Measuring and Decomposing the Distance to the Shapley Wage Function with Limited Data

FieldValue
dc.contributor.authorAguiar, Victor
dc.contributor.authorPongou, Roland
dc.contributor.authorTondji, Jean-Baptiste
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-15T14:31:02Z
dc.date.available2020-04-15T14:31:02Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10393/40377
dc.description.abstractWe study the Shapley wage function, a wage scheme in which a worker's pay depends both on the number of hours worked and on the output of the firm. We then provide a way to measure the distance of an arbitrary wage scheme to this function in limited datasets. In particular, for a fixed technology and a given supply of labor, this distance is additively decomposable into violations of the classical axioms of efficiency, equal treatment of identical workers, and marginality. The findings have testable implications for the different ways in which popular wage schemes violate basic properties of distributive justice in market organizations. Applications to the linear contract and to other well-known compensation schemes are shown.
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectShapley wage function
dc.subjectfirm
dc.subjectfairness violations
dc.subjectlinear contract
dc.subjectbargaining
dc.subjectlimited data
dc.subject1613E
dc.titleMeasuring and Decomposing the Distance to the Shapley Wage Function with Limited Data
dc.typeWorking Paper
CollectionÉconomie - Publications // Economics - Working Papers

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