

# Estimating the Immigrant Wage Penalty Across Categories of Admission

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## **Abstract**

This paper exploits a unique record linkage between Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada's (IRCC's) administrative immigration records and the 2016 Canadian Census to analyze the immigrant/native-born wage gaps and wage assimilation profiles across categories of admission. I find that immigrants admitted under the Skilled Workers category as principal applicants (PAs) experience better assimilation profiles than those admitted under non-economic categories. I also find that Family Class immigrants face a poorer assimilation profile compared with immigrants admitted under economic categories. Canadian Experience Class (CEC) PAs and the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) PAs face the best profiles out of all categories. Lastly, immigrants admitted under Business Class have the worst wage outcomes.

# 1. Introduction

Immigration has always been an important part of Canada's history. The discussion on immigration policies is often a key talking point in political campaigns due to its contentious nature. The general consensus seems to be that Canadians welcome both diversity and the sense of providing immigrants with the opportunity to build better lives in Canada. Since immigrants represent over a fifth of the Canadian population, identifying their labour market prospects, and clarifying how these prospects differ from their Canadian-born counterparts, is vital for informed decision making by individuals and policy makers alike. Improving immigrant wage integration is beneficial for both immigrants and the Canadian economy. Dungan, Fang, and Gunderson (2013) find that if immigrant wages assimilate with those of their non-immigrant counterparts, GDP per capita would increase by roughly \$200 a year. However, recent studies seem to suggest that immigrant earnings are declining relative to those of earlier cohorts (e.g. Aydemir and Skuterud (2005); Frenette and Morissette (2005); Reitz (2001)).

A separate but related strand of the immigration literature has focused their attention on the admission categories under which immigrants enter their host country (e.g. Aydemir (2011); Warman, Webb and Worswick (2019)). The goal of this literature is to better understand the poor labour outcomes of recent immigrants and to see whether admission categories matter. Using the Immigration Master Data Base, Warman, Webb and Worswick (2019) find that adult immigrants admitted under Economic Class categories experience a significant wage benefit relative to Family Class immigrants. Data limitations have, however, limited the progress of this literature. This literature had to rely on administrative records which meant that they could only compare one group of immigrants to another. As such they could not directly address the immigrant/native-born wage gap.

This paper contributes to the immigration literature along two fronts. First, I update the evidence on the assimilation profile of immigrants by using the recently released 2016 Canadian Census data. Second, I explore how it differs across immigrant admission categories. To do so, I exploit a unique record linkage between Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada's (IRCC's) administrative immigration records and the 2016 Census. The record linkage added data to the 2016 Census on the immigrant category of admission and applicant type for all immigrants since 1980. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the role played by the admission categories in explaining the immigrant/native-born wage gap.

The main findings of my paper indicate that there is a statistically and economically significant immigrant earnings penalty in Canada. I find that Skilled Worker Principal Applicants (PAs) experience significantly better wage assimilation profiles relative to non-economic categories. I find that Family Class

immigrants experience a poorer assimilation profile compared with immigrants admitted under economic categories. Canadian Experience Class (CEC) PAs and the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) PAs face the best profiles out of all categories, while those admitted under Business Class have the worst wage outcomes.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature. In Section 3, I provide some context on Canada's immigration policy history, and its current immigrant admission categories. Section 4 presents the data. In Section 5, I discuss the methodology used in this paper, and the results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 provides some robustness checks. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.

## **2. Literature Review**

The purpose of this section is to review the current literature on the wage gap between immigrant and native-born Canadians. In doing so, I hope to provide context for this paper and reasoning behind its methodology. The review will explain the purpose of each article, describe the data sets used, and relay their main findings. I will review traditional immigrant wage gap literature as well as literature concerning the effects of immigrant admission category on the wage gap.

### *2.1 Admission Category*

Warman, Webb and Worswick (2019) study the effect different Canadian immigrant admission categories have on Principal Applicant (PA) immigrants' earnings and employment probability, on those of their spouses/dependents, and on those of their children once old enough to enter the labour market. In doing so, they seek to establish whether an earnings benefit exists for economic class categories. The authors use the Immigration Master Data Base (IMDB) to complete their analysis.<sup>1</sup> The authors utilize a human capital earnings regression model and an employment status linear probability model to estimate annual earnings and employment probability differentials for both adult and child arrivals. In both cases, the authors provide separate estimates for men and women, citing differences in labour market outcomes. For adult arrivals,<sup>2</sup> their independent variables of interest are the immigrant admission category variables

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<sup>1</sup> The IMDB is managed by Statistics Canada on Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada's behalf, and combines tax data and administrative immigration data to provide sound and thorough information regarding the socioeconomic standing of immigrants following entry. It provides data on income and immigration characteristics. It is contained in Statistics Canada in Ottawa, and is not yet accessible in the Research Data Centres.

<sup>2</sup> Although not pertinent to this paper, it is worth noting that the authors' child arrival regression equations differ slightly from adult arrivals in that the immigrant admission category controls are less complex since children are

which include Family Class, Skilled Worker Spouses and Dependents (SDs), Live-in-Caregiver (LIC) PAs, LIC SDs, Canadian Experience Class PAs, CEC SDs, Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) PAs, PNP SDs, Refugees, and other immigrants. The authors use various control variables, notably ones for age, age squared, province/territory, years-since migration (YSM), and YSM squared. They also include multiple indicator variables including highest educational attainment at arrival, knowledge of official language, and country/region of birth. The authors find that adult male (female) PAs admitted under the Skilled Worker category experience an earnings benefit of 29% (38%) relative to Family Class PAs, and that said benefit persists after controlling for characteristics such as language fluency and education. However, they note that CEC PAs and PNP PAs have the highest earnings premium (relative to Skilled Worker PAs) of all categories at 55% and 22% respectively for men, with similar results for women.

Aydemir (2011) uses multiple econometric methods to analyze Canadian immigrant labour market outcomes for different immigrant admission categories. He utilizes data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) to study immigrant labour market outcomes, including labour force participation, employment, and earnings.<sup>3</sup> All analyses in this paper are completed separately for males and females. The author carries out a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to first understand whether educational differentials between skilled-worker and family class immigrants are due to differences in national-origin composition of immigrants or to a different selection of immigrants within source countries. He finds that over 90% of educational differentials is due to the latter, and less than 10% due to the former. Aydemir then employs one log-linear function as well as two probit functions to analyze short term labour market outcomes (earnings, labour force participation, and employment respectively). For all three functions, the independent variables are identical, and include a set of dummies for admission categories, years-since migration (YSM) variables as well as YSM interacted with admission category dummies. He also includes controls for official language fluency marital status, province, and region of birth. Aydemir finds that, for males, immigrants under the skilled worker category experience no difference in LFP rates, lower employment rates, and substantially higher earnings than their family class counterparts for both principal applicants and dependants. He notes that some of these differences persist even after controls are added, and that these unexplained differences reflect the significance of unobserved disparities in immigrant characteristics across the different admission categories.

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never PAs. To study child arrival outcomes, the authors identified their parents' admission class and their labour market performance using income tax filings.

<sup>3</sup> The LSIC surveys immigrants (aged 15 and older) who landed in Canada from abroad, between October 2000 and September 2001, 6 months, 2 years, and 4 years after landing. It provides information on educational attainment, work experience, language fluency, and immigrant category of admission.

Sweetman and Warman (2013) analyze earnings and employment differentials for the different immigrant admission categories taking into account Canada's points system. They use the LSIC to carry out their analysis. The authors' sample is restricted to those aged 19 to 62 at their first interview, and they use average weekly earnings as the dependent variable in their earnings regressions. In their first model, they estimate separate log-linear weekly earnings regressions for each cycle of the LSIC (6 months, 2 years, and 4 years after landing), with controls for months since migration and independent variables for immigration class/category and immigration points.<sup>4</sup> Their second and third models are a traditional log-linear earnings model and a probit employment model respectively. For both, they use controls for age, months since migration, years of schooling, educational attainment prior to landing, marital status, number of children, official language ability, region of origin and region of residence. They find that economic class immigrants experience a significant earnings benefit to immigrants admitted under most other classes.

Bevelander, Emilsson and Luik (2018) examine Sweden's immigrant/native-born employment gap for the different immigrant admission categories. They utilize data from the STATIV database, which includes data on segregation, integration, and immigration, and relies heavily on administrative data linkages. They utilize both probit regressions and Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. The three types of immigrant admission categories are labour, family, and humanitarian. They find that employment probability is decidedly correlated with admission category, and that differences in human capital and sociodemographic factors only explain a small portion of this correlation. They argue that the low transferability of human capital among the humanitarian and family immigrant categories helps explain why this is the case.

## *2.2 Traditional Immigrant Wage Gap*

Fortin, Lemieux and Torres (2016) analyze the immigrant/Canadian-born earnings gap taking into consideration the origin of their human capital. They make use of data from the 2006 Canadian Census, which include data on whether the respondent obtained their highest degree in Canada or abroad, as well as information on field of study. Their population of interest includes individuals aged 20 to 64 who attained an education higher than high school, and who worked full time in 2005. The authors also focus

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<sup>4</sup> Two different forms of the points variable are used. The first is made up of a set of 46 indicator variables, which allows for "the estimator to select weights that optimally associate the characteristics with the labour market outcome and maximize their explanatory power." The second is merely a number representing the sum of predicted points.

on immigrants who landed in Canada aged 15 to 29.<sup>5</sup> The authors estimate the earnings gap by regressing the log of weekly wage on an immigrant dummy variable along with gender, work experience, and education controls. They include more comprehensive specifications that differentiate between Canadian and foreign education and work experience, and that include controls for mother tongue, province, and field of study. The authors carry out regressions for men and women separately, and they disaggregate the gap by country of origin. The authors also utilize interactions between location of study and field of study to determine how the gap changes for different fields. They estimated the native-born wage premium to be roughly 10%, however, when differentiating between foreign and Canadian education and experience, the premium is reduced to roughly 3%. They conclude that source location of human capital (foreign or Canadian) accounts for up to 70% of the immigrant/Canadian-born earnings gap.

Ferrer, Green and Riddell (2006) assess the effect of literacy skills, foreign-acquired education, and language fluency on immigrant earnings. Their paper relies on the Ontario Immigrant Literacy Survey (OILS) implemented by Statistics Canada, along with the Canadian version of the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). The OILS surveys language and literacy skills of Ontario immigrants, and includes questions regarding education, earnings, age at arrival, etc.<sup>6</sup> The authors seek to answer three questions, the first being whether immigrants and native-born Canadians have different literacy skills. The second is whether immigrants and their native-born counterparts experience different returns to these literacy skills, and the third questions whether these differences in skills and returns can explain the earnings differential between the two groups. They utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to answer these questions. In regards to the first question, they find significant differences in literacy skills between the two groups (i.e. native-born individuals experience higher average test scores relative to their immigrant counterparts). In answering the second question, they argue that the two groups receive similar returns to skills. They also find that immigrants receive lower returns to foreign education because foreign universities induce weaker literacy skills, at least for use in Canada. Lastly, in regards to the third question, they argue that if the two groups had similar literacy scores on average, the earnings gap would be reduced by two thirds.

Nadeau and Seckin (2010) inspect the immigrant/native-born wage gap in Quebec and compare it to that in the rest of Canada. They make use of Canadian Census Public Use Microdata Files on Individuals for the years 1980, 1990, and 2000. They limit their sample to males, working more than 20 hours a week

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<sup>5</sup> They do so in order to pinpoint immigrants old enough to experience difficulty adapting to Canada but young enough to invest in human capital.

<sup>6</sup> The IALS is similar, however, the authors use the full Canadian sample arguing that only using Ontarian Canadians limits sample size.

and 26 weeks a year, between the ages of 20 and 64. They also exclude those who are self-employed. They find that the earnings gap immigrants experienced went from a 3-point premium in the 1980s to a 3-point penalty in 2000. They note that although it is clear immigrant integration has worsened since the 80s for Canada as a whole, integration was always difficult in Quebec. The authors also carry out a decomposition of the immigrant wage gap in Quebec and in the rest of Canada. They found that the reason Quebec maintained a higher immigrant wage penalty was due to lower French language skills of immigrants to Quebec compared to English skills of their counterparts immigrating to the rest of Canada. They also argued the significant drop in the citizenship premium in Quebec might also have had an effect on the gap. Lastly, they found no evidence of discrimination.

Frenette and Morissette (2005) use Census data from 1981 to 2001 to find the necessary conditions for new immigrant cohorts (at the time) to reach an earnings parity with native-born Canadians. They argue that Census data are uniquely significant in immigration economic literature, because it includes both immigrant and native-born Canadians. To carry out their analysis, the authors employ OLS, decompositions, and quantile regressions. Their dependent variable is the log of annual earnings, and they include controls for province, visible minority status, potential work experience, education, and marital status. They find that, for both genders, immigrant entry earnings relative to their native-born counterparts fell in both the 80s and 90s. For men, the gap almost doubled from in the two decades since the 80s. Their quantile regression results indicated wider earnings gaps for all immigrants in all three earnings distributions excluding women at the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, who did not experience a decline or change in their earnings gap with their native-born counterparts. They conclude that the larger relative earnings growth observed by new immigrant cohorts has not fully offset the recent stark drop in relative entry earnings.

Nadeau (2013) studies how the immigrant/native-born wage gap differs between the public and private sector. To complete his analysis, he uses data from the 2006 Canadian Census of Population based on the long-form questionnaire targeting 20% of the population. Nadeau employs both traditional wage OLS regressions and a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. For both models, controls include country of birth, citizenship, language fluency/knowledge, educational attainment, and age. The author confirms a roughly 3% differential in earnings and finds that returns to foreign education and experience are lower than returns to domestic education and experience for immigrants in both the public and private sector. However, according to his decomposition, the wage gap is to the advantage of immigrants in the public sector, while the opposite is true in the private sector. He argues this is the case because, excluding females in the public sector, immigrants' domestic/Canadian schooling is much less rewarded in the private sector than in the public sector. He also argues that foreign education and experience are considerably less rewarded in the

private sector than in the public sector. Finally, he notes that immigrants from less traditional source countries experience greater disadvantages in the private sector than in the public sector.

Bloom, Grenier and Gunderson (1995) study the immigrant/native-born earnings gap upon entry to Canada as well as the speed immigrant earnings grow over time relative to their native-born counterparts. They use 1971, 1981, and 1986 Canadian census data to carry out their analysis. They employ a typical regression equation with the logarithm of yearly earnings as the dependent variable. Their independent variables include an indicator for immigrant status, years since migration, years of schooling and work experience, and marital status. They find that recent immigrant cohorts experience wider earnings gaps upon entry, as well as greater difficulty integrating and catching up with their Canadian-born counterparts. They contend that this is due to the changing composition of immigrant source countries, from more traditional European countries to less traditional Asian and African countries.

In summary, although the literature on the immigrant/native-born wage gap is vast, analyzing the different wage gap and assimilation profiles across categories of admission has not been done. I intend to fill this hole in the literature.

### **3. Context**

In order to appreciate the findings of the analyses conducted in this paper, a clear understanding of Canada's immigration policy is necessary. This section aims to discuss the historical background of immigration in Canada, clarify Canada's immigrant admission categories, and explain how they will be utilized in this paper.

Canada has had immigration policies in place since 1869 aimed at encouraging settlement in the West. In 1962, new regulations abolished racial discrimination and preferred nationalities in favour of skill and family based policies. Regulations established in 1967 introduced a point system based on education, official language fluency, and professional skills. Lastly, the Immigration Act of 1976 was the first to put in place a well-defined framework for Canadian immigration policy. It confirmed three distinct classes of independent immigrants applying under the point system, immigrants sponsored by immediate Canadian family members, and refugees claiming asylum. Currently, Canada recognizes four immigrant admission classes, each of which contains multiple categories and types of immigrants. The four classes are Economic Class, Family Class, Refugee Class, and Other.

The Economic Class is the most complex of the four, and it encompasses eight admission categories. For each admission category, there are two types of applicants: principal applicants (PAs) and

secondary applicants. The latter includes the spouse and dependants (SDs) of the PA.<sup>7</sup> The first two admission categories are Skilled Workers and Skilled Trades Workers. These categories concern skilled individuals with foreign work experience looking to immigrate to Canada. The next three categories are Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Self-Employed.<sup>8</sup> All three categories have a similar requirements mainly regarding a large investment in the Canadian Economy. Next, the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) targets immigrants looking to live in a specific province; each province has different requirements and streams specific to its needs. Those admitted under the PNP category are often highly skilled or educated. The Canadian Experience Class (CEC) targets prospective immigrants with at least one year of Canadian work experience. Usually, immigrants applying under CEC have spent some time in Canada, studying or working, prior to immigrating. Lastly, the Live-in-Caregiver (LIC) program targets prospective immigrants with home support, child care, or nursing experience.

For this paper, the two categories Skilled Workers and Skilled Trades Workers are merged into one “Skilled Workers” category, because they undergo the same requirements. The three categories Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Self-Employed categories are also merged into one “Business” category for this paper since their main requirement is a large investment in the Canadian Economy. Therefore, the five collapsed Economic Class categories used in this paper include Skilled Workers, PNP, CEC, Business and LIC. For this paper, each category (except for the latter two) has two variables, one for PAs and another for SDs.<sup>9</sup>

The Family Class encompasses six categories and includes sponsored spouses and partners, parents and grandparents, children, intercountry adopted children, family sponsored public policy or humanitarian and compassionate cases, and other family sponsored immigrants. For this paper, all six of these categories are merged into one “Family Class” variable, because, unlike under Economic Class, family sponsored immigrants do not undergo strict selection measures and are therefore not likely to experience much different labour market outcomes.

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<sup>7</sup> The reasoning behind differentiating between PAs and SDs for some categories is that these SDs are expected to do better in the labour market than immigrants admitted under family class categories due to assortative mating. This is the view that humans mate within social classes and/or based on genetic similarities, such as intellect or ability. Spouses and dependants of PAs admitted under programs requiring highly skilled or educated applicants are therefore expected to outperform other types of immigrants.

<sup>8</sup> These categories have recently been eliminated due to concerns on whether or not immigrants admitted under them maintain ties to Canada. It is also claimed that these immigrants have lower investment and employment income and pay less taxes than the average Canadian.

<sup>9</sup> LIC and Business categories are not split into PA and SD variables since these programs do not necessarily require high-skilled applicants. Therefore, the assortative mating theory discussed in footnote 7 is not relevant.

The Refugee Class is comprised of five categories and includes protected persons in Canada, dependants abroad of a protected person in Canada, government-assisted refugees, privately sponsored refugees, and blended visa office-referred refugees. Lastly, the Other Class contains two categories: public policy or humanitarian and compassionate cases and all other immigrants. These two classes are merged into one “Refugee Class” variable for this paper due to their similarities.

The collapsed categories used in this paper are structured as in Warman, Webb, and Worswick (2019). Therefore, the ten immigrant admission category variables used in this paper are Skilled Worker PAs, Skilled Worker SDs, PNP PAs, PNP SDs, CEC PAs, CEC SDs, Business, LIC, Family, and Other.

#### **4. Data**

This paper exploits a unique record linkage between Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada’s (IRCC’s) administrative immigration records and the 2016 Census. Specifically, the immigrant admission category and applicant type variables were added to the 2016 Census using a record linkage to IRCC’s administrative records for all immigrants admitted since 1980. The record linkage allows for an enhanced understanding of the diverse economic outcomes of immigrants admitted under different admission categories.

Therefore, this paper utilizes 2016 Canadian Census of Population master files based on the long-form questionnaire.<sup>10</sup> The census is a mandatory national survey conducted every five years by Statistics Canada, and it provides detailed statistical, sociodemographic, and economic data on Canada and its population. The 2016 mandatory long-form questionnaire targets roughly 25% of the population, including Canadian citizens, landed immigrants, and non-permanent residents and their families in Canada.<sup>11,12</sup>

The long-form portion of the 2016 Census includes rich data on immigrants, such as year of immigration, place of birth, and information on other countries of citizenship. Information on year of immigration and other countries of citizenship is not available in previous censuses such as the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS). In fact, the 2011 NHS does not provide much data on immigrants at all. Unlike the voluntary 2011 NHS, the 2016 Census long-form questionnaire is mandatory and therefore arguably of better quality. Another advantage of utilizing the census is sample size; having almost nine

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<sup>10</sup> Due to the data’s confidential nature, they are contained within Research Data Centres (RDCs) across Canada. My analysis employs confidential files housed in the Carleton, Ottawa, Outaouais (COOL) RDC.

<sup>11</sup> Non-permanent residents include those with study or work permits as well as refugee claimants in Canada.

<sup>12</sup> The long-form questionnaire does not include Canadians living abroad temporarily, and persons living in institutional and non-institutional collective dwellings such as hospitals, nursing homes, hotels, motels, work camps and student residences.

million observations is particularly useful when looking at immigrants. Since some immigrant admission categories are very small, a large sample size is very beneficial. Additionally, the data include suitable information regarding various sociodemographic and economic variables that can be used as controls such as age, education, marital status, ethnicity, and province/region.

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada is the department of the government of Canada responsible for supporting the arrival of immigrants, offering protection to refugees seeking asylum, and granting Canadian citizenship. As such, its administrative data contain rich information on the immigration records of immigrant Canadians. Exclusively for the 2016 Census, a record linkage with IRCC data added information on immigrant category of admission and applicant type for all immigrants since 1980. The admission category variable provides the names of the immigration programs under which an immigrant is granted the right to permanently reside in Canada. The applicant type variable indicates whether an immigrant is identified as the principal applicant (PA) or the secondary applicant, i.e. spouse or dependants (SD) of PA, on their application for immigration.

To complete my analysis, I restrict my sample to native-born Canadians and immigrants between the ages of 23 and 68 in all ten Canadian provinces, who are non-institutionalized. Non-permanent residents were dropped since they are neither immigrants nor Canadians, and therefore not relevant to this paper. Those aged under 23 and over 68 were dropped, following the literature, in order to exclude those who have not yet completed their post-secondary education.<sup>13</sup> Those living in the three territories were dropped due to the unlikelihood of immigrants living there. Individuals who were not in the labour force in both 2015 and 2016 were dropped as they did not earn a wage income during 2015.<sup>14</sup> Individuals who were self-employed were also dropped since their earnings are harder to quantify and not comparable with regular employment earnings. Those who earned less than \$1000 dollars were dropped as in the literature.<sup>15</sup> Immigrants who landed prior to 1980 were also dropped since the previously mentioned record linkage to IRCC's administrative records only applies to those admitted since 1980. Immigrants who landed in 2016 were dropped since they did not earn an income in 2015. These restrictions lower my sample to approximately 3,285,025 observations.

Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the summary statistics of my sample by immigrant status for males and females respectively. They contain the means and standard deviations for various sociodemographic and

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<sup>13</sup> An upper age limit of 68 is typical in the literature (see Aydemir (2011), Fortin, Lemieux, and Torres (2016), or Sweetman and Warman (2013)). Also, as part of the robustness checks for this paper, I verify whether using a sample of prime-aged workers (aged 25-54) significantly affects my findings.

<sup>14</sup> 2015 is the 2016 Census' reference period for income related variables.

<sup>15</sup> See Aydemir and Skuterud (2005).

job characteristic controls. All means are weighted using a unique person weight provided in the census. Immigrants represent approximately 21% of my sample for both males and females. The mean age is roughly 43 for all samples. For both sexes, roughly 10% of native-born individuals are visible minorities, compared with approximately 77% of immigrants. For both sexes, 65% of native-born individuals are married or in a common law relationship compared with 76% and 71% of male and female immigrants respectively. English is spoken by a majority of people in all samples, however, fluency in French is much more common among native-born individuals. Similarly, bilingualism is almost twice as common among native-born Canadians for both sexes.<sup>16</sup> For both sexes, more immigrants hold bachelor's and graduate degrees than non-immigrants. However, more non-immigrants hold post-secondary degrees and certificates below bachelor's than immigrants. Roughly half of immigrants of both sexes live in Ontario compared with a third of non-immigrants. Similarly, a higher percentage of immigrants reside in British Columbia and Alberta compared to non-immigrants. For the remaining provinces, the percentage of native-born individuals is higher than that of immigrants. A higher percentage of native-born individuals are unionized. For both sexes, a higher percentage of immigrants work in sales, manufacturing, and science related occupations. A higher percentage of non-immigrants work in managerial and policy related occupations for both males and females. For males, the table indicates mean yearly earnings of roughly \$59,000 for immigrants and \$69,000 for non-immigrants. For females, the table indicates mean yearly earnings of roughly \$40,000 for immigrants and \$46,000 for non-immigrants.

Table 3 illustrates admission category summary statistics by sex for a sample of immigrants only. For both sexes, Family Class and Skilled Workers are the first and second most popular categories of admission respectively. However, the majority of males admitted under the Skilled Workers programs are principal applicants, while the majority of females admitted under said program are secondary applicants.<sup>17</sup> The third most common category for both sexes is Refugee Class. The CEC, LIC, PNP, and Business categories combined represent less than 17% of the immigrant sample for both sexes.

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<sup>16</sup> Since this paper uses controls for knowledge of official languages, bilingualism refers to English-French bilinguals only. In Quebec, roughly 55% of individuals are bilingual for both samples (immigrants and native-born Canadians).

<sup>17</sup> Secondary applicants include the spouses and dependants of principal applicants.

## 5. Methodology

The model estimated in this paper is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 lwage_i = & \alpha + \beta_1 imm_i + \beta_2 imm_i * ysm_i + \beta_3 imm_i * ysm_i^2 + \sum_{c=1}^{C-1} \gamma^c imm_i * IAC_i^c \\
 & + \sum_{c=1}^{C-1} \theta^c imm_i * ysm_i * IAC_i^c + \sum_{c=1}^{C-1} \phi^c imm_i * ysm_i^2 * IAC_i^c + X_i \psi + \varepsilon_i
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where  $lwage_i$  is the dependent variable and represents the log of yearly earnings of individual  $i$ . The first variable of interest  $imm_i$ , is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the individual is an immigrant and 0 otherwise (native-born). The variable  $ysm_i$  represents the years since migration of the individual.<sup>18</sup>  $IAC_i^c$  is a vector made up of  $C - 1$  binary variables for each of the immigrant admission categories listed in Section 3.<sup>19</sup> Each indicator takes a value of 1 if the individual is admitted under category  $c$  and 0 otherwise.

In a traditional regression, where terms containing  $IAC_i^c$  are not included,  $\beta_1$  measures the entry effect (i.e. the immigrant wage gap upon immigration), while  $\beta_2$  and  $\beta_3$  measure the assimilation effect (i.e. how the gap changes over years since migration). This helps illustrate the traditional immigrant wage assimilation profile typically seen in the literature. On the other hand, including the terms containing  $IAC_i^c$  allows for variation in the assimilation profiles across categories of admission. In this case,  $\beta_1$  measures the entry effect for the reference group, and  $\beta_2$  and  $\beta_3$  measure the assimilation effect for the reference group. Also,  $\beta_1 + \gamma^c$  now measures the entry effects for category  $c$ , while  $\beta_2 + \theta^c$  and  $\beta_3 + \phi^c$  measure the assimilation effect for category  $c$ . Therefore, including  $IAC_i^c$  in the equation helps portray the different assimilation profiles for each category.

The vector  $X_i$  represents various sociodemographic, occupation, and source country/region control variables. The sociodemographic control variables include age and age squared<sup>20</sup> as well as four highest educational attainment indicators,<sup>21</sup> a marital status indicator,<sup>22</sup> a visible minority status indicator,<sup>23</sup> three

<sup>18</sup> The  $ysm_i$  variable is obtained by subtracting the year of immigration of the individual from 2015. The calendar year 2015 is the reference period for the 2016 Census' income variables.

<sup>19</sup> Family Class is the reference group.

<sup>20</sup> Age and age squared act as proxies for experience and experience squared.

<sup>21</sup> The highest educational attainment indicators include no degree, high school, post-secondary, bachelor's and graduate. The post-secondary indicator represents an individual who completed Cégep, a post-secondary certificate, apprenticeship, trades program, or any program below bachelor's. High school is the reference group.

<sup>22</sup> The *married* <sub>$i$</sub>  indicator has a value of 1 if the individual is married or common-law, and 0 otherwise.

<sup>23</sup> Visible minorities include non-white and mixed individuals. The *vismin* <sub>$i$</sub>  indicator has a value of 1 if the individual is a visible minority, and 0 otherwise.

knowledge of official languages indicators,<sup>24</sup> and nine province indicators.<sup>25</sup> The occupation controls include ten indicators for broad occupational categories.<sup>26</sup> The source country/region controls include binary variables for the top seven immigrant source countries, for previously stateless immigrants, and for those with an unknown source country.<sup>27</sup> The remaining sending countries are grouped into nine regional indicators.<sup>28</sup>

To accomplish a more comprehensive depiction of the immigrant/native-born wage gap, I estimate Eq. (1) using three different approaches. The more traditional first approach does not include terms containing  $IAC_i^c$ . This provides results concerning the standard immigrant wage gap and assimilation profile. The unconventional second approach estimates Eq. (1) in its entirety, thereby allowing immigrants of different categories to have their own wage gaps and assimilation profiles. The last approach uses a subsample of immigrants only; this does not impose the parameters on the controls to be identical for native-born Canadians and immigrants.

All regressions are run separately by sex due to the well documented difference between male and female labour market outcomes. Controls are added sequentially over three specifications. The first specification does not include any of the controls in vector  $X_i$ . The second includes source country/region controls. Lastly, the third incorporates all source country/region, occupation, and demographic controls.

## 6. Results

In this section, I first present earnings regression results without accounting for immigrant admission categories, as is typically done in the literature. Next, I present results where I allow for immigrants of different categories to have their own wage assimilation profiles. This will illustrate how

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<sup>24</sup> The knowledge of official language indicators include English, French, Bilingual, and Neither. English is the reference group.

<sup>25</sup> The province indicators include all ten provinces. Ontario is the reference group.

<sup>26</sup> The occupational indicators include Management, Administration, Sciences, Health, Policy, Sales, Recreation, Transport, Natural Resources, and Manufacturing. Sales is the reference group. Occupational controls are excluded as part of a robustness check.

<sup>27</sup> The source country indicators use the “other country of citizenship – first write-in” variable provided in the census as a proxy for source country. Each binary variable has a value of 1 for the individual who comes from said country/region and 0 otherwise. A native-born individual gets a value of 0 for all source country/region dummies.

<sup>28</sup> The eighteen source country/region indicators include indicators for the top seven sending countries China, India, France, the UK, the USA, Philippines, and Pakistan. The remaining immigrants are grouped into nine regional indicators for Asia, Africa, Europe, the Caribbean, Central America, South America, Oceania, North Africa, and the Middle East. Lastly stateless individuals and those who did not write-in their other country of citizenship fall under a stateless indicator and an unknown indicator respectively. The reference group is immigrants with an unknown source country/region.

the different admission categories' wages compare to native-born individuals and to each other. Lastly, I present results concerning a subsample of immigrants only. Doing so does not impose the parameters on the control variables to be the same for native-born Canadians and immigrants.

### 6.1 Standard Immigrant Wage Gap

Table 4 illustrates the results of Eq. (1) for males where immigration categories are not accounted for.<sup>29</sup> Controls are added sequentially in Columns (1) through (3), with Column (3) representing the richest and preferred specification.<sup>30</sup> The results show that the addition of controls has very little impact on the assimilation profile. Therefore, the discussion in this section will focus on the richest specification i.e. Column (3).<sup>31</sup> It should be noted that all immigrant related estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.<sup>32</sup> Similar to previous findings, male immigrants experience a significant earnings penalty (i.e. 50%) upon entry as compared to native-born Canadians.<sup>33</sup> As expected, this gap narrows over time. Fifteen years after landing in Canada,<sup>34</sup> the penalty is still very present (i.e. 12%), which is also consistent with the literature. Male immigrant wages finally assimilate with those of their native-born counterparts 25 years after migration. The full assimilation profile is illustrated in Figure 1.

Table 5 presents the results of Eq. (1) for females where immigration categories are not accounted for. Again, controls are added sequentially in Columns (1) to (3).<sup>35</sup> The findings for females are similar to males in that there is a significant entry penalty (i.e. 55%), however wage assimilation for women takes a little less time. Fifteen years after landing, the penalty persists at 13%. Female immigrant wages assimilate with those of native-born females roughly 23 years after landing. The full assimilation profile is illustrated in Figure 2.

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<sup>29</sup> All terms including immigrant admission categories (IAC) are therefore excluded. A full sample of immigrants and native-born Canadians is used.

<sup>30</sup> All regression results in this table, and in subsequent tables, are weighted, and all standard errors are robust.

<sup>31</sup> The same is true for subsequent discussions of results.

<sup>32</sup> I found the standard immigrant wage gap estimates for both males and females to be statistically significant at the 1% level 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 years after migration. For example, to test statistical significance of the gap 15 years after immigration, the null hypothesis is  $\beta_1 + 15\beta_2 + 225\beta_3 = 0$ .

<sup>33</sup> Note that, although it is beyond the scope of this paper, there exists a large literature that examines the job displacement effect on wages (i.e. the wage penalty of losing a job). Since a majority of immigrants arrive in Canada without a job, some of the entry wage penalty analyzed in this paper might be attributed to a job displacement effect similar to that experienced by non-immigrants when they lose a job. Morissette, Qiu, and Chan (2013) find that native-born Canadians experience an earnings loss ranging between 10% and 20% after displacement. Therefore, even after accounting for this loss, the immigrant entry effect remains economically significant.

<sup>34</sup> The average immigrant has been in Canada for roughly 15 years.

<sup>35</sup> The addition of controls minimally changes the estimates, but has no effect on their pattern. All immigrant related estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.

In summary, I find very similar results to other studies that rely on less recent data. It would appear that immigrant outcomes are not getting worse as measured by wages. However, a significant entry effect remains present and wage assimilation still takes time.

## 6.2 Admission Category Specific Immigrant Wage Gaps

Tables 6 and 7 illustrate the results of Eq. (1) for males and females, respectively, where immigration categories are now accounted for.<sup>36</sup> A majority of the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level for both sexes.<sup>37,38</sup> In order to clearly visualize the results presented in Tables 6 and 7, the following discussion refers primarily to the assimilation profiles plotted in the figures.<sup>39</sup>

### 6.2.1 Males

For males, Figure 3 shows that immigrants admitted under the Family Class face a 53% earnings penalty upon entry relative to native-born individuals holding other variables constant. Fifteen years after landing, the penalty diminishes to 12%. For this category, wages do not fully assimilate. The Family Class assimilation profile is very similar to that of the average male immigrant, but they do not fare as well.

Figure 4 displays a significant 62% earnings penalty upon entry for male Principal Applicant (PA) immigrants admitted under the Skilled Workers category. Spouses and Dependents (SDs) admitted under the same category experience a much higher earnings penalty upon entry (i.e. 82%). Fifteen years after migrating, the penalty shrinks to 6% and 10% for PAs and SDs respectively. Under this category, PA and SD male immigrant wages assimilate with those of their native-born counterparts roughly 19 years after landing.<sup>40</sup> Both groups also experience earnings benefits 25 years after landing. Upon entry, Skilled Workers do not fare as well as the average immigrant, however, their wages assimilate significantly faster.

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<sup>36</sup> All terms including IAC are therefore included. All regression results are weighted, and all standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.

<sup>37</sup> For males, all entry effect estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the assimilation effect estimates for CEC PAs and PNP PAs are not. For females, CEC SD entry effect estimates and PNP PA and LIC assimilation effect estimates are not. This is most likely due to the small sample size of males or females for these specific categories. It could also be because the CEC and PNP categories are relatively new, and were implemented in 2008 and 1998 respectively.

<sup>38</sup> I found all estimates of the wage gaps for both males and females to be statistically significant at the 1% level at 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 years after migration (except for those concerning CEC PAs, which were found to be statistically insignificant). For example, to test statistical significance of the gap 15 years after immigration for family class, the null hypothesis is  $\beta_1 + 15\beta_2 + 225\beta_3 = 0$ .

<sup>39</sup> Each figure presents the assimilation profile for each category and includes the profile of the average immigrant (i.e. the profiles plotted in Figures 1 and 2).

<sup>40</sup> It is interesting to note that male immigrants admitted under the Skilled Worker Category as SDs eventually fare better in the long run than those admitted under Family Class. This is consistent with the assortative mating theory discussed in footnote 7.

Figure 5 conveys an entry penalty of 25% and 76% for Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) PAs and SDs respectively, relative to their non-immigrant counterparts.<sup>41</sup> Neither PA nor SD wages assimilate, however, the penalties reach highs of 7% and 6% respectively. PNP PAs fare much better than the average immigrant both upon entry and over time,<sup>42</sup> however, PNP SDs do not.

Figure 6 illustrates the immigrant wage assimilation profile for PAs and SDs admitted under the Canadian Experience Class (CEC).<sup>43</sup> CEC PAs experience an earnings benefit of 2% upon entry, relative to their non-immigrant counterparts.<sup>44</sup> Said benefit persists and reaches a high of 7% three years after migration. CEC SDs face an entry earnings penalty of 64%, and the penalty persists and worsens over time. CEC PAs fare much better, relative to non-immigrants, than the average immigrant, while CEC SDs do not.<sup>45</sup>

As seen in Figures 7 and 8, male immigrants admitted under the Business and Live-in-Caregiver categories experience the worst entry penalties out of all categories at 92% and 87% respectively. Business Class male immigrants experience a worse immigrant/native-born wage gap than the average male immigrant for the entirety of the 25 years after migration. However, their wages assimilate 24 years after migration. Overall, neither category performs better than the average immigrant in the long run relative to native-born individuals.

Figure 9 presents the wage assimilation profile for male immigrants admitted under the Refugee/Other Class. Those admitted under this category face a slightly better entry penalty than the average male immigrant does at 44%. However, in the longer run, they perform worse, relative to native-born individuals, than the average immigrant does.

In summary, although male Skilled Worker PAs perform better than non-economic admission categories over time, relative to non-immigrants, male CEC PAs and PNP PAs experience the best assimilation profiles. Male Family Class immigrants experience very similar assimilation profiles to the average immigrant. Male immigrants admitted under Business Class face the worst assimilation profile.

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<sup>41</sup> Since the PNP was initiated in 1998, results are presented up until seventeen years after migration for both males and females.

<sup>42</sup> This is expected since requirements for PNP PAs often include a job offer, strong ties to the province, or having completed a graduate degree.

<sup>43</sup> The CEC was implemented in 2008, thus the figure only plots the results up to seven years after migration for both males and females.

<sup>44</sup> This is expected since requirements for CEC PAs include one year of Canadian work experience. Therefore, PAs are often former international students at Canadian universities.

<sup>45</sup> Although PNP and CEC PAs perform better than all other categories, including Skilled Worker PAs, their estimates should be taken with a grain of salt since both programs are relatively new.

### 6.2.2 Females

For females, Figure 10 shows that Family Class immigrants face a 57% earnings penalty upon entry relative to native-born individuals. Fifteen years after landing, the penalty diminishes to 17%. For this category, wages assimilate to those of non-immigrant counterparts 26 years after immigration. The Family Class assimilation profile is very similar to that of the average female immigrant, but they do not fare as well.

Figure 11 displays a significant entry penalty (i.e. 69%) for female Principal Applicant (PA) immigrants admitted under the Skilled Workers category. Spouses and Dependents (SDs) admitted under the same category experience a much higher earnings penalty at 88% upon entry. Fifteen years after migrating, Skilled Worker PA wages assimilate with those of their non-immigrant counterparts. However, for female Skilled Worker SDs, the penalty decreases to 14% fifteen years after migration, and wages assimilate 21 years after migration.<sup>46</sup> Both groups also experience earnings benefits 25 years after landing. Upon entry, female Skilled Workers do not fare as well as the average immigrant, however, they fare better over time.

Figure 12 conveys an earnings penalty of 25% and 71% for immigrant PNP PAs and SDs respectively, relative to their non-immigrant counterparts upon entry. For females, PNP PA wages assimilate roughly 8 years after migration, while SD wages do not assimilate. Relative to non-immigrants, female PNP PAs fare much better than the average female immigrant;<sup>47</sup> PNP SDs do not.

Figure 13 illustrates the immigrant wage assimilation profile for female PAs and SDs admitted under the Canadian Experience Class (CEC). Female CEC PAs experience an earnings benefit of 4% upon entry, relative to their non-immigrant counterparts. Said benefit reaches a high of 8% three years after migration. Female CEC SDs face an entry earnings penalty of 59%, however, unlike males, the penalty decreases over time. CEC PAs and SDs both face better assimilation profiles than the average immigrant.<sup>48</sup>

As shown in Figure 14, female immigrants admitted under the Business Class experience the worst entry effects out of all the categories at 93%. They face a worse immigrant/native-born wage gap than the average female immigrant for the majority of the 25 years after migration. However, their wages assimilate earlier than those of the average female immigrant at 22 years after migration. On the other hand, Figure

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<sup>46</sup> Note that, in the long run, female Skilled Worker SDs also fare better relative to non-immigrants than family sponsored immigrants.

<sup>47</sup> This is as expected since requirements for PNP PAs often include a job offer, strong ties to the province, or having completed a graduate degree.

<sup>48</sup> Although female PNP PAs and CEC immigrants perform better than all other categories, including Skilled Worker PAs, caution should be taken when examining their estimates since both programs are relatively new.

15 shows that female LIC immigrants face a smaller immigrant wage gap than the average female immigrant for the full 25-year period. Their wages assimilate after 19 years, and they achieve an earnings premium (i.e. 6%) 25 years after migration.

Figure 16 presents the wage assimilation profile for female immigrants admitted under the Refugee/Other Class. Those admitted under this category face a slightly better entry penalty than the average female immigrant does at 47%. Overall, they perform similarly to the average immigrant, relative to native-born individuals.

In conclusion, female assimilation profiles are similar to those of males for most of the admission categories. However, female Skilled Worker PA wages assimilate with native-born wages faster than male SW PAs do. Female LIC immigrants also do better than male LIC immigrants. For Family Class, females face the same results as males do. Again, CEC and PNP PAs experience the best profiles, while Business Class immigrants experience the worst.

### *6.3 Wage Differentials Between Admission Categories*

Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the results of Eq. (1) for males and females, respectively, where a subsample of immigrants only is used.<sup>49</sup> Doing so does not impose the parameters on the control variables to be the same for native-born Canadians and immigrants. Also, in this case, the results are more comparable to the literature. A majority of the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level for both sexes. Figures 17 to 28 illustrate the wage differential between each category of admission and Family Class (i.e. the reference group). In order to clearly visualize the results presented in Tables 8 and 9, the following discussion refers primarily to the wage differentials plotted in the figures.<sup>50</sup>

#### *6.3.1 Males*

Figures 17 to 19 indicate that male Skilled Worker, PNP and CEC PAs all experience a significant earnings premium relative to Family Class for the majority of the 25-year period. Figure 20 shows that male Business Class immigrants face a consistent wage penalty relative to Family Class. Figures 21 and 22 establish that male immigrants admitted under the LIC and Refugee categories experience similar wage outcomes to family sponsored immigrants. These findings are consistent both with the literature<sup>51</sup> and with the relative performance of the categories discussed in Section 6.2.1.

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<sup>49</sup> Therefore, the immigrant status indicator is excluded from the equation. All regression results are weighted, and all standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.

<sup>50</sup> Each figure presents the assimilation profile for each category and includes the profile of the average immigrant (i.e. the profiles plotted in Figures 1 and 2).

<sup>51</sup> See Warman, Webb, and Worswick (2019).

### 6.3.2 Females

The findings for females are similar to males in that Figures 23 to 25 show that female Skilled Worker, PNP and CEC PAs all experience a significant earnings premium relative to Family Class. However, unlike males, Figure 26 shows that female Business Class immigrants have an earnings premium, relative to Family Class, 16 years after migration. Similarly, Figure 27 establishes that female LIC immigrants experience a wage premium relative to Family Class for the full period plotted. Lastly, Figure 28 shows that Refugee Class female immigrants experience earnings similar to Family Class female immigrants. These findings are consistent both with the literature<sup>51</sup> and with the relative performance of the categories discussed in Section 6.2.2.

## 7. Robustness Checks and Econometric Issues

In this section I carry out four robustness checks. First, I verify whether excluding occupation controls has a significant impact on my estimates. Second, I verify whether including a union status control has an impact on my estimates. Third, I re-estimate my model using a sample of prime-aged individuals (i.e. aged 25-54). Finally, I re-estimate my model without using weights.

Although much of the literature includes occupational controls, their addition is controversial for some as they are believed to be endogenous. I found that excluding these controls does not materially affect my estimates (i.e. the signs and magnitudes remain essentially unchanged). Since previous studies did not include a control for union status, I excluded it from my main specifications. However, upon verifying whether the addition of a union status control matters, I find my assimilation profiles remain essentially unchanged. Re-estimating my model with a subsample of prime-aged individuals also leaves my assimilation profiles mostly unchanged. Lastly, excluding weights from my analyses has little to no effect on the patterns and magnitudes of the assimilation profiles. Results for these checks are available upon request.<sup>52</sup>

## 8. Conclusion

In this paper, I exploit a unique record linkage between Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada's (IRCC's) administrative immigration records and the 2016 Canadian Census to analyze the immigrant/native-born wage gaps and wage assimilation profiles across categories of admission. I utilize

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<sup>52</sup> Except for the robustness check concerning weights as the COOL RDC does not allow the release of unweighted estimates.

a log-linear earnings function to complete my analysis. I find that immigrants admitted under the Skilled Workers category as principal applicants (PAs) experience better assimilation profiles than those admitted under non-economic categories. I also find that Family Class immigrants face a poorer assimilation profile compared with immigrants admitted under economic categories. Canadian Experience Class (CEC) PAs and the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) PAs face the best profiles out of all categories. Lastly, immigrants admitted under Business Class experience the worst wage outcomes.

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Table 1. Summary Statistics by Immigrant Status for Males Only

Variables	Immigrant	Native-Born
A. <i>Demographics</i>		
Age	43.350 (11.071)	43.185 (12.357)
Visible Minority	0.761 (0.426)	0.098 (0.298)
Married	0.758 (0.428)	0.651 (0.477)
B. <i>Knowledge of Official Languages</i>		
English	0.788 (0.409)	0.662 (0.473)
French	0.042 (0.201)	0.110 (0.312)
Bilingual	0.138 (0.345)	0.228 (0.420)
Neither	0.032 (0.175)	0.000 (0.012)
C. <i>Educational Attainment</i>		
No Degree or Diploma	0.091 (0.288)	0.107 (0.309)
High School	0.193 (0.395)	0.256 (0.436)
Post-Secondary < Bachelor's	0.273 (0.445)	0.419 (0.493)
Bachelor's Degree	0.258 (0.438)	0.158 (0.365)
Beyond Bachelor's	0.185 (0.388)	0.060 (0.238)
D. <i>Province</i>		
British Columbia	0.153 (0.360)	0.118 (0.322)
Alberta	0.138 (0.344)	0.127 (0.333)
Saskatchewan	0.018 (0.134)	0.034 (0.182)
Manitoba	0.035 (0.183)	0.037 (0.188)
Ontario	0.485 (0.500)	0.336 (0.472)
Quebec	0.160 (0.366)	0.262 (0.440)
New Brunswick	0.003 (0.058)	0.028 (0.165)
Prince Edward Island	0.001 (0.029)	0.005 (0.071)
Nova Scotia	0.006 (0.077)	0.032 (0.177)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.002 (0.041)	0.020 (0.142)
E. <i>Occupations</i>		
Management	0.100 (0.300)	0.124 (0.330)
Administration	0.106 (0.308)	0.094 (0.292)
Science	0.176 (0.380)	0.104 (0.306)
Health	0.034 (0.181)	0.020 (0.139)
Policy	0.060 (0.237)	0.087 (0.283)
Recreation	0.013 (0.114)	0.018 (0.134)
Sales	0.206 (0.404)	0.157 (0.364)
Transport	0.199 (0.399)	0.293 (0.455)
Natural Resources	0.012 (0.110)	0.034 (0.181)
Manufacturing	0.095 (0.293)	0.067 (0.251)
F. <i>Wage</i>		
Yearly Earnings (in \$)	58,896 (95,653)	68,917 (137,473)
Observations	336,240	1,298,980

Notes: All means are weighted. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 'Post-Secondary < Bachelor's' includes all programs below bachelor's including trades programs, apprenticeships and Cégep.

Table 2. Summary Statistics by Immigrant Status for Females Only

Variables	Immigrant	Native-Born
A. <i>Demographics</i>		
Age	43.044 (10.691)	43.359 (12.227)
Visible Minority	0.773 (0.419)	0.103 (0.304)
Married	0.705 (0.456)	0.645 (0.478)
B. <i>Knowledge of Official Languages</i>		
English	0.796 (0.403)	0.643 (0.479)
French	0.047 (0.212)	0.123 (0.328)
Bilingual	0.125 (0.331)	0.234 (0.423)
Neither	0.031 (0.174)	0.000 (0.008)
C. <i>Educational Attainment</i>		
No Degree or Diploma	0.075 (0.263)	0.062 (0.242)
High School	0.179 (0.383)	0.227 (0.419)
Post-Secondary < Bachelor's	0.298 (0.457)	0.402 (0.490)
Bachelor's Degree	0.293 (0.455)	0.224 (0.417)
Beyond Bachelor's	0.156 (0.362)	0.084 (0.277)
D. <i>Province</i>		
British Columbia	0.168 (0.374)	0.116 (0.320)
Alberta	0.130 (0.336)	0.117 (0.322)
Saskatchewan	0.016 (0.126)	0.035 (0.184)
Manitoba	0.033 (0.178)	0.037 (0.190)
Ontario	0.498 (0.500)	0.345 (0.475)
Quebec	0.144 (0.351)	0.261 (0.439)
New Brunswick	0.003 (0.056)	0.028 (0.165)
Prince Edward Island	0.001 (0.029)	0.006 (0.075)
Nova Scotia	0.006 (0.074)	0.034 (0.182)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.001 (0.036)	0.020 (0.140)
E. <i>Occupations</i>		
Management	0.068 (0.252)	0.094 (0.291)
Administration	0.217 (0.412)	0.266 (0.442)
Science	0.056 (0.230)	0.031 (0.174)
Health	0.135 (0.342)	0.126 (0.332)
Policy	0.144 (0.351)	0.191 (0.393)
Recreation	0.015 (0.120)	0.022 (0.148)
Sales	0.276 (0.447)	0.220 (0.415)
Transport	0.017 (0.128)	0.020 (0.141)
Natural Resources	0.007 (0.083)	0.006 (0.079)
Manufacturing	0.066 (0.248)	0.022 (0.146)
F. <i>Wage</i>		
Yearly Earnings (in \$)	40,479 (42,063)	46,453 (44,672)
Observations	345,730	1,287,080

Notes: All means are weighted. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 'Post-Secondary < Bachelor's' includes all programs below bachelor's including trades programs, apprenticeships and Cégep.

Table 3. Immigrant Admission Category Summary Statistics by Sex

Immigrant Admission Category	Males	Females
Family Class	0.269 (0.443)	0.334 (0.472)
Skilled Worker PA	0.268 (0.443)	0.130 (0.337)
Skilled Worker SD	0.162 (0.369)	0.239 (0.426)
Canadian Experience Class PA	0.015 (0.123)	0.007 (0.086)
Canadian Experience Class SD	0.002 (0.043)	0.005 (0.068)
Live-in-Caregiver	0.022 (0.146)	0.067 (0.250)
Provincial Nominee Program PA	0.048 (0.214)	0.023 (0.149)
Provincial Nominee Program SD	0.015 (0.122)	0.029 (0.167)
Business	0.035 (0.183)	0.034 (0.180)
Refugee/Other	0.164 (0.370)	0.133 (0.340)
Observations	336,240	345,730

Notes: All means are weighted. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 'Skilled Workers' also includes the Skilled Trades Workers category. 'Business' includes the Self-Employed, Investors, and Entrepreneurs categories. PA stands for Principal Applicant. SD stands for spouses and dependants of the PA.

Table 4. Standard Earnings Regression Results for Males Only


Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Immigrant	-0.519*** (0.0045)	-0.458*** (0.0059)	-0.498*** (0.0056)
Immigrant*YSM	0.0396*** (0.0006)	0.0344*** (0.0007)	0.0334*** (0.0006)
Immigrant*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000706*** (0.0000)	-0.000623*** (0.0000)	-0.000535*** (0.0000)
<i>Demographics</i>			
Age			0.126*** (0.0005)
Age <sup>2</sup>			-0.00136*** (0.0000)
Visible Minority			-0.175*** (0.0021)
Married			0.274*** (0.0015)
Source Country/Region Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Language Controls	No	No	Yes
Education Controls	No	No	Yes
Province Controls	No	No	Yes
Occupation Controls	No	No	Yes
Constant	10.790*** (0.001)	10.790*** (0.001)	7.511*** (0.009)
Observations	1,635,215	1,635,215	1,635,215
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.27

Notes: Dependent variable is log of yearly earnings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are weighted. 'YSM' stands for years since migration. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


Table 5. Standard Earnings Regression Results for Females Only

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Immigrant	-0.619*** (0.0046)	-0.567*** (0.0061)	-0.555*** (0.0059)
Immigrant*YSM	0.0457*** (0.0006)	0.0432*** (0.0007)	0.0354*** (0.0006)
Immigrant*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000731*** (0.0000)	-0.000714*** (0.0000)	-0.000491*** (0.0000)
<i>Demographics</i>			
Age			0.122*** (0.0005)
Age <sup>2</sup>			-0.00128*** (0.0000)
Visible Minority			-0.0757*** (0.0021)
Married			-0.0132*** (0.0014)
Source Country/Region Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Language Controls	No	No	Yes
Education Controls	No	No	Yes
Province Controls	No	No	Yes
Occupation Controls	No	No	Yes
Constant	10.430*** (0.001)	10.430*** (0.001)	7.283*** (0.009)
Observations	1,632,810	1,632,810	1,632,810
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.24

Notes: Dependent variable is log of yearly earnings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are weighted. 'YSM' stands for years since migration. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Figure 1.** Standard Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Males Only



**Figure 2.** Standard Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Females Only

Table 6. Category Specific Earnings Regression Results for Males Only

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Immigrant	-0.719*** (0.009)	-0.681*** (0.009)	-0.525*** (0.009)
Immigrant*YSM	0.0453*** (0.001)	0.0416*** (0.001)	0.0337*** (0.001)
Immigrant*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000720*** (0.000)	-0.000655*** (0.000)	-0.000552*** (0.000)
Immigrant*SWPA	0.171*** (0.013)	0.220*** (0.013)	-0.0906*** (0.012)
Immigrant*SWSD	0.0265 (0.016)	0.0692*** (0.016)	-0.292*** (0.015)
Immigrant*CECPA	0.874*** (0.023)	0.851*** (0.022)	0.541*** (0.020)
Immigrant*CECSD	0.244*** (0.074)	0.237*** (0.072)	-0.112* (0.068)
Immigrant*LIC	-0.288*** (0.021)	-0.267*** (0.022)	-0.347*** (0.023)
Immigrant*PNPPA	0.456*** (0.017)	0.510*** (0.017)	0.273*** (0.016)
Immigrant*PNPSD	-0.138*** (0.031)	-0.0687** (0.031)	-0.250*** (0.030)
Immigrant*Business	-0.471*** (0.038)	-0.304*** (0.038)	-0.390*** (0.035)
Immigrant*Refugee	-0.151*** (0.016)	-0.0857*** (0.016)	0.0816*** (0.015)
Immigrant*SWPA*YSM	0.0453*** (0.002)	0.0423*** (0.002)	0.0163*** (0.002)
Immigrant*SWSD*YSM	-0.0147*** (0.002)	-0.0163*** (0.002)	0.0331*** (0.002)
Immigrant*CECPA*YSM	-0.0235 (0.022)	0.0179 (0.021)	-0.00143 (0.019)
Immigrant*CECSD*YSM	0.173** (0.073)	0.205*** (0.073)	0.222*** (0.066)
Immigrant*LIC*YSM	0.0780*** (0.005)	0.0761*** (0.005)	0.0877*** (0.005)
Immigrant*PNPPA*YSM	0.0302*** (0.006)	0.0182*** (0.006)	0.000827 (0.005)
Immigrant*PNPSD*YSM	0.0644*** (0.010)	0.0507*** (0.010)	0.101*** (0.010)
Immigrant*Business*YSM	0.0153*** (0.004)	0.00493 (0.004)	0.0317*** (0.004)
Immigrant*Refugee*YSM	-0.00495** (0.002)	-0.00954*** (0.002)	-0.0156*** (0.002)
Immigrant*SWPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00159*** (0.000)	-0.00156*** (0.000)	-0.000299*** (0.000)

Table 6. (continued)

Immigrant*SWSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000664*** (0.000)	0.000655*** (0.000)	-0.000703*** (0.000)
Immigrant*CECPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.00035 (0.004)	-0.00737* (0.004)	-0.00395 (0.004)
Immigrant*CECSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.0286** (0.014)	-0.0364*** (0.014)	-0.0344*** (0.012)
Immigrant*LIC*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00313*** (0.000)	-0.00306*** (0.000)	-0.00328*** (0.000)
Immigrant*PNPPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00269*** (0.000)	-0.00239*** (0.000)	-0.00112*** (0.000)
Immigrant*PNPSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00502*** (0.001)	-0.00463*** (0.001)	-0.00580*** (0.001)
Immigrant*Business*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000248** (0.000)	0.000422*** (0.000)	-0.000583*** (0.000)
Immigrant*Refugee*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000300*** (0.000)	0.000386*** (0.000)	0.000419*** (0.000)
<i>Demographics</i>			
Age			0.126*** (0.000)
Age <sup>2</sup>			-0.00136*** (0.000)
Visible Minority			-0.173*** (0.002)
Married			0.275*** (0.002)
Source Country/Region Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Language Controls	No	No	Yes
Education Controls	No	No	Yes
Province Controls	No	No	Yes
Occupation Controls	No	No	Yes
Constant	10.79*** (0.001)	10.79*** (0.001)	7.512*** (0.009)
Observations	1,635,215	1,635,215	1,635,215
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.28

Notes: Dependent variable is log of yearly earnings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are weighted. 'YSM' stands for years since migration. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


Table 7. Category Specific Earnings Regression Results for Females Only

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Immigrant	-0.871*** (0.009)	-0.785*** (0.009)	-0.571*** (0.009)
Immigrant*YSM	0.0544*** (0.001)	0.0485*** (0.001)	0.0328*** (0.001)
Immigrant*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000792*** (0.000)	-0.000702*** (0.000)	-0.000423*** (0.000)
Immigrant*SWPA	0.279*** (0.015)	0.269*** (0.015)	-0.116*** (0.014)
Immigrant*SWSD	0.0522*** (0.015)	0.0582*** (0.015)	-0.304*** (0.014)
Immigrant*CECPA	0.973*** (0.032)	0.939*** (0.031)	0.614*** (0.031)
Immigrant*CECSD	0.338*** (0.048)	0.299*** (0.047)	-0.021 (0.045)
Immigrant*LIC	0.458*** (0.013)	0.393*** (0.014)	0.147*** (0.014)
Immigrant*PNPPA	0.523*** (0.021)	0.531*** (0.021)	0.322*** (0.020)
Immigrant*PNPSD	0.014 (0.024)	0.009 (0.024)	-0.140*** (0.023)
Immigrant*Business	-0.352*** (0.039)	-0.310*** (0.039)	-0.362*** (0.038)
Immigrant*Refugee	-0.005 (0.017)	0.001 (0.018)	0.0991*** (0.017)
Immigrant*SWPA*YSM	0.0498*** (0.002)	0.0491*** (0.002)	0.0310*** (0.002)
Immigrant*SWSD*YSM	0.0146*** (0.002)	0.0147*** (0.002)	0.0324*** (0.002)
Immigrant*CECPA*YSM	-0.015 (0.031)	0.012 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.029)
Immigrant*CECSD*YSM	0.060 (0.045)	0.0966** (0.045)	0.0740* (0.043)
Immigrant*LIC*YSM	-0.0122*** (0.002)	-0.00790*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Immigrant*PNPPA*YSM	0.0447*** (0.008)	0.0352*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
Immigrant*PNPSD*YSM	0.0689*** (0.008)	0.0640*** (0.008)	0.0734*** (0.007)
Immigrant*Business*YSM	0.0252*** (0.004)	0.0236*** (0.004)	0.0385*** (0.004)
Immigrant*Refugee*YSM	-0.00891*** (0.002)	-0.00983*** (0.002)	-0.00957*** (0.002)
Immigrant*SWPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00183*** (0.000)	-0.00179*** (0.000)	-0.000750*** (0.000)


Table 7. (continued)

Immigrant*SWSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000404*** (0.000)	-0.000418*** (0.000)	-0.000678*** (0.000)
Immigrant*CECPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)
Immigrant*CECSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.0149* (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)
Immigrant*LIC*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000126* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Immigrant*PNPPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00311*** (0.001)	-0.00257*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
Immigrant*PNPSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00547*** (0.001)	-0.00529*** (0.001)	-0.00472*** (0.001)
Immigrant*Business*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000261** (0.000)	-0.000247** (0.000)	-0.000885*** (0.000)
Immigrant*Refugee*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000302*** (0.000)	0.000333*** (0.000)	0.000226*** (0.000)
<i>Demographics</i>			
Age			0.122*** (0.000)
Age <sup>2</sup>			-0.00128*** (0.000)
Visible Minority			-0.0749*** (0.002)
Married			-0.00933*** (0.001)
Source Country/Region Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Language Controls	No	No	Yes
Education Controls	No	No	Yes
Province Controls	No	No	Yes
Occupation Controls	No	No	Yes
Constant	10.430*** (0.001)	10.430*** (0.001)	7.286*** (0.009)
Observations	1,632,810	1,632,810	1,632,810
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.24


Notes: Dependent variable is log of yearly earnings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are weighted. 'YSM' stands for years since migration. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1




**Figure 3.** Family Class Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Males Only




**Figure 4.** Skilled Workers Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Males Only




**Figure 5.** Provincial Nominee Program Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Males Only




**Figure 6.** Canadian Experience Class Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Males Only




**Figure 7.** Business Class Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Males Only




**Figure 8.** Live-in-Caregiver Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Males Only




**Figure 9.** Refugee/Other Class Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Males Only




**Figure 10.** Family Class Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Females Only




**Figure 11.** Skilled Workers Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Females Only




**Figure 12.** Provincial Nominee Program Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Females Only




**Figure 13.** Canadian Experience Class Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Females Only



**Figure 14. Business Class Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Females Only**



**Figure 15. Live-in-Caregiver Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Females Only**



**Figure 16. Refugee/Other Class Immigrant Wage Assimilation Profile, Females Only**

Table 8. Category Specific Earnings Regression Results for Male Immigrants Only

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
YSM	0.0453*** (0.001)	0.0416*** (0.001)	0.0358*** (0.001)
YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000720*** (0.000)	-0.000655*** (0.000)	-0.000568*** (0.000)
SWPA	0.171*** (0.013)	0.220*** (0.013)	-0.0524*** (0.012)
SWSD	0.027 (0.016)	0.0692*** (0.016)	-0.202*** (0.015)
CECPA	0.874*** (0.023)	0.851*** (0.022)	0.529*** (0.020)
CECSD	0.244*** (0.074)	0.237*** (0.072)	-0.072 (0.067)
LIC	-0.288*** (0.021)	-0.267*** (0.022)	-0.327*** (0.022)
PNPPA	0.456*** (0.017)	0.510*** (0.017)	0.284*** (0.016)
PNPSD	-0.138*** (0.031)	-0.0687** (0.031)	-0.200*** (0.029)
Business	-0.471*** (0.038)	-0.304*** (0.038)	-0.358*** (0.035)
Refugee	-0.151*** (0.016)	-0.0857*** (0.016)	0.0525*** (0.015)
SWPA*YSM	0.0453*** (0.002)	0.0423*** (0.002)	0.0212*** (0.002)
SWSD*YSM	-0.0147*** (0.002)	-0.0163*** (0.002)	0.0154*** (0.002)
CECPA*YSM	-0.024 (0.022)	0.018 (0.021)	0.002 (0.019)
CECSD*YSM	0.173** (0.073)	0.205*** (0.073)	0.212*** (0.065)
LIC*YSM	0.0780*** (0.005)	0.0761*** (0.005)	0.0857*** (0.005)
PNPPA*YSM	0.0302*** (0.006)	0.0182*** (0.006)	0.0140*** (0.005)
PNPSD*YSM	0.0644*** (0.010)	0.0507*** (0.010)	0.0858*** (0.010)
Business*YSM	0.0153*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.0213*** (0.004)

Table 8. (continued)

Refugee*YSM	-0.00495**	-0.00954***	-0.0152***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
SWPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00159***	-0.00156***	-0.000518***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SWSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000664***	0.000655***	-0.000238***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CECPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000	-0.00737*	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
CECSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.0286**	-0.0364***	-0.0340***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)
LIC*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00313***	-0.00306***	-0.00325***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PNPPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00269***	-0.00239***	-0.00176***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PNPSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00502***	-0.00463***	-0.00549***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Business*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000248**	0.000422***	-0.000264**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Refugee*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000300***	0.000386***	0.000427***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
<i>Demographics</i>			
Age			0.0903***
			(0.001)
Age <sup>2</sup>			-0.000995***
			(0.000)
Visible Minority			-0.173***
			(0.004)
Married			0.184***
			(0.004)
Source Country/Region Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Language Controls	No	No	Yes
Education Controls	No	No	Yes
Province Controls	No	No	Yes
Occupation Controls	No	No	Yes
Constant	10.07***	10.11***	7.887***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.024)
Observations	336,240	336,240	336,240
R-squared	0.11	0.13	0.29

Notes: Dependent variable is log of yearly earnings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are weighted. 'YSM' stands for years since migration. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


Table 9. Category Specific Earnings Regression Results for Female Immigrants Only

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
YSM	0.054*** (0.001)	0.049*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.001)
YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000508*** (0.000)
SWPA	0.279*** (0.015)	0.269*** (0.015)	-0.020 (0.014)
SWSD	0.052*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.015)	-0.193*** (0.014)
CECPA	0.973*** (0.032)	0.939*** (0.031)	0.634*** (0.030)
CECSD	0.338*** (0.048)	0.299*** (0.047)	0.014 (0.044)
LIC	0.458*** (0.013)	0.393*** (0.014)	0.230*** (0.014)
PNPPA	0.523*** (0.021)	0.531*** (0.021)	0.340*** (0.020)
PNPSD	0.014 (0.024)	0.009 (0.024)	-0.113*** (0.023)
Business	-0.352*** (0.039)	-0.310*** (0.039)	-0.327*** (0.037)
Refugee	-0.005 (0.017)	0.001 (0.018)	0.076*** (0.017)
SWPA*YSM	0.0498*** (0.002)	0.0491*** (0.002)	0.0343*** (0.002)
SWSD*YSM	0.0146*** (0.002)	0.0147*** (0.002)	0.0242*** (0.002)
CECPA*YSM	-0.015 (0.031)	0.012 (0.030)	0.004 (0.029)
CECSD*YSM	0.060 (0.045)	0.0966** (0.045)	0.0832** (0.042)
LIC*YSM	-0.0122*** (0.002)	-0.00790*** (0.002)	-0.00750*** (0.002)
PNPPA*YSM	0.0447*** (0.008)	0.0352*** (0.007)	0.0124* (0.007)
PNPSD*YSM	0.0689*** (0.008)	0.0640*** (0.008)	0.0715*** (0.007)
Business*YSM	0.0252*** (0.004)	0.0236*** (0.004)	0.0305*** (0.004)


Table 9. (continued)

Refugee*YSM	-0.00891*** (0.002)	-0.00983*** (0.002)	-0.0107*** (0.002)
SWPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00183*** (0.000)	-0.00179*** (0.000)	-0.000979*** (0.000)
SWSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000404*** (0.000)	-0.000418*** (0.000)	-0.000524*** (0.000)
CECPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)
CECSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.0149* (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)
LIC*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000126* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
PNPPA*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00311*** (0.001)	-0.00257*** (0.001)	-0.000842* (0.000)
PNPSD*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.00547*** (0.001)	-0.00529*** (0.001)	-0.00492*** (0.001)
Business*YSM <sup>2</sup>	-0.000261** (0.000)	-0.000247** (0.000)	-0.000618*** (0.000)
Refugee*YSM <sup>2</sup>	0.000302*** (0.000)	0.000333*** (0.000)	0.000276*** (0.000)
<i>Demographics</i>			
Age			0.0824*** (0.001)
Age <sup>2</sup>			-0.000866*** (0.000)
Visible Minority			-0.0758*** (0.004)
Married			-0.0416*** (0.003)
Source Country/Region Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Language Controls	No	No	Yes
Education Controls	No	No	Yes
Province Controls	No	No	Yes
Occupation Controls	No	No	Yes
Constant	9.557*** (0.009)	9.643*** (0.009)	7.658*** (0.024)
Observations	345,730	345,730	345,730
R-squared	0.1	0.11	0.25


Notes: Dependent variable is log of yearly earnings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are weighted. 'YSM' stands for years since migration. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1




**Figure 17.** Skilled Workers Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Males Only




**Figure 18.** Provincial Nominee Program Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Males Only




**Figure 19.** Canadian Experience Class Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Males Only




**Figure 20.** Business Class Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Males Only




**Figure 21.** Live-in-Caregiver Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Males Only




**Figure 22.** Refugee/Other Class Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Males Only




**Figure 23.** Skilled Workers Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Females Only




**Figure 24.** Provincial Nominee Program Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Females Only




**Figure 25.** Canadian Experience Class Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Females Only



**Figure 26.** Business Class Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Females Only



**Figure 27.** Live-in-Caregiver Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Females Only



**Figure 28.** Refugee/Other Class Wage Differential relative to Family Class, Females Only