How has the immobility experienced by some FARC ex-combatants harmed the peacebuilding efforts in Colombia since 2016?

Sergio Rodríguez

Faculty of Social Sciences, Master of Arts International Development and Globalisation,

University of Ottawa

Christine Gibb

April 2022

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

- ACCU: Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá.
- AGC: Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia.
- ARN: Agencia Nacional para la Reincorporación.
- AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia.
- COMUCCON: Cooperativa Multiactiva Comunitaria del Común.
- CONPES: Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social.
- DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.
- DPB: Development Plan Budget.
- ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional.
- ETCR: Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación.
- FARC-EP: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo.
- FFS: Former FARC-EP Soldier.
- FNLA: National Front of the Liberation of Angola.
- JEP: Justicia Especial para la Paz.
- MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
- NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation.
- UN: United Nations.
- UNAL: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- UNDDR: United Nations approach to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.
- UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
- UP: Unión Patriótica.

Introduction

The Peace Accords of 2016 are doomed to fail because the current execution of the reintegration processes keeps preventing the integral mobility of Former Farc-EP Soldiers (FFS) within Colombian society. For around fifty years, the government of Colombia and the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC-EP) were involved in what was known as the last stronghold of the Cold War in South America: a Marxist and exceedingly hierarchical guerrilla, composed at the top by a politburo and the lower levels composed mainly of rural farmers, had been fighting against an ineffective and a corrupted State that had neglected the development of rural farmer's territories, minimised their political voices and ignored their basic needs daily since at least the 1950s (Pizarro, 2011).

The social strata and background of the former soldiers of the now-extinct FARC-EP is a crucial aspect of this research paper, on the one hand, because most of them come from areas where access to public and education services is minimal or non-existent. On the other hand, access to the militia represents the only opportunity these farmers have to get a stable income inside the Colombian unequal economic framework. As a result, the vindication of social inclusion plus the repression of the Colombian State to rebellious activities often linked to liberal or communist ideals left little room for democratic discussion and ignited the ongoing conflict (Pizarro, 2011). Furthermore, the conflict intensified in the 1990s, when the economic aperture was one of the priorities of Cesar Gaviria's government. The economic policies of that government posed a disadvantage to many rural farmers by the introduction of cheaper imported crops into the national market, setting a significant decline in the profit of the harvests coming from small land properties, which were already affected by the harsh security conditions and the much more profitable international market of coca leaves and cocaine (Bushnell, 1993).

With the increase of the violence and the spread of the war into new territories in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Colombian government under Alvaro Uribe's presidency set an aggressive advertisement campaign on the radio and on TV to persuade FARC-EP soldiers to demobilise and reintegrate themselves into mainstream Colombian society. It represented one attempt to weaken the bottom of the guerrilla pyramidal structure beyond the military strategy of bombing and attacking their encampments in the deep southern jungle of the country (Pécaut, 2008). Later, in 2012, the government of Juan Manuel Santos revealed that his cabinet had started peace negotiations with some representatives of this organisation in Havana (Cuba) (Santos, 2008).

For the first time in history, the president of Colombia and the leadership of the FARC-EP sat down and stretched their hands to commit to a disarmament process guaranteeing the peace and the defence and protection of the now-former FARC-EP soldiers (FFS) (Santos, 2018). While these negotiations would eventually lead to the signing of the Peace Accords of 2016, the negotiation process would later prove to be problematic given the highly polarised political climate stirred up by the participation of FFS within democratic institutions (Santos, 2018).

As part of this agreement, the first point guarantees the application of inclusive development strategies in the most affected communities by the conflict, usually located in remote areas. Those strategies entail an extensive Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process of former FARC soldiers (FFS), intending to avoid contexts of relapsed violence and promising their inclusion into the social, political and economic cores of the nation. However, the approach designed to achieve a protracted peace has proven to be limited when it comes to keeping FSS physically safe and guaranteeing the complete restoration of their citizenry. This research explores the surging immobilities affecting FFS as part of their DDR processes and ultimately assesses how these have jeopardised peacebuilding in Colombia since 2016. Specifically, this paper asks how the immobility experienced by FFS has harmed the peacebuilding efforts in Colombia since 2016.

Following Davis et al. (2014), who highlighted the importance of gathering empirical evidence to achieve transparent and relevant research conclusions, the development of this paper entailed a methodological approach in three phases. Engaging with Efron, & Ravid (2019), a literature review critically analyses, assesses and synthesizes research finding to present an accurate understanding of the current state of knowledge to expand it and contribute to a fuller understanding of a given topic. Therefore, this paper develops a literature review involving professional historians to provide a historical context of the Colombian conflict. Simultaneously, the resulting historical frame contains the two theoretical literature reviews that explain the threats to peacebuilding in Colombia, immobility and DDR processes. Lastly, this paper fosters a primary-source document analysis that weaves the current situation faced by FFS into the theoretical framework of immobility and DDR processes.

Since the Colombian literature lacks significant analysis on immobilities linked to migration studies, the mentioned methodology will compensate for this through international literature and propose possible answers on how the Colombian post-conflict case involving FFS

inserts into this specific academic field. As for the needed empirical data analysis to answer the research question, this study will mostly rely on public records and personal documents to balance the bias of their content. According to Bowen (2009), public records include official ongoing or past sources and statistics, strategic plans or policy manuals. On the other hand, personal documents -also called 'primary sources'- involve first-person accounts of events or actions through oral or written reflections, e-mails, journals or newspapers.

To do so, the paper organises into three different chapters. The first one centres around the concept of immobility scarcely explored in Colombian literature. First, it is necessary to clarify its meaning and reach in the context of Colombian rural areas, providing a brief state of the art keeping the so-called immobility turn of migration studies at the core of the investigation. Second, the paper supports part of its analysis on the 'sociology of immobility' proposed by Turner (2007), where the resulting re-territorialisation logics coming from securitisation policies consolidate what he calls "enclave society". This type of society ultimately allows governments to regulate the flow of people, goods and services in defined spaces. As an example of these areas, the Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación (ETCR)[1] have become the territories where some FFS find themselves marginalised and denied their recently-acquired rights since the signing of the Peace Accords in 2016. Therefore, this study will explain how immobilising contexts transform spaces initially conceived to reintegrate individuals into sites where social boundaries block community action and political possibilities in an extended temporality (Mountz, 2011).

Third, to get an insightful analysis of how immobility patterns work, Massey (1994) adds theoretical background to this study proposing the concept of 'power geometries'. According to this author, power geometries explain to what extent individuals physically move under unequal power relations in a determined territory. This same concept was used by Belanger and Silvey (2019) as it proved to be pertinent to analysing immobility patterns among female care workers from the Philippines in the Middle East. This conceptual framework is pertinent because it sheds light on why FFS find themselves under a forced immobility status and will help us clarify to what extent those 'waiting territories' entail a threat to peacebuilding efforts in Colombia. Finally, it is necessary to explain that this project understands immobility as a multi-layered concept, where economic, social and political immobilities emerge beyond the physical or geographical

[1] Translation in English: Reintegration and Capacitation Territorial Spaces.

confinement, complementing Mountz's (2011) spatial-centred approach. It is relevant since FFS's immobilising dynamics do not limit their physical movement solely; they come along with a lack of economic opportunities, political representation or social acceptance from neighbouring communities and established elites.

For the second chapter of this research, it is essential to address the very nature of peacebuilding processes by analysing the policies or institutional actions intending to consolidate a protracted peace in specific contexts. In fact, as part of the global strategy to assist war-torn societies with long-term stability, the United Nations (UN) suggests the application of complete disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs involving former combatants to reduce the likelihood of relapsed violence. As a result, this perspective was not only followed by the negotiators of the Peace Accords of 2016 but conceived as an indispensable step to accomplish peace in rural communities in Colombia. To comprehend how DDR processes may benefit warn-torn societies, and more specifically, how reintegration portrays characteristics of specific contexts, we will expose the cases of Angola and Liberia. This will help us frame the definition of reintegration processes, asses their results and contrast them with the Colombian DDR process adopted after 2016.

DDR processes commonly involve the belligerent actors, governments and organisations –NGOs- working together through the transformation of combatants into civilians from a multidimensional perspective. Talentino and Pearson (2020) argue that, even if the primary goal of any DDR procedure must be guaranteeing the security of the war-affected regions, the civilians and the former combatants, also economic, social and political circumstances need to be considered as part of the terms to construct a protracted peace. Therefore, identifying how these circumstances overlap with the immobilising strategies conceived as an essential component of DDR processes could also shed light on how non-desired immobilities among FFS result from the execution or rejection of the Peace Accords of 2016 by the competent parties.

Besides, a complete analysis of primary sources that evidence imposed immobilities among FSS is essential. In the third chapter this research will examine several podcasts, local newspapers such as *El Espectador*, editorial columns, interviews and data gathered by NGOs and some Colombian institutions such as the Agencia Nacional para la Reincorporación (ARN) and Centro Nacional de la Memoria Histórica (CNMH). Additionally, reviewing some in-field surveys is indispensable due to the remoteness of areas where the ETCR are. Under those circumstances,

where the State is still absent, only journalists or independent organisations gather pertinent and revised data. This approach will provide pieces of evidence where immobility patterns are constant and facilitate the identification of ECTRs where these seem to consolidate to finally evaluate its consequences among FFS and its impact on the peacebuilding processes in Colombia. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that in this paper, we do not intend to establish whether the physical, economic, social and political immobilities lived by some FFS are a widespread or a marginal issue. Instead, we look forward to making immobilities visible and raising awareness that they represent, in some cases, a threat to their lives and ultimately an obstacle to the execution of the peacekeeping efforts in Colombia.

Lastly, the discussion and conclusion of this paper answers how the immobility experienced by some FFS has harmed the peacebuilding efforts in Colombia since 2016, attempting to insert the Colombian post-conflict case into the 'immobility turn' of Migration studies.

Chapter 1

Understanding immobility

Introducing immobility in the Colombian case entails a precise definition of this term and a rigorous revision of the theory that could explain the asymmetric realities experienced by FFS. This chapter will focus on comprehending how immobility surges, explaining what historical dynamics justify its perpetuation and to what extent it could show itself as a disadvantage when reintegrating ex-combatants into the Colombian citizenry.

Assessing why people decide to stay in a place is challenging since immobility is rarely absolute. This means that as long as people move or choose not to move in their everyday lives, we need to consider some extent of relativeness in everyone's agency and immediate circumstances of migration. This paper understands agency as the ability an individual or a community has to make purposeful choices (Samman & Santos, 2016). Therefore, we stand on the definition proposed by Schewel (2020), where immobility is the spatial continuity of an individual in their centre of gravity over a certain period determined by specific circumstances. Thus, this definition resolves that the centre of gravity is a place of residence or permanence where individuals' agency is subjected to temporal and spatial restrictions.

Consequently, just as migration, immobility happens due to multiple decisive variables evidenced through involuntary or voluntary frameworks. This principle was first highlighted by Carling (2002) when the aspirations and the ability to migrate were reviewed separately as part of a survey concluding that, in the first place, having the aspiration but not the ability to migrate corresponds to involuntary immobility and, in the second place, that having the ability but not the aspiration to migrate relates to voluntary immobility. Again, considering both as conscious decisions is necessary, which may vary depending on the context of the individual. (Carling and Schewel 2018). Then, this last point of view may suggest that immobility can also result from structural limitations, at least when referring to involuntary immobility. As Schewel (2020) stated, the aspiration-capability perspective suggests that some of the limitations individuals face could be political or legal, economic, social, and physical.

According to the Reintegration National Agency (ARN), the commission in charge of executing the DDR processes in Colombia, the objective of ECTR is to facilitate the adaptation of

FFS to civil life through their integration with nearby communities. To accomplish it, the government must provide essential public services and support to those FFS deciding to stay in the ECTR and those deciding to leave them because the permanence at the ECTRs is not compulsory under the terms of the Accord of 2016 (ARN. N.d). Due to the conception of these places as transitional, their end date was the 15th of August of 2019, when their juridical figure of provisional inhabitable spaces would stop existing, and another DDR strategy was supposed to replace it. In a geographically-centred approach, Mountz (2011) highlights the ambiguous nature of temporary spaces when they embody zones of exclusion in the case of transnational refugee flows. For this author, exclusionary patterns such as time-space stagnation or unclear forms of belonging evidence a link between the local power dynamics with dominant global forces, connecting small-scale events with bigger-scale Neo-colonialists power relations. Keeping this in mind, she engages with the 'counter-topography' approach previously coined by Katz (2001), where power imbalances present in big-scale exclusionary patterns facilitate structuring new lower-scale power imbalances regardless of the physical territories -topography- where these take place. One of those resulting imposed exclusionary patterns is immobility, where the detention practices enforced by national and transnational authorities often create a constant limbo state for refugees that has effects beyond their spatial immobilisation. For the interest of this study, despite Mountz's (2011) global scope, her approach sheds light on ways ETCRs possibly recreate the historical exclusionary patterns of Colombian political and economic systems among demobilised individuals, most notably because the majority of FFS come from impoverished and marginalised rural backgrounds.

Regarding the Colombian case, the immobility imposed by ETCR on the ex-combatants through the Peace Accords of 2016 can be understood through those four categories proposed by Schewel (2020): political because their belonging to a former Marxist armed organisation is the principle that rules their resettlement; economic because the permanence in the reintegration processes supposes -at least in theory- some extent of financial support; social because the creation of ETCR entails the development of educational workshops intending to prepare FFS for the Colombian citizenry and, lastly, physical because these zones, located far from populated areas, prevent the free movement of FFS further away from their territorial boundaries even if they are not fenced (Cancillería de Colombia, 2016). The Peace Accords of 2016 considered implementing

reintegration processes under these four categories to revert exclusionary patterns among rural populations by allowing mobility among FFS.

In comparison, the case of the Mozambican civil war between 1977 and 1992 is an example of wartime immobility, according to Lubkemann (2008). During the war, mobility was evidenced primarily among women and children fleeing their residing areas into neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe. At the same time, immobility was imposed by both government authorities and rebel armed organisations through the siege of villages and the prohibition of transit between these settlements and their hinterland; both strategies intended to avoid any possible cooperation from the civil society with the belligerent parties. This forced immobility in the villages supposed risk of execution or violent intimidation to those individuals breaking the curfew, even if the transit between the settlements and their surroundings was a matter of survival: subsistence agriculture became untenable, and the water supply ran low after the access to water boreholes was blocked. Despite airborne humanitarian provisions supplying subsistence goods, only government troops benefitted from them, leaving villagers to starve to death. The author estimates that the hunger provoked by this forced immobilisation was responsible for more casualties than the military violence.

However, the immobilities imposed during the Mozambican civil war were not tangible solely through hunger and coercion. Instead, it had lasting effects on the surviving population. The 15-year war period subjected civilian women to circumstances where fertility was complex due to conscription and where young male adults would not have marriage prospects because the prohibition of agriculture made riches unavailable to pay as a dowry or afford a living for a family. This scenario jeopardised the survival of that generation since local communities see fertility - children - as a way to guarantee individual survival at an advanced age (Lubkemann, 2008). This case is pertinent because it represents how immobilities emerging in a context of conflict have effects beyond the movement limitation of people, supporting Schewel's (2020) thesis where economic, social, and political disturbances are also symptoms of the forced immobility patterns set by imbalanced power relations. Thus, even if the villagers during the Mozambican civil war and the FFS after the sign of the Peace Accords of 2016 in Colombia were/are subjects of two different contexts, they share the involuntary immobility patterns product of wartime power relations. The war in Colombia has not ended yet despite the constant post-conflict narrative, most FARC-EP members demobilised, but the rest are still active across the country, including the ones

that joined paramilitary organisations, dissident groups and organised crime; which is why this research privileges forced or involuntary immobility over voluntary immobility.

Also, this paper highlights an additional effect that involuntary immobility may have among individuals, according to Belanger and Silvey (2019). Even though their research focuses on international migration patterns, the well-known case of Manus Island sheds some light on how uncertainty among the detainees may lead to anxiety, depression and suicides among nationals from Nauru, who were obliged to stay there for long periods as part of a deportation, detention and repatriation policies carried out by the Australian government. It is pertinent because it proves that feeling stagnant can ultimately result in a limbo state where individuals cannot conceive hope in the future, which seems familiar for many of the FFS enrolled in the Colombian DDR processes. Hence, opening space for a debate linking conflict-peace transitions to the immobility field is necessary, a standpoint backed by Tsapenko (2021) as he states that the forcibly immobilised people usually suffer the worst living conditions due to the protracted nature of political conflicts. This study also highlights the importance of an analysis of surging ETCR as the geographical frame where the agreed DDR processes for FFS would execute. Studying geographical dynamics of British cities at the end of the XXth century, Massey (1994) stated that the construction or notion of territories entails the emergence of social structures organised by power relations: economic activities (jobs included), educational levels or social functions related intimately to the spatial distribution of individuals within the territory. Besides, these power relations also shape the extent to which inhabitants of a given territory associate with the surrounding communities, where factors like distance, accessibility and available amenities reinforce patterns of power relations. Therefore, since the spatial forms comprise hegemony-submission patterns among individuals, they constitute elementary power geometries.

When referring to ETCRs in Colombia, we need to consider them as spaces where either new power geometries surge or old power geometries reproduce among the hosted individuals, given the specific circumstances of the Colombian conflict. According to the last FSS census done by the National University of Colombia (UNAL) in 2017, 66% of the demobilised FARC-EP soldiers came from a rural background, with agriculture as the main economic activity (UNAL, 2017). Even though the census is recent, another rapport issued by the University of Notre Dame confirms that those statistics concerning the social and economic background of FARC-EP soldiers remained practically constant along with the history of the organisation because the base of the

pyramidal structure had always been the peasantry (Kroc I., 2020). This information is relevant because some individuals making part of historically vulnerable and marginalised populations are going through forced immobility at the hands of the dominant structures of the Colombian State, including the Army they initially opposed. Due to this power geometry, where impoverished farmers as FFS highly depend on the extent to which the elite-run State is willing to execute the terms of the Peace Accords, ETCRs embody territories where the securitisation policies of the war continue when reintegrating processes fail. Turner (2007) suggests the term "enclave society" as the result of re-territorialisation and spatial regulation of a community for political ends in a world increasingly marked by movement flows of migrants and refugees; State authorities conceive these spaces mainly aiming to contain and curtail communities perceived as dangerous for the rest of the citizens through physical barricades or walls. Nonetheless, the author adds the bureaucratic barriers and the adoption of legal exclusions to a given community in a specific territory as complementary containment methods through military, political, social or cultural dominance. Thus, in the case of some FFS living in ETCRs in Colombia, the precarious execution of reintegration processes in charge of the authorities maintain these spaces as the field of growth for exclusionary dynamics among already marginalised individuals.

Even though the war has had several actors, FARC-EP, the Colombian Armed Forces and AUC -a paramilitary group- are by far the organisations that have had the most significant impact on the social consciousness of Colombian society due to their disruptive and destructive capacities (CNMH, 2014). Therefore, the mutual hate or mistrust among combatants and commanders of these three armed organisations needs a revision when studying immobilities among FFS, significantly because history explains how this hatred grew for almost 60 years of rebellion in the case of guerrillas and 40 years in the case of contemporary paramilitary movements.

There were three different peace processes with the FARC-EP, the first one aiming to redirect the actions of the guerrilla into a political movement, the second one to construct a peace process and the last one to urge its demobilisation. In 1985, the political party of *Unión Patriótica* (UP) was mostly but not exclusively made up of civil figures assimilating the leftist ideals some guerrillas were vindicating. The UP would privilege the democratic scheme and the legal frame of the constitution despite its open relation with FARC-EP, still functioning as an armed reliance. Unexpectedly, the UP got outstanding results in the 1985 elections, an unprecedented performance for a left-wing organisation in Colombia (Sanchez and Peñaranda,

2007). Despite this optimistic context, the party's representatives started falling to paramilitary forces in concordance and complicity with some state institutions and influential politicians who saw their interests menaced by the rising popularity of left-wing ideologies among the population, especially among those historically marginalised (Pécaut, 2008). Several FFS were also parts of the UP's assassinated members, such as presidential candidates Jaime Pardo Leal in 1987 and Jaime Jaramillo Ossa in 1990; approximately 5500 were victims (JEP, 2022). Thus, the party extinguished, and FARC-EP used this genocide as the main argument on why taking power by the armed way was the only option to change the Colombian political and disadvantageous economic structures (Gómez-Suárez, 2015).

This cooperation between state institutions and paramilitary groups consolidated in the 90s with the expansion of the leading paramilitary group in the country, the AUC. This organisation inherited the armament and philosophy of smaller private militias or self-defence organisations intending to protect private property from the actions of the growing Marxist guerillas. Under the leadership of Carlos, Fidel and Vicente Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso, these cooperatives transformed from small defensive organisations into a unified and well-equipped militia financed mainly by the drug trade and by donations from private companies. While their purpose was allegedly to defend the landowners from cattle thieves and the ambushes of armed organisations – FARC-EP included- the purposes changed as the AUC carried out a nationwide offensive campaign to eliminate the Marxist guerrillas and anyone related to them; it intended to commit massacres against civilians accused to collaborate with guerrillas (CNMH, 2014). Despite the AUC demobilisation in 2006, several smaller paramilitary structures subsist in the territory vindicating fascist ideals in alliance with Mexican cartels and Colombian organised crime (Verdadabierta, 2009). Thus, the risk of paramilitary action against FFS was an essential factor in establishing a frame of safe reintegration of FSS into Colombian society during the peace negotiations in Havana in 2016 (Duzán, 2018).

Considering again the power geometries exposed by Massey (1994) and the limbo state some individuals suffer when forced to immobilise (Mountz, 2011; Belanger and Silvey, 2019), the Colombian post-conflict panorama is far from being promising. While some FFS still inhabit several ETCRs in 2022 (ARN, 2022), the perpetuation of these settlements demonstrates that these spaces risk transforming into the main immobilising factor for some of them due to both the lack of an effective reintegration process into the Colombian society and the latent physical risk they

undergo at the hands of their former enemies that are still active in the country. This is evident because, first, the existing dominant structures that pushed them into the war and, at the same time, were reinforced during the conflict set them in a disadvantageous position where migrating was not a foreseeable option. Second, the FARC-EP total disarmament process left FFS's defence in charge of the Colombian Army, which cannot be enough warranty of their security since some FFS do not trust their neutrality. Besides, it all comes to a more critical scenario because these territories were initially supposed to last for a defined period yet remain active at the expense of the FFS's stability and tranquillity.

Consequently, understanding ETCRs as spaces where the State carries out re-territorialisation policies to securitise a specific group of individuals (Turner, 2007) requires a profound revision of how these spaces intend to reintegrate FFS into the Colombian citizenry. Since DDR processes are essential to avoid relapsed violence, it is necessary to ask where precisely the reintegration process of FFS is failing to the extent where it is creating immobility patterns among these individuals, creating a scenario where it poses a severe threat to the peacebuilding efforts in Colombia.

Chapter 2

Understanding reintegration

As stated in the previous chapter, the failure of previous peace processes in Colombia is a topic of utmost importance seeing that relapsed violence has some of its roots in the incapacity of the armed actors to guarantee the respect of the lives of former combatants. Therefore, as part of the global strategy to assist war-torn societies with long-term stability, the United Nations (UN) issued a document exposing what seems to be the most effective strategies for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), taking into consideration its own experience and that of several other organisations. With this survey, we insist on the importance and accuracy of understanding DDR processes as essential components of a successful post-conflict scenario:

> …integrated DDR processes can contribute to preventing conflict escalation, supporting political processes, building security, protecting civilians, promoting gender equality and addressing its root causes, reconstructing the social fabric and developing human capacity. Integrated DDR is at the heart of peacebuilding and aims to contribute to long-term security and stability. (UNDDR, 2020, p.1).

Additionally, to fulfil these objectives, the UN suggests that several peace agreements around the world involving DDR processes require four principles to guarantee the no repetition of violence to a greater extent: the signing of a negotiated ceasefire or a peace agreement that provides the framework for DDR; a sustained trust in the peace process; the willingness of the parties involved in the armed conflict to engage in DDR; and a minimum guarantee of security for former soldiers of the involved factions (UNDDR, 2020, p.1).

Consequently, DDR processes commonly implicate the belligerent actors, governments and organisations working together in stages to transform combatants into civilians, which is only effective when understood from a multidimensional perspective. Talentino and Pearson (2020) claim that, even if the primary goal of any DDR procedure must be guaranteeing the security of the war-affected regions, the civilians and the former combatants, also economic, social and political dimensions need to be considered as part of the terms to construct a protracted peace. This

perspective makes sense if we consider that, even if former soldiers commit themselves to disarm and demobilise, the chosen reintegration path must reflect an institutional interest to solve or at least reduce the vulnerabilities that initially pushed them to participate in the conflict. As already stated in the first part of this essay, if these minimal conditions do not exist, the sustained reintegration of former combatants as citizens and the risk of relapsed violence are high, particularly in regions where legal and economic opportunities are reduced or limited.

To comprehend how DDR processes may benefit warn-torn societies and, more precisely, how some belligerent parties have understood reintegration in their specific contexts, we will expose the cases of Angola and Liberia. Through these examples, this paper intends to identify possible practical definitions for these DDR processes and their results while contrasting them to the Colombian DDR process conceived in Havana in 2016.

The Angolan civil war erupted in the country even before gaining total independence from Portugal. In 1975, three factions were already controlling different geographical zones of the country and executing their power as local governments: the first one, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), was a Marxist armed group based in Luanda, the capital, and backed by Cuban and Soviet forces; the second one, the National Front of the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) rooted in the north of the country and the third one, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as a branch of the FNLA supported by the Ovimbundu ethnic majority and the United States forces (History State, 2021). Despite a truce between 1991 and 1992, the conflict continued and intensified due to the unsuccessful reintegration of former soldiers into a unified Angolan Army, resulting in a general context of relapsed violence as the adoption of scorched earth strategies forced most of the rural population to migrate from their homes to Luanda (Messiant, 2004). Almost a decade after the end of this civil war in 2002, Berdal and Ucko (2009) elaborate on the Angolan case to explore why reintegration processes -and DDRs as a whole- are crucial in any given post-conflict society claiming that:

> "ensuring that armed groups that have prospered during the active phase of hostilities do not return to the battlefield or find other ways of undermining local and international efforts to build lasting peace, and to do so by finding ways of integrating ex-combatants into the social, economic and political life of post-war society" (p. 2).

Thus, while it is clear what the fundamental goal of reintegration is, the authors do not take the risk to define reintegration itself simply because it would portray these kinds of processes as monolithic and limited notions. Instead, they leave the door open to several interpretations of the term, always keeping in mind that reintegration patterns and processes may differ from one country to another and are, consequently, impossible to define without assessing specific contexts. Engaging with this observation, Vines and Oruitemeka (2009) show the dimensions considered as reintegration processes of former soldiers for the Angolan case and ultimately analyse whether the measures carried out to reintegrate them were successful or not in this specific post-conflict setting.

In 2008, up to 97,390 UNITA former soldiers counted as demobilised, and 84,409 individuals were registered in at least one process of reintegration support, while the Angolan government had contracted 250 sub-projects to encourage other 128,000 ex-combatants from both belligerent parties including other community members to overcome the violence cycle (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). The method carried out by the researchers to find out if the reintegration processes were effective from an economic standpoint based on 10,500 interviews done with UNITA ex-combatants between three to six weeks after receiving their reintegration supports such as allowances, training and access to micro-credit schemes. The results show that 61 per cent of these former soldiers were self-employed and that only 4 per cent worked in the formal sector, although around 35 per cent remained unemployed (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). A report issued in 2009 by the World Bank –one of the reintegration funding actors- also relates that 95 per cent of the UNITA demobilised soldiers had access to arable land, 98 per cent had established families, and 93 per cent considered themselves reintegrated into their communities of destination (World Bank, 2009). The economic reintegration was structured around the payment of five months of salaries depending on the military rank of the former combatant, a $100 reintegration grant, a 'kit' of essential domestic items and tools, and a national identity document (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009).

From a social standpoint, Porto and Parsons (2007) complement this last idea by stating that from a sample of 46,940 former UNITA fighters returning to civilian life after the conflict, nearly 90 per cent affirmed feeling welcomed by their resettling communities. It means that even if the concept of wellness was problematic to define, this social reintegration required alternative channels beyond economic assistance, primarily because this type of reintegration implied "allocation of land and housing, donation of material goods such as clothes, utensils or food, or

the holding of some kind of meeting or party. Brief descriptions of these were given (food, alcohol, dancing)" (p. 68).

It is necessary to remark that despite this reintegration process being also assisted by the churches and political affiliations in the short term and that the ex-combatants maintained communication with each other, families were the principal structure supporting reintegration for UNITA former soldiers: from a sample of around 900 ex-combatants, 442 affirmed relying on already existing familiar structures while 173 claimed to do so with ex-combatants networks and only 143 declared trusting this process to churches (Porto and, Parsons, 2007). Thus, UNITA is now itself a political party, but the NGOs and religious groups are *de facto* developing its former combatants' social and economic reintegration processes.

Hence, it would be easy to conclude that under the auspice of the Angolan peace agreement of 2002, the community-based reintegration programmes were more successful than those developed on the economic front. If we recall the already exposed high unemployment rate and informality among former combatants in 2009, we would quickly think that most of the measures designed to pursue this kind of reintegration were erroneous or limited. Nevertheless, this interpretation is deceiving since the general context of the country was precarious regarding employment rates when the survey concluded.

Therefore, this case evidences that DDR processes, and more specifically, reintegration processes, need to be created and executed exclusively in their contexts. The Angolan peace process is a significant case because several scholars consider it a success in peacekeeping efforts (Berdal and Ucko, 2009) and because it nurtured several DDR peace protocols around the world, as the publication of the UN DDR guidelines in 2006 suggested it. Additionally, it is a piece of evidence on how only one definition for reintegration is problematic, proposing instead to conceive it as a multi-dimensional principle that each context demands. For example, economic and community reintegration approaches engaged several players such as the churches, NGOs, government officials, the international community and private sectors towards UNITA former soldiers from 2002.

Considering the success that community-based reintegration processes had in Angola, it is thus safe to state that, in some contexts, an individual focus like the economic reinsertion might not be as practical as expected to contribute to reconciliation and reconstruction of the social fabric in war-torn societies. On the other hand, an example of how DDR processes may fail, or at least

be unable to reach the expected results, is the reintegration process held in Liberia after the end of the civil war in 2003. Levely (2014) is very critical regarding the effectiveness of the reintegration pattern set by the UN and the belligerent parties because it centred on an economic dimension that aimed to incorporate the former combatants into the national job market. The implemented methodology to carry out his survey is based on the reinterpretation of available data from a nationwide survey done in 2006 to 590 ex- combatants.

As we stated before, the way this reintegration process was understood and designed in Liberia had a clear emphasis on an economic dimension since the program strongly relied on the job training component: In Liberia, former soldiers were encouraged to enrol in a job instruction program of their interest among four different economic fields: agricultural training, civil services, volunteering, and formal education (Soderstrom, 2015). Consequently, the impact of those pieces of training can only be evaluated through the performance of employment rates and wages year after year and are, ultimately, the way to assess whether reintegration was effective as a means of rebuilding the society and preventing relapsed violence. Surprisingly, after reinterpreting the data from 2006, the conclusions indicate that these training programs did not have a meaningful effect on wages and had a negligible impact on national employment rates, a constant pattern for all educational levels. It suggests that if the DDR program was successful to some extent in reintegrating former combatants, its accomplishment did not rely on the job training or the reduction of the national unemployment rate. For the author, this makes sense because, in a country like Liberia, "where employment opportunities are minimal, job training may be of little value to participants – even when it is of high quality, which is often not the case." (Levely, 2014, p.140). Plus, it is also important to mention that, even though 90 per cent of the demobilised individuals registered for the training programs, not all of them made it to the end of them (UNDDRRC, 2011); as an example, "while around 14% of survey respondents registered for the formal education program, only 1.3% had completed the program" (Levely, 2014, p.145).

Although overcoming the violence at a national level in Liberia has been considered a success among international peacekeeping missions, the fact that the reintegration processes were incomplete reveals the weaknesses of a one-sided approach to the problem. Alusula (2008) and Akam (2011) argue that some of the ex-soldiers of former rebel groups in Liberia are directly responsible for the rise of violence in neighbouring countries like the Ivory Coast. They denounce that a rebel militia operating in the country's west is mainly composed of Liberian mercenaries.

Therefore, if the applied DDR process has not shown the desired results and proved ineffective in making the economic reintegration possible for former combatants, it is probably because of the disregard for realistic scenarios and a proper context evaluation. In the case of Liberia, the job training programs were ineffective because the evident economic situation the country goes through does not offer enough positions for recently qualified individuals. In short, the job market is insufficient to absorb the ex-combatants. In short, the cases of the DDR processes in Angola and Liberia provide some guidelines on how DDR processes execute peacekeeping efforts. Nonetheless, it is safe to state that the flexibility of reintegration methods and peacebuilding practices respond to the needs of specific contexts, forcing us to understand the dimensions of the Colombian DDR process (FFS) as another way to understand reintegration, leaving aside any interest to define it as a monolithic concept in this paper.

The transit from an armed organisation to a new political party represents why the FARC-EP accepted to pursue a DDR process after signing the Peace Accords in 2016. It meant the beginning of a whole demobilisation and disarmament procedure with a reintegration step, consisting of the exchange of weapons for legal recognition under the law. This reintegration process entailed two main requirements: the first one, making FFS able to implicate themselves into the economic, political and social dimensions of Colombian citizenry*;* the second one, emphasising the urgency of guaranteeing security mechanisms for the FFS as an answer to the threat that paramilitary groups could pose to the implementation of the accords and their own lives (Cancillería de Colombia, 2016). This last concern is a remnant of a fear rooted in the genocide suffered by *Unión Patriótica* (UP) (Santos, 2018). Also, aiming for the consolidation of lasting and stable peace, the accords of 2016 state that differential assimilations of the DDR processes need to be developed depending on the threats, particularities and personal experiences of FFS in their territories and communities, putting as a priority the reintegration of women, children and teenagers affected by the forced recruitment of the FARC-EP (Santos, 2018).

To advance in this multi-dimensional approach, the belligerent parties, assisted by some international organisations, agreed on two primary strategies to execute the reintegration process to avoid relapsed violence on behalf of FFS: an initial "normalisation grant" of around 500 USD, and a 24-month stipend for each demobilised participant consisting of the 90% value of the legal minimum salary, and finally, an allowance of around 2000 USD if they ever came up with a business idea to develop (Cancillería de Colombia, 2016). Although, receiving the monthly stipend

would only be possible if FSS proved to have no other revenue for the established period. In the second place, the peace accords conceived the National Commission for Security Guarantees, a new agency aiming to prepare and apply public policies against criminal organisations and individuals that may threaten the peacekeeping processes and the general implementation of the peace agreement (Cancillería de Colombia, 2016). This commission is particularly interesting for this essay because of the way it is structured, how it makes the existing institutions available for the reintegration of FFS, and who is excluded:

> The National Commission on Security Guarantees will be presided by the President of Colombia and will be constituted by the Interior Ministry, the Defence Ministry, the Justice Ministry, the National Attorney, the National Defence Attorney, the Director of the National Investigation Unit, the Commander in chief of the Armed Forces, the Director of the National Police, three well-known experts chosen by the *Comisión de Seguimiento* and two delegates from Human Rights platforms. (Cancillería de Colombia, 2016, p. 81)[2]

Hence, the prominence and margin of action given to different government institutions in this agency evidence the multi-dimensional approach to understanding reintegration after 2016 in Colombia. Nevertheless, it is through the same commission that it is possible to notice the absence of FARC-EP officials in the design and execution of their security strategies and raises the question of how this dependence on public workers appointed by the government in office may endanger the safety of FFS, especially when the political project of the government in office opposes to or neglects the peacekeeping processes.

The disregard of the current government towards the continuation of the ETCRs or an equivalent policy intending to reintegrate FFS into the Colombian society was evident when it ignored the inclusion of the Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social CONPES[3] 39312 in the Development Plan Budget (DPB) for the 2018-2022 period. CONPES documents are institutional guidelines issued by the National Planning Department to engage the State's efforts to develop national interest projects. The CONPES 39312, a public policy instrument allowing the alignment and commitment of the actors involved in the conflict under the institutional frame and

[2] Translation of the author.

[3] CONPES stands for National Council for Economic and Social Policy in Spanish.

the instrument of estimation of overall costs of the reincorporation process, remains out of the priorities for the mentioned period (Torres-Henao, 2019). As a result, given that many of the actions contained in reintegration processes imply a significant investment, the FFS, initially expecting to receive institutional support, find themselves in limbo. Besides, August 2019 was when the economic guarantees directed to FFS in reintegration into civilian life after the Peace Agreement concluded, meaning a halt of their primary income and social security coverage.

In May of 2019, President Iván Duque announced that the government would guarantee the primary conditions of habitability of ETCRs to ensure FFS advance in their social and economic reintegration. To this end, he promised a total reintegration within a year, with urban facilities, land purchase and redistribution and access to the government's habitability programmes (ARN. 2019). According to the ARN, 25% of ex-combatants, that is, 3,366 people, reside in the ETCRs and 8,509 outside them in 2019, highlighting that the reintegration programmes would benefit those FFS living in ETCRs and those living elsewhere too. Nevertheless, it is impossible to track down any CONPES as this public policy instrument is essential to provide the financial and legal frame for those intentions. Besides, some elements prove that strengthening the ETCRs while neglecting complementary reintegration processes among FFS brings difficulties in establishing long-term peacebuilding projects in Colombia.

ETCRs are usually organised through standardised rows of housing, shared bathrooms and communal areas; these spaces also count on facilities that guarantee health services and education. Many, though not all, are near other rural settlements. The military has maintained a security perimeter around the areas and is supposed to patrol them regularly. Nonetheless, establishing ETCRs as permanent productive and residential areas seems problematic due to the lack of a juridical frame of land distribution and their location within indigenous territories, natural parks or reserves. It ultimately places limitations on building, cultivation, and further land use (Crisis Group Latin America, 2021).

According to the UN, as of September 2021, 10,500 FFS, making up 77 per cent of all those involved in DDR processes, live outside ETCRs (Crisis Group Latin America, 2021). Since the FFS still living in ETCRs in 2022 demand attention in different fields like healthcare, education, and prosperity projects, the government extended the validity of the legal Resolution 2536 of 2019 and the Decree 2446 of 2018 and healthcare services to an "undefined" period (ARN, 2022). The legal Resolution 2536 grants a monthly allowance equivalent to 90% of the legal

minimum monthly salary to FFS; nonetheless, the ARN can only provide this allowance when ex-combatants attend at least one of the social and economic reintegration activities on a monthly basis, which usually takes place in ETCRs (JEP, 2019). Conversely, this indefinite period of assistance also covered the Decree 2446 of 2018, which guaranteed the supply of dry and fresh food to the ETCRs. This evidence shows that the peacebuilding policy of Duque's government is closer to the reinforcement of ETCRs as permanent settlements instead of being the temporary spaces initially conceived at the Peace Accords of 2016.

Additionally, ARN has approved some productive projects mainly thanks to international cooperation and the self-management of ex-combatants. As of August 31st 2021, only 80 productive projects have been approved inside ETCRs, benefitting 419 out of the 2438 people established within these territories (Presidential Council for the Stabilisation and Consolidation, 2021). Nonetheless, a report issued by the Congress of Colombia found that as of July 2020, 71.3% of ex-combatants did not have a productive project disbursed by the National Government (Congreso de la República, 2020). It is scandalous considering that this proportion is still far from the initial objective of 100% projected at the Peace Accords of 2016 to be by 2019, remaining practically the same by the end of 2021: The National Council for Reintegration states that only 28% of the total FFS have had the approval for a collective productive project by December 2021 (2022). Besides, the council states that most approved projects are at risk of default due to the lack of access to the local and national markets, integral technical assistance, land distribution, and increased insecurity against FFS (National Council for Reintegration, 2022). Also, even though some collective productive projects are executed, these projects have operated in a disorderly manner and do not make part of a more significant and coordinated reintegration initiative. Many of these projects remain disjointed, impacting only a few regions and lacking sustainability in the medium and long term, creating a scenario of ambiguity among FFS that might jeopardise the continuation of peacebuilding in Colombia (Torres-Henao, 2019).

In summary, this chapter exposed the possible ways policymakers carry out DDR processes in different contexts. Keeping in mind that each of them needs to consider specific goals to create new social symmetries and power relations, the transformation of social norms allowed by accurate DDR processes often leads to sustained peacebuilding initiatives and their consolidation. In contrast, fragile DDR processes often lead to relapsed violence and stagnation. Additionally, this chapter exposed the Colombian government's policy towards the execution of DDR processes

involving FFS after 2016, where the strengthening of ETCRs as permanent settlements seemed to be at the top of its priorities over alternative DDR processes directly committed to spatial, social, economic or political scopes. Consequently, the next chapter will centre its analysis on how this emphasis adopted by Duque's government produces immobility among FFS and damages the peacebuilding efforts in Colombia.

Chapter 3

The ETCRs.

In light of Colombia's government reintegration policy involving FFS, this chapter will focus its analysis on the contrast of a wide range of primary sources like official reports, journal articles and interviews that demonstrate the existence of rising violence within or close ETCRs, evidencing severe limitations in Duque's strategy to execute the Peace Accords of 2016. This chapter will also consider how the rising violence constantly targeting FFS worsens the existing multidimensional immobility product of the lack of alternative successful reintegration processes and ultimately supposes the perfect setting for a context of relapsed violence.

According to the ARN, of the 24 ETCRs active in 2019, 11 presented barriers to their consolidation as permanent settlements. These are in the departments of Nariño, Cauca, Chocó, Antioquia, Guaviare, Norte de Santander, Meta, Arauca and Putumayo, mainly located at the periphery of the country[5]. Thus, a transfer of FFS was necessary to other areas where the government promised land for their territorial and political organisation. This promised transition process would last approximately one year, during which time the ARN will continue to administer these spaces, guaranteeing conditions of habitability, advice on the development of productive projects and permanent accompaniment by professionals in the territory (2019). Nonetheless, in the last report issued by the Defensoría del Pueblo[6], the threat to FFS living in ETCRs is evidenced in 36 Alertas Tempranas where this authority highlights the high risk of armed intrusion in the reintegration spaces (2020). The *Alertas Tempranas* (Early Warnings in English) are official documents where the Defensoría del Pueblo monitors and warns of possible human rights abuses scenarios. This Colombian institution must issue early warnings to alert the competent defence authorities about a high risk of violence, displacement, confinement, or natural disasters to conceive preventive policies to avoid tragedies before they emerge (De Zubiría, 2019).

[5] See Annex 1 for the location of ETCRs in Colombia.

[6] The *Defensoría del Pueblo* is the national authority responsible for the protection, defence, promotion, dissemination and exercise of human rights in Colombia.

For example, this document highlights the Alerta Temprana 052 of 2018 as it denounces the presence and territorial expansion of the left-wing guerrilla Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the right-wing paramilitary organisation Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) in Segovia and Remedios, located in the Antioquia department. As a result, the actions of illegal armed groups are increasing, especially in areas surrounding the ETCR of Carrizal in Segovia. This presence has involved acts of violent intimidation of the population, pressure on social leaders, and presidents of local authorities. Moreover, the document condemns the intimidation of human rights defenders who have openly supported the implementation of the Peace agreements of 2016. Likewise, the repeated threats by the AGC to settle in areas surrounding the ETCRs create anxiety among ex-combatants engaged in reintegration processes (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2020). This is particularly important because the origins of the AGC root in the formation and evolution of self-defence and paramilitary groups inheriting the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (ACCU) and AUC's political ideologies, revenue sources and location in Urabá, a region in Northwestern Antioquia. After 2006, they emerged due to the demobilisation of Centauros, Élmer Cárdenas and Norte Blocs, all former structures of the AUC (Ideaspaz, 2017).

Another example of this critical situation is the Alerta Temprana 001 of 2019. The Defensoría del Pueblo emphasised the current situation of the risk scenarios in the department of Caquetá, including the area surrounding the ETCR of Aguabonita, La Montañita. In this area, the perpetrators of human rights violations are unknown. However, they are associated with the actions of the residual organised armed groups or dissidents of the FARC. As has been noted, these events produce a generalised atmosphere of insecurity and anxiety, mainly due to the selective killings and, in some cases, threats aimed at disrupting the leadership's work and even provoking the forced displacement of the population. Thus, the high risk to leaders (men and women), FFS, and civil servants working on peacebuilding initiatives is alarming (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2019). This scenario consolidates the existing asymmetric power relations between FFS and the consequent social immobility derived from inaccessible constitutional rights (Schewel, 2020).

It is also possible to evidence this threat in 2021, when the same authority published another Alerta Temprana for the Vichada department, bordering Venezuela to the east. The 005 warning of 2021 denounced that in Puerto Carreño, the capital, the presence and actions of illegal armed groups such as the ELN, the dissident factions of the former FARC-EP's Tenth Front and paramilitary successor groups such as Los Puntilleros Libertadores del Vichada and the AGC of

Vichada have increased. These armed groups move throughout Vichada, converging in the jurisdiction of Puerto Carreño as their presence has consolidated in the Venezuelan territory. As a result, despite the absence of ETCRs in the territory, the agency has found that the 22 FFS are at possible risk of recruitment due to pressure from armed groups in Puerto Carreño and other areas of Vichada since members of paramilitary groups and ELN have reportedly approached some ex-combatants to re-enter criminal structures. The organisation highlights that the transfer of one of the menaced FFS has taken place (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2021). Given the recurrence of the threats and security problems for FFS, in June 2019, President Duque announced 23 measures for the protection of ex-combatants in the reincorporation process, including an elite police corps with immediate dedication in cases of threats to ex-combatants, an Integrated Information Centre that coordinates actions in the face of threats and aggressions, and the issuing of a decree to control security risks in the ETCRs (El Tiempo, 2020).

Despite this warning system and the subsequent reaction of the Presidential office, some FFS located in ETCRs have already suffered violent attacks intending to deter them from continuing the reintegration path. For El Espectador, a nationwide news outlet, the attack suffered by 43 FFS in Yarí (Meta) in December 2021 is further evidence of the complex situation of violence that forced the authorities to transfer FFS from their ETCR and move to San José El Doncello (Caquetá) (2021). According to the newspaper, a humanitarian caravan of FFS was composed of three buses and 33 trucks with belongings and animals. At around 10 am, between the La Sombra and La Machaca sectors on the border between Meta and Caquetá, FFS and their families were attacked with rifle fire, while one of the trucks carrying their belongings was burned. The transfer intended to avoid several intimidating campaigns and life threats in their original ETCR. Five hundred people were affected (El Espectador, 2021).

Additionally, on 14th July 2020, the transfer of the ETCR Santa Lucia from Ituango to Mutatá in Antioquia began with 93 people, including FFS and their families. More than 250 abandoned the territory where they had been advancing in their reintegration process when the authorities had to displace them due to poor security conditions. It represented a spatial change implying a severe territorial uprooting (Congreso de la República, 2020)[8]. As a result, the UN highlighted the transfer of ETCRs as an obstacle to peacebuilding in Colombia when the urgent

[8] According to the report, until the last trimester of 2020, 12 FFS had been killed in Ituango, in the department of Antioquia.

relocation of La Macarena ETCR was carried out from the department of Meta to Caquetá following an increase in threats from illegal armed groups (UN, 2022). On the other hand, the assassination of José Alexis Báez Mesa on 3rd March of 2022 proved that the system of early warnings is not enough to halt the risks for FFS. Báez's killing took place one kilometre away from the Colinas ETCR, close to the jurisdiction of San José del Guaviare, where he had belonged since the government negotiated peace with the FARC-EP (El Espectador, 2022). In 2019, the Alerta Temprana 005 of 2019 noticed armed incursions and illegal activities in the same territory where Báez was killed, including San José del Guaviare, Calamar and Retorno. The historical absence of effective civilian authorities and State institutions explained the imposition of these mechanisms of control and social order by illegal armed groups such as AGC, FARC-EP dissidents and Los Puntilleros (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2020).

Another evidence of the recurring risk FFS suffer are three assassinations of their leaders. The first case is the killing of Alexander Parra, publicly known as Gonzalo Fierro, who was shot in his home. Parra was killed inside the ETCR located close to Mesetas, in the department of Meta. Parra had been working as a contractor for the ARN and was known to be the leader of this ETCR. His responsibilities included monitoring the transition to civilian life of ex-combatants, advising them and following their reintegration processes (SEMANA, 2019). Conversely, the Comisión de la Verdad, the national authority seeking to clarify the patterns and explanatory causes of the internal armed conflict, had denounced a similar case in October 2020, when Juan de Jesús Monroy Ayala, better known as Albeiro Suárez, who led the reintegration of FFS in the department of Meta, was shot dead. One of his bodyguards, Jefferson Mandela, an ex-combatant and member of the National Protection Unit, was also killed in the incident. Suárez had established a new settlement with 44 more FFS after abandoning the ETCR of Colinas in the department of Guaviare, where Albeiro led the implementation of different agricultural and livestock production projects as part of a reintegration process (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020). The third case is the murder of Jorge Santofimio Yepes, who was the leader of Cooperativa Multiactiva Comunitaria del Común (COMUCCON), an example of FFS' productive initiatives and environmental restoration in Puerto Guzmán (Putumayo). On Thursday, 24 February 2022, he was murdered, and four more cooperative organisation members were wounded (El Espectador, 2022). Since all of the three FFS were leaders among ex-combatants, these crimes represent another attempt to intimidate the rest of the FFS involved in reintegration processes such as productive initiatives and political

participation, evidencing violent patterns that create economic and political immobilities among FFS (Schewel, 2020).). In words of William Betancourt, a member of the COMUNES Political Party:

> When an ex-combatant who leads economic, political and social reincorporation processes is killed in a region that has suffered 50 years of conflict and has not seen any of its children grow up in peace in the last three generations, the possibility of development in the territory is cut off. The possibility of the implementation of peace is cut off. (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020).

This phenomenon does not respond to a series of isolated events. According to the UN General Secretary, since the Peace Accords of 2016, 303 FFS (10 women) have been killed. Ten out of those crimes happened in the trimester from the 25th of September to the 27th of December of 2021. The document reveals that violence against social leaders, ex-combatants and communities has been concentrated mainly in 30 municipalities, most of them prioritised implementing the Peace Agreement through ETCRs. It also highlights that, although murders of ex-combatants have decreased by 27% in the last year, the Mission has confirmed a growing trend of threats by illegal armed groups against those involved in collective projects initiatives (UN, 2022). Nevertheless, to March 4th of 2022, the number of FFS' assassinations increased to 306 (El Espectador, 2022).

To understand why FFS are a target for several armed organisations, Ideaspaz proposed three principal reasons for their victimisation: first, the reintegration processes of many FFS are taking place in ETCRs surrounded by an environment where multiple illegal armed actors are present, setting the scene for vendettas or forced recruitment; second, the delays in the reincorporation process and the national government's failure to fulfil its obligations have generated uncertainty among the demobilised combatants; and third, the fact that most ETCRs and the communities created by FFS around them are usually in areas where the presence of the state has always been weak (2017). Valencia (2021) engages in this perspective. Nonetheless, he adds that the persecution suffered by ex-combatants at the forefront of the management of economic projects intending to reintegrate FFS is explained by the visibility of this activity, making them

easy targets. Alias Pastor Alape, one of the former guerrilla members of the Politburo, denounces this condition:

> We are facing a genocide among FFS, and nevertheless, we are still here, resisting. I am here at an ETCR, and it is inspiring to see how the people remain, despite the security threats, an irresponsible government and a quartered and incapable State… it is hopeless when we find an ineffective justice system that can only trace down the material authors of the crimes ignoring the intellectual authors and the people benefitting of the political and economic control of these territories… this generates incertitude among FFS (Uniandes, 2021).

On 29 August 2019, through YouTube and somewhere between the Colombian-Venezuelan border, Luciano Marín, alias "Iván Márquez", announced the return of a group of ex-combatants to the war and the creation of Segunda Marquetalia, alleging the "betrayal of the State to the peace agreements". Márquez described it as the return of the FARC - EP. He was joined by other leaders of the demobilised guerrilla including Hernán Darío Velásquez, alias "El Paisa", Seuxis Pausías Hernández known as "Jesús Santrich" (who died in May 2021), Henry Castellanos Garzón alias "Romaña", as well as people including former commanders of various FARC blocs and mobile columns (Insight Crime, 2022). The self-denominated Segunda Marquetalia movement exemplifies the structures composed of FARC-EP ex-combatants who changed their position on the Peace Agreement motivated by the lack of guarantees of their physical security and legal status, as well as disagreements with their former comrades. In the rearmament process, they seek to legitimise their actions by appealing to the identity and ideology of the former FARC-EP guerrilla (Indepaz, 2021). For this research, it is interesting to note that El Paisa reportedly left the Miravalle ETCR in Caquetá in April 2018 for Venezuela, alleging life threats. Months later, in August of the same year and from the same ETCR, Iván Márquez disappeared, while the last available information presumed him at Miravalle ETCR after resigning his seat in the Senate of the Republic in response to the detention of Jesús Santrich, another high-rank member in the former FARC-EP (Insight Crime, 2022).

Another emerging group is the case exposed by El Original, a local newspaper located in the south of Bolívar department, a region usually referred to as Magdalena Medio. On the 28th

March of 2021, FARC-EP dissidents announced their armed return to southern Bolívar through a communiqué signed by the self-denominated commander Diego, formerly part of the 24th Front of the extinct FARC-EP, further aggravating the armed conflict in the region:

> Due to the non-fulfilment of the Peace Agreement with the Colombian State, due to the assassinations of former FARC combatants by the National Liberation Army (ELN) and groups such as the Gulf Clan, the dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are returning to the south of Bolivar (El Original, 2021)[9].

Nonetheless, these two post-FARC-EP groups are not the only ones operating in Colombia. In 2020, post-FARC-EP groups' actions were recorded in 123 municipalities in 22 out of the 32 departments of Colombia, representing an increase in the number of affected municipalities compared to the 30 municipalities affected in 2019 (Indepaz, 2020). According to that organisation, these dissident groups have threatened these territories, imposed controls on circulation, and regulated social life while seeking to coordinate alliances and articulations among them, allowing them to reach broader areas and stronger organisation and tactical deployment (Indepaz, 2020). The cases exposed above get more relevant to this study when considering a geographical analysis because the locations of most ETCRs that are currently active as communities coincide with the range of action of several armed groups across the country like FARC dissident groups, neo-paramilitary organisations and groups making part of the organised crime. According to PARES Foundation, human rights violations against FFS and their families coincide geographically with the places that report the highest number of violent actions committed by illegal armed structures[10].. For example, among the 47 cases of registered murders for which it was possible to identify the perpetrator, 17 were committed by Clan del Golfo, -a paramilitary organisation-, 14 by FARC-EP dissident groups and 9 by the ELN (2022). This is an essential point because, as this paper has shown, latent threats to their lives and the burden of the social stigma against FFS legitimise, in some scenarios, a rearmament process to protect their lives but also as a means of political participation

[9] The Clan del Golfo, or its equivalent as Gulf Clan in English, is a criminal structure that inherited some military, ideological and economic structures from the AUC, a demobilised paramilitary group.
[10] See Annex No. 2 showing the epicentres of violence against FFS in Colombia.

As it is evident, both Segunda Marquetalia and the new dissident group from Magdalena Medio are examples of FFS stating the non-fulfilment of the Peace Accords of 2016 and physical security risks as the most critical causes for them to fall back into armed structures against the Colombian State. Velasco (2020) engages with this perspective as he provided a practical study based on a series of interviews inquiring ex-combatants in Colombia about their reasons to fall back into the conflict. Among these factors that drive or lead to relapsed violence, economic stress and life-threatening contexts stand out as two of the most recurrent and influential elements that fuel ex-combatants decision to return to illegal activities, regardless of the original armed organisation they come from or intend to join.

The evidence exposed in this chapter suggests that the ETCRs show unequivocal failure in responding to a complete reintegration process that could guarantee sustainable peace in Colombia. Instead, the lack of successful reintegrating mechanisms combined with the constant threat posed by several armed groups worsens patterns of multidimensional immobility among FFS, facilitating surviving strategies like falling victims of forced or voluntary recruitment and weakening the Peace Accords' execution 2016 from the core.

Discussion and Conclusion

Peacebuilding initiatives involving FFS in Colombia are far from reaching a no returning point. Since they are not complete, the growing vacuum left by their precarious execution menaces leaves the affected communities at the mercy of marginalisation and several criminal actors operating close to the ETCRs. The Peace Accords of 2016 intended to integrate these territories into the economic and political core of the nation. Nonetheless, some FFS still living inside these defined spaces do not conceive themselves as incorporated subjects of the Colombian citizenry. For the objective of this paper, immobility as a cause for the re-emergence of violence as a vindicating political means and an instrument of control among former FARC-EP soldiers entails the comprehension of ETCRs as a necessary space to guarantee their survival but, at the same time, its depiction as locations that limit the fulfilment of more ambitious reintegration processes.

As stated before, the historical context of most rural areas affected by the conflict in Colombia obliges this paper to consider the peasantry origins of most FFS as a crucial phenomenon in the power geometries emerging or replicating within ETCRs. Their identification as marginalised individuals within the dominance-oppression dynamics of the Colombian economic and political systems supposes their understanding as subjects who had found an opportunity to maintain a stable income and an extent of political participation only through the belonging to the FARC-EP ranks. Consequently, even if the causes for their recruitment have roots in the personal will, ideological compatibility or economic necessity, any of those were always inserted in a context where the armed path represented a valid option to fulfil individual interests facing the social, economic and political ruptures of the Colombian society. This paper stated before that the objective of ECTRs is to facilitate the adaptation of FFS to civil life through their integration with nearby communities and the rest of the country; nonetheless, this study identified cases where FFS are subjects of several Immobilising logics beyond the limitation of their physical movement.

Initially conceived as temporary spaces of reintegration, ETCRs transformed into territories where exclusionary patterns such as time-space stagnation, lack of political representation and economic marginalisation are currently reinforcing the existing power geometries of Colombian society. The same big-scale dominant-oppressed dynamics that historically had pushed some rural inhabitants to conflict resurge in the form of lower-scale political suppression and violent intimidation as the basis of another scenario of relapsed violence.

The continuous transfers of ETCRs primarily due to security risks and the intimidation suffered by FFS at the hands of different armed actors have impacted the government's reputation when it comes to judging its effectiveness in defending FFS from forced recruitment or assassination. The worrying number of killed FFS since the signing of the Peace Accords in 2016 is evidence of constant life-threatening conditions regardless of their location within or outside ETCRs. Nonetheless, these assassinations are far from having a limited impact since some of the victims of these murders are FFS in leading positions within reintegration projects or political advocacy, inhibiting the consolidation of a strengthened political representation and avoiding the establishment of democratic governance in the territories that had been historically affected by the war. Thus, leaving some FFS without basic guaranties for political representation and governance, immobilising their ambitions to fulfil civil or ideological partisan projects via democratic principles sets a critical obstacle to achieving one of the Peace Accords pillars of 2016. This scenario aggravates when most of the crimes remain unsolved or with minor consequences for their intellectual authors, spreading incertitude among FFS for the possibility of an eventual reduction of intimidating and violent actions against them. Consequently, the resurgent dominance-oppression power geometries remain at the hands of more powerful entities such as the Colombian State and several armed groups against vulnerable and marginalised rural workers and their families.

Additionally, it is necessary to highlight that the disarmament process completed in 2017 left FFS still living in ETCRs at the mercy of the willingness or efficacy of the Armed Forces to protect them. Even if this is not a complete warranty, the security measures designed in 2016 and somehow evidenced through the institutional presence in ETCRs provide, to some extent, a sense of security among FFS that does not exist outside of these territories. Thus, it is safe to state that this sense of relative security also makes part of the immobilising causes among FFS, despite it not being accurate given the assassination of some of them within or close to ETCRs.

Furthermore, the geographical location of ETCRs also poses challenges to the fulfilment of reintegration initiatives intending to consolidate a post-conflict atmosphere. Due to the isolated location of some of them and their proximity to the territories co-opted by several armed groups – including their former enemies- FFS find scarce options to integrate with nearby communities and markets since the available infrastructure only allows them to reintegrate into the peripheral areas of the country but keep them away from the industrial and economic powerhouses of Colombia.

Even if the Peace Accords of 2016 deliberately conceived the temporary spatial immobility of FFS within ETCRs despite the absence of fences or walls, the delay in executing sustained and coordinated reintegration initiatives has transformed ETCRs into rather permanent settlements that can hardly respond to the political, economic and social reintegration needs of these historically marginalised territories.

The failure or lack of execution of productive projects conceived as peacebuilding pillars to guarantee the FFS reintegration into the Colombian citizenry and the economic core of the nation enhances a situation where FFS have little option to satisfy their basic needs and ultimately force them to depend on the services provided by the available facilities at ETCRs like housing, clean water, education or healthcare. Besides, since most demobilised FARC-EP soldiers come from a rural background, with agriculture as their main economic activity, the inability on behalf of the institutions to offer a land distribution close to the active ETCRs is preventing FFS to insert into the economic sector that is most likely to host them after the war. As a result, the monthly allowance of 90% of a minimum salary and the groceries provided by the government in ETCRs are a safe guarantee of survival when economic reintegration does not seem like a priority in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, this lack of additional economic sources and the relative stability provided by the monthly allowance results another factor to consider when explaining immobilising policies set by the Colombian State against FFS.

Moreover, considering Duque's government's decision in 2019 to set the monthly allowance and the provision of groceries as state policies without a defined deadline, along with the insufficient advances evidenced in the execution of joint or individual productive projects initiatives supported by the State agencies, the result is redundant in a re-territorialisation policy that entails a securitisation scenario for some FFS, at least at the hands of the government in office since 2016. Given the contradictory institutional actions that seem to benefit their permanence within ETCRs through subsidies while at the same time discouraging any attempt to achieve personal and financial self-sufficiency through the execution of reintegration-oriented activities, economic immobility represents a threat to the implementation of peacekeeping mechanisms established in the Peace Accords of 2016. Purposely or not, the measures taken by the current government to proceed with the constitutional mandate to commit to the implementation of peacebuilding are insufficient and put the whole process in danger of relapsed violence.

As the cases of Angola and Liberia have demonstrated, the successful execution of DDR processes is a fundamental component of peacebuilding when considering the specific problematic dynamics of the societies they intend to transform. In the case of Colombia, the resulting immobility from the inconsistent character of the reintegration projects plus the immobility resulting from life-threatening scenarios FFS often face leave space for the incursion of relapsed violence among demobilised individuals in the historically war-torn territories. Evidence suggests that FFS are more likely to join armed structures when there are not enough guarantees of their economic sustainability in the foreseeable future or when the security conditions are unfavourable to peacebuilding attempts. Examples of this last argument are the recurrent assassinations of FFS -including their leadership- and the re-organisation of FFS in new dissident groups claiming the principles of Marxist ideology, and the lack of action of the Colombian government regarding the execution of the Peace Accords of 2016.

Thus, it is safe to state that the constant failure of DDR processes -especially when considering the reintegration efforts- creates a generalised context of multi-dimensional forced immobility among FFS that jeopardises peacebuilding efforts in Colombia through the re-emergence or aggravation of the social, economic and political disparities that had sustained the war with FARC-EP from the 1950s in peripheral areas of Colombia. Even if this paper did not intend to have a quantitative approach regarding the amount of FFS suffering from Immobilising dynamics, the feelings of frustration, stagnation and fatigue are undoubtedly evidenced through the exposed cases and reveal the existence of immobilities as a direct threat to the post-conflict in Colombia.. Simultaneously, this paper draws attention to the importance of immobility the Colombian post-conflict context, a perspective that, to date, has been largely neglected in academic studies of migration and mobility in the country due to the focus often set on movement patterns. Although this paper better explains the failure of the current reintegration process policy, this is not irreversible and thus, exhorts the public agencies to mitigate the consequences of immobility and to focus on re-arranging peacebuilding efforts to avoid a worsening war scenario.

Annexes

Annex 1:



The map shows the locations of the 24 ETCRs in Colombia. To the right, a list of their names and locations organised by Departments (ARN, N.d.).

Annex 2:



Human rights' violations against FFS and their families coincide geographically with the places that report the highest number of violent actions committed by illegal armed structures. In red, the places where violence is more intense. In yellow and green, the places where there has been evidence of violence and intimidation against FFS (PARES Foundation, 2022).

Bibliography

- Agencia Nacional para la Reincorporación ARN, (n,d). Los ECTR. Retrieved November 30th, 2021 from: https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Paginas/Los-ETCR.aspx
- Agencia Nacional para la Reincorporación ARN, (2019). Así será la transición de los 24 ETCR. Retrieved March 10th, 2022 from: https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/sala-de-prensa/noticias/Paginas/2019/Asi-sera-la-transicion-de-los-24-ETCRs.aspx
- Agencia Nacional para la Reincorporación ARN, (2019). Gobierno-Nacional-extiende-asignación mensual a exintegrantes de las FARC-EP. Retrieved March 10th, 2022 from: https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/sala-de-prensa/noticias/Paginas/2019/Gobierno-Nacional-extiende-asignacion-mensual-a-exintegrantes-de-las-Farc-Ep.aspx
- Agencia Nacional para la Reincorporación ARN, (2022). Gobierno-cumple-con-la-peregrinación de personas en proceso de reincorporación. Retrieved March 20th. 2022 from: https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/sala-de-prensa/noticias/Paginas/2022/Gobierno-cumple-con-la-peregrinacion-de-personas-en-proceso-de-reincorporacion.aspx
- Akam, S. (2011). Liberia uneasily linked to Ivory Coast violence. The New York Times. Retrieved November 24th, 2021 from: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/world/africa/01liberia.html
- Alusula, N. (2008) Disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration in Liberia report for the center for international cooperation and security, July 2008
- Belanger, D. and Silvey, R. (2019). An immobility turn power geometries of care and migration. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies*. P. 1-18.
- Berdal, M. R., & Ucko, D. H. (2009). *Reintegrating armed groups after conflict:* politics, violence and transition. Routledge.
- Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative Research Journal, 9 (2), 27-40.
- Bushnell. (1993). *The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself*. University of California Press.
- Carling, J. (2002). Migration in the age of involuntary immobility: Theoretical reflections

and Cape Verdean experiences. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *28*(1), 5–42.

- Carling, J., Schewel, K. (2018). Revisiting Aspiration and Ability in International Migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(6):945–63.
- Cancillería de Colombia. (2016). Acuerdo Final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera. Retrieved from: https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/Fotos2016/12.11_1.2016nuevoacuerdofinal.pdf
- Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2014). Guerrilla y población civil. Trayectoria de las FARC 1949 – 2013. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia. 400p.
- Comisión de la Verdad. (2020). "No es posible que vayamos en 233 excombatientes asesinados y no haya respuesta contundente del Estado o de la sociedad". Retrieved March 25th, 2022 from: https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/no-es-posible-que-vayamos-233-excombatientes-asesinados-no-estado-sociedad
- Congreso de la República (2020). ¿En qué va la paz a 2 años del gobierno Duque? Retrieved March 5th, 2022 from: https://ce932178-d58f-4b70-96e7-c85e87224772.filesusr.com/ugd/883ff8_e5b209fa605445b0acc47dab072168fa.pdf
- Davis, M., Bennett, S., & Mazerolle, L. (2014). Viewing systematic reviews and meta-analysis in social research through different lenses. *SpringerPlus*, *3*(1), 1–9.
- Defensoría del Pueblo. (2019). Alerta temprana 001 de 2019. Retrieved March 26th, 2022 from: https://alertastempranas.defensoria.gov.co/
- Defensoría del Pueblo. (2020). *Informe defensorial Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación.* Retrieved March 1st, 2022 from: https://www.defensoria.gov.co/attachment/3441/Informe%20Reincorporaci%C3%B3n_16-09-2020.pdf?g_show_in_browser=1
- Defensoría del Pueblo. (2021). Alerta temprana 005 de 2021. Retrieved March 26th, 2022 from: https://alertasstg.blob.core.windows.net/alertas/005-21.pdf
- De Zubiría, N. (2019). *¿Qué es el sistema de alertas tempranas de la defensoría del pueblo? ¿qué es y cuáles son sus antecedentes?* Corporación Excelencia en la justicia.

- Duzán, M.J. (2018). Santos, paradojas de la paz y del poder. Bogotá: Debate. 330 p.
- Efron, & Ravid, R. (2019). *Writing the literature review: a practical guide*. Guilford Press.
- El Espectador. (2021). ¿Qué está pasando con los excombatientes de las FACR en el ETCR de Yarí en Meta? Retrieved January 2nd, 2022 from:https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/que-esta-pasando-con-los-excombatientes-de-las-farc-en-el-etcr-de-yari-en-meta/
- El Espectador. (2022). Asesinaron a excombatiente de las FARC en San José del Guaviare. Retrieved March 15th, 2022 from: https://www.elespectador.com/colombia/mas-regiones/asesinaron-a-excombatiente-de-las-farc-en-san-jose-del-guaviare/
- El Espectador. (2022). Asesinan a Jorge Santofimio, exguerrillero de las FARC y líder ambiental de Putumayo. Retrieved March 15th, 2022 from: https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/asesinan-a-jorge-santofimio-exguerrillero-de-las-farc-y-lider-ambiental-de-putumayo/
- El Tiempo. (2020). Estas son las medidas de protección para los desmovilizados de las FARC. Retrieved March 25th, 2022 from: https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/estas-son-las-medidas-de-proteccion-para-los-desmovilizados-de-las-farc-552467
- El Original. (2021). Disidencia de la FARC anuncia su retorno al sur de Bolívar. Retrieved March 29th, 2022 from: https://eloriginal.co/disidencia-de-la-farc-anuncia-retorno-al-sur-de-bolivar/
- History State. (2021). The Angola Crisis 1974-75. Retrieved March 20th, 2022 from: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/angola
- Ideaspaz (2017). Crimen organizado y saboteadores armados en tiempos de transición. Retrieved March 1st, 2022 from: https://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/59b2f3940f71c.pdf
- Indepaz. (2021). Los focos del conflicto en Colombia. Informe sobre presencia de grupos armados. Retrieved from: http://www.indepaz.org.co/indepaz-ediciones/
- Insight Crime. (2022). Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, alias 'El Paisa'. Retrieved

March 16th, 2022 from: https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-crimen-organizado-colombia/hernan-dario-velasquez-saldarriaga-alias-el-paisa/

- Insight Crime. (2022). Segunda Marquetalia. Retrieved March 16th, 2022 from: https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-crimen-organizado-colombia/segunda-marquetalia/
- Instituto Kroc de Estudios Internacionales de Paz. (2020). Tres años después de la firma del Acuerdo Final de Colombia: hacia la transformación territorial. Informe 4,Universidad de Notre Dame y Bogotá. 135 p.
- JEP (2019). Resolución 2536 de 2019 ARN. Retrieved March 5th, 2022 from: https://jurinfo.jep.gov.co/normograma/compilacion/docs/resolucion_arn_2536_2019.htm
- Katz. (2001). On the Grounds of Globalization: A Topography for Feminist Political Engagement. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, *26*(4), 1213–1234.
- Levely, I. (2014). Measuring intermediate outcomes of Liberia's disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration program. Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2, 139–162.
- Lubkemann, S. C. (2008). Involuntary immobility: On a Theoretical Invisibility in Forced Migration Studies. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *21*(4), 454–475.
- Massey, D. (1994). *Space, place, and gender*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Mountz, A. (2011). Where asylum-seekers wait: feminist counter-topographies of sites between states. *Gender, Place & Culture*, *18*(3), 381–399.
- Messiant, C. (2004). Why did Bicesse and Lusaka Fail? A Critical Analysis, in Meijer, G., (ed.), *Accord: From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan PeaceProcess*, Conciliation Resources, London.
- National Council for Reintegration. (2022). Avances Reincorporación. Retrieved March 29th, 2022 from: https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Paginas/Consejo-Nacional-de-Reincorporacion.aspx
- PARES Foundation. (2022). *Plomo es lo que hay*. Línea de Paz, Posconflicto y Derechos Humanos Edición y diagramación.
- Pécaut, D. Las Farc: ¿una guerrilla sin fin o sin fines? Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2008. 188 p.

- Pizarro, E. (2011). Las FARC 1949-2011: De Guerrilla Campesina a Máquina de Guerra. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma. 356 p.
- Porto, Alden, C., & Parsons, I. (2007). From soldiers to citizens: demilitarisation of conflict and society. Ashgate.
- Presidential Council for the Stabilisation and Consolidation (2021). Informe de Gestión Agosto 7, 2018 – Agosto 31, 2021. 34 p.
- Samman, E., & Santos, M. (2016). Agency and empowerment: a review of concepts, indicators and empirical evidence (Publisher's version). Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI).
- Sánchez, G. And Peñaranda, R. (2007). Pasado y presente de la violencia en Colombia (3 ed). Bogotá: La Carreta Editores. 432 p.
- Santos, J.M. (2018). La batalla por la paz. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta, 2009. 730 p.
- SEMANA (2019). Excombatiente de FARC Alexander Parra contratista de la ARN fue asesinado dentro de un ETCR en Meta. Retrieved March 22nd, 2022 from: https://www.semana.com/excombatiente-de-farc-alexander-parra-contratista-de-la-arn-fue-asesinado-dentro-de-un-etcr-en-meta/637383/
- Schewel, K. (2020). Understanding immobility: Moving Beyond the Mobility Bias in Migration Studies. *International Migration Review*, *54*(2), 328–355.
- Soderstrom. (2015). *Peacebuilding and ex-combatants: political reintegration in Liberia*. Routledge.
- Talentino, A. K., & Pearson, F. S. (2020). Weapons of War, Weapons of Peace: DDR Processes in Peacemaking. *International Peacekeeping*, *27*(1), 152–175.
- Torres-Henao, J. P. (2019). Ausentes de estrategia: La disputa entre el Gobierno Nacional y la FARC por dotar de un horizonte de sentido el proceso de (re) incorporación económico y social. In J. E. Álvarez (Ed.), *El Acuerdo de paz en Colombia: Entre la perfidia y la potencia transformadora* (pp. 267–286). CLACSO.
- Tsapenko, I.P. (2021). Forced Mobility and immobility in a Turbulent World. *Her. Russ. Acad.*

Sci. 91, 525–534.

- Turner, B. S. (2007). The Enclave Society: Towards a Sociology of immobility. *European Journal of Social Theory*, *10*(2), 287–304.
- UN (2022). La violencia contra excombatientes sigue siendo la mayor amenaza para su transición a la vida civil. Retrieved March 20th, 2022 from: https://news.un.org/es/story/2022/01/1502572
- Universidad Nacional de Colombia (2017). Caracterización comunidad FARC EP.:censo socioeconómico UN-CNR. Retrieved March 1st, 2022 from: http://pensamiento.unal.edu.co/fileadmin/recursos/focos/piensa-paz/docs/presentacion_censo_farc.pdf
- Uniandes (2021). Actitudes de exintegrantes de las FARC-EP Frente a la reincorporación. Retrieved March 25th, 2022 from: https://uniandes.edu.co/es/noticias/gobierno-y-politica/transmision-actitudes-de-exintegrantes-de-las-farcep-frente-a-la-reincorporacion
- Valencia, G. (2021). El asesinato de excombatientes en Colombia. *Estudios Políticos*. Universidad de Antioquia. 60, pp. 10–25.
- Velasco, C (2020). *El DDR en Colombia ¿desmovilización, desarme y reincidencia? Factores que impulsan o inhiben la reincidencia de actividades ilegales en excombatientes desmovilizados de grupos armados ilegales en Colombia.* Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. https://repository.javeriana.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10554/50624/Trabajo%20de%20grado%20REINCIDENCIA%20DE%20EXCOMBATIENTES%20Carlos%20Velasco.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Verdadabierta. (2019). Bloque metro, el fantasma que ronda a Álvaro Uribe. Retrieved November 15th, 2021 from: https://verdadabierta.com/bloque-metro-el-fantasma-que-ronda-a-alvaro-uribe-velez
- Vines, Oruitemeka, B., & Oruitemeka, B. (2008). Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola: Analysis. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *8*(2), 241–263.
- UNDDR (2020). IDDRS Framework: concepts, policy and strategy of the IDDRS. Retrieved March 3rd, 2022 from: https://www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/level-2/