Remembering Japanese Colonialism: Comparing Traumas and Memories in Taiwan and Korea

A MRP

Presented

To the Faculty of

Social Sciences

At the University of Ottawa

In Partial Fulfilment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

In

Political Science

By

Ken Yoshida

Summer 2022

Under the Supervision of

Dr. André Laliberté

Acknowledgements

This MRP would not have been possible if it were not for the following persons I have had the pleasure of meeting during my post-secondary studies and who greatly enriched this endeavour.

Thank you/merci/謝謝你/ありがとうございます/감사합니다 to:

Professor William Tait from my alma mater of Carleton University to have recommended me Leo Ching's book, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* for a book review. This was my first exposure to Taiwan and the start of my fascination with the island; Asia's hidden gem.

Dr. Dong Kwang Kim from my one-year international exchange alma mater of Okayama University to have encouraged and supported me to pursue graduate studies. For without his encouragement and support, I would not be writing this MRP that concludes my master's degree.

Dr. André Laliberté from my current academic home of the University of Ottawa for being my supervisor of this MRP. His guidance and insight on this MRP and its topic have allowed me to indulge further into my fascination with Taiwan that started years ago with a book review for a second-year history class.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Despite there being extensive literature on Japanese colonialism and its legacy, there seems to be a literature gap on the topic. That gap is how the former colonies remember Japanese colonialism between themselves and not with their former colonial ruler. I attempt to fill this gap by asking "Why do Taiwan and Korea remember traumas and memories from Japanese colonialism differently?" Taiwan and Korea were chosen for comparison because they share geographic, historical, political, and economic similarities, thus identifying and analyzing exact causes of any difference in remembrance is possible. The Method of Difference, Comparative Process Tracing (CPT), politics of memory, and trauma theory of the research methods and conceptual frameworks I use to identify and analyze variables that cause that difference in remembrance.

Introduction

2020 was the 75th anniversary of the end of WW2, but also marked the end of Japanese colonial rule over the island of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. Despite the end of Japanese colonialism over 75 years ago, its legacy still affects Taiwan and South Korea (hereafter only as "Korea") to this day due to ongoing sensitivity of unresolved historical issues. Sensitivity around these issues could be attributed to the countries' opposing perceptions, even after reaching a settlement like Japan and Korea's 2015 Agreement on Comfort Women. The comfort women issue continues to bedevil relations between the two even after the agreement because Japan still views Korea as not being sincere in its reconciliation, while Korea continues to believe that Japan has not properly apologized for the atrocity (Kumagai, 2020). After Korea's success in getting an agreement with Japan in 2015, Taiwan immediately sought a similar resolution with Japan on the comfort women issue (Rivett-Carnac, 2015). Taiwan has not reached an agreement with Japan because Korea had more leverage as an important security partner, but the comfort women issue had never dominated Taiwan-Japan relations like in Korea-Japan relations (Pollmann, 2016). However, Taiwan did unveil its first statue honoring comfort women in the city of Tainan in 2018 that sparked diplomatic tensions with Japan (Kratz, 2018). Otherwise, Taiwan has good relations with Japan despite the colonial history, which was exemplified when Taiwan was the second biggest donor to Japan following the Fukushima disasters in 2011, and relations are expected to improve due to regional trade and security issues (Pollmann, 2016).

Despite there being extensive literature on Japanese colonialism and its legacy, there seems to be a literature gap on the topic. That gap is about how differently from each other the former colonies remember Japanese colonialism. Thus, comparing Taiwan and South Korea's remembrance of Japanese colonialism would begin filling that gap and confirm differences in

remembrance between the two. Formally, this paper seeks to answer the following question, "Why do Taiwan and Korea remember traumas and memories from Japanese colonialism differently?" To answer this question, two conceptual frameworks and two research methods will be applied complementarily. For the conceptual frameworks, the politics of memory and trauma theory will be applied to explain how the identified variable(s) would cause the difference in remembrance between Taiwan and Korea. Meanwhile for the research methods, the Method of Difference and Comparative Process Tracing (CPT) will be applied to identify the variables that would create a difference in remembrance between the two. It is upon the application of these concepts and methods that I argue Taiwan and Korea remember differently the traumas and memories from Japanese colonialism because Taiwan was "colonized" by the KMT (I note this is a controversial interpretation) while Korea achieved independent self-rule after liberation from Japan in 1945, and this led to different processes in remembering the traumas from their colonial experience. Thus, my argument implies that whether achieving independent self-rule immediately after decolonization is a crucial element to the different remembrance of the traumas and memories from colonialism.

Determining the validity of my argument will start through an overview of the concepts and methods identified above to defend their selection as the tools for analysis in the comparison between Taiwan and Korea. Following the overview, a literature review of how Taiwan and Korea currently remember their colonial past will be done to provide context before examining Taiwan and Korea's colonial and post-colonial history to identify potential variables that might have caused a difference in remembrance. Once the variables have been identified, they will be put in comparison for an analytical discussion with the chosen conceptual and research frameworks that seeks to explain how their remembrance came to be in modern times. The

conclusion will outline the merits and limits of this paper's research.

Conceptual Frameworks and Research Methods

In doing the overview of the conceptual frameworks and research methods that will be used in this paper, I seek to justify their selection and explain their intended application. As this paper is not focused on solving conceptual debates, potential solutions to existing conceptual problems will not be provided.

Conceptual Frameworks

For the theoretical frameworks that will be utilized, there will be a primary theory that is supplemented by another related theory. The first theoretical framework being the politics of memory. Verovšek (2016) notes that a vast literature on memory has been generated across the humanities and social sciences, but that there is little agreement what it is and how it should be studied (p.530). This statement was suggested and supported earlier by Huyssen, where he (2003) states "memory is one of those elusive topics we all think we have a handle on. But as soon as we try to define it, it starts slipping and sliding, eluding attempts to grasp it either culturally, sociologically, or scientifically" (p.3) Therefore, this paper will not seek to contribute to the theoretical debates on the politics of memory, but rather take some inspiration from its many different interpretations and understandings and apply it to my research. My theoretical framework will draw from Verovšek's thesis where he suggests that (2016) the politics of memory should focus on the collective memory expressed by actors within state institutions and on the informal interactive channels through which ideas about the past are conveyed, disputed, silenced, and negotiated (p.531). His thesis is clear and comprehensive on the concept of politics of memory. It calls for research into formal and informal actors and channels of how the politics of memory is expressed and serves as the fundamental lesson which guides my conceptual and

research frameworks. It also permits me to analyze memory as a homogenous process and experience instead of a heterogeneous one because I can focus on the memories that create an interaction between the state and its people.

To supplement the concept of the politics of memory, trauma theory will be used in my research. Much like the concept it seeks to supplement in my research, trauma theory contains complexities and controversies that have had an important influence in the humanities and social sciences, especially in postcolonial studies (Visser, 2011, p.271). Radstone expressed similar thoughts, where she (2007) stated that "there are repeated references to this (trauma) theory, its provenance and its reach (which) are, however, rarely traced" (p.10). Once again, this research does not seek to contribute to the theoretical debates on trauma, but to take inspiration from it. The inspiration comes primarily from Radstone, where she (2007) suggests that the theory of trauma is about the relation between the representation and the event or actuality; in other words, not a theory of recovered memory but of recovered referentiality (p.12). Referentially is derived from the thinking that representations bear only a highly mediated or indirect relation to an event or actuality (Radstone, 2007, p.11). Defining trauma theory and its aspect of referentiality in such a manner suggests that there is an element of fabrication in remembering traumas and memories. This serves as a conceptual narrowing on the politics of memory because it specifies a memory type (in this case trauma) that is evocated in postcolonial remembrance. Such a conceptual narrowing would also help in creating a modest argument that has credible historical evidence, which has gone through chronological process tracing. Additionally, I believe that trauma theory and the politics of memory are concepts that are applicable with the theory requirement of Comparative Process Tracing (CPT) – which I discuss below - because it follows CPT's two-step method of looking within and between historical cases for analysis.

Research Methods

Of the many comparative methods in the social sciences that exist, John Stuart Mill's Method of Difference was chosen because his method was the first systematic formulation of the modern comparative method and has been the conceptual instigator of such work (Moses and Knutsen, 2019, p.96). As the pioneer of the field whose work has inspired others, it is an indication that his comparative method is reliable in conducting experiments within the political and social fields. His method neutralizes similarities and highlights differences found in compared political and social systems of countries that share several common features as to control the causal effect (Moses and Knutsen, 2019, p.98). In controlling certain variables of each country, these variables can be determined as not being the potential causes for the different remembrance of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and Korea because they would have been neutralized. Research can therefore focus on other contextual variables that are more likely to explain the difference in memory between the two countries.

In light of my paper's focus on remembrance of traumas and memories, there is a strong historical element that requires an appropriate research method. Comparative Process Tracing (CPT) is a research method that would complement my use of the Method of Difference. CPT is a two-step methodology that systemically examines two or more historical cases by combining elements of theory, chronology, and comparison (Bengtsson and Ruonovanaa, 2017, p.45). This method is complementary to the Method of Difference because the method described earlier seeks to identify variables that cause a difference, while CPT seeks to provide context to those variables through theory, find connections between them through chronology, and ultimately place the contextualized variables and their connections in comparison. While CPT is predominantly used in comparative analysis about theories on democratization, globalization,

modernization, conflict and war, peacebuilding, and revolutions (Bengtsson and Ruonovanaa, 2017, p.47), I believe it can be applicable to the theories I wish to utilize in my research. It is applicable because trauma and memory are concepts that are also present in the issues identified by the scholars on CPT.

Literature Review

The question of why Taiwan and Korea remember Japanese colonialism differently points to a need to understand how each country remembers their colonial history in contemporary times. For without this understanding, the comparison would become an incomplete puzzle because it is missing a piece that completes the picture.

Modern Taiwanese Remembrance

Taiwan has explored and continues to explore its colonial past through film. This exploration was permitted due to the end of martial law in Taiwan in 1988, when cultural and intellectual freedoms were restored. This restoration brought heightened concerns of Taiwan's local history and the once taboo subject of Japanese colonial rule on the island was opened for reinterpretation and went beyond the academic corridors of history departments (Taylor, 2004, p.174). While films exploring Taiwan's colonial past are certainly made outside of history departments, these films nevertheless became subject to academic analysis. Select examples include *Cape Number Seven, City of Sadness, 1895, Hill of No Return,* and *March of Happiness,* where analysis of these films was done while asking whether some Taiwanese were nostalgic for the colonial era (Struggs, 2017, p.113-114). Conducting analysis of these films within the confines of the chosen question reveals that Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan is remembered partially by nostalgia. However, it also hints that there are other forms of remembrance of the colonial past. This suggests that Taiwan's remembrance of its colonial past is complex, but that

complexity is coloured by nostalgia. This colouring by nostalgia is not limited to the films analyzed by Struggs. Green (2018) found that Wei Te-Sheng's successful Japan-Taiwan trilogy, one of them being *KANO* (which was the focus of his analysis), also used nostalgia to re-imagine the contested theme of Japanese colonial legacy in contemporary Taiwan (p.170). Re-imagining its colonial past with the use of nostalgia suggests that this more "positive" remembrance of Japan's colonial legacy is new in Taiwan.

The re-imagination of Japan's colonial legacy in Taiwan extends beyond popular culture through films as well. Taylor (2004) noted how there is a noticeable consumer trend in Taiwan of a renewed appreciation for, and renovation of Japanese-era architecture and emulation of pre-war interior design styles (p.174). While popular culture and consumer trends are having a more positive remembrance of the Japanese colonial legacy, this seems to not be limited to local Taiwanese society. Amae (2011) found that the Council of Cultural Affairs in January 2011 had designated 1,626 structures as historic assets, where more than half (850) were from the Japanese colonial period, which was a 50-fold increase from the 17 in 1997 (p.22). These figures confirm that the more "positive" remembrance of Japan's colonial legacy in Taiwan is a new phenomenon that exists within local society but also at the national government. Even local governments in Taiwan are promoting their colonial heritage. Lee and Huang (2021) noted that Chiayi in Taiwan, but also Gunsan in Korea, are small cities in East Asia that have chosen to build their city branding on their colonial heritage, despite their respective complicated and fraught Japanese colonial histories (p.2). For small cities in Taiwan like Chiayi to embrace their colonial heritage, in addition to the other examples mentioned earlier, Taiwan seems to be revisiting Japan's colonial legacy in a manner that leads to a more positive remembrance of their colonial past in contemporary times.

Modern Korean Remembrance

How Korea might remember Japan's colonial legacy was glimpsed at with the small city of Gunsan building its city brand around its colonial heritage. Such a glimpse might lead to an interpretation that Korea also has a "positive" remembrance of its colonial past. However, Gunsan's city branding around its colonial heritage should be considered as an exception. This is due to Korea having official anti-Japanese narratives that lead to authorities being reluctant in preserving and promoting colonial Japanese architectural legacies; Gunsan is the first city in Korea to use its colonial heritage as part of its city branding (Lee & Huang, 2021, p.2). By having official anti-Japanese narratives, it hints at Korea's "negative" remembrance of Japan's colonial legacy. The negative remembrance can be exemplified through Korea's celebration of its independence from Japan every year on August 15, where resentment and pure enmity towards Japan is palpable and persists, even after Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto provided an official apology on August 10th, 2010 (Lee, 2014, p.1). For anti-Japanese sentiments to persist despite receiving an official apology, it indicates that Korea's negative remembrance of Japan's colonial legacy is deeply engrained into the national psyche. Newspapers in Korea seem to help maintain this public narrative that focuses on preserving memories of collective victimization and how Koreans make sense and cope with the challenges from their colonial history (Jeong & Vollhardt, 2021, p.638). The preservation of collective victimization memories reveals that certain memories of the colonial past are prioritized while others are ignored.

However, when the ignored memories resurface, it provides a surprise to the public. One such surprise is the portrayal of Kyung-Sung, the colonial-era name of Seoul, in modern media. Kang (2015) notes that memories of Kyung-Sung had been repressed from Korean discursive fields because it was associated with colonial experiences of oppression and exploitation until

late 2000s media representations like *Modern Boy* made a clear departure of those common cultural perceptions of Korean colonial modernity (p.28). This change in perception of memories of the colonial past among the public was seen in Taiwan as well with its contemporary films. It would suggest that films are a powerful medium that can effectively revisit colonial memories and could even change the remembrance of those memories. Perhaps it is due to these popular cultural films of Kyung-Sung that convinced Gunsan to use its colonial heritage, a first in Korea, for city branding described earlier. However, there are other popular culture media that still presents Korea's remembrance of its colonial past in a "negative" manner. Such as the popular comic book series *Nambul* that lays out a typical popular culture representation of Korean society's past in which it contains a sentiment of melancholia, a longing of something lost (Cho & Chae, 2020, p.1067) While Korea's remembrance of its colonial past in contemporary times has a growing complexity, official and societal discourse of this past seems to remain negative and differs from Taiwan's more positive remembrance of its colonial despite its contemporary complexity as well.

Colonial Experience

Taiwan and Korea will be analyzed separately to determine any differences and similarities in colonial experience that each have endured. From examining how each country experienced Japanese colonial rule, their colonial traumas and memories can be more clearly defined when conducting a comparative analysis later in this paper.

Taiwan (1895-1945)

Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895 when the Qing Dynasty was defeated by Japan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. While the war occurred to settle the Qing Dynasty and Japan's rivalry over the Korean peninsula, its conclusion resulted in Japan gaining its first

colony with Taiwan. In addition to Taiwan, Japan also gained the Pescadores Islands (modern-day Penghu), the Liaodong Peninsula, an indemnity of 200 million taels, and the opening of ports of Shashi, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou to Japanese trade with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This meant that the war signified Japan's new power status in the region and intensified strategic competition among various foreign powers over economic privileges in treaty ports but also control of territories in East Asia (Park, 2020, p. 225). Japan gaining its new power status and entering this strategic competition meant that there were major questions on how to rule Taiwan. The first major question was whether to treat Taiwan as a colony or part of Japan like Okinawa before it was annexed in 1879 and the second question was how to develop the colonized subjects' loyalty to the Japanese nation considering Taiwan's importance to Japan's security (Matsuda, 2012, p. 690-691). These questions underline a catalyst for the creation of colonial traumas and memories because all scenarios place Taiwanese as a second-class citizen at best within Japan. The first question highlighted a possibility for Taiwan to become a formal part of Japan, but the second question implies that even if the island is a part of Japan, its population was subjugated. Thus, while becoming a part of Japan would have granted Taiwan and its population legal equality, Taiwanese would still be considered second-class socially. And being a colony implied not only social second-class citizenship, but legally as well because the salary (along with the colonial bonus and housing allowance) of public servants in Japanese colonies like Taiwan were determined on the basis of which Japanese family registry (*koseki)* individuals belonged to (Matsuda, 2012, p.694) . This legal difference on the basis of ethnicity in turn would result in injustices that create traumas and memories.

Examining colonial traumas and memories in Taiwan is challenged by its portrayal of being a "model colony" that modernized under "scientific colonialism" that was met only by

moderate opposition by the local population over the course of Japanese rule (Hee, 2014, p.632). A notable opposition group came in the form of the Taiwan Cultural Association (TCA) that was founded in 1921, whose cosmopolitan and educated young members called for home rule by establishing a Taiwanese parliament, and published newspapers and gave speeches to raise awareness to their anticolonial movement (Ho, 2022, p.212-213). Despite such opposition, the positive portrayal of Taiwan's colonial past underlines how there is a focus on tangible elements (ie. architecture and industrialization) of its colonial experience while the intangible aspects (ie. social or cultural conflict) are not as widely examined. Such a positive portrayal ignores that Taiwan was a destination for Japanese emigration whose interactions with the local population were greatly coloured by the Japanese government's intentions for settlers on the island. Japanese settlers were thought to create a solid ruling class that could suppress local independence movements, to ease population pressures of the Japanese nation, and to be role models for the local population to assimilate into Japanese customs and culture (Matsuda, 2012, p.692). By encouraging Japanese emigration to Taiwan for these outlined reasons all point to an unfortunate perception by the colonial rulers of the local Taiwanese as being targets for violence, replacement, and manipulation. Being subject to this negative perception would lead to the Taiwanese resisting their Japanese rulers and create its first colonial traumas and memories.

Various cases of Taiwanese armed resistance were instigated and violently suppressed by the Japanese, particularly in the early days of the colonization of Taiwan. The Tapani Incident in 1915 and the Musha Uprising (alternatively the Wushe Rebellion) in 1930 are the select historic events to examine for colonial memories and traumas because of their effect on colonial policy. Prior to the Tapani Incident, low-ranking members of the gentry class in Taiwan had assaulted 54 Japanese installations and staged 94 attacks between 1896 to 1913 that resulted in the deaths

of nearly 10,000 Taiwanese (Tsai, 2015, p.133). While this illustrates the level of resistance against Japanese rule and consequently the brutality of it, however these cases pale in comparison to the scale of the Tapani Incident. This incident was one of the largest acts of armed resistance during the colonial period that lasted for a period of two months and resulted in over 1,000 Taiwanese and Japanese killed and the arrest of nearly 2,000 Taiwanese, with nearly half who were sentenced to death (Katz, 2005, p.389). Another defining aspect of the Tapani Incident is the political context in which it occurred in. Anti-Japanese sentiment in Taiwan between 1910 to 1915 was fueled by the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and a local Taiwanese religious fervour (Tsai, 2015, p.134). The combination of the scale and political context of the Tapani Incident make it stand out from previous cases of armed resistance on the island against its colonial rulers. In standing out among the other uprisings, it becomes a clear trauma and memory of the colonial experience on the island. Its clarity as a trauma and memory is increased further by identifiable effects on colonial policies after the incident.

The handling of the Tapani Incident prompted Japanese lawmakers to question the effectiveness of colonial policies on Taiwan. Such questioning led to changes on three policies areas identified by Katz (2005) as being leadership changes where civilians were appointed as governor generals instead of military men (Katz, 2005, p.211); moderated previous colonial policies and pushed for assimilation of Taiwanese people through education (Katz, 2005, p.212); and not suppressing Taiwanese religious but to organize and control them instead (Katz, 2005, p.214). Whether the Tapani Incident is solely and directly responsible for these colonial policy changes is not entirely clear, but these policy changes seemed to have an effect as there would be no further major uprisings until the Musha Uprising in 1930. Being the final uprising nearly two decades before the last major uprising could be another aspect that makes the Tapani Incident

stand out and be remembered in Taiwan's colonial history. However, remembrance of this uprising and others is clouded by opposing interpretations within scholarship, where one presents it as simply a form of banditry, while the other presents it as patriotic partisan warfare driven by nationalist sentiment (Katz, 2005, p.388). The current examination of the Tapani Incident (and upcoming Musha Uprising) have not engaged in either interpretation, as an unbiased historical view is needed to ensure these colonial traumas and memories are clearly defined for an objective analysis between the two.

Fifteen years separate the Tapani Incipent and the Musha Uprising, and this would suggest that the changes to colonial policies following the Tapani Incident were effective. However, it must be noted that the colonial policies were simply moderated, not repealed. Thus, it meant that grievances occurring before the Tapani Incident might have continued afterwards until the Musha Uprising because the root cause of the grievances were not addressed before. Scholarship on the uprising point to police brutality, forced labour, and assimilation efforts as the grievances that crystalized into Indigenous violence against the Japanese (Roy, 2022, p.17). Despite appointing civilians instead of military men as governor generals of Taiwan, it seemed that Japanese brutality against the Taiwanese persisted after the Tapani Incident. And changing assimilation efforts by conducting it through education instead seemed to still be not completely welcomed by the local populace. While forced labour was not identified as a cause in the previous Tapani Incident, uprisings in Taiwan were noted to have been conducted by low-ranking members of the gentry class. This is an indication that there were economic changes in Taiwan that benefitted the new Japanese rulers more than the local elites. Taiwan's agricultural exports to Japan for its growing industrial base and the consolidation of farming and creation of commodity markets on the island did result in Japanese firms gaining an upper hand over local

elites (Rigger, 2016, p.335). Thus, grievances over forced labour can be correctly attributed to the Musha Uprising that had shown continuities with the earlier Tapani Incident.

Such factors for the occurrence of the Musha Uprising are not the primary reasons why this uprising was another clear colonial memory and trauma for Taiwan. It was the brutality of the uprising and how it influenced changes to colonial policy like after the Tapani Incident. When the indigenous people of six Seediq groups under the leadership of Mona Rudo killed 154 Japanese people, it resulted in the annihilation of two-thirds of the population of the participating Seediq groups, where beheadings were widespread on both sides (Chiu, 2017, p.137). The level of violence associated with the Musha Uprising was higher than at the Tapani Incident not only in technologically rudimentary methods (ie. swords for beheadings) but also in technologically sophisticated methods. Military airplanes were used for the first time to conduct air raids in suppression activities against the involved Seediq groups, where internationally outlawed incendiary bombs and biological weapons like mustard gas were dropped upon the Seediq. (Roy, 2022, p.36). Such level of violence was used against the Seediq after the Musha Incident because it occurred during a global economic crisis and colonial officials feared "it would spark nationalist movements and stimulate class antagonisms not only in colonial Taiwan, but also in colonial Korea and perhaps in Japan itself" (Ching, 2000, p.799). Thus, the brutality shown with the Musha Uprising is much higher than with the Tapani Incident and makes it a stronger colonial trauma and memory when it comes to uprisings in Taiwan's colonial period.

For the Musha Uprising to potentially have such a large level of impact within Taiwan but also across the Japanese Empire and even Japanese nation draws more attention to it and provide more clarity on this colonial trauma and memory. It also highlights how there were different colonial policies in relation to the different ethnic groups in Taiwan. As Indigenous

peoples in Taiwan were accorded a special status (considering their naming as *Takasagozoku* – *Formosan Aborigines*) among as imperial subjects and that their region on the island was partitioned into a special administrative zone known as the Aborigine Territory (Barclay, 2018, p.2-3). The increased clarity over this trauma and memory is enhanced further when considering the effect it had on colonial policies. Colonial policies on the local population were re-evaluated and overhauled because a fundamental ideological shift occurred in the assimilation efforts where it was no longer simply about "civilizing" them but to make them imperial subjects (Ching, 200, p.803). While the effect on colonial policies in relation to the Indigenous populations was when they were formally included in the tax base from 1930 because the Japanese viewed them as backward and economically incompetent before the Musha Uprising (Barclay, 2018, p.6). By having a sole and direct impact on colonial policies, the Musha Uprising solidifies its importance as a colonial trauma and memory related to uprisings because the Tapani Incident was unable to establish a clear direct effect on colonial policies. However, by examining both uprisings, it revealed that assimilation was a shared grievance that requires a separate examination as another colonial trauma and memory.

Assimilation through education was a colonial policy identified earlier in the discussion of the Tapani Incident and this policy seemed to have some level of success. This level of success could be attributed to the Meiji educational system that was designed to enlighten, discipline and indoctrinate the Japanese masses, and its implementation in Taiwan was to train the Taiwanese for life and work in a new world – a world where a segment of traditional China was transformed into an integral part of modern Japan (Tsurumi, 1977, p.11). As 71% of elementary school-aged children in Taiwan by 1944 were in school being taught in Japanese and using Japanese textbooks by Japanese teachers and local Taiwanese teachers (who had

undergone intensive Japanese language training) most Taiwanese became in the eyes of colonial rulers "good" Japanese citizens (Vogel, 2019, p.181). However, this indicated that nearly 30% of elementary school-aged children were not in Japanese-styled schools and that many older children and youth were not attending such schools. This is despite there was a universalization of public education (particularly in the Japanese language) in Taiwan, which was an important component of the *dōka* (assimilation) policy, even if such an initiative was uneconomical and unreasonable (Lin, 2005, p.56). Such efforts to assimilate the Taiwanese into Japanese culture reveal that there were significant challenges with the policy and underline the subjugation local Taiwanese underwent in the elementary education system. As the elementary school system in Taiwan was divided between *shōgakkō* (state primary school for Japanese) and *kōgakkō* (state primary school for Taiwanese), where both schools taught *shūshin* (moral training), but this core course was not taught in the "original" Japanese way at *kōgakkō* (Ueno, 2021, p.23). Segregation within the public education system and the difference in teaching of the same core subject matter highlight the contradiction within the *dōka* policy because it sought to make the Taiwanese children "Japanese", but it only effectively made them second-class "Japanese" citizens.

Second-class citizenship of Taiwanese people who were being assimilated to Japanese culture extended beyond the education system. Throughout the colonial period, the Japanese usually held higher positions in government and business, while the Taiwanese held the lower positions until the Japanese were recruited into the military with the outset of WW2 and the Taiwanese were then promoted to higher positions (Vogel, 2019, p.182). Widespread segregation of the Taiwanese from the Japanese would make the contradiction within the *dōka* policy glare even stronger. However, the *dōka* policy only promised a brotherhood between Asian peoples, not necessarily political and economic equality with the Japanese (Tai, 2013, p.13). By not

promising political and economic equality, it may have been to ensure that controlling the Taiwanese population was more feasible, as Japanese authorities disapproved of assimilating the Taiwanese for fear of losing their superior status in Taiwan as a privileged ruling class (Lin, 2005, p.58). Having such fears might have contributed to the contradiction with the *dōka* policy because if the Taiwanese were completely equal to the Japanese, it would not be illogical for them replace their Japanese rulers as equals and then seek independence for themselves. As such, the *dōka* policy can be considered to have been a measure to mollify local nationalism and expand control of the colony's economy (Tai, 2013, p.12). These factors under the *dōka* policy point to a colonial trauma and memory of discrimination and subjugation.

Implementing the *dōka* policy could be considered a mixed success in Taiwan. It is a mixed success because there was basic infrastructure such as elementary schools, moral suasion groups and youth groups to implement it relatively smoothly but the desired changes in people's social values and way of life were slow (Chatani, 2018, p.129). This indicated that colonial directives from the Japanese rulers were acknowledged but not accepted by the Taiwanese population. The non-acceptance could be attributed to the lack of state legitimacy with the process of assimilation in Taiwan because there is a distance from the colonial periphery and the imperial centre, but also due to Taiwan's unique social conditions (Chatani, 2018, p.130). In light of Japan's increasing militarism from the 1930s that resulted in the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Taiwan was placed in a situation to provide to Japan more than it had before. To better serve Japan for war, Taiwan had to undergo an accelerated and intensified process of assimilation. That new process was the *kōminka* policy where Taiwanese people were needed to become imperial subjects willing to die as "Japanese" for the Emperor, instead of simply being colonized subjects who had to live as "Japanese" under the *dōka* policy (Ching,

2001, p.93-94). *Kōminka* could therefore be considered as an extension, acceleration, and intensification of *dōka* because its end result was to make Taiwanese as equal to Japanese, not only as a second-class version of Japanese.

If *kōminka* was an extension of *dōka,* it raises questions on what is uniquely entailed in *kōminka*. Under *kōminka,* the Office of the Governor General aggressively promoted the "Japanese popularization network" where use of Japanese was to be praised, that changing to a Japanese name was to be encouraged and forming a "Japanese family" was desired (Peng & Chu, 2017, p.446). Such schemes revealed that the Taiwanese identity and culture had to be annihilated and the transformation of colonized subjects into imperial subjects required significant effort for it to be achieved. That annihilation took in the form of prohibiting the use of Chinese script and language, a ban of publishing in Chinese and staging Chinese plays, abolishing local temples and suppressing local religious beliefs (Ching, 2001, p.94). This cultural death was extended to the Taiwanese needing to die for the Japanese empire as part of the policy because the Japanese empire's wartime efforts required a larger labour force. And acquiring this labour force from the colony was done through the education system in Taiwan. Primary schools in Taiwan were reformed to be the same as in Japan, where all 150 elementary schools and 820 public schools were to be renamed as national schools (Peng & Chu, 2017, p. 447). As such, *kōminka* represents Taiwan's second colonial trauma and memory associated with assimilation, where it is a trauma and memory of complete submission and disposability.

During the increased militarization from the 1930s that eventually led to the wartime era, Taiwan suffered from another colonial trauma and memory, which was the comfort women that was discussed in the introduction. The first comfort station was set up in Shanghai in 1931, with increases in the rest of China from 1937, in Southeast Asia from 1940, and they were even set up

in colonies like Taiwan (Ching-Yuan, 2008, p.118). While this trauma and memory was from the later end of the colonial rule of Taiwan, it was nevertheless a strong trauma and memory due to the increasing demand for comfort women by the Japanese military. Comfort women were seen as a military necessity and a strategic asset because the Japanese military believed it would increase soldiers' combat power, help maintain discipline and prevent rapes, to allow anger to be vented against women from enemy countries, and other reasons (Ching-Yuan, 2008, p.118). Such reasons are reprehensible, and the reprehensibility strongly represents how comfort women are a tragic colonial trauma and memory.

This tragedy affected between two to three thousand young Han, Hokklo, and Hakka women of a poor socio-economic background (Peng, 2017, p.116). For Taiwanese women from socially and economically disadvantaged backgrounds to be the primary victims of this colonial memory and trauma heightens the reprehensibility because the most vulnerable of society were exploited. The reasons for the exploitation were to encourage greater violence during wartime by the Japanese military. These women were also forced into becoming comfort women because they were deceived by brokers under the guise of working abroad for better pay as cafeteria staff and waitresses, which was not much better than their previous jobs as factory workers, farmers, tailers, nannies, and other low-end occupations (Kang, 2022, p.709). It resulted in the women becoming even more socio-economically poor because there was no positive trade-off as they were forced into the sexual horrors of being comfort women. Besides the horrors from sexual violence, comfort women faced the high likelihood of death because only ten percent of comfort women survived and returned home to Taiwan at the end of the war (Peng, 2017, p.118). Comfort women therefore has a commonality with the previously identified colonial traumas and memories because all had an element or symbolism of death for the Taiwanese that was caused

by their Japanese rulers whether it be during wartime or not.

Korea (1905-1945)

The Korean peninsula was formally colonized by Japan in 1910, however Japan's interest in the peninsula began much earlier. As seen in the overview of Taiwan's colonial experience, Taiwan became a Japanese colony as a consequence of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894 where China and Japan battled over the fate of Korea. Japan's modern interest in Korea can be traced back to 1876 when it forced Korea to sign the Kanghwa Treaty to establish diplomatic relations, open up the ports of Wonsan and Inchon for Japanese trade, and Japan fought a second war over Korea during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 (Vogel, 2019, p.100-101). Following Japan's victory over Russia, Korea officially became a protectorate of Japan in 1905 where Korea signed a series of treaties that gradually relinquished control of the country's diplomatic, financial, and internal affairs and resulted in a Japanese colonial administration to be implemented in 1910 (Moon, 2013, p.29). For Japan to have fought two wars with different nations over Korea indicated its high level of interest in the country. However, it also highlights how Korea's path to become a Japanese colony was gradual with increasing intensity while for Taiwan it seemed abrupt and impromptu. Thus, the colonization of Korea was more fluid than the colonization of Taiwan and this fluidity increases the complexity of Japanese colonization of the peninsula.

The complexity of Japanese colonization of Korea can be traced to the migration patterns from Japan to Korea after it became a Japanese protectorate. Japanese emigrants in Korea numbered over 170,000 by 1910 and represented the largest Japanese community within the empire (Uchida, 2011, p. 10). For the Japanese community in Korea to be the largest within the Japanese empire at the start of Korea's official colonial status in 1910 suggests that Korea was effectively a colony before then. This colonial situation was not only attributed to the size of the

settlement, but also to the activities that the settlers engaged in. Migrants seized land, merchants pursued aggressive commercial tactics, educators and Buddhist priests spread the Japanese language and culture, and other dominating and "civilizing" activities were engaged in after Korea became a protectorate in 1905 (Uchida, 2011, p.10). Such activities provided a taste of what official Japanese colonial rule would be in Korea, however the occurrence and success of these activities were aided by Korea's internal realities at the time. One such reality was the existence of the largest Korean pro-Japanese organization named Ilchinhoe, which constructed railways to transport Japanese troops, helped the Japanese depose the Korean emperor Kojong, organized voluntary guards to quell anti-Japanese Korean guerilla activities, and issued a statement in 1909 urging Japan to annex Korea (Moon, 2013, p.21). While this group is not solely responsible for enabling the dominating and "civilizing" activities of Japanese settlers, their listed activities did not hinder Japan's gradual control of Korea. Korea's gradual transformation into a Japanese colony started the process of creating colonial traumas and memories until its independence in 1945.

Local collaborators such as the Ilchinhoe who might have facilitated easier colonization of Korea, but the existence of such groups and movements would mean that there were also local resistance movements to Japanese colonization. Whether the resistance to colonial rule was violent or peaceful, they were bound to meet suppression by their Japanese rulers in a violent manner as was seen with the Tapani Incident and Musha Uprising in Taiwan. Official Japanese statements proclaimed that rebellions in Korea had finally been suppressed by 1915 (Chung, 2011, p.188), however they had not because the March First Movement occurred in 1919 and it was the largest show of resistance against Japanese rule. The March First Movement was organized as a non-violent appeal for independence because its Christian and Buddhist

organizers urged for non-violence to attract the world's attention and then receive help from foreign powers to achieve Korea's independence (Mary, 2019, p.219). By being aware of its potential for international attention, it reveals that the March First Movement was influenced by movements from abroad. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the October Revolution in Russia are such foreign events that have been argued to have influenced Korea's March First Movement (Ledebev, 2017, p.282-283). Despite such foreign influences, the March First Movement did not result in Korea's independence, but its non-violent nature and the violent reaction it received from the Japanese make it a clear and tragic colonial trauma and memory.

The March First Movement took advantage of the former Korean emperor Kojong's funeral to stage the independence demonstration on March 1st, 1919. In preparation for the demonstration, a declaration of independence was written. It declared that Korea was an independent state with autonomous people, it was experiencing the pain of foreign rule for the past ten years, and it was first founded 4252 years ago (Park, 2019, p.243). These three points in the declaration underline the Korean's high sense of historical and cultural identity that was facing suppression and injustice by the Japanese colonial administration. Being strongly denied its sense of self and seeking independence explains how the March First Movement was the biggest uprising during Korea's colonial period. Between one to two million Koreans, despite arrests, participated during a two-month period with an average 15 demonstrations per day across the peninsula and it was only subdued when the Japanese government sent six infantry battalions and 400 gendarmes to Korea (Hecter et al., 2009, p.40). The size of the Japanese force sent to subdue the movement provide an indication of the scale of abuse Koreans faced by participating in the movement. Nearly 16,000 were wounded, about 7,500 were killed, and American and Korean Christian missionaries testified to the occurrence of torture, rape, and executions (ie.

Koreans were shut into a church that was set on fire and those who escaped were shot) during the period (Deede, 2010, p.69-70). Such level of brutality in suppressing this uprising sent a strong message to Koreans that their suffering under colonial rule would only increase if they continued to resist against their Japanese rulers. This did not seem to deter the Koreans, it only seemed to persuade them to continue, as their independence activities went underground, and a provisional government was established in Shanghai in 1919. While this colonial trauma and memory spurred Koreans to action, it remains a tragic and brutal event from their colonial past.

In addition to the influence the March First Movement had on Koreans, it also had an impact on the Japanese colonial administration. That impact was the modification of colonial rule on the peninsula, where it started of as *budan seiji* (military rule) and evolved into *bunka seiji* (cultural rule) after the March First Movement. While both terms on the surface might bring contrasting images of the form of colonial rule, they shared a common goal of assimilating Korea into the Japanese nation when it was formally annexed in 1910. The assimilation goal was presented and explained differently in English, Korean, and Japanese press on the peninsula. English-speaking press informed its readers of the amicable relations between Koreans and Japanese, Korean-speaking press instructed its readers of the efforts needed to be accepted as Japanese, and Japanese-speaking press warned its readers that a positive attitude towards Koreans is required for the success of the assimilation policy (Caprio, 2011, p.2). This conveying of intentions with the colonial policy of assimilation on the peninsula through the different language press, revealed the policy's contradictory nature. This was most apparent in the differences between the Korean and Japanese press releases. That contradiction was that despite the supposed goal of assimilation to make the two peoples the same, there were a large enough number of cultural, social, and political differences between the two that needed to be overcome.

How to overcome those differences marked the distinction between *budan seiji* and *bunka seiji*. Under *budan seiji,* Korea was ruled by Governors-General Terauchi Masatake (1910–1916) and Hasegawa Yoshimichi (1916–1919) who were military men and ruled with a heavy hand by ordering civil officials and teachers to carry a sword and not hesitate in jailing or executing disobeying Koreans to create fear for their subordination (Pak & Hwang, 2011, p.381). Equating assimilation as total subjugation is a characteristic of this repressive period of colonial rule that extended to many areas of ordinary life for Koreans. *Budan seiji*'s repressive nature was characterized by other colonial measures such as the dissolution of political organizations, the prohibition of public assemblies, the suspension of independent and local press, and the confiscation of swords and knives because of security concerns held by the governor generals (Ou, 2001, p.24). The concerns of security on the peninsula seemed to have at least be on par if not overtook the desire to assimilate the Korean people during this period. The ratio of police per capita in Korea increased steadily from 1,700 Koreans per police in 1907 to 1,200 Koreans per police in 1919, and finally to 1,000 Koreans per police in 1944 (Hechter et al., 2009, p.41). These increases in policing in Korea also revealed the level of intrusion the colonial administration had in Koreans' lives, and even in death in regard to burials. Burial practices were changed in Korea and were under the purview of the colonial police, thus violations of burial rules were punishable by the police instead of the courts and Koreans were the main offenders of burial rules between 1915-1917 (Lee, 2014, p.412). By creating an environment of fear under *budan seiji* colonial rulers affected Koreans in life and death, which created a new colonial memory and trauma.

As mentioned earlier, *budan seiji* evolved into *bunka seiji* following the March First Movement. The more evident changes between the two is the removal of the repressive elements

found in *budan seiji*. *Bunka seiji* did not require civilian officials to wear uniforms and swords, allowed political groups and labour unions to organize and Korean-language press could publish again with the promise of religious and cultural freedom, a respect for the Korean language, and equal treatment of Koreans (Ou, 2001, p.30). Removing the evident repressive elements of colonial rule may have removed an environment of fear in assimilating the Koreans into the Japanese culture, but it did not mean that there were no other forms of subjugation because assimilation was still the ultimate goal of the colonial administration. Assimilation had only modified when *budan seiji* evolved into *bunka seiji*. The objectives of *bunka seiji* were to preserve peace, spread education, develop the economy, build infrastructure and public health facilities, and reform the provincial administration (Shin, 2018, p.118). For the first objective of *bunka seijii* to be the preservation of peace reveal that security was a major concern and was not different from *budan seiji*. A civilian police force replaced the military police, but the ratio of police presence nevertheless increased following the March First Movement as noted earlier in the discussion of *budan seiji*. While the objective of spreading education is to be understood as the intensification of cultural assimilation within this particular institution, Japanese emigrants had been spreading the Japanese language and culture since Korea became a protectorate in 1905, as noted in the discussion of how Korea became a Japanese colony.

Education was an aspect that saw noticeable changes between the two different types of rule, as education-related problems were highlighted by the Japanese prime minister Hara Takashi in his criticism of *budan seiji* (Caprio, 2017, p.132). An education ordinance was issued in 1911 for Korea that was based on Japan's Imperial Rescript on Education from 1890 as its ethical base, but the reality of the 1911 ordinance was based on the colonial education policy established in Taiwan (Pak & Hwang, 2011, p.382). To recall the discussion on education as a

form of assimilation in Taiwan, there were elements of segregation, an imposition of the Japanese language in school material, and a ban on the teaching of native culture and language to the local students. Thus, Korean students also faced the same challenges as Taiwanese students when under pressure of the assimilation policy through the education system.

However, these challenges were addressed by reforming the education system with a new ordinance following the March First Movement. The number of elementary schools increased from 556 to 870, years to graduate were increased from four to six, and allowed Korean students competent in the Japanese language to attend schools designated for Japanese "settlers" (Caprio, 2017, p.135). There were also changes to the curriculum where the Korean language was a compulsory course and there was a greater emphasis to teach Korean history and geography (Ou, 2001, p.30-31). While these educational reforms following the March First Movement may have increased access and quality of education for Koreans, they were still subject to cultural assimilation within the education system (even if the Korean language, history and geography was taught). This is evident when the separate school systems were proposed to be united as a singular "national education system" following the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to erase any lingering difference between Japanese and Korean students so that both had the opportunity to "volunteer" in the Japanese army (Caprio, 2017, p.136). Thus, the assimilation efforts under *budan seiji* and *bunka seiji* represent another colonial trauma and memory for Korea because it sought to bring a cultural and physical death to its people.

Korea experienced another major colonial trauma and memory associated with Japan's wartime activities starting from the 1930s. That trauma and memory is the comfort women that was discussed in the introduction of this paper and was shown to continue affecting contemporary relations between Korea and Japan. As seen with the discussion of comfort women

in the section on Taiwan's colonial experience, it was a horrific practice carried out by the Japanese military for shameful reasons for nearly 15 years from 1931 to 1945. While Taiwan shared a burden with this colonial memory and trauma, Korea's share of the burden was much larger. Out of the tens or even hundreds of thousands of estimated comfort women who suffered from the ordeal, between 80-90% of the comfort women were from Korea (Ching, 2019, p.59). It is perhaps because of the large scale in which Korean women were victims to this sexual violence that it remains a contentious issue, which will be discussed more in detail in a later section.

As Korean women made a up an overwhelming majority of comfort women, it raises questions on why and how that might be the case. The answer to how lies in the geographic proximity, and therefore the convenience, of Korea to Japan. Korean comfort women would be sent to Shimonoseki or other port in Japan via Busan, the second largest city in Korea with a major port, before being sent to comfort stations around Asia and many Korean women were recruited from provinces close to Busan (Min, 2021, p.76). While Busan being a major Korean port that is closest to Japan provides a satisfactory answer on how Korean women made up a majority of comfort women, it does not provide sufficient answer as to why that was the case. An answer might be found in the attitude Japanese military men had on the pregnancies that came from the repeated sexual violence against the Korean comfort women. A common comment from Japanese military men was that they did not want babies from Korean women who would not be loyal to the emperor (which revealed that Korean blood was regarded with suspicion and heralding treachery) (Ahn, 2020, p.98). Such a comment also displays the contradiction within the assimilation policy pursued in Korea because it revealed the discrimination and segregation mindset the Japanese had against the Koreans. Thus, it also shows how the colonial trauma and

memory of comfort women compounds unto the trauma and memory from assimilation discussed earlier. It highlights how Korea's colonial traumas and memories are marked by immeasurable violence inflicted by the Japanese that would not end until its defeat in 1945.

Post-Colonial Aftermath

The following sections will examine how the colonial past in general was treated in the former colonies following Japan's sudden defeat in 1945. As both countries fell to authoritarian governments upon decolonization but also democratized around the same time from the late 1980s and early 1990s. This examination will help determine any domestic post-colonial variables that might cause a difference in colonial remembrance between the two.

Taiwan: Decolonization to Democratization

Prior to Japan's abrupt end of colonial rule on Taiwan in 1945 as a result of its defeat against the US in WW2, the post-colonial fate of the island was predetermined by non-local brokers. At the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the Allied Powers agreed that the island of Taiwan was stolen from the Chinese and agreed to return it to the Republic of China (Rigger, 2017, p. 336). After fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, Taiwan was liberated but its sovereignty was left ambiguous following the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 and the Treaty of Taipei of that same year (Thim and Turton, 2017), but fell into the laps of the ROC government led by Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang (KMT). Taiwan's retrocession to a Chinese society would be considered a joyous event for both sides of the Taiwan strait considering the colonial memories and traumas the Taiwanese suffered under the Japanese for fifty years. However, for the Taiwanese the retrocession to the ROC was ambiguous because their excitement was tinged with anxiety and for the Chinese KMT, they viewed the Taiwanese as being tainted for fifty years by their bitter Japanese enemy (Rigger, 2017, p.336). The negative feelings the KMT had towards the

Taiwanese hinted at how Taiwan's liberation from Japanese colonial rule would be challenging because many Taiwanese had their own misgivings about the KMT. For many of them, the KMT was another foreign regime because it had never ruled the island since the KMT's establishment of the ROC as the successor to the Qing Empire in 1911. Thus, the Taiwanese and KMT were on course for conflict that took the form of 1947's February 28th Incident.

For a major uprising to occur on Taiwan within two years of liberation from Japanese colonial rule indicated a high level of dissatisfaction and frustration the Taiwanese had with their new KMT rulers. After the KMT had begun governing the island through direct central control from Nanjing, the Taiwanese were barred from political participation, experienced incompetent, and corrupt governance, suffered an economic decline, and underwent unprecedented levels of poverty and unemployment (Fleischauer, 2007, p.374). These negative political and economic conditions, in combination with the social and cultural tensions between the two groups meant that conditions were ripe for conflict. All it needed was a spark to start a local uprising against the KMT. That spark took the form of agents from the State Monopoly Bureau arresting a street vendor selling contraband cigarettes in Taipei and wounding several bystanders (Fleischauer, 2007, p.374). The actions of the agents set off armed resistance from the Taiwanese whose anti-Chinese sentiments boiled over and the ensuing demonstrations across the island required the KMT to bring in military reinforcements from the mainland on March 8 to regain control. An estimated 10,000 – 20,000 Taiwanese were massacred by the KMT troops, and representatives of the Taiwanese opposition, reporters, doctors, lawyers and other elites and intellectuals were arrested and most died or "disappeared" forever (Chen, 2018, p.443). Such death figures are higher than the death figures from the Tapani Incident and Wushe Uprising, marking the 228 Incident as the deadliest uprising in modern Taiwanese history. And it also becomes Taiwan's

first clear post-colonial trauma and memory that overshadows the previous colonial uprisings.

While the 228 Uprising placed a shadow over the Tapani Incident and the Wushe Uprising in terms of its level of violence, it also put a shadow in terms of the type of uprising it was. The colonial uprisings could be considered as ethnic conflicts since the Tapani Incident was a mix of Han Taiwanese and Indigenous Taiwanese rebelling against the Japanese, while the MushaUprising was about Indigenous Taiwanese rebelling against the Japanese. In the 228 Incident, the ethnic dimension of the uprising is Taiwanese against the Chinese as noted earlier where the KMT viewed the Taiwanese as being "tainted" by the Japanese. This is most evident when military reinforcements were sent under the pretext of stopping Communist influences on the island. However, the KMT was aware that the Communist influence on Taiwan was minimal, and they made that claim in bad faith; they believed it was the island's Japanese heritage that was the evil root of the uprising (Louzon, 2018, p.172). This was the case for some of the resisting Taiwanese, particularly those who served in the Japanese military. Some reasons for their resistance were due to contempt for the Chinese soldiers (whom they called with the wartime derogatory term *shina hei* – roughly translated as "Ch***k soldier"), but also due to their Japanese spirit (*nihon seishi*) being too strong to contain (Louzon, 2018, p.173). As the Japanese military was waging war in China before and the assimilation policies had allowed the Taiwanese to join the Japanese army, this latter reason by the Taiwanese resistant's hostility to the KMT is an example of successful Japanese indoctrination that was played out despite the Japanese defeat over a year before during the 228 Incident. Thus, the ethnic conflict dimension of the 228 Incident establishes greater clarity of it being a first post-colonial trauma and memory that can also overshadow similar traumas and memories from the Japanese colonial period.

The KMT was engaged in a civil war against Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) when the 228 Incident happened. The Chinese Civil War ended with the CCP declaring victory and the KMT retreating to Taiwan in 1949. With nowhere else to go, the party had learned the lesson from the 228 Incident that a strong military presence was needed to control the local population and ensure its survival. To achieve these objectives, the KMT declared martial law, which gave the minority Chinese population from outside Taiwan (roughly 1 million) the ability and mechanisms to control the majority local population (roughly 6 million, and another 100,000 aboriginal peoples) following the collapse of the KMT in China in 1949 (Yang, 2021, p.17-19). By 1968, the Chinese population from outside Taiwan grew to roughly 2 million and the local population grew to about 11 million, where the island's total population was 13.5 million (Shattuck, 2020, p.63). The inability for the native population to publicly dissent against their new rulers, which many saw as foreigners, meant that they faced suffering to a large scale, and this suffering was known as the White Terror. During the White Terror, around 140,000 Taiwanese were arrested, tortured, or imprisoned for their real or perceived opposition to the KMT and an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Taiwanese were executed for the same offence (Chen, 2018, p.443). Considering the large number of victims from the White Terror and the relatively small size of the KMT, this indicates there was an environment of fear and a system of incentives with the White Terror. The effectiveness of the White Terror is attributed to the amendments and adoptions of laws that increased the scope of crimes and its corresponding punishments, as well as obligating citizens to report suspected crimes and being rewarding for such behaviour by receiving a small portion of the property or assets of the convicted person (Shattuck, 2020, p64). This reveals the brutality of KMT rule in Taiwan that was reminiscent of the brutality of Japanese rule and hints at the possibility of other post-colonial trauma and memory that might also be similar to previous colonial trauma and memory.

As noted previously, the KMT viewed the local Taiwanese of being tainted by Japanese education, and therefore needed to be re-sinicized. Re-sinicization efforts were most prominent during the period of martial law in Taiwan as the KMT had the means to enforce its views on national and cultural identity with a more obedient local population. One notable example of this enforcement was through national historiography. Taiwan's political history and post-war modernization was written by the KMT according to Chinese nationalist thought that fit Taiwan into "one-China" where it was an inalienable part of Chinese culture, geography, history, and Confucian canon to offer Taiwan a respectable national past and a promising future (Heylen, 2012, p.20). This presentation of Taiwan being part of China is not incorrect as the island was a territory under the Qing Dynasty and its Chinese characteristics were being eliminated under Japanese assimilation policies. However, even Taiwan's Chinese characteristics were being eliminated under KMT rule. This was most evident in the education system where Mandarin was the only language of instruction and students would be punished if they spoke Taiwanese dialects (Su, 2007, p.209). The enforcement of a one-China perspective by the KMT meant that local Taiwanese references were ignored, and this includes its history of being a Japanese colony. In the first edition of the KMT-sanctioned history textbook for middle school students from 1949 to 1952, the Japanese era of Taiwan was not mentioned but the only clue it provided about the era was when it noted Taiwan was taken over by the ROC government after the Second World War (Yao, 2019, p.310). These actions undertaken by the KMT in the education system is reminiscent of the education policy pursued by the Japanese where it sought to impose non-native language, culture, and knowledge on the local students. It is therefore another post-colonial trauma and memory that overshadows the similar colonial trauma and memory of assimilation by education.

Imposing a one-China perspective on Taiwan started to ease once the KMT leader

Chiang Kai-Shek passed away in 1975 and his son Chiang Ching-Kuo replaced him. Unlike his father who suppressed local Taiwanese opposition, he facilitated Taiwan's transition from a one-party authoritarian regime to a democracy. From the late 1970s local Taiwanese were allowed to be in government and join the KMT. In 1987 martial law was repealed, one year later the government relinquished control of the press and other media, and in 1989 political opposition parties could be formed (Su, 2007, p.210). These actions allowed for local Taiwanese to challenge the KMT on its censorship of the island's history and allow local Taiwanese to examine it through their own lens. This was critical especially in examining traumas and memories from the post-colonial period such as the 228 Incident. The KMT regime made efforts to erase this incident from Taiwanese society but democratization during the 1980s undermined those efforts and the incident was addressed for the first time by President Lee Teng-hui at his inauguration in 1989 (the first Taiwan-born president who lived under Japanese colonial rule) (Fleischauer, 2012, p.37). It was also critical in having the freedom to examine its colonial history without interference from the KMT's experience with Japanese brutality from the Second Sino-Japanese War, as seen in the review of modern Taiwanese remembrance of Japanese colonialism. Democratization on Taiwan revealed that despite the Taiwanese and KMT having suffered from the same antagonistic force, their experiences with the Japanese were different because the former were colonized by the Japanese while the latter were at war with them.

Korea: Decolonization to Democratization

Korea experienced the same abrupt end to Japanese colonialism like Taiwan when Japan was defeated in 1945. Also, like Taiwan, its future was determined by foreign brokers during the Cairo Conference of 1943. The U.S., U.K., and China proclaimed that Korea would become free and independent in due course, and the proclamation would be endorsed by the USSR at the

Tehran Conference later that year (Barry, 2012, p.38). For Korea to become free and independent in due course implied that Korea required post-war tutelage by the great powers, despite it was a self-governing vassal state for a long time before Japanese colonization and that there was a Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in exile in Shanghai. Ignoring such political and historical realities of Korea in determining its postwar future underlines how the country was caught in the great power politics of World War Two (and later on the Cold War) between the US and USSR. The effect of this great power politics on Korea was the country's division along the 38th parallel with the USSR controlling the north and the US controlling the south. While the division was a seminal event in Korea's post-war history, it was decided hastily and intended to be temporary because it was born out of military convenience and an expediency in accepting a Japanese surrender (Barry, 2012, p.49). Such a hasty decision within the context of a sudden end to Japanese colonialism brought tragic post-war traumas to Korea, such as the Jeju Uprising and the Korean War that will be examined later, and the intended temporary division has been in place for nearly 80 years with no signs of reunification for the foreseeable future.

The Jeju Uprising was the first major post-colonial trauma for Korea that lasted between April 3rd, 1948, and May 1949. Studies on the uprising's causes provide the following three explanations: (1) it was an ideological conflict between right-wing and left-wing groups in post-colonial Korea; (2) it was a local reaction to US military policies of the country; (3) or it was an opposition to the implementation of the April 3rd Special Law (Chun & Han, 2017, p.397). These vastly different explanations (intra-people, local vs foreign, people vs state) of what caused the Jeju Uprising hint at how there is not yet a singular agreed-upon historical narrative of the event. The lack of a widely accepted narrative is indicative of the uprising still being culturally, socially, and politically sensitive to the general population and this sensitivity can be attributed

to the high level of violence associated with the uprising. An estimated 25,000 to 30,000 people died, 40,000 people became political refugees, and 95% of the villages on the island were destroyed (Park, 2010, p.359). The estimated number of deaths from the Jeju Uprising are triple the deaths associated with the March First Movement, making this post-colonial trauma and memory more violent than the most violent uprising during the colonial era. While the absolute levels of violence might have differed between the two, the source of the violence are similar. For the Jeju Uprising, the brutal repressive means used by the Korean police forces were due to their influence from their former colonial rulers. 82% (949 out of 1,157 officers) of middle- to high- ranking police officers who served the Japanese were retained after decolonization due to the sense of urgency to maintain stability south of the 38th parallel (Park, 2010, p.368). Thus, the brutality in Jeju Uprising brought echoes of brutality from Japanese colonialism and making this post-colonial uprising a strong trauma and memory in the newly established era.

One short year after the end of the Jeju Uprising, Korea found itself in another major post-colonial event, which was the start of the Korean War in 1950 when North Korean forces crossed south of the 38th parallel. The war is known as a confrontation between the two Koreas over control of the entire peninsula and being a proxy war during the Cold War between the USSR and US. However, just like the complex dimensions of the Jeju Uprising, the Korean War has other aspects that increases its complexity. Suh (2010) claimed that the conflict was a violent confrontation about Korea's colonial past, on who is the post-colonial subject, and how to chart a post-colonial future (p.514). This claim suggests that examining the war and its effects cannot be complete without understanding Korea's colonial past as concerns of the future are based on the experiences of the past. Since the start of the war was only five years after the end of Japanese colonial rule, the traumas and memories of that period are undoubtedly still vivid in 1950.

The short time span between the end of Japanese colonialism and the start of the Korean War can be best exemplified by UN prisoner of war number 600,001 (Matsushita Kazutoshi). Prisoner 600,001 was the first and only Japanese soldier who was captured by UN forces during the Korean War, where he was fighting for the Chinese and North Korean communists but ended his military career serving the South Korean army (Morris-Suzuki, 2015, p.411). His story is emblematic of the complexities with Japan's sudden defeat in World War Two that left behind loose ends that were not properly addressed. Not properly addressing the sudden surrender and decolonization brought tragic traumas and memories for Korea in the immediate post-colonial period that had connections to the Japanese military or police. Connections to the Japanese military or police continued to linger in Korea's post-colonial period because the Rhee government had not only exonerated former pro-Japanese collaborators, but the former pro-Japanese collaborators were also praised for their efforts to combat communism prior and after the Korean War (Suh, 2010, p.517). Thus, the presence and influence of Japanese colonialism remained in post-colonial Korea and kept the associated traumas and memories alive even if the colonial rulers no longer governed the peninsula after its defeat in 1945.

The signing of a ceasefire, and not a peace treaty, between the two Koreas at the end of the Korean War in 1953 solidified the division between the two. This division represents a failure of the Korean independence movement as their country could not remain united after liberation from Japanese colonial rule. By becoming divided, Korea had to reformulate their national identity in the post-colonial era because their national identity during the colonial era was to establish distinctness from their Japanese rulers' colonial assimilation policies. Just as their Japanese rulers had used the education system to assimilate Koreans into the Japanese nation, the new Korea in the post-Korean War era used the education system to assert their new

national identity. Korea had to assert its new national identity through elementary textbooks because it needed to differentiate itself from its ethnically synonymous neighbour to the north as to establish domestic legitimacy and loyalty (Won & Huntington, 2021, p.283). Differentiating itself from its ethnically synonymous neighbour in the north proved to be challenging as its definitions varied over time. Korean textbooks would portray their northern neighbour as either a definitive enemy who instigated the Korean War or as extended family who is suffering and in need of South Korea's help (Won & Huntington, 2021, p.279). Such a challenge with its new national identity would not have been present in its textbooks if the peninsula had remained united after the end of Japanese colonialism and did not become subjected to Cold War politics. On the other hand, Korean textbooks on the country's colonial experience, and therefore its national identity, are straightforward. It is presented as a national tragedy, a loss of national identity and dignity, with nothing of appreciation or praise for colonialism; no room for alternative interpretations are offered (Hsiao, 2011, p.188). Despite the challenges in its national identity in the post-Korean War era, Korea was successful in keeping alive the traumas and memories from their colonial experience. And by not providing any alternative interpretations, it reveals how such colonial traumas and memories are fundamental to their national identity in the post-Korean War era.

Democratization in Korea during the late 1980s gave space for its people to examine its traumas and memories that were either silenced or were not recognized. One such trauma and memory is the Jeju Uprising. During the dictatorial regimes of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-Hee, and Chun Doo Hwan, the Jeju Uprising was suppressed until a truth commission was established after a long and painstaking journey (Kim, 2009, p.412). The suppression of the uprising under three dictators reveal that it was an event that was considered to be a strong enough force to

destabilize a regime. This would explain why the uprising came to surface under democratization when it began to replace the one-man dictatorship system in Korea because there was no longer a political force suppressing it. Regained consciousness of the uprising started with the publication of the novel *Aunt Suni* and memorial services, media coverage, and research. The latter activities solidified the new-found consciousness and led to the establishment of a truth commission in Seoul and Jeju Island in 1999 (Kim, 2009, p.414). The long process to establish the truth committee demonstrates the dedication Korean people had to know and understand the historical reality of the brutality associated with the uprising. Its multiple actors in different activities also demonstrate that dedication and reflects how various unheard voices can be expressed under democracy to uncover past traumas and memories.

Just as democratization uncovered the post-colonial trauma and memory of the Jeju Uprising, it also uncovered a trauma and memory from the colonial era. Comfort women were known in parts of Asia, but it was not recognized as a major issue from Japanese colonialism until the comfort woman survivor Kim Han-Suk gave a public testimony of her experience in December 1991 (Jun, 2019, p.8). By uncovering this "new" colonial trauma and memory into the national conscious of Koreans, it only served to reinforce its national identity of being a victim of Japanese colonialism. This is reflected in how comfort women are incorporated into Korea's national education curriculum as an exclusively Korean experience, and therefore obscured any shared responsibility and simplified historical complexities (Jun, 2019, p.9). The "discovery" of the trauma and memory of comfort women during democratization confirms how democratization provided a platform for various voices to be heard. It also adds new layers to Korea's colonial and post-colonial national identities that are heavily defined by differentiation and victimization either by Japan or North Korea.

Comparative Analysis and Discussion

Taiwan and Korea were chosen for comparison because of the many similarities they share. They are geographically similar because both are smaller-sized neighbours of Japan. Their colonial history is similar because both were colonized for comparable amounts of time (50 years for Taiwan and 40 years for Korea) and experienced the same abrupt end to Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Similarities in post-colonial politics can also be found because both were ruled by authoritarian governments until they democratized during third-wave democracy (a period from the late 1970s to early 1990s), have cultural siblings and neighbours who are communist (Taiwan with China and South Korea with North Korea), and received strong military support from America. Finally, their economic development was similar because both were Asian Tiger economies (states who underwent rapid industrialization and developed into high-income economies). With these geographic, historical, political, and economic similarities, comparing Taiwanese and Korean remembrance of Japanese colonialism is interesting because identifying and analyzing exact causes of any difference in remembrance is possible. Therefore, Taiwan and Korea are the most suitable former Japanese colonies for comparing and analyzing the potentially different remembrance of Japanese colonialism.

In comparing the colonial periods of Taiwan and Korea, both have followed similar patterns in their colonial experience. There were major uprisings opposing Japanese rule, with the Tapani Incident in Taiwan in 1915 and the March First Movement in Korea in 1919. Both took inspiration or at least within the context of new international developments, such as the Chinese Revolution of 1911 for the Tapani Incident and Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points and Russia's October Revolution for the March First Movement. A difference between the two is that the Tapani Incident involved multiple ethnic groups (Chinese and indigenous), while the March

First Movement involved only ethnic Koreans. This difference over involved ethnic groups could not be a major factor for a difference in remembrance as the ethnic groups involved in the Tapani Incident experienced the same level of brutality by the Japanese. Taiwan did experience another major uprising with the Musha Uprising in 1930 that was brutally repressed, it did not mean that brutal repression decreased in Korea. Police presence in Korea saw constant increases during colonization, which reflects the high level of brutality that persisted. While Japan's brutality against uprisings in Taiwan was implied to be enacted by military actors than police actors, however its police were also guilty of brutality. As Japanese colonial authorities in Taiwan imposed a Rechsstaat version of law as an instrument that did not have an ideological basis for distinguishing between law and violence as a matter of principle because both fused elements of central power (Martin, 2019, p.8) Thus, colonial traumas and memories from uprisings or from general brutality in Taiwan and Korea are a similar variable and they are not a suitable to explains the difference in remembrance.

The examination of the different uprisings in Taiwan and Korea saw that they influenced colonial policies. One identifiable influence was a moderation in the colonial policy, such as the change to appoint civilians as governor generals in Taiwan and the removal of repressive symbols (ie. administrators carrying swords) in Korea. While Korea maintained the appointment of military men as governor generals, this difference would not be sufficient to explain their negative remembrance as Taiwan reverted to appoint military men as governor generals from the 1930s. Other effects of the uprisings were evident in the education system. Schools in Taiwan accelerated and intensified assimilation practices after the Musha Uprising, while schools in Korea allowed the teaching of the Korean language, geography, and history after the March First Movement. Despite the more intense assimilation policies pursued in Taiwan compared to

Korea, Taiwan maintains a more positive perception of its colonial past than Korea. This increases the extent of the puzzle identified in this paper. Thus, the differences in assimilation policy through the education system between the two countries cannot explain their opposing remembrances in contemporary times.

Comfort women are a trauma and memory that is also shared by Taiwan and Korea from their colonial past. A major difference between the two over this shared trauma and memory is that Korea's burden is much larger than Taiwan's. This difference is significant, however it does not diminish the fact it was a horrific experience for the Taiwanese women of various ethnic backgrounds, as much as it was for the Korean women, because most comfort women would not return home after the Second World War. While both governments of Taiwan and Korea have challenged their former colonizer over the issue of comfort women in modern times, the issue was first raised by Korean comfort woman survivor Kim Han-Suk in Korea's democratization period. The fact it was first raised by Korea, and that it suffered the most from this shared trauma, suggests that this may be a key factor in the opposing remembrance.

Without any identifiable variables in the colonial era (asides from Korea's increased burden from comfort women) that would strongly explain the dissimilar remembrance between Taiwan and Korea, it suggests that the dissimilarities will be found in the post-colonial period. While both experienced an abrupt end to Japanese colonialism, the aftermath of the suddenness brings about the differences between the two. Upon Japan's defeat, Taiwan was handed over to the KMT in the ROC, and the Korean peninsula was divided into two states. This is a crucial difference because it would influence any post-colonial traumas and memories thereafter. Taiwan and Korea both experienced violent uprisings soon after liberation from Japan, with the 228 Incident in 1947 for Taiwan and the Jeju Uprising in 1948 for Korea. The major difference

between these two uprisings is the type of suppressors. In Taiwan's case, it was suppressed by military forces from the ROC who had never been Taiwan prior to the island's handover. While for Korea's case, it was suppressed by local military and police forces who had been trained by their former colonial ruler. This underscores how Taiwan did not achieve independent self-rule after liberation, while Korea achieved independent self-rule (albeit after undergoing an initial US trusteeship). Another interpretation to Taiwan's post-colonial governance was that it had been "colonized" by the KMT and this is evident with the textbooks that did not mention Taiwan's Japanese colonial experience to focus on a "One-China" view and re-sinicize the Taiwanese. While Korean textbooks do not shy away from describing Japanese colonialism negatively, even if their textbooks were also concerned in differentiating themselves from North Korea and establishing its own legitimacy after the end of the Korean War.

The effect of achieving independent self-rule was most evident when both countries underwent democratization. Democratization permitted the local populace to re-examine or unearth past traumas and memories. For Taiwan, the focus was more on the traumas caused by the KMT like the 228 Incident and for Korea it was over the Jeju Rebellion and the Comfort Women. As local Taiwanese were silenced in examining their colonial and post-colonial past, the resurfacing of the 228 Incident reveals an interest in condemning their foreign KMT rulers and examining the colonial past with a sense of nostalgia was another way to distance themselves the KMT. For Korea, as its colonial past was not forgotten (however the complicity of Korea's military leaders with their former colonial rulers was conveniently silenced), the recognition of comfort women as a colonial trauma and memory simply added to the negative discourse of Japan's colonial rule. While the Jeju Rebellion was silenced by successive dictatorships, and its re-surfacing during democratization served to condemn the military

dictatorships but the colonial past was not used as a way to distance the Korean people from their government because their government had incorporated that past into their national identity. Thus, the difference in remembrance between Taiwan and Korea can be traced back to the immediate aftermath of decolonization whether independent self-governance was achieved, its effects were not evident until both countries underwent democratization during the late 1980s.

Conclusion

Trauma theory was framed as recovering referentiality and democratization in Taiwan and Korea was the vehicle with which both countries could recover references of their post-colonial and colonial pasts. In recovering their pasts, certain traumas and memories were prioritized to successfully distance themselves from their authoritarian governments. Politics of memory called on a focus of interactions between the state and its people, and the examined colonial and post-colonial traumas and memories were all such interactions. Employing the Method of Difference permitted the selection of similar traumas and memories and identified how achieving independent self-rule was the variable that caused the difference in remembrance. While using CPT would contextualize those traumas and memories in a comparative and chronological manner under the chosen conceptual frameworks.

While the combination of these different research methods and conceptual frameworks successfully answered this paper's research question on why Taiwan and Korea remember Japanese colonialism differently, my argument's validity is not complete due to some limitations of the scope of my paper. In focusing on primarily domestic factors that would explain the difference in remembrance, my paper ignores important international factors. These factors are particularly important in the post-colonial history of Taiwan and Korea because both countries have significantly more varied differences in that period. Taiwan's loss of the China seat at the

UN in 1971 and the ensuing decrease in international recognition, and Korea not being an official state at the UN until 1991 are two such important differences. Other unexamined variables are the differences between each country's relationship with their rival cultural sibling and neighbour that might have influenced their remembrance. Not examining the influence of US foreign and military policy for East Asia is another variable that could have explained the difference in remembrance, since Korea has a security treaty with the US, but Taiwan's security relationship with the US is through the US Congress' Taiwan Foreign Relations Act.

Despite such limitations, the research framework (or parts of it) of my paper has applications outside of colonialism in East Asia. It could be applied to the former Soviet states where they are geographically close to their former colonizer and share similar cultures that are region-dependent (ie. Central Asia vs Eastern Europe). Or it could be applied to countries that have had multiple rulers during the 20th century, such as Bangladesh that was under British rule until 1947 and then to Pakistani rule until it became independent in 1971. And with Eritrea that was under Italian rule until it was annexed by Ethiopia in 1952 and then achieved independence in 1993. However many applicable areas it may have, this research framework does not seek to suggest how compared countries ought to remember their traumas and memories inflicted by their shared foreign ruler(s). It only seeks to understand whether there are differences in remembrance and why that is the case.

Reference List

Ahn, Yonson. (2020). *Whose comfort?: Body, sexuality and identities of Korean "comfort women" and Japanese soldiers during WWII*. World Scientific.

Amae, Yoshihisa. (2011). Pro-colonial or Postcolonial? Appropriation of Japanese Colonial Heritage in Present-day Taiwan. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, *40*(1), 19–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261104000102

Barclay, Paul D. (2018). *Outcasts of Empire Japan's Rule on Taiwan's "Savage Border," 1874-1945*. University of California Press.

Barry, Mark P. (2012). The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging the "Big Decisions" *International Journal on World Peace*, *29*(4), 37–59.

Bengtsson, Bo, and Hannu Ruonavaara. (2017). "Comparative Process Tracing: Making Historical Comparison Structured and Focused." *Philosophy of the social sciences* 47.1, p.44–66.

Caprio, Mark E. (2011). Marketing Assimilation: The Press and the Formation of the Japanese-Korean Colonial Relationship. *Journal of Korean Studies (Seattle, Wash.: 1979)*, *16*(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1353/jks.2011.0006

Caprio, Mark E. (2017). Janus-Faced Colonial Policy: Making Sense of the Contradictions in Japanese Administrative Rhetoric and Practice in Korea. *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies*, *17*(2), 125–147. https://doi.org/10.21866/esjeas.2017.17.2.001

Chatani, Sayaka. (2018). *Nation-empire: ideology and rural youth mobilization in Japan and its colonies*. Cornell University Press.

Chen, Chia-Li. (2018). Museums and National History in Conflict. In *A Companion to Public History*, edited by David Dean. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., p. 441–453. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118508930.ch32

Ching, Leo T.S. (2000). Savage Construction and Civility Making: The Musha Incident and Aboriginal Representations in Colonial Taiwan. *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, *8*(3), 795–818. https://doi.org/10.1215/10679847-8-3-795

Ching, Leo T.S. (2001). *Becoming "Japanese" colonial Taiwan and the politics of identity formation*. University of California Press.

Ching, Leo T.S. (2019). *Anti-Japan: the politics of sentiment in postcolonial East Asia*. Duke University Press.

Ching-Yuan, Chou. (2009). A cave in Taiwan: Comfort women's memories and the local identity. In *Places of Pain and Shame.* Edited by Keir Reeves and William Logan. Routledge, p. 128–141. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203885031-16

Chiu, Kuei-fen. (2017). "Violence and indigenous visual history: Interventional historiography in Seediq Bale and Wushe, Chuanzhong Island". In *Taiwan Cinema,* edited by Chiu, K.-F., Rawnsley, M.-Y.T., & Rawnsley, G.D. Routledge, (1st ed.), pp. 146–158. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315170244-12

Cho, Eunjoo & Chae, Ou-Byung. (2021). Nationalism, Mourning, and Melancholia in Postcolonial Korea and Japan. *Interventions (London, England)*, *23*(7), 1066–1085. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2020.1818274

Chun, Ja-hyun & Han, Jung-Sun. (2017). Delayed Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Korea. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, *45*(3), 294–315. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685314-04503004

Chung, Henry. (2011). *The case of Korea: a collection of evidence on the Japanese domination of Korea, and on the development of the Korean independence movement*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203845448

Deede, Sara Elizabeth. (2010). *Activism and Identity: How Korea's Independence Movement Shaped the Korean Immigrant Experience in America, 1905–1945*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Fleischauer, Stefan. (2007). The 228 Incident and the Taiwan Independence Movement's Construction of a Taiwanese Identity. *China Information*, *21*(3), 373–401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X07083320

Fleischauer, S. (2012). Perspectives on 228: The "28 February 1947 uprising" in contemporary Taiwan. In *Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives* edited by Gunter Schubert, Jens Damm. Routledge, p. 35–50. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203813607

Green, Frederik H. (2017). All under heaven KANO: The politics of nostalgia and the making of a new Taiwanese identity in Wei Te-sheng's Taiwan-Japan trilogy. *East Asian Journal of Popular Culture*, *3*(2), 169–182. https://doi.org/10.1386/eapc.3.2.169_1

Heé, Nadin. (2014). Taiwan under Japanese Rule. Showpiece of a Model Colony? Historiographical Tendencies in Narrating Colonialism. *History Compass*, *12*(8), 632–641. https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12180

Hechter, Michael, Matesan, Ioana, & Hale, Chris. (2009). Resistance to alien rule in Taiwan and Korea. *Nations and Nationalism*, *15*(1), 36–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2009.00378.x

Heylen, Ann. (2012). Legacies of memory and belonging in Taiwan history. In *Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives* edited by Gunter Schubert, Jens Damm. Routledge, p.17–34. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203813607

Ho, Ming-Sho. (2022). Desinicizing Taiwan: The Making of a Democratic National Identity. *Current History (1941)*, *121*(836), 211–217. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2022.121.836.211

Hsiao, Huang Michael. (2011). One colonialism, two memories: representing Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and South Korea. In *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia*, edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider. Routledge, p. 184–201. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203831663-16

Huyssen, A. (2003). *Present pasts: urban palimpsests and the politics of memory*. Stanford University Press.

Jeong, Hu Young & Vollhardt, Johanna Ray. (2021). Koreans' collective victim beliefs about Japanese colonization. *Peace and Conflict*, *27*(4), 629–641. https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000496

Jun, Hana. (2019). "I think the comfort women are us": National identity and affective historical empathy in students' understanding of "comfort women" in South Korea. *Journal of Social Studies Research*, *44*(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jssr.2019.09.005

Kang, Kyoung-Lae. (2015). Kyung-Sung: Cinematic Memories of the Colonial Past in Contemporary Korea. *Camera Obscura* (Durham, NC), 30(3), 27–59. https://doi.org/10.1215/02705346-3160641

Kang, Shu-Hua. (2022). Toward a Humanistic Discourse: Approaches to Gaining Public Support for Taiwanese Comfort Women. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, *13*(3), 703–720. https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huab044

Katz, Paul R. (2005). Governmentality and Its Consequences in Colonial Taiwan: A Case Study of the Ta-pa-ni Incident of 1915. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, *64*(2), 387–424. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911805000823

Katz, Paul R. (2005). *When valleys turned blood red: the Ta-pa-ni incident in colonial Taiwan*. University of Hawai'i Press.

Kratz, Brigit. (2018, August 17). *Smithsonian Magazine.* Taiwan Unveils Its First Statue Honoring Comfort Women. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/taiwan-unveils-its-first-statue-honoring-comfort-women-180970053/

Kim, Hunjoon. (2009). Seeking Truth after 50 Years: The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Events. *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, *3*(3), 406–423. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp014

Kumagai, Naoko. (2020, September 10). South Korea and Japan Resolving the Comfort Women Issue. *The Diplomat*. https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/south-korea-and-japan-resolving-the-comfort-women-issue/

Lebedev, V.V. (2017). Influence of the Russian Revolution on the March 1st Movement in Korea (1917-1919). *RUDN Journal of Russian History*, *16*(2), 281–302. https://doi.org/10.22363/2312-8674-2017-16-2-281-302

Lee, Hyang A. (2014). Managing the living through the dead: Colonial governmentality and the 1912 burial rules in colonial korea. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, *27*(3), 402–422. https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12056

Lee, Hyun Kung & Huang, Shu-Mei. (2021). The "commodified" colonial past in small cities: shifting heritage-making from nation-building to city branding in South Korea and Taiwan. *International Journal of Cultural Policy: CP*, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2021.1979532

Lee, Jerry Won. (2014). Legacies of Japanese colonialism in the rhetorical constitution of South Korean national identity. *National Identities*, *16*(1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2013.843516

Lin, Hsu-Ta. (2005). *Reflavored nostalgias: A history and ethnography of Taiwan's muted marginality, 1895–2004*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Louzon, Victor. (2018). From Japanese Soldiers to Chinese Rebels: Colonial Hegemony, War Experience, and Spontaneous Remobilization during the 1947 Taiwanese Rebellion. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, *77*(1), 161–179. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911817001279

Martin, Jeffrey. (2019). *Sentiment, Reason, and Law Policing in the Republic of China on Taiwan*. Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501740060

Matsuda, Hiroko. (2012). Becoming Japanese in the colony: Okinawan migrants in colonial Taiwan: Colonial Modernity and Beyond: the East Asian Context. *Cultural Studies (London, England)*, *26*(5), 688–709. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2012.697723

May, Hope Elizabeth. (2019). The march 1st movement and the red thread of international peace history. *Korea Observer*, *50*(2), 207–233. https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2019.50.2.207

Min, Pyong Gap. (2021). *Korean "comfort women" : military brothels, brutality, and the redress movement*. Rutgers University Press. https://doi.org/10.36019/9781978815001

Moon, Yumi. (2013). Immoral Rights: Korean Populist Collaborators and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 1904—1910. *The American Historical Review*, *118*(1), 20–44. https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/118.1.20

Moses, J. and T. Knutsen. (2019). *Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Ou, Andrew Hak. (2001). *The Japanese Policy of Cultural Assimilation in Colonial Korea Under Governor-General Minami Jirō*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Pak, Yoon-Yong & Hwang, Keumjoong. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: "Educating" the colonised during the 1910 - 1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. *Paedagogica Historica*, *47*(3), 377–397. https://doi.org/10.1080/00309230.2010.534104

Park, Myung-Lim. (2019). A Paradigm Shift of The March 1st Movement: From Independence to Restoration, From Anti-Japanese Struggle to Peaceful Coexistence, and From Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism. *Korea Observer*, *50*(2), 235–260. https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2019.50.2.235

Park, Seo-Hyung. (2020). The Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895. Edited by Haggard, S. & Kang, D.C. in *East Asia in the World*. Cambridge University Press, p. 224–238. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108807401.013

Park, Soul. (2010). The unnecessary uprising: Jeju Island rebellion and South Korean counterinsurgency experience 1947-48. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, *21*(2), 359–381. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2010.481432

Peng, Huan-Sheng & Chu, Jo-Ying. (2017). Japan's colonial policies - from national assimilation to the Kominka Movement: A comparative study of primary education in Taiwan and Korea (1937-1945). *Paedagogica Historica*, *53*(4), 441–459. https://doi.org/10.1080/00309230.2016.1276201

Peng, Jenyu. (2017). When the "comfort women" speak—shareability and recognition of traumatic memory. In *Shared Traumas, Silent Loss, Public and Private Mourning*. Edited by Lene Auestad. Routledge, p. 115–135. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429480126-8

Pollman, Mina. (2016, March 4). Will Taiwan's Comfort Women Get an Apology from Japan? *The Diplomat.* https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/will-taiwans-comfort-women-get-an-apology-from-japan/

Radstone, S. (2007). Trauma theory: Contexts, politics, ethics (Caruth, Felman, Laub). *Paragraph (Modern Critical Theory Group)*, *30*(1), 9–29. https://doi.org/10.3366/prg.2007.0015

Rigger, Shelly. (2017). “Taiwan: Margin, Center, Node”. In *A Companion to Chinese History*, edited by Michael Szonyi. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., pp. 327–342. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118624593.ch26

Rivett-Carnac, Mark. (2015, December 30). Taiwan Urges Japanese Apology for “Comfort Women”. *Time*. https://qa.time.com/4164004/taiwan-japan-comfort-women-resolution/

Roy, Toulouse-Antonin. (2022). "The Discourse and Practice of Colonial “Suppression” in the Making of the Musha Rebellion and Its Aftermath". In *The Musha Incident: A Reader on the Indigenous Uprising in Colonial Taiwan*, edited by Michael Berry, New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, p.15-44. https://doi-org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.7312/berr19746-004

Scruggs, Bert Mitchell. (2017). The Appearance of Colonial Taiwan in Fiction and Film. In Translingual Narration (pp. 113–136). University of Hawaii Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780824857301-007

Shattuck, Thomas J. (2020). Taiwan’s Reckoning with the White Terror. *Orbis (Philadelphia)*, *64*(1), 58–77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2019.12.005

Shin, Michael. (2018). *Korean National Identity under Japanese Colonial Rule: Yi Gwangsu and the March First Movement of 1919* (First edition.). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315544717

Su, Ya-Chen. (2007). Ideological Representations of Taiwan’s History: An Analysis of Elementary Social Studies Textbooks, 1978-1995. *Curriculum Inquiry*, *37*(3), 205–237. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2007.00383.x

Suh, Jae-Jung. (2010). Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Confronting War, Colonialism, and Intervention in the Asia Pacific. *Critical Asian Studies*, *42*(4), 503–524. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2010.515386

Tai, Richard King. (2013). *The Japanese occupation of Taiwan: An analysis of the Japanese policies “dōka” and “kōminka” in colonial Taiwan*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.

Taylor, Jeremy E. (2004). Pop music as postcolonial Nostalgia in Taiwan. In *Refashioning Pop Music in Asia: Cosmopolitan Flows, Political Tempos, and Aesthetic Industries* (pp. 173–182). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203641835

Thim, Michal & Michael Turton (2017, July 17). The Chinese Cult of Cairo and the Status of Taiwan. *The Diplomat.* https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/the-chinese-cult-of-cairo-and-the-status-of-taiwan/

Tsai, Shih-shan Henry. (2015). *Maritime Taiwan: Historical encounters with the East and the West*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315702544

Tsurumi, E. Patricia. (1977). *Japanese colonial education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*. Harvard University Press.

Uchida, Jun. (2011). *Brokers of empire: Japanese settler colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945*. Harvard University Asia Center.

Ueno, Hiroko. (2021). The 'Japanisation' of the Taiwanese lifeworld during and after the colonial period. In Memories of the Japanese Empire: Comparison of the colonial and decolonisation experiences in Taiwan and Nanyo-Gunto. Edited by Yuko Mio. Routledge, p.21-39.

Verovšek, P. (2016). Collective memory, politics, and the influence of the past: the politics of memory as a research paradigm. *Politics, Groups & Identities*, *4*(3), 529–543. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2016.1167094

Visser, I. (2011). Trauma theory and postcolonial literary studies. *Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, *47*(3), 270–282. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2011.569378

Vogel, Ezra F. (2019). The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945. In *China and Japan*. Harvard University Press, p. 175–202. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674240759-007

Vogel, Ezra F. (2019). Rivalry in Korea and the Sino-Japanese War, 1882–1895. In *China and Japan*. Harvard University Press, p. 100–131. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674240759-005

Won, Chealin & Huntington, Anne. (2021). What it means to be Korean: national identity in North and South Korean elementary textbooks, 1960-2019. *Comparative Education*, *57*(2), 267–289. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2020.1812237

Yang, Dominic Meng-Hsuan. (2021). *The great exodus from China : trauma, memory, and identity in modern Taiwan*. Cambridge University Press.

Yao, Ming-Li. (2019). Creating and re-creating the nation of Taiwan: representations of the history of the Japanese colonial era in history textbooks and teachers' discourses. *National Identities*, *21*(3), 305–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2018.1443324