Strategy, Coercion and the Effectiveness of Airstrikes in Counterinsurgency Campaigns

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dc.contributor.authorRitchie, Robert Matthew
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-14T14:03:35Z
dc.date.available2016-10-14T14:03:35Z
dc.date.issued2016-10-14
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10393/35287
dc.description.abstractAir power has played a major role in unconventional and counterinsurgency campaigns since the advent of the military airplane. How effective is it in these types of campaigns? I use Pape’s typology of coercive strategic models in conventional war and apply it to six counterinsurgency campaigns since the Second World War. I then assess each strategy’s effectiveness in the conflict. Two trends emerge: strategies have shifted over time from those targeting supporting elements (logistics, mobility) to strategies directly targeting insurgents in combat; at the same time, air power has become less strategically effective. I examine three drivers for these trends: new technology making close air support missions technically feasible, doctrinal changes providing a military logic supporting these missions, and societal factors encouraging the replacement of ground forces with air strikes.
dc.language.isoen
dc.titleStrategy, Coercion and the Effectiveness of Airstrikes in Counterinsurgency Campaigns
dc.typeResearch Paper
dc.contributor.supervisorParis, Roland
CollectionAffaires publiques et internationales - Mémoires // Public and International Affairs - Research Papers

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