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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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Melanie Klein's Psychoanalytic Approach:
Its Historical Foundations
Brian C. Regan

Thesis presented to the School of Graduate
Studies of the University of Ottawa as
partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Ph.D. in Psychology.

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Curriculum Studiorum

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1. Abstract	444

Melanie Klein was a famous psychoanalyst whose theoretical and clinical work spanned almost four decades of the history of psychoanalysis. During that time, she developed her own ideas about psychoanalysis and man. Unfortunately, no one to date has ever presented in a detailed fashion Melanie Klein's concept of man. For this reason and also because Klein's work represents an important and influential school of thought in the psychoanalytic community of Great Britain and many European and South American countries, I have decided to present her image of man. It also is the purpose of this study to demonstrate the originality of Klein's thinking and besides presenting her concept of man, to illustrate the historical foundations of both. Therefore, the aim of this work is not only to illustrate the uniqueness of Melanie Klein's views but also to establish her place in the history of ideas.

The first four chapters of this work are designed to introduce Melanie Klein and her work to the reader. Following a short biography of Klein, The thesis proceeds to a presentation of her main theoretical tenets and then to a comparison of her ideas with those of classical psychoanalysis. This brings us to the fourth chapter which is an attempt to present a summary of the major criticisms that have been voiced against Kleinian theory, technique, and even Melanie Klein's style of writing. Not only have the major criticisms been summarized but so also have many of the responses of Klein and her followers to

these charges been outlined. I have also included in this chapter remarks of my own which I hope will help the reader to see some of the criticisms and refutations in a clear light.

Chapters five and six form the core of the dissertation. In these chapters I have tried to set forth Melanie Klein's concepts and views of psychoanalysis and of man and to demonstrate the historical links between many of her ideas and those of past thinkers. In chapter five a broad range of topics dealing specifically with Kleinian psychoanalytic theory are discussed and where applicable their historical roots are outlined. Then in chapter six Melanie Klein's concept of man is presented at first in a very general way and then it is examined in respect to those issues which represent the fundamentals of Klein's image of man.

The thesis then concludes with a brief look at the impact that Kleinian thought has had on psychoanalysis in particular and on other areas of life in general. Klein's influence on both has not ended with her death because several of her colleagues have continued her work and many of their contributions are also presented here. Chapter eight presents both a summary of the thesis and a statement of the conclusions that have been derived from this work.

An historical-doxographical method was chosen as an appropriate method for this research. Briefly, it consists of a comparative analysis and also an interpretation

of the development of the opinions and ideas of an author and the influence both received and transmitted by that author. This method involves the compiling of ideas of past thinkers about the nature of man and commenting on their relevance as precedents for Melanie Klein's image of man. This historical relativism of these precedents refers to their past relevance or usefulness for gaining an understanding of the author and is not meant to imply proof that Klein's image of man and her brand of psychoanalysis are unique or the only valid scientific approach for conceiving of or treating mankind. It should be emphasized in addition, that Klein's psychoanalytic approach focuses upon the intrapsychic processes of the individual rather than the dynamics of social reality.

Chapter I

The Life of Melanie Klein

Since I personally never had the privilege of knowing Melanie Klein, I have had to rely mainly on the written reports of others in order to compose her biography. The main sources for this chapter were Balint (1952); Bion, Rosenfeld, and Segal (1961); Hoffer (1961); Lindon (1972); Main (1961); Segal (1961, 1979), and a communication from Melanie Klein's son Eric. In the process of compiling this biography, I have come across several discrepancies in the facts as reported by other authors. I will point these out from time to time during the biography.

Both of Melanie Klein's parents demonstrated a sense of personal independence and a resistance to follow the conventional patterns of the times. Her father, Dr. Moriz Reizes, was an orthodox Jew who came from a family where his parents not only planned for their son to become a Rabbi but also betrothed and wed him to someone he didn't even know prior to his wedding. Due, however, to his independent spirit, he managed, at the age of 37, to break away from his strict orthodox background and to obtain an academic education. He also ended the marriage which had been arranged for him. His educational interests led him to study medicine and finally to become a doctor. When he was 44 years of age,

he married a woman of 25 named Libussa Deutsch. Their marriage was a very harmonious one. The couple had four children, Melanie being their youngest. Unfortunately, Dr. Reizes was not a very successful physician but his new wife was a very strong and resourceful person. She opened a shop which sold exotic plants and animals in order to supplement her husband's income and to provide the extra money needed for her children to have a good education. When Melanie Klein was born on March 30 1882, her father was over 50 years of age and perhaps this contributed to the fact that they were never very close. However, she greatly admired his scientific attitudes, his independence, and his intellectual achievements. He not only read extensively but he also taught himself 10 European languages. The family's financial circumstances improved substantially when Melanie was about five years of age. Her father inherited some money which provided him with the opportunity of buying a dental practice in which he proved to be more successful. Then when Melanie was 18 her father died.

Melanie had a warm and close relationship with her mother, who as well as being beautiful, had a keen mind and a great thirst for knowledge. Although Libussa also came from a rabbinical family, her parents were very different from her husband's. They were well versed both in philosophy and the humanities and their attitude was more enlightened and liberal. Klein's mother was not a devout

1
orthodox Jew but she did go to the synagogue once a year and observe the yearly fast. During the last few years of her life she came to live with her daughter Melanie, who it is reported was experiencing an unhappy period of her life and who found great comfort in having her mother with her. Melanie's mother's death in 1914 was preceded by a lengthy period of illness. Her mother approached her forthcoming death with serenity and courage and this made a lasting impression on her daughter. During this year Klein was faced with two very important and emotionally charged events, the death of her mother and the birth of her son Eric. This indeed must have been a stressful time in Melanie's life.

Possibly as a reflection of her mother's own upbringing, Melanie's was both liberal and easy-going. She was not a religious person. Actually, her only serious encounter with religion was through a close relationship she had with a Roman Catholic governess whom she was very fond of. For a time she had contemplated the idea of becoming a Catholic but she realized the pain this decision would cause her parents so she abandoned the idea. Although she was aware of her Jewish background and even professed to liking some of that religion's traditions, she was nonetheless an atheist and even took steps to insure that no religious services would be held at her funeral.

Melanie had three older siblings, Emilie was six years

older, Emmanuel was five, and Sidonie was four years her senior. Even as a child death was no stranger to Melanie. Her ~~sister~~ Sidonie, of whom Melanie was very fond, died at the age of nine when Melanie was only five years old. It was Sidonie who started Melanie on her early education. Sidonie was bedridden for a year before her death and she spent a great deal of that time imparting her knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic to her younger sister. Melanie looked upon this as a great trust and to please her sister she worked very hard acquiring these skills.

Fortunately, Melanie also had a brother five years her senior who developed a loving relationship with her. He was a very intelligent and gifted boy who fostered an interest in literature, art, and music in Melanie. He sensed her potentialities and under his auspices she developed a passion for literature and music. This relationship as well was destined to end in death. While abroad Emmanuel died suddenly. There is however some discrepancy as to Melanie's age and status at the time of her brother's death. Lindon (1972) says that she was 20 years old and therefore unmarried and Segal (1979) mentions that Melanie was married, pregnant, and living in Silesia at the time. This then would make her at least 21 years old because she was married at 21 and after her marriage, according to Segal, first lived in Slovakia before moving to Silesia. Furthermore, Segal (1979) also mentions that she believes that the death of Klein's two

siblings, Sidonie and Emmanuel significantly contributed to a "lasting streak of depression which was part of Melanie's personality" (p.30).

At 14 Melanie decided to study medicine and with her brother's help and encouragement she passed the entrance examination to the Vienna Gymnasium, the only girl's preparatory school for university. She matriculated at the age of 17 and according to Bion, Rosenfeld, and Segal (1961) and Lindon (1972) she became engaged shortly thereafter. Segal (1979) however states that Klein was 19 at the time of her engagement and Melanie's son, Eric, although not certain, is inclined to agree with Segal. Since Melanie's father died when she was 18, it is interesting to note that she either became engaged at a time just before her father's death or shortly thereafter, depending on whose account is correct. However, regardless of Melanie's age, her engagement and subsequent marriage at age 21 to Arthur Klein, an industrial engineer and friend of her brother, did result in a change in her educational plans. She attended the University of Vienna but studied art and history instead of medicine and never obtained a degree. Melanie did however keep her interest in medicine and is reported to have experienced regret at not having studied this subject.

Following their marriage, the Kleins moved to a small town in Slovakia and later to one in Silesia. Melanie had

three children, Melitta, Hans, and Eric and they were born in 1904, 1907, and 1914 respectively. Segal (1979) has incorrectly listed Hans as the first born instead of Melitta and has stated that she was born in 1910 not 1904. The years in these small towns were an unhappy period in Melanie's life partly because of problems in her marriage and also because she longed for the intellectual circle and stimulation she had left behind in Vienna. Then in 1910, the Kleins moved to Budapest and Melanie was able to re-experience the intellectual stimulation she had been craving. It was here that Melanie came across Sigmund Freud's book dealing with dreams and she became immediately interested in psychoanalysis. This interest and the awareness of her own depressive streak prompted her to seek out Sandor Ferenczi (1873-1933) in 1916 to analyze her. After a few years of psychoanalysis, Ferenczi recognized, through Klein's treatment of a relative's child, her potential talent in the field. He encouraged her to work in this new area of child therapy. Melanie Klein credited Ferenczi's remarkable rapport with children and his strong and direct feeling for the unconscious to have a lasting influence on her.

Segal (1979) reports that Klein met Freud (1856-1939) for the first time in 1917 at a psychoanalytic meeting between the Austrian and Hungarian Societies. Lindon (1972) and Main (1961) disagree with Segal and state that the first meeting between Freud and Klein took place three years later

at the Congress at the Hague in 1920. However, it was in Budapest in 1919 that she presented her first paper to the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society. "The Development of a Child" published in 1921, is an expanded version of that paper and her first published work. As a result of meeting and impressing Karl Abraham (1877-1925) with her ability at the Hague Congress, he asked her to come and practice child psychotherapy in Berlin. Klein moved to Berlin in January 1921 but unlike Lindon (1972) and Main (1961) who report Klein separated from her husband at this time, Segal (1979) points out that the separation took place in 1919 and that Klein spent the next year with her parents-in-law in Slovakia. These authors also disagree over the date of the divorce between Arthur and Melanie. Lindon and Main state that it occurred in 1923 and Segal gives the date as 1922. Melanie was never to remarry, although she did have one very important and longlasting relationship of which little is known.

When she arrived in Berlin she began working at the Berlin Psychoanalytical Institute that had just opened a year before her arrival. Melanie Klein was the first child therapist at this institute. It was with her first patient, a five year old boy, that Melanie initiated the development of her psychoanalytic play technique. She recognized that her young patient expressed his phantasies and anxieties principally in playing with his toys. During the next five years, she developed the foundations of her technique. But

these years were not without hardships and turbulence. It was her findings about the horrifying and unrealistic nature of her young patients' phantasies that led her to controversy and dissension with many of her colleagues. They often found it difficult to accept her contention that child psychoanalysis was possible without any educative or reassuring concomitants such as providing sex education or reassuring remarks to children. Furthermore, in Vienna, Anna Freud's findings were not supportive of Klein's work and a good deal of controversy arose as a result. Through this time, she courageously stood up to even very harsh personal attacks. It was Karl Abraham who supported her through this trying time. He was able to understand both from a practical and theoretical position the importance and potential of child psychotherapy. In 1924, at Wurzburg, during the First Conference of German Psychoanalysts, he summed up Klein's paper by saying "the future of psychoanalysis lies in play analysis" (M.Klein, Heimann, and Money-Kyrle, 1955, p.xii).

Despite Abraham's reluctance about engaging in psychoanalytic relationships in the small Berlin Psychoanalytic Society, Klein was able to persuade him to treat her. Her treatment continued until his untimely death either 9 (Segal, 1979) or 14 (Lindon, 1972) months later. He made a strong and lasting impression on her and she had the deepest admiration for her teacher and psychoanalyst. She continued a daily self analysis after his death. Ernest Jones (1879-1958) recognizing Klein's outstanding talent invited her to

give a course of lectures in London during the summer of 1925. Finding the atmosphere in Berlin oppressive with the growing anti-Semitism and her work constantly assailed by colleagues, she accepted and later moved in 1926 to England where she lived first in Felixstowe and then in London with her son Eric. Her daughter Melitta and her husband Dr. Walter Schmideberg also moved to London six years later in 1932. Hans remained in Berlin where he worked as an engineer. Since there were a number of British psychoanalysts eager to learn child analysis from her, Klein undertook the supervision of their child cases. Three psychoanalysts particularly receptive to her ideas were Edward Glover, Susan Isaacs, and Joan Riviere. It was not until the early 1930's that Klein began to psychoanalyze adults and also to develop her technique of adult analysis which was mainly derived from her findings about the earliest internal anxieties.

Unfortunately, while her professional life continued to flourish, her private life was to be marked once again with tragedy. Bion, Rosenfeld, and Segal (1961) and Lindon (1972) report that Klein's eldest son Hans died at the age of 27 in the spring of 1934 in a mountaineering accident. Her youngest son Eric however, states that it was a year earlier in 1933 in the Tatra Mountains of Slovakia that his brother died. Hans thus would also only be 26 at the time. The Tatra Mountains were the same ones in which Melanie Klein had spent the Christmas of 1920 prior to coming to Berlin to work with Abraham. In addition, her daughter Melitta studied

medicine and like her mother became a psychoanalyst. When they were in Berlin, they jointly studied and became familiar with the methods of psychoanalytic pioneers. In later years, this harmonious situation disappeared when their opinions differed and an estrangement resulted.

It was with her son Eric that Melanie Klein found a rewarding and happy relationship. Eric married, had three children, and resided in London. After he joined the army in 1939, Klein left London to accompany her daughter-in-law Judy and her grandson Michael to Cambridge for a few months before the trio went to Pitlochry in Scotland where Klein stayed for just over a year. It was here that she psychoanalyzed Richard, a well-known case of Klein's. She was devoted to her grandchildren and found much joy through them. Her friends and pupils provided her with a lasting pleasure and in later years she derived great enjoyment from art.

It was during the 1930's that Klein wrote prolifically elaborating on her earlier concepts. She was occupied with the appearance of the Oedipus complex and the superego in infancy and subsequently, she developed her concept of the depressive position and began work in the area of psychotic processes.

Her findings about fluctuation of mood, caused by immediate introjection and projection processes, created controversy because it was out of line with the views of other psychoanalysts. In addition, many Viennese psychoanalysts began to seek asylum in London in the late 1930's

in order to escape the threat of Hitler. With their arrival came a more intense opposition to Klein's views. Their work with ego psychology led them to different findings about the child's capacity for early experience.

During the next decade, Melanie Klein lost the support of many of her British colleagues who had originally been so receptive to her ideas. It was at this point that a group of her pupils united around her and became known as "Kleinians". Thus, this group could work with her concepts and support one another while at the same time avoiding constant controversy. Although the nature of the controversy was highly emotional and personal, Klein confined her defense to the theoretical criticisms of her work. She was however, very outspoken in the criticism and uncompromising when it came to her work.

Melanie Klein, through the psychoanalysis of young children sought to confirm Freud's theories by direct evidence and to extend the knowledge about childhood and infancy. She considered herself a strict follower of Freud and was said to be a little bewildered and hurt by his coolness towards her work, as evidenced by his only referring to her in three very brief footnotes in the entire corpus of his writings. Shortly before World War II, a group within the British Psychoanalytic Society was formed to foster understanding between its members but with the outbreak of the war, many members left London. Several bitter disagreements about Melanie Klein's work led to a series of papers being presented at the British Psychoanalytic Society on opposing views. These papers did little to shorten the gap

of misunderstanding and helped to lead to a very deep schism. The Kleinian school trains psychoanalysts who practice in England; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, France, Italy and Spain, as yet they do not have a substantial following in the United States.

Melanie Klein excelled as a teacher who did not insist on Kleinian interpretations but instead emphasized transference interpretations at every stage of psychoanalysis. Her ability and perceptiveness made it possible for non-Kleinian students to profit from her perception of deep transference material. Although Melanie Klein treated her last child patient in the late 1940's, she kept close touch with this work through the supervision of many students who practiced her technique. To teach and psychoanalyze became her major function in later years. Writing also remained a major occupation, with Envy and Gratitude being written four years before her death and Narrative of a Child Analysis just prior to her demise. She died at 78 years of age while preparing a paper for the Edinburgh Psychoanalytic Congress.

It was during the last ten years of her life that Klein came to rely on her students for support as her own generation was thinning out. She was a woman of astounding vitality and also very feminine. She enjoyed life to the fullest. She is reported to have displayed amazing sensitivity, enthusiasm, and fortitude throughout her life. Klein sought peace from the controversy that surrounded her through the companion-

ship of friends and students. In 1959, she joyfully accepted a North American lecture series but was prohibited from travelling by her doctor.

The close of the summer term in 1960 was the beginning of the end for Melanie Klein. At first, she felt very exhausted and unwell but her physician felt it was probably due to her working too hard and being so active. Accompanied by her grandson Michael, she went on a vacation. She spent a few weeks in Switzerland in the company of her friend and pupil Mrs. Esther Bick. Unfortunately, she continued to get weaker and finally she suffered a severe haemorrhage. When she returned to London she was found to have an operable cancer so she was admitted to University College Hospital. Following the successful removal of a growing malignancy, she died suddenly a few days later of a pulmonary embolus on September 22, 1960 in London.

Chapter II

The Main Tenets of Klein's Psychoanalytic Theory

The fundamental purpose of this chapter is to present and explain in detail the main tenets of Melanie Klein's theory. Some of the concepts that will be discussed here originate specifically from Kleinian theory (i.e. the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, projective identification, and reparation). Others (i.e. envy, introjection, projection, introjective identification, the super-ego, and the Oedipus complex) while already familiar to psychoanalytic theory, have been approached from a new perspective and their meanings have been further expanded and their influence on the process of human development has been emphasized to a much greater degree. I will now proceed to outline each of the above concepts in greater detail.

The Paranoid-Schizoid Position

Prior to outlining Klein's concept of the paranoid-schizoid position, it is essential to first grasp the significance of her choice of the word "position". It is probably best here to refer to Melanie Klein's own statement on this matter.

I chose the term "position" in regard to the paranoid and depressive phases because these groupings of anxieties and defences, although arising first during the earliest

stages, are not restricted to them but occur and recur during the first years of childhood and under certain circumstances in later life. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.93) (1952)

The term position implies something more complex but with less rigid boundaries than a phase or stage in libidinal development. It represents a specific grouping of anxieties and defences which are characterized by particular types of object-relations. Moreover, the phenomena of the two positions, paranoid-schizoid and depressive, from the very beginning are intermingled and interact with each other. The shift from one position to the other, especially in early childhood, can be very rapid and occur several times during the course of a single day in a child's life. Movement between positions therefore, can take place throughout a child's or an adult's entire life and a position thus, can not be confined to or identified with any of Freud's separate stages of development. Instead, "the two positions are identified primarily by reference to the ego and its structure and only secondarily by reference to the libido" (Stokes, 1972, p.27). While it is true that neither position can ever be said to be entirely overcome, it was Melanie Klein's belief that a person could contain the anxieties associated with these two positions most of the time and thus attain a stable personality.

The paranoid-schizoid position is a composite term Klein invented to describe a specific grouping of anxieties, defences, and object relations which she felt predominated

the first three to five months of a child's life. The composite nature of the term signifies that the leading anxiety is persecutory (paranoid) and secondly that the state of the ego and its objects is characterized by splitting (schizoid). Segal (1973) has been kind enough to describe how Klein arrived at the concept of a paranoid-schizoid position.

Following the child's symbolization and repetition, in the transference, of earlier object relationships and anxieties, she was led to see that the child's object relationships extend far into the past, right back to the relationship to part-objects, such as the breast and the penis, preceding the relationship to the parents as whole people. (p.3)

Through diligent work and a closer analysis of the earliest phases of the child's development Klein discovered that "the child normally passes through anxiety-situations of a psychotic character" (M. Klein, 1975c, p.155) (1932), which she named the paranoid-schizoid position.

The paranoid-schizoid position is characterized by omnipotent destructive impulses, persecuting anxieties, and splitting of the object. This position predominantly extends from birth until the third or even fifth month of life. According to Klein, the foundation of the paranoid-schizoid position is primal splitting of both emotions (i.e. love and hate) and the first object-relation (i.e. good and bad). It is therefore characteristic of the child's mind during these first few months that it too is split, since the ego can not split an object without itself experiencing a split. The origin of both splitting and

projection stem from the ambivalence of loving and hating which are expressions of the life and death instincts which Melanie Klein believes are present from birth in each child.

Thus, in her view, the infant's ambivalence towards the breast, loving when satisfied, hating when frustrated, causes him to divide their object into two: a "good" breast containing projected love that is felt to love the child, and a "bad" one containing projected hate that is felt to hate him.
(Money-Kyrle, 1966, p.226)

The tendency to resort to splitting results from both a lack of coherence in the young ego and also its need to defend itself against persecutory anxiety. In the paranoid-schizoid position, it is because of splitting mechanisms that the idealized object is able to remain totally good. It is kept completely away from the bad object. Similarly, the bad object remains completely vile because of its being cut-off from any good object.

Due to the presence of the death instinct within the child's mind, its mental life is dominated by anxiety with respect to its own destructive impulses. In order to relieve this anxiety, it projects a portion of the death instinct into the outside world, where it at once attaches itself to an object. The remainder is bound by libido within the child's mind. Consequently, due to several factors, the child's own initial projection of the death instinct, the trauma of birth, and because of its lack of intellectual development, the child perceives every deprivation and discomfort as originating from bad objects and thus it experiences anxiety of a persecutory nature. The leading anxiety of

the paranoid-schizoid position is the fear that through the mechanisms of introjection the bad persecuting objects will be taken inside the ego, where they will totally destroy not only the idealized good breast but also the ego itself.

This anxiety stems from the leading role that greed plays in the child's attacks on its objects. As a result of projecting its own greed into its objects, the child fears that they will devour its good objects and ego when they are introjected. In the paranoid-schizoid position, persecutory anxiety is mainly related to the preservation of the ego.

Klein believed that object-relations existed from birth and in the paranoid-schizoid position they were represented by part-object relations. The first part-object in the child's life is the mother's breast which it splits into the good (gratifying) and the bad (frustrating) breast. The ego during this position lacks cohesion and it tends to vacillate between states of integration and disintegration, thus reflecting the influence of the life and death instincts. The ego introjects good and bad objects from the beginning of life. Because the ego is unco-ordinated and the objects it introjects are still part-objects, it therefore, has very little ability to identify with its objects during this position. In the first few months of life, one of the main tasks of the developing ego is to deal with anxiety generated by the death instinct within and felt as a fear of annihilation. When these destructive impulses are projected outward

they are experienced as oral aggression. They are expressed as a phantasied oral-sadistic attack on the mother's breast. However, because the child believes its thoughts are omnipotent, these phantasied attacks are confused with real ones. Since this impulse stems directly from the death instinct, it is present from the beginning of life.

The phantasied onslaughts on the mother follow two main lines: one is the predominantly oral impulse to suck dry, bite up, scoop out and rob the mother's body of its good contents.... The other line of attack derives from the anal and urethral impulses and implies expelling dangerous substances (excrements) out of the self and into the mother. Together with these harmful excrements, expelled in hatred, split-off parts of the ego are also projected on to the mother or, as I would rather call it, into the mother. These excrements and bad parts of the self are meant not only to injure but also to control and to take possession of the object.
(M. Klein, 1975a, p.8) (1946)

The bad breast which has been thus attacked in phantasy is felt to be in fragments. On the other hand, if the breast is perceived as gratifying, then it is introjected under the dominance of libido and felt to be in a whole and undamaged state.

The paranoid-schizoid position is also typified by a group of specific defence mechanisms which arise as a result of the ego having to deal with anxieties typical of psychosis. Those that are prevalent during the first three to five months of infancy are projection, introjection, idealization, denial, projective identification, splitting, and omnipotence.

In Melanie Klein's theory, these defences have a dual role. Segal (1973) explains this in her book.

We must, therefore, look at the mechanisms of defence used in the paranoid-schizoid position not only as mechanisms of defence which protect the ego from immediate and overwhelming anxieties, but also as gradual steps in development. (p.36)

As an example, idealization involves a splitting of the object which results in an exaggeration of the goodness and a denial of the frustrating and persecuting qualities. The ego idealizes certain objects to protect itself from the persecutory anxiety emanating from the terrifying ones. Not only is a part of the object denied in idealization but so too is that portion of the ego that relates to the frustrating and persecuting part of the object. Nevertheless, as Segal states, idealization plays a useful part in development. It is essential for an individual's belief in the goodness of objects and his or her own goodness. In conclusion, as Yorke (1971) points out "the ultimate defense of the ego in reducing the anxiety of the paranoid-schizoid position is disintegration" (p.137).

As a consequence of continuing to work with and to examine the concept of the paranoid-schizoid position and "the earliest stages of the ego and a fuller recognition of the gradual nature of the infant's emotional development" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.35) (1948), Melanie Klein came to revise some of her thinking in this area. Therefore, in 1948, two years after her initial work on the topic of the paranoid-schizoid position she now contended that the

life instinct starts at birth to influence the ego in the direction of integration and synthesis of its objects. The splitting processes are therefore, never completely successful and a certain amount of synthesis takes place even in relation to part-objects. According to Klein's new formulation, the child while in the paranoid-schizoid position does experience some degree of depressive anxiety and guilt towards part-objects. However, due to the interference of persecutory anxiety, these are experienced as only transitory feelings.

If during the course of development, the fundamental oral desires and persecutory anxieties fail to lessen in intensity, then this is sound evidence for concluding that the paranoid-schizoid position has not been worked through. This unfortunate result may seriously distort a person's sense of reality and therefore prevent one from forming satisfactory relationships throughout one's life.

The aim of a successful development in the Kleinian framework is eventually to work through the paranoid-schizoid position. The mother's breast, as the first object to be internalized plays a central role in this process.

This first internal object acts as a focal point in the ego. It counteracts the process of splitting and dispersal, makes for cohesiveness and integration, and is instrumental in building up the ego.
(M. Klein, 1975a, p.6) (1946)

In order for the good breast to be perceived as such and to act as a focal point in the ego, there must be as Yorke

(1971) states

a relative preponderance of "good" over "bad" experiences, so that the ego is more closely identified with the ideal object and thereby develops a sense of its own goodness as well as the goodness of the object. (p.137)

Since it is the child's parents and most notably its mother, who has the opportunity of providing most of her infant's good experiences during these first months, it therefore becomes very evident that Melanie Klein sees the mother, by means of her love and understanding, as playing a central role in helping her child work through the paranoid-schizoid position. The gratification and motherly love, which the child experiences in all its contacts with its mother, reduces the influence of persecutory anxiety and the trauma experienced at birth. As a result of its mother's love and its own natural advances in emotional and intellectual development, the child's need to split its object lessens and the child begins to perceive its mother as a whole object. This advance marks the beginning of the depressive position.

The Depressive Position

Before actually outlining the Kleinian concept of the depressive position, it is extremely important to be aware of the incredible progress and changes that are taking place within the infant at this time.

During the second quarter of the first year certain changes in the infant's intellectual and emotional development become marked. His relation to the external world, to people as well as to things, grows more differentiated. The range of his gratifications and interests widens, and his power of expressing his

emotions and communicating with people increases. The observable changes are evidence of the gradual development of the ego. Integration, consciousness, intellectual capacities, the relation to the external world and other functions of the ego are steadily developing. At the same time the infant's sexual organization is progressing; urethral, anal and genital trends increase in strength, though oral impulses and desires still predominate. There is thus a confluence of different sources of libido and aggression, which colours the infant's emotional life and brings into prominence various new anxiety-situations; the range of phantasies is widening, they become more elaborated and differentiated. Correspondingly there are important changes in the nature of defences. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.71-72) (1952)

As the ego continues to develop and to become more integrated, the child reaches a point where it can perceive its mother as a whole person. When the child is able to recognize its mother and to identify with her as a whole, real, and loved object, then the depressive position begins. The depressive position follows as a natural progression from the paranoid-schizoid position.

The depressive state is based on the paranoid and genetically derived from it. I consider the depressive state as being the result of a mixture of paranoid anxiety and of those anxiety-contents, distressed feelings and defences which are connected with the impending loss of the whole loved object. (M. Klein, 1973, p.295-296) (1935)

The depressive position is represented not only by the child's growing level of integration and its ability to form whole object relationships but also by the presence of

feelings of guilt, depressive anxiety, and ambivalence. As Melanie Klein explains herself, the depressive position is founded on basic psychoanalytic concepts.

My hypothesis of the infantile depressive position is based on fundamental psycho-analytic concepts regarding the early stages of life; that is to say, primary introjection and the preponderance of oral libido and cannibalistic impulses in young infants. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.76) (1952)

According to Klein's theory, the depressive position is a normal phenomenon in every infant's life. Although the infant is beginning to experience some degree of depressive anxiety and guilt in the paranoid-schizoid position, it isn't until the second quarter of the first year that it becomes fully established, reaching its peak around the sixth month. Attaining the depressive position is an achievement. It signifies that the child is relying on processes of integration rather than those of splitting. One must be careful not to be deceived by this time span into thinking that the depressive position is a process that extends over only a few months of infancy, ending long before the infant becomes a toddler. On the contrary, it is Klein's view that the depressive position is never totally overcome even though many people are able to work through the vast majority of their depressive feelings. Nor is the depressive position a smooth and continuous process. During this position "schizoid mechanisms still remain in force, though in a modified form and to a lesser degree, and early anxiety-situations are again

and again experienced in the process of modification" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.15) (1946). Moreover, the pain of unhappy experiences that one encounters throughout life can arouse once again the infantile depressive position. Hence, integration is constantly being undone and must be re-achieved. It is important to remember that "in the Kleinian theory the depressive position is the main hurdle in development" (Money-Kyrle, 1966, p.227).

When the child comes to realize that the good and bad mother are one and the same, it also becomes aware of the fact that not only is she the source of all good and bad experiences but also that she is the one towards whom all hating as well as loving impulses are directed. There ensues a continual struggle between the child's aggressive phantasies and its reparative desires. When the child in phantasy attacks the hated object, it now realizes that it is also damaging the loved one, which leads to feelings of depression. However, through this process of bringing both objects closer together, the bad object becomes less terrifying and the good one becomes less idealized. In the depressive position, contrary to the paranoid-schizoid position, the idealized object "is not kept good by a split but by neutralization of its bad parts" (Wisdom, 1971, p.351).

Melanie Klein discovered that while children are busy trying to integrate their ego and their objects and also contending with their ambivalent feelings of love and hate,

they are also having to go through a mourning process.

The object that is being mourned is the mother's breast and all that the breast and the milk have come to stand for in the infant's mind: namely, love, goodness and security. All these are felt by the baby to be lost, and lost as a result of his own uncontrollable greedy and destructive phantasies and impulses against his mother's breasts. (M. Klein, 1973, p.312) (1940)

Each time the breast and later the mother are absent during this position these feelings, which Klein sees as connected with mourning, are reawakened and must be worked through by the child. The small child and the mourner in her view, have a similar task. They must restore the loved object which they feel has been lost and destroyed, back into their internal world.

In the initial phase of the depressive position, the ego is slowly becoming more integrated and many of the objects it introjects are still part-objects. Therefore, the ego's ability to identify with its objects is not very great. At this stage the ego is still uncertain of the benevolence of its objects and also its own powers of reparation. Through the process of experiencing depressive feelings the ego attains further integration. Both the depressive feelings and the ultimate integration stem from the continuous re-experiencing of love overcoming hate, ultimately the life instinct overcoming the death instinct. This leads to further ego integration and the ability to

synthesize the good and bad aspects of the object. As the ego becomes more unified and organized it becomes more aware of psychic reality. There is a better perception and relation to the external world, and to real people, and also a greater synthesis between internal and external situations. In addition, the ego will identify more fully with its good objects. Consequently, survival of the ego now becomes dependent and equivalent to the preservation of the good objects. This increased development of the ego leads to a process of incorporating whole objects and is accompanied by a new type of anxiety, namely depressive anxiety. Accompanying this increased sense of psychic reality is the feeling that it is the child's own uncontrollable greed and destructive phantasies and their projection onto its objects that causes them to appear so bad. Due to the increased identification of the ego with its objects, these hostile projections also create a great deal of conflict and anxiety within the ego as a result of the incorporation of these objects into the internal world.

The depressive position is represented by two different types of anxiety. The first type is really a continuation of paranoid anxiety and relates to the fear of annihilation of the ego by internal bad objects. The second type is depressive anxiety.

Depressive Anxiety is the anxiety lest one's own aggression should annihilate or has annihilated one's good object. It is experienced on behalf of the object.

and on behalf of the ego, which feels threatened in identification with the object. (Segal, 1973, p.125)

It is the synthesis of feelings of hatred and love for one and the same object that is the basis of depressive anxiety. After many years of studying depressive anxiety, Melanie Klein concluded that initially, it originates in relationship to part-objects. Persecutory anxiety is also present in the depressive position but its influence gradually decreases as the ego continues to develop. Because there is a constant correlation in the child's psychic reality between external and internal objects, any loss of either good object will tend to also generate depressive anxiety over the loss of its internal or external counterpart. Since the child experiences both persecutory and depressive anxiety in this position there consequently exists defences against both types. In the depressive position splitting mechanisms occur "between an alive and uninjured object and an injured and dying object" (M. Klein, 1975b, p:434). Splitting relates mainly to whole objects now and allows the child to make reparation to his good object without interference from hostile ones. During this position there is a decrease in splitting as a defence against phantasies and impulses and the ego turns to the mechanism of repression.

The mechanisms of projection and introjection are also utilized by the ego to deal with anxiety. In an effort to

protect the internal good object, the ego may try to project any internal bad objects out of itself leaving its inner world safe or it may feel overwhelmed by bad objects and feel that the only way to protect its good object is to project it out into someone else for safekeeping. When the ego begins to fear that the good object may be also being expelled with the bad one, projection, then diminishes in value as a defence mechanism. Good objects may also be introjected to reduce depressive anxiety. They can achieve this in three ways. Firstly, by introjecting the good object, the ego tests the reality of whether or not it destroys the object by cannibalism during the process of introjection. Secondly, by introjecting good objects the child's fear of internalized bad objects is reduced. Finally, the good object is introjected into the child's inner world where it is felt to be more safe and thus depressive anxiety is reduced.

Omnipotence is also a method of dealing with depressive anxiety. Feelings of omnipotence are used as a means of restoring or repairing the damage felt to be done by the child's sadistic phantasies. "Omnipotence decreases as the infant gradually gains a greater confidence both in his objects and in his reparative powers" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.75) (1952). However, if the reparative powers are governed by omnipotent phantasies alone, then the child's attempts at reparation

are really a part of Klein's manic defences. The aim of manic reparation is not only to restore the object but to accomplish this in such a way that the guilt and anxiety concerning the state of the object are never felt or acknowledged. Segal (1973), as a representative of Klein and her teachings, has outlined special conditions under which manic reparation is carried out.

For instance, manic reparation is never done in relation to primary objects or internal objects, but always in relation to more remote objects; secondly, the object in relation to which reparation is done must never be experienced as having been damaged by oneself; thirdly, the object must be felt as inferior, dependent and, at depth, contemptible. There can be no true love or esteem for the object or objects that are being repaired, as this would threaten the return of true depressive feelings. (Segal, 1973, p. 95-96)

She also goes on to explain that manic reparation cannot be completed as this would signify that the object had been successfully restored and now worthy of love and esteem "and free from the manic person's omnipotent control and contempt" (Segal, 1973, p.96). When the pain from the fear of having lost the good object and the guilt and mourning that are also related to the object's loss become too great to bear the ego may regress back to the paranoid-schizoid position or resort to manic defences. The method used by manic defences to protect the ego is to deny the psychic reality of either the extent of the harm done to the object or the importance and dependency felt towards the object.

Therefore, objects are treated with contempt, controlled, and triumphed over. If the manic defences are the main form of dealing with depressive anxiety then further development can become seriously impaired. However, if the use of manic defences is gradually reduced then a realistic form of reparation may begin and the ego will continue to develop.

Klein explains that "the young child passing through the depressive position is struggling, in his unconscious mind, with the task of establishing and integrating his inner world" (M. Klein, 1973, p.321) (1940). The child must learn to modify its ambivalent feelings so that it becomes certain of its capacity for love despite its aggressive impulses. The child must therefore resolve the conflict between love and hate. Its feelings of love must be strong enough to mitigate its hate and the ego needs to arrive at some degree of acceptance of the death instinct operating within. In order to work through the depressive position, the child must develop in many respects. Fortunately, "every step in emotional, intellectual and physical growth is used by the ego as a means of overcoming the depressive position" (M. Klein, 1973, p.320) (1940). In general, there must be a growing adaptation to reality. The child has to learn to differentiate between fact and phantasy and to accept responsibility and guilt for the damage it has inflicted. This necessary step will be enhanced by a

growing trust in its reparative abilities and also by the greater integration and security of the state of its good objects. It is also very important that good experiences outweigh bad ones, which will help to diminish the fear and anxiety of the depressive position. This will also increase the child's belief in its parents' love which is essential if this position is to be worked through.

The parents, especially the mother, can play a very decisive rôle in helping their child overcome the depressive position. Just the actual physical presence of the mother at least provides the child with a real object to make reparation to. Similarly, the return of the mother after an absence is itself proof to the child that his hostile phantasies have not destroyed her. It also helps reduce the child's belief in the omnipotence of its aggressive impulses. Klein states that the degree to which the child will overcome the depressive position is in direct proportion to the extent to which a happy relationship develops between mother and child. Consequently, the attitude of the mother to her child is crucial. The importance of the mother's attitude and the quality of the mother-child relationship is vital for the process of weaning and weaning plays a significant rôle in overcoming the depressive position.

Every detail in the way weaning is carried out has a bearing on the intensity of the infant's depressive anxiety and may increase or diminish his capacity to work through the depressive position. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.118) (1952)

The child's mother is the first object, initially represented as the breast, which is internalized and this good object forms a focal point in the ego for a sense of security and love.

Klein also indicates that many of the unusual types of behavior that young children display are not only signs of but also ways of working through the depressive position. She lists several of these phobias and idiosyncracies, such as disturbed sleep, irritability, a changed attitude towards food, and a greater need for attention. Her contention is that these are all normal and really just part of passing through the depressive position.

If the child has been able to successfully work through the depressive position then it means the child has been able to successfully internalized a predominantly good object. This accomplishment will prove invaluable when the child must deal with real object loss. Instead of experiencing depression, it will now feel sadness and grief. The child is now more able to expand its range of object-relations and to continue to develop good ones throughout its life.

Unfortunately, there are many children who are unable to succeed in securely internalizing a good object. Melanie Klein has outlined some of the indicators of this failure. She states that if the normal idiosyncracies mentioned earlier, are excessive and persist unduly then this may be a sign that the child is unable to overcome its depressive position. The child may also begin to withdraw not only from other people but also from its mother. If this continues and becomes stable and not just a transitory occurrence, then it is a sound indicator of a problem with the depressive position.

If together with this the infant becomes more apathetic, failing to develop the widening of interests and acceptance of substitutes which is normally present simultaneously with depressive symptoms, and is partly a way of overcoming them, we may surmise that the depressive position is not being successfully worked through; that a regression to the former position, the paranoid-schizoid position, has taken place. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.120) (1952)

If the child's aggressive impulses are stronger than its capacity to love then persecuting fear and schizoid mechanisms will not diminish but will continue to operate during the depressive position. If this occurs, the good object will never be felt to be fully restored and the child will feel its introjected objects to be damaged and destroyed. Deprived of a sense of trust in the goodness of its object and its ability to love and to make reparation, the child will suffer a whole constellation of depressive feelings.

(guilt, depression, hopelessness, despair) again and again during its life. Loss of an object will, consequently, result in depression rather than sadness and grief.

In conclusion, it must be restated that according to Klein neither the paranoid-schizoid nor the depressive position are overcome once and for all. As it was explained earlier, the concept of position implies that these are not fixed stages of development but rather that the defences and anxieties associated with each do recur throughout life. However, the personality of the individual does attain a basic core and this core reflects the individual's method of working through the depressive position. "The way in which object relations are integrated in the depressive position remains the basis of the personality structure" (Segal, 1973, p.ix), according to Klein and her followers.

Reparation

During the paranoid-schizoid position, the ego has no need for reparative mechanisms. This is because splitting and part-object relationships prevail. The ego therefore, is unaware that the good object is also being attacked when it directs its aggressive impulses towards the bad or frustrating object. But as children enter the depressive position, their ability to make reparation plays a very significant role in their development. It is in fact one of the main ways of working through the depressive position. Reparative tendencies stem from the life instinct and are a method of

dealing with the influence of the death instinct. Several changes taking place within the child help to bring about this desire to make reparation. For instance, as the ego of the child begins to relate to its parents as whole objects its love begins to mitigate its feelings of hate and there develops a sense of concern for these objects. Accompanying this advancement in the life instinct is a lessening of the severity of the superego. Consequently, this allows the ego to develop a sense of guilt. Thus, the child's desire to undo the harm done is a direct result of its sense of responsibility and guilt for having inflicted the damage. "The experiences of suffering, depression and guilt, linked with the greater love for the object, stir up the urge to make reparation" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.279) (1963). Since Klein feels man is never entirely free from a sense of guilt, he must therefore always possess a certain amount of impetus for making reparation to his objects. In addition to this, there is also a growing identification of the ego with its objects, resulting in the preservation of the ego becoming associated very closely with the well being of its objects thus, the child comes to believe "that the restoration of its own person depends on the restoration of its objects" (M. Klein, 1975c, p.170) (1932). The anxiety associated with the state of the child's own ego calls forth obsessional defences and mechanisms which in turn set going the desire to make reparation. Reparation can itself then become a manic

defence. Wisdom (1971) has pointed out an essential notion in Klein's concept of reparation namely, that reparation is not just a defence but an "acceptance mechanism" (p.332). By employing this phrase, he is demonstrating his understanding of Klein's view that the child both accepts its ambivalent feelings towards the object and is attempting to make reparation for its hostile attacks. Reparation is really a sign of an advancement in psychic reality and of the ego's integration. It is a demonstration that the ego is dealing more realistically with depressive anxiety which results as a consequence of its own aggressive impulses. Melanie Klein believes that there is an unconscious principle which dictates that restitution must adhere in every way to the injuries inflicted.

For both boys and girls, the primary object towards whom they direct their restorative impulses is their mother. Since children, especially young ones, are not able to direct all their restorative phantasies to their real objects they often show their desire to repair these objects in their play. If however, the majority of these phantasies are directed towards imaginary rather than real objects, the child's adaptation to reality and his object-relations, may become seriously disturbed. Klein illustrates this when she says

turning to the girl, we find that such considerations as the contents and composition of her sadistic phantasies, the magnitude of her reactive trends and the structure and strenght of her ego will affect her libidinal fixations and help decide whether the restitution

she makes shall have a masculine or a feminine character or be a mixture of the two. (M. Klein, 1975c, p.219) (1932)

In her sadistic phantasies the girl feels she has destroyed her mother's insides, robbed her of her children, and also the father's penis. These anxieties about the state of the mother and her insides gives rise to the impulse to restore her. For both sexes genital activities serve as a means of repairing the damage done to both parents. Reparation may be carried out from either a heterosexual or a homosexual position. If the girl's sadistic phantasies centered around her father's penis damaging her mother then her reparative trends will also utilize the penis but this time as an instrument of restoration. But if she feels her father's penis has become incapacitated either because she feels she has castrated him or because his penis is a bad object then she may adopt a homosexual position as a means of restoring her mother herself. However, if the girl believes in the reparative powers of the penis she may adopt a heterosexual position. She will therefore, try to internalize the good penis in an effort to restore her internal mother and return to her all the children she has robbed her of in phantasy. Thus, Melanie Klein believes that part of the girl's desire for a penis is due to her wish to use it for reparative purposes.

With boys, many of the restorative phantasies they have focus on destroying the bad penis of the father which is felt to be harming their mother. When the boy reaches the

genital state, his penis may be perceived by him as having great restorative powers. He will therefore use his penis to repair the damage done by his own and his father's bad penis.

The boy's sense of guilt towards his mother and his fear that his father's "bad" penis may do her harm contribute in no small degree to his endeavour to restore his father's penis as well and give it back to her, and to unite the two in an amicable fashion. (M. Klein, 1975c, p.249) (1932)

His desire to restore his father's penis may become so great that he will relinquish his mother as a love-object and adopt a homosexual position.

It is quite evident, that for Klein, the reparative tendencies have a very profound influence on a person's sex life as well as their object-relation in general. The extent to which a child's parents enjoy a happy and loving relationship acts as an outward sign to the child of its ability to make restitution. If the child believes in its reparative powers then both its external and internal world will be at peace and it will develop a satisfying sex life and object-relations. Alternatively, if the child does not believe and trust in its ability to make reparation either because it fears its own hostile impulses or distrusts its capacity to love or both, the consequence will be very much the opposite.

The Oedipus Complex

It wasn't long after Klein began analyzing children that

she began to see signs of the Oedipus complex in children of a much younger age than was indicated by Freud's writings. Her ideas with respect to the Oedipus complex changed in several ways over the years. Initially, she placed the onset of the Oedipus complex at between the age of two and three. This was done mainly in an attempt to account for the anxiety in the pavor nocturnus of children aged three and also to avoid diverging from Freud's belief that the superego was the heir of the Oedipus complex. As a result of further work, the onset of the Oedipus complex was moved back in 1927 to the time of weaning. She now believed it started during the phase of narcissism and at a time when sadism predominated.

Melanie Klein stated that

the Oedipus tendencies are released in consequence of the frustration which the child experiences at weaning, and that they make their appearance at the end of the first and the beginning of the second year of life; they receive reinforcement through the anal frustration undergone during training in cleanliness. (M. Klein, 1973, p.202) (1928)

As a consequence of being frustrated at the mother's breast, the child turns to its father's penis as an idealized source of oral gratification. These feelings plus those of envy and hatred towards the mother initiate the onset of the Oedipus complex. Melanie Klein therefore believed that this complex began predominantly under the impulse of hate and developed during a phase of life when oral, urethral,

and anal sadistic impulses were prevalent and genital impulses were just emerging. Defences, accordingly, were believed to be directed against destructive impulses during the initial stages of the Oedipus complex. In conclusion, Klein also maintained until 1945 that the decline of the Oedipus complex was primarily due to feelings of guilt.

Many of her beliefs concerning the Oedipus complex changed significantly after she formulated the depressive and paranoid-schizoid positions. These developments of course did not alter the fact that she believed the Oedipus complex developed over several years and along similar lines for both sexes and played a central role in personality development. Nevertheless, by 1945 she was of the opinion that sadism rather than being at its height during the early phases of the Oedipus complex was on the decline. Since Melanie Klein held that object-relations begin to be formed from birth onward, she no longer maintained that the Oedipus complex commenced during the narcissistic phase, nor was this complex felt to arise as a result of oral frustration at the time of weaning.

I see in the depressive feelings derived from the fear of losing the loved mother — as an external and internal object— an important impetus towards early Oedipus desires. This means that I now correlate the early stages of the Oedipus complex with the depressive position, (M.Klein, 1975c, p.xiv) (1948)

Now that the infant is in the depressive position it is able to perceive that its mother is a whole object and separate

from itself. This awareness of separateness means that the child also realizes that its mother is no longer under its control. Consequently, she is free to have relationships with other objects. In fact, because of the child's growing awareness of reality, it is able not only to perceive its father but also that its mother and father have a relationship from which it is excluded. Thus, all the ingredients are present for the Oedipus complex.

Before the child is ready to embark on the Oedipus complex, it must have advanced developmentally in many directions. Specifically, it must develop in the areas of physical and mental skills, ego integration, symbol formation, adaptation to its external world, and a forward progression of its libido. These advances will signify that the child has entered the depressive position. Because the Oedipus complex begins in the depressive position, its onset takes place under the growing impetus of love rather than hate. Klein no longer feels it is only frustration at the breast which propels the child forward in search for new objects of love and gratification but rather that it is mainly as a result of the gratification the breast has provided. The role of frustration has been greatly reduced. After 1945 she felt that it is inherent in the forward drive of the libido that it should seek new objects and have new aims, namely genital ones. The father's penis is one of these new objects to which both male and female children

turn. Moreover, depressive anxiety and guilt also play a crucial part in spurring the ego on to seek out new objects. Good objects must be found to introject and to direct sexual desires, feelings of guilt and reparation towards. Alternatively, bad objects must be projected into the external world where they can be hated and feared. The child's desire to make reparation for the aggression shown to both its objects, as outlined in the previous section, greatly influences the strength of its sexual impulses. The father's penis becomes an instrument of reparation and a means of reducing guilt feelings.

In the beginning of the Oedipus complex, the child perceives the mother as containing the father's penis. It is towards this combined object that the child's first Oedipal feelings of love and hate are directed.

In comparison with later phases of the Oedipus complex, the picture of its earliest stages is necessarily more obscure, as the infant's ego is immature and under the full sway of unconscious phantasy; also his instinctual life is in its most polymorphous phase. These early stages are characterized by fluctuations between different objects and aims, with corresponding fluctuations in the nature of the defences. (M. Klein, 1973, p.378) (1945)

The child's perceptions at this early stage are very much influenced by his own projections which in turn are representative of his oral, anal, urethral, and genital impulses. Consequently, the parents are perceived as constantly giving each other a vast array of sexual satisfactions which the

child itself longs for. The child is therefore left feeling extremely frustrated. Feelings of envy, rivalry, and jealousy soon develop and the child attacks his objects in phantasy with every weapon that it possesses. Envy is responsible for the child's wish to rob the parent of the opposite sex of their attributes and to obtain or spoil those of the same sexed parent. Melanie Klein believed

paranoid jealousy and rivalry in the direct and inverted Oedipus situation are in both sexes, however divergent their development, based on excessive envy towards the primal object, the mother, or rather her breast.
(M. Klein, 1975a, p.201) (1957)

The strength of the child's envy plays a crucial role in the entire development of the Oedipal situation. If envy towards the mother's breast is excessive this will prevent the internalizing of a secure good object. This of course means that the depressive position has not been worked through. As a result, a child in this situation when also confronted with its Oedipal impulses finds it difficult to share its mother or to feel love for its father, who is seen as a rival. Envy therefore, can lead to serious difficulties in working through the Oedipus conflict. With girls, the intense envy for the mother's breast can be transferred to the father's penis. This may give impetus to the girl's inverted Oedipus impulses. If excessive envy towards the mother's breast causes intense anxieties and conflicts, the girl may flee to the penis as a defence. The relation-

ship to the penis if based on excessive envy of the breast will not be stable. The envy directed towards the breast will soon be transferred to the penis as well. This type of excessive envy of the mother may also reveal itself in exaggerated Oedipal rivalry with her. The result in later life will be that men will not be loved for themselves but each success with a man will be viewed as a triumph over her mother. With respect to men, excessive envy of the breast may arouse hatred and anxiety that are transferred to the vagina. This may result in impaired potency, a compulsive need for genital gratification, promiscuity, ~~and~~ or homosexuality.

For the girl, Oedipal impulses are bound up very closely with her strong attachment to her mother. According to Klein, a warm and gratifying relationship to the breast influences the girl's concept of the penis as being a beneficial and good object. Genital sensations assist her in wanting to incorporate her father's penis and to adopt a heterosexual position. However, her wish to have a penis of her own is a sign of a homosexual adaptation. The girl's Oedipal impulses are characterized by a receptive quality due to the structure of her genitals and also are influenced to a greater degree by oral impulses than are the boy's. In addition, she normally will have stronger and longer lasting positive desires towards her father's penis and destructive ones towards her mother's body than

the boy. With girls, their Oedipal rivalry centres on wishing to rob the mother of the father's penis and of her unborn babies which are felt to be inside her. For the female in the Oedipus situation, envy of her mother can also play a positive role in motivating her to want to replace her mother and to adopt a heterosexual relationship to her father and to have his children. In reference to the Oedipus complex Klein states that

it remains an essential factor throughout her sexual and emotional development, and has an important effect on her identification with her mother in the sexual relation with the father as well as in the maternal rôle. (M. Klein, 1973, p.384-385)(1945)

The boy during the Oedipus complex desires to possess his mother exclusively and to destroy his father's penis within her. Klein believes that when the boy experiences genital sensations that these initiate both the expectation that his father has a penis which the boy wants and also a search for an opening to insert his own penis. The boy's negative impulses towards his father's penis are more intense than for the girl. This is mainly due to having been orally frustrated by his father's penis and also because his desire for his mother increases his destructive impulses towards it. If the boy is going to adopt a heterosexual position in the Oedipus complex he must come to appreciate his father's penis as a good and creative organ. Since both the positive and inverted Oedipal tendencies interact with one another and

develop simultaneously, the boy's appreciation of his father's penis may also lead to a desire to be gratified by it and to be given children by him. The boy's envy of his mother and also his fear of his father as castrator can contribute to the boy's inverted Oedipus complex. In addition, both sexes may turn to the production of an inverted Oedipus complex as a defence against sexual and aggressive tendencies which the superego has condemned.

Melanie Klein believes that the little girl has an unconscious awareness of her own potentiality for having children. But because of her Oedipal attacks on the inside of her mother's body and her wish to rob her of the children in there and to destroy her reproductive capacity, the girl fears that her mother will do the same to her. This for Klein is the equivalent of castration anxiety in the boy. She believes that for the boy castration anxiety is first experienced under the dominance of oral libido as soon as genital sensations are experienced. Since the boy wishes to bite off his father's penis, he fears a similar form of retaliation. Oral, anal, and urethral phantasied attacks on the inside of his mother's body also contribute to castration anxiety. The boy fears that in retaliation he will experience internal attacks both on his penis and his good objects from his bad internal objects. The boy's castration anxiety is ultimately mitigated by love. The mother and the inside of her body are viewed as

a source of goodness not destruction. He is now able to introject loved objects, the good breast and the father's creative penis. Due to feelings of love and an identification with his father's good penis, his trust in the reparative and creative power of his own penis increases. The small boy also has the opportunity of being able to continually reassure himself in reality that his penis is present and intact. Unfortunately, the girl has no such means of reassuring herself and must wait until she gives birth to a child.

The decline of the Oedipus complex is definitely influenced by these anxieties as they are experienced by both sexes. Melanie Klein also believed that love and guilt contributed greatly to its decline. Due to feelings of love for the parents and a sense of guilt at the attacks upon them, the child desires to preserve them both internally and externally and represses its Oedipal impulses. Furthermore, advances and developments in the structure of the superego allow the child to see its parents more realistically and this helps the child in effectively repressing its Oedipal tendencies. Klein also adds that

the gain of new objects who can be loved —the father and siblings—and other compensations which the developing ego derives from the external world, mitigate to some extent jealousy and grievance. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.197) (1957)

Both of these feelings are central to the Oedipus complex.

The Superego

Melanie Klein's concept of the superego underwent numerous changes as a result of her continued work in psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, due to her omission in re-appraising and re-working her earlier theoretical views in light of her changing ideas in regard to the superego, Klein's work in this area really fails to explain the ramifications of these changes on the rest of her concepts. This section will attempt to delineate her concept of the superego, outlining the various stages and changes that her thinking underwent.

When Klein began working with children she realized that even those around the age of three were showing signs of a superego (i.e. feelings of guilt). This prompted her, in accordance with Freud's teachings, to move the start of the Oedipus complex back a few years and to postulate that the superego originated at the beginning of the Oedipus complex rather than at the end. In 1927 she stated that the Oedipus complex ensued at weaning or "at the end of the first or the beginning of the second year of life" (M.Klein, 1973, p.169) (1927). This also marked the commencement of the superego's development. It was not only the presence of guilt in young patients, but also the very nature of their superego which prompted her to move its origin back to such an early age. The superego was depicted by these patients as being represented by parental figures who bite, cut, and devour. To Melanie Klein, it seemed more plausible that a child of one would introject this type of

object rather than a child of four or five. It is very important to note that this shift in the beginning of the superego means that Klein now saw all development except for the first year of life as occurring in the presence of the superego.

Initially, the superego was put forth by Klein as being formed on the basis of various identifications with both parents during different periods of mental development. Because identifications begin during the pre-genital phases they are strongly influenced by the child's own sadism and the result is a very severe and frightening superego. Consequently, these identifications, as a rule vary greatly from the real nature of the child's parents. However, with further development to the genital level, the identifications become less distorted by phantasy and eventually come close to representations of the real parents. The progression of the superego towards this level is dependent upon a strong fixation to the oral sucking stage. Alternatively, if the child becomes fixated at an early age, for example by observing parental intercourse, further development of the superego may be severely hampered or distorted.

If for any reason this development has not been fully accomplished and the identifications are not wholly successful, then anxiety, in which the whole formation of the super-ego originated, will preponderate in its functioning. (M. Klein, 1973, p.172) (1927)

The development of the superego ceases when latency begins. From this point on the nature of the superego is seen as being practically unalterable. Further development is thought to contribute very little to influencing it. Therefore, the superego of the child is very similar to that of the adult. Differences are seen as attributable to the ability of a more mature ego to deal with the superego and also "adults can defend themselves better against those authorities which represent the super-ego in the outside world" (M. Klein, 1973, p.170) (1927). The child then, with his weak infantile ego, will experience this early superego as a great source of anxiety.

By 1931 Melanie Klein is stating that "in my view it is the introjected father's penis which forms the kernel of the paternal super-ego" (M. Klein, 1973, p,260). (1931). A portion of the father's anatomy now seems to form the core of the paternal superego for Klein.

In 1932 Melanie Klein wrote The Psycho-Analysis of Children. In this book, she reiterates many of her previous views concerning the superego and added several new ideas which dealt with the different ways the superego influences both sexes. She believed, that unconsciously people viewed the interior of their bodies as standing for their superego and the nucleus of this structure was the penis

and the breast. She also held the view that anatomical differences between males and females affect the development of the superego.

In consequence of the structure of the female genitals, which marks their receptive function, the girl's Oedipal trends are more largely dominated by her oral impulses, and the introjection of her super-ego is more extensive than in a boy. In addition there is the absence of a penis as an active organ. The girl's greater dependence on her super-ego which is the result of her stronger introjective tendencies is further increased by the fact that she has no penis. (M. Klein, 1975c, p.232-233) (1932)

Klein felt that the girl was more under the power of her introjected father and thus her superego was more potent. The superego of the girl was also believed to be more efficient than the boy's and in addition the girl was felt to have a greater fear of it.

In her writings of 1932, Klein makes some further changes in her concept of the superego. After discussing the portion of the death instinct that remains inside the child she goes on to discuss its influence on the formation of the superego.

It seems to me that the ego has yet another means of mastering those destructive impulses which still remain in the organism. It can mobilize one part of them as a defence against the other part. In this way the id will undergo a split which is, I think, the first step in the formation of the instinctual inhibitions and of the super-ego and which may be the

same thing as primal repression. We may suppose that a split of this sort is rendered possible by the fact that, as soon as the process of incorporation has begun, the incorporated object becomes the vehicle of defence against the destructive impulses within the organism. (M. Klein, 1975c, p.127) (1932)

According to this statement, the superego is no longer viewed by Klein as simply a mental structure formed as the result of identifications with the Oedipal objects to prohibit excessive libidinal demands. It is now being presented also as a defence mechanism, a defence against the death instinct. The superego is described here as a split off portion of the id which comes into existence with the child's first incorporations. Therefore, its beginning has been moved back to the first days of life and with that the superego is no longer linked by time or purpose of onset to the Oedipus complex. However, the most paramount point of divergence in this quotation is undoubtedly Melanie Klein's assertion that the superego comes about as a result of a split in the id. At first glance, this may appear simply as a slip on her part or some printing error and what is really meant is the word ego not id. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to adopt one of these alternatives when a year later Klein makes a second reference to this point. She states that

a division takes place in the id, or instinctual levels of the psyche, by which one part of the instinctual impulses is directed against the other.

This apparently earliest measure of defence on the part of the ego constitutes, I think, the foundation-stone of the development of the super-ego. (M. Klein, 1973, p.269) (1933)

In her subsequent writings, which will be discussed later, Melanie Klein changes her position and refers to the superego as resulting from a split in the ego. It is important to note that nowhere in her work does she specify that she is making this major change or that it is due to new insights or as a result of a wish to bring her work more in line with Freud's teaching. It would then seem reasonable to conclude that what is being pointed out here is a serious inconsistency in Klein's position which may or may not have been consciously intended.

Despite this grave inconsistency, The Psycho-Analysis of Children is nevertheless an attempt on Klein's part to provide us with a few clarifications and explanations. In it she explains that the reason she believes these early identifications represent the early stages of the superego is because it is from them that the first instinctual inhibitions proceed. Moreover, she outlines the significance of her view that both anxiety and guilt emanate from the superego. She explains that in the early stages of the superego's development it is experienced by the ego as anxiety but as development continues and the anal-sadistic stage ends, it is subsequently experienced as guilt rather than anxiety. Finally, she describes the importance of the

mechanism of projection for the formation of the superego. The terrifying superego that has been introjected during the oral-sadistic phase is now in the anal-sadistic phase projected. The ego projects its frightening internal objects into the world as a defence. Both introjection and projection play a significant role in the formation of the Kleinian superego.

The formulation of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions helped Klein to clarify her concept of the superego. She now proposed that the superego was unconsciously felt by the child as a concrete and complex world of objects deep within itself. Since she believed that object-relations begin immediately after birth and that a relation to an object implied its introjection and projection, she put forth the view that these processes contribute to the formation of the superego which also begins immediately following birth. Melanie Klein described the core of the superego as

built up from the devouring breast (mother) to which is added the devouring penis (father). These cruel and dangerous internal figures become the representatives of the death instinct. Simultaneously the other aspect of the early super-ego is formed first by the internalized good breast (to which is added the good penis of the father), which is felt as a feeding and helpful internal object, and as the representative of the life instinct. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.30) (1948)

As this statement indicates, Klein's new stand is that the superego begins with the child's first incorporations and therefore the breast is the first and primary object in the superego. The breast and the child's relationship to it

now influence the child's relationship to the penis.

Earlier, when the superego's beginning was linked to the Oedipus complex, the father's penis initially formed part of the nucleus of the superego. The penis has now been assigned a more secondary role to play and this indicates a significant shift in emphasis. This quotation of Klein's has also clarified the part that both the life and death instinct play in her concept of the superego. It is now evident that due to the presence of the death instinct, the fear of annihilation is an anxiety that is present in the superego from the beginning.

Because the superego comes into being during the paranoid-schizoid position, when the child's oral-sadism is at its height, the breast is often attacked and then introjected as a dangerous retaliating object.

This in Melanie Klein's view is the earliest root of the persecuting and sadistic aspect of the super-ego. Parallel with this introjection, in situations of love and gratification the infant introjects an ideal loved object and loving breast which becomes the root of the ego-ideal aspect of the super-ego. (Segal, 1973, p.4)

Thus the superego in the paranoid-schizoid position is made up of two very opposite and conflicting aspects.

As the child enters the depressive position several developments occur which influence the superego. Splitting decreases and this allows the ideal and persecuting objects to come closer together and to be experienced as whole objects.

In conjunction with this step forward, the continuous re-introjection of a loving and kind external real world helps the child internalize good objects. With these developments the superego has become more integrated. As the child's adaptation to reality and the number of its object-relations increases, the superego begins to achieve a greater synthesis in its own development. This newly integrated superego is now more easily assimilated by the ego.

Now too it is possible for Klein to explain the distinction between fear and guilt. Fear emanates from a persecuting superego which has been attacked during the paranoid-schizoid position. While guilt arises because of destructive attitudes towards a superego which in the depressive position, is seen more as a helper or mentor. Later in her writings, Klein alters her views slightly and in accordance with her new stand that depressive anxiety can be experienced during the paranoid-schizoid position, she states that guilt too can intermittently be experienced then also.

In 1957, Klein published her work on the concept of envy. In this paper, she pointed out the disparaging effects envy can have on the formation of the superego. The envious superego will not only be very persecuting but it will also destroy any attempts at reparation. It also "interferes" with thought processes and with every productive activity,

ultimately with 'creativeness' (M. Klein, 1975a; p.202)(1957)

Melanie Klein now thinks of the development of the superego as a process that extends over the child's first few years of childhood. The climax in its development comes following the Oedipus complex. This view was never again changed by Klein.

After her formulation of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, the superego is always presented as resulting from a division in the ego, not the id. Never again does Klein refer to the superego as being formed from a split in the id. The superego is now said to occur as a consequence of the ego splitting itself. "In my view, the splitting of the ego, by which the super-ego is formed, comes about as a consequence of conflict in the ego, engendered by the polarity of the two instincts" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.240) (1958). The split-off part of the ego that criticizes and controls the id impulses is now referred to as the super-ego. The superego is composed of a portion of both the life and death instincts and also parts of the good and bad object. Contrary to her earlier position, Klein states that "the super-ego is normally established in close relation with the ego and shares different aspects of the same good object" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.241)(1958). Furthermore, the life and death instincts are believed by Klein to be predominantly in a state of fusion while the superego is being formed.

Throughout her career in psychoanalysis, Melanie Klein always presented the early superego as being merciless and terrifying. However, very late in her life she reformulated her beliefs and stated that the most frightening figures in the psyche were not part of the superego. Her contention is that they are split off from the rest of the mind and reside in the deeper layers of the unconscious. They remain there totally rejected by the ego and consequently never become integrated or modified. As a result there is a closer union between the ego and superego and it is therefore possible for the superego to be more fully integrated and accepted by the ego.

Initially, Klein's position was that the nature of the superego was immutable. Then with the development of her concept of the depressive position, she changed her opinion and believed that the severe persecuting nature of the superego became altered in this position to one of guilt and a guiding mentor. However, her new view allows her to return to her earlier belief in immutable terrifying figures in the psyche and also to retain the superego as a part of the psyche that can be modified and integrated.

Because the superego is no longer seen as impervious to change, more of its unconscious parts can achieve consciousness and be experienced as conscience. Melanie Klein also felt that the child's real parents and their actual relationship with their child could influence, either in a

positive or negative direction, the superego's development. In conclusion, she believed that if the depressive position could be worked through satisfactorily that the child would experience its superego as a restraining and guiding influence in its life.

Envy

Prior to Klein's writing of Envy and Gratitude in 1957, she conceived of envy as primarily a response to the frustration experienced during the Oedipus complex. This was her view even as early as 1924 when she treated a child named Erna.

Erna's phantasies that in coition her mother incorporated her father's penis and semen and her father incorporated her mother's breasts and milk formed the basis of her hatred and envy.
(M. Klein, 1975c, p.40) (1932)

Thus envy is due to the frustration experienced in conjunction with the child's early sexual theories of copulation between their parents.

In a girl's life, envy plays a motivating role in her positive Oedipus complex. A portion of her desire to possess her father stems from the envy she feels towards her mother. Alternatively, the girl's envy of her father's penis which arises from her inverted Oedipus desires for her mother, can interfere with her adopting a feminine role in life. Therefore envy is an essential factor in the development of the girl's sexual relations and also her maternal role. Furthermore, Melanie Klein (1973) believes that the girl's "penis-envy succeeds the wish for a child, which again replaces

penis-envy in later development" (p.209) (1928)

In the boy's life, envy is also a component of the inverted Oedipus complex. The boy envies his mother whom he feels possesses his father's penis. Melanie Klein in her early writings also introduced a new idea about the role of envy in the lives of males. In some ways it appears almost as a counter-balance to feminine penis-envy. During the feminine phase in the boy's development, she believed that he becomes very envious of his mother's ability to have children. But as he grows older he will often increase his pride in his penis as a way of compensating for this inability. He may also displace some of this pride onto intellectual endeavors in order to reassure himself that he has nothing to be envious of.

At this stage in her conceptualizing, envy is regarded as stemming from oral, urethral, and anal sadistic sources. It is also viewed as forming the central point in a neurosis. In 1952, Melanie Klein makes a brief reference to envy which indicates that she is reformulating her ideas on the subject.

Envy appears to be inherent in oral greed. My analytic work has shown me that envy (alternating with feelings of love and gratification) is first directed towards the feeding breast. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.79) (1952)

It is five years later, when Envy and Gratitude is written, that she reveals the extent of her reformulations.

"I consider that envy is an oral-sadistic and anal-sadistic

expression of destructive impulses, operative from the beginning of life, and that it has a constitutional basis" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.176) (1957). . Envy is a very destructive feeling. It entails the awareness that there exists objects of value which are desired for oneself but are possessed by someone else. The aim of envy is to rob the other of these objects and if this is not possible, to spoil or destroy them so that no one can enjoy them. Klein believed that envy by definition implied a relationship to only one person and is present from the beginning in the child's relationship to his mother. Therefore, the first object to be envied is the feeding breast. It is seen by the child as the source of all nourishment, gratification, and of everything that is desirable. If the child's feeding experiences are very satisfying they may arouse envy due to the child's impression that he or she could never possess anything so valuable. On the other hand, if the child feels deprived and hungry this may lead to feelings of greed and the creation of phantasies of a bountiful breast which is keeping all the nourishment for itself. The child may then come to feel hatred and envy for the mother's breast. Therefore, envy can be stirred up by anything that interferes with the child experiencing a feeling of gratification at the breast.

Klein explicitly states that she is speaking about a concept which she labels primary envy of the mother's breast. She feels that it is necessary to differentiate

this from its later forms in relationship to the Oedipal desires. The influence of envy on these desires has already been discussed in the section dealing with the Oedipus complex. Envy, because of its early origin, is one of the most primitive emotions. It has a fundamental role to play in both infantile development and personality formation. Because envy is seen as an inborn motivating force it has the capability of influencing an individual throughout his entire life. Initially, envy is directed towards part-objects. However, as the individual continues to develop it also will come to influence his whole-object relations. Segal (1973) has pointed out a fundamental aspect of envy namely, that "it may be considered to be the earliest direct externalization of the death instinct" (p.40). Envy operates mainly through the mechanism of projection. When the infant is feeling envious of the breast, he attacks it and tries to spoil its goodness by projecting his own excrement and bad parts into it, thus causing its devaluation and destruction. One of the deepest sources of envy, which relates directly to the primal object, is the capacity to give and preserve life. Creativeness itself becomes a source of envy and envy may therefore seriously interfere with creative processes and endeavors. Ambition and the absence of envy in others are also cited by Klein as being capable of arousing envy. Finally, an individual who feels he has projected many of his own good parts into the external world may become envious

of others whom he feels are now in possession of them.

Excessive envy can have serious effects on both the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. If envy is experienced as being very intense during the paranoid-schizoid position, it may impede the splitting of the breast into a good and bad object. The good breast then becomes a source of envy and is attacked instead of idealized. The ego is therefore not able to maintain the split between the good and bad breast. Consequently, it is not able to establish a secure relationship with either a good internal or external object nor is it able to establish a clear differentiation between good and bad. Moreover, intensive envy which has led to hostile attacks and spoiling of the object may result in a premature sense of guilt. This guilt, in turn, increases feelings of persecution and disintegration and can seriously impede the working through of the depressive position. Feelings of gratitude give impetus to the child's desire to preserve his objects and thus help to overcome the depressive position. But, if envy is very strong, it can interfere with the child's ability to enjoy the breast and to feel gratitude. As a result, the child's feelings of gratitude and love are undermined. According to Klein, a serious disturbance of oral gratifications by excessive envy can result in an intensification of genital desires and trends. In addition, strong feelings of envy of the mother's breasts will probably generalize to other feminine abilities, especially

their ability to give birth to children. Finally, it is important to stress that for Melanie Klein intense envy has the power to cause serious emotional disturbances even in the very young.

The ego, in order to protect itself from the intense feelings of pain, despair and hopelessness which envy engenders, has erected many forms of defence. "Some of the earliest defences often described before, such as omnipotence, denial and splitting, are reinforced by envy" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.216) (1957). In addition to these defences, the ego may idealize the object in order to preserve it and to facilitate splitting. Contrastingly, the object is often devalued, since a worthless object is no longer a source of envy. Devaluation of the self may also be resorted to as a means of denying envy. The child may decide instead to greedily internalize the breast and by doing so feels the breast's goodness is now its own. Alternatively, the child may project its envy into others. It no longer feels any envy but those around the child are made to feel envious of its qualities and success. If this fails, the child may decide to withdraw from people thereby lessening its contact with those whom it envies. In order to avoid directing the hostile feelings which are associated with envy against their mother, a child may take flight from her to other admired people. Furthermore, the child may become confused as to whether these substitutes are good or

bad, as a method of defending itself against feelings of guilt and persecution for having attacked the envied breast. For Klein, even acting out can be a defence against envy, since it interferes with the integration of the envious parts of the self. It would appear also that Klein believes that these defences may not always be very successful.

When schizoid and paranoid features are in the ascendant, defences against envy cannot be successful, for the attacks on the subject lead to an increased feeling of persecution that can only be dealt with by renewed attacks, that is to say, by reinforcing the destructive impulses. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.219) (1957)

As the child begins to work through the depressive position certain feelings begin to emerge which aid it in counteracting envy. Guilt and depression arouse a wish to preserve the loved object and to mitigate envy. The depressive position also implies the desire to make reparation to the envied object. Finally, if envy is not too intense, the child will develop feelings of love and gratitude towards the breast which will diminish its envy and allow it to securely internalize a good object. Some degree of envy with regards to the mother's breast will always remain in an individual's personality. However, Melanie Klein (1975a) feels that "whereas envy is a source of great unhappiness, a relative freedom from it is felt to underlie contented and peaceful states of mind—ultimately sanity" (p.203) (1957).

Introjection and Projection

Introjection and projection refer to two mental mechanisms which are the complement of one another. Projection denotes an expulsion while introjection an incorporation. Melanie Klein's early writings lead one to believe that she held that the development of introjection precedes that of projection and that in fact projection comes into existence as a result of introjection and that both mechanisms don't emerge until the start of the Oedipus complex.

The child himself desires to destroy the libidinal object by biting, devouring and cutting it, which leads to anxiety, since awakening of the Oedipus tendencies is followed by introjection of the object.
(M. Klein, 1973, p.203)(1928)

When, as a small child, he first begins to introject his objects--and these, it must be remembered, are yet only vaguely demarcated to his various organs--his fear of those introjected objects sets in motion the mechanism of ejection and projection.
(M. Klein, 1975c, p.142)(1932)

Klein's final view however, was that introjection and projection operate from the beginning of life. Introjection, for her, meant that the experiences and objects a person encounters in the external world are taken into the self and come to form part of the person's inner world. Alternatively, projection was seen as an expulsive defence mechanism whereby an individual expels his feelings or parts of his self and objects out of his inner world into the

external world. Klein believed it was the ego's first defence and was established as a protection against the danger of its own sadism and of retaliation from the attacked object. Both introjection and projection operate on the level of unconscious phantasy.

Melanie Klein presented both introjection and projection as being in the service of the life instinct. Projection not only deflects part of the death instinct outwards, thus preventing the infant from being overwhelmed by its self-destructive impulses but it also instils the breast with libido. The process of introjection, on the other hand, enables the infant to incorporate things that sustain life (in the first instance food) and thus enable it to bind the death instinct operating within. The first object to be introjected is the mother's breast. Its introjection lays the foundation for all internalization processes which will take place during the infant's life. The nature and strength of the projection processes are partially determined by the extent to which the good breast has become securely internalized. The extent of the good breast's internalization helps to determine whether projections will be predominantly loving or hostile. If projections are in the main hostile, they tend to arouse counter-feelings of hostility in others and to interfere with the development of real empathy and understanding of others.

As Klein continued to work with and theorize about

children, projection and introjection came to occupy a very important role in her conception of development.

"The development of the infant is governed by the mechanisms of introjection and projection" (M. Klein, 1973, p.282) (1935).

In general, these two mechanisms are responsible for constructing the child's internal world and also for shaping its perception of the external world. They have a fundamental role to play in the formation of object-relations, the superego, and also the child's adaptation to reality.

Furthermore, introjection and projection are essential to the formation of phantasy. Projection and introjection are capable of both influencing an individual's perception of reality and also its objects' reaction to itself. In the beginning, a child's perception of reality is influenced greatly by its own projections and introjections which in turn, are extensively coloured by phantasy. Since the quality of the mother's relationship with her child can be influenced by her infant's response to her, a child's distorted perception of its mother and consequent style of relating to her, can therefore seriously alter the mother's way of relating to her child. Projection and introjection will always operate to some degree throughout life, affecting both an individual's perception of and relationship with the world.

In the same way introjection and projection go on throughout life and become modified, in the course of maturation; but they never lose their importance in the individual's

relation to the world around him.
(M. Klein, 1975a, p.250)(1959)

Introjection is a critical process in development because it is essential to securing good internalized objects. These good introjections not only enrich the child's internal world but also act as a defence by nullifying the influence of bad objects. Introjection can also be used as a method of collecting reserves to be used in the future to sustain external attacks or to restore to one's objects that which one has previously stolen from them. Furthermore, introjection greatly influences projective mechanisms. The internalization of the good breast "acts as a focal point in the ego, from which good feelings can be projected on to external objects" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.144)(1955).

In the paranoid-schizoid position, projection is used as a defence against internal persecutors by projecting them into the external world. Alternatively, good objects may be projected into the external world for safekeeping when the individual's internal world appears too hostile and threatening. The mechanism of introjection is also utilized in this position. Its aim is to incorporate bad objects in order to gain control over them.

The onset of the depressive position tends to influence both the degree of introjection and projection. During the depressive position feelings of love and hate become more integrated within the ego and the child's sense of security about possessing a good internal object increases. As a

result, the child becomes less terrified of its own hostile impulses and has less need to project them. In conjunction with this, the child also fears that its good objects may be expelled with its bad ones. The child attempts to prevent this from happening by lessening its use of projection. This reduction in the use of projection will result in a less distorted perception of reality and of one's objects. Concern for one's objects lest they should be destroyed in the process of introjection and anxiety about the dangers threatening these objects in the inner world will combine to reduce the ego's use of introjection as well during the depressive position. Paradoxically, introjective mechanisms also receive an impetus to increase during this position.

As a child (or an adult) identifies himself more fully with a good object, the libidinal urges increase; he develops a greedy love and desire to devour this object and the mechanism of introjection is reinforced. Besides, he finds himself constantly impelled to repeat the incorporation of a good object—i.e. the repetition of the act is designed to test the reality of his fears and disprove them—partly because he dreads that he has forfeited it by his cannibalism and partly because he fears internalized persecutors against whom he requires a good object to help him. (M. Klein, 1973, p.284)(1935)

Melanie Klein, in addition, warns us that introjection if too extensive can be detrimental to the ego. It may become completely dominated by its introjected objects and thereby lose its own strength. In conclusion, she believes that a

well balanced interplay between introjection and projection, if it is not overshadowed by hostility, will result in an enriched inner world and better relations with the external world. The capacity to attain this balance is directly related to the secure establishment of a good object.

Introjective and Projective Identification

According to Melanie Klein, there are two types of identifications, introjective and projective. Introjective identification is not a new concept in psychoanalysis. The earlier work of Freud and Abraham illustrated the connection between introjection and identification; identification being a sequel to introjection. Introjective identification refers to a process whereby the object is introjected into the ego which then identifies with the object's characteristics either wholly or partially. Introjective identification is a process that occurs in development prior to symbol-formation, speech, or sublimation. Initially, Klein felt this type of identification was initiated only by libidinal interests but several years later she amended this view. Anxiety was also included as having a motivating effect in regard to introjective identification. Moreover, Melanie Klein discovered that the earliest identifications were not true representations of the objects on which they were based. They were distorted and unreal. At this stage, a child's identifications are seriously influenced by his pre-genital level of development. But as the development of the child's libido

and superego progress towards the genital level, his identifications become less distorted. Since the superego is built up of identifications, the level, whether genital or pre-genital, at which these identifications occur can seriously affect the superego's development.

When one person identifies with another, it may take the form of admiring or imitating that person and their work or it may lead to the person themselves actually being creative. In her early writings, Klein points out the influence of the primal scene or phantasies of it have on sublimation of an intellectual or artistic nature. Since identification is a preliminary stage in sublimation, she is able to illustrate that the degree of activity the child takes in these phantasies is indicative of its sublimations and its mode of identification. In other words, will the child be a creator or will it simply be an imitator or admirer?

For the degree of activity certainly influences the mode of identification. I mean it is a question whether it will spend itself in the admiration, study and imitation of the masterpieces of others or whether there will be an endeavor to excel these by the subject's own performances.. (M. Klein, 1973, p.114) (1923)

Projective identification is both a defence mechanism and a method of establishing object-relations with the external world. It involves the process of splitting and also projection. The term projective identification refers

to the splitting off of parts of the ego, be they dangerous or endangered parts, and the subsequent projection of those parts into an object with whom the subject then feels identified and also in control of. This form of identification "is based on attributing to the other person some of one's own qualities" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.252). Projective identification operates during the paranoid-schizoid position and is very influential in the developmental processes. In fact, it plays a crucial role in defending the ego against the persecuting anxiety associated with the paranoid-schizoid position. Since Klein believes that introjective and projective identification are complimentary processes, she has placed the start of projective identifications at the point when the child begins, due to oral-sadistic impulses, to introject the mother's breast. Projective identification itself is derived from oral, urethral, and anal impulses and results in an expelling of products of the body (i.e. excrement and urine), parts of the ego, or parts of the self. Klein makes no distinction here between the ego and the self. It is interesting to note that her earlier writings on identification indicate that part of her final concept of projective identification has its origin in the work of Ferenczi. He described a form of identification in which the object is identified with parts of the infant's own body and activities.

The parts the infant has split-off and projected into

its objects are phantasied to continue to exist and operate within that object. There are many reasons why the infant employs projective identification. It may be due to the fact that the infant wishes to attack, destroy, or gain control of a bad object or to greedily take possession of its object. An identification on these bases will result in feelings of being persecuted by the object and a feeling of depletion and weakness in the ego.

For the aggressive component of feelings and of the personality is intimately bound up in the mind with power, potency, strength, knowledge and many other desired qualities. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.8) (1946)

Moreover, the infant may resort to projective identification as a means of avoiding a separation from an ideal object. If good parts are projected it may serve the purpose of leading to the idealization of the object or it might be an attempt to keep the good parts safe from the persecution of bad internal objects. Segal (1973) has even suggested that it may operate as a primitive form of projective reparation by which the external object is restored by the projection of the ego and good excrement. Integration of the ego and the formation of the good object-relations rely heavily on the infant's ability to project good parts of its ego and good feelings into its maternal object. If the projection of good parts of the ego and good products of excrement is excessive, the ego once again is weakened and this may result in an over-dependence on objects which are felt to contain

the lost good parts or a fear that one is no longer capable of loving "because the loved object is felt to be loved predominantly as a representative of the self" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.9) (1946).

This issue of control is essential to the concept of projective identification. The infant feels that this type of identification affords it a certain degree of control over its objects. It is very important for the infant to feel that it controls the person who now possesses all its bad objects lest they should be turned against the infant. Furthermore, the infant must also believe that its good parts which have been projected into its object are still under its control and are not lost forever. If this were to happen the infant would experience anxiety over the loss of part of itself. Projective identification besides being a defence against anxiety is also the basis of many anxiety situations. Melanie Klein points out that the phantasy of forcefully entering the object to control it also entails the fear of being trapped and persecuted inside it. In addition, the process of re-introjecting the object that now possesses all the infant's bad and dangerous parts and excrement readily leads to feelings of anxiety concerning internal persecutors. Therefore, the main anxiety associated with projective identification are the loss of self, a sense of imprisonment, and a fear of harboring internal persecutors.

Projective identification which begins in the paranoid-schizoid position does not cease to operate when the infant

reaches the depressive position. In fact its use may increase, with the result that the whole object is felt to be in the infant's control. Late in her career, Klein wrote about a type of projective identification in which the subject acquires the identity of the object. The motives for adopting this pseudo-identity were illustrated by Klein through the analysis of a novel by Julian Green entitled If I Were You. The hero, Fabian, adopted various identities because he was dissatisfied with his appearance, his lack of success with women, his financial situation, his career, his burdensome religious beliefs, and finally because of a self-hatred. Many of these motives as the novel reveals are disguised forms of envy and greed. Melanie Klein's analysis also reveals several reasons for choosing an object for the purposes of this type of identification. In the story Fabian chose people who were wealthy or who he thought had the ability to enjoy life to the fullest or they had power and also there was some common ground between himself and the object of identification.

Roger Money-Kyrle (1966) states that Kleinians view projective identification as a primitive method by which a baby can communicate its emotions to its objects and if the emotions are distressing it allows the infant to experience a sense of relief. Money-Kyrle and other followers of Klein have also pointed out the clinical usefulness of projective identification in understanding such conditions as

psychotic delusions, megalomaniac or confusional states, and depressive or persecutory hypochondria.

For Melanie Klein projective identification had the capability of influencing many facets of a person's life, be they its object relations, its emotions, or its total personality. However, "the wish to preserve the integrity of the object leads to a gradual abandonment of projective identification" (Segal, 1979, p.133) says Klein and her followers.

Following Klein's conceptualization of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive position, several of her ideas with respect to identification processes were revised. Her earlier work on this subject is presented along with her final views in order to present her complete work and to allow one to see where her views changed as a result of developments in her thinking. Melanie Klein's early work on identification made no explicit distinction between introjective and projective identification. Many of her remarks on this subject were in reference to the similarities and differences between the process of identification as it developed in boys and girls. In both sexes the child's identification with its mother occurs in conjunction with anal-sadistic impulses. These impulses lead to a wish to rob and destroy the mother. The desire to rob the mother of her unborn children is motivated, in both sexes, first by the child's wish for children of its own and secondly due to feelings of jealousy. The child is jealous of new

brothers or sisters who would be its rivals so it wishes to steal these unborn children and prevent their birth. Boys have a third motive for their oral-sadistic attacks on the inside of their mothers and that is to destroy their father's penis which they believe resides within. This stage of identification with the mother is called the femininity phase and it is based on the mechanism of projective identification. A predominance of oral-sadistic impulses during the process of identification with the mother can lead to a serious disruption of genital development. It is the girl's Oedipal impulses that are the direct initiator of an identification with her mother. However, if the sadistic tendencies are very strong during this phase of identification, the girl may come to fear her mother so intensely that she ceases to identify with her. Instead, she will turn to a far less anxiety provoking figure, her father, and begin to identify with him. This new identification, however, is itself very complex and determined by many affects, for example hatred, envy, fear, guilt. If the girl has sadistically attacked her mother's body, she may fear that her mother will retaliate and destroy her body or she may feel extremely guilty for attacking her mother. Whether alone or together both of these affects can result in the girl abandoning an identification with her mother and identifying with her father. A lack of satisfaction and the frustration experienced at not receiving the father's penis when the girl

identified with her mother may also lead to her abandoning the maternal identification.

Feelings of hatred and envy towards her mother as well as libidinal desires for her, go to create this earliest identification of the girl with her sadistic father, and in this identification enuresis plays an important role.

(M. Klein, 1975c, p.212-213)(1932)

Here Klein indicates that not only negative affects related to her mother but also libidinal desires for her may motivate the girl to identify with her father. Through an identification with her father, the girl can not only attain libidinal satisfaction from her mother but also launch hostile attacks against her. Even the girl's belief in the omnipotence of her urinary functions facilitates an identification with the father. There are however, two factors which contribute to the girl's relinquishing her identification with her father. They are fear of her father and feelings of rivalry and hatred of her mother. The girl will now look upon her father as an object of love and an object to be loved by, thus identifying with her mother. It is obvious from Klein's description of the many phases that the identification process can go through that the nature of the girl's identifications can greatly influence her sexual development. As Melanie Klein herself states the girl's sexual development will be favorable and a state of internal harmony will exist if it

is founded on the existence of a good relationship between her ego and its

identifications and between those identifications themselves, and especially of a peaceful union of her father-*imago* and her mother-*imago*. (M. Klein, 1975c, p.237) (1932)

The femininity phase in boys stems from a frustrated desire to possess

the organs of conception, pregnancy and parturition, which the boy assumes to exist in the mother, and further with the vagina and the breasts, the fountain of milk, which are coveted as organs of receptivity and bounty from the time when the libidinal position is purely oral. (M. Klein, 1973, p.206) (1928)

Because the boy does not possess these feminine organs he wishes to destroy or to rob his mother of them during this phase. His father's penis which the boy believes is present in his mother's womb is also a target for his destructive tendencies. If these destructive tendencies predominate, the boy's maternal identification will be viewed as a rivalry and characterized by feelings of hate and envy.

During the femininity phase, Klein explains that the boy experiences anxiety of a diffuse nature which is not related to only the loss of a particular organ but also that his body as a whole will be mutilated and dismembered. Since the boy in phantasy attacks both his mother's womb and his father's penis his anxiety stems from a fear of retaliation from both parents. Melanie Klein states that the anxiety associated with this phase soon becomes displaced onto the penis and becomes obscured by and contributes to the castration complex. The anxiety associated with the femininity

phase can now be resolved more successfully by the boy.

The disappointment and fear of this phase in his development can be lessened by an increased pride in his penis.

Klein also explains that even the boy's desire for a child becomes obscure through its amalgamation with the epistemophilic instinct and its subsequent displacement onto intellectual endeavors.

The identification of the boy with his mother comes to a close as a result of the increased strength of his genital impulses in combination with the anxiety he experiences as his mother's rival and also his anxiety of having internalized a dangerous paternal penis. His genital impulses and his fears thus result in the boy turning to his father as a figure to identify with. If the boy's identification with his mother was based on rivalry and sadistic tendencies predominated, then this type of identification becomes the source later for the boy becoming very contemptuous of others, feeling he knows better than they and he may develop a tendency to express an excessive amount of aggression. Klein also points out that for both sexes, the anxiety and guilt associated with this phase of development can contribute later in life to an inhibition in the ability to work. Alternatively, Melanie Klein explains that

if, on the contrary, the identification with the mother is based on a more securely established genital position, on the one hand his relation to women will be positive in character, and on the other the desire for a child and the feminine component,

which play so essential a part in men's work, will find more favourable opportunities for sublimation.
(M. Klein, 1973, p.207) (1928)

Furthermore, she also notes that the femininity phase can provide men with an intuitive understanding of the opposite sex and an awareness of their mental needs. Klein also believes that male potency and attaining the genital position are at least partially due to a favorable resolution of the desires and anxieties of the femininity phase. She states that when the boy passes out of the femininity phase that he embarks on a phase which is marked by the struggle that takes place between pre-genital and genital libidinal impulses. This phase at its zenith is known as the Oedipus complex.

Identification with objects initially assumed a place of central importance for Melanie Klein back in 1925 when she realized the significance it played in the psychogenesis of the tic. During the remaining years of her life she developed and outlined the concept of the femininity phase, projective identification and also expanded Freud and Abraham's notion of introjective identification. All these developments have been outlined in the previous paragraphs. However, before concluding this chapter I would like to present Klein's views on the general topic of identification which were formulated during and following her discovery of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions.

Melanie Klein still maintains following the discovery

of these two positions that the good and bad breast and penis and later the mother and father, represent the first identifications and that these objects form the basis for all future identifications, be they either favorable or unfavorable ones. She also maintains that in order for a full identification to take place with a good object the self must be aware of its own goodness. Moreover, if the self wishes to form a strong identification with another then there must be a feeling that there exists sufficient common ground between the self and the object. On the other hand, when a person is attempting to prevent an overwhelming identification with one object, they are often driven into an identification with someone else who possess an opposite set of qualities or characteristics.

As a final note on the topic of identification, Melanie Klein stresses an important aspect of successful identification that extends from childhood to adulthood.

When envy and rivalry are not too great, it becomes possible to enjoy vicariously the pleasures of others. In childhood the hostility and rivalry of the Oedipus complex are counteracted by the capacity to enjoy vicariously the happiness of the parents. In adult life, parents can share the pleasures of childhood and avoid interfering with them because they are capable of identifying with their children. They become able to watch without envy their children growing up. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.259) (1963)

Melanie Klein's Views on Psychoanalysis

Before continuing on with a discussion of the reasons and the criteria for and the limitations of psychoanalysis, it seems appropriate, at this point, to first outline some of Melanie Klein's views concerning psychoanalysis. Shortly after beginning her career as a therapist, she began to regard the psychoanalysis of anxiety as crucial to the analytic progress. She also held that child psychoanalysis not only allowed the therapist to attain the same degree of depth and scope as an adult analysis but it also afforded the psychoanalyst a closer view of early experiences and fixations which in adult cases can only be reconstructed. Since Klein contended that all children go through a childhood neurosis, she believed that psychoanalysis should play a part in ~~all~~ children's upbringing. All children in Melanie Klein's view were capable of forming a transference and therefore no child is unfit for psychoanalysis not even those whose intelligence is below normal.

I consider analysis helpful not only in every case of obvious mental disturbance and faulty development, but also as a means of diminishing the difficulties of normal children. (M.Klein, 1973, p.181) (1927)

Psychoanalysis is a therapeutic method for helping all patients work through early conflicts and sufferings and thus further integration and stability. Melanie Klein believed that the psychoanalysis of children provided a service to education, to society, and to the advancement of culture. By removing inhibitions and unconscious resistances to education, psychoanalysis makes it much easier for schools to achieve their aims. However, psychoanalysis itself was never meant to be a method of exerting any kind of educative influence on the child. Melanie Klein was quite adamant on this point. Furthermore, an early analysis has preventive benefits. Klein felt that if the procedures for psychoanalysing children became more widespread that it would result in a reduction in the number of adult criminals and mental patients later on. The development of art and culture would also benefit from this practice, because in lessening the child's inhibitions, it opens up the way for new sublimations and interests. One of Melanie Klein's earlier phantasies which never came to pass was that there would one day be kindergartens run by psychoanalysts. It was hoped that these psychoanalysts and their assistants could then intervene whenever a child's development needed their special help. In closing, it seems that Klein believes that child analysis has

prophylactic benefits, it enhances a child's development and adaptation to reality and it provides the opportunity of making important contributions to psychoanalytic theory because it gives a good insight into early development.

The Aim and Outcome of Psychoanalysis

At different times throughout her career Melanie Klein made many references to various aims and desired outcomes of psychoanalysis. According to her, the aim of psychoanalysis was to strengthen the ego, lessen the severity of the superego, reduce anxiety and feelings of guilt, and diminish the number of inhibitions. In addition, it was given the task of uncovering and clearing up psychotic traits in children and of correcting the course of an unhealthy psychological development in adults plus bringing harmony to the demands of both id and superego. Much of this list can be summarized under the aim of bringing integration to the patient's personality by means of an exploration of the unconscious.

Following a successful analysis, the patient should have more awareness of its intrapsychic processes and be able to control them more efficiently by the power of its ego. Adults and children alike should have become more successfully adapted to reality and have better object-relationships and the patient's emotional relationship to the parental figures should improve. Klein also stipulates that a complete analysis provides full sexual

enlightenment, increases the capacity for sublimations, and ensures the child's future stability in direct proportion to the degree it has successfully resolved the patient's deepest anxieties. Segal (1973) has explained exactly how Kleinians view the structure of the personality and also how they believe they influence its structure to bring about the above changes.

The structure of the personality is largely determined by the more permanent of the phantasies which the ego has about itself and the objects that it contains.

The fact that structure is intimately related to unconscious phantasy is extremely important: it is this which makes it possible to influence the structure of the ego and the super-ego through analysis. It is by analyzing the ego's relations with objects, internal and external, and altering the phantasies about these objects, that we can materially affect the ego's more permanent structure. (p.20)

Criteria for Termination

In each case, the psychoanalyst must decide when the analysis has reached a successful completion. Melanie Klein has suggested several factors or guidelines which she considered crucial in deciding to terminate a patient's analysis. A few of these have just been mentioned above as part of the changes that analysis brings about. They are full sexual enlightenment, a successful adaptation to reality and improved relationships with one's parents. For adults, a good adaptation to reality includes the

ability to work and love, and also to be able to look after oneself in one's present life's circumstances and to be capable of making decisions necessary for managing one's life. Children, on the other hand, must demonstrate a reduction in their inhibitions in both play and learning. They must also be able to use speech to its full capacity in their analysis before it can be terminated. Melanie Klein (1975c) has adopted this criterion because she believes "language constitutes the bridge to reality." (p.14) (1932). Furthermore, the conflicts and anxieties related to the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions must have been sufficiently analyzed and worked through before an analysis should be ended. The patient should have also attained a strong heterosexual attitude and the transference having been satisfactorily analyzed should be resolved. In conclusion, Melanie Klein (1975c) states that "the transition to puberty, and from it to maturity, seems to me to be the test of whether a child analysis has been carried far enough or not" (p.52) (1932).

Limitations of Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis like every psychological discipline and technique has its limitations. Initially, however, Melanie Klein wrote with great optimism, seeing psychoanalysis as having very few limits to what it could achieve. With increased experience and understanding of man and herself, she came to realize and to set forth the limitations of

her technique. First and foremost it must be pointed out that a complete and permanent cure does not exist. There always exists in the personality some degree of anxiety related to the early anxiety situations that continues to operate throughout life. Therefore, the quantity and quality of the anxiety present and the nature of the ego's main defense mechanisms all set limits on the degree of success that can be achieved in psychoanalysis. Moreover, psychoanalysis does not put an end to the points of pre-genital fixation or to sadism, it only reduces their influence on the personality. Similarly, it is possible to transform into genital libido only a portion and not the whole amount of a patient's pre-genital libido.

Melanie Klein also came to realize that there are innate factors within the individual which also prevent a complete cure. She believed that people were born with varying degrees of inherent hate, greed, envy, and that individuals also differed in respect to the amount of pain, suffering, and anxiety they could bear. In the end, Klein came to the conclusion that the most terrifying and destructive part of the personality could never be completely integrated with the rest because no one could tolerate the depressive pain this would entail.

Summary

After reading this chapter it is quite evident that there were many shifts in Klein's thinking and theorizing.

during her career. Before concluding this section I would like to present a chronological summary of the more significant changes in her work.

Her thinking in regard to the Oedipus complex underwent several revisions over the years. In 1923 she moved the onset of the Oedipus complex back from age five to between the second and third year of a child's life. This shift was the result of an attempt by Klein to account for the anxiety in the pavor nocturnus of children younger than five and also to accommodate Freud's belief that the superego developed as the heir to the Oedipus complex. Two years later the onset of this complex was moved back to the time of weaning. This shift was based on Melanie Klein's discovery that a number of young female patients chose their father as love-objects on being weaned. The final change came in 1945 when Melanie Klein linked the start of the Oedipus complex to the onset of the depressive position. It was now proposed that love not deprivation in conjunction with libido propelled the child forward to find new objects. This final change was based on clinical findings and Klein presented a good deal of clinical data which she felt supported her conclusions.

Based on Ferenczi's contention that the essence of identification was the young child's early attempts to re-discover its own organs and activities in the different objects it encountered, Klein in 1925 claimed that iden-

tification was a stage of development prior to symbol formation. Two years later she introduced the notion that an identification with a whole object can form the basis of a symptom. She arrived at this conclusion after psychoanalyzing a boy with a tic. Her findings in this case added support to Abraham's work of 1921, which stated that the object-relations must be fully understood for a tic to be analyzed. Abraham's work was a significant factor in forming the basis of Melanie Klein's thinking in regard to the importance of understanding object-relations for psychoanalysis. Then in 1928 Klein introduced a new concept known as the femininity phase. She postulated, based on her clinical experience, that both sexes experienced a strong identification with their mother. The next shift in her thinking came in 1934 with her reference to an identification to part-objects, namely the mother's breast. Finally in 1946 Klein introduced the concept of projective identification. This hypothesis was based on clinical findings and also Ferenczi's work on early forms of identification. Later in 1955 Klein also made a reference to Freud's paper on "Group Psychology" (1921) in which he described and appeared to be aware of an identification by projection but he had failed to differentiate and label it as such.

Previous to 1927 Klein, like Freud, assumed that the superego began at the close of the Oedipus complex around age five. However, due to the nature of the young child's

superego (i.e. it was composed of parental figures who bite, cut, and devour), it seemed more plausible to her that a child of one would introject these types of objects rather than a child of four or five. Therefore, she hypothesized that the superego began to develop at the start of the Oedipus complex around the beginning of the second year of life. In 1932 Klein differentiated the early superego from the developed superego. The former was experienced in the psyche as anxiety and the later as guilt. There was no theoretical rationale for this statement, it was founded solely on clinical evidence. Two years later when she presented her concept of the depressive position, the theoretical rationale became crystalized. During this same year, 1934, Klein proposed that the superego began with the first incorporations of an object after birth. Melanie Klein claimed that the evidence for this conclusion came from her own and her English colleagues observations of young children. In 1948 Klein stated that she believed the depressive position began to develop intermittently during the paranoid-schizoid position. She also posited that guilt could therefore be experienced during the paranoid-schizoid position. The last major change in Klein's thinking about the superego came in 1958. The early superego was now said not to be extreme or terrifying but to develop with the life and death instincts predominantly in a state of fusion. The most terrifying and immutable

figures resided not in the superego but in a split off unconscious part of the mind where they remained unintegrated and unmodified by normal developmental processes. This dramatic shift was accompanied by very little supportive evidence. There was no case material presented nor was there any reference to similar ideas having been put forward by other theorists.

In 1924 Klein spoke of envy as primarily a response to the frustration experienced during the Oedipus complex. However, with the advent of the femininity phase in 1928, a child's envy was now viewed as also being provoked by the mother's ability to have a child. The first indication of a shift came in 1952 when Klein mentioned that "envy appears to be inherent in oral greed" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.79) (1952). This finding was said to be due to her psychoanalytic work with patients. Five years later her major theoretical work on this subject Envy and Gratitude was published. In it she expressed the belief that envy operated from the beginning of life, had a constitutional basis, and was an oral and anal-sadistic expression of destructive impulses. Melanie Klein linked her conclusions with Abraham's belief that envy was an oral trait and that there was a constitutional element in the strength of oral impulses. In addition, she indicated that Abraham's work, like her own, stressed the importance of destructive impulses in the development and functioning of the mind. The final source of her hypotheses about envy came from psychoanalyzing adults and children.

Finally, it was the year 1934 that marked the beginning of a major re-orientation in Melanie Klein's thinking. The primary focus of her theorizing was now centered around object-relations. It was at this point that she introduced her concept of positions and in particular the depressive position. Klein states quite specifically that the depressive position was based on clinical evidence. Then in 1946 she postulated the existence of the paranoid-schizoid position. Melanie Klein based her concept of the two positions on the evidence derived from the child's symbolization and repetition in the transference of early object-relations and anxieties concerning whole and part-objects. By 1948 she had changed her view slightly and now proposed that depressive anxiety could occur on a transient basis during the paranoid-schizoid position. She stated that " this modification is the result of further work on the earliest stages of the ego and a fuller recognition of the gradual nature of the infant's emotional development" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.35) (1948).

In conclusion, it would appear from this summary of the shifts in Melanie Klein's theorizing that the majority of them were based on insights gleaned from psychoanalyzing patients and also the works of Abraham, Ferenczi, and Freud.

Now that I have outlined Klein's basic theoretical tenets, we will proceed to a comparison of her work with classical psychoanalytic theory. This chapter will help to demonstrate both the originality of many of Melanie Klein's concepts and also the direct historical relationship of her

work to classical psychoanalytic theory.

Chapter III

An Historical Summary of Perceived
Differences and Similarities Between
Classical and Kleinian Psychoanalysis

No two individuals who possess brilliant and creative minds will ever approach any topic in an exactly identical manner. Their own personal qualities and characteristics will influence the manner in which they conceptualize and formulate the data they are presented with. It is therefore not surprising to find that Melanie Klein's psychoanalytic concepts are not a carbon copy of Freud's or other classical psychoanalysts, such as Abraham or Jones. There are similarities and there are differences. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical summary and synthesis of the areas of agreement and disagreement between these two approaches to psychoanalysis as they have been elucidated by different authors over the years. Therefore, this section will deal only with the historically significant issues of agreement and disagreement. For purposes of clarity please note that Segal, Money-Kyrle, Rosenfeld, Isaacs, Heimann, and Riviere can be classified as representing the Kleinian point of view unless otherwise specified. All other mentioned authors represent individuals espousing ideas which differ from Klein's by varying degrees.

Several authors have made statements about the general nature of the theories of Freud and Klein. Glover (1945) quotes a fellow analyst, Lantos' as saying that both Freud and Klein are basing their work on behavioral observations and in that respect

they are similar. However, their differences lie in that they don't interpret this data in a like manner. Guntrip (1961) feels that Klein's "work is a development from and beyond Freud's ego-analysis and his structural theory" (p.215). He agrees with Wisdom (1956) that Klein's is an object-relation theory and states that it is therefore incompatible with the classical instinct theory. He is also of the opinion that Freud and Klein actually studied the development of two very different qualities of psychic life, namely the libidinal and the aggressive. In a later article, Wisdom (1962) points out that with respect to structure the two theories are identical, except "for the location of the target of ambivalence" (p.113). Klein, herself, considered her work to be a natural development of classical psychoanalytic thinking. It was not meant to supplant classical theory but to extend its evolution.

The Unconscious

There can be very little doubt that with regards to acknowledging the unconscious and the fact that it plays an important role in man's life, Melanie Klein is definitely in accordance with classical thinking. However, with respect to nature of the unconscious, Wisdom (1971) states that Freud and Klein differ. According to the Kleinian model, when individuals are confronted with distress they resort to splitting. The two aspects of the personality are kept apart to reduce the distress. The division that has resulted in the uncon-

scious using Wisdom's terminology is along a vertical plane. It is visualized as a vertical imaginary line that separates one side from the other. While in the Freudian framework, repression by an unconscious part of the superego on an unconscious portion of the id or ego would have occurred. This division for Wisdom is along a horizontal plane. Therefore, the imaginary line of separation is drawn horizontally through the mind. Wisdom also mentions that splitting is usually followed by a projection, thus indicating an additional division between inner and outer areas of the mind. A division which Freud regards as the exception rather than the rule. Wisdom is pointing out a fundamental difference in the way Freud and Klein conceive of the unconscious part of the mind operating. Klein has also been accused of eliminating a very fundamental division of the entire psyche. Glover (1945) was one of the first to charge her with having undermined and blurred the classical distinction between unconscious, preconscious, and conscious systems. Glover, who at one time was a follower of Klein but by 1945 had become a bitter adversary, is correct in pointing out that Klein rarely acknowledged the topographical divisions of the mind as presented by Freud. There is however no indication that this was done with malice as Glover's remark would imply.

Narcissism, Auto-Eroticism, and Object-Relations

Anna Freud, as quoted by Glover (1945) says that

Freudian theory states that when life begins the child goes through a narcissistic and auto-erotic phase lasting several months. This phase is said to occur prior to the development of object-relations in the proper sense of the term. It is acknowledged, however, that the rudiments of object-relations are beginning to develop during this earlier phase of narcissism and auto-eroticism. Anna Freud states that

it is ... in agreement with the Freudian conception of a narcissistic beginning of life to conceive of auto-eroticism as an intrinsic source of pleasure, independent of relations to the object.
(p.102)

Joan Riviere (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) speaking as a representative of Klein and her teachings has challenged these remarks and has stated that 'the distinction between object-relations in the proper sense and rudiments of object-relationships is invalid unless by proper sense, Anna Freud is referring to fully-developed adult object-relationships. Since Melanie Klein, herself, doesn't believe the child from birth onwards is capable of adult object-relations but only the beginning of very primitive part-object relations, there seems to be very little cause for disagreement. Zetzel (1953) feels that Melanie Klein has not only ignored the concept of narcissism and failed to show its relationship to her own work but she has also replaced it and substituted her concept of

internal object-relations. This results in a focusing on the processes of projection and introjection and the aggressive instinct rather than narcissism. Guntrip (1961) and Wisdom (1962) have both stated that Melanie Klein's theory is incompatible with the classical concept of primary narcissism. Wisdom elaborated on this point by explaining that whenever Klein referred to narcissism, it was secondary and not primary narcissism. Since primary narcissism is characterized by an absence of object-relationships, the total amount of libido remains within the ego and is not as yet invested in an external object. Unfortunately, Freud himself is not consistent in his statements about stages of auto-eroticism and narcissism preceding object-relations.

In the first instance the oral component instinct finds satisfaction by attaching itself to the sating of the desire for nourishment; and its object is the mother's breast. It then detaches itself, becomes independent and at the same time auto-erotic, that is, it finds an object in the child's own body. (Freud, 1923, Standard Edition XVIII, p.245)

Klein refers to this quotation as indicating that Freud is referring to an object to which libido is attached prior to either auto-eroticism or narcissism. She believes that both external and internal object-relations exist contemporaneously with auto-eroticism and narcissism.

I shall briefly restate my hypothesis: auto-eroticism and narcissism include the love for and relation with the internalized good object which in phantasy forms part of the loved body and self. It is to this internalized object that in auto-erotic gratification and narcissistic states a withdrawal takes place. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.51) (1952)

It is important to note that Klein is referring to states while Freud uses the term stages to denote auto-eroticism and narcissism. They are not stages of development for Klein, but rather as Heimann (1973) has remarked, modes of behavior. Therefore, Freud and Klein definitely differ over the issue of narcissism and auto-eroticism being stages as opposed to just modes of behavior. Although Freud is mentioning an object-relation prior to narcissism and auto-eroticism, he did not believe as Klein did that these two stages involved object-relations. Furthermore, Zetzel is correct in stating that narcissism plays virtually no role in Klein's theory and that she has interpreted the concept of narcissism in terms of object-relations. Similarly, Wisdom and Guntrip have illustrated a valid distinction between Freud and Klein in regard to primary and secondary narcissism.

The Ego

Many authors, including Klein, have stated that there are differences in hers and the classical concept of the ego. Yorke (1971) has stated that Klein predominantly uses the term "ego" to represent "the self" and as a result, she has no term in her work which represents the classical definition of the ego. For Yorke, the distinction between Freud's ego, id, and superego has been replaced by a "self". Klein nowhere in her work admits to this but she does explicitly indicate that she

does not agree that the ego and the id are as differentiated as Freud indicates. After pointing out that "Freud stated that the ego differentiates itself from the id by the repression-resistance barrier" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.244)(1958), she proceeds to state her view that no repression is absolute. Consequently, no differentiation between the ego and the id can be absolute. Furthermore, she states that

the conscious and unconscious parts of the ego are therefore not separated by a rigid barrier; as Freud described it, in speaking of the different areas of the mind, they are shaded off into each other. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.244)(1958)

The question as to whether or not the ego is present from birth onwards has been cited (Guntrip, 1961) as an area of disagreement between Klein and Freud. For Melanie Klein, the ego is present from the beginning of post-natal life and its first task is to deflect the anxiety of the death instinct outwards. Freud, in contrast, does not believe the ego is present from the beginning. "It is impossible to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego can exist in the individual from the very start; the ego has to develop" (Freud, Collected Papers 1950 IV, p.34). There can be little doubt that not only does Klein assume the ego is present at birth but she also feels that it has a higher degree of organization than Freud would agree to. The ego is capable of experiencing anxiety and of defending itself by means of projection, introjection and splitting. Furthermore it possesses a drive towards integration and synthesis

and is able to form object-relations. Segal (1973), on the other hand, has indicated that Freud's position on this issue may not be unequivocal. She is referring to the deflection of the death instinct, which Freud attributes to the organism not to a separate entity called the ego. She also mentions that "his concept of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment implies an ego capable of forming a phantasy object relationship" (p.24). However, more recently, Segal (1979) has indicated that Freud used the word organism to indicate that he considers "it a biological and not a psychological entity" (p.114). This difference of opinion, as to when to date the origin of the ego, points up a fundamental difference between Freud and Klein i.e. her approach to psychoanalysis has always been to trace concepts back to their earliest possible precursors. She did this not only for the ego but also for the superego and the Oedipus complex. In each instance, she saw these first rudimentary beginnings as part of the later fully developed concept. Freud, possibly because he worked with adults, appears to wait until the earlier rudiments have developed further and are more integrated before he labels them as representative of the concept; be it ego, superego or Oedipus complex. Consequently, when Freud, as quoted above, refers to "a unity comparable to the ego", he, by the very use of the word "unity", is referring to an entity that has attained a level of development far beyond Melanie Klein's early ego.

Klein would certainly agree with Freud that there is nothing at birth comparable to an ego possessing unity. According to her, the early infantile ego is "an ego which has some rudiments of integration and cohesion, and progresses increasingly in that direction" (M. Klein, 1975a, p. 71) (1952). This quotation also implies that, as Freud stated, the ego must develop over time. It does not emerge as a fully integrated entity. Heimann (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) has referred to this early ego as an incipient ego. This view of Heimann's would tend also to dispel Guntrip's (1961) charge that Kleinians view the ego as "a whole entity from the beginning" (p.238).

Freud and Klein also differ over the issue of how the ego enriches itself. Freud contends that this is a constant process by which the ego enriches itself from the id. Klein, however, believes that the internal enrichment of the ego occurs as a result of projection and re-introjection of the good breast. In conclusion, Kernberg (1975) states that both Freud and Klein agree "that the ego originates from the common matrix of the ego and the id in an effort to deal with reality" (p.642). It appears, in summary, that the main points of disagreement between Freud and Klein concerning the ego lie in the areas of timing of its onset, how it is enriched, the degree to which it is differentiated from the id, and the lack of clear distinction in Klein's work between the ego and the concept of self. The timing of the onset of the ego as a psychological structure is a very real distinction not because Freud is unaware of processes going on in the first days of life but because he doesn't link

these, as Klein does, with the first sign of the existence of an incipient ego. The question of how the ego enriches itself and the degree of the differentiation between the id and ego are I believe very straightforward and valid differences between these two theorists. However, the issue as to whether or not Melanie Klein muddles together the concepts of the ego and self and therefore loses any clear classical definition of the ego is not straightforward. The problem appears to lie with Melanie Klein's concept of object-relations. At times she speaks quite clearly about the ego, id, and superego and the reader knows exactly which hypothetical psychic structure Klein is referring to. Unfortunately, when Melanie Klein talks in terms of object-relations it is often difficult to understand whether the object-relations referred to pertain to the ego, id, superego, or the self. Consequently, the clarity of the classical structural dimensions can easily become blurred and obscured in the Kleinian approach.

The Superego

The psychoanalytic concept of the superego is another focal point for both discord and agreement between Kleinian and classical psychoanalysis. The final position of both Freud and Klein was that the superego originates from a split off portion of the ego and that it is mainly uncon-

cious and is comprised of introjected qualities of the parents. They differ in the fact that Melanie Klein believes that the superego begins to develop with the child's first introjections, while Freud contends that the superego begins much later in the child's life, around the age of five and is the heir of the Oedipus complex. In fact, it was Freud's view that the superego brought about the decline of the Oedipus complex. Heimann (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) has advanced a very interesting criticism of Freud's position.

Freud thought that the super-ego, which steps into the place of the Oedipus complex, contributes to its very decline. This seems a difficult position. If the super-ego is the successor of the Oedipus complex and owes its origin to its destruction, it seems difficult to understand how it can help to bring about its decline. (pp.132-133)

This difference of several years as to the onset of the superego meant that for Klein, the superego was present in some rudimentary form from the beginning and played a part in the entire process of mental development. Freud on the other hand, postulated that the child's development proceeded for many years before it was influenced in any way by the superego. His writings on the subject of identification do reveal some inconsistency in his conclusions about the onset of the superego. According to Freud, the superego was formed by means of parental identifications. However, Riviere and Heimann (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) both refer to the fact that Freud explici-

tly indicates in his work that he is aware of early parental identifications which precede the decline of the Oedipus complex and the formation of the superego. Freud (1932), in talking about the loss of the object that occurs with the decline of the Oedipus complex, states that "to compensate for this loss of objects, identification with the parents, which have probably long been present, become greatly intensified" (Standard Edition XXII, p.87).

Klein points out that she and Freud also differ over the question of when the fear of death enters into the superego. She contends that it is present from the beginning, while Freud sees it as a final transformation.

The final transformation which the fear of the super-ego undergoes is, it seems to me, the fear of death (or fear for life) which is a fear of the super-ego projected on to the powers of destiny. (Freud, 1926, Standard Edition XX, p.140)

In addition to the earlier points of agreement, both authors also stressed the fact that anatomical differences between boys and girls are responsible for some of the differences present in the superego of both sexes. Klein, however, felt they differed in the fact that Freud emphasized the influence of the father and neglected a detailed outline of the mother's role in the formation of the super-ego. For Melanie Klein, the mother's breast was the first object the superego introjected in its development and it therefore played a central role in the superego of both sexes.

Two main contentions of Melanie Klein's concept of the

superego were that its severe and punitive nature was a consequence of the child's own sadistic impulses and therefore that the child's superego is not a true representation of the actual parental figures. Freud, late in his career, agreed with Melanie Klein on both these issues.

The original severity of the super-ego does not—or does not so much—represent the severity which one has experienced from it {the object}, or which one attributes to it; it represents rather one's own aggressiveness towards it. (Freud, 1930, Standard Edition XXI, pp.129-130)

Experience shows, however, that the severity of the super-ego which a child develops in no way corresponds to the severity of treatment which he has himself met with. (Freud, 1930, Standard Edition XXI, p.130)

Melanie Klein (1975c), in addition, also cites the name of several prominent classical psychoanalysts, i.e. Jones, Glover, Searl, Riviere, who agree with her "that the child's early phantasy life and libidinal development play a large part in the evolution of the super-ego" (M. Klein, 1975c, p.138) (1932). Regardless of the similarities and differences, it is important to remember that what Freud referred to as the superego represented to Melanie Klein the end result of a long development lasting several years.

The Oedipus Complex

The classical Oedipus situation has often been recognized as an area of controversy and disagreement between Freud and Klein. According to the classical view, the Oedipus complex begins to develop around the age of three or four. Klein, in contradistinction to Freud, holds that

it begins with the dawning of the depressive position, around the first four to six months of life. Therefore in Klein's view, pre-genital and genital trends both play an important part in the development of the Oedipus complex. Freud attributes far less importance to the pre-genital trends, since he feels the Oedipus situation emerges under the dominance of the phallic phase. The period from three to five years of age which Freud has designated as the time of the Oedipus complex, Klein sees rather as representing the climax of the Oedipal situation. A climax which has resulted after many, many months of prior development. For Freud, these early months of life represent a pre-Oedipal phase. During this period, Freud contends that the girl is solely attached to her mother. Klein alternatively states that both sexes are experiencing direct and inverted Oedipal desires for both parents during these first years of life. Furthermore, she felt that both sexes had an unconscious knowledge of the vagina and the penis. Freud disagreed. Brierley (1951) states that "Freud thought the vagina remained unknown to both sexes and that the infantile genital primacy was exclusively phallic" (pp.84-85).

According to Freud, it is the castration complex (i.e. the girl's discovery that she does not possess a penis) that initiates the girl's Oedipus complex. The girl turns from her mother to her father when she realizes that her mother is not going to give her a penis and in fact does not possess one herself. Freud, thus, sees the girl's

turning to her father as the result of penis envy. That is the wish to have a penis of her own. It is only later that this desire becomes a wish for a child from him. Although Melanie Klein agrees with Freud that at a point in her life the little girl does phantasize her mother as actually possessing a penis, this belief has a far less significant role to play in her theory. Klein maintains that initially the girl turns to the penis as an object of oral gratification. The oral desires also include a mixture of genital ones and the wish to incorporate the father's penis is an expression of Oedipal impulses. Therefore, the girl arrives at the Oedipus complex due to her feminine instinctual components, since the girl equates the penis with the child. "The feminine desire to internalize the penis and to receive a child from her father invariably precedes the wish to possess a penis of her own" (M. Klein, 1973, p.390) (1945). Moreover, penis-envy is viewed by Klein as having its roots really in feelings of envy for the mother's breast. It originates primarily from oral sadism and becomes linked to the male genital through the infant's equating the penis with the breast.

Freud held the opinion that it was fear of castration that caused the boy to repress his Oedipal desires. While Melanie Klein concurred that this was the leading male anxiety, she refrained from designating it as the sole factor in bringing about the repression of the Oedipus

complex. Klein, unlike Freud, believed that fear of castration began in infancy and resulted from the boy's own oral sadistic projections of biting off the father's penis. She felt that as the boy's depressive feelings developed that love and guilt also played prominent roles in curtailing the desires of the Oedipus situation.

In my experience the Oedipal situation loses in power not only because the boy is afraid of the destruction of his genital by a revengeful father, but also because he is driven by feelings of love and guilt to preserve his father as an internal and external figure. (M. Klein, 1973, p.389) (1945)

Sexual Development, Libido, Regression and Fixation

In addition to the differences that exist between these two psychoanalysts concerning the Oedipus complex, many others have been noted in regards to sexual development, libido, regression and fixation. Melanie Klein, in her writings, has shown that sexual impulses and intercourse itself, can in phantasy represent a means of making reparation to internal objects. Indeed, this reparative phantasy associated with sexual intercourse does contribute to an individual's, not only adopting, but also maintaining, a heterosexual position. Yorke (1971) believes that Klein has severely reduced the role of Freud's concept of libido in heterosexual development by the introduction and emphasis on the part that reparation plays. Furthermore, he also states that Klein and Freud did not view the concept of

libido in the same light. Libido, in and of itself, does not generate anxiety according to Klein. She demonstrates this point when discussing the effects of incestuous sexual relations between children.

Whether its effects will ultimately be good or bad—whether it will protect the child from anxiety or increase it—seems to depend upon the extent of his own sadism more especially upon the attitude of his parents. From my knowledge of a number of cases, I shall say that where the positive and libidinal factors predominate, such a relationship has a favorable influence upon the child's object relations and capacity for love; but where destructive impulses and even acts of coercion on one side dominate, it can impair the whole development of the child in the gravest way.
(M. Klein, 1975c, p.119) (1932)

Therefore, sexuality even of an incestuous nature, does not necessarily result in a disturbance and anxiety unless it is sadistic. Yorke (1971) however, explains that for Freud, libido did not always represent something good. Anxiety did arise with respect to "libidinal incestuous impulses or erotic drives as such" (p.149), in the form of castration anxiety. It therefore appears that Yorke is right in concluding that Freud and Klein view libido in a different light. The difference appears to lie in the fact that Klein views the effects of libido as dependent on other emotions or individual's actions. Freud, on the other hand, conceived of libido in and of itself as being able to cause anxiety. Glover (1945) has also noted that Klein deviated from Freudian theory when she maintained that libidinal primacies emerge due to a conflict with aggressive impulses. He believes that in many areas of her work she has not adhered to Freud's libidinal theory.

The concept of specific dominant phases or stages in development is fundamental to classical psychoanalysis. These phases are linked very closely with specific erotogenic zones. In fact, Glover points out that she has eliminated the concept of a phallic phase occurring in females.

In my view, infants of both sexes experience genital desires directed towards their mother and father, and they have an unconscious knowledge of the vagina as well as of the penis. For these reasons Freud's earlier term "genital phase" seems to me more adequate than his later concept of the "phallic phase". (M. Klein, 1973, pp.387-388) (1945)

It would appear from Klein's remarks that she has replaced one Freudian concept by another which she believes is more adequate. She has not abandoned the concept of stages of development and moreover she feels that a failure to adequately experience either libidinal or aggressive impulses at their designated stage of development will result in disturbances later. But Klein, unlike Freud, certainly does not stress the stages of development in her work. Instead, she refers to object-relations.

In his article Glover quotes the psychoanalyst Friedlander as saying that Klein does not subscribe to the biological development of the libido. This, he concludes, results in far less emphasis and importance being placed on the mechanism of regression. Guntrip (1961) has also indicated that because of the overlap of genital impulses being introduced during the oral phase Klein's work has allowed very little room for regression as Freud understood it. Moreover, Yorke (1971) proposed that for Klein regression and fixation meant only a return to the paranoid-schizoid or depressive position. He also feels she has disregarded the classical causes of regression. However, a

reference directly from Melanie Klein's work provides only partial support for Yorke's position.

The libidinal development is thus at every step influenced by anxiety. For anxiety leads to fixation to pre-genital stages and again and again to regression to them.
(M. Klein, 1975a, p.82) (1952)

Thus, regression for Klein is not simply a return to the paranoid-schizoid or depressive position. It also involves a regression to pre-genital stages. Heimann and Isaacs (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) maintained that regression occurs in Kleinian theory as a result of the inability of libido "to master the destructive impulses and anxiety aroused by frustration" (p.187). This view is in direct opposition to Freud's contention that regression is caused by the damming-up of libido. As Segal (1979) points out regression and the concept of fixation occupy a far less prominent spot in Klein's theory, especially after her formulation of the paranoid-schizoid position.

Defense Mechanisms

The issue of psychological defenses is another area which has been utilized to express both the differences and similarities between classical and Kleinian psychoanalysis. Yorke (1971) contends that Klein does not put forth the classical view of what a defense is and he is struck also by how unsuccessful defenses appear to be in her concept of man's psyche. In contrast to this view, Winnicott (1965) holds that Melanie Klein's work on

defense mechanisms in relationship to primitive anxieties has helped elucidate Freud's theory. There can, however, be no disagreement over the fact that Klein did not hold that repression was the first defense to emerge.

According to what I have found in analysis, the earliest defence set up by the ego has reference to two sources of danger: the subject's own sadism and the object which is attacked. This defence, in conformity with the degree of the sadism, is of a violent character and differs fundamentally from the later mechanism of repression. In relation to the subject's own sadism the defence implies expulsion, whereas in relation to the object it implies destruction. (M. Klein, 1973, p.237) (1930)

Many years later, in Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963, she alluded to the fact that Freud had mentioned the possibility of methods of defense that pre-date repression in his "Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety". Unfortunately, she did not specify the exact reference that she felt indicated a sense of agreement between them. However, Segal (1979) does cite Abraham as one classical psychoanalyst who believes that there may be an earlier defense than repression. Klein, herself, held that projection, introjection, denial and splitting all preceded repression. The concept of repression was not presented by Klein, as it was Freud, as being "the corner-stone on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests" (Freud, 1914, Standard Edition XIV, p.16). Melanie Klein felt that repression begins during the second year of life and that it is founded on the earlier process of splitting. The degree to which splitting was

used in the early months of life directly influences the consolidation between the unconscious and conscious parts of the mind and consequently, determines the extent to which repression may serve as a defense later on. The splitting that takes place in repression is mainly between conscious and unconscious. "In repression the more highly organized ego divides itself off against the unconscious thoughts, impulses, and terrifying figures more effectively" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.244)(1958). Wisdom (1971) noted Freud's emphasis on repression as being fundamental to his conception of man's psyche and his world. He correctly contrasted this, to Klein's, which he felt was heavily based on the concepts of splitting and projection. He concluded that this pointed to a difference in their complete outlook.

Projection and introjection are two mental mechanisms both classical and Kleinian psychoanalysts recognize as operating in the psyche. Melanie Klein in her writings has acknowledged her debt and gratitude to Freud, Abraham, and Ferenczi. Her divergence from classical theory lies in the central role she attributes to projection and introjection not only in the development and functioning of the ego but also of the entire psyche. In addition, Freud held that projection developed much later than Klein and was mainly related to paranoia.

Emotional States

Anxiety. The area of affects, such as anxiety, love, envy, and guilt, is another broad category which illustrates

many points of convergence and divergence. From the beginning and throughout her entire career, Klein always stressed the crucial part that anxiety played in understanding the development of man. A great deal of her work was devoted to expanding and clarifying the classical viewpoint of anxiety. Klein saw anxiety as having the potential to be either an extremely malevolent force or a tremendous impetus to growth and development. If the quality and quantity of anxiety was too excessive for the ego to deal with the result would be serious illness and inhibitions in development. However, if the ego did not become overwhelmed by anxiety, it could spur the person on to further achievements in areas such as art, knowledge, or human relations. Thus, for Melanie Klein, the issue of anxiety and how well an individual copes with it became a pre-requisite for further development. According to Klein (1975a), the primary cause of anxiety is "the danger which threatens the organism from the death instinct" (p.28) (1948). She states that she is of the opinion that Freud's writings on the struggle between the life and death instincts leads to this conclusion. Klein also cites a quote from Freud which she feels expresses his belief that instinctual anxiety derived from the destructive instinct can become a part of reality anxiety.

It may quite often happen that although

a danger-situation is correctly estimated in itself, a certain amount of instinctual anxiety is added to the realistic anxiety. In that case the instinctual demand before whose satisfaction the ego recoils is a masochistic one: the instinct of destruction directed against the subject himself. Perhaps an addition of this kind explains cases in which reactions of anxiety are exaggerated, inexpedient or paralysing. (Freud, 1926, Standard Edition XX, p.168n)

Unfortunately, Freud did not believe that the unconscious had any conception of what it means to die, to cease existing. Therefore, his position is not in agreement with the Kleinian viewpoint. Freud's original view was that anxiety was the result of a transformation of undischarged libido. Later, he adopted the position

that anxiety arises automatically whenever the psyche is overwhelmed by an influx of stimuli too great to be mastered or discharged. Such automatic anxiety may arise in response to stimuli either of external or of internal origin, but most frequently it arises from the id, that is, from the drives (id anxiety)....

There is a second type of anxiety, characteristic of the psychoneuroses, which Freud called signal anxiety. In the course of development, the child learns to anticipate the advent of a traumatic situation and reacts to this possibility with anxiety before the situation becomes traumatic. The unpleasure arising from this threat of a danger situation automatically sets into operation the pleasure principle. The latter acts by enabling the ego to check or inhibit whatever id impulses might be giving rise to the danger situation. (Hinsie & Campbell, 1977, p.49)

There were two types of anxieties for Freud, one related to the loss of the object and the other was castration

anxiety. Klein on the other hand explains that she has arrived at her view as to the origin of anxiety both from analytic observation and deductive reasoning. She believed that if you assumed there was such a thing as a death instinct operating within the mind, it was quite logical to therefore have assumed that the mind would respond to this instinct with a fear of annihilation.

Segal (1964) believes that Klein's emphasis on aggression rather than libido is in accordance with Freud's later theory of anxiety. While Greenson (1974) and Yorke (1971) both point out the discrepancy between Freud's concept of signal anxiety and Klein's definition of the origin of anxiety. Instead of expanding the concept of anxiety, Yorke accuses Klein of reducing Freud's different danger situations to those of either the paranoid-schizoid or depressive positions. In his paper on Kleinian theory, Glover (1945) states that Melanie Klein proposes that in situations where introjection and projection have led to a state of confusion regarding the real and phantasied object of danger, that the real object lends only a little to this anxiety situation. He feels that this conviction is in direct disagreement with Freudian theory which stresses the importance and the vital role that external real dangers play. It is important to note here, that Klein held that all perception of external reality and external objects was affected by unconscious phantasies. Consequently, she contended that there was an interplay between external

and internal sources of anxiety. The result being that "external experiences which rouse anxiety at once activate even in normal persons anxiety derived from intrapsychic sources" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.40) (1948)

Finally, the question as to what is the earliest anxiety situation also is a source of contention. Freud held that for boys it was castration anxiety and that for girls it was a fear of loss of love, of being alone, and abandoned by their mother. According to Klein, the girl's most basic anxiety situation is a fear that her mother will attack and destroy the inside of her body and rob her of her imaginary children. With respect to males, Klein agrees with Freud that castration anxiety is their most basic anxiety. However, she does add that due to the feminine phase in the male's development, the girl's leading anxiety also has an important effect on the male's development as well.

Therefore, despite the attempt of Klein and her followers to establish a direct link between her work and Freud's, there still appears to be serious differences. For instance, Freud didn't believe the unconscious could conceive of its own death and while signal anxiety may imply aggressive impulses, automatic anxiety does not necessarily. Furthermore, neither automatic or signal anxiety are really equivalent to the anxiety of the paranoid-schizoid or depressive positions.

Guilt. Guilt is another emotion that illustrates differences and similarities between Freud and Klein's theories. Freud maintained that the child first experienced guilt following the Oedipus complex; guilt was due to an internalized fear of punish-

ment. Klein felt guilt arose from the child feeling that his aggressive impulses and phantasies had harmed his loved object. She also believed that guilt feelings set in much earlier in life than Freud.

The earliest feelings of guilt in both sexes derive from the oral-sadistic desires to devour the mother, and primarily her breasts (Abraham). It is therefore in infancy that feelings of guilt arise. Guilt does not emerge when the Oedipus complex comes to an end, but is rather one of the factors which from the beginning mould its course and affect its outcome. (M. Klein, 1973, p.388) (1945)

Guilt is first experienced in the paranoid-schizoid position during transient states of integration in relation to part-objects.

Despite these differences, Klein lists several quotes from Freud in her work which tend to indicate that he felt guilt feelings were present prior to the Oedipus complex and furthermore are linked to the aggressive impulses.

As a result of the inborn conflict arising from ambivalence, of the external struggle between the trends of love and death—there is inextricably bound up with it an increase of the sense of guilt. (Freud, 1930, Standard Edition XXI, p.133)

It is after all only the aggressiveness which is transformed into a sense of guilt, by being suppressed and made over to the super-ego. I am convinced that many processes will admit a simpler and clearer exposition if the findings of psycho-analysis with regard to the derivation of the sense of guilt are restricted to the aggressive instincts. (Freud, 1930, Standard Edition XXI, p.138)

Melanie Klein takes Freud's remarks that guilt arises from aggression and that there is an inborn conflict of ambiva-

lence as indicating that guilt emerges very early in the development of the child. Abraham is also cited by Klein as being in agreement with her concerning the origin of guilt, since he indicated that there was a link between guilt and cannibalistic desires. However, due to Freud's inconsistency about the onset of feelings of guilt it is very difficult to accurately assess the degree of agreement or disagreement on this point.

Freud and Klein did agree on the relationship between the sense of guilt and crime. Both of them held the view that guilt did not arise from crime but rather that crime arises as a result of a sense of guilt. The crime is committed with the desire to be caught and punished and thus relieve the sense of guilt.

Envy. The next emotion that has aroused controversy is envy. In her paper on envy, Klein pointed out that Abraham's and her views coincided with respect to envy being seen as an oral trait and also that there is a constitutional element in that trait. Their concept of envy diverges with respect to its onset. Melanie Klein believes envy operates from the first day of a child's life but Abraham felt it started later at the child's second oral-sadistic stage. In his paper on envy, Joffe (1969) stresses the fact that Abraham saw envy as only one of many possible types of oral sadism. He also mentions that Freud referred to envy as a secondary manifestation. In contrast, Klein spoke of envy as being a primary instinctual motivating force. Wisdom (1971) also explains that Freud would not have agreed with "the Kleinian modification... of oral envy to

fit an object-relational mold" (p.334). All analysts are aware of the existence of envy but classical and Kleinian analysts seem to differ over whether or not it is a primary or secondary motivating force in man.

Love. In the same article, Wisdom also expresses the differences he sees in the way Freud and Klein conceive of love. Love, for Freud, is simply a by-product of excess libido. It is a derivative of this sexual energy, not a feeling distinct from, yet also encompassing sexual desires. Klein, however, presented love as having many components. The object of love was capable of giving pleasure, of being valued in and of itself, of being felt as lost and mourned for and finally of engendering concern and a desire to repair any harm inflicted upon it. According to Freud, love is simply a by-product of sex but for Melanie Klein love operates through sex therefore love and sex can have a common focus.

Mourning. If a love object is lost in both the classical and Kleinian theory, a period of mourning ensues. Kernberg (1975) explains that for Freud and Abraham, the process of mourning requires the mourner to test the reality of his loss over and over again. Through the gradual process of mourning he comes to detach his libido from the lost loved object. The mourner is assisted in overcoming his loss by his own narcissistic pleasure in still being alive. When the lost external object has been successfully

introjected the process of mourning comes to an end. For Freud, the normal process of mourning does not entail any sense of guilt.

For Melanie Klein, normal mourning repeats the processes of the depressive position and reinforces the synthetic processes of the ego by which bad and good part objects are integrated into whole objects, and by which the superego crystallizes and determines the experience of guilt over the aggression toward the good, ambivalently loved object. (Kernberg, 1975, p.646)

Klein's theory of mourning differs from Freud's in that mourning, by involving a repetition of the depressive position, entails feelings of guilt associated with that position. Thus, the mourner feels guilt for all the hostile feelings and phantasies he has ever had about his lost loved object. While, in Freud's conception of mourning, only the external object needs to be introjected. Klein's view also requires the introjection of the internal object, which she believes is also experienced as being lost. Besides a feeling of being grateful for still being alive, Klein believes that the mourner also experiences a sense of triumph over the lost object which retards the process of mourning. Freud disagrees with Klein. He doesn't feel that a phase of triumph is part of normal mourning. Klein's theory also includes the use of idealization which Freud makes no mention of. If the lost loved object could not be introjected because of excessive oral sadistic impulses which introduced feelings of ambivalence into the relation-

ship, then Freud and Abraham believed the mourner would experience melancholia. Mendelson (1960) explains that Freud and the other classical analysts saw the depression experienced during melancholia as a reparative mechanism. During melancholia punishment is inflicted upon the introjected object to atone for the injury it has caused the mourner by its loss. In Klein's opinion, the ambivalence Freud designates as being specific to melancholia, she regards as part of the normal mourning process. Similarly, Klein believes that the depressive anxieties are also part of normal mourning. Wisdom (1962) expresses the difference between the classical and Kleinian outlook on melancholia as being respectively, the difference between a loss that results in a narcissistic wound as compared to the dilemma of failing to effect a reparation. I think the essential difference is that Klein sees mourning as a more complex process involving the introjection of an internal object, the experiencing of more emotions (i.e. guilt, triumph, and depression), and the use of idealization.

The Death Instinct

The death instinct is a topic which in itself is highly controversial. The controversy that surrounds this area doesn't appear to be reduced even when we are discussing the perspectives of two authors who both adhere to the concept of the death instinct. Guntrip (1961) and Money-Kyrle (1966) have both stated that they believe Klein has accepted Freud's theory of a death instinct. There are however, other analysts who hold that Freud and Melanie Klein differed fundamentally in their

conception of instincts and the death instinct in particular. Joffe (1969) explains that Freud thought it was impossible to have direct knowledge of instinctual drives. He relied on conscious and unconscious ideational contents and affects in order to make inferences concerning their operating within the organism. Joffe informs us that Klein held that drives were knowable because she saw phantasies as the mental representatives of instincts. Another very basic difference is that Freud conceptualized the death instinct and also the life instinct in terms of biological processes while Klein conceived of them in strictly psychological terms. In fact, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Freud was opposed to the Kleinian belief that a fear of annihilation or death existed in the unconscious. Furthermore, Zetzel (1953 & 1956) says that Melanie Klein presents the death instinct as an active destructive impulse focused from the beginning of life against the self. While Freud conceived of it as a wish to return to an earlier state, the absolute rest of an inorganic state. Money-Kyrle (M. Klein, Heimann & Money-Kyrle, 1973) also notes a basic distinction in the way Klein and Freud conceive of the death instinct. He refers to their difference respectively as "a primary impulse to fear and to avoid death" (p.501) as compared to "a primary impulse to seek death" (p.501). He does not, however, feel that this difference must result in the exclusion of one from the other. More

recently, Wisdom (1971) has also alluded to the existence of a difference in the way Freud and Klein perceive the death instinct. He is of the opinion that Klein has modified Freud's original concept of the death instinct to accommodate her object-relations theory. A final point of divergence that has often been cited is that Freud regarded his theory of the death instinct as highly speculative whereas Klein regarded it as a definite force operating within the psyche.

To begin with, it was only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed here, but in the course of time they have gained such a hold upon me that I can no longer think in any other way.
(Freud, 1930, Standard Edition XXI, p.119)

While these remarks of Freud's do not lead one to believe that he regarded the death instinct as a proven fact, they do help to put the claims that he regarded the death instinct as simply speculative into a truer perspective. It is obvious from his own words that the death instinct, although unproven, occupied an important place in his thinking. Equally obvious is the fact that the above authors have illustrated many valid differences between Freud and Klein's death instinct.

Phantasy

The concept of phantasy has also been cited as a topic revealing a lack of harmony between Freud and Melanie Klein. Some of the differences that have been noted are really quite insignificant or as in some cases reflect a difference in emphasis. Guntrip (1961) points out that Melanie Klein has elucidated more types of primitive phan-

tasies in her work than Freud; while Wisdom (1971) has simply mentioned that she utilizes the concept of phantasy more than Freud in certain areas of her theory. Definitely, one of the earliest and most vehement exponents of the discontinuity that existed between the classical and Kleinian viewpoints of phantasy was Glover. Melanie Klein believed that phantasies existed from the beginning of life and are mental expressions of the instincts. Glover (1945) explains that Freud's idea of phantasy referred to a more complicated and revolutionary development which is not present at the child's birth but occurs much later. He also lists three criteria for the development of phantasy, "the failure of the hallucinatory process, the development of object formation and the action of repression." (p.100) and states that according to Freud phantasy is a product of frustration. In order to illustrate further discrepancies he points out that the Kleinian viewpoint of phantasy conflicts with the classical idea of narcissism and auto-eroticism. Heimann (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs & Riviere, 1973) disputes this conflict and feels that it is to a phantasy of a good internal breast that the child retreats to in auto-eroticism. Finally, Glover emphasizes the fact that in his theory Freud has demarcated several distinctions which occur in mental functioning e.g. an image, a memory trace, an hallucination. All of these and many others he feels are either subsumed, blurred or obliterated by the

Kleinian notion of phantasy. This he feels indicates a great discrepancy in these two approaches to psychoanalysis. There is little doubt that for Melanie Klein, phantasy was the basis of all mental functioning. However, because she discussed mental functioning, in what she believed to be its most elementary unit, this does not necessarily imply that she was opposed to Freud's mental distinctions, as cited by Glover. Writing on the topic of Kleinian theory at a much later date, Yorke (1971) also referred to the fact that Freud placed the emergence of phantasy at the time of the development of the reality principle. Thus its beginning was much later than Klein hypothesized.

Joan Riviere (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) attempted to demonstrate a link between Freudian theory and Klein's term phantasy. She explained that Freud's hypothesis, that the psyche makes an interpretation of reality by means of introjection and projection, which he designates as hallucination, is the basis of Kleinian's phantasy-life. Similarly, Isaacs (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) tried to demonstrate that although Freud did not state that "phantasies are the primary content of .. unconscious mental processes.... such a formulation is in essential alignment with his contributions" (p.82). She further proposed that Freud's description of the process of introjection, although it did not contain any specific mention of unconscious phantasies, was essentially in

agreement with Klein's view of phantasy operating at the beginning of life. In addition, Isaacs referred to comments Freud has made with regards to mental pain and oral frustration as also implying that phantasy can be deduced as being basic to them.

Reality

The question of reality, be it reality testing, distinguishing external from internal reality or several other issues dealing with reality, has been brought forth as a focal point of disharmony between Klein and Freud. Both of them of course acknowledge the existence of external and psychic reality. Zetzel (1956) believes that as a result of Melanie Klein's emphasis on the existence of an inborn instinctual conflict and an unconscious phantasy-life from birth that she stresses the importance of always interpreting external reality in the light of psychic reality to a far greater degree than Freud. Klein (1975a) states that

the young child's perception of external reality and external objects is perpetually influenced and coloured by his phantasies, and that this in some measure continues throughout life. (p.40) (1948)

She maintained that a recognition of intrapsychic reality was a precondition for a true understanding of external reality. She even makes reference to Ferenczi's article "Problem of the Acceptance of Unpleasant Ideas" (1926) in which she feels he expressed a similar view of reality.

Balint (1957) has listed four processes which he believes are essential for reality testing. He feels that both Freud and Klein concern themselves with only two of the four steps and that each has focused their attention on two different steps. Balint explains that Klein is interested in discovering whether the sensations are internal or external and what is responsible for causing them. Freud, on the other hand, is concerned with understanding the significance of these sensations and with locating the proper response to them. Balint contends that this difference in their approach to reality testing also helps in partially understanding the inability of these two approaches to utilize and evaluate each others research findings.

Pathology.

In their actual clinical work and their view of pathology Klein and Freud demonstrated additional points of agreement and disagreement. Melanie Klein recognized the difference in her play technique as compared to Freud's method of analyzing adults but she firmly believed their differences were limited to technical ones and a result of the differences in the ages of their patients.

It is a question only of a difference of technique, not of the principles of treatment. The criteria of the psycho-analytic method proposed by Freud, namely, that we should use as our starting-point the facts of transference and resistance, that we should take into account infantile impulses, repression and its effects,

amnesia and the compulsion to repetition and further, that we should discover the primal scene, as he requires in the "History of an Infantile Neurosis"--all these criteria are maintained in their entirety in the play technique. (M.Klein, 1973, pp.150-151) (1926)

Pathology in psychoanalytic terms often result from some type of conflict. Yorke (1971) thinks that the Freudian and Kleinian view of conflict is very different. He feels that the basic conflict for Kleinians is between the life and death instincts while he describes Freudians as seeing conflict in terms of different agencies e.g. ego versus id or ego versus superego. He further expresses the view that in Klein's work

the Freudian theory of symptom formation has been replaced by a totally different theory in which the boundaries between normality and pathology are obscured, with so-called psychotic "positions" playing the predominant part in each and every case. (p.150)

While Yorke is correct in regard to Freud and Klein's two different ways of conceptualizing conflict and symptom formation, he is in error when he contends that Klein has obscured the boundaries between normality and pathology. Her paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions in fact provide an additional dimension upon which to base a decision about normality and pathology.

Guntrip (1961), Yorke (1971), and Wisdom (1971) have noted the difference in the views of Freud and Klein with regard to neurosis and pathology in general. They state that Freud stressed the role of sexuality in pathology whereas Klein, while not ignoring the influence of sex, tended to see aggression as being even more significant. Her belief in the importance of aggression she felt was simply a result of a natural extension of

Abraham's examination of the role of aggression in mental illness. Both Klein and Abraham agreed that the origin of psychoses could be traced to the oral and early anal phases of development. Wisdom (1971) explains that Klein has a purely psychological view of neurosis. Freud, however, he feels, held that neurosis was not strictly due to psychological factors but also had a quasi-biological basis i.e. bodily tensions. One of their most basic differences was that Klein viewed infantile neurosis as a defence against psychotic anxieties while Freud believed it to be caused by the Oedipus complex and the accompanying fears of castration. Melanie Klein in her own writings has made reference to the fact that she and Freud agree that the nucleus of paranoia in later life for women is their hostile childhood projections against their mothers. She has also pointed out that they agree that the basis of homosexuality originates with an oral-sucking fixation upon the mother's breast, which becomes displaced onto the father's penis. Furthermore, Mendelson (1960) was of the opinion that as Freud, in later years, began to approach a formulation of neurotic anxiety in terms of the loss of the actual and introjected love objects that his view came close to Klein's.

The Clinical Practice of Psychoanalysis

Greenson (1974) has cited many areas in the actual clinical practice of psychoanalysis which he believes differentiate Kleinian and Freudian technique. Greenson is a

prominent opponent of Klein and her followers. Unfortunately, many of his criticisms about the Kleinian technique can not be verified or disclaimed by referring directly to Klein's work since they refer to data which is not explicitly outlined in her writings. However, many of the issues Greenson raises have been replied to by a noted Kleinian, Rosenfeld, and at least provide us with some bases on which to judge Greenson's accusations. According to Greenson, Kleinians, unlike Freudians, do not take extensive case histories prior to beginning therapy and they do not take into account the part real life occurrences play in their patient's illnesses. He also states that Kleinians neither try to establish a working alliance with patients nor do they admit to their patients that their interpretations may at times be incorrect. Moreover, Greenson says that Kleinians will not only accept neurotics but also psychotics, borderline cases, psychopaths, and addicts as patients. He mentions at this point Freud's view that psychoanalysis is not a suitable method of therapy for psychopaths, psychotics, and pre-psychotics, thereby illustrating a significant difference. In contrast to Freudians, he also proposes that Kleinians do not assess the intactness of a patient's ego prior to therapy nor do they try to establish the ego's capacity for anxiety prior to making interpretations. Basically, it appears that Greenson has concluded that the two approaches are extremely dissimilar. Furthermore, he states that "Kleinians will make deep interpretations i.e. interpretations of primitive infantile material, early in the analysis, even in the very first hour. (Greenson, 1974, p.39)

Again he quotes Freud who criticizes analysts who make these deep interpretations early in the therapeutic relationship. Finally, he notes that while it is the practice of Freudians to differentiate between a transference neurosis, a transient transference phenomena, and a treatment alliance, Kleinians do not adhere to this practice. Wisdom (1971) in accordance with Greenson's view of the many areas of divergence, states that Klein and her followers revealed a lack of harmony with classical theory in the very fact of analysing toddlers. Classical analysts held that this was not possible.

Greenson's contentions as to the vast differences in approach between Kleinian and Freudian psychoanalysts has not met with overwhelming acceptance by Kleinians. Rosenfeld (1974), an eminent Kleinian analyst, does not feel that the Kleinian approach has been accurately presented by Greenson. He attempts to illustrate the errors of Greenson's remarks by simply presenting his own views and methods of practicing psychoanalysis. He, himself, professes to trying to assess the state of his patients' ego right from the beginning and especially at times when unacceptable information about the self is presented to the patient. He also says that he focuses his interpretations on the most immediate as opposed to the most deeply unconscious anxiety of his patient. In presenting a case illustration, Rosenfeld is also able to demonstrate that he

indeed makes a distinction between transference phenomenon and transference neurosis and that he acknowledges both the existence of a therapeutic working alliance with his patients and also the fact that it takes time to develop and become well established. However, Greenson has illustrated very valid differences when he refers to the fact that Kleinians and this includes Melanie Klein do treat psychotic patients and psychoanalyze toddlers. It is important to note also that Freud and Klein both professed the salience of analysing, not only the positive but also the negative transference in their patients.

Before ending this chapter, it should also be mentioned that there are several more similarities between Freud and Klein that have only been presented in passing by many authors. A list of these would include such items as sublimation, inhibition, psychic reality, psychic continuity, dreams, condensation, displacement, and many others.

In closing, I would like to add that many of the differences between these two theorists can be summarized under just a few fundamental dimensions. Melanie Klein's approach to man was from a strictly psychological perspective and her aim was to map out his development. Freud, in contrast, focused on the pathology of mankind and adopted both a psychological and biological approach to this problem. In addition, Freud and Klein often differ radically over the issue of the timing of the onset of basic psychological structures and processes. Several of these have been presented in this section, for example the ego, superego, and Oedipus complex.

Melanie Klein has consistently adopted the view that these processes and structures begin much earlier in life than Freud hypothesised. Consequently, this resulted in another very fundamental difference, namely that Klein saw the child as a much more complex and dynamic individual from its birth onwards than Freud. Moreover, the Kleinian child not only possesses an incipient ego and superego during the first year of life but it also is capable of employing several defence mechanisms (i.e. splitting, denial, introjection, and projection). It is also able to experience an impressive number of feelings such as love, hate, anxiety, guilt, triumph, envy, and a desire to make reparation. Additionally, the focus of a great deal of Melanie Klein's research centered around the area of studying the development and influence of anxiety while Freud's, on the other hand, dealt with the importance of libido. Finally, Melanie Klein's is basically an object-relations theory while Freud's is a structural and energy theory.

This chapter having shown both the originality and the psychoanalytic roots of many of Klein's ideas, I will now proceed to a presentation of many of the criticisms and counter arguments that have been put forth in response to Melanie Klein's psychoanalytic writings. This next chapter will complete my introduction of Klein and her work.

Chapter IV

A History of the
Criticisms of The Kleinian Approach

Theoretical Criticisms

There undoubtedly will be some who having read the last chapter will contend that a good deal of the material from that chapter rightly belongs in this one. It is true that many of the criticisms of the Kleinian approach have been based, sometimes solely, on the evidence that her conclusions deviate from Freud's. Since Freud himself was not adverse to deviating from Freud, this at times appears very feeble grounds for criticism. If a science or body of knowledge is to grow it must, like a child, ingest new sources of nourishment and must assess the value of these on the basis of their nutritional value rather than on the basis of whether or not they taste identical to the original source, the mother's milk. Consequently, Glover's (1945) criticism of Klein's work as being unorthodox was rightly challenged several years later by Guntrip (1961). He said that this was a "singularly misplaced accusation to make against scientific work" (p.199) and he later concluded that the important question was really whether or not Klein's work could be substantiated

by clinical data. Topics from the last chapter will be represented here but authors whose only criticism is that Melanie Klein's work is unorthodox will be omitted. Moreover, as in the last chapter, an historical perspective is being adopted. Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to present the major criticisms of Klein's writings over the past five decades.

Several authors have made critical remarks about her entire work and the basis of its foundation. Guntrip (1969) is both critical and understanding of the deficiencies he feels are present in Klein's theory. He states that "she did not evolve a total systematic theory" (p.411). In his opinion, she had "no true ego-theory as a foundation for her study of the psychodynamics of ego-object relations" (p.411). But in defence of these criticisms he explains that it was her work that illustrated the need for a new theoretical approach. Furthermore, he contends that her work was hampered by having to use Freud's instinct theory. Zetzel (1953) recognizes the importance of Klein's approach for dealing with early developmental disorders but she is very concerned that Klein's theoretical framework rests on "specific premises regarding the basic instincts and archaic mental processes" (p.81), which are not generally accepted as proven. Finally, it would appear that Glover (1945) not only felt that Klein's work was based on speculation and therefore unsound but also that it was a menace to psycho-

analysis leading to "confusion and obstruction" (p.90) and to the suspension for a time of a great deal of psychoanalytic research. It is of course possible to see in retrospect that Klein's ideas, probably due to the very nature of their controversiality, have done a great deal to stimulate psychoanalytic research.

Early Psychic Life

Several psychoanalysts (e.g. Glover, Jones, Riviere) besides Melanie Klein have been interested in and have attempted to describe the development and early functioning of the infant's mind. Waelder (1937) in an article aimed at pointing out the difficulties and pitfalls of this task criticized the conjectural basis of Klein's theory. He mentioned specifically her book The Psycho-Analysis of Children (1932) and papers prior to this book. Waelder believes there are three basic methods which can be used to study early infantile processes. They are direct observation, memories, and reconstruction by psychoanalyst and patient during the actual psychoanalysis. He contends that the first two methods are not very useful since infants have a very limited repertoire of behavior from which to infer details about psychic processes. Furthermore, he believes that conscious memory of the first year of life is impossible. Reconstruction, which includes the transference process, is seen by Waelder as the only method left. He feels it must be used with caution since it is so difficult to prove our inferences.

Between 1943 and 1944 a series of controversial discussions on Melanie Klein's work was instituted by the British Psycho-Analytic Society. A group of four papers were presented, one each by Klein, Susan Isaacs, Paula Heimann, and one given jointly by Isaacs and Heimann. Their purpose was to present Melanie Klein's theoretical findings up to that point and to try to answer many of the criticisms raised by other psychoanalysts. This was Melanie Klein's and her followers only organized attempt to deal with the remarks of her critics and it was unsuccessful. It resulted in increased opposition instead of an understanding and resolution of controversial issues such as the state of the infant's mind during the first year of life. Prior to and following this series of discussions Klein consistently responded to criticism regarding early psychic life and other areas by continuing to present more and new clinical evidence for her assumptions. The remarks of critics had very little influence on getting Melanie Klein to alter her beliefs since she felt her hypotheses were founded on what she believed was the cornerstone of all psychoanalytic theory, direct clinical experience with patients.

Glover in 1945 following Klein's most recent work which outlined the depressive position presented criticisms which attempted to refute the merit and validity of her reconstruction of early psychic life. He stated that her formulations concerning early mental life could never be more than hypothetical

reconstructions because there was always a gap between what you presumed was going on in the infant's mind and what you could clinically observe and prove. Moreover, he accused her of basing her findings on only seven cases. It is possible that Klein presented material from all her patients and that they amounted to only seven cases. It is however, more probable that she chose only those patients from her entire caseload which best illustrated her hypotheses. Glover also argued that child psychoanalysts were not justified in concluding facts about the first year of mental life since they could not verify them by direct analysis.

Two years later in 1947, Bibring accused Melanie Klein of retrojecting "into the earliest phases of physical development much that belongs to later stages" (p.92). This became a main criticism of Klein's work in the area of early psychic life. It referred to the fact that critics such as Bibring felt that Klein based her conclusions about the first year of life on clinical material derived from three and four year and even older children. Bibring's article focused mainly on the sexual development of the child and the child's unconscious and symbolic knowledge of various sexual functions and organs. Although Klein's papers on the depressive position and her recent hypotheses about the paranoid-schizoid position had both appeared in print by this time, Bibring alluded almost exclusively to her work in The Psycho-Analysis of Children (1932).

Similarly, Brierley (1951) also focused her criticism that conclusions drawn about the first months of life "become increasingly conjectural and diminishingly self-evident" (p.59) on Klein's 1932 book. In addition, Brierley felt the revival of primitive phantasies from older children reflected more their present stage of development rather than the disposition of their mental life when they originally had the phantasies.

In 1953 Zetzel wrote a paper which focused on Melanie Klein's depressive position. She felt that Klein's hypotheses about the depressive position revealed a basic Kleinian premise, namely that the earliest material in a child's development was that which was the most difficult to uncover and had the most archaic structure. She criticized Klein for extending this premise beyond the known limits of validation. Moreover, in contrast to Glover's (1945) claim that Melanie Klein was unorthodox, Zetzel criticized her for adhering too closely to classical hypotheses about the Oedipus complex, psychoses, and the superego. She contended that this had detrimentally affected Klein's theoretical reconstructions of the infant's early life. I believe that Glover's criticism reflects his own need to affiliate with Freud ideologically and to use Freud's teaching as the ultimate scientific criteria. However, Zetzel's remarks reveal a lack of understanding on her part as to how dramatically at times Klein's concepts do differ from classical teaching. Several years later Winnicott (1965)

argued in a similar vein to Zetzel (1953) that Melanie Klein had made an erroneous assumption concerning psychology. He said that she assumed that the deepest material which was uncovered was the earliest. Winnicott, quoting Strachey, explains that an alternative explanation may be to consider the deepest material and mechanisms as simply those "under an especially heavy weight of repression" (p.111) and not necessarily the earliest. I wonder if it isn't really Winnicott and Zetzel who are making an erroneous assumption in this case. They are assuming that Melanie Klein based her decision as to whether or not a piece of material was archaic or deep and consequently pertained to a very early period of development solely on the grounds of how repressed it was. However, Klein also considered the content of the material and if the content also revealed a lower level of psychic development and integration (i.e. primitive part-object relationships) then and only then would she conclude that the material referred to a very early stage of mental development. Zetzel, on the other hand, is correct in stating that some of Klein's premises do go beyond the known limits of validation. Furthermore, even though Melanie Klein's theory underwent many changes over the years the criticism as to the validity of her assumptions about early psychic life remained a constant.

This array of criticisms from very prominent psychoanalysts of course has not gone unchallenged. As mentioned

earlier, there were the controversial discussions of 1943-44 organized by the British Psycho-Analytic Society. The remarks presented in this section by Riviere and Isaacs refer back to the papers they presented at these discussions. Riviere (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) explains and I agree that there is only one method that provides the evidence required to substantiate the conclusions drawn about infantile impulses and conflicts and that method is repetition in the analysis. In addition, she contends that only "analytic experience on the same lines" (p.39) would convince others of the truth of her statement. In response to Bibring (1947) and Brierley (1951) and others who have contended that Melanie Klein reads back into early development material obtained at a later age, Hanna Segal (1973) states that there is no need for this hypothesis. She believes and I concur with her that the high degree of consistency between material obtained from infant observation, from phantasies expressed verbally or in play, and from psychoanalytic sessions obviates the necessity for any such hypothesis. The most formidable argument in defence of Melanie Klein's approach to reconstruction is the principle of genetic continuity. Isaacs (M.Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973) explains that this principle refers to the assumption that any phase of mental or physical development emerges "by degrees out of preceding phases in a way which

can be ascertained both in general outline and in specific detail" (p.74). Therefore, this principle refers to a detailed continuity of development which is not to imply that development proceeds at an even pace throughout. But the principle of genetic continuity "enjoins upon us to accept no particular facts of behavior or mental processes as sui generis, ready-made, or suddenly emerging, but to regard them as items in a developing series" (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, & Riviere, 1973). Isaacs believes that this established principle allows Melanie Klein to maintain that the phantasies of the two year old did not suddenly emerge fully developed but were the result of a gradual growth process extending over those first two years. Guntrip (1961) agrees that development is presumed to adhere to the principle of continuity, yet he also acknowledges that there is still controversy surrounding the exact details of development. In a discussion referred to by Glover (1945), he mentions that Schmeideberg criticizes Isaacs for contending "that there is no need to distinguish between psychoanalytic and behavioristic observation... and demanded that the principle of continuity should be supplemented by that of development" (pp.92-93). In attempting to reconstruct the early phases of development, Melanie Klein firmly believed that she was following Freud who had stressed the need for this practice and who had also outlined the procedure.

We should also remember that, according to Freud, the conscious part of the mind

develops out of the unconscious. Therefore, in tracing to early infancy material that I found first of all in the analysis of young children, and subsequently in that of adults, I followed a procedure now familiar in psychoanalysis. Observation of young children soon confirmed Freud's findings. I believe that some of the conclusions that I reached regarding a much earlier stage, the first years of life, can also be confirmed up to a point by observation. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.177) (1957)

It seems quite evident from Klein's own words that she is far more ready to acknowledge the limitations of infant observation than some of her disciples. She stresses that not all but only some of her conclusions and those only up to a certain point may be corroborated by observation.

It would appear from the statements of both critics and supporters that the issue of Klein's approach to describing mental life during the first years of existence is still unresolved. Due to our lack of skill and instruments to probe the mind during the first year it may always remain a topic of controversy.

Environmental Factors and External Reality

The importance ascribed by Klein to environmental factors and external reality in her theory is another very contentious area. Several authors (Glover, 1945; Greenson, 1974; Guntrip, 1969; Winnicott, 1965) have criticized her for what they believe to be only a cursory acknowledgement of any other factors in psychopathology besides endopsychic ones. Moreover, Zetzel (1956) disapproves of Klein paying

only minimal attention to such issues as maturation in the process of mental development and the importance of the differentiation of external and internal reality for ego development. The point has also been raised (Guntrip, 1969) that in Melanie Klein's theory "both good and bad object fantasy life is held to exist independently of experience of outer reality which only 'confirms' what is felt already anyway" (p.415). Guntrip contends that clinical data do not support this view but "rather the view that good and bad object fantasy life arises out of the infant's difficulties in coping with his real outer world" (p.415). Although he attempts to discredit Klein's view of phantasy life here, in an earlier article (Guntrip, 1961), he appears to be trying to solicit tolerance and understanding for her over-emphasis on endopsychic factors. He attributes it to the pressure a pioneer is under in exploring a new area to describe it fully and ignore other previously discovered factors. While it is true that Melanie Klein was a pioneer in many respects, her method of approaching the psychology of man stems from her beliefs rather than the idiosyncracies of a pioneer. External and internal reality from birth on were constantly influencing one another. This can be seen very clearly in the emphasis and the description she gives of the processes of introjection and projection. External reality never exists in the mind in its pure form but is always subject to some

degree of interpretation by intrapsychic processes. Melanie Klein (1975a) states that

the young child's perception of external reality and external objects is perpetually influenced and coloured by his phantasies, and that this in some measure continues throughout life. (p.40) (1948)

Since I concur with this quote, it becomes quite obvious that if one is ever to arrive at a valid interpretation of the psychology of man, that a thorough understanding of his intrapsychic processes is essential: Melanie Klein's writings are an attempt to provide just that.

Neither she nor her colleagues would admit to neglecting or ignoring reality. A close scrutiny of her work shows quite plainly that this is not a valid criticism of Klein. In fact, she has stated several times how important both the child's mother and also advances in maturation are in helping the child to attain a healthy development. Klein (1973) maintains "that every step in emotional, intellectual and physical growth is used by the ego as a means of overcoming the depressive position" (p.320) (1940). In addition, she believes that "the mother's love and understanding of the infant can be seen as the infant's greatest stand-by in overcoming states of disintegration and anxieties of a psychotic nature" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.10) (1946). A very lengthy and detailed discussion of this area of contention is provided by Wisdom (1963). Initially, he simply discounted the criticism that Klein doesn't consider environmental factors in normal and abnormal development on the grounds that a careful reading

of her work proves the statement erroneous. He also points out that possibly Klein is felt by her critics to ignore environmental factors because she holds that certain intrapsychic processes would develop regardless of the environment. Wisdom draws a parallel to genetics and explains that the ego like a zygote must always develop in relation to an environment and with some mechanisms the environment can only act to facilitate or to impede but never to prevent their emergence. He concludes his argument by stating that the task of psychology and psychoanalysis is to explain only the psychological processes of man and not man in total. Therefore, environmental factors should not be the main focal point. Furthermore, in her most recent book, Segal (1979) correctly refers critics to the case of Richard in which there are numerous examples of Klein not only being aware of the importance and influence of external factors on her patient but also her demonstrating the interplay that operates between reality and the child's phantasies.

The Paranoid-Schizoid and Depressive Positions

Melanie Klein's conception of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions have also been the subject of criticism. Winnicott (1965) believes that Klein's paranoid-schizoid position presents the child as beginning life under the influence of a talion dread and a splitting of the mother into a good and bad object. He criticizes Klein for ignoring

the influence of good-enough mothering on these two mechanisms. He contends, that with this type of mothering the importance of these mechanisms is minimal until a later date when "the ego-organization has made the baby capable of using projection and introjection mechanisms in gaining control over objects" (p.177). He also holds that in the absence of good-enough mothering chaos results not the activation of the paranoid-schizoid position's two mechanisms. Klein, of course, maintains that projective identification, a mechanism designed to gain control of one's objects, does operate quite extensively during the paranoid-schizoid position. Therefore, she does not believe that there is a gap during the paranoid-schizoid position which can be filled by good-enough mothering until the ego develops enough to use projective identification. The concept of the paranoid-schizoid position is one of those intrapsychic processes referred to above by Wisdom, which can be influenced by the environment but not prevented from occurring. Both the fear of annihilation and the child's own innate sadistic impulses originate from the death instinct and to some degree are therefore inevitable. Good-enough mothering can do a great deal to reduce persecutory anxiety and splitting but it can not eliminate them completely because Klein contends that the basic state of the child's mind at this stage is that it is prone to splitting and persecutory anxiety. This is due to the death instinct operating in relation to an immature and not fully integrated ego.

Both Winnicott's and Klein's view are very hypothetical and neither can be proven empirically.

Padel (1977) criticizes Klein for not providing some idea or concept to explain the transition from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position. A similar criticism has also been voiced by Wisdom (1962). Padel attempts to explain this transition in terms of a shift from an awareness of only two people (i.e. self and mother) to an awareness of three. According to him, father is perceived and identified with as a whole person prior to or at the same time as mother is and it is this phenomenon that makes it safe and possible for the child "to accept damage to mother and defects in her care" (p.29). He also believes it would therefore be incorrect "to describe the 'depressive position' in terms of only two persons—mother and self" (p.29). However, since Melanie Klein linked the Oedipus complex with the depressive position, it would appear that she is fully aware that this position involves more than a child and its mother. Padel's explanation of the transition is predicated on the fallacy that a binary mode exists during the paranoid-schizoid position. In its most primitive state the paranoid-schizoid position is characterized by the self, a good breast and a bad breast. This seems more ternary than binary according to Padel's definition of this term. The transition to the depressive position marks a qualitative advancement in the child's

development. Padel attempts to explain it as a quantitative advancement, namely the child now perceives and relates to three people instead of two. His explanation reflects a complete misunderstanding of Klein's concept of either position. After reading Melanie Klein's work, it would appear that she put forth two interrelated concepts to account for this transition. The first is maturation, growth natural development, ultimately the life instinct. The ego becomes more integrated. Its intellectual and emotional capabilities grow. It can identify more fully with the good object and its sources of interest and gratification have expanded. This, coupled with the love and understanding of the mother, results in the child advancing to the depressive position.

The concept of the depressive position was severely criticized by Glover (1945). He argued that it was not a clinical syndrome, that it was not composed of substantiated theories, and that he could find "no justification for postulating a 'central position' of this sort" (p.90). He also stated that he did not feel Klein had substantiated her claim that there is a genetic sequence between clinical depression and mania. Finally, Glover criticized her for including reparative mechanisms in her depressive position because he believes they do not emerge until the child is much older. Six years later, Brierley (1951) presented a paper in which she warned Klein and her followers to elucidate more fully the importance and significance they placed on the depressive position for

all infants' development. She also correctly, I believe, posits that in Klein's theory the importance attributed to the Oedipus complex in neurogenesis has been diminished and been replaced by the concept of the depressive position. Zetzel (1953) is critical of the actual term depressive position, she feels it implies "more far-reaching implications of infantile psychosis than is in fact the case" (p.80). Her main criticisms, however, are that in developing her thoughts on pathology, especially severe depressions, Klein based her ideas on patients which differ from the severer cases found in hospitals. Zetzel added that Klein has not paid enough attention here to constitutional factors and maturation. In support of Klein's concept of the depressive position, Zetzel refers to the work of Spitz (1946) in which he showed that young infants who lost their mothers developed clinical depression. She feels his work indicates the depressive vulnerability of six to twelve month old infants. I believe that Zetzel's reference to Spitz's work reveals her lack of understanding of the depressive position. It does not refer to clinical depression even among infants who have lost their mothers. Instead, it refers to a concern on the infants part that its hostile feelings may damage the love object. In addition, Zetzel states that there is considerable clinical evidence that depression results from the struggle between love and hate. It is very interesting to note that Spitz himself could not accept the idea that the depressive position was a normal phase of development. He considered it an abnormal state. Wisdom (1962) attempts to refute Spitz's reasoning by explaining that to accept an

abnormal state as part of normal development is not uncommon for psychoanalysis. He refers to Freud's castration complex as an example of this policy. Wisdom does, however, point out what he believes to be a sin of omission on Klein's part; he feels she should have explained the role of envy in her theory of depression. In a later paper (Wisdom, 1971), he expresses a feeling of puzzlement at the lack of analytic acceptance of this concept since "it is essentially a theory of emotional integration centering around ambivalence" (p.333) and psychoanalysts believe in both ambivalence and emotional integration.

The Life and Death Instincts


Freud's concept of the life and death instincts was and still is a very controversial area of psychoanalytic theory that has enjoyed only minimal acceptance even among psychoanalysts. Melanie Klein was one of the few who did accept the hypothesis of life and death instincts operating within the individual.

I recognized, in watching the constant struggle in the young infant's mental processes between an irrepressible urge to destroy as well as to save himself, to attack his objects and to preserve them, that primordial forces struggling with each other were at work.
(M. Klein, 1975a, p.236) (1958)

The primordial forces Klein refers to are the life and death instincts. She did not ascribe to Freud's formulation that the life and death instincts were biological processes. Instead, she saw them as strictly mental processes whose

interaction was the ultimate basis of mental dynamics. They are "the actual instinctual basis of love and hate" (Segal, 1979, p.149). This also means they are at the basis of all mental conflict. It is Melanié Klein's view that these two instincts attach themselves to objects as soon as the infant is born. The first objects that these instincts attach themselves to is the mother's breasts. By the processes of introjection and projection of the life and death instincts, the first object is split into a good breast and a bad breast. The good breast represents the life instinct and the bad breast the death instinct.

Klein has been criticized by many of her colleagues for her adherence to instinct theory and most especially, for her adoption of the death instinct. Zetzel (1956) and Guntrip (1969) have both argued that Klein is on very tenuous ground when she attempts to prove the existence of a death instinct by her clinical data. They have denounced the death instinct as being speculative and based on premises that are circular. Both Wisdom (1971) and Guntrip (1969) have stated that it was unnecessary for Klein to base her work on instinct theory and that it only detracted from its scientific merit and originality. In his paper on Klein, Kernberg (1975) pointed out that her instinct theory had been criticized for being pseudo-biological and not founded on modern neurobiology. Kernberg's criticism appears both self-evident and irrelevant when one remembers that Klein conceives



of instincts on a psychological plane. Guntrip (1961) said Melanie Klein was unable to recognize that she had no need for an instinct theory. He feels that her work can account for the dynamics of the mind in terms of object-relations without recourse to a theoretical construct such as life and death instincts. He also challenges the Kleinian assertion that the death instinct is object seeking. He believes that "by definition it does not seek a proper relationship but the destruction of the object" (Guntrip, 1969, p.413). Freud, himself, has even been quoted by critics of the instinct theory as having referred to them as mythology and mythical entities. However, as D. Klein (1970) illustrated in his book

Myths are not always to be equated with entertaining fiction like fairy tales for children. They may serve as expository devices to portray some insight or teaching as happens in serious drama or in the instructional use of parable or fable. (p.50)

Many critics have concluded that there is no need for a concept such as the death instinct and that one of inborn aggressiveness would explain our clinical data much better. Heimann (M. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs & Riviere, 1973) attempts to present several benefits for adopting Freud's theory of instincts. She does not believe that the death instinct can be replaced by a concept such as inborn aggressiveness. If it were, then she contends that "the entire background of our theoretical concepts and the total frame of reference for psychological work would be impoverished" (pp.334-335). This is however a vague and poorly delineated argument for the existence of a death instinct.

Heimann also believes that if the destructive instincts are not linked to the death instinct then it is difficult to explain their function or existence. Heimann seems to ignore the fact that destructive feelings have often been seen as due to other emotions (i.e. frustration) or external factors. Furthermore, she maintains that acceptance of both the life and death instincts "offers us a bridge to the deepest aspects of human nature" (p.335) and allows us to sort out the meaning of a great deal of the confusion we encounter in the psychological processes. Basically, the instinct theory increases our understanding of our patients and increases "our capacity to deal with such baffling technical problems as sado-masochism, delusions of persecution or negative therapeutic reactions" (p.337). Essentially, Heimann's arguments seem vague. They lack a precise detailed exposition of validating clinical data.

Aggression

In Kleinian theory the child's aggressive manifestations stem directly from the death instinct. Thus aggression is given a central role in the development of psychic life right from the beginning of life. Waelder (1937) acknowledges the fact that we can observe expressions of aggression in infants but he feels this is not conclusive proof "that violent manifestations of aggressiveness during the first year of life are universal" (p.472). In his paper on envy, Joffe (1969) makes a distinction between aggression which is directly instinctual and aggression which is really a secondary defence reaction. This latter type is seen as a response to anxiety, frustration, or pain. Joffe contends with justification that Melanie Klein's work has neglected to sufficiently stress these secondary ways of arousing

aggression. In fact, some critics argue that Melanie Klein has made a serious error in ascribing such a high priority to the concept of aggression. Brierley (1951) calls into question Klein's contention that it is aggression which is always the cause of anxiety. She maintains that while clinical data often supports this finding it also supports the alternative one, that aggression may arise as a result of anxiety. It appears that Brierley may be referring here to what Joffe has designated as a secondary means of mobilizing aggression.

The Oedipus Complex

To ascribe the origin of a psychic phenomenon, as important to psychoanalysis as the Oedipus complex to the second half of the first year of life, is bound to create a good deal of controversy and criticism. Since a child at that age is unable to talk, you are prevented from illiciting direct verbal data from the child as a means of confirming your hypothesis. Consequently, Klein's contention that the roots of the Oedipus complex extend back to the dawn of the depressive position has been accused of being a hunch, hypothetical, doubtful, and unscientific (Glover, 1945; Zetzel, 1953). The fact that very primitive Oedipal phantasies exist in children who are old enough to talk has been confirmed by others but her critics state that they cannot find evidence in Klein's work for extending the age of the Oedipal conflict back to the start of the depressive position (Zetzel, 1956). The

problem in this controversy is really that Klein is not defining the Oedipus complex in the same way as classical psychoanalysis. For Klein, the Oedipus complex in its most rudimentary form refers to the recognition by the child that the mother is a separate person who has a relationship with another object (i.e. the father). This definition is much more basic or elementary than the classical one. Furthermore, Balint (1952) has serious reservations about trying to describe an infant's mental processes regarding the Oedipus complex in terms of an adult's perceptions. In a similar vein, Zetzel (1956) does not believe that a child of six months has matured enough to conjure up the type of Oedipus fantasies that Klein attributes to infants. However, it is important to note here that Winnicott (1965) refers to the fact that he found that the Oedipus complex had begun in one of his child cases at the age of one. There have also been critics who maintain that Klein "denigrates the role of the oedipus complex and is even anti-Freud in focusing on the pre-genital stages of development" (Lindon, 1972, p.53). In his paper, Lindon contends that Gitelson may have provided an answer to this criticism. Gitelson maintained that a satisfactory mother-child relationship must precede the Oedipal period. Thus, Gitelson is stressing the importance of the pre-genital stages of development and therefore one could conclude that he feels Klein is justified in focusing on these early stages. He says that the child who has reached the Oedipus period has already attained a substantial degree of development.

The Superego

As stated in chapter two, Melanie Klein did not place the origin of the superego at the dissolution of the Oedipus complex around age five. Instead, she claimed that it began immediately

after birth with the child's first introjections. This assertion called forth from her critics many of the same accusations as did her statement concerning the early origin of the Oedipus complex. Glover (1945) argued that her claim as to the date of the origin of the superego was based on postulated phantasies which she then put forth as proof. However, it is more accurate to say the superego's origin is based on clinical data (i.e. patients' phantasies) which she then put forth as proof. Several years prior to Glover's paper, Waelder (1937) also criticized Klein for her lack of evidence in this matter. After accusing Freud of placing too much importance on the external side of things when discussing the origin of the superego, Guntrip (1961) warns his readers that Klein may be guilty of erring in the opposite direction. He feels that according to her "at times the super-ego as inwardly directed aggression seems to become a purely subjective development of the death instinct" (p.205). This of course is incorrect since the superego even at its origin is a developmental response or reaction to the death instinct not of the death instinct, according to Melanie Klein's writings. While acknowledging that the basis of the super-ego begins during the child's first year of life, Jacobson (1973) asserts that it is only following the Oedipus conflict that the superego can be regarded as a distinct psychic system. Moreover, she posits that the reason why Klein is incorrect in her dating of the onset of the superego is because she

fails to distinguish the constitution of self and object representations, and of object relations and ego identifications, from superego formation.... She does not clearly distinguish the esta-

blishment of object relations, which proceeds with the building up of self and object representations in the ego, from the processes of partial identification with the love objects. These build up the ego and eventually lead to superego formation. (pp.94-95)

Finally, Klein has been criticized for her lack of consistency in the use of the term superego. Segal (1979) points out that at times it has been used to refer to internal objects which have a host of functions, such as "feeding, helping, reinforcing sexuality, or, on the contrary, as persecuting and internally attacking the ego" (p.103). While alternatively, the superego has been referred to by Klein as "that particular synthesis of various objects, which exercises moral pressure" (p.103). Since the main thrust of the criticisms focus on the early origin of the superego and since Klein claims that this occurs at an age when it is impossible to obtain the clinical proof some critics require, this point, consequently, will continue to remain an area of controversy.

The Ego

Similarly, Melanie Klein's assertion that the ego exists from the beginning of post-natal life has also been the subject of a good deal of criticism and controversy. Glover, in his 1945 paper, has accused her of believing the ego is both unified and organized at this early age. This he feels she contends despite clinical evidence to the contrary. Klein herself, has stated that she believes

"the early ego largely lacks cohesion, and a tendency towards integration alternates with a tendency towards disintegration" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.4) (1946). Klein's point of view does however, imply that from birth the neonate is capable of differentiating between self and object. Joffe (1969), does not believe this is possible but he adds that even if he were to accept this, he definitely could not subscribe to the idea that the neonate's ego is capable of attributing intentionality to its object. He even quotes Hartmann, who states that it is not until around the third month of life that we can discern signs of intentionality in the infant. Melanie Klein has justly been shown to be inconsistent in her distinction between the terms ego and self. At times, the terms are used synonymously. Yorke (1971) maintains that "without a clear concept of 'ego' in the Freudian sense, all distinction between the 'self' and its representation disappears" (p.142). Alternatively, it has been stated by Wisdom (1962), that the classical concept of the ego as being unintegrated at first and only gradually attaining integration is not founded on clinical evidence but on commonsense. Commonsense is however not a valid method of proof. In her new book Segal (1979), in support of Melanie Klein's position, refers to new research that has indicated "that the infant's perception and object relatedness is far greater than had been suspected" (p.169). Perhaps new research findings will help to elucidate some of

the controversy that has been raised in the past over the question of whether or not Klein attributes unwarranted precocity to the infant. Brierley (1951) refers to critics who raise arguments that are similar to those of Joffe and Glover. These critics complain that Klein's description of early object-relations implies "too early endo- psychic co-ordination of instinctual drives" (p.76), which they find to be in opposition to their observations of babies' moods and behaviors. Brierley tries to defend Klein against these charges of precocity by saying that it is unavoidable when an adult is trying to interpret an infant's experiences to other adults and be understood by them. In addition, Kernberg (1966) has stressed the fact that the integration of object-relations is a complex process. He argues quite validly that Klein's account of the inner world is lacking because it does not show how these inner objects are related to specific psychic structures. He believes that the internalized object relations are "integrated into higher level ego and superego structures such as the ego ideal, character constellations, and autonomous ego functions" (p.243). In the same article Kernberg refers to criticisms by two other authors directed at her concept of inner objects. He quotes Fairbairn as saying that

Melanie Klein has never satisfactorily explained how fantasies of incorporating objects orally can give rise to the establishment of internal objects as endopsychic structures—and, unless they are such structures, they can not be properly spoken of as internal objects at all, since otherwise they will remain mere figments of fantasy. (p.246)

Kernberg also refers to Jacobson who points out that Klein's concept of inner objects fails to differentiate between self-images and object images. Unfortunately, Kernberg and Jacobson have failed to realize that Klein's hypothesis about the interplay between introjection and projection in the formation of inner objects makes a clear distinction between self-images and object images an impossibility.

Introjection and Projection

In Klein's theory, the mechanisms of projection and introjection have been given a crucial role to play in psychic development from birth onward. Glover (1945) asserts that Klein's ideas are founded on phantasies which she proposed existed but which were never substantiated. This lack of substantiating evidence appears to be the basis of a great many of Glover's criticisms and interestingly enough, lack of substantiating evidence is a criticism that has been voiced about most classical psychoanalytic concepts. Glover's criticism stems from the inability of clinicians to get verbal accounts from patients during the first year or so of life. Brierley (1951) argued that Klein had given so much weight to projection and introjection in early infancy that one felt she saw early development as "wholly a matter of reciprocal processes of super-ego differentiation and object-relationship, leaving no room for primitive ego development or larval reality-sense" (p.58). Finally, in her 1956 article, Zetzel referred to two criticisms of Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein. They felt Klein was in error in thinking that infantile conflict could only be explained in terms of introjection and projection. They also could not accept Klein's con-

All descriptions of early unconscious phantasies—and for that matter of unconscious phantasies in general—can therefore only be considered as pointers to the contents rather than to the form of such phantasies. (p.379)

Another critic, Guntrip (1969), maintained that Klein had attributed the origin of infantile phantasy life to the death instinct. He believed that she had no clinical justification for this. Guntrip's criticism is however, not quite accurate since Klein saw phantasies as the expression of not just the death instinct but also of the life instinct. This conceptualization of phantasy did though result in Waelder (1937) criticizing it for implying that phantasies followed a predetermined and fixed path throughout life and Brierley (1951) arguing that it was a closed system which dominated all of the individual's future development. In 1945, Glover and several years later, Yorke (1971) both criticized Klein's concept of phantasy on the grounds that it eliminates the distinction between a great many of the forms of mental content that had previously been discovered and defined. Both these authors referred to the fact that memory-traces are one of the mental contents that are lost as a distinct entity because of the notion of Kleinian phantasy. Brierley (1951) however, disagrees with their contention. She states that

phantasies about "internal objects" no more contravene Freud's memory-trace hypothesis than any other kind of phantasy. Remembering

and phantasying are different modes of psychic activity but both depend upon reactivation of past experiences. (p.72)

Envy

It was very late in Melanie Klein's career when she wrote her book on envy. In this book she states that envy has a constitutional basis and it originates at birth. This view of course revived old criticisms such as Klein was erroneously relegating envy to the beginning of life without sufficient proof. Guntrip (1969) took exception to Klein's view that envy was directly related to the death instinct. He felt that this implied that envy was something permanent and could not be overcome. It would appear that Guntrip has adopted a very pessimistic view of envy. Melanie Klein however, has not presented envy as a fixed and unalterable emotion. She explains quite clearly that envy can be mitigated by many of the feelings associated with the depressive position. For example love, gratitude, a wish to make reparation, and feelings of guilt help to diminish feelings of envy towards the object. Guntrip is correct in believing that Klein assumes envy to be present in man to some degree throughout his life but the extent to which envy influences his life is not fixed. It can be lessened or increased depending on his future course of development. The most extensive criticism of Klein's concept of envy was written by Joffe in 1969. He not only criticized Klein herself but also

others whom he felt had accepted her views and were referring to them in their work even though they had not been proven. Joffe (1969) maintained that Klein was wrong to assume that envy was a unitary phenomenon. He held that

both clinically and theoretically, the various forms of envy can be regarded as a consequence of the operation of a great number of antecedent factors and processes.
(p.534)

He sees envy as not being present at birth but as developing later in life. In his view, envy contains certain id elements and requires a degree of ego development. The individual's ego must have reached the level where it can differentiate between self and object and also have developed the capacity to phantasize what it desires. According to Joffe, envy is a complex emotion that requires time to develop. He also disagrees with Klein in linking envy to the death instinct. His view is "that possessiveness and associated envious feelings are complex social responses rooted in the development of ego functions and reality object relations" (p.542). After reading both Melanie Klein's book and Joffe's criticism, it almost appears as if Joffe and Klein are referring to two different emotions yet using the same name for them. An essential feature of envy for Melanie Klein is the desire to not only possess the object of envy but also to spoil it. In the first instance, the child not only wants to rob the breast of its milk but also to spoil it by putting into it its bad excrement. Yet Joffe refers to the possibility of envy

actually motivating development. "particularly when it is not associated with the need to destroy" (p.544). Consequently, since envy always implies a wish to destroy or spoil for Klein, she would therefore not classify the emotion Joffe is referring to as primal envy.

Anxiety

Throughout her career, Klein always studied and was interested in anxiety. Her final conclusion about anxiety was that it resulted from the working of the death instinct within the individual: Critics, such as Guntrip (1961) who could not accept the existence of the death instinct argued that this link between them only spoiled and lessened her otherwise important work on the concept of anxiety. Moreover, Zetzel (1956) maintained that the clinical evidence did not support Klein's assumption that the primary origin of anxiety is aggressive impulses. When Klein expressed the view that reality and real objects act as a means of proof or dis-confirmation of anxiety situations, her concept of reality was also assailed. She was then criticized for regarding outer reality as being secondary and under the dominance of psychic reality. This is of course incorrect. Klein hypothesized an interaction between internal and external reality not a dominance of one over the other. Joffe (1969) stated that perception for Melanie Klein was inextricably bound up with drives and was not permitted a separate form of maturation and development. I believe this to be a fairly accurate statement about Klein's notion of perception. Also, Glover (1945) claimed that the

behavioristic studies of infants were proving her to be wrong since the infant's feelings were taken to be "reality estimates, whereas according to the 'psychic-reality' hypothesis they ought to be phantasy misinterpretations" (p.115). Therefore, Glover is saying that the child's perception of reality is not according to some studies being influenced by phantasies.

Animism

Brierley (1951) refers to the fact that the work of Klein has led some psychoanalysts to regard it as animistic. She believes and I agree that it is unfair to label Klein an animist just because she is describing a phase of development which is in and of itself animistic. By the term animism, I am referring to the theory that all things in nature, both animate and inanimate, contain a so-called spirit or soul. In Klein's theory, these spirits are referred to as internal objects and she believes they represent the unconscious phantasies which exist in people's minds. Brierley does however, refer to a few instances where Klein's incorrect phraseology has itself contributed to this charge against her. Moreover, Segal (1973) explains that when Klein talks about internal objects, she is merely attempting to put into words the conscious phantasies that individuals have about what is inside them.

Concluding Criticisms

Before concluding this section on the criticisms against Kleinian theory, there are several very brief complaints which have been lodged and need to be included here: It has been remarked by some critics that Melanie Klein's adherence to Freud's libido theory was a sign of inconsistency in her work (Fairbairn, 1954; Wisdom, 1971). In

addition, Brierley (1951) refers to the criticism that Klein has ignored the concept of regression in her theorizing. Klein's contention that infants have an unconscious knowledge of genital functions has also aroused criticism. Moreover, Bibring (1947) felt that she had not fully considered the restrictions imposed by biological development or the part environmental factors may play. In his paper on envy, Joffe (1969) took Klein's work to task for what he considered a very serious transgression.

Her merging of orality, anality and genitality makes redundant the complex characterological effects of the "carry over" from one phase to another. It also does away with the effects of development and maturation of the ego and its defensive apparatus, and the effects of the Oedipal superego on ultimate definitive character, etc.
(p.538)

Finally, Padel (1977) believes that Klein has committed a serious sin of omission by neglecting to include the concept of looking and shame in her picture of the child's world.

Criticisms of Klein's Clinical Technique

The majority of the criticisms surrounding Melanie Klein's work have focused on theoretical issues. However, there have been both some general and also some quite specific questions and complaints raised against the clinical technique employed by Klein and her colleagues. Many years ago, Glover (1945) noted that there was no proof of improved therapeutic results when interpretations

were based on Kleinian hypotheses. In the interim of some 30 years there has been no research study carried out to deal with the issue Glover raised. This probably has been due to the difficulty in designing a well controlled study with matched subjects, all extraneous variables controlled and an agreed upon criteria of improvement. More recently, Yorke (1971) commented that Kleinians appear to focus on a very limited number of affects in their work. Besides being accused of neglecting to consider a broad enough range of affects, critics have also complained that they also neglect to analyze many of their patients' defences (Greenson, 1974; Kernberg, 1972). The defences of intellectualization, isolation, and repression are the ones that have been cited as being neglected. In an attempt to answer this criticism, Segal (1967) explains that she believes that the foundation for such criticisms are based on a lack of understanding of the way Kleinians deal with defences. Segal states that

we attach great importance to analyzing the unconscious anxiety that is defended against in conjunction with the analysis of the defenses against it, so that the emergence of the defended material into consciousness is facilitated not only by the analysis of the defenses but also by the lessening of the unconscious anxiety The concept of mental mechanisms as one facet of phantasy life implies also that there is less division between interpretations of defense and those of content, and interpretation can deal more readily with the patient's total experience. (p.172).

Consequently, it would appear that Segal is answering ~~this~~ criticism by saying that Kleinians do not divide their interpretations into those aimed at content and those directed towards defences. Instead, they make interpretations that deal with content and defences all at once because in their conception of mental life there is not such a marked division between the two. They are both aspects of phantasy life. Directly related to this issue of not analyzing all the defences is the question of making deep interpretations early on in a patient's analysis. Not only have critics argued that this practice is responsible for the failure of Kleinians to analyze certain defences but also that many other crucial aspects of the individual's personality are neglected. Greenson (1974) and Kernberg (1972) have both commented on this issue. Kernberg points out that this technique of interpreting can result in a failure to properly analyze the patient's character structure or "the defensive organization may go 'underground' resulting in possible serious complications" (p.87) or "the natural ordering of the material may be seriously interfered with" (p.87). Similarly, Greenson questioned the effect of avoiding the analysis of "all the intermediary layers of impulses and defences" (p.41). He had serious reservations as to whether therapeutic gains could be maintained when one employed this type of technique of interpreting unconscious material to patients. In his

book, Winnicott (1965) refers to the issue of interpreting unconscious material early on in the analytic relationship. He does not specify that he is referring to deep unconscious interpretations. However, since he is dealing with Klein's method of interpreting, it seems reasonable to conclude that he is speaking both of early and deep interpretations. Winnicott agrees with Klein that the analyst should interpret unconscious material as soon as possible to the patient. He maintains that this technique of interpreting is beneficial because it "orientates the child towards analytic treatment, and the first relief undoubtedly gives the first indications to the child that there is something to be got out of analysis" (p.119). He does however, caution therapists that this technique can result in some latency children stopping treatment abruptly. Finally, Guntrip (1969) asserts that Klein's concept of the death instinct implies that psychotherapy is limited in what it can ultimately achieve because he feels "one can not analyse a 'death instinct'." (p.416). He maintains that if one believes in its existence then one is confronted with an entity so firmly rooted that it can never be eliminated. In her final years, Melanie Klein's optimism concerning the progress psychoanalysis could achieve did lessen. Her concept of envy, which she held to be an expression of the death instinct, does limit the degree of therapeutic progress. It therefore seems quite probable that Melanie

Klein would agree with Guntrip's formulation since she does not believe instincts can ever be eliminated. She nevertheless, does believe that the influence of the death instinct can be reduced by the life instinct, though this process is one of mitigation not elimination.

Literary and Stylistic Criticisms

Very few psychoanalysts who have written about Melanie Klein's work have omitted to make critical remarks concerning her style of writing. The vast majority of her work was written as single papers and only later bound into books. Furthermore, it should also be remembered when critics comment on her writing as being repetitious and that her arguments tend to overlap one another, that due to the controversy and confusion surrounding her work, it was often necessary to restate earlier ideas. Several authors have criticized Klein for her lack of precision in using and defining psychological terms. Glover (1945) has referred to her liberties in terminology as leading "to the creation of a kind of slang in which it is no longer possible to distinguish between mechanisms, psychic imprints (nuclei or institutions) and unconscious presentations (including fantasies)" (p.85). Similarly, Brierley (1951) and Guntrip (1961) have both remarked on the looseness and ambiguity of Klein's terminology. Brierley points out that Melanie Klein "seems to mix the language of phantasy with abstract terminology" (p.68).

Klein is also very remiss about giving precise definitions for terms referred to in her work. Moreover, the meaning of her terms can change radically throughout her writings. She herself, has apologized to her readers for the fact that at times, the id refers to only the death instinct and at other times it represents the unconscious. Kernberg (1972) has noted similar changes in meaning with regard to the ego and the self and also the meaning of splitting. Unfortunately, this lack of precision, as Kernberg has pointed out, interferes with one's ability to fully understand some important concepts. In his obituary of Melanie Klein, Main (1961) referred to the detrimental effects inflicted upon her work by her practice of combining metapsychological, clinical, and experimental terms. Finally, Zetzel (1956) noted that some of the semantic confusion present in Klein's work can be attributed to an inadequate distinction between content and concept. It would appear that the majority of the complaints about Melanie Klein's style focus on a lack of precision in her writing and in her use and definition of key terminology. Regrettably, as most of the critics seem to be implying, this has resulted in unnecessary confusion and misunderstanding of her theory and clinical work.

Summary

This section will attempt to summarize and evaluate the criticisms and the responses to them. This will not

entail a rehashing of all the criticisms but rather an evaluation of four salient dimensions along which the majority of them lie.

The first dimension is that of the timing of the onset of essential psychological structures and processes. These include the onset of the ego and its ability to differentiate self and other and also to attribute intentionality to objects, the onset of the superego, the Oedipus complex, and the notion that infants are capable of an intricate phantasy life. Klein dated the onset of all these structures and processes to a time of life (usually from birth onwards) that was much earlier than classical psychoanalysis. Therefore, the critics' remarks on this dimension were quite unique to Kleinian theory. I do not however believe that some of the criticisms are justified such as those related to the notion that the Kleinian ego or superego is fully formed and coherently operating from birth. Melanie Klein never stated this. In fact, as earlier mentioned, she described the ego as lacking cohesion and unity at birth. The other criticisms which relate to the complexity of the early ego and phantasy life and the early onset of the Oedipus complex reveal that the critics have accurately understood what Klein was hypothesizing. However, the question of whether or not these criticisms were justified is inextricably bound up with the issue of verifiability. I do not believe Klein's statements about the timing of the onset of these psychological processes and structures can ever be proven. Melanie Klein herself even admits that there is a limit to what infant observation can prove. Nonetheless, I do believe

that she has employed all the methods (i.e. infant observation, repetition in the analysis, and the principle of genetic continuity) which are typically used to verify psychoanalytic hypotheses.

This leads us to a second dimension under which many of the criticisms can be grouped, namely, her lack of proof for many of her hypotheses. It is true that Melanie Klein does not provide "empirical" proof or evidence for many of her hypotheses, nor may I add does psychoanalysis in general. The vast majority of evidence upon which the theory of psychoanalysis rests is clinical data. Clinical data in psychoanalysis is collected in the consulting room and is subject to interpretation by the analyst gathering the data. Therefore, there is the possibility of a large error component. Consequently, it is not possible at our present level of sophistication and technology to prove in an empirical sense the existence of very early Kleinian structures and processes. It is also not possible to verify the efficacy of Kleinian psychotherapy simply because it is impossible to design a truly well controlled study, especially in the area of obtaining matched subjects or therapists since each individual be it therapist or patient is so unique.

Many of the criticisms about Klein's theory also group themselves around the idea that her theorizing was too psychogenic and ignored such things as external reality, maturation, and external objects. For instance, Joffe (1969) is quite correct when he accuses Klein of not allowing perception a separate form of maturation and development. However, critics

(Glover, Greenson, Guntrip, & Winnicott) who denounce Klein for only a cursory acknowledgement of external factors in psychotherapy or for ignoring the influence of good-enough mothering are really overstating their case. Melanie Klein definitely did not stress external factors or good-enough mothering to the degree that psychoanalysts such as Winnicott did but on the other hand, she did not totally ignore them either. The case of Richard is a prominent example of the degree to which the physical setting of the therapy room and the day to day events of the war influenced his therapy and his psychopathology. The charges by Waelder (1937) that phantasies follow a predetermined and fixed path throughout life and those by Brierley (1961) that the Kleinian phantasy life represented a closed system which dominated all of an individual's future development are totally unjustified. Klein's continued emphasis on the importance of introjection and projection to the development of phantasy life negates any idea that it represents a closed system. It is unquestionably an open system. Similarly, her belief that internal and external reality continually influence one another makes it impossible for phantasies to follow a fixed or predetermined path.

The final dimension under which many of the criticisms cluster is that of omissions. Melanie Klein has been charged by her critics of having neglected to deal with several issues. This criticism is by no means unique to Kleinian theory. However, Padel (1977) for instance is quite correct in pointing

out that Klein did not deal in her work with the concepts of looking and shame. Similarly, Fairbairn (1952) and Kernberg (1966) respectively, have both astutely noted Klein's failure to properly explain how internal objects become established as endopsychic structures or how these inner objects are related to specific psychic structures. The areas of neglect that have been referred to so far are valid points of criticism. All have gone unanswered by Klein. However, she was no longer living when Kernberg and Padel made their criticisms. Greenson (1974), Jacobson (1964), and Kernberg (1972) all criticized Klein for failing to deal sufficiently with other areas of her work but these too came after her demise. Nevertheless, I do not feel that their remarks were really valid. Jacobson (1964) accused Klein of failing to differentiate between self-images and object images and she is quite right. However, Klein did not really fail in this respect since her work was aimed at demonstrating the exact opposite, namely that there is no clear differentiation between the two. For Melanie Klein, one's self-image is not only composed of one's own talents and characteristics but also it is composed of object-relations and the nature of those object-relations in turn effects a person's self-image. Greenson (1974) and Kernberg (1972) have both accused Klein of failing to analyze patients' defences but as Segal (1967) has correctly illustrated, Klein and her followers do not neglect defences they just analyze them in a manner that is different from the classical approach.

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The purpose of this chapter has been to present as completely as possible all the diverse criticisms that have been written about Klein's work. There has also been an equally sincere effort to put forth all of the known refutations of these criticisms. Finally, the author has also inserted remarks of his own where they appeared necessary in order to clarify or to further illuminate certain poorly defined areas of controversy that have come to be associated with Melanie Klein's writings and technique. This chapter brings to an end the introduction of Melanie Klein and her ideas. Now that the reader is more familiar with this prominent psychoanalyst and her work we can proceed in the next two chapters to an outline of her concept of man and the historical precedents of several of her theoretical ideas and her psychoanalytic technique.

Chapter V

Kleinian Psychoanalysis and Its Historical Roots

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present an historical outline of the various treatment approaches which man has adopted in an attempt to deal with mental disorders. To avoid falling into an anachronism both in this chapter and the next I have subdivided the history of each main topic into several subtopics. Therefore, each point that is pertinent to my discussion of Klein is grounded in an historical-philosophical frame of reference. The main historical sources for this and the following chapter, unless otherwise specified, are Alexander & Selesnick (1966), Boring (1950), Brett (1974), Ellenberger (1970), D. Klein (1970), and Misiak & Sexton (1966). This chapter will begin with a general outline of the history of treatment methods and then the antecedents of a number of Kleinian psychoanalytic techniques will be delineated.

A Short History of the Treatment of the Mentally Ill

References to the treatment of the mentally ill go back several centuries before the birth of Christ. The Assyrians and the Babylonians, who were among the oldest Semitic populations, viewed treatment as a form of penance which included prayers, offerings, exorcism, and sacrifices. The Greeks, on the other hand, approached the question of treatment from many directions. One method extolled the

benefits of physical purification. The body must "be cleaned through proper regimen and catharsis so as to restore the equilibrium of the physis" (Mora, 1978, p.354). Alternatively, Greek culture also prescribed many other forms of treatment such as astrology, reciting ritualistic words, dream interpretations, examining the liver of sacrificial animals (hepatoscopy), participation in the orgiastic rites of Dionysius and also incubation. The most famous clinic in the ancient world had the god of healing, Aesculapius, as its patron. Situated at Epidaurus, this centre of healing provided help to those with both physical and mental ailments. The physicians there, were among the first psychotherapists. They were skilled in the ways of Nootherapia (mind-healing) and in dealing with psychosomatic problems. These centres were the places where the Greeks and later in history the Romans came when a form of incubation was prescribed for their mental disorders. The atmosphere in these places was very artistic and harmonious. The setting plus the intervention of the priests combined together to restore a state of natural harmony and to drive away erroneous beliefs and illusions. The treatment consisted of dream interpretations, gymnastics, athletic games, artistic pursuits and contemplation. These were supplemented by the harmony provided by music, dance, and poetry. In fact, poetry has been referred to as furnishing the Greeks with a "major form of emotional therapy" (Simon, 1973, p.5). In

Homer's poem the *Odyssey*, the bards and the singing of epic tales are presented as providing comfort and relief to men suffering from distress. The poem's therapeutic effect was seen as emanating from the multiple forms of identifications they offered the listener, plus the opportunity of experiencing many intense emotions and also the harmony of the rhythm and accompanying music. Plato, (427-347 B.C.), however, was one Greek whose rationale for treatment was in direct opposition to the use of poetry. His method will not be presented here but later as one of the historical roots of the psychoanalytic method.

Aulus Cornelius Celsus, who lived in the first century after the death of Christ, classified insanity into different types and prescribed different treatments according to the nature of each case. His prescription ranged from music, special types of food and massages, to flogging, exercise, bloodletting, and induced vomiting. Later on in history, the Romans who had a very pragmatic approach to the mentally ill, drew heavily on the works of Asclepides and Celsus. Their writings offered the Romans practical ways of caring for the mentally disturbed and for preventing abnormal behavior. During the second century, Galen (131-200) was a very famous healer of the mentally ill. His treatment approach in some respects was similar to the therapists who had lived before him. One of the aims of his treatment program was to rid the body of any noxious or excessive

substances. This was accomplished by means of laxatives, bloodletting, emetics, and diuretics. Galen's treatment program also focused on strengthening the body so that its natural processes could speed healing and he prescribed specific remedies designed to counteract the effects of the disease.

With the advent of Christianity, society was provided with a new group of healers namely the priests and monks, who willingly lent their skills to the problem of curing mental disorders. On a very practical level priests assumed the role of caretakers for the disturbed. In addition, they performed exorcisms and prayed to God on behalf of the mentally ill, asking Him to heal them. Christianity also continued the practice of incubation that proved so successful with the Greeks and the Romans. Because early Christianity often associated mental disorders with sin, repentance and confession became very powerful psychotherapeutic tools. The repentant sinner strove to change his thoughts and life style thus attempting to bring about a change or reintegration of his personality. St. Augustine (354-430) advocated that therapy should consist of confession, persuasion, introspection, and soliloquy.

There appears to be very conflictual reports about the treatment of the mentally ill during the Middle Ages. Many authors have referred to this era as a time during which the mentally ill were tortured, persecuted, and murdered.

under legal accusations of practising witchcraft and being possessed by the devil. However others, such as Foucault in his well-known book Madness and Civilization, (1965) refer to the mentally disturbed as being taken care of by family and friends or by authorities of the community. Those who were deemed harmless were not put in any type of confinement but allowed to wander about freely. More recently, Neugebauer (1978) has referred to the work of Neaman (1975) in which new evidence indicated that a very physiological approach was adopted in dealing with mental disorders and these people were considered to be physically ill and were treated kindly. Neugebauer also presents legal records from English courts during the 13th to 17th centuries which indicate that the Crown appointed guardians for the disturbed and did not prescribe torture or persecution of them. In fact, in Valencia in 1409 a few hundred years before Pinel, physicians removed the chains from mental patients and inaugurated an open system based on a total regime involving exercises, special diets, entertainment and work projects. Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) is one example of a therapist at the time of the early Renaissance who even as late as the 16th century advocated compassion and humane treatment for the mentally ill. He insisted that each case be assessed for its specific needs. His treatment ranged from medical care and attention to instruction and mild friendly treatment designed to induce

a gentle spirit in the disturbed. He believed that the key to curing them was in bringing back a state of tranquility to their minds. Even when force or chains were needed they were to be introduced in a way that would not exacerbate the patient's violence. In 1526 Vives even placed the mentally ill under the domain of his public assistance scheme. The name of Paracelsus (1490-1541) is also associated with this period and he professed a belief in the psychic causes of mental disorders. In fact, he treated his patients with bodily magnetism, a form of treatment that was later re-named hypnosis. Furthermore, Kirsch (1978) has shown that the era of official persecution was at its height during the middle of the 17th century and not the Middle Ages.

The last half of the 16th and the first half of the 17th century in Europe were marked by upheaval and change in all areas of life, be they religious, social, political, or intellectual. The stresses and pressures engendered by all these changes helped to set the stage for the emergence of many visionaries, mystics, and those who felt themselves to be spiritually possessed. This emergence coupled with the struggles between the Catholics and Protestants in France during 1560 to 1590 led to an era of persecution and violent witch hunts. The mentally ill were now viewed as being possessed and were often subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment during this period of history.

Following this period of unrest and turbulence, policies were adopted by the governments of Europe to bring order to all aspects of society and life in general. In the late 17th and then in the 18th century large institutions were used to intern everyone who might disrupt the new sense of order that was emerging. Consequently, the mentally ill were locked up along with anyone who exhibited socially unacceptable behavior. Treatment for the disturbed had now been reduced to nothing more than incarceration. It should be noted that this in no way resembled the incubation of the Greek, Romans, or Christians. Patients in these institutions lived in squalid conditions and were harshly treated and often wore chains.

History was about to introduce a new era and late in the 18th and continuing into the 19th century a new breed of reformers brought an end to the inhuman treatment of the big institutions. After the French Revolution, Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) in 1794 was appointed chief of the Salpêtrière and following his appointment he set out to improve the physical conditions and standards of treatment and in fact, the entire way of viewing mental illness. Pinel and his successor Esquirol urged that the insane be seen as sick people. They removed their chains and advocated better housing and benevolent treatment. This spirit of reform emerged in America around 1840 in the person of Dorothea Dix (1802-1887). She devoted many years of her

life to promoting the establishment of institutions and care for the insane not only in America but in a great many countries throughout the world.

Cabanis (1757-1808) did not subscribe to institutional treatment of the mentally disturbed but rather to a physiological treatment regime. His method in attempting to influence and change the mind and feelings of his patient was to recommend a suitable climate and physical exercise and occupation. He believed that if you could alter the "internal impressions and habitual dispositions of organs" (Staum, 1974, p.141), by means of this physical regime that it would result in a subsequent change in the state of the mind and the patient's feelings. Despite all the advances and reforms in the treatment of the mentally ill, Diamond (1974) points out that certain forms of torture were still being prescribed by psychiatrists well into the 19th century.

With the ending of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, psychoanalysis emerged as a new and influential form of therapy. Therefore, we will stop at this point in our history of the various treatment methods so that we may present the historical antecedents of Melanie Klein's method of psychoanalysis.

The Concept of Self-Knowledge

Kleinian psychoanalysis is first and foremost a method for obtaining knowledge of oneself. Its emphasis on the

importance of self-knowledge is the theme that has a very long history. Heraclitus (536-470 B.C.) was one of the first recorded figures who stressed the need for man to understand his inner processes. He was followed by Socrates (470-399 B.C.) who believed that the good life could be attained if men used their faculties of reasoning to acquire more self-knowledge. Plato's name can also be added to the list of men throughout history who have been interested in having man come to know himself. In Plato's case the emphasis was really on man coming "to know himself in relation to 'ideas', and to the world of 'true being'" (Simon, 1973, p.6). In order to achieve the goal of understanding one's inner processes, Seneca (c. 4-65) advocated that one set aside some time each day for self-examination. Thus psychoanalysis, in this respect, carries on the tradition of Seneca. Initially, patients are assisted by a psychoanalyst in their daily session of self-examination and later when their analysis is over it is hoped that they will continue the process as Klein herself did each day. Plotinus (205-270) also recognized the self-reflective nature of man and was very interested in the process of getting to know oneself by self-observation. Next, St. Augustine provided us through his autobiographical confessions with the first written example of a self-analysis. He demonstrated long before the formal birth of psychoanalysis the beneficial effects

that could be gained through self-observation and self-examination. Similarly, in the Oriental tradition Buddhism stressed the idea that man should shift his focus from the external world to a more internal one. Many centuries later we find references to the renewal of this practice of self-study in the French essayist and philosopher, Montaigne (1533-1592). Then in the 18th century we have Karl Gustav Carus (1789-1865) expressing the view that in order to know and understand oneself we must become aware of the unconscious part of our mind. This psychoanalytic tenet of stressing the importance and benefits of self-knowledge is evident in the work of Nietzsche (1844-1900) though not quite as explicitly stated. In the Zarathustra, he advises healers of others, that they first heal themselves and warns them that their worst enemy will always be themselves. Nietzsche not only appears to be advocating some type of self-knowledge but also expressing another cornerstone of psychoanalysis, namely that all psychoanalysts must undergo their own personal psychoanalysis before they became healers of others. Nietzsche can also be seen as a forerunner of psychoanalysis because

he wishes to uncover and to sublimate the Dionysian instinctual forces in order to free man and recognizes that the repression of such forces actually leads to man's enslavement and the danger of breakdown. (Chessick, 1977, p.192)

The final links' in the chain that leads to Melanie Klein are of course the founder of psychoanalysis, Freud and her own teachers and therapists Sandor Ferenczi and Karl Abraham. All these men in their personal lives and in their work strove for more knowledge of themselves and their patients, thus carrying into the 20th century a tradition that has an extensive history.

Precursors of the Dynamic Approach

Psychoanalysis is a dynamic form of psychotherapy. Ellenberger (1970) believes that dynamic psychotherapy can be shown to have its roots in primitive medicine. He contends that "an uninterrupted continuity can be demonstrated between exorcism and magnetism, magnetism and hypnotism, and hypnotism and the modern dynamic schools" (p.48). If we understand dynamic to mean conation and to include desiring, wishing, and conflict, then Plato can definitely be classified as propounding one of the first dynamic psychologies. Many authors have pointed out the dynamic similarities between Freud and Plato. His famous concept of the soul as the charioteer trying to control his two horses and his realization that Eros can activate behaviour other than sexual behaviour are two examples of Plato's dynamic psychology. Now an example of this in Aristotle's work would be his awareness of a wish as being a form of appetite. Similarly, the Spaniard Juan Luis Vives, a figure from the 16th century may also be seen as a pre-

decessor of present day dynamic psychology. His place in this historical outline was secured by his work in describing the principles of several human passions, for example love, hate, resentment, envy, jealousy, and hope. Next, we have Spinoza (1632-1677) who revealed his affiliation with dynamic psychology through his contention that desire was not only a primary emotion but basic to conation. Furthermore, like Plato, his psychology depicts the conflict that exists between duty and desire and he presents man as striving for moral excellence. A contemporary of Spinoza, Leibnitz (1646-1716) used the term monad to represent psychical units of ideational force or perceptual energy. They were a form of conation, a striving or impetus to action. Leibnitz conceived of the whole universe in terms of these dynamic and active units. Ellenberger (1970) has stated that he believes that "the emergence of dynamic psychiatry can be traced to the year 1775, to a clash between the physician Mesmer and the exorcist Gassner" (p.53). Mesmer (1735-1815) reveals his dynamic approach to treatment in his belief that his patients' illnesses were the result of a disequilibrium in a physical fluid which he believed was present in the entire universe "and forms a connecting medium between man, the earth, and the heavenly bodies, and also between man and man" (Ellenberger, 1970, p.62). For Mesmer a cure was brought about by restoring the fluids equilibrium. Another name that forms

a link in this historical chain is that of Herbart (1776-1841). His depiction of the striving and dynamics of mental processes was presented in terms of ideas rather than instincts or monads. Boring (1957) quotes Herbart as saying that

'every movement of the ideas is confined between two fixed points: their state of complete inhibition, their state of complete liberty'; and there is a 'natural and constant effort of all the ideas to revert to their state of complete liberty (absence of inhibition)'. (p.255)

In Germany, Johann Christian Reil (1759-1813) proposed that mental disease required psychological methods of treatment. Actually, he wrote the first systematic treatise on psychotherapy in 1803 in which he outlined his approach. Another precursor of the dynamic approach was A. Schopenhauer (1789-1860). His concept of will represented a driving, dynamic, internal force in men which guided their conduct. In a similar vein, Karl Gustav Carus held that unconscious repression brought on some disorders and that they were best treated by uncovering the repressed memories. Freud initially employed this method when he started his work with hysterics. In addition, Eduard von Hartmann's (1842-1906) work demonstrates both his belief in a dynamic unconscious and its influence in many areas of men's lives, such as religion, language, etc. D. Klein (1970) has also mentioned some examples of the dynamic approach, such as Brentano's

(1838-1917) intentional acts, James' (1842-1910) impulsive consciousness, and Wundt's (1832-1920) voluntarism. In France, Charcot (1825-1893) and later Pierre Janet (1859-1947) used hypnosis and suggestion in treating neurotics suffering from hysteria. These psychological techniques gave them access to the dynamics behind their patient's behaviour. Two more well-known names that belong in this historical outline are McDougall (1871-1938) and Freud. McDougall contended that instinctual urges were the driving force of behaviour and further that the behaviour was directed to achieving a definite end. Thus, his psychology was classified not only as dynamic but also as hormic. Freud's dynamic theory was of course based on the principles of unconscious motivation, libidinal energy, the impetus to behaviour of the life and death instincts and the conflict between the id and the superego. Finally, Melanie Klein who is the final link in our historical outline, like Freud, believed in unconscious motivation and although she, like McDougall and Freud, spoke of instincts as the impetus behind all behaviour, the life and death instincts were never conceived of as existing without an object (i.e. the breast or the mother, the father, etc.) to which they were directed. Moreover, her conception of the mind as being an internal world populated with objects that have active ongoing relationships both with one another and with the self definitely signifies her as someone

who embraces a dynamic and not a static approach to man and psychology.

Historical Interest in the Child

Klein's theory and work were aimed at understanding man but her focus for developing this understanding was the child. Diamond (1974) has provided a brief resume of references to child psychology throughout the ages. He mentions Aristotle's (382-322 B.C.) contention that children do not have dreams before they are four years old and St. Augustine is mentioned as one of the rare exceptions who has written about observing children. His observation of envy in children will be referred to in a later chapter. Kroll (1977) has recently shown that medical writings, legal documents, and religious chronicles from the Middle Ages present an image of the child "(although with great ambivalence) as being fragile, vulnerable, and naive, while also possessing a potential for closeness to God and the supernatural world." (p.384). Diamond also notes Locke's (1632-1704) belief that prior to experience children have no knowledge of innate truths. Their minds are a tabula rasa. During the 18th century Rousseau (1712-1778) wrote his famous book Emile in which he stressed that children were individuals and had personalities of their own. Fröbel (1782-1852), another man who saw the need to understand and observe children as they grew, set up the first kindergarten for young children.

Similarly, Preyer (1842-1897) took the time to make exhaustive observations of children and he concluded that their development should not be hampered by undue training during the early years. The first reported case of a child receiving any form of psychoanalysis treatment came in 1909 when Freud published the "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy". He himself did not do the actual treatment but instead acted more in the role of a supervisor for the boy's father, who actually treated his son. It was not until 1917 that H. Hug-Hellmuth became the first therapist to analyze children on a consistent basis. Two years later, Melanie Kléin gave a lecture to the Hungarian Psycho-Analytic Society in which she reported the role of her psychoanalytic interventions in the upbringing of a young relative. This was followed in subsequent years by undertaking the systematic psychoanalysis of children and adults. At about the same time in history many others were also becoming more interested in the child. In Switzerland, in 1920 Hans Maier established the first child observation centre. A leading Swiss psychoanalyst Reverend Oskar Pfister (1873-1956) in the 1920's wrote on the topic of psychoanalysis as an influence in education. Drs. Lazar and Alfred Adler (1870-1937) both set up clinics specifically to deal with disturbed children. The early 1920's saw a great movement towards psychoanalytic interest in the child and Melanie Klein was definitely of prime impor-

tance to this new field.

Antecedents of the Psychoanalytic Technique

At this point, I would like to present some historical roots of the psychoanalytic technique. One of the earliest known ancestors of this technique is the Sophist, Antiphon, (c. 480-411 B.C.). Socrates in his work refers to the fact that the Sophists use words to heal people. In fact, Antiphon indicated on his doorplate that he would heal by words those stricken with grief and melancholy. The power of words is also acknowledged by Klein, especially when they are used in making interpretations. "For in child analysis it is interpretation alone, in my experience, which starts the analytic process and keeps it going" (M. Klein, 1975c, p.75). Another early Greek whose method had a great deal in common with Kleinian technique is Plato. Therapy or treatment for the soul for Plato was not psychoanalysis but philosophy. However, the way that he approached both the search for truth and his students who came to him for help in finding the truth, has many elements in common with Kleinian psychoanalytic technique. Plato's method was a dialogue which led to a dialectic. The dialectic was a form of communication used to seek the truth through a process of questioning and answering. During the process ideas and opinions are examined by means of defining, categorizing, and abstracting. Kleinian therapy also involves a dialogue which then proceeds to an analysis.

With adults the dialogue or the communication may be in the form of words or bodily gestures and with children it may entail not only words and bodily gestures but also play behaviour. Klein saw play as a form of communication that was expressed in a highly symbolic format like a dream. The analysis that follows the dialogue, like Plato's, involves a defining and categorizing but not in terms of ideas but rather in terms of object-relations. Both Plato and Klein see this process of searching for and attaining the truth, be it an abstract or a very personal truth, as being a very active experience. One, in fact, that is unpleasant and unsettling and in Klein's view is even painful. According to Simon (1973), the dialectic process forces man to inspect anew his ideas and values. Psychoanalysis for Klein certainly involves a re-examination of both of these plus a great deal more. The nature of the work in both dialectic and psychoanalysis is such that man is constantly being made aware of the fact that he or she is experiencing internal conflicts. These internal conflicts were the introspective data that both Plato and Klein utilized in their work. Moreover, Klein's use of object-relations to describe these conflicts and psychic life in general finds a definite parallel in Plato's use of anthropomorphic language. Both adopted the language of person-within-the-person. Finally, whether you are employing Plato's dialectic or Melanie Klein's

version of psychoanalysis you will be confronted by impasses or resistances. Although the genesis and the meaning is very different in both cases, the problem and how to overcome them still are relevant to both.

During the second century, Galen, a therapist we discussed earlier, is also referred to by Mora (1965) as having ties with modern psychotherapy and in this case Klein because he worked in a one-to-one relationship and emphasized the importance of verbal expression. Critical to the technique of psychoanalysis is the therapist's ability to refrain from making moral judgements about a patient's behaviour. Even with child patients, Klein did not criticize or chastize her patients' behaviour. She did on one or two occasions report that she intervened in order to put a stop to a child's abnormal sexual relationship with another child but this was done because she feared that this relationship was endangering the continuation of the therapeutic process, and not because she decided it was morally wrong and therefore her job to end it. Melanie Klein believed it was a psychoanalyst's job to analyze people, not to make moral judgements about their behaviour.

Ellenberger (1970) after discussing the similarities in technique between the psychoanalyst and the hypnotist (e.g. rapport, resistance, weekly sessions, dependency, the setting) goes on to mention the points of congruence between psychoanalysis and Benedikt's (1935-1920) teachings. The

understanding and uncovering of a patient's inner life which included wishes, conflicts, and phantasies was of paramount importance in both Klein's and Benedikt's method of treatment. Ellenberger also points out that Benedikt's notion of the pathogenic secret has links with magnetism and hypnosis and further with the work of Janet and Freud.

With the further development of psychoanalysis, the concept of the pathogenic secret became gradually absorbed into those of traumatic reminiscences, repression, and neurotic guilt feelings. (Ellenberger, 1970, p.46)

Although Melanie Klein did not utilize the concept of pathogenic secrets, feelings of guilt played a central role in her theory and treatment. Guilt was inextricably joined with anxiety for Klein and it influenced the development of reparative tendencies and the superego. In addition, Ellenberger also illustrates by means of a personal example from the life of Descartes that even back during his lifetime people were aware that a lessening of the influence of symptoms could be obtained by insight into their unconscious roots. A view which is consonant with Klein's teaching and is reflected in her technique by her emphasis on exploring the unconscious.

Melanie Klein's method of psychoanalysis is not authoritarian, it places no restraints on the patient's personal liberty. A patient, be it child or adult, is free to accept or reject any interpretation given to

them by a psychoanalyst. The purpose of the interpretations is to inform the patient of what the analyst believes is going on inside their mind. Finally the method of psychoanalysis acts by no other means on the patient than through the patient's psyche. All these criteria for Klein's treatment technique were already known to Van Eeden in the 19th century. In France, Pierre Janet introduced into his work with patients, techniques that are used in psychoanalysis today and were also employed by Klein. Janet saw his patients alone and kept an exact record of all that transpired between them. Similarly, Klein, except on rare occasions, always treated her patients on an individual basis. She would diverge from this practice only if a child was too anxious to remain with her alone. Her book Narrative of a Child Analysis demonstrates clearly that she like Janet, keeps a complete record of each treatment session. Finally, it was Freud, who although as we have seen and will continue to see had many precursors, managed to put all the techniques of free association, interpretation, transference, etc. under one rubric called psychoanalysis.

The Technique of Interpretation

Psychoanalytic interpretations were the mainstay of Melanie Klein's technique. She believed that child psychoanalysis was initiated by and kept going solely by means of interpretations. Therefore, she began making

interpretations to her patients as soon as she had some insight into their complexes. Interpretations were so much a part of her technique that she set down certain conditions for a proper interpretation

A correct and rapid estimation of the significance of the material as it is presented at the time, both as regards the light it throws on the structure of the case and its relation to the patient's affective state at the moment, and above all a quick perception of the latent anxiety and sense of guilt it contains - these are the primary conditions for giving a right interpretation, i.e. an interpretation which will come at the right time and will penetrate to that level of the mind which is being activated by anxiety. (M. Klein, 1975c, p.30) (1932)

It is the function of interpretation to lessen the patient's anxiety so that the therapist is allowed access to the unconscious and the patient feels freer to talk about their phantasies. Furthermore, as Smirnoff (1971) has pointed out, they make the child aware that the anxiety experience in the transference mirrors anxiety associated with earlier conflicts. Ideally, for Klein, interpretations are meant to assist in bringing about a synthesis or re-integration of the patient's personality. Melanie Klein always felt that interpretations should be directed at the patient's main anxiety at the time. She also held that even the patient's sense of satisfaction derived from the analysis and the deeper motives for such satisfaction should be subjected to analytic interpretation.

Historically, Bakan (1958) has traced the technique

of interpretation back to the Jewish Kabbala and he explains that the ancient Jewish religious literature has many examples of manifest and latent meaning requiring interpretation. Therefore, the Jewish people for centuries have been approaching the Torah in the same manner as Klein did her patients and their behaviour. Every nuance and subtlety undergoes an analysis and interpretation. Many centuries later Bachofen (1815-1887) realizing the limits of man's memory, resorted to interpreting myths in order to reconstruct mankind's history. Similarly, Klein has acknowledged the limitations of the child's memory and she has also used interpretation as a method for rediscovering man's earliest beginnings. Klein differs from Bachofen in that she interprets the child's play and not myths and also she employs the method of infant observation in her reconstructive process.

The Concept of Transference

Transference is a psychoanalytic term and according to Melanie Klein it refers to all emotions, conflicts, and object-relations from the past which are transferred onto the psychoanalyst. Ellenberger (1970) approaching the concept of transference from an historical perspective has proposed that the transference neurosis of today is similar to the concrete disease object which primitive shaman contended they drew forth from the sick person's body. In both cases a process of materialization occurs,

be it the unfolding of a transference neurosis or the extraction of a primitive symbol of disease. Furthermore, the process of materialization in both is followed by a cure. Consequently, the transference neurosis is very valuable for the therapeutic process when it is properly utilized. Ellenberger (1970) has likened its usefulness "to the conjuring up of a latent possession in exorcism, or to Mesmer's techniques of bringing forth crises in order to control them gradually" (p.523). The phenomenon of transference itself was first noticed by Mesmer. He gave it the name "rapport" which stood for a special relationship and awareness that developed between magnetizer and patient. Hypnotists at that time also knew of the rapport that developed between themselves and their patients but they never really comprehended all its implications. Ellenberger (1970) states that "neither Charcot nor Bérnheim paid much attention to the rapport" (p.153). He claims that this was partly due to "Braid's insistence on self-induced hypnosis and on the patient's role" (p.153). Pierre Janet was the next person to focus attention on this concept. He studied and theorized about this rapport which he called somnambulic influence. Janet felt that somnambulic influence consisted of a mixture of a special group of feelings the patient had for the hypnotist plus a need to be directed by the hypnotist. Often in literature there are found writers who due to their skills at observing people manifest in

their work an awareness of important therapeutic concepts. Ibsen (1828-1906), who in 1881 wrote Ghosts presented a dramatized example of concepts prevalent to the notion of transference. Freud, in fact, quoted Ibsen in his own writings. Ibsen realized that people do not always act voluntarily. Instead, their behavior is influenced, unbeknownst to them, by re-enactments of their relationship with their parents. Finally, Freud became aware of the strong emotional feelings that his patients developed towards him in therapy. At first, he saw these feelings as an impediment to the treatment process but then he began to realize their significance and usefulness. In the end, transference became a cornerstone of psychoanalytic therapy especially Kleinian psychoanalysis.

Melanie Klein was the first therapist to realize that children are capable of transference neurosis and that it develops in a similar way in them as it does in adults. In both instances, she believed that transference was due to the mechanism of personification and that its origin could be traced back to "the same processes which in the earliest stages determine object relations" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.53) (1952). She felt that children were able to develop a transference situation immediately because of the natural propensity of their minds to project into the personifications of their play the conflicts, emotions, and object-relations present in their inner world. Moreover, she

contended that transference never ceases to function during our lifetime and it influences every relationship we ever have. Melanie Klein (1975a) cautions us that

in unravelling the details of the transference it is essential to think in terms of total situations transferred from the past onto the present, as well as of emotions, defences, and object-relations.
(p.55) (1952)

Therefore, she stresses that the transference is to be deduced from all the material of a therapeutic session, since it is a total situation that is transferred. Consequently, the transference situation allows us "to discover the past both in its realistic and phantastic aspects" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.54) (1952). Klein then, took this knowledge and began presenting new ideas about the deeper levels of the unconscious and the earliest stages of infancy. She used transference like a telescope into the earliest development of mental life and she believed that with it, she could see how the earliest phantasies and emotions contributed to psychic development. Furthermore, she maintained that both the positive and negative transference must be subjected to analysis if the roots of the patient's persecutory and depressive anxieties are to be reduced.

The 'Free Association' Technique

Melanie Klein always considered her therapeutic technique to have its foundation in Freud's. Consequently, she naturally utilized his 'free association' technique.

By this point, it may not seem very surprising to learn that this technique also has a very long history. Coleman (1972) refers to a Greek play named "The Clouds" in which Aristophanes (c.448-380 B.C.) described the method of free association. The next reference to this technique is in the 13th century. A man named Abraham ben Samuel Abulafia (c. 1240-1291) is reported by Bakan (1958) to have utilized in his work a method which bears a striking similarity to Freud's method of free association. The concept of associations and the role they play in forgetting and remembering was known to Vives in the 16th century. He was even aware of the fact that emotions could exert an influence on the association processes. Many historical writers have credited Hobbes (1588-1679) with the founding of the concept of mental associations but this is not quite accurate. However, D. Klein (1970) does indicate that Hobbes contributed to the notion of a differentiation between free and controlled associations. The former being due to unguided fancy and the latter to guided fancy. Bakan (1958) in his book refers to two more predecessors of Freud's method of free association. They are J. J. Garth Wilkinson and Schiller (1759-1805). He also mentions that Freud actually gives the credit for this technique to Ludwig Börne (1823). Furthermore, Herbart's view that apperceptive mass can be defined as a constellation of associated ideas also warrants his name being

included in the history of this concept. Freud himself has acknowledged the congruence between his ideas and those of Eduard von Hartmann, the author of Philosophy of the Unconscious (1867), on the concept of free association. Capps (1970) has taken this a step further and contends that von Hartmann can be seen as a link between Freud and the Jewish mystical tradition. Capps' work is really an elaboration of Bakan's because he points out the relationship of von Hartmann's views to that of Abraham ben Samuel Abulafia. "We want to suggest that Abulafia's method and von Hartmann's discussion of the intuitive and discursive style of association are also remarkably similar." (Capps, 1970, p. 167). Next Janet's description of the technique of automatic talking can be shown to have strong analogous links with the Freudian technique of free association. In fact, they engaged in a long polemic with each other over this issue. Finally, it must be noted that a great deal of the credit for this Freudian technique really belongs to his patient Elizabeth von R. because she suggested the procedure to Freud.

Klein of course, in her analytic work with adults used their free associations as the foundation for many of her interpretations. However, it became quite obvious to her when she began to psychoanalyze children that they do not verbally free associate, especially very young children because anxiety, which they are more prone to, prevents

them; they do however play. This was really a very unique and important discovery of Klein's namely, that it was possible to equate the child's play with the free associations of adults. This is very different from past concepts of play. In fact, Diamond (1974) has indicated that in the past play has been viewed as a way of consuming excess energy (Herbart, Spencer) and also as helping to promote the development of essential behaviors (Groos). Moreover, he suggests that imitative play has been seen as useful to the acquisition of certain behaviors like speech in man and it can preserve mankind's heritage which is passed down by tradition. Finally, play renders instincts more malleable and aids in opening up new paths for intellectual development.

Like Freud, Klein believes that 'free associations' reveal the unconscious life of the mind. But with children the associations are presented in the symbolic form of play.

In their play children represent symbolically phantasies, wishes and experiences. Here they are employing the same language, the same archaic, phylogenetically acquired mode of expression as we are familiar with from dreams. We can only fully understand it if we approach it by the method Freud has evolved for unravelling dreams. Symbolism is only a part of it; if we want rightly to comprehend children's play in connection with their whole behaviour during the analytic hour, we must take into account not only the symbolism which often appears so clearly in their games, but also all the means of representation and the

mechanisms employed in dream-work,
and we must bear in mind the necessity
of examining the whole nexus of phenomena.
(M. Klein, 1973, pp.146-147) (1926)

Therefore, the child's play and other forms of its behavior plus any verbal expressions that may accompany its actions during the analytic hours are analyzed by Klein in a manner analogous to that employed when analyzing associations to dreams. Melanie Klein believes that "the special primitive peculiarities of the mental life of children necessitate a special technique adapted to them" (M. Klein, 1973, p.150) (1926). This special technique is play therapy and it represents a medium for communication between patient and psychoanalyst. Personification which is the basis of play stems from the mechanisms of splitting and projection. Klein realized that the child's play was actually a form of work. Through this play-work, the child is able to discharge his masturbatory phantasies, to master a quantity of anxiety, and to express acts of reparation. Play affords the child the opportunity of fulfilling its wishes, of overcoming painful reality and of mastering both its internal and external fears and dangers. An inhibition of the child's phantasies may result from feelings of guilt or an unmanageable quantity of anxiety which will result in a repression of phantasies and this in turn leads to an inhibition in play. In cases where the inhibitions are so great that the child is completely inaccessible, Klein advises therapists to engage

in some form of simple play themselves in order to induce the child into joining in the game.

Melanie Klein firmly believes that play therapy can accomplish all the aims of an adult analysis.

The analysis of the transference-situation and of the resistance, the removal of the early infantile amnesia and of the effects of repression, as well as the uncovering of the primal scene—all these things play analysis does. (M. Klein, 1975c, p.15) (1932)

In addition, this technique allows us insight into the dynamics of the child's mind because even a change from one game to another may reveal, in symbolic form, the reason for similar shifts in psychological positions. Klein believes that the child's play also has a prognostic function for its future development. The child's interest in games, their extent, breadth and variety allows a trained observer to gain some insight into the course of the child's future sexual development and also its capacity for interests and sublimations as an adult. These insights are possible because one of the bases of play is masturbation phantasies. In general, the child in its play is expressing its attitude to reality. Klein found that schizophrenic children wished to negate reality and to prevent the production of any phantasies and consequently they found it difficult to play in the true sense. The play of neurotic children revealed a wish to be punished and also to avoid unhappy topics. In addition, the normal child's play demonstrated "that they have more power to

influence and live out reality in conformity with their phantasies" (M. Klein, 1973, p.223) (1929).

Therefore, in summary Melanie Klein concluded that the proper psychoanalytic approach should comprise the following, "consistent interpretation, gradual solving of resistances and persistent tracing of the transference to earlier situations" (M. Klein, 1973, p.149) (1926).

This chapter has dealt with the historical roots of Klein's psychoanalytic technique. The next one forms the remaining portion of the main core of this thesis. It will focus on presenting Melanie Klein's concept of man plus its historical antecedents.

Chapter VI

Melanie Klein's Concept of Man and Its Historical Foundations

A General Overview of the Kleinian Man

Introduction

Melanie Klein was not a philosopher but as someone who was psychologically very interested in man and who wrote a good deal about people, there is undoubtedly embedded in her work a concept of man or a psychological anthropology which is uniquely her own. The image of the Kleinian man has however never been distilled from her many papers and presented in a detailed manner. The second reason for choosing to present Melanie Klein's image of man is because her theories not only had and still do have a substantial influence in the psychoanalytic communities of Great Britain, Europe, and South America but they also have emerged as a force in the way Britains are viewing their schools, business organizations, and politics. Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to present what I believe to be at least part of Klein's concept of man. Moreover, this chapter will attempt to present some of the historical antecedents to her view of man, thus providing historical precedents for her concept of man. It is important to bear in mind that I am not claiming to present individuals from the past who have definitely influenced Klein in the formulation of her image of man. It will be

obvious however that some of those referred to here, for instance Freud, undoubtedly had a very direct influence on her thinking. Instead, an attempt is being made to illustrate the roots of Melanie Klein's thinking in respect to the history of ideas of man. The term image of man as it pertains to Klein's view of mankind will include such areas of interest as mental health and illness, knowledge, free will and determinism, motivation, and the conscious and unconscious mind. These specific issues were selected because they encompass the most pertinent topics of interest in Melanie Klein's concept of man. A very broadly focused approach is taken in presenting the historical antecedents of Kleinian thinking. The aim of this approach is to be comprehensive and no attempt is being made to enhance the importance of Klein's writings by associating her ideas with numerous outstanding thinkers from the past.

It is well known by philosophers and psychologists alike that psychology has its historical roots in the philosophy of many previous centuries. In fact, in many universities psychology continues to be a branch of philosophy up until the late 1890's and in some institutions even up until the 1920's. In Eastern Europe and some Western countries this tradition of close links between the two disciplines continues to operate even until today, particularly in the realm of theoretical psychology. Psychoanalysis is not however directly a branch of

philosophy. It was conceived of by Freud as his own different and unique way of looking at and understanding man. Nevertheless, it is true that philosophy and psychoanalysis hold many similar beliefs about man and also that many of Freud's concepts can be shown to have their roots in philosophy. As mentioned above, one of the aims of this chapter is to illustrate the roots of Klein's concepts, which often too can be traced back to prior philosophical ideas. Psychoanalysis itself is a dynamic process. It always contains the potential for change and for further evolution. Psychoanalysts approach man in a unique way. They observe, experience, piece things together, and eliminate ideas that have been disproven and include new discoveries. As dialectics, the psychoanalytic theory of man has no static end. It is always an evolving, living process.

This chapter will begin with a few brief remarks about Melanie Klein's theory in general. The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to presenting Klein's concept of man its historical foundation.

Segal (1973) has pointed out that Melanie Klein's work in psychoanalysis can be divided into three phases. The initial phase extends from 1921 to 1932 during which time Klein formulated the basis of her ideas of child analysis and explored the early beginnings of the superego and the Oedipus complex. The second phase is centered around two papers, one in 1934 and the other in 1940 in which Klein presented her concept of the depressive

position and the manic defence mechanisms. The last phase began in 1952 with her development of the paranoid-schizoid position and this was followed by her book Envy and Gratitude in 1957. The emphasis of her view is definitely psychological in nature as is evident from her concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, both of which deal with mental functioning. Klein's is also a psychodynamic approach which conceptualizes man as living in both a material and psychological world and having object-relations in each world which are capable of influencing one another. Kernberg (1975) has described Klein's theory from a psychological frame of reference as being "closest to the constitutionalist, instinct-oriented pole" (p.641). In fact, in essence her theory is based on the concept of conflict between destruction (i.e. the death instinct) and integration (i.e. the life instinct). Unlike Freud's, Klein's theory is primarily an attempt to describe development and not pathology. "It is a theory in which the nodal notion is development as a task for an active ego in relation to an object through two main positions" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.326).

This section will begin with a general overview of Melanie Klein's image of man and then proceed to a detailed discussion of the pertinent issues mentioned earlier (e.g. motivation). There will also be a presentation of several of the important controversies associated with understanding the nature of man plus an account of many of the historical predecessors of Klein's thinking.

Man is seen from a dynamic point of view by Klein. She maintains that mental activity, whether conscious or

unconscious, is due ultimately to an interplay between the life and death instincts. Unlike Freud, Melanie Klein conceives of man on an exclusively psychological and emotional rather than a biological plane, even the life and death instincts are referred to in emotional terms (i.e. love and hate). These two instincts represent a basic duality or dialectic underlying human existence. Because human beings are born with these instincts, the Kleinian man from the beginning "contains an enormously powerful innate destructive force which is anti-social and anti-libidinal" (Guntrip, 1969, p.414). This destructive force which Guntrip refers to is the death instinct. He also points out that this concept has a long past from Zoroaster, Plato, St. Paul, to Freud and Klein. The instincts according to Klein are primarily object-seeking not pleasure-seeking. Object-relations form the basis of her view of man. For example, man's psyche is conceptualized as a miniature internal microcosm. Objects within man's internal psychic world have relationships with one another and they also effect the way man relates to external objects. We are therefore left with a picture of an inner and outer man, one who lives in two worlds at the same time. This idea of an inner and outer man has been presented before in history in both a religious and a psychophysiological format. Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) and St. Paul represent the religious perspective

which conceives of an outer man who is irrational, earthly, and has a tendency to sin. At the same time they acknowledge an inner man who tends towards virtue and like Klein, they see these two as dwelling within the one individual. From a materialistic point of view, when Cabanis thought of man in psycho-physiological terms he also visualized that there existed both an inner and outer man. The inner man for Cabanis is represented by the brain and the nervous system and all the sensations coming from the internal organs while the outer man was represented by all the outer sensations. It should also be mentioned that in Klein's view all human activities be they play, social behavior, or cognitions are influenced by internal object-relations. Klein explicitly states "that from the beginning of post-natal life the internalization of the object is the basis of development" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.265) (1960). In fact, she has even outlined this in great detail.

There is no instinctual urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, external or internal; in other words, object-relations are at the centre of emotional life. Furthermore, love and hatred, phantasies, anxieties, and defences are also operative from the beginning and are ab initio indivisibly linked with object-relations. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.53) (1952)

Furthermore, Klein's image of man as a microcosm is also not without roots in the past. Christianity has for a long

time conceived of man in these terms. Among others, Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), Paracelsus, Gassendi (1592-1655) and the Italian philosophers of the Renaissance and also Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-1535) all have presented man as containing all the things of the world within himself. Similarly, this idea was represented once again in the 17th century by Robert Fludd (1592-1637).

Man's personality according to Klein "is largely determined by the more permanent of the phantasies which the ego has about itself and the objects that it contains" (Segal, 1973, p.20). Furthermore, man is viewed by her as a loving creature. She believes that the capacity for love is present, though at times hidden, in every child. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) in his Essence of Christianity (1841) expressed the same idea earlier when he stated that the ability to love is part of the essence of man. In addition to love, the Kleinian man and even the infant has the capacity to feel concern, concern for the state of its objects. Why should the infant be concerned? The answer is because man has value. Winnicott (1965) has pointed out that it was through Klein's work that this idea was introduced into psychoanalytic theory. Both these ideas about man, his ability to love and his value as a being, can be easily shown to have their roots in the Hebrew-Christian image of man.

A Positive and Negative View of Man's Nature

During the ages there seems to have developed two opposing views of man's nature. The one view presents an optimistic and positive image and the other a negative and pessimistic one. This of course is not to deny the more recent development of meliorism by such men as William James and John Dewey (1859-1952) which contends that the nature of the world and man's lot can be improved by human effort. A very early representative of this positive view is Mencius (372-298 B.C.). His philosophy was that man was innately good. Man not only knew what was good but he also was able to do good deeds. Chessick (1977) has mentioned that Mencius believed also that man was wise, humane, and righteous. Rousseau was also a proponent of this positive image of man. He believed in the intrinsic worth of man and in his human dignity and innate virtue. During this same period in history Vauvenargues (1715-1747) and Kant (1724-1804) both added their support to the idea of the natural goodness of man. The names of Cumberland (1631-1718), Hutcheson (1694-1746), and Shaftesbury (1671-1713) refer to a group of men living during the 17th and 18th centuries who also deserve to be mentioned here. They all professed a belief in the altruistic tendencies of man. Wisdom (1971) has indicated that because the Kleinian man has the potential to exercise responsibility, concern, and reparation with respect to its objects

that altruism therefore plays some part in man's nature according to Kleinian theory.

History of course has also provided us with many representatives of a more negativistic concept of man's nature. The ancient oriental writer Hsun-Tzu (313-281 B.C.) pessimistically held that the nature of man was evil and sought only personal gain. Similarly, Hobbes and Mandeville both presented man as an egoist seeking personal gain and vices. Pascal (1623-1662), a great representative of the Catholic perspective, stresses that ever since Adam and Eve's sin man's nature has been portrayed as corrupt. In more modern times, Freud also has steadfastly presented the negative, selfish, and destructive force of man's drives and instincts. Freud does however realize that repression and sublimation can influence this force in a positive direction so that man can produce art, music, and a society.

Melanie Klein appears to be aware of the dual nature of man. The Kleinian man is capable of love, concern, altruism, and reparation. This being is also motivated by the death instinct and is consequently capable of feeling hatred, selfishness, and envy towards its objects. Furthermore, Melanie Klein (1973) believes that "we can see criminal tendencies at work in every child" (p.186) (1927). Man, for Klein, as for Kierkegaard (1813-1855) before her, also has as part of his nature a sense of loneliness.

This inner loneliness is always experienced to some degree throughout life. If Klein were to be placed on a continuum between a positive and a negative view of man, I believe it would be correct to place her closer to the positive end. This seems justified because basically Melanie Klein does stress the power of love over hate and she does see man as having an immense potential for development providing he can resolve his anxiety situations.

The Phylogenetic Law

Following Darwin's (1809-1882) work, the phylogenetic law which states that embryonic development recapitulates racial development soon became a component of many 19th and 20th century thinkers' view of man. Haeckel's book The Riddle of the Universe (1899) contributed greatly to making this law a well-known topic for intellectual conversation in Vienna. Rieff (1975) has pointed out that Freud was familiar with the phylogenetic law but adopted a slightly different version of it, one that had already been employed by Herder (1744-1803), Herbart, Comte (1798-1857) and Spencer (1820-1903). It stated that "the individual mind presents in its development a resume of the stages of human history" (Rieff, 1975, p.80). Melanie Klein's view of man also included an adherence to the phylogenetic law.

As the individual repeats biologically the development of mankind, so also does he do it psychically. We find, repressed and unconscious, the

stages which we still observe in primitive people: cannibalism and murderous tendencies of the greatest variety. (M. Klein, 1973, p.185)(1927)

Klein also saw man's development as a process that was extremely painful, especially during the early years. It was subject to numerous injuries and inhibitions. From the beginning, man was confronted with anxiety, conflict, and feelings of guilt. Segal (1967) has described the child's development as "a constant struggle toward integration and the overcoming of powerful splitting mechanisms" (p.170).

A Conflict Model of Man

The notion of a struggle and especially that of a conflict are central to Melanie Klein's view of man. From the beginning of life the child must deal with the conflict that exists between the life and death instincts. This conflict is inevitable. It is an inherent, inborn part of the Kleinian man. Consequently, man must utilize devices which will establish a balance or equilibrium between these two opposing instincts if he is to achieve any sense of harmony in his life. Klein does not see man's aim as being to eliminate all conflict. In fact, she considers a certain degree of conflict as essential and highly beneficial to man's development.

The absence of conflict in the infant, if such a hypothetical state could be imagined, would deprive him of enrichment of his personality and of an

important factor in the strengthening of his ego. For conflict, and the need to overcome it, is a fundamental element in creativeness. (M. Klein, 1975a, p.186) (1957)

This image of man as having to deal with conflicting forces within his nature has been traced back several centuries before Christ. Brett (1974) has concluded that Heraclitus and Empedocles (490-430 B.C.) formulated theories about the cosmos which were the forerunners of man's struggle between love and hate. Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.) in his writings about the animal organism spoke of them being composed of fire and water and that these two elements constantly struggle against one another. He also realized just like Klein did many centuries later, the necessity of establishing some form of balance between these elements. The Greek philosopher Plato also viewed man as being in a state of conflict. In his work, he often employed political metaphors to express the struggle between reason and instincts which he believed existed within man. Similarly, the philosophy of man in many of the Eastern countries contained references to a struggle between antithetical forces. In China it was between Yang and Yin, in Persia between good and evil, and in the Hindu religion Shiva (evil) and Vishnu (the forces of preservation). In the Christian tradition, man is also seen in a state of conflict. The struggle according to this religion is between good and evil or virtue and sin. Man has these two

tendencies in his nature which are represented by God and the devil. They both struggle to gain control or to influence man. During the era of German Romanticism, Friedrich von Schelling (1775-1854) founded the philosophy of nature. An essential concept of this idealistic philosophy was the law of polarities and these polarities were believed to be almost ubiquitous. Ellenberger (1970) notes that "polarities were often conceived as a dynamic interplay of antagonistic forces" (p.203). He also mentioned August Winkelmänn, a physiologist, who held that nature was simply a struggle between positive and negative forces. The notion of conflict was also essential to Herbart's image of man. The type of conflict he tended to emphasize as a part of men's lives operated on the plane of ideas not in terms of instincts. Man's unconscious, according to Herbart, consisted of ideas of differing intensity which were constantly struggling with one another in order to reach consciousness. Finally, in our time there is Freud's concept of man possessing id instincts and urges that are always struggling against the force of the superego. In addition, the life and death instincts although conceived of by Freud in a very biological as opposed to purely psychological framework also operated in a state of strife within man throughout his life.

According to Melanie Klein's view, man's development

may be conceptualized as proceeding through a series of fluctuations between two psychological 'positions'. These 'positions' are in part distinguished by the predominant quality of the anxiety experienced. Moreover, Klein conceives of man's development as a process, one that entails a great deal of interaction between all the areas of the personality. "Thus emotional and sexual development, object relations and superego development interact from the beginning" (M. Klein, 1973, p.390) (1945). This developmental process from beginning to end is described in terms of internal object-relations. Lindon (1972) has indicated that normal development for Klein entailed a working through process. This term refers to the child's gradual relinquishing of their phantastic picture of reality for a more reality based conception of the world. In fact, Melanie Klein believed that every child during their development experienced anxiety situations of a psychotic nature. Klein explains that

it is because the baby projects its own aggression on to these objects that it feels them to be "bad" and not only in that they frustrate its desires: the child conceives of them as actually dangerous—persecutors who it fears will devour it, scoop out the inside of its body, cut it to pieces, poison it—in short, compassing its destruction by all the means which sadism can devise. These imagos, which are a phantastically distorted picture of the real objects upon which they are based, become installed not only in the outside world but, by the process of incor-

poration, also within the ego.
Hence, quite little children pass through anxiety-situations (and react to them with defence-mechanisms), the content of which is comparable to that of the psychoses of adults.
(M. Klein, 1973, p.282)(1935)

Furthermore, Melanie Klein (1973) also conceived of the child passing "through a transitory manic-depressive state as well as a state of mourning" (p.337)(1940). Both these states plus the psychotic anxiety which the child experiences during development are modified by an infantile neurosis. Therefore, Melanie Klein (1975c) contends that "every child passes through a neurosis differing only in degree from one individual to another" (p.100)(1932). This infantile neurosis was the normal way of dealing with and working through these two states and the psychotic anxiety. It is important to note that these concepts of man at the psychological level are quite unique to Melanie Klein's theory.

The Bisexuality of Man

An issue which is not as unique is her belief that human beings have a bisexual nature. One of the early advocates of this concept of man was Plato. Ellenberger (1970) described how in Plato's Symposium man is originally depicted as having both sexes but Zeus separates them and now men and women seek each other so that they may become one again. Similarly, Simeon ben Yohai writing in the Kabbalistic tradition about the middle of the second century,

also emphasized man's bisexuality. Many centuries later Plato's myth was adopted by the German mystic Jakob Boehme (1575-1624), and later by Franz von Baader (1765-1841) and others to express the Romantic concept of man's bisexuality. Fliess (1858-1928) was the one who introduced this notion to Freud and as a result it became a cornerstone of the psychoanalytic movement's view of man. In addition, Otto Weininger and G. Herman both wrote books in 1903 which presented human nature as fundamentally bisexual. Thus Melanie Klein was adhering to an image of man that had a long tradition. Her belief that all males experience a femininity phase in their development is however, quite novel to her particular image of man. Wisdom (1971) however, has taken exception to Klein's portrayal of man. He feels that "although, for Melanie Klein, woman is female, man is not intrinsically male but a female derivative" (p.342). This contention is based on Klein's description of the male child having unconscious phantasies about his penis as being but an extension of the mother's nipple. While I do believe that Melanie Klein in her writings does put forth the female of the species as an object of much greater value than Freud does, I also realize that she is talking about an unconscious phantasy of the male child and not the reality of the situation. I do not believe Klein really loses sight of the female's desire to be a male but this is not stressed as much because it is not a new concept. Freud and other

psychoanalysts have already discussed it at length. Melanie Klein (1975a) states that

in women there is universally the wish to be a man, expressed perhaps most clearly in terms of penis envy; similarly, one finds in men the feminine position, the longing to possess breasts and to give birth to children. (p.306) (1963)

Furthermore, Melanie Klein, like Freud, contends that anatomical differences between the sexes do effect personality development. While Freud limited this influence to the development of the superego, Klein has extended it to include the ego's development as well.

Childhood Sexuality

For Melanie Klein, man's sexual desires are always object relational from the very beginning to the final end. In addition, her concept of man entails the belief that even infants are capable of sexual desires. She believed that psychoanalysis made an important discovery when it realized "that children possess a sexual life which finds utterance both in direct sexual activities and in sexual phantasies" (M. Klein, 1975c, p.111) (1932). As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Klein proposed that the child's Oedipus complex began with the depressive position which commenced during the first months of life. Obviously some awareness of Oedipal tendencies must extend back in history at least as far as the actual time of the writing of this famous Greek play. More recently, Ricoeur (1970) has proposed

that one can see an analogy between the Freudian Oedipus complex and the struggle that Hegel depicts between master and slave. Similarly, Ellenberger (1970) has presented numerous men during the 19th and early 20th centuries who were aware of both childhood sexuality and the child's sexual feelings towards its mother. Priests and educators such as Father Debreyne and Bishop Dupanloup spoke of the sexual behavior of young children in their books. Jules Michelet (1798-1874) a figure from the same period, described the "magnetic" tie that can be established between a mother and her child if she adopts a practice of taking it into bed with her. Today, this tie is called the Oedipus complex. In addition, Stendahl (1783-1842) in his novel Vie de Henry Brulard (1836) has described his own incestuous feelings of love for his mother. Ellenberger also maintains that Urphänomene, a Romantic philosophical concept, can be seen as being analogous to the Oedipus complex and the murder of the primordial father. Even thumbsucking was noted by Lindner, a Hungarian pediatrician, as a form of infantile gratification. Finally, Rohleder and the French philosopher Arréat were both men of this period in history who were aware of the sexual feelings of very young children. Thus, just prior to the beginning of Melanie Klein's career, there appears to have been a growing awareness of the sexual interests and activities of the young. Klein did not discover infantile sexuality

but her work did a great deal in describing the early phantasies of children and of furthering our understanding of the effects of these phantasies on early development.

Man: An Irrational Being

4 Unlike men such as John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) or St. Thomas Aquinas, Klein does not conceive of man basically as a rational being. She believes that "we are all capable of being influenced by irrational factors, but in normal life we are not dominated by them" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.258)(1959). The presence of unconscious phantasies and object-relations which influence motivation and cognition definitely indicates that the Kleinian image of man is not always a rational one. Similarly, Simon (1973) has explained that Plato and Freud also did not consider man to be totally rational. In fact, he is capable of doing things which can have negative repercussions for himself. During the 18th century, Hume (1711-1776) expressed a view that man was neither governed nor guided solely by reason. Schopenhauer (1788-1860), stated his disbelief in the rationality of man much more fervently. He imagined man to be a being who unknowingly was allowing himself to be guided by internal forces. Finally, the evolutionary theory of Darwin with his emphasis on biological instincts also concluded that man was not a fully rational being. Darwin's influence then branched off in two directions to effect both the behaviorists and the Freudians.

Intentionality

In his book A History of Scientific Psychology D. Klein (1970) gives us a brief history of a number of the men who have subscribed to some form of the concept of intentionality. He mentioned the Aristotelian concept of final cause as entailing teleological considerations which in turn refer to intentions. In his work Aristotle described a transition from being to becoming and also the change that occurs from the potential to the actual. This transition to the realization of one's potential involves intentionality. Many centuries later this concept emerged once again and this time as a central issue in the theorizing of Brentano, the immediate precursor of German phenomenological psychology. He held that all psychical phenomena "intentionally contain an object within themselves" (D. Klein, 1970, p.80). Therefore, according to Brentano all mental acts referred to objects. D. Klein (1970) also refers to William James as discussing the concept of intentionality. James' explanation introduced the notion of 'pointing' which was really a re-phrasing of the concept of transcendent reference. D. Klein explains that this implies a "going beyond or transcending a fragment of mental content like the letters of the word TIGER, one is pointing to what is beyond in far-off India" (p.82). The notion of intentionality appears also in Melanie Klein's work but this time it is the object not the subject which

is said to be doing things intentionally.

Projection, which goes on simultaneously, implies that there is a capacity in the child to attribute to other people around him feelings of various kinds, predominantly love and hate. (M: Klein, 1975a, p.250) (1959)

According to Klein, the child is able to attribute certain intentions, either loving or hating, to its objects. Frustration and deprivation even in earlier infancy are phantasied by the infant as being intentional attacks by bad objects and nourishment and proper care are equally thought to be due to the benevolent intentions of good objects. Therefore, Klein's image of man includes the ability to attribute intentionality to its objects right from its earliest days of existence.

This then completes our general description or overview of Melanie Klein's image of man. We have learned so far that she conceived of man from a psychological and developmental perspective. Developmentally, Klein proposed that man began life as a very complex and sophisticated creature possessing an ego, a superego, and several feelings and defence mechanisms. Because of the substantial part the unconscious and phantasy life played in mankind's development, she can be characterized as conceiving of man as an irrational being. Melanie Klein's is an object-relations view of mankind. It is also very psychodynamic. Man is said to be in a state of conflict and furthermore that a degree of conflict is essential for development. Klein has adopted a very balanced view of human beings. She is aware of man's ability to hate, to envy, and to be selfish

but she also contends that he has value. He is capable of love, concern, and altruism. Therefore, having concluded a general outline of the Kleinian man, I will now proceed to a more detailed study of several specific areas related to Melanie Klein's image of man. The first issue that I will address is Klein's view of the mind.

Klein's View of the Mind

Anyone who has attempted to formulate a view of man must at some point in time have dealt with the concept of mind even if all they may have done was to try to deny its existence. This section will present Melanie Klein's view of both the mind and the mind-body problem plus the historical background relating to each of these. The discussion on the mind will deal with such areas as phantasy, projection, unity, continuity, and several others. The aim will be to demonstrate the importance and the relevance of these topics to Melanie Klein's image of man's mind and furthermore, the historical precedence for her views.

The mind itself has been conceived of and described in many ways over the ages. One of the Greek philosophers Anaxagoras (c. 499-428 B.C.) conceived of the mind as a metaphysical concept, an all powerful, creative cosmic

force that is all knowing and controls all the things in the universe. Anaxagoras represents mind as something superior to and separate from matter. Plato also regarded the mind as a separate stable entity that is immaterial in nature and composed of various interrelated parts. The mind for Plato is split in two parts, a rational and an irrational. Aristotle, disagreed with his master Plato and maintained at times that the mind was neither a separate nor an immortal entity. Chessick (1977) stated that

For Aristotle the soul or psyche represented the actualization or "entelechy" of an organic body potentially endowed with life. As he claimed it in De Anima, the soul is the raison d'être of the body. (p.51)

Plotinus (205-270) and Proclus (410-485) both proclaimed the immaterial nature of the mind and Proclus continued to argue as Plato and Aristotle had that the psyche was essentially a principle of motion. The early Christian view of man's mind was that it has an infinite capacity. The mind is capable of unlimited knowledge.

In the 17th century Descartes (1596-1650) introduced the idea of mind as a separate substance. It was an unextended thinking thing which does not occupy space and has no length or width. It is res cogitans as differentiated from the body or res extensa. Descartes designated the

pineal gland as the place where the mind and the body join. In the end he came to amend his concept of mind to include the notion of the will. The human mind not only understands but also wills.

Associationism and the Mind

MacLeod (1970) explained that Locke conceived of the mind "as composed of particles (the ideas) which exist in space and time and which are fused, amalgamated or chained by forces outside themselves" (p.209). Locke was attempting to establish a science of the mind that was similar in nature to Newton's (1642-1727) physical science. Thus he adopted a reductionistic view and believed that complex mental ideas could be broken down into smaller less complex mental elements. Locke did not devote much time to discussing the principles of association that bound the ideas together, this was left to those who followed him. Hume also used the principle of association in his concept of mind. Mind he felt was nothing but a succession of perceptions associated together. The metaphor he often employed was that the mind was like a theatre or stage on which perceptions passed in succession. In De Memoria et Reminiscentia, Aristotle was the first to formulate the laws of association (i.e. the laws of contiguity, similarity, and contrast). The concept however of association is very old in fact Aristotle used it to explain memory. Later in the 18th and 19th centuries, the principle of

association was employed to describe the functioning of the entire mind. The law of contiguity which states that ideas or events that occur contiguously in time and space are associated, is probably one of the best known laws of associationism. Hartley (1705-1757) who conceived of the mind in very physiological terms, used the concept of association to explain the relationship between brain functions and mental processes.

Two very well known 19th century associationists were James Mill (1773-1836) and his son John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). James Mill used the principle of association to explain the workings of the mind which he believed operated like a machine. His son also utilized the principle of association but unlike his father, he conceived of the mind in terms of a framework borrowed from chemistry. The mind functioned in such a way that simple ideas could produce new complex ideas that did not resemble a simple combination of ideas but as in chemistry, a totally new element as for example, when hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water. It seems an appropriate adjunct to also mention Thomas Brown (1778-1820) at this point since he has the distinction of being the first person to suggest the notion of mental chemistry.

Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) were opposed to associationism and they like Condillac (1715-1780) and Herbart (conceived of the mind as an

unextended, indivisible substance. Misiak and Sexton (1966) noted that

later associationist psychology, descended from philosophical associationism and represented in Germany chiefly by Wilhelm Wundt and in America by E. B. Titchener, was attacked by various individuals for its atomistic conception of mind (pp.24-25).

James rejected this notion of mind and conceived of it as a moving and constantly changing stream of consciousness.

Freud's work presents the traditional psychoanalytic notion of the mind. In this scheme, mind is represented as a dynamic interplay of instinctual forces or energy. The mind is composed of an id, ego, and superego and divided into conscious, preconscious, and unconscious realms. The mind according to Freud is also governed by certain principles such as the pleasure, reality, and Nirvana principles.

The Kleinian mind is viewed in very animistic terms. It is felt to be like an inner world in which part and whole objects interact and form relationships with one another. In some respects Klein's view of the mind is similar to Homer's. They both describe men as conceiving of their minds in an animistic fashion and the mechanism of projection plays a predominant role in both their concepts of mind. Projection, introjection, and splitting are all very basic ideas in Klein's notion of the mind. Projection and introjection as explained in an earlier

chapter are the two fundamental mechanisms whereby the child takes thoughts and feelings into or expels them out of its mind. Simon and Weiner (1966) have pointed out that one can regard the gods in Homer's work as projections or self-representations. In addition, they contend that "the gods can be said to represent something of the 'object relation' of the individual" (p.308). This notion of our projections revealing the nature of our own object-relations is very much in line with Melanie Klein's thinking.

The Concept of Projection

Homer was by no means the only one who recognized the mechanisms of projection operating in the minds of men. Aristotle was another ancient Greek who realized that the projection of emotions could interfere with the accuracy of our perceptions. Similarly, the Bible, the writings of the Jewish Talmud, and the Tibetan Book of the Dead plus many centuries later the work of the playwright William Shakespeare (1564-1616) all revealed an understanding of the concept of projection. D. Klein (1970) has presented examples from the works of Spinoza and Thomas Brown in order to substantiate his claim that they too recognized that projection operates within our minds and reveals much about our own personality and affects our ability to perceive things clearly at-times. Although Meynert (1833-1892) adopted a very physiological approach to his description

of projection (i.e. referring to the nerve cells projecting stimuli from the outside world into the cortex), he nevertheless understood its nature. James also presented a warning to psychologists which demonstrates once again the concept of projection. He tells them to take care lest their own point of view interfere with their inability to report mental facts correctly. Finally, Melanie Klein in her own writings has acknowledged that Freud and Ferenczi respectively introduced into the theory of psychoanalysis the concepts of projection and introjection.

Phantasy and the Mind

In Melanie Klein's early papers she uses the terminology of Freud to describe the child's mind and its operations. She refers to the pleasure and reality principles and also to the fact that energy is released from being utilized for repression by means of interpretation. It took a few years for Klein to reformulate her concept of the mind strictly in terms of object-relations and to abandon the notion of an energy model of the mind. However, during these early years she came to recognize that the child regarded its own mind as a very powerful and omnipotent structure. In its phantasy life, which is the basis of its psychological reality, the child can do anything it desires. No opponent is too powerful for him or her to destroy. In Melanie Klein's view the psyche has a reality of its own and its structure is composed of

phantasied object-relations. Consequently, phantasies play an essential role in the formulation and foundation of the mind. All the impact that external reality has on the formulation of the mind is coloured to some degree by unconscious phantasies. Many of the early Greeks used the word phantasia which is often translated as imagination rather than phantasy. Xenophanes (c. 560-c. 478 B.C.) is well aware of the fact that imagination is inextricably bound up with perception. Plato too realized its importance for both perception and thought. Aristotle claims that phantasia is something different from perception and thought. Actually, he uses the word in two senses, one refers to its operating as an interpreter of external reality to the mind and the second views phantasia as a form of memory which recalls the absent object to the mind. Juhasz (1971) notes that in Aristotle's view "imagination as interpreter comes to be seen as the vehicle for transforming environmental to psychological space, and for retransforming psychological to empirical events" (p. 57). It is quite obvious from what has been said about Klein's concept of phantasy in this chapter and others that she too sees it as performing an interpretative function in the mind. In Melanie Klein's work the word imagination is used very rarely, it would appear that she regards phantasy as the basis of imagination. "In consequence of an excessive repression of its masturbation phantasies the child suffers from an inhibition of its imaginative life which

"affects both its play and work" (M. Klein, 1975c, p.185) (1932). Therefore, it would appear that Goethe's (1749-1832) belief that imagination is an essential factor in all loving, thinking, and willing is but another example of a forerunner of Klein's thinking. Finally, Benedikt and later Freud both stressed the importance of phantasy life in the functioning of the normal and pathological mind.

The Tripartite Mind

Melanie Klein's concept of the mind has retained the id, ego, and superego as structures within it and has introduced the notion of object-relations as a means of further explaining these structures and their relationship to each other. Klein's view of the ego and the superego have been described earlier at length and will not be repeated again at this time. Her concept of the id however has not been mentioned up to this point. Fortunately, it can be described very succinctly using Klein's own words, "I regard the id as identical with the two instincts" (M.Klein, 1975a, p. 243) (1958). The two instincts referred to here are of course the life and death instincts.

This notion of the tripartite division of the mind has a very long history. Plato's myth of the charioteer trying to control his two steeds has often been referred to as an early representation of the mind as being divided into three parts which are analogous to the id, ego, and

superego. In Plato's terms the three divisions of the psyche were the rational, affective, and appetite. In the second century, Galen adopted a triadic division of the soul very similar to Plato's but he located the three powers of the soul in bodily organs. The liver, heart, and brain were the bodily centres for the soul's cupiscent, irascible, and rational powers respectively. Much later in history this triadic division emerged once again in Hume's Treatise (1739). The Treatise is divided into three books dealing with understanding, passion, and morals. D. Klein (1970) gives us a brief history of this tripartite division of the mind when he writes that

it was already implicit in Plato's myth of the charioteer and received explicit formulation in Moses Mendelssohn's "three faculty" doctrine of 1755. Johann Nikolaus Tetens, it may be recalled, also based his psychology on the latter doctrine, with its three key concepts of thinking, feeling, and willing. It was reflected in Kant's three Critiques as well as in Freud's ego, id, and superego. (p.557)

Furthermore, Von Schubert's (1780-1860) contention that the nature of man is divided into Leib (the living body), soul, and spirit has been likened to Freud's id, ego, and superego notion. Heinroth (1773-1843) conceived of a tripartite division that applied directly to psychological processes. He believed that these processes functioned on three different levels which he designated as the lowest level, the ego and the super-us. Finally, Freud's three

structures have also been likened by Wyss (1973) to "a translation of Meynert's brain topography into psychic structures" (p.102). Thus we see how Freud's links with the past also become in this case, as in others, links for Melanie Klein to that same past.

The Superego

Not only does the concept of dividing the mind into an ego, id, and superego have a history but so also does each of the separate structures. Laver (1972) has mentioned that the early Egyptians believed the conscience or superego to be situated in the heart. In fact, the heart was considered to be the site of all psychological activity. Now, in Plato's concept of mind the superego was represented by the higher irrational soul. In his charioteer myth it was the good winged horse. The Greek cynic philosopher Antithenes and the Spanish rabbi Maimonides (1135-1204) although they didn't specify that they were speaking about the superego both stressed the importance of moral or superego factors for the attainment of mental well-being. Several years prior to even the birth of Freud, Johann Christian Heinroth designated a level of mental functioning by the term *super-us*.

Heinroth stated that the conscience develops by a differentiation within the ego, appearing first as something alien to the ego, something that opposes the ego's self-centred strivings. This higher force, which is part of the ego, produces a conflict within the ego. For the higher force Heinroth uses the term

"super-us" (Über-uns). (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966, p.141)

It is obvious that there is a striking resemblance between the origin of the super-us and the superego. A contemporary of Heinroth's, Charles Darwin, also mentions that individuals have within them a conscience which has the ability to reflect back on their past behavior and also to guide their future actions. He believed that conscience had its origin in the social instincts being directed by the sanctions of our fellow-men. Within the individual, conscience was ruled by reason, self-interest, and religious feelings. One's fellow-men and the influence of their sanctions also formed part of Paul Ree's (1849-1901) and Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of moral conscience. Ree is said to have inspired Nietzsche's thinking in this area. Both men felt that because of the founding of societies, man's more primitive and aggressive instincts had to be turned inward. This resulted in feelings of guilt which later formed the basis of moral conscience. Nietzsche, like Freud, realized that our conscience or superego was composed of all the sanctions imposed on us as we are growing up. Melanie Klein, as explained earlier, incorporated this idea into her concept of the superego and added an additional emphasis on the importance of the child's own feelings or in other words, the operation of the life and death instincts, in the formation of the super-ego.

The Ego and The Id

Many of the same men who presented ideas that became the precursors of the superego also formulated early concepts of the id and ego. In Plato's work, the ego is the rational soul of the charioteer and the id is part of the irrational soul, the unruly steed. Heinroth represents the id as instinctual forces that make up the lowest level of mental functioning. Its aim is strictly pleasure. From this lowest level develops the ego (ich). The ego is directed by the intellect and its

aim (which is entirely self-centred) is "security in relation to the external world" and "the enjoyment of living". The main characteristic of the ego is "self-awareness". (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966, p.141)

Ellenberger (1970) cites Thomas Mann (1875-1955) as stating that Schopenhauer's concepts of will and intellect when translated from metaphysics into psychology bear a remarkable resemblance to Freud's id and ego. Actually, the term id is said to originate with Nietzsche and was then adopted by Groddeck. It was from Groddeck that Freud borrowed the term although they both meant slightly different things by it. According to Freud, the term stood for instinctual forces and drives while Groddeck conceived of it as "an almost mystical powerful Unconscious, the source of activity and consciousness, an Es in which soma and psyche are one" (Reider, 1968, p.194).

The term ego has also been defined in many different

ways, some of which differ from Freud and Klein. Herbart defined the ego as a drive but he believed that both ego and drive stemmed ultimately from the will. Meynert defined the ego in terms of a neurological framework. It was simply a network of associated nerve cells. Brentano marks a return to a more psychological description because he regards the ego as being composed of all an individual's conscious acts. Ellenberger (1970) has shown that Freud's concept of the ego has links with Janet's function of synthesis and his notion of psychological tension. Furthermore, he states that

Nacht's definition of the ego as "the entity through which the individual becomes conscious of his own existence and of the existence of the external world" is almost identical with that which Fichte had given in philosophical terms. (p.517)

It is obvious that there were several ways of defining the ego prior to either Freud or Klein. Since I have already pointed out the similarities between Freud's and Klein's view of the ego, there is no need to repeat it again at this point.

Throughout this outline of the historical background of the ego, id, and superego it is possible to notice several ideas that are similar to Melanie Klein's. For instance Plato's and Heinroth's description of the id is almost analogous to Klein's. Similarly, Klein believes, like Heinroth, that the superego stems from a differen-

tiation of the ego and that it influences our future behavior. I believe history also provides us with definitely one and possibly two examples of forerunners of Klein's very controversial contention that the ego exists from birth onwards. Locke believed that the unborn child is capable of ideas in the womb. He mentions the ideas of hunger and warmth as two plausible examples. "At all events, by implication he seems to have endowed the unborn child with understanding and with the capacity to think" (D. Klein, 1970, p.367). In Kleinian terminology it is the ego that understands, thinks, and formulates ideas. Therefore, Locke would appear to be maintaining a position equivalent to Klein's in respect to the ego's presence at birth. Moreover, Titchener held that mind was inherently meaningful from the beginning and possessed an inherited organization which directed the individual's responses to stimuli. Once again, this description of the mind at birth appears to foreshadow Melanie Klein's thinking.

According to Melanie Klein (1975a), the mind is not divided into separate areas which are segregated from one another but rather the different areas of the mind "are shaded off into each other" (p.244)(1958). Furthermore, the infant's mind is flexible and resilient and has a tendency to strive towards integration. Since the interaction between love and hate form the basis of psychic life it is consequently dominated by conflict. It is also Melanie

Klein's contention that the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions represent two permanent developmental levels of the mind which operate throughout life. Padel (1977) has pointed out that the roots of Klein's depressive position stem from Abraham's concept of primal parathymia. Abraham explained the depressive state of his wartime patients as being due to the unconscious loss of an incorporated object.

The Dynamic Mind

One essential characteristic of the Kleinian mind which has been expressed only implicitly so far is the fact that it is an active, dynamic part of the human being. The objects which Klein believes compose the mind are continually interacting with one another, forming new relationships and engaging in conflicts. Numerous people over the ages have conceived of the mind as being active and dynamic. Similarly, many individuals have also described it as a very passive entity. This dichotomous way of regarding the mind is often linked with the question of how the mind acquires knowledge. I will therefore not go into this issue in great detail at this point but I will deal with it later in the section on knowledge. At this time I will however, give a brief outline of many of the men who agree with Klein that the mind is an active entity.

Anaxagoras and Plato both regarded the psyche as an organizing and actively controlling entity. D. Klein

(1977) also cites Aristotle and several others who regard active reason as a central component of the mind.

This theme is reflected in Aristotle's intellectual soul, in the Cartesian res cogitans, in the rationalism of Spinoza, in Locke's reflection, and in Kant's pure reason. And it is also reflected in what Freud had called the primacy of the intellect. (p.104)

Plotinus and St. Augustine are two additional figures from antiquity that also regard the mind as active. Plotinus lists three activities of the soul. It is capable of turning towards matter and the senses, or inward to the life that exists there; or finally, it is able to turn above itself to Reason. Alternatively, St. Augustine believes that the mind is active because of its three functions, memory, will, and imagination.

Now in more modern times this notion of mind as active has been expressed by men such as Leibnitz in his monadic system. Christian Wolff (1679-1754), his-disciple, also felt that the mind was intrinsically active since it had the power to think its own thoughts. Within an idealistic context, Berkeley (1685-1753), also regarded the mind as an active agent and Thomas Reid, the main representative of the Scottish school, like Wolff, in Germany, realized that the mind's ability to think signified its active nature. Since Leibnitz and Reid's time the list of names has been extended and

Brentano's psychical acts, Wundt's processes, the transitive states of

James, the propensities of McDougall, and the cathexes of Freud are all variants of a common recognition of mind as active. (D. Klein, 1970, p.463)

Another name not included in this list of Leibnitz's successors in this notion is Herbart. He conceived of ideas as active forces in the mind striving to reach consciousness. His was a very active and dynamic perspective. Finally, Nietzsche also adopted an active and dynamic view of the mind. He represented the mind as a system of drives which involved the inhibition, release, and exchange of quantities of energy. It would appear therefore from this outline that Melanie Klein's view that the mind is active has a long historical foundation in the thoughts of men of the past.

Continuity of the Mind

In addition to conceiving of the mind as active, Klein also believes that it strives to attain unity or integration and that a fundamental principle of the mind is its continuity. The mind develops according to Klein without gaps, each step in development has its roots in the preceding steps. This principle is called 'genetic continuity' and was referred to earlier in chapter four. Melanie Klein (1975a) also stated that "nothing that ever existed in the unconscious completely loses its influence on the personality" (p.262) (1959). 'Not only do steps in development emerge by degree from preceding ones but there is also a continuity in the influence of unconscious factors

on the mind's development. Moreover, a hallmark of Klein's theory is the fact that infantile object-relations continue to influence all future development.

The notion that the principle of continuity is a characteristic of the mind can be seen to date back to Aristotle. For instance, he conceived of the psyche in terms of a hierarchy of levels whereby the lower ones were a necessary condition for those above it. Each level had its roots in the ones below it. Similarly, in Leibnitz's system of monads we find that they too were arranged in a hierarchy which contained no gaps or leaps. There was a natural progression from maximal to minimal levels of unconsciousness. Herbart, who also believed in the principle of continuity, acknowledged his indebtedness to Leibnitz's work for introducing this idea to him. He expresses in terms of ideas a very similar notion to that which was just quoted from Klein. He believes that ideas which drop below the threshold of consciousness continue to exist and to influence the whole of consciousness. The influence of ideas does not end when they go below the threshold of consciousness. Finally, D. Klein (1970) has noted that Fechner's thinking in respect to his concept of psychophysics also reflects an adherence to the principle of continuity.

The Unity of the Mind

As mentioned earlier, Melanie Klein also believed that

the mind had an inherent tendency to strive towards unity or integration. This Klein believed was an expression of the life instinct operating within the mind. Her notion of unity entails the idea that parts of the mind cannot be destroyed completely, they continue to exist to some degree. She cites a passage from Freud which she subscribes to, which expresses this concept admirably.

. . . All of the essentials are preserved; even things that seem completely forgotten are present somehow and somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to the subject. Indeed, it may, as we know, be doubted whether any psychical structure can really be the victim of total destruction.
(M. Klein, 1975a, p.178) (1957)

The mind however, in Klein's view, never attains complete unity since she maintains that the most terrifying objects in the mind, which are split-off and exist in the deepest layers of the unconscious, never become integrated. It could be argued that Klein's concept of splitting negates any idea of the mind operating according to the principle of continuity or of achieving any substantial degree of unity. However, Melanie Klein did not believe that splitting is an absolute process. In fact, even the terrifying figures mentioned above are not so split-off from the rest of the mind that they no longer influence its development. They can indeed have a very negative effect on the mind's development.

Those who believe in the unity of the mind or who like

Klein, subscribe to the idea that the mind tends towards unity can trace their ancestors as far back as Aristotle. Baker (1961) mentions that both Aristotle and the Stoics stressed the unity and integrity of the psyche. So too does St. Augustine in his Confessions (397-400) when he acknowledges that his dreams still reveal the existence in his mind of his pagan personality. St. Augustine's former conscious lustful desires may no longer appear in his waking life but their continued unconscious existence is quite evident in his dreams. They have not been destroyed, only removed to another part of his mind.

Although Descartes proposed that there existed a division between mind and body res cogitans and res extensa, he believed the mind was indivisible. In his view, it was a unified whole and he was opposed to the concept of the mind being composed of separate faculties. Leibnitz also objected to the idea of faculties and maintained in accordance with Descartes that the mind was a unity. However, Christian Wolff expressed both a belief in the existence of mental faculties and the unity of the mind.

"For him, this unity was viewed as function of integration mediated by symbols—especially language symbols—as representatives of or surrogates for experience" (D. Klein, 1970, p.470). Other supporters of the concept of mental faculties such as Reid and Gall (1758-1828) did not stress the unity of the mind as Wolff had done. Gall, who was the

founder of phrenology, proposed different areas in the brain as the sites which corresponded to the various faculties. Finally, Herbart, Brown, and James all represent additional supporters of the concept of a unified mind. Particularly Herbart and James both contended that the mind was a unitas multiplex, an idea which comes from Leibnitz.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the mind-body problems I would like to conclude this description of the Kleinian mind by briefly mentioning a few additional characteristics. Melanie Klein believed that the degree of organization present in the child's mind was not as great as that in the adult's and that during the early phases of development the principle of pars pro toto is in operation. There also exists within the Kleinian mind a group of defence mechanisms which if not excessively resorted to, help to further its normal development. Finally, the nature of the mind according to Klein depends upon the interaction between many constitutional factors and the circumstances present in external reality.

The Mind-Body Problem

The question of the relationship between the mind and body is a centuries old problem. Over the years two major solutions have been proposed, one is monism and the other is dualism. Both of these solutions however have become further subdivided during the ages. For example, a few

of the monistic theories that have been proposed are idealism, materialism, double-aspect and hylomorphism. Similarly, the concept of dualism has found expression in such theories as interactionism, occasionalism, parallelism, and psychophysical parallelism.

When Greek philosophy first emerged in Ionia the mind-body problem was not an issue, since the men of that time, Thales (650-580 B.C.), Anaximander (610-547 B.C.) and Anaximenes (570-500 B.C.) had adopted a monistic explanation of the universe. The seeds were sown for the introduction of the mind-body problem during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. when the Greeks began to make a distinction between the material and the spiritual worlds. This distinction was soon applied to the nature of man as well. But before considering the dualistic explanation I would like to present an outline of the history of the monistic movement.

Monism

Monism is a philosophical doctrine that reduces all of reality to only one form of substance or admits only one basic principle. The actual term monism was first introduced to philosophy by Wolff during the 18th century. Consequently, the idea of classifying theories as either monistic or dualistic is a very recent development in philosophy.

One of the earliest monistic theories is materialism. This doctrine states that matter is the only reality and that all things in the universe can be explained in terms of matter. A list of several of the proponents of materialism over the ages would include the Greek naturalists, the Greek atomists (e.g. Leucippus, Democritus(460-360 B.C.)), and Epicurus(c. 342-270 B.C.), the Stoics, Hobbes, La Mettrie (1709-1751), Cabanis, von Holbach (1725-1789), Marx (1818-1883), and Engels (1820-1895).

In opposition to this materialistic form of monism there developed a system of thought known as idealism. It represents a mentalistic metaphysics whereby mind is not reduced to body sometimes to the exact reverse, body is elevated and transformed into mind. The essence of reality is dependent on the experiencing mind of ideas not of matter. There have been many prominent advocates of this position over the ages, men such as Berkeley (subjective idealism), Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel (objective idealism).

Hylomorphism was a very unique form of monism proposed by Aristotle. It consisted in applying the hylomorphic doctrine to the nature of man. The result is that man is assumed to be a unity composed of one substance that is formed from the body and soul. "The soul appears as the entelechy of the physical organism and is as closely bound to it as the power of sight is to the eye" (Choron, 1963, p.53). A Christian version of the Aristotelian solution was

adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas during the 13th century. He claimed that the soul is spiritual and exists in its own right and is not dependent upon matter for its existence. The body, on the other hand, while being a real part of man is dependent upon the soul for its existence. The soul determines the body.

Finally, the double-aspect theory is yet another solution that has been put forth as an answer to the mind-body problem. It is a form of monistic parallelism. It assumes that "there is but one underlying reality and that physiology sees one aspect and psychology another" (Eoring, 1957, p.667). Thus man is composed of mind and body but neither act upon the other though both reflect the same one reality but from two different vantage points. Spinoza is regarded as the father of this theory.

Dualism

An alternative approach to the mind-body problem that many have adhered to is known as dualism. This doctrine states that reality is ultimately determined by and explicable in terms of two basic principles. The two basic entities, when this doctrine is applied to man, are mind and matter. In the beginning, dualistic concepts appeared to center around an awareness of a spirit-world as being something distinct from the corporeal world of man's body. The early Greeks (e.g. Anaxagoras) on many levels proposed the dualism of man. Similarly, the early proponents of

Christianity such as St. Augustine also ascribed to a dualistic view of man. This dualism between matter and mind or body and soul also emerged as a philosophical principle among the thinkers of the Arab world. For instance, Ibn Sina (980-1037) believed that matter and soul represented two distinct and separate realities.

The idea that man represents a dualism has been expressed in several different ways. One of these is the concept of interactionism. This simply means that the mind and body influence one another's functions. Plato can be seen as an early representative of this position. He argued that psyche and matter are two completely distinct entities.

During the Renaissance many of the psychological treatises that were written by men like Vesalius, Bright, Laurentius, Huarte, Burton, and Harvey expressed this idea that mind and body interact. The man who has often been heralded as the father of dualistic interactionism in respect to the mind-body problem is Descartes. He felt that man was a complete dualism being composed of an extended, material body and an unextended, immaterial mind. Man body was conceived of as being like a machine that operated according to the laws of mechanics. Animal spirits were the energies that circulated through the muscles and nerves of the body causing it to move and function. According to Descartes, mind and body interact with one another with the help of God. The pineal gland is the point in human beings where the mind

or. soul interacts with the body and influences the flow of animal spirits. Boring (1957) pointed out that Lotze (1817-1881) put forth a similar view to that of Descartes but did not specify the pineal gland as the point of interaction between mind and body. Finally, Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) is an example of a more latter day philosopher who adopted the theory of interactionism as a solution to the question of the nature of the relationship between mind and body.

Occasionalism which turned out to be a forerunner of parallelism was presented as an alternative theory by many of those who rejected Descartes' theory e.g. Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669) and Malebranche (1638-1715). Occasionalism rejected the Cartesian notion that mind and body interact and upheld the independence and separateness of the two. Mind operates according to mental laws and body to physical ones. While mind and body appear to interact and to have a cause effect relationship, this is not really true. The true explanation is that God has so created mind and body that the activity of one occasions a corresponding activity in the other.

A similar theory called parallelism was proposed by Leibnitz. The mind and body remain independent of one another and operate on perfectly parallel courses thanks to a pre-established harmony initiated by God. One of the differences between the occasionalist and the parallelists' positions is that the former believe that God continues to

intervene while the latter does not.

Interposed between the historical line of development from Leibnitz's parallelism to Alexander Bain's (1818-1903) psychophysical parallelism is Hartley's truncated form of parallelism. He tried to explain the mind in physiological terms as neural activity and brain processes. Hartley's parallelism is described as truncated because he is certain only about the physical side of the parallel, the part dealing with physical vibrations in the brain. He is vague about the site of the ideational processes. This concept of parallelism was further developed by Bain into the theory of psychophysical parallelism round about 1860. This theory states that mind and body are two separate and independent realms which while dependent on one another for their existence, do not influence or cause activity to occur in one another's realm. Mind and body function rather in a parallel fashion. Corresponding or correlational activity can be found in both domains whenever an event occurs in either one. This theory became extremely popular among psychologists during the 19th century. Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) and Wundt both endorsed it. Sigmund Freud also subscribed to the theory of psychophysical parallelism. He distinguished between psychical and material reality. This distinction allowed him to develop a science that dealt exclusively with the psychological realm, namely psychoanalysis.

Melanie Klein has not explicitly stated her position on this issue. I believe that it is possible however to surmise with some degree of certainty from various statements she has made her stance on this problem. Melanie Klein (1973) says in discussing one of her child patients that

there is little doubt that such anxieties are apt in turn to produce colds or other physical illnesses, or at least to lower the resistance to them. This means that we are here confronted with a vicious circle, because these illnesses in turn reinforced all his fears. (p.362) (1945).

Melanie Klein is talking about an interaction between physical and psychological factors. Anxiety can influence the well-being of the body and the state of one's physical health can effect their psychological disposition. There is a causal relationship between the two for Klein. She is not referring to a form of dualistic parallelism but to an idealistic type of dualistic interactionism. I believe she has adopted a position that has links to that of Descartes, Lotze, and Stumpf but not identical since Descartes' dualism is not idealistic. Unlike Descartes, she has also not specified the pineal gland as the point of interaction between mind and body, nor has she introduced the notion of God as playing some part in the interaction between these two elements. My decision to classify

Melanie Klein as an interactionist is not based simply on this one example but rather on her general approach to man's development. She has always stressed that development was the result of an interaction between internal and external factors, between psychological and environmental factors or if you prefer between the mind and body. "I have tried to convey the importance of the interaction between innate factors and the influence of the environment. In giving full weight to this interplay we get a deeper understanding of how the child's character develops".

(M. Klein, 1975a, p. 262) (1959)

The Unconscious

Therapists have been at least implicitly aware of the unconscious for centuries. Not only have there been numerous meanings assigned to the unconscious, according to the epistemological position assumed, but we may also mention that different authors have not always restricted themselves to using only one meaning. Equally important is the fact that not everyone over the centuries has of course agreed that there is such a thing or entity as an unconscious part of the mind. Neural activity that was both purposive and independent of cortical control formed the basis of a long lasting controversy over the issue of conscious and unconscious functions.

Helmholtz (1821-1894) and Wundt are an example of two men who initially appeared to endorse the idea of an unconscious influence in the process of perception. Closer analysis reveals however that Helmholtz's definition of unconscious inference was related to habit formation and an awareness of past associative memories that influenced perceptual judgement and had nothing to do with reasoning or dynamic processes. Both Helmholtz and Wundt later rejected the use of the term unconscious inference. Brentano was also reluctant to utilize the concept of an unconscious to explain mental functioning. However, as Fancher (1977) points out, "while doubting the existence of unconscious mental act, however, Brentano does not rule out the possibility of dissociated ego states, which might have independent and unassociated ideas and memories" (p.222). Similarly, James, Ebbinghaus, Titchener (1867-1927), and others all had serious doubts and concerns about the development of a psychology which included the unconscious as a system. However, Ellenberger (1970) has assumed that James' interest in automatic writing signified a sort of belief in the possibility of building up a psychology of the unconscious. D. Klein (1977) maintains that Henri Ellenberger is in error, since William James, he feels, did not even consider

the preservation of ideas over time to be due to some function of the unconscious as a separate psychological entity but rather to the neurological basis of memory.

Supporters of The Idea of The Unconscious

Many men over the ages have recognized the motivational function of the unconscious part of the mind. Spinoza's well-known phrase that "men are usually ignorant of the causes of their desires" has been cited by authors as a sign that he anticipated Freud's notion of unconscious motivation. However, D. Klein (1977) has informed us that Spinoza

differed from Freud not only with respect to his recognition of the distinction between motives and their causes, but also with respect to his recognition of the difference between endogenous and exogenous motives. (p.166)

According to Spinoza, it is the cause that remains unconscious not the motive. But, irregardless of this discrepancy between Freud and Spinoza, Spinoza still realized the existence of an unconscious part of the mind. During this same century Pardies (1636-1673) spoke of fine and delicate perceptions of which we are unaware but which nevertheless influence our thinking. Pardies' work anticipated Leibnitz's concept of petites perceptions and his distinction between the two types of thinking also came at a time that just preceded the growing interest in the unconscious mind. Whyte (1960) has stated, that he has located over 50 writers who have made contributions to our understanding of the

unconscious during the period between 1680-1880. During these two centuries men like Leibnitz, Rousseau, Hume, Herbart, and Schopenhauer all came to realize the motivational influence of the unconscious mind.

As just mentioned, Leibnitz was one of the earlier advocates of the concept of the unconscious. As part of his hierarchy of monads, Leibnitz spoke of degrees of consciousness which ranged from a level of maximum perception to a level below consciousness referred to as 'petites perceptions'. These 'petites perceptions' later became equivalent in Herbart's system to inhibited ideas.

Although the English Platonist, John Norris (1622-1704) was aware even in the 17th century that all our ideas are not conscious, it was much later before the term unconscious was actually employed. Whyte (1960) claims that

the available surveys suggest that "Unbewusstsein" and "bewusstlos" (in meanings close to those now current) were first used by E. Platner in 1776 and these or similar terms were made popular by Goethe, Schiller, and Schelling between 1780 and 1820. The word "unconscious" as an adjective (with the same meaning) appears in English in 1751 and more frequently after 1800 for example in the writings of Wordsworth and Coleridge. (p.66)

Platner (1744-1818) besides being the first to use the German equivalent of the term unconscious also held that conscious and unconscious states alternate with one another

in a constant series.

Four decades before Freud was even born, Herbart presented a concept of a dynamic unconscious. Herbart's dynamic concept, unlike Freud's referred to an interplay between ideas rather than desires, instincts, and psychic energy. Ideas struggle with one another to rise above a threshold called a limen of consciousness. Those that are below this limen are not as clear or intense as those ideas above it, instead they remain in a state of tendency. This area below the limen of consciousness is the unconscious part of our minds.

Schopenhauer, a contemporary of Herbart, described the mind as being like the earth. It has a surface or crust and also an area inside of which we know very little. The surface of the mind is consciousness and the inner unknown area is the unconscious. Schopenhauer conceived of the unconscious as being equivalent to the will. The will and consequently, the unconscious both referred to a dynamic, blind, indestructible force which endlessly strives to attain a goal that will end its struggle and suffering. Ultimately, for Schopenhauer the will is the essence of the world and of man.

Karl Gustav Carus likened the unconscious to a creative life force which formed the cornerstone of our mental functioning and guided the growth processes and the function of all our organs. Carus believed that one must understand

the unconscious part of the mind first if one is ever going to be fully able to understand conscious processes. Ellenberger (1970) mentions that Carus's work later had an influence on von Hartmann's view of the unconscious, who also followed the same philosophical line as Schopenhauer.

Some of the previous concepts of the unconscious such as Leibnitz's and Herbart's have represented it as a type of underworld from which perceptions or ideas rise to consciousness. But Brett (1974) states that Beneke (1798-1854) does not regard the unconscious in this way. Instead Beneke believes, that

all mental states persist, as it were, in the same plane. But they disappear from direct consciousness in various ways. They may enter into more developed states in which complexity is represented by a change of quality; or they may persist beyond the horizon of actual thought. (p. 566)

Fechner (1801-1887) however, is another example of a return to the concept of a limen dividing the conscious from the unconscious. He borrowed Herbart's notion of limen and regarded degrees of intensity below this limen as negative sensations. Fechner's negative sensations are really equivalent to Leibnitz's petites perceptions. Lotze also following in a Herbartian tradition believes that unnoticed ideas are not lost but reside in an unconscious realm of the mind. Lotze in referring to these unconscious ideas notes the self-contradiction of such a statement and explains that the term really indicates only

that these ideas still have the potentiality to be reinstated into consciousness again as ideas.

Freud in his work acknowledged Griesinger's (1817-1868) precedence in realizing that dreams and psychoses both express a wish-fulfillment. This recognition of course signified Griesinger's awareness of unconscious mental processes. These processes were described as an unconscious life and movement. The unconscious represented an active part of the psyche which was not only the largest but also the most important in terms of representing the true nature of the individual.

Von Hartmann's ideas about the unconscious reflect the influence of many earlier authors which I cannot outline in full here. Earlier I mentioned, that Carus' work formed part of the basis of von Hartmann's concept of the unconscious, like Carus, von Hartmann considered the unconscious to be a creative force, an essential active principle in the universe. He divided the unconscious into three layers, the absolute, the physiological, and the psychological. The second and third layers are derived from the first, the absolute unconscious, which represents the spiritual foundation of the universe..

The physiological unconscious, was assumed to be the dynamic source of evolutionary processes involved in the creation of all forms of life from the simplest organism to man. The third layer was the psychological unconscious, deemed to be the source,

of all experienced phenomena or of every kind of awareness of state of unconsciousness. (D. Klein, 1977, p.26)

Kant's influence can be seen quite clearly in the third layer. His noumenal and phenomenal world, representing the unconscious and conscious, respectively.

Nietzsche recognized also the motivational function of the unconscious. He conceived of it as an area of the mind which contains the unacceptable emotions, thoughts, and instincts of man. He warned therapists that their worst enemy lay in wait in their own unconscious and that they must come to understand the workings of this part of their mind before they could truly help others. He believed that the most important aspects of the individual's true nature lay in the unconscious and like Theodor Lipps (1851-1914), he felt that conscious processes were but a reflection of the deeper unconscious ones. Both of them also believed in the psychic reality of the unconscious and Lipps emphasized further that it was not possible to use physiological terms to fully explain the unconscious. In other words, Lipps did not endorse the approach that people like neurologists such as Maudsley (1835-1918) professed.

Whyte (1960) has mentioned that prior to Freud's work around 1870 to 1880, the notion of an unconscious mind was fairly widespread in Europe. The unconscious of course held the centre stage in Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. This concept formed the core of his thinking.

At times, he spoke as if it was a proven fact that men have an unconscious part of their minds and at other times, he regarded this idea as something that was still unproven. Nevertheless, he regarded the unconscious as a highly organized system of repressed ideas which exist in a separate part of our minds. It was a system that was inaccessible to consciousness and represented the unacceptable instincts, infantile memories, and strivings which repression had forced out of consciousness into an unconscious realm. The unconscious is very emotional and highly irrational. It disregards the limits of space and time and also any concept of a negative or any idea of not being able to have what it desires at any time. According to Freud, all things are possible in the unconscious. D. Klein (1970) has also mentioned that there is a similarity between Plato's concept of two irrational souls and Freud's view of the unconscious as striving and irrational. There is also a similarity between Freud's notion of the unconscious and the external real world of Kant's work. Freud (1900) states that

the unconscious in the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the communications of our sense organs. (Standard Edition V, p.613)

Furthermore, just as Lipps and Nietzsche before him, Freud regarded the unconscious as representing the most important

aspects of human character. Finally, Freud also believed that the forces or instincts of the unconscious were the motivational basis of all our actions and, consequently, he stressed that if we are to attain any degree of freedom from the unconscious part of our mind we must first uncover its content. This of course Freud believed was possible through the process of psychoanalysis.

Melanie Klein conceived of the unconscious as being an inner phantasy world peopled with both part and whole objects. In the unconscious these objects interrelate with one another, forming numerous and varied types of relationships. Therefore, according to Klein, the unconscious is a very active and dynamic part of the mind. All of man's thoughts, actions, and feelings are influenced by and are an expression of the unconscious, since unconscious phantasy forms the basis of all mental processes. The unconscious can therefore influence man's entire development either in a positive or a negative direction. Thus, Klein's view is similar to Griesinger's in the importance she places on the unconscious and also because she regards it as being an active area of the mind. It can also be seen that Klein would agree with Carus that one must first have an understanding of the unconscious before one can properly know what is occurring in the conscious mental processes, since all mental processes and actions stem from the unconscious. Moreover, following

the line of ~~thought~~ established by Herbart and passed down to Freud, Melanie Klein represents the unconscious as a dynamic realm of the mind. But unlike Herbart, she sees the dynamic struggle as occurring between objects rather than ideas. In addition, Klein recognizes the motivational function of the unconscious just as ~~Pardies~~, Leibnitz; Rousseau, Hume, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Freud, and many others before her. It is evident too from my description of the Kleinian unconscious that she believes like Nietzsche, Lipps, and Freud that the unconscious is an essential part of an individual, forming the basis of psychic life. Consequently, a person's conscious life is highly influenced by unconscious representations which Klein refers to as phantasies.

Melanie Klein also believes that the unconscious of the adult and the child do not differ very much fundamentally. She believes, like Freud that

we find in the adult all the stages
of his early childish development.
We find them in the unconscious
which contains all repressed phantasies
and tendencies. (M. Klein, 1973, p.185) (1927)

Melanie Klein stresses too, that young children have fairly easy access to the unconscious part of their minds. They are thus able to represent their unconscious very directly through their behavior. The ideal situation for a favorable development is that a porous or fluid boundary exists between the conscious and unconscious parts of the

mind. This state of affairs will come about provided there has not been an excessive use of splitting as a defence in the early stages of development. Melanie Klein (1975a) has described what she believes constitutes the unconscious in the following way:

I have emphasized that the dynamics of the mind are the result of the working of the life and death instincts, and that in addition to these forces the unconscious consists of the unconscious ego and soon of the unconscious super-ego. (p.243) (1958)

In conclusion, since Melanie Klein maintains that unconscious phantasies play such a crucial part in all aspects of man's life, it is obvious that they must influence his perception of the real world as well. Since this point will be discussed in greater detail later, I will simply say here that Klein would agree with Kant in the active role played by the subject in the perception of the world. Her thinking thus reiterates a point of view that has been passed down from Kant to von Hartmann to Freud.

Consciousness

Now that I have outlined Melanie Klein's view of the unconscious and illustrated its historical roots, I would like to focus on the conscious segment of the mind. Many of course believe that the mind is not divided into conscious and unconscious parts and that the mind in its totality is equivalent to consciousness. It would

appear that one of the major issues in the area of consciousness is the problem of actually defining this term. In fact, credit for the consideration of consciousness as a separate psychical entity had to be postponed in history until the time of Descartes (i.e. dualism). Watson (1971) states that according to Descartes "consciousness is a substance, a thing, an aspect of the structure of the mind" (p.244). It is a definite inner state in an individual's mind. The notion of consciousness is present in Descartes' cogito. It signifies a state of consciousness arrived at by the process of reflection. Arnold Geulincx following Descartes' lead regards the changes that occur in consciousness as a product of the mind's own thinking processes rather than the result of changes that occur in the external world. Similarly, Pades argued, as did Descartes, that consciousness entails a reflective awareness of the act of being conscious.

Consciousness for Reimarus (1694-1768) is not something static but rather a process entailing the notion of change. He conceived of it in terms of a change that takes place in our awareness. Reimarus' conception of consciousness could be compared to "a constantly changing area of awareness around a focus of attention that adapts the animal or man to a changing and problematical environment" (Jaynes & Woodward, 1974, p.154). Consciousness as involving a notion of change is a view that was also held

by Herbart. He likened consciousness to a stage on which thoughts and ideas present themselves in a continuous moving stream.

Thomas Brown regarded consciousness as a general term that stood for all a person's sensations, thoughts, and desires. In an analogous fashion, James Mill believed that consciousness was not a separate power or entity but was instead synonymous with our feelings and ideas. Both these men were opposed to Thomas Reid's concept of consciousness as being an intellectual power. Alexander Bain considered the experience of change and transition as the sine qua non of consciousness. He felt that this term referred in a very concrete way to the feelings and actions that constitute our subjective and objective knowledge. In addition to Brown, James Mills; Bain, and William James also stressed the fact that consciousness involved the notion of constant change and movement. D. Klein (1970) has stated, that James conceived of consciousness "as a metaphysically 'neutral' relational process of awareness" (p.254) based on neurological factors.

The structuralists' concept of consciousness as a dynamic process is represented in the work of Titchener and Wundt. They both regarded consciousness as the linking, unifying function of psychical content: all the sensations, ideas, feelings, and volitions or in other words, all the mental processes which were occurring at any given moment.

Wundt adopting a frame of reference borrowed from chemistry, analyzed the structure of consciousness into its psychical elements, its sensations, images, and affective elements.

The Psychoanalytic View of Consciousness

In opposition to many of his predecessors, who contended that all that is psychical is conscious and all that is conscious is psychical, Freud proposed a psychoanalytic idea of consciousness. He believed that the process of hypnosis proves quite conclusively that "there are such things as unconscious psychical acts and that consciousness is not an indispensable condition of [psychical] activity" (Freud, 1940, Standard Edition, XXIII, p.285). Thus, according to Freud, consciousness is not equivalent to the psychical but rather a quality or attribute of it. Moreover, consciousness is inconstant because it never represents the total picture of any phenomena since the unconscious factors are always absent. Consequently, Freud has stated that he is inclined to disregard the quality of consciousness. He also refers to Theodor Lipps as someone who concurs with him in his decision. Finally, I believe that it is justifiable to state that consciousness for Freud was only an epiphenomenon of the unconscious, its true underlying basis being rooted in the forces of the unconscious.

As is quite evident from the previous discussion of Melanie Klein's concept of the unconscious, she too can be seen as considering consciousness as merely an

epiphenomenon, since she holds that all of one's actions, thoughts, and feelings stem from unconscious phantasies. Thus, Klein would agree with Malebranche who contends that consciousness provides us with imperfect knowledge of only a small part of our total being. For Melanie Klein, consciousness is both rooted in and substantially influenced by the unconscious and in emphasizing this fact her view is analogous to those of her predecessors like Carus, von Hartmann, Hericourt, Nietzsche, and Freud. All these men, like Klein, believed that consciousness was either influenced directly or determined by the unconscious realm of the mind. Similarly, Fichte and Hamilton both emphasized the fact that consciousness emerges from the unconscious.

Because Melanie Klein's interests lay mainly in exploring the uncharted regions of the child's unconscious mind she has not elaborated a theory of consciousness. She did however, argue that consciousness did develop and expand as the child entered and began to work through the depressive position. Furthermore, since she believed that the ego is present from birth onward, it can be inferred that she, like Locke, attributed consciousness to the newborn infants as D. Klein (1970) has pointed out (p.367). In point of fact, Locke went even a step further by arguing that the foetus was capable of having intra-uterine ideas and was therefore capable of experiencing some degree of consciousness.

In conclusion, this section illustrates that Melanie Klein uses an object-relations model to conceptualize the mind of man. The human mind is viewed as being very animistic. This means it is seen as being populated with a multitude of part and whole objects all interrelating with one another and with external reality. According to Klein, phantasies play an integral part both in the formulation and foundation of the mind. The Kleinian mind has retained Freud's structural division but Klein does not believe that these areas are rigidly separated but rather shaded off into each other. Melanie Klein also presents the mind as being both a unity and continuous and as constantly striving towards integration. Man's mind is also divided into a conscious and unconscious. The conscious part is believed to be but an epiphenomenon of the unconscious. The unconscious itself is composed of the life and death instincts and the unconscious ego and superego. Finally, in relationship to the mind-body question, Klein has been classified as positing an idealistic form of dualistic interactionism.

Motivation

The life and death instincts are the basic motivating factors in Melanie Klein's concept of man. Unlike in Freud's theory, instincts do not represent biological forces within the organism for Klein. Instead, they represent psychological forces which she deems to be expressions of love and hate. Because Klein has chosen to adopt a psychological definition of the life and death instincts, an outline of the historical foundation for this section must include an historical perspective of the concept of affect or emotion, especially focusing on love and hate plus background material on the notion of instinct.

Some Antecedents

Some of the early Greeks revealed an awareness of important psychological principles in the area of emotions. For example, Cicero's (106-43 B.C.) realization of the contagious characteristic of feelings anticipated the modern day psychoanalytic notion that people often project their feelings into others. Moreover, Simon (1972) informs us that Plato was aware of the role that identification and early family life play in the development of our emotional life. Following Aristotle's death, the Hellenic principle of moderation became the cornerstone of two rival schools, the Stoics and the Epicureans. Both schools recognized the importance of emotions in men's lives and

both although they dealt with the problem of emotions in different ways ended up derogating them. Zeno (c. 336-264 B.C.), a representative of the Stoic tradition warned of their disruptive influence on reason. Plato also viewed them in a similar light and felt that emotions were obstacles to be done away with or overcome. Now Epicurus (c. 342-270 B.C.), of the Epicurean school of thought, because he believed pleasure could be experienced only after a prior pain, advocated that it was therefore wisest to stay away from all desires. Later on in history, this theme of the evilness of emotions was adopted by the Neoplatonists and then in turn by the Christians. Kant likewise regarded emotions negatively when he realized their inhibiting effect on the intellect.

The Basic Emotions and The Physiological and Psychological Approach to Them

Throughout the history of emotions one theme that is consistent with many of Klein's predecessors is their attempt to specify man's most basic emotions. Hobbes had maintained that there were seven in all, love, hate, appetite, aversion, grief, joy, and desire. Next, Descartes came along and reduced the number to six, wonder, love, desire, hate, sadness, and joy. This list of primary emotions underwent a further reduction with the advent of Spinoza. He felt that there were really only three fundamental emotions, sorrow, joy, and desire. In the early

part of the 20th century, Watson (1878-1958) and Morgan (1852-1936) also formulated a list of what they felt were basic unlearned emotional reactions. They maintained that fear, love, and rage were the most fundamental three, that they could observe. Definitely, the most parsimonious of the group were Freud and Melanie Klein who both subscribed to the notion that man's two principal emotions are love and hate. Many other emotions such as gratitude, a desire to make reparation and restitution, envy, and jealousy are referred to in Klein's work but they are ultimately expressions of the two primary emotions love and hate.

Emotions, because they were considered as evil for so many centuries, remained a neglected area of investigation. When this topic did begin to gain popularity it became evident that some investigators were taking a very physiological approach while others a predominantly psychological one.

One of the first to recognize the major influence that emotions have in man's life was Juan Luis Vives. In contradiction to his predecessors, Vives maintained that emotions were very valuable because they had an adaptive function. He thought of emotions in very physiological terms, consequently, for Vives they consisted of the four humors, (hot, cold, moist, and dry) in a state of motion. According to this physiological way of concep-

tualizing emotions they not only are effected by any circumstance which causes physiological disturbances and changes in the individual but they also can reciprocally influence the somatic state of the individual. Thus, Vives can be seen as one of the first to recognize the psychosomatic quality of emotions. In addition, differences in value judgements, temperaments, and constitutions represented the three factors that for Vives accounted for differences between individuals' emotional make-up. "The emotions are dependent upon the nature of the body, and indeed, acquire their main strength from the constitution of the body" (Clements, 1967, p.231), according to Vives. Melanie Klein has also stressed the constitutional component in the strength of such feelings as love, hate, and envy and in this way demonstrates an affinity to the physiological approach to emotions. Furthermore, the fact that Vives considered love as the fundamental emotion illustrates another point of similarity between Vives and Klein.

Francis Bacon's (1561-1626) contribution to a physiological understanding of emotions was his description of all the somatic expressions which accompanied them in terms of the motion of animal spirits. La Chambre (1594-1669) who followed Bacon in history not only provided a much better physiological description of emotions, but he also had the distinction of influencing Descartes' work

in this area. Descartes, as those before him, also focused on the physiological aspects of emotions or the passions, as he referred to them. Watson (1971) explains, that Descartes' concept of the passions entailed more than is usually meant by the term emotions. He classified passions in terms of three types of perceptions those referable to the external world, to the mind, and to the body. Those passions that are referable to the mind are caused by the bodily movement of the animal spirits and reside in the brain according to Descartes. He also took the position that all the passions are by nature good and problems arise only when they are misused or permitted to grow to excess. During the 17th century Spinoza put forth a definition of emotion which predated the views of James and Lange (1834-1900) by 200 years. The James-Lange theory held that bodily changes both preceded and caused emotions and Spinoza's definition was very similar to this. He stated that

by emotion I understand the modifications of the body, by which the power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered, together with the ideas of these modifications. (D. Klein, 1970, p.411)

In both Spinoza's definitions and that entailed in the James-Lange theory, it is bodily changes that are the crucial factor. Misiak & Sexton (1966) list Aristotle, Maudsley (1834-1918), Henle, Sergi, and Lotze as several other men who also foresaw the advent of this type of interpretation

of emotion. For example, Lotze regarded feelings as being caused by a neural stimulation of the nerve. If the stimulation is so powerful that it disrupts the harmonious functioning of the nerve then the result is pain but if the functioning is undisturbed then the person feels a sense of pleasure. Finally, Alexander Bain's work not only anticipated that of James and Lange but was also perceived as being more valid because he proposed that bodily changes accompanied emotions and were essential to them but they did not constitute the emotion.

This type of somatic or physiological way of conceptualizing emotions was of course not accepted by everyone. A predominantly psychological or cognitive method was seen by many as providing a much more valid explanation. For Hume emotions begin with a primary state of pleasure or pain which in turn is accompanied by secondary affects such as fear or hope, Hume's aim is "to resolve complex passions into simpler states of feeling associated with ideas" (Brett, 1974, p.435). One of Wolff's followers, Johann Tetens (1736-1807) stated that feelings should be considered a separate mental faculty in its own right.

Tetens did not restrict the phenomenon of feeling to sensation, but regarded it as a characteristic of all conscious processes, in the sense that every memory, perception, or other ideational event involves the pleasantness-unpleasantness continuum to some degree. (D. Klein, 1970, p.484)

Two contemporaries of Tetens, Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) and Edward Reynolds presented in their separate works the idea that feeling was a distinct faculty and that it belonged between reason and will. Reynolds claimed that passions really needed to be guided and controlled by the other two faculties and therefore should be placed between them. In the 19th century, Herbart, although he realized that emotions often are accompanied by somatic changes, rejected the notion that bodily changes cause emotions. Instead, he held that it is man's understanding or knowledge of what is occurring that determines his emotional reaction. Wundt also recognized and experimented on the physiological changes that result from the expression of emotions. But he saw the two as distinct and felt that emotions could not be classified by any other characteristics except psychological ones.

Since Melanie Klein's view of emotions is inextricably bound up with both her concepts of instincts and motivation, I will not discuss it at this time. Instead, I will present her views on all three at the end of the section dealing with the historical predecessors of the concept of motivation.

Several Notions of Instincts

The word instinct is derived from the Latin verb, *instinguere* which means to impel or instigate. Thus, its very root implies the act of motivating someone or some-

thing. Originally, the topic of instincts was not really an issue in its own right. It began life as a "parasitic adjunct to the theory of man's superiority over other animals" (Diamond, 1971, p.334). Heraclitus actually laid the first stone in the foundation of the notion of instincts when he distinguished men and gods as separate from the irrational animals. Aristotle concurred with Heraclitus' distinction and he along with the Stoics and the Scholastics held that this instinctual behavior of animals did not connote intelligence but was an "expression of a transcendent reason" (Richards, 1977, p.12). An additional theory set forth by Seneca, Galen, and Nemesius to explain unlearned animal behavior was that it was due to nature. When the early classical authors and Christian Fathers employed the word instinct to refer to the actions of man, it implied a type of motivation.

Late in the 13th century, Albertus Magnus (c. 1193-1280) claimed not only that man was unique because unlike the animals, he possessed the ability to reason but he also made the first reference to the fact that animals are guided by natural instincts. His student, Thomas Aquinas upheld both these assumptions. Next, Dante (1265-1321) presented two notions of instincts which have been expressed previously. One is that animals are directed by natural instincts and the other refers to instincts as having their

source in a transcendental Being. Montaigne and much earlier in history Plutarch (c. 46-120) however, both expressed a different view of animal instincts, namely that they were intelligently acquired forms of behavior. The stage was well set in the 16th century for controversy and opposing sides to begin to develop. Jerome Rorarius and Huarte rejected the notion of instincts as an explanation of animal behavior and for the first time in more than 300 years the adjective natural was dropped from the phrase natural instincts. Diamond (1971) credits Shakespeare as being the first person to write just instinct instead of natural instinct and he feels this signifies a definite change in peoples' attitudes. He noted that with the beginning of the 17th century "the sharp line of separation between men and animals was being blurred" (p.333). La Chambre's stance at this time was of course physiological. He contended that the brain is innately imprinted with ideas and that these are the fundamentals of instinctive behavior. Instincts therefore, have a physical basis in the actual structure of the brain.

Up to this point in history the controversy over instincts has mainly been between instinct versus learning but with the advent of Reimarus (1694-1768) a new dimension is added to the controversy. That dimension is the concept of motivation. Reimarus introduced the concept of trieb or drive and he is the first link in the chain that extends

from the German Romantics to Freud and McDougall. He conceived of drives in a manner that could be translated in modern scientific language "as innate bodily organizations including nervous tissue sensitive to specific environmental stimuli" (Jaynes, 1974, p. 153). Jaynes' (1974) article provides us with a brief history of this concept. He recounts the fact that Fichte (1772-1814) used it as a basis for his concept of subjective causation and that Schelling (1775-1854) had three levels of drives similar to Reimarus. He also points out that for Herbart drive is a tension originating in the will. He mentions too that Schopenhauer contends that there are two drives, one for sex and the other for conservation. The concept of drive is also mentioned as being at the basis of von Hartmann's unconscious. Finally, it is known that Freud uses the word trieb to mean libidinal energy. Actually, Freud's concept of trieb, which was translated by the word instinct instead of drive, contains a degree of inconsistency. His first view of instinct is that it is "a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic . . . the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind" (Freud, 1915, Standard Edition XIV, pp. 121-122). During the same year he published "The Unconscious" and in this article he stated that "an instinct can never

become an object of consciousness—only the idea that represents the instinct can" (Freud, 1915, Standard Edition XIV, p.177). Freud's first remarks lead one to conclude that instincts are psychical representatives of somatic stimuli while the second implies that instincts are something non-psychical. Therefore, Freud used the term trieb in more than one way and both meanings continued throughout his work. The latter view did however occur most often. In a later Freudian definition we can see the motivational aspects of the concept more clearly.

It seems then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life. (Freud, 1920, Standard Edition, XVIII, p.36)

Freud argued that all instincts have three elements, a source, aim, and object. The source of instincts lies in the somatic processes, their aim is to reduce the tension present in the organism, and the object is that thing which allows the instincts to achieve their aim.

Before advancing too far in history we should return to the 19th century to mention a few more important names related to the concept of instinct. Darwin (1809-1882) and the evolutionary movement were a very influential force in the area of instincts. Darwin stressed the natural selection and heritability of instincts and a

fellow evolutionist George Romanes (1848-1894) added "that instinct was a species of reflex action and that it included consciousness" (Richards, 1977, p.16). Both men argued that instincts were not fixed but could be altered if survival dictated the utility of such change. James also set forth a similar notion when he insisted that instincts are subject to change and modification through the process of learning or experience. Actually, during the 1920's the concept of instinct came under a great deal of attack over the issue which James had stressed. People attacked the idea that behavior derived from instincts was innately determined. Many felt like James, that learning and experience play an important role in determining behavior.

Since Freud has already been discussed, this section will conclude with a few remarks on Morgan and McDougall. The view held by Morgan was very physiological in nature. He held that instincts were a form of reflex. According to Morgan, "the anatomical source of instinct lay in the inherited arrangement of neural connections found in the lower brain centers of animals" (Richards, 1977, p.24). McDougall, on the other hand, looked upon instincts as psychophysical dispositions or innate tendencies that furnished the organism with energy and guided it towards the attainment of a goal. In McDougall's schema the force and direction of the instinct were innately deter-

mined but the form of its behavioral manifestation were not. By 1932 McDougall's list of instincts had grown to 18 and each had its own affective and cognitive component.

Emotions as Motivators and Unconscious Motivation

Now before proceeding into a discussion of the historical foundation of Melanie Klein's concept of the life and death instincts, I would like to present a brief historical perspective on the topic of emotions as motivators.

As was noted earlier in this section there are many different views as to the basis of emotions. Nevertheless, emotions are listed as motivating factors by many individuals throughout history. Vives regarded emotions as motivating the soul to attain good and alternatively to avoid evil. Similarly, Descartes thought of the passions as arousing the mind to give its permission for some type of "actions which may serve to maintain the body, or to render it in some manner perfect" (Watson, 1971, p.242). La Primaudaye however, viewed affects as not only arousing the individual to some form of behavior or actions but also as motivating one to refrain from performing some action. If passions were properly directed by reason and social approbation, La Mettrie considered that they were capable of providing the force necessary for man to achieve notable accomplishments. Next, Schopenhauer introduced the notion that human behavior was motivated by three basic

emotions egoism (self-love), malice, and compassion. He regarded egoism as the most predominant motive for human behavior. Thus, he would appear to have a very pessimistic view of human motivation. Finally, there is Ribot (1839-1919), who foreshadowed Freud and Melanie Klein's emphasis on the emotional aspect of motivation. He regarded emotions as essential components of psychological processes and human behavior or to put it another way, to human motivation.

Bound up with the concept of human motivation is the idea that motivation may be unconscious. David Hume is a figure from the past who appears to be aware of this notion that man's motives are not always conscious. He expresses this idea in his statement that

our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves when it is mingled and confounded with other motives which the mind, from vanity or self-conceit, is desirous of supposing more prevalent. (D. Klein, 1970, p.598)

While Hume exemplifies an individual from the past whose ideas about motivation share a common bond with Melanie Klein's, history has also provided many divergent perspectives. John Locke, for instance, subscribed to the notion that human behavior was motivated by an uneasiness of desire. This uneasiness would incite the will to

voluntary action. As mentioned earlier Locke's idea was transformed by French sensationalists like Helvetius (1715-1771) and Le Roy (1723-1789) into the notion that man has many needs. These needs can be arranged in a hierarchy of their strength to motivate man to action. Boring has made a very interesting claim about the history of motivation. He believes that it is linked with the early work done in the area of psychoneurosis.

Write in order the words magnetism, mesmerism, hypnotism, hysteria, suggestion, translate them into proper names, writing Van Helmont, Mesmer, Braid, Charcot, Bernheim, and you have an outline of the psychology of motivation before Freud. (Boring, 1957 p.694)

The important aspect which is common to all these men and their work is the notion of unconscious motives. This characteristic of motivation was paramount to Freud's theory. According to Freud, man's behavior was determined by unconscious motives. The power and force behind all motivation was the life and death instincts. Freud and McDougall both held that behavior was motivated by instincts. McDougall also maintained that with maturity not all the adult's behavior or emotional life is directly motivated by instincts. For McDougall, like Spinoza before him, all behavior was goal-directed. Spinoza's concept of self-preservation as the basic conatus is a form of intrinsic teleology just like McDougall's goal-directed

behavior. D. Klein (1970) points out also, that "McDougall's rejection of extrinsic teleology is in agreement with Spinoza's denial of final causes" (p.429). When we come to discuss Melanie Klein's views of motivation we will note not only that emotions are at the core of her theory but that ultimately all motivation stems from unconscious sources.

The Hedonistic Approach and the Goal of Unconscious Motivation

The next group of people to hold a different view about motivation were the British associationists who adopted the Greeks' theory of the pleasure-pain principle. Jeremy Bentham presented a hedonistic theory of motivation. A man's actions depend on whether he expects pleasure or pain as a consequence. It is basically an expectancy model of motivation. His use of the terms pleasure and pain was very broadly defined and really amounted to simply attraction and aversion which he conceived of as two points at either end of a continuum. McReynolds (1968) points out that the predecessors to Bentham's hedonistic approach "go back at least to Aristippos and include Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, and his successors include both Mills, Spencer, [and] Freud (p.241) Alexander Bain's name can also be added to McReynold's list because he used the same hedonistic principle to explain learning. He contended that inconsistency was actually painful for the mind and was

one of its strongest motivators. Finally, Freud's version of this hedonistic theory was his hypothesized pleasure-pain principle. He believed that the organism perceived disturbing stimuli as painful and was then motivated to undo their effects in a manner that would most easily provide pleasure or satisfaction.

Klein argues that all behavior is ultimately motivated by just two instincts. She is opposed to the view that there are a number of acquired motives which are independent of the original instincts of life and death. Furthermore, according to Melanie Klein's conceptualizing there is no such thing as being directed toward a definite end or of having an ultimate purpose. In other words, she rejects the whole idea of intrinsic or extrinsic teleology and also any notion of final cause. There is no room for final causes or teleology in Klein's concept of man as a being who is always involved in the process of development. The Kleinian man is not motivated by an ultimate purpose inside or outside of himself as is the man of Aristotle, Spinoza and McDougall. Man is motivated, according to Klein, by the conflict between the life and death instincts, between love and hate.

As mentioned earlier in Melanie Klein's conception of man, instincts, emotions, and motivations are linked together. The life and death instincts which Klein translates into the psychological terms of love and hate are

the motivating impetus behind all behavior. In her schema the instincts are represented in the mind by phantasies. Melanie Klein (1975a) quotes the view of phantasy presented by Isaacs and acknowledges her support of it.

Phantasy is (in the first instance) the mental corollary, the psychic representative of instinct. There is no impulse, no instinctual urge or response which is not experienced as unconscious phantasy. (p.251) (1959)

Therefore, unconscious phantasies represent the instinctual urges, which motivate the human being to act. Unlike the Stoics and Epicureans, Klein values emotions because she sees them as motivating all of man's behavior. In the beginning of life, anxiety which stems from the death instinct operating within the individual motivates the child to begin projecting, introjecting, and splitting. This is a very persecutory type of anxiety. A depressive form of anxiety, in addition, may motivate the child to perform reparative acts either in phantasy or in reality towards its objects. "Guilt which engenders the drive for réparation also inhibits libidinal desires" (M. Klein, 1973, p.381) (1945). Thus, according to Klein, emotions not only motivate but they can also inhibit or prevent behavior. La Primaudaye, as we saw earlier, held a similar view. Unlike Tetens, Mendelssohn, Reynolds, and the other faculty psychologists, Klein does not regard feelings as a distinct faculty between reason and will. Instead, she believes emotions are bound up with the development

of both. In fact, emotions are really the source of both reason and will, since they generate phantasies and actions. Herbart's view was that emotions develop from ideas. Klein's as just stated is the exact opposite of this.

Klein and The Precursors of The Life and Death Instincts

The interaction between the life and death instincts operating within the individual also provides the incentive for the development of symbol formation and object-relations. Both these are used by the child to integrate and express its feelings of love and hate. In fact, it is the predominance of love, of the life instinct over the death instinct, which gives the child's ego the impetus to carry on the process of integration. Melanie Klein acknowledges not only the essential role these two instincts play in motivation but she also stresses their importance for mental functioning in general. "The perpetual interaction between the life and death instincts and the conflict arising from their antithesis (fusion & defusion) govern mental life" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.59) (1952).

Like so many of Klein's concepts of man, her idea of life and death instincts also has a sound foundation in the work of past thinkers. Alexander and Selesnick (1966) have cited Empedocles' (490-430 B.C.) belief "that elements were attracted and separated by forces of love and hate" (p. 30) as being an early forerunner of Freud's and we may add Klein's concept of life and death

instincts. Moreover, like Klein, Empedocles felt these two elements, both in the universe and in the mind of man, are always in a state of conflict. Ricoeur (1970) has also mentioned the similarity in the ideas about life and death present in the instinct theory and Empedocles' work. He notes too that the similarity extends to the ideas of the great pre-Socratics and also to Goethe and Romantic thought. It is not difficult either to see a resemblance between Spencer's (1820-1903) conception of evolution and dissolution and Freud's notion of "Eros as a tendency to form larger units, and the death instinct Thanatos as the reverse tendency" (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 515). Similarly, in Melanie Klein's work, the life instinct is presented as a fusion and the death instinct as a defusion. Finally, in Darwin's psychology, which was based on instincts, aggression, and love instincts were extremely important just as feelings of love and destructive tendencies are in Klein's.

Melanie Klein adopted with a few modifications Freud's concept of the life and death instincts. However, prior to there being a life and death instinct Freud also mentioned an instinct for self-preservation. This instinct became part of the function of the life instinct. As a concept, self-preservation has a long history and due to Freud's inclusion of this concept into the life instinct a direct link exists between the two. This notion of

self-preservation was present in the writings of the Stoics and those of Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas. During the 16th century Bernardino Telesius (1508-1588) is reported by Copleston (1963) to have also recognized self-preservation as a basic instinct in man and furthermore, he sought to understand emotional processes in terms of this instinct. Telesius even anticipated Klein in understanding that love promotes self-preservation and hate prevents it. The instinct of self-preservation was also one of the fundamental principles that Hobbes believed governed psychological life. This principle took on more of an expanded meaning in Spinoza's philosophy. For him the basic motivator of all things was a conatus or striving to preserve in one's own being. This phrase expresses more than just attempting to sustain life, it denotes "the source of all striving, longing, ambition, [and] self-expression" (D. Klein, 1970, p. 413). Spinoza, in contradistinction to Freud and Klein, believed that love and hate both promoted self-preservation or the life instinct. By the 18th century, Fichte is conceptualizing man as a system of self-preservation impulses and Herbart is maintaining that the only motivating factor in the soul is a similar tendency for preservation. Herbart even related this concept to ideas and speaks of the force of an idea as an expression of its tendency for self-preservation. As a final example, Ellenberger, (1970) has

presented McDougall's list of instincts as representing many of the factors comprising the concept of self-preservation.

Klein and The Notion of Love

Since Melanie Klein considered the life instinct to really be equivalent to the loving feelings within a person, it seems appropriate to include a short reference to the concept of love or Eros. The term Eros has had many different meanings over the ages. In the mythology of the Greeks, Eros is elevated to the status of a god. He is the god of love and physical desire. Eros, for Homer represents violent physical desire while love is presented in the form of the beautiful Aphrodite. Hesiod provides us with a more nebulous representation because he depicts Eros as the fundamental creative force. In Olympian theology, Eros is renounced as being a threat to reason and Anaximander following this line of thought also condemns Eros. During the seventh and sixth century B.C. the lyric poets depicted Eros as a handsome, young winged male who effected those in-love. This theme was continued by the Roman's idea of Cupid.

The Greeks recognized three different types of love. Eros stood for the sexual form, philia for friendship or a sense of brotherhood, and finally agape which referred to a spiritual and idealized type of love. Socrates considered love to be something divine, like a god. Plato,

on the other hand, distinguished four types of love ranging from sensual desire to a love of the Beautiful, as some eternal form. This is the ultimate type of love, an ideal above and beyond the personal and the physical aspects of lower forms of love. In both the Old and the New Testament love is the predominant theme. Man's creation was an act of love, and peace and happiness can be attained through love. The early Christians like St. Paul, praised the Greeks' form of love called agape and rejected Eros or sexual love. The essence of love was personified for the Christians in Jesus Christ. He represented for them perfect unselfish love because He loved His fellow man so much that He was willing to sacrifice His life to redeem all of mankind.

Greek concepts of love, especially Plato's were still influential in the time of Vives. He has borrowed many of his ideas on love from Plato. Clements (1967) cites several points of agreement between the two men. Vives sees love as the basis of the greatest good and of all emotions. Moreover, beauty is seen as the ideal object of love. In the early part of the 17th century, love is presented in an intellectual and philosophical manner as being a passion for the good. La Chambre defines it as a "pure impulse or inclination, which arises as a response to a spiritual effusion or transmission" (Diamond, 1968, p. 42). In addition, during the same century Spinoza

presents an idea concerning love which Melanie Klein reiterates a few hundred years later, namely that love is at the basis of feelings of gratitude. "The infant can only experience complete enjoyment if the capacity for love is sufficiently developed; and it is enjoyment that forms the basis for gratitude" (M. Klein, 1975a, p. 188) (1957). Klein's assertion that love is a principle affect in man's life also has a forerunner in Jonathan Edward's (1703-1758) theory, in which he states an identical notion. Once again, this time in the 20th century we find another individual who has derived a number of his ideas about love from Plato. Freud, like Plato, depicts love as life giving energy. Love for both men has a lowly beginning because its aim is centered around pleasing the self but love is capable of rising above its baser origin to achieve beauty and self-sacrifice. Freud speaks of two types of love, genital love and aim-inhibited love.

Genital love leads to the formation of new families, and aim-inhibited love to 'friendships' which become valuable from a cultural standpoint because they escape some of the limitations of genital love, as, for instance, its exclusiveness. (Freud, 1930, Standard Edition, XXI, p. 103)

In genital love, the relationship is between only two people and there is no desire for any additional third or fourth parties. But for the formation of a civilization there must also exist a form of aim-inhibited love because a civilized society is based on relationships

between a large number of individuals. For Freud, love is rooted in the sensual and has strong bonds with the pleasure principle. It is also the driving force behind civilization, music, art, and all of man's loftier pursuits.

Since love and hate are bound so closely together in Klein's thinking, I will postpone the presentation of her views on love until I have first given an historical outline of the death instinct and the feeling of hate. Following this, I will present Melanie Klein's ideas on both love and hate.

Klein, The Notion of Death, and The Death Instinct

Prior to discussing death as an instinct, I believe it is essential to first present some of man's different thoughts about death. One of the first ways of conceiving of death was that it represented a separation of body from soul. The Babylonians and Assyrians believed that death was not an absolute end of life but that the soul lived on and avoided destruction. The concept that the soul lives on in another world was also a part of the Egyptian, Greek, and Christian philosophy of death. Any notion that there might not be a life after death first emerged around 1200 B.C.

It appears that two stages can be distinguished in the rise of the notion of the perishability of the soul. First, the collective group soul becomes atomized into individual souls which still feel themselves immortal, imperishable; secondly, the breakdown of the original duality

(thymos and psyche) which led to the idea of a more complex psyche in which the two are fused and have become localized in the body (in the head or in the chest), opened up the possibility that the psyche may not survive the body to which it was so intimately attached. (Choron, 1963, pp. 24-25)

The Greeks held very diverse opinions about death. Pythagoras (572-497 B.C.) spoke of the transmigration of souls and Heraclitus of the naturalness of death. He, like Nietzsche, proclaimed the eternal return of the same. Death for Heraclitus was not absolute because the soul returns over and over again to be a part of everything. Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Seneca all believed in the immortality of the soul. Alternatively, Democritus (460-360 B.C.), Epicurus, Aristotle, and Marcus Aurelius (121-180) held that man was a mortal being and as such subject to a final annihilation. For the Stoics, birth and death were just part of the cosmic order of things.

Choron (1963) has noted that the Christian beliefs of the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the dead appeared originally as part of the doctrine of an ancient Jewish sect called the Pharisee. For the Christians, death led to the possibility of a reunion with God. During the Renaissance, man denied the total destructive power of death. Death, instead, was viewed as a transformation. Leibnitz spoke of the soul undergoing a transformation after death. The Renaissance man

attempted to reduce the fear and destructive power of death by focusing on the task of living a full, creative, and robust life. As time has progressed men have come to be very divided on the issue of what death holds in store for them. Men of different philosophical positions, like Montaigne, Holbach, Hume, Feuerbach, and Simmel (1858-1910), have all come to accept man's finality. However, others such as Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Schelling, and Schopenhauer all upheld the doctrine of the immortality of the soul or the will of man. In fact, Melanie Klein did not address herself to the issue of whether or not man is in some way an immortal being. Her notion of the death instinct has reference only to the psychological plane, and it is to the history of this concept that I will now turn to.

Tourney (1966) in presenting parallels between Plato and Freud provides one of the first roots to the death instinct. He informs us that Plato has his concept of destruction called Ares and Freud has his Thanatos or the death instinct. Similarly, Melanie Klein's theory also refers to a death instinct which she translates into feelings of hate and destructive tendencies. A central theme in Freud's concept of the death instinct was the idea of a transformation from the organic back to the inorganic. Lucretius (99-55 B.C.), many centuries prior to Freud, mentioned this same idea in his writings. In

his book Discovery of the Unconscious, Ellenberger (1970) presents a long list of men who can be seen to pre-date both Freud's and Klein's notion of the death instinct. One of the Romantics, von Schubert, speaks of longing for death, a wish to return to nature and Novalis conceives of life as being for the sake of death. Next, there were two Russians, Tokarsky who referred to a natural desire to die and Metchnikoff who believed in an instinct to die. Ellenberger also mentions that

the idea of destructive and self-destructive instincts was much more widespread throughout the nineteenth century. It followed a tradition going back to Hobbes and popularized by Darwin and the social Darwinians, by Lombroso, and by Nietzsche. Fechner had written a curious little essay in which he advanced the idea that destruction was a more fundamental principle than creation. (pp. 514-515)

Marx and Hillix (1963) have proposed that the Freudian death instinct can be seen to draw upon the evolutionists' concept of the origins of life. Similarly, we also find in Fechner's concept of full stability and repetition parallels to the Freudian death instinct. In Kierkegaard's Sickness Unto Death there is a similar awareness of von Schubert's notion of a longing for death. Hartmann has also embraced the spirit of the death instinct when he describes his disillusioned man as a being who looks forward to the peace of non-existence. This comes about when the illusion of being able to achieve a state of

personal happiness is destroyed by intelligence and man is then left with only the consolation of a peace to be attained in a state of non-being. In addition, Nietzsche's work stresses the importance of aggressive and self-destructive drives. For Freud as well as Klein the two instincts exist in a state of fusion. In Freud's theory, the fusion ceases at death and he, like Schopenhauer, believes that death is the aim of life. The death instinct is thought of as a destructive force which can be directed at one's own self or others. Since the final goal of the life and the self-preservation instinct is viewed as only preserving the organism till it can finally return to the inorganic state, it is easy to see the death instinct as being more fundamental to Freud's thinking than the life instinct.

Hate and Love as Instinctual Translations

Before concluding this section, I would like to present a few ideas from the past concerning the feeling of hate. It will be quite evident from my presentation that man has devoted much more time and thought to writing about love than about hate. For example, Machiavelli (1469-1527) has stated that he feels hatred is derived from fear and envy. Klein, however, views hate as a primary emotion and not derived from any other emotion. In actuality, she endorses the exact opposite position to that of Machiavelli because she sees fear as

a consequence of hatred and moreover, she believes that envy is an expression of hatred rather than the source of its origin. Brett (1974) describes Vives as seeing hatred stemming

from persistent anger or from grudging: we hate most strongly when there is a basis of love, that is to say when the object is one that excites the deepest interest. Pity, as it increases love, tends to diminish hate. (p. 330)

Melanie Klein, in contrast to Vives, feels that concern for or a wish to preserve the object diminishes hate. She makes no mention of pity as mitigating destructive impulses. As a final example from the past, the associationist Hartley defines hate as an aggregate of simple ideas united by the associations of pain.

Melanie Klein believed that the capacity to both love and hate were to some extent constitutionally determined. A second factor which influenced their strength was the external conditions which the child confronted during life. These could either exacerbate or diminish the child's feelings of love and hate for its internal and external objects. Hatred, according to Melanie Klein, leads to splitting and to disintegration. If hatred is stronger than love, the child may never develop a good object-relation and will never advance in its psychological development. Hatred can also be seen as a form of defence. It can prevent the child from

feeling sorrow, loneliness, or guilt.

Klein conceives of love as a very complex emotion entailing really several different emotions.

Full identification with the object based on the libidinal attachment, first to the breast, then to the whole person, goes hand in hand with anxiety for it (of its disintegration), with guilt and remorse, with a sense of responsibility for preserving it intact against persecutors and the id, and with sadness relating to expectations of the impending loss of it. These emotions, whether conscious or unconscious, are in my view among the essential and fundamental elements of the feelings we call love. (M. Klein, 1973, p. 290)(1935)

There is always a sense of ambivalence in Klein's notion of love. This occurs because love and hate are in a state of fusion and hate thus always effects love. Primitive love impulses contain an aggressive aim of wanting to devour the breast in order to possess it. Primitive love is also very sensual. It is equivalent to a feeling of gratification by the breast and alternatively, hatred can be viewed as a sense of being frustrated by the breast. Finally, Klein, unlike Freud and Schopenhauer, does not see death as the goal of life. Life is seen as a process of development during which the individual strives to attain a sense of integration and synthesis and not simply some state of non-being called death.

Man is presented by Klein in these pages as someone whose aim in life is not death, as it is for Freud, but

development, integration, and synthesis. She has adopted a very positive, optimistic view of man. In addition, she believes that the development of all mental life is governed by the life and death instincts, conceived by her in psychological terms as love and hate. These are man's basic emotions and the basis of all motivation. Motivation stems from conflict. A conflict between love and hate. According to Klein, emotions are therefore extremely valuable. They both motivate and inhibit mankind.

Free Will and Determinism

The issue of free will vs. determinism is a very complex problem. There are several areas of conflict embedded in this one issue. First, there is the question of how to define will. History has provided numerous definitions. Next, we must define freedom, free will, and determinism. There exists more than just one type of determinism and the issue of determinism also is related to motivation and causation. Finally, the concept of free will also leads to the conflict over predictability and also the notion of responsibility. This section will attempt to present an historical perspective which will include each of these topics as they relate to the main theme of free will vs. determinism. When an historical basis has been established I will then present Melanie Klein's ideas on the topics of free will and determinism.

In the days of Plato and Aristotle the will and willing were not issues that were greatly discussed. Both men believed that the act of willing should be guided by reason. Brett (1974) claims that "for Aristotle will is ultimately reason" (p. 130). Similarly, the Stoics tended also to include will in their concept of reason. Down through the ages two sides seemed to have formed over the issue of will and reason. The one side, which included men like Aquinas, the Puritans, Francis Bacon, Shakespeare,

and Hobbes proclaimed that the intellect was superior to the will and that the will was subject to the guidance of the intellect. The other side proposed the exact reverse, that will was superior to intellect. This belief is known as voluntarism and its advocates were men such as Saint Augustine, John Duns Scotus, and Arthur Schopenhauer.

St. Augustine introduced the idea that man's will operates on two levels. The lower level was composed of strivings initiated by sensual desires and the upper level encompassed acts directed towards spiritual ends. Much later in the 13th century, Aquinas (1225-1274), following the example of St. Augustine, also proposed a lower and higher level of volition. The lower one entailed the will's natural attraction to universal good and evil and the higher one involved the participation of the intellect in the process of deliberation and free choice. John Duns Scotus kept Aquinas' distinction regarding volition and added the notion that the will is only moved to action by its own power or that of God's. He also dealt with volition in terms of efficient rather than final causality. During the Renaissance, Baker (1961) maintains that "the will . . . was then generally held to be the instrument of virtue, virtually the prince consort of reason itself" (p. 290). As the Renaissance drew to a close and the spirit of Puritanism began to grow, the will was removed from its regal position as prince consort. The Puritans

emphasized instead the corruptibility and the responsibility of the will. They felt will must remain under the influence of reason. Hobbes and Descartes both presented views divergent from those of the Puritans. Hobbes held that will was really the efficient cause of acts and he defined it as appetite. For Descartes, the animal spirits in the body create the passions which in turn stimulates the mind to will. The act of willing involves the decision of whether or not to agree to the desire and then to initiate some form of action. In Descartes' view action originates with the will unless it is a form of reflex action. Alternatively, the approach of many noted British philosophers (e.g. Hartley, Locke, Hume, and James Mill) from the 17th to the middle of the 19th century was very mechanical in respect to the concept of volition. Willing was viewed as a process involving desires or needs, the strongest leading to an appropriate action to satisfy that desire.

Schopenhauer proposed one of the most dramatic and encompassing views of the will. He equated man's existence with his ability to will, "volo ergo sum". Will was elevated to the fundamental metaphysical principle. Willing is viewed as a form of striving which arises from deficiency and suffering and which no final goal can ever satisfy. This is a very pessimistic view which stems "from his recognition of will; its relentless, irrational

striving, not enlightened reason and morality, is what governs the world" (Alexander and Selesnick, 1966, p. 169). Royce (1970) has also listed for instance, Schleiermacher (1768-1834), von Hartmann, and Nietzsche as extreme voluntarists. Their view placed them in opposition to the intellectualistic approach of Aquinas because they made the will the most important factor in human nature. Nietzsche, in fact, proposed that it was man's will that gave the world meaning.

Now men like Spencer and William James held a very different view of will. It has been referred to as an ideo-motor view. For James, willing involved not only the idea of movement but also attention and effort on the part of the individual. D. Klein (1970) quotes James as saying that "whether or not there be anything else in the mind when we consciously will a certain act, a mental conception made up of memory-images of the sensations, defining which special act it is, must be there" (p. 300). In adopting a view that volition depended only on a kinesthetic idea, James was opposing the traditional view held by men such as Bain, Wundt, Helmholtz (1821-1894) and Mach (1838-1916) who contended that a feeling of innervation (i.e. conscious neural impulses) was needed as a guiding element. Actually, Wundt rejected the notion of the necessity for feelings of innervation at a later date. Originally, however,

Wundt held that will was an affective process in which unpleasant feelings, arising from conflicting emotionally toned ideas, innervated the individual to act. The result was a feeling of satisfaction and a reduction in feelings of emotional strain. Volition for Wundt was something that evolves over time and manifests itself in activity. According to Gilbert's (1972) quotation, Wundt believes that "the origin of the first volitions can most probably in all cases be traced back to unpleasurable feelings which arouse external movements, which in turn produce contrasted pleasurable feelings" (p. 103).

Freedom and Free Will

Having presented several views of volition, I will now discuss the question of freedom and free will. The concept of free will is being presented here predominantly from the viewpoint of a metaphysical idealistic tradition. The idea of being free and possessing a free will has been interpreted to mean several different things. Some regard it as signifying an absence of any type of coercion, constraint, or compulsion. If you are free and have a free will then it may also mean that you have the option of choices. You therefore have freedom of exercise, to act or not act and also the freedom of specification, to act in this way or that way. However, just because a choice is made easily does not mean that there were no other alternatives available. Furthermore, the ability to

predict a person's act of volition does not mean that it was not a free choice that the person made. Because a choice that is made in accordance with one's character is still a free choice. Some determinists (e.g. J.S. Mill) feel that the issue of predictability is an important one and that one day when more is learned they will be able to predict an individual's behavior. There are others (e.g. Spinoza) of course who do not see predictability as a fundamental feature of determinism. Instead they regard as deterministic any theory that proposes that an individual's actions are based on its character. Copleston (1965) in speaking of Schelling has presented us with an example of both free will and predictability.

Hence he is forced to depict a man's intelligible character as due to an original self-positing of the ego, as the result of an original choice by the ego itself. He can thus say both that a man's actions are in principle predictable and that they are free. (7/1, p. 165)

Volition and Causality

There have also been philosophers who regard free will to mean uncaused and therefore, definitely not determined. This is the view that, "since man possesses a non-material mind or spiritual soul endowed with the power of free choice, he transcends the material world, and therefore, the system of causality" (Watson, 1971, p. 246). The question as to whether or not there is a relationship between volition and causality has existed for many centuries.

Medieval philosophers concluded after studying the problem that volitional acts were definitely caused. They occur as a result of willing on the part of the individual which constitutes an efficient cause. Spinoza too concluded that acts of will were caused and he further maintained that they therefore must not be free because free to him meant that "which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to action by itself alone" (Nolan, 1967, p. 813).

Gilbert (1972) has even described a split among those who accept causality as a fundamental part of willing. There is one group which believes willing is a mechanical process stemming from natural causality. The representatives of this group include Hume, Hartley, Priestley (1733-1804), Condillac, and the English sensitivists. "To them, human action is a stimulus-provoked mechanical process, carried by learned associations" (p. 105). His second group are comprised of those who advocate free causality. I believe he is really referring to those who define free as uncaused causation. Leibnitz and Kant are two philosophers whom Gilbert believes espouse this notion of free causality to some degree in their concepts of volition.

During the age of scientism which occurred just before the advent of Wundt's experimental work, theories of volition and the idea of volition itself were under serious

attack and often labelled unscientific. This accusation stemmed mainly from the fact that neither final causes (i.e. motives) nor efficient causes (i.e. the selection processes of the agent) could be observed and measured. Acts of volition thus began to be considered as unmotivated or uncaused. D. Klein (1970) points out that theorists should really make a distinction between causation and motivation. He believes that "all acts may be caused or determined, but not all acts are motivated" (p. 305). Furthermore, he feels psychoanalysts who claim that all acts are consciously or unconsciously motivated have adopted an uncompromising position that excludes factors such as "luck, supernatural intervention, or control of one's destiny" (p. 306). Psychoanalysts believe that the solution to the problem of a lack of "control of one's destiny" is psychoanalysis itself. Psychoanalysis is a process by which psychoanalysts believe people increase the degree of control over their destiny by attaining a greater amount of self-awareness. According to Melanie Klein's theory, psychoanalysis provides man with insight into unconscious object-relations which play an important part in motivating behavior. By becoming aware of unconscious object-relations an individual increases their freedom since they are no longer being influenced by unknown factors. The person can now choose whether or not they wish to be guided by these factors.

Feigl (1959) contends that "docility, the capacity of modifying both one's beliefs and one's attitudes under the influence of cumulative experience, is of the very essence of freedom" (p. 117). The process of psychoanalysis is felt to provide the experience and knowledge of oneself necessary to make such modifications. In Melanie Klein's view, it is the individual who has achieved a sense of integration and synthesis who is really free. Conversely, the unintegrated individual whose ego is very split and who is unaware of the various unconscious object-relations which are operating within its mind is really at their mercy and is definitely not free. In Kleinian terms this person's life is governed and directed by object-relations which it is totally unaware of and consequently its freedom is greatly reduced.

An Historical Perspective of Free Will

Over the centuries there have been many who have argued that man's will was free. The Epicureans, unlike the Stoics, felt that man possessed a free will and that salvation did not depend on forces outside of the self but on one's native intelligence. It was a belief in the freedom of man's intellect which motivated Philo also to declare that man was not only a free but a responsible being. William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349), a Franciscan philosopher, also professed a belief in the freedom of will. He conceived of the will as an active power which

was not subject to the guidance of intellect. Consequently, will was capable of choosing to do an act which was contrary to habit or inclination. His only restraint on free will was that it was subject to moral obligation. Man is thus "morally obliged to will what God orders him to will and not to will what God orders him not to will" (Copleston, 1963, 3/1, p. 115). In Italy during the 15th century Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1493) argued that an individual was free to determine their fate and therefore, capable by means of education of realizing an ideal condition. Education was the instrument that allowed man to make wise choices. Pico's line of thought was adopted later by Vives, the educator. Vives, in the Aristotelian tradition, regarded the actions of human beings to be subject to the power of self-control and therefore, free. Although Vives became aware in his work of many factors that influence man's behavior, he still did not adopt the concept of determinism. A century later in France, the free will movement found a staunch supporter in René Descartes. He believed that man's free will displayed itself in connection with making judgements and choices and also in man's ability to doubt all things. For Descartes, free will was an innate gift from God.

Knight (1946) maintains that philosophers in the past have realized that a relationship exists between freedom and law. The term law as used by Knight in a psychiatric

historical context refers to a code of conduct. Kant and Hegel (1770-1831) are both cited as examples of men who subscribe to the notion that freedom is synonymous with law and morality. "Kant ascribed to man the capability to act freely, out of his free causality, stemming from his transcendent, ineffable self" (Gilbert, 1972, p. 105). For Kant and also for Fichte, freedom relates more to actions on a spiritual rather than a sensual plane and tends to denote rational moral behavior. Now as we approach the 19th and 20th centuries the existential philosophers like Kierkegaard and Jaspers, are prone to emphasis and at times exaggerate and complain about the extent of man's freedom. Jaspers (1883-1969) sees man as being able to transcend and even create himself through the power of his freedom.

Finally, two additional figures from this era are McDougall and Freud. McDougall regarded the will as a complex type of conation and although he advocates a deterministic view, he does allow for a certain amount of freedom in the mind according to Boring (1957). Similarly, Freud (1923) believed that his method of treatment increased his patients' freedom of choice. He said that

after all, analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give the patients' ego freedom to decide one way or the other. (Standard Edition, XIX, p. 50)

From a psychoanalytic context and without pretending to enter into a philosophical analysis, I do not believe free will is incompatible with the concept of determinism unless you define free will as uncaused causation which is really indeterminism and not free will. In fact, causal determinism is essential to free will, especially if man is to be held responsible for his actions. If behavior was based on indeterminism then man would be freed of all responsibility. Furthermore, it is important not to confuse determinism with coercion. Determinism simply means that all occurrences, even human behavior, fall into causal patterns. The idea of coercion does not enter into this definition at all.

Determinism in an Historical Perspective

Determinism as a concept has been divided up into a hard and a soft form. Hard determinism is really a synonym for fatalism or in the religious sense, pre-destination. One of the earliest examples of hard determinism can be found among the Babylonians. They maintained that the position of the stars at the moment of one's birth dictated the future course of that person's life. When religion began to play an important part in men's lives, deities too began to be viewed as having great deterministic control over man's future. The Fates represented this type of external influence in Greek mythology. The early Greeks had a very teleological view

of the universe. Chrysippus (c. 280-c. 206 B.C.) conceived of freedom as co-operating with the predetermined causality that is already functioning in the universe. For the Stoics freedom amounted to adapting one's will to the natural laws and also to the social laws that existed at the time. During the time of St. Augustine, the stars were considered to determine men's lives. Augustine in his youth was interested in astrology but as he grew older he came to realize that the astrological belief that the position of the stars at one's birth determines the course of a person's whole life was false. D. Klein (1970) states that Augustine was able to prove the fallacy of this claim by considering the fact that twins though born when the stars are in the same position do not have identical futures. Therefore, he concluded that the stars did not predetermine our lives. According to Augustine, men were free to choose between good and evil but they were not capable of attaining their own salvation. That depended on the grace of God. Consequently, a person was not totally free to determine the outcome of their life. Actually, Augustine became embroiled in a famous controversy over the issue of free will with a British monk named Pelagius. It was maintained by Pelagius that man's will was free and therefore men could decide their own moral destiny and thus were not reliant on God for their salvation. St. Augustine in contrast

seems to have realized that the will is really a function of the whole nature of man, and therefore dependent ultimately on that nature; the will expresses what we are, and we cannot will to be what we are not; conversion is not an act of will but a change of nature, preceding any possible change of will. (Brett, 1974, p. 230)

Augustine understood that it was an individual's nature that predetermined their actions and the course of their life and not their will which Pelagius conceived of as some special faculty distinct from the total make-up of the person.

In the 16th century John Calvin's (1509-1564) religion re-introduced the notion of predestination which had been implicit in the Stoics' concept of determinism. The Greek notion of the Fates ruling men's lives had now been transformed into the theistic view that God predetermined who will be saved and who will be damned. In Calvin's eyes man was weak, corrupt, and powerless to save himself. "Each man is what he is because God has willed it so" (Baker, 1961, p. 321). Martin Luther (1483-1546), another religious reformer like Calvin, professed a belief in predestination. However, his brand of predestination was more reminiscent of St. Augustine. Luther believed that man was saved through the grace of God and that it was God who decided upon whom He would bestow His grace. Finally, in the 18th century the notion of predestination found another supporter in David Hartley. His arguments against

free will often left him open to the charge of heresy. In addition, he adopted a very mechanical view of will that was based on the principle of associationism.

This discussion of the supporters of the concept of predestination has stemmed from an attempt to define hard determinism. Now that the roots of this movement have been presented, I would like to proceed to define soft determinism. This type of determinism does not hold that it is possible to predict the actions of man or nature with 100% accuracy. An individual's actions are based on decisions which reflect their nature and are not pre-ordained by God or the Fates. Contingent determinism is a form of soft determinism.

Contingent determinism holds that within limits behavior can be changed, but it is opposed to interpretations of such change as being "free" in the sense of being uncaused or unmotivated.

It regards change as a product of learning to exercise control in the light of knowledge of relevant cause-and-effect relationships. (D. Klein, 1970, p. 311)

Spinoza's determinism is an example of the contingent type. He claimed that all volitions were determined by a cause which itself was similarly determined. This chain of causes extended to infinity. It was possible however, to achieve a certain degree of freedom through knowledge and understanding. A man was free in Spinoza's view to the degree that he had learned to control his emotions by his

own power of reason. In psychoanalytic terms this knowledge would be called insight. Spinoza regarded man's actions to be the product of his personality, just like St. Augustine. Man's personality was determined by its own group of antecedent causes.

During the 13th century in Paris, Averroës (1126-1198) advocated a doctrine of determinism. This and other doctrines of Averroës were subsequently attacked by representatives of the church. They were formally condemned in 1270 by the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier. In Britain, a few centuries later, Hobbes and Locke can be found to both be denying the existence of free will. Hobbes was a determinist who believed in causal relationships. Locke, on the other hand, while denying that a human being's will is free, does however, allow individuals the capacity to suspend their conflicting desires long enough to consider if they are being impelled by the worthiest aim for their will. The work and approach of scientists had a strong influence on the deterministic movement. Rychlak (1968) points out that "the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century scientists believed in a completely determined, Newtonian and Laplacian universe of immutable lawfulness" (p. 123). Many philosophers and early psychologists tried to conceive of volition in similar terms. Hume proposed that opposition to the doctrine of determinism arose from people's aversion

to the notion of constraint and also from their subjective experience of feeling they were completely free and finally because their religious convictions dictated against the idea of determinism. Herder (1744-1803) challenged the reliability of peoples' conviction that they were free. He believed that man's cognitive faculty was really not as free as people often maintained.

It was Herbart who, rejecting the notion of free will, proposed in 1824 that a relationship existed between unconscious motivation and determinism. Woodward's (1972) description of Fechner's (1801-1887) belief that forgotten childhood mental associations "continue to determine the course of future thoughts" (p. 375), would appear also to strengthen the link between determinism and the unconscious.

In Schopenhauer's theory of character, we find a very rigid and inflexible concept of determinism. A person's noumenal character is fixed for life and it expresses itself in successive acts which Schopenhauer calls the empirical character. Since the noumenal character is predetermined and unchanging, a person's life is totally deterministic. All man can do is to come to understand it and to grow with it. James was opposed to the fatalistic type of determinism extolled by Schopenhauer. Instead, he subscribed to "the postulate that what ought to be can be, and that bad acts cannot

be fated, but that good ones must be possible in their place" (D. Klein, 1970, p. 311). At one point in his career James endorsed an extreme form of indeterminism but later he curtailed his extremism and maintained instead that actions can often be the result of unknown causes.

Marx and Hillix (1963) have suggested that Freud may have formulated his concept of psychic determinism as a result of having contact with Helmholtz's conservation of energy principle. Furthermore, Rychlak (1968) feels that psychic determinism was Freud's "tool for answering those who doubted his method of study" (p. 126). It was a way of counteracting charges that he was making interpretations solely on the basis of procedural evidence. Freud believed that all psychological processes were governed by the principle of determinism. In addition, he maintained that the unconscious part of the mind, of which we are unaware, has a substantial influence in the process of determinism. Psychological phenomena are determined by causes and follow directly from them. Freud's brand of determinism does not imply any type of coercion. It implies rather a complex array of causal factors "hereditary and environmental, internal and external, past and present, conscious and unconscious, which combine to produce a certain resultant in a given individual" (Knight, 1946, p. 255). Therefore, a person's actions are the

result of all the various forces operating on them at the time of their behavior. Freud was not a fatalist, he believed that an individual determined their own ends, either consciously or unconsciously, depending on whether or not they had gained the understanding and insight provided by psychoanalysis. It will be obvious from my discussion of Melanie Klein's views that she is in full agreement with Freud on this point.

Responsibility

The final issue to be dealt with in regard to free will and determinism before turning to Melanie Klein, is the question of responsibility. The controversy for centuries has been that if one is not free then how can they be held responsible for their deeds. Some who have objected to determinism have argued that since according to legal and moral laws an individual is considered responsible for their actions then they must by necessity be free and have free will. Aristotle believed that a person was only responsible for their voluntary acts and Philo similarly, concluded that since human beings have a free intellect, they therefore are responsible for what they do. Brett (1974) points out that "the doctrine of redemption which figures in Hebrew and Christian theory required a theory of the will which admitted full responsibility" (p. 189). Despite the need of these religions for the notion of responsibility in conjunction with man's

actions, it was canon law which realized long before civil law that certain factors could reduce man's culpability. Other religious movements such as Puritanism and Calvinism also had an influence on the question of man's responsibility and freedom. While the Puritans tended to stress man's responsibility, the Calvinist's doctrine of predestination on the other hand, tended to make the issue of responsibility almost irrelevant. In this issue as in previous ones there is a conflict over the idea of responsibility for one's actions only if we interpret determinism to mean some form of coercion or constraint. In point of fact, a person can have a free will, their actions can be determined in the sense that they are caused, and they can be responsible for their acts. A person's culpability is arrived at on the basis of the extent of their free will, meaning an absence of coercion. It is only if one's actions are due to indeterminism that the question of responsibility becomes meaningless. The absence of causation or the presence of chance and predestination all eliminate the necessity for a concept such as responsibility. In conclusion, man's whole system of rewards and punishments are based on the notion of causal determinism.

If by free will we mean the absence of coercion and if by the term determinism we are referring to phenomena that are caused, then I would classify Melanie Klein as

a person who believes in both of these concepts. Like Spinoza, Klein believes that men are free to the extent that they have an understanding of their emotions. For Klein, this ultimately means insight into the unconscious workings of the life and death instincts (i.e., love and hate). These instincts are expressed as phantasies in mental life, phantasies involving object-relations. Thus, an individual can be said to have a free will to the extent that they are aware of the nature and the influence of their internal phantasied object-relations. It would seem reasonable to conclude from this also that Klein appears to be in agreement with Plato and Aristotle in emphasizing the importance of insight and knowledge in directing our will.

Phantasies operate from the very beginning of life and help to determine all facets of development. In the following passage Klein points out how childhood phantasies can come to influence adult sexual life.

According to the oral- and anal-sadistic stage which he is going through himself, intercourse comes to mean to the child a performance in which eating, cooking, exchange of faeces and sadistic acts of every kind (beating, cutting, and so on) play the principle part. I wish to emphasize how important the connection between these phantasies and sexuality is bound to become in later life. All these phantasies will then apparently have disappeared, but their unconscious effect will be of far-reaching importance in frigidity, in impotence and in other sexual disturbances: (M. Klein, 1973, p. 191) (1927)

Childhood phantasies also help to determine the course of later cognitions. This concept is very similar to Fechner's notion that childhood associations determine the development of future thoughts. Woodward (1972) quotes Fechner as saying that

I learn something as a child,
unconsciously, i.e., I do not think
about it again, it continues to
have an effect up into my old age,
it determines somehow the manner
and the course of my later ideas.
(p. 375)

According to Melanie Klein, unconscious phantasies influence our artistic endeavors, our work, and all our everyday activities. She maintained that "our mind, our habits, and our views have been built up from the earliest infantile phantasies and emotions to the most complex and sophisticated adult manifestations" (M. Klein, 1975a, p. 262). It is therefore obvious that Klein subscribes to the doctrine of determinism. In fact, she believes that all our behavior is determined by the interaction of internal and external reality. Choices are not made on the basis of some separate faculty called will but rather like St. Augustine and Spinoza, Klein regards an individual's actions as being the product of their whole personality.

Melanie Klein has proposed a contingent determinism as opposed to a hard or fatalistic one. This conclusion is based on the fact that she does believe that behavior can be changed by the insight or knowledge gained during the process of psychoanalysis. "It has always been a

most important aspect of psycho-analytic work that, in the course of a successful analysis, the patient's character undergoes favorable changes" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.262) (1959).

The notion of responsibility which was so important to the view of Philo, the Hebrews, the Christians, and the Puritans is also prominent in Klein's work as well. Her belief that man must be held responsible for his deeds can be seen very clearly in her concept of reparation. "The urge to undo or repair this harm results from the feeling that the subject has caused it i.e. from guilt" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.36) (1948). Therefore, it is the awareness of being responsible for injuring the loved object which motivates the child to an act of reparation.

In summary, Klein sees man as a being whose thoughts, actions, and feelings are caused or determined but not predestined. Klein subscribes to a form of contingent determinism. Moreover, man is seen as a being who is responsible for his deeds. He is free to the extent that he is aware of the role his unconscious phantasy world influences his life. Thus, Klein believes that man has the potential to be free even though his thoughts, actions, and emotions are determined.

Knowledge

The theory of the nature, origin, methods, and limits of knowledge is called epistemology or gnoseology. During the ages there have been many schools of epistemology but broadly speaking they can be grouped in terms of two polarities, idealism and materialism. This dichotomy is expressed also in the different forms of the rationalist and empiricist traditions.

Empiricism and Sensationalism

According to the empiricists, knowledge originates with sensory experiences and the senses. In its strict form empiricism maintains that sense knowledge is the only authentic type of knowledge that exists. It rejects the validity of notions such as innate, universal, or a priori ideas. Sensationalism is the name given to this extreme form of empiricism.

The notion that all knowledge stems from the senses was the only way primitive man conceived of acquiring knowledge. Man's knowledge of supernatural being or spirits was also assumed to come to him through his senses, often in the form of dreams or visions. Even in the Bible, man's knowledge of God is repeatedly revealed in either visual or vocal sensory modalities. Other religions, such as Buddhism have even proposed that all man's knowledge is received through the senses.

In the fifth century B.C. Empedocles subscribed to the theory that objects and the sense organs both emit effluences which actively seek out one another and when there is material contact between them sensation occurs. This sensation is the basis of knowledge. This whole process is a very physical one. Further evidence of Empedocles' material conception of knowledge can also be seen in his assertion that the blood was the organ of cognition. During this same era, Protagoras (480-410 B.C.)

was also proclaiming knowledge to be equivalent to sensation since knowledge of an object depended on contact with it. Aristippus (c. 435-c. 356 B.C.) continuing this line of thought, added that all knowledge must be subjective because all that is perceived by humans is the effects of the object's action on them. One of the first atomistic theories of knowledge was formulated by Democritus. He held that the entire universe was made up of small indivisible particles. Thought and other mental processes occurred as a result of these small particles. This atomistic way of conceiving of perception was adopted many centuries later by Leibnitz, Maupertius (1698-1759), Diderot (1713-1784), and Wundt.

Epicurus of Athens and his followers employed the doctrine of effluxes and also Democritus' theory of atoms in their explanation of knowledge. The soul of man is corporeal. It is composed of finer and more mobile atoms than the body. Because it is corporeal it is capable of receiving impressions from objects. These impressions form images on the soul which amount to a sensationalistic kind of knowledge of the objects. Like the Epicureans, many of the Stoics conceived of the soul as being material and that knowledge is stamped on the mind via the senses. The Sceptics also maintained a similar view that all knowledge was produced by the senses. However, since they believed that the senses were unreliable they were very

suspect of the knowledge derived from them.

Although the early Christian Fathers were against pure sensationalism, their belief in the principle that God reveals himself to man contains the same passive concept of the mind as does sensationalism. Moreover, the sacraments of the Church represent a view that God's grace passes to the soul through the senses. During the 13th century St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) and St. Aquinas two noted representatives of the Church, tended to lean towards an Aristotelian view of knowledge.

St. Bonaventure agrees with Aristotle that the soul does not of itself have either knowledge of species of sensible objects: the human intellect is created in a state of 'nudity' and is dependent on the senses and imagination. (Copleston, 1962, 2/1, p. 313)

Similarly, St. Aquinas maintained that sense experiences were the foundation of all our knowledge. Finally, William of Ockham, claimed that knowledge is based on universals which are symbols for real things. He held that these symbols themselves were ultimately the result of sensations and therefore knowledge was in the end a product of sensations.

During the Renaissance interest grew in studying nature and also the physical sciences. Man once again realized how important the senses and the empirical approach were to the process of understanding. Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) is a perfect example of a man who

utilized his senses to gain understanding and wisdom. Moreover, Telesius (1508-1588) and Campanella (1568-1639), two Roman Catholic writers, both maintained that the knowledge they gained in studying the natural sciences was dependent on their sense experiences. In fact, Campanella in defending the work of Galileo concluded that if this work is to be proven erroneous, it could only be done by the method of observation. Finally, another Catholic, Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), who was very interested in reintroducing the technique of the Epicureans, attempted a revival of their view that knowledge comes from the senses. His only exception to this Epicurean view was to concede to the Church their authority in knowledge about religious matters.

In Britain during the 17th century, Francis Bacon stressed the importance of the empirical method for the attainment of scientific knowledge. His insistence on this approach for the acquisition of knowledge demonstrated his belief in the importance of the sense organs in this process. Thomas Hobbes has the distinction of being the first modern writer to propose a theory of knowledge based on sensationalism. Like the ancient atomists, Hobbes' approach was reductionistic, mechanical, and materialistic. Knowledge is derived from the impressions of objects on the sense organs which produce sensations. These sensations set up a motion in the body

which goes directly to the brain. His concept of how the mind works during the process of acquiring knowledge also made use of principles which later became known as free and controlled association and were germane to the doctrine of associationism. Another Englishman, John Locke, professed many ideas about knowledge that followed in the sensationalist and empiricist tradition. He declared that the mind at birth is empty and that it becomes furnished with ideas in a passive manner through experience. By experience, he meant either sensations or reflexions. Locke has been described as the founder of associationism though he was not an associationist. Furthermore, he was not a complete empiricist either, since he spoke of an intuitive knowledge of the self and of a demonstrable knowledge of God. In Ireland, Peter Browne, the Bishop of Cork, assumed as Locke had that the mind is blank at birth. He also maintained that all knowledge could be shown to have originated in the senses.

A genuine forefather of associationism, David Hartley, has combined his understanding of anatomy, physiology, Newtonian physics, and the principle of associationism to arrive at his theory of knowledge.

He considered sensations the result of small vibrations in the nerves. But images and ideas, mental phenomena of a high order, consist of still smaller and more delicate vibrations ("vibrations of the brain"). The vibrations in the brain are the effect and the

replica of the vibrations in the nerves. This correspondence between these two sets of vibrations is the reason why images and ideas are similar to the original sensations. (Misiak and Sexton, 1966, p. 22) --

For Hartley there was an infinite number of sensations and vibrations involved in the perception of an idea and they were all bound together by association. David Hume had introduced the concept of association 10 years before Hartley but he did not found his system on this concept. He simply maintained that the notion of association accounted for the order and unity among ideas. Hume claimed that impressions and ideas were the only two sources of knowledge. Sensations are the bases of impressions and are in the end the foundation of ideas too, since ideas are really just mental copies of impressions. All knowledge ultimately stems from sensations. James Mill who attempted to explain all mental phenomena by the principle of associationism also subscribed to a belief that knowledge originates in sensations. He held that all knowledge was derived from two types of feelings. The first referred to bodily sensations and the second was equivalent to Hume's notion of mental copies. A central feature of Mill's concept of knowledge was the notion of the association of ideas by contiguity. J. S. Mill continued and improved on his father's presentation of an empirical theory of knowledge. Unfortunately, J. S. Mill found that besides sensations and association he had to

introduce an inexplicable principle called expectation into his system in order to explain all man's knowledge of the world.

Meanwhile, in France during this same era, the doctrine of sensationalism was tending to develop along the lines of materialism. Condillac and Bonnet (1720-1793) both proposed that sensations were the essence of knowledge. They in the true spirit of sensationalism conceived of the mind as being passive, empty, and dependent on sensations for its content. For Condillac, sensations were intrinsic to the very nature of consciousness and the mind. Another Frenchman, Cabanis, following in the tradition of Condillac even went so far as to claim that our existence depends on our ability to sense. "We sense; We are". It was left to La Mettrie to transform the notion of sensationalism into materialism. He did this by making the mind synonymous with the brain and as a result all the operations of the psyche were conceived of as mechanical processes taking place within the brain. These mechanical processes of the brain were directly dependent upon the senses. Later in 19th century France, the senses became the basis of another philosophical movement, positivism. Its founder was Auguste Comte (1798-1857). He argued that our knowledge is based solely on the positive data of sense experience. This doctrine rejected all forms of speculation about ultimate origins.

It proposed that the aim of science was to discover all it could about the nature and relationship of observable facts.

A final example of the empiricistic approach to knowledge can be found in the person of William James. D. Klein (1970) has quoted James as saying that "there is no thought-stuff different from thing-stuff" (p. 849). In James' view experience was the essence of all knowledge.

Rationalism and Idealism

It is quite evident from this outline of the numerous followers of the empirical tradition that knowledge for the empiricist is rooted in sensory perception. Alternatively, rationalists conceive of knowledge as something that is ideationally perceived. Rationalists do not discount the importance of sensory data for intellectual development but they do not support the contention that it alone leads to knowledge. The crucial point for them is the way in which a person reacts to the information provided by their senses. Most philosophers believe that rationalism is associated mainly with modern rather than ancient or medieval philosophy but this is not completely accurate because rationalism first developed as intellectualism (e.g., Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas). There are however, some examples of earlier thinkers who have anticipated this later doctrine.

Socrates, for instance, although he was mainly

concerned with the concept of virtue, realized that if man was to live a virtuous life it must be fashioned from wise decisions. Since he felt that true wisdom could not be based on something as changeable as opinion, he sought to base knowledge on permanent, universal concepts. Consequently, knowledge for Socrates ceased to be founded on purely sensory data. He recognized two levels of knowledge, a sensual and an ideational. Plato, a pupil of Socrates, further extended this line of thought. He conceived of the notion of transcendent Ideas or Forms which were more reliable types of knowledge than those provided by the senses. An individual came to understand these higher forms of knowledge through reason rather than experience. The existence of these Ideas provided man with the stable knowledge he required in order to make wise decisions. Baker (1961) notes also that

like Plato's Ideas, Aristotle's form is the ultimate object of knowledge—not, as Plato thought, because form is transcendent, but because, being inherent in things, it determines their kind of species. (p. 57)

Thus Aristotle also has a place in the history of rationalism. Similarly, Stoics such as Chrysippus realized that the mind's knowledge was not just a copy of sensory experience but was rather a representation. Sensory data was reacted upon by reason which is an inherent propensity in the mind. Therefore, in the process of

acquiring knowledge, the "mind is not only acted upon by sensory events but also reacts to them" (D. Klein, 1970, p. 121). Thus, some Stoics tended more to the rationalistic end of the empiricism-rationalism continuum. The final ancient thinker to be mentioned as an early representative of this tradition is Plotinus. It was his contention that matter could not be experienced directly but only through sensory impressions. Plotinus appears here to be anticipating the notion of subjective idealism presented by Berkeley several centuries later. The existence of an object's shape, size, colour, or weight were all dependent on sensory awareness and are thus never directly perceived.

As stated earlier there are no pure forms of idealism or rationalism in the Middle Ages, instead we find only thinkers who demonstrate leanings towards idealism or rationalism. For example, St. Augustine stressed that true knowledge lay within the individual rather than in external experiences which are capable of being deceptive. The Arabian thinker, Alkindi (786-809) spoke of four degrees of intelligence. Three are present in the soul and one is external to it. Brett (1974) explained that "knowledge seemed to the Arab to be an external and abiding reality, everlasting and indivisible, which for a time reproduced itself in the individual" (p. 245). Averroës as an Arabian thinker also subscribed to this

position and he called this everlasting knowledge the "Agent Intellect". A further example of a rationalistic concept is also found in the notion of the "floating man" which Avicenna (980-1037) described as a man who is aware of himself and the workings of his mind even though he is not receiving any form of sensory stimulation.

In the scientific world around the end of the 16th and the early part of the 17th century Galileo (1564-1639) began discovering that sensory experiences were highly subjective. The properties of the material world such as the sound of a note or the wetness of water were really not inherent in the objects themselves. Galileo explained water to be actually a large group of particles in motion. Thus, our knowledge of the world was highly subjective and occurred in the mind and was not a direct copy of the external sensory experiences. This discovery of Galileo's provided Descartes with additional evidence for his dualistic concept of the world. Descartes maintained that ideas could stem from three sources. They could be innate, or they may arise from external sources, or finally, they may be produced by the imagination. True knowledge however, depends on thinking and not just sensation or imagination. Descartes was sceptical of the information provided by the senses because he realized it could be erroneous. Sensations represent what is in the

mind and not what is present in the object.

Even a staunch empiricist like Locke has been shown to have rationalistic tendencies. Although he rejected the notion of innate knowledge, he did believe human beings had a capacity for reflection. This capacity amounts to

an inherent readiness to group sensory impressions into ordered forms. Viewed in this light, Locke's "reflection" suggests an inborn readiness to form or welcome ideas Plato and other rationalists deemed to be innate. (D. Klein, 1970, p. 63)

Spinoza is another thinker who demonstrates a belief in rationalistic and empirical principles. His definition of a free man, as someone whose emotions were guided by reason, is a definite sign of his affirmation of rationalism. Reason played an essential part in Spinoza's concept of knowledge. However, it was definitely not an abstract type of reason, cut-off from realistic input.

In the 17th century, Leibnitz put forth a completely rationalistic explanation of knowledge. He conceived of the universe as being composed of immaterial, animated units called monads. Knowledge, thus, was best achieved through an understanding of the nature of these monads. Furthermore, the existence of the intellect was not dependent upon sensation but rather it was inherent to itself. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was a follower of Leibnitz, but unlike his master, he tried to establish

a union between the viewpoints of rationalism and empiricism. His metaphysical rationalism, as it was named, attempted to provide a supplementary rational form of knowledge for every empirical one. The rational component was supposed to elevate the empirical knowledge to a level of genuine cognition by deducing it from the principle of cosmology and general ontology. This rationalistic stand was later criticized by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Anglican bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) proposed a form of subjective idealism which emphasized that our knowledge of the world originates in subjective experiences stemming from sensory perceptions. He was therefore denying the existence of Locke's primary qualities. All qualities depend on being perceived for their existence. His famous dictum was "to exist is to be perceived". God was established by Berkeley as the Grand Perceiver in order to explain the continued existence of unperceived objects. David Hume shared Berkeley's reservations about the reality of substance, he could not accept Berkeley's idea of God as the ultimate perceiver. Hume endorsed both the principle of rationalism and empiricism. As a rationalist he believed for instance that knowledge of mathematics could be arrived at solely on the basis of thought. However, he was very much aware of the interrelatedness of observations and thinking in

both scholastic and everyday pursuits.

In opposition to Berkeley, Kant claimed that things do exist even when they are not perceived.

The Kantian view asserts that the external world exists in itself, but appears to us in a way that is determined by the nature of our minds. This view is called "critical idealism". (D. Klein, 1970, P. 492)

Kant, like Wolff, attempted to present a theory of knowledge that bridged the gap between rationalism and empiricism. In fact, Brett, (1974) has referred to Kant as having been named the founder of epistemology. Kant was a philosopher who believed, that a priori categories or principles for organizing sensations exist in the mind of men. With this concept in mind, he thought of knowledge as the product of an interaction between sensory impressions and a priori categories. The incoming sensory data is organized according to the existing principles in the mind and the result is knowledge. Thus, in Kant's view knowledge was dependent on both reasoning and sensory experience. Kant's successors in Germany, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all attempted to eliminate his dualism. They wished to restore the concept of authentic metaphysical knowledge. This attempt culminated in the absolute or objective idealism of Hegel. According to his system of thought, reality and reason were synonymous with one another. Pure thought was regarded

as being the substance of reality itself. Then the voluntaristic and irrationalistic idealism of Schopenhauer developed as a reaction to Hegelian idealism. His famous phrase was "the world is my idea". It is obvious from this statement that for Schopenhauer knowledge of objective reality is limited to the subjective representations of the individual. The intellect in Schopenhauer's system however does not have an existence separate from the Will. The world therefore consists of a Will and a subjective ideation.

Finally, Brett (1974) states that

for Hartmann the Unconscious is the fundamental active principle in the universe. It is not identified, as by Schopenhauer, with the nature of will, but is a synthesis of will and intellect, a creative force in which resides the principles of construction, and on which, therefore, depends the meaning of all creation. (p. 578)

Hartmann divided the unconscious into three layers the absolute, the physiological, and the psychological unconscious. The psychological unconscious formed the basis of all experienced reality or consciousness. Thus there is an analogy between von Hartmann's notion of the unconscious and the conscious and Kant's noumenal and phenomenal worlds. Hartmann's unconscious is analogous to Kant's "thing-in-itself" and his consciousness is a general equivalent to Kant's phenomenal experiences. An individual's knowledge of the external world is

highly subjective. Similar notions have been expressed by Freud and his followers. They believed that the unconscious influenced all man's perceptions. Consequently, an individual's experience of external reality is highly subjective, being dependent on the disposition of the person's psychological reality. This view is strikingly similar to the Kantian idea of a priori categories that organize incoming sensory stimulation and give it meaning.

Since Melanie Klein is also a psychoanalyst, many of the comments about Freud's theory of knowledge are also applicable to hers. Her views on knowledge and the perception of reality are more in line with an idealistic approach rather than a materialistic one. Klein focuses the majority of her attention on understanding how one reacts to incoming sensory data rather than on the sensations themselves or the reality itself. Furthermore, if by the term critical idealist we mean someone who acknowledges that reality exists but that the way it is perceived depends on or is determined by the nature of the perceiver's mind, Klein's outlook could definitely be described as being critical idealism. Therefore, Melanie Klein in this respect is similar to Kant. Both believe that our perception of the world is shaped by the nature of our minds. For Kant, the nature of the mind refers to the a priori categories it contains while for

Melanie Klein it refers to the various types of object-relations present in the mind. The presence of object-relations in the mind is taken by Klein to be a universal concept for all mankind. Kleinians believe a person's intrapsychic object-relations influence their perception and experience of reality. In Klein's view an understanding and awareness of intrapsychic reality is a precondition for the recognition of external reality. She explains that "the young child's perception of external reality and external objects is perpetually influenced and coloured by his phantasies, and that this in some measure continues throughout life" (M. Klein, 1975a, p.40) (1948). Thus, according to her, unconscious phantasies always influence our perception of reality to some extent. Moreover, they play a role in all our thought processes. Klein of course was not the first person to recognize the importance of the unconscious in cognition. Pades realized that there is a type of perceiving which goes on in human beings of which they are totally unaware. Similarly, Leibnitz introduced the idea of petites perceptions and later in the beginning of the 20th century the Würzburg school presented the notion of imageless thought. Finally, Freud throughout his career stressed the role of the unconscious in our thinking. One of his most famous works The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901) describes in great detail the

essential part that the unconscious plays in both our thinking and behavior.

Innate Knowledge

Melanie Klein's endorsement of the concept of innate knowledge is further evidence of her idealistic position. An acceptance of a concept such as that of innate knowledge and ideas is associated far more with rationalism than empiricism, it is really in direct opposition to the empiricists' belief that all knowledge is the result of sensory experiences. For centuries men have been both supporting and repudiating this concept. St. Augustine is an example of someone who has contended that all knowledge is innate and that learning is simply a process of uncovering our innate knowledge. Alternatively, John Locke is a figure whose work has illustrated his opposition to innate ideas or knowledge (e.g. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690). In his attack on this doctrine he distinguished three different meanings for innate ideas. He claimed that innate ideas could mean that the principles are known from birth onward, or that they are understood when an individual reaches the age of reason, or finally, that when the meaning of a proposition is arrived at so too is a recognition of its truth. Locke holds, that there is no evidence to support the first two meanings and that the third is not really a valid definition of the concept of innateness. There have been over

the ages many different ideas and propensities that have been proclaimed as being innate. Even in Locke's theory we find his explanation of the knowledge of our existence to be equivalent to an innate idea. He believed that this knowledge is intuitive. This notion of intuitionism was emphasized in Germany also, by men such as Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte. A list of some of the various concepts and ideas that have been declared innate and their supporters would include the axioms of geometry (Maimonides and Descartes), the notion of God (Damascene, Bonaventure, Melachthon, and Descartes), the idea of being (Ghent and Leibnitz), universals, such as loyalty, justice, and truth (Plato), and the idea of beauty (La Chambre). A great many of the ideas which have been described as innate can be defined in terms of Locke's second meaning. They are "virtually" innate ideas and refer really to an innate potentiality for forming these ideas. The works of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant for instance, all contain this type of virtually innate ideas.

Throughout Melanie Klein's work there are several references to forms of innate knowledge. These bits of knowledge or realization are usually referred to as also being unconscious. If we were to use Locke's classification system, I suspect that Melanie Klein's notion of innate knowledge would fall under the heading of the virtual type, since according to Locke's definitions,

the explicit form of innate ideas signifies knowledge that is consciously apprehended. As an example, Melanie Klein (1975c) states that "oral frustration arouses in the child an unconscious knowledge that its parents enjoy mutual sexual pleasures and a belief at first that these are of an oral sort" (p. 130). Thus, knowledge of the parent's sexual relationship is not stated as being consciously known by the child. Besides this knowledge of the sexual relationship between the parents, Klein also believes that children have unconscious awareness of the existence of the vagina, the breast, the penis, and of their mother and also that babies grow inside of her. Finally, like Freud and Carl Jung (1875-1961), Melanie Klein also claims that a number of these innate realizations are the result of a phylogenetic inheritance..

Epistemophilic Instinct

Melanie Klein has named man's desire for knowledge the epistemophilic instinct. Because the epistemophilic instinct begins its development in the first few months of life when sadism is at its height, a bond is formed between the two and the desire for knowledge is put into the service of the oral-sadistic trends. Actually, according to Klein, it is really the anxiety aroused by the oral-sadistic impulses directed against the mother's body which activates the child's instinct for knowledge:

If the anxiety is not excessive, the child's desire for knowledge becomes focused on the interior of the mother's body. This is the first object of knowledge and the aim of the epistemophilic instinct at this point is to find out the extent of the damage done by its sadistic attacks. A little later in life the epistemophilic instinct is further stimulated by the onset of the Oedipus complex. At this stage the child wants to explore the inside of its mother's body in order to learn about what is happening in there. The child's phantasy is that intercourse is taking place there and that that is where its future siblings are and also the father's penis.

Another crucial factor which activates the child's desire for knowledge is anxiety about the interior of its own body. This anxiety is aroused because, through the process of introjection, the child fears that it has taken into its inner world a retaliatory and damaged mother. If the child feels it has no means of controlling the destruction taking place either inside its mother's or its own body, it may displace the anxiety onto real, external dangers which can be more easily mastered. The child now has the option of finding out about the nature of these external dangers and of testing out the successfulness of the measures it adopted to deal with them. All these steps provide a strong incentive for the child to develop and increase its knowledge. It is however very

important that the child's anxiety about its mother's body not become so intense that it overwhelms its ego. Consequently, Melanie Klein (1973) contends that "it is essential, for a favorable development of the desire for knowledge that the mother's body should be felt to be well and unharmed" (p. 259) (1931).

Throughout her career, Klein was always very interested in uncovering all the causes which could lead to an inhibition of the epistemophilic instinct. According to Kleinian theory, an inhibition of the child's desire for knowledge is directly related to its relationship to the breast. If the child comes to feel an excessive amount of hatred and envy of the breast, it will lead to a distrust and anxiety about taking in the food it offers. In later life, this may reappear as a distrust in taking in mental food. Similarly, if the infant experiences a strong grievance towards the mother when the bottle is introduced, this may also lead to anxiety and distrust which later on can be generalized once again to the taking in of knowledge as a form of symbolic food.

In addition, if the child possesses an excessive amount of sadism as a result of constitutional and/or environmental factors, it may in phantasy lodge very vicious attacks against its mother. These attacks may in turn lead to the arousal of excessive amounts of persecutory and depressive anxiety and also to the exaggerated

use of schizoid mechanisms. Consequently, the child will not be able to explore either its mother's body or its own because they arouse too much anxiety and the epistemophilic instinct as a result will become inhibited. Moreover, if the child distrusts its constructive and reparative tendencies, this can also lead to an inhibition of the desire for knowledge, since the ego is not able to use these as a defence against feelings of guilt and depressive anxiety. Thus, once again, the child is not able to investigate the first object of knowledge, the mother.

With the onset of the Oedipus complex and the sexual curiosity aroused by it, the child's immature ego finds itself faced with an onrush of problems and questions. Since the infant is still intellectually unfit to answer all the questions, it may feel overwhelmed by them. In addition, not even all the questions are conscious, many are only partially conscious or completely unconscious. But even if they all were conscious, the infant has no speech or words with which to formulate its questions nor could it fully understand any answer that was verbally expressed. This bitter grievance is, according to Melanie Klein, the deepest source of severe disturbances of the epistemophilic instinct.

Finally, Klein believes that learning is libidinally determined and that sexual and masturbation phantasies

lie behind many school subjects. Therefore, a repression of sexual phantasies leads to a subsequent inhibition of the epistemophilic instinct. Furthermore, in the male, the penis is equated in phantasy with an organ of perception. The boy's penis in phantasy enters the mother's body in order to learn about its interior. However, an increase in castration anxiety may result in a reluctance to want to enter the mother's body and as a result an inhibition in the desire for knowledge. Bakan (1958) has shown that the relationship between sex and knowledge has very ancient roots. The Bible uses the same word for both sexual relations and knowledge. Similarly, in the Jewish Kabbala the word Daath means both knowledge and sexual intercourse. In point of fact, Daath, meaning knowledge, is the offspring of the mystical union between a male (Chokmah) and a female (Binah) principle. Bakan of course also emphasizes the fact that Freud too was well aware of the connection between knowledge and sexuality.

Knowledge: A Passive Phenomenon

Knowledge, in the empirical tradition, is generally associated with an image of man as the passive recipient of sensory impressions coming in from outside of the organism and arousing in the person some higher level of cognitive awareness. For instance, in ancient times this school of thought was represented by Democritus'

materialistic copy theory. A theory whereby the mind is impressed with sensory impressions. There have also been the more deified versions such as Philo's belief that real knowledge is the result of a Divine Illumination. The early Christians and much later in history Malebranche both held a similar view, that knowledge was received from God. Furthermore, Condillac's reduction of all mental processes to the simple act of sensation also resulted in a totally passive notion of the mind.

Knowledge: An Active Phenomenon

The rationalists, on the other hand, regarded man as a very active participant in the whole process of acquiring knowledge. The intellect actively selects and organizes the different incoming sensory impressions into thoughts and ideas. This tradition has also had many representatives over the ages. In some cases like with the Pythagoreans, the sense organs are depicted as actively seeking out the correct objects in the process of sensation. Empedocles, Plato, and Aristotle all subscribed to a theory in which sensation was the result of activity on the part of both the object and the sense organs. Much later in history, there were men such as Leibnitz who thought of the intellect as inherently active and also Kant with his a priori categories. Finally, two more latter day examples at the psychological level are Brentano and Freud, men who both realized the active and

even dynamic processes involved in perception.

I am sure it is quite obvious from the description above of Melanie Klein's epistemophilic instinct that she too considers the acquisition of knowledge to be the product of a very active and dynamic mind. The child's phantasies, emotions, and defence mechanisms play a very active part in the whole process. Melanie Klein (1975a) has stated quite explicitly that "excessive persecutory fears and schizoid mechanisms in early infancy may have a detrimental effect on intellectual development in its initial stages" (p. 10) (1946).

Perception of Reality

Earlier I classified Klein as a critical idealist and at this time I think it is important to outline her views on reality. Klein does not deny the extramental reality of the world but she does believe that the individual's assimilation and interpretation of that reality depends upon the disposition of its intrapsychic reality. She maintains that "for all children in the beginning external reality is mainly a mirror of the child's own instinctual life" (M. Klein, 1973, p.251) (1930). This occurs because the child's early psychic life is so heavily dependent on the mechanisms of introjection and projection. Emotions and phantasies deriving from the life and death instincts are continually being projected onto the external world and its objects and thus strongly

influencing the child's perceptions. This positively or negatively skewed picture of the world is then introjected into the child's mind where it forms part of the basis for the child's perception of external reality. Consequently, reality is perceived in a highly subjective manner.

It is with growing integration and by working successfully through the depressive position which includes a greater clarification of internal reality, that the perception of the external world becomes more realistic—a result which is normally well on the way in the second half of the first year and the beginning of the second year. These changes are essentially bound up with a decrease in projective identification, which forms part of paranoid-schizoid mechanisms and anxieties. (M. Klein, 1975a, p. 221) (1957)

Thus, the degree of subjectivity does diminish in normal development but never to the point where intrapsychic reality has no influence whatsoever on our perception of external reality.

This notion of the subjectivity of our perception of reality also has historical roots. Alexander and Selesnick (1966) have mentioned Protagoras (481-411 B.C.), Berkeley, and William James as all being men who realized, admittedly to varying degrees, the subjective influence that exists in the act of perceiving external reality. In fact, Berkeley went so far as to deny the existence of any other world except subjective experiences. There are of course many others who could be added to this list. Men such as Kant, Schopenhauer, Brentano, and Freud, all were supporters

of this notion. In addition, as mentioned above, emotions, which are highly subjective, play an important part in our ability to perceive the world according to Klein. She also states that emotions such as anxiety can have either a motivating or an inhibiting effect on the development of our sense of reality. This fact has been one of those constants that has prevailed throughout the history of psychology and philosophy. For example, Aristotle and Spinoza, like Klein, were both aware of the fact that cognitive and perceptual distortions could result from emotions.

In conclusion, we can say that Klein's notion of knowledge and reality is conceived of predominantly from the viewpoint of idealism and irrationalism. She stresses the influence of an inner psychic reality which is dynamic and instinctual throughout her writings on these two interrelated topics. Man is presented here as a being who acknowledges the existence of external reality but his perception of it can vary greatly depending on the nature of his internal world. The acquisition of knowledge is an active process since man's perception of reality is substantially influenced by internal reality. Finally, she also believes that man possesses some ideas which are innate or according to Locke's classification, virtually innate.

Mental Health and Mental Illness

An important part of any concept of man is its insight into the issue of what actually constitutes of contri-

butes to the development of both a healthy and an unhealthy member of the human race. Initially, Melanie Klein's image of a normal or healthy human being will be presented along with its historical antecedents and then the procedure will be repeated for her notion of an emotionally disturbed individual. At different times throughout history two concepts have continued to recur in relation to the notion of mental health. One is the idea of some form of balance being present within the person and the other is the importance of insight or understanding which is essential to achieve stability.

The Notion of Balance

Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.) adopting a very physiological approach, presented a view that mental well-being depended on the balance of physiological processes. Plato's analogy between man and the state represents this notion of balance. Just as a healthy and lawabiding state is the result of a balanced fusion between reason, spirit, and desire so too is a healthy and well integrated person. This notion that a form of balance is essential for mental health is also present in the concept of the Golden Mean, which advocates the avoidance of excesses. Aristotle is an early example of one who stressed the importance of avoiding extremes and wholeheartedly endorsed the principle of the Golden Mean. He believed that adherence to this principle would result in a healthy

and integrated personality. Alternatively, he maintained that excesses disturbed the balance in the personality and would result in character defects. Another variation of the balance theme was presented by Galen around the second century. This time the idea of balance was put forth as a harmonious relationship between the three parts or powers of the soul. These three powers are the concupiscible, irascible, and rational powers which Galen believed were seated in the liver, heart, and brain respectively. This same idea occurs many centuries later in Freud's work. He, too is aware of the need for harmony or balance between the id, ego, and superego. Clements (1967) indicates that "Vives, in the Galenic tradition, conceived of life as the process of maintaining a balanced mixture of the four qualities hot, cold, moist, dry" (p. 223). If this balance was adhered to then Vives believed that both the bodily and cognitive processes would continue to function smoothly.

The Notion of Insight

The next theme, that has been very predominant over many centuries is the role insight plays in mental health. The Stoics, according to D. Klein (1970), emphasized that an individual's well-being was "contingent upon the sovereignty of reason or upon insight into the probable consequences of yielding to given impulses" (p. 122). Plato discussed the importance of insight for an integrated

personality also, but he referred to it as self-knowledge. Several of the forefathers of this concept of self-knowledge, such as Seneca, St. Augustine, Nietzsche, etc. were mentioned in the last chapter and will not be repeated here. Simon (1972) has also indicated that Plato equated sanity "with the highest abstracting and rational activities" (p. 399). In the Republic, Plato presented the idea that a healthy state is essential for the development of healthy citizens. A healthy soul depends on a relationship among its parts that is based on controlling and being controlled by one another. The concept of insight was also very pronounced in Spinoza's thinking. He believed that everyone had the ability to understand themselves and their emotions to some degree. Alexander and Selesnick (1966) have described the similarity between Freud's concept of mental health and Spinoza's freedom of the mind. Insight brings freedom to the mind from the power of its passions, just as in Freud's terms it brings understanding of the unconscious and promotes psychological well-being. Spinoza's aim, which is on an ethical plane rather than a psychological one, is to increase a person's understanding of their emotions. According to D. Klein (1970), Spinoza's concept of mental health also entails both emotional and cognitive values and implies a mature outlook and a strong character. The Romantics were also very interested in the question of

mental health and one of the prescriptions of Feuchtersleben was to gain some insight and understanding of one's own emotions. This was seen as an important prophylactic measure. As mentioned above, Freud also endorsed the concept of insight. He realized that insight provided self-knowledge by transforming the unconscious content of the mind into conscious knowledge. Freud also maintained that in order to be considered mentally healthy a person must be able to work and to love and to bear some degree of uncertainty in their lives.

Finally, there is one additional man whose concept of mental health I wish to mention, whose ideas do not fit into the two themes already mentioned. He is Johann Heinroth a German psychiatrist who wrote in his book Lehrbuch der Störungen des Seelenlebens oder der Seelenstörungen und ihrer Behandlung (1818) that the psychological processes are divided into three levels of functioning. The highest level was conscience and he designated this level by the term super-us. In order to attain a state of mental health, he believed the ego must fully assimilate the principle of this super-us (Über-uns). As stated earlier in this chapter the super-us develops from the ego in a way that is very similar to the Freudian superego. Heinroth was not very optimistic about the possibility of this task being completed by many people. He felt it was an achievement only few would completely accomplish.

Kleinian Views on Mental Health

Melanie Klein had a good deal to say about the topic of mental health during her career as a therapist. In her first paper "Development of a Child" (1921), she presented a whole list of suggestions for parents to help them ensure the mental well-being of their children. She advised parents to be open and honest in providing their children with the sexual information which their questions indicate they desire. Klein directed the parents to never allow their child to share their bedroom and also that the parents should never use physical punishment or threats when disciplining their children. Instead, she advocated that they simply withdraw their affection from the child from time to time when they are disobedient. Melanie Klein also advised the parents to give their child a little more time to be natural by not being too insistent on compulsory ethical requirements and by allowing their child to become aware of their instinctual impulses and the pleasure they bring.

Besides this very direct advice aimed specifically at parents, Klein has scattered throughout the rest of her papers numerous remarks concerning various factors which promote or are preconditions for sound and healthy development. An outline of these factors will demonstrate that they include both internal as well as external preconditions.

Melanie Klein like many of her predecessors also

employed the notion of balance in her concept of mental health. She maintained that an optimal balance between the mechanisms of projection and introjection was essential for a good development of the ego and object-relations. The child must be able to both project into its first object, the mother's breast, good feelings and good parts of the self and also have the capacity to introject this breast as a good object. While this optimal balance within the child between projection and introjection is important for a healthy development and good object-relations, so is the presence of real, external loving relations between the parents and the parents and their children. Melanie Klein also believes that not only a child's good relation to its mother but also its good relation to the food, love, and care the mother bestows upon her child are also pre-conditions for a stable development. According to Klein's view of development, the child will experience both persecutory and depressive types of anxiety as it grows. In order for the child to be mentally healthy these two types of anxiety must be sufficiently reduced or modified. They will never be totally eradicated and actually, Melanie Klein feels that a certain amount of anxiety is essential for the promotion of good health, because it enhances development of symbol formations and phantasies. Relatively early in her career, Klein

(1973) put forth the belief that mental health was achieved by means of inhibitions and repression and that a person "who remains healthy succeeds in doing so on account of his greater capacity for sublimating at a very early stage of his ego-development" (p. 91)(1923). Normal development was not a straightforward progression for Klein. She saw it as an interplay between progression and regression. However, if the person is to attain a state of mental health the fundamental basis of its progress must remain intact and any threat to its overall integrity must be only transitory. Therefore, an individual must possess an ability to cope with upheavals and conflicts if they hope to ensure their sense of well-being. One conflict which Klein believes is crucial for the child to cope with, is the Oedipus conflict. This situation demands that the child tolerate a great deal of frustration as well as a sense of deprivation. The child's ability to cope with the Oedipal situation is really a precondition for all future successful adaptations to reality. The child will demonstrate its ability to deal with the Oedipus complex through games and sublimations which contain the theme of fighting a father-figure for the right to possess its mother. Melanie Klein (1975a) believes that splitting processes are crucial for development and that "a certain amount of splitting is essential for integration" (p.192) (1957). Splitting ensures

that the good object is kept apart from the bad object and therefore is preserved and left intact. Melanie Klein (1975a) cautions her readers that "in the early splitting processes fragmentation should not dominate" (p. 233) (1957) and that the child must also have the capacity to regain at some point the parts of its personality, which it has split-off, if it is to have a healthy development. The child's healthy development also depends on how successfully it has worked through the depressive position and to what degree the superego has continued to develop within the genital stage. Klein, in the tradition of men like Plato, Spinoza, and Freud, also emphasizes the importance of insight into one's feelings, impulses, and inner conflicts for mental health. The theme of insight was so important for Klein that she advocated for prophylactic child psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic intervention in the child's upbringing both at home and at school. Melanie Klein was fully aware that the preconditions and the factors which she listed to promote mental health did not furnish an absolute guarantee for this type of outcome. The influence and demands of external reality, which can never be fully known in advance, can tip the scales either towards normality or pathology. External reality can also enhance normal development by disproving many anxieties associated with internal reality.

Constitutional Factors

A further essential element in Melanie Klein's concept of both mental health and mental illness is the role that constitutional factors play in development. These factors were of course always discussed on an emotional level and as representing an inherent factor in the person's psychological make-up. It can be argued that a very distant antecedent of this notion of constitutional factors can be found in the work of Empedocles. He presented this concept in physiological terms and emphasized that a person's nature or temperament was dependent upon the arrangement of elements within the body. Moreover, Hippocrates spoke of the proportion of constitutional elements, like fire and water, as directly influencing the susceptibility of the body to disease. Consequently, since he maintained that "mental activity was directly dependent on physical states" (Brett, 1974, p. 57), constitutional factors can be definitely shown to influence a person's mental health. Similarly, Aristotle focused his attention on the biological and physiological processes of man. He spoke about people having flaws in their make-up from birth which limit their ability to live a virtuous life. A contemporary of Aristotle's, Theophrastus (372-287 B.C.) stressed that it was man's natural constitution that made people abnormal. This abnormality was thus part of their nature.

and could remain with them permanently. Maimonides several centuries later also stated that constitutional factors were capable of influencing behavior either in the direction of virtuous or evil acts. Thomas Brown noted the presence of constitutional differences both in respect to the mind and bodily temperaments. A little later in history Griesinger referred to inherent mental dispositions which influenced the development of insanity. McReynolds (1968) has indicated that Bentham presumed that there are "inherent individual differences in the texture, constitution or temperament of mind" (p. 244). Constitutional factors have also been designated as playing a part in neurosis. Charcot, Janet, and Freud and his followers, all subscribed to this premise, not to mention authors like Kretschmer, Sheldon, and others.

Throughout her work Melanie Klein refers to several factors which she believes have a constitutional basis and are capable of influencing development in either a positive or negative direction. She has herself referred to Wilhelm Reich (The Function of the Orgasm, 1927) and Karl Abraham ("A Short Study of the Development of the Libido", 1924) respectively as predecessors to her belief in the presence of a constitutional predisposition in the strength of an individual's genitality and oral-sadism. Klein also proposed that there was a constitutional basis to the intensity of a child's anal sadism. In actuality,

she proposed that constitutional factors played a part in determining the strength of one's capacity to love, to hate, to feel envy and greed, and that the strength of the ego and its capacity to bear tension, anxiety, and frustration were also constitutionally influenced.

Klein's View of Normality

Melanie Klein has also presented various passages in her work which when combined give an indication of her description of a normal child and a normal adult. First, I will present a description which is based on passages which make no distinction as to whether they are meant strictly for children or adults or in fact applicable to both. A person who has a well developed personality is able to endure the stresses and strains of life and still maintain a feeling of inner security. Furthermore, the person's inner world is a place where objects are at peace with one another and with the ego. There is an inner sense of harmony and integration. Melanie Klein (1975a) has stated that

a well-integrated personality is the foundation for mental health. I shall begin by enumerating a few elements of an integrated personality: emotional maturity, strength of character, capacity to deal with conflicting emotions, a balance between internal life and adaptation to reality, and a successful welding into a whole of the different parts of the personality. (p. 268) (1960)

Klein assumes that integration processes begin at birth .

and continue to increase as the ego grows in strength but she maintains that a person's personality never achieves complete integration.

This process of integration is based on the introjection of the good object, primarily a part object—the mother's breast, although other aspects of the mother also enter into even the earliest relation. (M. Klein, 1975a, p. 300) (1963)

Finally, Klein believed that integration is stimulated by the insecurity derived from splitting, the desire to mitigate impulses of hate, and also from the feeling that parts of the self are unknown. In addition, Klein indicates that a mentally healthy person is not overpowered by the grief and unhappiness of others and a capacity for love predominates within their personality over impulses of hate. These people have also been able during their development to modify their need to idealize, to deny, and also their feelings of omnipotence. Finally, like Heinroth, Klein describes a well balanced person as someone whose ego has sufficiently integrated its superego.

In her first paper Melanie Klein gave a brief description of the type of child she considered not to need an early psychoanalysis. She stressed this child's lack of inhibitions. It was not only able to reveal its sexual curiosity but also able to seek out and to assimilate the information it was given. Similarly, its desire for knowledge in general is quite unrestricted. In games and phantasies as well, this normal child allowed its intellectual

impulses, especially those associated with the Oedipus situation, to be experienced and acted out in a playful setting. This type of child enjoys playing and does so with enthusiasm. Melanie Klein, does not paint an idealized picture of the normal child.

Up to a certain point, the normal child openly shows its ambivalence and affects; its subjection to instinctual urges and phantasies acts recognizably and so do the influences of its super-ego. It puts certain difficulties in the way of its adaptation to reality and therefore in the way of its upbringing and is by no means always an 'easy' child. (M. Klein, 1975c, p. 102) (1932)

The normal child generally displays a good adaptation to reality. This comes about because with a decrease in splitting, the ego becomes more integrated and its good and bad objects come closer together and the child is now able to understand the world around it in a more realistic fashion. These accomplishments in integration also assist the normal child in establishing good object-relations. In conclusion, the normal child has achieved a degree of stability in its development, has acquired defences, and has arrived at a stage of genital primacy.

Melanie Klein believed that the final steps in the process of stabilizing the personality were not achieved until the stage of puberty was completed. At this point, she felt that the normal adult began to take shape. This person was someone whose ego and superego had arrived at a set of adult aims which were suitable to both. As an

adult this individual is far less dependent on its immediate environment and its primary object. In the process of adapting to the external world, the normal person both acknowledges and internalizes the demands of the real world so that they are part of its own internal world. This will further assist the person in becoming less dependent on objects in general. Anxiety situations from childhood still operate within Klein's normal person and these people, just like neurotics, turn to a love partner in order to test them out in reality by having sexual relations with them. Before concluding, I should also add that Melanie Klein has also described the normal adult as possessing a strong ego and a well developed phantasy life.

Mental Illness

Man's awareness of abnormal behavior or mental illness has a very long history indeed. Theories about man's aberrant behavior reach back in time to even the most ancient civilizations. The vast majority of these theories can be grouped into those relating mental illness to somatic causes, psychological causes, a combination of both of these, or to some type of divine punishment or intervention. The purpose of this section will be to

give a brief historical outline of each of these ways of conceiving of the cause of mental disorders. At the same time Melanie Klein's ideas concerning the etiology of psychopathology will be introduced into each section in varying degrees depending on the extent of the links that have been established between her work and past thinkers. As always, an attempt is being made to illustrate the salient historical precedents for Melanie Klein's thinking and her view of mankind.

Sin and Mental Illness

The ancient Assyrians and Babylonians taught that disease was due to sin. Similarly, we find in the Old Testament in the Book of Deuteronomy that God has threatened to punish his people with madness if they break his commandments. Here we encounter really two themes relating to mental illness. One is that it is the direct result of sin and the other is that it is sent by a Divine Being. In the Old Testament, as just stated, we saw that God sent madness as a form of punishment. However, in the New Testament, God is depicted as sending this affliction as a trial which, if borne well, will enhance one's spiritual stature. Consequently, human maladies no longer need to be seen as always a form of punishment for man's sins. The ancient Greeks also support the idea that mental disorders

were sent to them from Divine Beings. Zeus and the other gods were often said to have caused man's mental tensions. This notion that psychological disorders were sent by beings who were not mortal was revived again during the era of demonology. During the Middle Ages the populace and the authorities both believed in witchcraft and demonic possession. Those in authority, however were still very skeptical of the extent of the power of demons and witches. An attitude of tolerance accompanied their skepticism. Zilboorg (1967) mentions that manuscripts from the 10th century reveal that mental disorders such as hysteria are seen as being due to demonic possession but that incantations rather than torture were the prescribed method of treatment. He also cites John of Salisbury, the Archbishop of Lyons, Agobard, and Abelard as representatives of those who, although not having a strong voice in this matter, maintained that mental disorders were not the work of the devil. During the 14th and 15th centuries there developed an increase in individual mental diseases and in mental epidemics. The fear that this situation generated became the fertile soil for the era of demonology and witch hunts. Kirsch (1978) has summarized the development of this era of rampant witch hunts or widespread concern with possession or witchcraft by stating that

the foundations for both were laid in the twelfth through fifteenth centuries, but the real explosion—the flowering of physics, astronomy, and demonology—took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (p. 152)

If at this point we return to our original theme of sin, we find that Tourney (1966) describes Plato, in a strictly psychological perspective, also as subscribing to the point of view that sin can be responsible for causing the soul to suffer maladies and afflictions. Psychoanalysis he believes also presents a similar point of view about pathology. The difference is that psychoanalysis has translated Plato's notion that ancient sins are the basis of mental illness into the concept that old guilt feelings are. Guilt, of course ultimately stems from some transgression. In psychoanalytic theory the transgression is not against God so it is not called a sin but the meaning is very similar. I do not intend to go into an extensive outline of this issue but I will point out that in classical psychoanalysis, feelings of guilt have become analogous to the religious sense of sin. The concept of religion for Freud stemmed from mankind's feelings of helplessness and a desire for protection. Initially, this child-like desire for protection is directed towards the father but in later life God fulfills this role. Transgressions as a child against the authority of the parents endangered the child's need for sustenance and protection. Similarly, in adult life sins

or transgressions against God once again jeopardize mankind's desire for Divine protection. Following in this ancient tradition, Melanie Klein also maintains that mental illness is due to a transgression which arouses anxiety and feelings of guilt. "The feeling that harm done to the loved object is caused by the subject's aggressive impulses I take to be the essence of guilt" (M. Klein, 1975a, p. 36) (1948). For Klein, the sin is an aggression against a loved object and this in turn leads to feelings of guilt. It is however, the transgression or aggressive attack on the object which in the end is at the basis of the emotional disorder. When the ego attacks its object and reduces it to bits and fragments, it has created a situation in which it can no longer introject a whole object and therefore become integrated. Instead, the ego introjects a multitude of persecuting fragments and this results in an increase in the level of persecutory anxiety and if the level becomes too great for the ego to bear, it will itself fragment and disintegrate into bits and pieces. This of course will result in a serious mental disorder. Moreover, according to Klein's theory, the ego can never split its object without itself undergoing a similar split. Consequently, when the object has been split into many pieces as a result of an aggressive attack on it by the ego, that same ego upon introjecting these

fragments itself becomes fragmented.

However, prior to the development of psychoanalysis and Melanie Klein's work, there emerged in Germany a psychiatrist Johann Heinroth who also proposed, like the ancient Assyrians and Babylonians, the Jews and Christians that sin was the cause of mental disorders. Alexander and Selesnick (1966) have claimed that Heinroth can be interpreted as using religious-moralistic terminology to express the notion that psychopathology is due to an inner conflict, one between the id and superego. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the concept of man in a state of conflict is a very old one and there is no need to repeat its historical roots here. This interpretation of Heinroth's work does however, introduce one of the other major streams of thought about psychopathology, namely that it is due to psychological factors.

The Psychological Basis of Mental Illness

Many of the ancient Greeks proposed that psychological or emotional factors were at the basis of mental disorders. Aesculapius believed that the cause of these illnesses was mental and proposed mental or spiritual methods of treatment. Euripides (480-406 B.C.) analyzed the emotions of the murderess in his play Medea and Sophocles (495-406 B.C.), who wrote Oedipus Rex and Electra, presented fundamental psychological motives for psycho-

pathological behavior. Both these men, therefore, are examples of those who uphold the psychological view of etiology. Cicero (106-42 B.C.) also subscribed to this belief and held that melancholia was due to psychological causes. During the 15th and 16th centuries men like Paracelsus and Cardano continued the psychological tradition. Even in literature, playwrights like Shakespeare revealed their psychological insight into pathology. Shakespeare's portrayal of Lady Macbeth after she has murdered King Duncan is an excellent example. Then once again in the 18th century we have Reil (1759-1813) who states that mental illness has a psychological basis. He is joined a little later by Haindorf and Héricourt who present respectively, the notions that mental illness is due to conflict either between emotions or between the conscious and unconscious parts of the mind.

The next theme to be introduced which is very relevant to the historical foundation of Melanie Klein's work was the idea that pathological behavior had its origin in childhood. Ideler (1795-1860) not only proposed that emotions were the main cause of psychoses, but he also felt that the origins of delusions could be found in childhood. Similarly, around the time of Dallemagne, the idea became prevalent that sexual disturbances could result from unconscious psychological causes whose origins were to be found in childhood. During the 19th century there were

many proponents of the psychological etiology of mental illness. Francois Leuret (1797-1851) stressed this theme in his book Psychological Fragments on Insanity and in Austria, Feuchtersleben (1806-1849) campaigned for the recognition of this idea. He was convinced that personality disturbances lay at the root of mental disorders. In France, Charcot introduced the concept of unconscious fixed ideas as playing a central role in the formation of a neurosis. This idea was later adopted by Janet and Freud. An analogous concept to the cause of pathology can also be seen in Benedikt's notion of the "painful secret". Finally, Wyss (1973) presents a proposition of Meynert's which is crucial to Klein's theory of mental illness. "Madness and myths are conceived as related phenomena; both constitute a projection of man's inner life on to the external world" (p. 103). According to Klein when the child or adult projects its sadistic impulses on to the objects in its external world, they then are phantasied as persecuting and fragmented. If the strength of the persecutory anxiety is too great for the ego to bear, the child will not be able to internalize its objects and will refrain from establishing object-relations and will suffer a great lack of integration.

A Physiological Perspective of Mental Disorders

Having outlined the list of defenders of the psychological basis for the etiology of mental illness, I will

now turn to those who subscribe to a more somatic or physiological basis. History's first indication of this alternative theme begins around the tenth or ninth century B.C. with the Homeric poems. They present disease as being due to physical impurities, or events and they recommend some form of physical purification. In the fourth century B.C. Hippocrates campaigned against the notion that mental illness was due to an intervention by the gods. Instead, he maintained that it was due to diseases of the brain or humoral balance. He therefore advocated a more naturalistic viewpoint in regard to the issue of mental illness. Following in the Hippocratic tradition, Aristotle and Aulus Cornelius Celsus both held that mental disorders were caused by problems in the bile. Jackson (1969) has noted that Galen made reference to both the fact that psychological maladies are the result of physiological factors and that physical symptoms are due to psychological elements. In the 17th century, Thomas Willis (1621-1675) acknowledged the idea a somatic predisposition to insanity and in the next century William Battie (1703-1776), the governor of Bethlem Hospital, incorporated this idea into his distinction between original and consequential forms of mental illness.

The first is solely owing to an internal disorder of the nervous substance: the second is likewise owing to the same nervous substance being indeed in like

manner disordered, but disordered ab
extra; and therefore is chiefly to be
attributed to some remote and accidental
cause. (Diamond, 1974, p. 651)

In France, another head of a mental hospital, Pinel joined the ranks of those proposing that mental illness was somatic in nature. He believed it was due to heredity or brain pathology. In actuality, up until the time of Charcot, psychopathology in France was held to be an organic disorder. Psychiatry was considered almost a branch of neurology at this time in France. A short time after Pinel, Griesinger in Germany staunchly supported the proposal that mental disorders were the result of brain pathology. This orientation in German psychiatry remained until the advent of Freud. However, contemporaneously with Freud's influence on German psychiatry there was another vehement supporter of the organic model, namely Emil Kraepelin (1855-1926). He proposed that the different mental disorders really belonged to just two groups either a manic-depressive or a dementia praecox group. In either case, the cause was due to a brain pathology. Finally, in Britain during this same period Maudsley was also busily propounding the same view of the etiology of mental illness.

Melanie Klein's approach to mental illness is of course very psychological rather than somatic or organic. While her approach may be strictly psychological, her concept of what causes psychopathology is not. She realizes that

mental disorders are usually the result of a blending of three factors. The internal psychological reality, the external reality, and the constitutional make-up of the person, all contribute in various proportions to the final formation of the pathology. Since Klein's view does include constitutional factors, it can not be said to totally ignore the historical theme of psychopathology based on physiological components.

A great deal of Freud's work and theorizing about neurotics was founded on the assumption that normals and neurotics, although they differ quantitatively on certain factors, were the same structurally. Klein adopted this position and extended it to include psychotics as well.

My psychoanalytic work with children has not only confirmed me in the opinion that the points of fixation for psychoses lie in the stages of development preceding the second anal level, but has also convinced me that these points of fixation apply in the same way to neurotics and normal children, though in a minor degree. (M. Klein, 1975c, pp. 141-142) (1932)

This view of the similarity between normals, neurotics and psychotics was also based on her belief that psychotic anxieties of a paranoid and depressive nature underlie infantile neurosis. Furthermore, the terrifying figures which are split-off and exist in the deepest layers of the unconscious present the same threat to the stability of the personality in a neurosis and a psychosis

except that the intensity of the threat is greater in the psychosis.

Central to Melanie Klein's view of psychopathology is the concept of anxiety. She believed that "excessive persecutory and depressive anxieties in young infants are of crucial significance in the psychogenesis of mental disorders" (M. Klein, 1975a, p. 116) (1952). Since anxiety is generated for Klein by destructive tendencies, the strength of the child's sadistic impulses and the main point of their fixation are decisive factors in determining the degree and the type of anxiety which the ego must deal with. If the child's sadistic impulses are excessive and very primitive this may lead to the production of such a large quantity of persecutory anxiety that the ego must resort to the prolonged use of splitting mechanisms. This in turn will result in fragmentation of the object and the ego and in a failure to internalize a good object. The ego therefore is unable to develop any sense of stability and the individual will develop some form of psychosis. Alternatively, "the infantile neurosis can be regarded as a combination of processes by which anxieties of a psychotic nature are bound, worked through and modified" (M. Klein, 1975a, p. 81) (1952).

A final and very important point to set forth about Klein's view of mental illness is that she believed that psychotics were capable of forming a transference

and therefore could be treated by means of psychoanalysis. Ellenberger (1970) has mentioned that the Marquis de Puységur (1751-1825) treated a psychotic boy for six months. He does not describe this attempt at treatment as psychoanalysis but Ellenberger does maintain that Puységur's efforts were the forerunner of the later attempts to psychotherapeutically treat such disturbed individuals. Ideler, a contemporary of Puységur, also supported this view that psychotherapy was a viable method of treatment for psychotics.

This final contribution to the description of the Kleinian man has focused on his mental stability and instability. Mental health according to Klein is based on a complex relationship between several internal and external factors which result in an interplay between projection and regression. For man to achieve and maintain a state of mental well-being, a balance must exist between the mechanisms of projection and introjection. Furthermore, he must have achieved a sufficient degree of insight into his private nature. Mental health is also dependent on the constitutional strength of the life and death instincts, the ability of the individual to cope with conflict, and a facilitating external reality (e.g. loving parents). However, if external reality is extremely harsh and/or the strength of man's death instinct is so strong that it results in aggressive acts (real or phantasied) that generate overwhelming anxiety and guilt then man will develop a mental

illness. Melanie Klein believes that the origin of emotional disturbances lay in childhood and that the fixation points for psychosis apply in a similar fashion to neurotics and normals, though in a minor degree. Consequently, she believed that one could treat psychotics by means of psychoanalysis.

This section concludes my outline of Melanie Klein's thoughts on psychoanalysis and man and their links with men of the past. I will now turn in the next chapter to an examination of the impact that Kleinian thought has had on psychoanalysis in particular and other areas of thought and our lives in general.

Chapter VII

The Influence of Kleinian ThoughtKlein's Influence on Psychoanalysis
and Other Areas of Thought

In general terms Melanie Klein's contributions to psychoanalysis have appeared in three fundamental areas. Her work has expanded the theory of psychoanalysis by introducing new concepts and also by increasing our understanding of existing ideas. Moreover, she has developed several new technical innovations (e.g. play therapy) and broadened the use of existing techniques (e.g. psychoanalysing psychotics). Finally, her ideas and her personal supervision of colleagues and students has done much to increase the awareness and to stimulate the interest of many psychoanalysts past, present, and future.

Friends and critics alike have cited many examples of Klein's contributions to psychoanalysis. The majority of them of course refer to her theoretical advancements, since she made so many important contributions to this area. Part of the reason for some of these new theoretical insights was due to the fact that she was one of the first psychoanalysts who realized the importance of observing and psychoanalysing very young children. Guntrip (1969)

states quite explicitly that

Melanie Klein's fundamental and major contribution was to develop a new conception of endopsychic structure.... After Klein, it became possible to see the human psyche as an internal world of a fully personal nature, a world of internalized ego-object relationships, which partly realistically and partly in highly distorted ways reproduced the ego's relationships to personal objects in the real outer world. This conception of endopsychic structure as an inner world of personal object-relations, revealed to consciousness in dreams, symbolically expressed in symptoms, and represented in fantasy, is 'the great divide' in the development of psychoanalysis. It is in Klein's work that object-relations first begin to replace instincts as the focal point of theory. This is making possible a subtle but enormously important change of 'atmosphere' in psychoanalytic thinking; from the mechanistic to the personal, from the study of mental phenomena, the clash of psychic forces, to the study of the human being's struggle for self-realization as a person in personal relationship
(pp. 407-408)

In addition, Guntrip believes that Klein's work in the area of object-relations helped lay the groundwork for the emergence and development of ego psychology. Actually, Melanie Klein was one of the major contributors to the construction of an object-relations theory in psychoanalysis. Her work in this area was particularly important because it drew the psychoanalytic community's attention to the importance of the early relationship between the mother and the child for the child's future development. Klein stressed both the positive and negative effects of this

early relationship. A good relationship between the two meant the possibility of progress towards integration accompanied by a reduction in anxiety and an increase in feelings of love, concern, and gratitude. However, a bad relationship often had the reverse effect leading to disintegration of the ego and an increase in persecutory anxiety and hostile phantasies.

It becomes quite evident both from reading my previous chapter and also Guntrip's remarks that Melanie Klein's work has done a great deal to change our view of man. Human beings can now be seen as individuals who live in two worlds at the same time and furthermore, they are beings that have value. Winnicott (1965) believes quite strongly that the notion of man's value is linked directly with a capacity to deal with guilt. Melanie Klein's concept of the depressive position has done much to illustrate the development of human guilt feelings and their relationship to aggressive phantasies. The introduction of the concept of reparation also provided the necessary insight needed to understand how the infant masters its guilt and advances to higher levels of integration. This concept also provided psychoanalysis with a new perspective for viewing many forms of sublimations such as work, play, and artistic pursuits.

Melanie Klein's theorizing about the importance of aggressive feelings in the development of early psychic

life has contributed greatly to our understanding of this period. She has pointed out its influence on the development of the child's object-relations and its contribution to pathology. Klein's realization also of the fundamental role that aggression plays in man's phantasy life has advanced our understanding in this area as well. Klein has tried to demonstrate the major influence that phantasies have in the day to day operation of our inner reality and in our perception of external reality. A primary focus of all Melanie Klein's work has been her attempt to describe the workings of phantasy life and its impact on man's whole development. She specifically stressed that a great deal of conflict exists in phantasy life right from the beginning of life. Besides drawing psychoanalysts' attention to this fact, she also informs them that the earliest conflicts are between only two objects, namely the child and the breast.

Klein's theorizing about the earliest precursors of later fully developed structural entities and complexes contributed greatly to psychoanalysis' insight into the early development of these factors and their influence on the first months of psychic life. She paid particular attention to the early stages of the ego, super-ego, and Oedipus complex. She also worked very diligently to elucidate the essential part that early forms of envy play in the child's development. Her views

on the importance of envy in man's life helped to elevate this concept to a more prominent place in psychoanalytic theory. Moreover, her work in the area of identification broadened our comprehension of introjective identification and introduced a fundamentally new type of identification, called projective identification, into the body of psychoanalytic knowledge. Similarly, she has also greatly advanced psychoanalysis' awareness of the paramount importance that the mechanisms of introjection and projection have on the infant's earliest development. In fact, besides introjection and projection, Melanie Klein has also furthered psychoanalysis' knowledge by her description of the operation of other defence mechanisms such as splitting and the manic defences. A description and insight into these defences also entailed a further understanding of anxiety. It was Klein's interest in anxiety and its influence on development that led to the introduction into psychoanalytic theory of the concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Zetzel (1956) states also that

Melanie Klein's early recognition of the role of anxiety as a spur to development and of the part played by symbol formation in early play, in early fantasy and the development of sublimation is of the utmost importance.
(p. 107)

The sum total of all these contributions really is that Melanie Klein introduced into psychoanalytic thought a

drastically new way of conceiving and thinking about the developmental process.

Moreover, because she was such a sensitive and astute clinician, she also revolutionized several areas of clinical technique. Firstly, she created an orthodox psychoanalytic play technique that could be used to psychoanalyze even very young children. She not only demonstrated that this technique allowed for the psychoanalysis of neurotic children but also that it was applicable when dealing with severely psychotic ones as well. Contrary to popular belief, she also was able to show that even very young children are capable of forming a transference relationship. Her concepts of early development also brought new insight into the treatment of psychotic adults and children. Her work pointed out further that schizophrenic patients are unable to either form or use symbols and thus their mode of communication is severely restricted. The Kleinian technique has also provided psychoanalysis with an example of a psychoanalytic method that emphasizes dealing with the present endopsychic situation rather than one that focuses on working to reveal the past.

In conclusion, Melanie Klein and her work have influenced psychoanalysis by the effect they have had on stimulating and improving the work and insights of her colleagues and students. During her life time, she had

an impact on the development of such people as Fairbairn, Winnicott, Isaacs, Heimann, Riviere, Bion, Money-Kyrle, Segal, Rosenfeld, Meltzer, and countless other well-known psychoanalysts.

The influence of Klein and her ideas is not contained solely within the bounds of the discipline of psychoanalysis. While the main impact of her ideas in other fields of thought and interest has been mainly due to the work of her close associates, Klein herself did branch out into other areas. Her work contains many important insights into the task of raising children, especially in the areas of weaning, discipline, and breast feeding, to name a few. Her ideas also provided a different and often very unique perspective to such topics as criminality, art, education, and the process of learning. For instance, art or actually any form of creativity was considered by Klein to stem from a wish to restore and repair damaged objects. In addition, she illustrated that sexual phantasies and sexual curiosity were essential to the entire process of learning. However, aggressive phantasies or sexual ones that aroused too much anxiety can also lead to an inhibition in learning. She has also demonstrated that her particular psychoanalytic perspective can be very useful in attempting to understand statesmen, international affairs, anthropology, and the concept of leadership. Klein's original insights

into the inner world of man has resulted in providing a new vantage point from which to observe and to try to understand many areas of man's complex life.

Contemporary Kleinians and Their Contributions

One of the most prominent contemporary Kleinians is Wilfrid Bion (1897-1979). During his lifetime Bion was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, President of the British Psycho-Analytic Society, and Chairman of the Melanie Klein Trust. He had made significant contributions to our understanding of group processes and dynamics and to the area of psychotic disorders. The work he did with psychotics involved studying the thought processes of schizophrenics. The area of thought processes interested Bion so much that he proposed a theory of thinking which took into account a great deal of knowledge derived from psychoanalysis.

Since Kleinians maintain that it is possible to establish a transference relationship with psychotic patients, many have worked extensively with these people and have been able to contribute greatly to the diagnosis and treatment of severe psychopathologies. Noted Kleinians such as Rosenfeld and Segal have worked and written at length on schizophrenic disorders. For instance, Rosenfeld and Segal have both stressed the necessity for using strict psychoanalytic technique in dealing with schizophrenics.

This technique focuses on the positive and negative transference and the interpretation of the unconscious material presented by the patient and avoids all form of reassurance or education. In addition, Francis Tustin has worked for many years with autistic children. Betty Joseph has written about the characteristics of the psychopathic personality, and Marion Milner has discussed in great detail the case of a schizoid person.

Donald Meltzer is another very well-known Kleinian. He is an American, who after his training as a child psychiatrist, came to England where he became both a student and a patient of Melanie Klein's. He is a child and adult psychoanalyst as well as a training analyst. He has taught at the Tavistock, the British Institute of Psycho-Analysis, and has lectured in Argentina, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. He has written books on the psychoanalytic process itself and on sexual theory and perversion. The areas of speech development and communication, transference, and the process of identification have also been of interest to Meltzer. In his work Meltzer has introduced a new type of identification called adhesive identification. He has also presented five factors essential for speech development and use and has attempted to revise Freud's psychoanalytic theory of sexuality in terms of Klein's paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions.

Contemporary Kleinians have not restricted their influence solely to the area of psychoanalysis. Roger Money-Kyrle has applied the Kleinian viewpoint to the topics of aesthetics, ethics, and politics. By means of this process he concludes that "wise men are humanists in morals and democratic in their politics" (M. Klein, Heimann, & Money-Kyrle, 1955, p. 439). Hanna Segal has also written on a psychoanalytic interpretation of aesthetics pleasure. She concluded that it was due to a spectator's ability to unconsciously re-live the artist's experience of both his triumph and final detachment. Similarly, a Canadian named Elliot Jaques, who graduated from the University of Toronto and who studied medicine and social relations in the United States before going to England to become a psychoanalyst, has also written and adopted a Kleinian perspective in dealing with issues not directly related to psychoanalysis. His specific areas of interest have been industry and economics. He has focused a great deal of his time and attention on illustrating the usefulness of a Kleinian approach to dealing with and understanding industrial relations, the problems of organizations and management, and economic problems and crises. Jaques puts forth the view "that one of the primary cohesive elements binding individuals into institutionalized human association is that of defence against psychotic anxiety" (M. Klein, Heimann, & Money-Kyrle, 1955, p. 479).

The area of art has also received attention from the Kleinian group. Besides aesthetics, Hanna Segal has written about the importance of the depressive position and the ability to work through it to the creation of a work of art. Marion Milner, a psychoanalyst, who although not analyzed by Klein was supervised by her, has described the relationship between art and psychoanalytic thinking. Another name that bears mentioning here is Adrian Stokes. He is a distinguished painter and art critic, and he has written extensively about art from a Kleinian psychoanalytic perspective. Stokes, for example, mentions the reparative aspect of art. Both the object and the self can be restored through the process of creating an art form.

A very important area of life where, thanks especially to the efforts of Susan Isaacs, Kleinian thinking has had a significant impact is the educational field. Although Isaacs (1885-1948) can no longer be considered a contemporary Kleinian, her many years of work in this area warrant her mention. She was trained in psychology, logic, philosophy, and psychoanalysis and used all this knowledge to try to improve school life for children. Her main focus for accomplishing this aim was to make teachers aware of the importance that phantasy played in the workings of the child's mind.

The men and women mentioned in this brief outline

represent only a few of the more well-known Kleinian writers who have influenced psychoanalysis and other areas of thought and society. The work Melanie Klein began several decades ago continues today and so does the influence of her thinking on many areas of our lives.

Before concluding this chapter, I would like to illustrate how Melanie Klein's image of man differs from Freud's and how this has both contributed to its influence and its rejection in certain areas. Klein has adopted a strictly psychological perspective in her approach to man while Freud has both a psychological and a biological one. This has resulted in Klein being criticized for failing to consider the influence of maturation on man's development. Furthermore, she was mainly interested in the psychological development of mankind rather than the pathological as Freud was. Because of this, her work has had an impact on day care and child rearing practices in Britain. In addition, her theory about the importance of phantasy life in learning has influenced the way many British teachers conceive of the workings of their students' minds.

The Kleinian infant is seen as being far more complex and sophisticated than Freud's auto-erotic and narcissistic youngster. This belief has caused Melanie Klein to incur several criticisms because so many of her hypotheses about infants are not empirically verifiable. Alternatively, this concept of the young child has led to

her formulating a method of communication with young children. This method is play therapy and in its strict psychoanalytic or more modified forms it has been very influential in the treatment of children. In a similar vein, Freud believed that only normal and neurotic individuals were the same structurally but Klein included psychotics as well. This meant that she felt that psychotics could also be treated psychoanalytically. Consequently, her work is of special interest to those who specialize in dealing with psychotics.

In Melanie Klein's concept of man the aim of life is integration and synthesis while for Freud it is death. According to him, man is motivated by the pleasure and nirvana principles. Man wishes to avoid pain and to reduce stimulation. Klein, on the other hand, views man as being motivated by conflict, a conflict between love and hate. Therefore, conflict is not necessarily something bad or something to be avoided. It is capable of motivating development. Freud, however, has a more hedonistic view of man and in it conflict is to be avoided. Freud's theory of man is an instinctual, structural, and energy model. It is ultimately mechanistic. While Klein's is an object-relations theory which stresses emotions and conceives of the mind as being very animistic. Her work has been criticized because it has presented the mind as animistic when her critics say it really isn't. In addition, her object-relations view of

man is felt to be too psychogenic. Guntrip (1969), however, has praised Klein's object-relations theory. He feels it brings a new conception of endopsychic structure to psychoanalysis and helps to lay the groundwork for the emergence and development of ego psychology.

Freud's concept of man is very pessimistic. Man is seen as negative, selfish, and destructive. Klein is aware of this darker side of mankind but she also points out man's ability to love and to be altruistic. Love is a complex emotion for Klein. It involves not only the sensual aspect which Freud focused on, but also feelings of guilt, sadness, depressive anxiety, and responsibility. Consequently, creativity, work, and play are viewed by Klein as stemming from a desire to make reparation which ultimately is based on love. In contrast, it is Freud's view that these activities result from the sublimation of sensual and/or destructive impulses. Melanie Klein's notion of reparation has led to a new way of viewing and understanding work, play, and creativity and art critics such as Adrian Stokes have often adopted her perspective in discussing art.

Finally, Melanie Klein did not adhere to Freud's notion that the relationship between man's mind and body was one of psychophysical parallelism. Instead, she viewed the relationship as being a dualistic interactionism. This resulted in her being criticized for not stressing sufficiently the importance of reality factors in pathology and psychic development.

In conclusion, we can say that Freud and Klein's image of mankind do differ on several points and that this has both increased Klein's influence on psychoanalysis and society and also the amount of criticism her work has received .

Chapter VIII

Summary and Conclusion

This thesis has dealt with Melanie Klein as a person, as a theoretician and as a psychoanalyst. Looking at Klein as a person from a psychoanalytic point of view, we can say that from a very early age and continuing throughout her entire life she experienced and dealt with many losses. The deaths of her sister and brother and of her eldest son plus the emotional loss of her husband, daughter, and many friends and colleagues all combined to introduce a great deal of tragedy and feelings of depression and grief into Melanie Klein's life. Fortunately for her, she was a woman of great strength, courage, vitality, and perseverance and thus able to endure and to even further grow and develop following these losses. Her work, though almost always the centre of great controversy, seems also to have been one area of her life that provided her with some of her greatest pleasure, fulfillment, and success.

Klein the theoretician, has helped to introduce a whole new perspective into the field of psychoanalysis, namely object-relations theory. She has also put forth a new way of looking at man's psychological development. She saw it in terms of two positions, the paranoid-

schizoid and the depressive positions. These positions are not as fixed as stages and there can be a great deal of fluctuation from one to the other, especially in childhood. Melanie Klein's theoretical and clinical insights led to new and daring statements about the nature and date of the origin of the Oedipus complex and the superego. Furthermore, her work expanded our knowledge and increased our understanding of the importance of envy, introjection, projection, reparation, and identification in man's development. In fact, Klein even introduced a totally new concept to psychoanalysis called "projective identification" which has proven extremely valuable in understanding both normal and abnormal development.

Next in this study, Klein, the clinician and theoretician was compared to Freud and a few other psychoanalysts who represented the classical approach. Numerous areas ranging from the unconscious, to the death instinct, to reality, etc., were discussed in terms of the similarities and differences between the Kleinian and classical approach to psychoanalysis. Then a summary was presented of the criticisms of Klein's work and the counter arguments against them. The author also introduced some of his own criticisms and refutations of other critics' remarks.

The thesis then proceeded to present Melanie Klein's philosophy of both psychoanalysis and man. Important areas that helped to illustrate her views on both issues were

presented in detail. An historical perspective was adopted in these discussions in order to highlight some of the controversial issues, especially in relation to Klein's concept of man, and to demonstrate her place in the history of ideas. Links between her concept of man and those of past thinkers in the areas of motivation, knowledge, mental health and illness, free will and determinism, and the nature of man's mind were illustrated. Finally, the influence of Klein and her followers on psychoanalysis and on many other areas of man's life was outlined.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the purpose of this study has been to try to present Melanie Klein's uniqueness and the originality of her work and her contributions to the psychoanalytic discipline which she approaches from an interactionistic dualistic frame of reference which is however, a critical idealism with irrationalistic overtones. In addition, this dissertation has attempted to outline the depth and breadth of the historical foundation of her ideas, which her disciples are continuing to apply to several areas of social life (psychotherapy, aesthetics, politics, economics, etc.).

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
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Abstract

The subject matter of this thesis is Melanie Klein and her psychoanalytic theory. The areas covered in this dissertation are a biography of Klein, the main tenets of her theory, a comparison of her ideas with those of classical psychoanalysis to show her originality, a summary of criticisms, the historical foundations of Kleinian psychoanalysis and her concept of man, and finally the influence of her work and that of her colleagues. The central thesis of this study is to demonstrate the relationship of Klein's thinking to the history of ideas. Her place in this history is as a psychological representative of a particular kind of idealism, which could be considered philosophically as "critical" however, with an irrationalistic emphasis. A survey of the literature dealing with the history of past thinkers demonstrated the historical foundations of a great many of Melanie Klein's interactionistic views of a dualistic type.