

China's Repression of the Xinjiang Uyghur:  
Ethnic Conflict in Xinjiang, China, and the Application of John Burton's Human Needs  
Theory

By

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## Abstract

This thesis is focused on the analysis of the conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese government in Xinjiang, China using John Burton's Human Needs Theory. Xinjiang or the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is a province in China's northwestern corner. It is a predominantly Muslim province, inhabited by the Uyghur population. Ethnic conflict and unrest plague the province. The Chinese government has designated separatism and terrorism in the region as one of the nation's largest security challenges. According to the Chinese government, the conflict in Xinjiang threatens the social fabric and stability in Xinjiang and the country as a whole.

In response to this security challenge, the Chinese government has adopted a policy of *striking hard*, whereby they employ methods to reduce extremism, and religious and ethnic terrorism. These approaches have been accused of being militarized, securitized, and embedded with religious and ethnic repression and discrimination which threaten the human rights and human needs of the Uyghur population. This thesis aims to describe and outline these occurrences and the general climate of marginalization in Xinjiang.

This thesis aims to demonstrate that this repression deprives the Uyghur population of their fundamental human needs and increases a sense of hopelessness and desperation. This exacerbates tensions in the region and leads to a rise in violence and terrorism. In this way, this thesis will use John Burton's Human Needs Theory to demonstrate and explore how the policies adopted by the Chinese government may not only be ineffective, but also counterproductive, in tackling the region's security challenges. It will focus on the intersections between repression, counterterrorism, and John Burton's Human Needs Theory. It aims to present a case study that offers an understanding of how the Chinese government's policies may be further threatening national security and stability and demonstrates the implications of certain counterterror policies aimed towards religious and ethnic terrorism. Ultimately, it aims to show that structural violence and the deprivation of human needs must be tackled for conflict resolution to occur.

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Shannon Gallagher

## **List of Abbreviations**

<b>CCP</b>	Chinese Communist Party
<b>ETIM</b>	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
<b>HNT</b>	Human Needs Theory
<b>IAC</b>	Islamic Association of China
<b>PAP</b>	People's Armed Police
<b>PLA</b>	People's Liberation Army
<b>PRC</b>	People's Republic of China
<b>RMB</b>	Renmenbi – The People's Money
<b>ROC</b>	Republic of China
<b>SARA</b>	State Administration of Religious Affairs
<b>SCO</b>	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
<b>XPCC</b>	Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
<b>XUAR</b>	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

## Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis concerns the conflict between the Chinese government and the Uyghur<sup>1</sup> minority in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. This topic is of interest due to the complexity of the conflict. It is characterized by significant historical antecedents but remains an unresolved contemporary conflict. It includes factors such as religion, ethnicity, culture and politics. Furthermore, it involves factors of political violence, terrorism and dissent. It is gaining attention both in China and in world politics.

This topic is also of great interest as a result of my personal experience and relationship with China. This experience began in 1998 with a relocation from the United States to China. While in China, censorship was heavy and it was difficult to learn about issues and conflicts within the country. Fear of the government and the authorities was omnipresent. It became clear that China was an authoritarian society, even for expatriates. After leaving China, it was easier to explore and understand the issues that existed there. Researching this was an illuminating experience that created a desire to advocate on the behalf of marginalized populations within China. No one should be victimized based on their beliefs or their ethnicity, especially in such a diverse nation. It is hypothesized that this thesis offers a means to address this in the Xinjiang case.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is a province located in northwestern China. It is also referred to as East Turkistan or Uyghuristan (Pokalova, 2013, p. 284). The province has a population of approximately 21.5 million people (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 10). The Uyghur Muslim Turkic-speaking community make up approximately forty-five

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<sup>1</sup> Different authors use different spellings of Uyghur but this thesis will use the spelling used by the Chinese government.

percent of Xinjiang’s population. They are the dominant ethnic group in the province. Forty percent of the population is made up of Han Chinese, the dominant ethnic group throughout China (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 68). The Han Chinese form approximately ninety two percent of the country’s population of approximately 1.3 billion people (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 10). They dominate the nation’s politics, government, economy and culture (Kaltman, 2007, p. 2).



Figure 1: Map of Xinjiang (Hsieh & Falkenheim, 2018)

While being a minority group within China, the Uyghurs are officially considered equal citizens under Chinese law (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2017;

Grieboski, 2014).<sup>2</sup> The Chinese government claims that “[t]he cultural landscape of Xinjiang has long been characterized by coexistence and communication between different cultures” and that “[t]he ethnic groups of Xinjiang live together, study together, work together and share happiness” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). Nevertheless, despite legal equality and the claims of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), ethnic tensions between the Uyghur and the Han have led to conflict and unrest in Xinjiang for decades.

In the post-Mao Zedong era in China, ethnic and national structures (*minzu*) have replaced class as the dominant analytical paradigm and means of identification in the country. As a result, *minzu* conflict is considered the largest threat to the Chinese geobody (Leibold, 2016, p. 229). Consequently, the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang is considered one of the largest security challenges in China, threatening the fabric and unity of the country. In addition, the Chinese government claims this conflict includes terrorist threats from some Uyghurs in the region, making it more difficult to challenge.

Therefore, the Chinese government has been invested in controlling the situation in Xinjiang. The Chinese government has attempted to manage domestic terrorism and conflict through enhancing regional economic growth, increasing internal security capabilities and deepening controls over ethnic cultural and religious activities (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 20). In 1996, they adopted the policy of *striking hard* against the three evils of terrorism, fundamentalism, and separatism (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). The goal of these policies was to promote ethnic unity and social stability (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015). These *strike-hard campaigns* continue today. The means used by the Chinese government within these campaigns have been criticized as repressive and authoritarian. There are concerns that the approaches

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<sup>2</sup> Articles from online sources without numbered paragraphs do not include page or paragraph numbers in their citations, in accordance with APA 6<sup>th</sup> Edition Style Guide. These sources can be referred to in the bibliography and direct references can be found using the find function in the browser to locate any specific passages or information.

used violate the human rights and needs of the Uyghur population. They are accused of being embedded with religious and ethnic repression and discrimination. Further, these methods may not only be fueling current violence but may increase the threat of extremism, violence, and terrorism in the future. Generally, my assessment is that that the Chinese government's policies and tactics are ineffective and counterproductive.

One of the most critical moments that caused escalation in the conflict was the Urumqi Riots. On July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2009, approximately one thousand Uyghurs took to the streets in the capital of Xinjiang to protest (Hillman, 2016, p. 2). They were protesting as a result of the death of two Uyghur men in a factory and felt that the treatment of their death highlighted inequality and ethnic discrimination towards the Uyghur in China (Wong, 2009). The protests were meant to be a peaceful. However, the tension grew and they turned to riots. Property and infrastructure were destroyed and Han Chinese citizens were attacked. The Han retaliated by attacking Uyghur citizens and provincial police. Eventually the People's Armed Police were deployed and ended the riots. According to the Chinese government, 197 people died and 1721 people were injured during the riots (Hillman, 2016, p. 2). However, rights organizations claim that the death toll was much higher and that many human rights abuses occurred. Nevertheless, China responded swiftly and seriously. Many Uyghurs were arrested on charges related to terrorism and some received the death penalty (Human Rights Watch, 2017b). This event showed China and the world the extent of growing tensions in Xinjiang and how the Chinese government responds to such pressures.

Protests and conflict continued as the Chinese government maintained their policies of *striking hard*. The degree of repression and securitization of dissent in Xinjiang increased. Nevertheless, as stated by Joseph Grieboski in 2014, “[a]midst a plethora of human rights abuses, Uyghur protests against state sanctioned discrimination have reached a fever pitch” (Grieboski, 2014). Uyghurs have

continued to challenge the state's monopoly on violence and attempted to change the reality of their lives in the province, despite growing constraints.

The conflict came into international news again in 2018 and 2019 due to the discovery of detention centres in Xinjiang. The government refers to these detention centres as *re-education camps*. They claim they are used to change Uyghur habits and thoughts, and prevent the rise of religious extremism in the province. However, a variety of rights groups and governments have condemned these centres or camps as violating human rights and freedoms (The Guardian, 2018). This has allowed these camps to come into Western media. This international publicity helps demonstrate the dire nature of the situation in Xinjiang to the rest of the world. As a result, the limitations of China's current approach in the region are being highlighted. With the growing complexity of the conflict, a new angle is required for conflict resolution to take place.

Ultimately, the conflict in Xinjiang is complex and multidimensional: it is political, cultural, ethnic and religious. It is political in the sense that there are demands from Uyghurs for independence and autonomy. It is cultural because the Chinese government threatens Uyghur culture. The Chinese government fears Uyghur culture threatens national unity and harmony. It is interethnic because the conflict is centred around the Uyghurs, the Han majority and Chinese government, run by the Han majority. Religion is a central component as there are disputes regarding the freedom of religious practice, which is paramount to Uyghur identity. The importance of these elements varies and are context specific (Dillon, 2019, p. 26). The complexities within the conflict must be recognized and addressed.

China itself remains an area that is typically under-researched and this is a conflict that is multifaceted. Xinjiang provides an interesting illustration of the implications of repression and

traditional counterterrorism policies. Policies aimed towards perceived religious and ethnic terrorism are important to explore and understand. Their effectiveness and repercussions must be explained as the methods and means of conflict are changing. This ethnic conflict provides an example of how to tackle these issues. Furthermore, the conflict offers an illustration of a post-Cold War conflict where one can observe pronounced identity politics, human rights abuses and a heavy military and police presence (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 63). With the commonality of these types of conflicts around the world, the conflict in Xinjiang can provide an exemplification of how these conflicts happen and how to resolve them. Furthermore, the nation may have arrived at a point where the conflict is ripe for attempts at resolution.

Ultimately, it is hypothesized that adopting an additional approach, using Human Needs Theory (HNT)<sup>3</sup>, can allow researchers and policy makers to more fully understand the issues and conflict that exist in Xinjiang. Their current approach is unsuccessful and potentially counterproductive. It may be further threatening the nation's national security and stability. HNT can allow for more successful resolution and prevention. It is believed that the conflict is ripe for resolution and HNT provides a means to do this.

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<sup>3</sup> Throughout this thesis Human Needs Theory will be referred to as HNT.

## **Chapter 2: Strategies of Inquiry and Methodology**

### **2.1 Review of the Literature**

Given the unique political climate in China, academics are keenly interested in how the state reacts to dissidence. Researchers are interested in the potential problems implicit in China's policies and tactics and how these may lead to resistance and violence. Due to the nature of the conflict, this interest further corresponds with academic attention to terrorism which includes the causes and consequences of it.

#### **2.1.1 Types of Data and Sources**

Accurate data and sources on Xinjiang can be difficult to find given that China remains a relatively private and non-transparent nation. Conducting research in Xinjiang and other regions with ethnic minorities can be challenging and potentially dangerous for all parties concerned due to the authoritarian nature of the government.<sup>4</sup> Information from within the country is censored and often biased. Generally, there is a state-controlled narrative of events that is adhered to (Holdstock, 2014, p. 51).

Contestation and criticism of government policies and the treatment of the Uyghur often come from outside observers and foreign sources. The breadth of knowledge used in this thesis must come from these sources. Despite originating from outside the country in question, the sources included in the literature review and this thesis provide valuable research from authors who are familiar with the area and Chinese state system. These authors use interviews with the diaspora and occasionally with

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<sup>4</sup> For this reason, many author's names are redacted from their publications and articles are published under the name of the organization which they work for. This is reflected in citations and done in accordance with the APA 6<sup>th</sup> Edition Style Guide.

Uyghurs living within the country. They also explore news articles and governmental reports.<sup>5</sup> The combination of academic articles, government sources and news articles will provide the most comprehensive understanding of the situation in Xinjiang given the challenges related to government censorship.

The following literature review shows how the situation in Xinjiang is currently explained, analysed, and classified. The recommendations analysts proposed are explored. Researchers approach this conflict from a variety of different disciplines, backgrounds, and approaches. This section outlines research contributions on the subject, but also their limitations. These limitations will be the subject of this inquiry. There are three main research approaches used to describe, analyse, and interpret the situation in Xinjiang; a descriptive human rights approach, a terror/counterterror approach; and an analytical human rights approach.

### **2.1.2 Descriptive Human Rights Approach**

The literature outlines a wide consensus that a variety of human rights abuses occur in Xinjiang. Accordingly, the first research approach is descriptive and portrays the situation many Uyghurs face. This approach details and examines the prevalence of human rights abuses. To do this, these authors attempt to demonstrate a history of deprivation and marginalization of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Michael Clarke is one researcher who has published several articles that describe human rights violations in Xinjiang and how the Chinese government has created a sense of marginalization through its social, economic, and political policies in Xinjiang (Clarke, 2007, 2010, 2015, 2016; International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016). Other sources, like the International Forum for Rights and Security and reports from non-governmental organizations and human rights bodies, outline human

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<sup>5</sup> News articles are important as the situation in Xinjiang is current and continuing to unfold. It has also been receiving increasing international and media attention. While these sources may be considered less academic than others, they are valuable in providing supplementary information and current developments. Their significance should not be discounted.

rights violations in Xinjiang and provide detailed accounts of their occurrences (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2017a, 2017b, 2018, n.d.). While these sources are largely descriptive and do not analyse their data, they do provide valuable detail to understand how the conflict has developed and the potential causes of violence.

Because of this historical deprivation and marginalization, theorists within this approach often hypothesize that there has been a failure on the part of the Chinese government in addressing root causes of dissidence and the resultant violence in the area. By outlining violations, the implication is that they cause a sense of desperation, frustration, and marginalization with violence as a consequence.

However, there is a lack of depth of analysis in this descriptive approach. Implications are not theorizations. Abuses and concerns are merely outlined and described. This leaves interpretation and analysis of data to the reader. The reader must discern the analytic connections and relations between these violations and violence. The root causes of the conflict must be assumed. How to tackle these challenges is left unanswered if this approach is used.

Recommendations and solutions to these problems are not presented. As a result, these authors do not make associations between their research and their hypotheses. Without doing this, the approach remains inadequate in evaluating and explaining the conflict. While understanding the characteristics and features of the situation in Xinjiang is vital to any analysis, supplementary sources are required to provide analysis. These sources ultimately do not go far enough and other steps have to happen for deeper examination of the conflict.

### **2.1.3 Terror/Counterterror Approach**

The terrorism component of the conflict in Xinjiang has frequently been discussed and explored by researchers due to the changing nature of conflict and the rise in asymmetrical non-traditional

warfare. This is the first approach that begins to analyse the situation in Xinjiang and can be referred to as the terror/counterterror approach (Mackerras, 2014; Pokalova, 2013; Primiano, 2013; Tschantret, 2016a, 2016b). These researchers explore how the perceived terrorism in the region may be caused by the Chinese government's repression of the Uyghur population through policies of securitization. These authors discuss the causes of terrorism related to repression and how this leads to innovation and potentially violent reactions in Xinjiang. Ultimately, they argue that the Chinese government's approach is counterintuitive and may be causing more violence and terrorism. This provides a great deal of information and insight on terrorism in this specific case. Furthermore, with this analysis, this approach provides the depth that the previous approach lacks. It offers the opportunity to explore the potential origins of the violence in Xinjiang and a means to combat these through, assumedly, diminishing the severity of the government's policies.

However, this perspective is limited. It focuses more on recent developments in policy in China. As a result, discussion of systemic injustice and the enduring challenging conditions for Uyghurs are underemphasized. Terrorism can be viewed as a symptom of the conflict in China, rather than a central component of it. Consequently, this body of literature is reductionist in explaining and understanding the causes of the conflict. The conflict becomes reducible to a cyclical narrative of terrorism and counterterrorism which ignores central historical antecedents. It also offers little meaningful resolution as it fails to acknowledge the importance of ethnicity and identity in this type of political violence, beyond providing a unifying force among potential terrorists. Without understanding these components, it is unlikely that durable peace can be produced in the province.

Furthermore, the inconsistent rhetoric and research on terrorism can be difficult to navigate when analyzing a conflict situation such as this (Holdstock, 2015, p. 6). Terrorism is a muddled term. Definitions of what constitutes terrorism can be difficult to navigate, especially when analyzing an

ethnic conflict with inequitable power dynamics. As a result, the theorization and analysis around it can be equally confused and varied. While there is valuable research to be gained from these disciplines, the inconsistencies in the research on terrorism make it difficult for one to gain a concrete sense of understanding. It is difficult to provide meaningful recommendations when the rhetoric is ambiguous and there are no generally accepted policies or procedures. There is also a propensity for bias within the discussions on terrorism due to the varying backgrounds and motivations of those who examine and theorize about it. Each discipline and perspective has its own distinct evaluations that may result in assumptions about this kind of violence and the actors who carry it out. These are often related to the actors' rationality, sanity, and the legitimacy of their causes. As a result, a more concrete and coherent approach is required.

#### **2.1.4 Analytical Human Rights Approach**

The second analytical and most compelling perspective explores the conflict in Xinjiang explicitly through a human rights lens. Researchers outline the human rights abuses that have occurred, including in development, culture, economics, and politics. They explore how long-standing Chinese policies in each of these areas have led to marginalization and frustration in Xinjiang. For example, China's emphasis on economic development is often cited as a factor in increasing inter-ethnic tensions and conflict (Tschantret, 2016b, pp. 7-8). The relative economic deprivation of Uyghurs compared to the Han majority is considered a source of grievances (Kanat, 2016, pp. 196-197). According to Clarke, Chinese programs of economic development increase disenfranchisement and political and economic marginalization. Furthermore, they reflect what he views as China's overarching goal, to absorb all non-Han ethnic groups into the national vision economically, politically, and culturally (Clarke, 2007, pp. 214-220). These policies are often seen to assimilate cultures via economic development (Clarke, 2007, pp. 324-330).

According to Nick Holdstock, these economic practices, coupled with social and cultural policies, have created grievances and systemic ethnic inequalities that inform a narrative of colonization or neocolonialism (Holdstock, 2015, p. 66). Christopher Primiano argues that these policies are part of the CCP's goal to "strip out and remove the culture of Uyghur people" (Primiano, 2013, p. 460). The aim of the Chinese government, according to Christian Cunningham, is to suppress Uyghur identity, cultural and religious rights and freedoms (Cunningham, 2012, pp. 18-31). These policies combined with the Chinese government's counter-terrorism policies are seen as discrimination against the Uyghurs (Cunningham, 2012, pp. 31-34). According to Grieboski, Uyghurs fear for their cultural survival and fear further human rights abuses and repression (Grieboski, 2014). This kind of context specific evaluation of Chinese policies and their consequences for the Uyghur community is both illuminating and valuable.

These authors explore how Chinese responses to dissidence and violence have result in the further violation of human rights. They clearly indicate how these violations can lead to desperation and, therefore, violence and increased threat (Clarke, 2007, 2010, 2015, 2016; Cunningham, 2012; Grieboski, 2014; Holdstock, 2014; International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016; Kanat, 2016; Mukherjee, 2015). Unlike the first approach, this perspective truly analyses the conflict. In this way, it is a very informative, useful, and compelling body of research. It provides the most insight into and analysis of the situation in Xinjiang. For example, by highlighting the potential social, economic and cultural rights violations, the plight of the Uyghur people can be more robustly understood. They also provide implicit and explicit recommendations for the Chinese government that could be applied in addressing some of these violations. However, the research lacks depth in its explanation of how this violence occurs. Furthermore, it neglects to mention the issues that exist in the field of human rights, which result in significant limitations for this conflict.

Louise Arbour, a Special Representative for the United Nations, explores issues with human rights discourse. She argues that economic, social, and cultural rights are not perceived as being as important as other types of rights, like civil and political rights. These types of rights are seen as aspirations rather than rights, therefore unimportant in justice and peace efforts. Nations generally do not devote a lot of resources to addressing these rights but governments are relied upon to provide these rights (Arbour, 2007, pp. 3-4). Issues related to this group of rights are underlined as some of the largest violations in Xinjiang. According to Arbour's critiques, these rights may not be recognized or prioritized. Without this recognition, they cannot be resolved.

Furthermore, the nature of human rights discourse can result in value judgments about policies and practices. A dialogue based on these judgments can become reduced to assertion and counter assertion. As a result, problems of power become moral problems requiring moral debate (Zhang & McGhee, 2014, p. 6). Consequently, critique of a nation's human rights record may be dismissed on the grounds of bias and subjectivity.

In terms of the Chinese case, China remains generally unconcerned about its human rights record and uncompelled by criticism regarding it (Vanderklippe, 2018a). The contexts in which China allows criticism are very limited. China generally dismisses human rights critiques based on state sovereignty. Any interference in the nation's domestic problems using the pretexts of human rights protection is seen as invalid or unacceptable by the government. As stated by Shaoyin Zhang and Derek McGhee, the nation's government "cling[s] tenaciously to the shield of sovereignty" (Zhang & McGhee, 2014, p. 7).

Thus, while the perspective is useful and informative, these critiques highlight the messiness inherent in human rights language and a human rights approach. Due to the country's attitude towards

human rights and priorities, a human rights approach will not have traction in China. Therefore, this approach provides unrealistic recommendations that are unadaptable to the Chinese case given the government's stance on prioritizing state security, sovereignty, and stability over human rights. Hence, this perspective may not be tangible nor compellable to Chinese authorities and governmental powers.

### **2.1.5 The Lacuna in the Literature**

Ultimately, all three analytical perspectives are potentially reductionist, rendering them insufficient in providing enough depth and insight into the conflict for extensive analysis to occur. This highlights a lacuna in the literature that needs to be addressed and where an additional approach is needed. The research needs to be interpreted using a different methodology to add to the strength of analyses of the conflict. HNT offers an alternative to the human rights approach, the most compelling perspective in the literature, and provides recommendations that may have more traction and operability in the Chinese context.

## **2.2 Theoretical Framework**

As demonstrated, while illuminating, the current research approaches and analytical perspectives are limited in their ability to explore and explain the conflict in Xinjiang. An additional methodology and theory needs to be adopted to enrich current understanding and analysis of the conflict in Xinjiang and address the lacuna in the literature. John Burton and his colleagues have developed HNT based upon theories of structural violence. HNT offers valuable insights that have not been applied in the current research.

### **2.2.1 Understanding Violence**

Johan Galtung, a key theorist in Conflict Studies, posits that there are two types of violence: direct and indirect violence. Three key elements of violence are direct violence, cultural violence, and

structural violence (Galtung, 1969). Using this methodology, Galtung acknowledges the importance of recognizing violence beyond personal and physical to include cultural and structural sources of violence (Dilts, 2012, p. 192). A comprehension of these is imperative in using and understanding HNT. Galtung defines violence broadly by arguing that it is present when human beings are being affected such that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations (Galtung, 1969, p. 169). Essentially, violence is present when humans are unable to reach their full potential.

Direct violence refers to a type of violence where the means of realizing one's somatic realizations are directly destroyed. For example, in war, there is direct violence where killing or harming an individual puts their "actual somatic realization" below their "potential somatic realization" (Galtung, 1969, p. 169). This requires having an actor who is committing violence. Direct violence is the most visible form of violence. It is verbal or physical and the actor committing the violence can be clearly identified.

Indirect violence refers to violence that occurs and is reproduced along a continuum. This includes how collective beliefs, norms and values impact how individuals relate to one another in a society. It also includes how institutional structures lead to inequality, discrimination, and injustice (Galtung, 1969, p. 169). It is often invisible. Cultural and structural violence fall under this umbrella.

Cultural violence is symbolic violence and the aspects of cultures that are used to legitimize violence, both direct violence and structural violence. Social norms, beliefs and values allow for the existence of direct violence and potentially normalize it. It also serves to suppress responses from victims and offers justifications for direct violence (Galtung, 1990a).

Structural violence is deeply embedded in a society. It relates to social injustice and the prejudices and inequities build into the structure of a society. It is the systematic ways in which social structures and institutions harm and disadvantage individuals (Burtle, 2010-2013). Burton defines structural violence as the “damaging deprivations caused by the nature of social institutions and policies. As such it is, by definition, an avoidable, perhaps a deliberate violence against the person or community” (Burton J. , 1997, p. 32). In this way, the origin of structural violence is within “the policy and administrative decisions that are made by some and which adversely affect others” (Burton J. , 1997, p. 32). It is often subtle or invisible. Structural violence is embedded in economic, political, and social structures that systematically deprive the satisfaction of needs for certain individuals or groups of individuals (Christie, 1997, p. 315). Invisibility is possible due to its perpetual visible repetition. The normalcy and continual nature of structural violence renders it invisible (Dilts, 2012, pp. 192-193). Structural violence results in unequal power, opportunities, and realizations. This violence results in the deprivation of human needs and may cause direct violence (Galtung, 1969).

Much of the violence in Xinjiang is structural, cultural, and often *invisible* (Dilts, 2012, pp. 192-193). In this way, the violence that occurs in Xinjiang is not exceptional or anomalous. It is not a recent catastrophe or manifestation, but part of a cycle of permanent and ongoing catastrophes stemming from structural violence. As a result, understanding the conflict requires a dynamic and multilevel approach (Dilts, 2012, p. 193). A human needs framework inherently analyses structural violence and responses to it. Within a system where structural violence is present, there are conditions that a person or group is unable to accommodate or endure. These conditions affect human needs. In response to this structural violence, there will be violence aimed at resisting these imposed conditions (Burton J. , 1997, p. 33). This knowledge and focus on structural violence allows for an additional analysis that does not exist in the current literature.

## **2.3 Human Needs Theory**

According to Burton and other theorists, including Galtung, Paul Sites, Richard Rubenstein and Vern Redekop, human needs are universal motivations related to growth and development.<sup>6</sup> They are integral to human beings and their evolution (Redekop, 2002, p. 23; Burton J., 1990b). Unlike human rights, which are located and granted between individuals, human needs are inherently rooted within individuals and therefore inalienable. Human needs can be granted regardless of the relationship between parties (Galtung & Wirak, 1977, p. 251). They are ontological and non-negotiable (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016, p. 117). Coercion, punishment, and repression will not prevent an individual or group from seeking to meet human needs or result in an individual giving up these needs (Walsh, 2016, pp. 286-287).

The theory is partially based on Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of human needs. However, it is universal in that it applies across cultures and time. The theory can be applied to all societal levels (Vayrynen, 2001, p. 35). Their satisfiers can be both physical and non-physical. In this way, it is less biased towards Western cultures and less focused on individualism. It emphasizes the importance of our common humanity and the shared experiences all individuals face. Human needs, in this theory, are also emergent and non-hierarchical. (Marker, 2003).

### **2.3.1 Specific Human Needs**

There is little consensus regarding a list of central human needs, the number of needs, their priority, nature, or universality (Christie, 1997, p. 317; Walsh, 2016, p. 286).<sup>7</sup> Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the theory, scholars come from various background with different priorities and understandings of human needs. However, human needs often include “needs for meaning,

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<sup>6</sup> This development is what Galtung refers to when he discusses somatic and mental realizations

<sup>7</sup> Theorists' lists and figures outlining specific human needs can be found in the appendices.

connectedness, action, security, and recognition” (Redekop, 2002, p. 164). Issues of safety, belongingness, love, self-esteem, personal fulfillment, identity, cultural security, distributive justice, participation, and freedom are also considered central to human needs (Walsh, 2016, p. 286). There is also a need to be perceived as a rational individual, a need for control of one’s respective environments and a need to have prospects (Griffiths M. , 2013, p. 63). Human needs are also “fundamentally connected to issues of identity, including the ability to develop a collective identity, to have that identity recognized by others, and to have fair access to the systems and structures that support and define the conditions that allow for the achievement and building of identity” (Cook-Hoffman, 2009, p. 22). In his text, *Deviance, Terrorism and War*, Burton outlines nine specific needs used within his framework:

1. A need for consistency in response
2. A need for stimulation
3. A need for security
4. A need for recognition
5. A need for distributive justice
6. A need to appear rational and develop rationality
7. A need for meaningful responses
8. A need for a sense of control
9. A need to defend one’s role (Scimecca, 1990, pp. 206-207).

Fundamentally, there are a variety of needs that contribute to growth and development. Despite a lack of consensus, there are overlaps in the various catalogues of human needs. However, Burton gives the most standard list that can be applied to the Xinjiang case.

Burton states that human needs are both specific and universal. They can be applied with precision to any situation and culture. Furthermore, they will be satisfied despite everything (Burton J. , 1979, pp. 228-229). Satisfaction of human needs leads to self-respect, self-esteem, self-confidence, self-recognizance and eventually self-actualization. However, in cases where human needs are threatened, the results can be anger, depression, sadness, fear, shame and potentially violence (Redekop, 2002, pp. 164-165). The following sections deal with the connection between human needs and conflict.

### **2.3.2 Human Needs Theory and Violence**

Essentially, human needs theorists argue that there are “certain ontological and genetic needs that will be pursued, and that socialization processes, if not compatible with such human needs, far from socializing, will lead to frustrations...” (Burton J. , 1990b, pp. 33-34). Burton argues that when these needs are threatened and combined with frustration, conflict may occur (Burton J. , 1990b). Burton states that the individual is conditioned, primordially, to pursue these needs. If needs are not satisfied within the norms of the society then the individual will operate outside the norms of the society to pursue them (Burton J. , 1990b, pp. 36-37). In this way, the frustration of human needs is a core problem in intractable conflicts and a threat to peace and social order (Steinmeyer, 2017, pp. 39-53). Violence and resistance are often felt to be the only tool available to combat structural violence and injustice (Burton J. , 1979, pp. 228-229).

### **2.3.3 Human Needs Theory and Terrorism**

Few theorists analyse terrorism and conflict in Xinjiang with direct reference to identity and HNT. Doing so can provide valuable insight into how and why terrorism occurs and how to achieve conflict management and conflict resolution. Actions labelled as terrorism can become a means to a political end by delegitimized or alienated groups when human needs are threatened (Crenshaw, 1987,

p. 13).<sup>8</sup> As stated by Alex Schmid, “[w]hen long-standing injustices in society are not resolved but allowed to continue for years, without any light in sight at the end of the tunnel, we should not be amazed that desperate people, and some others championing for their cause, are willing to die and to kill for what they perceive to be as a just cause” (Schmid, 2005, p. 227).

#### **2.3.4 Human Needs Theory and Identity**

Human needs become significant source of action for some ethnic groups. According to Stefan Wolff, “when ethnicity [and identity] becomes politically relevant and determines the life prospects of people belonging to distinct ethnic groups, it is possible to mobilize group members to change a situation of apparently perpetual discrimination and disadvantage or in defense of a valued status quo” (Wolff, 2006, p. 31). This mobilization can result in violence. Conflicts with the aforementioned traits and are based on non-negotiable human needs are defined by Burton as deep-rooted conflicts and identity-based conflicts (Gawerc, 2006, p. 436). They are often protracted and difficult to resolve. When power is unequal in these conflicts, terrorism can become a prominent feature of resistance. This can increase the difficulty of reaching a just and sustainable resolution.

#### **2.3.5 Human Needs Theory and Resolution**

An adequate understanding of the causes of a conflict is necessary for successful resolution. Redekop argues that incorrectly defining the cause of a conflict results in the adoption of incompatible policies and procedures of conflict management and conflict resolution. Doing so can result in escalating or protracting the conflict (Redekop, 2002, p. 26). This can be the case when instances of terrorism exist. These instances may be blamed on religious extremism and root causes are not

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<sup>8</sup> This thesis adopts the understanding of terrorism as a means of political violence to reach political ends. Terrorism like that carried out by organizations such as ISIS are not explored in this thesis. As a result, more established and developed research based on post-colonial conflicts involving terrorism are used. While this research may not be as recent, it has been well developed and successfully applied to a variety of cases. As a result, it is still very relevant to contemporary contexts.

assessed. Current responses to deep rooted conflicts and ethnic terrorism will be unsuccessful in suppressing, containing or resolving the conflict in the long term if the causes of the conflict are not adequately considered (Gawerc, 2006, p. 436).

The benefit of adopting HNT is that it allows for the exploration of possible solutions after adversaries abandon efforts to coerce one another into accepting only their own solutions. Resolution is no longer a zero-sum game<sup>9</sup> when HNT is used. HNT promotes the cooperative search for alternative solutions and the fostering of a sense of common humanity, compassion, and empathy (Mitchell, 2001). HNT illuminates a potentially realistic solution to the problem that could be durable and sustainable.

Essentially, HNT provides a systems approach to conflict that allows researchers to more accurately understand some forms of violent social conflict, how it manifests and potential changes to foster positive peace (Cook-Hoffman, 2009, p. 22). As stated by Burton, “[a] human needs theory opens up a new world, different interpretations of the past and different predictions of the future, and different policy possibilities” (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 35). As a result, HNT seems to provide the most effective analytical perspective for understanding and exploring the conflict in Xinjiang and potential means of resolving it.

### **2.3.6 Application of Human Needs Theory**

Ultimately, this thesis attempts to add to the understanding of the situation in Xinjiang. As mentioned, the current research is insufficient. HNT has not been applied to the case in Xinjiang and may provide an additional understanding of the conflict that can lead to resolution. The existing literature makes impractical recommendations for the region that may be perceived by the Chinese

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<sup>9</sup> Originating in Game Theory, a zero-sum game refers to a situation where the gains of one party directly corresponds with losses for the other party. This can occur in conflict resolution and results in sentiments related to *winning* or *losing* a resolution process.

government daunting and perhaps unrealistic to implement. Using HNT, a coherent and pragmatic understanding can be developed. After developing this robust understanding of the conflict, recommendations could be proposed and implemented.

This thesis aims to use HNT to highlight the root causes of the conflict and to offer a more comprehensive understanding and more theoretical depth in analysis than current analytical perspectives. It is hypothesized that the government's policies in Xinjiang have resulted in a deprivation of human needs. There is also a hypothesized causal relationship between the deprivation of human needs and social violence. Therefore, this deprivation has caused a cycle of violence and unrest between the Uyghurs and the Chinese government. It is posited that the continued use of current Chinese policies and tactics may further jeopardize human needs and cause frustration among Uyghurs, thereby increasing violence and conflict in the area. Addressing these deprivations as the root cause of the conflict may lead to more meaningful and realistic approaches to resolution. Because of these reasons, HNT has been adopted here as the primary analytical perspective to explore the conflict in Xinjiang.

## **2.4 Methodology**

### **2.4.1 Historical Trajectory**

This thesis aims to analyse the conflict by initially following a historical trajectory as part of the regional context. Chapter 3 and 4 explore the events that have occurred from prior to Xinjiang's introduction into China, in 1769, up to the most current context. This historical trajectory focuses on key events and turning points that have affected either the government's policy choices or Uyghur unrest.

Due to the complexity of the conflict and the importance of memory and historical narratives to the parties involved, the historical antecedents must be acknowledged. Following the historical trajectory underlines incidents and policies that have furthered the deprivation of human needs and produced frustrations, traumas, memories, a sense of hopelessness and conflict, according to HNT. This historical memory can influence identity formation. Joseph Montville defines identity as “the accumulation of individual and large-group historical memory” and is “composed of the memory of what has happened to us as individuals and as identity groups or nations” (Montville, 2015, p. 38). This concept of memory and history is important within Xinjiang and China. Memory can lead to the conception of “chosen glories and chosen traumas” for an identity group (Montville, 2015, p. 39). These glories and traumas influence the actions of actors and must be considered.

Reports showing the perspectives of the Chinese government are included to illuminate how they perceive the conflict and how policies related to it have been adopted and implemented. This includes considerations of how they define unrest, terrorism, and political violence. It also includes their assessments on rights and identity in Xinjiang and their opinions of the conflict and risk of terrorism. It also explores how these considerations have affected their policy-making decisions.

#### **2.4.2 Application of Human Needs**

HNT is explained and explored in more depth in Chapter 5. This includes a section discussing and defining each human need. The section also further explains the value of human needs in understanding human action and behaviour.

As demonstrated in the literature review, there are multiple approaches available to analyse the conflict in Xinjiang. However, it is believed that HNT provides an additional means to dissect the conflict in Xinjiang, as “[t]o deal with deep-rooted, intractable conflicts at any level, one requires a

comprehensive, holistic framework to ‘capture the complexity of conflict’” (Sandole D. J., 2001). The relationship between human needs and conflict is discussed in depth.

Chapter 5 includes various subthemes and goes into depth into each of these areas. It discusses the relationship between the deprivation of human needs and violence. It explores the role of government and institutions in satisfying and how, when this fails to be done, violence will occur. This relates to the exploration of authoritarianism and conflict. China is run by an authoritarian government and this affects the ability of individuals to challenge the systems and policies they do not agree with. This lack of access to representative institutions and the inability to express and address grievances results in the deprivation of human needs. This increases the propensity for violence. The connection between terrorism and human needs are explored. This subtheme examines the causes of terrorism and, more specifically, how terrorism and political violence are often means to challenge inequitable dominant state structures. The potential dangers of dominant counterterrorism approaches are also considered. The impacts of the problematic rhetoric regarding terrorism and how this influences counterterror theory and policy are also included in this subtheme. A discussion of the role of religion in dominant understandings of terrorism follows. Finally, repression and conflict are examined because it is believed that policies of deterrence via repression cannot resolve conflict. This subtheme predominantly focuses on China’s current policies in Xinjiang and how they are resulting in a further deprivation of human needs. It also includes themes related to religious and cultural repression. It is theorized that this repression, and the resultant deprivation of human needs, is another risk for the continuation of violence.

Burton’s theories regarding conflict resolution and prevention are also investigated in Chapter 5. This section discusses the benefits of adopting a human needs approach during conflict resolution processes. It argues the importance of communication, trust, empathy and human connection. It also

examines the need for environmental and policy restructuring for successful resolution to take place. This section highlights how Burton's theories on conflict resolution and prevention differ from those that dominate conflict resolution. But, it shows how this difference results in lasting and durable peace.

In the conclusion of this thesis, the contributions of these theories to understanding the conflict in Xinjiang are reiterated. Implications and limitations are acknowledged. Directives for further research follow.

## **2.5 Academic and Social Pertinence**

Exploring the conflict in Xinjiang has important academic and social implications for several reasons. Adequate understanding of the conflict may lead to effective resolution. Resolution is assumed to be important to both the Chinese government and the Uyghur population. China faces similar conflict situations in other parts of the country where ethnic tensions exist, such as in Tibet and Taiwan. Understanding and effectively dealing with a similar conflict in Xinjiang may aid the government in dealing with these conflicts in other areas of the country. Approaching the conflict from perspective of the deprivation of human needs, rather than human rights, may make the Chinese government more able to and interested in resolving the conflict.

The conflict also provides an important and interesting illustration of ethnic and grievance based political violence and terrorism. Terrorism is often associated with religious violence. However, this has complicated discussion on conflict and terrorism. This rhetoric tends to dismiss grievances or potential reasoning behind religiously motivated violence and reduce this reasoning to religious extremism (Cavanaugh, 2009, pp. 3-5). The grievances of perceived terrorists are important to consider when discussing the relationship between unrest, disobedience, and security challenges (Schmid, 2011). HNT emphasises an individual or group's need to be considered rational. This suggests that the

grievances of terrorists should be considered as being based in rationality and that they should be explored. HNT provides a potential way to do this. It could provide insight into the alternatives available in counterterrorism and the creation of positive peace.

Finally, the discipline of Conflict Studies does not adequately address the relationship between the deprivation of human needs, conflict, and violence. Application of HNT is undeveloped. However, this approach could be useful in other settings, including application and policy. Applying it in a specific case, like in Xinjiang, can illuminate the benefits of this approach. Ultimately, this is the goal of this thesis, to demonstrate that HNT has immense value in understanding, explaining, analyzing, and resolving conflicts.

## **Chapter 3: Regional Context: History of Deprivation and Conflict in Xinjiang**

Due to the protracted nature of the conflict, a historical perspective is necessary (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii). The causes and evolution of unrest and Uyghur discontent can be found in a consideration of the history of deprivation and conflict in Xinjiang. The Chinese state's perceptions of, and responses to, Uyghur demands and movements have also been shaped by this history (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11). The conflicting parties' historical consciousness or memory and how this has affected their respective actions is paramount to understanding the conflict. Furthermore, the deeply held opposing views, beliefs and prejudices held by each party to the conflict affect any attempts to resolve the problems that are at the root of unrest in Xinjiang (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii). In this way, it is imperative to explore the various events and incidents that have affected the conflict and the memory of the parties involved. This historical account also demonstrates a chain of events that have resulted in the deprivation of the human needs of the Uyghur. This deprivation may result in a sense of desperation and hopelessness that can lead to violence.

### **3.1 Pre-1949: introduction of Xinjiang into China and History Prior to the Establishment of the People's Republic of China (1949)**

#### **3.1.1 Claims to Xinjiang**

Both parties to the conflict, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Uyghurs, have constructed historical narratives to lend credibility to their claims over Xinjiang. These narratives are routinely shaped and used to meet political ends (Holdstock, 2015, p. 21).

The CCP claims that "Xinjiang has since ancient times been an inseparable part of China" (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 6). The CCP states, in a 2003 report, that "[s]ince the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 24 A.D.), it has been an inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation"

(Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2003). Many Han Chinese argue that their policies and presence in Xinjiang has brought progress to the region and freed

the common people from the cruel oppression and arbitrary decisions of the *bays* (wealthy landowners and merchants), the *begs* (officials who acted as intermediaries, translators and interpreters and who were appointed by governments of China to assist them to rule the local population) and the *akhonds* (strictly speaking the imams of the mosques, but a term that is also used to refer to any clerics exercising spiritual authority) who between them dominated the 'feudal' society in which they lived. (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii)

In this way, the official narrative of the Chinese government is that Xinjiang was *peacefully liberated* and this liberation was welcomed by everyone in the region (Holdstock, 2015, p. 35). Moreover, to the Chinese government, Xinjiang was and remains an integral part of China.

Meanwhile, some Uyghurs claim that they have been living in what is now known as Xinjiang for six thousand years (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 6). Many Uyghurs feel that their historical presence in the region dates to the defeat of Buddhism by Islam in the twelfth century (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii). They claim that Uyghurs are a distinct ethnic community who do not share much with the dominant Han Chinese. For many Uyghurs, Xinjiang is the cradle of Uyghur history and culture, therefore unlike the rest of China (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 69). This difference reinforces Uyghur belief and confidence that they have a right to live in and control the region (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii). Resistance and challenge to Chinese rule has occurred since the beginning of Xinjiang's relationship with China. China is not facing a new problem in Xinjiang (Jacobs J. M., 2016, p. x).

### **3.1.2 Introduction of Xinjiang into the Chinese Geobody**

Xinjiang was originally part of the Turkic region that included Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Kazakhstan and Takistan. The Uyghurs were traditionally a nomadic group (Ross, 2017). Chinese westward expansions took place as China aimed to establish military colonies to stake political claims in the West (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 6). Therefore, the ethnic groups in Xinjiang have been loosely

associated with the Qing empire since the 1750s (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 10). The Qing dynasty conquered the region now known as Xinjiang in 1769 to reduce the threat to the Dynasty from Mongol neighbours. At this point, Xinjiang became a colony of China (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 338).

The colony was re-established into a Chinese province. Xinjiang, meaning new boundaries, new frontiers or new dominions was officially established as a Chinese province in 1884 during the Qing Dynasty (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 6). This was done in part to place the territory beyond the claims and aspirations of the Russian empire and other foreign threats (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 340).

### **3.1.3 The Opium Wars and Their Impacts on Chinese History and Memory**

During this period, there were two Opium Wars between the Chinese government and the British empire. These occurred from 1839 to 1842 and 1856 to 1860. These wars were essential for defining Chinese actions and national identity that endures to this day. During these periods, China lost a significant amount of power and sovereignty. The British Empire brutally defeated the Chinese military and established what is referred to as *The Unequal Treaties* and opened treaty ports. After Britain established its influence in China, other major powers followed suit and required similar treatment from the Chinese government in trading and economy. Britain maintained *most favoured nation status* but China was dominated by multiple foreign powers, including France, Germany, and Japan.

The Opium Wars and various other conflicts with foreign powers resulted in a devastating blow to China's economy, government, and national narrative. Alex Woo states that "[b]eginning with the First Opium War (1839-42), China had to endure more than 100 years of humiliation at the hands of the Western powers and Japan" (Woo, 2012). As stated by the Chinese government, "[f]or 110 years from the Opium War in 1840, China suffered repeated invasions and bullying by imperialist powers,

and the Chinese people of all ethnic groups were subject to oppression and slavery” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2005). As a result, China developed a narrative of victimhood that continues to this day and influences their domestic and foreign policy (Bovingdon, 2010). Furthermore, it has led to a desire for a strong central government and sense of national harmony (Gracie, 2015). These sentiments affected and continue to affect Chinese policies towards Xinjiang.

After the Opium Wars, the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) by the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1912, autocratic Han warlords governed Xinjiang (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 340). Gradually, the Republic of China ruled by the Nationalists allowed Xinjiang some autonomy and it was ruled by a Military Governor (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11). It was argued by officials and academics that it was of great importance to maintain control over Xinjiang to preserve the nations power and territorial integrity. With the loss of much territory following the Opium Wars, the collapse of the Qing empire and increasing Japanese encroachment, this became a priority (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 340). China could not afford to continue to lose any more land and power. As a result, the Nationalists tightened their control over the region.

#### **3.1.4 Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule**

Resistance by the Uyghurs to the ruling governments has existed since at least the eighteenth century. However, the cultural identity of the population in Xinjiang grew increasingly politicized after the fall of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the ROC. The culture of the Uyghurs is more like that of Central Asian nations than Chinese culture. Some Uyghurs refer to their homeland as East Turkestan, which means they look to places with similar culture such as Turkey and Central Asia (Primiano, 2013, p. 455). The term Uyghur became a source of cultural pride. It had been increasingly

used in the late nineteenth century by Turki intellectuals and in the mid-1930s the ROC government ruling over Xinjiang gave the name official recognition (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 341).

There have been continuing demands for an independent East Turkestan from some Uyghurs. There were two instances where this was achieved. In 1933, Kashgar, a city in Xinjiang was briefly independent (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11). In 1944, the Soviet Union also supported an independence movement in a city called Ili that lasted from 1944 to 1949 under the name of East Turkestan (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11; Ross, 2017). These two periods of independence remain in the historical memory of the Uyghurs (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii). In 1949, rule in Xinjiang changed again.

### **3.2 Establishment of the PRC: Post-1949 and the Establishment of an Autonomous Region**

#### **3.2.1 Establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC)**

After a long and bloody civil war between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People's Republic was established in 1949 (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11). Many Uyghurs hoped that political independence in Xinjiang would follow the establishment of the PRC. Prior to the Communist Party winning the Civil War, Chairman Mao Zedong had promised many ethnic groups that they would be able to decide freely if they wanted to join a federal China under the CCP or declare independence. It is believed this was done to outbid the Nationalist party and win support among non-Hans for the anti-Japanese war. However, in the 1940s, Mao no longer spoke about self-determination. After the founding of the new state, CCP leaders granted limited regional autonomy under a unified Chinese state hoping this would satisfy the Uyghurs (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 341). However, this was not established under the laws regarding autonomous regions until 1955 (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 12).

### **3.2.2 Autonomous Regions in China**

Under the laws regarding autonomous regions established in 1955, these provinces have the equivalent administrative status as those directly under central government rule. However, they have a high proportion of ethnic minorities and are therefore officially allowed some freedom to adopt certain regional policies related to their cultures and customs. Nevertheless, they remain under the political and military authority of Beijing (Joseph, 2010, p. 28). Essentially, they have more local control than non-autonomous provinces over resources, taxes, birth planning, education, legal jurisdiction, and religious practice and expression. Yet, ultimate political control belongs to the central government (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 69). Local government bodies are headed by a non-Han Chinese, such as an Uyghur, with a Han Party Secretary by their side. The International Forum for Rights and Security refers to this as *nested autonomy* (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 12).

While this system of autonomy existed in Xinjiang as of 1955, it was only formally codified in 1984 through the passing of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law by China's National People's Congress. This legislation officially established that ethnic minorities were allowed, under unified state leadership, to practice regional autonomy in areas where these minorities live in concentrated communities. It guaranteed minorities the right to administer their internal affairs, use and develop their own spoken and written languages and the freedom to preserve their own customs (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 12). Ethnic minorities are also meant to benefit from policies including preferential access to education, employment, and welfare (Hillman, 2016, p. 4). The law stipulated proportional representation of ethnic Deputies in the Provincial and National People's Congress. Furthermore, it specified that the Chairman of the Autonomous Region, Prefect of the Prefecture or the Head of the Autonomous County must be a citizen of the concerned ethnic

autonomous region (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 13). As CCP in a report published in 2015 stated that:

[t]he principle of equality among all ethnic groups has been upheld. All ethnic groups in China, regardless of the sizes of their population and levels of development, are equal. They enjoy equal rights and are required to fulfill the same obligations in accordance with the law. The establishment of the system of ethnic regional autonomy served to protect the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic minorities and safeguard the equal rights and interest of individual citizens. People of all ethnic origin in Xinjiang are ensured an equal legal status. They enjoy the rights to vote and stand for election as prescribed by the Constitution and the law, the right of equal participation in the administration of state affairs, the right of religious belief, the right to receive education, the right to use their own spoken and written languages, the right to inherit and carry on the traditional culture of their own ethnic groups, etc. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015)<sup>10</sup>

However, this politicizing of ethnicity created expectations within the Uyghur community and other ethnic groups that the government has consistently failed to meet (Brady, 2012, p. 8). These failures have been embedded in the historical memory of the Uyghur and have implicated the Uyghurs need to participate in and influence their environment.

### **3.2.3 Autonomy in Xinjiang**

For many Uyghurs, the laws regarding autonomy have become diluted and ineffective (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 13). Nevertheless, the CCP maintains that the system of regional autonomy “is an important step on the correct path towards resolving ethnic problems in China in a Chinese manner and an institutional guarantee that the path will be followed” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015).

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<sup>10</sup> The specific language and rhetoric within the Chinese governments published laws and policies are important. Quotes show exactly how the government phrases their policies and frames their arguments. These are important for showing how they may contradict or act in ways that defy their own laws and policies. They also show the way China discusses these issues. Therefore, these quotes are included for essential contextualization.

Despite these formal and informal guarantees of autonomy, the CCP adopted policies of forced assimilation targeting Uyghur culture, language, and religion (Pokalova, 2013, p. 284). This, along with strong party control and continued Han dominance, led to increasing dissatisfaction among the Uyghur population (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 342). Some Uyghurs have felt that they are excluded from the decision-making processes and that they have lost fundamental rights in their own land (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 70). The belief seems to be that the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has never been either Uyghur or autonomous (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 342; Mukherjee, 2015, p. 69). These beliefs lead to frustration with the existing political structures in Xinjiang and implicate the satisfaction of human needs for the Uyghur.

Despite the claim that autonomous regions assure the protection of cultural, social, and political rights for those living in the areas, there have been many critiques (Kanat, 2016, p. 191). Some theorists compare the policies in Xinjiang to policies of colonialism or neocolonialism (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 70). It is argued that the policy fostered and maintained national unity rather than the protection of regional political rights (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 342). Clarke asserts that:

China's approach to the region has been defined by one over-arching goal – to integrate Xinjiang with China. This has been a quest not only to consolidate China's territorial control and sovereignty over the region but to absorb, politically, economically and culturally, the various non-Han ethnic groups in Xinjiang into the 'unitary, multi-ethnic state' of the PRC. (Clarke, 2010, p. 215)

Clarke claims that this is an “inherently imperial project, informed by both geopolitics and history” (Clarke, 2015, p. 128). The CCP has cemented this in its commentary and discourse regarding Xinjiang. As stated by a CCP report in 2005 entitled *Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China*,

the Chinese people of all ethnic groups keenly recognized that the great motherland is the common homeland of them all, and that only when China's sovereignty and territorial integrity

are maintained will all ethnic groups truly come to enjoy freedom, equality, development and progress. People of all ethnic groups must further enhance their unity to safeguard the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and make China a prosperous and rich country. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015)

Nevertheless, the CCP's policies have led to widespread repression for both the entire Chinese population and minority regions, resulting in the deprivation of human needs.

Kilic Bugra Kanat argues that the regime under Mao "adopted policies for the homogenization of the society, where Muslim Uyghurs and their cultural and social differences were perceived as counter-revolutionary threats" (Kanat, 2016, p. 191). In 1960, Wang Enmao, former Communist Party of China Committee Secretary of Xinjiang stated that the "complete blending of all nationalities was necessary for the continuing development of Xinjiang" (Holdstock, 2015, p. 41). This statement came with the assumption that if minorities were sufficiently assimilated, their ethnic identity would fade and only Han Chinese culture would remain (Holdstock, 2015, p. 41). Policies of forced assimilation, the denial of cultural and religious rights and the lack of accommodation for grievances and self-determination have led to an increase in anti-government and anti-Chinese sentiments among the Uyghur (Pokalova, 2013, p. 284).

Within the aforementioned policies regarding autonomous regions, the CCP has control and influence in all religions in China. The Chinese government does recognize the Muslim faith but continues to discriminate against it. The government has more involvement in, and limitations on, the religious practices of Muslim Uyghurs than other religions (Primiano, 2013, p. 457). This increased during Mao's rule.

Martha Crenshaw (1981) argues that in the absence of policies of inclusive participation, groups may turn to violence. It is claimed by Elena Pokalova that this was the case after the establishment of the XUAR. She states that:

[w]hile on paper, China propagated autonomy, in reality it imposed the policies of central control over religion, education and language in Xinjiang. Practicing a combination of forced assimilation and migration policies, China relied on the military and the police to carry out its policies. As a result, China has created conditions ripe for the emergence of terrorism. (Pokalova, 2013, p. 287)

Pokalova continues that this terrorism is closely related to separatist's aspirations following the unsatisfactory establishment of policies of autonomy in the XUAR (Pokalova, 2013, p. 287). For more moderate Uyghurs, the lack of legitimate channels for expressing grievances and discontent has led to desperation and outbursts of violence (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 20). This violence may be a result of the effect of these factors on the fulfillment of the Uyghurs human needs for safety and security, self-esteem, identity, cultural security, freedom and participation.

#### **3.2.4 Repression under Mao ZeDong**

Joshua Tschantret argues that after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, repression of the Uyghur in Xinjiang was constant. As a result, coordinated violent dissent was largely absent (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 6). However, due to these repressive policies, Uyghur diaspora continued to aim for the establishment of an independent Eastern Turkestan Republic for Uyghurs (Kanat, 2016, p. 192). This fuelled discontent and disagreement between the Uyghurs and the government.

Another factor increasing discontent was Mao's ordering of the chief military and party official in Xinjiang to demobilize over 100,000 troops in 1949. These troops did not leave the region but rather settled in a network of paramilitary farms and small-scale industrial projects throughout Xinjiang. This fostered frustration about increasing Han encroachment and settlement in the region. This network was sanctified as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) or the *bingtuan* in 1954. It was given the task of protecting the region from external incursion and internal rebellion by Uyghurs (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 342). It plays a prominent role in ensuring the security of the region (Morin, 2017). The CCP also encouraged urban youths to relocate to Xinjiang to help *build the borderlands*, as

they called it (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 343). These Han Chinese migrants joined the *bingtuan* and moved into other cities in Xinjiang (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 343). This migration has continued and produced grievances among Uyghurs.

In 1956, Mao also initiated the Hundred Flowers Campaign. The goal of this campaign was to encourage criticism of party rule and corruption. He framed this as a means to demonstrate that his rule would be different from the Nationalists so he could consolidate his power. However, this campaign was not really to benefit the population but so that Mao could identify potential critics and challenges to his rule. As Mao phrased it, it was a campaign to “to coax the snakes from their holes” (Holdstock, 2015, p. 41). However, in Xinjiang, the grievances and criticisms expressed were far stronger than the “gentle breeze and mild rain” that Mao had requested (Holdstock, 2015, p. 41). The non-Han population of Xinjiang expressed frustration that despite the autonomous status of the region, there was no local control over local and called the *bingtuan* or *XPCC Han colonists*. They also complained that if one voiced criticism of the party, they were labelled separatists, which continues today. Mao and the CCP responded by branding more than 1500 people local nationalists. Many were imprisoned (Holdstock, 2015, p. 41). Uyghur frustration rose as a result and these events were embedded in the historical memory of the Uyghur.

In 1957, The Communist Party also developed and instituted an Anti-Rightist policy, as part of its bid to reduce the threat from Nationalists seeking to regain control of the nation (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11). However, the effects of this policy extended beyond the Nationalists and affected the Uyghurs as well. It opposed what it referred to as “local nationalism among ethnic minorities.” This resulted in the criminalization of nationalism and the introduction of restrictions on religion, implicating individuals’ need for cultural security (International Forum For

Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11). More Uyghurs were repressed, and often detained, because of this policy, affecting their need for safety and security (Holdstock, 2015, p. 41).

Mao's Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976 had disastrous affects for all of Chinese society and resulted in even further clampdowns on ethnic minorities, such as the Uyghur. It led to the suppression of religion, ethnic language and cultural rights. For many Muslims, throughout the country, their religious texts and places of worship were destroyed. Their religious leaders were persecuted (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11). Their sense of cultural security was further jeopardized.

### **3.2.5 Repression after Mao's Death**

After the death of Mao in 1976, the 1980s were a period of temporary relief for Uyghurs. Basic freedoms were granted and the Uyghurs could enjoy of limited liberalization policies (Kanat, 2016, p. 192). Unfortunately, the initial liberalization of the state's approach to the region did not last long (Clarke, 2015, p. 128).

Towards the end of the 1980s, public unrest increased. The open policies allowed for more minorities to speak out against discriminatory economic, religious and political policies (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 11). Demands by ethnic minorities for greater political autonomy increased (Clarke, 2015, p. 128). The government approached this dissent as a potential regional and national destabiliser and threat to the survival of the Communist regime. As a result, it increased its securitization policies (Kanat, 2016, p. 192).

In 1989, The Tiananmen square incident occurred. This further changed the political and social climate in China. The state became much less permissive and took tighter control of media and

education. The government increased the amount spent on internal security. This shift is claimed to have facilitated and encouraged stricter policies in Xinjiang (Holdstock, 2015, pp. 74-75).

### **3.3 The Fall of the USSR and Rising Concerns regarding Separatism in the 1990s**

Separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang rose in the 1990s due to a variety of factors. A rise in political opportunities partially because of the collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant factor (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 1). The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the independence of neighbouring nations which rekindled the hope in Xinjiang that independence and separation from China may be possible (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 7). Within the Chinese government, this led to an increase in what Kanat calls a *fear of Balkanization* (Kanat, 2016, p. 195). The government also referred to potential separatism as *national chauvinism* (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2003). Territorial integrity became a substantial concern for the Chinese government.

Now, new means and pathways for transnational communication and connection were developing and social connections and opportunities for dissent progressed. New transnational networks and trade routes also allowed Uyghurs to strengthen ties with Central Asia (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 8). The Islamic revival in neighbouring areas of Central Asia and Afghanistan increased these ties (Clarke, 2015, p. 128). Uyghurs became more optimistic about potential independence.

Terrorism and other forms of dissent became a means of contention. It became a method to challenge the CCP during the 1990s as political opportunities grew. However, this rise in terrorism and dissent dampened with the implementation of the *strike-hard campaigns* (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9).

### **3.4 Strike Hard Campaigns and the Nation's First Formal Counterterrorism Policies**

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, dissent and unrest rose in the region, causing “disintegration and division anxiety” in the CCP (Kanat, 2016, p. 195). Any form of dissent was

perceived to be a security issue and security forces began to play a central role in handling potential conflict (Kanat, 2016, p. 195). As a result, the CCP introduced what they referred to as the first *strike-hard campaign* in 1996. The stated targets were the “three evils of separatism, terrorism and fundamentalism” (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). The goal of this policy was to promote ethnic unity and social stability (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015). The government also aimed to depoliticize ethnicity and identity (Brady, 2012, p. 8). The belief within the government has been that what they refer to as *great ethnic unity* (民族大团结) will produce social stability. Any remaining unrest and difficulties were the result and responsibility of external forces (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii). The Chinese narrative became characterized by former President Deng Xiaoping’s idea that “stability overrides everything” (稳定压倒一切) (Kam, 2018). These policies epitomized the CCP’s approach to Xinjiang.

After the Yining Uprising in 1997, which demanded independence and sought justice for the execution of thirty Uyghur activists, more strike-hard crackdowns were introduced as part of the “rectification of the social order” in 1997 and 1998 (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). China also worked to strengthen its ties with neighbouring countries, supposedly to suppress the Uyghurs capacity to organize abroad (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). While this uprising caused a marked increase in repression and the *strike-hard* rhetoric, it also resulted in a great deal of international criticism, as these policies often violated the human rights and human needs of the Uyghur. Turkey and the European Union (EU) were vocal in their condemnation. The EU expressed concern about arbitrary arrest and execution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and “condemned China’s policy aimed at eliminating the culture of Uyghur people, most of whom are Muslim” (Holdstock, 2015, p. 114). The European Parliament called on the Chinese government to “stop oppressing the Uyghur and to launch political talks with all the parties involved in the issue of East Turkestan” (Holdstock, 2015, p. 114). The use of the term East Turkestan

by the European Union and European Parliament also called into question the legitimacy of China's territorial claims (Holdstock, 2015, p. 114).

### **3.4.1 State Repression as a Feature of the Strike Hard Campaigns**

Nevertheless, initial state repression in response to separatism and terrorism heavily suppressed violence and challenges to the status quo (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 1). The Chinese government continues to assert that any political unrest and conflict in the region would not exist if the “violent separatists bent on destroying China” are destroyed (Hillman, 2016, p. 4). However, repression towards perceived separatists, fundamentalists, and terrorists extends to many Uyghurs who had different grievances with the administration (Kanat, 2016, p. 203). The terms included in the policy have been criticized as overly broad and often misused to punish peaceful activism and expression (Human Rights Watch, 2018). As a result, any criticism of government policy is interpreted as sympathy with the *three evils* (Gracie, 2015). Carrie Gracie claims that “China makes no attempt to distinguish between religious extremists who may be prepared to carry out or condone acts of terror, and those in Xinjiang with a religious, political or economic grievance which they attempt to resolve peacefully” (Gracie, 2015). Holdstock states that, by failing to distinguish between crime and social and political dissent, the government tarnishes or invalidates the legitimacy of dissent (Holdstock, 2015, p. 109). This demonstrates the ineffective nature of the Chinese political institutions in providing the Uyghur a means to express their grievances and address any deprivations of human needs.

The strike hard campaigns have allowed the CCP to carry out politically motivated ethnic discrimination (Grieboski, 2014). Furthermore, the rejection of and campaign against separatism, extremism and terrorism appears to have led to the rejection of religious belief as a whole (Mudie, 2016). In 1999, Amnesty International reported that China committed human rights violations in Xinjiang and that the CCP aimed to impose strict societal controls (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). Unofficial

cultural activities, religious practices and expressions of dissent are associated with the *three evils* the Chinese government refers to and are punished (Berton-Hunter, 2011). These human rights abuses have also included police raids, “widespread arbitrary arrests, closure[s] of places of worship, crackdowns on traditional religious activities, [and] prohibition[s] of personal religious practices in state-controlled institutions” (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 10). Detention and imprisonment of those charged with what the government calls *splittism* or inciting *separatism* may be the result of an individual exercising their freedom of expression, association, and religion, including the right to enjoy and develop their culture. These individuals are often denied legal counsel of their choice, are kept in long-term detention without a charge, their families are not informed of their whereabouts, they suffer torture and ill-treatment and do not have access to fair and open trials (Berton-Hunter, 2011).

These policies have led to the deprivation of a variety of human needs and increased marginalization of the Uyghur community. The further repression of moderate Uyghur voices led to increased radicalization among Uyghurs and the number of violent incidents increased (Kanat, 2016, p. 203). As stated by Antonion Terrone, “... authorities make insufficient distinctions between antistate terrorism and everyday protest against state policies. This delegitimizes and, in some cases, criminalizes ethnic protest, which further fuels resentment and undermines the CCP’s nation-building efforts” (Terrone, 2016, p. 48). The government has reinforced this belief when referring to their security policies by stating that “[y]ou can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops in the field one by one – you need to spray chemicals to kill them all” (Foreign Policy Special Correspondent, 2018). As claimed by Sean Roberts and Adrian Zenz, the Uyghur population is framed as almost a biological threat to society that must be contained using security apparatus and policies of securitization (Zenz, 2018, p. 3; Clarke, 2018). This amounts to a significant threat to the safety and security of the Uyghur.

The government's inability or unwillingness to pay attention or listen to the grievances of Uyghurs worsens relations between the parties and results in further deficiency in the fulfillment of human needs. As stated by Kanat:

[t]he government had run a campaign of 'otherization' in a bid to foster social unity, but in effect had turned all Uyghurs in China into 'usual suspects'. The outcome of these 'securitized' policies adopted by the Chinese government to 'protect and preserve' national unity started to endanger the same 'harmonious society' that the Chinese government was aspiring to build. (Kanat, 2016, p. 206)

Nevertheless, the government did not attempt ethnic reconciliation or peaceful resolution. The security forces increased their repressive measures (Kanat, 2016, p. 206).

Excessive use of force and disappearances of Uyghurs following Uyghur demonstrations lead to further deterioration of the situation. These actions demonstrated an elimination of inter-group trust between the parties and that the CCP was unwilling to address the root causes of violence or Uyghur grievances, but rather increase its policies of securitization. This further validated fears among Uyghurs that the administration was unwilling to acknowledge problems in the region and difficulties that they faced (Kanat, 2016, p. 213).

#### **2.4.2 The Strike Hard Campaigns Today**

The strike hard policies continue today. As said by former Xinjiang party secretary Zhang Chunxian in 2016, "[w]herever the terrorist mentality and extremist behaviour exists, we will maintain (our policy) of striking hard" (Martina, 2016). This has included the intervention of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and paramilitary organizations such as the People's Armed Police (PAP) and the previously mentioned Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). Uyghurs can enroll in some of these institutions but the Han Chinese control the PLA and there are very few Uyghurs in senior military positions (Morin, 2017). As of 2016, there were more than 30,000 members in the

armed police force in Xinjiang dedicated to dealing with violent terrorist cases (Kawase, 2016). The number of guards on duty nationwide through the PAP is up to 260,000 daily and the government stresses that the PAP's most prominent role is to "hunt down the East Turkestan terrorists" (Morin, 2017). Marc Julienne describes the situation as typified by an "omnipresent security apparatus" (Julienne, 2018).

China maintains the belief that these policies will be successful and the potential of alienating the Uyghurs and further radicalizing them as a result these policies' implications for human rights or human needs are not a consideration. As stated by Zhang Chunxian, former Party Secretary of the XUAR, "[w]ill it [terrorism] not take place if you don't strike hard?... Terrorism, is not something that happens because you fight it; it is a malignant tumor that is born from society" (Clarke, 2015, p. 133). Nevertheless, the implementation and continued use of the strike hard policies appears to have led to "a vicious cycle of resistance and repression from which there appear[s] to be no escape" (Dillon, 2019, p. 49).

### **3.5 September 11<sup>th</sup> and the Effects on Chinese Policy**

#### **3.5.1 China and The War on Terror**

The September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks on the United States had a profound effect on Chinese policy. After September 11<sup>th</sup> and the United States began its War on Terror, China framed its conflict with Uyghur separatists as part of the global war on terror (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). The government claimed that it had long been a victim of terrorist activities (Kanat, 2016, pp. 202-203). The conflict was no longer an issue of ethnic separatism but of terrorism connected to international Islamic networks (Pokalova, 2013, p. 280).

Due to the ambiguity in terrorist discourse and the blurred line between terrorism and separatism, China could increase its counterterror efforts. However, the line between genuine counterterrorism and repression is similarly blurred (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). By aligning the conflict in Xinjiang with the War on Terror, the Chinese government could obtain a *carte blanche* from the international community in dealing with its own *terrorist threat* (Cunningham, 2012, p. 15). China could increase its limitations on religious freedom and minority rights with little consequence internationally (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). The United States' initial endorsement of China's War on Terror "was hugely damaging for any attempt to discuss the problems in Xinjiang without linking them to violence and terrorism" (Holdstock, 2015, p. 162). Uyghur grievances were effectively rendered illegitimate and ignored or criminalized. As a result, their needs for participation and cultural and physical safety and security were further compromised.

China claimed its largest threat was from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). However, there has been little reliable information on this group or proof of its existence, especially after 9/11 (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 10). The civil unrest in Xinjiang seems to be carried out by individuals or small groups rather than an organized militant terrorist threat (Hunt & Rivers, 2015). However, the CCP argued that ETIM had been responsible for numerous acts of terrorism including assassinations, arson attacks and bombings (Cunningham, 2012, p. 15). The government also claimed there was a need to protect its borderlands from the influx of violent forms of Islam from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (Cunningham, 2012, pp. 12-13). Xinjiang became the focus of counterterror efforts and the government intensified its rhetoric and response to perceived Uyghur militancy and terrorism (Cunningham, 2012, p. 13).

It is important to note that despite the Chinese government's opportunism to frame its conflict in line with the War on Terror, there had been no corresponding increase in terrorism since 1997

(Tschantret, 2016b, p. 9). Furthermore, according to Tschantret, September 11<sup>th</sup> provided no real opportunity for Uyghur activists or separatists to advance their claims of sovereignty (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 10).

But the opportunity for the CCP was substantial. The CCP could increase its securitization policies. Chinese authorities tried to create the narrative that “all unrest in the region [is] associated with nationalist movements and all nationalist movements are associated with Islamic fundamentalism (Kanat, 2016, p. 213). The Chinese government learned from the United States “the utility of discrediting non-Han dissents by suggesting transnational links to known terrorist groups” (Jacobs J. M., 2016, pp. 237-238). This approach of discrediting dissent became central to Chinese policy.

### **3.5.2 Critiques of China’s Counterterror Approaches**

Nonetheless, despite previous support, in 2007 the United States House of Representatives reviewed the Chinese conflict in Xinjiang. In Resolution 497 it was stated that

the authorities of the People’s Republic of China have manipulated the strategic objectives of the international war on terror to increase their cultural and religious oppression of the Muslim population residing in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Pokalova, 2013, p. 291).

The US State Department’s 2016 annual terrorism report also criticized the Chinese government for its lack of transparency and information sharing. They claimed this led to limited cooperation. They also stated that they were apprehensive about sharing intelligence with China due to possible human rights abuses (ABC News Australia, 2016). This had very little effect on the CCP’s policy.

Joseph Grieboski argues that “Xinjiang’s Uyghurs have become collateral victims of foreign terrorism and scapegoats for Chinese fears of radical separatism, further jeopardizing their already dwindling civil rights” (Grieboski, 2014). Many scholars, human rights groups and advocates maintain that the CCP has systematically exaggerated the threat they face in Xinjiang in order to justify

increasingly repressive policies that violate human rights and human needs (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 20). This has resulted in the further demonization and delegitimization of the Uyghur (Morin, 2017).

The increase in repressive policies has also appeared to be ineffective. Adrien Morin states that an overview of the data available reveals that Chinese counterterrorism policies implemented after September 11<sup>th</sup> has been mostly inefficient in reducing the terrorist threat in China overall. Moreover, the data suggests that the casualties from terrorist attacks in China have increased. In this way, while September 11<sup>th</sup> provided no real opportunity for Uyghur separatists or activists to advance their claims, the harsh response by the Chinese government gave Uyghur opposition groups the opportunity to find a new way to mobilize support and enhance resentment towards the Chinese government through religious fundamentalism. As claimed by Morin, “[t]he spread of global jihad has provided disillusioned and frustrated Uyghurs with a new rhetoric and strategy to oppose what they consider as an opposition from the Chinese central leadership” (Morin, 2017). He continues by arguing that:

ETIM and other Uyghur separatist organizations – and increasingly, isolated individuals – were able to continue their struggle against the Chinese central government by reshaping their narrative around religious arguments, a process facilitated by the harsh security measures implemented in Xinjiang. (Morin, 2017)

As stated by Scott N. Romaniuk and Shih-Yeuh Yang, “[n]early two decades following the 9/11 attacks on America, China is still able to draw on those experiences as the most powerful source of anti-Islamic, Islamic extremism, and anti-jihadist discourse and practice” (Romaniuk & Yang, 2017). This has allowed the government’s securitized and repressive policies to continue relatively unchecked.

## **3.6 Han Migration and Economic Reform**

### **3.6.1 Economic Development to Counter Unrest**

Apart from the security related policies, the CCP sees economic improvement, investment, and development as a powerful tool in undermining unrest and dissent (Cunningham, 2012, p. 16). The CCP believes that economic growth will encourage the depoliticization of ethnicity and the integration of Uyghurs into mainstream Chinese society (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 19; Brady, 2012, p. 8). This has been part of the CCP's main narrative regarding Xinjiang since before 1949 (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii). As stated by Clarke, "China's strategy to ameliorate ethnic-minority discontent with continued rule from Beijing has since the late 1990s almost entirely rested on the delivery of state-led modernization" (Clarke, 2015, p. 129). In Xinjiang, this has meant a strategy of rapid economic modernization and development coupled with a policy of zero tolerance of expressions of autonomy and dissent (Clarke, 2007, p. 335).

### **3.6.2 Han Migration**

Nevertheless, dissent in Xinjiang increased because of former President Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms which included promoting a further influx of Han Chinese into the province (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 7). Han migration and settlement occurs despite high unemployment figures amongst Uyghurs (Holdstock, 2014, p. 66). Amnesty International claimed that this migration has also led to discrimination against the Uyghur in employment, housing, and education (Grieboski, 2014). For example, job recruitment advertisements published on the XUAR government website reserve positions for Han Chinese exclusively in civil servant posts and in both state owned and private enterprises (Berton-Hunter, 2011). Uyghurs also have shorter life expectancies, lower levels of education, higher unemployment rates and lower per capita incomes, arguably, because of the CCP's migration policies (Kaltman, 2007, p. 2). As stated by Cao Huhua, "[e]conomic growth cannot guarantee vulnerable

populations the freedom to exploit their abilities, or to achieve social and political rights regardless of their identity or place in society” (Holdstock, 2015, p. 106). Because of this lack of participation, distributive justice, equal opportunity and benefit, dissent is likely to continue (Holdstock, 2015, p. 106).

Segregation between Hans and Uyghurs has also increased since the 1990s because of these policies. Part of this segregation was spatial, the Uyghurs and Han lived in separate neighbourhoods. Uyghurs tended to live in single-story brick or adobe houses built around a walled courtyard. Han areas typically had and continue to have more modern residential buildings in four or five story blocks of apartments. The different neighbourhoods had their own shops, markets and restaurants which were almost exclusively used by the local residents (Holdstock, 2015, p. 94). This also led to social segregation. Increasingly, however, Uyghur communities are being indiscriminately demolished in the name of economic development (Hillman, 2016, p. 4).

In 2014, it was estimated that over 1.2 million ethnic Han had settled in the region in the last twenty years (Grieboski, 2014). In 1953, the Han population only made up approximately six percent of the population of Xinjiang. In 2000, they made up forty percent. The Uyghur proportion of the Uyghur population has fallen from eighty per cent in 1941 to forty six percent in 2000.

The aforementioned Han dominated *bingtuan* or XPCC, for example, continues and grows in the region. In the late 1990’s, it was separated from the PLA’s supervision and designated a corporation directly accountable to the CCP and Beijing rather than the XUAR government. This decision highlighted how the CCP’s decisions have prioritized central goals over local needs (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 343). The XPCC is now a quasi-military and business conglomerate that employs approximately 2.6 million people today. Most of these employees are Han Chinese. Furthermore, they own about a third

of the land in Xinjiang. They are also responsible for approximately 25 percent of industrial production. President Xi Jinping has tasked the organization with playing the central role in Xinjiang's development (Morin, 2017).

This migration and segregation has led to a fear that Uyghurs will become a minority in their own land. It has also led to a fear that Beijing's goal is to strip out and remove the culture of the Uyghur people (Primiano, 2013, p. 460). Ultimately, Han migration has led to the demographic marginalization and dilution of the Uyghur (Clarke, 2010, p. 220). James Leibold claims that "the party is attempting to dilute Uyghur culture and identity by encouraging more interethnic mingling and fusion with the majority Han Chinese" (USC US-China Institute, 2016). Some have accused the government of cultural genocide (Hillman, 2016, p. 4). This poses a significant threat to the Uyghur's need for cultural security. Justin Jacobs accuses the Chinese government of *ethno-elit[ism]* (Jacobs J. M., 2016, p. x). In this way, these policies operate to delegitimize Uyghur claims of sovereignty and marginalizes them politically (Grieboski, 2014). However, the extent of marginalization and ostracization in their own province has led to increased radicalization (Abbey, 2017).

### **3.6.3 Strategic, Economic and Security Interests in Xinjiang**

China has many strategic, economic and security interests in Xinjiang that strengthen its desire to maintain territorial control over the area and affect CCP's policy decisions (Cunningham, 2012, p. 15). These interests make the Chinese government more inclined to prioritize stability in the region and ignore the demands of the Uyghur. First, Xinjiang makes up nearly one-sixth of China's landmass (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 10). Xinjiang not only is important to China in terms of territorial integrity but it also shares borders with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir (Cunningham, 2012, p. 15). The major passageway to Central Asian countries passes through Xinjiang (Cunningham, 2012, p. 16).

Xinjiang is also rich in natural resources such as gas, oil, coal, and other minerals (Pokalova, 2013, p. 284). This includes large oil and natural gas reserves in the Tarim and Dzungeria Basins. There are gas pipelines in the province or pipelines running through the area. There are vital nuclear testing sites in the province (Cunningham, 2012, p. 16). Eighty percent of China's valuable gold, jade and other precious metal reserves are also in Xinjiang (Cunningham, 2012, p. 15). There are resources such as cotton (Cunningham, 2012, p. 16). This wealth of resources plays a role in China's interest in controlling conflict and unrest in the area by any means.

The region is vital to the Chinese government's Great Western Development Strategy. The CCP has devoted vast resources to this project (Cunningham, 2012, p. 16). In June 1999, former president Jiang Zeming launched the Great Western Development Strategy. This campaign included the goal of integrating Chinese provinces (Clarke, 2007, p. 323). In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced a further policy of economic development. The *One Belt, One Road* initiative aims to improve economic ties with Central Asia and increase economic development (Hunt & Rivers, 2015). In a 2018 Government White Paper, the CCP stated that "... Xinjiang has been active in building the core area along the Silk Road Economic Belt, strengthening cultural and scientific and technological exchanges with countries along the Belt" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). The view of the Chinese government is that instability in the region greatly threatens economic investment and development and therefore must be controlled (Cunningham, 2012, p. 16).

Despite these policies, Xinjiang has fallen behind the rest of the nation economically and is reported as one of the poorest regions in the country. In 2010, the government announced a large-scale investment program, with the promise to raise incomes in Xinjiang to the standard of the national average. However, without addressing the underlying grievances of ethnic groups and including the voices of these groups in their economic policy formulation and implementation, they are bound to fail

to result in economic benefits that are enjoyed by all. Furthermore, failure to address the lack of distributive justice and the discrimination in the economic realm, such as in employment, land ownership and access to economic opportunities has affected the potential success of these development plans (Berton-Hunter, 2011).

### **3.7 A Tipping Point: The 2009 Urumqi Riots**

In the summer of 2009, the conflict in Xinjiang reached a tipping point. On July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2009, approximately one thousand Uyghurs took to the streets of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, to protest. These protestors demanded a full investigation into the deaths of two Uyghur men at a factory in Shaoguan, Guangzhou (Hillman, 2016, p. 2). Many migrant workers are employed in Shaoguan. The government claimed that a disgruntled former employee spread rumors in late June that two Han women had been raped by six Uyghur men (Jacobs A. , 2009). No evidence to support these allegations were found. On June 25<sup>th</sup>, there was a brawl in the factory between Uyghur and Han workers where the two Uyghurs were killed. Uyghurs felt that the government had failed to protect the workers or prosecute any of the Han men involved. The protests were meant to voice their discontent and demand a full investigation (Wong, 2009).

It is estimated that anywhere between 1000 and 10,000 Uyghurs participated in peaceful protest. Over the next two days, these protests turned into riots. Dozens of buildings and vehicles were destroyed. Police and government property was attacked. Uyghurs attacked Han Chinese citizens and their property. Many more Han and Uyghurs joined the protests as they became violent. The Han Chinese retaliated with force, attacking Uyghur citizens and police. The People's Armed Police were deployed and use batons, live ammunition, tasers, water hoses, and tear gas to disperse rioters (Hillman, 2016, p. 2).

According to the Chinese government, 197 people died during the riots and 1721 were injured (Hillman, 2016, p. 2). Rights groups claim the death toll was much higher and many human rights abuses occurred (Human Rights Watch, 2017b). Communications were cut off completely, widespread arrest and detention occurred and mosques were closed. Mass protest had ended by July 8<sup>th</sup> but some sporadic violence continued (Wong, 2009).

China's immediate response to the uprisings included jailing alleged separatists and interrogating protestors about possible links to terrorism (Ross, 2017). At least 26 individuals received the death penalty (Human Rights Watch, 2017b). This event illustrated the growing tensions in Xinjiang and how the Chinese government responds to such pressures.

### **3.8 Conflict and Violence After the 2009 Urumqi Riots**

Despite the CCP's attempts to contain unrest, there have been continued bursts of violence since the 2009 riots both within Xinjiang and the country at large. Protests and unrest have become increasingly violent. Attacks have been carried out against government targets and Chinese citizens (Hillman, 2016, p. 3). This violence has led to the deaths of many Hans and Uyghurs, government officials and police personnel (Patranobis, 2016). These bursts of violence may be indicative of a sense of frustration and desperation within the Uyghur population that stems from the deprivation of human needs in the province.

However, since 2010, the CCP has been more cooperative in releasing information on terrorist attacks (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 21). As a result, it is alleged that quite a few attacks have occurred since the Urumqi riots. These have occurred within Xinjiang, in other parts of China and abroad (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 22). Examples of these terrorist attacks follow.

On October 28<sup>th</sup>, 2013, there was an attack in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 21). A SUV ploughed into pedestrians and caught on fire (Hillman, 2016, p. 3). Two tourists were killed and forty people were injured. The driver and two passengers, reportedly Uyghur, also died in the incident (Hillman, 2016, p. 3).

On March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014, there was a mass knifing attack at the Kunming railway station in Yunnan province (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 21). Eight people came into the station and began indiscriminately attacking people with knives and machetes. Twenty-nine people were killed and 143 were injured. The police quickly claimed that the assailants were Uyghur separatists (Hillman, 2016, p. 3). President Xi Jinping called for stricter state control in Xinjiang because of this attack. He requested that “Uyghurs be assimilated better into Chinese culture in an effort to control violence in the region, describing the way Uyghurs held tightly together as ‘as close as the seeds of a pomegranate’” (Ross, 2017). He implied that this unity was problematic and a threat to national unity.

On May 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2014, there was a car bomb attack on a market in Urumqi (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 21). In July 2014, the CCP reported that Uyghur terrorists staged an attack on a local police station in Shache County in Xinjiang. In September 2014, state media reported that forty assailants were killed by blasts or shot by police during a series of explosions in Luntai County in Xinjiang. In June 2015, as many as twenty-eight people were killed in an attack on a police checkpoint in Kashgar, Xinjiang (Hillman, 2016, p. 3). In 2015, the government claimed there had been at least 14 incidents in Xinjiang directed against government offices and police personnel (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 21). Yet, the CCP claimed it destroyed over 180 terrorist groups between May 2014 and May 2015 (CCTV.com, 2016).

Because of these threats, in December 2015, China announced it would be adopting its first national counter-terrorism law. This law proposed adopting a national agency to coordinate the CCP's fight against terrorism (CCTV.com, 2016). It was implemented at the beginning of 2016 (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 21). Part of the new law's guidelines include forbidding "instigating, encouraging or enticing a minor to participate in religious activities", the wearing of clothing that advocates extremism and make specific reference to Islam practice by forbidding distortion of the concept of halal" (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 22). Rightfully so, many Uyghurs and human rights groups feared that this new law would give the Chinese authorities license to further infringe upon the rights of Uyghurs and peaceful religious practices (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 23).

Nevertheless, in 2016, there were more than 1,000 violent terrorist incidents according to the Hong Kong-based Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Kawase, 2016). However, they stated that "most of these incidents in Xinjiang are understood to be not necessarily premeditated acts of terror, are usually rooted in religion, and sometimes spiraled out of hand into armed clashes" (Kawase, 2016).

In 2017, five people were killed and five were wounded before suspected Uyghur militants were shot in Xinjiang. The attack occurred in a residential compound in Pishan country. It was described by the authorities as a terrorist attack (FPJ Bureau, 2017). Regardless of whether the seeming increase in terrorist incidents is due to changes in CCP reporting or an actual increase in episodes of violence, this trend clearly demonstrates the presence of a conflict in the region. This conflict may be a result of the cumulative effect of this history of marginalization and deprivation of human needs towards the Uyghur. Each event becomes embedded in the historical memory of the Uyghur and may increase frustration and hopelessness.

## **Chapter 4: Regional Context: Features of Deprivation and Conflict in Xinjiang**

The perspectives of the Chinese government are necessary to illuminate how the government perceives the conflict and how policies related to it have been adopted and implemented. These perspectives are often included in governmental reports discussing national security and defense and religious and cultural freedoms. The language and rhetoric used within these reports are also informative. They demonstrate how the Chinese government has been able to curtail freedoms and carry out human rights abuses while acting in accordance with their laws.<sup>11</sup> The consequences these laws and policies have on the Uyghur and their human needs is also explored and discussed in this chapter. Ultimately, these policies demonstrate the presence of institutionalized cultural and structural violence towards the Uyghur.

### **4.1 Chinese Definition of Terrorism**

#### **4.1.1 Definition and Understanding of Terrorism**

Given the prevalence of what the Chinese government refers to as terrorism in Xinjiang, it is imperative to explain how the government defines and typifies terrorism. Terrorism is a difficult and precarious term. There is no international accepted definition of terrorism and what activities this may include. Without an internationally accepted definition, there is the possibility of the misuse of the term terrorism. It may be applied to non-terrorist and non-criminal activities. This can lead to the violation of human rights and human needs (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018). This is a concern in the Chinese context.

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<sup>11</sup> Due to the complexity of the conflict and the long history of governmental policies related to Xinjiang, it is necessary to explore these policies in depth and how they may affect Uyghurs and the satisfaction of their human needs. Long quotations from various government reports and White Papers are included because the specific language and rhetoric used is vital in highlighting the issues within these policies and the implications they may have. They also highlight inconsistencies or contradictions between the government's statements and the reality of consequences of the policies implemented.

Article three of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China's report on *Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China* defines terrorism as:

any proposition or activity that, by means of violence, sabotage or threat, generates social panic, undermines public security, infringes upon personal and property rights, or menaces state authorities and international organizations, with the aim to realize political, ideological or other purposes. (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2015)

Article 3 continues that, to the Chinese government, terrorist activities include:

- “organizing, planning, preparing for, or conducting activities which cause or attempt to cause casualties, grave property loss, damage to public facilities, disruption of social order and other serious social harm;”
  - “advocating terrorism, instigating terrorist activities, or illegally holding articles advocating terrorism, or forcing other persons to wear costume or symbols advocating terrorism in public places;”
  - “organizing, leading or participating in terrorist organizations;”
  - “providing information, funds, material, labour services, technologies, places and other support, assistance and convenience to terrorist organizations, terrorists, the implementation of terrorist activities or training on terrorist activities” and “other terrorist activities”
- (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2015).

It is very important to acknowledge the rhetoric and specifics used within this definition as they demonstrate how broad the government's definition is. It allows the government the ability to criminalize behaviours that may not otherwise be considered terrorism. For comparison, the Canadian Department of Justice defines terrorism as “an act committed ‘in whole or in part for a political, religious, or ideological purpose, objective or cause’ with the intention of intimidating the public “” (Government of Canada Department of Justice, 2015). This definition, while also broad, seems less

likely to result in the criminalization of innocent behaviour. As a result, it is less likely to result in the violation of human rights and human needs.

#### **4.1.2 Chinese Counterterrorism Law**

Article four of the *Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China* claims that “the state shall include counterterrorism in the national security strategy, comprehensively implementing policies, address both the symptoms and root causes...” (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2015). However, according to HNT, the government’s counterterrorism national security strategy cannot address the symptoms and root causes of terrorism using their current techniques. The article continues that “the state shall combat all forms of extremism, such as the incitement to hatred and discrimination and agitation for violence by distorting religious doctrine or other methods, so as to eliminate the ideological basis for terrorism” (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2015). This phrasing implies that the distortion of religious doctrine is the predominant cause of extremism in the region. This may be inaccurate in this case.<sup>12</sup>

Article six states that “[c]ounterterrorism work shall be conducted in accordance with the law by respecting and safeguarding human rights and protecting the lawful rights and interests of citizens and organizations” (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2015). It claims that “[i]n counterterrorism work, citizens’ freedom in religious belief and ethnic customs shall be respected, and any discriminatory deeds based on regions, ethnic groups, religions, and other causes shall be prohibited” (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2015). However, the repressive policies that continually violate the human rights and human needs of the Uyghur demonstrate that this statement is inaccurate, implying that they are not carried out in accordance with the law.

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<sup>12</sup> The significance of this phrasing and emphasis on religious doctrine is discussed in Chapter 5 section 5.2.5 The Rhetoric Surrounding Terrorism and Terrorists and 5.2.6 Religion and Terrorism in the Xinjiang Case

The Chinese government has also published a list of “75 behavioural indicators of religious extremism (Human Rights Watch, 2018). This includes “incitement of violence, such as ‘inciting Holy war,” and what Human Rights Watch refers to as “a range of vague and imprecise ‘behaviours’ and symptoms’ that are considered ‘unusual’ and thus warrant additional scrutiny” (Human Rights Watch, 2018). These include storing large amounts of food in homes, suddenly quitting smoking or drinking or buying and storing equipment such as dumbbells and boxing gloves, maps, compasses, telescopes, ropes and tents without an obvious reason (Human Rights Watch, 2018). However, these are behaviours that many people carry out and may not be indicative of religious extremism or terrorism.

#### **4.1.3 Critiques of China’s Definition of Terrorism**

There have been criticisms that the Chinese government’s definition of terrorism and its policies are broad and vague (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 22). They have been called *sweeping* and *tough* by Western media (Zhou, 2016). Steven Polyakov argues that the definition “differ[s] from a substantive notion of an actual terror threat” (Polyakov, 2017). A large range of activity related to ethnic and religious expression and customs are criminalized. These activities are becoming increasingly prohibited and punishable (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). Furthermore, acts of protest and rebellion are covered under the broad definition of terrorism (Kawase, 2016). As stated by Zunyou Zhou, “... most parts of the law involve granting enormous discretionary powers to a government that already has broad, intrusive competences. These new powers will inevitably affect fundamental human rights” and human needs (Zhou, 2016). Clarke states that the Chinese government’s approach “amounts to a cautionary tale in the global ‘war on terrorism’ whereby an authoritarian state has eagerly instrumentalized the threat of terrorism to enhance its control over a historically-contested frontier region and distinctive ethnic minority population” (Clarke, 2018). Nevertheless, the CCP maintains that due to its “more complex and dangerous security environment,” it

“requires an accelerated response in the form of broad and comprehensive law” (Romaniuk & Yang, 2017). Therefore, their problematic definition of terrorism continues to be broadly applied in Xinjiang.

## **4.2 The White Papers of the Government Regarding National Defense and Terrorism**

The Chinese government publishes White Papers or reports on national defense approximately every two years. These reports provide insight into how the Chinese government operates and portrays itself to the outside world. They also illuminate China’s approaches to security, terrorism, and Xinjiang and how these may encroach upon human rights and human needs.

### **4.2.1 White Papers Prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001: *China’s National Defense (1998)* and *China’s National Defense in 2000***

The first White Paper, *China’s National Defense (1998)* makes no mention of Xinjiang or Terrorism in China (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1998). *China’s National Defense in 2000* does make a brief mention of terrorism but more specifically discusses regional security efforts. The report discusses the development of the Shanghai Five, made up of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2000). The goal of the Shanghai Five was to provide a “regional mechanism for... multilateral cooperation in all fields” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2000). This included:

[deepened] cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic and trade, military, military technology and other fields to consolidate regional security and stability, and to effectively implement all the clauses of the agreements they have signed concerning confidence-building in the military field and the mutual reduction of military forces along the border areas. They... made it clear that they will never allow any country to use their territory to conduct any activities detrimental to the sovereignty, security and public order of any of the five countries, and that they will support each other’s efforts in safeguarding their national independence, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and social stability. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2000)

The White Paper also stressed

their firm opposition to interference in other countries' internal affairs on the excuse of protecting ethnic or religious interests, or human rights. They declared that they would never tolerate national separatism, religious extremism or terrorism, and that they would resolutely oppose any activity by such forces on their respective territory against other countries. They pledged to jointly take effective measures to crack down on such activities so as to safeguard regional peace and stability. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2000)

This goal of cooperation between the Shanghai Five was the only mention of terrorism in the 2000 report. These statements do not highlight a grave concern regarding terrorism, despite the CCP's claims that they have long been a victim of terrorism (Kanat, 2016, pp. 202-203). They do highlight China's firm commitment to stability, security and public order. They also emphasise China's concerns regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes their prioritizing of state sovereignty over human rights concerns. This is important because it demonstrates China's lack of commitment to the notions implicit within human rights rhetoric.

#### **4.2.2 White Paper: *China's National Defense in 2002***

After the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the White Paper entitled *China's National Defense in 2002* was very different in its focus. The government made wide-ranging changes to its criminal and security laws (Holdstock, 2015, p. 165). Terrorism became a central focus and the government expressed that they would "unremittingly put the new security concept into practice, oppose all kinds of hegemonism and power politics, and combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2002). They stated that they would stop separatism in order to foster the "complete unification of the motherland" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2002). The report claimed that "China's armed forces will unswervingly defend the country's sovereignty and unity, and have the resolve as well as the

capability to check any separatist act” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2002). In terms of social stability, the report specified that

[r]egarding the maintenance of public order and social stability in accordance with the law as their important duty, the Chinese armed forces will strike hard at terrorist activities of any kind, crush infiltration and sabotage activities by hostile forces, and crack down on all criminal activities that threaten public order, so as to promote social stability and harmony (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2002).

This quote demonstrates the firm and securitized approach they adopt towards terrorism. The rhetoric is strong and vehement. They reported that, like the United States, they were victims of terrorism and that terrorist forces posed “a serious threat to the security of the lives and property of the people of all China’s ethnic groups, as well as to the country’s social stability” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2002). This again highlights the prioritization of social stability in China.

#### **4.2.3 White Paper: *China’s National Defense in 2004***

The *China’s National Defense in 2004* White Paper maintained the gravity of the terrorist threat China claims to face. It outlined the main goals and tasks involved in maintaining national security as stopping separation and promoting reunification, guarding against, and resisting aggression and defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004). The report also emphasized the need to safeguard “the interests of national development,” promote economic and social development and increase “the overall national strength” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004). They stated the goal of safeguarding “the political, economic and cultural rights and interests of the Chinese people” while “crack[ing] down on criminal activities of all sorts and maintain[ing] public order and stability” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004). This

statement is problematic given that it has been demonstrated that the Chinese government appears to be actively threatening the rights of the Uyghur in its attempts to counter terrorism.

#### **4.2.4 White Paper: *China's National Defense in 2006***

*China's National Defense in 2006* reiterated that China faced a serious threat from terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The goals of national security, unity and national development were also repeated (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2006). The report introduced two new permanent bodies founded under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure. New documents on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism were also announced through the SCO (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2006). The themes present in the other White Papers were repeated in this document.

#### **4.2.5 White Paper: *China's National Defense in 2010***

*China's National Defense in 2010* states that “terrorist, separatist and extremist activities [continue to] run amok” and have “inflicted serious damage on national security and social stability” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). The report states that “[p]ressure builds up in preserving China’s territorial integrity...” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). This quote emphasizes the goal of China to maintain territorial integrity. This is perhaps as a result of its historical narrative of victimhood. This goal further affects the government’s ability to address the needs of the Uyghur. No further reports were released until 2015.

#### **4.2.6 Report: *China's Military Strategy***

In 2015, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense published a report entitled *China's Military Strategy*, which discusses many of the issues mentioned in the White Papers. It highlighted the increasing worry within the CCP about terrorist activities and stated that in China, “ethnic, religious, border and territorial disputes, are complex and volatile” (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015). As a result, “China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity, and development interests” (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015). The report emphasises a growing need to “maintain political security and social stability” (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Within the report, the role of China’s armed forces in “resolutely safeguarding the unification of the motherland” is underlined (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015). This includes “operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China’s political security and social stability” (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Involved in this is a “holistic approach” to balance “rights protection and stability maintenance” (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015). However, in Xinjiang the balance seems to tip in the favor of stability maintenance.

#### **4.2.7 Criticisms of the White Papers**

The White Papers of the government are often criticized. Nectar Gan quotes rights groups stating that the papers are “methodologically flawed” and “flimsy pieces of propaganda... detached from the reality on the ground” (Gan, 2017). William Nee of Amnesty International stated that the government’s issuing of White Papers is brazen given that “[t]here is no freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, or freedom to speak of in the region” and that the reports deny “the routine censorship of television, books, newspapers and the internet, plus the fact that people

are given lengthy prison sentences for expressing their views” (Gan, 2017). Nevertheless, the White Papers define and outline China’s approach to security. These documents and the policies within them affect the human needs of the Uyghur and the conflict in Xinjiang.

### **4.3 Religion in Xinjiang After 2009**

#### **4.3.1 Religion in China**

China has a complex relationship with religion. After being under communist rule for almost seventy years, religion has been almost entirely excluded from the lives of most Han Chinese (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 10). The nation is predominantly atheist. The *sinicization* of religion in China is seen by the government as paramount to promoting ethnic solidarity and religious harmony (Reuters, 2018). This affects religious expression and freedom in Xinjiang and human needs related to cultural and physical safety and security. The policies associated with it demonstrate cultural and structural violence towards the Uyghur based on and related to their religious belief. Furthermore, the consequences of these policies may be embedded in the memory of the Uyghur and foster a sense of frustration and helplessness.

#### **4.3.2 White Paper: *Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang***

In 2016, the Chinese government released a report entitled *Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang*. It claims that prior to the establishment of the PRC, “[r]eligious wars and conflicts not only caused serious damage to the economy and society, but also brought grave disasters to the people. As a result, people lost freedom of faith” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). However, it argues that after the establishment of the PRC, all people in China gained freedom of religious belief. Consequently, “[a]ll religions in Xinjiang have thus reached a new historical stage at which they coexist in harmony” (Information Office of the State Council of the

People's Republic of China, 2016). Yet, the report states that “[a] religion should adapt itself to the times and human environment, and achieve localization, so that it can continue” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). This suggests that the government may only support religion that adapts to its policies, threatening religious freedoms and individuals’ needs for cultural security.

#### **4.3.3 The Chinese Constitution, Ethnicity, and Religion**

The Chinese Constitution stipulates equality for all before the law. It claims to provide checks against ethnic discrimination and religious freedoms for all faiths (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 10). It does explicitly state that “[n]o one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). These are quite broad requirements that the government may shape to justify its religious repression in Xinjiang.

#### **4.3.4 The State Administration of Religious Affairs**

The government has established a department under the Chinese government’s State Council called the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA). SARA is in charge of religious affairs and officially responsible for the protection of religious belief of Chinese citizens as well as to “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of religious groups and the venues of their activities, ensure that religious leaders can conduct regular religious activities as well as ensure citizens, who wish to do so, can take part in regular religious activities” (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 10).

All aspects of Islam, specifically, are controlled by the Islamic Association of China (IAC) that falls under the jurisdiction of SARA. The training of Imams, the conduct of religious practices and rituals in mosques and so on are controlled by the IAC. In this way, the practice of Islam in Xinjiang and China are controlled by the CCP (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 16). Ethnic minorities' religious activities are monitored and regulated according to specific policies that aim to prevent social unrest, threats to Chinese territorial integrity and disruptions to national unity (Terrone, 2016, p. 43). This affects one's ability to freely practice religion, especially if it contradicts with the desires of the CCP.

#### **4.3.5 Role of Religion for Ethnic Groups in China**

To non-Han ethnic groups in the country, religion, language and the practice of their cultures are fundamental to their daily lives (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 10). Ethnicity and religion are closely intertwined with histories and identities for many of these ethnic minorities. Religion itself “constitutes a cohesive and nonnegotiable element of ethnic self-identification and cultural self-representation” (Terrone, 2016, p. 43). Uyghur identity, specifically, is often represented by their religious and Islamic practices (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 7). Religion has also provided a vehicle to express grievances (Holdstock, 2015, p. 78). Importantly, religion offers many Uyghurs “an alternative to the sense of hopelessness engendered by their economic [and social] situation, one that offer[s] the possibility of personal, and even national, salvation” (Holdstock, 2015, p. 117). Some Uyghurs believe that the government's policies aim to dissolve Uyghur identity via the suppression of religious belief and practice (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 7). If this is the case, the Uyghurs needs for cultural and physical safety and security are jeopardized. This also would qualify as structural violence towards the Uyghur.

#### 4.3.6 White Paper: *Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang: Religious Practice*

The CCP's 2016 report on *Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang* outlines the government's view on religious practice in Xinjiang. It states that:

[t]he customs of religious believers are fully respected. State laws, including the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, Criminal Law, General Principles of the Civil Law, Education Law, Labour Law, and Advertising Law, and local regulations, including the Regulations of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on Administration of Muslim Food and the Regulations of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on the Work of Ethnic Unity and Progress contain specific provisions on the protection of religious customs, including production, processing, storage, distribution and selling of halal food, supply of special food, setting up of halal restaurants and halal canteens. During the Spring Festival, Eid al-Adha (Corban Festival, Eid al-Fitr and other major traditional festivals, all ethnic groups can enjoy statutory holidays and be supplied with special foodstuffs. Special cemetery areas are allocated for some ethnic-minority groups who traditionally bury their dead in the ground. Traditional practices of a religious nature, such as naming a child, funeral pray, burial, and holding Nazer (memorial activities), are respected. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016)

This quote is important because the policies of the government have contradicted these claims.

Furthermore, the report states that:

[i]n accordance with laws and regulations [and the principle of 'protecting the legal, stopping the illegal, containing the extreme, resisting infiltration, and combating crimes,' Xinjiang manages religious affairs, protects people's freedom of religious belief, and ensure that normal religious activities proceed in an orderly way. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016)

This includes punishing any behaviour deemed illegal or different from what the CCP regards as *normal*. More specifically:

[t]he Chinese government prohibits any organization or individual from splitting the country, disseminating extremist religious thoughts, inciting ethnic hatred, undermining national unity, disturbing the social order, or impairing citizens' physical and mental health in the name of religion. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016)

Further, the government prohibits "any act that impedes the implementation of the systems of state administration, justice, education, culture, marriage, family planning or inheritance in the name of

religion” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). Behaviour that “violates national security and interests, public interests, and citizens’ legitimate rights and interests in the name of religion” is forbidden (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). The list of unacceptable religious activity is quite broad and lacks specificity.

Nevertheless, the report states that “[n]o Xinjiang citizen has been punished because of his or her rightful religious belief” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). The government claims that:

Xinjiang encourages religious organizations and believers to promote patriotism, peace, unity, moderation, tolerance and benevolence through their sermons and preaching, spread the Chinese cultural concepts of advising people to perform good deeds, teaching people morality and being merciful, and lead religious believers to maintaining proper faith and honest deeds, and resisting religious extremism. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016)

The use of the words *proper faith* is interesting. This again emphasises that the CCP has the ability to dictate what religious activity or belief fall under this category. Moreover, they argue that “Xinjiang takes active measures to make religions to adapt to socialist society, and prevents the use of religion in interfering in the administrative, judicial, educational and other social affairs” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). However,

the citizens’ freedom of religious belief is fully respected, believers’ normal religious needs are effectively met, the positive role of religious circles in promoting economic development and social stability is well displayed, the government’s capacity in administering religious affairs is constantly strengthened, international exchanges in the religious field are being expanded, and the proliferation and spread of religious extremism is being effectively contained. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016)

They conclude the report by arguing that:

the freedom of religious belief in Xinjiang cannot be matched by that in any other historical period, and is undeniable to anyone who respects the facts. The Chinese government resolutely opposes the politicization of religious matters and any other country's interference in China's internal affairs in the name of religion. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016)

These statements highlight the priorities of the CCP. These priorities include protecting social stability, sovereignty and the control of religious practice. The results of policies reflecting these priorities have been demonstrated to be detrimental to the Uyghurs and their human needs.

#### **4.3.7 White Paper: *China's Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief***

In 2018, the CCP published an additional report entitled *China's Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief* (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). The report begins by stating that:

[a]s a socialist country under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), China adopts policies on freedom of religious belief based on national and religious conditions to protect citizens' right to freedom of religious belief, build active and healthy religious relationships, and maintain religious and social harmony. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a)

Again, the rhetoric here highlights that the government has the ability to dictate what religious practices are appropriate or *healthy* and what may affect social harmony in China. The report claims that the CCP maintains policies of “independence and self-management” while it “actively guides religions to adapt to the socialist society” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). The report reiterates that “[b]elievers and non-believers enjoy the same political, economic, social and cultural rights, and must not be treated differently because of a difference in belief” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). However, “[n]o one shall use religion to interfere in the lawful rights and interests of citizens. Believers should

respect public order, customs, cultural traditions and social ethics in exercising their freedom of religious belief” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). The value of *normal* religious activity is continually restated. “No activities which employ religion to endanger social stability, national unity and state security are allowed to be carried out” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). What may endanger these values remains subjective and up to the CCP to decide.

The report emphasises the goal of “actively guiding religions to adapt to the socialist society” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). More specifically,

[a]ctively guiding religions in adapting to the socialist society means guiding religious believers to love their country and compatriots, safeguard national unity, ethnic solidarity, be subordinate to and serve the overall interests of the nation and the Chinese people. It also means guiding religious groups to support the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system; uphold and follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics; develop religions in the Chinese context; embrace core socialist values; carry forward China’s fine traditions; integrate religious teachings and rules with Chinese culture; abide by state laws and regulations, and accept state administration in accordance with the law. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a)

This becomes problematic for religions that do not adapt to Chinese Han society or conform to the government’s goals. It could be argued that this is the case for Islam in Xinjiang.

With regards to legal guarantees, the report repeats many of the same claims made in the 2016 report but adds that “China takes measures against the propagation and spread of religious extremism, and at the same time, carefully avoids linking violent terrorism and religious extremism with any particular ethnic group or religion” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). However, religious activity must be carried out “in an orderly manner” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). From this, “the CPC adheres to the principle of ‘uniting and cooperating politically, and respecting each other’s beliefs’ in the handling

of relations with religious groups, and maintains good relations with religious circles” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). Though,

[r]eligious groups carry on the longstanding tradition whereby religions in China must be Chinese in orientation, and actively adapt to society. They also carry on the fine traditions of patriotism, unity, progress, service to society, harmony, and inclusiveness. Religious groups conscientiously safeguard national and social public interests, public order and good customs, and fulfill social responsibility. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a)

In its conclusion, the report states that “China has embarked on a road to success which enshrines freedom of religious belief in law, promotes harmonious religious relations, and encourages religious groups to play a positive role” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018a). Despite these guarantees, the concerns regarding the vague rhetoric in these statements and their potential consequences for the Uyghur remain.

#### **4.3.8 Religious Freedom in Xinjiang**

Despite the grand claims within the CCP’s *Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang* report and the *China’s Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief* report, the laws, regulations, and policies in Xinjiang have and continue to deny Uyghurs of cultural and religious freedom, freedom of association, assembly, expression and more. This jeopardizes their human needs. Ultimately, Chinese policy and law stifle religious activity (Grieboski, 2014). The government claims the restrictions it places and the police presence in the area are to control the spread of Islamic extremism and separatism (Agence France-Presse, 2017). However, some Uyghurs believe that the increasing controls placed on religious freedoms by the Chinese government have criminalized peaceful religious activities and equated them with illicit and violent activity (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 16). The reports and laws published are broad and vague, which provides an opportunity to do this. Which, in turn, threatens the Uyghur’s cultural and religious security.

The following examples demonstrate how these religious policies jeopardize human needs, especially the need for cultural security and the need for recognition of one's religion and identity. These policies extend to schools and the home (Grieboski, 2014). For example, parents and legal guardians are forbidden from "allow[ing] minors to participate in religious activity" (Grieboski, 2014). In 2016, another law was introduced preventing Muslim parents from *forcing* or *coercing* their children to follow their faith or participate in religious activity. This includes making it illegal for anyone under the age of eighteen to pray, fast, learn about religious, follow someone to pray or go to underground religious places (Mudie, 2016). Parents who allow their children to participate in religious activity, allow them to attend mosque or provide them with religious education may face a fine or detention (Berton-Hunter, 2011). This law was added to existing legislation on preventing juvenile crime. Children found to be taking part in religious activities are to be sent to "specialized schools for correction" (Mudie, 2016). Students also risk being expelled from schools for going to a mosque (Berton-Hunter, 2011). Under the law, children are required to attend government schools (Al Jazeera, 2017).

The CCP also issued a list of banned names for Muslim newborns in Xinjiang in 2017. These include names such as Islam, Saddam, Medina, and Imam. The names are deemed *overly religious* (Hindustan Times, 2017). Failure to comply with this law could result in the loss of government benefits for those children. Children with these banned names will not be given a *hukou*, or local household registration. This means they will have no access to civil amenities such as education and healthcare (Hindustan Times, 2017). Dilxat Raxit, a spokesperson for the exiled World Uyghur Congress stated that "[t]his is another example of an extremely hostile attitudes towards the Uyghur community. If the Uyghurs don't accept (the rules) there will be allegations and punishments" (Hindustan Times, 2017). Sophie Richardson of Human Rights Watch said that "these policies are

blatant violations of domestic and international protections on the rights to freedom of belief and expression” (Hindustan Times, 2017).

After the age of eighteen, Uyghurs still often require permission from employers to practice as Muslims or join a mosque (Mudie, 2016). Public prayer is also banned (Agence France-Presse, 2017). Police raids on households are frequent (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 18). Marriages may not be performed using religious procedures and practices. Family planning policies also must be abided by despite religious belief (Al Jazeera, 2017).

There are strict restrictions on the religious materials that Uyghurs are allowed to possess (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 18). Religious texts are provided by the Chinese government and these texts “are published and distributed in accordance with the law” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). However, only religious texts published, endorsed, and distributed by the government are allowed for use and worship (Lipes, 2017). In 2017, all Qurans published more than five years ago were confiscated due to *extremist content* (Lipes, 2017). Possessing, publishing, printing or distributing content that is perceived to contain terrorism is criminalized (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). Uyghurs may not refuse or reject “radio, television or other public facilities and services,” even if they conflict with their religious values (Al Jazeera, 2017).

Civil servants, students and teachers are not allowed to fast during Ramadan and Uyghur restaurants are forced to stay open during the holiday (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). The government also obligates Uyghur restaurants and stores to sell and advertise alcohol (Morin, 2017). Uyghurs are also not allowed to use the “name of Halal to meddle in secular life of others” (Al Jazeera, 2017). Civil

servants are prohibited in general from practicing their religion. If they fail to comply, they risk losing their employment or criminal prosecution (Berton-Hunter, 2011).

For women, headscarves and head dresses are banned in many places (Abbey, 2017). Furthermore, both men and women are not allowed to wear robes that cover the whole body and face (Al Jazeera, 2017). These rules are harshly enforced. For example, in 2014, government authorities confiscated Muslim women's head dresses, including hijabs, head scarves and any fabric that could potentially be used to make *illegal religious garments* (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 19). In the same year, protests occurred following the detention of several women and middle school age girls who had defied a school's ban on headscarves. The police opened fire on these protestors (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 19). For Uyghur men in Xinjiang, they are banned from growing long beards (Abbey, 2017). The government considers long beards to be abnormal (Al Jazeera, 2017). These are practices that are often important to the practice of Islam.

The population of Xinjiang is encouraged to report members of their communities for anything believed to be in violation of the law and policies and to report terrorism and terrorist activities. Failure to do so can result in penalties and criminal convictions (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). It is believed that these policies are aimed at eliminating religious belief and cultural practice among ethnic minorities in Xinjiang (Mudie, 2016). The Office of the High Commissioner of United Nations Human Rights argued during the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that "members of the Xinjiang Uyghur minority, along with others who were identified as Muslim, were being treated as enemies of the state based on nothing more than their ethno-religious identity" (United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, 2018). The laws and policies of the CCP reflect this fear.

The Chinese government's propaganda labelling Uyghurs as terrorists has led to ethnic and religious stereotyping that has spread fear and institutionalized anti-Uyghur sentiment across China and among Han Chinese (Grieboski, 2014). Anti-Islamic sentiment and Islamophobia are on the rise and can contribute to cultural violence. This anti-Muslim sentiment can be seen on Chinese social media (USC US-China Institute, 2016). It also provides a societal basis to allow the CCP to further criminalize religious belief and the continuation of policies that amount to structural violence.

Dong Xinguang, the Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of Xinjiang's Regional Legislator allegedly stated in 2017 that "[l]aw makers need to distinguish between ethnic habits and extremist practices and understand that not all extremist ideas constitute a crime" (Reuters, 2017). Nevertheless, in 2018, Clarke quoted Newcastle University expert on Uyghurs, Joanne Smith Finley as stating that the government "securitize[s] all religious behaviours, not just violent ones," which leads "to highly intrusive forms of religious policing" that continue to humiliate Uyghurs and violate their human rights and human needs (Clarke, 2018). This humiliation and lack of rights fuels discontent in the province.

#### **4.4 Uyghur Culture in Xinjiang After 2009**

##### **4.4.1 White Paper: *Cultural Protection and Development in Xinjiang***

In November 2018, the Chinese government published another White Paper entitled *Cultural Protection and Development in Xinjiang* (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). The report states from the outset that "[s]ince the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Chinese government has attached great importance to documenting and protecting the excellent traditional ethnic cultures in Xinjiang, and ensuring that they are passed on to succeeding generations" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China,

2018b). Furthermore, “[t]he government has worked to modernize ethnic cultures, to strengthen cultural exchanges with foreign countries, and to enhance each group’s cultural confidence while engaging in exchanges with and mutually learning from others” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). The report claims that “[t]he local government promotes mutual respect for folkways among all ethnic groups while encouraging appropriate and healthy lifestyles, wedding and funeral practices, and customs and rituals” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b).

#### **4.4.2 Cultural Constraints in Xinjiang**

However, Chinese policies have changed with regard to cultural allowances in Xinjiang, contrary to the provisions of Ethnic Autonomy Law. These policies threaten the survival of Uyghur culture and violate their human needs. This perpetuates discontent in the region (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 16).

Uyghur language, for example, has been largely abandoned in schools (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 16). A policy of *bilingual education* was introduced that has effectively resulted in Mandarin Chinese being the dominant language of instruction in schools, judicial systems, and other realms of public life (Berton-Hunter, 2011). The 2018 *Cultural Protection and Development in Xinjiang* report outlined one of its main goals as promoting the use of standard Chinese to help “different ethnic groups to communicate, develop and progress” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). The report discusses The Educational Law of the People’s Republic of China which decrees that:

’[t]he standard spoken and written Chinese language shall be the basic language used by schools and other educational institutions in education and teaching... Schools and other educational institutions dominated by ethnic minority students in ethnic autonomous areas shall, according to the actual circumstances, use the standard spoken and written Chinese language

and the spoken and written languages of their respective ethnicities or the spoken and written language commonly used by the local ethnicities to implement bilingual language'. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b)

This occurs at the expense of the Uyghur language. Uyghurs perceive any loss of Uyghur language as one of the greatest threats to their culture and identity (Berton-Hunter, 2011). Nevertheless, the CCP argues that “[e]thnic people are enthusiastic about learning and using standard Chinese to adapt to economic and social development and increased communication” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). It also claims that “[e]thnic minority languages are extensively used in such areas as judicature, administration, education, press and publishing, radio and television, internet, and public affairs” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b).

The CCP states that:

[t]he central government and the local government of Xinjiang have made a continuous effort to strengthen the legal system for the protection of the region’s cultural heritage. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Cultural Relics and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Intangible Cultural Heritage provides important legal protection for the diverse cultural heritage of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b)

Furthermore, “[l]iterary, artistic creation, press and publishing are booming. A variety of brilliant works of literature and art created in Xinjiang demonstrate the glamour of Chinese culture” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2018b). However, it is claimed that there are increasing controls on artistic freedom and expression (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 16). Many Uyghurs fear that their culture has been criminalized (Thum, 2018). This contributes to the deprivation of human needs and a resultant sense of hopelessness and desperation.

## 4.5 Current Consideration

### 4.5.1 The Integration of Xinjiang and the Establishment of a Security State

The Chinese government claims that “Xinjiang fully respects and effectively guarantees the civil rights of its citizens in accordance with the law, by respecting and protecting life and property, safeguarding the right to a fair trial, and promoting free expression” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2017) . Nevertheless, Chinese policies regarding Xinjiang and other autonomous regions continue to foster the integration of these regions into the national core and national sense of identity at the expense of Uyghurs’ human rights and human needs. Thomas Cliff contends that:

Arguably the most pervasive of the ‘by design’ influences on Xinjiang is the ongoing state project to integrate this periphery into the core region. At the human level on which I focus—culture, society, and micro-economics—this form of integration might be better described as ‘normalization.’ In the Foucauldian sense normalization is a process of disciplining through the imposition of precise norms. Normalization in this context, is the process of making Xinjiang feel more like *Neidi*<sup>13</sup> and, in particular, making people in Xinjiang more like people in *Neidi*. Normalization includes providing bilingual education, restricting religious practice and teaching, ‘civilizing’ the populace, ‘remaking’ history, and reshaping habits. Ethnic minorities may be seriously affected by normalization, in both intended and unintended ways, not least because they are the furthest from this ‘normal to begin with’. (Cliff, 2016, pp. 124-125)

These policies continue using the various methods mentioned above and increase Uyghur grievances. In 2017, President Xi Jinping stated that “[j]ust as one loves one’s own eyes, one must love ethnic unity; just as one takes one’s own livelihood seriously, one must take ethnic unity seriously” (Reuters, 2017). Clarke argues that the Chinese policies are “representative of an emerging ‘national security state’ mentality in Xinjiang” (Clarke, 2016). This national security state mentality is characterized by the “institutionalized provision of security and its prioritization over other functions of the state”

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<sup>13</sup> *Neidi* refers to the Han dominated core.

(Clarke, 2016). Rian Thum argues that “Xinjiang has become a police state to rival North Korea (Thum, 2018). Furthermore, Thum argues that Xinjiang has a “formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid” (Thum, 2018). In a situation like this, the fulfillment of human needs is difficult, if not impossible.

Uyghur grievances are considered illegitimate and are associated with fostering separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism (Grieboski, 2014). There is no opportunity for open independent political groups to represent the views of the Uyghurs to the government and open political debate is prohibited (Dillon, 2019, p. 109). Expressions of frustration or dissent are often equated with separatism which is punishable by death under Chinese law (Grieboski, 2014). This is a violation of the Uyghur’s human need for participation. There has been a marked increase in criminal trials in Xinjiang (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 24). Uyghurs are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system (Kaltman, 2007, p. 2). This demonstrates an increase in suppression of human rights activism and dissent (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 24). These policies also alienate the Uyghur population and delegitimize any grievances they may have.

Rather than improving the situation, this repression and control has become increasingly strict under the rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who came to power in 2012. The arrest rate in the province nearly doubled in 2014 (Tschantret, 2016a). National security forces often use lethal forces against crowds of, often unarmed, Uyghur protestors (Grieboski, 2014).

The CCP claims that:

the right to freedom of expression is protected. To safeguard the public’s right to free expression as prescribed by the Constitution, and to expand, diversify, and improve access to the required channels, Xinjiang has created a wide range of Internet infrastructure and websites (or platforms), while continuing to promote traditional media, such as radio, television, newspapers and magazines. As a result, the citizens’ right to information, right to participation

and right of scrutiny are guaranteed. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2017)

Despite this, the government continues to be unwilling to tolerate public discussion of the role of religious, social, cultural, political, and economic grievances in contributing to the conflict in Xinjiang, whether it is from Uyghurs or foreign journalists (Gracie, 2015). Severe punishments are given to those who communicate sensitive information about the condition of Uyghurs to sources outside of China (Berton-Hunter, 2011). Freedom of press and basic liberties do not exist (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 24).

The Uyghur community lives under intense surveillance with limited freedoms of speech, religion and movement that seem to dwindle (Gracie, 2015). Increasingly tight controls are applied to the process of obtaining a passport or travel documents to leave Xinjiang (IHS Jane's Country Risk Daily Report, 2016). In 2016, this also included a new policy of confiscating passports (Tschantret, 2016a). The Shihezi Public Security Bureau Immigration Office instructed all residents of Xinjiang to turn in their passports to public security authorities for *annual review* (Hwang & Enos, 2016). These passports are then held for *safekeeping* after the review (Hwang & Enos, 2016). Those who wish to get access to their passports must get approval to travel (Hwang & Enos, 2016). Residents are required to give DNA samples and other biometric data with any application for a travel permit (Hwang & Enos, 2016; Human Rights Watch, n.d.). The government claims these policies are driven by the separatist threat from Uyghurs and evidence that Uyghur militants are operating domestically and abroad (IHS Jane's Country Risk Daily Report, 2016). Human Rights Watch has criticized these policies for arbitrarily restricting freedom of movement (Hwang & Enos, 2016). Sophie Richardson of Human Rights Watch stated that “[m]ass DNA collection by the powerful Chinese police absent effective privacy protections or an independent judicial system is a perfect storm for abuse” (Wang X. , 2017). She continued that “China is moving its Orwellian system to the genetic level” (Wang X. , 2017).

However, the Chinese government maintains that these collections are a necessary feature of nationwide *stability maintenance* (Wang X. , 2017).

Xi Jinping has also increased state surveillance to “spread from the earth to the sky” (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 23). He has also stated that he wants “walls made of copper and steel” to defend against terrorism in Xinjiang (Morin, 2017). His appointment of Xinjiang’s Communist Party chief, Chen Quanguo, who previously served as leader in Tibet, has also led to an increase in even harsher measures in Xinjiang (The Economist, 2017). Under Chen, Muslim minority regions are assigned detention quotas resulting in many Uyghurs being interned without due process (Zenz, 2018, p. 2).

The XUAR’s government security budget has also been greatly expanded. In 2009, expenditures were 1.54 billion RMB (241 million USD). In 2016, expenditures were estimated at 154.2 billion RMB (24.6 billion USD) (International Forum For Rights and Security, 2016, p. 23). These policies demonstrate a continuous shift towards securitization and control rather than conflict resolution.

#### **4.5.2 Detention Centres and Re-Education Camps**

In 2018 and 2019, China’s policies in Xinjiang have been in international news because of their use of detention centres and re-education camps. Re-education camps are not a new phenomenon in China and have been used since the CCP took power in 1949. However, these policies have increased as authorities attempt to “reshape Uyghurs’ habits—even the state says, their thoughts” (Thum, 2018). In September 2018, it was estimated that one million people were imprisoned in detention centres or re-education camps in Xinjiang (Ma, 2018). This is part of what the CCP calls the “transformation through education” campaign (教育转化). The aim of these camps and centres are to *de-extremitize*

“elements of the society that are ‘infected by religious extremism and violent terror ideology’” (Julienne, 2018). However, with the increasing criminalization of Uyghurs, the net is widely cast and many Uyghurs may find themselves in these camps for less serious offenses. The government defends these camps as part of their policies of “taking measures to prevent and crack down on terrorism and extremism” to “help reserve stability, as well as the life and livelihood of all people of all ethnicities in Xinjiang” (Griffiths J. , 2018). They have also been referred to as *thought-control camps* or *ethnic gulags* (Thum, 2018; Foreign Policy Special Correspondent, 2018).

It is claimed that the government organizes public ceremonies within communities where Uyghurs are asked to pledge loyalty to the CCP. Mandatory re-education courses are held. There are also forced dance performances, as some forms of Islam forbid dance. Security agents then conduct risk assessments of the residents. Uyghurs automatically receive a ten-percent deduction of their score for their ethnicity and another ten-percent if they pray daily (Thum, 2018). Their score also depends on their age, other faith and religious practices, their foreign contacts and experiences abroad (Foreign Policy Special Correspondent, 2018). Each resident is labelled *safe*, *normal* or *unsafe* based on these metrics (Foreign Policy Special Correspondent, 2018). This policy is described as *compulsory indoctrination* (Thum, 2018). Those who do poorly on these risk assessments, who are considered unsafe or are believed to oppose Chinese rule are placed in re-education camps (Thum, 2018).

Within the camps, punishment is carried out (Thum, 2018). Some inmates claim to have been tortured. Detainees are forced to write *self-criticisms*, a policy that has long been used by the CCP (The Guardian, 2018). They are also forced to sing patriotic songs and chant slogans that praise the CCP (The Guardian, 2018). These detainees are rarely formally charged or sentenced. Many are held indefinitely (Thum, 2018). This uncertainty and “arbitrary logic of detention” instills fear in Uyghur communities and acts as a Chinese tool of deterrence (Thum, 2018). The Chinese government does not

present these camps as “court-sanctioned criminal punishment” but rather as “akin to free medical treatment of a dangerous addiction to religious ideology” (Zenz, 2018, p. 2). This has been part of a long tradition in China of considering those whose thoughts differ from the governments as *mentally ill* or suffering from *ideological defects* and forcing them to undergo political indoctrination (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Human Rights Watch stated that these camps have resulted in a “rights violation of a scope and scale [that has] not been seen in China since the Cultural Revolution unleashed in 1966” (The Guardian, 2018). Adrian Zenz reiterated this by stating that “China’s re-education drive in Xinjiang is arguably the country’s most intense campaign of coercive social re-engineering since the Cultural Revolution. It represents the epitome of China’s securitization approach in its restive western minority regions” (Zenz, 2018, p. 23). A United Nations committee in 2018 criticized China for these camps and described Xinjiang as a *no-rights zone* (Vanderklippe, 2018c). China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi responded to these criticisms in 2018 by stating that “[i]f we can take care of prevention, then it will be impossible for terrorism to spread and take root” (Vanderklippe, 2018a). He continued by arguing that China’s efforts are “completely in line with the direction the international community has taken to combat terrorism” and that individuals “should not listen to gossip or rumor, because the Xinjiang regional government, of course, understands the situation in Xinjiang best, and not some other people or organizations” (Vanderklippe, 2018a). This makes criticism and dissent difficult.

#### **4.5.3 Current Considerations Related to Conflict in Xinjiang**

The current auspicious international climate and rise of international terrorist groups like ISIS has affected the landscape of the conflict in Xinjiang (Tschantret, 2016a). Suicide bombings and attacks against civilians are growing. These tactics were previous avoided by Uyghurs and suggest that frustrated and more militant Uyghurs are being inspired by jihadist movements. New restrictions have

predominantly failed to deter the small minority of violent radicals. In fact, China's assertion that every Uyghur is a potential ISIS recruit or terrorist threat may only convince more individuals that they should ally with jihadists. Furthermore, the risks of radicalizing younger generations into this kind of ideology, which has previously been alien to Xinjiang, is growing (Tschantret, 2016a). Tschantret argues that "[b]y overreacting to dissent and exaggerating Uyghur ties to jihadists, China may be unwittingly fostering the insidious ideologies and terrorist violence that it seeks to suppress, and all without the need for any Uyghurs to travel abroad" (Tschantret, 2016a).

Currently, the majority of Chinese government officials and the Han population continue to believe that Xinjiang is an integral part of China. Additionally, they believe that the Uyghurs fighting for independence represent a small minority of the Uyghur population and lack popular support (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 336). The party claims a great deal of success has occurred in reducing terrorism in the region (Martina, 2016). Despite criticism, it claims that:

[i]rrespective of their size of population, degree of development, and religious faith, the people of all Xinjiang's ethnic groups enjoy the same status and the same rights, and must fulfill the same obligations in accordance with the law. Their political rights as citizens are fully protected. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2017)

They also argue that:

[t]he socialist system with Chinese characteristics has provided a solid institutional guarantee to human rights development in Xinjiang; the rapid economic and social development has provided solid material foundation; and the harmonious and stable political environment has ensured a satisfactory social environment. It is a principle of the Constitution to respect and protect human rights. To promote progress in human rights is the consistent pursuit of all Chinese people, including the ethnic groups of Xinjiang. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government, and with the realization of the Two Centenary Goals and the Chinese Dream of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, further improvement will be seen in the protection of human rights in Xinjiang, and all ethnic groups in Xinjiang will be sure to greet a brighter future. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2017)

However, these statements do not reflect the reality for many Uyghur. As argued by Michael Dillon, they also demonstrate that the government seems unwilling to acknowledge that the problems in Xinjiang may be internal, have evolved over decades and that the situation of deprivation for the Uyghur lies at the root of the conflict (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii).

However, if China fails to face the problem effectively, the risk of violence will increase. Force and securitization is merely a short-term measure in establishing political control. The government needs to develop a more sustainable and long term solution to resolve the antagonisms in Xinjiang (Brady, 2012, p. 6). The growing focus on violence and terrorism has obscured any discussion of the conditions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Holdstock, 2015, p. 6). Clarke discusses the *Palestinization* of Xinjiang. If China is unable to address the problems in Xinjiang, leading to violence and “[i]f China does not explore other options besides repression, restriction and investment, millions of Uyghur Muslims might become disenfranchised, encouraging some to look to the intifada, the Taliban or al-Qaeda for inspiration” (Clarke, 2015, p. 127). He continues by stating that “China’s refusal to listen to any autonomous demands, even cultural ones, can only encourage radical separatism to take root” (Clarke, 2015, p. 138). Discussing and subsequently addressing human needs may provide a solution to this problem and offer a real and tangible opportunity for conflict cessation and resolution.

## **Chapter 5: Application: Human Needs and Conflict in Xinjiang**

### **5.1 Human Needs Theory**

As mentioned earlier, Galtung argues that “[v]iolence is present when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (Dilts, 2012, p. 192). Human Needs Theory (HNT) elaborates on this hypothesis and provides a system and a macro-level approach to not only understanding the causes and course of violence and conflict, but also offers potential means of resolution and prevention (Cook-Hoffman, 2009, p. 22). John Burton, a main HNT theorist, contends that HNT provides “a short-hand way of describing the problems created by structural violence and point[s] more directly to ways in which they could be tackled” (Burton J. , 1997, p. 35). This makes HNT a highly useful and innovative approach, especially in protracted ethnic conflicts where structural violence is prevalent.

#### **5.1.1 Meanings and Definitions of John Burton’s Human Needs**

Sites claims that “[p]eople can thus be said to have needs for those conditions or state of existence which will alleviate the suffering caused by negative emotions and which will enhance the possibility of satisfaction which... is also necessary for healthy survival” (Sites, 1990, p. 16). He argues that people are inherently “driven by this distress and/or anticipated distress to produce social conditions that will provide insurance against distress occurring in the future” (Sites, 1990, p. 16). The fulfillment of human needs is necessary for “creative, whole, free, sociable, and multilateral developed persons” (Roy, 1990, p. 125). In this way, human needs are necessary for healthy human life and relations.

There are a wide variety of human needs identified by various HNT theorists.<sup>14</sup> Burton specifically highlights needs for distributive justice, safety, and security, belongingness, self-esteem, personal fulfilment, identity, cultural security, freedom, and participation (KOK, 2008, pp. 5-6). Each of these needs comprise of a variety of factors. Sandra Marker has defined each of these needs and what they may entail:

- Distributive justice includes the need for the fair allocation of resources between all members of a society.
- Safety and security involve the need for structure, predictability, stability and freedom from fear and anxiety.
- The need for belongingness comprises of the need for acceptance from others and to have strong personal ties with others, including an identity group.
- Self-esteem incorporates the need for recognition of oneself and others as valuable and capable humans. It also includes the need to know that one has some effect on their environment.
- The definition of personal fulfilment is the need to reach one's potential in all areas of life.
- Identity is one's sense of self, in relation to the outside world. This becomes a problem when; there is a lack of recognition of one's identity as legitimate; or others consider it inferior; or there are threats against it.
- Cultural security relates to identity and is the need for the recognition of one's culture, languages, traditions, religion, values, ideas, and concepts.

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<sup>14</sup> John Burton and two other theorists' lists of human needs can be found in Appendix I, II and III

- Freedom is the need to have no physical, political, or civil restraints and to have the capacity to exercise choice in all aspects of life.
- Participation is the need to be able to participate actively and freely in society and influence society (Marker, 2003).

The fulfillment of these needs increases the likelihood of satisfaction and development. The deprivation or denial of these needs may result in violence and conflict.

### **5.1.2 Human Needs in Xinjiang**

Structural, cultural, and direct violence in Xinjiang have negatively impacted the fulfillment of these needs. The policies and practices of the Chinese government have exacerbated this situation. Human rights abuses and policies that result in the deprivation of human needs have become embedded in the historical consciousness of the Uyghur and have potentially resulted in intergenerational trauma.<sup>15</sup> It is important to understand how this occurs in order to address these issues. A brief summary of how each of these needs have been affected follows.

In terms of distributive justice, this thesis has demonstrated that resources are not fairly allocated in Xinjiang. Inequality has served to exacerbate sentiments of deprivation and frustration. China's emphasis on economic development has failed to address the needs of the Uyghur. These economic policies have resulted in increased inequality and systematic difference between the Uyghurs and the Han (Bovingdon, 2010, pp. 345-346). This is also true for other the inequitable distribution of other resources, including housing, education, and social services.

In regards to safety and security, this thesis has adequately demonstrated that there is a lack of structure, predictability, stability and freedom from fear and anxiety. Social and economic justice is

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<sup>15</sup> The previous two chapters provide detailed examples of the deprivation of human needs and how this occurs

central to one's sense of wellbeing, safety, and security. Deprivation of these needs and a presence of physical, cultural and structural violence lead to a sense of powerlessness (Montville, 2015, p. 39). For the Uyghur, a large part of their grievances relate to ethnic security or their perceptions of their ability "to preserve, express, and develop their ethnic distinctiveness in everyday economic, social, and cultural practices" (Hillman, 2016, p. 4). With this ethnic and cultural security being vulnerable, the Uyghur's needs for safety and security are threatened. The aforementioned economic policies have resulted in a lack of predictability and stability. Furthermore, there is an absence of physical security due to the securitized and repressive policies of the Chinese government that result in arbitrary arrest and detention and violence towards the Uyghur.

Regarding belongingness, the CCP's continued efforts to undermine and eliminate important cultural and religious practices has demonstrated to the Uyghur that others, specifically the Han-dominated core, do not accept them. While there may be strong personal ties within the Uyghur community, they seldom extend outside the identity group. The impression created within China seems to be that until the Uyghur conform to the dominant identity and the national image in China, they are not accepted in Chinese society. Their distinctive identity is not acknowledged as part of a larger Chinese identity.

This relates to the need for self-esteem, as Uyghurs themselves are rarely recognized or appreciated in Chinese society, as individuals or a group. The policies in China may lead them to believe they are not seen as valuable or capable. Due to the lack of political participation, representation and freedom, they are not able to have an effect on their environment. Their actions are severely restricted.

Concerning the need personal fulfillment, Uyghurs are not able to reach their full potential in many areas of life. There are limits on their ability to gain employment, housing, resources and so on. They are often treated as second class citizens. The restrictions placed upon them and the prejudice that surrounds them makes personal fulfillment incredibly difficult.

Identity needs are heavily suppressed in Xinjiang. The government's repressive and securitized policies have worked to criminalize and potentially eliminate Uyghur identity. As a result, Uyghur identity is not considered legitimate within China. It is considered inferior by the government and the Han dominated core. This is perhaps one of the needs most greatly implicated in Xinjiang.

This is similar for cultural security, where Uyghur identity, culture, languages, traditions, religions, values, ideas, and concepts are criminalized and endangered. The Uyghurs feel they face a significant threat to both their identity and culture. With this identity and culture being politicized, they become more important to the Uyghur. As a result, threats to it are very damaging to their sense of fulfillment and satisfaction.

Freedom is curtailed for Uyghurs in Xinjiang as well, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. There are physical, political, and civil restraints on the Uyghurs and their movement. The capacity to exercise choice is not available in many aspects of life as they are heavily surveilled and restricted by the government and its policies. This lack of freedom increases a sense of hopelessness and helplessness.

This further implicates the need for participation. The Uyghurs are unable to participate actively and freely in Chinese society or to influence Chinese society. This is the case in their own province despite legal guarantees of autonomy and political participation. Ultimately, the Uyghurs are being actively deprived of their human needs.

HNT allows one to understand the impact the deprivation of these needs has for the Uyghur population and for safety and security in the province. It also offers means to address this deprivation to prevent further violence and conflict.

### **5.1.3 Role and Importance of John Burton's Human Needs Theory as an Analytical Approach in Understanding and Approaching Conflict**

Burton did not invent HNT, but gave it “its most impassioned and uncompromising expression” (KOK, 2008, p. 4). Therefore, his approach has been chosen as the interlocutor for this thesis. He theorized about human needs and conflict and he hypothesized a link between the deprivation or violation of basic human needs and violent conflict (Sandole D. J., 1990, p. 64). Burton emphasized the failure of existing state systems to satisfy the need for identity as one of the primary sources of modern ethno-nationalist struggle, like that in Xinjiang. Burton believed that HNT would provide an objective basis that transcended local political and cultural differences. This would allow for the understanding of causes of conflict, the development and design of successful conflict resolution processes and the founding of conflict analysis and resolution as an autonomous discipline (KOK, 2008, p. 4).

Nevertheless, HNT is often ignored or neglected in policy and research. Yet, it offers valuable insights into the causes and sources of conflict. Ultimately, HNT contributes to explanations of human behaviour, social interaction, and violence (KOK, 2008, p. 1). Needs satisfaction is “a *sine qua non* of a harmonious society” (Roy, 1990, p. 125). “The emphasis on human needs as the basis of analysis and problem-solving is oriented towards the stability and progress of societies: the human needs of the individual enable him to operate as an efficient unit within a social system without which no social organization can be harmonious” (Roy, 1990, p. 126). As a result, HNT offers mean of potential resolution. Resolutions that take HNT into consideration offer means of reducing both direct and

structural violence (KOK, 2008, p. 2). HNT provides a powerful alternative to the dominant school of thought of power politics and conflict studies (Christie, 1997, p. 316).

## **5.2 Human Needs and Conflict**

Structural violence destabilizes societies. It results in inequitable power relations and institutions that lead to the deprivation of human needs. It is hypothesized that this deprivation poses a significant threat to stability and peace. HNT offers a means to understand and address these issues.

### **5.2.1 Human Needs and Violence**

Burton refers to violence as “observable symptoms of unobservable motivations and needs” (Burton J. W., 1984, pp. 12-13). According to HNT, violence is “a tragic expression of unmet human needs, implying that all actions undertaken by human beings are attempts to satisfy their needs” (KOK, 2008, p. 2). Havva KOK argues that most conflicts relate to unmet human needs, such as protection, identity, recognition, participation and understanding and efforts to satisfy these needs (KOK, 2008, p. 3). Rubenstein contends that “... the unsatisfied basic human needs of... people provide the tinder for various sorts of violent rebellion, from violence against the self and common crime to terrorism, revolution, and war” (Rubenstein, 1990, p. 344). One argument is that giving importance to these needs and recognizing them as essential to the wellbeing of humans will address current intractable conflicts (KOK, 2008, p. 3).

### **5.2.2 Institutions and Human Needs**

Institutions and governments play a fundamental role in assuring the satisfaction of human needs. According to Burton, the functionality of authorities and governments is dependent on the functionality of human needs fulfilment (Vayrynen, 2001, p. 35). The satisfaction of human needs is central to the successful functioning of social and political institutions (Kelman, 1990, p. 284).

Subsequently, Herbert Kelman argues that “the satisfaction of human needs is the ultimate criterion by which the quality of institutions and their policies must be evaluated. Empirically, the degree to which institutions satisfy basic human needs is an important determinant of their perceived legitimacy and thus, at least in the long run, their stability and effectiveness” (Kelman, 1990, p. 284). HNT posits that social systems must respond to human needs or instability and forced change, potentially through violence or conflict, may occur (KOK, 2008, p. 1).

As a result, HNT proposes that aggression and conflict are the result of potential incompatibilities between institutions or social norms and inherent human needs (KOK, 2008, p. 1). Burton asserts that “[c]onflict, therefore, can meaningfully be defined as a situation in which authority or power is being exercised without the sanction or approval of those over whom it is being exercised” (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 126). This may be because state machinery is often “dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016, p. 117). Burton argues that “there are human limits to capacities to conform to elite-sponsored institutions and norms; the person is not wholly malleable. On the contrary, the needs that are frustrated by institutions will be pursued in one way or another” (Burton J. , 1997, p. 19). These needs require satisfaction or violence may occur (KOK, 2008, p. 1).

For the Uyghur, the consequence of progressively worsening conditions in a variety of aspects of life are discontent, dissent, violence and conflict (Holdstock, 2014, p. 66). Like in Xinjiang, the failure of the government and institutions to address these needs results in a strain in “the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016, p. 117). In this way, conflicts are “political manifestations of system failures, the failures

of a domestic system to provide the needs of people” (Vayrynen, 2001, p. 36). This is especially true in authoritarian states.

### **5.2.3 Authoritarianism and Conflict**

States are “endowed with the authority to govern and use force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens, and to provide collective goods” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016, p. 118). Given this, states are responsible for the satisfaction or frustration of human needs. Most states that experience protracted social conflict continuously fail to address and satisfy basic human needs. Parochial and authoritarian governments often characterize these states, as in China (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016, p. 118).

Pokalova argues that there is a correlation between terrorism, political violence, and regime type (Pokalova, 2013, p. 281). Ineffective institutional arrangements, typified by a lack of legislative outlets or legitimate political outlets, can increase frustration (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 4). Ralf Dahrendorf uses the terms *domination* and *subjection* to describe how these types of institutions function (Burton J. , 1979, p. 86). For Dahrendorf, domination is endowment with authority and power. Subjection is the exclusion from the exercise of authority and power (Burton J. , 1979, p. 86). Domination results in a deprivation of human needs and a sense of frustration and hopelessness for the subjected party. This is the case in Xinjiang.

The radicalization of national protest into terrorism is more likely under authoritarian regimes where domination and subjection exist (Bjorgo, 2005, p. 9). Without opportunities to express or address grievances related to political participation, there is little hope to change the incompatibilities between conflicting parties (Pokalova, 2013, p. 282). Political violence and terrorism become a means of political expression (Pokalova, 2013, p. 281). When citizens can resolve their grievances peacefully

through democratic rule of law systems, they are less likely to have feelings of hopelessness and desperation. It is these feelings that motivate terrorist action. In Xinjiang,

there is no opportunity at all for the Uyghurs to develop open independent political groups to represent their views to the government. It is not possible for people in Xinjiang to conduct an open political debate that could generate ideas about possible alternative political futures for the Uyghur people, although these ideas are often discussed in private. In this type of atmosphere, it is hardly surprising that militant groups, although outlawed and pursued by the Chinese state, continue to maintain a clandestine existence. (Dillon, 2019, p. 109)

Therefore, in places like Xinjiang under authoritarian regimes, where these opportunities do not exist, one is more likely to turn to political violence and other means of addressing grievances (Pokalova, 2013, p. 282).

This phenomenon has been demonstrated to be the case in Xinjiang. In employing authoritarian policies, China has failed to address the grievances at the root of the conflict and has offered no means for the expression of these issues. Policies like this cannot lead to the resolution of disputes. Rather, they lead to an increasing build-up of grievances that eventually may give rise to terrorism (Pokalova, 2013, p. 283). The radicalization pattern in this conflict indicates that there are urgent unresolved grievances and needs and that more violence could break out. The continued failure to address these grievances can lead to an increase in radicalization (Pokalova, 2013, p. 291).

#### 5.2.4 Human Needs and Terrorism<sup>16</sup>

Consequently, an important feature of the conflict in Xinjiang is the presence, real or perceived, of a terrorist threat. HNT provides an innovative and comprehensive method of understanding the cause and course of terrorism. This understanding is imperative to reducing the threat of terrorism and political violence.

The root causes of some forms of terrorism are frustration, hopelessness, misfortune, and despair. These experiences make certain individuals willing to sacrifice human lives in a bid to achieve radical change (Tkhostov & Surnov, 2009, p. 478). Anger, despair, frustration, and fear can motivate terrorists. They have often see themselves and their people and community as severely victimized. They may believe that this victimization will continue unabated unless some radical action takes place (Redekop, 2002, p. 146). With this outlook, their passivity ensures further victimization (Volkan, Montville, & Julius, 1990, p. 170). Terrorists may believe their ethnicity and identity are the basis of the threat they face. In cases like these, identity is the only “qualification[s] necessary for them to be assured a life or, equally important, an unacknowledged history of insult, degradation, violence and danger” (Volkan, Montville, & Julius, 1990, p. 165). Consequently, violence stems from the “conviction that further threats [to identity and cultural security] can only be reduced by using defensive activity” (Redekop, 2002, pp. 157-158).

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<sup>16</sup> It is the view of this thesis that the perceived terrorism in Xinjiang can be more accurately characterized as political violence typified by some terrorist actions and an influence of religion. In this way, it is treated as violence carried out by marginalized actors for political gain. Terrorism is simply the tactic used. Religion is an ideology that is merely associated with this violence and not a fundamental cause of it. Given the lack of consensus on the definition and features of terrorism, this thesis chooses to use the definitions and theories provided by John Burton and his colleagues, as they appear to best describe the situation in Xinjiang. They are also well-established theories with significant supporting evidence. More modern and contemporary definitions are considered in previous chapters but have been excluded from this analysis for these reasons. However, the terms terrorism and political violence will be used interchangeably as this corresponds to the rhetoric used by the Chinese government.

Terrorism, in these cases, implies that challenging the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force and violence is necessary to attain some balance in power and redress such grievances (Cohen & Arnone, 1988, p. 188). Terrorists are often employing tools that “appear to be the only ones available to combat injustice, defects in the economic or social system and other unacceptable conditions as perceived and experienced by them” (Burton J. , 1979, p. 229). In this way, terrorism is a means to a political end. In these cases, the behaviour of terrorists is rational and the parties, the government and its *adversary*, are engaging in a typical conflict, where the parties are aiming to influence the behaviour of the other (Crenshaw, 1987, p. 13). The purpose of this terrorism is to bring about a change in the actor’s environment, often due to desperation where the status quo is intolerable (Crenshaw, 1987, pp. 14-27). As stated by Schmid, “[w]hen long-standing injustices in society are not resolved but allowed to continue for years, without any light at the end of the tunnel, we should not be amazed that desperate people, and some others championing their cause, are willing to die and to kill for what they perceive to be a just cause” (Schmid, 2005, p. 227). Based on HNT, this is how some forms of terrorism develops.

### **5.2.5 The Rhetoric Surrounding *Terrorism and Terrorists***

It is important to note that the use of the word terrorism is problematic. Labelling one as a terrorist results in the individual or group being contrasted with the ideal of the *true warrior or soldier* (Jaggar, 2005, p. 211). This has been the case for the Uyghur. Within this dichotomy, a terrorist “fights for some ideology rather than to defend his country, his cause is illegitimate rather than legitimate, he is uncivilized rather than civilized, undisciplined rather than disciplined, a bandit, a barbarian or savage” (Jaggar, 2005, pp. 211-212). With these kinds of hierarchical dualisms implicit in the rhetoric and discourse surrounding terrorism, the actor becomes irrational and illegitimate. Any legitimate grievances or deprivations become ignorable.

Language and rhetoric are important in molding thoughts that precipitate action (Kapitan, 2003, p. 19). The pejorative bias implicit in the terms terrorism and terrorist “discourages a clear moral assessment of political conflict.... If those words cannot be used in a consistent and unprejudicial manner, then they are obstacles in the path towards the resolution of such conflicts and stimulators of further violence against civilians” (Kapitan, 2003, p. 19). An all-purpose moral condemnation of terrorism is damaging (Held, 2004, p. 60). This condemnation often results in the automatic discrediting and dehumanization of any individual or group that is carrying out *terrorist* actions. Their behaviour, therefore, is outside the norms of acceptable social and political behaviour and they are portrayed as individuals who cannot be reasoned with (Kapitan, 2003, p. 7).

This delegitimization of groups or individuals described as terrorists has a variety of effects. These include erasing any incentive an audience may have to understand the point of view of the labelled terrorist. As a result, the nature or origins of their grievances and the possibility of the legitimacy of their demands are not considered. It deflects any attention away from policies that may contribute to grievances. It also allows governments to challenge any calls to negotiate with the labelled terrorist. Furthermore, this label allows governments to use force and violence to deal with potential terrorists. It allows a government to exploit the fears of their citizens and stifle any objection to the manner and methods used in countering terrorism (Kapitan, 2003, p. 7). Additionally, the label allows for little distinguishing between the motives of terrorists and the types of terrorism (Kapitan, 2003, pp. 7-8). These effects have been illustrated in the Xinjiang case.

This is all especially challenging given the growing asymmetry of warfare where it is increasingly difficult of forces or members of the *weaker side* to attack combatants of a powerful country (Jaggar, 2005, pp. 214-215). As stated by Burton:

behaviour by members of society that is against the accepted the accepted social norms has been treated as a fault in the individual or group so deviating. It has been held to be due to a failure on the part of the individual to respond to the socialization process or alternatively to some abnormal state. On this basis, it was logical to develop political theories that asserted the monopoly or legitimized use of force by authorities over minorities, designed to maintain law and order and the norms of society in the interest of the majority. (Burton J. W., 1984, p. 44)

However, this does not address the underlying causes of terrorism. In cases like Xinjiang, populations become marginalized politically by authoritarian, powerful and armed governments (Jaggar, 2005, p. 215). Their lack of power and means are often the reason terrorism is their weapon (Held, 2004, p. 61). As a result, these marginalized populations are more likely to regard their cause as just and their terrorism, or political violence, as just and necessary (Jaggar, 2005, p. 215). Burton asks, “[t]o what extent can the individual, whose ontological needs must be met, be socialized into conforming behaviour that is incompatible with the pursuit of [human] needs?” (Burton J. W., 1984, pp. 44-45). As a result, the legitimacy of these actors and their grievances must be considered.

### **5.2.6 Religion and Terrorism in the Xinjiang Case**

Matters are further complicated when religion is perceived as a factor. In Xinjiang, the government considers religion to be the problem, not grievances or the deprivation of human needs. However, as argued by William T. Cavanaugh, “... there is no transhistorical and transcultural essence of religion and... essentialist attempts to separate religious violence from secular violence are incoherent. What counts as religious or secular in any given context is a function of different configurations of power” (Cavanaugh, 2009, pp. 3-4). This relates to concerns regarding power asymmetries and the devaluation of certain religions in societies like China. He continues by stating that:

[t]he myth of religious violence helps to construct and marginalize a religious Other, prone to fanaticism, to contrast with the rational, peace-making, secular subject. This myth can and is used in domestic politics to legitimate the marginalization of certain types of practices and

groups labelled religious, while underwriting the nation-state's monopoly on its citizens' willingness to sacrifice and kill. In foreign [and domestic] policy, the myth of religious violence serves to cast nonsecular social orders, especially Muslim societies, in the role of the villain. They have not yet learned to remove the dangerous influence of religion from political life. Their violence is therefore irrational and fanatical. Our violence, being secular, is rational, peace-making, and sometimes regrettably necessary to contain their violence. We find ourselves obligated to bomb them into liberal democracy. (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 4)

This myth of religious violence is applicable in the Chinese case. By framing Uyghur dissidence as a problem of religious extremism, the Chinese state can use coercive measures against the Uyghurs.

Labeling such groups as irrational, fanatical and violent delegitimizes their violence and the grievances behind it. State violence and coercion, however, are perceived as being necessary for peace (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 5).

Nevertheless, it is impossible to separate religious motives from social, economic, or political motives (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 5). Religion is rarely the root cause of violence but, rather, a tactic used in service of broader objectives, such as mobilizing identity (Pape, 2006, p. 4). But by framing conflicts like this as an issue of religious violence or religious extremism, the state can marginalize certain practices, like in Xinjiang (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 12). This rhetoric serves to “reinforce patriotic adherence to the nation-state as that which saves us from our other, more divisive, identities” (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 12). It allows attitudes and policies towards those who have a “stubborn refusal to tame religious passions in the public sphere” (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 12). In Xinjiang, this rhetoric has resulted in the securitization of all religious behaviours that have led to “highly intrusive forms of religious policing” that violate and humiliate the Uyghurs (Clarke, 2018). As Cavanaugh argues, “Muslim societies are commonly stereotyped as fanatical and dangerous because they have not learned, as ‘we’ have, to separate politics from religion” (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 12). This is problematic.

### **5.2.7 The Consequences of the Focus on Terrorism in China**

These types of ideology and the focus on *terrorism* obscures and prevents any discussion regarding the conditions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Holdstock, 2015, p. 6). Terrorism is a real threat in China. However, the Chinese state has consistently overreacted to disturbances and unrest, which merely serves to exacerbate problems in the area (Mackerras, 2014, p. 247). Many observers and theorists understand the violence in Xinjiang as a reaction to Chinese repression, human rights abuses and the deprivation of human needs rather than religious fundamentalism, extremism, or terrorism (Mackerras, 2014, p. 248). Resentment in the region grows as Chinese policies fail to recognize this.

If the government continues with its current methods of repression, the number of people with extremist views or who support terrorism may increase (Primiano, 2013, p. 455). In using these tactics, China has and may continue to facilitate the construction of a more threat radical in Xinjiang (Pokalova, 2013, p. 279). As stated by Robert Pape, “the use of heavy offensive force to defeat the existing generation of terrorists is the mostly likely stimulus to the rise of the next” (Pape, 2006, p. 239). In terms of human needs, “[t]hreat of punishment, punishment itself, isolation from society will not control [the terrorist’s] behaviour: already there has been a loss of identity, of a sense of control, and of other needs that led to the deviance and further loss will not constrain” (Burton J. , 1979, p. 79). The methods and tactics used by the Chinese government need to change.

### **5.2.8 Combating Terrorism and Political Violence**

Combating terrorism and political violence requires prevention (Pape, 2006, p. 7). This includes the prevention of a potentially larger generation of disenfranchised individuals from becoming radicalized and desperate enough to resort to this type of violence, this necessitates understanding the causes and logic of terrorism (Pape, 2006, p. 4). Focusing on the symptoms of terrorism alone will only result in more terrorism (Bjorgo, 2005, p. 1). Burton argues that “the tactic dictated by a prejudice or a

belief system and not by the nature of the problem, may further suppress a minority and thus promote more terrorism (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 41). Essentially,

dissent and deviance... are symptoms of problems, manifestations of conflicts between human needs and aspirations and the structures and institutions that determine the environments of an individual or nation. Finally, it is the latter that must adjust to the former: social structures are there to serve the needs of members of society, not the other way around. (Burton J. W., 1984, p. 48)

This is true for terrorism as well. It is a symptom of a problem. Burton states “[b]ehind the terrorist is a community of feeling and a support group” (Burton J. W., 1984, p. 48). It is not an isolated problem caused by extremism or fanaticism. As a result, “our policy must be to uproot the causes of terrorism by putting an end to... oppression of classes, nations, and ethnic communities” (Burton J. , 1997, p. 27).

### **5.2.9 Repression, Conflict, and Human Needs Theory**

Beijing has maintained the belief that liberal policies relating to Xinjiang have been a mistake and, as a result, have refused to negotiate with external parties or accommodate local demands (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 348). By framing the conflict as one concerning territorial integrity and national security, the CCP has internally justified their reliance on police measures, repression, and securitization rather than paying attention to social and economic needs. The focus on the indivisible unity of the nation has resulted in a neglect of understanding and addressing identity needs. Identifying the conflict as an issue of fundamentalism and terrorism rather than considering the needs for religious freedom have distanced Uyghurs and the state (Kanat, 2016, p. 213). This sentiment has also fuelled the belief that the solution to terrorism and violence is what Pape refers to as the *wholesale transformation* of Muslim societies (Pape, 2006, p. 3). It has also made it difficult for those within China to investigate the unrest from the perspective of grievances (Hillman, 2016, p. 6). These

pressures have led to social unrest and violence. Ultimately, existing means cannot successfully solve the conflict (Kanat, 2016, p. 214).

As stated by Burton, “the persistent response to conflict, violence, and anti-social behaviours, national and international, has been to try to contain them by punishment and by deterrent strategies. Even though it has for a long time been clear that this tactic fails, little attention has been given to the sources of these behaviours and to appropriate means of avoiding their occurrence” (Burton J. , 1997, p. 3). Repression, as in China, may briefly result in the reduction of opportunity for violence but remains an ineffective and counterintuitive means of combating violence and the causes behind it. Individuals and groups will often adopt innovations that allow them to circumvent existing models of repression (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 1). In the case of Xinjiang, the CCP’s indiscriminate oppression often targets the largely peaceful Uyghur population and eludes the actors whose violence the CCP aims to reduce or punish. As a result, indiscriminate repression fuels discontent among the Uyghur and potentially pushes more separatists and disenfranchised individuals into adopting violent tactics that can bypass repression (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 16). This repression of the Uyghur also intensifies the salience of their religious, cultural, and ethnic identity (Cunningham, 2012, p. 31).

#### **5.2.9.1 Religious Repression, Conflict, and Human Needs Theory in Xinjiang**

Despite this, the CCP seems committed to the continuation of religious repression. Tahir Hamut, an Uyghur poet and filmmaker, stated in 2018 that the CCP’s

top priority is to break our religious system as a whole. Why would they want to do this? Because to many people, religion is spiritual sustenance. It can bring them together and inspire them to fight for a common goal. It connects Uyghurs. But the Chinese government fears that we would use this religion as power and fight against Communist Party rule. (Vanderklippe, 2018b)

Uyghur religious belief deviates from the dominant national identity. But for many Uyghur, religion remains a “cohesive and nonnegotiable element of ethnic self-identification and cultural self-representation” (Terrone, 2016, p. 43). Religion has also become a “key marker of difference and resistance to an ethnically non-Uyghur and avowedly atheist state” (Clarke, 2015, p. 134). Further, religion has offered “an alternative to the sense of hopelessness engendered by their economic situation, one that offered the possibility of personal, and even national, salvation (Holdstock, 2015, p. 117). It is an essential aspect of their human needs for identity and cultural security.

China’s response is problematic as it has been demonstrated that religion is rarely the root cause of violence (Pape, 2006, p. 4). For states like China, where atheism is a core value of the administration, there is a belief that “[r]eligion must... be tamed by restricting its access to public power. The secular nation-state then appears as natural, corresponding to universal and timeless truth about the inherent dangers of religion” (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 3). As a result, governments in areas like Xinjiang remove religion from institutions, even though religious values are important to the population’s culture and identity. However, this produces a great degree of frustration and results in the deprivation of a variety of human needs.

### **5.2.9.2 Cultural Repression, Conflict, and Human Needs Theory in Xinjiang**

Regarding culture, Uyghurs feel they live in a society that does not reflect their culture or values (Primiano, 2013, p. 457). The strong assimilationist and integrationist policies in China have allowed the CCP to tighten its grip in the region but further alienates the Uyghurs (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 69). It is believed that the state is “waging a campaign of extermination against them (Pokalova, 2013, p. 285). To these individuals, it not is a separatist issue but rather an issue of the extinction of their culture (Cunningham, 2012, p. 19). Clarke discusses a fear of “cultural cleansing in the name of terrorism” and security (Clarke, 2018). He argues that China has characterized Uyghur identity as “an

almost biological threat to the health of Chinese society” (Clarke, 2018). These actions are all part of an effort by the CCP to “stifle unique, distinctive cultures that deviate from the CCP’s idealized, singular, national mold” (Grieboski, 2014). In general, the state’s various programs aimed at *nation-building* or *integration* have come into direct conflict with the identity of the Uyghur and created an increased perception of threat within the Uyghur community (Clarke, 2007, p. 325). As appropriately stated by Burton:

In practice, even when leaders and others avow integration, the dynamics of politics, supported by the classical idea of democracy, give rise to majority policies that make second-class-citizens of minorities. Elites of the majority or more powerful group are pressured to preserve their cultural values – for example, the use of the majority language as the official language. They take advantage of their majority or power role, and the legality that recognition gives them, to ensure that they are in full control. The more they exercise their authority to this end, the less it is respected by other ethnic communities, and the greater are the resistances, and the less is the legitimized status of authorities. The long-term goal may be an integrated and non-discriminatory society, but the coercive means employed in attaining this goal are likely to be destructive of it. (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 140)

Experts and theorists maintain this hypothesis, that the more the Chinese government continues its cultural repression, the more likely the development of unrest.

#### **5.2.10 The Effectiveness of Repression**

Ultimately, the means of repression used by the CCP have resulted in the further alienation of Uyghur society from the Chinese state (Kanat, 2016, p. 196). The fear of group and cultural extinction has activated the security need for the Uyghurs (Christie, 1997, p. 317). Regardless of the root causes or consequence of the conflict, China has maintained its policies of securitization. This has included denying any responsibility in the causes of unrest and blaming separatists, resulting in the rise of marginalization among Uyghurs (Kanat, 2016, p. 196). The CCP has maintained its policies of repression and securitization.

Offensive militarized and securitized action rarely works. It may disrupt operations and violence temporarily but it rarely ends the threat (Pape, 2006, p. 239). Burton argues that “[d]eterrent and coercive approaches do not lead to the discovery or removal of causes in conflict in the particular case, and do nothing to stop others occurring” (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 14). The pursuit of human needs as inherent human drives is more powerful than institutional or physical constraints (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 14). There are very few unambiguous cases where deterrence or repression have been successful, especially in protracted conflicts (Christie, 1997, p. 316). It is erroneous to believe that “social conflict is due to human deformities rather than to structural or institutional deformities, and can be controlled, therefore, by deterrents, constraints and coercion” (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 32). Combating terrorism and political violence, specifically designed to sidestep oppression, are solvable using humanitarian methods that provide a more constructive way to deal with dissent (Tschantret, 2016b, p. 2). Such methods allow for one to address the discontent and grievances at the root of the conflict.

### **5.3 Conflict Resolution and *Provention***

#### **5.3.1 The Role of Human Needs Theory in Conflict Resolution**

Security does not merely include physical security. It is complex and multifaceted. It needs to include other aspects such as development and conflict transformation (Sharoni & Welland, 2016, p. 6). This means structural violence must be understood and acknowledged as a cause of conflict and unrest. As in Xinjiang, incorrectly understanding and defining the causes of a conflict can lead to the adoption of procedures of conflict management and resolution that are inconsistent with the realities of the conflict. If a conflict caused by a need for identity and cultural security is defined as a conflict stemming from aggressiveness or even terrorism, effective resolution is not possible and the conflict will escalate and become protracted (Redekop, 2002, p. 26). In general, without the treatment of the causes of a conflict, John Burton argues that, “there can be no resolution of a particular conflict, let

alone prevention of such conflict in the future. In the absence of the treatment of causes there can be, at best, only containment” (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 5). This describes the current state of affairs in Xinjiang.

HNT, however, supports collaborative and multifaceted problem solving models and techniques in conflict resolution (Marker, 2003). It considers the complexity of human life and the “insistent nature of human needs” (Marker, 2003). It helps interested and invested parties to find and develop acceptable means to meet the needs of all parties concerned (Marker, 2003). Burton’s concept of *provention* concerns “the promotion of an environment conducive to harmonious relationships” (Steinmeyer, 2017, p. 20). Traditional power structures often do not adequately address these issues (Steinmeyer, 2017, p. 34). *Provention*, however, offers a means to do this.

There is a difference between needs and satisfiers that must be recognized for conflict resolution. Traditional conflict resolution and negotiation models often deal with satisfiers (Marker, 2003). Needs are universal and non-negotiable. Satisfiers or strategies are cultural, contextual, specific and negotiable. Needs are always compatible while strategies or satisfiers may not be. This suggests that all conflicts are resolvable, if the focus remains on human needs rather than strategies or satisfiers (KOK, 2008, p. 6). Using a human needs approach, conflict resolution no longer requires that one party’s gain results in the opposing party’s loss (Marker, 2003).

### **5.3.2 The Role of Communication and Dialogue in Conflict Resolution and *Provention***

Narratives and collective memory play an important role in identity, human needs, and conflict. A sense of victimhood caused by historical experiences of oppression, aggression or other traumatic events can sustain ethnic and sectarian violence (Volkan, Montville, & Julius, 1990, p. 163). Failure to address or acknowledge these grievances can result in this sense of victimhood passing from generation to generation, as part of the ethnic narrative (Volkan, Montville, & Julius, 1990, p. 167).

In terms of the Chinese government and Han society, feelings of shame surrounding past trauma can lead individuals to over-exaggerate current threats and desires for revenge (Wang Z. , 2008, p. 802). The impacts of the Opium Wars and the period of conflict that followed have contributed to this sentiment and feelings of victimization in Chinese society and government. This narrative has affected Chinese security policy. Rather than focusing on negotiation, compromise and succession, China has adopted a general policy of refusing to concede or compromise, especially when facing real or imagined threats. Individuals or nations with a sense of victimhood can be prone to feelings of entitlement or privilege (Bitzinger, 2016). These sentiments can potentially explain Chinese policy. When it comes to Xinjiang, this reaction is important to understand. While the area itself may seem relatively insignificant to China, to the CCP, “‘every inch’ of the motherland is sacred” and any challenge to power is a reminder of the nation’s *century of humiliation* (Browne, 2016). Furthermore, this narrative also informs China’s response to international intervention (Bitzinger, 2016). China’s political discourse national and internationally focus on the mentality of China as a victim of both hostile internal and external *predators* (Renwick & Cao, 1999, p. 112).

Since before 1949, the consequences of the resultant policies and actions in China have been embedded in the memory and narratives of Uyghurs. The repression they have faced is a large component of their collective memory, and therefore, identity. This memory and narrative sustains fear and mobilizes one into a defensive psychology. When this happens, persistent anger, perceptions of injustice, distrust and fear can result in ethnic or sectarian conflict. This also results in a resistance to traditional diplomacy that does not address the impact of trauma and memory (Montville, 2015, p. 39).

These factors work together to create a phenomenon of group think and an *us versus them mentality* (Grieboski, 2014). For the Chinese state, Uyghur nationalism is perceived as an “ethno-nationalist threat to the Chinese state” and therefore, Chinese identity (Grieboski, 2014). Because

Uyghur identity is predominantly grounded in the practice of Islam, China has and continues to take “draconian steps to smother Islam as a means of subordinating [Uyghur] national sentiment” (Grieboski, 2014). For the Uyghur, the CCP poses a threat to the survival of their culture and identity. As a result, this *us versus them dichotomy* is strengthened and makes resolution more complex.

With this in mind, presenting and acknowledging the needs, narratives and positions of all parties is necessary. Doing so results in an understanding of each other’s experiences and needs and, consequently, empathy. Empathy is essential to conflict resolution (KOK, 2008, p. 10). Parties in these types of conflict must listen to the minority voice, while being sympathetic and hearing what these marginalized groups truly have to say (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 78). Understanding the Uyghur populace at large and understanding the genuine negative effect of CCP policies and the deprivation of human needs in Xinjiang can strengthen the relationship between China and the Uyghur and therefore, discourage further violence (Cunningham, 2012, p. 39). It also allows the empowerment of the unempowered, the support of subnational identities and the treatment of non-state actors as legitimate. This results in the necessary change in the underlying balance of power for true and equitable dialogue that respects identity to occur, without violence (Cohen & Arnone, 1988, p. 188).

Building trust is also imperative for human needs-based conflict resolution. This includes fostering cooperation and deconstructing enemy imagery (KOK, 2008, p. 7). HNT emphasizes common humanity. As stated by KOK, “[i]n a world context where differences are accentuated, HNT attempts to unify human beings from different regions and cultures, creating a common understanding of who we are and how others need and feel the same way we do” (KOK, 2008, p. 7). Dehumanization of opposing parties prevents resolution from occurring. Parties must recognize their shared humanity for a turning point in peace processes to take place (KOK, 2008, p. 10).

There needs to be open channels for communication between the parties where problems and concerns can be voiced and demands discussed (Kanat, 2016, p. 215; Primiano, 2013, p. 458). Representative institutions can be responsible for alleviating some demands and needs of the Uyghur and can lead to a reduction in violence (Reinares, 2005, p. 129). Uyghur diaspora and organizations abroad can facilitate this process by addressing the crisis of confidence between the Uyghur people and the Chinese government. This can potentially serve as a starting point for dialogue between the parties (Kanat, 2016, p. 215). Ultimately, it is the responsibility of those in power to make means other than violence effective in achieving political change. This requires open channels of communication and representative institutions where grievances can be safely discussed and addressed (Held, 2004, p. 59). Individuals and groups need to have opportunities to wield power and influence the societies in which they live. One of the most effective way to reduce the appeal of terrorism is through allowing participation in the relevant political processes (Held, 2004, p. 69).

### **5.3.3 Challenging Structural Violence and the Deprivation of Human Needs through Restructuring**

Conflicts rooted in the deprivation of human needs also necessitate significant environmental and policy restructuring for resolution to take place (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 1). At a minimum, sustainable peace involves addressing the equal satisfaction of the human needs for security, identity, well-being, and self-determination (Christie, 1997, p. 329). Ultimately, Burton's concept of conflict *provention* requires the removal of all causal conditions that contribute to conflict and the promotion of an environment that is conducive to collaborative and cooperative relationships. This extends far beyond the scope of traditional conflict resolution (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 18).

The conceptions of *normal* and *abnormal* responses of people to their environments have traditionally informed understandings of conflicts like this and other forms of terrorism and political

violence (Burton J. , 1990c, p. 1). As a result, this led to “anti-human practices because there is no built-in guarantee that such development really aims at improving the conditions of human beings” (Galtung, 1990b, p. 302). The remedy for this was never to change societal institutions (Burton J. , 1990c, p. 1). *Provention* requires addressing social problems and the alternation of the environment that leads to conflict. It also stresses the importance of the creation of an environment that mitigates conflict (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 18). Social norms and institutions must adapt to human aspirations and needs, not the other way around (Lebovic, 2013, p. 13).

#### **5.3.4 Resolutions Informed by Human Needs Theory**

In HNT, there is no compromise. A compromise implies loss on either side, which makes it unlikely to find a long-term solution that satisfies human needs (Danielsen, 2005, p. 15). With HNT, it is possible to find a win-win solution where all individuals’ needs are met. These types of resolution require time, creativity, and energy but no compromise is necessary. When there is an implied loss, peace may not be as stable and durable as one would hope for. HNT offers the opportunity for a stable and sustainable resolution and positive peace rather than just conflict management (KOK, 2008, p. 10). Prioritizing the satisfaction of human needs is more likely to result in durable solutions that will be perceived as moral and just (Kelman, 1990, p. 284). Rather than achieving some immediate gains, *provention* and conflict resolution look to the future to prevent and resolve conflict rather than just settle or manage it (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 55).

In general, HNT is widely applicable. It provides sustainable solutions that focus on the root causes of conflicts. It promotes understanding from the basis of our common humanity. It also highlights the distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable issues in a conflict (KOK, 2008, p. 8). It provides a means to begin to create positive peace.

### 5.3.5 Conflict Resolution and *Provention* in Xinjiang

China's current approach to the conflict in Xinjiang is ineffective. It has centred around concerns of territorial integrity, national security and cultural uniformity (Kanat, 2016, p. 213). In general, there has been "an unwillingness even to consider the possibility that the problems faced by Xinjiang are internal and have evolved over decades or even centuries, and that it is the dire situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang that lies at the root of the conflict" (Dillon, 2014, p. xviii). Policies need to be put into place that address the grievances and deprivation of the Uyghurs. This includes allowing religious freedoms, ending the demolishing of Uyghur homes, cultural centres, and places of worship, providing opportunity, allowing the use of Uyghur language, and limiting Han migration into the area (Primiano, 2013, p. 469). Ethno-cultural diversity needs to be part of the CCP's national vision (Clarke, 2010, p. 227). These policies would help to reduce unrest (Primiano, 2013, p. 469). Policies that address structural violence, human rights abuses and the deprivation of human needs reduce the likelihood of unrest and conflict.

In the case of Xinjiang, some perceive the goal as separation. Cultural identity and security needs suggest the necessity of a separate entity of cultural groups. This implies that to provide for the cultural security and political participation of minority groups, separate political entities should be established. However, this does not require separate nation states (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 142). If China were to grant true and full autonomous region status to Xinjiang, as stipulated in the laws on regional autonomy<sup>17</sup>, this may help to curb some of the discontent in the region and address the human needs of the population. This has been done in Hong Kong and Macau with some degree of success. In these cases, there is a policy of "one China, two systems" (Garcia, 2016, p. 292). This would allow Xinjiang to have true control over their political, legal, and economic policies and affairs while the government

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<sup>17</sup> These laws are outlined in Chapter 3, Sections 3.2.2 Autonomous Regions in China and 3.2.3 Autonomy in Xinjiang

retains control over foreign policy. China remains apprehensive about such a policy due the fear of emboldening separatist groups. Nevertheless, it may prove to be the best solution and the best means to address human needs (Garcia, 2016, p. 292). Because, despite the CCP's efforts to curb unrest through repression, the Uyghurs have not caved to the CCP's demands. Therefore, the current method of governing the province through repression is not viable (Primiano, 2013, p. 469). Burton's methods and theories provide the means to transform the conflict and Chinese society. They provide for the treatment of structural violence and the creation of positive peace, resulting in human fulfillment and development.

## Chapter 6: Conclusions: Implications and Directives for Further Research

### 6.1 Conclusions

The objectives of this thesis have been to explain the conflict in Xinjiang and to find an effective and just way of addressing the threat of violence. It has demonstrated that the Chinese government's approach is ineffective and counterproductive. The policies implemented in Xinjiang since the province was integrated into the nation have resulted in repression that has become embedded in the historical consciousness of the Uyghur, which may result in intergenerational trauma. For decades, these policies and practices have demonstrated to the Uyghur that they are second-class citizens in China and that their values, beliefs, culture and religion are not respected. Their grievances and concerns are not recognized and any dissent is met with swift and heavy repression. Clarke summarizes the situation in Xinjiang impeccably by stating that:

[t]he core issue for Beijing is that it has created a self-fulfilling prophecy in relation to Uyghur terrorism. It has not only sustained a decades-long and tightly-controlled state-building agenda in Xinjiang that has generated Uyghur discontent but also coupled this, since 9/11, with a pervasive securitization of ethnic identity through its discourse on the 'three evils' of 'separatism, terrorism and extremism'. The former has prompted increased alienation among the Uyghur population, compelling some to seek a better life beyond Xinjiang and others to become radicalized. Both of these developments have in turn provided further justification for hard-line responses by Beijing, completing the vicious circle of the Chinese national security state. (Clarke, 2016)

In doing so, the Chinese government has not only failed to address the human rights, human needs and grievances of the Uyghur but has demonstrated a lack of concern and empathy for the Uyghur, their identity, and their culture.

By continuing to institute and practice policies that actively deprive the Uyghurs of their human needs and that can be likened to cultural genocide, the government has sustained and prolonged this

conflict. Therefore, this conflict has arisen and continues because of the Chinese government's historical and continued deprivation and devaluation of the human needs of the Uyghur. Their current policies, especially related to counterterrorism and the framing of Uyghur dissent as terrorism or terrorist activities has allowed the government to justify and resume this deprivation.

Even if Uyghur dissent can be characterized as terrorism, the resolution and prevention of terrorism requires an understanding of the root causes of terrorism. This includes an understanding of the logic of terrorism and the desperation that leads an individual to carry out such acts of violence (Pape, 2006, p. 7). Terrorism results from frustrations over essential human needs; a feeling of powerlessness; and Uyghur perception of a significant threat to their Muslim faith, considered central to the uniqueness to their identity. Without political power to address the suffering that they face and to end the oppression or the power to fulfill their own needs, frustration grows. This thesis has demonstrated that this process and all the resultant frustration and powerlessness leads to political violence and terrorism. HNT and Burton's analysis of terrorism and deviance allows one to understand and determine this.

HNT exposes these broad, entrenched patterns of structural violence and structures of dominance and oppression. It illuminates how this has resulted in conflict in Xinjiang and how some Uyghurs may have justified their turn to terrorism. Moreover, it allows theorists and practitioners to recognize the need for structural change and equitable peaceful relationships. Successful peace must involve the absence of all forms of violence, including structural and cultural violence. Justice and equality are important elements of any successful peace process. Nevertheless, the definition of peace reflects the political position and perceptions of the group who defines it and the sociopolitical context in which it evolves. Different definitions of peace reveal different degrees of commitment to social and political change or the maintenance of the status quo (Sharoni & Welland, 2016, p. 6). For resolution to

occur, the Chinese government must commit to changing their definition of peace from conflict management to conflict resolution and *provention*. HNT provides a guide for doing this and allows for the beginning of change and the creation of positive peace.

HNT has not yet been applied to this case. Nonetheless, it offers a robust understanding of the conflict, its root causes and the concerns of the parties involved. It offers a mean to explain violence and the evolution of terrorism in the region. It provides a coherent and pragmatic set of recommendations that can be proposed and implemented.

To respond to what William Zartman refers to as the “legacy of bitterness that hampers [contemporary] conflict resolution,” it is imperative to develop and institutionalize methods of conflict resolution and prevention that respond to the full range of psycho-political and socioeconomic communal needs (Gawerc, 2006, p. 438). This will aid in the resolution of structural violence. This thesis has demonstrated that applying HNT in Xinjiang can help to resolve these issues.

## **6.2 Limitations**

There are some limitations in the application of HNT. First, identifying the needs of conflicting parties can be difficult. Knowing if these needs and the strategies to address them will be accurate and effective is challenging (KOK, 2008, p. 8). There is a very long list of needs and identifying needs and prioritizing them is highly subjective (Vayrynen, 2001, p. 32). It is difficult to know which needs are the most important. Power dynamics come into play when the question of who decides the importance of needs is raised (KOK, 2008, p. 8). It is also hard to know objectively when needs are satisfied or to which degree they are satisfied. Without further research and empirical evidence to support needs theory, the list of human needs may remain inconclusive (Vayrynen, 2001, p. 32).

HNT can appear idealistic and unrealistic in its application. However, Burton argues that the mechanisms of managing conflicts are often repressive rather than investigatory or problem-solving. These mechanisms have remained part of a long-standing tradition that had origins in past authoritative systems of governance. This has been demonstrated to be the case in China. Theories must be politically realistic but to be successful but they should address the needs and grievances of the concerned parties. According to Burton this means that governments either must fall in line with the long-standing tradition of repression and coercion that has been proven not to address the root causes of conflict or offer an alternative that works for members of society (Burton J. , 1990b, p. 69). HNT offers an alternative that can be meaningful for all members of society. Addressing human needs may be lofty to achieve and challenging, but the benefits are overwhelming and can significantly benefit the realization of conflict resolution processes that respond to the needs of many, especially the disenfranchised.

In terms of China, the Chinese state and CCP are powerful. The state has a vested interest in maintaining its position in Xinjiang. Without support inside and outside China, the Uyghur may face extreme difficulty in addressing their needs (Mackerras, 2014, p. 249). The likelihood of major changes in China's ethnic policies are unclear. China's ethnic relations, overall, are not in crisis. Ethnic contradictions and conflict do not pose a significant threat to the political and social stability of the PRC as a whole. From a macro perspective, the unrest in Xinjiang is anomalous and it is unclear whether this unrest will trigger a major shift in ethnic policies (Hillman, 2016, p. 11). Therefore, it needs to be demonstrated to China that it is within their self-interest to change the policies in Xinjiang. Addressing human needs can calm the unrest in the region (Primiano, 2013, p. 469). There are many means of doing this. For example, once the Uyghurs feel embraced and are allowed freedoms, the Chinese state

will no longer need to invest so much in controlling its periphery, or in homeland security and defense (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 78).

The current exposure regarding the re-education camps in Xinjiang offer an opportunity to do this. The camps have gained international attention but have been met with little international response (The Guardian, 2018). Foreign governments have done little to push back against China's worsening human rights record (Human Rights Watch, 2017b, p. 137). As a result, China has had little incentive to moderate its course or actions (The Guardian, 2018). Furthermore, China may not see any significant political cost to its actions in Xinjiang (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Awareness of the situation in Xinjiang and the crimes and repression that occurs there has only begun to attract the level of attention "demanded by their severity" (Caster, 2018). However, this offers an opportunity to begin international pressure to change the situation in Xinjiang and realize the benefits of structural and macro-level change in the region (The Guardian, 2018). With China's growing global influence, its human rights violations now have international implications (Human Rights Watch, 2017b, p. 137). While the Chinese government may not appear concerned about its human rights record, it does not want to be an outlier within the international community (Vanderklippe, 2018a). This means the government may be more susceptible to international pressure.

### **6.3 Further Research**

Despite China's growing international engagement and power, it remains a private and non-transparent nation. Research in China and Xinjiang is challenging due to the nature of the government. Further research into the situation in Xinjiang and other regions with ethnic minorities is needed. The international community must understand what is occurring there. Furthermore, the explicit effects of Chinese repression and policies should be quantified and researched to a greater extent. This would

provide more insight into what is occurring there and how to apply concrete policies to tackle the conflict.

Counterterrorism is an ever-growing field as less traditional conflicts are taking place and terrorism and non-traditional forms of combat are rising. Conflict Studies could benefit from integrating this into research. Moreover, counterterrorism, security and military studies could also appreciate the benefits of conflict studies and its associated theories, like HNT. Failure to do so is detrimental to the understanding of terrorism, conflict and the resolution. Theories like HNT can illuminate effective and just counterterrorism measures that promote conflict resolution and positive peace.<sup>18</sup> Further research must be conducted to understand how to better integrate these fields and foster cooperation. This includes cooperation between researchers and policy makers to make sure these approaches can be applied at the local level.

More research needs to be completed regarding HNT. This includes exploring the validity, applicability, and usefulness of HNT in current violent conflicts (KOK, 2008, p. 8). Doing so will demonstrate the profound value of the theory and allow for its increased applicability in real world contexts. It will also demonstrate the theory's validity to policy makers. This could have immense effects on the nature of conflict management, cessation, resolution, and reconciliation.

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<sup>18</sup> Johan Galtung and Paul Lederach's concept of conflict transformation is not included in this thesis. However, the values and goals of conflict transformation are similar to John Burton's concept of *provention* and the desire to change the underlying structures that contribute to violence and conflict. This would be an interesting area for further research as HNT could provide a valuable addition to this concept and a potential means to assist in conflict transformation.

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**APPENDICES**

**Appendix I: HAVVA KOK’S Summary of Various Theorists’ Lists of Human Needs (KOK, 2008)**

<b>Maslow</b>	<b>Burton</b>	<b>Rosenberg</b>	<b>Max Neef</b>
Food, water, shelter (1)	Distributive justice	Physical Nurturance	Subsistence
Safety and security (2)	Safety, Security	Interdependence	Protection
Belonging or love (3)	Belongingness	Love Integrity	Affection
Self-esteem (4)	Self-esteem	Autonomy	Understanding
Personal fulfilment (5)	Personal fulfilment	Play	Creation
	Identity	Celebration and mourning	Identity
	Cultural security	Spiritual Communion	Leisure, Idleness
	Freedom		Freedom
	Participation		Participation

(KOK, 2008, pp. 5-6)

## Appendix II: Johan Galtung's List of Human Needs

	<i>Satisfiers held to be relevant in some societies</i>
<b>Security needs</b> (survival needs – to avoid violence)	
- Against individual violence (assault, torture)	<i>Police</i>
- Against collective violence (wars, internal, external)	<i>Military</i>
<b>Welfare needs</b> (sufficiency needs) – to avoid misery	
- For nutrition, water, air, sleep	<i>Food, water, air</i>
- For movement, excretion	<i>Physical freedom</i>
- For protection against climate, environment	<i>Clothes, shelter</i>
- For protection against disease	<i>Medical treatment</i>
- For protection against excessive strain	<i>Labour-saving devices</i>
- For self-expression, dialogue, education	<i>Schooling</i>
<b>Identity needs</b> (needs for closeness) – to avoid alienation	
- For self-expression, creativity, praxis, work	<i>Jobs</i>
- For self-actuation, for realizing potentials	<i>Jobs and leisure</i>
- For wellbeing, happiness, joy	<i>Recreation, family</i>
- For being active and subject; not being passive, client, object	<i>Recreation, family</i>
- For challenge and new experiences	<i>Recreation</i>
- For affection, love, sex; friends, spouse, offspring	<i>Primary groups</i>
- For roots, belongingness, support, esteem: association with similar humans	<i>Secondary groups</i>
- For understanding social forces; for social transparence	<i>Political activity</i>
- For partnership with nature	<i>Natural Parks</i>
- For a sense of purpose, of meaning with life; closeness to the transcendental, transpersonal	<i>Religion, ideology</i>
<b>Freedom needs</b> (freedom to; choice, option) – to avoid repression	
- Choice in receiving and expressing information and opinion	<i>Communication</i>
- Choice of people and places to visit and be visited	<i>Transportation</i>
- Choice in consciousness formation	<i>Meetings, media</i>
- Choice in mobilization	<i>Organizations, parties</i>
- Choice in confrontations	<i>Elections</i>
- Choice of occupation	<i>Labour market</i>
- Choice of place to live	<i>?</i>
- Choice of spouse	<i>Marriage market</i>
- Choice of goods and services	<i>(Super-) market</i>
- Choice of way of life	<i>?</i>

(Galtung, 1990b, p. 309)

### Appendix III: Katrin Gillwald's List of Human Needs

Classification of needs according to categories of satisfiers that mainly satisfy them		Personal	Extrapersonal			
Classification of needs according to categories of needs		A) Psychosomatic or intrahuman	B) Psychosocial or interhuman	C) Psychoecological or extrahuman		
VI. Existence  XI. Coexistence  XVI. Growth  XXI. Perfection	III. Subsistence	I. Maintenance	a) Nutrition, rest, exercise	b) Earning work, reproduction, social habitability	c) Shelter, clothing, physical habitability	
		II. Protection	a) Prevention, cure, defense	b) Prevention, restitution, defense	c) Prevention, restitution, defense	
	V. Security	IV. Love	a) Belief in one self, self-love, identity	b) Friendship, sexual and family love	c) Rooting, attachment	
		VIII. Belongingness	VII. Understanding	a) Psycholization, introspection, study	b) Socialization, education, information, observation	c) Habitization, observation
	X. Dignity	XIII. Development	IX. Autonomous Participation	a) Liberty, independence, autonomy	b) Autonomous participation in decisions	c) Autonomous participation in management
			XV. Renewal	XII. Recreation	a) Self-recreation	b) Social recreation
	XVIII. Transcendence	XX. Maturity	XIV. Creation	a) Creation by oneself	b) Creation of social environments	c) Creation of habitational environments
			XVII. Meaning	a) Self-realization	b) Historical, prospective and religious meaning	c) <i>Weltanschauung</i>
			XIX. Synergy	a) Authenticity, equanimity, security, humility	b) Solidarity, justice, altruism, generosity, responsibility	c) Beauty, ecological equilibrium

(Gillwald, 1990, p. 118)