provision, if the League affirmed Kurdish independence, it would become heir to the problems already disinherited by the British and the French at San Remo, and this was undoubtedly the idea.

The League, or in fact the Turks, had little to worry about in the provisions for Kurdistan. Without Allied protection to ensure stability in the territory and to prevent Turkish aggression, most of the Kurdish leaders with national aspirations gravitated back to the Turks. As also reported, these Kurds were very disgruntled with the limitation of their area and with the uncertainty of their future frontier with Armenia.⁶² If there was anything that could unite the Kurds it was having the despised Armenians

61 Kurdistan Draft Article 3, DBFP., VIII, p. 45.
Article 64, Treaty, pp. 807-808.

62 Memorandum by Ryan, 9/23/20, DBFP., XIII, p. 147.

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dominating Kurdish districts, and would sooner unite with the Turks to fight the Armenians than turn against their old masters.

The question of Kurdistan never stimulated too much debate among the Allied leaders. The task for arranging a satisfactory solution had been left to Curzon, and he had worked on the simple assumption that it was best to separate the Kurds from the baneful influences of the Turks. Kurdistan's raison d'être therefore, was that it comprised a wedge of territory separating Armenia from Syria and Mosul, and to leave this area under Turkish rule meant risking Turkish or Turkish inspired intrigues in all three areas. But without Allied willingness to enforce the decision, coupled with a general disinterest on the part of the majority of Kurds, the provisions for Kurdistan, as in Armenia, remained without substance.

C. The New Turkish State

Stripped of the eastern vilayets and the zone at Smyrna, the remainder of Anatolia was to form the new Turkish state with her capital at Constantinople. The area left to the Turks was approximately 350,000 square kilometres with

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a population of some 7,000,000 or 8,000,000.⁶³ Though the area was to constitute a national homeland for the Turks, the restrictive measures proposed by the Allies in this area would have made Turkey's independence an absurdity. A survey of some of these measures gives a clear indication of how the Allies intended to control the new state.

Allied Military Commissions. Analogous to the other peace treaties with the Central powers, provision was made for three special commissions to supervise the reduction of the Turkish army, navy and air force to the levels specified by the Allied military experts. Contrary to the other treaties however, one of the commissions was to continue to operate after the execution of these stipulations. For five years, and with the option for renewal, the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Organization would supervise, with the collaboration of the Turkish government, the formation and employment of the Turkish armed forces; restricted to a 700 man bodyguard for the Sultan, 15,000 regular army troops and 35,000 gendarmerie.⁶⁴

⁶³ Roughly, Turkey lost a third of her Anatolian territory and population. See Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Venture, p. 56.

⁶⁴ Articles 152, 154, 156, 157, 200-202, 205, Treaty pp. 834-836, 852-854. As was common in the Ottoman Empire, a distinction was made between the gendarmerie and the regular police force; the gendarmerie was heavier armed than the police and less so than the army.

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Minority Rights. Turkey was obligated to sanction the usual political, civil and religious rights of the minorities remaining within her state. Two additional regulations made these minority provisions exceptionally severe; all conversions to Islam during the war were declared null and void unless the ceremonies were performed again; and all Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race could reclaim their confiscated, sold or abandoned properties as of January 1, 1914. These stipulations were intended to rectify some of the flagrant injustices perpetrated by the Turks on their Christian minorities, and though the League's Council was designated with the difficult task of supervising these provisions, the Allies could always use the nonfulfillment of these provisions as a pretext to interfere in Turkish affairs.⁶⁵

The Capitulations. The Capitulatory system originated in 1536 when France negotiated a privileged commercial position with the Turkish Sultan. By 1914, this system had developed and expanded until all of the major powers enjoyed special judicial, economic and commercial rights and privileges within the Ottoman Empire; in particular, these

65 Articles 141, 142, 144, 145, ibid., pp. 828-831.

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extraterritorial rights provided immunities from Turkish law and from the bulk of Turkish taxation. The Porte had long resented these rights, and prior to entering the war the Turks announced the abolition of the Capitulations. The move was never recognized by the Allies, and apart from planning an eventual judicial reform in Turkey to replace this segment of the system, the treaty re-established the Capitulations in favour of all the Allied nations whether they enjoyed the benefits previously or not; the significant additions would be Greece and Armenia.⁶⁶

The Ottoman Public Debt. In 1875, the Ottoman government defaulted on her foreign debt, and under the pressure of her European creditors, the government issued a decree in 1881 which unified these foreign charges, and hypothecated certain imperial revenues to European control in order to service the debt. An Ottoman Public Debt Council was created to administer the collection of these revenues consisting of a representative from each of the various bondholders in Germany, Holland, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Italy, Turkey and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was largely a French concern. By 1914, the Debt Council

⁶⁶ Articles 136, 261, 426, ibid., pp. 826, 879, 937. See Howard, Partition of Turkey, p. 305.

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was administering an extensive and powerful network of collection agencies throughout the Empire, and had assured control of almost one-fourth of the total revenues available to the Ottoman government. The loss of these revenues was one of the main reasons why the Porte was forced to negotiate many more bond issues, and just prior to the war, the public debt had risen to \$716 million.⁶⁷

By all odds, the most interested financial power in Turkey after the war was France, holding approximately 60% of the debt, while Britain held 15% and Italy 3%. Despite British and Italian efforts to have the functions of the Debt Council merged with the proposed Financial Commission, the French succeeded in getting this Council reinstated by the treaty but only for three more years. At the end of this period and after consulting with the bondholders, the British, French and Italian governments could decide by a majority vote whether the Council was to be maintained or merged with the Financial Commission. In the meantime, only British, French and Italian delegates, plus a representative from the Imperial Ottoman Bank, would

⁶⁷ Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, Columbia University Press, New York, 1929, pp. 2, 92-98. Bowman, The New World, pp. 437-438.

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continue the operation of the Council. Turkey, as well as all the territories detached from the Empire either as a result of the Balkan Wars or the treaty would be liable for all the debts contracted before November 1, 1914, or October 17, 1912, in the case of the territories detached during the Balkan Wars.⁶⁸

The Financial Commission. The European practice of implementing special supervisory commissions to protect their financial interests in areas guilty of fiscal backwardness, was adopted by the Allies at the London Conference. Such commissions had been established in Egypt, Macedonia and Greece, but the one proposed for Turkey was unprecedented in the power and duties that it would have over the fiscal economy of a state. In fact, if the provisions for this proposed Financial Commission were enforced, Allied financial control of Turkey would be complete and absolute.

The Commission's membership was restricted to representatives from the three Allied powers with whom would be associated a Turkish agent in a consultative capacity. First of all, the provisions stipulated that this body approve the budget before its submission to the Turkish

⁶⁸ Articles 241-243, 246, Treaty, pp. 867-868, 869-870. Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/19/20, DBFP., VIII, pp. 40-42.

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parliament, and here no amendment could be made unless approved by the Commission. The enforcement of the budget was also under the Commission's control since it would supervise the functions and personnell of the Turkish financial system. Other extensive powers attributed to the Commission included: a veto over the contracting of internal or external government loans; a hand in regulating and improving the Turkish currency; the right to appoint and dismiss the Director General of Customs; the right to increase taxes including the custom charges; and the right to refuse any new economic concession granted by the government.⁶⁹

The most conspicuous provision provided that all of Turkey's revenues, not specifically hypothecated to the service of the Ottoman Debt, be placed at the disposal of the Commission. With these revenues, the Commission was to discharge certain financial obligations imposed on the Turks before the needs of Turkey could be considered. Though formal reparation was waived by the Allies, the Turks were still held responsible for all losses and damages suffered by the civilian Allied nationals and for the Allied occupation costs since the Armistice in the territories

⁶⁹ Articles 231-234, 239, 246, Treaty, pp. 864-865, 867, 869.

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remaining Turkish.⁷⁰ As the British had provided most of the occupation, they insisted that these costs be given first priority of payment. The French on the other hand, wanted priority given to any deficiency which could arise in servicing the Ottoman Debt. As a compromise, the treaty provided that priority would be given to the occupation costs but only in such a way as to enable the Commission to meet a possible deficiency in the service of the Debt.⁷¹

Apart from the problem of enforcing this proposed financial tutelage on the Turkish state, there was the obvious question of whether Turkey was actually capable of meeting these charges. The only likely prospect was that the Turkish state would continue along the same bankrupt path already laid by the Ottoman government. It was also evident that the proposed Financial Commission would not only hold the whip hand over Turkish fiscal policy, but that constant interference in the state's administration would be unavoidable.

⁷⁰ Turkey was also obliged to pay for the British costs in occupying Syria since the French refused to pay Britain, Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/31/20, DBFP., VII, p. 702.

⁷¹ Article 236, Treaty, pp. 865-866. See Blaisdell, European Financial Control, pp. 194-196.

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The Tripartite Agreement. Alongside the treaty, a private agreement was concluded between Britain, France and Italy by dividing a large portion of the new Turkish state into a French and Italian zone of influence. The French zone extended north of her Syrian border to Sivas, west to Mersina and east to the Tigris; it was the Turco-Kurdish region envisaged as the French zone of direct control in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Italian zone too, despite the Anglo-French insistence concerning the invalidity of the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement, was a modification of the wartime partition scheme; her zone encompassed western and south-western Anatolia as had been proposed in the wartime agreement with the exception of the Greek enclave at Smyrna. As Turkey was not a party to the Tripartite Agreement she was not legally bound to it, nor was it required since the agreement was merely a voluntary commitment by each signatory to the idea of a 'self-denying ordinance'; among the three powers, Italy and France would enjoy a preferential claim to all requests for assistance and for economic concessions within their respective zones. As the treaty had sanctioned all concessions held by Allied nationals before Turkey's entry into the war,⁷² the Italian and French

72 Article 311, Treaty, p. 908.

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economic priority in their zones referred to those concessions once held by German or Austrian nationals or simply to new concessions. Britain's advantage in this agreement was that all rights recognized in the French and Italian areas were reciprocated in the areas under British mandate, namely Palestine and Mesopotamia.⁷³

As these rights were extended to the French in Syria, the idea of a 'self-denying' agreement circumvented the stipulation of the League's Covenant that no rights of economic priority were to be allowed in the mandated territories. There was nothing in the agreement however, which could impede the commercial activity of other powers in these territories, but in Turkey, the French and Italian zones of influence had the added protection of the Financial Commission's right to refuse new concessions granted by the Turkish government. In these Turkish zones at least, the highly competitive European practices of the past and the old Turkish practice of playing one power off against another would be eliminated.

⁷³ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1920, "Tripartite Agreement between the British Empire, France and Italy respecting Anatolia. Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920". Cmd. 963, London, 1920, pp. 1-6. Hurewitz, (ed.), Diplomacy, II, pp. 87-89.

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The success of this agreement, as in all the proposed controls for the new Turkish state, depended on how willing the Allies would be to enforce them. The Kemalists in particular, would not be complaisant; the re-establishment of the Capitulatory system, and the introduction of both the Financial Commission and spheres of economic influence, were completely contrary to the principles set forth in the National Pact. Unless the Allies were prepared to wage war to ensure the proposed peace, their restrictive measures for the Turkish state were doomed to failure. War was not avoided but the Allies preferred to fight it by proxy; Greece was suddenly to find herself with the responsibility and burden of enforcing the treaty alone.

CHAPTER V

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The decisions made by the Allies is so far as they concerned the Arab provinces, North Africa and the Greek islands, were facilitated by one important condition, and that was that these territories had already been de facto separated from the Ottoman Empire either before the war or as a result of the war. The Kemalist National Pact made no pretense of seeking the recovery of these non-Turkish territories, and it only remained for the Allied powers to arrange the future political status of these regions or simply to obligate Turkey to recognize the established political status in Egypt, Libya or Morocco. The formal separation of these territories from the Ottoman Empire were the only real provisions of the Turkish treaty which proved of some permanence; an important fact ignored by those historians who criticize the treaty as so much waste paper.

A. The Arab Provinces

Though Arab independence had been the subject of pious wartime pronouncements and pledges, the Arabs' ultimate fate caused little discussion at the London and San Remo Conferences. Those conversations about the Arabs that did

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take place concerned principally the question of boundaries, the disposition of the Christian Holy Places and the French share of Mesopotamian oil promised to Clemenceau by Lloyd George as early as December 1918. The British from the beginning had instituted direct administrative control in Mesopotamia, Mosul and Palestine,¹ and once they abandoned Feisal and the Syrian coastal region to the French late in 1919, the fate of the Syrian Arabs too was for all intents and purposes sealed. Syrian unity became a possibility only under French auspices, and for most of 1920, the Arab drama centred about Feisal and his efforts to maintain Syrian independence in the area once designated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement as the French zone of influence with the exclusion of Mosul.

On the advice of the British, Feisal went to Paris and entered into direct negotiations with the French government in the hope that some amicable Arab-French understanding was possible. The French proved receptive, and before the replacement of British by French troops was completed, a tentative agreement was reached: while Arab-French talks

1 See Memorandum on the Future Control of the Middle East, 5/17/20, DBFP., XIII, pp. 260-269.

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were to continue, the French promised not to occupy the Bekaa district containing the strategic mountain pass to Damascus and the interior, and Feisal, on his part, consented to withdraw the Arab forces from the district.² In just over a fortnight, the French, after informing the British,³ broke their promise to Feisal and moved into Bekaa. Feisal, still in Paris, responded by protesting the French action to the British Foreign Office but his protest was not formally acknowledged; instead an official of the Foreign Office verbally informed Feisal's representative in London that he did

not see how we can help or intervene in any way. We should very strongly resent any French protest as to our action in Mesopotamia or even in the Vilayet of Mosul or on its borders and the French position with regard to the Bekaa is somewhat analogous.⁴

The stark reality that the Syrian Arabs stood alone could not have been made clearer to Feisal. Left with no other alternative, he continued the negotiations with the French.

2 Enclosures 1-4, Feisal to Curzon, 11/28/19, ibid., IV, pp. 555-558.

3 Allenby to Churchill, n.d., ibid., p. 591.

4 Kidston's verbal reply to General Haddad Pasha, 12/24/19, ibid., p. 592 n.l. Monroe, Britain's Moment, p. 65.

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Early in January 1920, the French submitted their terms to Feisal. Couched in phrases reminiscent of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France promised to guarantee a united and independent Syria on the understanding that she would enjoy certain rights: France was to be the sole supplier of capital, advisors and experts necessary for the formation and administration of the state; she was to organize the army, gendarmerie and police; she was to enjoy economic priority and control the revenues hypothecated to the service of the Ottoman Public Debt; she was to represent Syria in foreign affairs; and lastly, Syria would be obligated to recognize a French mandate over Lebanon.⁵ Feisal did not refuse the terms nor did he sign the proposed agreement; he was far too committed to the cause of Syrian independence to accept these obligations without first consulting his supporters. Feisal returned to Syria with this intention but his supporters undoubtedly found the terms unpalatable since nothing more was heard of them and negotiations with France were not resumed.

⁵ French-Feisal Agreement communicated secretly to Colonel Gribbon by General Haddad Pasha, 1/16/20, DBFP., IV, pp. 625-626.

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Feisal was really in no position to insist on further negotiations with the French. By leading the Arab nationalist forces against the Turks, he had also undertaken the leadership of the Arab national movement, and though he never fully controlled this loose organization, the continued support of the nationalists was basically contingent upon Feisal's ability to deliver the Sherifian promise of Arab independence. An important feature of this movement was that its composition consisted mainly of Syrian Arabs, and not surprisingly, the larger more moderate group of nationalists were thinking in terms only of Syrian independence, while the lesser, but still very vocal group, maintained a strict adherence to the pan-Arab principle enunciated earlier in the Damascus Protocol—Hussein's guide in the negotiations with McMahon.⁶ The chances of reconciling these two basic Arab objectives was hopeless but the one factor which kept the Arab nationalists united was their uncompromising opposition to any form of French intervention in Syria.

⁶ Report by British Liaison Officer on Political Situation in Arabia, 5/16/19, ibid., pp. 264-266. Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, I, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, p. 124.

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This anti-French feeling was not simply restricted to the nationalists. The same attitude generally pervaded the upper echelons of Syria's Moslem society.⁷ They and the nationalists had only to point to the existing French possessions in North Africa to illustrate what was supposedly in store for a Syria dominated by the French. The prime example was Algeria; French immigrants had reduced the Moslems here to second class citizens and a patent effort was being made to supplant native custom and tradition with French culture. Feisal himself, had typified these fears when he declared that a French mandate would bring "French colonists and French citizenship and Christian hegemony."⁸ The Arab vision of French colonists streaming into Syria was a distorted notion, but it still seriously afflicted Arab sensitivity to the extent that Feisal abandoned the one opportunity to barter for specific Arab rights, at least in the area of Syria remaining under Arab occupation.

The fate of the Syrian Arabs had really depended upon the success of Lloyd George's policy to limit French pretensions by maintaining the British military advantage

⁷ Appendix B in Clayton to Curzon, 6/23/19, DBFP., IV, p. 292.

⁸ Ibid.

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in Syria until a peace could be concluded. The long delay in the Turkish negotiations forced the abandonment of this policy, but by the latter half of 1919, it had actually become desirable for the British to have the French in Syria.

This British volte-face was due to the growing campaign among the Arab nationalists and the Palestinian Arabs to remain united in a greater Syria and their adamant objection to any application of the Balfour Declaration. Feisal himself, had dropped his conciliatory attitude to Weizmann and the Zionist programme, and in the General Syrian Congress convened in Damascus on July 2, a resolution was passed which claimed the indivisibility of Syria-Palestine, and most important, declared opposition to Jewish immigration to any part of Palestine under any pretext.⁹ Though this Congress was an instrument of the nationalists, these views were indisputably representative of Arab sentiment in these territories. This very fact was proven by the findings of an American inquiry, the King-Crane Commission, sent to the Near East in order to ascertain the wishes of the people

⁹ Resolution of the General Syrian Congress, 7/2/19, Hurewitz, (ed.), Diplomacy, II, pp. 63-64.

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before the Supreme Council allocated the mandate.¹⁰ Amid a great deal of publicity, the American commissioners arrived in Palestine on June 10, 1919, and for the following two months they toured Palestine and Syria conducting extensive interviews and accepting all petitions from Moslems, Jews and Christians alike. The Commission's recommendations based on its findings were most discreditable to the Zionist cause as well as to French pretensions. In Palestine, it recommended that the idea of a distinct Jewish commonwealth should be given up and only nominal Jewish immigration should be allowed in the area; in Syria, it rejected a French mandate and recommended keeping the unity of Syria-Palestine under either an American or British mandate.¹¹ The Commission had taken liberties in providing for limited Jewish immigration so as not to be totally negative to Zionist aspirations, but the State Department still felt that the recommendations were too severe on Zionist aspirations and to avoid reaction from American Jewry, the Commission's findings were officially

¹⁰ President Wilson wanted the inquiry to be international but Clemenceau refused to participate, and as a result, Britain and Italy also refused to participate in fairness to the French. Supreme Council, 5/31/19, DBFP., IV, p. 258.

¹¹ King-Crane Recommendations in Arab Territories, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relation of the United States: 1919, XII, pp. 787-797. Howard, An American Inquiry, pp. 320-322.

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suppressed. This did not mean that the British Foreign Office was left unaware of these genuine Arab desires; their representatives on the spot had been saying pretty well the same thing,¹² and one of them had even managed to get some of the initial findings of the Commission.¹³ The demand for a greater Syria obviously complicated the British position in Palestine since they were already under Zionist pressure for the immediate application of the Balfour Declaration in its widest sense. With the prospect of the French in control of an undivided Syria, the British government could feel assured that the existing complicity between Syrian nationalists and Palestinian Arabs would be greatly lessened since the nationalists would have enough on their hands in their relations with the French. For the British, it was a simple expansion of the old adage of divide and rule.

The arrival of French troops to Syria had definite repercussions which Feisal could do little to control; Arab nationalists activity was intensified and it had its reflex

12 See for example Clayton to Curzon, 6/8/19, DBFP., IV, pp. 272-274, 272 n.1.

13 French to Curzon, 7/19/19, ibid., pp. 315-316.

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in Mesopotamia. After the French broke their promise and entered the Bekaa district, Arab attacks across the Aleppo-Damascus line became frequent. In the Aleppo district bordering Cilicia, Kemalist propaganda was succeeding in arousing pro-Turkish feeling and the Arab Chief of Staff, Yassin Pasha, took the initiative to enter into communication with Mustapha Kemal.¹⁴ The threat of a united Turco-Arab front against the French in Cilicia and the Syrian coast became a distinct possibility. In Mesopotamia, Arab extremists from Syria spearheaded the drive to activate old militant societies or form new ones. Two of the prominent ones were the Ahad-el-Iraqi and the Mesopotamian League: the first was pro-Sherifian, and its objective was to rid Mesopotamia of the tight British control and bring the area into a close union with an independent Syria;¹⁵ the second was predominantly anti-Sherifian, and its objective was to stir a general Arab uprising against all foreign domination preferably in conjunction with a Kemalist offensive in Turkey.¹⁶

¹⁴ Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 11/10/19, ibid., p. 523. Evans, United States Policy, p. 246.

¹⁵ "Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia," Cmd. 1061, p. 132.

¹⁶ Report on Mesopotamian League, n.d. DBFP., IV, pp. 568-569.

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The growing restiveness of the Arab nationalists was also pressuring Feisal to keep pace with the demands of his close supporters. At their request, he called for a new Syrian Congress to be convened at Damascus on March 8; its purpose was to declare the territory's complete independence and Feisal as king. Feisal informed Allenby, the new High Commissioner in Cairo, of this coming event and asked for British reaction.¹⁷ Allenby was instructed by the Foreign Office to warn against such a move,¹⁸ but the Congress was held and Feisal was proclaimed king over an independent Syria which was to include both Lebanon and Palestine.¹⁹ At the same time, a small group of Mesopotamian delegates at the Congress proclaimed Feisal's brother, Abdulla, king of a new and independent Iraqi state extending from the northern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul south to the Persian Gulf.²⁰ In an attempt to remain at the head of Arab aspirations it was apparent that the Sherifian party was willing to oppose both the French and the British equally.

17 Allenby to Curzon, 3/7/20, ibid., XIII, p. 221.

18 Curzon to Allenby, 3/8/20, ibid., p. 222.

19 Allenby to Curzon, 3/13/20, ibid., p. 224. Howard, Partition of Turkey, p. 318. Evans, United States Policy, p. 248.

20 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 3/26/20, DBFP., XIII, p. 236.

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The British government never took the proclamation of the Mesopotamian delegates seriously, but there was a definite Anglo-French reaction to the Syrian proclamation. They officially announced that the "fate of Syria could not be determined by an irresponsible body in Damascus, but could be settled only by the Peace Conference."²¹ By claiming the invalidity of the proclamation, the two European powers had simply taken the easiest route out of an irritating development, and by affirming the exclusive power of the Supreme Council to settle these matters, they implied that the future status of Syria and Palestine was still in the balance. To any intelligent Arab however, it was obvious that his fate had been prejudged; his destiny depended not on the wishes of his countrymen but on the wishes of the two great powers.

In the Council one month earlier, Lloyd George had already taken the initial step to ensure an exclusive Anglo-French solution for the Arab provinces. At his suggestion, the Turkish treaty was to confine itself merely to severing the Arab provinces from Turkish rule; their future administration and the delimitation of their common boundaries were

21 Curzon to Derby, 3/13/20, ibid., p. 229.

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to have nothing to do with the Turks and would be determined by agreement between the powers concerned.²² In effect, the Arabs were separated from the Turkish settlement, and though this separation was considered a necessity so as not to delay the treaty while the remaining Anglo-French differences in the Arab provinces were ironed out, these remaining differences were few, and except for some minor details, they were settled even before the San Remo Conference ended. It was evident therefore, that Britain and France did not wish to subject their intended solution of the Arab question to outside criticism; the matter was private and only for them to settle.

On April 25, the Council finally made the formal decision in the allocation of the mandates; Syria including Lebanon went to France, and Palestine and Mesopotamia went to Britain.²³ It was decided that the decision be recorded in the minutes of the meeting only and not inserted in the treaty. This procedure was justified by the precedent of the German treaty where the names of the powers accepting

²² Allied Conference at London, 2/17/20, ibid., VII, pp. 103-104.

²³ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/25/20, ibid., VIII, p. 177.

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mandates over Germany's former colonies were not mentioned either. This justification however, was not technically valid. Mandates had been arranged into three classes commonly designated as A, B or C depending upon their development and the assistance needed.²⁴ While Germany's colonies fell in the lesser developed categories of B and C, class A was limited to territories detached from the Ottoman Empire which were considered to be advanced enough only to require temporary assistance until they could stand alone. While the Covenant of the League made no qualification how the mandatory powers were to be chosen in the lower categories, it did for the Arab provinces; it specifically stated that the choice must be based on the wishes of the people.²⁵ This definitely implied that if mandatory powers were provided for the Arab provinces then they were to be indicated as the choice of the inhabitants. Though the Covenant had been inserted in the Turkish treaty, the treaty merely provided for unnamed mandatory powers and stipulated that the final selection would be made by the Allied powers.²⁶

24 Norman Bentwich, The Mandates System, Longmans, Green, Toronto, 1930, p. 12.

25 Article 22, Paragraph 4, The Covenant of the League of Nations, Hurewitz, (ed.), Diplomacy, II, p. 62.

26 Articles 94, 95, Treaty, pp. 816-817.

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A more significant contravention of the Covenant concerned the formulation of the mandate terms. The Covenant stipulated that these terms were to be worked out by the members of the League or failing that, they were to be explicitly defined by the League's Council.²⁷ A Mandates Commission had been established by the League for this purpose, and though the terms for the B and C categories had been devised, the A scheme was still undefined. Despite this failing the prerogative remained unquestionably with the League, yet the Allies made no pretense of working with or even consulting the League in the formulation of the A scheme; the treaty simply specified that the terms would be framed by the principal Allied powers and then submitted to the League's Council for approval.²⁸ Though the term 'principal Allied powers' including Italy as well as the silent partner Japan, the British and the French later agreed to modify this provision so that these two Allied partners would not be consulted in the drafting of the scheme but would have an opportunity to make 'comments', as the other

27 Article 22, Paragraph 8, The Covenant of the League of Nations, Hurewitz, (ed.), Diplomacy, II, p. 62.

28 Article 96, Treaty, p. 817.

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Council members of the League, when the final plan was submitted to this body.²⁹ Thus Britain and France ensured themselves that they would be the sole judges in determining what degree of control was to be instituted in their mandates over the Arabs.

Except for regions conterminous to Turkey and Kurdistan, the Arab boundaries were left undetermined by the treaty but these were to be the subject of a later Anglo-French agreement. Little difficulty was foreseen in delimiting these mandated territories and the only area which caused some debate in the Council was Palestine's northern frontier. The problem here involved available water supplies located in southern Lebanon which Lloyd George, as well as the Zionists, considered vital for the existence of Palestine. The British leader insisted that Palestine's northern frontier should be extended to its ancient limits of Dan so as to include some of these water supplies.³⁰ Berthelot declared France's willingness to arrange a private

29 Curzon to Derby, 12/11/20, DBFP., XIII, p. 383.

30 Allied Conference at London, 2/18/20, ibid., VII, pp. 114, 115.

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compact with the Zionists guarantying an adequate supply of water but declared reluctance to cede any territory. A settlement was eventually reached on a quid pro quo basis; the British accepted the extension of Syria's northern frontier to include a large segment of the Baghdad railway formerly owned by German interests, and the French agreed to cede the caza of Safed as far north as Dan to Palestine.³¹ As defined in the treaty, Syria's new boundary included the Gulf of Alexandretta and extended eastwards north of the railway which passed through the towns of Aintab, Urfah, Mardin and Nisibin to the Tigris.³² This boundary extension entailed placing Turco-Kurdish populations within Syria but this was considered unavoidable. The extension of Palestine's frontier brought the initial reaches of the Jordan into the area but not its headwaters. The British however, appeared

³¹ Allied Conference at London, 2/21/20, ibid., pp. 182-184. Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/25/20, ibid., VIII, pp. 172-173.

³² Article 27, Treaty, p. 795.

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satisfied and dropped all claims to the other water supplies.³³

Palestine presented one other major problem between the French and the British. There was general Allied agreement that some form of home was to be established for the Jews in Palestine, and at Curzon's suggestion, the Council agreed that the safest way in handling Zionist sensitivity was simply to reiterate the Balfour Declaration in the treaty.³⁴ However, before the French would accept this procedure, a point in this pledge had to be debated. The Balfour Declaration had guaranteed the religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities, and this brought into question France's traditional protection of the rights of the Palestinian Catholics and of the Catholic Holy Shrines. The clamour for the preservation of these privileges by the French made it extremely difficult for Millerand to relinquish

the

³³ When it came time to define the exact details of the Arab boundaries, the British, under Zionist pressure, again raised their pretensions to other water supplies both in the north and the east of Palestine, and this time French opposition was stiff. In the subsequent Franco-British Convention, the boundaries of the mandated territories were defined without further extensions to Palestine, instead a special joint commission was appointed to study Palestine's water problem and to provide possible solutions for developing and utilizing the water supplies to benefit both sides. Articles 1, 8, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1921, "Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, on certain points connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia." Cmd. 1195, 1921, pp. 1-4.

³⁴ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/24/20, DBFP., VIII, pp. 159, 163, 170. Article 95, Treaty, pp. 816-817.

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these rights to the British as Lloyd George insisted. The British leader had pointed out that French protection might have been necessary when Palestine was under the Turkish regime, but a continuation of these prerogatives would interfere with the British administration of the area and would imply British incompetence to deal fairly with religious issues, and this he would never accept.³⁵ Nitti himself, was interested in seeing these French rights come to an end since Italy, as a rival Catholic state, had resented the French privilege of protecting the Holy Places for the Catholic Church. In an effort to resolve this Anglo-French difference, he offered a compromise favouring the British; it called for an end to these privileges and provided for a commission, composed of the religious interests concerned, to study and regulate all the claims of the religious communities under the chairmanship of a representative appointed by the League's Council.³⁶ As Lloyd George accepted it, Millerand's position weakened and he finally consented to accept the formula providing the stipulation declaring the abandonment of existing privileges was not included in the treaty, instead

³⁵ Allied Conference at London, 2/17/20, DBFP., VII, pp. 110-111.

³⁶ Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/24/20, ibid., VIII, p. 162.

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he offered to accept the abandonment as a binding pledge to be recorded in the minutes of the meeting.³⁷ Lloyd George consented and Nitti's formula with the appropriate omission was inserted in the treaty.³⁸ The old acknowledged right of France as protector of Catholics in Palestine had come to an end.

With the settlement of these differences in Palestine, only one other significant question remained to be resolved between Britain and France in the Arab provinces and this had nothing to do with the treaty; it concerned the French share of Mesopotamian oil. Nevertheless, this question did not cause any anxiety at the London or San Remo Conferences. Two separate oil agreements had in fact been negotiated earlier outside the Council,³⁹ and though basically identical, Lloyd George had rejected them for different reasons: the first had been negotiated in the spring of 1919 and Lloyd George would not commit anything to the French in the Middle East as long as he had hopes of keeping them out of Syria;

37 Ibid., p. 170.

38 Article 95, Treaty, p. 817.

39 Long-Bérenger Agreement, 4/8/19, DBFP., IV, pp. 1089-1092. Greenwood-Bérenger Agreement, 12/21/19, ibid., pp. 1114-1117.

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and the second, negotiated after the French landed in Syria, was rejected because of the rights it conferred on private joint-stock companies. In this last rejection, Lloyd George was not objecting to France's share of the oil; he was simply adhering to recently adopted Cabinet policy not to allow any oil company but the government controlled Anglo-Persian Oil Company to exploit the Mesopotamian oil fields. As he stated in the Council, the costs of administering Mesopotamia far exceeded the area's normal revenues and profits derived from working the oil fields must go to meet these costs and not to the speculators.⁴⁰ The oil agreement therefore, had to be strictly between the two governments without any involvement from private interests. With this qualification, a third and final agreement was negotiated outside the Council and Lloyd George and Millerand confirmed it on April 25. As had been proposed in the second agreement, the French received a 25% interest in the company exploiting the oil fields, and in addition, a new provision gave the French the right to purchase 25% of the produced oil at market rates; in return, France gave the British government

⁴⁰ Allied Conference at London, 2/17/20, ibid., VII, p. 108.

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the right to construct two separate railways and pipe-lines over Syrian territory to the Mediterranean.⁴¹ Though this oil settlement had been pending ever since the Lloyd George-Clemenceau talks in December 1918, the settlement was among the most easily attained of all Anglo-French agreements centering on the Arab provinces.

The Anglo-French satisfaction over the oil settlement was generally true of the overall division of the Arab provinces even though the original wartime partition scheme had been greatly modified at French expense. France was thankful that Syria, often considered the jewel of the Ottoman possessions, was now legally within her grasp when just a year earlier she seemed destined by the British to only some minor role in the eastern Mediterranean. Though the Anglo-French desiderata in the Middle East had been settled, their long difficulties with the Arabs were only beginning. Within two months of the San Remo Conference,

⁴¹ Points 7-10, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1920, "Memorandum of Agreement between M. Philippe Berthelot, Directeur des Affaires politiques et commerciales au Ministère, and Professor Sir John Cadman, K.C.M.G., Director in Charge of His Majesty's Petroleum Department". Cmd. 675, London, 1920, pp. 2-3.

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the British were confronted with a serious rebellion which lasted until the following spring.⁴² The French, initially at least, fared better; their immediate objective was to gain control of the Syrian hinterland, and early in July, Feisal, who never relented in his hope for British assistance, informed Allenby that the French were demanding unconditional acceptance of the French mandate and were concentrating their forces to attack Aleppo.⁴³ The British maintained an official silence, and within a fortnight, the French began their expected move eastwards. Arab resistance collapsed quickly and Feisal fled to the British; the short-lived and self-proclaimed independent Arab state came to an undramatic end.

Arab independence, Hussein's price for Arab intervention in the war, had been a fantasy; it was the Arabs' misfortune that both Britain and France considered control of the Middle East vital to their interests as great powers. This control offered protection to their commerce in the eastern Mediterranean, and for Britain particularly, it

⁴² Curzon to Allenby, 6/9/20, DBFP., XIII, p. 286.
286 n.2. Monroe, Britain's Moment, p. 61.

⁴³ Allenby to Curzon, 7/13/20, DBFP., XIII, p. 311.

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safeguarded her imperial communications via the Suez Canal to India and placed her in possession of known oil deposits. Though British preponderance was established soon after the armistice, it was not in France's interests to see this British preponderance complete, and unavoidably, the Arab liberation from the Turks produced a new set of masters. Of the original McMahon-Hussein understandings, only Hussein's own territory the Hedjaz, a barren 700 mile strip of territory along the Red Sea, was to be free and independent.⁴⁴ This was little consolation for the disgraced Hussein, the once proclaimed King of the Arabs, whose independence in the Hedjaz had already been recognized by the Entente soon after the Arab intervention. Though the McMahon-Hussein exchanges had been substantiated and in fact reinforced by later public pledges and assurances, they played no consequence at the Peace Conference. There may have been no real chance for a unified Arab state due to the differences among the Arabs themselves and to the geographical nature of the territories, but a loose confederation of states was always a distinct possibility. Self-interest, and not promises of self-determination or consent of the governed, guided the Anglo-French solution for the Arab provinces.

⁴⁴ Article 98, Treaty, p. 817.

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B. North Africa

In the other peace treaties of the war, Britain and France had included several clauses regulating their relations with the Central Powers in Egypt and Morocco; Germany, Austria and Hungary were obligated to relinquish what rights they held or could claim in the areas, and were required to recognize Egypt and Morocco as protectorates of Britain and France respectively. Though no prewar rights were enjoyed there by the Bulgarians, they too were required to recognize the protectorates. The inclusion of these regulatory clauses in each treaty was standard practise, and though the North African areas were extended to include the Sudan, Libya and Tunis in the Turkish treaty, there was no reason to believe that the settlement of this matter would cause any difficulty in the Council.

The question in fact was not placed on the Council's agenda until the London Conference had been in session for over five weeks, and at this time both the British and the Italians submitted their proposals. The Italian proposal had been promised by the Entente in the London Agreement; it simply called for an end of the Sultan's remaining rights and privileges in Libya, and without debate the proposal was

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accepted.⁴⁵ Easy acceptance was also given to the British request that recognition be given by Turkey, as well as by all the signatories of the treaty, to the Anglo-Egyptian condominium over the Sudan established in 1899.⁴⁶ The British proposals for Egypt however, startled the French; instead of the anticipated clauses, the British presented fourteen articles which at several points at least, specifically regulated not Anglo-Turkish relations, but Anglo-French relations in Egypt. An obvious departure from the other peace treaties was that instead of obligating Turkey to a simple recognition of the British protectorate over Egypt, the clause was reworded so that Turkey declared this recognition in conformity with the action already taken by the Allies.⁴⁷ Though the French delegates were uncertain whether France had or had not formally granted this recognition, Italy and Japan had definitely not yet done so.

⁴⁵ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/23/20, DBFP., VII, p. 599. Italian Proposals, Libya Article 1, ibid., p. 605. Article 121, Treaty, p. 822.

⁴⁶ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/23/20, DBFP., VII, p. 598. British Proposals, Sudan Article 1, ibid., p. 605. Article 113, Treaty, p. 821. For the terms of this condominium see Anglo-Egyptian Convention, 1/19/99, Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy, I, pp. 216-218.

⁴⁷ British Proposals, Egypt Article 1, DBFP., VII, p. 603.

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Nevertheless, the problem was minor since none of Britain's Allies intended to dispute the British protectorate over Egypt. For the British, the rewording was merely designed to speed up this recognition among the Allies.

Anglo-French disagreement arose from the British proposal to suppress the Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt established in 1876.⁴⁸ Like its counterpart in the Ottoman Empire, the interests of the French bondholders were involved, but this was not what caused French anxiety since the British were willing to undertake responsibility for all of the Egyptian debts, including responsibility to the holders of the bonds.⁴⁹ French financial interests were being safeguarded, and as such, the French were not objecting to the suppression of the Debt Commission, but, as Berthelot stated, "the French Government must have corresponding advantages in Morocco if they were to accept this article."⁵⁰

48 British Proposals, Egypt Article 13, ibid., p. 604.

49 British Proposals, Egypt Articles 11, 12, 14, ibid., pp. 604-605.

50 Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/31/20, ibid., p. 688.

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This French demand was perfectly understandable; the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 had specifically called for reciprocal advantages in Morocco and Egypt, and soon after the war, Anglo-French negotiations were begun to settle interests in the two areas. By May 1919, a draft convention had been prepared: France was to consent to the abrogation of the Debt Commission in Egypt while Britain was to renunciate all rights and interests in the State Bank of Morocco.⁵¹ The proposed convention however, was left unsigned due to France's subsequent demand that Britain give prior consent to any future Franco-Spanish arrangement over Tangier, which France hoped to acquire. Thus the British position at the London Conference was to force France to give up her bargaining power in Egypt without the corresponding British concession in Morocco, and this the French refused to do.

The disagreement was carried over into San Remo but by then, the British position had become more flexible. Curzon declared Britain's willingness to resume the discussions of the previous year regarding Egypt and

⁵¹ Articles 6, 14, *Projet de Convention relative à l'Application au Maroc et à l'Égypte de la Déclaration du 8 Avril. 1904, ibid., pp. 697-700 n.11.*

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Morocco providing the question of Tangier was left out.⁵² Millerand consented and it was agreed that the clause referring to the suppression of the Debt Commission, as well as those referring to British responsibility of the Egyptian Debts, would be included in the treaty only if the convention were signed before the treaty was handed to the Turks.⁵³ The convention was not signed and the treaty left France with her bargaining power in Egypt still intact.

Basically however, the object of the treaty in the section relating to North Africa was to regulate the relations of the Allied powers with Turkey, and in this respect there was no objection to proposals within this context. France's request for Turkey's recognition of a French protectorate over Morocco and Tunis was easily acknowledged by the British once their disagreement had been cleared up.⁵⁴ The French too, lifted their reservations on the remaining Egyptian clauses with the San Remo compromise, and the British erased

⁵² Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/21/20, ibid., VIII, pp. 87-88.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 88.

⁵⁴ Articles 118, 120, Treaty, p. 822.

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all remaining rights and privileges held by Turkey or the Sultan in Egypt.⁵⁵ Though some issues remained unsettled between Britain and France, the treaty nonetheless, confirmed these states as well as Italy in their North African possessions; from then on, their principal concern was not to parry outside interferences in their respective areas but to control the indigenous populations. For Italy and for Britain particularly, this proved to be a formidable task; while Britain found it necessary to terminate the protectorate within two years in order to accommodate the Egyptian nationalists, it took Italy ten years of constant fighting just to bring Libya under her control.

C. The Greek Islands

Like North Africa, the disposition of the Greek islands played only a minor role in the negotiations and in the treaty. There were over twenty islands involved in the Turkish settlement, stretching from Samothrace just northwest

55 Articles 101, 109, 112, ibid., pp. 818, 820-821.

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of Gallipoli, south to the Dodecanese which included Rhodes and Castellorizo, and east to Cyprus. By the end of the war none of these islands remained under Turkish control. Britain had occupied Cyprus back in 1878 and had announced its annexation soon after Turkey entered the war. The Dodecanese, except for Castellorizo, had been under Italian occupation since 1912, and late in the war, the French themselves occupied Castellorizo. Most of the remaining islands north of the Dodecanese, had been assigned to Greece by the European powers in 1913, and though Turkey did not relinquish control to the Greeks, their administrators were forced off these islands by the British during the war.

As these islands were unquestionably dominated by Greek populations, it appeared natural that Veniselos would claim all of them at the Paris Conference, but he had tactfully omitted Cyprus from his claims. This was in spite of the fact that Britain, in October 1915, had actually offered to cede the island in one of the Allied attempts to draw Greece into the war.⁵⁶ Since that time however, both the French government and the British War Office had indicated

56 Lloyd George, Truth, II, pp. 1217-1218.

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their opposition to such a move. In the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British were obligated to pledge that they would not enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus without the prior consent of the French government.⁵⁷ The island was a mere seventy miles away from the Syrian coast, and the prospect of a Greek controlled Cyprus was little guarantee for the French against a stronger and possibly hostile power entrenching its influence on the island. Strategical importance was also emphasized by the War Office just two days prior to the formal opening of the Paris Conference; it had informed the British Peace Delegation that if naval and air bases were developed on Cyprus, the island would become vitally important for the protection of the lines of communication throughout the Near East and the Suez.⁵⁸ The abandonment of the island implied neglecting the safety of these lines of communication, and this was always a persuasive argument to gain the support of the India and Foreign Offices.

57 Grey to Cambon, 5/16/16, DEFP., IV, p. 246.

58 Memorandum of the War Office General Staff, 1/16/19, printed in Lloyd George, Truth, II, p. 1238.

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Lloyd George might have been receptive to a Greek claim for Cyprus, but Veniselos would have risked immediate reaction within the British government at a time when it was absolutely essential to remain on the best of terms with the British for the sake of the other Greek claims. Besides, Veniselos did not consider it a sacrifice; his intimate friendship with the British leader and the prospect of an ever increasing friendship between their two countries, convinced Veniselos that Britain would eventually cede the island to Greece. His immediate concern was that Turkey would be obligated to relinquish her existing rights and title to the island, and this was accomplished in the treaty.⁵⁹ Though the French in 1920 still feared the consequences of a minor power controlling the strategically important island,⁶⁰ the cession of Cyprus was never anything more than hypothetical after the war; as Britain increased her commitments in the Middle East, and as naval and air bases were developed on Cyprus, so did Greece's chances of obtaining the island decline accordingly.

59 Article 116, Treaty, p. 821.

60 Britain was again obligated to restate her wartime pledge to France relative to Cyprus. Point 4, "Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920." Cmd. 1195, p. 2.

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In contrast to Cyprus, the British made no effort to make their wartime occupation of the group of eight islands north of the Dodecanese, anything more than temporary. Even during the war, Greek civil authorities loyal to Veniselos, had been allowed to administer these islands under general British supervision.⁶¹ Placing these eight islands under Greek sovereignty was never disputed in the Council, but five of them did have a special importance, at least to the Allied military experts, due to their proximity to the Dardanelles. The Council accepted the military's suggestion that Samothrace, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos and Mitylene be classified within the demilitarized zone of the Straits and that all fortifications, batteries and roads allowing for rapid transport of mobile batteries be demolished under Allied supervision.⁶² Otherwise, there was so little concern in the Council over these islands that it was brought to their attention late in the San Remo Conference, that no formal decision had yet been taken to sanction the transfer of sovereignty from Turkey to Greece over the islands, and without hesitation, the sanction was made.⁶³

61 Granville to Curzon, 10/21/19, DBFP., IV, pp. 837-838.

62 Allied Conference at London, 2/18/20, ibid., VII, p. 122. Article 178, Treaty, pp. 841-842.

63 Supreme Council, San Remo, 4/25/20, DBFP., VIII p. 191. Article 84, Treaty, p. 813.

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The Council's settlement over the last group of islands, the Dodecanese, was a little more complicated since it involved obtaining Italy's consent to transfer these islands to Greece. Nitti was never too enthused about this transfer even though his government had entered into certain commitments with Veniselos on this subject. On July 29, 1919, a secret agreement had been negotiated by the Greek leader and Nitti's first Foreign Minister, Tommaso Tittoni, supposedly settling the outstanding Italo-Greek questions particularly in Turkey: while Veniselos consented to grant Italy a free zone in the port of Smyrna and agreed to some territorial claims, Italy accepted the Greek claims to the Smyrna area and consented to give up all the islands of the Dodecanese except for Rhodes, where it was agreed, a plebiscite was to determine the island's final status within five years of Britain's cession of Cyprus.⁶⁴ Veniselos obviously, was willing to postpone Greece's acquisition of Rhodes in order to get Italian acceptance of his desiderata in western Turkey. Nitti however, never felt obligated to avoid his criticism of the Greek claims, and still less did he feel committed to transfer the rest of the Dodecanese to Greece.

⁶⁴ Summary of the Tittoni-Veniselos Agreement printed in Albrecht-Carrié, Italy, pp. 242-243. Curzon to Granville, 8/5/20, DBFP., XIII, p. 119.

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Though Nitti could ignore the commitments to Veniselos, he still faced the opposition of Britain and France to Italian retention of the Dodecanese even though the wartime London Agreement clearly assigned sovereignty over the islands to Italy. For France particularly, this opposition was based on the necessity of eliminating Italy's chances to establish a naval command in the eastern Mediterranean; something which Orlando's government had proposed in the Dodecanese.⁶⁵ The prospect of the Italians inaugurating a control in these waters was to be avoided, and Berthelot, at the London Conference, requested that the islands be assigned directly to Greece in the treaty.⁶⁶ Nitti reacted immediately stating

that he had no doubt in his mind that he was about to be buried with full honours...he could not help saying that he occupied a ridiculous position. Every day he was being made to give up something, and thereby his position in Italy daily became more difficult...in Asia Minor, Italy had been guaranteed equitable treatment under the Treaty of London; but the net result would appear to be that she would receive nothing. Under these circumstances the question arose in his mind whether it would not be better to refuse to sign the treaty, and whether it would not be better to enter into direct relations with Turkey.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Extract from the 'Official Gazette', 4/16/19, ibid., IV, pp. 664-665.

⁶⁶ Allied Conference at London, 2/20/20, ibid., VII, pp. 160, 161.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 161.

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Whether Nitti was referring to the Turkish nationalists or the Sultan's government was not clear, but once the bargaining for the Tripartite Agreement got underway, Nitti became somewhat mollified. He revealed Italy's commitment to Veniselos though he omitted mentioning that the plebiscite in Rhodes was contingent upon Britain's cession of Cyprus.⁶⁸ Since both Britain and France were relieved that they were succeeding in satisfying Nitti with a Turkish sphere of influence and of economic priority rather than territorial concessions, they accepted the Italo-Greek arrangement, and France even consented to Nitti's request to hand over Castellorizo.⁶⁹

A month later, the Italians submitted their proposed clause for the Dodecanese and no mention was made of Greece; it merely obligated Turkey to renounce in favour of Italy all rights and title over the islands listed in the clause.⁷⁰ After some debate on ceding Castellorizo to the Italians and whether to mention Greece in the clause, the Italian proposal was accepted unaltered on the understanding that

68 Allied Conference at London, 2/21/20, ibid., p. 193.

69 Ibid.

70 Italian Proposals, Dodecanese Article 2, ibid., p. 605.

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the islands, except Castellorizo, would be subsequently handed to Greece according to the Tittoni-Veniseles Agreement. Castellorizo, a small insignificant island just off the coast of Turkey which the Italians insisted they keep for themselves, was declared to be apart from the Dodecanese in order to meet the Italian demand.⁷¹

Thus Italy's territorial acquisitions in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire were to be Rhodes and Castellorizo, and Italian control of Rhodes was considered by the French and British only to be temporary. The disparity between these acquisitions and what had been promised to Italy in the wartime agreements was something which Nitti had to explain before the Italian Parliament, and in this he did not succeed; as far as the Parliament was concerned Nitti had sold out to Britain and France.

As a whole, the Greek islands were the most legitimate claims Greece could make before the Council, but Veniseles never considered them anything more than of secondary importance to his claims in western Turkey. With the British,

⁷¹ Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, 3/23/20, ibid., pp. 598-599 n.11. Article 122, Treaty, p. 822.

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he had omitted Cyprus from his desiderata in order not to prejudice Greece's opportunity in Smyrna. With the Italians, he had postponed Greece's acquisition of Rhodes in order to gain Italian acceptance to the same end. While his gamble with the British paid off, his private compact with the Italians brought no advantages but only unwelcomed results. Nitti never once voluntarily supported any of the Greek claims and indeed, if he would have had his own way the Greeks would have been forced to evacuate Smyrna, but most important of all, the Dodecanese were ceded only to Italy in the treaty and the transference of the islands was dependent upon Italian goodwill, and Italian goodwill was lacking.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The negotiations for the Turkish peace and the accompanying Tripartite Agreement were completed when the San Remo Conference ended on April 26, 1920. The proposed peace was testimony to the dominant position held by Britain in the negotiations. Throughout the London and San Remo Conferences, the British had led the discussions and had sponsored most of the major proposals which were ultimately to be found in the final draft. This was particularly true of the political clauses. Lloyd George had furnished the Council's final solution for Armenia, while his Foreign Secretary had provided for an autonomous Kurdistan. In the rest of the Turkish territories, Lloyd George's efforts were alone responsible for obtaining official recognition of the Greek claims to Eastern Thrace down to the Chatalja line and to the Smyrean enclave. In addition, Britain had obtained all her desiderata in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire: she received formal recognition of her position in Egypt, the Sudan and Cyprus; she obtained Mesopotamia including the vilayet of Mosul and Palestine; and she was assured of the unconditional freedom of the Straits just when the superiority of the British fleet was indisputable. British diplomacy had triumphed; they had emerged from the negotiations as the true victors of the Ottoman spoils.

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France could well complain that many of her interests in the Ottoman Empire had been compromised or totally abandoned. It was her misfortune to feel dependent upon Britain for support on specifically European questions such as collective security or German disarmament and reparations, and as a result, no real attempt was made during the negotiations to oppose actively the British ambitions in the Near East. Yet, France managed to emerge remarkably well from the Turkish negotiations considering her almost powerless bargaining position in the Near East a year earlier. Besides obtaining Syria and Lebanon, France received a Turkish sphere of influence and economic priority through the Tripartite Agreement, and most important for French capital investments in Turkey, she had managed to gain British acceptance of the proposed Financial Commission despite Lloyd George's original objection to any such body.¹

Of the three principal Allies, Italy benefited the least in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Far from the Entente's promises and her own great expectations during the war, Italy emerged from the negotiations in legal possession of Libya, two islands and, her only real gain,

¹ Allied Conference at London, 2/14/20, DBFP., VII, pp. 57, 58.

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a Turkish sphere of influence and economic priority. Though she was to cooperate with Britain and France as an equal on all the commissions proposed by the treaty, her subordinated position in the negotiations was certainly indicative of her future position on these commissions. At best, Italy's role in the Conferences had been as a mediator in Anglo-French disputes with little or no influence in policy-making, and there was little prospect that this role could be changed in the proposed commissions.

The fourth and final state to benefit from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was Greece. Premier Veniselos had proved to be extraordinarily persuasive and skillful at the Peace Conferences, and under Lloyd George's patronage, he had been treated almost as an equal at the Turkish negotiations much to the chagrin of Nitti. The almost complete acceptance of the Greek claims reflected the overwhelming influence of the British Premier among his colleagues; in his support of the Greek claims to a zone in western Turkey, Lloyd George had overcome what seemed to be the insurmountable opposition of France, Italy and even sections of the British Cabinet. Once France bolted from the ranks of the opposition to support Lloyd George's position, the others could do little but follow but with nagging doubts about how

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the Turks would respond to such a decision. Just why Lloyd George was such an enthusiastic philhellene remains one of the most important unsolved questions of interest to historians. His trust in the Greek people as exemplified in Veniselos, and his confidence that the Greeks were once again on the ascendency in the eastern Mediterranean as opposed to the declining fortunes of the 'unspeakable' Turks was immense and persistent. Veniselos' steadfast loyalty to the Allied cause during the war was a debt which Lloyd George proved most eager to reward particularly since the Greeks were militarily prepared to protect these claims, and since a strengthened and friendly power in the Aegean offered advantages and security to British interests and naval communications in the area.

As a whole, the intended peace terms clearly illustrated the maximum aims that could be negotiated with British concurrence. The foundations of the treaty and of the Tripartite Agreement had been provided by the secret wartime agreements, and neither the long interval of fifteen months, from the Turkish armistice to the convening of the London Conference, nor the rise of the Turkish nationalist movement had been able to diminish the ardour of the victors to impose a stringent peace on the Turks. Altruism was not

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a feature of the treaty; Wilsonian idealism had failed to penetrate the Turkish peace. Rather, the terms for the Turks had been created in the image of nineteenth century imperialism. When a territory provided opportunities, whether strategic, economic or other, a settlement along imperialistic lines was forthcoming. This was definitely the case in the Arab provinces where Anglo-French pretensions were screened with the adoption of the mandate system, and where the Council's decisions accorded neither with the talk of liberating subject races from oppression nor with the pious pronouncements and assurances concerning the wishes of the inhabitants or self-determination. Zionism gave the Palestinian decision an idealistic motivation, yet the area had a vital interest for Britain due to its proximity to the Suez Canal, and Britain would certainly not have been there if it were otherwise. In the area left to the Turks, Allied self-interest again dominated the Council's decisions. The new Turkish state was to be independent but only theoretically; with the resurrection of the Capitulatory regime, the proposed implementation of the Financial Commission and the majority of the country actually divided into spheres of influence and economic priority, Turkish national independence would have been a mere absurdity. In addition, a multitude of other stipulations exemplified the

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Allies' meticulous concern to protect all their interests, however small or insignificant, in the area to remain Turkish.

While Allied intentions were to dominate completely the Arab provinces and to exert a tight control particularly in fiscal matters over all new Turkish state, their decisions relating to Armenia and Kurdistan were distinguished by their unwillingness to undertake any form of responsibility. When one talked of the liberation of oppressed nationalities in the Ottoman Empire near the end of the war, the Armenians inevitably topped the list. These peoples' long aspirations for nationhood had in fact given the war against the Turks an idealistic motivation, and the Armenians themselves had nurtured sympathy in the west for their cause by publicizing their oppression under the Turks. Yet only Tsarist Russia had anything more than just a humanitarian interest in the Turkish Armenians and humanitarianism was not enough to ensure the eventual prospect of a self-contained Armenian state. Due to the scarcity of Armenians and the hostile elements both inside and outside of their territories, an independent Armenian state had no chance of survival unless some major power undertook the protection and financing of the state. None of the Allies were willing to undertake the task and when attempts failed to get the League to assume the responsibilities, the fate of the Armenians was left to

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the one slim chance that the Americans would accept the mandate, even though the Senate had refused in 1919 to accept any responsibilities in Turkey. Allied solemn promises had again been cast aside and the Armenians were left to vie for themselves against both the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists.

The Kurds on the other hand, were not suffering oppression under Turkish rule, and in fact, no official promise of independence had been made specifically to them during the war. Except for a few who presented themselves as Kurdish spokesmen, there was a general lack of sentiment for nationhood among the Kurds or even for a change in their political status. Nevertheless, the Kurdish area eventually designated for independence was considered most strategic by the British, and by Curzon in particular; it would act as a buffer state between Turkey, Armenia and the Arab provinces. In addition, as the Kurds had often been spurred by the Turks into violent action against the Armenians, the separation of Kurds and Turks was thought to be prudent. Yet the dilemma confronting the Council was the need militarily to guarantee an independent Kurdistan against certain Turkish opposition and at the same time to 'impose' this independence on the reluctant Kurds. The final solution provided by Curzon gave the Kurds local autonomy with the privilege to opt for independence within a year of

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the treaty's enforcement. But without Allied enforcement not even local autonomy was ever tested.

The Council's irregular solutions for Kurdistan and Armenia arose from the fear of the Turkish nationalist movement. It was only on these eastern vilayets that the movement had been of concern to the negotiations, and even then, it was regarded only as a military annoyance and not as a political force. The establishment of the nationalist government at Angora soon after the 'second' occupation of Constantinople initiated a new period of development for the movement, yet even before then, Kemal could have claimed to be the spokesman for the Turk by virtue of his control of most of Anatolia. The Constantinople government's authority was limited to the capital and the south shore of the Marmora. The division of Turkey into these two unequal parts had been the most serious effect of the delay in negotiating the Turkish peace, but the altered circumstances had made little impact on the negotiators despite the appeals for a lenient peace from their officials in Turkey.

What particularly accentuated the difficulties of the Constantinople government vis-à-vis the nationalists was the attitude of the Allies themselves. The nationalists were as much a threat to the 'old order' as they were to the

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intended peace terms, and yet the Allies stifled the very means by which the Sultan may have re-established his authority in Anatolia. Various plans to raise an adequate force to fight the nationalists and requests for financial assistance to alleviate near bankruptcy were met with apathy by the Allied leaders. Immobilisme had become the order in Constantinople and it was a feature which left Kemal free to consolidate the control and loyalty of Anatolia. The entrenched immobilisme in Constantinople and the Council's total indifference to Kemalism as a political force, suggests that the Allied leaders, with the possible exception of Nitti, did not regard the nationalist movement as anything more than a transient phenomenon, and if it did not disappear, then it would eventually become conciliated to the Sultan's government.

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APPENDIX I

The Entente's Prewar Interests in the Ottoman Empire

The Entente's Ottoman interests listed below must be regarded only as a summary. Its purpose is to give simply a general idea of the commercial, economic and financial penetration of the Ottoman Empire by these Powers. No Russian investments were uncovered, but if any had existed in Turkey they were quite negligible in comparison with her Allies. Among the rest of the Entente, France had a definite edge in investments: there was some three thousand millions of French capital invested in Turkey alone.¹

A. France

Though French interests existed in Syria and Palestine, the bulk were in Turkey. None were found to exist in Mesopotamia.

1. French bondholders held some 60% of the Ottoman Public Debt which stood at \$716,000,000 before the outbreak of the war.

2. The Ottoman Public Debt Council, managed largely by the French and less so by the British bondholders, controlled certain revenues of the Ottoman Empire. These included a monopoly on salt and revenues derived from taxes on fish, spirits, stamps, silk and a number of other indirect taxes. A monopoly on tobacco was leased out.

¹ Note from the French Government, 9/21/19, DBEP, IV, p. 77.

3. The powerful Imperial Ottoman Bank with numerous branches in Turkey had capital outlays worth 125,000,000 gold francs. Though originally a Franco-British concern, it eventually came under the control of the French shareholders. At the beginning of the war, this concern still had large holdings in the German Baghdad Railway.
4. Other significant French banks in Turkey were the Crédit Lyonnais and the Banque Périer.
5. France held 12.3% of the import-export trade with Turkey in 1913.
6. By 1914, French nationals owned 760 miles of railway in Turkey or 21% of the total; the largest being the Smyrna-Afium-Karahissar line with a branch to Panderma for a total of 443 miles.
7. In 1914, the Régie Générale de Chemins de Fer, of Paris, received a concession to construct an Angora-Sivas-Samsun line which in addition with various branches would total some 762 miles.
8. In Syria and Palestine, the French owned the Beirut-Rayak-Damascus line, the Rayak-Homs-Hama-Aleppo line, and the Jaffa-Jerusalem line.
9. Construction of roads in the Ottoman Empire had been entrusted to the French controlled Société Générale d'Entreprise des Routes.

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10. The Société Anonyme des Quais, Docks et Entrepôts de Constantinople, in which the British also had a large interest had exclusive control of the quays and warehouses in the capital.
11. The Société Anonyme Ottomane des Docks et Ateliers des Haut Bosphore had constructed a floating dock with workshops and repair facilities in the Bay of Stenia above Constantinople.
12. The Société des Quais de Smyrne held the quay and part of the tramway concessions in the city.
13. French companies had also received concessions for the construction of port facilities in Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut, Tripolis and Panderma.
14. The Administration Générale des Phares de l'Empire Ottoman was a French concern.
15. The Compagnie des Eaux de Constantinople supplied the European sector of the city and its suburbs.
16. The Compagnie des Eaux de Scutari, owned jointly with Italian interests, supplied the Asiatic side of the capital.
17. A French company also supplied electricity and gas on the Asiatic side of the capital.
18. French capital together with Belgian capital controlled a gas, tramway and electric company in Beirut.

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19. In the Gulf of Smyrna, a French concern ran a ferry service.
20. The Société Ottomane des Mines d'Heraclée had been granted a long concession to mine the coal deposits in the area.
21. Various other minor mines were held by French companies in Cilicia and in different sectors of Turkey.

B. Britain

Though inferior to the French in their economic and financial penetration of the Ottoman Empire, the British were superior in trade. No British subjects held any direct concessions in either Syria or Palestine by 1914.

1. British bondholders held 15% of the Ottoman Public Debt.
2. Sir Ernest Cassel had founded and controlled the National Bank of Turkey, and though its holdings were large, it was incomparable to the powerful Imperial Ottoman Bank.
3. British mercantile firms such as MacAndrews and Forbes or J.W. Whittal, held a commanding position in Constantinople and Smyrna.
4. In 1913, Britain held 26.7% of the import-export trade with Turkey far ahead of the second place Germany with 14.7%.
5. The Smyrna-Aidin line including branches was the only railway held completely by British interests in Turkey. It

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comprised some 378 miles or some 10% of the total railways in Turkey in 1914.

6. The short Mersina-Adana line, once wholly owned by British interests, had passed to German ownership and only a few shares remained in British hands.

7. Lord Inchcape, chairman of the British India Steam Navigation Company, had secured exclusive rights of navigation over sections of the Tigris, Euphrates and the Shatt el Arab.

8. In the Ismid area, the Armstrong and Vickers group received contracts in 1913 to construct floating docks and shipyards.

9. In 1911, the National Bank of Turkey secured options to construct port facilities at Trebizond and Samsun.

10. A British concern had constructed and controlled a pier and warehouses in Smyrna.

11. The Ottoman Gas Company supplied Smyrna.

12. In Constantinople, British concerns controlled the telephone company and a cold storage company.

13. The bulk of the shares of the Société Anonyme Ottomane de Fabrication de fils et d'étoffes en coton et laine were in British hands.

14. The Abbott's Emery Mines Limited worked the emery deposits in the vilayet of Aidin.

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15. Paterson and Company worked the chrome mines in the Brusa area.
16. The working of boracite mines was also in British hands.
17. Various other mining concessions held by British interests existed principally in western Anatolia.
18. The Turkish Petroleum Company, of which most of the shares were owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company a British government concern, had been promised oil concessions embracing the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad.

C. Italy

Italy had only turned her attention to the Ottoman Empire towards the end of the nineteenth century. From that time till the outbreak of the Great War, Italy had been unable to export any appreciable amount of capital to Turkey, and as a result, her penetration there was far smaller than Britain or France in particular.

1. Italian bondholders held 3% of the Ottoman Public Debt.
2. In 1908, the Società Commerciale d'Oriente was founded and made an enthusiastic effort to gain concessions in Turkey.
3. Italy's share of the import-export trade with Turkey in 1913 was 10.5%.
4. The Société Anonyme Ottomane des Bateaux de la Corne d'Or was an Italian concern which provided ferry service.


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5. By 1914, the Italians had gained an interest in the French coal fields at Heraclea.
6. Concessions had been secured to construct a railway from Makri to Adalia in southwestern Anatolia.
7. In 1913, the Italian Nogara concern had signed an agreement with the British Smyrna-Aidin railway concern allowing them the right to construct railways south of this line.
8. When war broke out, the Italians had been concentrating their efforts in the exploitations of southern Anatolia.²


2 The information for sections A, B and C was taken from a variety of sources which included - G. Bie Ravndal, Turkey: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook, U.S. Department of Commerce, Trade Promotion Series No. 28, Washington, 1926, pp. 46-57, 58-64, 75-76, 131-133. Enclosure in Meinertzhager to Curzon, 1/11/19, DBFP., IV, pp. 504-505. Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 in Robeck to Curzon, 9/21/19, ibid., pp. 772-775. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in Turkey, pp. 92-113, 218-220. Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism, Macmillan, New York, 1923, pp. 13-15, 30, 396n 45. W.W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1957, pp. 19-21, 146. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry, pp. 11-12. Djemal Pasha, Memories, pp. 91-102.

APPENDIX II

Map A. The Ottoman Empire and the Secret Agreements 1915-1917



Map B. The Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreement 1920



APPENDIX III

ABSTRACT OF

The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire: The Study
of the Political Clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres,
August 10, 1920

The outstanding political fact in the Near East following World War I was the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Allies had prepared for this event; they had negotiated among themselves the partition of most of the Ottoman Empire in four secret agreements during the war years. Two factors had greatly complicated these neat Allied arrangements: the first was the elimination of the Tsarist claims; and the second was the entrance of the United States in the war and the advent of a new idealistic spirit in pursuing the struggle against the Central Alliance. In the Ottoman theatre of the war, the new spirit meant the liberation of the subject nationalities as well as the promise of a secure sovereignty for those areas predominantly Turkish. At the Paris Conference, the representatives of the Armenians, Kurds, Arabs, Greeks and Zionists all travelled to the French capital to support their claims for independence, or as in the case of the Zionists, for a national home for Jewry. The Turks too were invited to come. Yet despite all pretenses to the contrary, the Allies never abandoned the secret agreements nor did they lose sight of them at the Paris Conference.

APPENDIX III

Though President Wilson was an obstacle in the attempts to use the secret agreements as a basis of the negotiations, the real difficulty in the Turkish negotiations proved to be the British attempt to minimize France's role in Syria. Confronted with disagreement, the negotiations were postponed much to the detriment of ever imposing the anticipated peace terms without the use of military force.

The Turkish negotiations were formally resumed in London on February 12, 1920, and by that time, the Americans had long abandoned the negotiations and the Anglo-French dispute over Syria had long been settled. Released of these obstacles, the Allies negotiated the treaty in a short ten weeks. Neither the long interval nor the rise of the Turkish nationalist movement had very much influence on the negotiations. Though the secret agreements had been modified and altered extensively, it was still self-interest which had provided the basis of the negotiations, and this self-interest was predominantly British and to a lesser extent French.