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
*Sammon*

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS  
(from 1870 to the present day)

(M.A. degree June 1913)

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*Sammon, John.*



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## ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

(from 1870 to the present day)

The author of "Germania Triumphans", a startling work which has been perused and studied by the whole world with interest and apprehension, pictures a map of Europe as it will be in 1915 with Germany extending all the way to the Dneiper and Volga, and possessing a slice of Russian territory, with the Crimea as its centre. Are then the forests of the Vosges, the plains of Poland, or the steppes of the Danube to be washed in rivers of blood? The 'jingo' of Europe and the printer's devils can tell more of this than the sanest man. Bismarck said that "every nation must eventually pay for the windows broken by its Press". Much to the regret of peace-loving Germans, the morning wires send forth daily alarms to be read by the world at its breakfast hour. Digestion of such can only result in the assimilation of erroneous notions regarding the state of Europe. If ever the long list of wasted life has to be read from the scroll of Armageddon, how much the 'jingo' will have to answer for can only be known by the Creator. A careful analysis of the case cannot fail to convince the seeker after truth that no problem in these Relations presents itself incapable of solution. In no part of the world do the Empires of Germany and Britain face each other directly. The rivalry of commerce is common to all nations as well as Germany. French and Russian conflict with British ambitions in various parts of the world, and the oft-fooled prophets of political disaster have been made to stand agape at the settlement effected by the French and the Anglo-Russian ententes.\*

What then is the reason of Anglo-German strife? The reason, we fear, is a subtler, a deeper one. This reason may be summed up in one word - hatred. It is the hatred born of rivalry in its widest sense. The basis of rivalry is jealousy. Germans frequently say that England always crushes an enemy who dares to challenge her power or supremacy. But apart from the jealousy itself,

it is fitting to inquire when and how the actual hatred began, and how long-lived it is. Assuming that the Relations grew out of the war of 1870, and were consummated in 1900, we may expect to find that the details have reference to dates and events anterior to this struggle. In the subsoil of history, a discovery is made by historical authorities, of a fault in the stratified peace of Europe. That fault occurred at the time of the Seven Years War, when Prussia won her place as leader of the German States. For the first time, "Perfide Albion" lowered the pride of Prussia. Allied to Frederick the Great, she not only left him in the lurch,\* but even permitted Bute to hand to Choiseul of France, the chosen military secrets of Germany. Thus early a blow against British and German concord was struck.

From the 18th Century, the war-barometer scarcely moved. And not until the middle of the last century when British resentment was aroused against Prussia, was discord impressed on the sensitive ears of Englishmen; whereas, previous to this, when Anglo-Saxon rulers of Europe were wont to meet, they were harmonious with united Teuton song. In the clashes of 1866 and '70, only differences of minor note occurred to disturb the even tenour of this song. But slight as the variation was, it served as a prelude to a change of tone:

It is the little rift within the lute,  
That by and by will make the music mute,  
And ever widening slowly silence all.\*

From her knees, France however has risen to insert the wedge between English and German friendship; until to-day these cousins, and erstwhile friends, are at daggers drawn.

After the war of 1870, Bismarck proceeded to build, by "blood and iron", a German Empire on the ruins of a fallen nation.\* Bitter rivals for many centuries, the spectacle of the ruin of France awakened little sympathy in the bosom of England. Neither

in sea-power, wealth, commerce, nor industry could Germans be mentioned as serious rivals of merrie England. Bismarck, by no means wavering in his Imperial aims, recognized and paid tribute to the matchless superiority of the Island Kingdom. That he valued England's friendship, is but mildly expressing the thought. His desire for her good wishes was, and is, an open secret. However, with characteristic duplicity, he berated and blandished at one breath the British people. He set Austria against Russia; Russia against <sup>Gt.</sup> Britain; Gt. Britain against France; and, his object of producing disagreement among European states thus achieved, he turned to his consular serfs and said, "Do all in your power to obtain the good will of England; you need not even use cipher telegrams. We have nothing to conceal from the British since it would be madness for us to quarrel with England". This was plain speech and good sentiment indeed, but how unprophetic of the sirocco of wrath that later was to sweep the plains of Germany !

This arch-diplomatist succeeded in so confusing the builders of the European Babel of Peace, that, over the crafty designs of Russia and France, and the "perfidious" purposes of England, he literally sang Io Pae<sup>an</sup>. Matchless in cunning, and terrible in force his mailed hand came down alike upon the heads of rulers and subjects. He stood at the forge and hammered with sledge-like blows the obstinate links of the Triple Alliance. He trampled the Austrians under foot, and over the Italians he exercised a virtual command. He was, according to popular conceptions, fiend, arch-master, god, and all, until Europe recognized in him the director of her destiny. He was conscious of power, and was content to let men subserve his aims. He created an Invincible Army. He held the Empire in the hollow of his hand and said "Do this, for I command". He collected, like Absethus of old, his Libyan Parrots, and taught them to repeat "Bismarck is a God"; and like

Absethus, allowed them to fly over the skirts of his Hinterland, to astonish his subjects with such divine pronouncement.

The final quarter of the 19th Century was 'made in Germany'; on the foundations laid by Bismarck. Bound up with the diplomacy of the present hour, the threads of older policies are inseparable. On the Chancellor's work, is reared a mighty Germany - a maligned and masterful Germany. Had but the Iron Chancellor survived to conduct the ship of state, who knows but at this moment the Colossus of Germany would bestride the world? She has prepared an Invincible Army. Why not also a Victorious Fleet? With a power to guide her, a spirit to shape consistent foreign policy, what is to prevent her from basking in the dual smiles of Mars and Neptune?

Only the slightest rumblings in the final quarter of the century gave notice of the portentous eruption of 1900. On the surface, all seemed tranquil, clear and still, and happy in their prosperities, the Germans and British lived at peace with one another. Their kinship yet remained a bond that kept them close together, until at length the Germans "discovered" their relationship with the Boers of Africa. No sooner were the rival standards unfurled on the veldts of South Africa than the Germans, like first rate opportunists, soaked themselves with bitter British prejudice and forthwith proceeded to mollify the traditional enemies of the Fatherland with a view to forming a European coalition against hated, grasping England. A ready excuse presented itself. The unfortunate Zanzibar and Samoa incidents and the search of two German ships at Delagoa Bay in 1900, did more than anything else to precipitate vitriolic feeling in Germany. It kindled an ire that has been slow to damp; and it has helped professional agitators to further their plans of a Pan-German people, and a New Imperial Navy League. An incident at once so inflammatory and so derogatory to British interests has spelt

itself since in a type of expenditure more grave than anything of its kind that has happened since the earlier search of American frigates. To the British people the cost has been tens of thousands of millions sterling, not to mention besides this an appalling loss in cumulative culture. It has brought the unlucky taxpayer fairly to his knees; and the end is not as yet. The day of England's greatness is openly challenged by the indomitable will of the German, who claims as well as his English cousin, his rightful 'place in the sun'. The "marplot" of Europe must be swept from the seas as well as <sup>the</sup> land and stripped of her dominions red on the map of the world. Amid loud applause and constant huzzas, the Kaiser proclaimed in no uncertain speech, "Our future lies upon the seas"; henceforth the nation's efforts in the main will be a masterful attempt to grasp the trident from the tyranny at present possessing it, that no longer may ships be searched upon the seas."

The passage of the new century has been marked by a milestone which clearly shows us the progress of events from that date. On the other side of that milestone all was as calm as might be expected; on this, the angel of Peace is seen departing with sudden meteoric flight. A once healthy rivalry has degenerated into being the aggravated cancer of Europe. Pronounced incurable by world-famous experts, the worst is hourly expected. German Professors are indeed the first to buttress this opinion. With Bismarck's dictum, "we lie in the middle of Europe. We have at least three fronts on which we can be attacked. We are, moreover, more exposed than any other people to the danger of hostile coalition because of our geographical position." This is a perfectly sane proposition. A more striking defence of the German position it is not possible in truth to give. "No man", said Bismarck, 'would dare to attack us when we have such a powerful war-machine as we wish to make the German Army'. Wilhelm would say, "No nation would dare attack us while we possess such a powerful weapon of offence as we wish to make the German Navy! The sands

of Time have run on, and this is but a new personality. "We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world" exclaimed the German Chancellor. This maxim is a true expression of the so-called German aggressiveness of to-day. Thorough by nature, a German never does things by halves. He wanted his Navy, so he parceled the country in districts, to each of which he allotted a professional agitator. Provided with lanterns and screens, and given the use of all school houses, the paid haranguer used his advantage without stint. He spoke violent words, and often pictured views of a capture at sea, where a giant warship triumphantly heaved by the side of a helpless German coracle. The result was what might be expected. Popular indignation gradually assumed most dangerous proportions, the expression of which soon vented itself in a hasty demand for the laying of keels and counter-keels. <sup>Thus began</sup> the grim business of ocean rivalry, ~~xxxx~~ ~~began~~. Enthusiasm pulsed through the length and breadth of Germany; but its beats, <sup>alas!</sup>, bestirred the slumbers of restless and jealous neighbours. The French, the Russian, and the English hatchets at length were buried in the soil of German Peril.

However unwelcome abroad, the new Navy plans were <sup>certainly</sup> welcomed at home. Germans felt that they were not building "an artificial limb against England's strong right arm". In 1895 Wilhelm II called to the Chancellorship, Admiral Von Tirpitz, to enact the first of Five Great Navy Laws. From time to time, with increment of number and size, fresh keels slipped to sea, beneath the fatherly eye of the German Kaiser. In England, on the other hand, the inevitable response was an appreciably merrier clank of dock-yard hammers. <sup>1</sup>

That peace at the present price cannot long be maintained, to the student of foreign affairs, seems ~~to be~~ a well-nigh irresistible conclusion. An object lesson of this sort has recently been afforded us. With ironic suddenness, in view of the present

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tendency toward universal peace, the costive stupidity of Europe was awakened in early morning hours by the flare-up in the Balkans. In the mind of expert opinion, German prestige has suffered a serious setback in the Turkish débacle of October last. German guns, and German methods, and all things 'made in Germany' appeared to succumb to Creusots, and everything brought from France. The Chauvinist cry of revenge ever since has been ringing in the cantons of France; while military experts are more and more daily inclined to discount the chances of German victory. <sup>2</sup>

The last few years have witnessed a serious deterioration in the German Army, and the same who used to talk of invading England now talk even of Germany being invaded by an English force. *Prima facie*, it would seem that this view must be wholly extravagant. A little reflection on the facts of the case will materially help to clear up the point. <sup>3</sup> The confidence of Germany is utterly shaken by the disclosure of a secret military understanding between France and England (through "The Indiscretions"), whereby the latter consents to the rapid dispatch to Belgium of all her Territorials, of 160,000 men to make up the discrepancy in numbers between the French and German forces and in time to take part in the great opening battle or battles of the war. The aftermath of Agadir is a weight in the scale which easily may have for its result the complete destruction of Germany at a given moment. On the chess-board of Europe, armed kings and knights move hither and thither, each of them blocking the deep-laid plans of the others. No sooner filters the story of the Territorial scheme than the engines of Germany lay houses and stores and military roads to a secret camp near the Belgic willows of Liege and Aachen.

Reverting to the year 1904, we behold the Germans, not less industrially than in a maritime sense, just beginning to be respectable competitors of England. Germany was becoming more and more dependent upon sea-borne trade. Since 1870, the population

increased by twenty-five millions and the yearly increment approaches one million souls. During one hundred and two days of the calendar year, the nation was fed on foreign corn. That is to say, one-fourth of her people were so provided for the entire year. Tropical foodstuffs and raw materials she imports mainly and these she is obliged to pay for with a large export trade. On a territory no bigger than Texas, the Germans have eighty millions; and the home resources are constantly being depleted. During the 19th Century, she watched six millions of her children embark for foreign settlements, never to return. Can we suppose that she will cheerfully lose three times as many in the twentieth? If she is not to lose them, there must be colonies formed for them to go to (Schöller). South American plantation districts are especially alluring to the German. But alas! the spectre of Monroe and his prohibitory doctrine loom always about the Western skies. An infringement of the Monroe doctrine would mean war with the United States. An irresistible conclusion is forced upon us from every view-point. Germany is absolutely dependent upon foreign trade, and that trade can be alone secure when protected by a masterful fleet. In fact, in the fleet-literature of Germany, no dread so often is expressed as the fear of a sudden blockade. Should the northern ports be closed, with war on the East and West, and no food to be had at any price, patriots fear they should lose the gain of the last twenty-five years; "while England would regain her old position of trade supremacy. (Nauticus). The Flotten Novelle" begins an article on the 'Blockade Peril' with the statement that none but battleships will do to guard against the danger. While Russia, France and The United States hold territories for their own exclusive trade, Germans have not thus far, in this respect, had anything to fear from England. Yankees play 'dog in the manger' on American continents, Russia attempts to secure a lien of trade in Asia, while France's commercial and colonial league is scarcely less extensive. But Germany grows pallid at the thought

lest England should some day follow their example, abolish Free Trade, and establish that worst of all things - a British Zollverein\* of the Mother Country and the Colonies. Such an arrangement would stifle a third of Germany's export trade, and the best British customer would be bitterly estranged. Canada, in 1897-98, lowered her tariff one-fourth to all nations that admitted her goods free. It sounded 'a bit like Free Trade', but in reality it profited only New South Wales and England. Two German Professors\* advocated the refusal of the most-favoured nation - treatment in retaliation for Canada's action. In this action, they see the beginning of the end. If England turn Protectionist, Continental Europe will have to unite to avoid being economically trampled on (brutalizirt), and the probable result will be war.\* Speaking of British Protection, Sir Wm. McMillan, Colonial Treasurer of New South Wales, declared that the day England gave up her Free Trade would likewise witness the beginning of her decline.<sup>4</sup> There was a time when Germans could put faith in the protection afforded their own in British Dominions, but that was long before Bismarck discovered "the Zollvereinish tendencies of England" (Schmoller).

Although our intention is not to wander beyond the limits set by the subject, there is <sup>still</sup> the necessity of referring to dates and events anterior to the outburst of German feeling since 1900. Not until the unfortunate Samoa incident and the South African war did the real ulcer of the German Menace come to a head. With these events an active crisis swept into being. Perhaps the time seemed opportune to form a European coalition against the 'arrogant searcher of the Seven Seas'; and when her hour had come Germany <sup>was</sup> neither <sup>slow</sup> nor inactive. The Sable Eagles had, for the first time, perhaps, in history, openly dared the frown of Perfidious England, and from that hour was set in motion all the "howling mechanism of a violent fleet-literature." The campaign

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for an Invincible Navy originated about 1900. That date was the birth-day of the present naval strain; and the methods employed to stir up German passion were without doubt the most methodical and malign ever used by demagogues.

There is nothing more remarkable in the history of politics than the failure of statesmen to foresee the ultimate effect of their actions. In 1897, the German Emperor exclaimed "We must grasp the Trident of Neptune. Our future lies upon the seas; and without the consent of Germany nothing may happen in any part of the world". Only the elect, he believed, could say, "Civis Germanicus Sum".

Strange to say, the triumph, 'real and ironic', of German policy has been the upbuilding of the British Empire. The Kaiser's vision of a polyglot Empire, encircling the world, and embracing all peoples, is rapidly vanishing before his eyes. "The fitful", fixed and immutable Navy Law has brought even the "Dominion of Canada to our side."\* The British Empire was only welded the closer by the famous Kruger telegram, which shed a piercing light on German aims. The effect of multi-colored policy is likewise multiplied. The current of foreign ~~and~~ statecraft has since been conducted ~~over~~ alternately. A one-man policy was needed, and capacity for such individual cunning died with Bismarck. In his day, Germany was secure and dominant in Europe. But post-Bismarckian policy has been an uninterrupted series of failures, in which Germany, by interfering, has estranged all her former friends. The Chancellor's motto was, Divide et Impera.\* He set England against France by encouraging the colonial policy of the Republic, and he antagonized Russia against England by abetting Russia's Turkish and Asiatic interests. England, isolated from the rest of Europe, would, in his view, be compelled to lean on Germany, and consequently would have to be Germany's potential ally. At the

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Berlin Congress he set Russia against Austria by giving to the latter, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and France against Italy by giving Tunis to France. Thus Italy and Austria, menaced on every hand, fell naturally into the lap of the Triple Alliance.

How different seem all these arrangements now ! *Omnium rerum principia parva sunt*. From small beginnings come great things. The ignominy of Germany's diplomatic defeat has forced her again to seek that 'rapprochement' with England, so respected of Bismarck. The inevitable results of her policy, embarked upon in 1900, remained hidden from her shrewdest leaders. These results may briefly be enumerated as below: (1) a resuscitated France; (2) a consolidated British Empire; (3) an Entente Cordiale between the British Imperial system and the Dual Alliance of Russia and France; (4) a definite Dual Alliance; (5) a closed Far-East, per Russo-Jap agreement; (6) a weakening of the Triple Alliance; (7) a loss of German prestige, accompanied by a succession of diplomatic defeats; (8) last, but by no means least, a serious economic strain at home.

Nothing can now be more evident than the revival of French patriotism. Humiliated and broken in the "terrible war" of 1870, with her military power scattered, her fortresses razed, and forced to bear a crushing war-indemnity, it was freely prophesied, even by friendly voices, that the onceproud nation of the Franks would not recover for many years. But the very struggle that was the making of Germany already threatens to undo her. The French rejuvenation is one of the wonders of the modern world; while the progress she has made toward a war of "revanche" is truly amazing. Chauvinism is by no means dead, and the Chauvinist appeal to England and Russia to lend a hand seems not to pass without a note of response. There are many experts in military science in Europe who to-day would scarcely

hesitate to predict a French victory in a Franco-German clash next year; while in addition one must not forget that England is expected by France to take a part in the struggle. German alarm, forsooth, seems not without foundation, if she faces a prospect of Creusote and Maxim guns ranged side by side; for the Krupp is admittedly no match for the first of these.

The British Empire is at this moment a dreaded reality; a fact with which Germans will have to reckon in all their future ship building programme. E Pluribus Unum, the several states and colonies and Dominions of the Empire fast are federating for common trade, and for common defence, and for common interests of every kind. Ten years back, the Imperial system was like a vast nebula, <sup>whose</sup> parabolic star-dust since has received from German aggressiveness the required centripetal force to whirl it into one harmonious whole. The most outlying parts of the British Empire now can feel the throb of the metropolitan heart. Old London pulses with an energy unrivalled heretofore; while the colonies' cluster, till recently a mosaic, inanimate conglomerate, now resembles the functioning agents of a markedly vital organism. To say that so happy an event, scarce-shaped for by the most optimistic of dreamers a decade ago, could have been brought about solely by internal agencies, is but to parry with the facts. None so well as the political student believes that Germany has been the smith, who unconsciously stood at the forge and welded with sledge-hammer blows, (of policy calculated for a different purpose), the British links that to-day girdle the earth.

When Wilhelm stood in the poop of a proudly vaunted cruiser, and proclaimed, for the four winds to bear to all whom it might concern, that he intended some day to master the ocean, he little dreamed how foolish the almost immediate future would make him appear. Could he have seen in advance, how he, a Hohenzollern, was destined to be the paradoxical

founder of a British Empire, he would have been in a position to realize that man is but an instrument in the hand of Providence. Could he have foreseen that he would place on his people a tax, (economically appalling), of double the rate per capita of the next highest tax <sup>on wealth</sup> in the world, he would never have voiced his boast. Had he prevision that the bitterest of traditional enemies <sup>would</sup> fly into each other's arms, and prepare to meet the common foe of England, France and Russia, he would not have opened his mouth. He did not foreknow that he would be the unintentional instrument of settlement of outstanding disputes between the members of the Triple Entente, which, if left to themselves, they never could have peacefully settled. In his glittering regalia on that bright summer's day he could have felt no premonition that the very same Chancellor, whom he chose for the purpose of enacting the famous "Five Laws" would be the identical personage to concede (so late as this year) <sup>5</sup> the real victory to England.

When the Prussian scheme of mastery over the land and the sea and the air began, alliances in Europe were in a much more jumbled condition than they are in at present. There was little cohesion between the pair of the Dual Alliance; while betwixt its members and England there was not less a positive antipathy than an open hostility on many matters of vital but conflicting colonial interests. France and England could in no sense agree to a settlement of African problems, while an almost hourly alarm was noised against the approach of the Russian Bear on the frontiers of Hindustan. But all this was gradually changed by a short-sighted policy on the part of Germany, which, however well-meant in the interests of peace or self-defense, can not be defended on the grounds of national wisdom. The moment that England perceived the uselessness of further preserving herself in rapt isolation, the last ion of

repulsion dissipated itself, and three of the most widely-sundered nations of Europe drifted together. Nothing more was needed than a feeling of repulsion towards a common enemy to make them run concurrently in such a manner as not even eons of time could have so well brought about. This feeling soon had its effect. Cherishing a sentiment of deadly revenge, the Chauvinistic section of the French Press was not found sleeping when the chance offered itself to accommodate their views to the more friendly tones of British diplomacy. Speedily, the hatred of centuries melted away, and the oldest historical rivals commenced to bask in the novel sun light of a new-found friendship. In the fire of German animosity, the Dual Alliance was reduced to a closer, more compact state; while the hitherto insociable atom, the British Teuton, has separated himself from his German kind, and freely claimed a place in a composite affinity with the Latin and the Slav ; a social miracle, it is true, but the inevitable product of a seething furnace in the heart of Europe.

By no means confined to the branches of the Caucasian family, the alliances of other peoples than the whites, with the whites\* has been brought about by the ponderous hammer of German diplomacy. Apart from an abstract consideration of these topics, space will later be found to deal with the practical results of each of these effects of the policy of the Fatherland. It is however impossible not to perceive the world-wide influence Germans have had in formulating policies other than their own, and friendships useful to any but themselves. It is only yesterday that responsible Germans could be made to believe that the inevitable result of their own foreign tactics would lead to sure defeat. <sup>6</sup> Checkmated in all her attempts at aggrandizement, whether in Africa, America, or the Near East,

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she fain would next have a piece off China. However, instinctive regard for her own self-protection caused one of the matadors of Europe\* to desist from a mortal combat with a nation of the Yellow race, in order to grip the hand of Nippon in a solemn covenant to close the door to Chinese partition in the face of ever non-plussed Germany.

This 'aggressiveness' of Germany has made of her a veritable delta, where is wont to be deposited all the vile muck of the diplomatic world. The effects of her foreign 'fanfare' are coming home to her on many tributaries; and not least of them is the putrid flow of her commercial life. The German tax of capita wealth of 48% as compared to the corresponding tax of 28% in England, has caused the price of bread to soar, and the living wage to go above the international level; so much, that this is mainly answerable for the steady migration in the past six years of factories and plants to Belgium, France and England. Significant indeed is the appearance of a powerful party of Reactionists, entirely distinct from Socialists, Centrists, Radicals, or Liberals, who have, since 1910, been most notably declamatory against the further growth of naval expenditure, and indeed extremely querulous of the present programme. In truth it would appear that there is more of this behind Von Tirpitz' latest utterance than generally may be supposed.

For Germans still inclined to strike an optimistic note, the slipping in recent years from her Triple Moorings of the modern state of Italy furnishes a dampening event. Rejuvenated, and perhaps the most ambitious of new nations, Italy has evidently determined to rescue herself from a somnolent sphere in the Triple Alliance. So far has this tendency shown itself of late, that no responsible German any longer believes that Italy would engage in a war with France, or indeed with England; while

as for Austria, it remains an open secret that Italy is extremely jealous of her on the Adriatic side, and would gladly humiliate her rather than suffer the Dual Monarchy to harbour a dreadnought fleet near Durazzo, or even at any station of the Mediterranean littoral. Reasons are not wanting for the weakness of the Triple Alliance. Expert opinion actually believes that the late Tripolitan war really was waged by Italy in anticipation of Germany's seizure of the Sanjak of Novibazar; while prudent Italian counsel forbids their country from waging in support of Germany and Austria, a purely unselfish war against so powerful a combination as the Triple Entente, strengthened by the possible accretion to its forces of the Balkan Federation.

In respect of prestige, then, the German nation has reached a critical period of its history. The succession of shocks administered to her diplomatic corps within the past few years brings us to a consideration of an entirely new chapter in the Relations, and one which is by no means devoid of interest or importance. In fact, it is a crucible wherein it is possible so to reduce the 'signs of the time' as to be able to build up a new product, i. e., an appreciation of the living moment, with an approximation of the future.

Plucking fruit from Germany's garden has, of late been the diverting sport of certain Powers. ~~Whether this be true or not,~~  
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There is an implied tribute to the greatness of the German. Practically the whole of the world's policy is to-day coloured by the statesmen of Germany or at least by a set of statesmen who are simply making moves which are nothing else after all than counter moves to those of Germany. The fact that their success appears to be now complete, very little takes from the respect and admiration which Germans have exacted from the rest of the world. The fruit which has been picked is indeed precious,

sweet. to the palates of "Cordiale" militants; but in the case of one of them at least, the seeds were very bitter. England had perhaps the most to gain by successfully thwarting the plans of Germany; and accordingly, as the object was a prize of real value, she reckoned not the cost. But this gives us an opportunity for conjecture towards the close of the chapter.

A knowledge of the facts leads a calm student of European politics readily to conclude that Germany secured, in 1905, to the discomfiture of France, the resignation from the Premiership of that country of the very man, M. Delcassé, who was last month, by the new militaristic Premier, M. Poincaré, so significantly appointed Ambassador to Russia. This incident of 1905 was the first of a series of antics, <sup>later</sup> so frequently indulged in by the "blind bull" of Europe. The bullying received an ill-defined check from Sir. H. Campbell-Bannerman of the new British Liberal Government, in the following year. But yet, not to be deterred, the noxious creature rushed across the borders of France, and tried, in 1908, to goad that people to war. The very next year, the attack was suddenly directed against Russia, when Austria successfully settled her "valid" claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The delicate balance of affairs then trembled visibly for two whole years, when suddenly in the summer of 1911, while many were enjoying a midsummer holiday, the Panther\* pounced on Agadir and forthwith trouble began in earnest. This time the China shop was nearly wrecked. On a Sunday, when the fewest possible number of Canadians were able to get the burden of cable messages, the British nation might easily have been at war. It is probable that this date marked the real climax of the Anglo-German tension. There were reasons for the choice of the date when the Panther cut across the seas before the chalk-white cliffs of Agadir. First of all, one of

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the most violent denunciators of Germany in this particular crisis. Lloyd-George, was believed in German circles to be the head of a "Potsdam" Party in England, opposed to Sir Edward Grey and the wishes of the Triple Entente. There then was some ground for hope that the Chancellor would induce his country perfidiously to leave in the lurch her Ally across the Channel. As she had done with Frederick the Great; why not so with her nearest ally? Secondly, credence was given to the belief that Russia was cooling towards France, and thirdly, the Caillaux press of France, in its advocacy of cosmopolitan finance, was even then denunciatory of British interest in the Triple Entente. Germany struck because "She believed" her hour had struck\* and, if her failure was a notable one, it was still more a striking test of the solidarity of the hitherto dubious Entente. If Germans based any hopes on the attitude of Lloyd-George, on any difficulties in the shape of a wide-spread coal strike which confronted him, the Little Man quickly dissipated them in a sensational bellicose speech, the twenty-first of July, nineteen hundred and eleven.

Thus are we brought to the very hour and the heart itself of the famous Moroccan crisis. But all the story has not yet been told about the so-called, mis-called aggressiveness of Germany. ἀπλούς ὁ μύθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἐφύ\* . The simplest and boldest recital of facts, therefore, can only serve as a disillusionment to the mind even of the most misguided "Press dieter", whether on the street or in the shelter of an "Englishman's Home". The complaint of Germans is, that, from the statesmen on top to the collier in the damps below, the English are fed on 'gutter-spout' literature of the most putrid sort in respect of all things German. This complaint is well founded. Respectable Germans constantly feel themselves hurt by the most absurdly patronizing advice from England not only as to how they shall conduct their affairs, but frequently as

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to how they must conduct them. The upshot is that even the most ardent disciples of peace in the Fatherland have come to entertain a wholesome dread of a sudden, malicious, and altogether unwarranted attack from England; and can we blame them? Let us see. King Edward as well as Lord Lansdowne, and others, have spared no efforts in a decade to isolate the enemy before (as Germans believe) doing away with her. No sacrifice towards the attainment of this end was considered too great. To Japan was surrendered the mastery of the Pacific, and the virtual control of the Far East; to America were lost all rights over the Panama Canal; Russia was appeased (not without untold misgivings for the future) by concessions in Persia; France was practically handed Morocco, by virtue of a deservedly notorious 'secret' clause in the Agreement of 1904. The historic friendship of Austria-Hungary was lost over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Italy and France were finally reconciled on the Mediterranean through the ministrants of Britain, while, the far-flung battle-line of England was gradually concentrated in the channel and declared to be 'in readiness for the utmost eventualities in the North Sea'.

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Of three diplomatic encounters since 1904 the English have successfully cramped the Germans in the first and the last. Not to speak of the defects of her projected Baghdad Railway scheme, the Hohenzollern Monarch has been forbidden to put foot on North West Africa, and has been made to face the interests of Japan in the East. It is current belief that the Supreme Navy exists mainly to keep Germany away from America, the Indies and Portuguese Africa. By no means faded from ~~her~~ memory, it is deserving of note that plans were laid in 1905 for the capture of the Kiel Canal and the landing of 100,000 British troops in Schleswig-Holstein. But this is a dim light beside another lately directed upon the 'Relations'. Bismarck said "No state

"should sacrifice itself on the altar of faithfulness to the "friendships it has made". Perhaps his advice was followed by France; perhaps not. But at any rate, France at the Algeiras Convention of 1904 openly declared for the "maintenance of the "integrity of the Shereefian Empire", and at the same time, in a secret clause, revealed only in 1909, practically divided between Spain and herself the whole of Morocco. Not till the occupation of Fez by French and Spanish troops were the virtual intentions of this treacherous league revealed. The duty of England clearly <sup>then</sup> was to uphold the Convention of 1904. But actually, what was her course? She not only defended France in the recent crisis but even connived with her in every way, compacting her already warm understanding with that country and backing by secret agreement her position, in such a way that, in short time, her fleet was mobilized, a Territorial army of 160,000 was promised for Belgium and General French was despatched as prospective Commander-in-Chief of the Allies to hold a review of the French forces along the frontier lines of Germany. And all this, it must not be forgotten, because Germany insisted with a perfect right on the observance of the Act of Algeiras, to which England, just as truly as any of the others, was a signatory; a treaty concerning Morocco, where British interests were comparatively unimportant, and which, to say the least, could best be served, in any case, by the very thing that Germans sought - the 'open door' for markets.

Can we wonder, then, that the aftermath of Agadir has left resentment, hatred, and mistrust in the minds of Germans towards the methods of Englishmen? Not at all, I think. "As long as men are men and states are states the question of limiting of armaments will remain insoluble!" "The meddling rôle of Sir Edward Grey in the conferences was a perpetual endeavour to injure Germany. General French's inspection of the French troops on our frontiers, the attitude of the most influential English

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"newspapers , Lloyd-George's speech in France, and the display  
"of the English fleet in readiness for war,'all were sparks to  
"light up the French Chauvinistic gunpowder reserve'. We in Ger-  
"many have striven long enough against the inclination to take  
"seriously Germany's enemies in England..... Tripoli was  
"certainly not given up willingly to Italy, or Morocco to France,  
"and to link Russia to England, half Persia was sacrificed.....  
"It is based on the unhappy old English tradition of "the balance  
"of power" in Europe. No power of the continent shall exceed a  
"certain strength determined by England. With this political  
"maxim there is no possibility of concord..... We must be  
"strong meanwhile, and we must wait till a saner policy gains the  
"ascendant in England..... England could well experiment with  
"such a policy..... Perhaps the time for a final change of view  
"will have come when officers of the Indian Lancers and Russian  
"Cossacks watch each other within pistol shot on the Russian front-  
"ier while reading the London Times and the Novoe Vremja"

Already, perhaps, the final change of view is at hand. The  
events of the past four weeks, while not exactly justifying the  
prophecies of dire calamity made in the last four years, yet  
sufficiently show how very nearly correct those prophecies might  
have been. Scarcely indeed do we appear to have emerged from the  
danger of the Balkan conflagration. The crisis is pronounced as  
past for now at least. But the state of political affairs is such  
that the certainties of one day are the unrealities of the next.  
anges The fluctuation of the stock-markets, the settling of the bourses,  
the movements of the war-barometers indicate, on every hand, a  
dangerous tension. Nothing but the levers of cosmopolitan finance  
seem able to cope with the enginery of war. Moreover it has been  
startlingly revealed by a sufficient investigation held in England  
in March, that 'the interests' are 'getting up' facts and figures

and forecasts to goad the nations to war and armament . Remembering all these things does it not strongly suggest itself that the people of the nations may not want to fight each other any more than the schoolboy who was goaded on to fight his fellow for the amusement of the rest ? Surely it does <sup>perchance</sup> seem as though the millions yet desire peace. and that the consumption of alarmist literature of the last five years will not succeed finally in reverting men back to barbarous and incessant warfare. Yet, even with the notes of cheerful optimism, comes the ominous warning that the elements which corrode civilization are already at work. Invention, since 1900, has noticeably slackened its pace, and it may be that mankind is about to revert to the work of destruction.

Whether civilization is rotting at the heart or not, the settlement of outstanding military problems is still pending. However, England begins to discover that Germans are not so viciously disposed after all. They must observe that the Germans are the only people who have not waged a war of conquest in forty years. It is plain to be seen that the position of Germany in Europe is a dangerous one. France is increasingly revengeful, and Russia is wholly more menacing than ever before; the Balkan Confederation has succeeded in dividing Austria-Hungary to some extent and to a very great degree is absorbing the attention of that country; the Triple Alliance is in need of more careful piloting; incidentally ~~the place of~~ a German dirigible, by an unlucky accident to those in command, has been captured, mapped and counter-designed by the French at Luneville; while finally the 'implacable' English have asserted once more their determination to maintain a vastly superior fleet at any cost.

Perhaps the last decision, more than any other, has had the effect of causing the German Government to welcome a limitation of armament.\* A better understanding already seems probable. The

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possibilities of the future by no means exclude an Anglo-German Alliance, framed <sup>so</sup> as to counteract the designs of Russia both as expressed in the Pan-Slavist movement, and in the acquisition of Persia as far as India. This is to say nothing of the French, who may easily revert to their old position of enmity towards Britain. The re-adjustment of Alliances, the breaking up of the Concert of the Powers, and the upsetting of the balance of Power in Europe, might easily result in the cataclysm so long dreaded of mankind, were it not for the blessed hopes engendered by the final success of diplomacy in the latest settlement of the Balkan crisis.

EXPLANATORY NOTES.

1. The plans of the Super-Brandenburg type of ships were forestalled 'coincidentally' by the launch of the battleship Dreadnought I; which in its turn gave way to a superior German Nassau. While Germans are wont to put the blame of ruinous competition on the British, for building the Dreadnought, it is now generally believed that, with regard to the Brandenburg ship, the English Intelligence agency at Berlin was singularly well-informed. - so much so, in fact, that the onus of ship-building competition seems fairly removed from the shoulders of Dreadnought designers.
2. The usual average of military conscription requires not less than 1.1% of capable manhood to undergo military training. In their modern zeal for a matchless Navy, the Germans have neglected the drilling of one-third of their manhood. The result, par consequence, of this, as well as the tandem policies of her triple opponents, has brought the Bismarckian Empire to a dangerous impasse. There lies, on her eastern frontier, a nation whose people number scarcely more than one-half of her own, but whose up-to-date military system has placed her indeed on a footing of consummate equality. To offset the danger, a League, the Wehrverein, has sprung into being, with <sup>the</sup> avowed intention of keeping the Army abreast of the Navy. (Since the abandonment of the one per cent standard, the army has received not 93000, but 14000 men only, - a discrepancy surely and overtly serious for a nation liable to tripartite attack.) To add to the danger, the world believes, with Col. Begel, a French artillery expert, that the field equipment of France is much superior to that of Germany; while Germany herself admits that her own methods are now for the most part antiquated and unimproved by the vital lesson of the Boer war and that of the Russo-Japanese.

3. It is a fact well-known to war connoisseurs, that in the minds of all leaders of German thought, the danger of invasion by land is a matter of deep concern. The latest figures from the press call for an additional strength of 168000 men which is an increase of 138000 on the earlier proposal of January. This brings the grand total to more than 850,000 men. In response to this extraordinary move, the French have voted to increase an already powerful army of 580,000 to the surprising number of 790,000, and have returned to the Presidency, a militaristic leader, M. Poincare. whose significant initial step was to send to Russia as foreign ambassador, the very man, M. Delcasse, whom we read was dismissed by "Les Allamagnes" (some years before). What this may mean to the so-called 'bully' of Europe can better be judged in the light of a more recent revelation.

4. "In spite of the fact that everybody profits from it, the British Empire excites enough envy as it is. But it is difficult to conceive the hatred and rancour it would excite if a serious attempt were made to confine its benefits to Anglo-Saxendom" (Sir Wm. McMillan). All this relates to economics of course; but, economics is inextricably tangled with the web of political rivalry which has formed between the two countries, and, as such deserves to be treated here.

5. Von Tirpitz at last believes it impossible to overtake the English battle-line in point of numbers.

6. Germany has been the blind bull of Europe. Rushing madly forward, in a vain attempt to impale her enemies, her sole consolation has been to see them fly, from time to time, to the umbrage of one another's friendships; while they, by cleverly side-stepping have led the enemy into a dangerous impasse, from which indeed she will recover, if she may.