

The Driving Factors of Canada's Foreign Policy and History Concerning Israel and Palestine

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Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Master's degree in Arts Political Science

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Abstract

One of the most prominent conflicts in the modern world is that regarding Israel and Palestine and Canada's role within this conflict has been apparent before the creation of the Israeli state. Literature has researched and demonstrated the United States' role in this conflict however, minimal literature has been produced for Canada's foreign policy role and attitudes towards Israel and Palestine. With the use of secondary literature, this thesis uses qualitative data to display four driving factors of Canadian foreign policy in Israel and Palestine. It also presents several Canadian Prime Ministers to demonstrate the various policies, actions, and attitudes towards notable Israeli-Palestinian events within their governments, and the driving factors that were used to implement these policies. This thesis will demonstrate that Canada's stated interests and values differ from their implied interests and values, as the first favours human security and peacekeeping initiatives, while the latter is rooted in racism and Western supremacy.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge my thesis advisor, Professor Emily Wills for all her help in allowing me to successfully complete this thesis. Without her knowledge and expertise, I would not have been able to complete this thesis in a way that best suited my thoughts. I would also like to acknowledge myself for all my hard work over the years of working a full-time job, pursuing my master's degree, planning a wedding, and a new chapter of my life with my husband Ali. I would also like to acknowledge him for his help and understanding as I navigated through a stressful time during our first years together. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my parents, Fadi and Sahar to whom I owe everything. Without them, I would not have been able to graduate from my bachelor's degree and move forward to completing this thesis and my master's degree. Their continuous love, care, help, and unconditional support has allowed me to have a successful career ahead of me. Their hard work for me and my brothers to have good lives full of happiness, love, health, and success has paid off and I only hope to make them proud of me every day I can.

Introduction

Canada's foreign policy has usually been seen by the international community as a diplomatic road towards peacekeeping, equality, democracy, and freedom that is upheld by human rights, morals, values, and ethics. Canada also plays a major role through their contributions and participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as Canada's participation supports its approach of providing stability to its members and surrounding neighbours), which allows for all states involved to benefit, whether the gain be for national interest, national security, or both. Where Canada's strongest ally, the United States, usually uses hard power methods to ensure their foreign policy goals are achieved, Canada has been known for its more soft power approach, prioritizing diplomacy during conflicts and ensuring all parties involved can find peace and common ground without the use of military intervention, in most cases. Due to Canada's immense advocacy for peace and security around the globe, it is important to look at one of the most prominent and important modern conflicts in the international community, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This thesis will look deeper into Canada's historical policy and actions towards Israel and Palestine and the extent to which it matches their stated foreign policy interests. In this case, I hypothesize that the factors driving Canada's approach to its stated and implied values in their foreign policy agenda regarding Israel and Palestine is not aligned with the perception of Canada's diplomatic attitude in international affairs and its stated interests and values. Canada's role does not advance its goals of peace and security, but instead encourages the diminishment of Palestinian self-determination and basic human rights while advocating for Israel's right to defend itself, which is often done in ways that transgress humanitarian laws.

This topic is important to research and write about for many reasons. The on-going conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is arguably one of the most persistent conflicts in modern times. There is continuous support for both the Israelis and the Palestinians from all countries around the world. For Israel, it is most often from Western nations such as the United States, Canada, France, The United Kingdom, etc., and for the Palestinians we see support from many other Middle Eastern countries, such as Lebanon, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, etc. Support for the Palestinian side, from other Arab, Middle Eastern, and Muslim majority countries draws from their cultural, geographical and/or religious commonalities to the Palestinians, creating a sense of responsibility to protect and encourage Palestinian self-determination. However, the immense support for Israel from Western nations has not been well studied or explained, with competing normative and strategic justifications offered in different analyses.

Canada's support for Israel is also a pressing topic in Canadian federal politics, with the right- and left-wing parties being almost always unanimous in keeping strong ties to Israel, although the New Democratic Party takes a more neutral stance on the issue. However, regardless of a Conservative or Liberal government, Canada has been firm in upholding its relationship to Israel as one of their strongest allies. However, this may not be in line with the preferences of Canadians; 48% of Canadians in 2012 stated that they would prefer the Harper government; to remain neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian disputes, while 19% preferred the government to favour Israel (Payton, 2012). Broadening the conversation around Canada's foreign policy objectives, attitudes, and role within the issues surrounding Israel and Palestine can give a better understanding of why Canada strongly supports Israel while not supporting the Palestinian cause.

Therefore, the central question I will be asking and answering within this thesis is, what has Canada's historical policy been towards Israel and the Palestinians, and what are the driving factors of Canada's approach to its stated and implied interests and values in the foreign policy sphere? I again hypothesize that the factors driving Canada's approach to its stated and implied values in their foreign policy agenda in regard to Israel and Palestine are not aligned with the perception of Canada's diplomatic attitude in international affairs and their stated interests and values.

The body of this thesis will be divided into four main chapters with this introduction serving as the first. The second chapter will answer the second part of my question regarding the driving factors of Canadian foreign policy towards Israel and the Palestinians. In this chapter I will be able to define Canadian national interest and national security as a base for the rest of the chapter. However, the focus of the chapter will look at a few main concepts such as Canada's usual default alignment to the United States, the lack of support for Palestinian agency in both countries and the relevance of Walt and Mearsheimer's essay on the U.S. foreign policy and the Israeli lobby. It will also touch on domestic politics, specifically the Canadian audiences for those specific policies, and the role of various identity groups, Canadian self-image, voting, and lobby groups. Lastly, it will include the economic factors that drive foreign policy, including the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA) and science, technology, and the innovation (STI) policy which are two of Canada's direct economic ties to Israel, excluding arms deals.

The third chapter will then analyse what Canada has done historically, which will be divided through four periods and Prime Ministers or officials. It will start with the Mackenzie King government, focusing specifically on 1947-1948 and Lester B. Pearson as the under-Secretary of External Affairs through his immense contributions to creating the state of Israel, as

well as Pearson's time as Prime Minister from 1963-1968. Then I will turn to the period of the first intifada and after with Brian Mulroney's later years as Prime Minister in the early 1990's, and the second Intifada through Jean Chretien's tenure between 1993-2003. This will serve as a comparison between a Conservative versus Liberal government during pressing times in Israeli-Palestinian disputes. Finally, I will focus on Stephen Harper's government from 2006-2015, specifically focusing on the war of 2014, and Justin Trudeau's government between 2021-2024, as the Hamas-Israel wars within these years may have shifted the factors driving Canadian foreign policy towards Israel and the Palestinians.

The fourth and final chapter will serve as the conclusion as it will focus on what Canada should do moving forward. The question of "so what?" is important to finish off with as it may allow for a better understanding of the consequences that Canada faces in its failures of foreign policy and where it may be able to succeed in to allow for its foreign policy to reflect its stated interests and values driving it forward in modern times. It will go through Canada's history with colonialism, the double standards Canada places on resistance and refugee issues, the increase in multiculturalism, and a pathway for Canada to become a leader in future peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians through the basis of the Oslo Accords.

This thesis uses a qualitative research approach, with a focus on textual analysis to explore Canada's foreign policy towards Israel and Palestine, specifically its role historically in the development and creation of the state of Israel and after with its alliance to Israel. The methodology aims to understand the underlying factors, stated and implied, shaping Canada's relationship with both Israel and the Palestinians, in which it examines the political, social, and historical narratives that have contributed to Canada's foreign policy stances.

The research for this thesis uses a historical textual analysis methodology as well as modern day statements and policies put forth by the federal government of Canada to critically analyze a variety of secondary literature and some primary texts related to Canada's foreign policy. This includes books and articles by scholars and policy analysts, speeches and statements made by various Prime Ministers, and indirect diplomatic correspondence. The analysis will focus on key periods in Canada-Israel relations, from the end of the Second World War to present-day diplomatic stances and implications for Palestine.

The textual analysis follows a thematic approach, involving identifying, analyzing and interpreting themes within the texts. Preliminary reading is the first step taken as a close reading of the various texts is done to understand the general content, historical context and political themes. Afterwards, identifying key terms, references, and phrases that could explain foreign policy stances and shifts in Canada's alliance with Israel and relationship with Palestine is done. This includes terms related to national security, human rights, international law, peace processes, and strategic interests. The themes are then developed around key issues such as, Canada's positioning in the broader international context such as its alignment to the United States, domestic factors such as Jewish and Arab communities in Canada and their influence and ideologies, Canada's early support and role in the establishment of Israel, and Canada's shifting stances during significant events between Israel and Palestine such as the Intifadas, the Oslo Accords and the Israel-Hamas wars.

This thesis uses the theories of realism and liberalism in international relations as its base. Combining these two theories allows this thesis to prove Canada's sometimes unclear and indirect support for Israel and Palestine. Realism emphasizes national interest and national security gains in an anarchic international system which helps to explain Canada's alliance with

Israel based on shared democratic values and strategic interests. However, liberalism focuses on international cooperation, human rights, and multilateralism which help to explain Canada's foreign policy actions with the peace processes, human rights advocacy, and international diplomacy, although these are not always used in the case of Palestinians. Therefore, these ideologies combined with the historical textual analysis will give a comprehensive answer throughout the four chapters to the question posed in this thesis.

Chapter Two: The Driving Factors

This chapter will go through several different general driving factors of Canada's foreign policy approach, focusing on its stated and implied values and interests and asking how they impact Canadian policies towards Israel and Palestine. After concluding my research, I have found four key driving factors that majorly influence the Canadian government's perspectives on foreign policy. The chapter will begin with the Canadian American alliance as the first driving factor. In this section, I will focus on the similarities between both nations' national security objectives and how Canada's security approach after the 9/11 attacks followed American priorities rather than prioritizing Canadian ones. It will also look at the pressure from the United States on Canada to follow their lead, specifically on the war on terror and their attitude and policies towards Israel. The next driving factor will focus on the discrepancies that can be found within Canadian national interest objectives between stated values and ongoing actions. I theorize these discrepancies to be based on Western and white supremacy and racism, and how this directly affects Canada's approach to Israeli-Palestinian foreign policy objectives. It will also include the general Canadian population's outlook on how their government should be handling Israeli Palestinian issues. The third driving factor will be based on the Canadian Jewish population and the Israeli lobby groups within Canada. It will explain how the Israeli lobby groups, although powerful, do not always align with or represent the Jewish community's views on Israel. The fourth and last driving factor that will be looked at in this chapter focuses on the economic ties and advantages between Canada and Israel, especially in the arms trade between the two states.

Canadian American Ties on The War on Terror and National Security

The Canadian American alliance will be the topic of this section with a focus on their national security objectives and how their foreign policies could have been shaped through the

war. Within this section I will be analysing Canada's actions and attitude towards the United States specifically with the war on terror and the overall impact this made on Canadian national security. This will allow me to come to a conclusion on the relationship between Canada and the United States and how this alliance is linked to Israel as well. One of the most interesting points from Walt and Mearsheimer's essay is their argument on how the war on terror has greatly impacted the relations between the United States and Israel by making it stronger as the United States believes that they share a commonality with Israel as a democracy that has opened its doors to the oppressed. Since 9/11 we have seen how the war on terror has impacted Israel and all Western states, therefore, making it important to include how Canada is part of this as well. As the war on terror involved several countries and groups within the Middle East that have immense tension with Israel and the United States, this section will demonstrate how Canadian foreign policies on the war on terror could have shaped their alliance with the United States and Israel and how this affected their stated interests and values.

Canada's foreign policy is influenced by the United States' objectives within their national interest and national security priorities, as the two countries are heavily linked, largely since they share the longest border in the world. Canada has also been very dependent on the United States for national security purposes, specifically since the end of the Second World War, and the United States has also been willing to protect Canada for its security and interests as well (Keating, Murray, 2014). The two states have linked their security through collaborating in military actions, such as when Canada sent troops to Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, etc. Keating and Murray argue that much of this alignment is rooted in shared values, "From a theoretical perspective, the prioritization of values that has brought Canada and the United States together in support of military interventions appears to be a deviation from that predicted by an interest-

based account of foreign policy behaviour, unless there is a demonstrable link between values and national interest defined from the start” (Keating, Murray, 2014). Hence, there is a definite relationship between the United States and Canada’s national interest which ultimately plays a major role in their foreign policy objectives.

Although the alliance is based in shared values, it can have negative effects for both countries as Walt and Mearsheimer examine the negative consequences through the United States’ case of the war on terror. The war on terror, stemming from the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon, caused backlash for the United States, as members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda would use the American Israeli alliance as a method to continue their attacks and spread their anti-American rhetoric throughout the Middle East (Mearsheimer, Walt, 2006). This, in addition to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, fueled further hatred for both the United States and Israel throughout the region and facilitated the terrorist groups in obtaining support from neighbouring countries. Walt and Mearsheimer argue this is one instance where national security was greatly impacted, in a negative way, due to the relationship with Israel.

Canada was involved in the war on terror as Canadian troops were deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq, and although Canada did not receive direct hits during the attacks, it was impacted by 9/11 as 24 Canadian citizens were killed (Public Safety Canada, 2015). Canada has also faced attacks of home-grown terrorism inspired by the propaganda put forth by Al-Qaeda, and later on ISIS, such as when “Martin Couture-Rouleau, a recent religious convert, deliberately targeted and struck two Canadian Armed forces personnel with his vehicle in the town of St-Jean-sur-Richelieu in the province of Quebec” which resulted in the death of one of the officers (McCoy, Knight, 2015). According to the RCMP, Couture-Rouleau was known to be a strong

supporter of ISIS, which could be linked as a motive for this attack. Another example of home-grown terrorism in the post-9/11 era was carried out by Michael Zehaf-Bibeau when he,

“...shot and killed a Canadian Armed Forces reservist, Corporal Nathan Cirillo, who was standing on ceremonial sentry duty at the Canadian National War Memorial in the nation's capital, Ottawa. Shortly thereafter, Zehaf-Bibeau entered the center block building of the Canadian Parliament on an apparent suicide mission, where he was shot and killed by Paul Vickers, the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons of Canada” (McCoy, Knight, 2015).

It is said that Zehaf-Bibeau had recorded a video explaining the motives behind this attack as being his frustration and anger with Canadian foreign policy. Major terrorist threats and plots that Canada dealt with during the post-911 era also include:

“...high profile cases such as the “Toronto 18” plot, the 2006 Transatlantic “liquid explosives” plot that targeted two Canada bound Air Canada passenger jets, the case of Momin Khawaja from Ottawa [a Canadian found guilty for his involvement in a plan to plant fertilizer bombs in the UK while working as a contractor for Global Affairs], the 2013 Via Rail terror plot that allegedly sought to derail passenger trains near Toronto, and also in 2013 the arrests of two individuals who were accused of planning to detonate improvised explosive devices at the province of British Columbia's legislative buildings during annual Canada Day celebrations. Canada has also been singled out as a potential target by Al Qaeda for its active participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and subjected to threats from members of the [Islamic State]” (McCoy, Knight, 2015).

These attacks and threats against Canada in the post-9/11 era suggest that Canada would and should have included terrorism as a priority within its national security objectives.

However, Canada's approach to anti-terrorism in its national security objectives focused more on reacting to terrorism in the United States, making it more of a reactionary policy, rather than a defensive one that focus on preventing possible attacks on Canadian soil. Canadian counter-terrorism policies instead responded to "... rapidly evolving United States (US) security concerns and the need to maintain cross-border flows of people and goods while protecting Canadian sovereignty" (Carvin, Tishler, 2020). Carvin and Tishler argue that Canadian terrorism policy is based on three key elements within the counter-terrorism policies, that "The Canadian government was more worried about the reaction to terrorism than terrorism itself; Canadian security policy is driven by a need to be "separate but cooperative"; and Canadian policymakers understand US security imperatives and can proactively act upon their wise insights" (2020). During the war on terror, it is apparent that Canada linked a majority of its national interest and national security to the United States which meant that the negative effects the United States suffered applied to Canada as well.

Many might suggest that if Canada were to shift its alliance with Israel, it may cause tensions between Canada and the United States. However, McMahon, who speaks on this issue directly, theorizes that if Canada were to shift away from its strong pro-Israel stance, it would not directly affect Canada's relationship with the United States (McMahon, 2004). Canada has been a leading voice for human security, humanitarian rights and laws, and civilian/children rights during conflicts, mainly through United Nations resolutions, such as the United Nations Security Council resolution 1322 on the Al-Aqsa Intifada which killed thousands of Palestinians at the hands of Israel. Canada endorsed the resolution, where the security council

“deplore[d] the provocation carried out at al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem on 28 September 2000, and the subsequent violence”; “condemn[ed] acts of violence, especially the excessive use of force against Palestinians”; “call[ed] upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and its responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention”; “call[ed] for the immediate cessation of violence”; “stresse[d] the importance of establishing a mechanism for a speedy and objective inquiry into the tragic events”; and “call[ed] for the immediate resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process” (McMahon, 2004).

It should be noted that the United States abstained from voting on this resolution, suggesting that the United States Canada alignment is not perfect. The Canadian UN representative at the time stated that Canada endorsed the resolution mainly due to the concerning number of Palestinian civilian deaths, again leading back to Canada’s national security norm of placing the security of humans before the security of the state; as McMahon states, “The Canadian delegation endorsed 1322 because it was in keeping with Canada’s human security doctrine” (McMahon, 2004). However, Canada fails to adopt similar attitudes when state sovereignty is at risk. For instance, UNSC resolution 1171 stated, “[the Security Council] expresses its determination to establish a United Nations Force of military and police observers to be dispatched throughout the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, with the aim of contributing to the implementation of the Sharm El-Sheik agreements, the cessation of violence and enhancing the safety and security of Palestinian civilians” (McMahon, 2004). The Canadian UN representative at the time stated that the reasoning behind not endorsing this resolution was due to Israel and Palestine not fully accepting this idea, which McMahon states as putting state sovereignty over the security of humans; in turn, going against the stated interests of Canadian national security objectives at this

time. The United States ties into this through their immense pressure to abstain or dismiss the resolution. McMahon explains that although the United States was unhappy with resolution 1322, it could only hold enough power to abstain from voting altogether due to the language that was used within the resolution. However, during talks for resolution 1171, the United States placed immense pressure on the Security Council members to reject the resolution. He states, “According to the Palestinian Permanent Observer to the UN, the American delegation exerted heavy pressure on all members of the Security Council when addressing 1171” (McMahon, 2004). This would be a possible explanation for Canada’s sudden shift prioritization, not of human security, but of state sovereignty instead. Although McMahon goes on to conclude that should Canada truly adopt its human security objectives while negating U.S. pressure, it would not harm Canada-U.S. relations, a key point to take from his findings is how one of the most prominent driving factors for Canadian implied interests and values within the foreign policy sphere is the direct link that Canada holds with the United States.

Canadian National Interest Discrepancies, Racism, and Canadian Audiences

Both Canada and Israel were founded in part on the notion of “othering” and white supremacy, as we see for Indigenous groups in Canada and Palestinians in Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Gaza. Yasmeen Abu-Laban also presents how anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and Orientalism have impacted Canada’s stance regarding Israel and Palestine. Therefore, we may find some political reasons as to why Canada’s historical foreign policy may have favoured Israel over the Palestinians and how this affected the war on terror towards the Middle East and those that are classified as “non-white”.

To understand the racialized foundation of Canadian foreign policy, in relation to Israel and Palestine, it is essential to look at Canada’s actions within the longer and often

unacknowledged history of race in the field of International Relations (IR). Although IR has claimed to be neutral and a positivist science concerned with the distribution of power among states, scholars such as Sankaran Krishna (2001), Robert Vitalis (2000), Edward Said (2003), and Nivi Manchanda (2021) reveal that the field has historically served to repeat racial hierarchies created during colonialism.

Krishna argues that IR was created while intentionally disregarding how race and colonial violence were the seal of the very foundations of the modern international system. Concepts such as sovereignty and statehood emerged with the dispossession of Indigenous peoples, the transatlantic slave trade, and settler colonialism. Canada's own foreign policy, then, is not out of place but a product of this larger system of global governance that rewards alignment with white Western powers and marginalizes racialized populations resisting colonialism, whether Palestinians or Indigenous peoples in Canada.

Vitalis furthers this critique by exposing the racial silences embedded in American IR scholarship, arguing that race was once central to early 20th century IR discourse but was later pushed aside and made invisible through the liberal reframing of the field. The "norm against noticing" race, specifically white supremacy and its imperial legacies, has allowed both American and Canadian foreign policy elites to frame their international interventions as peace-driven, even as they reinforce colonial hierarchies (Vitalis, 2000). Canada's alliance with Israel, despite the Israeli state's continued occupation of Palestinian territories, mirrors the same rhetorical contradictions Vitalis highlights being that human rights discourse is weaponized to sustain racialized forms of state violence.

Edward Said's concept of "rival geographies" provides a framework for understanding how Canada positions itself in the Israel Palestine conflict (Said, 2003). Said argues that the way

in which imperial powers have historically seen the world constructs a world in which some lives are made visible and valuable, while others are erased, as imperial powers are then able to justify their own dominance. Canada's self-presentation as a peacekeeping nation coexists with its erasure of Palestinian resistance and Indigenous claims, both of which challenge the spatial and racial logic of settler colonialism. Said's statements on the limitations of geographical solutions to colonial conflicts resonate strongly with the Canadian state's calls of diplomacy and liberalism, even as it denies the legitimacy of Palestinian self-determination.

Nivi Manchanda adds a modern-day lens, arguing that even critical security studies have failed to properly address the structural role of race in shaping global power. The concept of "security," she argues, is itself racialized and used to justify imperial interventions while rendering non-Western peoples as threats. Canada's unwavering support for Israeli military actions, despite broad public disapproval, is typical of what Manchanda terms the "banalization of race" being a normalization of racialized state violence that remains unchallenged within both domestic and international security discourses (Manchanda, 2021).

Taken together, these scholars display how Canada's actions are not abnormal but rather reflections of IR's deeper complicity in constructing a racialized world order. Canadian foreign policy, through its selective application of international law, disproportionate emphasis on Israeli security, and marginalization of Palestinian suffering, highlights what Krishna calls a strategy of abstraction, where historical and structural violence are implied in favor of sanitized, depoliticized narratives of diplomacy which are stated. Therefore, linking Canada's role in the Israel Palestine conflict to the history of race in IR reveals more than policy inconsistencies, it exposes a foundational ideology of racial exclusion.

Canada's take on their national interests and national security may also differ from their actual actions, as Canada has been seen to take a more diplomatic and humanitarian approach to foreign policy issues and less of an economically advantageous approach (Clark, 1997). Former Prime Minister Joe Clark remarks, "All countries have national interests, but Canada has defined its national interest more broadly, less selfishly, than many others. That is why the British economist and commentator, Barbara Ward, called Canada 'The first international country'" (Clark, 1997). This demonstrates what Canada displays its stated interests to be but does not show their implied interests, which will be discussed in this section. Due to this, stated national interest in Canada's case can be defined as a diplomatic yet democratically strategic approach that favours soft power methods but remains firm in spreading democratic values to ensure its security from foreign threats that can affect Canada and the United States.

In contrast, Canadian Middle East policy has taken different forms as Wildeman also looks at how Canada's involvement in Israel-Palestine has shaped Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East through Pearsonianism, which will be elaborated on in the next chapter, and how this has affected Canadian national identity. While many consider Canada to be a peacemaker of sorts, Wildeman argues that Canada is firm in upholding Western civilization and values as they try to enforce this onto the Middle East with the help of Israel, which many consider as having Western values.

Paikin, Kemp, Fitzgerald, and Blais, state that Canada's national interest has three important concepts, "cultural ties, the shape of the international order, and the realities imposed by geography" (Paikin, Kemp, Fitzgerald, Blais, 2023). When looking at cultural ties, it lays within the same note of the idea of Pearsonianism and many discrepancies can be found as it is intended to allow for Canada to align itself with Western nations due to their cultural similarities.

However, the issue in this stems from the fact that every one out of four Canadians are not White nor Indigenous, hence they are excluded in some way through this aspect of Canadian national interest aspect. Canada is also expected to become even more multicultural, only worsening this national interest aspect and making it even more difficult for Canada to include anything related to culture in its national interest.

The second discrepancy the authors touch on is that of the shape of the international order, which explains Canada's double standards in holding certain countries accountable while ignoring others. In this case, the authors state,

“Canadian foreign policy discourse has demonstrated little difficulty in labelling Russia and China as threats to the rules-based order, even as Ottawa has openly supported instances of the United States violating international law. Clearly, there are other factors informing how Canada calculates its national interests beyond a desire to see international norms be uniformly applied” (Paikin, Kemp, Fitzgerald, Blais, 2023).

This ties into the author's third point of discrepancy in Canada's national interest aspects that play into their foreign policy objectives, the realities of geography. The authors use Beijing as an example. They ask, “If Beijing were unambiguously committed to upholding a multilateral order, an open global economy and freedom of navigation, would Canada be a closer partner?” (Paikin, Kemp, Fitzgerald, Blais, 2023) and imply that it would not. This would tie into the idea that Canada would want Western nations to remain in control of the international order and global influence, thus explaining Canada's unwavering link to the United States.

These discrepancies can very easily be applied to the case of the issues surrounding Israel and Palestine as in many instances the Canadian government has been quick to condemn any

form of Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation and aggression but is slow to offer even minor critiques of the actual Israeli occupation and aggression and instead states that Israel has the right to exist and defend itself. The authors make the argument I've made above by stating,

“Currently, Ottawa does not possess the capacity to exercise significant outcome-determining power — either in global multilateral fora or in regional security arrangements in Europe or Asia — for it to exercise something approaching an independent foreign policy. The result is that Canadian foreign policy has increasingly become concerned with maintaining good relations with the U.S. Given Washington’s predilection for decisive and unilateral action amidst today’s deepening great power competition, this leaves Ottawa constantly in reactive mode.” (Paikin, Kemp, Fitzgerald, Blais, 2023).

Thus, a driving factor of Canadian stated and implied interests and values may hold truth about human security and diplomacy, which I believe to be their stated interests and values however, their implied interests and values show a side of Western supremacy and racism, which allows its foreign policy objectives to hold onto the United States for inspiration.

Emily Regan Wills, Jeremy Wildeman, Michael Bueckert and Nadia Abu-Zahra analyze how Canadian institutions as well as the public understand the Palestinian case and what might be done to further promote it in Canadian discourse, as the authors speak on the difficulties of seeking to speak on the Palestinian issue in Canada and why the Canadian government is far more accepting of allowing pro-Israel speech instead. The authors touch not only on the Palestinian voices that wish to be heard, but also marginalized groups within minority groups in Canada such as the Jewish population who do not align themselves with the Zionist project, Quebec sovereigntists who understand the Palestinian struggle for self-determination as they

seek the same, and the “critics of settler Canadian development assistance and foreign aid policy who are skeptical of policies towards Israel/Palestine” (Wills, Wildeman, Bueckert, Abu-Zahra, 2022). It is important to bring in Canadian audiences and understand their feelings towards their government’s objectives on Israel and Palestine, which these authors include in their work. As I stated in the first chapter of this thesis, statistics have shown that a majority of Canadians prefer the government to remain neutral on the issues surrounding Israel and Palestine, as was seen during Stephen Harper’s government in the early 2000s which was a strong advocate and friend of Israel. During Trudeau’s time, the alliance between Canada and Israel has only strengthened as well, although this does not represent what the majority of Canadians feel about Israel. The authors state,

“This approach is deeply at odds with public opinion in Canada, which is far more critical of the Israeli government and supportive of Palestinians rights. Following Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza, a poll showed that 51 percent of Canadians disagreed with Stephen Harper’s pro-Israel stance, compared to only 30 percent who agreed with it, and far more agreed (42 percent) than disagreed (25 percent) that Israel’s reaction to Hamas rockets was ‘out of proportion’. A 2017 national survey of people in Canada found that a majority disapproved of our government’s policies on Israel and Palestine. Only about one in four (28 percent) Canadians expressed a positive opinion of the Israeli government, and almost half (46 percent) expressed a negative opinion of it. Similarly, a 2020 poll found that three out of four Canadians wanted their government to oppose Israel’s plan to annex parts of the West Bank, including 42 percent who wanted Canada to impose economic and/or diplomatic sanctions against Israel” (Wills, Wildeman, Bueckert, Abu-Zahra, 2022).

The majority of Canadians are not represented by their government on their foreign policy demands on Israel and Palestine, especially within the periods of Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau who have only strengthened the bond between Israel and Canada. However, the next section will look more specifically at the political opinions of Jewish Canadians and whether or not they accept or reject the Canadian government's hardline support for Israel.

Jewish Canadians and The Israeli Lobby Group

As Israel presents itself as a haven for the Jewish people all over the world, a deeper look into what Jewish Canadian citizens believe about Israel and Canada's foreign policy on the matter is important to understand if the average Jewish Canadian supports Israel as strong as Canada does. One of Canada's repeated arguments for its choice to stand loyally by Israel is to support Canada's Jewish community but in doing so "... they treat all Jewish Canadians as one monolithic 'community' and presume that Jews all agree with these claims" (Wills, Wildeman, Bueckert, Abu-Zahra, 2022). However, this is a rather generic assumption that encourages the silencing of Palestinian rights and lives during times of conflict. If any criticism against Israel or the Israeli government is seen as "antisemitic", Palestinian voices critical of Israel are overruled and silenced. Two surveys that Wills, Wildeman, Bueckert and Abu-Zahra used in their work openly explain the varying Jewish opinions about their identities, their stance on Israel and their thoughts on Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. What the authors found was that both surveys displayed how vast Jewish opinions are especially on the topic of Israel and Palestine, as some hold a strong attachment to Israel while others do not, some viewed Israel in a positive outlook while others did not, and some viewed criticism of Israel as antisemitic while other did not. Many of the Jewish voices and opinions that were shared do not agree with the Canadian stance on Israel and Palestine, while also not believing in the actions and beliefs put forth by CIJA (the

Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs). Thus, for the Canadian government to group all Jewish Canadians as having the same views and opinions, especially when it comes to matters regarding Israel and Palestine, would be doing a disservice to the many important and real opinions of Jewish Canadians who may differ in many aspects within their identity.

Through these new narratives about Palestinian voices in Canada, we can begin to assume that Canada's actions towards Israel and Palestine are not aligned with their stated foreign policy goals, but instead, perhaps it is aligned with their implied foreign policy goals. As I explained earlier, Canada's stated national interest and national security are based on humanitarian, peacekeeping, and diplomatic foreign policy goals. However, their implied national interest and national security objectives come through the forms of cultural alignment, Western power, and whitewashing. In other words, Canada may be portraying their foreign policy agenda to be softer and more humanitarian but the underlying tones for its implied foreign policy are rooted in racism, white-supremacy, and Western power.

As mentioned slightly above and linking back to McMahon's arguments for Canada-U.S. relations, the author touches on another point that could also be a driving factor of Canadian foreign policy interests and values which may hold more power than their habitual link to the United States. A key aspect of a democratic nation's foreign policy objectives can usually be traced back to lobby groups within that nation. In this case, a prominent Israeli lobby in Canada is the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC), now known as its parent organization title, the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA). The CIC has played a crucial role in Canada's foreign policy towards Israel and Palestine and could be a driving factor in explaining why Canada's role has not been consistent with its foreign policy beliefs regarding this issue. Peyton Lyon, a Political Science professor at Carleton University, suggests that the CIC has so much influence that it may

even have a greater impact on Canada's foreign policy than the Prime Minister or the Department of External Affairs (now known as the Department of Global Affairs), and to the almost very bottom of the list of influential actors regarding Canada's Middle East policy, would be the Palestinian Liberation Organization, now known as Fatah, and the Arab Canadian community (Lyon, 1992). Lyon states this on the basis of the survey conducted in 1987 from officials at the Department of External Affairs who ranked the Israeli lobby as the first major influence over Canadian foreign policy towards Israel and Palestine. Peyton does state that although this survey is based on the officials opinions and not facts, it does hold some credibility in that the officials working at the department feel almost unanimously this way.

As stated previously, Canada has much difficulty in condemning Israeli aggression against Palestinians and repeatedly stating their belief in Israel's right to exist and defend themselves. A possibility for this, besides their national interest discrepancies and link to the United States, could be due to the influence of CIC. Lyon states that the CIC's sole objective is "the maintenance of a Canadian foreign policy that will ensure the right of Israel to live within secure borders" (Lyon, 1992). They routinely call ministers, officials, parliament members, and journalists to form friendships and encourage them to continue Canada's strong alliance to Israel. Lyon states, "CIC lobbyists present themselves to the decision-makers as allies in the quest for the most advantageous policy for Canada in a perilous area. Hospitality is generous but not overdone; each year about 20 parliamentarians and journalists are treated to study trips to Israel where they are received at a senior level" (Lyon, 1992). With a lobby group that has a strong grip of influence in Canada's Middle Eastern foreign policy, and a stated objective of Israel's right to defend itself, it may ring true that they are a major driving factor of Canadas stated and implied interests and values in the foreign policy sphere as this completely negates the humanitarian

issues of Palestinians and the Palestinian right for self-determination, to live in a peaceful, secure, and independent state from Israel. However, Lyon and Tucker both mention that David Howard Goldberg, professor, and national executive director of the academic wing of the pro-Israel lobby, feels that the CIC does not wield nearly as much influence over the Canadian foreign policy objectives in the Middle East as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), in the United States. Goldberg believes that the CIC does not nearly influence the Canadian government as much as people tend to believe, however, Tucker rebuts that by stating,

“But he wrongly concludes that the limited power of the CIC can be attributed principally to the statist quality of the Canadian political system. As his own frequently perceptive analyses of Canada's Middle East approaches show, non-governmental actors other than the CIC, both corporate and church, were able to make their influence felt. Indeed, he paints a deeply ambiguous picture of the lobbying power of the CIC” (Tucker, 1992)

Both authors conclude through Goldberg's statements, that he is modest about the actual influence and power the CIC has over the Canadian foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. An example of this is shown through the UNSC resolution 1171, mentioned above, and how Canada's sudden shift from placing human security above state security could have been due, not only to U.S. pressure but also to CIC pressure. McMahon states, “In the context of the Palestinian Israeli peace process the CIC gave its highest assessment to Canada's policy in the Security Council regarding the introduction of observers into Israel/OPT” (McMahon, 2004). However McMahon has his doubts about the power that the CIC holds over this as he goes on to state,

“Canada’s inconsistent norm advocacy could be explained as an attempt to placate or satisfy this group. However, on other points of importance to Canada’s Jewish community, the CIC gives Canadian foreign policy poor grades. This would seem to indicate that Canadian policy is not being directed solely by political considerations of this constituency. In fact, if we consider that the lowest evaluations of Canadian policy (Canadian reaction to the policies of the Palestinian Authority, Canada’s representative office in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Israeli settlement activity) assigned by the CIC outnumber the highest assessments (Canadian policy on the prospects of a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood and peacekeeping) by a ratio of 2:1, we see that there is limited symmetry between Canadian foreign policy and the views of Canada’s Jewish community. According to the CIC, there is more policy dissymmetry than symmetry. While an influence in the foreign policy formation process, the role played by Canada’s Jewish community in the domestic environment cannot be understood as determinant. Taken in isolation, this domestic factor cannot explain Canada’s inconsistent norm advocacy.” (McMahon, 2004).

This demonstrates the power of the CIC in applying pressure on the government to fit their foreign policy objectives in Israel regarding the Palestinians, although it is not to the degree where it is the sole driving factor of Canadian foreign policy on Israel and Palestine and other factors must be taken into consideration, as this chapter aims to do. The CIC or CIJA also ties in my argument of the underlying tones of racism within Canada’s implied interests and values in the foreign policy sphere as CIJA has been known for their anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian views. They have also yet to condemn the Jewish Defense League which spews Islamophobic rhetoric and, “has allied itself with such white supremacist groups as the Soldiers of Odin, the

English Defense League, and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the Occident (PEGIDA)” (Wills, Wildeman, Bueckert, Abu-Zahra, 2022). Again, these thoughts do not represent the Canadian Jewish community as a whole and are a key reason as to why one of Canada’s arguments to keep strong ties to Israel due to grouping all Jews into one ideology is unjust in the name of the Jewish population. Although some of the Jewish Canadian population do hold similar beliefs to the policies that CIJA reinforces, it does not speak for the general population, leaving many Canadian Jews as a marginalized group within their identity group. This again links in my argument that Canada’s driving factors for their stated and implied interests and values in foreign policy differ as their stated interests come off to be a humanitarian effort to bring peace while their implied interests allow for white supremacy and racism.

Canadian Israeli Economic Agreements and Arms Trades

Lastly, a major economic advantage for Canada regarding its foreign policy toward Israel is through the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA). Canada’s shift towards becoming more active in the Middle East since the creation of Israel was mainly through arms exports due to the multiple Arab Israeli war’s however, during the early 1990’s, it expanded into not just arms trade, but investments, and innovation as well which is done through CIFTA. One of Canada’s first Free Trade Agreement outside of North America, CIFTA allows free trade between both countries in multiple areas such as science, technology, and innovation. Gudofsky and Hofley state that, “between 1990 and 1995, exports from Canada to Israel increased by over 66 percent, while imports from Israel to Canada increased by roughly 93 percent” (Gudofsky, Hofley, 1997). It was also calculated that through CIFTA, Canada allocated 515 million dollars to Israel in 2020 alone (Embassy of Canada to Israel, Canada Israel Relations, 2021). Here we


see the clear economic advantages for both states and how this may play a role in one of the driving factors of Canada's foreign policy favouring Israel.

Another critical aspect of the economic advantages between Canada and Israel relates to a massive arms trade between the two. This plays directly into Canada's discrepancy in their stated foreign policy objectives of peacekeeping. Michael Bueckert explains in depth the export of arms to Israel from Canada as he states that in 2020 Canada exported military goods and arms worth \$19,583,838 and between 1978 to 2020 it was estimated that \$228,827,781 worth of arms were sent to Israel from Canada (Bueckert, 2022). Although the dealing of military weapons to Israel was not always as significant as it is today due to the arms embargo Canada had signed on to, as mentioned previously however, since Stephen Harper's time, there has been a dramatic shift towards favouring Israel. This was also the case with arming Israel and lifting the arms embargo which all happened since the early 2000s along with reaching the highest amount of exported military goods to Israel in over three decades, in 2020 under Trudeau (Beuckert, 2022). This directly reflects my hypothesis that Canada's foreign policy attitude towards Israel and the Palestinians does not align with its stated foreign policy objectives. Bueckert states,

“Within the last two years, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have independently concluded that many Israeli practices (for example, unlawful killings) can be understood in terms of the crime against humanity of apartheid, as defined by the Rome Statute and the 1973 Apartheid Convention, since they are committed in the context of an “institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over another, with the intention of maintaining that regime.” (Bueckert, 2022).

This goes against all forms of humanitarian efforts that Canada puts behind its foreign policy objectives as it continues to actively arm a state that transgresses humanitarian laws and pursues forms of apartheid. Canada has always actively pursued exporting arms to Israel, even during the arms embargo from 1948 to 1996 where the Canadian government would only limit the quantities of military goods to Israel, but not halt them completely. The one instance where exporting arms to Israel was calculated at 0 dollars was during the first intifada between 1992-1994 under former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, although it was at its highest under Mulroney at the start of the Intifada in 1987, which will be explored in the next chapter (Bueckert, 2022). This could be due to the severity of the first intifada and the fact that Canada may not have wanted to be seen on the international stage as a state that funds unlawful killings, as the Palestinian resistance, at this time, was generally non-violent. The graph below presents the trends in Canadian military exports to Israel between 1978 and 2020 from Bueckert's findings.

Trends in Canadian Military Exports to Israel (1978–2020)



Values are expressed in constant (2021) Canadian dollars. Source: Global Affairs Canada, provided by Project Ploughshares.

However, Canada did make two economically advantageous changes under Trudeau between 2014 and 2015 as Bueckert states,

“Canada and Israel signed the Canada-Israel Strategic Partnership Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which strengthened defence and security cooperation between the two countries. One of the MOU’s aims was to “increase Research and Development (R & D), defence material cooperation, and defence procurement opportunities.” The following year, Canada made an amendment to add Israel to the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCL), which allowed Israel to import automatic firearms from Canada; the stated objective of this initiative was to “open potential new market opportunities for Canadian exporters by allowing them to apply for export permits for the export of certain

prohibited firearms, prohibited weapons and prohibited devices to Israel.” (Bueckert, 2022).

By signing onto these partnerships with Israel regarding the deals and export of military goods that fall under CIFTA, Canada again proves that its interests and values of promoting human security and humanitarian rights in times of conflict do not align with its stated foreign policy objectives. Article 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty does not allow Canada to export any military goods that could be used to undermine the peace and safety of civilians and CIFTA and MOU are not above this. Although there is no way of telling what the military exports include and what they are used for, it is quite clear that the continuous violent attacks against Palestinians at the hands of Israel are benefitting from Canadian military exports, going against the very nature of Canada’s stated interests and values. Bueckert concludes his analysis with the following, “Canada’s arms exports to Israel are inconsistent with its obligations under international treaties and violate – at a minimum – the spirit and intent of the Arms Trade Treaty” (Bueckert, 2022). This again proves that the driving factors of Canada’s stated interests and values differ vastly from the driving factors of Canada’s implied interests and values, as one promotes human security and humanitarian law, while the other encourages forms of apartheid, transgressing humanitarian laws, and white supremacy and racism. However, this may have differed from each Prime Minister since the creation of Israel in 1948, as we have seen already under Harper and Trudeau-led governments, which leads this thesis to its next chapter concerning the history of different periods and Canadian Prime Ministers and their actions taken on Israel.

Conclusion

Therefore, from the research presented, the main factors driving Canadian foreign policy interests and values towards Israel and Palestine are the inherent ties between Canada and the

United States regarding national security and Canada's willingness to adopt similar policies and attitudes to that of the United States, including when those policies are positively directed towards Israel and undermine stated Canadian values and interests. The implied stated interests and values begin to show through the driving factor of Western supremacy and racism which has been shown through Canada's national interest discrepancies. The Israeli lobby in Canada also play a significant role in driving Canadian foreign policy interests and values that are biased towards Israel although many within the Jewish Canadian population disagree with these attitudes and policies. Lastly, the economic advantages of agreements such as CIFTA and arms trades also significantly drive Canadian foreign policy in regard to Israel as the statistics and numbers show in the section above. What I can conclude from these driving factors is that Canada's stated and implied interests and values differ. Their stated interests and values revolve around their reputation as a peacekeeping nation that upholds human rights and laws, while their implied interests and values are rooted in Western supremacy, racism, and economic advantages even if it infringes on human rights and laws.

Chapter Three: Historical Analysis

This chapter will go through four different time periods in Canadian history with the respective Prime Ministers of the time to understand the way different circumstances and different Canadian leaders dealt with foreign policy issues regarding Israel and Palestine. It will begin in 1947, when the United Nations partition plan was in the works to create the State of Israel, then Under-secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, and his immense contributions to the plan. It will then follow Pearson's time as Prime Minister and his further contributions to Israel in the 1960's. The next part will compare how a Conservative leader, Brian Mulroney, and a Liberal leader, Jean Chretien, dealt with the first and second Intifada's (Palestinian uprising) and their aftermath in the late 1980's until the early 2000's. The last section will again compare Conservative versus Liberal leaders, namely Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, in order to understand how they dealt with multiple Israel versus Hamas wars such as the 2014 war, the 2021 war, and the 2023-ongoing war. With these four periods and multiple Prime Minister's, the chapter will be able to explain the different actions taken by a diverse ideological range of Canadian leaders during pressing times in Israel's occupation of Palestine. The chapter's general findings ultimately come down to two distinct ideologies, multilateral views like those of Pearson, Chretien, and the later years of Trudeau's government and more hardline approaches to favouring Israel like those of Harper, Mulroney and the beginning of Trudeau's government. Thus, the chapter will be able to answer how the driving factors of Canada's stated and implied interests and values in the foreign policy sphere have changed from one government/time-period to another.

Pearson as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1947-1948 and as Prime Minister in the 1960's

Nearing the end of the British Mandate of Palestine, in 1947 the United Nations decided on a partition plan for the state where it would split the country into two separate states, one Arab and the other Jewish, as the British were beginning their plan to exit Palestine. Canada played a vital role in this partition plan, as then Under-secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson is credited with organizing the General Assembly's First Committee to discuss Palestine (Tauber, 2007). Canada was also an active member of United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which Pearson chaired, and played a significant role in the partitioning of the state. Tauber explains that a sub-committee was also created with four states in its working group, The United States, Guatemala, The Soviet-Union, and Canada, in order to "...study the implementation options of the partition idea. It was during this phase of the Palestine debate that the Canadian involvement became crucial" (Tauber, 2007). From here, Pearson saved the partition plan many times through his mediation between the United States and the Soviet-Union; when the British had threatened to put an end to the whole plan, again Pearson took diplomatic measures to handle the situation and ensure the British, the U.S. and the Soviet Union's conditions were all met. "Pearson's draft compromise on the terms of partition moved from the working group to the sub-committee and eventually to the floor of the General Assembly" and here Pearson took the initial lead to draft up the conditions of the partition plan which would satisfy all of its member states and bring it to the UN General Assembly to begin the adoption of the plan (Anderson, 2023). Pearson was called the "Canadian Balfour" and "Rabbi Pearson" by pro-Zionists in Canada and internationally, which he happily accepted as a title (Tauber, 2007; Anderson, 2023).

While the special committee was taking place in New York, the Jewish Agency used their influence over Pearson there, Canadian Zionist advocacy groups sought to use their influence on policymakers in Ottawa. Tauber states,

“On the eve of the special assembly, Samuel Zacks, president of the United Zionist Council of Canada, and Ellsworth Flavelle, chairman of the Canadian Palestine Committee sent a lengthy letter to St. Laurent [Minister of External Affairs], stressing the need to normalize the Jewish situation and establish a Jewish national home. They underlined Britain's inability to run the Palestine Mandate and the attendant misery caused to the Jewish refugees, forbidden to enter the country. They argued that as this situation was likely to create friction between Britain and the United States, an early solution to the problem was in Canada's best interest. In practical terms, they asked St. Laurent to ensure that no interested parties (that is, the Arab states) would participate in the proposed inquiry commission, to pressure Britain to increase the quotas of Jews admitted to Palestine, and to support the establishment of a Jewish State as fulfilment of the Mandate” (Tauber, 2007).

The Zionist advocacy groups increased their influencing as the partition plan was beginning to take form through UNSCOP as they urged the Canadian government to adopt the recommendations in the partition plan. When the UNSCOP plan was being negotiated with Pearson taking the lead in negotiations, many representatives from UNSCOP nations were sent to Palestine to get a better understanding of what plan might work best on the land. The representative sent on behalf of Canada was Mr. Justice Ivan Rand of the Supreme Court of Canada. While on his trip to Palestine, many pro-Zionist groups formed alliances with Rand to advocate what they believed would be the best for the creation of the Jewish state (Tauber,

2007). Husseini quotes Canadian military and political historian David Bercuson's statement in his work by stating, "The time Rand, and other committee members, spent with Horowitz, Eban, and men like Hull [dispatched by the Jewish Agency to lobby the committee] was important in moulding their thinking about the Palestine question because pro-Zionist positions were presented in an intimate atmosphere and at an informal and personal level" (Husseini, 2008). Mackenzie King, Prime Minister at this time, stated that Rand's contribution to the plan gave a "special sense of pride" to Canadians (Tauber, 2007). It was clear at this point that the Zionist advocacy groups were heavily influencing Rand and could be a main factor in Canada's contributions to the partition plan. The Zionist advocacy groups used other aspects to influence Canadian policymakers to ensure the Canadian government would meet their demands. This was done by approaching the policymakers to ask them to advocate for the partition plan which had some success as the Minister of Defence Bruce Claxton informed the Zionists that he has many Jewish members in his constituency with very little Arabs (Tauber, 2007). Lastly, ordinary Canadian Jews would use their struggles from history, especially World War Two, to gain sympathy and remind the Canadian government of what they had endured. Tauber argues that these personal stories were oftentimes more influential to Canadian policymakers than the professional Zionist advocacy groups. She states,

"A former student of Pearson wrote to him that he remembered him as a conscientious 'square shooter'. With one third of world Jewry killed by the Germans, and with Canada and all other havens closed to them, 'don't stop the Jews from surviving in Palestine'. 'Now that you share the power to decide ... don't do anything you won't be able to live with after you've retired from public life'. Pearson answered that he indeed hoped to do nothing which would 'to use your own words, prevent me from living with myself after I

have retired from public life'. Another letter informed Pearson of the plight of 2,000 Jewish children, survivors of Nazi camps, interned by the British in Cyprus. They needed supportive surroundings to get rehabilitated, said the writer, which could only be obtained in Palestine. They were 'the responsibility of all of us', she emphasized, as the democratic world knew the nature of Nazism, but did nothing. Pearson agreed that only by returning the children to normal conditions could the impact of their miseries be removed" (Tauber, 2007).

Although the Israeli lobby groups, being one of the main driving factors of Canadian foreign policy interests and values regarding Israel, were not yet established as official lobby groups, Pearson was nonetheless influenced by the pro-Zionist advocacy groups and ordinary Canadian Jews at this time and sought to bring justice to them for the struggles they had endured throughout history. The idea of an Israeli lobby in Canada can be traced back to 1919, "when representatives from the Federation of Canadian Zionists and the Canadian Jewish Congress pressed the government to plead with the British government and PM Lloyd George to 'include that area east of the Jordan River and north to the Litani River in what is now Lebanon' in the Palestine Mandate" (Husseini, 2008). Pearson was influenced just as much as Rand was by the Zionist advocacy groups and therefore, pushed for the creation of the partition plan. Many members of pro-Zionist advocacy groups at that time, such as Horowitz, Eban, and Hull, kept very strong friendships and alliances, not only to Rand but to Pearson as well. Elizabeth MacCallum, a pro-Arab member to the UN delegation, stated that Pearson was willing to help the Zionist advocacy groups whenever he was needed and was "wooded" by their arguments for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (Tauber, 2007).

Pro-Arab advocacy groups were also at work, not only in New York with the special committee, but mostly, in Ottawa, which was being led by Muhammed Said Massoud, a Lebanese Druze immigrant in Canada (Tauber, 2007). Although the Arab population in 1947 Canada was only around 12,000, they nonetheless tried to influence policymakers to not adopt the partition plan and fight against Zionist advocacy (Tauber, 2007). Massoud can be seen as the leader of Arab advocacy against Zionist advocacy as he found an article published by the Montreal Daily Star, written by a Jewish Rabbi, highly offensive to Arabs. Tauber states, “According to Massoud, the article described the Arabs as lazy people who had dried up Palestine into a desert, and the Jews as those who would make it flourish. Massoud responded with a counter-article and soon a press campaign between him and the Zionists had begun” (Tauber, 2007). Massoud went on to establish and be the President of the Canadian Arab Friendship League, with its primary goals being,

“...to promote, encourage and propagate friendship and understanding between Canada and the Arabic speaking nations of the world. In order to accomplish this, the League would hold meetings and approach statesmen and newspapers (mainly the Daily Star, where Massoud had some friends), combating and protesting against the Zionist propaganda, particularly when it offended the Arab image” (Tauber, 2007).

The League went on to create their own news service in 1945 which, later in 1947, was intended to fight against the Zionist advocacy for the partition plan. It was distributed to university professors, schoolteachers, policymakers, religious leaders, and more in which it warned that should the partition plan be adopted and put into action, the members of UNSCOP would be responsible for a possible third world war. The Arabs also approached Canadian policymakers to influence their position on the partition plan. Tauber explains that,

“In April 1947, for example, Massoud cabled both the Canadian delegation and the General Assembly's President, Oswaldo Aranha, informing them of his League's opposition to partition. In May he again cabled Aranha, calling the United Nations to prevent another world war 'which can only serve the interests of a small minority'. In September he cabled the chairman of the Canadian House of Commons External Affairs Committee, expressing surprise at the 'incomprehensible' negative attitude of the Canadians members of UNSCOP, and protesting against the damage done to both Canada and Britain. In November he warned the Department of External Affairs [in which Pearson was Minister of] that their attitude to Palestine meant 'friendship or war' between the Canadian and the Arab peoples. Conversely, if Canada took a new course, all the Arabs would admire it, 'like we are doing in Canada during every election'. When he reached the conclusion that Pearson was 'appeasing the Russian government at the expense of Britain and the Arabs', he cabled both the Department of External Affairs and Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, expressing the Arab distrust of Pearson. The Canadian Government was required to support Palestine's independence according to the White Paper of 1939, he argued, and to instruct its delegation 'not to increase the danger of war in the Near East'" (Tauber, 2007).

However, as the partition plan was adopted, the League stated in their magazine that it was a “shameful decision”, and warned UNSCOP members that what was about to happen in the Middle East, especially Palestine will be “the scene of the most terrible atrocities” (Tauber, 2007). He later on stated that “Pearson and Rand had no right to represent Jewish interests as they did” and ““the Arab World would ‘remember’ Lester B. Pearson and Justice Rand [who] did their utmost to impose upon Arabs the infamous partition scheme” (Tauber, 2007). Tauber

concludes that Zionist advocacy groups were able to influence the government and saw some successes for their demands however, the Arab, or pro-Palestine advocacy groups found no success in influencing their demands at all.

However, the Prime Minister of Canada at the time, Mackenzie King, disapproved of Canada's involvement and was steadfast that they should remain neutral and keep a low profile to ensure the British would not be agitated. King held a strong belief that post-World War Two, Canada needed to mediate relations between the United States and Britain to ensure Western strength against the opposing and increasing power of the Soviet Union (Husseini, 2008). He also held strong pro-British views, as he did not want to do anything that could threaten the peace or security between Canadian British relations. Thus, to King the Palestine issue was at the bottom of his list of priorities in order to keep the British satisfied with Canadian interests. Nonetheless, Pearson saw the issue through a more personal lens due to the horrors of the Holocaust and decided that a Jewish State on the land of Palestine was the only way to bring justice for the Jewish refugees. Therefore, we can see how the beginning of the issue was mostly organized, lead, and encouraged by Canada as favouring the State of Israel while paying no mind to the issue of the Palestinians who still lived on the land.

Due to Pearson's strong advocacy for the creation of the state of Israel as he chaired UNSCOP, saved the partition plan several times ensuring all its member states were satisfied, and re-assured Canadian Jews that he understands their demands and historical struggles with the goal of bringing justice to them, and with Rand's encouragement as well, he can be seen as the first big push for Canada's involvement in the Middle East as a diplomatic state that could resolve issues of the great powers of the world concerning foreign policy. Hillmer states "it was ... the Canadian performance, or more particularly Lester Pearson's performance, over Palestine

in 1947 that might be regarded as the beginning of ... Canada's role ... and reputation as a moderate mediatory middle power” (Hillmer, 1989). Pearson continued to serve as the Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1957 with Louis St. Laurent as Prime Minister. After the Liberals failed to win the next federal elections, it was then that Pearson was appointed leader of the Liberal Party in 1958. John Diefenbaker won the first two federal elections against Pearson as the Liberal leader from 1958 until 1963, when Pearson was officially elected Prime Minister of Canada.

Lester B. Pearson served as the 14th Prime Minister of Canada between 1963-1968. These will be the years I focus on in for the remainder of Pearson’s section to examine how his perceptions of Canada’s Middle East foreign policy, especially in regard to Israel and Palestine, could have altered or perhaps remained the same from his time as Minister of Foreign Affairs. As we have seen above, Pearson was involved in the creation of the state of Israel however, there was not much mention in secondary literature about his plans or positions on the Palestinian issue as well. Nonetheless between 1950-1969, which all of Pearson’s time as Prime Minister are included, Canada was the third largest donor to UNRWA (United Nations Refugee and Works Agency) which supports Palestinian refugees “who had been expelled and [Canada] accepted them at a time when policies favored white European immigration” (Khazaeli, 2023). Why would Pearson take such a strong stance on the partition plan to create the state of Israel and the influx of European Jews to the land but only a few years later adopt the Canadian stance on being one of the world largest donors to the Palestinian refugees who were impacted directly by his immense contributions the issue as a whole? This is a question that will continue to appear for many Prime Ministers to come who both fund and support Israel in all of their transgressions against the Palestinians yet fund and send aid for Palestinian refugees who are victims of the

Israeli occupation and aggression. I argue that this was due to the idea of Pearsonism, mentioned in chapter three. Although Pearson was a strong advocate for the creation of the state of Israel, he shared empathy for the Palestinian refugees who were struggling in adapting to new environments and loss of their homes. In 1955 under Louis St. Laurent's government, when Pearson was still Minister of External Affairs, the department of External Affairs stated in a press release,

“The Department of External Affairs announced today that the Canadian Government has tentatively decided to admit a limited number of Palestinian refugees as immigrants to Canada. This decision has been taken in view of the requests received from Palestinian refugees for immigration to Canada and in the context of Canada's continuing desire as the fourth largest contributor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to do what it can to promote the welfare of refugees. The immigrants would be chosen from amongst English or French speaking refugee applicants in Lebanon or Jordan who have certain specified trades or skills which would enable them to find employment in Canada. Prospective immigrants and their families must also meet certain health and other requirements. Because of the lack of Canadian immigration facilities in Lebanon and Jordan, the Canadian Government has requested UNRWA to assist with pre-selection of refugee applicants who have the necessary qualifications and UNRWA has been kind enough to agree to provide this assistance. The final choice of immigrants, however, will be made by Canadian Immigration officials who will visit Lebanon and Jordan in the near future for this purpose. Because of the limited number of applicants to be accepted, the Canadian officials will make a selection from amongst applications submitted by UNRWA” (Molloy, 2020).

By this time, Canada was the fourth largest contributor to UNRWA and had also contributed 4 million dollars for Palestinian relief as Canada believed it was within its interest to resettle the Palestinian refugees, in the Middle East or elsewhere like in Canada, as soon as they could (Molloy, 2020). Two reasons for why Canada felt it was within its national interest to aid the Palestinian refugees and admit a limited number of them into Canada was that firstly, it believed that in doing so, it would encourage other states to do the same, thus Canada would be a role-model for other nations and continue to promote their honest-broker status on the international stage. The second reason was that the large number of Arab refugees within the Middle East at this time was causing the already political hotspot to have even more tension and with the strategic importance of the Middle East for Western states, Canada felt that if the refugee crisis settled down, it would allow for the region to decrease in tension. With these goals in mind, the Canadian government was persistent in helping Palestinian refugees all over the world. However, Arab governments did not approve of resettling Palestinian refugees as they believed Canada should have been working for the right of their return instead (Molloy, 2020). Nonetheless, Pearson proceeded with the Canadian plan to resettle Palestinian refugees with encouragement from MacCallum. As stated above, MacCallum was a pro-Arab Canadian representative to the United Nations and although she and Pearson disagreed about the Partition Plan, Pearson trusted her opinion of the matter of the Arabs due to her professional credibility on the area. Thus, when MacCallum presented her plan for the relocation of the Palestinian refugees into Canada, Pearson sought it through and continued Canadian funding to UNRWA (Molloy, 2020). Although Pearson was one of the strongest advocates for the creation of a Jewish state, he also trusted and respected his colleague's opinion on the Palestinian issue and took her advice into actions which

ultimately allowed for Canada to be perceived as an honest broker on the international stage who could help both the Israelis and the Palestinians.

It should also be noted that before Pearson became Prime Minister, he was heavily involved in the Suez Crisis between Egypt and Israel and was able to mediate the situation for which he won a Nobel Peace Prize. When discussing the Suez Canal Crisis and Pearson's hand in it, the Pearson government initiated the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which was a peacekeeping force, led by Canada. The most notable event in Israel during Pearson's government was during the third Arab Israeli war, also known as the 1967 Arab Israeli war or the Six-Day War. It was during this time that former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered Canadian members of UNEF to leave Sinai immediately. As Canada left the Sinai, it showed the international body that Canada was going to try to remain neutral in the Middle Eastern problems at this time, which on the other hand, left the Zionist and Israeli lobby groups feeling the need to begin to pressure the Pearson government to take action for Israel. The main lobby group for Zionists and Israel in Canada at this time was the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) who used three main points to influence the Canadian government at the time to take Israel's side during the war. They re-affirmed their anti-Nazi views in trying to gain sympathy for the terrors that the Jewish people faced under Nazi Germany and World War Two and how the same might occur at the hands of the Arabs during the Six Day War. The second method they used was in relation to the United Nations Charter in order to justify Israel's position to defend itself, and the third method they used was directly aimed at Canada's outspokenness on their values and morality in the sense that it should be applied to the state of Israel and the threat looming against it. Many within Canada's Jewish community at this time felt compelled to become Zionist after the CJC's compelling arguments for Canada to take Israel's side in this war

and not remain neutral as they believed that should the state of Israel fall so soon after the end of the second world war, their lives as Canadian Jews would also be at risk. Before the 1960's, these lobbying tactics would ultimately fail as Canada was not as friendly to the Jewish community however, during Pearson's government they were able to sway the government with their lobbying influence and rhetoric as Pearson believed the Jewish community and the state of Israel to be of utmost importance and thus, the CJC was successful as Pearson took a strong stance on Israel's right to defend itself against Arab enemies and his support for Israeli's freedom to travel across the Gulf of Arabia.

Thomas Woodley, President of Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East stated in an article, "Lester B. Pearson won a Nobel peace prize for his role in mediating the Suez Crisis in 1956, and for many decades afterwards, many perceived Canada as an "honest broker" in the Middle East, trusted by both Israel and the Palestinians." (Woodley, 2017). However, this does not seem to be the case with many Arabs or pro-Palestinian voices as a member of the Canadian Arab Friendship League stated,

"Our Canadian government at one time also favoured the creation of a federated State of Palestine which had at least some resemblance to a democratic solution.... Mr. Lester B. Pearson and Mr. Justice Ivan C. Rand changed that official position of our government. Instead of the democratic solution, these gentlemen did their utmost to impose upon the Arabs the infamous partition scheme. The Arab world, I am sure, will remember them." (Engler, 2017).

Although Pearson is regarded as a pioneer in Canada's stance on diplomacy and peace-making, his widely known support for the state of Israel and his hand in its making does not, for obvious

reasons, give the Canadian Arabs or Palestinians this same view on him or the Canadian government.

Therefore, although Pearson did much more for Israel before his time as Prime Minister, after he took office, he was still a strong advocate, friend, and supporter of the Israeli state, while continuing to send aid for Palestinian refugees. As Pearson was a Liberal, the next section will look at the differences between a Conservative versus Liberal leader and perhaps give more insight into if Canada had tightened or strayed away from its alliance to Israel.

Conservative versus Liberal Governments from the 1990's to the 2000's and the Intifadas

The first and second Intifadas were a series of non-violent, merely actions of uprising of the Palestinians within occupied Palestine and the West Bank with a multiple protests and riots against the Israeli state and government. This section will serve as a comparison of Conservative Canadian governments and Liberal Canadian governments during the first and second Intifadas. Namely, it will explain Brian Mulroney's stance on Israel and the first Palestinian uprising with the Conservatives in office, leading to Jean Chretien and his stance during the second Palestinian uprising with Liberals in office.

Mulroney, who served as the 18th Prime Minister of Canada between 1984-1993, was a hardline Israel supporter especially during the first Intifada, even more-so, some claim, than the United States President at the time Ronald Reagan. Mulroney and Reagan shared a close friendship as Mulroney was known to be one of the most pro-American Prime Ministers Canada had seen until that point. Some even claimed Canada, under Mulroney, to be nothing more than a "lapdog for the US" (Dirlik, 1991). Mulroney was also one of the most pro-Israeli Prime Ministers Canada had seen at that point. As Mulroney announced his resignation from office,

members of CJC stated, “We have lost a good friend... He understood the needs of our community. He was very sensitive to them and he had a visceral attachment to Israel.” (Dirlik, 1993). Mulroney was also openly opposed to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as he stated that they were “completely discredited” due to their support for Saddam Hussein and that Canada’s support for the organization was at a “zero” (Dirlik, 1993). Dirlik gives more examples of just how pro-Israel Mulroney was as he also states,

“Mulroney pandered to the pro-Israel community not only with his unwavering public support for Israel but also with his choice of appointments for key positions in his government. He delighted Jewish organizations by removing the outspoken Joe Clark in 1991 and naming as new external affairs minister the staunchly pro-Israel Barbara McDougall. (Just hours before being sworn in, McDougall received a standing ovation at a Toronto synagogue for her lavish praise of Israel.) A few months later, Mulroney scored more points with the Jewish community by naming Norman Spector as Canada's first Jewish ambassador to Israel. After yanking back to Ottawa the respected Michael Bell, Mulroney explained his decision at the reception honoring Spector. "I thought this posting would not only strengthen the bond between Canada and Israel," said Mulroney, "but also eliminate the doubt in anybody's mind as to where we stand on certain issues.”” (Dirlik, 1993).

These are just a few examples of the Mulroney government’s unwavering support for Israel and negligence to the Palestinian cause and lives. I differentiate between the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian lives here as the Palestinian cause can be seen as a political movement for Palestinian right of return and self-determination whereas Palestinian lives are seen more through a humanitarian lens through agencies such as UNRWA who do not get involved in the politics

but aid in a humanitarian sense. As the quote showed above, former Prime Minister Joe Clark, who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for some time within Mulroney's cabinet, encouraged and stated his views of the importance of PLO members to be involved in the Arab Israeli peace talks. Although Joe Clark was not pro-Palestinian or anti-Zionist, he understood the importance of having both Palestinian leaders and Israeli leaders involved to creating peace between them and was sensitive to Arab realities of Israel's actions towards them and mirrored the Pearsonian approach. However, Mulroney was of quite the opposite views as he believed any PLO members invited to take place in talks was a disservice to the Jewish community. Although both men were of conservative ideologies, it is interesting to see the differences in how both approached Canadian foreign policy interests and values towards Israel and the Palestinian/Arab world. This led to Joe Clark's replacement as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1991 with Barbara McDougall, who shared the same pro-Israel sentiments as Mulroney.

Nonetheless, before Clark's replacement, this did not change Mulroney's foreign policy interests and values as Ian Watson, head of the National Council on Canada Arab relations at that time stated that the two priorities in Mulroney's political ideology were "...keeping the Americans happy and the other is keeping the Israeli lobby happy" (Dirlik, 1991). Mulroney's foreign policy was heavily shaped and influenced by CJC at this time, and as stated earlier the lobby group is known to have more influence over Canadian foreign policy in relation to Israel than the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thus, with Mulroney's intense pro-Israel stance combined with the powerful Israel lobby, Joe Clark and any pro-Palestinian opinions and voices within Canada were overshadowed during the first Intifada. Although the Palestinians remained mostly non-violent during the first Intifada, the Israeli government launched several attacks killing more than 20 Palestinians by the end of Mulroney's time as

Prime Minister. During this time Mulroney was asked about human rights concerns over Israel's response to the uprising to which he responded, "No, I think the Israelis who are in an extremely difficult situation, a historically difficult situation, [are] showing restraint". Meanwhile Reagan, who was also an Israeli supporter did voice his concerns over the unjust scales taking a less hardline approach favouring Israel than Mulroney did.

The Madrid Middle East Peace Conference also took place during Mulroney's government in 1991. Canada's role during the peace talks was to begin the process of the refugee working group concerning the Palestinian refugees, and they continued this work even after the Madrid Conference was overtaken by the Oslo Accords, under Jean Chretien's government. Referencing the graph in the second chapter concerning military exports to Israel, the difference between the beginning to the end of the first Intifada should be noted. At the beginning of the first Intifada, Canada sent military goods to Israel worth just over \$26 million in 1987, the highest number of military exports to Israel in Canadian history (Bueckert, 2022). It aligns directly with Mulroney's support for Israel, especially during a time of a direct national security threat against the state. However, as stated in the second chapter, after 1987, military exports were almost non-existent as they hit \$0 between 1992-1994, with the Intifada ending in 1993, although by the early 1990's Israel had injured thousands and killed over 670 Palestinians with Mulroney's full encouragement (Bueckert, 2022). With Joe Clark being the previous Minister of Foreign Affairs and his outspokenness against the violent attacks against the Palestinians, Israel found he was a source to blame for the low military aid they received from Canada, although it was due mostly to the Canadian arms control policy that was still in place at this point. The policy stated that Canada would restrict arms to "countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities or where there was a credible risk that the arms could be used against civilians."

(Bueckert, 2022). Although this policy did not fully halt arms exports as they were able to export the most amount in Canadian history at the beginning of the Intifada, it was more rigorously followed in the later years of the Intifada. It could also not have been due to Joe Clark as he was dismissed from his position in 1991 and replaced by strong Israeli ally Barbara McDougall, as mentioned above. Therefore, the only conclusion one could come to as to why the policy allowed over \$26 million in 1987 and less and less until it reached \$0 in 1992-1994 is due to the flaws of the policy itself and the battle between Mulroney versus other Canadian officials in their respective different views on Israel and the Palestinians. As Mulroney resigned from office, and was replaced by Kim Campbell for a short time, federal elections were on their way and saw a new Prime Minister, with a different attitude towards Canadian foreign policy concerning Israel and Palestine.

Jean Chretien served as the 20th Prime Minister of Canada between 1993-2003 and was known to take a step back from Mulroney's hardline pro-Israel stance to take a more multilateralist approach in his foreign policy goals. He was also known to want to back away from the idea of Canada having very close relations to the United States' as we will see with the war on terror, in one specific case. Chretien based his Israeli Palestinian foreign policy on the basis of the Middle East Peace Process in 1991 during the Madrid Conference, which allowed Chretien to continue to be pro-Israel. However, he did not dismiss pro-Palestinian voices and believed in a diplomatic approach that would reflect Joe Clark's ideology of allowing Palestinians a seat at the table to negotiate peace talks with Israel on the world stage (Seligman, 2018). Chretien's government was engaged with peace talks surrounding the Middle East before he came into power as Seligman recounts,

“The previous year, Canada was selected as the “gavel holder” of the Refugee Working Group (RWG), one of five multilateral working groups created as a result of the 1991 Madrid Conference. The RWG met several times during the mid-1990s, but its meeting in December 1995 proved to be its last as the peace process began to deteriorate by 1996. Although Canada continued to try to work on the refugee issue for the next few years by organizing informal meetings with a smaller group of actors, Canada’s ability to impact the Middle East Peace Process was limited following the end of the multilateral working group process. Despite these challenges, Mira Sucharov views Canada’s role in the RWG as a key example of the Chrétien government’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy, noting that “the multilateral format of the working group was well suited to the Canadian style of internationalism” (Seligman, 2018).

Although both Mulroney and Chretien’s government believed the peace process would be a success, it fell through a few years later and led to the second Intifada. The arms control policy also did not live for much longer as it was lifted in 1996-1997 under Chretien’s government. Chretien found other ways to show support for both sides as he negotiated and put into force CIFTA, as mentioned in the second chapter. Due to his implementation of CIFTA in 1997, the trade between Canada and Israel increased to \$507.3 million in the same year and allowed for the trade to increase to \$1.4 billion in 2012 (Seligman, 2018). As for the Palestinians and neighbouring Arab countries, Chretien’s government provided \$330 million in aid which was used for “budgetary support for the Palestinian Authority, refugees, and civil society, among other things” (Seligman, 2018).

However, the end of the Middle East Peace Process coupled with the beginning of the second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada (referring to the third holiest site in Islam

located in Jerusalem), between 2000 and 2005, Chretien's foreign policy was criticized by other parties in Canada as not being pro-Israel enough and not aligning with the new pressures of the issues regarding Israel and Palestine. The second Intifada was mainly caused by former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to what Jews refer to as Temple Mount and Muslims refer to as Al-Aqsa, a holy site in Jerusalem for both religions. Sharon visiting the site was seen as provocative and coupled with the failure of the Camp David Summit that same year, the second Intifada broke out. With this Chretien thought of a pragmatic approach that would re-iterate Canada's support for Israel while remaining sympathetic and understanding of the Palestinian cause. Of course, this did not please either side, Israelis, or Palestinians, hence why Chretien's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham stated "if we are disliked by all sides, then it may mean we are doing the right thing" (Seligman, 2018). This demonstrates Chretien's multilateral approach towards Israel and Palestine as he did not wish to take a side too firmly but rather tried to find ways to mediate both Israelis and Palestinians by giving both of them his attention in different areas.

Chretien's government also voted in favour of a United Nations Security Council Resolution, 1322, which "deplore[d] the provocation carried out at Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem on September 28, 2000" and "call[ed] upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations" (Seligman, 2018). However, this was met from backlash within Chretien's own party as it was split between Liberals who defended the resolution while others criticized it as being biased against Israel. Here, we can see similarities between Chretien and Mulroney's time where both leaders had opposing views from those within their parties. As Mulroney and Clark had opposing views on Israel although both Conservatives, Chretien and some members of his caucus also had opposing views on Israel. Nonetheless, with federal

elections on its way, leaders of opposing parties saw Chretien's pragmatic views as an opportunity to gain support from the Jewish community for their hardline pro-Israel stance and win seats in the next elections, leaving Chretien with the task of winning over the Jewish community in order not to lose their votes. He decided to meet with members of the Jewish community to address their concerns over resolution 1322 and stated, "one UN vote cannot define—or re-define—the deep and longstanding friendship that exists between Canada and Israel" (Seligman, 2018). Although Chretien might truly believe what he stated, his actions in favouring resolution 1322 does align with his government's previous beliefs on several other UN resolutions that favour what the majority of the international body prefers rather than what Israel and the United States prefer. As previously mentioned, Chretien was not of the idea that Canada needed to follow the United States' lead in all foreign policy matters, unlike Mulroney, although they sometimes were forced to align due to their shared border and Western ideologies. This was the case with the previously mentioned war on terror after the September 11 attacks. Chretien backed the United States invasion of Afghanistan as they committed \$7 billion for "improvements in border security and infrastructure, refugee and immigration screening, and increased military spending" (Barry, 2005). They also "deployed a naval task force to the Persian Gulf as part of U.S.-led operations against al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban government in Afghanistan that sheltered them. It also dispatched a battle group to operate alongside U.S. forces in that country" (Barry, 2005). However, Chretien made it quite clear that Canada would not back the Iraq invasions as the United States claimed it must act pre-emptively against Saddam Hussein as they believed he was holding weapons of mass destruction, although no weapons were ever found. Even with the British backing the United States in their invasion, Chretien's government was steadfast in that they would not be a part of it without evidence of

weapons of mass destruction or UN approval of the invasion. Even so, Chretien and Bush did meet to discuss Canada's involvement in the Iraq regime overthrow with Chretien urging Bush to get approval from the United Nations Security Council in order to get Canadian support on the invasion, however, Bush was not able to present any evidence that was compelling enough for Chretien's approval. However, it should be noted that Chretien's government's military contributions to the Iraq war exceeded those who were openly backing the war, such as Britain, as Canada "provided extensive material and military support to the Iraq War effort, as Royal Canadian Navy warships in the Strait of Hormuz offered stealth support and the Royal Canadian Air Force conducted strategic airlifts for the Iraq War" (Khazaeli, 2023). Therefore, we can see how Chretien differed from Mulroney in taking more of a multilateralist approach regarding Canadian foreign policy interests and values in Israel and Palestine as he sought to remain neutral by neither pleasing nor heavily displeasing either side and was not heavily swayed by advocacy from pro-Israel groups nor pro-Palestine groups. Although his policies concerning national security after 9/11 resembled those of the United States, he also did not blindly follow what the Bush administration did during the war on terror, leaving Canadians with the impression that Chretien was very pragmatic and just in terms of his foreign policy.

Stephen Harper, Justin Trudeau, and the Israel-Hamas Wars

This section will look deeper into Stephen Harper's views on the war on terror, that completely oppose Chretien's pragmatic views, as well as his return for Canada and Israel's strong alliance, especially through his Western supremacy ideals. This will then lead to Justin Trudeau as the current Prime Minister and his government's actions on the Israel Hamas wars in 2021 and 2023. In recent times, Seligman concludes that Canada-Israel relations have only gotten stronger since Stephen Harper who was a firm believer in tightening the two states'

relations during his time as Prime Minister. He states that Justin Trudeau is continuing to strengthen it as well rather than returning to a more neutral stance that other Prime Ministers have had, such as that of Pearson and Chretien. This section will explore whether Seligman's statements are true or not by looking at what both Prime Minister's policies looked like regarding Israel and Palestine.

Stephen Harper served as the 22nd Prime Minister of Canada between 2006-2015 and was known for his extreme conservative views and ideology, returning Canada to its highly supportive pro-Israel stance and great alliance to the United States, even more so than ever before. Khazaeli states, "Harper overturned decades of Canadian neutrality on Israel and Palestine in favor of an unabashed pro-Israel posture" (Khazaeli, 2023). He also overturned Chretien's hesitance on the Iraq war and allowed Canada to join the United States in their intervention against Iraq, Libya, and Syria as, "Harper, who had called Chrétien's decision 'gutless and juvenile,' was determined to set things right" (Khazaeli, 2023). As mentioned in the second chapter, counterterrorism policies after the September 11 attacks, then under Chretien, were criticized as mirroring the United States too closely without considering the need for Canada's own national security objectives. This continued and was heightened in Harper's government, due to Harper's ideology of fully backing, supporting, and imitating the United States to reinforce the relationship between the two states. Khazaeli states,

"Harper reoriented Canadian foreign and defense policy around the US-led War on Terror. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration re-emphasized national security, prioritizing counterterrorism, democratization, and the Iranian nuclear program as the foremost objectives of US policy in the Middle East. Harper took note. Whereas previous governments, cognizant of anti-American undercurrents, avoided taking positions that too

closely resembled those of the US, Harper had no compunction about doing so. Once in office, he accepted terrorism as the West's new great struggle. He adopted Bush's extreme script, expressing skepticism about multilateralism, calling out dictatorships, and inflating the domestic threat of radical Islam” (Khazaeli, 2023).

This was coupled with Harper’s unconditional support for Israel and opposition to Iran, linking Canada and Israel as close partners once again, while opposing the rest of the Arab and Muslim world. Harper’s government closely reflects one of Canada’s driving factors regarding their interests and values in the foreign policy sphere, being that of Western supremacy and underlying tones of racism. This stems from Harper’s evangelical base for his ideologies, as well as his party’s ideology, that were easily persuaded by the Canadian Jewish community who backed Israel. Although under Mulroney the Canadian government fully supported Israel, they still left some room for interpretation on the Palestinians as his government continued to fund UNRWA. However, this changed under Harper’s government, who did not care for Canada’s reputation as a diplomatic and “honest- broker” nation; rather, his government “abstained from taking any position damaging to Israel, defended Israel's use of force against terrorism, and cut funding to UNRWA, citing Palestinian aggression in the 2008–2009 Gaza War. By 2015, Canada was voting against almost all UN resolutions in support of the Palestinians” (Khazaeli, 2023). Under Harper, Canada’s foreign policies were driven primarily by Western power, opposing any state who threatened it and supporting any state who resembled it, mainly Israel. McKenna backs this argument as he states,

“...the most critical influences were the personal prejudices and ideological commitments of leading Conservative figures, especially Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign Minister John Baird. The government’s support for Israel and dismissal of the

Palestinians also fit into the Conservative Party's strong rejection and even demonization of Muslims. These attitudes drew on a particular set of ethnic prejudices and perspectives that reflect a "Eurocentric world view" that implicitly devalues non-European peoples, their histories and perspectives. Thus, ethnic/religious solidarity informed the Conservative Party's pro-Israel policy" (McKenna, 2022).

This was also in part, to please the CIC with whom Harper formed a strong alliance in order to win a majority government with which he took Jewish Liberal voters and made them Conservatives.

Arguments against this case would state that Harper's government was not rooted in racism as it backed the Jewish community in Canada where they do not always fit into the "white western" category however, the Canadian government often saw the Jewish community through a lens of empathy for what they had faced under European dictatorships and therefore were victims. However, the same can be said about the Palestinians who are discriminated against, being labelled "terrorists", and face the reality of apartheid, threats of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Thus, the struggles that the Jewish population all over the world have endured throughout history, ultimately encourage the Canadian government to side with Israel, as they are seen through a lens of empathy. This, coupled with Israel having European and Western values and interests, although being geographically located in the Middle East had driven forward Harper's pro-Israel stance through his government's policies and actions. This directly reflects Canada's discrepancy within its national interests as 1 in 4 Canadians are not white, thus Harper's government neglected a majority of the Canadian population in his foreign policy goals regarding Israel and Palestine.

This even went as far as Harper's Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Baird who shared very similar views to Harper, and his full opposition to allowing Palestinians the right to seek recognition as an observer state in the United Nations. Baird contacted many foreign ministers, all of whom shared the "Western" ideals, such as Australia, New Zealand, and many European states, to oppose Palestinian recognition (Clark, Ling, 2012). Although Baird was unsuccessful and Palestine was introduced as a non-member observer state at the United Nations, this did not stop Harper's government from refusing to recognize the State of Palestine. In the Israel Hamas war in 2014, where thousands of Palestinians were killed by Israeli aggression, Harper made no oppositional statement against Israel and fully backed their attacks, dismissing the Palestinian lives completely. Just a few months before the war, Harper made his first trip to Israel where he again re-iterated his unconditional support, claiming Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East, his sentiments towards the struggles of the Jewish people throughout history as a reason for the state of Israel to exist and defend itself against the terrorists, and that any failures of peace between Israel and the Palestinians should be attributed to the Palestinians, not the Israelis (CBC News, 2014). Harper would remain steadfast in his support for Israel and great alliance to the United States, along with the rest of the states who shared similar values to those of the West, leaving behind a reputation for Canada as being a Western state who values other Western ideological states, opposes the Middle Eastern states, Muslims, and many others, for Trudeau to come and, surprisingly, re-enforce this once again, despite changing some of the language used.

Justin Trudeau is the 23rd Prime Minister of Canada serving since 2015, and is known for his liberal, multicultural, and accepting views on foreign policy, stating "Canada is back" at the Paris World Summit, regarding Harper's not-so Canadian foreign policy agenda (Seligman, 2018). Although Trudeau made it appear as through Canada would return to a Chretien or even

Pearson style ruling government, with time that did not seem to be the case anymore as he kept in place many of the same goals Harper put fourth during his time. Before Trudeau was elected in 2015, his pro-Israel stance was already known, as he made similar remarks to that of Harper during the Israel Hamas 2014 war. He stated in 2014, “Israel has the right to defend itself and its people. Hamas is a terrorist organization and must cease its rocket attacks immediately”, bearing a resemblance to the statements put out by Harper that same year (Seligman, 2018). The following year, Trudeau made it clear to the Canadian public that the issue of Israel will remain the same in the Canadian government’s eyes, whether it is a Liberal government or a Conservative government. What might have caused this is due to Harper being able to win over a great deal of Jewish Liberal voters during his election campaign for his strong support for Israel, which Chretien previously did not have. Thus, under Trudeau’s campaign, the Liberal sought to gain these Jewish voters back by re-iterating the same support for Israel as Harper had so vocally expressed. In other words, it was a game of politics to simply win votes, and later on during this government, keeping those votes for re-election.


During UN resolutions, Trudeau also had the same approach as Harper did voting against many resolutions that condemn Israel’s actions towards the Palestinians or otherwise abstaining. Seligman states,

“Notably, Canada voted against resolutions affirming the Palestinian right to self-determination, the illegality of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, and the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Conventions to occupied areas under Israeli control. Overall, Canada’s voting record at the UN under Trudeau government thus far is among the most pro-Israel in the world and is markedly different than Canada’s voting record under Chrétien and Martin” (Seligman, 2018).

This is exactly in line with Harper's cabinets comments, mainly his Minister of Foreign Affairs, in that the state of Palestine would not be recognized, will not have the right to self-determination, and the actions of Israel will still be supported by the Canadian government under Trudeau. However, there are two changes that can be noted, first, Trudeau uses difficult language to express support for Israel, which favours less of a hardline approach, than Harper, and uses a tone of professionalism. The second change, which is more notable, is that Trudeau returned to a state more like Mulroney of fully supporting Israel, however, funding UNRWA. Seligman states, "In 2016, Trudeau announced that his government would restore funding to UNRWA, a decision that one Israeli newspaper called 'a significant break' from the Harper government's policy", which was not supported by the Conservatives as they still believed that UNRWA was cooperating with Hamas (Seligman, 2018). Nonetheless, it was the only real noticeable change Trudeau made within his foreign policy regarding Israel and Palestine. What could be the main cause from this was actually due to the Israeli lobby who, surprisingly, did not support Harper's funding cut to UNRWA as they believed UNRWA to help keep Gaza somewhat stable and far from wars with Hamas.

Nonetheless, a majority of the Canadian population does not agree with the way in which their government has been dealing with the Israeli Palestinian issue. The graph below demonstrates the views of Canadians from all political ideologies, or not, and how they believe their government to be biased in favour of Israel.

Most Canadians view the Canadian government as biased toward Israel



Produced by CJPME, IJV, dedicated to the public domain, <http://survey.cjpme.org>
Based on EKOS research, conducted Jan. 25 - Feb. 2, 2017

2017 Survey of Canadian Attitudes on Israel/Palestine
Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East

What this graph shows is that, majority of Canadians, excluding those who align themselves with the Conservative party, believe the Canadian government to be overwhelmingly biased in favour of Israel, while neglecting the Palestinians and their cause. Conservatives, however, are the only group that believe there is almost equal amount of Palestinian representation as Israeli representation, which is in sharp contrast to what their political party stands for, as we have seen under Harper's government.

However, in more recent years, Trudeau's governments policies towards Israel and Palestine have been dubbed as "schizophrenic" as the government often swings back and forth between supporting Israel's right to exist and defend itself and the Palestinian's human rights to self-determination, peace, and prosperity. Most notable, during the 2021 Israel Hamas war,

where more than 200 Palestinians were killed and more than 1500 injured, the Prime Minister put out a statement wishing peace for both sides, the whole of the Israeli state, and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, excluding Hamas. The statement put out on May 28, 2021, stated, “Canada firmly believes that the Palestinian and Israeli peoples have a right to live in peace, security, and dignity – without fear and with their human rights respected... The Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, today announced \$25 million in funding to support Palestinian civilians in the region” (Trudeau, 2021). \$10 million would be used for food, water, shelter, hygiene, and psychological support, especially for children impacted by Israeli aggression. Another \$10 million would be regarding infrastructure and rebuilding, especially for medical assistance. The remaining \$5 million would be used for peace building initiatives to ensure peace in the region and the remaining Middle East. He also urged for a cease-fire demanding both sides to lay down their weapons and find common ground for peace, although the United States did not back a cease-fire and gave Israel the go-ahead to continue their strikes. It is here we begin to see the shift from Trudeau’s support for Israel that he had before and right after Harper’s government, as he now seemed to be taking the pragmatic approach that Chretien once adopted. Although Trudeau began to discuss Palestinian rights and livelihood, this did not stop him from increasing arms exports to the region, as we see in the graph provided in the second chapter. Canada reached the second highest number of military exports to Israel with just over \$19 million in 2020 alone, right behind the record high under Mulroney’s government. This again could be due to the Israeli lobby’s efforts to ensure Trudeau would continue to pledge and demonstrate his support for Israel, which, not so coincidentally, was also one year before the next federal elections, in which Trudeau formed a minority government.

However, things also took a sharp turn in 2023 with the ongoing Israel Hamas war which has taken the lives of more than 40,000 Palestinians and possibly over 100,000 which remain unconfirmed. As mentioned in the second chapter, although the Palestinian or Arab lobby groups are not nearly as influential as the Israeli lobby groups, there was quite a dramatic shift in the way the Canadian community viewed the Israel Palestine issue, without the use of lobby groups but more so through social media and a new generation of Palestinian Canadians who want to be heard. On October 7, 2023, when Hamas militants broke through the fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel and were able to seize 251 Israeli hostages as leverage over what Hamas states as Israel's unjust and inhumane detention of Palestinian civilians from the West Bank, there was quite a dramatic turn in the international community on Israel's true intentions on eliminating Hamas and their position on the future of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After the October 7 attacks, Israel's Western allies were quick to defend Israel and encourage their right to defend themselves. Trudeau released a statement the following day stating, "Canada unequivocally condemns these terrible attacks in the strongest possible terms and reaffirms its support for Israel's right to defend itself, in accordance with international law." while also stating, "To our Israeli friends, Canadians stand with you. The Government of Canada stands ready to support you – our support for the Israeli people is steadfast." (Trudeau, 2023). Trudeau made no remark of Palestinians or Canadian citizens who stand with Palestinians and the genocide they were facing.

However, after much pressure from Canadian's large and successful protesting, demanding for a cease-fire after nearly 20,000 innocent Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli aggression almost 80 days in, Trudeau alongside foreign affairs minister Melanie Joly voted in favour of a cease-fire at a United Nations resolution. Joly stated, "From the very

beginning we have said that Israel has the right to defend itself... How Israel defends itself matters.” (Major, Woods, 2023). This shift from the Canadian government allowed for their citizens voices to be heard while simultaneously allowing for Trudeau to make remarks on the future of Israel. Trudeau stated that he doubts the longevity of support for Israel after their genocidal attacks on Palestinian civilians in Gaza caused international outrage and for Israeli citizens to protest their government, demanding Prime Minister Netanyahu to resign from office. Trudeau stated in an interview with CBC, “The voices from Israel's strongest friends, like Canada, like Australia, especially like the United States ... are becoming increasingly concerned that ... the short-term actions being taken by Israel are actually putting at risk the long-term safety and even support for a Jewish state into the future” (Barton, Major, 2023). Here we begin to see the real turning point on Trudeau’s stance on Israel as he makes the suggestion of the relationship, not only between Canada and Israel, but with many other allies to the state in regard to their genocidal attacks on Palestinians. However, CIJA put out a press release stating their opposition to the government’s actions. They stated,

“Canadian foreign policy shows itself to be hypocritical. We’re disgusted and frankly shocked that only hours after issuing a statement that a ceasefire would only be possible under the condition that Hamas release the hostages, stop its use of Palestinians as human shields, lay down its arms, and surrender its control of Gaza, Canada voted in support of a UN General Assembly resolution supporting a ceasefire. ...Canada’s Jewish community will not forget that, in the face of unprecedented antisemitism, only further emboldened by Hamas’ October 7 massacre, the Canadian government chose to ignore not just Israel’s right to defend itself, but Israel's obligation to defend itself. Canada’s

decision to support the resolution will undoubtedly lead to further hate being directed towards Jews here in Canada.” (CIJA, 2023).

CIJA representatives took clear issue with the Canadian government calling for a ceasefire to end the killing of Palestinian civilians however, Canada returned to defend Israel once again through their opposition to the ICJ investigations on the possible Palestinian genocide at the hands of Netanyahu’s government.

In 2024, when South Africa took Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on accounts of genocide, the Canadian government repeatedly tried to stop the ICJ from providing its opinion on the matter, only fueling further double standard claims against the Canadian government. Bueckert states, “Regrettably, Canada has previously attempted to discourage the ICJ from providing an opinion on this matter, showing how it favours Israel with a double standard when it comes to the application of international law. Following today’s ruling, we hope to see Canada finally give its full support for the ICJ and help bring a rapid end to Israel’s illegal occupation” (CJPME, 2024). Nonetheless, the court went ahead with the proceedings and at the end found plausible cause for South Africa’s case in that Israel could be committing acts of genocide against the Palestinians. Canada has yet to accept the ruling because as a result of accepting it, the government would be forced to halt all military exports to Israel. Although Trudeau has made countless remarks concerning the well-being of Palestinians and asking Israel to end its bombardment on Gaza, he has yet to take real action in allowing a permanent cease-fire to happen.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the many time periods and Prime Ministers discussed in this chapter have many similarities in how they approached their foreign policy interests regarding Israel and the Palestinians. For one, they have never fully stood behind Palestine, always backing Israel, with some Prime Ministers making exceptions to the Palestinian cause, mostly in forms of humanitarian aid. What it also showed was how regardless of a Conservative or a Liberal, the Canadian government will continue to support Israel due to the driving factors discussed in the second chapter. We may be able to break up the actions of the Prime Ministers through two differing ideologies. The first can be referred to as a Pearsonist style approach to Canadian foreign policy regarding Israel and Palestine. This approach which was adopted by Pearson, Chretien, and the latter years of Trudeau's government and adopt more multilateral policies that do not dismiss the Palestinian lives but still favour Israel by placing emphasis and importance on Israel's right to exist and defend itself. They view the Palestinians through a humanitarian lens where funding UNRWA and accepting Palestinian refugees is encouraged and welcomed in their government. The second ideology is that of Harpurnism adopted strongly by Harper, sometimes Mulroney, and the early years of Trudeau's government where Palestinian lives are dismissed completely and a strong emphasis on the Canadian Israeli relations are put forth. Here, funding to UNRWA is decreased significantly or nil, exporting arms to Israel is increased, and the Canadian American alliance is strong. Although certain parts of the two ideologies overlap, they have their differences in their approach to Israel and the Palestinians as I have described throughout the chapter. The driving factors discussed in the second chapter can all be found within the time periods discussed as a leading factor for why Canadian Prime Ministers continue their long-lasting support for Israel, although with sometimes distancing the alliance between the

two states. The basis of Canadian foreign policy interests and values in regards to Israel and Palestine, will remain firm in their driving factors of economic advantages, namely military exports, racism and Western power, ties to the United States, and most notably, the Israeli lobby.

Chapter Four: The Future of Canadian Foreign Policy

This concluding chapter will discuss how Canada's future foreign policy could be shaped to fit their stated interests and values better. To reach a conclusion to this thesis as well as a conclusion for Canada's next steps, I will be presenting some of the reasons for why and how Canada's foreign policy is outdated with current trends in the international sphere and how their implied interests and values are beginning to show more than their stated interests. The first section of this chapter will revisit Canadian history with colonialism with an emphasis on Canada's treatment of its Indigenous population. Comparisons will be made through the history between Canada's Indigenous population and the treatment they received from European settlers versus the treatment Palestinians have received through the Israeli occupation. It will display how Canada is repeating its past mistakes with their current policies towards Israel and Palestinians. This will lead to the second section which will look at Canadian double standards in their foreign policy regarding how they have viewed Ukraine in its fight against Russian invasion, versus how they view Palestinians in their fight against Israeli occupation. It will also present the double standards on how the Canadian government has aided Ukrainians fleeing from the war versus how the Canadian government has treated and viewed Palestinians fleeing the war. The third section will focus on Canada's growing multiculturalism and its future effect on Canadian foreign policy. Here I will argue that Canada's increasingly diverse population will be better served with foreign policies that better reflect and appeal to Canadian audiences and highlight the key points set out in the Multiculturalism Act. The fourth section will serve as a tool for how Canada can be a better overall ally to Palestinians as a front-runner for creating long-lasting peace and a solution that will satisfy their stated foreign policy objectives. I will end this chapter with a conclusion of the results I found throughout this thesis.

Canada's History of Colonialism and its Impact Today

Canada was formed as a state on the basis of settler-colonialism in the early to mid-1500s with Jacques Cartier through his voyages from Europe. Although some claim that this was when Canada was discovered, this is false as there had been Indigenous peoples living on the land with their languages, cultures, practices, norms, values, and beliefs. Within this chapter, I will be referring to the native people of Canada, including First Nations, Metis, and Inuit as the Indigenous people. Cartier claimed the land for the French, although this was also contested in Europe as the British also believed they had claims to the land later. As for the Indigenous people, the British, French, and other European colonizers knew about them but due to their own beliefs and being that they were not Christian, the land was seen as “terra nullius”, meaning land belonging to nobody (Reynolds, 2024). In the early stages of contact, European settlers built relationships with the Indigenous people that were, for the most part, respectful, and had mutual tolerance as “each was regarded as distinct and autonomous, left to govern its own internal affairs but co-operating in areas of mutual interest and, occasionally and increasingly, linked in various trading relationships and other forms of nation-to-nation alliances” (Reynolds, 2024). During this time, the Indigenous people and the European settlers built a high degree of cooperation through trade and military alliances, such as the Covenant Chain which allowed for separate and equal relationships for peaceful co-existence; signed treaties for friendship and peace; intermarriages; and skill teaching, as the Indigenous people often taught European settlers how to adapt to the environment of the land. However, there were problems arising as the European settlers increased and the Indigenous population decreased due to the diseases Europeans brought which they were immune to, but the Indigenous peoples were not, thus causing many more deaths among their population. More issues occurred with the British and

French rivalry over who had more control and influence over the land, with the Indigenous people believing they had the upper hand in who they gave their alliance. With the Indigenous people cooperating with the British, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was introduced and would state that land could only be acquired by settlers through mutual peaceful treaties with the Indigenous peoples. However, over time, this was forgotten, and more settlers began to claim Indigenous lands. Indigenous people found themselves victims of the “Darling Report of 1828 [which] promoted what became known as the civilization and assimilation program. It recommended this program be based on establishing reserves where Indigenous people could be educated, converted to Christianity, and transformed into sedentary farmers, thus ending their nomadic habits” (Reynolds, 2024). This led to what we now refer to as Residential Schools, which is one of the most traumatic aspects of the Indigenous people’s struggles in their colonization. They were forced to abandon their languages, beliefs, norms, values, and practices, and adopt a European mindset and lifestyle. If they chose not to or had difficulty in doing so, they would pay the consequences of torture, beatings, and even killings at the hands of Christian European colonizers. They were denied their previous rights to their own autonomy and governing affairs and were treated as a group of people, who were seen as “barbarians”, to be ruled over and forced assimilation into their colonizer’s culture of “civilized peoples”.

Many comparisons can be made from these aspects of Canadian history with Indigenous people and Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. I do not intend to group the struggles of the Indigenous people with the struggles of the Palestinians; however, I believe this section will serve better as a comparison between the two histories, in their respective struggles, and how this has influenced Canadian foreign policy today. Beginning with the term “terra nullius” or land belonging to nobody. Here we see the first similarity between Canada’s history with the

Indigenous people and Israel and the Palestinians. The idea of the land belonging to nobody due to the fact they were not Christians can be compared to what Israelis claim about the land of Palestine. The land was referred to as “a land without a people for a people without a land” by the Zionist project as a means to colonize the land as a Jewish haven, with no regard for the Palestinians living there, in fact erasing their existence. As the Jewish people did not have a specific region or land for themselves and were victims of various struggles in history, mostly throughout Europe, the end of the Second World War drove forward the idea that land was needed for the Jewish people to govern themselves and be safe from further oppression. However, the disregard for Palestinians who had sought to gain their independence from the British and govern themselves as an independent nation were disregarded, leading to the Nakba, or catastrophe, of 1948 when the state of Israel was established and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were killed or forcibly expelled from their homes. The difference here is in the fact that the Zionist project felt a deep attachment to the land of Palestine due to religious beliefs whereas the British and French settlers on Turtle Island simply wanted control over the land for more influence over the world at that time, and more resources than what the land in Europe could offer. The second comparison that can be made is through the peaceful times between the Indigenous people and the European settlers. Before World War One, Palestine, then under Ottoman rule, had a small percentage of Jewish people living alongside the majority of Muslims and other Christian populations, all of whom co-existed and were allowed to practice their faiths in Palestine. According to the United Nations, “Both the Arabs and the Ottoman Turks accorded the Jews the right to continue to worship and to keep alive the Jewish spiritual link with Palestine. During the nineteenth century, the Ottomans authorized small settlements of Jewish immigrants from European countries where anti-Jewish discrimination was increasing.” (United

Nation, 1980). Thus, we see how before the state of Israel was created in 1948, there were relatively no issues with Muslims, Christians, and Jews living in the land and practicing their faiths through cooperation and peace. Although there might have been a few instances of clashes between the groups, it was relatively respectful and thought to be cooperative, as it was between the Indigenous people and the European settlers. The third comparison ties into the second one, where the Indigenous people were starting to be taken advantage of by the European settlers and the settler population increased. A similar case happened for the Palestinians during World War One, many pro-Zionist labour parties began to pressure the Zionist Organization to change policies to allow unlimited immigration of European Jews, specifically from Ukraine and Russia, and seek asylum in Palestine. Alroey states,

“Above all, the local body called on the heads of the Zionist Organization (ZO) to “initiate” post haste “broad settlement activity so that it will be possible to divert part of the stream of emigration of Russian Jewry to Palestine.” A resolution was also passed to urge the ZO to do “everything in its power to enable the young pioneering elements in Russia to be brought to Palestine as soon as possible,” so that they may “work the land and prepare it for wide-scale immigration.” (Alroey, 2017)

However, the Zionist Organization felt that mass Jewish immigration to Palestine was not suitable at this moment in time as they required sound-minded Jews to help build up the country for mass immigration soon to come, and in their point of view, Jewish Ukrainians did not fit their match (Alroey, 2017). Alroey goes on to mention this as he states,

“Weizmann repeatedly stated that it was not Palestine’s capacity for absorbing immigrants that troubled him, but the character of those who arrived. In fact, he welcomed olim (immigrants) who were of sound mind and body. On December 17, 1919,

the eve of his departure from Palestine for the Zionist Congress in London, Weizmann delivered a speech at the Lemel School in Jerusalem before local dignitaries, communal workers, teachers, doctors, and writers. He made sure to note that, while Palestine could take in thousands of immigrants per year, those who were presently interested in coming were unsuited for “the great Zionist project” of building a national home in the Land of Israel” (Alore, 2017).

Here we see the beginning of the Zionist Organization plans to “build” the land of Palestine into a future home as the “Land of Israel” for all Jewish people to reside in. During the Ottoman rule, mass Jewish immigration to the land was tightly restricted although some immigration was allowed, illegal immigration increased due to these restrictions. However, under the British Mandate on Palestine after World War Two, mass Jewish immigration, both legal and illegal, into Palestine was encouraged to begin the process of creating the state of Israel. Walidi argues that the state of Israel was established in 1948 due to “two major simultaneous operations conducted with relentless perseverance: land acquisition and immigration, both legal and illegal” (Walidi, 2006). He goes on to state,

“During the last decades of Ottoman rule, illegality predominated because of Istanbul’s hostility to Zionism, however ineffective. Under the British Mandate, illegality was never absent from Zionist land dealings (almost by habit) and progressively increased in the immigration sphere after the mid-1930s, until it became a predominant strategy in the years 1945–1948.” (Walidi, 2006)

The colonialism that was seen with European Settlers on Turtle Island, referring to today’s Canada, was also seen through mass illegal Jewish immigration, mostly from Europe as well, into the land of Palestine. Both colonization also occurred under British rule and influence. Legal

Jewish immigration to Palestine in 1948 increased from “about 50,000 in 1918 (8 percent of the total population) to about 630,000 in May 1948 (33 percent of the total population)” and illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine in 1948 was around 120,000 under the British Mandate, representing 15-20 percent of the total Jewish population in Palestine (Walidi, 2006). The Zionist Organization was successful in their mass immigration plans to increase the number of Jewish residents on the land, and as mentioned previously, in 1948 were able to expel around 700,000 Palestinians or 85 percent of the total population, from the land, thus establishing a Jewish majority population for a Jewish homeland. Just as the Indigenous were pushed out of their ancestral lands and had a decreasing population, the same was seen for the Palestinians, both at the hands of European settler colonialism.

Recently, Canada has put forth actions and policies to reconcile the relationship with the Indigenous people and recognize the injustices brought onto them since the settler Europeans arrived on their land. Global Affairs Canada has begun an action plan on reconciliation with Indigenous people, not just in Canada, but for Indigenous people all over the world who were victims of colonization. The Canadian government stated, “The Action Plan guides the department’s efforts to advance the rights, perspectives and prosperity of Indigenous peoples in Canada and around the world over a 4-year period, from 2021 to 2025” (Government of Canada, 2023). They also go on to state,

“Working toward the six goals in the action plan and advancing reconciliation means listening to, learning from and working in partnership with Indigenous peoples. We all must strengthen our understanding and respect for the rights, histories, traditions, cultures, languages and perspectives of Indigenous peoples and continue to reflect on the

ongoing impacts of colonialism experienced by Indigenous peoples” (Government of Canada, 2023).

With the Canadian government beginning the process of bringing justice to Indigenous people who have suffered from European colonialism in Canada, they should be applying these same beliefs to Indigenous people all over the world, including the Indigenous Palestinians who, as mentioned above, are currently facing genocide at the hands of settler colonialist Israelis. Thus, by Canada taking action to reconcile the relationship with the Indigenous people, allowing them their rights to live with the same standards that all other Canadian citizens have, and acknowledging their colonial roots in the country, it can be expected that they will provide the same values and interests to the Indigenous Palestinians as well. As this thesis has demonstrated, Canadian foreign policy objectives regarding Israel and the Palestinians have been biased in favour of Israel and undermine Palestinian rights to self-determination, human rights, and the end of Israel’s illegal settlement on the land. If Canada believes that all Indigenous peoples all over the world have the right to reconciliation as they are stating for the Indigenous people in Canada, surely, they will adopt a similar approach to Indigenous people internationally. However, this is contested by pro-Zionist voices who claim that Palestinians are not Indigenous to the land but that the Jewish population are and therefore, Canada will not recognize or adopt the same reconciliation beliefs for the Palestinians. I argue in the next section however, that regardless of claims of Indigenousness by varying groups, it is clear that Canadian foreign policy demonstrates a double standard on who they believe have the right to resist their occupiers and who do not, namely the double standards Canada has applied to the case of Ukraine versus the case of Palestine.

Canada's Double Standards in the Face of War and Resistance

Similarly to the discrepancies pointed out in Canada's national interest mentioned in chapter two of this thesis, the recent events unfolding between Ukraine and Russia, and Israel and Palestine have revealed Canadian double standards in their foreign policy, perhaps more than ever. The issues between Russia and Ukraine have been ongoing and increasing especially since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Since then, there have been many conversations surrounding the building tensions between the two states and the possibility of Russian invasion and colonization of Ukraine. Tensions increased even more so under Joe Biden's presidency in the United States when Ukraine expressed an interest in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), causing what Russia views as a national security threat. The thought of Ukraine joining NATO had been in talks for quite some time with Russia demanding that any NATO members retreat from Eastern Europe. In December of 2021, "President Biden warned Putin not to invade Ukraine, preparations for which were already evident. Putin demanded that Ukrainian NATO membership be banned and that NATO capabilities be withdrawn from various areas in Eastern Europe" however, with NATO still within regions surrounding Russia, and Ukraine still actively looking to join the organization, Russia began its on-ground invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Fedorchak, 2024). Fedorchak explains,

"...Putin began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by combining bombing raids on its key cities, military facilities and infrastructure with movement of the ground forces and armoured convoys across the border from three directions: north (from Belarus), south (from Crimea) and east (reinforcing their sponsored separatists and previously established units in Luhansk and Donetsk) targeting the eastern frontline. The first barrage included

approximately 100 missiles from both land and sea. They included short- and medium-range missiles, cruise and surface-to-air missiles” (Fedorchak, 2024).

Thus, the Russia-Ukraine war began and was immediately met with support for Ukraine from all Western states, including Canada. Before the Russian invasion in 2022, Canada played a part in preparing Ukraine in the event of a Russian war against the state as Fedorchak states,

“Just like the UK, Canada also conducted training and capacity-building activities in Ukraine since 2015 under the umbrella term of Operation Unifier, aimed at training 36,000 Ukrainian military and security personnel in battlefield tactics and advanced military skills. As the mission progressed, much of the direct training undertaken by CAF members transitioned to members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with Canadians acting as advisors and mentors as well as assisting in the development of courses” (Fedorchak, 2024).

With Canadian military training, alongside other Western states, Ukraine felt it was in good hands in the international community during the 2022 war. Canada also committed \$4.5 billion in military assistance to Ukraine from 2022 until 2029 and stated, “We deeply admire the bravery and courage of Ukrainians who are fighting to defend their independence and freedom, and we will continue to work closely with our Allies and partners to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty and security” (Government of Canada, 2024). This does not include the billions of dollars the United States, England, and other Western states have committed to Ukraine’s fight in resisting Russian invasion.

Ukraine was and is still heavily supported not just in humanitarian terms, but also in military terms, as well as refugee policies Canada has implemented for Ukrainians fleeing the

war. Canada proceeded to implement the Canada Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel to support Ukrainians looking to flee the war. The government announced the policy in 2022 following the beginning of the war and stated that “It offers Ukrainians and their family members free, extended temporary status and allows them to work, study and stay in Canada until it is safe for them to return home” (Government of Canada, 2022). This policy allows Ukrainians to stay in Canada on a visitor’s visa for up to 3 years, unlike the regular 6-month deadline, apply for a work visa, free of charge, and additional benefits encouraging Ukrainians to feel safe and free to enjoy Canada until it is safe enough to return to Ukraine (Government of Canada, 2022). This was a great initiative implemented by Trudeau’s government to help women, children, and all Ukrainians to have a second home, while their home is undergoing turmoil. The issue that arises from this, however, is when the ongoing 2023 genocide, ethnic cleansing, and bloody war against Palestinians in Gaza was not met with the same Canadian kindness and humanity and was boldly called out by people all over the world, including those in Canada. As the bombardment on Palestinians continued, the Canadian government allowed Canadian Palestinian families still living in Gaza to apply for 3-year visas to enter the country, as they announced in their policies implemented for Ukrainians. Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada announced this policy, although having to re-iterate their claim that this war was due to the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel. The IRCC stated,

“The ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel, following Hamas’s terrorist attacks on October 7, has created a humanitarian catastrophe on an unprecedented scale in Gaza. Understanding that many Canadians are concerned about the safety of their loved ones in Gaza, in December, the Government of Canada announced new measures to support extended family members who are able to exit the area” (Government of Canada, 2024).

However, while the policy for Ukraine was uncapped and approved more than 600,000 Ukrainians, the policy for Palestinians fleeing Gaza was capped at 1,000 applicants in 2023, although this was later raised to 5,000 in 2024 due to public scrutiny (CJPME, 2023; Leger, 2024). The government also provided financial support and up to two weeks of temporary housing for Ukrainians', the same was not given to the Palestinians who would have to find financial support and housing from their Canadian relatives. The government limits Palestinians trying to flee for the safety of their families and themselves, not providing financial support, accommodations, and in a way, guilted the Palestinians for what is currently happening to them by claiming the issues began with Hamas attacks of October 7, disregarding the 75 years of Israeli occupation and oppression, which is a double standard. Ukrainians were unlimitedly welcomed into the country with open arms and were praised for their heroic acts of fighting for their freedom. Meanwhile, the number of Palestinians was limited, due to the government of Canada implying that they view the Palestinians entering the country as an "inherent security threat" (CJPME, 2024). There was also the double standard where, for Gazans to apply for their visa, they had to have family already residing in Canada and had to pass several security requirements and eligibility requirements, although this was not a requirement for Ukrainians. When speaking on the Palestinians entering Canada, Immigration Minister Marc Miller, repeated the word "terrorism" several times, indirectly linking the Palestinians fleeing Gaza and entering Canada as potential terrorists and security threats (Theobald, 2024). This was never mentioned for any Ukrainians entering the country. Theobald also explains,

"The application process for refugees from Gaza requires an unprecedented level of personal detail. People are being asked to supply their social media accounts, all previous phone numbers and email addresses, every passport they have ever had, and details about

‘any scars or injuries which have required medical attention. The application form asks for a full and detailed employment history, since the age of 16 years, including exact dates, description and details on your roles and responsibilities, name(s) of supervisors(s), reason for leaving the job, and any disciplinary issues’” (Theobald, 2024).

There is a clear double standard in the way the Canadian government views the Ukrainians’ resistance against the Russian invasion as well as their overall population, versus the way that the Canadian government views Palestinians fleeing Gaza and seeking asylum in Canada as well as the way Palestinians resistance against Israeli aggression and occupation is viewed. I again argue that this is based on Canada’s implied interests and values that are rooted in racism and Western supremacy along with anyone who fits in the same mould, such as Ukraine and Israel. Where Middle Easterners and/or Muslims are viewed by the Canadian government as security threats and potential terrorists, anyone who holds citizenship or background from a country that applies the same Western ideals, norms, values, and even appearances, is held to a much higher degree of respect and considered heroes, freedom fighters, and self-defenders, with a clear advantage of gaining Canadian support and encouragement. The New Democratic Party also spoke out on the Liberal Party’s double standards during this time. They stated in a committee report in the House of Commons,

“Over the past several years, and especially since the terrible attacks of October 7th, the world has witnessed the erosion of the rules-based international order. While Canada has risen to the challenge in the case of Ukraine, it has not done the same for Israel/Palestine. Rather, the Liberal government’s refusal to defend international law and human rights in the context of the war in Gaza is a blatant example of double standards and hypocrisy that

threatens Canada's reputation among its allies, especially in the Global South." (House of Commons, 2024).

Due to the direct call-out on Canada's double standards on how it views different crises, people, and issues in the world, it would be within Canada's stated interests to apply the same human rights, morals, and ethics to all those who wish to seek refuge and peace within its borders or choose to resist their occupiers within their territory. Canada is known worldwide for its humanitarian efforts and approaches in dealing with international issues and foreign policy but with double standards such as those pointed out with Ukraine and Palestine, it will be known as a discriminatory state leaving its very diverse and multicultural population at odds with their government. The NDP continued in their committee report stating,

"Unfortunately, Canada's credibility with regard to international law is now in question, precisely because of this government's double standards when it comes to Israel/Palestine. Multiple witnesses noted Canada was once a leader in international justice, at the heart of the creation of the International Criminal Court. Yet while Canada has rightfully supported Ukrainians, the Rohingya, and the Syrian people in recent processes at international courts, it has not done the same for Palestinians and Israelis. Canada has opposed every single case at the International Court of Justice regarding Israel/Palestine, and refuses to support efforts at the International Criminal Court, despite these being two of the only mechanisms available to Palestinians and Israelis seeking justice. These choices send a clear message that Canada does not believe international law has a role to play in the context of peace between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, Canada's position undermines its stated commitment to a global rules-based international order." (House of Commons, 2024).

As the NDP pointed out, Canada's stated interests in the security of humans, humanitarian laws and rights, and its diplomatic approaches to resolving conflicts and encouraging peace are now being questioned due to its blatant double standards against the Palestinians. If Canada saw all resistance against humanitarian transgressions the same, it would be highly praised for its morality on the international stage as it has been credited within its history. It would also reassure its population, who come from all over the world, that they stand ready to support humanitarian laws and rights and gain much more respect and even voting power in their federal elections, as more than 70 percent of immigrants have voted in federal elections since 2011, which leads to the next section (Statistics Canada, 2022).

Canada's Increasing Multicultural Population

Canada is credited with introducing official multiculturalism to the world through its increasingly diverse population leading to the adoption of the Multiculturalism Act. The Act was introduced in Canadian policy in 1988 serving as a "legislative framework for promoting diversity, equality and inclusion in Canada, recognizing multiculturalism as a defining characteristic of Canadian identity" (Government of Canada, 2024). The Act's main objectives include:

"recognizing and preserving the multicultural heritage of Canadians, promoting the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society, assisting individuals and communities of all origins to eliminate barriers to their participation in Canadian society, [and] assuring that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity" (Government of Canada, 2024).

Although the Act is flawed and critiqued until today by both right-wing and left-wing thinkers, it has continued to be a dominant factor in Canadian identity and is encouraged even more so through Canada's stated values and interests in humanitarian rights and security goals. The idea of multiculturalism in Canada began before the Act was adopted in 1988, as it was due to the Canadian identity issues Canada faced with the increase of Quebec nationalism in the 1960's. In response to the demand for Quebec's secession, the Canadian government was forced to find new ways of encouraging Quebec residents to feel at home in Canada. This included, "...enhancing the status of the French language, so as to make the federal government genuinely bilingual, and to increase the representation of francophones in the civil service. More generally, the federal government sought to re-emphasize Canada's "duality" – i.e., to re-emphasize the equality of British and French as the 'founding nations'" (Guo, Wong, 2015). However, Guo and Wong explain that the increase of Francophone representation in Canada began to marginalize other ethnic groups that believed they were an important tool in helping to build up the country, mainly the Ukrainians, Polish, and Italians. As the Federal government was worried that these ethnic groups would undermine Quebec's importance in the country, Guo and Wong state that,

"In other words, the whole idea of multiculturalism arose as an 'afterthought', tacked on to a series of government reforms intended primarily to accommodate Québécois nationalism. And the goal of these multiculturalism reforms was primarily to gain ethnic group support for (or at least neutralize ethnic group opposition to) what the government perceived as the real issue: namely, defusing Quebec separatism" (Guo, Wong, 2015).

As more ethnicities, races, and religions were introduced into Canadian society, the idea of multiculturalism was established as an integral aspect of Canadian identity.

However, as mentioned in Chapter Two, Canada's increasingly diverse community has led to discrepancies within its national interest definitions. Where their national interests in cultural ties might have been beneficial before the 1960s, it is no longer an advantage Canada can assume. Before 1961, over 90 percent of immigrants in Canada came from Europe, thus the idea of cultural ties was a plausible national interest at that point in aligning Canadian foreign policies with other European states such as Ukraine, Poland, and Italy (Innovative Research Group, 2005). However, only a decade later, Asian immigration to Canada began to increase by 33 percent in the 1970s, 47 percent in the 1980s, and 58 percent by the 1990s (Innovative Research Group, 2005). With just above half of Canada's immigrants coming from Asia, including the Middle East, it can be concluded that Canadian foreign policy towards the Middle East is of higher significance than perhaps any other area of foreign policy concerns. The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute's conference in 2005 showed that just four years after the 9/11 attacks and the start of the war on terror,

“There [was] a wide-spread fear that concern over terrorism could encourage the abuse of Arab-or Islamic-Canadians' human rights. This concern is expressed by two-thirds (63%) of Canadians, while one-third (32%) disagrees. Newcomers (65%) and longer established Canadians (62%) are statistically as likely to express agreement. Established English Canadians (65%) are slightly more likely than established French Canadians (57%) to agree with this position” (Innovative Research Group, 2005).

Thus, we see how immigrants in Canada view the issues surrounding the Middle East during a time of worldwide concern in the region. However, the issues surrounding Palestinians in 2024 are almost split through the Canadian population's views. A report from the Leger in August of 2024 shows that 41 percent of Canadians are supportive of the government's intake of

Palestinian refugees while 43 percent are opposed to the idea (Leger, 2024). This displays just how divided Canadians are on the issues surrounding Palestinian refugees in 2024, with a majority of those opposing it being Conservative voters. However, this may be due to numerous reasons such as the housing crisis and increased prices for basic human necessities, which may have more Canadians wanting the government to think of them first before trying to help those around the world. Regardless, Canadian foreign policy is being heavily scrutinized abroad and domestically and if the Canadian government wishes to please both its population and the international community, it needs to reform its foreign policies to be more of an ally to the Palestinians and in-turn become a broker of peace between Israeli's and Palestinians as to not create the issue of refugees, humanitarian crises, and fulfill its stated foreign policy interests.

Canada as a Better Ally to Palestinians

One of Canada's most significant contributions to the on-and-off-again conflicts between Palestinians and Israel is through their military exports. As discussed previously, Canada's arms exports to Israel are significant and can cause transgressions against human rights, something Canada has previously strongly opposed. From the research conducted throughout this thesis, I can conclude that should Canada halt arms exports to Israel, it could see a decrease in attacks on Palestinians by Israel, thus decreasing the likelihood of refugees. This would all be a part of the security dilemma question. If Canada and other Western states halt arms exports to Israel, it would give fewer reasons for regional terrorists, as Canada states Hamas is, to emerge. There would be less of a security dilemma due to Israel's drop in arms and therefore less of a reason for Hamas to be funded by Iran and other states creating more openness and trust in the West to begin conversations for peace. This leads to the next action Canada should take regarding recognizing Palestine. Should Canada fully commit to upholding its previously stated claims of

the right to Palestinian self-determination along with recognizing the State of Palestine, it would be able to become a leader in a new round of peace negotiations between Israel and Palestinians.

The Green Party of Canada backs this claim as well as they state,

“Taking a principled stand on Palestine would enhance Canada's reputation as a fair and just actor on the world stage. It would demonstrate Canada's commitment to human rights and international law, consistent with its foreign policy values. This move could also strengthen Canada's influence in international forums and among its allies, positioning it as a leader in peace and conflict resolution... At its core, recognizing Palestine is about reflecting the values that Canadians hold dear: justice, equality and peace. The Palestinian people have endured decades of occupation, displacement and conflict. Recognition would acknowledge their rights and aspirations and demonstrate that Canada stands with those who seek dignity and self-determination. The time is ripe for Canada to recognize Palestine as a state. This action would reaffirm international law, support a viable peace process, promote democratic development, enhance Canada's global standing, and reflect core Canadian values. It's a step toward a more just and peaceful world that Canada can and should lead. Doing so will restore Canadian integrity on the world stage and make Canadians proud of being on the right side of history” (Green Party of Canada, 2024).

By recognizing Palestine as a state, Canada would re-gain the confidence of the international community as an honest broker who upholds human rights in any circumstances. This would lead to new international conversations on what can be done to ensure peace can be plausible for Palestinians and Israelis along with halting all arms exports to Israel. This would in turn give less reason for new terrorist groups to emerge and cause further tensions between the two groups,

also decreasing Canada's security concerns and implied racism towards Palestinians and all other Arabs and/or Muslims. Although arguments against this could be made as being naïve, I argue that this was the road to one of the more successful peace talks between Israel and Palestine through the highly recognized Oslo Accords. Although the Oslo accords were not successful for long, they were one of the only direct peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, beginning with the recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), who were previously labelled a terrorist organization. The accords were signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993, as a major step forward in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The U.S. Department of State recalls the events in stating,

“The Oslo Accords were a pivotal milestone in Israeli-Palestinian relations, aimed at propelling the peace process forward and providing for the expansion of Palestinian self-rule throughout most of the West Bank. Along with the DOP, the agreement included Letters of Mutual Recognition in which the PLO recognized the existence of the State of Israel and Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Under the DOP, Israel committed itself to withdrawing from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and acknowledged the Palestinian right to self government in those territories under a Palestinian Authority. During a 5-year interim period, a permanent peace settlement would be negotiated. The DOP went into force one month after it was signed. Two months later, Israel and the PLO agreed on withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho (excluding Israeli settlements). (U.S. Department of State, 2001-2009)

However, due to the final disagreements between Israel and the PLO at the Camp David Summit in 2000, the Oslo Accords were not successful in creating long-lasting peace in the Middle East.

The disagreements at the Camp David Summit included significant changes to the status of Israel such as the status of Jerusalem, the right of return of Palestinians, territory contiguity, and Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In this case, I argue that with Canada leading future negotiations when halting arms exports to Israel and recognizing the state of Palestine, as well as learning from the past mistakes of the Oslo Accords and Camp David Summit, as well as their own past mistakes with the Indigenous people, the next peace talks between Israel and Palestinians could see long-lasting success. This would again restore Canada's reputation as a diplomatic, peace-making, honest state that values human security above all, while creating a new world-order where the risk of refugees, international crises, and implied racism ultimately decrease significantly.

Conclusion

To conclude this thesis, I re-affirm that the driving factors of Canada's stated and implied interests and values within the foreign policy sphere include Canadian American ties on national security, stemming from the post 9/11 world order and the war on terror in specific, and Canadian national interest differing in their stated interests of being a honest, diplomatic, and humanitarian state versus their implied national interests rooted in Western supremacy and racism. It is driven further by influential pro-Israel lobby groups that do not represent the whole of the Canadian Jewish population, and lastly through Canadian economic ties to Israel including their arms exports and CIFTA. At least one of these driving factors have played a part in each Canadian government since the creation of Israel and even prior during the Partition Plan in 1947. Although each Prime Minister has dealt with the issues of Israel and Palestine in their respective times differently, the driving factors have remained the same with the Canadian government almost always supporting the Israeli state and neglecting the Palestinian political

calls, dealing with the Palestinian issues within humanitarian terms of providing aid through UNRWA and/or accepting refugees, something the Canadian population does not agree with anymore.

I hypothesized at the beginning of this thesis that the factors driving Canada's approach to its stated and implied values in their foreign policy agenda regarding Israel and Palestine are not aligned with the perception of Canada's diplomatic attitude in international affairs. Canada's role does not advance its stated goals of peace and security, but instead encourages the diminishment of Palestinian self-determination and basic human rights while advocating for Israel's right to defend itself, which is often done in ways that transgress humanitarian laws. I believe this thesis has defended this argument through the ways in which it has demonstrated Canada's bias favouring Israel over Palestine, and the ways in which its stated interests and values do not align with its implied interests and values as the first favours human security and peace, while the latter is rooted in racism and Western supremacy. The Canadian governments modern stance on repairing the relationship with their Indigenous population, dealing with the crisis in Ukraine versus Gaza, and its differing multicultural populations views can only lead Canada to reform its foreign policy objectives, in favour of its stated interests and values within the foreign policy sphere, to become a better ally to the Palestinians and be a future forerunner in long-lasting peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians.

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