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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF IGOR A. CARUSO'S
DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LIGHT OF
MICHELE F. SCIACCA'S PHILOSOPHY
OF INTEGRALITY

by Claude A. Della Zazzera

Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Ph.D. in Psychology

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INTRODUCTION

Michele F. Sciacca's¹ philosophy of integrality (filosofia dell'integralità) has been considered, in terms of its implications for psychology, in a unique publication by O. J. Ruda, Dialectique de la personnalité.² In this work, Ruda provides an incisive critique of any psychology which negates its philosophical foundations, that is, any psychology which is closed to the philosophical moment of its own unfolding. He argues that the philosophical moment sets the limits and defines the nature of psychology. He sees philosophy and, in particular, Sciacca's philosophy of integrality, as providing fundamental intuitions for a psychology of personality.

The present researcher's Master's thesis, Individuality and Personality in Michele Federico Sciacca's Philosophy of Integrality (Implications for Psychology),³ continued this program of research into the implications of

1 For a biographical sketch of Michele Federico Sciacca, see Appendix 1.

2 O. J. Ruda, Dialectique de la personnalité, Ottawa, Les éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1973.

3 Claude Della Zazzera, Individuality and Personality in Michele Federico Sciacca's Philosophy of Integrality (Implications for Psychology), Master's thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, 1976.

Sciacca's thought for psychology. It demonstrated the importance for a psychology of personality of the ontological-transcendent dimension of man. Sciacca's unique epistemological-ontological position with respect to modern and contemporary thought, coupled with the basic principles of his philosophical anthropology, were examined. The particular psychological focus was on the dynamics of individuality and personality.

In keeping with aforementioned research, the writer assumes the importance of (1) the need for philosophical foundations in psychology and, (2) the need for a consideration of a transcendent dimension in personality. To further elaborate the importance of these dimensions the writer considers and analyses the development of Igor Alexander Caruso's⁴ thought in depth psychology. Caruso's work exemplifies an awareness of the philosophical moment in psychology. Furthermore, in his early work he stresses the importance of an "objective transcendent hierarchy of values" in his understanding of personality (thus taking into account the transcendent dimension). In fact, he develops a theory of neurosis and psychotherapy consonant

4. For a biographical sketch and discussion of publications of Igor Alexander Caruso, see Appendix 2.

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with this view.⁵

Through the course of the development of his thought, however, Caruso does not consistently uphold the importance of the transcendent dimension in the human personality; after an early period (which he refers to as his Christian Existentialist phase), he becomes ambiguous about the transcendent dimension. The unfolding of the relationship between transcendence and immanence becomes increasingly more difficult for him to the point of his questioning the tenability of the transcendent aspect of personality. In his later thought, he virtually refutes his earlier position by conceiving of a framework where transcendence has to be positively excluded. His strong disapproval of any purely immanentistic view in his early period contrasts highly with his rejection of the transcendent in his later period.⁶

Caruso's thought is evidently characterized by dramatic modifications of his earlier positions. It is precisely these inconsistencies or contradictions which become the focus of this thesis.

5 Igor A. Caruso, Existential Psychology, From Analysis to Synthesis, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1964.

6 Igor A. Caruso, La psychanalyse contre la société?, Presses Universitaires de France, trans. from the German by Jeanne Etoire, 1977.

During the course of these changes, Caruso's intellectual orientation shifted from a somewhat idealistic position to a materialistic dialectics of personality. This is discussed as an attempt on Caruso's part to resolve a certain incompleteness and ambiguity in his early philosophical and psychological thought by seeking a new ground or basis in materialism. It will be shown, however, that the fundamental point of inconsistency in Caruso's thought is not between an idealistic and materialistic dialectics as may first appear. Rather, from a Sciaccian point of view, it is Caruso's increasing acceptance of exclusively immanentistic tenets which preclude the resolution of the underlying problem in his thought. In other words, the focal issue in his depth psychology is fundamentally understood, in the perspective of the philosophy of integrality, as a conflict between a dialectics of sole immanence (materialistic or idealistic) and a dialectics of immanence and transcendence.

Caruso's thought will be described and interpreted as unfolding through three stages or moments: (1) First is his "thesis" phase where he not only insists upon a transcendent dimension of personality but also develops a theory of neurosis and psychotherapy consonant with this view. (2) His second phase will be designated by the writer as his "developing antithesis". During this period he became in-

creasingly ambiguous about the transcendent aspect of man.

(3) His third phase or moment will be identified as his "conclusive antithesis". This moment sees Caruso as definitively rejecting the transcendent dimension, and, with this rejection, adopting a somewhat nihilistic and negative view of human potential and of the future of mankind.

In the light of the philosophy of integrality, Caruso's thought as a whole, in the contradictions of its various phases and moments, is understood as carrying the exigency of a synthesis. The inner dynamics of his thought call for a renewal of his understanding of the essentiality of the transcendent dimension.

Sciacca's philosophy of integrality provides the framework for the analysis and interpretation of this exigency in Caruso's thought. This philosophy stands as a definitive critique of immanentistic thought. Sciacca has elaborated his system, to a great extent, as a critical reaction to the development of immanentistic rationalism (Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Gentile), arguing that the conclusions of this current of thought lead historically and dialectically to a nihilistic and self-contradictory position. In fact, Sciacca interprets the nihilistic conclusions of certain contemporary philosophies as renewing the issue of the transcendence of truth and being by virtue

of their very self-contradiction. For Sciacca the transcendent relation is necessary and fundamental to mankind.⁷

Caruso's own pessimistic and nihilistic conclusions bear a certain analogy to the nihilistic conclusions of contemporary thought as understood by Sciacca. It is argued, in this thesis, that the increasing espousal of a purely immanentistic view by Caruso, leads to nihilism and pessimism, much the same way the development of immanentistic rationalism (from Descartes to Hegel and others) lays the groundwork for nihilism. However, just as Sciacca interprets these nihilistic conclusions of contemporary thought as renewing the issue of the transcendence of truth and being, so do Caruso's pessimistic conclusions renew the issue of the transcendence and objectivity of values in personality.

Thus Caruso's early program is renewed in the light of the positive exigency within his own thought. The process of this renewal is illumined by the perspective of the philosophy of integrality.

The hypothesis or basic theoretical propositions (central and correlative) for this thesis may be summarized as follows:

7 M. F. Sciacca, *L'interiorità oggettiva*, Milano, Marzorati, 1960, p. 23-24; see also Chapter I, section 2F of this thesis.

Central or Core Proposition

Caruso's thought, in its fundamental aspects, carries within it the exigency of a dialectics of immanence and transcendence as essential to a psychology of personality (even where he fails to recognize or excludes this exigency).

Correlative Propositions

(1) There is a correspondence between the program of the philosophy of integrality and these positive exigencies of Caruso's thought.

(2) The focal problem of Caruso's developing psychological thought is between a dialectics of immanence and transcendence versus a dialectics solely of immanence. His shift from an idealistic to a materialistic dialectics does not resolve this issue. In the light of the philosophy of integrality Caruso's position is understood as becoming increasingly problematic due to his increasing acceptance of the tenets of an immanentistic rationalism, be they idealistic or materialistic.

(3) The "conclusive antithesis" period of Caruso's thought (where transcendence is excluded) is analogous to the ultimate conclusions of immanentistic rationalism as understood by Sciacca. As the ultimate conclusions of immanentistic rationalism lead to the renewal of the

question of truth and transcendence in philosophy, so do these "ultimate" conclusions of Caruso lead to a renewal of his earlier program of seeing transcendence as crucial for a psychology of personality. Furthermore this renewal suggests a novel synthesis.

Order of exposition:--in the first chapter certain focal issues in the philosophy of integrality are presented. The historical perspective of this philosophy is discussed in view of situating it with respect to modern and contemporary philosophical currents. The philosophy of integrality's critical stand vis-a-vis immanentistic rationalism is particularly emphasized. The basic methodology and principles of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality are then elaborated with the main features of Sciacca's understanding of personality being presented.

The second chapter provides an introduction to the essential characteristics and basic periods of Caruso's thought in depth psychology. It presents an overview of the course of development which his thinking has undergone. Three moments or stages are identified: the period of "thesis", the period of "developing antithesis" and the period of "conclusive antithesis".

The third chapter is an elaboration and analysis of Caruso's "thesis" as it is expressed in his theory of neurosis and in his theory of psychotherapy. The

philosophical support for this "thesis" in Sciacca's philosophy of integrality is also discussed.

The fourth chapter deals with the period of "developing antithesis" in Caruso's thought. The focus is on his theoretical ambivalence concerning a universal anthropology and on his increasing ambiguity with regards to the issue of transcendence in man. Sciacca's dialectics of implication and compresence (dialettica dell'implicanza e della compresenza)⁸ is proposed as an alternative to an immanentistic dialectics of the resolution of opposites.

The fifth chapter elaborates and analyses Caruso's "conclusive antithesis", his definitive exclusion of transcendence in man. Nihilistic and pessimistic aspects of his position are viewed as consequent to his increasing adoption of immanentistic tenets. There is an analogy made between the course of development of his thought and the course of development of immanentistic rationalism (the latter, as analysed by Sciacca). Sciacca views the ultimate negative

8 Sciacca proposes the dialectics of implication and compresence of the different orders of being as the method of the philosophy of integrality. This method permits the understanding of the immanent and transcendent dimensions of being in a synthesis. It is opposed to a dialectics of the exclusion of contraries or of the resolution of opposites. This dialectics is the general method of the present research into Caruso's thought (see Chapter I, section 2A of this thesis).

conclusions of immanentistic rationalism as raising anew the issue of transcendence. The writer presents his view that Caruso's own negative conclusions may be interpreted in a Sciaccian vein: that is, as raising anew the question of the objectivity and transcendence of values in personality dynamics. Aspects of a new synthesis are proposed on the basis of this critique.

CHAPTER I

FOCAL ISSUES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEGRALITY¹

Although there is no sign of any direct influence between Sciacca and Caruso (neither author cites or refers to the other in his works), the attempt will be made to show that important conclusions may be drawn from the consideration of the relation between the works of these two authors. More specifically, it is proposed that the evaluation of the development of Caruso's depth psychology is greatly aided and clarified by both the method and content of Sciacca's philosophy. The perspective of the philosophy of integrality is not applied in an a-prioristic or extraneous manner to Caruso's depth psychology. Rather, it will be shown that in a certain respect it meets and clarifies the internal exigencies of Caruso's own thought.

The main factors of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality which will be helpful in evaluating Caruso's depth psychology will be presented in this chapter. Section 1 presents the context out of which Sciacca's philosophy developed together with its main periods or

¹ This chapter represents in part a synopsis of the earlier work presented by this writer entitled: Individuality and Personality in Michele F. Sciacca's Philosophy of Integrality (Implications for Psychology), Master's thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, 1976.

phases. Section 2 of this chapter will present the historical perspective of Sciacca's thought: the position which it adopts with respect to immanentistic idealism from Descartes to Hegel together with its vision of the crisis in contemporary thought. The third section of this chapter will outline some focal principles of Sciacca's philosophy of man.

1. Origins of the Philosophy of Integrality

Sciacca's philosophy developed out of the idealistic current of modern and contemporary thought in reaction to the immanentistic tenets within that current. He reacted critically to the idealism which he understood as developing from Descartes, through Kant, Fichte, Schelling, culminating in Hegel and repropounded by Gentile. His early thought was especially influenced by Gentile's attualismo, though he soon responded critically to the immanentistic tenets of this prominent Italian philosopher.²

Sciacca's focus in his critique of immanentistic idealism was not on the epistemological or gnoseological question as such (i.e. an idealistic vs. a realistic

2. R. Jolivet and G. Roggerone, "Michele Federico Sciacca," in Les grands courants de la pensée mondiale contemporaine, ouvrage publié sous la direction de M. F. Sciacca, Vol. II, Fischbacher and Marzorati, Paris, 1964, p. 1389-1392, see also: Dall'attualismo allo spiritualismo critico (1933-1938), Milan, 1960, by M. F. Sciacca.

understanding of the validity of knowledge). Rather, working from the influence of Augustine, Pàscal, and particularly Rosmini, Sciacca viewed the epistemological question as part of a more comprehensive ontological-metaphysical issue. He quickly acquired in his philosophical unfolding, an acute sense of the insufficiency of immanentistic idealism to found the moral and spiritual exigencies of the concrete man. The first phase of his thought from 1933 to 1950 may be understood as developing the sense of this insufficiency. As Jolivet and Roggerone explain in an article presenting a portrait of Sciacca and a summary of his work:

...les écrits des années antérieurs à 1950 sont tous orientés vers la démonstration de l'insuffisance de la raison à résoudre le problème qu'elle est à elle-même et celui de l'homme dans sa singularité existentielle.³

During this period Sciacca variously proposed his thought as a critical spiritualism, as a Christian spiritualism and as an ontological or objective idealism. Through these positions he came to emphasize, in contrast to Gentile's attualismo and to idealism in general, that the ideal object (being as idea) present to the subject is not resolvable into that same subjectivity of the act of thinking. Rather the subject finds this object as his given; is illuminated and conditioned by it (this will be elaborated below).

3 Jolivet and Roggerone, op. cit., p. 1392.

The second phase of Sciacca's thought may be considered as extending from 1951 until his death in 1975. This is properly the phase of the philosophy of integrality wherein his thought achieves its full development.⁴ His main works during this period expose the main tenets of his philosophy of integrality. These works include: L'interiorità oggettiva,⁵ which explores the ontological-metaphysical foundations of interiority; Atto ed essere,⁶ which establishes the primacy of ontology over gnoseology and treats the relation between reality, existence and Idea according to a dialectics of implication and compresence; L'uomo questo "squilibrato",⁷ which looks at the basic structure of the human condition as ontologically disequibrated; La libertà e il tempo,⁸ which discusses human becoming and human development as distinctive yet integrated processes correlated respectively to the freedom of choice and the freedom of election. The emphasis of the

4 Ibid., p. 1394.

5 M. F. Sciacca, L'interiorità oggettiva, Milano, Marzorati, 1960a.

6 M. F. Sciacca, Atto ed essere, Milano, Marzorati, 1960b, 3rd ed.

7 M. F. Sciacca, L'uomo questo "squilibrato", Milano, Marzorati, 1963.

8 M. F. Sciacca, La libertà e il tempo, Milano, Marzorati, 1965.

philosophy of integrality may be stated as an anthropological-metaphysical one: its focus is on the concrete human existent with his ontological exigency. It may be designated as an ontology of man; concerning this, Soto writes in an article on Sciacca's intellectual itinerary:

...Michele Federico Sciacca nos da una verdadera filosofía del hombre, en la qual el hombre es ontológico (el ser que es el acto primero) y su estructura consiste en la apertura del ser de su existencia concreta, hacia el Ser que lo trasciende. El itinerario de Sciacca es un descenso del idealismo al espiritualismo, y de éste, al hombre concreto, "al espíritu personal" y "al yo intrasferible"; por eso, para él, la filosofía es--como rifiere en Atto ed Essere--reflexión sobre la vida espiritual en su concreción existencial, esto es, encarnada y viviente en el mundo.⁹

2. The Historical Perspective of the Philosophy of Integrality

A. Objective vs. Subjective Idealism

Sciacca sees in the development of modern thought from Descartes through Kant, Fichte, Schelling to Hegel, a progressive movement towards the absolutization of human reason. He qualifies this trend as a subjective idealism contrasting it to objective idealism which he sees expressed by such philosophers as Plato, Augustine, Pascal, Malebranche

9 José Alberto Soto Badilla, "Michele F. Sciacca: itinerario intelectual," Tiempo Actual, 1978, No. 9, p. 69.

and Rosmini. His own emphasis is on the objective or ontological idealism. The basic difference between a subjective and an objective idealism in Sciacca's view is that the former makes the subject, in his own immanent becoming or in his own formal structure, the basic truth; the latter sees truth as objective, it stresses the givenness of the Idea (of being) as object to the human intellect or mind. The subjective idealist tendency is to reduce truth or being to a function, a faculty or property of the subject, be it the a-priori categories (Kant), the transcendental ego (Kant), the subject in act (Gentile) or the absolutized reason (Hegel). In such a position Sciacca says that human reason and human thought no longer find principles which illumine them but by an irrational act judge the very principles whereby they ought to be judged.¹⁰

B. Descartes vs. Pascal

Sciacca sees in Descartes' initial absolute doubt the founding moment of this subjective idealism for modern thought. He says that Descartes' initial doubt, even if provisional, suspended all truth (objectively). Reason considers as valid only what it clearly and distinctly knows. Sciacca adds that it negates, even if not openly that it

¹⁰ Sciacca, op. cit., 1960a, p. 19-22.

could have any limits, and affirms that the limits of reason are the limits of truth: that is, that beyond its clear and distinct ideas there is non-truth which for the reason is nothingness. Sciacca explains that modern thought is born of this exaggerated confidence in reason, of this tendency to absolutize reason. He writes:

Il pensiero moderno nasce come fiducia nella ragione, come rivendicazione o scoperta dell'assolutezza dell'assoluta ragione. L'iniziale "dubbio iperbolico" è l'atto di nascita della "ragione iperbolica" di capacità illimitate. La ragione decreta con esso la propria sovranità, maggiore se stessa oltre ogni limite, malgrado ancora Cartesio consideri Dio come garanzia di ogni umana verità.¹¹

It is Pascal whom Sciacca sees as providing a corrective to Descartes' aberrant "hyperbolic" reason. Sciacca writes that for Pascal, the act, whereby the reason recognizes that something goes beyond it, is not an irrational act but rather is conformed to its authentic, intrinsic and actual order. He concludes that Pascal's position is not the product of a skeptical attitude, but stems from the recognition of a reason that fulfills its own rational exigency, a reason that is normal and real (normale e reale). He adds that Pascal's position stands "contro la cartesiana ragione-iperbolica, non-normale, non-reale e perciò non-razionale; contro la ragione

¹¹ M. F. Sciacca, Il pensiero moderno, Brescia, La Scuola, 1949, p. 8-9.

scatenata" (as opposed to the Cartesian, hyperbolic reason, non-normal, non-real [non-concrete] and therefore non-rational; a chaotic reason).¹²

Pascal saw human thought as miserable, yet sublime in its awareness of this misery, in its consciousness of its limitations. Mario Stefani, who discusses Pascal's influence on Sciacca's thought, writes concerning this issue that weakness belongs properly to an abstract reason which thinks itself omnipotent, whereas strength belongs properly to a concrete reason which recognizes its limits (i.e. which is open to a transcendent norm and reality). Thus citing Sciacca, Stefani writes that the act whereby the reason recognizes truths of a non-rational order like the reasons of the heart which the reason, per se, does not know about "è sempre razionalmente fondato, ragionevolissimo" (is always rationally founded, eminently rational).¹³

Sciacca sees in this Pascalian view of human reason, in its misery and greatness (in its contradictoriness), the Christian development and a surpassing of the Greek conception of man which had in contrast emphasized the harmony of

¹² Ibid., p. 9.

¹³ Mario Stefani, Il problema della fondazione del finito nello sviluppo del pensiero di Michele Federico Sciacca, Roma, Città Nuova, 1976, p. 81.

life and reason.¹⁴

C. The Empirical Tradition

Sciacca considers that Descartes' initial doubt (which Sciacca calls a "hyperbolic" doubt) had the effect of making the subject in his immanent rational order and process the ultimate arbitrator of truth and falsehood. Descartes' intention may well have been otherwise--to arrive to a purified objective knowledge--but the effect, as far as Sciacca is concerned, was, to inflate the reason in its natural order beyond its limits, to promote a self-sufficient "proud" reason. Thus, in this sense, there is already the tendency in Descartes to see human reason as itself founding the objectivity of ideas. Following Descartes, reason is no longer seen as judging according to an objectivity to which it is essentially related or submitted. Rather, it comes to judge or pretends to judge the very ideas or principles to which it is submitted. Thus, Sciacca says that lacking a ground in any objective principles, the empiricists like Locke and Hume seek out a new criterion or basis for the activity of reason in sense experience. There is in this a reduction of the idea: for Locke it is the content of subjective consciousness,

¹⁴ M. F. Sciacca, Pascal, Milano, Marzorati, 1962, p. 169.

for Hume, the memory of a subjective impression. With empiricism, there is a loss of the intelligible object intuited by the intellect. The idea loses its objectivity and becomes the weak subjective representation of sensations. Sciacca adds that without an object to contemplate, philosophy becomes action: practical interests prevail over theoretical ones. In the place of rational demonstration, philosophy comes to recommend "belief" (la credenza) in view of the attainment of practical goals. Furthermore, with the loss of an objective transcendent foundation to reason, there is the tendency to make sense experience the fundamental criterion of rational judgements. Sciacca writes:

...non vi sono giudizi oggettivamente validi e le stesse idee non sono che sensazioni affievolite e trasformate, puri contenuti della coscienza soggettiva.¹⁵

D. Kant: The Reduction of the Idea to a
Universal Function or Category of the Subject

Sciacca explains that it was Kant's attempt to re-establish the validity and objectivity of human knowing after the empiricists (particularly Hume) had brought it into question. However, the objectivity and universality which Kant sought was not in a principle of intelligibility given to the reason from beyond it (as in an objective or

15 Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 6.

ontological idealism in the sense defined by Sciacca), but was a condition or function proper to the reason itself in its immanent order. The a-priori categories and forms are proposed by Kant as universal attributes of the subject and not as qualities of an objective intelligible reality. Kant negates the metaphysical moment. Lacking from a Sciaccian point of view is the moment of initial objectivity which gives thought its essential foundation: the given relationship to intelligible being. Sciacca sees Kant and Gentile after him, as negating in this way the sense of interior experience or objective interiority (this term will be further defined in a later section). He writes:

Gentile, con Kant, nega... l'esperienza interiore. o l'interiorità oggettiva che è il pensare stesso nella sua oggettività (principio di ogni conoscenza) e non può non negarla una volta che l'Idea è ridotta a funzione. Per conseguenza, c'è il "conoscere"-- l'attività trascendentale o funzione in cui tutto il conoscibile è via via conosciuto in virtù di detta attività--, non c'è il "pensare," atto primo o la sintesi originaria ontologica, che è il soggetto pensante nella verità o Idea, che è il suo oggetto interiore, che lo costituisce come pensante e perciò come attività pensante "in atto," in per e con l'essere, suo oggetto o Idea.¹⁶

Sciacca is saying in the above, that with Kant, the Idea becomes reduced to a function, to a function of the intellectual perception of the world. In itself, without the world, it remains empty: it does not explain the

16 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 146.

foundation of human interiority or inner experience.

Further, Sciacca distinguishes between conoscere (Eng., to know; Fr., connaître) and pensare (Eng., to think; Fr., penser). He indicates in the above passage that thought (il pensare) in its objectivity is the principle of all knowledge (di ogni conoscenza: literally, of every known thing). For Gentile or for Kant, however, there is knowing (il conoscere) as a transcendental activity or function; thinking (il pensare) does not exist as a primary act or originary ontological synthesis of the thinking subject (soggetto pensante) in the truth or Idea. In Sciacca's critique, the Idea is understood to be a transcendent reality and not a Kantian transcendental. The Idea, for Sciacca, is the interior object of the human subject and constitutes him as a thinking activity, "in act" (in atto), in, for and with being as Idea (i.e. being as present to the intellect). The immanent abstracted form or category of the process of knowing, the transcendental function, does not provide the ontological foundation for human interiority which necessarily implies a transcendent interior object in being as Idea.¹⁷

Sciacca writes about the transcendental "I", as the supreme condition or a-priori category of man's knowing of

¹⁷ See also the discussion of the dialectics of reason and intelligence in section 3 of this chapter.

the world:

...tutta la sua capacità e tutto il suo oggetto, quello che lo adegua e lo compie come trascendentalità, è il molteplice della esperienza: esso è la condizione della conoscenza del mondo, ma è condizionato dal mondo stesso, al quale si adegua come funzione trascendentale, senza possibilità di conoscere altro, di aspirare a conoscere una realtà che non sia quella del mondo. E ciò è coerente, una volta ridotta l'Idea a concetto, il concetto o categoria a funzione dell'intelletto, la oggettività alla stessa attività trascendentale del soggetto.¹⁸

The transcendental function does not aspire to know anything else but the world. It does not have a transcendent direction; it is simply the abstracted form of subjective experience and is entirely adequated by the multiplicity of sense experience. Sciacca concludes that Kant remains essentially under the influence of the Enlightenment by essentially retaining and in a sense combining the rationalist dogma which has reason found and construct the truth, and the empiristic one which sees sense experience as the limits of human knowledge.¹⁹

Sciacca sees Kant as having sought a solution to the gnoseological or epistemological problem without first dealing satisfactorily with the ontological or metaphysical problem. The consequence of pursuing the first question without the other implies a tendency to identify being with

18 Ibid., p. 147.

19 Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 10.

the categories of knowing, to identify truth with thought, to base metaphysics or ontology on gnoseology or epistemology. Sciacca explains how Rosmini grasped the fundamental importance of this problem for modern and contemporary thought:

Il Rosmini pone un problema fondamentale ed ancora oggi attuale: egli ha visto, per primo, contro il gnoseologismo della filosofia moderna, che altro è il problema della "oggettività del pensare" o dell'"intelligibilità" o del "principio della oggettività," e altro quello del "conoscere oggettivo": il primo è ontologico-metafisico ed è il fondamento dell'altro. Risolvere la metafisica nella gnoseologia, come ha fatto l'idealismo da Fichte a Gentile, è perdere il senso metafisico del principio dell'autocoscienza e con ciò sacrificare le più profonde ed invincibili esigenze dello spirito umano. Giustificare invece queste esigenze nell'ambito stesso della problematica filosofica moderna è inserire l'istanza critica nella metafisica, ma in modo che l'innesto non uccida, bensì rinvigorisca l'antico tronco. Qui l'essenza vera, il contributo valido e l'attualità del rosminianesimo.²⁰

Sciacca says above that, for Rosmini, the problem of "objectivity of thought" or of "intelligibility" or of the "principle of objectivity" is other than that of "objective knowledge." For Sciacca the latter gnoseological question is conditioned by the former ontological ones. In other words, the essential interior relation or synthesis of thinking subject and intelligible objective principle is the foundation of the knowing subject. One could say in

²⁰ M. F. Sciacca, La filosofia morale di Antonio Rosmini, Milano, Marzorati, 1968, 5th ed., p. 47-48.

this respect that reason (judgement about reality) is rooted in intelligence (intuition of being).²¹

But for Kant, as for Gentile, the knowing subject lacks any objective principle of intelligibility: intelligibility is constituted solely subjectively, in terms of the immanent subjective process itself. The process of knowing (conoscere) tends to become itself the source of truth and being; it does not seek its rootedness in truth and being (with Gentile as with Hegel, its immanent becoming constitutes truth and being).

E. Hegel vs. Rosmini

The tendency to absolutize reason is brought to a forceful conclusion with Hegel who definitively transforms objective idealism into subjective idealism. Reality is identified with the becoming of the spirit in its dialectical moments. With this definitive transformation of transcendent, objective, ontological idealism into transcendental, immanent, subjective idealism the process begun by Descartes is completed. Sciacca writes:

...il ciclo aperto dalla "ragione" cartesiana si chiude: la ragione scatenata conclude e si conclude nella sua assolutezza. La regola generale del metodo cartesiano ("è vero tutto ciò che la ragione conosce come chiaro e distinto") trova la

²¹ M. F. Sciacca, L'uomo, questo "squilibrato", Milano, Marzorati, 1963, p. 126; see also section 3E of this chapter.

sua esplicitazione assoluta e conclusiva nell'aforisma hegeliano: "ciò che è razionale è reale e ciò che è reale è razionale"... Hegel è la fiducia totale e finale nella Ragione dalla iniziale ragione scatenata ed iperbolica di Cartesio; perciò Hegel conclude l'avventura della ragione, che pone in se stessa il fondamento di ogni cosa, che tutto fonda senza essere fondato da altro: la Ragione (e la ragione di ordine umano o naturale) è Dio. Così Dio era già morto, prima che Nietzsche lo proclamasse.²²

The germinal immanentism in Descartes reaches its ultimate conclusion in Hegel. As Sciacca notes in the above passage, the absolute and conclusive explicitation of this absolutized reason is found in the Hegelian aphorism: "that which is rational is real and that which is real is rational."²³

22 Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 11.

23 Sciacca rejects this idealistic identification of reason and reality, of subject and natural object, of rational activity with truth and being. He distinguishes between real, existential, and Ideal levels of being: the real is that which is but which does not exist to itself; the existential is that which exists to itself by virtue of the given Idea; the Ideal is the essential of the existential in that it constitutes it objectively and ontologically (furthermore, the Ideal tends towards Being; it is the created "logos", the "natural" mediator between God and man). Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 52-53 & 58. The subject or existent is not seen by Sciacca as constructing reality in the Kantian sense or as resolving the real into itself in the process of knowing or in a law of thought as with Gentile and Hegel. Ibid., p. 86.

One could say that epistemologically, Sciacca tends towards a realistic position. However, the focus of his philosophy is not on the epistemological question as such (i.e. the knowing of the real); rather, he seeks out the ontological basis of the intelligibility of the real. In a general way Sciacca seems to accept the realist assertion that the real has its own existence and essence which the

According to Sciacca, it was Rosmini who grasped the error of immanentistic rationalism where reason had made itself its own foundation. He had "dared" to say that philosophy had to return to the point before Hegel, before Kant, and before Descartes. Sciacca adds: "e, di là, dimostrare che una ragione che si autofonda si autoaffonda, perchè è una ragione infondata" (and from there to demonstrate that a reason which founds itself annihilates itself because it is a reason without foundation).²⁴

Mario Stefani explains Rosmini's position:

Rosmini appare, quando il pensiero moderno ha portato a termine la parabola ascendente: dall'immanentismo germinale del Rinascimento all'immanentismo assoluto. Di là o si torna indietro o si precipita. Rosmini propone una operazione neoclassica di ritorno a "prima di Hegel," a "prima di Kant," a

intellect discovers and does not simply construct. However, Sciacca focuses or stresses the fact that it is in the nature of the real to be sensed by an intellect. For him this signifies that the real takes its meaning and significance from its ontological relation to a sensing subject. The real is for the existent. In other words, the real is not intrinsically alien from the sensing subject but in an essential accord with him (this will be elaborated on in a later section). Ibid., p. 79-80 & 83.

Sciacca's philosophy of integrality does not propose a dialectics of the exclusion of contraries or the resolution of opposites, but rather proposes a dialectics of implication and compresence of the different orders of being. Reason is not opposed to reality and then resolved into reality or vice-versa; rather, the three orders of created being--real, existential and Ideal--are seen in an essential synthesis; there is an ontological distinction between them, yet they are in a fundamental ontological accord. Ibid., p. 83 & 86.

24 Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 11-12.

"prima di Cartesio". Al principio dell'immanenza della verità oppone il principio della trascendenza; alla teoria dell'idea come contenuto soggettivo o condizione o funzione a priori della conoscenza oppone quella dell'idea come oggetto; alla risoluzione dell'oggetto nel soggetto, un irriducibile dualismo, capace di generare la dialettica della trascendenza teistica, nella prospettiva di un platonismo cristiano, agostiniano ... Rosmini ripropone, nel cuore del pensiero moderno, il significato platonico, agostiniano, che l'idea aveva fino a Malebranche, a Leibniz, a Vico: l'idea è l'intelligibile, ha un significato ontologico e non solo logico, ha un valore trascendente e non solo trascendentale, è oggetto e non solo forma a priori dell'intelletto, in se stessa vuota. Altrimenti ne consegue che: a) il principio del sapere si identifica con il sapere; b) il principio della realtà si identifica con la realtà; c) la metafisica, come teoria del principio del sapere e del reale si risolve nella psicologia, nella teoria della scienza, nella logica.²⁵

After Kant there is the tendency through Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Gentile to reduce the Kantian categories to the supreme one, the transcendental "I", and to make it the absolute reference point.²⁶ Without anything presupposed to the act of thought or knowledge there is a definitive founding of ontology on gnoseology. The consequences of this as understood by Rosmini, are well described above by Stefani. The principle of knowing identifies itself with knowing because it is a property of the subject. The principle of reality is identified with reality because there is no principle transcendent to it with which it has

25 Stefani, op. cit., 1976, pp. 88-89.

26 Ibid., p. 98.

a relation; and metaphysics resolves itself into psychology and logic because it is based on the processes of the subject. It follows, therefore, that thought would lack the Idea of being by which it would be objectively constituted.

Rosmini had tried to avert the coming crisis of contemporary thought. But as Sciacca says, Rosmini went unheeded. He explains that like the proverbial frog of Lafontaine, Hegelian Reason, the culmination of Descartes' initial absolute doubt, had to explode. The chaos of contemporary philosophy in fact was not averted. Sciacca writes that Hegel, paraphrasing the words of Louis XV could have said "After me, the deluge!" He concludes that the Hegelian Reason had to explode, and could not not explode because it was the most irrational and unreasonable conception of reason that had ever been imagined.²⁷

Sciacca explains that initially, positivism made an attempt to salvage reason from these "inevitable" consequences. Renewing the empiricist approach, it tried to give reason a role in the acquisition of knowledge within the limits of a methodology ultimately restricted to a consideration of sense experience. However, even positivism is then attacked: i.e.-- intuitionism, vitalism, pragmatism, relativism, the philosophy of action, etc. These positions according to Sciacca are all in some way

27 Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 11-12.

irrationalistic or anti-intellectualistic.²⁸

Sciacca further explains the consequences of the "exploded" Reason of Hegel:

It is a whole movement, both philosophical and cultural, which for more than a century has shaken every rationalistic and systematic construction from its foundation by calling into doubt all principles of knowledge, whether scientific or philosophical, thereby denying the very base of all objective understanding. Engaged in a ceaseless war against the metaphysical or theologizing "dogmatism" of the intellect, vast and manifold currents of thought have vindicated all that is irrational, primitive, and immediate in the human subject. And these are opposed to Descartes' rationalism resting on his clear and distinct ideas, as well as to Kant's rationalism resting on his "a priori" forms of the spirit...²⁹

F. The Three Moments of
Modern and Contemporary Thought

In an incisive and comprehensive synthesis, Sciacca summarizes the developments of modern and contemporary western philosophical and cultural thought into three main phases or moments.

First moment.--The first moment sees the identification of the absolute truth with human thought. Reason is absolutized and truth is grasped as immanent to thought. Absolute truth is the same human thought. This is the

²⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁹ M. F. Sciacca, Philosophical Trends in the Contemporary World, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1964 (trans. by Attilio Salerno), p. 1.

conclusion of the development of what Sciacca calls subjective idealism. This movement ran its course from Descartes, the empiricists, through to Kant and Hegel, and was reassumed by Gentile.

Second Moment.--The second moment sees the rejection of this absolutized "dogmatic" reason and the relativization of truth. This moment proposes that a critical thought cannot grasp this "abstract dogmatism" (dommatismo astratto) but only a "concrete relativism" (relativismo concreto) in terms of factual circumstances, functional requirements, situational elements, vital exigencies, subjective properties, etc. Truth is totally relativized: there is not absolute truth--as neither immanent nor transcendent to human thought. Reason is supplanted by non-rational forms of knowing, by sentiment, intuition, or it is subordinated to pragmatic activity.

Third Moment.--This moment arrives with the realization of the "nothingness of truth and being" (nulla di verità; non-essere), and the conclusion that there is neither absolute nor relative truth. Truth is no longer seen as immanent to human reason, nor as relative to circumstance or instinctive life, but becomes itself problematic. The foundation and goal of human thought is seen in Nothingness (il Nulla). This is the metaphysical conclusion of contemporary nihilism and problematicism, as

expressed in atheistic and agnostic existentialism.

However, Sciacca notes that contemporary nihilism and problematicism have the merit of showing, from a dialectical point of view, that it is impossible to found absolute truth in a way immanent to human thought. In this way they represent the final dissolution of immanentistic rationalism which ran its course from Descartes to Hegel. And furthermore, they paradoxically provide the ground for a new synthesis.

For Sciacca, the statement that nothing is true is untenable,--for by what implicit truth can that statement be made? He writes: "L'affermazione--niente è vero--è filosoficamente senza senso" (The affirmation--nothing is true--does not make sense philosophically). He therefore concludes dialectically: "perciò il problema della verità rinasce dalle stesse conclusioni assurde del pensiero contemporaneo" (Therefore, the problem of truth is reborn from the same absurd conclusions of contemporary thought).³⁰

3. Principles of Sciacca's Philosophy of Integrality

A. The Method of the Philosophy of Integrality: the Dialectics of Implication and Compresence

The research method of the philosophy of integrality is the dialectics of implication and compresence

³⁰ Sciacca, op. cit., 1960a, p. 23-25.

(diallettica dell'implicanza e della compresenza). This method is not only valid for a philosophy but also conditions any psychological research adopting the philosophy of integrality as its basis. It is this method which is applied to the present research into the development of Caruso's depth psychology. In view of its importance, it is presented here in some detail.³¹

Sciacca notes that one does not properly enunciate or define a dialectics because it is not prior to or outside of the philosophical discourse: the dialectics is grasped and lived in the actual unfolding of the human spirit. Sciacca writes that to enunciate a dialectics would suggest that one's philosophy is already completed.

Nevertheless, he does proceed to make some important distinctions. He considers as erroneous and sterile both the dialectics of the "exclusion" of contraries and that of the "resolution" of opposites. This follows from his view that in the concreteness of spiritual life contraries and opposites implicate one another without excluding, resolving or annulling each other. Within this dialectics, identity and contradiction implicate one another.³²

³¹ This section on the dialectics of implication and compresence is taken, for the most part, from the 3rd section of Sciacca's Introduction to Atto ed Essere, 1960b, p. 26-34.

³² Ibid., p. 26-27.

The identity of A to itself, posits it as opposed to B, its contrary. There is not an identity without an opposition and vice-versa. But Sciacca asks: Does the identity of A with itself truly exclude its contrary? If A and B posit themselves as two identicals (each one identical to itself), they then oppose themselves as two contraries one with respect to the other. In this way, with each one identical to itself and opposed to the other, they evidently exclude one another. However, Sciacca notes that in the concreteness of life, they coexist, not one in front or beside the other, but one within the other, indissolubly united. Sciacca writes: "Non diciamo che A diviene B e perciò si nega, ma che A è A e, restando A, è B." (We do not say that A becomes B and therefore negates itself, but that A is A and, remaining A, is B.) He adds that A, which is B, is not A plus B as a sum; but is a synthesis, something new. This synthesis is the compresence of two contraries, which remain contrary and therefore each one identical to itself (one is not the other). And, it is as contraries that they do not exclude one another, that they do not negate one another. In fact A is A (identical to itself--it does not change itself into B ceasing to be itself); but it is B, it is its contrary; it is B as B, and not insofar as B changes itself into A. Sciacca explains that he would not say that A is "also B," because in such a

case B would be an external accident, an "added part"; rather it is A-B, it is one thing and the other, a new synthesis of two realities each one identical to itself and between them contrary. This is a dialectics of the implication of the identical and the contrary as of the diverse, without exclusion, annulment or resolution. This dialectics, without negating the being of a thing, implies the being of its contrary in a new synthesis. Sciacca states that this is properly a dialectics of the philosophy of integrality.³³

Such a dialectics concerns being, which is and remains essentially being, and as such is "duration" and not "becoming". This duration of being or duration in being, refers to being as "immutable" but not as "immobile". This immutability attests to the permanence of being as being, and at the same time it attests to its life and to its perennial richness and infinite capacity of enrichment. This "duration" of being is not the "becoming" of being or being in becoming (essere in divenire); neither is it being that is becoming, nor being that negating itself in non-being, becomes, and is hence neither being nor non-being. The latter position Sciacca calls the idealistic illusion.³⁴

33 Ibid., p. 27.

34 Ibid., p. 27-28.

However, he is also critical of what he calls a realistic illusion. In such a conception it is contradictory for something to be at the same time and in the same circumstances that which it is and its contrary. One contrary excludes the other and each thing is considered identical to itself. He gives some examples: heat is heat and cold is cold; when one approaches, the other flees; the apple today sour, tomorrow ripe, is the same apple, it remains identical to itself. Sciacca explains that this manner of intending the contrary and the identical stems from a conception of the real as "thing" (cosa), as a given "material" object. He says further that the real (il reale)³⁵ thus conceived is a quantity. If the principle of identity is intended in the sense that each real or thing, even if it becomes, remains identical to itself, it follows that change and becoming are purely "quantitative". They concern the accidental aspects, not the substantial or essential aspects. Sciacca further explains this "realistic" position: there is an identical essence in all the individuals of the same species; change concerns only the numerical transformations--the essence remains always identical to itself and each accident as such also remains identical to itself. The human species is conceived in a similar vein; there is an essence

³⁵ See sections 3C and 3D of Chapter I for an elaboration of distinction between real, existential and ideal.

of man (i.e. rational animal) identical in all men, which individuating itself (the individuation is given by a "quantity of matter") gives rise to the multiplicity of human individuals. These latter are diverse as individuals and identical as essence. Sciacca concludes that in this way one comes to negate that the person is a principle or essence, that each man is a singular personal essence.³⁶

For Sciacca it is the principle of contradiction inserted in the heart of the principle of identity and with which it makes a synthesis that renders possible the elevation from the purely quantitative plane of the "fact-thing" (fatto-cosa) to the qualitative plane of the "real-existence" (reale-esistenza). In the first place, Sciacca explains that there is a dialectics of implication and co-presence of essence-accident. The accidents are not without the essence and the essence does not exist without the accidents. The essence is not abstractly "universal", but concretely so: that is, it is this essence which is existentialized in these accidents. As this essence, it is no longer the essence of man (or of some other as a universal), but it is the universal essence (that whereby one says that all men are men) of this singular one (questo singolo). As such it is a singular essence. Furthermore it does not remain identical to itself as though "uninterested" by its

36 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 28-29.

accidents. Rather, it forms a unity with them (as they do with the essence). The accidents are not any accidents, but these accidents, "essentialized" by this essence which is "existentialized" by these accidents. Consequently, the essence is identical to itself (every being, in fact, is itself), but it is not on the outside or beyond the becoming of the accidents, which in their turn are not on the outside or beyond the identity of the essence. Their unity does not annul their distinction: essence and accidents are compresent and implicated in that singular unity which every being or entity (ente) is.

Sciacca continues that it is evident that these accidents (essentialized by this essence) as determining and expressing this essence are essential to the essence and not substitutable: they could have not been or been otherwise, but once they have been, they are essential to the essence. The latter is this essence existentialized in this way and not in some other way. The essence is not reduceable or resolvable to the accidents, nor are the accidents reduceable to the essence; but because of this reciprocal irreducibility, whereby the essence is the essence and not the accidents, and the accidents are the accidents and not the essence (identity and opposition), they form an indissoluble concrete unity.³⁷

37 Ibid., p. 29-30.

Furthermore, this unity's "being" remains or endures (permane) in its "becoming". The "being" is present and implied in the "becoming", and the "becoming" becomes in the "being". The becoming determines and expresses the being. Thus one may say that the essence is made (si fa): not in the sense that it is made other than itself negating itself as essence, but in the other sense that it develops (sviluppa),³⁸ it enriches itself through the "becoming".³⁹

Furthermore, the accidents are: not in the sense that they annul themselves in the essence or hypostatise themselves, but in the other sense that as accidents they "translate" (traducono) the essence; they essentialize themselves. Each entity is its integrality: every act is part of its being and essential to it. To grasp a pure intelligible essence abstracting (astruendo) from the accidents, is a logical operation to which the authentic "intelligibility" of the real is not present (if intelligibility means to grasp the "ontological" sense of the real itself). This ontological sense is the fullness of an entity, that is, the entity in its existentialized essence and in its essentialized accidents. An entity reduced to

38 See section D of Chapter I for the elaboration of the distinction between becoming and development according to Sciacca.

39 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 30.

its pure essence or solely to its accidents is no longer the entity on which one performs the reduction: it is an abstraction and an abstraction is "inexistent". Sciacca adds that one may not even speak in such a case of "its" (the entity's) essence or "its" accidents, because the essence abstracted from its accidents is no longer "its" essence. It is its' essence only in unity with its accidents. The accidents are of this essence and the essence is of these accidents.⁴⁰

From this point of view, Sciacca explains, that the "contingency" and "particularity" of the accident on the one hand, and the "necessity" and "universality" of the essence on the other (each side as identical to itself), oppose one another as two contraries; but they do not negate or exclude one another. In fact, Sciacca adds that it is because identity does not exclude contrariness and vice-versa, that change (il cambiamento) or the passing beyond (l'oltrepassamento) a situation or a state is not quantitative but qualitative. It is a manifestation of value and requires a judgement of value, not simply one of fact.⁴¹

Widening the scope of his discourse Sciacca writes that being is the contrary of non-being and that each one

40 Ibid., p. 30.

41 Ibid., p. 30-31.

is identical to itself; but the two identicals-contraries are compresent and form (in the finite being) a unity even as one remains being and the other non-being. Non-being is not on the outside of being but is its essential limit. In the same sense, being (i.e. finite being) is not outside of non-being. Sciacca expresses this relation in the first person saying: my non-being is within me, within my being without which it would not be; neither would my being be without its (i.e. his) limit or non-being. He goes on to say that there is not being which excludes non-being or "being" which negates itself in "non-being" and negated "becomes". Becoming is given by the permanence of the two contraries each in its identity. This permanence of being-non-being is not a static unity but a dynamic one. From the fact that non-being is the essential limit of being follows the implication that being is constituted by essence as a being-in-becoming (essere in farsi; lit: being-in-making-itself), in a tension towards the actualization of its full being. Becoming is already immanent to the ontological synthesis of being-non-being: that is, of being and the limit of being. Being, grasped in its essential limit, becomes: not in the sense that it annuls itself in becoming in order to repropose itself and indefinitely or always annul itself; but in the sense that in the compresence of its contrary (non-being) it is, while remaining as being,

in a tension to the fullness of itself. Sciacca writes "ha l'orgoglio ontologico di essere sempre insodisfatto." (It or more properly he has the ontological 'pride' of always being dissatisfied.) Becoming is already there in the compresence and implication of the presence (being) and the absence (non-being): each one respectively "present" as presence and absence (presence of the presence-being in the absence; and presence of the absence-non-being in the presence). Sciacca adds that the presence tends to fill the absence with itself, such that nothing is lacking to its completion or fulfillment. He concludes that only the unity of two contraries in the permanence of their identities explains the integral movement of being in its concrete dialectics of implication (as opposed to a dialectics of abstract exclusion or abstract negation).⁴²

In the "normal" order of life there is not presence (being) without absence (non-being); there is not positivity without negativity and vice-versa. Sciacca continues: there is not pain and pleasure, sadness and joy, good and evil; rather there is pain suffused with pleasure, and pleasure embraced (sposato; lit. married) to pain, joyous sadness and sad joy, evil which has always a little good and good which has to liberate itself ulteriorly from its evil. The fullness of oneself is an exigency intrinsic to

⁴² Ibid., p. 32-33.

the internal dynamism of one's spirit; however, Sciacca comments that this fullness is not actualizable in the human order and with one's own powers. Nevertheless, he concludes that this dynamism remains a permanent and indestructible possibility.⁴³

Sciacca writes in conclusion that the dialectics of implication confirms the validity of the principles of identity and contradiction, but it grasps them in the concreteness of spiritual life. As such it employs these principles differently than a dialectics of the exclusion of contraries or a dialectics of their resolution or negation. It is a dialectics of the real-existence (reale-esistenza) and not of the real-thing (reale-cosa).⁴⁴

B. Objective Interiority and
Ontological Disequilibrium

Man's self-consciousness and consciousness of the world is, in Sciacca's system, rooted in a primary ontological synthesis of the subject with the Idea as his given object. Self-consciousness (and consciousness of the world) does not exhaust this presence of the light of truth or Idea to the mind, but rather derives from it. Sciacca calls the basic objective principle of the human intellect,

43 Ibid., p. 33.

44 Ibid., p. 34.

objective interiority (interiorità oggettiva). It has a logical priority (priorità logica) over self-consciousness (and consciousness of the world) because it is presupposed in self-consciousness: the intuition of being as Idea is fundamental to the grasping of one's own existence or of any other existence. Furthermore, this objective interiority has an ontological power or primacy (maggioranza ontologica) over other aspects of the human intellect: because of the infinity of the Idea that constitutes this interiority, man is open beyond the limits of self, of the world, of history, that is, of the finite. One may understand in this respect the distinction and relation between self-consciousness and objective interiority: the consciousness of self is finite insofar as it is the consciousness of a finite existent; but the synthesis of subject and being-as-Idea which makes possible this consciousness implies an infinite objective referent. The consciousness of self is, however, a primal determination or specification of objective interiority: the application of the Idea to the existent which one is.⁴⁵

Because of the necessary presence of an infinite referent to the finite existent, man's ontological status is not seen by Sciacca as a stable one. The interior object

45 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960a, p. 103 & 106.

which constitutes the human subject as intelligent is an infinite potency or power. Man is not adequated in his acts either by himself or by other finite actualizations because the norm of his being is infinite, because of his essential interior relation to being-as-Idea. Thus Sciacca speaks of man as ontologically "disequilibrato" (l'uomo questo "squilibrato"). Man is seen as essentially related to the transcendent. Sciacca speaks in this respect of man's transnaturalità, and says that no finite, not even in its indefinite extension in time and space, is adequate to him. He explains that the capacity or power of human thought, in the objectivity of the presence of being to it (and not in its subjectivity), that is, in the original synthesis of subject and Idea, confers on man the infinite capacity of thinking, sensing and willing; that is, the capacity of self-transcendence.⁴⁶

For Sciacca man cannot not transcend experience. This is in contrast to the sense of the Kantian a-priori and transcendentalità, because man is inadequated by all the knowing of his experience. For Sciacca the Idea as transcendent object of the mind is prior to the Idea as form of the subject and sets limits to the Idea in the latter sense (the form of the knowing of the world). In this way

46 Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 111.

Sciacca posits the possibility of metaphysics in a "critical" manner that overturns the criticality of Kant's Critique. He adds that the critical problem for metaphysics (as first seen by Rosmini), is not the not being able to prescind from the limits of experience, but the not being able to prescind from the surpassing of the limits of experience.⁴⁷

Thus, Sciacca writes that man, in the totality of his ontological components is a primal or primitive synthesis of finite and infinite: a finite existent who cannot not be in relation to the infinite that constitutes him objectively. The human condition is, therefore, not solely finite or infinite but both finite and infinite, immanent and transcendent--it is an internal "dialogue". Furthermore, in view of this, Sciacca adds that the human condition is "dramatic", that is, ontologically "disequilibrated".⁴⁸

C. The Person as a Synthesis of
Real, Existential and Ideal Being

For Sciacca the real (il reale) is any determination of being. However, he chooses to distinguish the existent (l'esistente) from the real. The existent is a real who exists to himself by virtue of the interiority of the Idea

⁴⁷ Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 38-39.

⁴⁸ Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 111.

and who, therefore, can have the sense of himself
(sentimento di sé).⁴⁹ As such he is not a pure real.

Furthermore, Sciacca understands the real as not existing to itself but to an existent: that is, it is essentially for an existent or subject (differently for the Creator Subject Who has it be in sensing it and the human subject who is not its creative principle but senses it secondarily).⁵⁰

As part of the real, the finite existent is fundamentally corporeal: that is, he cannot not exist in nature or the world. Sciacca speaks in this respect of the fundamental corporeal sentiment (sentimento fondamentale corporeo). This sentiment in man is in an original synthesis with the sentiment, or intuition of being. These two, in turn are rooted in the more basic total primary sentiment (sentimento primario totale).⁵¹ Thus, one sees that in man the real is not a form of being that is added to the existential in an extraneous way but is in an original unity with it.

For Sciacca, in fact, it is the human person who expresses the synthesis of the diverse forms or orders of being. He sees the human person as the ontological synthesis

49 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 83.

50 Ibid., p. 79-80.

51 Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 95-107.

of Ideal, real and existential being. The person is thus the principle and end of created being: the ontology of created being is the ontology of the person.

However, Sciacca distinguishes between a person as a finite being and Infinite Being in which the person participates via the Idea, but from which the person remains immeasurably distinct. He explains that in the finite person the synthesis of the forms of being is different from the one properly of Being. The being-as-Idea does not belong to the existent as such: it is in the first place an objective given, not a subjective property. The Idea properly belongs to the Infinite Being as His sentiment (sentimento). The Infinite Being communicates to man the Idea but not His Existence. The finite existent "naturally" participates through the Idea with the Infinite Existent.⁵²

Sciacca stresses that the basic ontological synthesis in the person is not between the "Ideal" and the "real" orders of being; but between the "Ideal" and the "existential" orders of being. It should be noted that the existential in Sciacca's conception is inclusive of the real. As explained above, there is an identity between Existence and Being only in God. In the created existent, existence or subjectivity and being as Idea or objectivity are not identified. However, the essential presence of the absolute, infinite

⁵² Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 83.

unlimited object to the relative, finite and limited existent establishes an ontological exigency in the human subject. The end of the human subject is not the real itself, but in view of the Idea that constitutes him, this end is Being. Thus the gnoseological synthesis of "existential" and "real" comes to serve or mediate the ontological synthesis of "existential" and "Ideal": the former (knowledge of the world) implies the latter as its foundation (intuition of being-as-Idea or synthesis of the finite existent and his infinite object).⁵³

D. Becoming and Development:
Choice and Election

As noted in the section above on the dialectics of implication and compresence, there is not, for the philosophy of integrality, the becoming of being or being which in its negation becomes; rather, there is becoming in being. Being in this way does not become (diviene) but more properly develops (sviluppa) or enriches itself. Becoming involves the actualization of potency (refers to being in potency, to a virtual being becoming actual); development involves an act capable of ulterior actualizations (refers to a potency or power of being: an actual being).⁵⁴

53 Ibid., p. 82-83 & 52-53.

54 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 52-54.

Corresponding to the orders of becoming and development are two respective aspects of human freedom: freedom of choice (libertà di scelta) and freedom of election (libertà di elezione). In the freedom of choice it is the subjective natural aspect which is dominant. In the freedom of election, it is the objective transcendent aspect which is dominant. Choice, on the one hand, serves the vital instinctive goals of the particular individual or collectivity of individuals; it concerns the domain of the real, the economic, the "exterior", the worldly, the corporeal-subjective (or real-existential) aspects. Election on the other hand, involves the personalizing of objective principles, the principles of truth, beauty and goodness; it concerns the existential-Ideal, or the "interior"-objective. One elects fundamentally in consideration of the truth or perfection of that which is elected. One chooses in order to meet a subjective need or interest.

Sciaccia views these two distinctive orders integrally. He says the spiritual needs are incorporated (incorporate) and the bodily needs are grafted (innestati) (in the spirit). Choice and election are in a dialectical relationship. The problem faced by the human subject in their regard is not one of a battle between the corporeal and the spiritual, but one of their integration. The

freedom of choice, exercised according to the order of being of the thing chosen, is conformed to the freedom of election. It becomes a means for the exercise of election and meets its own exigency in doing so. The "interior" objective freedom of election and the "exterior" subjective freedom of choice are in a fundamental accord which calls for their integration in each concrete human act.⁵⁵

Furthermore, Sciacca says that choice is exercised in the "empirical" time of becoming while election is exercised in the "interior" time of development. The most basic choice the human existent makes is the choosing of his body (on this all other choices are based); the most basic election is the election of his spirit (on this all other elections depend). These two acts are in an original synthesis: Sciacca speaks of an initial freedom (libertà iniziale) underlying the freedom of choice and election. In this sense, the interior time of development is inclusive of the empirical time of becoming, as the time of becoming implies the time of development. Corresponding to the initial freedom which underlies election and choice, Sciacca refers also to an original synthesis of time which he calls initial time

55 Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 79-82 & 145.

(tempo iniziale).⁵⁶

E. Reason and Intelligence

The polarity of immanent finite subject and transcendent infinite object which constitutes the human existent in his interiority and makes his ontological condition a disequibrated one, expresses itself as noted above, in a dialectics of choice and election. However, not only the will, but also the mind or intellect, expresses this basic polarity or relationship that constitutes the human person. In this respect Sciacca speaks of the relation of reason and intelligence.

Reason, for Sciacca, captures the unity of an entity; intelligence embraces a being.⁵⁷

He explains that reason is the "description" of the essential of the world and its "transcription" into concepts. It is not the penetration of a reality in its wholeness or integrality (nel suo "tutto-insieme"), in its essentialized existence and in its existentialized essence. It looks for what is uniform seeking to establish universal abstract connections. Sciacca writes that reason in this respect is "cosmological"; it is a judgement on the things of the world; it builds concepts. Yet the

56 Ibid., p. 109 & 116-17.

57 Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 213.



truth of intelligence, whereby reason is able to make its judgements, transcends the reason. Sciacca adds that it is not reason which is "metaphysical" but intelligence; this is because the truth which is the object of intelligence is the foundation of the truth-value of the judgements of reason. He says that reason is "cosmological" whereas intelligence is "theological".⁵⁸

Intelligence, on the other hand, is the primal intuition of truth prior to the consideration of truths of a natural order. It is, furthermore, the self-grasping (cogliersi) of the subject intuitively in his participation in being-as-Idea. It does not pose man as a problem but as a certainty. Intelligence is transcendence. The finite entity grasps himself by going beyond himself because he grasps himself in being-as-Idea which calls out to Infinite Being. Sciacca writes that the certainty of one's self is deepened from beyond oneself. He adds: "essere nel proprio essere è se-trascendere" (to be in one's own being is to transcend oneself). The same fundamental attitude of the intelligence is expressed towards others. They are not posited as objects to be known and defined by reason; rather by the intelligence one shares with them: there is a mutual openness and penetration.⁵⁹

58 Ibid., p. 126.

59 Ibid, p. 126-27.

Between reason and intelligence there is not a basic conflict or antinomy but a fundamental accord. Man is not by nature split in two. In fact, reason inserts itself (s'inscrive) in the intelligence when the thinking being acquires a reflected knowledge of himself: that is, when he formulates a judgement on his existence. Such an act is a rational one: it is the application of the intuition of being (which constitutes the intelligence) to the existent which one is. Reason mediates in its reflective knowledge the pre-reflective fundamental intuition of being wherein existent and Idea form an immediate synthesis. Furthermore, Sciacca understands this reflective rational consciousness as an inviolable and intrinsic aspect of human nature. He concludes that between reason and intelligence there is a fundamental ontological-metaphysical accord.⁶⁰

For Sciacca, it is not reflective knowledge or consciousness which constitutes man as intelligent but the given synthesis of existent and being as Idea. The reflective rational knowledge and consciousness expresses this synthesis in a mediatory fashion. Sciacca writes that it is not reason which closes the intelligence within its limits, assimilating it to itself, but the intelligence which illuminates the reason and imposes on it

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 125 & 127-29.

the limit of its truth. He adds that the rational mediation cannot extend to the point of conceptualizing the content of intelligence. He writes:

Vi è una verità che costituisce l'uomo come ente pensante, che è madre dei concetti ma non è concetto, è Idea che la ragione non può giudicare: è la perenne trascendenza dell'uomo a se stesso.⁶¹

(There is a truth which constitutes man as a thinking being, and which is the source of all concepts but which is not itself a concept. It is Idea and as such the reason cannot judge it: it is the perennial transcendence of man to himself.)

Reflective consciousness is not simply the reflection of a direct consciousness of the things of the world, but is a development of the relation to being-as-Idea which the human entity has as his given (he could not construct it). Self-consciousness and rational consciousness could not arise if the self were not in an essential relation to being-as-Idea if he did not possess objective interiority.

In summary, on the one hand, Sciacca is saying that rational reflective thought has an essential rootedness in direct intuitive intelligence; on the other, he is saying that it is an intrinsic aspect of human nature that this intuitive intelligence is unfolded in rational consciousness.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 128; see also p. 123.

F. Individuality and Personality

Sciacca's philosophy of integrality in its anthropological and psychological aspects is in a way summarized or synthesized by the principles of individuality and personality. These express the synthesis of the bio-psycho-socio-spiritual aspects of the concrete man. They embody, as it were, the dialectics of choice and election and of reason and intelligence; furthermore, they reflect the synthesis of the orders of being (real, existential and Ideal) in which these latter are rooted; and of the orders of time which these engender (becoming and development).

In fact Sciacca writes that the individuality represents the becoming of the individual while the personality represents the development of the person.⁶² The individual refers to man's "real" or natural aspect: his reality as a member of a biological species, individuated in a particular manner in time and space, with particular characteristics dependent on this "naturalness". Sciacca says that the individual is comprised by or founded in the vital, sensitive and human instincts and that the individuality is formed through the reciprocal

62 Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 55.

interaction of these with the given environment.⁶³ He explains that the individual exists in a collective context wherein these instincts or needs are met through economic, political and other human institutions. The attachment of the individual to the collectivity is often determined by his needs for possession, for self-protection, for power etc. . . . as opposed to his needs to give, to serve others etc. . . . (which reflect the personality).⁶⁴

The person is the principle of man's integrality or unity: it unifies all other aspects in the concrete man as individual, sensing subject, human subject and self. The person as a synthesis constitutes man as intellectual (intuiting truth or being as Idea), volitional (choosing and electing according to the intuitive norm), and rational (judging reality in terms of the intuitive principle). The person develops his personality in the election of value, in the expression of his fundamental vocation.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the person does not properly constitute with others a collectivity as the individual does, but rather a communion. The person, as noted above, is not inspired in the first order by ego-needs and wants

63 Ibid., p. 42-46 & 64-66.

64 Ibid., p. 83-85.

65 Ibid., p. 38-42 & 77.

but by the law of giving (la legge del dare). Sciacca speaks further of the distinction between the collective consciousness (coscienza collettiva) of the inferior us (noi inferiore) and the communionistic consciousness (coscienza communionistica) of the us of value (noi di valore). He writes that the collective consciousness ceases with the cessation of the need that inspires it, whereas the communionistic consciousness never ceases: in fact the more it gives, the more it senses itself united to its giving and love. He says further that the personal us (or us of value) while returning the functional or bio-social us (or inferior us) to its norm, permits the latter to realize values which it could not realize in itself.⁶⁶

Sciacca also makes a distinction between ethical reason, which is understood as regulating the collective relations, and moral intelligence which is the norm of personal communion.⁶⁷

66 Ibid., p. 83-88.

67 Sciacca is critical of Hegel's positing of morality as inferior to ethiccity. He writes:
"Hegel pone la moralità come momento inferiore della eticità e in questa superato, ma Hegel ammazza l'uomo nella dialettica, nello stato e nella Storia: l'idealismo trascendentale non ha mai potuto giustificare una morale morale e ha sostenuto un'etica non morale, appunto perchè, nella posizione metafisica iniziale, è già la negazione della persona e di quanti elementi la costituiscono."
Ibid., p. 25.

Between the person and the individual, there is not any essential conflict or antagonism. The human person, because he is a principle of synthesis, includes the individual; the individual, on the other hand, in his distinctive order, implies the person. For example, Sciacca explains that although the moral communion of persons may not be actualized solely by the collectivity of individuals, it is possible that through the mediation of the latter (if well ordered) the communion of persons will be favored.⁶⁸ One may speak in this respect of a mediatory role that the individuality has with respect to the personality.

Structure and dynamics of the concrete personality:-- Sciacca notes that Cicero called man a "multiple" or multi-faceted" animal (animale molteplice) and that Rosmini commented "multiple in his actions, attitudes and aspects."⁶⁹ Sciacca notes further, that if one focuses on one's sensations, volitions and thoughts in their multiplicity and indeterminate immediacy, one is confronted by a chaos. He explains that although man is a unity and solidarity of body and spirit, because of the multiplicity of vital potencies and mental attitudes that comprise him he can, in a certain sense, be described in his immediacy

68 Ibid., p. 82-91.

69 Ibid., p. 55.

and complexity as a confusion. He says that a single human existence, even the most simple, in the diversity of its moments, presents itself as irregular and contradictory. A succession of elevations and falls, of repentances and returns to failure: states which may be incompatible for reflection, nevertheless co-exist and compenetrates one another in the concrete man.

This chaos and confusion, carries within it, however, the tendency to order. There is something which orients and unifies. The vital, sensitive and human instincts which comprise the individual already push the multiplicity of potencies and attitudes to specify themselves in a determined direction. The power of reason and reflection, which collaborates, disciplines and purifies the instincts, stimulates one to choose and decide according to an ordered norm. It is, in fact, ultimately through his spiritual life that man discovers the sense of himself, overcomes his immediate indeterminacy and transcends his temporal contingency.

Although each of the multiple activities of the embodied or concrete human spirit has its own proper intrinsic norm, Sciacca notes that there is a "monarchical" tendency in each aspect, a tendency towards exclusivity and autonomy. For example, the cognitive activity may tend to supercede the moral, or vice-versa; the economic

will claim its independence from the other; each realm or activity tends to weaken and exclude the others transgressing its own norm--one could say absolutizing or totalizing itself. It is the unity of the spirit, which tends to keep each tendency within the limits and fullness of its norm and have them all converge into the spirit's own profound order. Sciacca explains that the spiritual act, concretely speaking, is inclusive of all the activities. Impulses, instincts, sentiments, reasons and principles, which initially seem to exclude one another, find themselves fused by the synthetic (and, in this sense, creative) power of the spirit.⁷⁰

In such a case one may speak of the personalization of the individual or of the instincts. Without ceasing to be natural, they become part of the personality, though, in themselves, they do not constitute it. Sciacca explains that a certain subjection (assoggettamento) of the individuality is not imposition of violence, because it is in conformity to the order in man's nature. The command (comando) of the superior activities is not despotic or tyrannical insofar as it does not impose on the individuality to transgress its order, but to remain within it and realize itself within that same order. When this occurs, Sciacca concludes, one actualizes the

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 15-20.

moral personality and consequently an individuality which is also moral--constituting in their harmony the normal man.⁷¹

However, the concrete spiritual life is a dynamism implying clashes and conflicts. The complex dialectics of personality goes beyond an abstract formal logic or a-priori order: each form or activity may potentially tend to overcome the others, each one possibly tending to become "monarchical", sometimes despotic and tyrannical. Sciacca explains that in such a case the dominating activity, if it becomes tyrannically exclusive, transgresses its norm. It abstracts one aspect of existence, absolutizes it and thereby deforms itself.⁷² The instinctive life comes to prevail over the spiritual, the individual over the person. The former loses its immediate natural spontaneity, its natural order and becomes, along with the laws which govern it, the end of the spiritual life. In such a case instinct becomes egoism. When, in this way, the individual takes the place of the person, the immoral personality is formed.⁷³

71 Ibid., p. 56-57.

72 Ibid., p. 20-21.

73 Ibid., p. 56-57.

4. Summary

The attempt has been made in this chapter to give an overview of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality: its historical perspective and its focal principles. A special emphasis has been placed on its metaphysical-epistemological position, on its unique dialectical method and on key principles in its vision of man. The philosophy of integrality will serve as a basis and ~~reference~~ point for the examination of the development of Caruso's depth psychology in the following chapters.



CHAPTER II

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND BASIC PERIODS OF CARUSO'S DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

Caruso's thinking in depth psychology has shifted radically over time. It is this radical change or development of his thought which is the focus of this thesis. However, one may identify certain constant or essential characteristics which remain despite or through the changes. The first section of this chapter will briefly state these "constants" of Caruso's thought. The second section will outline the changes or developments which his thought has undergone according to three "phases". The treatment of Caruso's thought in this chapter will be somewhat schematic and cursory. It is intended as an introduction to, or overview of, the developments in Caruso's depth psychology. This introduction will be elaborated in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

1. Essential Characteristics of Caruso's Depth Psychology

Caruso presents his thought in depth psychology as a reflection on praxis. By this he means his praxis or practice of psychoanalysis.¹ One has here what is

¹ Igor A. Caruso, Existential Psychology, From Analysis to Synthesis, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1964, p. vii.

perhaps the most important and enduring characteristic of Caruso's work: a fidelity to psychoanalysis as a whole, a fidelity which seems if anything to increase with time. The objectives of the Vienna Working Circle for Depth Psychology which Caruso has directed since its inception in the mid-forties (see Appendix 2), proposes itself as carrying out an inner critique of psychoanalysis. Caruso's work as a whole, may be seen as such a critique, and becomes increasingly, as his thinking evolves, an inner critique, taking its ground from within Freud's theory of psychoanalysis.²

Caruso's approach has been called a "dialectical critique of psychoanalysis."³ His dialectical bent makes him critical of the positivistic bias in psychoanalysis; however, he suggests that despite this bias, a dialectics is latent in psychoanalysis itself. For example he writes:

Prisonnier des catégories d'une pensée en même temps idéaliste et naïvement matérialiste, Freud a été néanmoins un observateur de génie; ses hypothèses explicatives sont mécanistes, mais elles ont tout ce qu'il lui faut pour être dialectiquement continuées, justement parce qu'elles sont basées, comme malgré elles, sur une observation qui n'est rien moins qu'unilatérale. Loin d'isoler le

² Igor A. Caruso, "Personalistic Psychoanalysis as Symbolic Knowledge," Journal of Psychotherapy and Religious Processes, 1955, 2, p. 2-3.

³ Eusebio Martinez, "Teoria de Igor A. Caruso sobre la persona en la psicologia profunda," Estudios filosoficos, 1959 (8), p. 315.

phénomène, l'observation freudienne le replace dans le flux génétique et, ce qui est moins évident mais virtuellement certain, dans le contexte de la sociologie. Et c'est précisément la fidélité à la méthode psychanalytique qui permet à la "psychologie des profondeurs", au lieu d'un psychologisme clos sur lui-même, d'aborder les perspectives sociales et dialectiques.⁴

Caruso has generally been critical of movements that would abandon basic Freudian postulates with their emphasis on biological determinants substituting social or spiritual ones in their stead (e.g. Horney, Sullivan, Fromm, Frankl).⁵ In his earlier works Caruso seemed to be searching for a synthesis of a "spiritualistic" psychology (like Jung's, Frankl's or Jasper's) and a biologically-rooted deterministic psychoanalysis.⁶ With time however, his dialectics has become increasingly materialistic; he himself notes in his later writings that he has been considered as a Freudo-Marxist.⁷ In his later works he makes the effort to arrive at a synthesis between psychoanalysis and historical materialism. It should be emphasized, however, that for Caruso the psychoanalytic world vision seems to prevail over the

4 Igor A. Caruso, Psychanalyse pour la personne, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1962, p. 120.

5 Ibid., p. 126-27; Caruso, op. cit., 1955, p. 7.

6 Caruso, op. cit., 1964, p. 105.

7 Igor A. Caruso, La psychanalyse contre la société?, Presses Universitaires de France, 1977, p. 200.

Marxist world vision in the end.⁸ This will be considered further when dealing with the stages or periods in Caruso's thought in the next section.

Another dominant characteristic of Caruso's thought in depth psychology is his personalism. This emphasis is seen throughout his writings. His whole system has been characterized as personalistic and he has been called a personalist.⁹ His personalism which was initially spiritualistic became with time an emphasis on the dialectical process of humanization which may be schematized as follows: (a) As the making conscious of the unconscious; (b) as the process of de-objectifying or de-reifying; (c) as the transmutation of nature into culture, of natural history into human history; (d) as the overcoming the opacity of the symptom into the transparency of the symbol.¹⁰

Thus, the dominant characteristics of Caruso's thought, which have to some extent remained constant throughout his many years of writing, may be summarized into three main areas: (a) an emphasis on praxis, i.e. psychoanalytic practice; (b) a dialectical defence and

⁸ Ibid., p. 212-13.

⁹ Caruso, op. cit., 1959, p. 319; also: J. M. Domenach, "En finir avec l'aliénation?," Esprit, 1966 (34) n. 5.

¹⁰ Caruso, op. cit., 1962, p. 23 & 142.

interpretation of psychoanalysis; (c) a personalistic orientation.

2. Three Periods in Caruso's Thought

It has not been appropriate to speak of the dominant characteristics of Caruso's depth psychology without some mention of the changes and the trends of his evolving system. These periods of change in Caruso's thinking are of critical importance for this thesis. In order to simplify and clarify the complexity of these changes, one may speak of three phases: (1) the initial "thesis" in his thought; (2) the developing "antithesis"; (3) the conclusive "antithesis" and need for new "synthesis". It should be noted that this is not an attempt to apply a formal interpretation of the Hegelian historical categories to Caruso as if these were an inexorable universal pattern of development. Rather it has been found in this research that Caruso's thought actually proposes itself in such a pattern and can be well elucidated through it. Chapters III, IV and V of this thesis deal respectively with each of these phases. What is provided here is an overview of their development.

A. First Period: "Thesis"

Caruso himself refers to an early period of Christian Existentialism.¹¹ His most important work of this period is his Existentialism, From Analysis to Synthesis. It was first published in German in 1952 and was largely derived from articles Caruso published between 1945 and 1951.¹²

Caruso invariably approaches psychological themes in a broad social, historical and philosophical context. In Existential Psychology he deals with the nature and treatment of neurosis. He speaks of analytical, causal-deterministic approaches on the one hand, and of "synthetical" existential approaches on the other. His emphasis is on a balance between looking for the causes in instinctual unconscious factors and searching out the synthesis of the subject with an "orthodox" Christian order of values. He cautions against considering the person as free when he is still bound to unconscious motives; this error he imputes to the existential movement in psychology.¹³ But he is equally critical of an exclusively deterministic analysis which he argues

¹¹ Caruso, op. cit., 1977, p. 200; see also: Caruso, op. cit., 1962, p. 163-64.

¹² Caruso, op. cit., 1964.

¹³ Ibid., p. 113-14.

absolutizes a partial truth about man.¹⁴

However, Caruso does not, in this book, deal simply with a comparison and synthesis of classical psychoanalysis and existential psychology. He deals with these, but at the same time introduces his own original notion into the core of his considerations. This is the notion of the objective transcendent hierarchy of values.¹⁵

To understand what he means by the objective transcendent hierarchy of values one has to look into his vision of the historical development of western society since the Renaissance. He sees the Medieval period as one where psychology was a branch of philosophy and a part of an integral world view. He writes that during this period:

The subject of psychology, the study of man, was subordinate to the total world view, that is to a hierarchy in which God, the world and all it contains, and man with his own characteristics, feelings and thoughts, had not yet been wrenched apart but formed a coherent whole.

It is important to note that for Caruso this unity was given by a transcendent relation. This hierarchy was given to man. He explains:

14 Ibid., p. 105.

15 Ibid., p. ix.

In this unity of knowledge concerning the soul of man, always related in certain essential ways to the world, his fellow man and God, metaphysics was the logical and living result of the contemplation of nature. Man as a subject of psychology was unimaginable outside of a stable system of relationships and values.¹⁶

Caruso goes on to explain the fragmentation and "totalitarianism" that have resulted from the defection from this hierarchy of values. Each "fragment" sought to assert its own absoluteness now that the integral relation to the whole was lost:--science, economics, political theories, technology, art and man himself--each sought to make itself a whole.¹⁷ This is what Caruso means by "totalitarianism" a trend he sees as prevalent in our own contemporary world.¹⁸

Psychology also was deeply affected by this development. Caruso writes that it investigated man's less essential characteristics, taken in isolation from the rest (as in experimental psychology) or it reduced all the values it could find in the human soul to immanence "and then declared them to be superstructures

16 Ibid., p. ix.

17 Ibid., p. x.

18 Like Dostoevsky, Caruso saw man as necessarily seeking an absolute:--in losing the relation to the real absolute man creates for himself a false absolute (Crime and Punishment).

Caruso's view is similar to Sciacca's in the latter's understanding of "monarchical" tendencies in man (see Chapter I, section 3F of this thesis).

based on human research or human interest, or human urges."¹⁹

The ensuing crisis in values which is the result of this fragmentation and alienation in man is understood by Caruso in the following way: by opting out of the traditional scale of values, man no longer regarded values as objective, but rather saw them as depending purely on his human and subjective point of view. Man came to believe that his position did not depend on the hierarchy of objective values but that the position of the values depended on him.²⁰

It should be noted that Caruso is not critical of the great humanistic discoveries and advances as such (which have been made since the Renaissance). He acknowledges the great progress that has been made. It is only the hubris or false pride of this concept of humanity that he sees as instrumental in the fragmentation and alienation of man.²¹

Caruso had viewed this defection from the hierarchy of values, in the socio-historical order, as analogously expressed in neurosis. There is an unconscious or partially unconscious absolutization of relative values

19 Cariso, op. cit., 1964, p. xi.

20 Ibid., p. xi.

21 Ibid., p. 10.

and subsequently a relativization of absolute values in neurosis that reflects the historical and social process. Caruso speaks of the neurotic's "greed for experience" as the expression of his "heretical" view of life ("heretical" with respect to "orthodoxy" of the scale of values).²²

He explains that where the frame of reference has been disturbed, feeling comes to be experienced as the central criterion of life. The value of life comes to be measured only by what is experienced. But, he adds that "experience is an uncertain, treacherous value, which soon loses its savour and demands fresh experience."²³ He explains the relation of his view to Victor Frankl's logotherapy: "Victor E. Frankl has summarised this loss of the meaning of life due to the greed for experience in these words: 'We have no right to ask about the meaning of life--life itself raises the question. It is we who are being questioned!'"²⁴

Caruso summarizes the "heretical view of life":

We may now summarize the heretical view of life in neurosis, that is, its negative aspect, as follows: Neurotic guilt, which the neurotic has repressed and for which he seeks a scapegoat ... consists in the fact that he has forsaken the hierarchy of values and allowed his own feelings to

22 Ibid., p. 44.

23 Ibid., p. 44.

24 Ibid., p. 44.

become absolute law. The absolute character conferred on partial truths is the neurotic's life heresy. Every heresy endangers the total structure of human relationships to the absolute; it presupposes the existence of an absolute, but transfers its characteristics to relative and partial truths. Heresy is therefore a defection from the absolute towards idolatry; but at the same time it also bears witness to the absolute, even if the evidence has not been fully deciphered or realized.²⁵

So there is in neurosis a positive aspect in the search for the absolute that is hidden in the neurotic process. Furthermore, Caruso goes on to explain that the neurotic greed for experience is a regressive form of what was once a positive desire to live, to be loved, to experience pleasure etc. As a result of difficulties in the life-history of the neurotic, there results an absolutization of a particular aspect of his experience, of a particular affective need. This aspect or need is normally "outgrown", it normally finds its place among other needs and experiences; one normally comes to recognize its relativity--its relative value. Paradoxically, however, the neurotic absolutization leads to the elimination even of the relative value. What has been idolized cannot be loved for itself any more. Caruso writes:

25 Ibid., p. 56.

The phenomenology of neurosis provides sufficient evidence that it is his greed for experience that makes the neurotic insensible to ordinary experience, and that the pleasure principle actually leads him to dislike life itself.²⁶

One may therefore conclude that neurosis, which starts as an exaggeration of a relative value, ends by compromising not only the absolute but the relative value as well.

Though Caruso speaks of the hierarchy of values as a fixed reference point, he does not imply a static relationship. In fact he sees life-orthodoxy as a truth to be lived. He writes:

There can be only one salvation from the neurotic existential anxiety, from the disjointed nature of feeling: the hierarchy of objective values. Objective not in the sense of the intra-individual proven findings of science, but in the sense of a truth lived through existence. A truth can be known without necessarily being possessed. It does not become operative in one until one has made it one's own truth, and admitting that there can be no turning back, that all one's behaviour is governed by this acknowledged truth... Being my truth it pervades my belief at all times, even when I am talking about the weather, let alone about psychotherapy and education. Indeed, I often have to remain silent precisely because I must not force my truth upon the other person; yet even though it may never be touched upon, my truth will still permeate my whole being and still govern my actions. I am unable to turn back; and I can heal and teach only according to my conscience. The whole of education starts from fixed, permanent values; and yet success is so variable. The art, indeed, lies in making these values so accessible to the growing person

²⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

that education ceases to be a training merely outwardly imposed, and instead becomes an individual decision, a genuine acknowledgement of these values.²⁷

Caruso has presented the hierarchy of values as a stable frame of reference for man where God forms the center or apex. He explained the crisis in values of the contemporary social order with reference to this hierarchy and saw the expression of this crisis in neurotic disturbances. Although Caruso provides one with a certain sense of what he means by the hierarchy of values he does not define this hierarchy specifically, nor does he precise its philosophical meaning. With the shift in philosophical orientation of his later writings he no longer refers to this term and this elaboration is never provided.

Similarities between Sciacca and Caruso:--One may note a certain correspondence between Caruso's historical understanding of the defection from the hierarchy of values (with its psychological implications), and Sciacca's understanding of the crisis in contemporary philosophy (with its implications for anthropological theory). Sciacca too notes since the Renaissance, a progressive absolutization of man in the development of immanentistic rationalism. There is furthermore an internal correspondence between the term "objective hierarchy of values" and the principle of "objective

27 Ibid., p. 129.

interiority" which Sciacca has analyzed and developed.²⁸ However, as noted above, Caruso's notion remains without an explicit philosophical basis; and as Caruso abandoned this term and changed his intellectual orientation this basis was never provided.

Sciacca's term of "objective interiority" has been elaborately defined and established philosophically. It may therefore provide a philosophical reference for the notion of the "objective hierarchy of values". From the point of view of the philosophy of integrality, the hierarchy of values may be conceived as the rational ordering of man's relationships in the principle of his objective interiority or, one may say, in a dialectics of reason and intelligence.²⁹ (These issues will be elaborated in Chapter III.)

B. Second Period:
Developing "Antithesis"

In the years following the presentation of his theory of the hierarchy of values, Caruso gradually but more increasingly became ambivalent and ambiguous with

28 M. F. Sciacca, L'interiorità oggettiva, Milano, Marzorati, 1960; also, Claude Della Zazzera, Individuality and Personality in Michele F. Sciacca's Philosophy of Integrality (Implications for Psychology), thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, 1976, p. 18-25 & 29; see also Chapter I, section 2F and 3B of this thesis.

29 See Chapter I, section 3E of this thesis.

respect to a transcendent dimension in human existence. His thought became increasingly dominated by the issue of change and becoming. By the late fifties and early sixties, he had become critical not only of positivism but of any metaphysics as well.³⁰ If one may think of his earlier position as Parmenidian, for defending a fixed and stable transcendent hierarchy of values, then his new position may be characterized as increasingly Heraclitean as it does not allow for any fixed reference, immanent or transcendent. For example, in an article called "Psychanalyse et souveraineté de l'homme" (originally published in 1962 in German), he writes:

Ni dans la nature, ni dans la culture, qui est le milieu propre à l'homme, rien n'est jamais immobile: tout devient... Le titre de noblesse de l'homme est son devenir illimité dans la culture; toute situation "achevée" est pour lui un lit de Procuste.

...Les philosophies essentialistes, elles ont affaire à l'être comme s'il était "devenu" (au moins à l'état de prototype), alors qu'ici l'être est un étant qui n'a jamais fini d'être.

...L'être n'étant pas ce qui est devenu et donc passé, mais étant le devenir, c'est un meurtre de l'être que de le faire devenir autre que ce qu'il est, en lui fermant les voies de son devenir qui, seules, le mèneront à ce qu'il est.³¹

One may note two points that are being stressed in the above passage: (1) that being (l'être) in man is not

³⁰ Caruso, op. cit., 1962, p. 121.

³¹ Igor A. Caruso, "Psychanalyse et souveraineté de l'homme," Esprit, 1966 (34), n. 1, p. 3-4.

to be identified with what he has already become in a static way (in other words to simply lock a man, as it were into the past is an insult to his being). (2) That being is becoming. From a Sciaccian perspective one may agree with Caruso about the essentiality of becoming in human existence, but one cannot agree with the simple identification of the human being and his immanent becoming. Caruso is critical of essentialist philosophies for treating being as if it had already become, as if it were already fulfilled in its being at least prototypically (as he says above). However, his own view of being, as endless becoming, implies the perpetual lack of fulfillment of the human being as his essential condition--for each new becoming is only to be surpassed and left behind. But more than this each new becoming is destined to turn into a non-value as he says below:

Et l'histoire humaine, comme la connaissance humaine, consiste à laisser derrière soi des synthèses provisoires pour en arriver à de nouvelles synthèses plus adéquates au palier de mûrissement. Par là même, le palier dépassé devient un symbole de plus en plus opaque; il pouvait être nécessaire pour le développement; mais si l'on ne le dépassait pas, si l'on restait "fixé" à ce symbole archaïque, il deviendrait valeur négative, non-valeur, au point de vue du devenir personnel. Toute la dialectique du "bien" et du "mal" tient dans le dépassement des valeurs relatives, à un stade donné du développement; ces valeurs deviennent, à ce nouveau palier, des non-valeurs relatives. Tant de relativité n'a rien

à voir avec le relativisme, car il ne s'agit pas d'"indifférence"--bien au contraire!--mais d'adéquation à un devenir.³²

But this becoming (devenir) is a becoming archaic. One may agree that becoming involves the surpassing of prior determinations, but when the immanent process of becoming is absolutized (as is increasingly the case with Caruso), it is ultimately voided of value either relative or absolute (this will be elaborated in Chapter IV).

Caruso, in discussing the issue of human becoming, refers to Ernst Bloch's "principle of hope". He explains that an anthropology which is consciously "praxis" and "theory" derives the future from the past, and is as Ernst Bloch says: "an ontology of that which is not yet" and a philosophy of the "really or actually possible"; such a philosophy is utopistic but Caruso adds man is able to realize utopias. But does hope have a real or actual basis if becoming is itself made the sole norm of human existence? Is man to fulfill (adequate, as Caruso says above) becoming or is becoming to fulfill man?

For Sciacca and the philosophy of integrality there is not this simple identification of being and becoming as was seen in Chapter I.³³ One may agree with

³² Caruso, op. cit., 1962, p. 23.

³³ See Chapter I, section 3A and also Chapter IV, section 3D of this thesis.

Caruso that for a man, his being is not simply his past in a "frozen" "archaic" state. But one would add that he is not simply his present immanent becoming either. His being includes all his becoming and his openness to what is beyond his immanent becoming: a transcendent dimension essential to his being and becoming (e.g. objective interiority). One may say from the point of view of the philosophy of integrality that man's becoming shares in his being but his being (and therefore his becoming) is constituted in immanence, and transcendence (dialectics of implication and compresence).

Caruso's initial dialectics did see, as essential, the human relation to the transcendent:--he did propose a dialectics of immanence and transcendence in man. This was seen explicitly in his theory of the hierarchy of values and in his vision of history. His thinking, however, moved in such a direction as to make this aspect of human activity and human nature increasingly problematic and ambiguous in the framework he was developing. For example, he writes:

Le symbole est essentiellement historique, fruit du développement. Y a-t-il cependant, sous-tendant ce développement, un principe qui rende ces étapes nécessaires, et qui serait ainsi le principe même de l'histoire et de toute évolution: un principe supra-dialectique de ce dialogue incessant?³⁴

34 Caruso, op. cit., 1962. p. 23.

Caruso provides two (possible and contradictory) answers to this question: that consciousness is moving towards a point Omega as in Teilhard de Chardin's conception, or that everything man searches for beyond the symbols which he thinks to be immutable, absolute and transcendent is all alienating myth, mystification and illusory projection of his misery (Feuerbach). At another point Caruso speaks of a fantastic solution to this problem. He writes that the contradiction between a transcendent and an immanentistic position is to be sought beyond history. He says that it is perhaps permitted to think of a synthesis, not realizable in history, which would reconcile this great contradiction in western thought. He explains that in this contradiction God is either the absolute Other who makes himself man in the relativity of the kénosis, or he is the projection of human alienation, which will be entirely overcome one day by absolute Man.³⁵

In any case the above considerations show Caruso at this stage in his writing to be undecided and ambivalent about the issue of human transcendence. However, his formulation and framework already predisposes a negative view of human transcendence. It is presented as an irresolvable issue, at least irresolvable in human history. If so, one might conclude that it is irrelevant,

35 Ibid., p. 27.

that it does not matter. Caruso speaks of transcendence as a possible supra-dialectical principle. This places the issue outside of dialectics simply. And again means it is irresolvable and suggests in this kind of formulation a certain irrelevance.

The philosophy of integrality moves from a critique of immanentistic rationalism from Descartes (in germinal form) to the English Empiricists, to Kant, to Hegel and to those who built on Hegel's conclusions like Marx and Gentile. It sees this position as philosophically self-contradictory. Sciacca shows transcendence to be a necessary principle of concrete human existence. It is, in the framework of his critical philosophy, at the heart and not at the periphery of human history.

Caruso increasingly adopted the framework of immanentistic rationalism in a Hegelian-Marxist vein. As an example of the latter, one sees that Caruso, in speaking of the fallibility of the dialectical method, nevertheless shows his firm faith in the Hegelian-Marxist vision of development. He writes:

Dans le flux concret de l'histoire, l'infailibilité dialectique est un non-sens, elle serait le symptôme d'une rigidité totalitaire, d'une suffisance sottise et aussi anti-dialectique que possible. Les "critiques" marxistes de la psychanalyse l'ont généralement oublié, et il serait vraiment trop facile de leur retourner leurs "arguments" (à commencer par la constatation que la dialectique hégélienne-marxiste, indépassable certes en tant que science du développement, est compromise dès le début par la pauvreté

de la gnoséologie marxiste avec sa théorie de la connaissance comme "reflet" de la réalité). La dialectique est un instrument difficile à appliquer et qui ne mène pas celui qui l'emploie à une infaillibilité mécanique. Le solipsisme idéaliste de certains psychanalystes n'est pas un meilleur argument contre les vertus dialectiques de leur méthode que l'antipersonnalisme féroce et borné de certains marxistes n'en est un contre la dialecticité de la leur. Les uns comme les autres, tout simplement, massacrent bêtement l'instrument précis et fragile qu'ils manient.³⁶

Despite the criticisms Caruso makes in the above passage of certain uses of Hegelian-Marxist dialectics, he accepts this dialectics as insurpassable as a science of development, and seems to accept its immanentistic rationalist tenets as well.

In the above, Caruso's period of "thesis" (which culminated in his theory of the hierarchy of values) and his period of developing "antithesis" (his period of ambiguity concerning human transcendence), have been discussed. The next period of Caruso's thought has been designated as his conclusive "antithesis" and it is understood as calling for a new "synthesis". It should be noted that these periods are not clearly demarcated one from the other chronologically and that aspects of one flow into the other as it were. This classification into periods is intended rather to show the tendencies and conclusions of Caruso's thought in a general way.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 122-23.

C. Third Period:
Conclusive "Antithesis"

The third period of Caruso's thought shows him adopting a dialectics exclusive of human transcendence, and thus a dialectics solely of human immanence, in a conclusive manner.

In an article "Destruction ou souveraineté de l'homme?"³⁷ (published in a collection of articles in 1977), Caruso raises the issue of whether the contemporary society will be able to bring about a more rational order favoring human development more quickly than the destructive forces in society extinguish human life and consciousness. He suggests that the two most active historical movements which have tried to bring about an ideal order have been Christianity and Marxism.³⁸ He feels that neither system has been able to turn back the tide of self-destruction which he sees as augmenting and accelerating at a speed which one would call geometric. He writes that neither life, which is its evolution, nor consciousness, which is the attribution of a meaning to existence, is moving sufficiently rapidly and with sufficient force to stay a return to the non-organic and to the absurd. Rather they are both moving indirectly but surely to their auto-destruction. He writes:
"Les ennemis du non-Etre--la vie et la conscience--créent

³⁷ Caruso, op. cit., 1977, p. 199-234.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 209.

toutes les conditions de leur propre suicide, c'est-à-dire de leur retour à ce non-Etre."³⁹

He is critical of Christianity for its other-worldly, one could say, transcendent solution to the problem of Death and the Absurd. He says that mystical and non-temporal rationalizations will not help life in its battle against death.⁴⁰ One should note that he rejects a "fundamental causality"⁴¹ to human life and consciousness; he says rather that living and conscious being has detached itself from nothingness (non-living, non-conscious being) by a fortuitous accident.⁴²

He sees the Marxist vision of utopia as a decisive demystification of the Judeo-Christian eschatology. He explains that Marxism rejects other-worldly solutions and has fixed itself the objectives of changing the world by means of a critical dialectical thought and implied praxis applied to a this-worldly reality. He sees this desire for change as a desire to conquer the force of death. However he concludes with regards to Marxism that its optimism is a weakness as great as the triumphalism of Christianity. He writes:

39 Ibid., p. 208.

40 Ibid., p. 210.

41 Ibid., p. 209.

42 Ibid., p. 207.

It est tout simplement hors du domaine du possible que la modification positive et humaine du monde par le marxisme se fasse plus rapidement que sa modification destructrice par les déchets mortels de la vie et de la conscience, modification qui s'accélère au rythme d'une progression géométrique. La bombe atomique, la pollution, l'explosion démographique, l'agressivité dévastatrice de l'homme, son in-conscience, son attachement à des croyances irrationnelles et chimériques alors que sa puissance s'accroît, tout cela progresse tout simplement à une allure plus rapide que la théorie ne progresse par la prise de conscience et la pratique de la modification correspondante du monde par une vision dialectique. On a bien l'impression que cette vision est plus faible et plus lente dans ses répercussions que le gouffre qui sépare l'absurdité de l'évolution effective du monde de l'obligation qu'a l'homme de lui donner un sens. Etre absurdement condamné à donner un sens à son existence, c'est une situation inconfortable; le marxisme a essayé d'en faire un tremplin mais jusqu'à présent, il se réfugie le plus souvent dans les vieux abris du christianisme au lieu de regarder l'absurde en face.⁴³

Caruso contrasts what he considers to be a false optimism on the part of Marxist thought with a stoic, somewhat pessimistic, yet realistic (in Caruso's view) attitude of psychoanalysis. He explains:

La psychanalyse ne croit pas à une amélioration fondamentale de l'univers de l'homme; elle ne le croit pas fait pour la paix et la justice. Elle se rapproche du marxisme dans la mesure où elle s'occupe des hommes qui ne peuvent pas se développer et sont aliénés dans la société existante. Mais elle fait, ou croit faire, une part plus grande aux racines biologiques de l'homme. Finalement, à ses yeux, l'aventure de l'esprit a peu de chances de s'affirmer contre la nature de sorte qu'au fond elle adopte une attitude stoïque en se préoccupant toujours de rendre l'homme conscient ou plus conscient sans avoir la conviction que cette aventure

43 Ibid., p. 212-13.

vaille la peine pour lui car les forces de destruction sont susceptibles de prendre le dessus. L'homme est en quelque sorte forcé de tirer le meilleur parti possible de la précarité de sa situation. Ce qu'il y a de frappant, c'est que l'idéologie psychanalytique ne croit pas à un ordre idéal, elle croit simplement à la profonde imperfection du monde tel qu'il est. Le marxisme ne croit non plus à l'existence actuelle d'un ordre idéal mais il croit pouvoir en créer un. La question est pour nous de savoir ce qui l'emportera dans le temps: la création d'un ordre idéal ou la destruction?⁴⁴

Caruso's position with regards to this last question is more on the side of pessimism than optimism; one could say more on the side of psychoanalysis than Marxism. He comments on possible personal motives having influenced him in his making of such a diagnosis with poor prognosis, as it were:

Il est bien clair dans mon esprit que le pessimisme du diagnostic et l'audace du pronostique constituent un syndrome de la pensée dépressive. Reste à savoir si ce syndrome dépressif ne découle que de mon propre "complexe" ou s'il a aussi des causes dans la dynamique culturelle et sociale. La dépression c'est l'absence d'avenir (L. Binswanger).⁴⁵

It would be beyond the limits of this thesis to evaluate Caruso's diagnosis and prognosis of the contemporary social order as such. There are, however, a number of assumptions which he makes in his thinking which may be questioned. His thinking on the Christian's

44 Ibid., p. 200.

45 Ibid., p. 230.

other-worldly approach to the problems he raises is highly anti-thetical; that is, the other-worldly solution is seen as somehow in a radical opposition to a this-worldly solution. Immanence excludes transcendence and vice-versa. The philosophy of integrality on the other hand proposes a dialectics of implication and compresence of these different orders.

Caruso's earlier thought, his "thesis", proposed that the problem in neurosis is analogous to the crisis in values in the society. He proposed that neurosis involves the loss of the relation to the absolute and the subsequent absolutizing of the relative. This latter negative absolutization he saw as containing something positive for it demonstrated the search for the absolute in the neurotic. Caruso's analysis, however, led to another important conclusion. The neurotic not only suffers a loss in his relation to the absolute but suffers a loss in relation to relative values as well. If one applies the vision of the earlier Caruso to the conclusions of the later Caruso, one may ask whether the total rejection of a transcendent utopic eschatological solution to human problems does not eventually lead to a loss of faith in this-worldly "becoming" as well. Caruso speaks of depression as being the absence of a future (see above). Might this not be due to his conclusion: "la vie ne peut avoir d'autre sens que celui que l'homme crée en tant

que représentant de son espèce et de sa société."⁴⁶ The neurotic loses the value even of the relative pleasure because he has absolutized it. Does not man inevitably become powerless when he absolutizes himself?

From a Sciaccian point of view one could say that Caruso followed through the exigencies of an immanentistic perspective to its ultimate nihilistic conclusions. But, as was discussed in Chapter I, Sciacca views the nihilistic conclusions of contemporary thought as providing a grounding for a new synthesis. He writes that these conclusions have the merit of showing that it is impossible to found absolute truth on an immanent human thought.⁴⁷ Thus, philosophically, the issue of a principle of truth transcendent yet necessary to human thought is born of these conclusions.

Psychologically as well, the transcendent reference may not be excluded in trying to understand what are the dynamics of normality and psychopathology. It is felt that the earlier Caruso has shown in his analysis of neurosis that the relation to the absolute is an operative psychological dynamic in man. It seems that this relation to the absolute is a corollary to a proper

46 Ibid., p. 234.

47 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960a, p. 24; also Della Zazzera, op. cit., 1976, p. 22; also Chapter I, section 2F of this thesis.

relationship to relative values seen within their limits.
These issues will be elaborated further in Chapter V of
this thesis.

CHAPTER III

IGOR A. CARUSO'S APPROACH TO THE HIERARCHY OF VALUES IN HIS THEORY OF NEUROSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (PRESENTATION OF HIS "THESIS"); ITS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEGRALITY

This chapter presents what has been designated as Caruso's "thesis". This "thesis" is found clearly expressed in his theory of neurosis as a "defection from the hierarchy of values," and in his theory of psychotherapy as a process of both causal-deterministic analysis and existential synthesis.

It has already been suggested in the previous chapter that the philosophical foundations of Caruso's "thesis", as expressed in his theory of neurosis and psychotherapy, were left largely on an implicit level without great elaboration. He did not refer the main tenets underlying his notion of the hierarchy of values to a given philosophical system. In fact, Caruso was quite ambivalent on the question of a universal anthropology; he seemed to adopt a contradictory position on this point by making such an anthropology implicitly the foundation of his theoretical formulations and then denying its actuality in a measure intended to avoid dogmatism. This issue will be elaborated in Chapter IV. As was seen in Chapter II and will also be elaborated in Chapter IV, the tenets of

Caruso's thesis became increasingly problematic and questionable for him as his thought unfolded. He eventually adopted a position which in many ways was diametrically opposed to his initial stance. He was increasingly drawn, firstly into an idealistic and, secondly into a materialistic dialectics conceived within the framework of an immanentistic rationalism. His philosophical basis for the promulgation of a dialectics of immanence and transcendence was unclear or ambiguous, and he eventually abandoned such a dialectics and even promoted the negative conclusion of immanentistic rationalism concerning human transcendence.

In the light of these considerations, the purpose of this chapter is not only to present Caruso's "thesis" in psychology but to show how the main tenets of this "thesis" are supported philosophically in Sciacca's philosophy of integrality.

1. The Determinism of Classical Depth Psychology

Caruso is critical of the strictly biological deterministic view in depth psychology. He writes that what may appear through a reductive analysis as strictly determined may, in certain cases, be the workings of the free spirit, or even that of divine intervention. He explains that Freud's rejection of the notion of "spiritual freedom" appears based on his identifying

human freedom with arbitrariness and with a pure indeterminism. Nevertheless, Caruso agrees with Freud's deterministic position insofar as "psychological associations are always determined by a previous event ... in other words there are in the life of the psyche no groundless, indifferent or replaceable phenomena."¹ However, he does not see this "determinism" as compromising human freedom. He writes:

It is true that biological methods have shown the dependence of man on the concatenation of his psychological reactions and, beyond this, on his own constitution and his psycho-physical environment: the spirit of man is largely dependent on his body. The fallacy lies in interpreting this broad dependence as an absolute determination, and declaring that man is determined purely and simply by the concatenation of his reactions. Yet in every free act of choice the whole man, including his constitution, takes part in the decision. In itself, however, the individual constitution is not an exhaustive cause of free decision, even though its effect is most significant in every free act. A free act is, in the last resort, brought about by conscious recognition of a motivation. It is through motivation that an indifferent and largely determined act becomes, in the end, a free act.²

Caruso makes a reference to the Aristotelian-Thomist hylomorphic theory in support of his position. He writes that if the theory of mind-soul, anima forma corporis, has validity, then psychology is not in a position to apprehend human matter without the essential

1 Igor A. Caruso, Existential Psychology, From Analysis to Synthesis, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1964, p. 4.

2 Ibid., p. 10.

link to its form, or human form without the essential foundation in matter.³ In this respect, he explains that compulsion and freedom or instinct and decision may at the same time be factors in human action. He says they are different levels or orders of human existence.⁴

Caruso sees even so-called "teleological" or "finalistic" views in "depth-psychology" as tending to be mainly deterministic. For example, he writes concerning Adler's individual psychology that although it seeks to provide final rather than causal explanations these are still deterministic. The determining influence in the case of Adler's theory is the continuous compensation of the inferiority feelings, and furthermore the task of education or psychotherapy is to bring the individual aspirations into harmony with society (presumably another factor of

3 Ibid., p. 19.

4 Caruso writes:

"This is our problem: the profound contradiction between urge and decision in every human action can be explained neither by the denial of the decision nor the denial of the urge. The former school of thought affirms, once again in Baudouin's words, the existence of identity on the grounds of continuity. The latter is aware that there can be no question of identity and, with equal short-sightedness, denies the existence of continuity. The former think they have solved the riddle of man if the word 'urge' is used at least once in every sentence. The latter seem to recognize no other names apart from 'spirit' and 'responsibility'."

Ibid., p. 21.

determination).⁵

Thus, on the whole, Caruso sees classical "depth psychology" as not providing the foundations for a consideration of real human freedom and conscience. Even Jung's analytical psychology, though it focuses on man's spiritual nature, is not seen as providing this foundation to a human conscience for it shies away from any metaphysical conclusions, staying at a phenomenal empirical level. Caruso writes:

Jung's inspired achievements suggest ... that, like Columbus, he discovered a continent without realizing what he had found. Columbus thought he had reached the Indies. Jung, whenever he refers to the numinous archetype, which in 'fear and trembling' discloses the mysterium tremendum in the depths of the soul, he always concludes with the somewhat embarrassed modesty of modern scientists who will tell us that only verifiable data are the objects of science. Jung can prove that 'fear and trembling' which man exhibits when confronted with mystery. But fear and trembling of what? The answer, says Jung, does not concern science. Thus the most acute psychologist of our time is as helpless on the borders of the newly discovered continent as any other son of this scientific age.⁶

This lack in the metaphysical or philosophical foundations of "depth psychology" is felt in the special difficulties it has defining human normality and perhaps more importantly in grasping that "normality" in situations accompanied by psychological conflict and struggle.

⁵ Caruso, op. cit., 1964, p. 5 & 10.

⁶ Ibid., p. 25.

Caruso shows the difficulties with defining human normality in terms of the pleasure principle. He writes:

Peaceful synthesis remains, indeed, the objective of every soul; but this is an ideal hardly attainable in this world, and least of all by 'scientific' means. But does this mean that a man who struggles with himself, who doubts and occasionally despairs, who is torn apart and yearns for peace and oneness, is necessarily 'mentally ill' because he is overcome by pain and grief? Does he automatically become 'healthy' if his pain is removed or his grief overcome by any means? Should he in the interests of his 'recovery' be freed from his conflict in all circumstances? Are not pain and sorrow sometimes far more essential to the health of the soul than 'peace', meaning here pleasure?⁷

Caruso concludes his discussion of the issues of freedom and normality in depth psychology by saying that the latter lacks the means of determining man's place metaphysically in a hierarchy of values. He adds however, that "if we succeed in showing that a knowledge of the objectivity of the hierarchy of values is essential and centrally important in our efforts to understand man, we shall have to reassess the methods and technique of depth psychology."⁸

The following sections will deal with the way in which Caruso attempts to show the importance of the hierarchy of values in the understanding of neurosis. He contends that one may not adequately understand neurosis without considering the ontological and moral issues involved.

7 Ibid., p. 14-15.

8 Ibid., p. 27.

2. Neurosis as an Absolutization of Relative Values--Its Negative Aspect

It has been noted that a biological causal-deterministic depth psychology (including systems that take into account "final" causes) or a depth-psychology that considers only the empirical phenomenal level of psychic events cannot incorporate into itself an adequate understanding of human freedom and provide the metaphysical foundations of such a freedom.

For Caruso such an understanding is crucial in the explanation of psychopathology, especially in the case of neurosis.⁹ He sees the role of conscience (as a metaphysical reality and as a source of freedom) as central to the neurotic process.

His focus in the analysis of neurosis is on what he calls the "neurotic guilt system". In this process there is a repression of an initial guilt which the neurotic cannot admit to himself. It is mentally pushed out of existence. Thus is formed the "existential lie" (the true circumstances of one's guilt are not admitted).¹⁰ However, the guilt-feeling itself and the punishment

⁹ The term "neurosis" for Caruso is taken in a wide sense; it implies the different forms of neurosis (obsessive, compulsive, hysterical etc.); at times Caruso seems to use it to refer to psychopathology in general (including the psychoses).

¹⁰ Caruso, op. cit., 1964, p. 30.

demanded are still present as "no dynamic psychological current can be annihilated."¹¹ The guilt is therefore transferred to a "scapegoat" be it some other activity in which one is involved, some other person or thing, or one's own body. (Any of the symptoms of neurosis may express this transposed guilt: compulsive thinking, inferiority feelings, depression, impotence or frigidity, paranoid feelings, scrupulosity, self-reproach, insomnia, headache, tic, paralysis, etc.)¹² Thus one suffers from his bad conscience in a roundabout way.¹³

Caruso argues that not every guilt or affliction of conscience leads to neurosis but that only which is not admitted and yet feared.¹⁴ He explains that a precisely known and circumscribed guilt feeling belongs to the moral theologian's or lawyer's domain. "But," he adds, "compulsive guilt feeling, born from self-glorification and from the repression of a bad conscience, belongs to the realm of the psychologist whose business it is to investigate unconscious processes."¹⁵

11 Ibid., p. 28.

12 Ibid., p. 33 & 34.

13 Ibid., p. 35.

14 Ibid., p. 34.

15 Ibid., p. 35.

Caruso speaks above of the repression of bad conscience (i.e. of a guilt feeling unacceptable to the ego) and of self-glorification. This latter aspect is the guilt of pride or superbia which often underlies neurosis. Caruso explains it as the neurotic's identification with his ideal image such that he cannot tolerate awareness that he may not match his ideal. All impulses not in accord with that image are repressed into the unconscious. He cannot accept to be at fault with respect to his own ideal.¹⁶

Caruso writes that guilt and expiation can exist in the neurotic only on the basis of a general capacity for moral judgement, but that in the case of neurosis, moral judgement is carried out by means of false evaluations. There is a making unconscious of impulses which ensues from an erroneous valuation either of the nature of the impulses themselves or of the repressing factor in the superego (ego-ideal). Caruso writes:

Anyone who believes in an order governing the world and human existence will again and again have to realize that the repression of guilt feelings and the ensuing illness caused by a bad conscience are made possible by the very fact that this order is not clearly recognized by the person affected.¹⁷

Not only is there an erroneous valuation, in the sense of implicit exaggeration and absolutization of the

16 Ibid., p. 34.

17 Ibid., p. 39.

meaning of the impulse and the ego-ideal directing it, but the actual process of valuation is largely obscure and unconscious to the person. Caruso writes:

The truant conscience, the consciousness of the existential lie is in neurosis repressed into the unconscious; more accurately, this consciousness was never very clear; it was certainly carefully disguised at the moment of origin of the guilt feelings associated with it.¹⁸

Through the neurotic guilt system the person afflicted is to some degree locked into his own immanence: he is stuck to his own immanent feelings and perceptions which have become absolutized. He unwittingly denies himself the normal functioning of his actual conscience which opens him to the transcendent. Caruso writes:

The absolute value given by the neurotic to his own emotional criteria represents a form of presumption, which, although almost always concealed, is quite easy to ascertain. The significance of this over-valuation, after all, is the neurotic's refusal to recognize an order experienced to be transcendent, replacing it by an exaggeration of his own personality. He refuses to recognize either the reality that is repressed, or the conditioned and relative character of the repressing factor within himself. He cannot quite silence his conscience, the voice of the transcendent order, but he refuses to listen to it. The importance of the 'id' and the independence of the 'superego' (to use Freud's terminology) are exaggerated and elevated into autonomous criteria.¹⁹

This exaggeration of aspects of the personality and loss of relationship to the transcendent hierarchy is referred to by Caruso as "life-heresy". He explains:

18 Ibid., p. 37.

19 Ibid., p. 42.

Instead of taking its appropriate place in a universal system of values, the ego becomes the hub of the world. But if our individuality is relegated as the highest value this will inevitably result in a philosophy dominated by private feelings. Through the inflation of the ego relative values are given an absolute status. That is the very heresy of life.

By heresy we understand the overvaluation of partial truths, which inevitably implies the degradation of absolute to relative values...

...Just as heresy in religion extends beyond its religious significance to all aspects of life, the 'life heresy' implicit in neurosis is not just an aberration as it were of 'hygiene' but also of ethics and metaphysics.

All errors, aberrations, delusions and exaggerations can, by the way, be regarded in their relationship to the hierarchy of values, as 'life heresies'.²⁰

In the context of his "life heresy", the neurotic comes to value his own emotions and projections to an exaggerated degree. He thus develops what Caruso calls a greed for experience: feeling becomes his central criterion. As a result, however, the neurotic begins to consider his life as having dubious value insofar as it has to be reaffirmed by every fresh experience. Caruso explains:

By making of experience an end in itself the natural perception of what is experienced is being dulled and the meaninglessness of life constantly reaffirmed. Those who are afflicted in this way are compelled to fly from their own threatening emptiness. Neurotic pseudo-activities are also well known: the frantic pursuit of a career, social position, pleasures and adventures may reach the proportions of genuine neurosis. It is immaterial whether or not the individual superego provides this.

20 Ibid., p. 40-41.

neurotic escape with more or less valid excuses; escape into work may be just as fatal for the development of the personality as escape into frivolity. It is perhaps better at least to be aware that we are drugging ourselves. What is really frightening are the totalitarian systems men will invent to cover up the meaninglessness of their lives.²¹

Since experience in this way becomes in itself an uncertain value, the neurotic begins to seek the corroboration of the value of life in the objects of the world. He is "placed in a position of intolerable dependence on the things of this world." The greed for experience is projected into the world of objects.²² His "concern becomes to place his own person (regarded as an object) in such a relation to other objects that these will foster and confirm the supremacy of individual feeling."²³ There is thus a "reification of the personality." Caruso explains:

The world cannot be reduced to objects without our own individuality becoming equally reduced. Each traumatising experience, each setback, humiliation and neglect operating in the birth of neurosis, have at one time revealed the defenceless self in fragility and weakness. The human person has come to regard itself as a thing, the toy of circumstance and has accordingly forfeited courage, love, trust and dignity. In his bitterness and disappointment, the threatening world that has reduced him to an object is experienced also as a hostile thing. He thus suffers a loss of reality by withdrawing his

²¹ Ibid., p. 46.

²² Ibid., p. 52.

²³ Ibid., p. 50.

energies from communion with the world and casting them upon the defence of his thing-like individuality.²⁴

3. The Positive Exigency within Neurosis--
A Search for "the Absolute"

In the previous section the negative aspect of neurosis has been essentially described as the absolutization of a relative value. However, the neurotic also expresses with his neurosis a positive exigency: a struggle for solution, a search for the hierarchy of values, a search for the absolute. Caruso writes that,

If we were to see only the heretical component in the life-heresy--the existential lie, the mistaken decision, the enlargement of the individual self, presumption, greed for experience, cowardly machinations, pseudo-knowledge and pseudo-obligations--we would ourselves remain attached to the negative aspects and our knowledge would be not only partial but in conflict with reality and tainted with error.²⁵

Caruso sees the neurotic process as deeply ambiguous--he describes it as a sort of crucible where the dialectical ambiguity of human life, in terms of its betrayal on the one hand and of its confirmation on the other, is almost hopelessly intertwined. In fact, every psychological content in neurosis is seen as ambivalent in this sense; "it bears eloquent witness to the ambiguity of

24 Ibid., p. 55.

25 Ibid., p. 62.

human motives."²⁶

Caruso's distinction between the entitative and operative aspects of the conscience underlies his treatment of the ambiguity in neurosis. He writes:

If initially it is agreed to define conscience as an innate faculty to designate some matters as good and others as evil, this faculty must, in order to function properly, refer to certain models which education provides. All these models, together in so far as they have proved effective, constitute the Freudian 'superego'. But to equate the superego with conscience is to confuse the exercise of a faculty with the faculty itself. It is a fallacy, a typically 'nothing-but' explanation, which at most can tell us about its author's view of the world. A tyrannical superego, or conversely an excessively lax super-I, merely mean that the capacity to consider something good or evil was due, in the former case to exaggerated social requirements, or, in the latter, to inadequate models. The superego is sometimes excellent, sometimes inadequate product of the personal conscience and of the requirements of society. The superego is the concrete, practically effective conscience, but this pragmatic conscience can be evaluated only from the standpoint of a hierarchy of values.²⁷

It is the voice of the neurotic's actual conscience that is trying to get through in his suffering of symptoms. The symptoms are, as it were, a fighting for his conscience. It is true that the self-torment or self-punishment in the neurotic is only an apparent or pseudo-solution, but these attempts already contain a hint of a final true solution. Caruso writes that "Whenever there

26 Ibid., p. 64.

27 Ibid., p. 64-65.

is a neurotic symptom there is also striving towards solution and liberation."²⁸ The neurotic punishes himself for his irreconcilable desires--his symptoms are thus already connected with the problems of offence and untruth. Even if they do not lead to truth, the neurotic symptoms and attitude to life represent a protest against the existential lie--thus in terms of life and truth they have an affirmative significance.²⁹

Caruso understands neurosis as an attempt to master a desperate situation. It is an attempt at a solution in a situation which makes a heavy claim on the personality involved. Constitutional factors in the neurotic may contribute a special sensitivity or weakness to the process calling for a defensive reaction. However, the neurotic may also be average in terms of resources and simply find himself in an excessively harsh environment.³⁰

As an attempt at a solution, neurosis constitutes, in a certain sense, a valuable vital function which furthers development. It has a compensatory role filling a need in normal development even if it does so inadequately. Caruso writes that "it is a pseudo-solution precisely

28 Ibid., p. 65.

29 Ibid., p. 65-66.

30 Ibid., p. 68 & 71.

because the available elements were, as yet, inadequate for a real solution. It is a tentative defence measure; it is therefore of vital importance, but it awaits other solutions."³¹

Caruso is very critical of a purely negative view of neurosis. A naturalistic consideration of it as simply an inferior condition or statistical deviation is grossly inadequate. He writes that neurosis is evaluated this way because it involves suffering and suffering is equated with inferiority. He explains that suffering and pain have a positive significance only from the point of view of a theory of values. He sees Frankl as having stressed this point of view:

Of all modern depth psychologists, Viktor E. Frankl has certainly been the severest critic of the "untenable character of the success morality" (the pleasure principle made absolute). "Lack of success is not equivalent to meaninglessness": to suffer from a condition that ought not to be is an "essential and significant" part of human life.³²

Caruso explains that every failure of the neurotic is at the same time an attempt at an improvement: if the intention to improve were not somehow present there would be no neurosis but only an unmistakable bad conscience. He gives an example:

31 Ibid., p. 69.

32 Ibid., p. 72-73.

If I fail to do my duty towards someone who is close to me, and realize my failure, I am free to satisfy my conscience and to make amends. If, however, due to my defence mechanism, I torment the same person, using his qualities, for instance, or his ingratitude as a scapegoat for my egotism, my dissatisfaction increases and I become more rigid in my defensive attitude. This is already a neurotic reaction. Restlessness, depression and fear will accompany my misguided defence. My failure will also be my punishment; an ineffective punishment that was not clearly recognized.³³

The neurotic is thus struggling to heal himself. His efforts are apparently useless. "Yet," Caruso writes, "it is no mean achievement to keep on struggling for a solution to the problem of life despite constant setbacks."³⁴ He compares the neurotic to Don Quixote:

Like Don Quixote, he is fighting windmills, since he has not clearly recognized his opponent, preferring to see in him a scapegoat. Like the fearless knight, however, he performs feats which may seem ludicrous to a utilitarian world, but which bear witness to the fire raging in his conscience.³⁵

Caruso speaks of the neurotic's vocation or calling and of the confusion he has at this level. In his greed for experience, the neurotic absolutizes the pleasure principle and he places in a central position his desire to make his existence as agreeable as possible. It has been already discussed (in section 2 above) how the search for pleasure can be self-defeating when it is made the main

33 Ibid., p. 73.

34 Ibid., p. 74.

35 Ibid., p. 74.

concern of one's life. The neurotic is mistaken in assigning to pleasure the dominant role in his vocation in life. Caruso writes that on the contrary he does not have a vocation to an agreeable life but a vocation to tragic existence (presumably to recognize his real suffering in having to answer the demands that life makes on him).³⁶

The issue of vocation raises the question of the final destiny or goal of life. The neurotic becomes fixated on something past. He identifies the condition of paradise, the plenitude of being with an immature mode of being.³⁷ Caruso explains how the absolutization implied in the greed for experience is related to the psycho-sexual stages of development:

Neurosis is characterized by greed for experience, it constantly attempts to re-establish the condition of pleasure. Freud has clearly shown the part played by neurotic fixation in pleasurable stages of existence. These stages are normally outgrown in the course of development. But if the process of outgrowing them is made particularly difficult, the individual will fall back upon accustomed pleasurable conditions. For instance, a child for whom the transition from the oral to the anal phase is made particularly difficult, will develop a tendency to meet the difficulties of transition by overemphasizing the phase he is accustomed to.³⁸

The neurotic is thus fixated in the past on an earlier stage of development that should normally have been outgrown.

36 Ibid., p. 74-75.

37 Ibid., p. 83.

38 Ibid., p. 69.

Caruso says that his implicit notion of a final destiny or paradise is not eschatological (the promise of history transcended) but immanent and stuck in the past. Caruso explains that in the eyes of naturalistic psychology the promised paradise becomes simply a projection of what is lost, the projection of a period of innocence before the advent of an operative conscience. However, he adds that "the 'paradise archetype' is also a teleological force. We know that the desire for innocence points not only to regression but also to faith and hope." Caruso goes on to explain the religious significance of such a hope:

To aim at innocence may, after all, also imply the assurance that existence will be abolished, not by being destroyed, but by the redemption of history; and that a redeemer has promised a Kingdom in which no longing, faith or hope shall be needed, but immediate knowledge in love.³⁹

Thus, the eschatological desire in neurosis, although compromised by the neurotic fixation, nevertheless has a positive value hidden within it.

At the origin of the neurosis the neurotic finds himself in an intolerable situation where he is compelled to adopt a defensive posture and narrow his life's focus to save his own existence. His attitude becomes predominantly one of making demands on life and wanting gratification from it rather than responding to life and

39 Ibid., p. 84.

accepting the latter's demands on himself. The guilt that results from this existential lie, this narrowing of focus, this absolutization of his own need, is projected onto a scapegoat, be it another person, some external object, his own faults and weaknesses, or his own body. His life-vocation becomes dominated by the pleasure principle although paradoxically this assures him to be in a miserable state. He remains a prisoner of the past because of the overvaluation of an early stage of his development, and is not open therefore to an eschatological dimension. These are the major negative aspects of neurosis as they have been discussed above. On the other hand neurosis stands as a testimony to the metaphysical value of human life. Caruso writes:

The very fact that the neurotic is dissatisfied with his experience, and dimly feels that all sensation foreshadows illusion and limitation, that all existence is finite and all pleasure poisoned, all this enables us to discover the positive aspect of neurosis. The rise of neurosis is a testimony that being cannot be rooted in sensation alone. Satiety of feeling affords no peace to the neurotic, and the dissection of experiences through depth psychology can be meaningful only if the relative character of these experiences can be recognized. Otherwise it only confirms the neurotic greed for experience through an illusory greed for knowledge, 'total knowledge' as Jaspers calls it.

Yet despite its greed for experience and sensation, neurosis is haunted by a sense of what ought to be; for the neurotic is dissatisfied with his greed for experience, his pseudo absolute values and his idealised image of himself. He feels that his fears and disappointments could be assuaged by some absolute, which the dismal attempts to absolutise

old fixations cannot attain. Thus his greed for experience itself insures the experience in every core of his nature that no earthly love will ever wholly satisfy him, that there is no treasure 'safe from thieves' nor any home in 'this world' to make him happy.⁴⁰

4. Psychotherapy as Involving a Causal-Deterministic Analysis, and an Existential Synthesis

Caruso argues that one cannot solve the neurotic problem at the same level at which it is posed. This would imply approving the neurotic scapegoat and thus reinforcing the neurotic process. Likewise a psychotherapy which regards the neurotic's problem as purely immanent, and reduces his scale of values to a relative and utilitarian point of view, cannot cure neurosis. He explains that "At most, this utilitarian type of therapy can achieve an apparent cure, whereby one neurotic symptom, which in the existing state of society was immediately obvious, is replaced by another, more in accord with the neurosis of our age. Thus individual neurosis is replaced by a participation in the collective neurosis."⁴¹ He speaks at times more strongly against this immanentization:

The neurotic's 'call to transcendence' has neurotic traits as has his whole spiritual life. Assigning an immanent character to this call is to emphasize the neurotic traits and to kill the fruit which is

40 Ibid., p. 94.

41 Ibid., p. 87.

ripening despite drought and cold. Especially in the case of the neurotic to assign such an immanent role to his vocation is equivalent to spiritual abortion.⁴²

Caruso explains that psychotherapy must be able to relieve symptoms but that symptomatic relief ought not to be its focus. Otherwise it simply shares in the neurosis itself. He discusses the limitations of symptomatic treatment in a case of impotence and argues how even an exhaustive causal analysis might also remain at the symptomatic level. He writes:

A 'symptomatic' treatment in this case would have been any process, such as hypnosis, which would simply have erased the characteristic symptom of impotence, without bothering too much to find out how it arose. But a complete causal analysis might also, in such cases, deserve the name of 'symptomatic' treatment, in as much as it would fix its attention on the symptom itself, the causes of which it would then trace back and investigate down to the earliest stages of development... Such analyses are, in practice, indispensable to psychotherapy; but one should remember that they are simplifications which cannot lead to an understanding of the spiritual whole and which if they are generalised, may degenerate into 'nothing but' solutions...⁴³

In Caruso's view it is the nature of neurosis that forces psychotherapy to become concerned with the question of absolute and relative values. He says that neurosis is what it is because it cannot agree with the absolute character it has itself assigned to relative values. It

42 Ibid., p. 85.

43 Ibid., p. 90.

derives its purpose and meaning from the fact that "it is at one and the same time a flight from the absolute and a yearning for the absolute." He concludes by saying that if neurosis is concerned with "the absolute", then psychotherapy must likewise be concerned with it. If the psychotherapy begins by annihilating the full scope of the problem through adopting an immanentistic view, it misses its own purpose and meaning.⁴⁴

For Caruso the neurotic conflict may be so fruitful and rich in values that a reductive psychotherapy might entail an impoverishment of the personality. The neurotic's suffering is a testimony to his search for "the absolute", for "truth", for an "objective hierarchy of values" and for "personal synthesis". To simply "free" him from such a conflict without recognizing the higher level would be a grave disservice. It would "reduce" or "analyse away" the existential conflict, including the positive aspect inseparable from the neurotic pseudo-solution. In the light of these considerations Caruso asks the question: What, one wonders would psychotherapy have made of St. Augustine's unrest, of Pascal's anguish, or of Kierkegaard's depression?" He adds: "But if we acknowledge that apparently neurotic phenomena may contain higher values, we must assign to

44 Ibid., p. 101.

metaphysical significance a position of preponderance with regards to the findings of depth psychology."⁴⁵

It is not the causal chain of psychological events which has been revealed by psychoanalysis that Caruso disputes. He says that the human spirit is all this, meaning all this determination by the instincts, but is something else as well; "therefore 'all this' should not be regarded as absolute."⁴⁶

The neurotic makes an abortive attempt at liberation. It is the task of psychotherapy to aid in this liberation by unmasking the "life heresy"--and if possible not replace it by restrictive half-truths. Caruso adds: "Even if the neurotic's conscience can consent to relative values being turned into absolutes, the therapist must refrain from making new absolutes of other relative values... The attempt to heal sick minds must not itself become a bad example of the repression of true values."⁴⁷

The focus of this section so far has been on Caruso's view of the limits and deficiencies of a biological causal-deterministic depth psychology. However, he is equally critical of an indeterministic existential

45 Ibid., p. 108.

46 Ibid., p. 109.

47 Ibid., p. 109-110.

psychology which sees man as simply free and responsible. He not only criticizes each of these positions for being partial in terms of excluding each other, but he criticizes both for being immanentistic and conceiving of man in an autonomous fashion, i.e. without a conscience open to the objective meanings and values in reality. Thus Caruso aims at more than a simple synthesis of classical depth psychology and existential psychology, though such a synthesis is part of his program.

Existential psychology reacted to biological psychotherapy (which saw the personality as determined strictly by the instincts) by treating the neurotic as a free subject. Caruso explains that:

This new psychology no longer regarded man as a machine, consisting of association, wires and a consciousness engine. Rather it proposed to approach man concretely: in his freedom, his life plan, his mental and spiritual resolve--in brief, in his existence.⁴⁸

Thus it defended the freedom and significance of existence from the mechanistic determinism of classical psychotherapy.

Existential psychology and psychotherapy found a fruitful psychological soil in our times because it attempted to express and overcome the solitude of autonomous man.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it shares in the collective

48 Ibid., p. 113.

49 Ibid., p. 115.

neurosis that creates that autonomy and solitude. It exaggerated the notion of freedom and responsibility in man.

Caruso writes:

For the existentialists ... man is self-sufficient; and for the most consistent among them he is the creator of his own existence. Thus their approach is accompanied by a veritable inflation of concepts such as freedom, responsibility and decision. If the psychoanalysts during the period between the wars defined man as the product of his instincts, he is now defined as the product of his own decision. For Jean-Paul Sartre man exists only in so far as he 'realizes' himself. It is not mere rhetoric when Sartre declares that man is 'the invention of man'. There is no such thing as human nature, man is what he creates himself to be.⁵⁰

Caruso goes on to criticize Sartre's position:

...Sartre's uncompromising position contains within itself the error that attaches to all artificial absolutes. It is simply not the case that man invents himself! It is not true that man is identical with his own planning. In the first place man brings with him the inertia of the creature, which is precisely the condition of being driven, the 'id'. The human ego is insidiously affected and conditioned by the 'id', the general human instinct; and neurosis shows us what happens to the ego that takes its own plans for unadulterated freedom. In the second place the idea of creating oneself out of nothing is absurd, and amounts to 'angelism'. There is a generally valid plan for mankind, and the conviction that man is part of a plan is certainly closer to the truth than Sartre's excessive indeterminism. In carrying out his planned development, man must take into account both the plan made for him and the determining factors of his own being.⁵¹

50 Ibid., p. 113.

51 Ibid., p. 113-14.

It is Caruso's view that for the neurotic to think clearly about freedom and significance, he has to obtain a clear notion of the "unfreedom" and "meaninglessness" of his "life-heresy". In man freedom is not absolute but tied to determinism. Caruso thus conceives of human freedom as a "progressive liberation".⁵²

Caruso accuses existential psychotherapy of being unclear as to methods. He writes:

...it would certainly be desirable if existentialist psychotherapists descended from their phenomenological clouds and, instead of significant explanations, suggested also a few practical steps.⁵³

Caruso says that in hesitating to analyse the determinate aspect of man, existential psychology turns all too easily to mere "stoic preaching". There is a danger that it may simply identify itself with the superego and thereby actually foster neurotic repression of and resistance to existential truth.⁵⁴ Caruso explains that the "analysis of existence" represents a sort of confrontation of the neurotic's real existence with an imagined norm of complete freedom and responsibility. But, "No amount of stoic or existentialist preaching can help a man who is struggling for more freedom, but is deprived of freedom

52 Ibid., p. 115 & 116.

53 Ibid., p. 116.

54 Ibid., p. 118.

by forces unknown to him."⁵⁵

Caruso does credit existential and ethical orientations in psychotherapy for bringing the spiritual dimension to psychology. He speaks of their findings in this respect as being great and admirable. However, he remains generally critical of them not only for their presumed neglect of man's determinate aspect but also for their spiritual immanentism. He writes:

...nearly all trends of this psychotherapy are marred by an ambiguity which is due to a secularized concept of man--of man who, in the last resort, is regarded as the sole criterion of transcendence.⁵⁶

It is the immanentistic view of man that is at the heart of Caruso's critique of both classical depth psychology and of existential psychology. He does seek a synthesis between a deterministic psychology and an existential one but in that synthesis he insists on an essential openness to a transcendent dimension. In this respect he speaks of depth psychology having to take into account both a homo libidinosus and a homo religiosus. He writes:

We are ... faced with the problem of the scale of values, and existential analysis will be found inadequate. Nor is it sufficient to recognize homo religiosus theoretically, while remaining 'neutral' in practice. A scale of values that would form part of an objective order cannot be

55 Ibid., p. 119.

56 Ibid., p. 117.

attained in this way, for our contemporary neurosis represents a defection from just these objective values. A depth psychology of this kind must perforce remain attached to the magic circle of its own problems. Depth psychology cannot afford to remain neutral towards either homo libidinosus or homo religiosus. If it recognizes only homo libidinosus, it is only a biology, and not a genuine anthropology. If it disregards homo libidinosus it is untrue to the facts. But if it overlooks homo religiosus, it becomes divorced from true values and once again falls a prey to deception.⁵⁷

Caruso proposes a personalist psychotherapy which seeks out both a psychological analysis and an existential synthesis, and thus takes into account both the biological and spiritual aspects of man. In this way psychotherapy may do justice both "to man's conditioned, unfree, determinate aspects and to the 'individual', free and responsible principle within him." It cannot "be simply based on biology and natural science" nor can it be merely "'logotherapeutic', a method 'rooted in, and directed towards, the spirit'." Caruso explains that it ought to include the whole person and might be described as personalist.⁵⁸

Caruso considered that there was generally a reluctance on the part of disciplines concerned with man to adopt and develop the personalist view. He did, however,

57 Ibid., p. 118.

58 Ibid., p. 122.

see promising approaches in the work of such authors as Emmanuel Mounier and Paul Tournier. For example he writes concerning the latter's approach to illness:

Tournier ... [says] that every illness requires two diagnoses; from the point of view of natural science, which is concerned with causes, and from the point of view of the human person a 'spiritual' diagnosis of the significance of the illness, which seeks to ascertain 'what God is trying to say through the phenomena of disease', and how the personal task thus set within the plan of creation may be fulfilled.⁵⁹

Thus, Caruso explains that, "Psychotherapy always tries to lay bare the concealed causes of suffering, and at the same time to help the patient to experience the existential meaning of his going astray and the new direction his life must henceforth take."⁶⁰

The causal-analytic aspect of psychotherapy involves connecting, by way of experience, the neurotic's unfree actions of the present with the earlier stages of his life history. In the neurotic there are protracted and disturbing after-effects of earlier stages of development because these stages have not been normally overcome or outgrown. Caruso explains that "the stages in themselves were healthy and necessary; what is morbid and abnormal is the fixation on stages already overtaken."⁶¹

59 Ibid., p. 124.

60 Ibid., p. 124.

61 Ibid., p. 125.

He sees the essential element in human development as being the progressive widening of values. He writes:

...development shows a progressive attachment to values of life history, the essential element being the widening of values. The same contents acquire different values; which is not to say that all values are relative! On lower levels, the height of valuation is proportionately lower than on higher levels. The symbol of the absolute is different on the primitive level than on the highest. If, on the higher level, we should recoil upon a lower level, this would be tantamount to absolutizing what is relative.

On the other hand, the widening of values taking place in the process of transcending the various stages of development means a progressive liberation from the compulsory false absolutes of the lower levels. Life within the womb, the digestive tract, the mother's breast, the developing defiance-ego--these are some higher values in primitive stages of development. The child, in order to subsist, is bound to regard these primitive values as absolute; but, in order to develop, it must progressively free itself from these compulsory absolutes. A fixation on primitive stages is therefore a genuine regression to primitive compulsory mechanisms.⁶²

The fixation and absolutization at an earlier stage of development involves not only the infantile instincts but also the infantile superego. The fixation on the latter not only implies a certain rejection of the instinctual forces but also thwarts the functioning and development of the free conscience. Caruso explains that "In order to remove the determinate regression as far as possible, it is necessary to penetrate to the stage in question, and experience, relive and rearrange the loosened

62 Ibid., p. 125.

forces." However, "at the same time psychological abnormality is a false synthesis of human existence."⁶³ This false synthesis refers to the absolutized infantile superego which, because of the fixation, did not develop normally towards the widening of values. It came to repress the instincts and to falsify rather than express the true conscience. Thus a causal analysis naturally raises the question of existential synthesis. The purpose of the analysis is to free the person from a false absolutization, that he may then seek out the "true absolute".

5. Correspondence to the Philosophy of Integrality

The purpose of this section is to show how Caruso's insistence on a transcendent relation as inherent to man finds its support and theoretical explanation in Sciacca's philosophy of integrality.

Caruso, though stressing the need for a "universal anthropology" remained ambivalent about it. This ambivalence, as will be discussed in Chapter IV, seems to have been intended as a safe-guard for truth, for avoiding any "false absolutization". It was a self-critical factor in his thought. It is this author's view that this factor

⁶³ Ibid., p. 126.

came itself to have an exaggerated importance for Caruso. Rather than helping to build a "universal anthropology", it came to undermine it. These ideas which will be elaborated in the next chapter are mentioned here only to emphasize the need for a stronger philosophical basis for Caruso's "thesis".

The philosophy of integrality as developed by Sciacca shares the early Caruso's deep concern for man's essential orientation to the transcendent as well as his critical stand vis-a-vis immanentism. Sciacca elaborates his philosophical anthropology on this basis. For this reason it has been chosen to provide a philosophical perspective for considering the formulations of Caruso's thought in psychology. This section will then focus on the support it provides for Caruso's "thesis".

In fact, there are two interlocking themes in Caruso's theory of neurosis that call for a philosophical foundation. The two themes concern the somato-psychic unity in man and the essential openness of this unity to transcendency.

On the one hand, Caruso defends the need for a biological causal-deterministic analysis because he recognizes as essential the determinate, corporeal-instinctive aspect of man. On the other hand, he stresses the need for existential synthesis because he sees human life as

constituted in relation to a "scale of values". For Caruso it is paramount that this "scale of values" be objective and transcendent. Central to his whole analysis of neurosis is the issue of conscience--a conscience essentially open to meaning and truth. Yet a conscience which in the course of its operative development in the superego (the concrete conscience) may deviate from this objectivity and close itself to true values. In neurosis such a course is adopted unwittingly or unconsciously in a circumstance where the individual is personally threatened. The focus of life is thus narrowed to the issue of "ego-survival". The particular "ego-ideal" involved is exaggerated in importance so that one is not open to objective reality and not able to make sound valuations. Although neurosis is an attempt to defend oneself in the subtle relations of ego, ego-ideal and instinct, it is at the same time the conscience's attempt at asserting what is beyond self: the values towards which that self is fundamentally open. The guilt feelings generated, and projected into a scapegoat, do not simply reflect the failure to meet an introjected ideal (in the superego), but basically come to express guilt for neurotic "superbia", for the hidden failure of the conscience. There is some ambiguity here in the implication of an unconscious failure of the conscience since one normally assumes a relatively

clear awareness in cases of actual failure. However, Caruso asserts that this ambiguity is part of the very nature of neurosis.⁶⁴

In view of the above it would seem that it is Caruso's particular conception of human conscience that lies at the core of his "thesis". However, it is not clear in Caruso's system where the conscience derives its ontological status. He suggests a formal, essential, even innate conscience which expresses itself concretely or operatively in the superego.⁶⁵ The problem, however, with

64 Caruso writes:

"We have seen that the overcoming of neurosis poses a guilt problem, for there can be no responsibility for errors without the possibility of guilt. But how can one be guilty of unconscious fixations? How can one make somebody responsible for developmental disturbances which have arisen in earliest childhood or perhaps even at the moment of birth? Daim [W. Daim, Die Umwertung der Psychoanalyse, Vienna, Herold, 1951, p. 253] remarks that psychotherapy is combating the natural results of collective guilt, that is of original sin. Unconsciousness and untruth are characteristic of fallen nature. All neurotic behavior, too, conditioned by original ignorance carries within itself the consequences of the universal offence."

Presumably Caruso means here that the neurotic or any human being for that matter begins to be free by acknowledging his given conditions to himself and taking responsibility for the weaknesses and difficulties that are a part of his nature. Ibid., p. 127-28.

65 Igor A. Caruso, "Personalistic Psychoanalysis as Symbolic Language," Journal of Psychotherapy and Religious Processes, 1955, 2, p. 13; see also section 3 above.

such a conception is in terms of how to construe this "essential conscience". Is it an a-priori category or transcendental? Is it a kind of Jungian collective archetype? Or is it an abstracted structural quality--an immanent essential form or structure of the operative super-ego? All these positions suggest a highly formal and abstract notion of conscience and it is presumably not such a formal abstract conscience that is producing neurosis but a concrete active one. Furthermore, these formal qualities may be transcendentals (in a Kantian-Gentilian sense), but they do not necessarily suggest a transcendent relation in the human subject.⁶⁶ And it is this transcendent relation which is the necessary "ingredient" of the human conscience in the production of neurosis in Caruso's argument.

Caruso seems eager and deeply concerned to see man in a genuine self-transcendence, in an openness to transcendent value. He rejects both the vision of man as an "autonomy of instinctual forces" and the vision of man as an "autonomy of freedom". He does not propose human freedom as some abstract general quality of mankind but chooses to discuss it, in fact, at the heart of neurosis, at the heart of an "unfree" condition, given in a concrete

⁶⁶ See Chapter I, sections 3B & 3C of this thesis.

psychopathology. However, for his "thesis" to hold, the principle of conscience has to find itself constituted as more than immanent formal quality. For in the latter conception it does not answer the central question about whether the human being may discover "true values".

It is Sciacca's philosophy of integrality which provides an understanding of the constitution of the human subject in his transcendent relation that answers this concern. This openness to the transcendent is the very focus of the Sciaccian anthropology and is expressed in two corollary principles: objective interiority and ontological disequilibrium.⁶⁷

Man cannot not transcend experience declares Sciacca in a philosophical tradition rooted in Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal, Rosmini and others. He thus overturns Kant's Critique. He is critical of any form of immanentistic rationalism. For Sciacca man cannot not think in the transcendent and objectively given truth, which constitutes his interiority as objective. Man experiences the concrete finite realities by virtue of the infinite norm which inheres in him and constitutes him ontologically. (One should note that this interiority is first an ontological given and not a gnoseological given: it is not simply an

67 See Chapter I, section 3B of this thesis.

innate concept or idea nor a formal property of human subjectivity, but an objective condition of the human subject.) Because of the inadequability of the infinite norm which constitutes him, the concrete existent is disequilibrated ontologically--in his very being. He is not existentially "autonomous" but in an essential dialogue. He does not arbitrarily assign meaning to the world. In fact, one could say that he is not simply in the world but penetrates it and transcends it. If Kant's vision in a certain sense is an image of human thought divorced from reality with the noumena ultimately inaccessible to it, Sciacca's vision is one where human thought not only may penetrate to the heart of reality of the world but in so doing arrives to the transcendent. All aspects of human dialogue are imprinted with this essential dialogue with the transcendent that is a given of the human nature. As Sciacca has said, man is by nature "transnatural".

Sciacca is critical of the reduction of transcendent to transcendental reality. For Sciacca the transcendental (e.g. in Kant or Gentile), is entirely a function of experience which gives it a content or matter. As a function of the intellectual perception of the world it is entirely conditioned by the world insofar as it needs the world to supply its content, without which it remains empty. In view of these considerations it is perhaps not surprising

to see this immanentistic view move towards a naturalism and even a materialism in certain currents of thought (e.g. from Hegel to Marx). Caruso seems himself to have followed this course becoming increasingly materialistic in his dialectics. From a Sciaccian perspective one must conclude that he lacked or somehow lost the philosophical assurance of a transcendent relation inherent to concrete human life. He came to gradually adopt the tenets of an immanentistic rationalism, and, being critical of idealism, moved increasingly towards a materialistic monistic conception.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ See Chapter I, sections 2D & 3C of this thesis.



CHAPTER IV

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE AMBIGUITY IN CARUSO'S DIALECTICS (HIS DEVELOPING "ANTITHESIS")

1. The Necessary Relation between Philosophy and Psychology According to Caruso; his Establishment of Philosophical Foundations for Psychology

Caruso stresses the importance and necessary role which philosophy plays in science, especially within psychology. He writes.

...nobody may stop the scientist from arranging his empirically acquired data into an orderly and significant whole by means of a logical process, and this applies even more to the psychologist, for the object of his research, as we have seen, is also a subject related to a meaningful transcendent order. This is precisely why even those psychologists who, frightened as they were of 'philosophising' as of an embarrassing disease, could not help, as it were unconsciously, drawing conclusions which, under the guise of objectivity, constituted a distinct philosophy. Yet to draw such conclusions is of particular importance to psychology; because the object of study is man, an object itself capable of drawing conclusions, thinking and of value judgements. Thus psychology, and in particular depth psychology, which is the science of the hidden motives of human behavior, plays its part in the philosophical thinking of our times; it is far better that it should play its part consciously than allow its influence to remain unrecognized.¹

¹ Igor A. Caruso, Existential Psychology--from Analysis to Synthesis, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1964, p. 212.

Caruso discusses the importance of a unified anthropological framework as a point of reference for a universal integral depth psychology in the following:

The question which a new generation of psychologists will ask is not so much whether man is a determinate being or responsible as how his specific freedom within the psychophysical determinants can best be represented and used within a unified and unequivocal anthropological framework... To take all aspects into account, even those which cannot be quantitatively or causally determined, is already perhaps to philosophise (Baudoin); but anthropology necessarily includes some such activity. Thus a universal integral depth psychology overlaps into the realms of both philosophy and science.²

Caruso himself is contributing to the preparatory phase of what that new generation of psychologists, about which he speaks in the above passage, will be developing. In his Existential Psychology³ he presents a highly original conception of contemporary psychology in its historical context. The originality lies perhaps not so much in his attempting to reconcile a deterministic Freudian psychology with the post-war existential reaction to what is reductionistic in this and other views of man. Nor is his conception of personality change and development in psychotherapy a radically new contribution in itself; although he is the first to state it so incisively and precisely for

2 Ibid., p. xix.

3 Ibid.

psychology (this is a reference to his stressing that causal-deterministic analysis must be complimented by existential synthesis, and to the corresponding theory about the positive and negative aspects of neurosis). His great originality is rather expressed in the support he provides for these views in what one could very well call his "universal integral anthropology" (i.e. in the philosophical value of the historical, social and psychological analyses that he makes showing the meaningfulness and necessity of an objective transcendent hierarchy of values).

2. Ambiguity in Caruso with Respect to a
Universal Anthropology--the Self-
Critical Factor in his Thought

One may note a certain ambiguity or theoretical ambivalence in Caruso's thinking about a universal anthropology. Although he stresses its need, he says we are not ready for such an anthropology, for a total view of man which would integrate all the modern scientific findings about man. For example, he writes concerning the partial truths discovered by science especially since the nineteenth century:

But for them our knowledge of man would be the poorer. Perhaps even now the time is not ripe for a complete integration of all these partial truths into a universal system of anthropology. On the contrary, however great the need for a universalist anthropology, it is

as yet too likely to lead to temptations of totalitarian thinking.⁴

However, his own critique of such partial views (for example, his critique of a deterministic depth psychology or of an "indeterministic" existential psychology), is based at least implicitly on a universal and total view of man.

One could agree that his view (with respect to his theory of the "objective transcendent hierarchy of values") is not "totalitarian" or "heretical": that is, he sees man in a genuine self-transcendence and does not therefore absolutize some immanent relative aspect of human existence. However, this theory of the "hierarchy of values", is already the core of a universal integral anthropology. Admittedly, there is not the full integration of all scientific findings concerning man; nor for that matter is the underlying philosophical anthropology not to undergo further development (for example the conception of the "transcendent hierarchy of values" may itself undergo further clarification, further refinement, further elaboration etc.). Caruso, however, does provide a definitive synthesis which suggests both an integral anthropology and a basis for the integration of scientific findings. In fact, the thrust of Caruso's whole program seems to be in such a direction.

4 Ibid., p. 202.

Caruso's ambiguity as a caution against false absolutes: a critique:--Caruso both wants and does not want a universal integral anthropology. His theoretical ambivalence is in some ways understandable. He wants to avoid perhaps some false absolutization, or some nominal reification of terms, and remain open to man's concrete history and to his concrete transcendence. Thus one may speak of a self-critical factor running through his thinking which would initially have a positive value (keeping one from false absolutes). Although the affirmation of a universalist anthropology may in some sense carry with it a "totalitarian" danger, however, the ambivalence or negation with respect to such an anthropology carries with it an equally "totalitarian" danger. The critical process and the doubting it involves can become themselves an absolute. This critical process is then no longer exercised with reference to that essential relation between human historicity and transcendence, but would come to serve an immanentistic dialectics. In fact, one may argue that the only "protection" one has against a "totalitarian" tendency is a universal anthropology which, as it were, perennially re-grasps man's originary synthesis as constituting a relation to the transcendent dimension. The "totalitarian" temptation to absolutize the relative, will always be there in the historical process and in the human

thought arising in that process. Historical man necessarily faces this danger. Neither can he defend himself against it via an indefinite postponement of the question it raises; rather through such a procedure he is likely to easily succumb to such a "totalitarianism".

3. Underlying Problem of Caruso's
Dialectics: an Immanentistic
Dialectics vs. a Dialectics
of Integrality

A. Source of the Problem

Caruso does express in his writings, especially in his Existential Psychology,⁵ a dialectics which one may say seeks to adequate man in his integrality by stressing his historical existence in its transcendent relation; this dialectics has been applied to psychology in Caruso's theory of neurosis as a defection from the "hierarchy of values" and in his theory of psychotherapy as a "causal-deterministic analysis" complimented by an "existential synthesis".

Within this framework, even as he stresses the transient nature and relativity of human principles and feelings, he points out their essential relation to a transcendent dimension. He writes:

5 Ibid.

All human principles and feelings are transitory and relative, uncertain and ambivalent, for on the one hand they relate to the hierarchy of values, objective and transcendent and, on the other, to the immediate reality of existence; and can thus be considered only dialectically.⁶

Yet even in the above passage one notes what one could call a marked emphasis on the negative aspect of the human: the latter's transient aspect, relativity, uncertainty and ambivalence. A certain ambiguity with regards to a universal anthropology has already been noted in Caruso's thinking. This ambiguity, although it initially aims at an appreciation of human transcendence, may, as has been suggested above, if pushed to an extreme, come to negate human integrality. A similar caution is in order with respect to the negative value of the human expressed above. It is positive in pointing to self-transcendence but may come to negate the very transcendence it seeks to guarantee if it is itself absolutized; if it loses its dialecticity in the sense of a dialectics of integrality (of a relation to the transcendent).

It is these issues which are understood here as constituting the central problem in Caruso's thought. They will be elaborated below.

6 Ibid., p. 94.

A period of change in Caruso's thought:--P. Eusebio Martínez, who published the second part of his thesis on Caruso, "Teoría de Igor A. Caruso sobre la persona en la psicología profunda,"⁷ met with Caruso in the late fifties to discuss the latter's work. He writes about a period of evolution in Caruso at that time:

Caruso se encuentra ahora en un período de evolución, dirigida por un espíritu sincero y abierto para encontrar y vivir el precioso don de la verdad sobre el hombre. El tema general de su doctrina actual se titula "personalismo dialéctico" y "realismo simbólico". Se mueve hacia una crítica hegeliana (dialéctica) del psicoanálisis. La concepción estática de la persona y de la realidad parece oponerse a esa dialéctica personalista; por eso desarrolla un realismo simbólico que intenta dar una nueva visión del mundo y de la persona; es una nueva acepción existencial de la cual, según él, debe penetrarse la práctica interpersonal, dirigida a una comprensión dinámica de los símbolos, que facilite el camino hacia la práctica del desarrollo personal independiente.⁸

The above passage actually presents an encapsulation of Caruso's program as it has developed over the years before and since the above was written. Martínez stresses the dialectical personalism and symbolic realism in the context of an Hegelian (dialectical) critique of psychoanalysis.

Martínez explains further the dominant characteristics of Caruso's thought at the time of the article.

⁷ P. Eusebio O. Martínez, "Teoría de Igor A. Caruso sobre la persona en la psicología profunda," Estudios filosóficos, 1959 (8), p. 315-16.

⁸ Ibid.

He writes:

La psicología de Caruso está penetrada de las siguientes características: Cristiana, teórico-práctica, histórico-dialéctica, concreta, realístico-simbólica y personal.

In the context of the present discussion of an ambivalence and negativity in Caruso's thinking about the human, it is not to any particular characteristic or aspect of his thought that the present critique is directed; but rather to the dialectics which pervade all his thinking, and are expressed to some degree in each of the "characteristics" noted above. It is clear that his basic program has been a dialectical interpretation, defence and development of psychoanalysis. His dialectics, as Martínez points out, has been Hegelian in inspiration; however, one may also note a Marxist influence in his later writings.¹⁰

The present critique will be based in a general way on Sciacca's vision of the crisis in modern and contemporary thought as previously discussed in Chapter I, section 2

⁹ Ibid., p. 317.

¹⁰ He expresses an affinity with Marxist concepts in several articles especially in terms of an emphasis on praxis and in his understanding of alienation. See: Igor A. Caruso, "Psychanalyse et Idéologie," Bulletin de psychologie, 1969-70, Vol. 23, n. 4-5, p. 215-20; Igor A. Caruso, "En finir avec l'aliénation?," Esprit, 1966 (34)a, no. 5, p. 1002-12; also, La psychanalyse contre la société Presses Universitaires de France, 1977.

of this thesis. Sciacca sees Hegel as the culmination of an immanentistic rationalism which ran its course from Descartes (where it was still in germinal form) through the British Empiricists, Kant, Fichte, Schelling up to Hegel. Following Hegel there was a chaos or fragmentation in the philosophical thinking. It is in this latter context that Sciacca renews the question of philosophical truth, of human truth and transcendence.

B. Caruso's Dialectics as
a Dialectics of Integrality

The "earlier" Caruso, though not a philosopher as such but a theorist-practitioner of psychoanalysis, had a vision and sense of the contemporary crisis which is commensurate with Sciacca's view.¹¹ He writes:

The dawn of humanism, the Reformation and the rise of modern democracy, contributed to the two-fold process of relative values becoming absolutes and, in direct consequence, of absolute values becoming relative ones. It was not only man who, in loosening or even breaking the ties of his metaphysical relationships, became free and autonomous; the absolutized values of freedom and science themselves became independent of man. A curious centrifugal movement resulted. Man's liberation from his Creator was the prelude to

¹¹ Michele Federico Sciacca, L'interiorità oggettiva, Milano, Marzorati, 1960a, p. 11-12; also see, Claude Della Zazzera, Individuality and Personality in Michele Federico Sciacca's Philosophy of Integrality (Implications for Psychology), Master's thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1976, p. 18-23.

the absolute independence of all creatures, including his own; economic and political theories, for instance, turned into ends in themselves. Depending on whether he intended to confer absolute value on an abstract individual or on an abstract society of individuals, man fell prey to nihilism or to totalitarianism. Indeed, the more he placed himself at the apex of the hierarchy or scale of values, the more uncertain became his relationship with the world. It was as if politics, economics, technology and art were all in some way becoming independent of him and threatening to enslave him--which is exactly what happened during the disasters that marked the first half of our century.¹²

Caruso is describing in the above the profound fragmentation and alienation of man in our modern times. He sees this fragmentation in man as resulting from an absolutization of man himself and from a loss of his transcendent relation. This view is very close to Sciacca's conception of history.

Although Caruso sees man as having made real progress since the Renaissance, he does not view this progress in a simply formal or abstracted way; rather he attempts to grasp its value and meaning in a concrete way. Thus, one would say he does not have at this point an absolutist notion of progress. He writes:

God was 'dead'. His place was taken by total man, with his reason and his urge toward enlightenment. Soon man became superman; but this entailed the appearance of subman. This divorce is, paradoxically, implicit in the very belief in progress. Between the wars it was the fashion in certain reactionary circles to deny the reality of progress, yet progress has brought forth great things.

¹² Caruso, op. cit., 1964, p. x.

Through such ideas as liberty, equality, fraternity, humanity has helped gradually to free the weak, the poor and the sick. Women have become emancipated, and so have whole nations and races; the goal of this gradual liberation was greater justice, health, and happiness. But the hubris of this uprooted, immanent, absolutized concept of humanity was soon to reveal itself. Humanism in the service of total man toppled over into its own contradiction and disavowal, and progress went into a terrifying decline; alongside a purely formal progress came the murder of liberty and human dignity, the extermination of the helpless, mass murder, total war, concentration camps, the atom bomb--all the vast misery and dread of this century.¹³

It should be emphasized that in the above it is the hubris or excessive pride in the concept of humanity of our modern age and not the humanistic discovery of man as such that has promoted alienation. So that when Caruso speaks of the divorce between the subman and the superman as being implicit in his belief in progress, one may interpret him as saying that a deformation of man is possible and has been actual with progress but that it is not a necessary or "essential" property of progress. In other words one may still make progress without a negative absolutization. Progress may bring with it a temptation: a temptation to absolutize the new discovery, to fail to see its legitimate boundaries; it is a temptation to which mankind all too often succumbs; but the failure is not a simple automatic attribute or consequence of progress

¹³ Ibid., p. 10.

as such. This will be considered further below in the discussion of the dialectics of becoming and development as presented by Sciacca's philosophy of integrality.

One may say that in a general way the historical dialectics of Caruso in the above passages conform to a vision of human integrality. They provide a general framework for his theory of neurosis as a defection from the "objective transcendent hierarchy of values". It is clear then that the general healing of man's relationship to himself and to the world is not independent from the healing of his relationship to the transcendent. These two relationships are therefore not separate worlds, although there is a distinctness between them. Thus one may conclude with respect to the above, that Caruso does express a dialectics of human integrality.

C. Shift Towards an
Immanentistic Dialectics

However, there is an ambiguity concerning this issue of transcendence in Caruso, an ambiguity which is present in a germinal way in the earlier writings and which becomes resolved increasingly in the direction of an immanentistic dialectics in his later writings. It is of note, however, that the theoretical ambivalence seems never definitively resolved in one direction or the other.

It seems that the Hegelian and later Marxist influence on the formulation of his dialectics leads Caruso to a depreciation and/or avoidance of the crucial sense of transcendence that he expressed above. The problem may be formulated as follows: his dialectics of man's immanence-transcendence (which correspond to a dialectics of integrality) does not sufficiently assimilate either the idealistic dialectics of Hegel or the materialistic dialectics of Marx. Rather the movement of his thought is apparently in the other direction.

In order to clarify the point of view of the philosophy of integrality on the question of an immanentistic dialectics, Sciacca's critique of a dialectics of the resolution of opposites will be discussed below. Following this a number of passages from articles which Caruso wrote in the sixties will be critically evaluated in the light of a dialectics of integrality.

D. Sciacca's Critique of an Immanentistic
Dialectics of the Resolution of Opposites

Sciacca is critical of a dialectics of the simple resolution of opposites; he proposes a dialectics of implication and compresence of the different orders of

both being and becoming.¹⁴ Within this context, he is critical of any dialectics which places before man a simply indefinite term or goal; that is, in front of an indefinite progression of the finite.¹⁵ Man is not simply finite or inde-finite or finite and inde-finite, but possesses a relation to the infinite.¹⁶ Thus the compresence and implication of Sciacca's dialectics is to be understood with respect to this relation; this dialectics supports a philosophy of human integrality. In an immanentistic dialectics the finite is ever negating itself in an indefinite progression. In the Sciaccian dialectics this progress may not be considered in its integrality without

14 Michele Federico Sciacca, Atto ed essere, Milano, Marzorati, 1960b, p. 26-34; see also Chapter I, section 3A of this thesis.

15 Michele Federico Sciacca, La libertà e il tempo, Milano, Marzorati, 1965, p. 92-93.

16 Dr. Ruda explains this distinction between infinite and indefinite:

"...l'indéfini est, en fait, l'espace de la mathématique dénommé infini au sens impropre du terme, l'infini étant un concept seulement et proprement philosophique et non mathématique. En effet, l'indéfini est ce à quoi on peut toujours ajouter quelque chose parce qu'il lui manquera toujours quelque chose. Mais l'infini est ce à quoi on ne peut rien ajouter parce que c'est un concept qui implique l'absoluité (assolutezza) et l'absence de limites."

O. J. Ruda, Dialectique de la personnalité, Ottawa, Les éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1973, p. 31 & 34-35; also, Sciacca, op. cit., 1965, p. 198-99.

the transcendent relation that is implicit to it. Without the transcendent relation the opposition between the finite and the indefinite (the procession of that finite from one expression to another in the historical or temporal process of change), is absolutized, and the nature of the human dialectics is negated.¹⁷

E. Caruso's Dialectics
as Lacking Integrality

A critique of Caruso's dialectics of man and man, and of man and nature:--Caruso speaks of an opposition between man and nature and between man and man which he suggests might be intrinsic or "essential" to man. He writes:

... on peut se demander avec L. Feuerbach si toute relation humaine n'est pas aliénante dans une certaine mesure, le Moi subjectif ne coïncidant jamais complètement avec le Moi objectif vu par l'autre. La société, même la meilleure, ne prétend pas seulement garantir l'épanouissement de l'individu dans toutes ses relations enrichissantes: elle limite ces dernières par la présence de l'Autre. Dans notre société, selon Marx, "l'objet de mon désir est propriété de l'Autre"; cela est évident et le marxiste orthodoxe ajoutera que cette aliénation générale disparaîtra

¹⁷ A dialectics of the "exclusion of contraries" will tend to separate the immanent from the transcendent, God from man but it does not imply an immanentistic perspective; a dialectics of the resolution of opposites is implicitly immanentistic:--it dissolves one order into the other, eliminates transcendence and tends therefore towards pantheism or atheism at one level, towards idealistic or materialistic monism on another level.

avec la communauté des moyens de production. Je n'en suis pas si sûr. L'homme désire le Tout, mais l'histoire qui se fait dans le concret le limite. Il importe cependant que la présence (peut-être inéluctable) de cette aliénation "essentielle anthropologique" ne serve pas d'alibi pour contrecarrer les efforts qui tendent à supprimer l'exploitation de base et les aliénations psycho-sociales et psychologiques qui en sont les corollaires. Le combat contre l'exploitation économique et l'aliénation secondaire contribue d'ailleurs à la réduction de l'aliénation anthropologique "essentielle", même si cette dernière est vraiment dans quelque mesure une "condition humaine", ce qui n'est pas certain ou du moins échappe encore à une affirmation précise.¹⁸

¹⁸ Caruso, *op. cit.*, 1966a, p. 1011; in another context, Caruso writes that there is not some essential opposition between nature and culture. Despite this avowal, one has the impression that culture is inherently a negation of nature (this will be elaborated in Chapter V in terms of Caruso's negative ontology). Caruso writes:

"...il n'y a pas d'antinomie fondamentale entre nature et culture, ce ne sont pas deux réalités opposées par leur 'essence'. La culture naît de la nature--au niveau de l'homme. Elle existe en tant que potentialité de développement dans le schéma "naturel" du comportement humain. La nature est dépassée dans l'acte culturel de l'homme, elle se transcende elle-même. Nous entrons la dans le domaine de la sublimation, du transfert et de la perversion avec tout ce que ces ramifications, ces segmentations et ces déformations de la pulsion naturelle peuvent comporter de contradictions et de conflits. La civilisation ne peut pas aller sans contraindre l'homme à se heurter à ces contradictions, à ces crises et à ces tensions. A une étape concrète de son évolution toujours pleine de contradictions, la civilisation peut paraître particulièrement contre-nature; elle représente, si l'on veut, l'élément de l'histoire de l'humanité qui est à la fois contre-nature et donné par la nature..."

Igor A. Caruso, *La psychanalyse contre la société?*, Presses Universitaires de France, trans. from the German by Jeanne Ettore, 1977, p. 80.

One could agree to some degree with the above remarks in that there is in historical man a failure of integrality with nature and with fellow man which he suffers perennially throughout his history. However, in what does this "intrinsic alienation" consist? At best Caruso suggests some kind of basic opposition which can be overcome with historical progress. He writes:

...même une société d'avenir, étant société, sera basée sur les échanges. On peut et on doit se demander dans quelle mesure tout échange, c'est à dire toute demande et toute réponse, tout cadeau même, est aliénant. Mais le domaine des échanges injustes et forcés doit diminuer avec la fin de l'exploitation et le nivellement de ses superstructures aliénantes. Nous pouvons entrevoir les échanges communautaires qui ne soient ni humiliants ni anonymes, étant puisés dans un trésor commun; de tels échanges--nous sommes encore en pleine utopie, mais l'histoire est l'accomplissement des utopies--pourraient donc être vraiment humains, personnels.¹⁹

However, does not much of human experience contradict what Caruso, echoing Feuerbach, is saying about an essential alienation or even an initial alienation in human exchanges? The problem from the point of view of a dialectics of integrality is not that the self in exchanging with the other suffers some alienation because of some I-not-I dialectics; the exchange is not alienating--it is whatever is a failure in the exchange that is alienating: it is not as deep, true and pervasive as one would wish;

19 Caruso, op. cit., 1966a, p. 1011.

there are limits imposed on community, on communion, on love. Caruso writes with regards to love:

Tout homme est faible dans quelque aspect de son existence, il est toujours livré à l'Autre. L'amour compense cette dépossession de soi-même, mais l'amour idéal n'est pas de ce monde, et surtout pas de cette civilisation qui est la nôtre.²⁰

Is Caruso implying in the above that to be submitted to the other is unequivocally alienating? Again, this does not seem to be the case in concrete human life. Love is not a compensation for some basic opposition between self and other so that one will be able to stand the other, but the realization of affinity and difference between self and other which step by step overcomes obstacles to union. There is not ideal love in this world or civilization Caruso says above; however, one would add that there is real love, and if, as he says elsewhere, history is the accomplishment of utopias, then real love legitimately aspires to ideal love. In the concrete and historical situation of man, belonging to an other may indeed be alienating of one's humanity; but belonging to the other may also signify a lover's genuine surrender, which does not alienate him but, in fact, grants him sovereignty

20 Ibid., p. 1010.

and integrity.²¹

As there is not, from the point of view of human integrality, an essential or basic opposition between man and man, so is there not one between man and nature. There is, however, a failure of integrality in both these realms; it is evident that mortal man does suffer from an alienation within himself, with others and with nature: there is a failure of being yet the essential contact remains salutary. Nature is negating in its failure, or in man's failure in relation to it, yet its essential alterity remains positive for man. There is not, from this perspective, the essential negation of man and culture on the part of nature, as Caruso implies.²² The failure that runs deep in nature, in man, and in the relationship between man and nature is not an essential opposition or alienation and less as an essential opposition simply overcome through some immanent progress.²³ Man's progress and

21 In his article "Psychanalyse et souveraineté de l'homme," *Esprit*, 1966 (34)b, n. 1, p. 3-20, Caruso presents a vision of human sovereignty which in our view misses the positive aspect of "belonging"; which a dialectics should have brought out.

22 Caruso, op. cit., 1966a, p. 1012.

23 Caruso seems to suggest that the affirmation of transcendence implies the denial of immanence; he writes:

"La mort est la réification dernière et totale; et toute oppression est au service de la mort, puisqu'elle déshumanise. L'homme ne sera ni libre ni

humanization in nature finds its meaning in human transcendence. In this way progress finds its norm in the service of man, and man is not submitted to progress in an inhuman way (this will be discussed further below). Indeed, even before a given evil, man may find the way to make good

heureux aussi longtemps qu'il ne supprimera pas la mort et ses mille masques.

Les religions ont projeté cette victoire suprême dans le domaine de la transcendance. Plus exactement-- pour rester sur le terrain de notre civilisation--le messianisme juif et l'eschatologie chrétienne ont été vidés de leur réalisme charnel, de leur contenu matérialiste et immanent. Cette triste désincarnation a été payée de nouvelles aliénations ici-bas, plus ou moins équilibrées par les promesses de l'au-delà. Celles-ci sont souvent un alibi de la mauvaise conscience, parfois un 'opium'."

Caruso, op. cit., 1966b, p. 18-19.

There may be some truth to what Caruso is saying here, however, one cannot accept his assumption that a quest for a transcendent solution to such a problem as death is somehow an alibi of bad conscience or an "opium".

In fact Caruso's position in this matter casts some ambiguity on his understanding of the principles of personalization and humanization which are focal to his theory. He writes:

"Le propre de l'instrument, de la technique est de révéler et de hâter ce que j'ai appelé la personnalisation progressive, c'est-à-dire le processus d'hominisation, de la transmutation de la nature en culture, de l'objet en conscience, de l'"histoire" naturelle en histoire tout court."

Igor A. Caruso, Psychanalyse pour la personne, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1962a, p. 142. This definition of personalization and humanization becomes ambiguous from the position of a philosophy of integrality in view of the above considerations. Is the transcendent an essential factor in these processes? This seems to become an uncertainty for Caruso.

to come from this privation (this is by virtue of his transcendence).²⁴

A critique of Caruso's view of human becoming:--
Caruso opposes a static with a dialectical view of man.
He writes:

The novelty of the analytic technique consists in studying man as someone who alters both himself and the world. The difference between this and earlier psychological techniques is that it is not an observation from without, but implies the involvement of both partners in the analysis.

Here is found the difference in principle between dialectic, on the one hand, and metaphysics and positivism, on the other. Essentialist methods--and this holds true for metaphysics as for positivism--contemplate man from without and aim at establishing his essence or static character. Dialectic, on the contrary, is necessarily and consciously a "praxis" since it concedes that consciousness has its effects on the world and the world has its effects on consciousness. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to speak of dialectic as being at least latent in the most orthodox psychoanalysis, because analysis is intrinsically concerned with the most fundamental characteristic of dialectic--that of being necessarily a "praxis" modifying the reciprocal relation of subject and object in a historical and all-inclusive perspective. Like every dialectic, psychoanalysis is the constant and fluid passage from one determination to another, from one pole of the relation to the other. At each stage of this spiral, contradictions are overcome and newly integrated. There is always a reciprocity of man with the world--or rather, man with the world of men, because the world consists above all of other men. This is not the linear, unilateral causality of metaphysics and positivism.

[From footnote]

The dialectic is, therefore, not just one scientific "method" among others, to be employed or

24 See Chapter V, section 3 of this thesis.

rejected, depending on which scientific hypothesis is in current favor. It is, first and foremost, a sharp awareness of the necessary course for every "praxis" involving man. Either reality will be accepted as an unchangeable object, essentially identical with itself, or it will be recognized as constantly alterable by conscious "praxis". Either man will find himself face to face with a world which he considers an a-priori and hence inhuman destiny, alterable at most by a voluntarism still more alienating, or he will see himself as acting in and on the world, just as he is acted on by it.

Whatever one may think of the dogmatic stratifications and naiveties of psychoanalysis, its basic attitude is certainly the second in each set of the above alternatives.²⁵ The point is to make it fully conscious of this.

Caruso says above that reality will either be accepted as an unchangeable object, essentially identical with itself, or it will be recognized as constantly alterable by conscious "praxis". He continues that either man will find himself face to face with a world which he considers a-priori and presenting an inhuman destiny ... or he will see himself as acting in and on the world, just as he is acted on by it. In the context of a dialectics of integrality this point of view presents an abstracted picture. Staticity and change are opposed and, for that matter, corollary in the world of becoming. But man is not for the sake of his becoming; he becomes for the sake of his being.

²⁵ Igor A. Caruso, "How Social is Psychoanalysis?" Cross Currents, 1962b, (12), p. 24-25.

Sciacca makes the distinction between becoming (divenire) and development or unfolding (sviluppare).²⁶

The former is the actualization of potency, the latter the expression of actual being; the former is the being-in-potency becoming actual, the latter is the potency or power of being actualizing itself.²⁷ The former be-comes, comes to be out of potentiality; the latter expresses its actuality in the becoming (in doing so, however, it is not properly said to simply become or come to be--since it is already--but to develop or achieve its fulfillment. Man (and nature in its essential sharing of the human destiny)²⁸ is not pure process; his dialecticity is not simply an abstracted becoming; a becoming abstracted from his being in its transcendent relation. Man is not without substantiality even as he becomes.

Caruso sees man in a limitless becoming. He writes:

Ni dans la nature, ni dans la culture, qui est le milieu propre de l'homme, rien n'est jamais immobile: tout devient. Certes, le devenir dans la nature (celui de l'animal, par exemple), est bien plus limité et partant plus prévisible que celui de l'homme qui travaille à identifier le monde avec la

26 Michele Federico Sciacca, L'uomo questo "squillibrato", Milano, Marzorati, 1963, p. 55; Sciacca, op. cit., 1965, p. 116-19.

27 For a distinction between these terms, see: Sciacca, op. cit., 1960, p. 53-57; also Della Zazzera, op. cit., 1976, p. 39-40.

28 See Chapter I, section 3C of this thesis.

culture et qui crée les utopies pour les réaliser. L'animal est davantage "achevé" que l'homme. Le titre de noblesse de l'homme est son devenir illimité dans la culture; toute situation "achevée" est pour lui un lit de Procuste.²⁹

Caruso says in the above passage that "L'animal est d'avantage achevé." This, one could say, is because the animal does not have the weight of responsibility for making and developing his own life. All of nature is "d'avantage achevée" in this sense. But it does not mean that man has not his own kind of achievement and accomplishment that is proper to him; whereby one may say that man is, from the beginning, "d'avantage achevé" over nature. In fact man stands above nature in being "d'avantage achevé"--as he can be "d'avantage inachevé": a failure that affects man is graver than a failure that affects only nature.

Man is not simply in a process of pure becoming and creation; from his inception he is also involved in a consummation and communion (achèvement) proper to his being.³⁰ Man rightfully seeks peace, fulfillment and finalization proper to his nature. One would say then, contradicting Caruso, that "Le titre de noblesse de l'homme

29 Caruso, op. cit., 1966b, p. 3.

30 Father Charles Henkey in his course "Systematic Theology" (1972), at Loyola College (now Concordia University, Montreal) made the distinction between "progress" and "consummation". He suggested that for man "progress" without "consummation" is an inhuman destiny; man's term is the "infinite" and not the "indefinite".

n'est pas son devenir illimité dans la culture" and "toute situation 'achevée' n'est pas pour lui un lit de Procuste." Man indeed discovers the indefinitude of his own becoming and of nature, but he discovers it by virtue of a relationship to the infinite that is his given--that achieves him.³¹ His being is thus both achevé and inachevé (achevé in his ontological synthesis; inachevé in the sense of the limits that this synthesis gives him). He is not achevé in the sense of immobility or staticity but in a way proper to the order of his being: in a given self-transcendence which Sciacca elaborates in the principles of objective interiority (interiorità oggettiva) and ontological disequilibrium ('squilibrio' ontologico).³²

Sciacca notes in discussing the dialectics of implication and compresence that man has the privilege of being ontologically dissatisfied: "ha l'orgoglio ontologico di essere sempre insodisfatto."³³ However, although this may at first sight resemble Caruso's position of man as "inachevé", there is a fundamental difference between the

31 For a distinction between the indefinite and the infinite, see footnote 16 above.

32 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960a, p. 106; Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 256-66; also Della Zazzera, op. cit., 1976, p. 29-32; see also Chapter I, section 3B of this thesis.

33 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 33; see also Chapter I, section 3A of this thesis.

two. In Caruso one is led to the conclusion that this "inachèvement" is a pure incompleteness and negativity in the heart of man that somehow generates his becoming.³⁴ In Sciacca, however, this "dissatisfaction" and "disequilibrium" in man rests on a synthesis--a primordial completeness and "achèvement" that unfolds and conditions his "inachèvement" and incompleteness.³⁵ Man is ontologically disequibrated because his finitude meets the infinite in his interiority, in the very ground of his being. The Carusoian man is not conceived in relation to the infinite in the proper sense, but rather in relation to the indefinite (the finite ever adding to itself indefinitely thus essentially, or by its very nature, never constituting the infinite). Human becoming is thus not viewed in its integrality (in its relation to the infinite) but is abstracted from the ontological synthesis. In such a conception human becoming loses what one may call its mediatory value; it loses that beyond for which and in

34 See Chapter V, section 3D of this thesis.

35 Sciacca writes in this regard:

"La pienezza di noi stessi è un'esigenza intrinseca al dinamismo interno del nostro spirito, ma non è attuabile nell'ordine umano e con le nostre sole forze pur essendo una nostra permanente e indis-truttibile possibilità."

Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 33.

relation to which it exists. Progress and becoming no longer are seen to serve man in his ontological synthesis but man is made the slave of immanent progress and becoming. This position inevitably leads to a loss of faith in even the progress and becoming itself, for every new stage of development is simply destined to negate itself. It is, therefore, not surprising to see Caruso himself turn to a pessimistic and quasi-nihilistic view of man's future in his later writings.³⁶

A critique of Caruso's dialectics of theory and praxis:--Caruso's ambivalence towards a universal relationship in man, in the sense of a transcendent presence becomes, over the years, increasingly problematic from the point of view of a philosophy of integrality. This ambivalence seems by moments no longer to be serving man's historical-transcendent relation as a positive critical factor (see above), but comes to negate or at least avoid this relationship.

Caruso is perhaps seeking a solution to this ambivalence by grounding ideological change in praxis. For example, he writes:

³⁶ This is developed further in Chapter V, section 3 of this thesis.

...la critique de l'idéologie va de pair avec un reste indestructible d'idéologie dans la critique lui-même--ce fait ne constitue un cercle vicieux qu'en apparence. La critique de l'idéologie n'est pas un relativisme pur pour lequel toutes les opinions se valent; elle doit, pour rester digne de foi, passer constamment par l'autocritique du critique et ce dernier ne doit en aucun moment perdre de vue les restes présents de ses propres idéologies. Le critique n'est pas un être abstrait qui planerait, lui, au-dessus de la critique. Au contraire, il a le devoir d'être en état, grâce à une méthode éprouvée, de calculer la part de sa propre perméabilité aux idéologies dans le travail critique même qu'il accomplit...

...l'homme qui observe l'évolution est engagé dans cette évolution et ne peut s'en abstraire comme juge intangible et souverain. Le critique participe à la misère critiquée. Il est appelé à démasquer et à combattre cette misère--non seulement dans l'Autre, mais avant toutes choses dans son propre Moi, en accomplissant la prise de conscience et en faisant la "praxis".³⁷

One notes in the above passage that Caruso, in keeping with certain dominant currents of contemporary thought, grounds the process of ideological change in praxis. He writes in the above: "Le critique ... a le devoir d'être en état, grâce à une méthode éprouvée, de calculer la part de sa propre perméabilité aux idéologies dans le travail critique même qu'il accomplit." Let us emphasize the words "grâce à une méthode éprouvée." By them Caruso stresses the importance of a method that is validated in action, in praxis; which in this case is the experimental

³⁷ Igor A. Caruso, "Psychanalyse et Idéologie," Bulletin de psychologie, 1969-70, vol. 23, n. 4-5, p. 219.

situation of psychoanalysis. This emphasis on praxis recurs in many of Caruso's writings.

Psychoanalysis, writes Caruso in this connection, shares Pilate's scepticism about the truth; but he adds that it renews the question of truth at each moment of the concrete life.³⁸ This statement is intended to be paradoxical; there is the implication that a scepticism of this kind about universal truth, is somehow reconcilable or even might favor a positive and concrete development of personality based in truth.

In our view, if the guarantee of truth following Caruso is to be found in praxis (since the critique of ideology is rooted in it), one has to see that that praxis is a genuinely human praxis.

If gnosis (theory) and praxis, conceived in an immanentistic sense, are to be the sole terms of the dialectics, one will then absolutize the gnosis or the praxis or both and lose their integrality. One may identify them; one may oppose them; one may reduce one to the other but ever remain without a conclusive sense of human integrality--in Sciaccian terms--because the transcendent dimension is not considered. Theory and praxis are an insufficient dialectics of the human unless there is

38 Ibid., p. 220.

discovered the objective transcendent principle inherent to both. For the idealists (e.g. Hegel, Gentile) one could say that praxis comes out of the movement of theory; for the materialists (e.g. Marx) one could say that theory comes out of the movement of praxis. For Sciacca, theory (reason) rises out of the concrete man, but the concrete praxis is seen in its originary humanness (i.e. is intelligent because of a given transcendence).³⁹

A critique of Caruso's dialectics of the symbol:-- Caruso's dialectics of the symbol is a dialectics of the abstract or transcendental and the concrete. He rejects a philosophy of the symbol or idea which only considers the "transparency" of pure ideas. He writes:

Ce n'est pas à l'aide d'"idées pures" que l'analyse veut contribuer à la libération de l'homme; il ne suffira pas de savoir spéculativement la cause d'un comportement pour le supprimer ou le modifier... Ce comportement, il faudra le "vivre" dans son opacité, et ayant pris conscience de cette opacité, en assumer peu à peu la transparence, qui en est l'antithèse dialectique.

39 Sciacca writes:

"Non è vero che l'uomo nasca 'alla vita morale' con la coscienza riflessa dopo essere nato 'alla vita umana' con la coscienza immediata, in quanto la coscienza diretta è già morale e porta implicita la verità che scopre la riflessione."

For the above discussion about theory and praxis the point to be derived from this passage by Sciacca is that human life (and therefore human activity and "praxis") itself contains "la verità che scopre la riflessione" (the truth which discovers reflection). Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 128-29.

...Le propos de l'analyse n'est pas l'impossible identité du connaissant avec le connu, la prétendue transparence de l'idée abstraite...⁴⁰

Caruso goes on to explain his conception of the symbol:

Car le symbole de toute connaissance étant comme un compromis entre le connaissant et le connu, il est par là même transcendance de l'un, mais aussi imman-entisation, réduction de l'autre. Le symbole, il faut bien le répéter, est toujours opaque en même temps que transparent: il signifie toujours chute de l'être dans l'existence limitée, mais aussi élévation de l'existence vers plus d'être. Le symbole n'est jamais élémentaire, n'est pas une monade, il ouvre des voies d'analogies vers d'autres symboles plus adéquats à l'être. Le symbole est toujours séparation, mais il est avant tout lien--avec les régions encore voilées de l'être; nul symbole ne peut être enfermé adéquatement dans les catégories de l'individualisme abstrait, du rationalisme se suffisant à lui-même, du positivisme naïvement réaliste.

Une vraie ascension dialectique de la conscience est toujours faite de telles ambiguïtés.⁴¹

Despite the "omni-comprehensiveness" of Caruso's view of the symbol expressed above, he remains non-committal about the place of the transcendent in his scheme. For example, he writes:

Le symbole, issu de la rencontre entre le connais-sant et le connu, est toujours, venons-nous de dire, ambigu, contradictoire: émergeant de la relativité du développement historique, une rencontre définitive et absolue signifierait identité univoque et parfaite, apporterait eo ipso la fin des tâtonnements humains... Le symbole est essentiellement historique, fruit du développement. Y a-t-il cependant, sous-tendant ce

⁴⁰ Igor A. Caruso, "La technique analytique en tant que technique 'existentielle'," Acta psychotherapeutica et psychosomatica, 1960, p. 17-18.

⁴¹ Caruso, op. cit., 1962a, p. 26-27.

développement, un principe qui rende ces étapes nécessaires, et qui serait ainsi le principe même de l'histoire et de toute évolution: un principe supra-dialectique de ce dialogue incessant? Toute l'histoire--le dialogue entier de la connaissance--ne serait-elle pas elle-même un vaste déroulement de symboles de ce qui est au-delà de la symbolization? Le développement de la conscience ne serait-il pas un acheminement vers ce qui est source et fin de tout développement et de toute connaissance relative, le Point Omega de P. Teilhard de Chardin? Ou serait-il vrai, au contraire, que tout ce que l'homme cherche au-delà des symboles et croit être immuable, absolu, transcendant à la relativité--que tout cela serait mythe aliénant, mystification, projection illusoire de sa misère?⁴²

However, in some of his writings as was seen earlier, Caruso did stress the necessity of a transcendent relation. In the above he presents the transcendent as an open question. He even suggests in an abstruse way that the contradiction between a transcendent and immanentistic position might be resolved supra-historically:

Il est peut-être permis de songer à une synthèse, irréalisable certes dans l'histoire, qui réconcilierait la grande contradiction de la pensée occidentale. Dans cette contradiction, Dieu est ou bien l'Autre absolu, et qui se fait homme dans le relatif de la kénosis, ou bien il est la projection de l'aliénation humaine, laquelle sera entièrement dépassée un jour par l'Homme absolu.⁴³

But he does not elaborate what he means by such an "absolute Man".

42 Ibid., p. 25-26.

43 Ibid., p. 27.

However, a dialectics cannot operate independently of a solution of some kind to the focal problem which Caruso poses above. Neither may the issue be simply postponed to an utopical future. Is this hesitation and doubt then, the source of ambiguity in Caruso?

In his efforts to overcome the theoretical ambivalence which this problem generates Caruso is insistent on the relativity of all human development. He writes:

Et il est en effet certain que c'est bien le cas lorsque l'homme tient pour définitif et absolu un symbole acquis dans son histoire et qui est nécessairement ambigu et provisoire. Peut-il en être autrement dans la limitation du développement? Et la définition la plus dogmatique est encore une synthèse bien provisoire et approximative. Absolutiser la connaissance quelle qu'elle soit, même la plus sublime et la plus intimement certaine, est la tentation du gnosticisme; n'y voir qu'une expérience fermée sur elle-même et ne supposant aucun prolongement vers des sources archétypiques est celle de l'agnosticisme relativiste.⁴⁴

These statements further complicate the ambiguity in Caruso. From the one side, he is saying that all symbols are provisional and ambiguous; from the other side, he is judging all human knowledge from above, from a transcendental height, as it were. Caruso writes above that to absolutize knowledge, even the most sublime and most intimately certain is falling into the temptation of gnosticism. But, is he not assuming that his statements are presumably true, and is he not therefore absolutizing his relativity?

44 Ibid., p. 26.

Supposedly, Caruso is positing the limits in human knowledge and in the symbol, in order to express reality more adequately, more deeply and fully. It is also a way to express the transcendence of the norm that inheres in human knowing. But if Caruso simply negates the symbol without a transcendent reference, then he makes room for a worse totalization and reification than that with which he had started struggling at the beginning.

The norm for ideological change, for a transformation and change of the symbol is not simply the progressive one as it seems to be for Caruso. The symbol (i.e. human knowledge expressed in symbols) has also a guiding and directive role: it is not there to serve movement and change as if these were absolutes. Human knowledge can legitimately serve to protect from movement and change that are simply entropic. In doing so it does not seek simply to adequate becoming or progress; in Sciaccian terms one could say that it also seeks to promote development, to conform becoming to development; it seeks to enrich the ontological synthesis which constitutes the human personality and the communion of persons. Thus, it has a transcendent meaning or purpose.⁴⁵

45 Caruso writes:

"Et l'histoire humaine, comme la connaissance humaine, consiste à laisser derrière soi des synthèses provisoires pour en arriver à de nouvelles synthèses plus

adéquates au palier de mûrissement. Par là même, le palier dépassé devient un symbole de plus en plus opaque; il pouvait être nécessaire pour le développement; mais si l'on ne le dépassait pas, si l'on restait 'fixé' à ce symbole archaïque, il deviendrait valeur négative, non-valeur, au point de vue du devenir personnel. Toute la dialectique du 'bien' et du 'mal' tient dans le dépassement des valeurs relatives, à un stade donné du développement; ces valeurs relatives deviennent, à ce nouveau palier, des non-valeurs relatives. Tant de relativité n'a rien à voir avec le relativisme, car il ne s'agit pas d'"indifférence"--bien au contraire!--mais d'adéquation à un devenir."

Ibid., p. 23; Caruso here makes becoming the norm for human development. In his later work (after Existential Psychology) Caruso places more and more emphasis on progress and becoming as the sole norms of human development. He simply identifies human being and human becoming where he writes,

"L'être n'étant pas ce qui est devenu et donc passé, mais étant le devenir, c'est un meurtre de l'être que de le faire devenir autre que ce qu'il est, en lui fermant les voies de son devenir qui, seules, le mèneront à ce qu'il est."

See Caruso, op. cit., 1966b, p. 4.

Sciaccia criticizes this identification of being and becoming in Gentile's philosophy. He writes:

"Ma c'è davvero questo divenire dell'essere e che cos'è? Se essere e divenire s'identificano, il 'divenire dell'essere' non è che il 'divenire del divenire'. E allora l'essere non c'è affatto. Infatti, il 'divenire dell'essere' non è altro che l'"essere del divenire"; ma l'essere del divenire è il non-essere del divenire; dunque il divenire non è.

...Non vi è il divenire dell'essere, che è negazione dell'essere e del divenire, ma divenire nell'essere."

Sciaccia, op. cit., 1960b, p. 168-69; see also Chapter I, sections 3A and 3F of this thesis.

4. An Understanding of Theory and Praxis
in the Framework of a Philosophy
of Integrality

The philosophy of integrality provides a light and vision which, when applied to Caruso's thought, renews his program of seeking the relation between philosophy and science, of seeing man in his historical and existential concreteness while emphasizing his openness to the transcendent. The focus in this section will be on the relationship between theory and praxis since this has been a central concern of Caruso's system.

Contemporary thought has insisted on the dependency of thought on praxis; this notion of praxis can be adequately elucidated by the philosophy of integrality.

Sciacca has shown, in a definitive way, how the human reason is impossible to conceive without a constitutive transcendence. He has also argued that self-consciousness and reason have to develop in man from an originary ontological synthesis of human life.⁴⁶ Thus, one may extrapolate that human thought can develop from praxis;--but from a praxis that is already intelligent with an intellection given by a transcendent relation.

This conclusion is quite important: it means that man is man as a living human organism (whose life and

46 See Chapter I, section 3B of this thesis.

activity is the basis of his praxis), and that this living organism is already in a deep interior and objective sense self-transcendent. As Sciacca has written, human life already contains the principle of transcendence within it: the latter constitutes the core of the developing consciousness. The unfolding knowledge and consciousness in the ontogenetic development of the human organism, does not itself confer transcendence on the individual; it builds upon the transcendence in the individual. The human individual is from his origin personal:--he develops and actualizes that personhood which is his as a given of his human nature.

These ideas about human praxis have found corroboration in the following passage by Karol Wojtyla, which is a reflection on a text from Lumen gentium from the Second Vatican Council. He writes:

It is a superb text! It certainly deserves to be read and interpreted in the light of contemporary anthropology, social ethics and economics. Any analysis of it must take account of the whole philosophical tradition, beginning with Aristotle (where "praxis" is complementary to and consequent on "theory") and proceeding all the way to present-day philosophy, Marxist especially, which puts "praxis" before "theory" and deduces all its explanation of reality--especially the reality of man--from that "praxis", that is to say from the work by which man "created himself" within nature.

...Vatican II sees in human "praxis" a manifestation of the "kingly character" of man, of his dominion over the earth, nature and the world. Two terms that belong in the biblical and Gospel vocabulary have to be stressed: "dominion" (cf Gen 1,26; 1,28; Ps 8,6; Wis 6,3, etc) and "kingliness" (cf Ex 19,6; Rom 5,17; 2 Tim 2,12; 1 Pet 2,9, etc).

These two terms belong to Christian dialectic, to anthropology, to ethics, which at this point differs essentially from dialectical materialism. Underlying the truth about man professed by the Church "usque ad sanguinem" lies the deep conviction that man cannot be "reduced" to matter alone. If he has mastery over matter, he has it solely thanks to the "spiritual element" (cf Rom 8, 23) which is inherent in him and which expresses itself in his knowledge and freedom, that is to say his activity. So one could acknowledge that a partial truth is contained in the assertion that "work creates man". Yes, it does create; but it does so precisely because it is a work--an activity, a "praxis"--of man: "actus personae".⁴⁷

5. Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with Caruso's developing "antithesis", his period of ambivalence with regards to the transcendent dimension of personality. It has considered some of the central themes of Caruso's psychology in the light of the philosophy of integrality as proposed by Sciacca. This has led to the making of certain critiques of Caruso's views of man's basic relationships: between man and nature, between man and man, between theory and praxis, between symbol and reality etc. It is the transcendent objective value of these relations which has been stressed in these critiques, since this is the area of ambivalence in Caruso.

⁴⁷ Karol Wojtyla, Sign of Contradiction, New York, Seabury Press, 1979, p. 138-39.

CHAPTER V

CARUSO'S CONCLUSIVE "ANTITHESIS"-- THE NEED FOR A NEW SYNTHESIS

1. Complimentarity of Marxism and Psychoanalysis According to Caruso

As noted previously Caruso's thought in depth psychology moved increasingly over time towards a materialistic orientation. In his early writings he was influenced by such authors as: K. Jaspers, V. Frankl, C. Baudoin, E. Tournier and others. He sought to integrate the personalistic and existential views of these authors in a psychoanalytical perspective. He was insistent that a transcendent "objective hierarchy of values" had to figure in this integration. In this early phase there was also a certain Aristotelian-Thomistic influence on his thought.

Increasingly Caruso turned to authors such as H. Marcuse, E. Bloch, T. Adorno, M. Horkheimer,¹ and, of course,

¹ It is of note that an important influence on Caruso's later thought have come from members of the Frankfurt School. This group includes a number of thinkers who were members of the Institut für Soziale Forschung (Institute of Social Research) in Frankfurt during the thirties. With the advent of Nazism this group continued its activity first in Paris and later in the United States. Among its members are found: M. Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, H. Marcuse, W. Benjamin and E. Fromm. The important contribution of this group may be stated as the elaboration of a critical theory of society, inspired by Hegel, the early Marx, and Classe e coscienza di classe of Lukács; certain aspects in the thought

K. Marx. One should also note that Feuerbach seems to have been an important influence (this will be discussed in section 2 below). Caruso's project increasingly became one of integrating psychoanalytical and Marxist thought, with now the attempt to exclude the transcendent relation from his considerations.

He came to see Marxism and psychoanalysis as complementary systems; the former dealing with the economic role of adults in the society at large and the latter with the child's development in the context of his family. He explains that each system alone remains partial; in such a way that one needs both systems in order to obtain a complete picture. He writes:

Le marxisme [as a general doctrine] s'est penché sur la relation directe de l'adulte à la structure sociale: dans cette optique historique et économique, l'enfant n'existe pas ou, s'il existe, ce n'est que comme petit adulte. La psychanalyse, de son côté, ne s'est au contraire préoccupée que de la situation de l'enfant par rapport à la famille, sans envisager le conditionnement social de ce rapport; sous cet angle individualiste, l'adulte n'est jamais qu'un grand enfant.²

of Husserl and Heidegger have also been influential on this group. Of note is the work by Adorno et al on the "authoritarian personality". Dizionario di Filosofia, Redattore Capo: Italo Sordi, Milano, Rizzoli Editore, 1976, p. 170.

2. Igor A. Caruso, La psychanalyse contre la société?, Presses Universitaires de France, trans. from the German by Jeanne Etoire, 1977a, p. 47-48.

Despite this individualistic tendency, Caruso sees an intrinsic social dimension to psychoanalysis. He writes:

Cependant, la psychanalyse dévoile les rapports concrets qui existent au sein de la famille dans un type de société donné; ce n'est pas une analyse de l'échange entre l'individu et la société mais ce n'est pas non plus--en dépit de l'impression qu'ont pu donner ses premiers théoriciens encore prisonniers des formes de la pensée idéaliste--une analyse de cet "individu humain abstrait, isolé" dans son humanité dont parle Marx dans ses Thèses sur Feuerbach. Cette "microsociologie" devrait coexister sans la moindre difficulté avec la macrosociologie. Elle pourrait même constituer un complément de la recherche sociologique de même que la recherche sociologique en constitue un pour elle.³

Caruso proceeds to elucidate aspects of this complementarity between Marxist socio-historical analysis and the psychoanalytical view of the individual in the context of the family.

With respect to the relation between the practice of psychoanalysis and issues in the larger society, Caruso makes two basic points. (1) He disagrees with a psychoanalysis which in the name of social adaptation and the "reality principle" seeks to have the individual simply conform to social demands. This, in his view, is a tendency in the writings of Horney and Sullivan. He, on the contrary, sees psychoanalysis as leading to a "prise de conscience" and to a "gradual liberation" of the individual. (2) He is similarly critical of the attempt to psychoanalyse

3 Ibid., p. 48.

society as a whole, and to make of psychoanalysis a movement seeking to reform it. This is a tendency which he sees in Fromm's writings. He writes:

En marge de la psychanalyse orthodoxe, se dessinent deux courants divergents que l'on peut, en simplifiant un peu, caractériser comme suit: il y a d'un côté les psychanalystes qui voudraient guérir la névrose individuelle par l'adaptation sociale (tendance d'Alfred Adler et, plus tard, de K. Horney, H. S. Sullivan, etc.), et de l'autre les psychanalystes qui cherchent à guérir la "névrose sociale" par le traitement des individus (Erich Fromm). Pour les uns-- nous simplifions encore--le processus névrotique individuel découle d'une inadaptation sociale, ils voient donc le principe de réalité dans la réalité factuelle de la structure sociale dont ils se font aussi les défenseurs. Pour les autres, aux yeux de qui c'est la société elle-même qui est névrotique, toute tentative sociale de modifier cet état de choses est également névrotique parce qu'elle se situe au niveau de la "névrose" générale et ne peut être que l'expression de la compulsion névrotique de répétition; par conséquent, en condamnant la société, ils condamnent aussi toute tentative de guérison qui voit le jour en son sein.⁴

Caruso goes on to criticize the role of the psychoanalyst in the context of these two conceptions. He writes:

En réalité, les deux tendances que nous venons d'évoquer sont toutes deux individualistes et idéalistes. Pour les uns, la "santé" mentale est garantie par la société (par l'intermédiaire du psychanalyste qui défend son "principe de réalité"), pour les autres, par le psychanalyste (qui guérit la société au travers des individus). Mais aucune de ces deux conceptions ne tient suffisamment compte du fait que l'on ne peut abstraire le développement individuel de l'ordre social et que la "réalité"

⁴ Ibid., p. 19-20.

n'est pas tout à fait identique à sa traduction mystificatrice et aliénante par le "principe de réalité".⁵

Caruso himself sees the role of the psychoanalyst as neither one of representing social conformity nor one of representing, in his terms, a social utopia. In defending the "reality principle", the psychoanalyst ought not to be simply defending the given social order, nor simply proposing a new one (paradoxically, however, he contributes to "social transformation" through the practice of psychoanalysis). He explains:

En fait, le psychanalyste représente le "principe de réalité", mais cela peut donner lieu à un malentendu: il n'est que trop souvent le représentant d'une réalité sociale au sens de principe conformiste de rendement. Que l'on ne me fasse pas dire qu'il doit représenter l'utopie sociale! La psychanalyse est un travail de détail sur les individus (même avec le paramètre du groupe), ce n'est pas essentiellement une thérapie sociale et il est bien possible que dans un monde futur où l'aliénation n'existerait plus, autrement dit dans l'utopie, sans donner à ce terme de nuance péjorative, au royaume de la liberté, on puisse se passer de psychanalystes (mais pour l'instant ... nous en avons besoin).⁶

Thus Caruso sees the "social role" of psychoanalysis being carried out in its work with the individual. This work in fact may serve progressive social change insofar as it analyses the "introjected domination" in the individual.

5 Ibid., p. 20-21.

6 Ibid., p. 196.

Caruso writes:

L'homme est un être conflictuel et la psychanalyse entreprend pour chaque homme de rendre conscientes les motivations du conflit concret dont les origines résident peut-être dans le gouffre spécifique qui sépare le désir de la réalité. Comme l'homme souffre de sa propre culture répressive, notre rôle ne peut être ni celui d'agents d'adaptation ni celui de prophètes d'un système utopique mais nous devons néanmoins aider l'individu par l'analyse de la forme de domination introjectée. Le travail critique n'est donc pas un alibi commode pour le conformisme répressif, c'est une contribution quotidienne à la libération de l'Eros avec son imagination utopique.⁷

Thus, for Caruso, psychoanalysis performs a role that complements but that evidently does not replace a revolutionary or transforming social action as such. He writes:

...selon moi, seule une psychanalyse bien conduite serait susceptible de mettre à nu les conflits dans lesquels l'individu se trouvait pris et, enfin, qu'au-delà des ressentiments personnels la psychanalyse ouvrirait les yeux sur la restructuration nécessaire du milieu.⁸

The role of psychoanalysis then would be that of a propaedeutics to social change.

2. The Metaphysical Issue in Caruso's Thought: His Conclusive "Antithesis"--Contrast with his Earlier "Thesis"

As one would expect, in Caruso's attempted synthesis of psychoanalysis and Marxism, the issue of a transcendent relation to the personality is absent. This absence

⁷ Ibid., p. 197.

⁸ Ibid., p. 187.

contrasts highly with his emphasis on transcendence during his early period. However, he has not stopped dealing with ultimate or "metaphysical" questions concerning human values and human developments as an orthodox Marxist might be expected to do. In the last chapter of his book, La psychanalyse contre la société?,⁹ he explicitly raises some of these ultimate issues. The chapter is entitled: "L'homme va-t-il à sa destruction au lieu d'accéder à la souveraineté?".

In this chapter Caruso raises the question about whether the human society can develop in a rational and life-oriented direction more quickly than irrational and destructive forces lead it to annihilation. He is quite pessimistic about the outcome seeing the destructive aspect as augmenting geometrically compared with the slow progress of rationality and consciousness. In the following, this chapter, "L'homme va-t-il à sa destruction au lieu d'accéder à la souveraineté?" will be discussed quite thoroughly because it contains certain major issues and conclusions of Caruso's thought. He analyses certain contradictions which he sees between the Marxist and psychoanalytic visions of the future of man and arrives at certain definite conclusions about ultimate human relationships and meanings.

9 Ibid., p. 199-234.

A. Optimism vs. Pessimism with
Regard to Man's Future

Caruso begins this chapter by contrasting Freud's practical optimism with his metaphysical pessimism. Freud's practice, he sees as dominated by a progressive injunction: "'Là où était le Ça doit s'instaurer le Moi'." But he sees Freud's metapsychology as expressing an absolute pessimism: "'Le but de toute la vie est la mort'" and "la nature steindra l'esprit."¹⁰

Caruso develops this contradiction further in considering the contrast between the psychoanalytic and Marxist vision of man's future. He writes that psychoanalysis shares with Marxism the interest in those who are alienated and unable to develop themselves in the existing society. However, the "Freudian" vision, in contrast to the "Marxist" one, remains quite skeptical with regards to the outcome of the human adventure. Psychoanalysis adopts a "stoic attitude" towards death in Caruso's view, seeking to make man more conscious of himself and his condition, but lacking the conviction that the forces of destruction will not overtake him. He explains that both psychoanalysis and Marxism do not believe in the presence of an actual ideal order.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 199.

However, Marxism does believe that it can create such an order.¹¹

In this Carusoian vision, psychoanalysis is more than simply skeptical about the future; one could say that it seems more on the side of pessimism than optimism. In view of Freud's two formulas as discussed above, one could characterize psychoanalysis as a relative meliorism¹² in the context of an ultimate pessimism.

B. Auto-Destructive
Tendencies in Mankind

Caruso goes on to discuss what he considers to be increasingly auto-destructive tendencies on the part of humanity. This aspect of auto-destructiveness becomes a dominant concern for Caruso, and is a major factor in his conclusive "antithetical" vision about human destiny. In order to give the reader a sense for what kinds of problems Caruso is considering when he speaks of this "auto-destructiveness", a number of passages are presented below which explain his position:

¹¹ Ibid., p. 199-200.

¹² Meliorism is a conception of the world which, refuting either a dogmatic pessimism or optimism, admits the possibility of progress on the basis of a rational use of human resources, yet does not guarantee this progress. The term comes from Anglo-Saxon philosophy, in particular from Dewey and his followers. Dizionario di Filosofia, 1976, p. 300.

La possibilité de suicide qui a été donnée à l'homme peu après la deuxième guerre mondiale a d'abord été neutralisée par ce que l'on a appelé "l'équilibre de la peur". Mais la peur ne peut en aucun cas être une garantie suffisante contre des actes totalement irrationnels qui demeurent dans le domaine du possible. A cette première possibilité totalement irrationnelle mais toujours aussi réelle--provisoirement passé au second plan des préoccupations--d'autres sont venues s'ajouter depuis peu qui n'ont pas tout de suite été identifiées comme telles (sauf par quelques penseurs isolés comme Malthus). Ce qu'il y a d'impressionnant dans ce phénomène c'est précisément l'irrationalité et la folie qui s'attache aux nouvelles possibilités et la lenteur avec laquelle la raison réagit à ces possibilités déjà partiellement actives. L'administration du savoir de l'Homo sapiens est déjà elle-même une irrationalité. L'augmentation du savoir humain connaît en effet une accélération telle qu'il double en cinq ans et on peut prévoir qu'elle se poursuivra en progression géométrique. Dans un certain état de la société, cette progression du volume de savoir exclut absolument l'exploitation rationnellement coordonnée de ce savoir par l'homme alors qu'il paraît tout à fait plausible que des expériences absurdes et néfastes (par exemple dans le domaine de la génétique) soient tentées à l'aide de ce même savoir.

L'augmentation en progression géométrique de la population mondiale posant des problèmes d'une extrême gravité, un contrôle rationnel des naissances commence à être généralement admis en dépit des interdits religieux; mais on devine de toutes parts que la solution définitive de ces problèmes n'avance que bien trop lentement par rapport à la foule de solutions partielles ou de pseudo-solutions irrationnelles. En outre, l'explosion démographique entraîne avec elle un anéantissement de l'environnement animal et végétal qui est pourtant le support de toute vie humaine. Actuellement, la domination (?) de la nature par l'homme est remise en question par la surpopulation et la surexploitation des continents, la pollution de l'atmosphère et des cours d'eau ainsi que les nuisances acoustiques. Des mesures commencent à peine à prendre forme mais elles agissent bien moins vite que le processus de destruction...

L'évolution socio-politique et économique des pays de notre monde est non seulement horrible et injuste mais elle est absurde au dernier degré. La consommation forcée des uns rivalise avec l'appauvrissement des

autres et ce phénomène revêt une telle ampleur qu'il semble par sa seule accélération infliger un démenti aux prévisions de Marx. De plus en plus d'hommes tombent gravement malades ou meurent des suites de la richesse dans un camp et de celles de la misère dans l'autre de sorte que les deux groupes sont victimes de la production et de la consommation humaines. Actuellement, on fait des milliards de chiffre d'affaires avec des besoins créés artificiellement chez les enfants alors que 300 millions (!) d'enfants souffrent de la faim...¹³

Caruso sees a further "auto-destructiveness" added to those discussed above in the form of an increase in anxiety, an anxiety which leads to pathological defence mechanisms and to an increase in violence. He sees this anxiety as leading to false solutions and illusory guarantees as for example the "equilibrium of fear" concerning nuclear weapons mentioned above. He explains the crisis in values that corroborates this anxiety:

La troublante insécurité de l'adulte indique bien qu'il ne perçoit plus les valeurs anciennes qu'aveuglément et tout au plus comme de simples formules mais qu'au fond, dans ce monde qui se modifie à toute allure, il ne peut utiliser efficacement cette panoplie de valeurs.¹⁴

C. Life as Leading to Death

Rejecting any transcendent origin or goal to human existence, Caruso affirms that life, or living being,

¹³ Caruso, op. cit., 1977a, p. 201-203.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 204-205.

detached itself from nothingness (presumably non-living being) by a fortuitous "accident". He explains further that life and conscious life in particular, is characterized by an irresistible proliferation overcoming nothingness (le néant). But he adds:

...cette prolifération est indirectement la cause du décalage entre sa propre croissance et les possibilités réelles de remplacer le néant par la vie et la conscience. Le néant ne rattrape certes pas directement le développement de la vie, mais la vie et la conscience produisent à leur tour des forces destructrices qui se multiplient à une allure vertigineuse.¹⁵

Caruso sees the final annihilation of life and consciousness by "nothingness" as more probable than their "victory over nothingness". This is in keeping with Freud's view.

Caruso writes:

La vie produit l'évolution (elle est cette évolution), la conscience produit l'attribution d'un sens à l'existence (elle est cette démarche) mais ni l'évolution ni la création de significations ne sont assez rapides et assez puissantes pour tenir tête à l'anorganique et à l'absurdité de l'insuffisance de la conscience de sorte que l'explosion de la vie et de la conscience n'obéit pas à la vie et à la conscience mais, pour une bonne part, à leur autodestruction.¹⁶

Caruso concludes that life and consciousness create all the conditions of their own suicide: that is, of their return to "non-being". Nevertheless, he sees life as not being

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 207.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 208.

able to do otherwise than to multiply itself, thus opposing death; likewise he sees consciousness as not being able to do otherwise than to seek out a meaning to the "absurd battle between life and death". Man's facing of the "absurd" and the "irrational" seems, therefore, to be a fundamental problem of human life according to Caruso.¹⁷ In his

17 Caruso explains what he means by the "absurd" and the "irrational":

Il faut se mettre d'accord sur la terminologie. Lorsque je parle d'"absurde" et d'"irrationnel", je ne parle pas de l'inconscient en tant que tel, dans son opposition à la conscience. L'inconscient est nécessaire à la vie et à la prise de conscience. L'instinct est la matrice et source de la raison. Il n'y a que les conflits mal résolus dans l'interaction entre le conscient et l'inconscient au cours du processus de prise de conscience, ces conflits refoulés ou rationalisés par l'homme dans une attitude de défense par laquelle il se trompe lui-même, qui produisent l'irrationnel--la fausse conscience."

Ibid., p. 216; Ruda defines irrationalism in his Lexique:

"L'irrationalisme philosophique souligne les limitations cognitives de la raison et fait appel à d'autres formes de connaissance comme l'intuition, le sentiment, l'instinct, la volonté qu'il considère comme supérieure..."

L'irrationalisme a été aussi le climat idéologique favorable aux philosophies totalitaires du fascisme et du nazisme, en anathème à la pensée théorique, et dans leur exaltation de la voix 'du sang et de la race' comme critères de suprématie et d'oppression."

O. Jorge Ruda, Lexique Philosophique-Scientifique, Les Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1977b, p. 79.

view man has produced utopias in order to resolve this problem.

D. Caruso's Critique
of Marxism and Christianity

Caruso considers the two "most active utopias" to be Christianity and Marxism. He understands the Marxist utopia as a decisive demystification of the Judeo-Christian eschatology. He explains that the former helps man to discover that it is not by means of projections into another world, nor by mystical and non-temporal rationalizations that life can be victorious over death. The objective of Marxism is to change the world by means of a critical dialectical thought applied to a this-worldly reality and by a praxis in accord with this thought. For Caruso, this willing of progressive change is tacitly a willing to conquer the force of death by "une prise de conscience plus profonde et plus pratique." In this respect he is critical of "Freudo-Marxists" who, he says, "font preuve d'illogisme lorsqu'ils nient pour des raisons d'optimisme tactique la 'pulsion de mort' freudienne." He concludes that the "optimism" of Marxism represents a weakness as great as the "triumphalism" of Christianity.¹⁸

¹⁸ Caruso, op. cit., 1977a, p. 210.

Caruso's analysis of Marxism (from within the School of Frankfurt's perspective) is not especially extensive or elaborated. He is, perhaps, trying to say through his statements that an excessive optimism may militate against a realistic evaluation of the human situation and the undertaking of practical steps to improve concrete socio-historical circumstances.

E. Christianity as Providing Other-Worldly Solutions

Caruso is critical of the Christian faith for providing other-worldly solutions to human problems (including the problem of death). Like the "Marxist optimism", the Christian dependency on the transcendent is seen as hindering the undertaking of practical real solutions.

He writes:

Au lieu d'offrir des solutions, d'offrir des possibilités réelles pour une vie supportable on nous fait des promesses pour ce qui viendra après la mort: "Heureux sont les affligés car ils seront consolés." Quelle émouvante promesse! Seulement: ils seront consolés par qui? Où? Quand?¹⁹

(Caruso is raising an existential question about Christian faith and hope.) In discussing these issues Caruso even suggests that the Christian's dependency on a "beyond" may not be essential to Christianity. He writes:

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 212.

...dans le dialogue qui s'engage entre chrétiens et marxistes (qui n'est précisément pas un dialogue entre christianisme et marxisme) on devine déjà que cette passivité qui se repose sur l'au-delà n'est pas essentiellement inhérente au christianisme. Mais de tels débats demandent--et prennent--, par leur importance et leur complexité, beaucoup de temps.²⁰

However, he also says:

Il se peut que toute religion ne soit pas motivée par la croyance en l'au-delà et en l'existence de l'âme, par la mauvaise conscience vis-à-vis des morts (Freud) mais, dans la pratique, c'est essentiellement à de telles représentations que nous nous heurtons: les dangers de ce monde perdent beaucoup de leur poids lorsqu'ils sont envisagés d'un point de vue eschatologique apocalyptique. Pour l'homme qui croit en la parole de Dieu, la mort est déjà vaincue. Nulle affirmation d'une solidarité "humaniste" (?) avec les non-croyants ne saurait dissimuler ce décalage: pour le chrétien, le sens de la vie réside dans l'au delà.²¹

Caruso's conception seems to establish a radical dichotomy between transcendence and immanence while absolutizing the immanentistic position. His critique of the human reliance on the transcendent in religion rests on supposing that this dependency and passivity (one could say receptivity) leads to inactivity, negligence or mystification vis-a-vis immanent social concerns. For Caruso all passivity and all dependency vis-a-vis the transcendent is unequivocally negative for human progress (if not in theory at least in practice).

20 Ibid., p. 210 (footnote).

21 Ibid., p. 211.

Caruso also rejects any dependence on the transcendent in the matter of the origin of values. He sees the dispute over the question as to whether values are created or discovered as symptomatic of the "pride of theology" (as a result of the insistence the latter places on the "givenness of values"). He writes:

Au cours d'un symposium, un théologien "humaniste", sans me condamner directement sur mon principe d'immanence au monde, exprima quelques réserves sur la terminologie que j'employais. À ses yeux, l'homme "cherchait" et "trouvait" un sens à sa vie. Je sais bien que l'opposition entre la "pure" création de signification et la "pure" recherche de signification n'est qu'un débat abstrait et insoluble. Il faut bien chercher un sens pour arriver à en donner un! En outre, cette démarche ne se fait ni dans un espace vide ni dans un état coupé de toute tradition mais au contraire dans le monde des hommes. Cependant, c'est précisément pour cette raison que ce changement de nuance me paraît symptomatique: c'est dans la querelle terminologique que se dévoile l'orgueil de la théologie. Voudrait-on nous faire croire que l'homme se voit imposer par un être transcendantal une tâche à accomplir, une devinette à trouver et que, par conséquent, le sens de la vie humaine est quelque part ailleurs que dans cette vie? Voudrait-on nous dire que l'homme trouvera le sens de la vie dans la "causalité originelle" comme on trouve--ou ne trouve pas--un porte-monnaie? La théologie (souffrant en cela elle-même de sa propre fausse conscience) se veut humaniste mais quelle valeur accorder à un tel humanisme?... Si cette expérience qu'est l'homme ne réussit pas, le théologien trouvera toujours la "cause fondamentale" de toute chose dans l'au-delà.²²

One sees again in the above comments made by Caruso that he envisages the transcendent as excluding man. He does

22 Ibid., p. 213-14.

affirm that values are originated in what one may call a certain condition of dependency on "tradition" and the "world of men". Implicitly this dependency and relation to the "world of men" does not render man less human and free but is a condition of his humanity and freedom. By analogy, it is a feasible understanding that the relation to the transcendent is a condition of man's humanity and freedom; but Caruso seems to exclude such a possibility.

F. Caruso's Struggle
against Mystification

Caruso carries on a ceaseless battle against "mystification", "rationalization" and "auto-illusion". Demystification seems to be for him the sine qua non condition of any progress. He sees man as having become, through evolution, largely independent of his innate instinctive mechanisms. Man has done this through creating a culture characterized by an enormous instrumentalization. However, the consciousness which should direct in place of innate mechanisms is only a small restricted problematical part of his being. Thus man, "insuffisamment dirigé par ses instincts et sans protection devant son environnement--est un être extrêmement démuné, un être toujours menacé d'effondrement."²³ Furthermore, he is a being who,

23 Ibid., p. 217.

contrary to other living beings, because of his consciousness, is able to avoid his own self, to lie to himself, to trick himself and to close his eyes before the difficult and perhaps impossible tasks that lie before him. Caruso adds:

Ce que les mécanismes innés de déclenchement n'assurent pas, c'est à dire la réglementation des coutumes et des comportements, l'homme l'abandonne dans une très large mesure au mensonge ou, tout ou moins, à la semi-vérité: à la rationalisation et à la mystification.²⁴

In this context, Caruso raises anew the question of whether human consciousness will be able to overcome "the absurd" that threatens it. He writes:

Peut-être a-t-il encore la possibilité d'apprendre à mieux gouverner son univers mais c'est, une fois de plus, une question de temps: sa conscience se développe-t-elle en synchronisme avec l'entropie qu'il provoque lui-même? Pour parler plus simplement: la question est de savoir si la destruction provoquée par l'homme et qui croît désormais en progression géométrique vers plus ou moins rapides que les forces constructives de la prise de conscience humaine.²⁵

He answers his question again emphasizing that "auto-illusion" must be renounced:

La réponse sera négative si nous voulons attendre que surviennent des mutations biologiques positives. Mais nous n'en sommes pas réduits à cela. Par sa prise de conscience, la faculté de "mutations psychiques" (Marcel Pradines) est donnée à l'homme. Seulement, ces "mutations psychiques" exigent le

24 Ibid., p. 217.

25 Ibid., p. 218.

renoncement absolu à l'auto-illusion qui n'est jamais qu'une "mutation psychique" létale (nous pouvons revenir ici à l'analogie avec la mutation biologique authentique car la plupart des mutations biologiques se déroule sous forme létale et il n'y en a que quelques-unes qui correspondent réellement à une adaptation).²⁶

In view of the immanentistic context in which Caruso has defined such terms as "auto-illusion" and "mystification", it is possible that the lack of a solution to the problem he poses is not due to a realistic lack of possibilities in the human society, but to his being consequent with himself about his tenets. According to Sciacca, the tenets of immanentistic rationalism lead historically and dialectically to absurd conclusions which nevertheless have the merit of reopening the question of transcendence as inherent to human reason.²⁷ It is possible then that Caruso's own vision of the "geometrically increasing absurdity" is not wholly due to actual social-historical conditions but to his immanentistic tenets which he has all too rigorously applied.

He does himself raise the question as to whether the "pessimism of his audacious diagnostic" might not constitute a "syndrome of depressive thought" (a subjective explanation). However, he concludes: "Reste à savoir si ce syndrome dépressif ne découle que de mon propre 'complexe'

²⁶ Ibid., p. 218.

²⁷ See Chapter I, section 2F of this thesis.

ou s'il a aussi des causes dans la dynamique culturelle et sociale."²⁸

G. The Problem of Life and Death:
Caruso's Adoption of an Existentially
Conceived Freudian Position

Caruso is struck by a problem to which he has difficulty finding a solution. On the one hand he sees that biological evolution proceeds from a "hypothetical original state of matter through stages of greater and greater complexity." On the other hand, he sees that every form of organization is subject to decadence and destruction. The most advanced manifestation of this evolution is civilization. He adds:

Comme c'est l'espèce humaine avec sa culture, le plus complexe de tous les produits de l'évolution, qui tend précisément à la destruction la plus violente, on comprend aisément que l'intelligence prospective qui crée du significatif décèle paradoxalement dans ce processus la plus profonde absurdité.²⁹

In this context Caruso makes a statement which seems to place him in a position that is neither Christian nor Marxist. It places him close to the existentialist positions which emphasize the ultimate absurdity of life (Camus, Sartre), but perhaps it places him closest to Freud himself.

28 Caruso, op. cit., 1977a, p. 230.

29 Ibid., p. 219.

Caruso writes:

...d'un point de vue scientifique, rien (absolument rien) ne nous permet de postuler qu'une finalité ou, plus simplement, qu'une dialectique soit ancrée dans la nature et qu'elle ne réside pas uniquement dans le schéma de comportement humain consistant à fuir ce qui est incompréhensible--incompréhensible parce que absurde. Vu sous cet angle, il y a toutes chances pour que la question du sens du processus compliqué qui est condamné à disparaître n'aboutisse elle-même à rien.³⁰

Caruso proposes here a dialectics radically opposing man and nature. This inclination on Caruso's part to separate man and nature has already been noted in the previous chapter. In the above Caruso suggests that the human finality or dialectics is not rooted in nature, but on the contrary, consists in a flight from the incomprehensible.

For the Christian who believes in the original goodness of the creation, its ongoing and final redemption, and in the resurrection of the body, the meaning of man is not divorced from the meaning of nature but fulfills it. For the Marxist also, the dialectical process is rooted in nature, even if man does come to separate himself from it through praxis and comes to transform it.³¹

Furthermore, Caruso sees in Freud's opposition of the life and death instincts a grasp of the problem which confronts himself. He writes:

30 Ibid., p. 219-20.

31 Ruda, op. cit., 1977b, p. 111.

En dépit de tout ce qu'il cherche à éviter, l'homme reste donc en dernière analyse confronté au décalage entre les possibilités qui lui sont offertes par le progrès et le comportement rétrograde et destructif du vivant qu'il porte en lui. Cela me semble définir parfaitement l'aporie dont nous venons de parler et qui reste sans solution. Il y a indubitablement au sein du vivant une tendance progressive et une tendance régressive conservatrice, cette dernière se manifestant sournoisement non seulement préluant à la première mais aussi comme en résultant. Freud se pencha beaucoup sur ce paradoxe et il crut en trouver la solution dans l'existence d'une "pulsion de mort".³²

Caruso concludes that the entropy which reigns in the physical universe may have a "biological and even psychological corollary" in the Freudian "death instinct".

In the face of this problem, Caruso in fact moves towards an "existentially" conceived Freudian position and away not only from a Christian position (his movement away from Christianity has been a long process) but also from a "Marxist" position, even one akin to the School of Frankfurt.

Caruso explains that Freud never believed in a radical betterment of humanity though he worked to give the neurotic individual a certain relative freedom. In terms of the ultimate meaning of human existence, Freud adopted, according to Caruso, a "Stoic agnostic attitude". He explains further that Freud thought that Eros would finally submit to death, and feels that Freud even underestimated the extent of the "self-destructive trend" in contemporary

32 Caruso, op. cit., 1977a, p. 222.

human society. He writes:

Il observait d'un regard lucide l'invraisemblable retombée de l'humanité dans la barbarie par le triomphe de la guerre et du fascisme. Mais il semble qu'il ne s'était pas rendu compte que la machinerie du génocide, de l'anéantissement de la vie, de la surpopulation, de l'appauvrissement du Tiers Monde et du malaise des peuples surdéveloppés, malaise découlant de la consommation, et le terrorisme progressaient à un rythme aussi impitoyablement rapide.³³

Also Caruso accurately explains that Freud did not have much faith in Christianity or Marxism as a means to alleviate world problems. Caruso himself, in fact, shares this view. He writes concerning Freud:

Il pensait bien que le christianisme n'avait fait que raccomoder et replâtrer un peu les dommages de ce processus de destruction. Il pensait aussi que même le marxisme, en dépit de son humanisme radicalement orienté vers la vie terrestre, ne pourrait jamais que repriser maladroitement le tissu de l'histoire.³⁴

Over the many years during which he has been writing, Caruso has remained faithful to Freud's vision of man. He has discarded Christianity and his acceptance of Marxism seems in the last analysis to be highly qualified; but he accepts Freud in an essential way, even if he does subject Freudism to a sort of "materialistic" dialectical interpretation.

33 Ibid., p. 229.

34 Ibid., p. 229.

H. A Paradoxical
Note of Optimism

Despite all appearances, behind Caruso's pessimism, there may actually lurk a certain expectancy. He defends a pessimism saying: "La conscience de l'insuffisance profonde de toute les recettes traditionnelles contre l'anéantissement qui menace ne doit pas servir ici d'arme contre celui qui perçoit le malaise de cette conscience." Might there be in this negation the expectation of an affirmation? Admittedly his phrasing is entirely in negative terms:

Ni l'absence de réflexion, ni le retour à la pensée du passé ne sont en mesure de créer quelque chose de positif, en admettant que l'aspect positif de l'histoire de l'humanité soit encore en mesure de rattraper la destruction et de l'emporter sur elle.³⁵

Furthermore Caruso is quick to caution against a belief that history obeys "an optimistic determinism". But he does propose a "common social action" which would seek to modify human relations. He explains: "mais cette modification est autre que ne se la représentent les églises--y compris l'église marxiste et psychanalytique."³⁶ He proposes that a politics must be found which will alleviate basic human problems and then achieve a universal planification of the scientific means "to lessen the misery of mankind." But

35 Ibid., p. 231.

36 Ibid., p. 232.

even here Caruso adds a cautionary pessimistic remark:

...les modifications de la structure sociale qui ont déjà été entreprises ont demandé bien trop de temps ou se sont étouffées dans un "activisme" prématuré qui n'a pas eu assez de souffle.³⁷

I. "Thesis" and
Conclusive "Antithesis"

Caruso now has come to propose the opposite of his early position where he defended the necessity of a transcendent "objective hierarchy of values". He sums up his "antithesis" in the following:

La connaissance--de l'extérieur--de l'absurdité de la vie et par conséquent de l'absurdité de la connaissance elle-même--dont le fondement est indifférent--est un très curieux paradoxe. Ne signifie-t-il pas en dernière analyse que le sens de toute connaissance ne peut venir que de l'homme, la vie revêt par conséquent aussi peu de sens ou autant de sens que l'homme est prêt à lui donner: de même qu'il est prêt à en investir dans sa vie sociale. Dans cette optique--pour rester logique dans notre raisonnement--la vie est alors véritablement l'affaire de l'homme et de lui seul; on doit mesurer le sens de la vie à celui que l'homme met dans le monde dont il est le créateur.³⁸

He further elaborates this notion of man as "creator of his world" in speaking of the "sovereignty" of the human person. He writes:

L'exigence de souveraineté de la personne humaine... peut échouer horriblement et rester insatisfaite, on a même parfois l'impression que c'est ce chemin qu'elle a pris. Mais si elle devait, à grand-peine et dans

37 Ibid., p. 233.

38 Ibid., p. 233.

l'incertitude, approcher de sa satisfaction ce ne pourrait être qu'au travers de la contradiction qui montre que la vie ne peut avoir d'autre sens que celui que l'homme crée en tant que représentant de son espèce et de sa société.³⁹

In contrast to the above Caruso wrote, in his early period, that "Man was never so poor and weak as when he wanted to be God."⁴⁰ The later Caruso, as presented above, may not quite have man want to be God, but he positively excludes God from man's becoming. In his criticism of the Sartrean-type existential therapy, the early Caruso had written: "Man now appears as a little god, who believes he creates himself and whose idolatry is constantly fed by 'freedom' and 'responsibility'."⁴¹ Paradoxically, the later Caruso also came to believe that man creates himself, although he retained his acute sense of biological determinism and came to emphasize the practical and social dimension of that self-creation. The earlier Caruso had written criticizing Sartre that "It is simply not the case that man invents himself!"⁴² Caruso saw man as exercising his freedom within the context of both the "inertia of the creature"

39 Ibid., p. 234.

40 Igor A. Caruso, Existential Psychology, From Analysis to Synthesis, trans. from the German by Eva Krapf, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1964, p. 109.

41 Ibid., p. 112.

42 Ibid., p. 114.

(i.e. the condition of being biologically driven), and an openness to a "given" spiritual "plan". The later Caruso, on the contrary, discounts any transcendent spiritual relation in man; he continues to emphasize the biologically driven aspects of man and introduces a greater emphasis on the social-historical process.

Caruso's position on religion changed dramatically as well. In his earlier period he had written:

Psychology is first and foremost a natural science, as was even held by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Yet the conclusions drawn from the observations of nature ought to allow themselves to be fitted easily into a general view of life. There should be no dilemma such as the alternative between 'Psychoanalysis or Christianity'.⁴³

In contrast, in his later period he sees religion in the main as a part of that mystification, rationalization and auto-illusion he denounces incessantly.

In view of the pessimism and existential emphasis on the absurd of Caruso's later period, the following words by the early Caruso seem to have a certain "prophetic" value:

When what is relative is regarded as absolute and the world of values is turned upside down, the whole world of man must of necessity become disjointed too. The hypertrophied ego must, since it recognizes only its own laws, paradoxically lead to the lowering of man's dignity, indeed to its destruction; just as one of its offshoots, the totalitarian state, must, despite the fact that it disposes of every means of

43 Ibid., p. 104.

destruction (or rather because of it), succumb to a psychosis of terror. This, indeed, is the oddest aspect of our problem: the more inflated the self becomes, so the conscience worsens; the more totalitarian the state, the greater the fear; the more autonomous mankind, the more absurd and despairing its creed.⁴⁴

3. A Critique of Caruso's Implicit Negative Ontology

Throughout his writings Caruso seemed, for the most part, to reject a fatalistic view of human life. For example, he said as part of the conclusion to a series of conferences he gave at the Instituto Médico in Bogotá, Colombia, on the death instinct:

...l'homme, qu'il le sache ou non, a le désir incessant de la surmonter [he was referring to death], en tant que fatalité et en tant que scandale. Nous voyons toujours et partout l'homme non seulement obéir à une compulsion de répétition qui est une lente agonie, mais aussi développer sa "praxis" en espérant.⁴⁵

In the above passage Caruso refers, on the one hand, to a praxis carried out in a spirit of hope. This shows the influence of Ernst Bloch.⁴⁶ His explanation of the repetition

44 Ibid., p. 111.

45 Igor A. Caruso, "Contribution à l'étude des concepts de pulsion de mort et d'agressivité chez Freud," Bulletin de Psychologie, 1965, 19 (1), p. 29.

46 Ernst Bloch was a German philosopher born in 1885 at Ludwigshaven. He was an exile in the United States during the Nazi period but returned to Germany after the war. In 1948 he became professor of philosophy at Lipsia and director of the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, a journal, which, due to the ideas it proposed, ran into some

compulsion as a "lente agonie", on the other hand, refers to the Freudian understanding of it as an expression of the death instinct: as a return to anterior states.

Caruso tended to accept the activity of the death instinct in the Freudian sense; he wrote: "le principe de mort agit réellement dans l'existence et se dévoile le plus clairement dans la compulsion de répétition."⁴⁷ However, at the same time, moving beyond Freud's conception, he sees in the action of the repetition compulsion a positive factor. the action of Eros. He writes concerning the repetition compulsion:

Seulement, cette dernière est fondamentalement ambivalente. En elle agit également la qualité essentiellement nouvelle apparue avec la naissance de la vie: cette qualité essentielle, nous la nommons avec Freud, l'Eros. Ce dernier fait que la vie est vie, et il consiste dans le dépassement continu, dans la transcendance de soi-même.⁴⁸

difficulty. In fact several of Bloch's collaborators ended in prison and Bloch himself received an official condemnation for revisionism from the East German government and was prohibited from publishing. In 1961, he taught at Tübingen University in West Germany. Bloch rethinks Marxism in the context of Jewish eschatological thought. In his works, The Spirit of Utopia (1918), Thomas Munzer Theologian of the Revolution (1922), and The Principle of Hope (1954-1956), he has delineated a vision of the world where progress and dialectics are possible only in view of a stable eschatological aspiration. Of particular importance is the positive value of utopia, understood as a global consciousness of history. Dizionario di Filosofia, 1976, p. 53.

47 Caruso, op. cit., 1965, p. 29.

48 Ibid., p. 29.

Caruso sees in the repetition compulsion not a simple return to the past, but a return to the past in order to go beyond it, a return which with each repetition brings forth new elements.

Schematizing this view, one could say that the repetitive aspect of the repetition compulsion is seen as the "conservative" action of the "death instinct" or

Thanatos (a return and preservation of an anterior state), and the new element which arises from the return, as the "progressive" action of the "life instinct" or Eros.⁴⁹ In

49 Caruso seems to identify any "conservative" tendency with the "death instinct" (this is consistent with his basic ontology which identifies being with immanent becoming). He writes:

"En dépit de tout ce qu'il cherche à éviter, l'homme reste donc en dernière analyse confronté au décalage entre les possibilités qui lui sont offertes par le progrès et le comportement rétrograde et destructif du vivant qu'il porte en lui... Il y a indubitablement au sein du vivant une tendance progressive et une tendance régressive conservatrice, cette dernière se manifestant sournoisement non seulement comme préluant à la première mais aussi comme en résultant. Freud se pencha beaucoup sur ce paradoxe et il crut en trouver la solution dans l'existence d'une 'pulsion de mort'. ('La fin vers laquelle tend toute vie est la mort; inversement le non-vivant est antérieur au vivant'--Freud.)

Il m'a toujours semblé qu'une telle "pulsion" que Freud lui-même reléguait dans le domaine de la 'metapsychologie' ne pourrait que difficilement trouver un fondement du point de vue biologique. Peut-être que la recherche et les thèses scientifiques devraient intervenir ici plus efficacement--en dépit de lourdes résistances affectives--: je ne peux m'empêcher de penser que l'entropie qui règne dans

Caruso's conception, as in Freud's, there is an implicit identification of anterior states (in the unfolding of life) with death. Thus, the resistance to evolution and change implied in the repetition compulsion is seen as the action of the death instinct. There is in this type of thinking a tendency to ultimately identify the non-living state of matter, seen as an ultimate anterior state to life, with death. For example, Caruso cites a commentary which Freud made about Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice:

En 1913, Freud publiait un commentaire psychanalytique sur deux scènes du "Marchand de Venise" de Shakespeare. Il terminait son essai par les mots suivants: "On pourrait dire que ce sont les trois relations inévitables de l'homme avec la femme qui sont ici représentées: voici la génitrice, la compagne et la destructrice. Où bien les trois formes sous lesquelles, au cours de la vie, se présente l'image de la mère: la mère elle-même, l'amante que l'homme choisit à l'image de celle-ci, et finalement la Terre-Mère, qui le reprend de nouveau. Mais le vieil homme cherche vainement à ressaisir l'amour de la femme tel qu'il le reçut d'abord de sa mère; seule

l'univers pourrait bien avoir un corollaire biologique et même psychologique. A cela viennent s'ajouter les nouvelles découvertes qui prennent de plus en plus d'importance en biologie et révèlent que la programmation des cellules par l'ADN (acide désoxyribonucléique) repose sur un immobilisme rigoureux. Dans la stricte segmentation cellulaire (laquelle représente une compulsion de répétition au sens le plus littéral du terme) le vivant qui accède à des niveaux d'organisation de plus en plus complexes doit ses modifications à des accidents totalement imprévisibles dans le cours de cette segmentation, ce que l'on appelle des 'fautes d'impression biologiques'."

Caruso, op. cit., 1977, p. 222-23.

la troisième des filles du destin, la silencieuse
déesse de la mort, le recueillera dans ses bras."
Le thème des trois coffrets. Traduction Marie
Bonaparte et E. Marty. Gallimard 1933.

In the above passage one sees an example of the tendency to identify an anterior state to life, in this case the earth (symbolized as a goddess of death), with death.

However death is not a return to an anterior state in the sense that death is equivalent to the anterior state (this would be an extreme positivistic position: one goes from "dust" through life to "dust", yet the state of "dust" is not equivalent to death). Death is a temporal event in the life of a living organism: the finalizing event of that life. One does not return to death: one never was dead prior to life; he wasn't yet alive, he wasn't yet actually being. In this sense death is a radically new event in the life of a living being.⁵⁰

The repetition compulsion, though it may represent in certain cases a resistance to new life and change, is, nevertheless, unlike death because it seeks to maintain

⁵⁰ Karl Rahner, in his Theology of Death, speaks of death as being an end and a fulfillment for man: an end in the sense that he is broken up or struck from without; a fulfillment in the sense that it brings the total result of his life's work to its final state in a personal consummation. This gives the religious corollary of what is being argued here:--death is not essentially a repetition or return, but has a unique meaning in the course of human life. Karl Rahner, On the Theology of Death, trans. by Charles H. Henkey, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1961, p. 40; Caruso, op. cit., 1965, p. 1.

a certain status, a certain achievement of life. It may happen to operate in a negative way thereby preventing normal development; a life instinct, perhaps, in a context of fear and anxiety, may not lead, as it normally should in man, to self-transcendence (i.e. in Sciaccian terms it expresses a "monarchical" tendency).⁵¹

In fact, self-transcendence ("dépassement" or "transcendence de soi-même"), which in a passage cited above, Caruso identified as the positive action of Eros (bringing forth new life), may be understood as an entering into deeper life through a dying-to-oneself. On the other hand, the repetition compulsion can in certain cases imply an anxious clinging to life and self. (This reverses Caruso's position: "death" can be the opportunity to achieve a positive self-transcendence; whereas "life" can prohibit self-realization.) In either case, however, one may not speak of a "death instinct". Even if death has a part in the activity of "dépassement" as is suggested here,

⁵¹ There may be resistance to this positive dying-to-oneself and rising to new life, because of a fixation expressed in a repetition compulsion; but even this resistance has a positive core. In fact, a repetition may not be unambiguously and unequivocally interpreted: it may be serving as a process of cognitive assimilation (Piaget); it may represent an attempt to deepen a profound relationship in life; it may be a positive psychological defence. But, in any case, the ambiguity is not between life and death instincts as positive forces but between life and the failure of life, being and the failure of being.

this "dépassement" takes its meaning from the deeper richer life it seeks to achieve.

Furthermore, it is death which negates life, not the anterior state or condition. The past stages of life as such were not negative; neither is the repetition (in the repetition compulsion) negative in itself: within its limits it is an affirmation of being. The new life that comes with each repetition does not negate ontologically the positive theme that founds it in the repetition, but assumes it and completes it, even if transforming it.

Caruso develops his thought in an implicit negative ontology of nature and of history. This is suggested by his negative dialectics of man and nature and by his negative and pessimistic conclusions about the future of man.⁵² It is not surprising to see that an implicit negative ontology of history and of nature involves also a negative ontology of the future, such that despite his "progressive" orientation and attitude he ends with a very pessimistic and quasi-fatalistic view of man.

Caruso confuses the linear or mechanical aspects of repetition and of death with their deeper ontological meaning. Without at least an implicit openness to the ontological and transcendent levels of human life, this

⁵² See Chapter IV, section 3E and Chapter V, section 2 of this thesis.

confusion cannot be resolved.

Clearly there is a factor of negation in all processes of human growth and development. Each new development negates the former one, as it were. However, this may not be understood as an ontological annihilation or destruction. For example, living matter deepens and develops non-living matter, and consciousness in man deepens and develops living matter. There is not an essential ontological negation of anterior stages in growth and development though there is a certain relative negation. This is the case even in cases of radical transformation. Sciacca explains how this process of growth and development occurs with respect to the action of the human will. I summarize Sciacca's position in my Master's thesis:

Sciacca is critical of any approach which applies the dialectics of negation and affirmation to the process of willing. This approach sees the will as proceeding through alternations of negations and affirmations: to affirm a new willed reality (un voluto), the will negates the prior one; thus it affirms negating and negates affirming. The motive force of this process is the exigency of being freed from the limiting finite reality. It is a movement of liberation from the finite which proceeds indefinitely. Sciacca explains that, if indeed it were so, the essence of the will would be either negation (la negazione) or (choosing not to choose) the nothing purely indetermined. In the first case, according to Sciacca, it is not worth choosing given that every choice is negated by the successive one; in the second case freedom would be empty, the non-willing filled with nothingness. He adds, however, that in the dialectics of the negation of every choice and in the refusal to choose at all, there is a truth which should be recuperated. He asserts that every new initiative taken by the will,

does, in fact, suspend its prior determination, by making a new choice. This suspension, however, does not necessarily mean negation, just as saying "no" to something does not mean its annihilation. Moreover, to recognize and affirm the insufficiency of the finite is not to imply that the will negates the finite, rather it implies that the will assumes it; takes it into one's wholeness (interezza), into the fullness of one's being. In fact, the act with which the willing will suspends its prior determination is an initiative taken on the basis of the prior act of the will (è iniziativa "su" di essa). It is the beginning of the movement of the compresence of the already willed, and of the new project towards which the will is now tending. Sciacca explains, therefore, that it is correct to say that the will, in its movement, goes beyond its finite determinations. Regardless of whether it should remain in one of them, its staying there (stare nel termine) always implies a willing of something beyond it, a will towards the final end of the willing will. Such is not a negation of what has already been willed, but its implication, its fusion in the willing process. Thus, in each new choice, all of the willed will (volontà voluta), that is, all that has been willed, is involved in the new work of the willing will (volontà volente). Therefore, concludes Sciacca, in each new free act there is always the whole person with all of his acts, each one distinct and yet all compresent in his inseparable (inscindibile) unity.⁵³

One notes in the above Sciacca's application of the dialectics of implication and compresence to the question of willing. There is a profound sense of human unity in Sciacca's conception. For the philosophy of integrality this unity extends not only to the action of the will, but to the whole man, instinctual, volitional, intellectual and sensitive. Human growth and development occurs with respect to and on the basis of this fundamental unity.

53 Della Zazzera, op. cit., 1976, p. 45-47.

From the perspective of the philosophy of integrality the negation or the dying-to-oneself that is necessary in human development is not an ontological negation of an anterior stage but its ontological affirmation, albeit its transformation. For example, it is not an ontological negation of natural instinctual-sensitive life to participate in consciousness and spiritual life. There is a relative negation in order to achieve a deeper affirmation.

Nevertheless, death in the sense of a finalizing event in life remains a "scandal". However, this is not because it represents a return to anterior states as Caruso implies, though this is involved; but because in the mortal dimension there is present a privation or failure in the finalization of life and this is expressed in the fact of death. Rahner speaks in this respect of the hiddenness or darkness of death.⁵⁴ In this sense death is neither an instinct nor a conservative principle in life, as Caruso suggests, but a privation, lack or failure of being in the created order (St. Augustine, Plato). This is death in the sense of sin or evil. There is not then a death instinct as a positive attribute or principle of nature. Death as an ontological privation and failure is as opposed by

54 Rahner, op. cit., p. 55.

non-living matter as it is by life.

However, despite its being a "scandal", death is not a fatality for man. This does not refer only to its theological value (i.e. the saving Death of Christ) but to its anthropological and psychological value. In this regard, Caruso's near-fatalistic conclusions are not only contrary to his whole progressive trend of thought, but what is more, seem contrary to much common human experience. The power of human self-transcendence is in evidence in the most difficult of human situations. It is cardinally important for psychology to recognize this power since in its applied role such issues as human privation, weakness and suffering are continually confronting it. In the context of human life, a weakness, a failure, a privation etc... though real and a "scandal", are not a pure fatality. Even when it is not possible to "positivistically" overcome them, e.g. permanent blindness or deafness, loss of a loved one through death, the coming of a retarded or disturbed child into a family etc..., human integrality permits the process of self-realization to go on despite a specific lack of a "positive" achievement. Indeed, when a "positive" achievement is impossible the person or the society, because of their transcendent constitution, may make of the "positive" lack an opportunity for growth and development. These kinds of achievements are not uncommon in personal and social

histories. There is not only a compensation for weakness and privation here, but something more; the particular evil is transformed; without changing it or "mystifying" it, it becomes the ground for positive growth. The society as a whole expresses this concretely in the respect and care which it shows to the human person especially to the disadvantaged one.

Caruso does say, himself, that the present rush of auto-destructiveness in the human society may in an unknown way lead to a better order of society, thus allowing for the possibility of a positive transcendence! But this comment appears in a footnote (perhaps, more than literally). It does not detract from his argument that the self-destructive tendencies will attain final victory, as it were. It does not sway him from his fatalism (Ananke).

Max Scheler's distinction between the "Negative" and the "Classical Theory of Man":--with respect to Caruso's negative ontology, one is reminded of Max Scheler's distinction between the "negative" and the "classical" theory of man. He sees the "negative" theory as proposing that the spirit arises from the negation of nature, from the negation of anterior stages. He attributes this position to such thinkers as Buddha, Schopenhauer, Alsborg and Freud. On Buddha, Scheler explains that human existence attains its meaning in the extinction of self as

a subject of desire. For Schopenhauer the essential difference between the animal and the human consists in the fact that the animal is unable to accomplish that

"liberating" negation of the will-to-live of which man is capable. Scheler explains that for Schopenhauer, as for his master Bouterweck, this negation is the source of all the "superior forms" of knowledge and consciousness. For Alsberg, a disciple of Schopenhauer, Scheler explains that:

"...le principe d'humanité" consiste uniquement en ce que l'homme a su soustraire ses organes à la lutte que mènent pour la conservation de leur vie l'individu et l'espèce, et y substituer l'outil, le langage, l'élaboration du concept; quant à celle-ci, il la ramène à la mise hors-circuit des organes et des fonctions sensorielles, et au principe de la plus grande "économie" possible en matière de représentations sensibles (cf. Mach).

He concludes that for Alsberg the "spirit" is:

...un succédané tardivement apparu d'une insuffisance d'adaptation, on pourrait dire dans le sens d'Alfred Adler: une surcompensation de l'infériorité organique constitutionnelle de l'espèce humaine.⁵⁵

Scheler also sees Freud's theory in its last form as a "negative" theory of man. He says that for Freud the repression and sublimation of instinct is the explanation of the uniqueness of the human constitution and of the formation of culture. He explains the affinity between Schopenhauer, Buddha and Freud:

⁵⁵ Max Scheler, La situation de l'homme dans le monde, trans. from the German by M. Dupuy, Paris, Editions Montaigne, 1951, p. 77-78.

On n'a pas assez remarqué que Freud, dans ses derniers ouvrages, et depuis la formation de sa théorie dualiste des deux instincts fondamentaux, la libido et l'instinct de mort, non seulement se rapproche singulièrement de Schopenhauer, mais se rattache directement à la doctrine de Bouddha. Ces deux penseurs considèrent qu'au fond toutes les formes de l'esprit, la chose matérielle, la plante, l'animal, l'homme et enfin le sage qui possède le savoir sacré, sont pour ainsi dire des groupes d'un cortège figé et solennel qui glisse vers le néant silencieux et la mort éternelle. Or d'après Freud qui, à tort selon moi, attribue à l'organisme une tendance à la conservation absolue de son être-tel (Sosein), une tendance à chercher le repos, à se défendre des excitations et à les "refuser", --le système moteur qui chez l'animal s'ajoute aux systèmes de nutrition, de croissance et de reproduction et s'insère (par opposition à la plante) entre ceux-ci et le milieu, résulte déjà en partie de l'instinct de mort, instinct sadique au fond et destructeur en tant qu'il est le désir primordial de la vie de "faire retour à l'inorganique."⁵⁶

One may add Caruso's name to the ones considered by Scheler in the above. Caruso shares Freud's views to some extent, and furthermore has concluded that a human dialectics is not only divorced from nature but consists in a flight from the incomprehensible and absurd.

Scheler sees, as the essential defect in the "negative" theory of man, the inability to explain the basis of the principle of negation: the reason why the negation furthering development occurs. For example, he asks: "...pourquoi l'énergie est-elle refoulée ou sublimée, et le vouloir-vivre, nié: en vue de quelles valeurs et de quels buts ultimes?" He concludes that "La théorie négative de

56 Ibid., p. 79-80.

l'homme présuppose toujours ce qu'elle doit expliquer: la raison, l'esprit avec ses lois propres et indépendantes, et l'identité partielle de ses principes avec ceux de l'être."⁵⁷

The "classical" theory of man sees the spirit as itself having power and force; it itself possesses an original activity and capacity to act. Scheler explains its origin in Plato and Aristotle:

On trouve cette théorie classique de l'esprit chez Platon et Aristote, qui voit avant tout dans les idées et les formes des puissances de façonnement qui ... de la "puissance" de la prima materia, font sortir par un processus d'"information" les choses du monde.

Also, he explains its Judeo-Christian sources:

On la rencontre aussi dans le théisme judéo-chrétien qui conçoit Dieu uniquement comme pur esprit et lui attribue en tant que tel non seulement direction et conduction (inhibition et libération), mais encore une volonté positive créatrice et même toute-puissante...

J. G. Fichte and Hegel are also seen as adopting this position:

...elle figure également, sous une forme plus panthéiste, chez J. G. Fichte ou dans le panlogisme de Hegel, d'après lequel l'histoire universelle doit reposer sur le développement spontané de l'Idée divine selon une loi dialectique, l'essence de l'homme étant seulement la progressive conscience de soi que prend "en lui" la divinité spirituelle et éternelle--: mais, qu'elle se manifeste ici ou là, la théorie classique est affectée toujours et partout de la même erreur, qui consiste à conférer à l'esprit et à l'idée une puissance originaire.

57 Ibid., p. 80-81.

Scheler identifies the "classical" theory with bourgeois ideology:

Au point de vue sociologique, la théorie classique est en même temps une idéologie de classe, l'idéologie d'une classe dirigeante, la bourgeoisie.⁵⁸

Scheler sees this theory as "more dangerous" than the negative one, because it is more widespread in western thought. His own solution to the problem as he presents it, is to view the spirit as lacking power in itself: in its original pure form it lacks all force and activity. The negation and sublimation of nature is seen as giving the spirit energy. He explains the relation of the "higher" and the "lower" levels:

L'ordre primitif des rapports qui existent entre les formes et catégories supérieures ou inférieures de l'être et de la valeur d'une part, et d'autre part les forces et énergies où ces formes se réalisent, se caractérise ainsi: "Ce qui est inférieur est originellement doué de puissance; ce qui est supérieur est impuissant." Chaque forme supérieur de l'être est relativement débile par rapport à la forme inférieure, et elle ne s'actualise pas par ses propres moyens, mais par la puissance de la forme inférieure.⁵⁹

It is well beyond the present scope to elaborate and evaluate Scheler's view of the problem presented above and his solution to it, with its ultimate implications and framework: i.e. pantheism. One may only mention here that his understanding of "spirit", perhaps conditioned by

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 82.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 84-85.

aspects of the phenomenological method, tends towards an essentialistic, "transcendental" and consequently non-existential and non-concrete conception. For the philosophy of integrality the issue of existence is not suspended as in the phenomenological method. Sciacca speaks of the existentialized essence and the essentialized existence:-- a dialectics of implication and compresence does not suspend the issue of existence to deal only with abstracted essences. Furthermore, the spirit is not seen as "transcendental", an abstracted form, but as actual in immanence and transcendence. The ideal is never abstracted from a concrete subject even where the Idea implies that the concrete subject is God. The natural is not an original "demoniacal", "blind" power, but part of human integrality. Scheler writes:

En d'autres termes, l'idéation progressive et la spiritualisation des forces obscures qui se trouvent derrière les images des choses, et en même temps la participation croissante de l'esprit à la puissance et à la vie, --engendrent la pénétration réciproque de la poussée originellement démoniaque, c'est-à-dire aveugle à toutes les idées et valeurs spirituelles-- et de l'esprit originellement impuissant: cette pénétration est le but et le terme de l'être fini et du devenir. Le théisme en fait à tort leur point de départ.⁶⁰

Scheler is attempting to determine the complementarity between man and nature and in this sense his attempt is commendable; however, his explanation does not seem to

60 Ibid., p. 90.

escape on a metaphysical level the "negative" view of man which he criticized:--in his conception, the "spirit" is fundamentally powerless and nature fundamentally "demoniacal" and "blind"!

4. The Need for A New Synthesis

A. Value of "Thesis" from a Psychological Point of View (A Psychology of the Motivation-towards-the-Absolute in Man)

Caruso's "thesis", as an emphasis on the transcendent relation in man, provides an important contribution to the psychology of personality. Caruso is not the first nor the only psychologist to have considered the human person as essentially open and oriented towards an absolute or ultimate reality and value. Neither is he the only one to have focussed on the absolutization of partial or relative aspects of human life as a factor in psychopathology. Other psychologists such as Karl Jaspers, Viktor Frankl, and more recently, Adrian van Kaam present theories which stress these human tendencies. Jaspers spoke of "turning the psyche into a god,"⁶¹ and van Kaam of "totalizing tendencies";⁶² concepts which are similar or analogous

⁶¹ Karl Jaspers, The Nature of Psychotherapy, trans. by J. Hoenig and M. W. Hamilton, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 33-34.

⁶² Adrian van Kaam, In Search of Spiritual Identity, Denville, N.J., Dimension Books, 1975, p. 112 & 160.

to Caruso's "absolutization of relative values". In van Kaam one finds an explicit reference to transcendence as in the early Caruso; there is even a close analogy between Caruso's distinction of analytical and synthetic aspects of psychotherapy and van Kaam's distinction of introspective and transcendent self-presence in the practice of spirituality.⁶³ Although Caruso is not the only psychologist to have considered the role of ultimate values, he is unique in terms of the centrality which he gives them in his theory of neurosis and psychotherapy and in terms of the particular angle from which he views these issues.

Caruso unambiguously insisted on giving a final transcendent ontological status to the "absolute" towards which the human personality is intrinsically oriented. Furthermore he interpreted this orientation towards a "hierarchy of values" as focal to the understanding of psychopathology, especially the neuroses. The underlying problem of neurosis involved the functioning of the human conscience, a conscience which is open to discovering true objective values.

Contemporary humanistic psychologies tend to be rooted in anthropologies which are immanentistic in nature: they negate or remain closed to man's transcendent relation. For example Jung hesitated to go beyond an empirical

⁶³ Ibid., p. 172-96.

description of psychic "archetypes" to consider if these somehow reflected an objective transcendent realm. Freud spoke of the projection of the "father-image". Fromm's focus was on the humanistic value of religion or of secular systems without concern with the ontological status of the absolute. Caruso's, on the other hand, was an attempt to define a psychology which supported and was supported by an anthropology stressing a transcendent relation in the human personality. He did this by considering it as an issue arising out of the very process of neurosis; by showing that the issue of an absolute reference is raised by neurosis itself.

In fact, psychology cannot put aside the issue of man's ultimate vocation, of his ultimate nature, of his final destiny, etc... The human being in the context of his society inevitably deals with these questions and expresses his convictions and attitudes to them in his practices, in his beliefs and in his philosophical systems. A psychology that is conceived with respect to the whole man, especially a psychology of personality, or a psychopathology, or a psychotherapy, cannot simply neglect these issues. Caruso's early work seems to have been sparked by an acute concern and sensitivity in this area. He saw the transcendent factor as the core of the human person. He may thus be characterized, in his early period, as a psychologist of the

motivation-towards-the-absolute in man. If one considers Frankl's classification of Freud's, Adler's and his own system as emphasizing the "will to pleasure", the "will to power" and the "will to meaning" respectively, one may interpret the early Caruso as the psychologist of the "will to the absolute".⁶⁴

B. Value of the "Antithesis"
(The Value of the Human)

In his early "thesis" period Caruso stressed, in keeping with his psychoanalytic background, the biological determining influences of the instincts in the personality. In connection with this he had a theory of personalization which emphasized a progressive awareness of determination as promoting personal freedom and development. Even as he abandoned the idea of a transcendent he retained his emphasis on this conception of personalization as central to his understanding of development and of the psychoanalytic process in therapy. He further elaborated this conception in the context of a Marxist socio-historical theory. Thus, one sees that Caruso's emphasis on a dialectical process of becoming aware of biological determination, has remained throughout his writings.

⁶⁴ Viktor Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, trans. from the German by Richard and Clara Winston, Toronto, Bantam Books, 1955, p. x.

In fact there is no basic contrast between the "thesis" and "antithesis" period of Caruso's thought in terms of the importance he attributes to biological instinctual processes. The difference between these two periods is really a difference between a conception of the human that allows for immanence and transcendence from one side and one that allows only for immanence on the other. As pointed out earlier, the problem in Caruso's development is not between an idealistic and materialistic dialectics as may first appear. Caruso always had an acute sense of the material-biological basis of human personality. This emphasis was sustained and elaborated--it was never put into question.

What value then does his "antithesis" period have in this context if he was not reacting to the issue of material-biological-instinctual determination? Neither does it seem that he simply reacted against the transcendent dimension as such. This factor had given a certain coherence to his understanding of personality by objectively founding his theory of conscience. What did become a problem, however, was the existence of the human. Caught between biological determination on the one hand, and a given objective hierarchy of values on the other, the human was not given by the early Caruso any positive value of its own. The later Caruso gave the human its socio-historical

and existential value, but the early Caruso tended to see the human as a mere symbol of the transcendent; it lacked its own reality.⁶⁵ One may suggest, therefore, that Caruso, in his "antithetical" period, rejected the transcendent to assert the human. He assumed in this way Feuerbach's thesis in his Essence of Christianity.⁶⁶ In fact Caruso's "antithesis" may be seen as an attempt to reaffirm the Feuerbachian thesis that one perfects an anthropology by negating a theology.⁶⁷

65 See Chapter IV, section 3A of this thesis.

66 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. from the German by George Eliot, New York, Harper and Row, 1957.

67 Soto discusses Sciacca's view of the relation between theology and anthropology:

"'El problema del hombre era determinante en sus meditaciones: si el hombre pregunta y da respuestas de sí a sí mismo, o, si el hombre que preguntándose a sí mismo recibe la respuesta de Dios en su interioridad; era el problema que debía "resolver filosóficamente probando, sobre la base del análisis más radical de los existente en su singularidad irrepetible e integral, que problema y solución son intrínsecos de su misma estructura ontológica.' 'Era--dice Sciacca--una toma de posición decidida, no sólo en las confrontaciones del humanismo absoluto y de toda otra forma de inmanentismo (existencialismos incluso), trastornar la afirmación; "él razonamiento sobre Dios es razonamiento sobre el hombre" y por esto la teología se resuelve con la antropología. En ésta, el razonamiento sobre el hombre es inteligente porque es también necesariamente sobre Dios y, por consiguiente, la antropología implica intrínsecamente la teología--pero también en las confrontaciones de todo agnosticismo metafísico--'"

Caruso's dialectics have always been highly antithetical; that is, the human is reduced as mere symbol of the transcendent or the transcendent is reduced as mystification of the human.⁶⁸ In this respect, it is of interest to note that the conclusive "antithesis" of Caruso, though it claims to be a materialism, rejects a naturalistic framework at a certain point by rejecting the basis of a dialectics in nature and radically opposing the human and the natural.⁶⁹ Caruso's dialectics is one that affirms negating and negates affirming--what Sciacca calls a dialectics of the resolution of opposites.. (Sciacca proposes a dialectics of the implication and compresence of the different orders of being, which aims at the unity of the human being.)

This antithetical factor seems to be the focal problem of Caruso's thought. He has at various times reduced the human to the merely symbolic, the natural to the absurd and irrational, and the transcendent to illusion. But the human is not merely symbolic but substantial; the natural is not absurd and irrational but a foundation to human reason (as even Caruso himself paradoxically admits);⁷⁰

68 See Chapter V, section 2E of this thesis.

69 See Chapter V, section 2G of this thesis.

70 Caruso, op. cit., 1977, p. 216.

the transcendent is not a mere projection and illusion but a necessary given principle of life and consciousness (Sciacca). One need not develop a dialectics of the natural, of the human and the transcendent in a manner where they radically exclude or negate one another. A dialectics of integrality, of compresence and implication, provides one with an orientation and a method which is not initially prejudicial to any realm of human life but seeks out the unity of these realms.

C. Outline of a New Synthesis

A psychology may be rooted in an anthropology which remains open to the natural, the human and the transcendent. Dialectically Caruso's thought as a whole, in the way it has been interpreted here (i.e. "thesis" ... "antithesis" ... "synthesis"), carries the exigency of such an integration. Such a psychology would call for a tool appropriate to its synthetical or integrative intent: a dialectics of implication and compresence of the different orders. It would need a foundation on a philosophy which stresses the synthesis of these dimensions in its conception of man.

A focal issue of such a psychology is brought out by an aspect of Caruso's early theory of neurosis. He considered that neurosis has a positive value because it carries within it an exigency to recognize the true absolute.

The neurotic becomes cured as he recognizes the relativity of the value he has absolutized:--negating the relative to affirm the absolute as it were. Thus the positive exigency in neurosis for Caruso was the recognition of the absolute; this was the positive factor that fostered a cure. However, implicitly, there was, in a correlative way, the normalization of the relative value as well. Neurosis, in other words, is not simply a search for the absolute as such (a metaphysical quest), but a search for the relative in its true relative value, in its actual relativity. As such the relative confirms the absolute, just as the absolute confirms the relative (dialectics of implication and compresence). The neurotic has not only to give up the relative he has absolutized but to discover the relative as relative, in its intrinsic value: e.g. the neurotic who has absolutized pleasure has to discover anew the value of pleasure in its relativity, indeed in its affirmation of the absolute.⁷¹

Caruso's early emphasis was on the negation of the relative in order to affirm the absolute. His later emphasis came to be, in a Feuerbachian vein, the negation of the absolute in order to affirm the relative immanent concrete order. His "thesis" and "antithesis" call for a synthesis where the exigency is not simply to affirm the absolute,

71 See Chapter III, section 2 of this thesis.

negating the relative, nor simply to affirm the relative, negating the absolute.

The Caruso of the "thesis" period did have a dialectics which took into account man's immanence and transcendence. As has been seen, however, even during that early period, his dialectics tended to an excessive depreciation of the human in terms of "human principles and feelings" being seen as "transitory and relative, uncertain and ambivalent".⁷² Furthermore, this skepticism towards the human extended into the realm of the philosophical foundations of his thought where he remained ambivalent about the construction of a "universal anthropology".

Admittedly, human knowledge, human feelings and principles are relative. It would be an error to follow a "neurotic" process in absolutizing them; they would then exert in Sciaccian terms their "monarchical" tendencies disforming themselves and transgressing their norm. The philosophy of integrality, however, stresses the implication and compresence of the immanent and transcendent, of the relative and the absolute. The one does not exclude the other; nor does the one simply resolve the other into itself. While remaining relative, finite, contingent, particular and accidental, a reality may express the absolute,

⁷² Caruso, op. cit., 1964, p. 94.

infinite, necessary, universal and essential. Indeed, man does not relate to the absolute directly but in the context of the mediating value of the relative. In concrete human life what is contingent and accidental shares in what is necessary and essential. It is in this sense that Sciacca proposes a dialectics of the concrete and not of the abstract. In the concrete the different orders are com-present and implicated.

The human may be relative but it mediates the absolute in a substantial way. It is substantiated by its relation to the absolute. This critique of Caruso focuses our attention on the mediating value of the human and on the process of mediation in general. Human life is steeped in mediation of all kinds, at all levels: the senses mediate reality for the intellect; the parents mediate the culture for the child; the culture mediates nature; man mediates God in his personal social structure (he is made in His Image); language mediates thought; thought mediates truth and being; praxis mediates theory; becoming mediates being; the body mediates the mind, the individual the person... The mediation of the absolute is man's natural condition.

The early Caruso did not sufficiently emphasize the substantial mediating value of the human. Between biological determination, on the one hand, and the

transcendent hierarchy of values on the other, there was not much room, as it were, for the human existential component (despite the title of his book: Existential Psychology). Philosophically the human component was negated. His "developing antithesis" and "conclusive antithesis" periods may in fact have been an attempt to restore the human to its proper value. He did this, however, by first expressing an ambiguity about the transcendent and later by a negation of the transcendent. In other words, in a Feuerbachian vein, he attempted to affirm the human by negating the transcendent. This, however, did not ultimately achieve the affirmation of the human but led to a nihilistic conclusion concerning man himself. Despite his emphasis with Bloch on a dialectics of hope, Caruso seems finally drawn to share Freud's pessimistic view that the purpose of all life is death.

Caruso's "thesis" and "antithesis", nevertheless, carry the exigency of a "synthesis". His thought as a whole calls for a "balanced" view of man, and a "balanced" understanding of psychological activity. Man's concrete socio-historical becoming, as reflected psychologically, would not be seen as excluding an openness to the transcendent as an ultimate source of values. An ultimate dependency and receptivity in man would not be seen as negating his independency and creativity, but indeed as guaranteeing

and affirming it. This is in contrast to a Feuerbachian view of Caruso, and to a dialectics of the resolution of opposites.

This "balance" or "equilibrium" ought not to be construed simply in terms of social adaptation (a fundamentally pragmatic view) or simply in terms of achieving optimum pleasure (a hedonistic view), because it is rooted in an "ontological disequilibrium": the finite in man does not adequate the infinite which is its norm. Man's psychological "equilibrium" has roots in a deeper anthropological-metaphysical "equilibrium": an "equilibrium" of finite and infinite, of immanent and transcendent: a "disequilibrium". The human finds itself concretely essentialized or personalized, by living its "tension" to the infinite and transcendent, by living in its self-transcendence: it lives the infinite in its finitude and its finitude in the infinite, thus remaining in a "tension" towards Being.

This should meet the internal exigency of Caruso's program: substantiating the human and promoting a psychology of hope, based in a non-fatalistic anthropology. In terms of psychotherapy and the business of contributing to the healing of the alienated human condition, this "synthesis" renews Caruso's notion of personalization, and his early view of psychotherapy as analysis and synthesis. Personalization is more than the awareness of determination;

it includes the awareness of value which gives the strength to face and master one's determination; thus synthesis and analysis proceed hand in hand. The synthesis of self and value is the ground which makes the analysis of determination (instinctual or other) meaningful.

The norm of the philosophy of integrality is thus applied to this aspect of psychotherapy: the analytic reflective factor has to depend on the basic synthesis of the subject and value. Reason is exercised with respect to intelligence. Consciousness and self-consciousness are exercised with respect to the given ontological synthesis of one's being: that given synthesis which constitutes each and everyone's personhood.

D. Directions for Further Research

The philosophical conclusions of this thesis suggest an emphasis on the mediating value of the relative and contingent reality: man does not relate "directly" to the absolute and infinite but through a mediation: this is his natural, normal condition. Furthermore, this factor of mediation is not only important in psychology (e.g. language mediates thought) but in sociology (e.g. the parents mediate the culture), in philosophy (e.g. thought mediates truth and being), in theology (e.g. man mediates God because he is made in His Image, or God's relationship to the world is

mediated through the Word). This is an area of research which could be very fruitful in contributing to a theoretical-practical science of personality which remains open to its theological and philosophical moments. The essentiality of mediation for the human would be an important issue also for a philosophical anthropology. One may thereby continue to build the edifice of a "universal anthropology" which would give its support to a science of personality.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Caruso's thought has been influenced by many and varied sources. His early works suggest the positive influences of such authors as V. Frankl, K. Jaspers, P. Tournier, C. Baudoin and others; and a critical response to the ideas of J. P. Sartre, S. de Beauvoir, C. G. Jung, A. Adler and others. His early philosophical foundations may be seen as receiving a Christian Personalistic or Existentialistic influence with Thomistic overtones. During his later period, however, these philosophical foundations changed dramatically. There appeared the influences of E. Bloch and of the Frankfurt School: T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer and H. Marcuse. At the same time he became critical of such authors as E. Fromm, H. S. Sullivan and Karen Horney. His philosophical foundations exemplified a Hegelian-Marxist and a Feuerbachian framework. However, throughout both periods--the so-called Christian Existentialist and the so-called Hegelian-Marxist--he retained an inner fidelity to Freud and remained identified with the clinical practice of psychoanalysis.

This diversity of influences, although contributing a richness and variety to his system, was found to result in polarizations and tensions in his thought. He proposed his approach as a dialectical interpretation of psychoanalysis,

a dialectical depth psychology. However, his increasing emphasis on irrationalistic elements and his increasing adherence to a quasi-fatalistic, quasi-nihilistic negative ontology of man tended to compromise this interpretation or position.

The developments and contradictions of his thought, in depth psychology, were considered in the perspective of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality. The content and method of this philosophy were seen as essential to help in the clarification of the internal dynamics of Caruso's thinking. His psychology was seen as developing through three main stages or phases: (1) an initial "thesis" where Caruso stresses the transcendent and objective meaning of values in explaining neurosis and in developing a rationale for psychotherapy; (2) a "developing antithesis" phase, where he begins to question the transcendent relation and to emphasize the process of progress and development according to immanentistic terms; (3) a "conclusive antithesis" phase where, although seeming to attempt a synthesis between Marxism and Psychoanalysis, he tends, in Freudian vein, towards a quasi-fatalistic and pessimistic view of his immanentistically conceived human progress. Dialectically, Caruso's thought was seen as positing the exigency of a "synthesis". The central problem of his thought was interpreted as a conflict between a purely

immanentistic view of man and a conception that affirms both the immanent and transcendent dimensions of man. In the light of the philosophy of integrality the later Caruso's nihilistic tendencies are, in the last instance, attributed to his immanentistic tenets. Furthermore, Caruso's thought is seen as carrying an internal transcendent exigency of its own.

The positive aspect of his "antithetical" phases can be recuperated insofar as it attempts to take into consideration the concrete aspects of human existence, especially the socio-historical ones. Nevertheless, this attempt was seriously compromised by the exclusivity of his immanentism. His "thesis" phase was seen as proposing too negative a view of the human component. The proposed synthesis brings together the metaphysical exigency of his first position with the humanistic exigency of his second position. This proposal is enlightened by Sciacca's philosophy of integrality. This philosophy offers a method, a dialectics of implication and compresence, which serves to complete the inner exigency of Caruso's depth psychology. Furthermore, it provides the key principles for a philosophical anthropology, a "universal anthropology" (the necessity of which Caruso had recognized early in his thinking; however his excessive criticism of it prevented him from actualizing it). In this sense, Sciacca's

philosophy of integrality, his ontology of man, provides the philosophical foundations for the synthesis of Caruso's psychology.

These conclusions renew Caruso's early program of seeing in neurosis the distorted expression of the motivation-towards-the-absolute in man. They add, however, the insight that for the human such a motivation is normally carried out in a relative and concrete order, carried out in mediated fashion. They also renew the emphasis on analysis and synthesis in psychotherapy, with the synthesis of the subject and the objective value understood as giving the context or framework to the analysis. Caruso's personalism is also reformulated: personalization is not the humanization of an ontologically alien natural-instinctive reality, nor is it the encounter with an ontologically alien other; the alterity of nature and other within their norms is, ontologically, a confirmation of the person. Furthermore, these conclusions lead to a psychology of hope--a psychology that may contribute to man's immanent becoming without absolutizing it; without absolutizing "autonomous" man.

A key to future research is suggested in the issue of the mediating value of the human: the concrete historical manner in which the relationship to the transcendent and absolute is lived in man. The philosophy of integrality

provides a content and a method which implicitly emphasizes this factor. Mediation, as intended here, is a concept which is undeniably rich for the human sciences. It is suggested here that its elaboration may deepen the unity between the different human sciences such as psychology, sociology, philosophy and theology.

In conclusion, the present analysis of the development of Caruso's depth psychology has been an attempt to show that a fruitful consideration of human personality needs to take into account the objective, transcendent, infinite, absolute reference, as inherent to personality and as substantially mediated in its immanent, concrete and historical order.



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APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MICHELE
FEDERICO SCIACCA

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA

Michele Federico Sciacca was born in Giarre, Province of Catania, Sicily, in 1908. Jolivet and Roggerone¹ who discuss his personality and his philosophical development state that since an early age Sciacca demonstrated an insatiable curiosity for ideas, and a vivid sense of the importance of the philosophical implications of the humanities.

In 1927, spurred by his interest in philosophy, Sciacca went to the school of Antonio Aliotta in Naples. Under Aliotta, he obtained his doctoral degree in philosophy in 1930. His thesis was entitled, The Philosophy of Thomas Reid. In 1936, at Naples, he began to teach the history of ancient philosophy and, in 1938, he was named professor of the history of philosophy at the University of Pavia. Prior to this appointment, he had also studied under the famous Italian philosopher, Giovanni Gentile. In 1947, Sciacca went to the University of Genova to teach theoretical philosophy, where he remained until his death in 1975.

¹ R. Jolivet and G. Roggerone, "Michele Federico Sciacca," in Les grands courants de la pensée mondiale contemporaine, edited by M. F. Sciacca, Vol. II, Paris, Fischbacher and Marzorati, 1964, p. 1379-1413.

Sciacca founded, in 1945, the Giornale di Metafisica, as the organ of Christian spiritualism. This movement stresses the Augustinian sources of Christian philosophy and seeks to integrate all the richness of modern and contemporary speculation. The Augustinian emphasis distinguishes Christian spiritualism from neo-Scholasticism. Christian spiritualism may be understood as having provided an important ground or basis for the philosophy of integrality. In addition to founding the Giornale di Metafisica, Sciacca was also involved in the editorship of Logos and Humanitas. Soto,² in an article on Sciacca's intellectual itinerary, further describes the Italian philosopher's extensive and dynamic involvement in the promotion of philosophy:

...fue uno de los fundadores del Centro di Studi Filosofici de Garallate y uno de los fundadores del Centro di Studi Filosofici de Garallate y de la Centro Internazionale de Studi Rosminiani (Stresa), y frecuentó la Universidad Internacional de Santander. Organizó con Lavelle y con Le Senne, los encuentros entre los filósofos del espiritualismo cristiano de Italia y los pensadores de la philosophie de l'esprit franceses, cuyo fruto más destacado es la fecunda corriente de ideas que dio origen a las ediciones Aubier de París. Traducido a cinco idiomas, llegó a ser uno de los filósofos italianos más leído y discutido. Sintió una honda predilección por la cultura europea latina, como buen italiano; tuvo gran cariño por España, a la que llamó "un oasis todavía capaz

2 José Alberto Badilla Soto, "Michele F. Sciacca: itinerario intelectual," Tiempo Actual, n. 9, 1978, p. 57-72.

de alimentarnos", además por Francia y sus grandes espíritus: Pascal, Blondel, Bergson, Lavelle. El verdadero difusor de las obras de Sciacca en lengua española fue Adolfo Muñoz Alonso, de la Universidad de Madrid.

En 1954 Sciacca llegó a América. Dio conferencias y se relacionó con profesores colegas de criterio teórico divergente al suyo, como asimismo, con otros afines a sus tesis. Su docencia ha dejado hondas raíces en América Latina, en cuyos países viven algunos de sus discípulos. Es importante señalar que Michele F. Sciacca fue el primer filósofo europeo que dedicó en sus libros algún capítulo a la filosofía de América Latina. (Cfr. II volumen de la Filosofía, Oggi, IV ed., 1963; Apendice: Sull' America Latina, 1957, en II Chisciottismo tragico di Unamuno, 1971)...

Los cursos que Sciacca impartía en el Istituto di Filosofia y después en la Facoltà di Magistero de la Universidad de Génova, fueron por muchísimos años fuente de un constante diálogo con estudiantes y docentes nacionales y extranjeros. La Cattedra Antonio Rosmini del Centro Internazionale di Studi Rosminiani, (Stresa-Italia), inaugurada por el mismo Sciacca, en agosto de 1967, fue un semillero de su labor docente y de escritor. Ahí fueron escuchados los grandes temas de sus futuros libros: Filosofía e Antilosofía, L'oscuramento dell' Intelligenza; Ontologia Triadica e Trinitaria, La Casa del Pane, obras en que se encuentra su vastísima cultura y la síntesis crítica del filósofo frente a los grandes problemas del hombre de hoy, su condición de persona, naturaleza, casa, sociedad, tecnología, política e ideología, cultura, progreso y verdad, moral, religión... Temas tratados con vivaz polémica desde la perspectiva de la "filosofía de la integralidad", con el propósito de rescatar, de modo teórico y práctico, a la persona y desvelar su propia dignidad, fundada en valores objetivos que ella encarna y realiza históricamente.³

Sciacca has also been a prolific writer. His complete works comprising about fifty volumes have been published by Marzorati Editore and Città Nuova Editrice

3 Ibid., p. 70-71.

since 1967. Ottonello⁴ has published a bibliography of Sciacca's works up to 1968. For a good synopsis of Sciacca's work, the reader is referred to the articles by Jolivet and Roggerone⁵ and by Soto.⁶

4 Pier Paolo Ottonello, Bibliografia di M. F. Sciacca (dal 1931 al 1968), Milano, Marzorati Editore, 1969.

5 Jolivet and Roggerone, op. cit., 1964, pp. 1379-1413.

6 Soto, op. cit., 1978, pp. 57-72.

APPENDIX 2

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF IGOR ALEXANDER CARUSO
AND A DISCUSSION OF PUBLICATIONS

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF IGOR ALEXANDER CARUSO AND A DISCUSSION OF PUBLICATIONS

1. Biographical Sketch

Igor Alexander Caruso was born in 1914 at Tiraspol (in the Russian section of the Kaiser Reich) in a family originally from Italy. He received the degree of Doctor of Psychology and Pedagogy at the University of Louvain in Belgium, in 1937. In 1945 he received the Diploma from the German Institute for Psychotherapy and Psychological Research (Deutsches Institut für Psychotherapie und psychologische Forschung). After a brief activity at the University of Innsbruck (Austria), Caruso founded the Vienna Working Circle for Depth Psychology of which he has been the director since that time. This organization which is of international repute and entertains exchanges with similar groups especially in Latin America (Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and others) presents a personalistic vision of man: its central idea is "to subordinate psychoanalysis to an inner constructive criticism and to set it within the spacious framework of the science of man."¹

¹ Igor A. Caruso, "Personalistic Psychoanalysis as Symbolic Knowledge," Journal of Psychotherapy and Religious Processes, 1955, 2, p. 2-3; above biographical details are taken from this article and from: Igor A. Caruso, La psychanalyse contre la société?, trans. from the German by Jeanne Etoire, Presses Universitaires de France, 1977.

Caruso has been teaching clinical psychology at the University of Salzburg in Austria and since 1972 has also taught at the free University of Berlin.²

2. Publications

Caruso has been a prolific writer in the area of psychoanalysis since the middle 40's. His most widely translated and probably most widely read book is his Existential Psychology, (From Analysis to Synthesis)³ first published in 1952 as Psychoanalyse und Synthese der Existenz, Beziehungen zwischen psychologischer Analyse und Daseinwerten. This book which has been translated into at least five languages presents a vision of psychopathology and psychotherapy in terms of the loss and restoration of an objective transcendent hierarchy of values. Besides German, Caruso has often published his works initially in French and Spanish. His articles have appeared in journals such as Esprit, Bulletin de Psychologie, Psyché, Revista de Psicoanálisis, Psiquiatría y Psicología, Revista espirituales, Jahrbuch für Psychologie, Psychotherapie und medizinische Anthropologie, and many others.

2 Caruso, op. cit., 1977.

3 Igor A. Caruso, Existential Psychology, From Analysis to Synthesis, trans. from the German by Eva Krapf, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1964.

Besides Existential Psychology, other books published include: Bios, psique, persona. Introducción a la psicología profunda en general⁴ first published in German in 1957. Another important publication, Psychanalyse pour la personne⁵ appeared in 1962. This book was in the main a collection of articles published in various French journals mostly in the late fifties and early sixties. In 1968 he published in German: The Separation of Lovers: A Phenomenology of Death (Die Trennung der Liebenden. Eine Phänomenologie des Todes).⁶ This book demonstrates the dialectic correlation between libido and death instinct on the basis of numerous case histories. In 1972 Caruso published Soziale Aspekte der Psychoanalyse (translated into French in 1977 as La psychanalyse contre la société?)⁷ which is in the main a collection of articles published

4 Igor A. Caruso, Bios, psique, persona. Introducción a la psicología profunda en general, trans. by Manuel Espadas Burgos, Biblioteca de Psicología y Psicoterapia, 4, Madrid, Gredos, 1965 (it was not possible to locate this book).

5 Igor A. Caruso, Psychanalyse pour la personne, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1962.

6 Igor A. Caruso, Die Trennung der Liebenden, Eine Phänomenologie des Todes, Bern, Switzerland, Hans Huber, 1968; La separación de los amantes (una fenomenología de la muerte), traducción de Armando Suárez y Rosa Tanco, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Mexico, 1969.

7 Caruso, op. cit., 1977.

between 1961 and 1971. It shows a definitive shift in Caruso's dialectics in the direction of a historical materialism, and away from an initial Christian existentialist position.

A good synopsis of Caruso's earlier psychology is given by Reinhardt in his book, The Existentialist Revolt⁸ and by Martínez in his article "Téoria de Igor A. Caruso sobre la persona en la psicología profunda."⁹

⁸ Kurt F. Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt, (enlarged edition), New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1952.

⁹ Eusebio Martínez, "Téoria de Igor A. Caruso sobre la persona en la psicología profunda," Estudios filosóficos, 1959 (8), p. 315.

ABSTRACT OF

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF IGOR A. CARUSO'S
DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LIGHT OF
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This thesis presents a critique of the development of Igor Alexander Caruso's thought in depth psychology in the light of Michele Federico Sciacca's philosophy of integrality. It traces the development of Caruso's thought through three different phases or moments: (1) a "thesis" phase, where Caruso considers the transcendent aspect of personality as essential to a depth psychology; (2) a developing "antithesis" phase where Caruso becomes ambiguous about the transcendent dimension; (3) a conclusive "antithesis" phase where Caruso excludes the transcendent in his understanding of personality and where he shows a quasi-nihilistic and pessimistic orientation in his understanding of man. In the light of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality, these developments in Caruso's psychology are understood as carrying the exigency of a "synthesis" which would renew Caruso's initial program with its emphasis on the transcendent dimension of personality. To this end, the Sciaccian dialectics of implication and compresence are seen as providing a method for understanding personality in both its immanent and transcendent aspects. In this way

the absolutization of the immanent order, which is a characteristic of Caruso's later thought, is avoided. It is concluded that a fruitful consideration of human personality needs to take into account the objective, transcendent, absolute reference as inherent to personality, and yet as substantially mediated in the immanent, concrete and historical order.

LEXICON OF TERMS

LEXICON OF TERMS

Dialectics (adj. dialectical):--This is a term with many diverse meanings. It may refer to developmental or genetic aspects of reality, to the contradictory forces or factors, to contraries in relation to each other, and to reason and the process of reasoning. In this latter case, it may refer to a speculative reason divorced from experimental demonstration, or to a rational process rooted in praxis. In Hegel it refers to the becoming of the World Spirit in the three moments of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In Marx the basis of the dialectical process is not an abstract World Spirit but matter and especially the material-economic relations among men. Caruso tends to use the term to emphasize the genetic dimension as well as the importance of maintaining an intimate relation between theory and praxis. For Sciacca a dialectics is not defined apart from the process of philosophical discourse. For Sciacca this discourse can proceed by exclusion of contraries (each reality is identical to itself and separate from the other) or reduction of opposites (a reality changes into its opposite radically negating

itself) or (and this is his position) by implication and compresence (identity and contradiction imply one another even as each term in the contradictory relation remains distinctive). For Sciacca a dialectics, in the broad sense of a discourse of thought and reality, is generated by the transcendent relation that inheres in the concrete human existent. Sciacca's philosophy of integrality in this way considers the epistemological, the ontological and the anthropological moments in an intimate relation. Sciacca is very critical of a reduction of the ontological implications of human thought and reason to their epistemological aspects. The corollary of this is that he studies epistemological problems with a view to their ontological implications. Since he develops his understanding of the relation with a focus on the concrete human existent there is an essential anthropological emphasis in his philosophy and in his dialectics.

In this thesis the dialectics of implication and compresence is adopted as the general method for the study of the psychological and philosophical implications of Caruso's thought.

Existential life-heresy:--Caruso's term used to designate the neurotic living of relative values as though they had absolute status. It signifies the defec-tion from the hierarchy of values.

Immanence-Transcendence:--These terms are used in the thesis largely in the meaning they have for the philosophy of integrality. Immanence refers to the whole dimension of the finite even in its indefinite extension in time and space, whether mental, spiritual or material in nature. Transcendence refers to the dimension beyond the subject or existent and beyond all the worldly deter-minations which affect him. It is present to man in his objective interiority, that is in the necessary infinite norm which inheres in his thought, indeed in his whole being. The transcendent is properly infinite and not indefinite. Objective interiority which is the necessary constitutive presence of being as Idea to the human existent implies an Infinite Existent though it does not directly manifest Him as such. Sciacca's philosophy analyses the development of modern and contemporary thought especially the development of idealism with a view to demonstrating the need for

a consideration of the transcendent in the sense of an infinite and absolute reference inherent to human thought. For Sciacca the transcendent is not simply the reality which lies beyond the knowing subject--an epistemological definition. Neither is it the universal, abstract form of the human subject in his knowing of reality (i.e., the Kantian transcendental). It is properly objective (not subjective: neither the human subject in himself nor the human subject in his possession of an abstract universal form) and infinite (neither finite nor indefinitely extensive but infinite: that which is complete without potency). There remains, of course, an essential note of mystery in the relation between the finite and the infinite, the immanent and transcendent. Sciacca's philosophy is an attempt to assert the necessity and certainty of transcendence, of the transcendent dimension, in human thought and in human existence. It does this by demonstrating the exigency of the transcendent as inhering in human reason; one could say as inherent to a dialectics. The note of mystery remains with respect to how the Infinite produces the finite, and how the finite unfolds towards the Infinite. In

other terms, Sciacca's philosophy is not an attempt to explain such mysteries as the Creation of the finite world by an Infinite God or the Redemption of the world by God but it does attempt to show the necessity of the relation between the finite and the infinite by looking to the evidence which shows that the relation is operative.

Objective hierarchy of values:--A term developed by Igor Caruso. He did not greatly elaborate its origin or nature. In adopting this term his intention seems to have been to emphasize the importance of an objective transcendent order as given to the human subject and not simply invented or manufactured by him. Thus the human subject in the first instance has to discover values and not create them. In other words, he has first to respond to the questions life poses to him, rather than impose his own demands on life. Of course there is a subtle balance that is perennially renewed in the course of a person's development. Caruso saw neurosis as an upset in the relationship between the subject and an objectivity of values. In neurosis the subject, somewhat inadvertently, makes himself or some aspect of himself the center of his value system. He is no longer open to the

transcendent objectivity of reality. Unfortunately Caruso did not develop further this concept of the objective hierarchy of values. He changed in orientation and came to deny any transcendent origin to human values. The concept of objective hierarchy of values suffers from its lack of elaboration. At times one has the impression of a static a-priori order given to man rather than a living personal dynamic relation. Caruso, of course, intended the latter meaning but did not sufficiently develop it.

Objective interiority:--A term developed by Sciacca

to signify the unique nature of human interiority. Human consciousness and self-consciousness is founded in an interiority which is not only subjective but objective: the presence of being is given to the interior life of man. It is present therefore as Idea. Man is a human subject by virtue of the Idea which inheres in him, by virtue of possessing an interiority which is objective. His sole subjectivity and immanence could not found the operative consciousness and self-consciousness which tends to unfold in his development.

Ontological disequilibrium:--For Sciacca the ontological status of man is disequilibrated because it is rooted in a finite existent constituted in an essential relation to an infinite referent. The existent is but that whereby he transcends him and is inadequate by his own immanent activity.

Subjective idealism-objective idealism:--For Sciacca the object of objective idealism has to be transcendent and interior. It is not the natural object, that is, the reality of nature but transcendent to nature as it is to the subject. Thus even Hegel's system is viewed by Sciacca as a subjective idealism because it lacks an authentically transcendent object. One is reminded here of Rosmini's distinction between the objective, the extra-subjective and the subjective. Even if a philosophical system admits the existence of the real world and a rapport between the Idea (immanently constituted) and the real, it is still in the realm of the subjective. Only the recognition of an absolute, necessary objective principle or dimension would bring it properly to the realm of objectivity as Sciacca understands it. It should be noted that Sciacca's distinction between subjective and objective

idealism is made in a unique manner and is derived in part from Rosmini's philosophy. Where the object is assumed to be simply the natural objects as such, then a system like Hegel's is properly referred to as objective idealism. This latter is a more common usage. It is not accepted in the Sciaccian approach because of the exigency to found an objectivity that is transcendent in the sense of an infinite absolute reference.