

NOTE TO USERS

Page(s) not included in the original manuscript are unavailable from the author or university. The manuscript was microfilmed as received

27-28

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI[®]

0006.15

Cap. 1

C37-2


THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN
AND
THE CLASH OF POLITICAL POLICIES IN BRITISH AFRICA

by

Bernard T. G. Chidzero

Thesis presented to the Faculty of
Political Economic and Social Sciences
of the University of Ottawa through
the Department of Political Science,
in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Master
of Arts.

Ottawa, Canada, 1955.



UMI Number: EC55388

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform EC55388
Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This thesis was prepared under the direction of Reverend Father Jean-Marcel Belanger, o.m.i., Head of the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Political Economic and Social Sciences.

Gratitude is here expressed to him for his interest and guidance, and to all those who have contributed by furnishing research material.

CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Name: Bernard Thomas Gibson Chidzero
Date of Birth: July 1, 1927
Place of Birth: Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia
University Training: Obtained B.A. (University of South Africa)
in 1952 at Pius XII Catholic University
College, Basutoland, South Africa;
did course work for the Master's degree
in Political Science at the University
of Ottawa, Canada.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
INTRODUCTION -----	V
I.- THE BURDEN-----	1
1. Basis of the Burden	4
2. Vitiating Ideal	12
II.- TRUSTEESHIP - Africanization-----	19
1. Theory	20
2. Practical Steps	24
III.- PERMANENT DOMINATION-----	34
1. Theory	35
2. Practical Steps	40
IV.- PARTNERSHIP-----	45
1. Theory	45
2. Practical Steps	48
V.- THE CLASH -- Internal -----	58
1. Trustee versus Ward	59
2. State Within State	62
3. Partnership Dilemma	64
VI.- THE CLASH -- External-----	67
1. Central	67
2. Commonwealth	73
3. International	75
CONCLUSION-----	81
BIBLIOGRAPHY-----	86

APPENDIX

A. British Africa -- Countries, Status, Area, Population---	91
B. Assimilation-----	92
C. Abstract of The White Man's Burden and the Clash of Political Policies in British Africa----	95

INTRODUCTION

Alongside missionary enterprise and distinguished from it, slave-raiding marked the early colonial history of Africa. As on the American Continent lands were oftener than not taken as "territoria nullius", so on the Dark Continent the native inhabitants, like gold and ivory, were a marketable commodity. Indeed, it is estimated that by 1537, at the hands of civilized men alone, the slave export to America was already running at the rate of ten thousand African men and women a year.¹ Nor did men of British loyalty play a small part in this inhuman export after 1562 when John Hawkins² initiated the long line of British adventurers into the profitable and brutal trade.

But the year 1807 saw men of the same British loyalty take a sharp and decisive turn. They abolished slave-trade and, twenty-six years later, effected the emancipation of slaves in all the far-flung portions of the Empire.

Yet in this same century of philanthropy and enlightened rule, the new imperialism, under the banner of the "White Man's Burden," quartered and partitioned Africa --- ever in search of land, wealth, and power; ostensibly in order to civilize. The Berlin Conference of European Powers (1884-1885) climaxed this long and phenomenal trafficking, and virtually sanctioned what history has recorded in its annals as the "Scramble for Africa." England, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, etc. -- all entered the imperial race at one

1. Empire Series, British Africa, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1899, p. 195.

2. (Sir) John Hawkins initiated British slave-trade in 1562; carried three slave cargoes to the New World between that year and 1576 (vide William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952, p. 524).

time or another; all laid claim over one territory or another. Throughout almost the whole of the vast continent were created and scattered European possessions and spheres of interest. The strong were the victors, the masters and the rulers.

In this partitioning of the Dark Continent, and following upon the exploits of British imperialists like Cecil John Rhodes and British missionary explorers like David Livingstone, Britain acquired more than a third of Africa's population. To the imperial throng of the Mistress of the Seas were added some fifty to sixty millions of African natives.³

By 1900 the British were already established in West, South, East, and Central Africa. The map of British Colonial Africa was coloured accordingly, as was the destiny of her peoples.

Doubtless, with the march of time and the interaction of ideas and events within and abroad, British Africa has undergone many diverse changes of addition and subtraction, as well as various constitutional developments, until it has become what it is to-day.⁴

But the problem of race relations, and of the exact definition of the white man's burden and responsibility in a multi-racial and restless continent, still begs a solution. How to control and harmonize social, economic and political relations between the conqueror and the conquered, the settler and the native inhabitant, the white man and the black man, the ruling minority and an emergent but subdued majority -- that still remains the tricky and

3. Empire Series, British Africa, p. 197.

4. For geographical location, area, population and status of the different British Dependencies in Africa as to date, see Appendix A.

urgent problem inherited by the British and others in consequence of their conquests.

What brought the European to Africa? What duties and responsibilities did he assume? Did he come to ruin or to build the land? Must he dominate forever or raise to a position of equality the myriad souls he has subjugated? What was, and what is, the nature of the so-called "White Man's Burden"?

These are pertinent questions which the present work will attempt to examine, if not to answer.

The problem is everywhere much the same and, theoretically, it has three main possible solutions, namely: leave the African alone, or rule him forever, or raise him to a position of equality. Opinions differ as to which is the best way out.

To the extent that anyone of these solutions, or any other is in some way the result of the white man's conception of his duty or task in Africa, it may be said to derive from the concept of the white man's burden understood in the general sense of an accepted responsibility.

Be he settler, foreign official, trader or missionary, or otherwise - the white man has interests in Africa, and he senses his own peril amidst the teeming millions of Africans. The inescapable reality lies before him that he cannot do with them as he pleases, any more than they with him. Between them the problem must be solved.

Some see the solution, as has been observed, in leading the African to a position of autonomy and self-government, others in permanent white supremacy, and others yet in partnership.

The effect, as must be apparent even "prima facie", is a conflict of theories and a clash of policies.

It is this conflict of theories and clash of policies that is the subject matter of the present work.

In the pages that follow, the "White Man's Burden" is examined with reference to the central aspect of political relations between the white man and the black man. The different political policies, obtaining to date in what is or was British Africa, are considered in their theoretical and practical settings, with the purpose of throwing them into relief as different solutions to a basically common problem. Then, finally, the conflict inherent in the policies themselves, and the clash between them, conclude the work.

Throughout, the writer offers no specific solution of his own. Facts, however, argue for the necessity of equality in legality on the moral basis of respect for human dignity. If harmony is to be achieved at all, it will be in that spirit which leads to the triumph of justice and humanity -- a thought vividly expressed in the striking metaphor of Aggrey of Africa:-

You can play a tune of sorts on the white keys, and
you can play a tune of sorts on the black keys, but
for harmony you must use both the black and the white.⁵

That, in the final analysis, is the challenge: harmony between man and man irrespective of race, colour or creed.

5. Dr. J.E. Kwegyr Aggrey, as quoted in "From Darkness to Light", New York, British Information Services, 1949, p. 25.

CHAPTER I
THE BURDEN

Throughout the length and breadth of British Africa there are problems which defy reduction to any one single causative factor, problems whose solution must, of necessity, be diversified. There is conflict between man and the external forces of a continent which is at all stages of development; conflict between black man and white man, black man and black man, white man and white man, and ceaseless conflict between principle and expedient, theory and practice.

Inextricably interwoven with these incessant problems is what has been termed in colonial and imperial history the "White Man's Burden" - a pregnant and time-honoured expression, which indeed is a key phrase in the affairs of race relations in Africa.

An examination of the usages and connotations of the phrase not only reveals the fact that it has been conceived differently at different times and places, but, what is more, indicates a nexus between its various meanings on the one hand and a variety of attitudes and policies on the other, in matters affecting the white man and the black man in British Africa.¹

Wilbur White defines the White Man's Burden as:

1. The same could be said of the rest of Colonial Africa; of any part of the world, where the European has gained control over the aborigines and set himself as leader.

The duty (and pleasure) which the white races have felt in extending the blessings of their civilization and economic system to the backward and usually the coloured races of the world.²

It is the "duty", and the "pleasure", of civilizing the uncivilized - on Western standards, that is; the duty and pleasure of what the French once called, in connection with their so-called "gallicizing" policies in Asia and Africa, "la mission civilisatrice."³ In other words, following White's definition, the white man sailing from the civilized shores of Europe assumed the responsibility, stood up to the challenge - bore the burden of dispelling darkness abroad and of saving huge populations from the grips of ignorance, economic hazards, spiritual aberrations and the like.

Erik Achorn has ironically expressed the white man's burden in sharp-edged, if fictitious words;

Give me control over these dirty, undisciplined, shiftless beggars and I will make them clean, orderly, and industrious - to the mutual benefit of all concerned. What is more, I will make them healthy and protect them from their tyrannical rulers.⁴

2. Wilbur W. White, White's Political Dictionary, New York, The World Publishing Co., 1947, under White Man.

3. Ralph Linton (ed.), The Science of Man in the World Crisis, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945 p. 329-330.

4. Erik Achorn, European Civilization and Politics, New York, Harcourt & Co., 1943, p. 640.

But the "bearers of the white man's burden"⁵, the agents of civilization, were possessed of overt and professed, as well as covert and unprofessed, motives. The motives of traders were not necessarily those of explorers; those of colonialists and settlers not necessarily, if at all, those of missionaries and philanthropists; those of avowed imperialists not necessarily, in fact scarcely, those of humanitarians; those of racialists radically not those of "assimilationists."

All these classes of agents of civilization came to Africa with their respective accoutrements of motives and paraphernalia of ideals and determinations, and have endeavoured to shape the destinies of their proteges accordingly.

What, then, precisely is, or has been, the white man's burden? Has it any one single meaning, or has it several? How does it compare with the different motives of its bearers? In what relation does it stand to the actual problems facing the world?

The matter is best approached by a general survey of the several ways in which the phrase has been used in the problematic circumstances resulting from the clash of different cultures, and from the political and economic objectives of modern European civilization.

5. Erik Achorn, Op. cit., p. 205.

1. The Basis of the Burden.

In the history of European colonialism and imperialism the conception of a "White Man's Burden," as distinct from the sacred mission of Christianity, is of rather recent date. From the beginning, humanitarians were not wanting who considered the aborigines as fellow men worthy not only of aspiring to eternal salvation but, also, to the good things of the earth. Their influence made itself felt in various fields of endeavour, bringing light, order and unmistakable economic benefits first to the shores and, then, to the hinterland of Africa.

Philanthropy was not wanting but for long it remained the concern of the few while the aim of the many - colonists or adventurers - was self-interest, not always through the oppression of native peoples, but with oppression and even destruction if need be. It is not our purpose to revive those dark centuries of colonial history from the merciful passing of time. Our concern is with the more modern acknowledgment of a burden by the imperialist nations of Europe and the official adoption of such a responsibility by their governments. It is necessary, however, that we bear this history in mind if we are to understand the discrepancies between the basic principles of the White Man's Burden which led to commendable achievements and the too-apparent shortcomings in their realizations. Three factors contributed to the former: the positive philanthropy of missionaries and humanitarians, present from the beginning; the well-understood self-interest of capitalists and governments during the nineteenth century; the indignant and successful protests against long-standing abuses which took form at the same time.

(a) The Philanthropy of Missionaries and Humanitarians.

Primarily concerned with the conversion of souls to Christianity and the inculcation of Christian values, the civilizing mission of Europe early assumed another tremendous task in the fields of health and education. It found fulfilment in the establishment of schools, hospitals and other institutions, in the transformation of Africa from the Dark continent it was to the bustling and vigorously growing continent of to-day.

To the European missionary and the humanitarian, their mission appeared as the lifting of the veil of ignorance and superstition, and as the letting-in of light through the wide-spread use of various institutions for the development of the whole African man.

No one will deny that the burden so understood has had its shortcomings. Nevertheless, missionaries and humanitarians have provided the white man's burden with all that in it is honourable. Whatever their failures, clearly to their credit as a class is the genuinely Christian and philanthropic concept of this burden.

It was, indeed, the conversion of souls to Christianity that, as the story goes, Pope Martin V saw in European expansion when, for the first time in 1442, he was presented with ten black people.⁶

And for that missionary explorer of undying memory, David Livingstone, the opening of South and Central Africa was "a matter for

6. British Africa, London, Kegan Paul, 1899, p. 195.

congratulation only in so far as it opens up a prospect for the elevation of its inhabitants".⁷ It was for him "the beginning of the missionary enterprise"⁸ understood as the inclusion of "every effort ---- for the amelioration of our race"⁹ - that is, the human race irrespective of its accidents of colour, race, or creed.

So understood, the burden meant at least the protecting of the fundamental rights of man and the promotion of the cause of social justice and Christian righteousness. Religion and philanthropy, of course, are distinct from politics. But neither, however, can keep altogether aloof from it, for neither can thrive where, in opposition to the professed teachings of Christianity and the requirements of human brotherhood, gross injustices favour sectional interests. Consequently, the humanitarian and Christian mission must express itself in a certain political form: the promotion of social justice through the spread of Christian righteousness and a determined opposition to discrimination in matters of fundamental importance.

(b) Self-Interest

While the cogent purposes for the acquisition of colonies, needless to recall, were primarily economic - chiefly for the settlement of surplus population, the investment of surplus capital, the creation of markets for

7. David Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1858, p. 718-719

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

manufactured products, and for the command of the sources of raw materials¹⁰— the new imperialism of the nineteenth century had, however, learnt hard lessons from former deeds of misrule, repetition of which it was expedient to avoid, This new imperialism saw the wisdom of ruling well, even if only to reap more benefits and profits. It was expedient to win the good will of subject races, in order to ensure their loyalty and the consolidation of empires; to civilize in order to create friends; to develop colonies, if not for their own sake, at least in order that they might yield more wealth for those who supplied capital and efficient enterprise.

In this sense, the welfare of subject races, though a by-product rather than a main product, became part of the white man's burden, so that a British writer at the turn of the nineteenth century could boldly say on the one hand:

We should establish efficient control over all the millions of inhabitants in so much of West Africa as we lay claim to, --- We should put an end to the base superstitions and cruel practices which are prevalent among them¹¹

and on the other hand:

We should induce them to supply us with the palm-oil, the rubber, and other commodities their country yields.¹²

10. Ploetz' Epitome of History (Trans. William H. Tillinghast), New York, Blue Ribbon Books, 1925, p. 624

11. British Africa, London, Kegan Paul, 1899, p. 207.

12. Ibid.

In other words, Britain could best use the resources of Africa and could more effectively and perhaps honorably do so, she realized, only if she had the good will and support of the subject races. Thus, bringing the blessings of civilization to Africa was to the imperialist not the primary purpose,¹³ but only an expedient or, at best, a by-product. The British, however, with their usual colonial versatility, turned things the other way round, so that Lord Lugard could formulate his dual mandate policy as -

First, to promote the moral and material welfare of the African, and secondly to develop the natural resources of Africa not only for its peoples but for all mankind.¹⁴

Thus what was in the first place a byproduct or an expedient in the general framework of imperialistic designs has come to assume a new form, expressing itself in the vigorous white man's burden: to change the face of Africa; to lose colonies, if only to retain their voluntary association as dominions or even as republics.

13. Rhodes, the avowed British imperialist of African fame, is reported to have said, "Land, not niggers" (vide, Basil Davidson, Report on Southern Africa, London; Jonathan Cape, 1952, p. 259)

Nor was he less convinced that, in his own words, "God's purpose was to make the Anglo-Saxon race predominant, and the best way to help God's work and fulfil His purpose was to contribute to the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon race and so to bring nearer the reign of justice, liberty and peace." And 1891 -, "Do you think any part (of Africa) was left in perpetuity for the pygmies? That these regions have to be peopled by pygmies while a superior race stands multiplying outside? I do not believe." (As quoted by Reginald Ivan Lovell, The Struggle For South Africa 1875-1899, A Study in Economic Imperialism, New York, Macmillan, 1934, p. 119 and 120 respectively).

Indeed, Rhodes's was a curious sort of "Pax Teutonica", in spite of his much publicized dictum of "Equal rights for all civilized men".

14. Introducing the Colonies, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1952, p. 35.

In British West Africa and British Central Africa, the burden there is now to develop the African as rapidly as possible, economically and politically, to forestall the infiltrations and inroads of dangerous foreign ideologies, to create a family of nations bound together by common interests and sentiments, and not by legal or political repressions and economic strangulations. Although interests and motives of the bearers of the burden still conflict, changing the face of Africa has become the avowed burden of the British in nearly all of their African dependencies.¹⁵

(c) Reaction to Abuse.

In yet another form, the white man's burden has presented itself in history as a reaction to the adulteration of Christian civilization and the mal-treatment of subject races.

British philanthropists like William Wilberforce (1759-1833), Thomas Fowell Buxton (1786-1845), Edward Stanley (Irish abolitionist, colonial secretary 1833) and leading statesmen like Lord Grey (1764-1845; at the helm of British Affairs during the so-called Era of Reform, 1830-1846), and missionaries like Dr. Philip at the Cape, and hosts of others, not only stood against slavery¹⁶ but championed the cause of the "dignity of human nature and promoted the humanitarianism so characteristic of the nineteenth century."¹⁷

15. cf. British Trusteeship, Chapter II of the present work.

16. Emancipation of Slaves in the British Empire 1834; subsequently, extension of franchise to white and black at the Cape, 1853.

17. C.H. Currey, British Colonial Policy, London, Oxford University Press, 1916, p. 123.

The white man's practices, exceptions granted, had in Africa been barbarons, indeed "quite inconsistent with the principles which Christian missionaries have been sent to teach the African native."¹⁸

Wittingly or unwittingly, he was viciating certain tenets of Christian civilization and, in the partitioning of Africa, was acting contrary to certain of his own professions in international conduct, as the British themselves acknowledged:

In the partition of Africa, native states have been treated as non-existent except as local bodies. They have been annexed to European states without reference to their will or consent. Treaties have indeed been made with them, but they have rather been regarded as evidence of prior occupation than as involving any question of native right.¹⁹

Reaction to such practices and abuses assumed proportions of a white man's mission. Thus in 1835 was formed a British and "Foreign Aborigines Protection Society," followed four years later by the "Society for the Extinction of the Slave Trade and the Civilization of Africa." The whole movement was a vehement protest against official apathy. Its angry indignation at civilized man's ways had already, a century earlier, found expression

18. Encyclopedia Britannica, (Public International Law), Vol. 12, London, 1943, p. 527c

19. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 12, 1943 ed., p. 427c. The view expressed above, though rather extreme, for there are cases, e.g. Nyasaland, Uganda, etc, where treaties were made with rights of Africans receiving priority, and where such states have not been annexed as colonies proper, is in general correct; for, even in such cases, advantage was taken of the ignorance and naivete of tribal chiefs.

in a passage in which Dean Swift, himself a philanthropist, compared colonialists and settlers to crews of pirates who butcher and plunder and rob harmless peoples:

The natives driven out or destroyed --- free
 licence given to all acts of inhumanity and lust ---
 this execrable crew of butchers --- sent to convert
 and civilize an idolatorous and barbarous people.²⁰

Here we have two diametrically opposed types of the white man's burden: the one destructive and nefarious, the other constructive and upholding the cause of Christian civilization; the former holding its agents to eternal condemnation in the eyes of civilization, the latter holding its agents to the eternal commendation of God and man.

In this connection, in a poem bearing the title of "The White Man's Burden", published in 1899, Rudyard Kipling pointed a sharp finger at the crux of the white man's burden, drawing attention to the disruptive consequences of misrule and injustice.²¹ For the subject races would weigh the

20. Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels, London & New York, George Routledge & Sons, p. 357-358.

21. Kipling: Take up the white man's burden -
 Send forth the best ye breed,
 Go behind your sons to exile,
 To serve your captives' need,
 To wait in heavy harness
 On fluttered folk and wild -
 Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
 Half devil and half child ---

(And the burden is to be)

No tawdry rule of kings
 But toil of serf and sweeper -

(Because)

By all ye cry or whisper,
 By all ye leave or do,
 The silent, sullen peoples
 Shall weigh your Gods and you.

(From "Rudyard Kipling's Verse - Definitive Edition", N.Y., Doubleday, 1945, p. 323)

white man's burden by what he cried or whispered, did or omitted. His "gods" and perhaps, unfortunately enough, Christianity itself, would be weighed, accepted or rejected according to what he did to those whom he held under victorious sway.

Well might the spirit of Christianity inspire him, well might tenets of his culture and civilization make him venture abroad, but it is what he does that will decide how his worth and how his burden is to be weighed and evaluated, accepted or rejected. For disparity between word and action, theory and practice, makes human affairs uneasy and uncertain, and tends to destroy that which civilization would fain preserve.

2. Vitiating Ideal

Powers with vested interests in Africa have not hesitated to resort to plausible rationalizations, indeed have not scrupled to exploit man's curious genius for fabricating reasons and elaborating half-truths.

Thus, for instance, to take a well-known example - outside the sphere of British Africa, but nevertheless pertinent to the general theme of specious justification of dubious acts - the chief, ostensible object for which the Congo Independent State was founded was, in terms of the Berlin Act, Art. VI, "to watch over the preservation of the native tribes and to care for the improvement of their moral and material well-being."²²

22. J.N. Larned, "The New Larned History", vol. II, Springfield, Mass., C.A. Nichols Publishing Co., p. 986.

Yet it is no historical secret that this object was not only neglected, "but was replaced by a deliberate policy of exploitation of the natives in the interests of commercial gain."²³

Leopold II of Belgium, with his "International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Africa", may have meant well.²⁴ But there can be no doubt as to the chief aims of the 1884-85 Berlin Conference of European Powers which virtually sanctioned the phenomenal partition of Africa and the subsequent scramble for its vast lands.

Economic imperialism operated, in its most subtle form, under the guise of civilizing.²⁵ While this type of rationalization is now practically dying with the shrinking of empires, there are, however, still extant specious rationalizations of a more local or particular application, which are accepted as part of the white man's burden by many. The following may be observed among others.

23. J.N. Larned, Op. cit., p. 986

24. However, in 1908, Leopold in his personal capacity as sovereign of the Congo State, transferred the Congo Free State to Belgium and with this act undid the independence of the said state, the independence which it had been his aim to build.

To-day, as recently expressed by the Belgian Minister of Colonies (M. Buisseret), "The union of Belgium and the Congo in one single community remains the principle objective of our policy." (vide The Belgian Congo Today, vol. III, No. 4, 1954, p. 128. Bruxelles, Centre D'Information et de Documentation ---).

25. cf. Erik Achorn, Op. cit., p. 205 & p. 640.

(a) The Colour Line and Racial Superiority -

In Southern Africa, to take a typical example, domination by a racial minority has often been justified on grounds of racial superiority. The anomalous situation is regarded not so much as a temporary measure or expedient, much less as an injustice, but as the right of the racially superior minority. Thus runs the justification and rationalization, to quote Mr. Sauer, himself an avowed racialist South African,

We are the superior race in South Africa. We have 2000 years of civilization behind us. We have the Western Civilization and the Western way of life. Does not that in itself constitute us the Herrenvolk where we have on the other hand to deal with a race which is only partly civilized in South Africa.²⁶

The quotation is eloquent enough; no comment can add to its manifest rationalization of the order in South Africa, where the white man's burden, other things considered, is to preserve western civilization by dominating the coloured peoples.²⁷

(b) Denial of Economic Opportunity -

The denial of economic opportunity to subject peoples is often rationalized, in South Africa at least, and to quote Keppel-Jones's summing-up of what he regards is the general attitude, as follows -

(-----)with their very low standard of living they would, if they competed freely with white workers, destroy the standards which these are still able to maintain.²⁸

26. As quoted by Arthur Keppel-Jones, "Friends Or Foes?", Pietermaritzburg (South Africa), Shuter and Shooter, 1950, p. 21.

27. Ibid., p. 26.

28. Ibid., p. 20.

Or, more convincingly but nonetheless speciously (and this not only in South Africa):

The natives are incompetent to operate the productive and distributive systems of their homelands --- they would not be able to develop the natural resources of their countries to full potentiality.²⁹

Obviously enough the chief motive of the words of the first quotation is to ensure and maintain cheap labour and to keep the subject peoples as economically crippled as possible - a necessary condition for the maintenance of power by the economically powerful minority. For the low standard of living is not inherent in the natives; it is, in the given circumstances, rather the result of practices and laws that make it virtually impossible for the native peoples to earn more, to compete, to sell their labour on the best markets and to raise their standard of living, all allowances being made for cultural and other differences.

As for the second quotation above, if the allegation were true, why pass laws that make it virtually impossible for natives to acquire skill and technical training?³⁰ There is no essential or inborn incapacity in the African to acquire knowledge and skill, and to develop his lands. If, in either case, it is necessary, as indeed it is, that the standard of living of the white man be maintained and preserved, and that lands be developed profitably, then conditions must be created equally to raise the

29. Raymond Kennedy, "The Colonial Crisis and the Future," in The Science of Man in the World Crises (Ed. Ralph Linton), New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, p. 315.

30. cf. Labour regulations & laws of the Union of South Africa and of Southern Rhodesia, briefly treated in chapters III & IV of the present work.

low standard of living of the subject races and to equip them with the necessary knowledge, skill and means. At least let the doors not be closed to them, and lands will be developed for the good of all - black and white. Only then will the burden in this connection be a truly civilizing one and not one that is one-sided and oppressive.³¹

However, it would be unfair to leave the impression that the sovereign Union of South Africa, or any British African territory, does nothing to promote the economic and social welfare of the African. There are development programmes throughout Africa, and the Union of South Africa, even if inspired by the pressing need for racial segregation, spends enormous sums of money on economic schemes that no doubt benefit the African. But our contention here is that life for the African is in general loaded down with repressive measures, which are revealed not only in disparaging remarks as quoted above but, what is more, in differences of pay for the same work done by a white man and a black man, in the low quality of housing provided for the African workers as compared to the lodgings of white workers, in the regulations regarding recognition of trade unions (as we shall see subsequently), etc - whose general effect is discriminatory and oppressive.

³¹. There is, of course, much selfless economic effort and development in Africa, as shall be seen subsequently. But with respect to earlier general and present local attitudes the criticism remains cogent and pertinent.

(c) Political Subjugation:

Here, to quote Kennedy³² once more, the rationalization could be expressed as follows: "they are unable to rule themselves properly," or, they "do not want to govern themselves and even like to be dominated," or more subtly, "a long period of tutelage will be necessary before the time is ripe for freedom."

Admittedly they may not be able to rule themselves properly according to Western standards, but that hardly constitutes valid argument for repressive measures and laws in order that they may not learn to do so. As for the long period of tutelage, true enough it took the West centuries of wars to equip itself with not-universally successful forms of government. The process cannot be an overnight affair with the conquered races, but it also need not take them centuries to handle tools that are already forged. At any rate, tutelage ceases to be that when it becomes a struggle for power between tutor and tutored. Tutelage is undoubtedly necessary and good, but only if it envisages independence of the tutored and if it actually works willingly and progressively towards that end.³³

In concluding this chapter, it may be re-iterated that the White man, in coming to Africa, was prompted by different motives, that he put

32. Raymond Kennedy, op. cit., p. 313.

33. In this connection it will be seen that the British, following their trusteeship policy, are in certain instances making good strides as in West Africa. But in places like South Africa only lip-service is paid to formal tutelage.

himself to work under different historical and local conditions, and that his burden was determined accordingly.³⁴

Arising from differences of race, colour and culture, and from hosts of other considerations ranging from the purely social and idiological to the economic and political, the problem of inter-racial relations in British Africa has gathered momentum, acquiring enormous proportions. The white, until the White man's hopes have become the black man's fears, and vice versa. The white man, having the upper hand and confronted with grim political and economic problems to shape his own destiny and that of the subject races in Africa, has resorted to various measures, divergent and clashing among themselves. To wit, several policies and experiments have been or are being devised and implemented, and all bear some connection with this or other form of the white man's burden.

With this background, different political policies aimed at regulating relations between the European and the African in British Africa may now be examined.

34. Objectively by concrete situations and circumstances, subjectively by his beliefs and intentions.

CHAPTER II

TRUSTEESHIP-AFRICANIZATION

The involved concept of the white man's burden finds a counterpart in a somewhat similarly involved set of political policies in British Africa.¹ Conceived as a challenge and a calling to the European to civilize the backward peoples and to develop their lands for the good of all, the white man's burden expresses itself in the doctrine of trusteeship. Conceived as a challenge to the European in Africa to preserve his racial purity and superiority by whatever means, the burden expresses itself in the combined doctrine of segregation and domination.

From the former, trusteeship, have arisen two distinct policies. The first of these is the so-called British Trusteeship Policy, whose goal is the "Africanization" of those British dependencies where there is no permanent white settlement, and which must eventually become black dominions.² The second, Partnership, is a modified form of trusteeship whose goal is eventual political and economic equality for all races in those British Territories where there is permanent white settlement.

From the doctrine of domination, on the other hand, stems the policy of Segregation, now popularly known as "Apartheid" in the Union of South Africa.

1. British Africa is taken here in a broad and loose sense, and includes the Union of South Africa which is a sovereign State and does not belong to it, but whose racial policies greatly affect the pattern of race relations both within and outside the borders of British Africa proper.

2. In general, it is the same policy which has led, other factors considered, to the independence of India (1947), Pakistan (1947), Burma (1948), Ceylon (1948), and now the Gold Coast (1953).

These three, closely connected with the equivocal concept of the white man's burden, are the major policies in British Africa.³ They overlap in several respects, for they have certain elements in common, but differ essentially and distinctly one from another as subsequent chapters will make clear.

In the present chapter the Africanizing policy of Trusteeship,⁴ as distinct from that of Partnership, is described and examined with regard to its theory and practical application. Accordingly, it is treated under the following two headings: Theory, and Practical Steps Taken.

1. Theory

Within the general framework of the policy of trusteeship the role of the European is regarded as that of a protector or trustee, throughout the stage of transition by the backward peoples from a state of primitive institutions to that of modern democratic institutions, from a state of subjugation to that of self-determination and self-government.

The general theory is, as Lord Grey put it in the heyday of
⁵
nineteenth century philanthropy --

3. A fourth "policy," Assimilation, which does not obtain in British Africa but which obtains at least theoretically in French Africa, is briefly described in Appendix B.

4. British Trusteeship is distinct from the former Mandate System and from the International Trusteeship System, although, as in the case of Togoland, the Cameroons and Tanganyika, British Trusteeship and United Nations Trusteeship operate jointly. (Cf Chapter VI of the present work, under "International.")

5. As quoted by C.H. Currey, British Colonial Policy, London, Oxford University Press, 1916, p. 131.

(-----) to train the inhabitants of this part of Africa in the arts of civilization and government, until they shall grow into a nation capable of protecting themselves and of managing their own affairs so that the interference and assistance of the British authorities may by degrees be less and less required.

It is a long-term policy of tutelage, carefully punctuated in time, as appears from the quotation, which entrusts the fortunes of the subject peoples to a paternalistic determination of those in power. The British are the trustees; the subject peoples the wards, the relation between the two resembling, by analogy, that between father and son throughout the period of minority of the latter.

Expressed more concretely, the policy has a twofold aspect. As an enlightened imperialist of the nineteenth century formulated it, it is a "dual mandate," aiming on the one hand at developing the "abounding wealth of the tropical regions of the earth-----for the benefit of mankind" and, on the other, obligating the controlling power "not only to Safeguard the material rights of the natives, but to promote their moral and educational progress".⁶

The twofold aspect of this policy, as pursued in several British dependencies, is thus the economic development of those dependencies, and the socio-political advancement of their inhabitants. It is an all-pervading policy, finding ramifications in nearly all spheres whose

6. Lord Lugard, as quoted in: "Introducing West Africa", H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1952, p. 45.

integration is prerequisite to nationhood and statehood. The native inhabitants gradually assume the different functions of the state, in this way replacing British Officials; hence, in Africa, the use of the term Africanization to designate the process to independence and self-rule.

In working towards the creation of independent autonomous states, the policy envisages the expansion and consolidation of the British Commonwealth of Nations, as a free association of equal states. The colonial history of England, at one time marred with economic exploitation, slave trade and repressive legislation, had brought the British to a full awareness of the disruptive nature of any policy or practices that aimed at keeping colonies solely for the benefit of the Mother-country. The breaking away of the thirteen American colonies in the eighteenth century was not only a blow to the British Empire but a lesson that colonies ripen and break away. Thus, following on this lesson and on the Durham Report (1839) which recommended responsible government for Canada, a new turn was taken in colonial history, which subsequently led to a totally new pattern of relations between Britain and her dependencies. The idea of an Empire was discarded. A new conception, of equal partners in a Commonwealth of Nations, was evolved. At the same time the basic policy with regard to non-self-governing countries became generally that of developing them from a colonial status to a dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations as defined

at the 1926 Imperial Conference⁷, and as given legal effect by the Statute of Westminster (1931).⁸

While the foregoing dealt specifically with self-governing Countries like Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, and did not directly affect non-self-governing countries under British rule, since then, however the general aim and in many ways the official policy is now to bring the latter to the status of dominions and to keep them within the commonwealth. Thus to-day -

Britain's Policy towards its dependencies is to help them to obtain self-government within the British Commonwealth and to pursue their economic and social development so that it keeps pace with their political advance.⁹

Behind this policy, needless to say, potent factors such as the realization that no people can be kept permanently under subjugation, that civilization is dynamic and not static and that, at any rate, as the well-being of the world at large necessarily depends on the well-being of every nation in it, so too the consolidation of the Commonwealth rests on the contented development of all its members.

7. The position of Britain and the dominions was defined as: "Autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations" (vide, "What is the Commonwealth?" Central Office of Information, London, 1954, p. 7).

8. In terms of this Statute, Commonwealth members make their own laws, decide their own policies (internal and external) and maintain their own diplomatic relations, etc. They are sovereign states within the Commonwealth.

9. "Britain's Colonial Policy and Record," Central Office of Information, London, 1953, p. 3.

In general, then, the policy of British Trusteeship may be said to aim at developing the economies of the different dependencies, at educating the native inhabitants to take charge of their own affairs, and at leading them to independence and self-government within the Commonwealth. It is a long-term policy, deliberate and calculated, for which reason, as we shall see elsewhere in the present work, it is by no means a smooth process - for the trustee tends to mark the time and, where possible, even to maintain the "status quo", while the ward's aspirations are oftener than not the exact opposite.

We may now proceed to examine certain practical steps being taken and which it is hoped will serve as examples of the concrete expression of the policy.

2. Practical steps under Trusteeship

British Trusteeship, in its genuine aspects, is essentially an interim policy of calculated but constructive tutelage, of modernizing old institutions and Africanizing the legislative, administrative and judicial personnel, as well as making the territories economically productive and stable. To this end a triple programme of political education, constitutional evolution (through various stages in the handing over of power to the native inhabitants), and socio-economic development is being followed.

a) Political Education: To develop a broader sense of political and administrative responsibility on a local level among Africans, and thus to provide them with practice in the exigencies of modern self-government, the British, throughout colonial Africa, have usually followed a system of local government under Chiefs or district councils. The system consists, in general

in investing the chiefs or the local councils with certain legislative, administrative and judicial functions of a local nature. In this way practical training, preparatory to participation in the central government, is provided.

Different cultural and social conditions make it impossible for local government, as for central-government, to be uniform throughout colonial Africa. However, the general principle followed by the British in granting local government is that while the British recognize Native Authority (Chiefs and District Councils) and give such authority aid to control local finances, to run local courts, and to control local developments in educational, health and agricultural matters, Native Authority in turn recognizes the overall authority of the British and accepts as advisers Resident or District Officers (European or African), who are directly responsible to the central government and through whom the central government exercises control and supervision.¹⁰

Local Government through chiefs (Indirect Rule,) or through elected Councils, where it has operated on progressive lines, has resulted in increased inculcation of modern civic sense, political responsibility and maturity, in favour of central self-government. In this respect the British may be said to have followed, in general, a constructive and foresighted policy, although, in certain cases, especially in countries where there is permanent white settlement, Indirect Rule tends to become a perpetuation

10. Introducing West Africa, H. M. Stationery Office, 1952, p. 35
For a general description of Indirect Rule and local Government and the council System, vide, Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British Territories, Vol. IV, H. M. Stationery, London, 1951, 61p.

of certain antiquated tribal institutions, prejudicial to participation by Africans in the national legislative bodies.¹¹

b) Constitutional Evolution: No two British dependencies in Africa are governed in exactly the same way, because none have exactly the same problems, and none are exactly on the same stage of development. Thus, for instance, the West African territories, which were once considered the "white man's grave" and which, partly, for that reason, enjoy a more progressive political climate, contrast sharply with the protectorates of Swaziland and Bechuanaland, which are within the ambit of South African race politics. Those territories that are richer in natural resources, like the Gold Coast or Northern Rhodesia, contrast with those that are relatively poor, like Nyasaland and Bechuanaland. Besides, territorial or local conditions differ according to the presence or absence of permanent white settlement, so that where there is such settlement not only is there

11. This, to a great extent, is part of the struggle in Kenya (vide Lord Hailey, op. cit., p. 13ff) and in Southern Rhodesia (vide "Central African Territories - Comparative Survey of Native Policy", London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1951, p. 17-18).

Also closely connected with Indirect Rule in general, it may be observed in passing, is the existence of a dual system of law and courts, namely ordinary (British) law and courts and Native Law and courts, in all of British Africa. While this juridical dualism serves a useful and practical purpose in a multi-cultural society, it does, however, pose certain problems in the interpretation of law and the administration of justice where parties to disputes belong to different "juridical categories", as in cases involving a tribesman and a Westernized African, or a European and an African, etc.

Of the "purely" black dependencies, to-day the Gold Coast is on the highest rung (along with the former Anglo-Egyptian Condominion of the Sudan). Having gone through most of the stages, the Gold Coast became in 1951 the first country in British Africa, where Africans went to the polls and elected a parliament with an African majority.¹³ Following on that, Dr. Nkrumah, as Prime Minister, piloted the young state past another constitutional stage towards self-government, which won it this year complete internal self-government in African hands.¹⁴

Following suit is Nigeria, which is due to have a new constitution shortly, leading eventually to a sovereign Federation of Nigeria.¹⁵

In Uganda and Tanganyika the trend is much the same,¹⁶ as it also is in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, though here emphasis is now on partnership rather than on Africanization.¹⁷ The same could be said of

13. "Introducing West Africa," p. 41-43.

14. The constitutional history of the Gold Coast has not been, of course, all smooth and planned. It has been characterized by slave-raiding, misrule by foreign commercial powers, exploitation by colonial and imperial powers, wars between the British and the Ashanti, as well as, on the other hand, by determined efforts of Africans themselves and certain European elements in the cause of enlightened rule and justice. Other factors, too, like climatic and health conditions (which once won West Africa the name of the "White Man's Grave") contributed to a more "liberal" British attitude.

15. "The Colonial Territories 1953-54", London, H.M. Stationery Office, p. 7-11.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 17-18.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 21-23: & "Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy," p. 5-6.

Gambia and Sierra Leone in the West, and even of plighted Kenya in the East, where efforts are being made to establish some form of inter-racial partnership.¹⁸ On the other hand, protectorates like Bechuanaland and Basutoland, which administratively fall under the local jurisdiction of Resident Commissioners, rank low and exhibit a system of Indirect Rule under Chieftainships which is more pronounced than in those territories where there is a greater tendency towards a central parliamentary system of government.

It is not easy, however, to grade with precision the different territories with respect to their political and administrative status. For there is constant constitutional mobility, and institutions rise and fall as needs dictate. And while we may distinguish between colonies proper, which have been annexed to the British Crown, and protectorates proper, which have not been annexed, it is quite another thing to categorize their exact forms of government. British Colonial administration is not so much doctrinaire as practical. Hence that the British can tread, at one and the same time, the paths to Africanization in West Africa, to so-called Partnership in East and Central Africa, and to Conservation of tribal political

18. The proposed new constitution for Kenya would provide for a Council of Ministers of fifteen members of whom one would be an African and two Asians: and three Parliamentary Secretaries of whom one would be an Arab and two Africans. (vide "The Colonial Territories 1953-54," p. 15-16).

Of course, the provisions would hardly meet the just demands of the African and Asian Kenyans. The objective of a multi-racial society is vitiated by the white-domination attitude of settlers. (vide "Report --- by the Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya, January 1954," H. M. Stationery Office, p. 13-14).

order in the South.

In general, however, constitutional niceties apart and clashes of interests notwithstanding, the aim of the British at home is to lead colonial territories, in one way or another, to a point where they can govern themselves, and in this way build up the Commonwealth.

c) Socio-Economic Development: An aspect of vital importance in the march of colonies to self-government is socio-economic development and integration. For ballot papers become meaningless where there is poverty, disease, starvation and ignorance. Indeed, as the British realize, "Political freedom is meaningless without economic stability."¹⁹ For that reason, "progress towards self-government must go hand in hand with economic progress and educational opportunity."²⁰

The general effect can be but ruinous, should the impact of the West on Africa result in little more than the disruption of traditional and tribal institutions without giving the people something constructive, not only in the art of modern government but also in the several other fields of life. Wherefore the colonies must be developed economically and socially so that the dominions they will be tomorrow might stand on firm foundations.

For this reason, and doubtless for fear of Communist exploitation of socio-economic discontent, colonial development has been quite phenomenal since 1940. Of course there had been developments before that, but the

19. "Towards Self-Government in British Africa," p. 5

20. Ibid.

inauguration of the Colonial Development Fund and the Colonial Development Corporation, marked a new era in colonial history, despite previous deeds of havoc and exploitation which had everywhere attended colonialism.

By the Colonial Development Act of 1940, which created the Colonial Development Fund, the British Parliament voted twelve million pounds sterling for colonial development. Another one hundred and forty was voted for the same purpose by the subsequent Acts of 1945 and 1950 together.²¹ These funds are being used for various developmental and research projects;²² for housing and town planning, for higher education in the colonies, and for various other projects.²³

To supplement the Colonial Development Fund, a Colonial Development Corporation, with power to borrow money from the British Treasury and to finance worthwhile projects in the colonies, was set up in 1948 and has since then financed several schemes.²⁴

In general, the effect of these Colonial Development and Welfare Acts is felt in marked educational, health and technological progress, in

21. "Introducing West Africa," p. 45 & "From Darkness to Light," New York, British Information Services, 1949, p. 5-6.

22. Such as Medical Research Institutions in Nigeria and Uganda, Sociological Research in Sierra Leone, etc. (Vide "The British Colonial Empire in 1946," Ottawa, U.K. Information Office, p. 13-15).

23. Ibid.

24. For concrete examples of schemes and projects, etc., vide "The Colonial Territories 1953-54," p. 34-65, & "From Darkness to Light," p. 6-21.

road and railway construction; river-water harnessing (for irrigation purposes and for hydro-electric power), and in several other schemes.

From these few examples, an idea may be had of the practical and constructive approach to the problem of socio-economic development in the backward areas which include not only British Africa but the British West Indies and other British dependencies.

It is not possible to do full justice to the policy of British Trusteeship within the scope of the present work, nor should the impression be created that we are oblivious of the dark past and of the troubled present in the march of colonialism. On the contrary, we are keenly aware of the ravages of the past, but the past is what it is. As for the present, we shall have occasion to return to certain pertinent points touching on British Trusteeship, which are not deserving of commendation. Our purpose in the present chapter has been not to criticize but to set in relief the theory and practice of trusteeship which contrast with the theory and practice of the policy of Apartheid which we must now examine.

CHAPTER III

PERMANENT WHITE DOMINATION

Opposed to the Africanizing policy of trusteeship is the characteristically racist policy of permanent white domination, according to which the challenge to the European in Africa consists in a relentless struggle to perpetuate his supremacy over the backward and subject peoples. The problem is essentially one of "survival" and power. Since the issues involved are many and confusing, it is not very surprising to find that the ruling power easily turns might into right, quite readily giving it trappings of legal sanction and force. Civic sense in such circumstances loses its meaning, while race phobias and antagonisms take its place. In general, the science and art of societal relations and government for the common good becomes but a sectional and vitiated handmaid of racism.

As is common knowledge, the policy of permanent white domination is nothing chimerical. It is, to all intents and purposes, the official policy in that cumbersome member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, South Africa. Apartheid,¹ as it is called there, is clearly a doctrine and a policy of segregation and herrenvolk predilection. It is the typical and retrograde example of domination in an otherwise progressively emerging Continent, upon which will probably depend racial harmony in the rest of Africa, and perhaps in the world at large.

We shall discuss it in the present chapter with respect to its theory and certain practical steps already taken in its implementation.

1. Afrikaans word meaning "apartness" or "separateness", or segregation, hence "racial segregation".

1. Theory:

Apartheid, as a political doctrine and policy, is characterized by two constitutive elements; namely, segregation and domination, with ostensible emphasis on the former and calculated stress on the latter.

The first element, segregation, as the name signifies, has as aim to keep apart the different racial groups (European, Asiatic, Coloured and African) and to effect a system of "parallel" development. For this reason, the policy has often been referred to as "parallelism." In general, the idea is to segregate the racial groups one from another, particularly the European from the African, while retaining them together in one autonomous state. In this way it is hoped and designed to keep differently-coloured and culturally-different people apart "geographically, socially, economically and politically."²

The second element, which is politically the more important of the two, is white supremacy in the artificially-divided multi-racial state. This supremacy, it appears, is regarded not as a temporary or expedient measure during the maturation period of the backward sections of the South African body politic, but as a permanent state of affairs in which the teeming millions of coloured races must indefinitely minister to the needs of those in effective power and control of the state.³

2. Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII, London p. 693

3. Speaking on Jan. 22 1948, in the South African House of Assembly, Mr. Paul Sauer, a member of the Nationalist Party, said: "We are going to remain the Herrenvolk in South Africa as long as we can---and as long as we deserve to remain" (vide, Arthur Keppel-Jones, op. cit. p. 25).

Cf. also the attitude and policy of the old Boer Republics; that of "no equality between coloured people and the white people in either church or state." (vide, G.H. Calpin, editor, The South African Way of Life, New York, Columbia University Press, 1953, p. 111-112).

Combined, the two elements or aspects, segregation and supremacy, yield a sort of horizontal parallelism; a curious system in which there is seeming parallel development but actual control, and even subjugation, of the majority by the self-styled herrenvolk. The parallelism is horizontal because the white line rests above, preventing any upward turn of, the rest of the lines. It is, in other words, an artificial parallel development, directed and controlled from above - what a Nationalist member of Parliament, Dr. N. Diedrichs, pictured as a process of constant staving-off of the natives.⁴

Such is the general theory of permanent white domination - in particular, of Apartheid.⁵ How it is to be effected, or how it is actually being put into practice, we shall see presently. But first it might be as well to examine briefly a few of the more important factors behind the general policy.

It may be asked why it is in South Africa that this policy has received such popular and legal support and to so great an extent? A categorical answer to that question, were it possible, would in all probability only cloud the many issues at stake. The South African problem is complicated. However, a general examination of certain factors probably provides a more satisfactory answer.

4. Basil Davidson, Report on Southern Africa, London, Jonathan Cape, 1952, p. 27.

5. Apartheid, interpreted as a measure whose final aim is the creation of separate states (whether autonomons or federated) on a strict racial basis, is both absurd and unrealistic amidst the realities of African aspirations and the general trend of world developments towards the free intercourse of races. At best it can only mean the creation of "imperia in Imperio"---and this problems taken up elsewhere in the present work.

The first and obvious factor lies in the social and cultural differences between, to take the two extremes, the European and the African. It is needless to enumerate the well-known differences in customs, beliefs, social manners and habits, standards of living, stages of civilization, etc. But it must be pointed out that these differences easily become divided, often incorrectly, into two categories: primitive and civilized. From this division it is only a step to identifying social and cultural differences with colour differences, and to segregating one people from another ostensibly on grounds of cultural difference but actually for spurious reasons. For even where the "primitive" have become "civilized" but cannot change their colour, the same arbitrary divisions oftener than not remain. Indeed, on the score of cultural differences, the segregationist, as in South Africa, bases his machinations all in the name of the preservation of culture.

Admittedly, culture must be preserved, but must it be preserved at the cost of human dignity and mutilation of Christian justice, let alone charity? One is afraid, the answer must be in the negative, or else Western Civilization has no meaning.

A second factor stems from fear. The permanently settled white population of South Africa has real and objective fears, let alone unreal ones. For one thing they are in minority⁶, hence the fear of being over-swamped. With this is tied up the explosive problem of social assimilation and miscegenation, which only strict segregation and legal prohibitions can prevent. There is fear of economic competition, fear of losing political

6. Out of a total population of over twelve million there are under three million white people in South Africa. (vide, G.H. Galpin, op. cit., p. 159.)

power, fear of being possibly driven away from South Africa, It is fear everywhere in South Africa. Indeed, it is here that the African's hopes are the European's fears, and vice versa.⁷ The problem is real, and the fears are understandable, but Apartheid can hardly be the solution. It only builds greater tensions and greater fears and hostilities. Legal barriers and artificial divisions are sorry bulwarks against the natural forces of man's mind and heart.

A third factor is an ideological fallacy and a brazen presumption, a pseudo-religious conviction among certain and many South Africans, that they are a chosen people, a pure race chosen by God to rule Southern Africa. Cut away from Europe by three hundred years, and holding with blind tenacity to crude Calvinistic beliefs, particularly that of predestination, the Boer of the herrenvolk mentality sees "nothing in the Bible", to borrow a keen observer's words, "telling him that the Black man should evolve and aspire to a greater share in civil right and economic opportunity."⁸

As the same writer observed further, and this explains the Boer mentality in history and space:

7. On this subject of fear in South Africa, vide Arthur Keppel-Jones, op. cit., p. 39-47., and Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 25-29.

8. Most Rev. Denis E. Hurley, o.m.i., (now Archbishop of Durban, South Africa), "The Race Problem in South Africa," in Worldmission, vol. 2, no. 1, Feb. 1951, Washington D.C., p. 52.

Their religion, Calvinism, made them great readers of the Bible---The theme of the Old Testament, the providential mission of a chosen race, entered into the very fiber of their being---Through the haze and dust of the wagon tracks, across the rolling space of the South African veld, they saw themselves as another chosen race, destined by God to wander in the wilderness and conquer a promised land from its Chanaanite inhabitants; and these Chanaanites were the black races who had got there before them; the Zulus, the Xosas and the Basutos.⁹

This, if true, as indeed it is, explain's a lot. In its light one begins to understand the uncompromising policy of the Old Boer Republics (the Free State and the Transvaal), which had it that it was the people's desire "to permit no equality between Coloured people and the white inhabitants, either in Church or State."¹⁰ It is also in that light that we can understand the declaration of a Nationalist Party commission of 1948, that Apartheid is "based on the Christian principles of justice and reasonableness",¹¹ or this recent ministerial statement -----

To introduce natives into the Senate would imply the granting of a certain measure of social equality, and this could be the thin end of the wedge of something that was wholly unacceptable to South Africa.¹²

9. Ibid., p. 51. - Cf. also, Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 40, "Being of God's elect he would toil not neither would he spin: but the sons of Ham should work for him and he should direct their labour."

10. As quoted from the "Transvaal Grodwet" by Arthur Keppel-Jones, op. cit., p. 94.

11. As quoted by G.H. Galpin, op. cit., p. 144.

12. Mr. Verwoerd (present South African Minister of Native Affairs), as quoted in an article on South Africa: "How the mind of the Government Works," in The African and Colonial World, vol. 2., no. 5, May 1954, London, p. 17.

The quotations speak for themselves and lay bare a most fundamental issue as to the true nature of Christianity and human dignity. At any event, they throw Apartheid into relief.

Other factors could be adduced, such as the sore and bitter memories of the Xosa Wars, and the many blemishes on the part of the subject people themselves. But, for the present purpose, the few examples already given will have sufficiently unmasked the general setting of the doctrine and policy of racial segregation and white supremacy.

2. Practical Steps:

It is a matter of common knowledge that there exist laws in South Africa which seek to implement segregation and to entrench the interests of the ruling few. It is therefore, not intended here to go into the matter of South Africa's legislative, executive and judicial system and machinery, which it would be impossible to do within the scope of the present work. Rather, a few typical and most important legal and practical examples will be given as illustrating Apartheid in the concrete.

a) Political

Constitutionally, natives are not regarded as Citizens. The South Africa Act (1909) leaves natives outside "the pale of the constitution",¹³ a fact reminiscent of the policies of the old Boer Republics which reckoned citizenship and civil rights in terms of race and colour.¹⁴ True enough,

13. G.H. Galpin, op. cit., p. 128. ("the pale of the constitution" a phrase of Gladstone, the English statesman); Cf also Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, vol. 1, New York, Macmillan, 1928, p. 7.

14. Cf. No equality in Church or state (Transvaal Grondwet), already quoted.

the Act provided that persons who already had the vote or might qualify for the vote in the Cape colony may not be disqualified by Parliament on reasons of colour or race, except by an act passed by a two-thirds majority of both Houses sitting jointly.¹⁵ But even this has recently been the subject of heated controversy, leading to the passing of the unconstitutional - in terms of the above provision - Separate Representation Voters Act, 1951; and to the setting up of a curious High Court of Parliament designed to circumvent the effect and interpretation of the "Entrenched Clauses."¹⁶

The general constitutional position is the exclusion of people of coloured races from true citizenship, or at least their being placed on a different footing, as is the design and effect of the Separate Representation Voters Act of 1951, the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946, and the Native Representation Act of 1936.¹⁷

Thus, for example, in terms of the last Act (1936), natives are accorded only indirect representation, so that they are represented in the Union House of Assembly by three indirectly elected Europeans (in a House of 159 members), and vote for but four European members to the Senate which has a total membership of fifty.¹⁸

15. Cf. the so-called "Entrenched Clauses", Section 35, as well as section 152 of the South Africa Act (1909).

16. A brief summary of this constitutional controversy appears in "Commonwealth Constitutions" (A reference document published by Central Office of Information, London, 1953) p. 17-18.

17. The 1936 Native Representation Act also provided for the puppet and now defunct Native Representation Council, (vide G.H. Calpin, op.cit., p.129)

18. For brief summaries of the present set-up, see "Commonwealth Constitutions", (A reference document, published by Central Office of Information. London. 1953), p. 16-18; and G.H. Calpin, op. cit., p. 116-117.

From these facts, and considering that five out of every six people in South Africa are Non-European (i.e. African, Asiatic and "Coloured"),¹⁹ It is fair to conclude that only a minority falls within the pale of the Constitution of South Africa, and that legislative power and supremacy is vested in that minority.²⁰

b) Economic

If we now turn to industrial and mining occupations, there too, racial discrimination or industrial colour-bar exists (Mines & Works Act of 1911). Further, it is virtually the official policy to discriminate racially, with respect to Natives, in nearly every type of occupation or employment, (Colour Bar Act of 1925-26). Finally, in the case of Africans, Collective bargaining is virtually non-existent in the determination of labour conditions and wages, since Native trade unions cannot be registered and any manner of strikes by Natives is illegal (Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924).²¹

19. According to the census of 1951, South Africa has a white population of 2,643,187 against a total of 10,003,188 Non-Europeans (Source: G.H. Galpin, op. cit., p. 159).

20. With regard to tribes, and even to individual Africans, the Governor-General has overwhelming powers to "legislate by proclamation even to the extent of repealing Act of Parliament". (Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII, p. 693). Cf. also the Native Administration Act of 1927.

21. For comments on these Acts, see Raymond Leslie Buell, op. cit., p. 7; Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII, p. 802; G.H. Galpin, op. cit., p. 187. (While in S. Africa, the present writer had access to the actual texts of most of the Acts quoted in this chapter, but has had to go by secondary sources in the actual preparation of the present work for lack of primary sources).

It is apparent that the idea of all these Acts is to safeguard European interests, to avoid competition, and to ensure cheap labour. Admittedly, labour - organization tools and weapons, like trade unions and strikes, are dangerous means if handled by ignorant and irresponsible hands, and the State must provide against such danger. But when the State resorts to such measures and provisions, not for the common good, but for sectional interests and as means to keep the minority supreme and the masses doomed to cheap and unprofitable labour, as is the case in South Africa, so soon such a state ceases to be democratic in the salutary sense of the word; it can hardly be said to be far from a dictatorship of the minority.

c) Territorial and Residential:

The Native Land Act of 1913 (and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936) effected territorial segregation. South Africa was divided into territories exclusively for white settlement and others exclusively for black settlement.²² Then, to complete the picture and to establish residential segregation, there followed the Urban Areas Act of 1925 and 1945, and the Group Areas Act of 1951. For, in spite of territorial segregation, the economic and labour conditions of South Africa inevitably bring the different

22. In terms of the 1913 Land Act, about 87% of the total land area is ear-marked for white settlement and use, the remainder (largely in the form of Native Reserves) for African settlement. Needless to say, the Reserves are poor and over-populated (despite certain government efforts to improve their productivity), and constitute virtual cheap-labour reservoirs. - By sheer necessity the native inhabitants are forced to leave for work on the mines or the farms, where they cannot settle permanently or acquire stabilized labour - these being white areas -; or else flock to the towns where they may settle but without rights, because towns fall within the territorial jurisdiction of white South Africa.

racial groups together, particularly in towns; hence the need to control the conditions of entry of Africans into, and settlement in, such areas (Urban Areas Act), and the need to legalize and render obligatory the strict zoning of urban areas on racial grounds (Group Areas Act). Segregation everywhere and at all levels, is the idea.

Other statutory examples, such as pertain to the fields of education and justice, or as pertain to the use of public places, etc; could be cited. But the above facts and evidence should suffice to substantiate the objectives of Apartheid and to contradistinguish them from those of trusteeship proper.

Whether this segregation and domination can be maintained permanently, or whether man can continue to be segregated indefinitely and artificially from man by man, is the urgent question which segregationists and racists must be at crucial pains to answer. For one thing, however, with the accession to premiership of the avowed segregationist and republicanist, Johannes Strydom, and with the "Malanite" Nationalist Party seemingly securely in power, a plightful era of the full implementation of Apartheid and of consequent clashes with policies and movements elsewhere in Africa and abroad, may well be apace. For another, man's heart can still find itself. At any rate, humanity cannot but triumph.

CHAPTER IV
PARTNERSHIP

Between the policy of Africanization or trusteeship on the one hand and that of domination on the other, lies a new and third policy, the so-called policy of Partnership, uneasily poised between the dangers of Apartheid and the aspirations of African nationalism.

In South Africa the European means to be there to stay -- to maintain his supremacy. In West Africa and other parts of Africa, he is not there to stay, but to civilize and ultimately to hand over power to the African. But in British Central Africa, more precisely in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the one or the other extreme must be avoided. A society wherein both white and black shall share political and economic rights as partners, it is alleged, is the goal.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland provides an interesting experiment of this socio-political hybrid of partnership.

1. Theory of Partnership

Underlying the policy of partnership, it appears, is a recognition that man is man irrespective of race, colour or creed. In so far as man is man, fundamental natural rights are his birthright, and for the same reason, he has a claim to the heritage of the human race. But with regard to secondary rights -- specifically, with regard to civil rights -- man does not lay claim to them simply by the mere fact of being man. He must possess requisite knowledge and maturity and other qualifications, in order that he may acquire those certain rights such as the right to vote; hence the principle of equality for all equally civilized people, which those who uphold the policy of partnership claim to be their criterion in race relations and in determining the political rights of the citizens of a multi-racial society.

Those equal rights, in a society where there is that equal civilization, are understood to be political and economic, not social. Hence partnership, and not assimilation.

Actually, however, the theory of partnership is rooted in practical considerations rather than in the vague generalization and criterion of equal civilization. The real issue is, as an advocate of partnership has put it, that

Two diametrically opposed policies have already been tried in Africa. One is based upon oppression of the native and the other seeks to turn an erstwhile cannibal into a world administrator virtually overnight in a frantic desire to get rid of a problem which seems to have no immediate solution. There is no need for us to copy these examples.¹

It appears from the quotation that the practical considerations implied are the consequences of the opposed policies of Apartheid and Africanization -- the former policy being definitely oppressive and the latter being a dreaded novelty.

Since the white man cannot reasonably hope to dominate forever, (which, if he could, would turn the African against him), a new pattern of relations must be established if only to avoid the consequences of extremism. Partnership, it is claimed, provides the answer.

But, if the African did not pose as a threat to the security of the European in Africa, or if he could be ousted somehow, it appears that there would be very little talk of equality or partnership. But the African is

1. F. G. Harper, "Whither the African?", in the weekly The New Rhodesia of May 16, 1952; Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.

there to stay and to demand his share. Wherefore F.G. Harper's logic --

He cannot be ousted from the territories where he has been established for so long; we have got to help him, and he us, to raise our country to the very vanguard --- Between us we shall succeed.²

Further, as understood by its protagonists, the policy of partnership, it appears, is one of unequal "partnership", now and for a long time to come. The senior partner is the white man, the junior the black man; the former by virtue of his Western Civilization and superiority in professional knowledge and technical skill; the latter by virtue of his present stage of tutelage. Full partnership, if ever it does come, is a matter of the future.

In 1950, Sir Godfrey Huggins, then Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, said of partnership:-

We are anxious to build up this country on the basis of a partnership between the various races, not to use colour as a test of a man's ability and culture. We can only develop and hold this country as partners. In the present stage of development it is difficult for some people to realise this, and because of the stage of development of the backward people it is not easy for outside observers to realise that we believe in such a policy and are attempting to carry it out.³

From this quotation and the preceding one, it can be seen that the policy of partnership contains elements of trusteeship, in envisaging a period of all-round tutelage for the African under European guidance and

2. F.G. Harper, Op. cit., May 23, 1952, p. 7.

3. As quoted in Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy, p. 6.

in seeing only a gradual opening of the doors to the African. . It also contains elements of white supremacy, namely, the seniority of the white man in the transition period and the necessity to ensure that seniority by law, as we shall see subsequently. The goal is not white domination or black domination, but, it is hoped, partnership.

That is the theory. But there are many problems attaching to it. In practice, the picture is complicated, and there are the usual dark shades of the perennial struggle between master and servant, the ruler and the ruled.

Indeed, as to date, the policy of partnership is specious and uncertain, and has many vulnerable points. Above all, it is torn between the polarized forces of "baasskap"⁴ in South Africa and the rising tides of African nationalism throughout Africa.

2. Practical Steps

An example of partnership in the experimental stage is that provided by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Ostensibly on the principle of partnership, and to forestall the white tide of the South and the rising black tide everywhere, as well as, of course, for economic advantages and other related factors, the New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (also

4. Meaning, in South Africa, "Self-preservation and white supremacy". See Arthur Keppel-Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 16-18 & 171.

often called the British Central African Federation) came into being in July 1953.⁵ Taking it as an example, and leaving aside the usual federal paraphernalia, we may proceed to examine the salient points with respect to the policy of partnership.

a) Federal Government: On the federal level the policy of partnership finds expression in the inter-racial composition of the Federal Parliament and in that of the "African Affairs Board." Thirty-five members constitute the Federal Assembly of whom twenty-nine are Europeans and six Africans.⁶ On the other hand, the "African Affairs Board", which is a special standing committee of the Federal Parliament, charged with safeguarding the interests of the Africans and with the function of advising the federal legislature on matters of specific interest to the Africans, is composed of three Europeans and three Africans.⁷

5. Royal assent was given to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council on July 14, 1953; the first federal elections were held on Dec. 15, 1953; the first Federal Parliament met at Salisbury, S. Rhodesia, on February 2, 1954. (See "The Colonial Territories 1953-54", H.M. Stationery Office, London, p. 19-20).

Interesting as are the events leading to federation, the way it was brought about, the opposition of the Africans to federation, the high-handed action of the British Government with regard to the wishes of the African population of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the deciding vote of Southern Rhodesia in the matter, etc., it is not within the scope of the present work to deal with, apart from incidental references.

Among others, documents which may be consulted on matters relevant to the foregoing are:

- i) Draft Federal Scheme (May, 1952)
- ii) Report by the Conference on Federation (January 1953)
- iii) Federal Scheme (January 1953)
- iv) "The Colonial Territories" (1951-1952, p. 24-27; 1952-53, p. 20-23). (All published London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

6. "The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Salisbury, Federal Information Services, 1954, p. 10.

7. Ibid.

Thus, on the basis of composition, irrespective of the anomalous proportion of representation, as we shall presently see, there is partnership at work on the federal level.

However, that partnership becomes dubious when seen in the light of the way the representatives are elected, and of the proportion of representation on a population basis.

Of the twenty-nine European members, twenty-six are elected directly by the respective European communities of the three territories, and in this way represent, for all practical purposes, sectional interests. The basis of representation is racial -- 14 represent the white community of Southern Rhodesia, 8 the white community of Northern Rhodesia, and 4 the white community of Nyasaland. That gives a total of twenty-six members to represent hardly a quarter million people.⁸

The remaining three European representatives are charged with special responsibilities for African interests. One of them is elected in Southern Rhodesia, the remaining two are appointed one each by the governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.⁹

The six Africans are elected in a special way, indirectly, on a racial basis, two from each of the federal territories.¹⁰ These six, together with

8. Population 215,600 Europeans & 6,710,000 Africans. ("The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", p. 5)

9. Ibid., p. 10.

10. "The Colonial Territories 1953-4", London, H.M. Stationery, p. 20.

the three Europeans above, represent the African section, i.e. nine out of a House of thirty-five represent close on seven million people.

Thus, on the federal level, partnership clearly and obviously means unequal partnership. In fact, it actually means perpetuation of conflicting interests on a racial basis. It affords an inter-racial political forum but draws rigid lines which ensure the supremacy of European interests and, by making elections a function of racial groups, it thereby crystallizes racial sentiments and feelings. It thus actually creates a situation where federal members represent the interests of their electors, and not so much those of the nation as a whole irrespective of race or colour.

The African Affairs Board, on the other hand, stands much in the capacity of an advisory organ whose recommendations may or may not be heeded by an assembly that is sectional and anomalously representative.¹¹

However, while it is relatively easy to point out these defects, it is not so easy to advocate for equal representation and for election on a non-racial basis, however desirable the latter may be, especially when the whole matter is seen within the general setting of fear, conflicting interests, and unequal stages of development.

The whole set-up is vitiated by the central problem, namely the desire to safeguard racial interests and to avoid equal partnership which would by sheer numbers, mean African domination. Thus partnership on the federal level,

11. The Board, however, may ask that any matter it deems serious "be reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure". See "The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland," p. 10-11. & "Federal Scheme," London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1953, p. 25-27.

while it ostensibly does not envisage permanent white supremacy, it actually means that, at least for the time being.

Then again, the picture of partnership is made more complicated by the fact that Native Policy has been left largely to the federal territories, for "the territories continue to enjoy the same constitutional status as before Federation."¹²

b) Territorial Native Policy: The three federal territories follow somewhat different native policies and in this way have somewhat different modes of partnership.

Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are "protectorates" and follow more or less closely the policy of British Trusteeship, and aim at full partnership. Accordingly, they do not have policies of racial segregation, although social segregation, incidentally racial, obtains in both protectorates.

In the territorial legislative councils of both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland there are African representatives,¹³ and political education is favoured and promoted among Africans¹⁴ so that they may play an increasingly greater part in the progress of their countries and enjoy full rights.

12. "The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland," p. 15

13. For details see "Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy," p. 12

14. There is effective Indirect Rule, which enables Africans to acquire legislative and administrative education and practice on Western standards. (See "Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy," p. 7-8, 16-18.)

In matters of land, preferential treatment is given to Africans and there is virtually no rigid geographical or residential segregation.¹⁵ If at all it obtains, as in Northern Rhodesia, it is only to a limited extent. However, it is the usual and general practice that different racial groups occupy different residential areas.

In both countries, in matters of labour organizations and regulations, the Africans can organize themselves into legally recognized trade unions, and thus wield effective means to obtain social justice.¹⁶

In both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, however, there exists "social colour bar, for which ---- there is no statutory authority,"¹⁷ but which nevertheless builds up psychological barriers and tensions, prejudices and stereotypes, which tend to pull the partnership apart rather than to consolidate it, and which inspire the need for differential legislation on the European side in order for the latter to maintain their present privileges.

In Southern Rhodesia the partnership is rather specious, and is vilified by certain laws which militate against close association.

15. Land is divided as follows: - Nyasaland: 5% freehold, occupied mainly by Europeans, but not exclusively so; 8% Public Land (Her Majesty's); and 87% African Trust Land, for lease to anyone resident in Nyasaland. N. Rhodesia: 6% Crown Land, settled by Europeans; 34% Native Reserves, established not so much in order to segregate as in order to protect African ways of life; 60% Native Trust Land, which can be leased to anyone. ---- See "Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy," p. 15 and p. 39-40.

16. Ibid., p. 22.

17. Ibid., p. 21.

By constitutional provision, the different racial groups have a common citizenship and there exists a Common Voters Roll, so that there is nothing in theory to prevent an African from standing for election.¹⁸ But the fact that the general policy has been to discourage political education among the Africans, and because of the high education and property qualifications required to become a voter,¹⁹ as well as because of the general practical economic and social barriers against the emerging African, there are only about 450 African voters out of an African population of more than two million.

For more or less the same reasons, there are as yet no African representatives in the Southern Rhodesia House of Assembly, the first ones being expected, at the calculated rate of the political theory and practice of Southern Rhodesia, "only in about twenty-five years' time."²⁰

Even admitting that there is some measure of partnership, however unsure²¹, what decries partnership in Southern Rhodesia is the existence of

18. "Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy,"
p. 8.

19. Annual income of £240 or possession of property worth £500; the average African's annual income is less than £100. (See Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 234).

20. "Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy,"
p. 8.

21. The Common Voters' Roll has been under constant attack and will probably go. In 1944 Sir. Godfrey Huggins had this to say: "Of course I do not mind leaving the Common roll for a time, but hon. members must realize that the time will come --- when if you leave matters exactly where they are, the African members of this country will control the House --- The time will come when the Common roll has to go." And in 1951 the qualifications were raised to what they are as indicated above. (See B. Davidson, op. cit., p. 234-235.)

two statutes, among others, which distinguish her Native Policy from that obtaining in N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with regard to land and labour regulations.

In terms of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, there is established territorial and residential segregation. The same Act allots 50% of the total land area to Europeans, 33% to Africans, the remaining 17% being forest or unassigned land, etc.²² Besides this unequal distribution of land, neither Europeans nor Africans can own land in the areas not assigned to them. Thus the Act ensures both territorial (or geographical) and residential segregation.

In this connection, a commission which investigated the Native Policies of the now federated territories had this to say:

The Southern Rhodesia Government's policy of geographical separation implies that there should not be a mixed society ---- So long as this policy lasts there can be no question of social assimilation ---- A social colour bar is therefore likely to be maintained ----, with equal cultural levels and common interests as the foundation for mutual contact.²³

That is the basic foundation of Southern Rhodesia's Native Policy.

That, too, is the form of her Partnership.

22. "Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy," p. 8, 15 and 39-40.

23. Ibid., p. 21.

Then there is the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934. In the preamble to this Act the word "employee" is defined as not including natives or Africans.²⁴ Since labour regulations, wage determinations, organization and recognition of trade unions, etc., -- all fall within the provisions of this Act, the overall effect is decidedly against the African who is excluded by definition and whose trade unions are recognized only "de facto" and not "de jure."²⁵ The implications are clear; no comment is necessary. Further, existing European trade unions limit their membership exclusively to Europeans, and are thus in a position to negotiate for labour regulations in their own interests²⁶ -- oftentimes to the disadvantage of the African workers. The whole set-up closely resembles that of South Africa, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, and cannot be said to contribute constructively to partnership.

It appears, then, that partnership in Southern Rhodesia is not the same thing as partnership in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Under the present conditions, partnership in Southern Rhodesia means very much the same thing as domination by the senior partner. It is technical partnership, and not real partnership, in spite of the common voters roll.

24. "Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy,"
p. 82 and 84.

25. Ibid., p. 65 and 89.

26. In 1947 the S. Rhodesia Government set up Native Labour Boards to protect African interests. But these are government organs, and the government itself is sectional, so that they do not adequately meet the needs that would be met by legally recognized African trade unions.

In general, it does seem that the Central African Federation experiment in partnership is inspired by fear rather than by genuinely good will. It is greatly chequered, above all, by complex socio-economic disparities as well as by sectional motives of a political nature. It is made the more specious and uncertain by the phobias of those who would preserve racial purity and avoid any manner of assimilation, even at the cost of adulterating the very spirit of Christianity and Western Civilization.

At worst, this type of partnership is another form of domination by the minority; at best, it is at least not a backward step. At any rate, it is pyramidal: few people meet, and only at the top.

CHAPTER V

THE CLASH--INTERNAL

The main currents of thought and action in Africa south of the Sahara inevitably run counter to each other, and complicate an already complicated problem of race relations. Issues become more rigid, more distinct, more alarming, and more diametrically opposed as the policies of white domination, black domination and unequal partnership are increasingly translated into reality and practice. As the problem of race relations continues to be looked at from different angles, so the divergencies in policies increase rather than diminish, and as solutions to that problem are constantly being shaped by different motives and aspirations, as well as by different local circumstances, so are chances for compromise and co-ordinated development the more depleted.

Over and above, world affairs in general and the polarized issues between the East and the West in particular, bring their weight to bear on the vast continent of Africa. In the general welter of internal strifes and external strifes, the teeming millions of the quartered and harassed continent sooner or later turn one way or another, and can hardly be expected to bear imported perpetrations and indignities passively and forever.

While the problem of order, justice and peace is as old as man, for wherever there are two men a conflict of interests is inescapable, it is not intended here, however, to attempt any account of the general psychological and sociological conflict, or the many other generic problems of the moral and the legal order. The conflict and clash in question here is basically a political and particular one. It is the conflict of doctrines, and of those issues that closely relate to the three policies under consideration, which

is the subject of the following pages.

Broadly, the clash or the conflict divides itself into two distinct forms, namely, internal and external.

Each of the policies that we have discussed exhibits an internal tension or conflict between theory and practice. This clash we designate here: "internal", which is at the same time also "intra-state", as, for example, Apartheid with respect to South Africa's internal affairs.

The second form of clash stems from a conflict between the different policies themselves, both as affecting inter-state relations and as impinging with other movements within and outside Africa. For this reason we may designate it "external", as distinct from internal in the sense of inherent and domestic.

In the present chapter we take the first clash, internal.

In all the three policies that we have seen, there exist certain conflicting elements. There is conflict between theory and practice as such, as well as between the different and crystallized sentiments of the racial groups. Under trusteeship the clash is between the trustee and the ward; under Apartheid, the clash resembles that existing between "a state within a state", and, under partnership, the conflict is a dilemma between equal and unequal partnership.

1. Trustee versus Ward.

British Trusteeship in Africa, even when progressive and constructive, exhibits certain elements of conflict.

The relation between the trustee and the Ward is by no means simple, let alone smooth. It is complicated.

Between the trustee and the ward there are differences not only of race and colour but also, and what is more, of tradition and customs, interests and general outlook.

The ward must be brought up. He must be taught in the school of Western democracy, protected, and guided. But he grows, and he must also be respected. If he is not accorded that respect, the tutelage is liable to beget contempt and distrust on his part.

Well may one give all the care to a protege, but if one does so without respecting the individuality and personality of the protected, one easily runs the risk of being thrown back one's own benefaction. Over paternalism begets resentment on the part of the protected. The situation arises, as in certain cases it has, where the African cannot but resent a deterministic sort of paternalism on the part of the British.¹

Trusteeship tends to be administered as if the backward people must accept whatever is thought good for them, and must abide the good time of the trustee for any progressive changes. It is apparent that such a state of affairs tends to develop into long-drawn trusteeship, and to beget an attitude of contentedness on the part of the tribesmen and antagonism among the educated.²

1. Thus for example the British ignored the wishes of the African inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and decided in favour of the Central Federation which the wards opposed. The trustee decided for the ward; the ward turned resentful of such paternalism.

(For African opposition and the British decision on the Central Federation, vide "The Colonial Territories, 1952-53", p. 20 ff, & "The Colonial Territories, 1953-54", p. 19; both published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London. See also, Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 256 ff).

2. A point in question is, for example, the situation in Basutoland, where the tribes people tend to be overly contented with British protection and the maintenance of an outmoded rule, and where the British seem to follow a policy of conservation with little progress, but where also the young generation and the intellectual spearhead resent British stagnation and would fain change the old order. (See Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 219).

British trusteeship tends to be a painfully slow process to self-government. On the other hand the wards tend to be over-anxious and restive, often with reason, and to want to have self-rule perhaps too hastily. The overall result amounts to a struggle for power and rights between trustee and ward, between the protector and the protected, between the tutor and the tutored. In fine, the trustee tends to maintain the "status quo", whenever that is expedient, or else to develop new constitutional institutions according to what he thinks best and not according to the hopes and aspirations of the ward.³

In yet another aspect, British Trusteeship finds itself caught up in no easy a situation--between the inevitability of losing colonies and the desirability of retaining them as self-governing dominions. The problem is one of developing the dependencies far enough to be self-governing, but near enough not to gravitate and break away completely. What this implies is complete internal self-government to the African states but reservation, at least temporarily, of their external relations to the British Government. Whether that is viewed as a temporary measure or as a long-term policy, it is nonetheless a situation that exacts utmost tact and care. For the "trusteeship" with regard to external affairs could easily become plagued with the same difficulties and problems that beset trusteeship with regard to internal affairs. It is possible for example that the Gold Coast, having successfully gone through the first hurdle which has won it internal autonomy, might have a no easy task to cross the second hurdle to sovereignty, to internal autonomy

3. Cf circumstances leading to the high-handed exile of the Kabaka of Uganda, whose pressing for constitutional changes the British muzzled by exile.

along with external legal competence in the family of equal sovereign states.

The world being so uneasily divided between East and West, it is apparent that the British will no doubt think twice and act with all hesitancy and caution when it comes to granting full sovereignty to the rising African states.

The rising states themselves have two alternatives: statehood within the commonwealth, or outside it. The choice will, no doubt, depend largely on events in the Commonwealth, itself and on the general policies of the British and other foreign powers with interests in Africa.

2. State within a State.

The policy of permanent domination and parallel development catches South Africa between the horns of a dilemma. To segregate and to dominate at one and the same time, to achieve white supremacy and parallel development at one and the same time, must mean,-- an obvious contradiction, the creation of a state within a state, a black state within a white state.

The cry is heard in South Africa that there must be developed a pure white state,⁴ and that the black man must be given his own "state"⁵ (within South Africa), where he will be his own "master" and where he will develop along his own lines. Apartheid, it is asserted, will do that. At the same time, however, the black state, or states, must not endanger white supremacy

4. In 1949, Dr. W.M. Eiselen said: "...The challenge to this generation is to build, no matter what unbearable sacrifices may be demanded of us, a self-sufficient independent European state..." (As quoted by B. Davidson, op. cit., p. 28).

5. The so-called "Bantustan", meaning a native or black state. (Cf. G.H. Galpin (Ed.), op. cit., p. 197-199, for different views on the subject).

(--the very end of Apartheid is, of course, the preservation of racial purity and white supremacy).

A well-known South African has aptly put the problem briefly in these words:

One of our paradoxes is the refusal of people who believe ardently in segregation to accept its logical consequences.⁶

The problem, indeed the dilemma, is that white South Africa is ill at ease to have black South Africans, and equally ill at ease not to have them. She cannot keep them without their fighting for their rights, and she cannot abandon them without their becoming a separate and eventually autonomous people who will threaten the very existence of white South Africa. Hence the policy of separation and domination at one and the same time: a policy which must at the same time, however, grant some form of "self-government" to the subjugated majority, if only to lull them.

But this peculiar state of an "imperium in imperio" does not do. Either the African is free or is not free. If free, he cannot accept the position of servitude. If not free, he cannot but fight for that freedom. The "imperium in imperio" situation is by its very nature self-contradictory and disruptive, unjust and based on the preposterous presumption that freedom can be so arbitrarily divided.

Besides, the whole economic system of South Africa largely depends on cheap and unskilled labour which African man power supplies. South Africa needs that labour and will probably continue to need it for a long time to

6. Arthur Keppel-Jones, op. cit., p. 52.

come. Accordingly, segregation will probably remain incomplete and therefore decidedly against the legitimate interests and demands of the labour that Africans supply. However, should, on the other hand, white South Africa's economy become self-sufficient and workable without cheap labour, the idle African man power will need to be absorbed and settled elsewhere away from white areas. This means a problem of finding adequate land for the resettlement of the present huge urban African populations. That land is not available. The only way to provide it is the incorporation of the neighbouring protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. Needless to point out, the incorporation is an explosive problem in itself, while the removal and lumping of Africans together cannot fail to drive them to revengeful realization of a common destiny against the European.

The issues seem clear enough. Apartheid is hardly the solution to the South African problem. It is not only belated, but unrealistic and aggravating. Born of fear and injustice, it is devoid of foresight and sound principle. It is self-preservation begetting self-destruction.

The stern reality is that the world is spinning towards racial amity. To arrest or reverse the progress is but to sow seeds of inter-racial disruption, which may conceivably embroil South Africa in brutal bloodshed, and the world at large in a plightful conflict of races.

3. Partnership Dilemma.

The pivotal problem of partnership in Africa lies precisely in whether that partnership is to be equal or unequal, whether it is to be a partnership of equal members or of senior and junior members.

Equal partnership is unacceptable to the white members who are not

only in minority but who lay claim to senior membership on grounds of their economic, technological and professional superiority, as well as because of their presently more advanced knowledge of the structure and functioning of modern government and public administration. In addition, equal partnership is unacceptable to them because it must mean, if effected, government by the majority, and that means government by the Africans.

On the other hand, unequal partnership runs counter to the aspirations of the African population. Unequal partnership (as is the present case in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) means, in fact, government by the minority, with only a shade of actual participation by the majority as the set-up of the federal legislature of the Central African Federation will have shown.

Partnership in British Africa is, at best, an experiment and a form of trusteeship. At worst, it is a qualified form of Apartheid. In making political representation racial rather than national, it actually strengthens and perpetuates racial divisions and conflict. Indeed, the clash in the central Federation has made itself keenly felt already in the federal legislature where the African representatives understand equal partnership, and the European representative mean unequal partnership, when they interpret the federal constitution.⁷ The real issue is what Lord Hailey has

7. One of the African representatives, Manoh Chirwa (M.P. Nyasaland) clearly put the African view-point as follows: "We do not intend at any time to drive away the Europeans. We prefer to have a government of all races, where people will advance according to their abilities and experience". But went on to give full force to the African attitude: "Partnership as contained in the constitution means equal partnership for all races, and I hope hon. members will remember these words. It is a co-partnership and nothing else. We accept nothing else Mr. Speaker". (Federal Hansard, Feb. 9, 1954, Salisbury).

On the other hand the federal Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, is reported as saying: equal treatment for all races would cause much ill feeling and resentment that "the clock of racial partnership will be put back 10 or 20 years". (Montreal Star, Montreal Canada, Aug. 24, 1954).

penetratingly pointed out in his study of British administration in Africa. Though he wrote before the birth of partnership in the Central African Federation, his words apply aptly to that uneasy and specious partnership:

--There is general agreement that no form of constitution can be satisfactory if it results in vesting political authority in a minority of the population, or fails to provide means by which the people at large can share in the responsibility involved in its exercise.⁸

In the Central African Federation, as we have already seen, political authority is vested in the minority. There is partnership, only technically and broadly understood. In actual fact it is unequal partnership, in which the minority has not only the seniority but the real and effective political power.

There is no need to labour the obvious. But however partnership may turn out, the bitter possibility, and in all probability the outcome, of "race-centredness" is that the European will not yield to unqualified political equality even under a system of partnership, let alone assimilation, while it is precisely for that equality at least that the African presses and will fight for. Therein lies the clash, and that, too, will decide the fate or the success of partnership in Africa at large.

In concluding this chapter, it may be reiterated even at the risk of seeming repetitious that any policy that compromises fundamental principles and resorts to race-centred expediencies cannot but sooner or later, as history indicates, crack and break down under its own weight.

8. Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, vol. 12, London Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951, p. 5.

CHAPTER VI

THE CLASH--EXTERNAL

Apart from the clash between theory and practice, which has been the subject matter of the foregoing chapter, there is a second and general clash between the policies themselves and which is external to national borders since it is inter-territorial and international.

It shows itself at three main stages: first and central, in Africa itself; second, in the Commonwealth; third and last, on the international scene. Accordingly, it may conveniently be discussed under the headings of: Central, Commonwealth and International.

1. Central

The denial of certain basic rights to black men in South Africa stands opposed to the granting and enjoyment of those rights in new states like the Gold Coast and the Sudan, while the sharing of rights between black and white in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and other British dependencies holds a precarious position between the two extremes. The paths followed are different, and so are the goals, but the problem is radically and generically the same --- the problem of civil rights and interracial relations.

A British writer recently observed with reference to the proposed new constitution for Uganda, following the crisis wrought by the exile of the Kabaka:

An African state with a largely African cabinet will arouse jealousy among Africans of Kenya and Tanganyika where cabinet posts are shared between European, Asian and African members. It will arouse great hostility in Mr Malan's Union, where Africans are totally excluded from government. But we have no alternative; we must go ahead because once the process of educating people for self-government is efficiently begun it must be carried to its conclusion.¹

The passage might well read: "The fact of emergent African states, such as the Gold Coast, Nigeria or the Sudan, begets restlessness and conflict in such states as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where Africans are junior partners and discrimination obtains on grounds of colour, or in such other states as Kenya, where there is actual hostility. It intensifies mutual fear and hostility among the different racial groups in such states as the Union of South Africa where the African is servant and the European master. We are in the grips of a real conflict; the cataclysm seems inevitable, but we must stick to principles and uphold the cause of justice, for that is the only constructive way."

That is a searching and realistic view, if perhaps oversimplified. For whatever may be said to the contrary, the enemies of the emergent black states will be white South Africa, and vice versa. Between these two irreconcilables of progressive Africanization and repressive Apartheid, vacillates the third force, that of partnership, which, if it met the demands of both black and white, would be the mediating and the moderating factor; but which, as presently pursued, is likely to split from internal dissatisfaction and from the onslaughts of the tides of black nationalism and white racialism.

1. Quoted from "Britain's Experiment in Africa", in The Listener, London, Nov. 25, 1954, p. 890.

Only a change of race relations in the Union of South Africa, a change for the better, may avert the disaster. That change failing, sooner or later forces will come to a head and Central Africa, where the extremes are intended to join hands in partnership, will probably be the storm centre and the battleground.² For the South will fight the Centre to destroy partnership, while the North and West will fight the Centre at least to effect full and equal partnership.

It is in this sense that it may be said that interracial peace in Africa will largely depend upon the turn of events and race problems in South Africa. The humiliation and suppression of millions in South Africa cannot fail to arouse the anger and determined hostility of the free and growing black states in Africa. The grim conflict, racial injustices remaining the way they are, is likely to be a peril between races. If blood is thicker than water in normal circumstances, it probably is thicker still when injustices curdle it. Indeed, one fears, each day that passes brings white and black Africa nearer to a crisis, which only a fundamental revaluation of the meaning and practice of Christianity can avert.

Each day that passes there is rising on either side tremendous forces, embodying themselves in white nationalism and black nationalism, and which the clashing policies can only aggravate and make more rabid, instead of

2. Ernest Watkins in his book "The Cautious Revolution" (London, Farrar & Straus, 1950, p. 334) wrote: "The Union and the Colonial Office, consciously or unconsciously, are fighting for control over the future of the Rhodesias, in fact for the soul of the Rhodesias. That is the most decisive battle that will be fought in Africa in the next decade" (The Colonial Office, of course, represents Trusteeship, and the Union of South Africa, Apartheid).

moderate and constructive. These are potent and explosive constellations of forces, moreso when they thrive on fear and pseudo-ideologies.

More than before, there is beginning to rise a spectre of African racialism, and a repudiation of certain of the white man's ways of life³, largely because of certain contradictions in that way of life, particularly in matters of race and Christian professions. The African begins to wonder and ponder; to ask simple but fundamental questions. How can one love one's neighbour as oneself and yet dispossess one's neighbour of his land and oppress him at one and the same time? How can one claim a higher scale of values and yet reduce race relations to a skin-deep criterion? How can one speak of the ideals of freedom and democracy and yet perpetrate on others acts that are anything but liberal and democratic?

The questions may be commonplace. But what prompts them is a factual problem rooted in the prostitution of principles and values, and in the use of expedients for the advancement of self-interests, by those who know better and should act better instead of destroying the very foundations of Western Civilization and Culture.

The African, disillusioned and stranded within a social framework of disrupted tribal institutions, in the dismal twilight between the old and the

3. Reverend Michael Scott: There is "beginning to arise the spectre of the counterpart of white domination, a kind of politico-religious black racialism... Even in (African) music, songs, and dances this influence is at work, fanning the fires of hatred and contempt for the white man's God, his justice and morality" (See Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 196) Cf. also Jomo Kenyatta's Dedication:-

"To...all the dispossessed youth of Africa: for the perpetuation of communion with ancestral spirits through the fight for African Freedom, and in the firm hope that the dead, the living and the unborn will unite to rebuild the destroyed shrines." (Jomo Kengatta, "Facing Mount Kenya", London, Secker & Warburg, 1953).

new, easily relapses to atavistic behaviour, as the negative side of the Mau-Mau movement fairly indicates. But it is clear enough, as Rev. Michael Scott points out, that this desperation and fury "arises from the urgently felt need for deliverance from oppression."⁴ The flames of that fury are fanned by the ideologies of racialists, black and white alike, and by the general ill winds of personal and institutionalized injustices that nearly always make themselves felt wherever coloured peoples live or move, be it in their own homelands or abroad.

It is a dangerous tide, even if understandable. It ruins and destroys. But there is another form of the black man's nationalism: constructive and controlled by his undying sense of humanity and a forgiving heart, inspired and quickened by the urgent need to take his place among the truly civilized peoples of the world.

It is a constructive nationalism which does not concern itself with driving away the white man, nor with throwing away, root and branch, the ways of the West, but which seeks, in the words of a noted African leader⁵--

(----)To abolish race discrimination which it rejects morally, and to attain legal equality and the same democratic political rights as the European.

It is that nationalism which, to take a concrete case, though it has won the Gold Coast independence, will not seek ("ceteris paribus") to destroy

4. As quoted by Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 196
As for the oppression itself, previous matter on the different policies will have shown.

5. Selby Bengani Ngcobo (one time Research Fellow in African Economics at the University of Natal, South Africa); vide G.H. Galpin (Ed.), op. cit., p. 59.

human relations. For its goal is harmony between black and white, harmony begot of justice and equality. It forgets the bitter days of slavery and the dark past of exploitation and oppression, and tenaciously seeks the triumph of humanity. Recognizing and appreciating the many good acts of the white man, it places them above the sad ones.

Even in South Africa, the determined quest for the triumph of humanity characterizes African nationalism, which the African National Congress fearlessly counterpoises against the berserk nationalism of the Boer type. Thus declared the Congress in 1951 at Bloemfontein, in the very heart Apartheid:

All people, irrespective of the national groups they may belong to and irrespective of the colour of their skin, who have made South Africa their home and who believe in the principles of democracy and equality of man, are South Africans. All South Africans are entitled to live a full and free life on the basis of the fullest equality...

The struggle....is not directed against any race or national group. It is against the unjust laws which keep in perpetual subjugation and misery vast sections of the population. It is for the transformation of conditions which will restore human dignity, equality, and freedom to every South African.⁶

Following on this, and with only a few regrettable incidents, the National Congress conducted with order and dignity the well-known Passive Resistance Movement against unjust laws and practices; and still advocates a peaceful and constructive approach to the problem of race relations in South Africa which it holds to be the home for all, black and white alike.

6. As quoted by Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 197-198.

However, unless the racist policies and practices of South Africa, the biased partnership of the Central Federation, and the injustices that begot the regrettable Mau-Mau movement in Kenya are rectified and replaced by a respect for the dignity of man and his natural and civil rights, irrespective of race or colour, opposing tides of racialism and nationalism may be the bane of Africa and the disaster of races at large when an ill-civilized world comes to grips with problems of its own making.

Racial consciousness dies hard; awareness of racial injustices may die harder still, but the triumph of humanity must be the task of all men.

2. Commonwealth

The conflict spreads and makes itself felt in the British Commonwealth at large. There are two main issues deserving of note in this regard, namely, the question of membership in the Commonwealth and that of the general racial policies of certain member states.

It is obvious in the first place, and quite in keeping with British aspirations, that once the United Kingdom grants independence and full self-government to African states, as she did to India, Pakistan and Ceylon, the new states will be entitled to full membership in the Commonwealth, on a basis of equality, autonomy and free association. The question that immediately poses itself is whether certain members of this "free association of equal nations", because of their peculiar policies, would recognize such membership or not; or whether, upon such recognition, they would remain members or cease to be.

South Africa, for example, being what she is as to race relations, would probably either walk out or press for unequal partnership, i.e. for

junior membership of African states like the Gold Coast.⁷

Should Britain and other Commonwealth countries like Australia and Canada compromise with South Africa on the issue, the Commonwealth would most likely lose her Asian and African members.⁸ On the other hand, should South Africa accept that equality, the whole situation would be, as indeed it already is, sorely embarrassing both to herself and to the other members of the Commonwealth. If she should walk out, she still would not have escaped the general hostility of those African and Asian States whose fellow men chafe under the political and economic injustices of a racist South Africa.

At any event, whether African states are accorded full membership or whether South Africa quits or remains, one of the vital issues in the Commonwealth is bound to be the one connected with the overall policies of the member nations, particularly in matters affecting racial groups. For if in general there should continue to exist discrimination in any part of the Commonwealth, or if there should continue to exist unequal partnership on

7. Dr. Daniel Malan (ex-Premier of South Africa) was reported in 1954 as "trying to bring pressure on the British Government to withhold complete independence and full membership in the Commonwealth to the Gold Coast" (West African Pilot", Nigeria, April 17, 1954).

8. The "West African Pilot", quoted above, carried another article in which the question was put whether Britain would "sacrifice the good will and economic relations with Africans and Asians at the instance of Malan's threats and bullying?" The article concluded with: "We like the Commonwealth but it would be hypocritical to pretend that we are prepared to put up with the continued provoking insults of the racialist..."

Only recently there appeared another article with this significant title: "Africa Threatens to Create Crisis if Gold Coast Asks Dominion Status". In it the correspondent, writing from Accra (Gold Coast), keenly observed: "A crisis that may shake the entire Commonwealth is possible. It would arise if South Africa raised a firm positive objection to Gold Coast membership in the Commonwealth, something which South African nationalists have repeatedly threatened to do." ("Montreal Star", Montreal, Canada, March 5, 1955).

grounds of colour or for unjust sectional reasons, or if there should continue to exist race vilifications in social intercourse, or the usual struggle between trustee and ward, the Commonwealth would not only be resting on shifting sands but would be running the risk of a split and break.⁹

It would be stretching things too far, however, to suggest that the colour problem alone will decide the future of the Commonwealth, or that there is any monomania of racism throughout the Commonwealth. Rather the pertinent point is that the Commonwealth can hardly hope to exist solidly if stricken by the social maladies of rampant racialism, or by complacency and connivance at gross injustices in such a matter of vital importance as inter-racial justice.

3. International

The clash by no means contains itself within the narrow orbit of the Commonwealth. It brings its weight to bear on the international scene, and has oftentimes been the subject of uneasy relations between Commonwealth members, as well as between members of the United Nations in general. Two points are particularly relevant, namely, the question of the International Trusteeship System and the thorny problem of the constitutionality of the United Nations' interference in the domestic affairs of member nations.

9. The crucial issue is what Mme. Pandit Nehru described as "the war against the racial discrimination of the West". It is of paramount importance and consequences "whether Western civilization is going to be based on the theory of racial supremacy or whether the barriers imposed between man and man on grounds of colour are to be broken down and justice and equality to be considered the due of all". (As quoted by Mabel Jackson Haight, "India's Aim in Africa", in The Listener, London, Jan. 6, 1955, p. 14).

The International Trusteeship System "co-operates" with the British Trusteeship System in as much as both systems have as object the promotion of educational, social, economic and political developments in non-self-governing countries, towards independence and self-government.¹⁰ However, where European interests are entrenched, as in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, unlike in territories where African interests have priority, as in Nigeria and Basutoland for example, British Trusteeship is very greatly qualified and, as we have seen, takes the form of partnership. To the extent, therefore, that this latter type of trusteeship subordinates interests of Africans to interests of the minority, even if technically under the form of partnership, it does not measure up to the objectives of the United Nations Trusteeship which places interests of native inhabitants above those of the "foreign" minority.¹¹ The problem is precisely that while United Nations Trusteeship, as such, aims at the self-determination of the presently non-self-governing peoples, British Trusteeship is becoming more and more inclined to move in the direction of partnership. What this implies, observations on Africanization and Partnership already made will have indicated, and there is no need for repetition here.

10. UN Trust Territories in Africa: Togoland (British and French), Cameroons (British and French), Tanganyika (British), Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian), and Somaliland.

11. There is already a clash of objectives between the British and the United Nations Trusteeship in Tanganyika in Connection with land "alienation", or expropriation of native land, for sale to European settlers. A recent United Nations Commission reported: "The eviction of the Meru people has deeply shocked responsible African opinion throughout the territory and has understandingly become a symbol of the worst of the widespread fears about the figure (sic) of the land" (As reported in the "Montreal Star" of March 5, 1955).

Distinguished from British Trusteeship, but of particular importance to the International Trusteeship System, is the case between the Union of South Africa and South West Africa,¹² which has tended to strain relations between the United Nations and South Africa herself, as well as to deepen the suspicion and animosity of Africans towards European powers in Africa in general, and to place the United Nations (and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights) in virtual discredit.

The high-handed action of South Africa in its attempts to incorporate South West Africa without the consent of the Herero and contrary to her international obligation under the Trusteeship System¹³ would, of course, not only bring under her repressive laws the native inhabitants of South West Africa, but would also further strengthen the fears and suspicions of neighbouring protectorates, and at the same time confirm the apparent ineptitude of the United Nations¹⁴ and the general suspicion of subject peoples who regard this World Organization as a dubious forum where non-self-governing people may easily be traded, and where rights have weight more in terms of power than in terms of human dignity.

12. Entrusted to South Africa by mandate of Dec. 17, 1920, under Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations. (Cf. also Art. 77~~2~~, of the United Nations Charter, which places former mandate territories under the International Trusteeship System).

13. Cf. South Africa's international obligation under the trusteeship system and her political manoeuvres at incorporating South West Africa without the consent of the Herero. The first serious step towards incorporation appeared in 1949, when by an Act of the same year South West Africa was granted direct representation in the Union Parliament, with regard to the European section (vide, G.H. Galpin, op. cit., p. 130).

14. The case of the Herero has been pleaded before the U.N. But it does seem that South Africa already has the edge in the matter.

Finally, as has been mentioned already, race relations in Africa become international relations with regard to UN competency or incompetency to interfere in the domestic affairs of member nations. The problem arises as a result of the "inter-state" and "infra-state" nature of the United Nations, which leaves member nations sovereign in the conduct of their internal and external affairs. It is a problem that stems from the legal structure of the United Nations and from the general problems that inevitably exist in a world of sovereign states.

Thus, Under Art 2, Section 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations shall not "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of member nations. But, on the other hand, the United Nations may not connive at mutilations of human rights¹⁵, and may not refrain from "interference" when certain acts (presumably even domestic) endanger world peace.¹⁶

It will be recalled that this issue between national sovereignty and the competency of the United Nations to intervene in domestic affairs which stand in violation of human rights or which endanger international relations and peace, is a problem which has seen Commonwealth countries and other states view differently UN resolutions condemning South Africa's racial policies and practices.¹⁷

15. Cf. Art 1, sec. 3, & Art. 76, c. & d. of the Charter.

16. Cf. Art. 11, sections 2 & 3, Art. 34, & Art. 39.

17. See "Annual Report of the Secretary -- General --- July 1953-30 June 1954", U.N., p. 18ff.

While India and Pakistan have sponsored and voted for these resolutions, South Africa, of course, has consistently voted against and flatly refused any co-operation with UN Commissions of investigation in this regard.¹⁸ On the other hand, other Commonwealth nations have nearly always abstained from voting. The whole is a sad fact of disagreement and division among members of the same family; and a particular consequence is that since colonial powers are European powers and since South Africa is a "European" power, tension tends to arise between European powers and Afro-Asian powers in general, while the Soviet bloc, which upholds the resolutions, whatever her reasons--easily makes diplomatic gains and appears as the champion of the voiceless. It is a painful price for the West to pay, but it is the price of failure to uphold moral principles in so vital a matter.

Whatever may be said, to conclude this unhappy issue, race relations in Africa are in their final analysis a human and world problem. They not only tend to lump Africans together and to beget in them generalized hostility, but they also affect Asians in Africa and abroad, and have tremendous consequences on the West.

The problem is real, and there is no easy solution to it. But any resort to short-lived expediencies can but augment its enormity and complexity. For no evasion of fundamental Christian principles, nor any prevaricating use of a race-colour calculus, can provide a way out without uprooting the very foundations of Western Civilization.

18. See "Annual Report of the Secretary -- General --- July 1953-30 June 1954", U.N., p. 18ff.

Indeed there can be no world order, let alone world peace, without the contented and harmonized development of, and mutual respect between, the units that constitute the family of nations. The problem of peace is a human problem, which racialist theories can only aggravate and which self-preservation practices cannot even hope to solve. Equality and legality, on a basis of morality and respect for human dignity, however difficult the task, provide the only constructive and realistic approach to this otherwise perennial problem.

CONCLUSION

The one common problem that is of momentous and vital importance to all in British Africa, as we have tried to show, is that of race relations in general, and political rights and power in particular. Permeating the warp and woof of daily intercourse as this central problem inevitably does, it cannot but determine the nature and the actual framing of official policies.

Ethno-centric prejudices and the morbid psychology of belonging and nationalism, perennial differences of culture and tradition, and the usual exigencies of wealth and power -- all these and other factors, virtuous and vicious alike, conspire to make the total situation a stark and almost desperate reality.

The cumulative effect is far-reaching. All too often the civilized tend to waive basic principles and to resort to dubious expedencies. Only too easily the backward tend to confuse Western heresies with genuine Christian civilization. Albeit, the problem of race relations and civil rights in multi-racial and multicultural Africa is a challenge which neither the European nor the African can escape.

To the white man, as to the emergent black man, the challenge is urgent and vital. It is no easy a challenge. For, far from superficial and simple, let alone exaggerated as some observers might be inclined to believe, the total situation is radical and complicated. For this reason alone, if for no other, it is not too much to conclude that no politician's magic wand can provide the desired panacea; only the patient hand of the true statesman and undaunted respecter of human worth can begin to untie the knots and to point the way to the wisdom and necessity of inter-racial justice and Christian charity.

Attempts have not been lacking. In British Africa alone -- the sovereign Union of South Africa included for historical and practical reasons -- three basic approaches to the problem obtain, as we have seen. Trusteeship, in the sense of Africanization; Apartheid, in the sense of parallel development and white supremacy; and Partnership, in the sense of a more or less equitable sharing of rights between black and white -- all are responses to that challenge, and are at the same time different solutions to a basically common problem.

As to why there should have been different approaches, it has been our contention that the equivocal concept of the White Man's Burden has led to divergent official attitudes and policies. Without ruling out geographic, demographic and historical factors, which are no doubt important, it is clear enough that upon the nature of his designs and the conception of his responsibilities in Africa, as upon his racial and cultural convictions, largely depends the type of measures the white man brings to bear on the vital conflict between his interests and those of the African. For as different motives beget different attitudes, so, to a great extent, different conceptions of the white man's role in Africa beget different policies.

For this reason, it seems fair to conclude that the nature and formulation of political policies in Africa are mostly, though not exclusively, a function of the involved concept of the White Man's Burden.

With regard to the present policies themselves, two general conclusions seem unavoidable. The first is the obvious fact that the policies clash with each; the second is an observation that these same policies tend to generate even more disruptive problems.

CONCLUSION

-83-

In all probability, Trusteeship will succeed, though it bring in its train other problems to a world that has not yet quite abandoned the practice of measuring human value by accidental differences, and where nationalism -- old and new -- easily turns rabid.

The African states, if and when they rise, will seek their place both in the Commonwealth and in the international society as equal partners. This, we have observed, poses a problem which the British Commonwealth cannot side-step without far-reaching consequences.

Further, the new states will not fail to fan the flames of black and white nationalism alike.

Well-handled, however, and purged of race maladies, the problem of equality and nationalism can be solved for the better, in the cause of a powerful family of freely associating sovereign states, such as the British Commonwealth of Nations aspires to be.

As to permanent white domination, be it of the Apartheid type or any other, the writer cannot escape the conclusion that artificial barriers and legalistic justifications of racist might and ideologies are feeble and sorry bulwarks against man's onward march to closer association, let alone against the eternal course of justice.

With regard to Partnership, two conclusions seem possible, In the first place, if it is unequal partnership, it is a form of domination and will probably, of its very nature, go the treacherous way of Apartheid. In the second place, if it is equal partnership, it is beset with problems which it cannot solve overnight. Besides, it is hardly realistic to think that equal partnership in the political and economic spheres will not beget social equality.

Man strives for completeness and perfection. Accordingly, equal partnership will in all probability lead to social equality, and, in this way, open the gates to social assimilation which is as problematic as it is frightening to so many even in a Christian world. At all events, vain are the efforts to legislate against man's God-given powers of the mind and the heart.

Turning to the clash or conflict between the policies themselves, it may be summarily inferred that Apartheid and emergent African nationalism stand to each other as fire to water. They cannot peacefully coexist, any more than can injustice and justice. They aggravate each other, and co-destroy each other. In the writer's opinion, the likely and eventual development is that both will yield place, of necessity, to some more tenable form of partnership, and all that this word implies.

On the international scene, it is difficult to see how tensions can be abated without -- to take only two examples -- a satisfactory solution of colonial practices and a satisfactory circumvention of the obstacle of domestic autonomy which sovereign states so easily exploit to shield unjust internal policies.

However it may be, if there cannot be accepted social equality in Africa, at least there can be accepted equality before the law on a basis of morality and respect for human rights. Without interracial justice, it is difficult to imagine any peaceful co-operation between the different racial groups.

Western Civilization and Christianity stand to gain and build in Africa, but only to the extent that doctrine and practice are harmonized.

CONCLUSION

~~-85-~~

A radical reorientation in interracial attitudes and policies, along with interracial justice deriving from sound principles of Christianity and democracy, is a prerequisite if the European, the Asian and the African are to live together as "Africans" in Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS --

Brady, Alexander, Democracy in the Dominions - A Comparative Study in Institutions, Toronto, University of Toronto, 1947, VI - 453 p.

A critical comparison and appraisal of democracy and socio-political institutions in the different "British" Dominions. Has an excellent and well-illustrated section on South Africa -- p. 295-384.

Buell, Raymond Leslie, The Native Problem in Africa, (in two volumes), New York, Macmillan, 1928; Vol. I, xii - 1045p; Vol. II, x - 1050p.

A comprehensive and documented description and account of economic, political and constitutional conditions throughout Africa, with particular regard to interracial relations.

Calpin, G.H. (Ed.), The South African Way of Life -- Values and Ideals of a Multi-racial Society, New York, Columbia University Press, 1953, 200p.

A collection of twelve different essays on various aspects of South Africa, based on first-hand information and investigations by South Africans from the English-speaking, Afrikaans-speaking, Jewish, Bantu, Indian and Coloured Communities.

Currey, C.H., British Colonial Policy, 1783-1915, London Oxford University Press, 1916, 266p.

Gives a critical view of the problems of colonialism, of the clash between the Black and the White, and of various measures devised till then to meet the problems. Somewhat biased, in favour of British Colonial rule in general.

Davidson, Basil, Report on Southern Africa -- (An Authoritative Last-minute Survey of the Facts Behind the Crisis), London, Jonathan Cape, 1952, 281p.

Gives a fair and documented picture of Partnership and Apartheid; cuts across the core of the problem of racism and nationalism in British Africa and the Union of South Africa.

Empire Series Publications, British Africa, vol. II, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1899, xiii - 413p.

A collection of essays on the different colonies, their history, the effect of British impact and rule on the natives, and on the outlook for the future. The authors are representative of missionary, philanthropic, imperialist and other elements. Gives a varied and balanced account.

Hailey, Lord, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part IV, A General Survey of the System of Native Administration, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1951, iii - 6lp. (Part IV).

Best authoritative survey on the matter, scientific and non-partisan.

Huxley, Elspeth, & Margery Perham, Race and Politics in Kenya, London, Faber & Faber, 1944, 236p.

This collection of personal letters gives an open and first-hand account of opinions, feelings and attitudes of individuals and groups on various aspects of the racial issue.

Kenyatta, Jomo, Facing Mount Kenya, London, Secker and Warburg, 1953, XIV - 329p.

An interesting and penetrating African's point of view on the social, economic and political conflict in Kenya (before the Mau-Mau Movement). The author himself is an African; shows anthropological leanings, and approaches the general problem culturally rather than politically.

Keppel-Jones, Arthur, Friends or Foes? -- A Point of View and A Programme for Racial Harmony in South Africa, Pietermaritzburg (S. Africa), Shuter and Shooter, 1950(?), 23lp.

Gives a constructive, if weak, liberal view; a virtual indictment of the racial policies of South Africa; throws into relief the conflict between black and white, as well as between English - speaking and Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans.

Linton, Ralph (Ed.), The Science of Man in the World Crisis, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, xiv - 520p.

A collection of essays one of which --- "The Colonial Crisis and the Future", by Raymond Kennedy, p. 306-346 --- is a telling criticism of the rationalizations of colonialism, exploitation and misrule.

Lovell, Reginald Ivan, The Struggle For South Africa, 1875-1899: A Study in Economic Imperialism, New York, Macmillan, 1934, xv - 426p.

A well-documented study of Anglo-Saxon imperial aims in general, and British imperialism in Africa in particular.

Stern, Jacques, The French Colonies, Past and Future, (Translation by Norbert Guterman), New York, Didier, 1944, xviii - 33lp.

An enthusiastic account of French colonial policy and practices. Throws British Colonial policy into relief in several ways, particularly on the matter of social intercourse and cultural assimilation.

U.K. Government, Introducing the Colonies, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1952, 88p.

Gives a very brief geographical, economic and political account of the various British Dependencies.

Introducing West Africa, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1952, 79p.

A factual account of economic and political developments in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, etc.

Watkins, Ernest, The Cautious Revolution: Britain To-day and Tomorrow, London, Farrar & Straus, 1950, xii - 451 p.

Primarily an exposition of British internal and foreign policy; gives a critical account of colonial and Commonwealth relations and problems.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, Official Reports --

Federal Government, The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury, Federal Information Services, 1954, 48p.

A factual and statistical document. Gives a general idea of the federal set-up.

Union of South Africa Govt., The Cape Coloured People and Their Vote, Ottawa, South African Information Office, 1951

Passive Resistance: Cause and Consequence, Ottawa, S.Africa Information Office, 1953, 8p.

Gives official point of view; ignores basic causes.

South Africa: Its People, Its Problems, Its Policies, The Condition of Race Relations, Ottawa, S. Africa Information Office, 1950, 17p.

A propagandist point of view; partial

U.K. Government, Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland -- History of Discussions with the Union of South Africa, 1909-1939, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952, 135p.

Britain's Colonial Policy and Record, London, Central Office of Information, 1953, 18p.

The British Colonial Empire in 1946, Ottawa, U.K. Information Office, 1947, 18p.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

-89-

- Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951, 91p.
- Changing Africa: New Developments in the British Dependencies, London, COI, 1953, 24p.
- The Colonial Territories 1952-1953; 1953-1954, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Commonwealth Constitutions, London, COI, 1953, 24p.
- A brief reference document, authoritative. Gives a brief summary of constitutional developments in the Dominions.
- From Darkness to Light: New Developments in British Africa, New York, British Information, 1949, 25p.
- Gold Coast, 1953, (Colonial Reports), London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954, 179p.
- Progress in the Colonies, British Policy in Action, London, COI, 1954, 16p.
- Report to the Secretary of State for Colonies by the Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1954, 23p.
- Towards Self-Government in British Colonies, Ottawa, U.K. Information Office, 1947, 62p.
- What Goes on in the Colonies?, London, Colonial Office, 1950
- What is the Commonwealth?, London, COI, 1954, 18p.

United Nations, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 1 July 1953 - 30 June 1954, United Nations, New York, 1954.

Gives some account of the problems of Trusteeship, UN Commissions of Investigation into South Africa's racial policies, and UN Competency (or otherwise) to interfere in domestic affairs of South Africa, etc.

PERIODICAL ARTICLES--

- Anonymous, European Scramble For Africa, in The African & Colonial World, Vol. 2 No. 5, May 1954, London, p. 4-5.
- A great Movement for Colonial Freedom, in The African & Colonial World, Vol. 2 No. 5, May 1954, London, p. 9-10.

A fairly balanced critical appraisal of the issues at stake in colonial Africa. Advocates friendship and confidence; deploras repressive policies.

Britain's Experiment in Africa, in The Listener, Nov. 25, 1954, B.B.C., London, p. 890ff.

Gives a fair picture of the clash between Africanization, Apartheid and Partnership.

Brockway, Fenner, From SEATO to ATO: South Africa Seeks Allies, in The Nation, Vol. 179 No. 15, 9 October 1954, New York, p. 305-306.

A short account of South Africa's fear of black domination, and her efforts to create with other powers in Africa an African Treaty Organization which would promote and effect a common policy towards Africans.

Collins, Canon L. John, A Reminder to Christians, in The African & the Colonial World, Vol. 2 No. 3, March 1954, London, p. 2ff.

A brief criticism of the false sense of Christians amidst social injustices in Africa.

Haight, Mabel Jackson, India's Aim in Africa, in The Listener, Jan. 6, 1955, B.B.C., London.

A brief examination of India's role in the conflict of races.

Harvey, A. Godfrey, The South African Political Scene, in the Dalhousie Review, Vol. 34 No. 1, Spring 1954, Canada, p. 373ff.

Hurley, Most Rev. Denis E., O.M.I., Introduction To An Inquiry Into South African Social Problems, in Kolbe Winter School Selected Papers, Vol. I, July 1952, Mariannahill, South Africa, p. 137-143.

A clear statement of principles and an invitation to Catholics to face squarely the problem of race relations and interracial justice.

The Race Problems in South Africa, in Worldmission, Vol. 2 No. 1, February 1951, Washington D.C., U.S.A., p. 45-55.

A critical analysis of several factors that complicate the race problem of South Africa.

Jowitt, Dr. H., The Doctrine of Trusteeship with Reference to Native Administration, in Kolbe Winter School Selected Papers, Vol. I, July 1952, Mariannahill, South Africa, p. 114-136.

Vieyra, H.J.B., Black and White in South Africa, in the Dublin Review, First Quarter, 1954, Dublin, Ireland, p. 65-71.

Description of conditions in South Africa, and statement of basic principles which should guide Christians in a multi-racial society.

BRITISH AFRICA -- COUNTRIES, STATUS, AREA, POPULATION

GROUP	COUNTRY	CAPITAL	STATUS	AREA	POPULATION 1952 Census
A. West Africa	1. Gambia	Bathurst	Colony & Protectorate	4,000 sq. mls	279,000
	2. Sierra Leone	Freetown	Colony	28,000	2,000,000
	3. Gold Coast and Togoland	Accra	Self-governing	91,843	4,399,000
	4. Nigeria and Cameroons	Lagos	U.N. Trust Territory Colony & Protectorate U.N. Trust Territory	----- 373,250 -----	----- 30,000,000 -----
B. East Africa	1. Br. Somaliland	Hargeisa	Protectorate	68,000	64,000
	2. Kenya	Nairobi	Colony & Protectorate	224,960	5,680,000
	3. Uganda	Entebbe	Protectorate	93,981	5,187,000
	4. Zanzibar and Pemba	Zanzibar	Protectorate	1,020	272,000
	5. Tanganyika	Dares Salaam	U.N. Trust Territory	362,688	7,827,000
C. "Central Africa"	1. Nyasaland	Zomba	Protectorate	49,100	2,613,600
	2. N. Rhodesia	Lusaka	Protectorate	287,640	2,034,800
	3. S. Rhodesia	Salisbury	Self-governing	150,333	2,301,400
D. "South Africa"	1. Basutoland	Maseru	Protectorate	11,716	563,854
	2. Bechuanaland	Mafeking	Protectorate	275,000	296,310
	3. Swaziland	Mbabane	Protectorate	6,704	185,215
<p>N.B. 1. The Union of South Africa is a sovereign state. For historical and practical reasons it is treated in the present work as part of British Africa, though actually it is not.</p> <p>2. The Sudan, not listed above, was until recently an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.</p>					

Source: Groups A, B & D -- "Changing Africa", U.K. Information Office, Ottawa, 1953, p. 25.

Group C -- "The New Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland", Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury, 1954, p. 5-6.

APPENDIX B
ASSIMILATION

Opposed to the segregationist policy of Apartheid is the doctrine of social integration and assimilation which is anathema in South Africa, taboo in Central and East Africa, uncertain in West Africa, nebulous in French Africa -- in general, a crime against racist ideologies.

Understood as a process of acculturation, leading to unqualified civil equality and social integration, regardless of race or colour, assimilation does not obtain anywhere in British Africa.

Under British Trusteeship, the aim is eventually to create autonomous states which are also racially distinct.

Under Partnership, as understood and practised in Certain Territories like the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, economic and political "assimilation" may eventuate, but social and racial assimilation is not envisaged. It is regarded disruptive and undesirable. Laws are made accordingly, and social intercourse defined and limited accordingly. Hence, the segregation policies and the socially discriminating practices, as obtain in Southern Rhodesia and in Kenya.

Assimilation, under the minority-supremacy and permanent-domination policies of South Africa, is wholly out of the question. It is accordingly fought at all levels. Hence such laws as the Act of 1949, forbidding all mixed marriages.¹ Indeed, the whole theory and practice of South African "democracy," as we have seen, quite rules out any manner of assimilation.

1. Basil Davidson, op. cit., p. 23.

On the other hand, theoretically at least, the policy of assimilation is a French aspiration and ideal -- a policy in keeping with that France which Albert Duchene², one time "Directeur des Affaires Politiques au Ministère de Colonies," once styled: "La France du dedans et la France du dehors, la vieille France d'Europe et la Nouvelle France." It is the policy of "friendly association and progressive assimilation", to use Jacques Stern's phrase,³ where "no discrimination exists between the white French-man and the coloured Frenchman," where --

Perhaps the unknown soldier who rests under
the Arc de Triomphe is a coloured Frenchman.⁴

Or, if full assimilation is not reached owing to stubborn traditional and sociological factors such as those that divide the Christian Frenchman from the Muslim Frenchman, or the stalwart black Frenchman of French Niger from the swarve white Frenchman of "L'Académie Française", at least:

On pourrait dire que citoyen, sujet, protégé,
ce sont là, dans les régions qui relèvent de
notre autorité, de simples prénoms, et que
Français est le nom de famille, au moins
par adoption.⁵

2. Albert Duchene, "La Politique Coloniale de la France", Paris, Payot, 1928, p. 1.

3. Jacques Stern, "The French Colonies, Past and Future", New York, Didier, 1944, p. 38.

4. Ibid., p. 12.

5. Albert Duchene, op. cit., p. 315.

APPENDIX B

ASSIMILATION

-94-

Such then is the ideal of the French assimilation and free-association policy which found expression in the preamble of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic.⁶ Yet events in French Indo-China and continued insurrections in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, tell a different story and herald the disintegration of an empire that is storm-tossed by domestic instability and caught in the cross currents of inept imperialism and insurgent Afro-Asian nationalism.

6. The following is the relevant clause in the Preamble of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic: "La France forme avec les peuples d'outre-mer une Union fondée sur l'égalité des droits et des devoirs, sans distinction de race ni de religion."

APPENDIX C

ABSTRACT OF

THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN AND THE CLASH OF
POLITICAL POLICIES IN BRITISH AFRICA¹

British Africa consists of several dependencies differing markedly in their respective stages of social, economic and political developments, as well as with regard to their constitutional status. In all of them, however, the common problem is one of race relations and civil rights.

The white man, who presently has the upper hand, is faced with the problem of shaping his own destiny and that of the subject peoples.

His motives and designs -- whether genuine or specious -- together with his duties and responsibilities, constitute his burden in Africa.

The "White Man's Burden", a phrase originating with the new imperialism of the nineteenth century, but whose pregnant meaning is almost all-embracing, sums up that task and challenge, and applies as equally to events before and after the new imperialism.

It expresses itself in several ways in matters of policy, and the general policies in Africa, other factors reckoned with, are mostly a function of that "burden". For as its nature varies, so do the policies.

In consequence, we have three main policies: 1) Trusteeship, which aims at developing the African to a point of self-determination and self-government within the British Commonwealth; 2) Permanent White Domination, which is a policy of racial segregation and white supremacy under the guise of parallel development, and 3) Partnership, which is a form of trusteeship

1. M.A. Thesis presented by Bernard T.G. Chidzero, in 1955, to the Faculty of Political, Economic and Social Sciences of the University of Ottawa.

APPENDIX C

ABSTRACT

-96-

based on the theory of equality for all equally civilized people.

Each of these policies contains certain elements of conflict. There is in all of them, in one way or another, a conflict between theory and practice. And between them there is an inevitable clash, both theoretical and practical. The tensions and clashes they engender bring their weight to bear on Africa itself, as well as on the Commonwealth and the international scene.

Thus different approaches to a generally common problem give rise to different policies which in turn clash and beget other problems.

No easy solution seems possible. No solution devoid of moral regard and interracial justice can succeed. Artificial and unjust barriers can be but ruinous substitutes for basic principles and mutual respect.