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WAR BY OTHER MEANS:
QUEBEC'S CONTRIBUTION
TO CANADA'S WAR

by
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
LIST OF TABLES	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	v
ABBREVIATIONS	vi
INTRODUCTION	vii
CHAPTER I - CANADA AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR	1
1. Canada 1939-1945: the Growing Needs of a Country at War	1
2. The Federal Government's Direction and Management of The voluntary War Effort	17
- The Department of Finance	23
- The Department of National War Services.	38
CHAPTER II - LEADERSHIP, PROPAGANDA AND ADMINISTRATION: QUEBEC'S PREDISPOSITION TO A VOLUNTARY WAR EFFORT	54
CHAPTER III - QUEBEC AND THE 'CASE OF THE CANADA- FRANCE RELATIONS COMMITTEE	110
CHAPTER IV - RESULTS OF THE VOLUNTARY WAR EFFORT IN QUEBEC: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE APPROACH	142
CONCLUSION	198
CHRONOLOGY	206
APPENDICES	210
BIBLIOGRAPHY	217

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Description	Page
1	War Expenditure in Relation to Wartime Cash Requirements	3
2	Total Wartime Revenue	7
3	Total Wartime Borrowing	8
4	Public Subscriptions to Auxiliary Service Organizations	12
5	Government Grants by Fiscal Year (1941-45) to Auxiliary Service Organizations	12
6	Wartime Budgets of Auxiliary Service Organizations	13
7	Wartime Red Cross Production of Parcels and Blood Donations	14
8	Canadian Red Cross Wartime Expenditures and Revenues	14
9	Receipts and Expenditures of War Charity Funds	16
10	Canada's Wartime Public Bond Issues	25
11	French Language Publications of The Office of Public Information (March- May 1942)	78
12	Effectiveness (on scale of 100) of First Victory Loan Materials in Canada and Number Distributed in Quebec	96
13	Effectiveness of Fourth Victory Loan Campaign Material	99
14	Selected Names - Quebec War Loan Committee	104
15	Victory Loans - Cash Sales and Objectives	146
16	Total Cash Sales as Percentage of Total Objective	155

Table	Description	Page
17	Number and Average Value of Applications	157
18	War Savings Certificate and Stamp Sales	167
19	Wartime Personal Income - Provincial and Per Capita Distribution Per Annum	170.
20	Sales and Objectives of Special Names and of General and Payroll Sections Combined	172
21	Comparison of General and Payroll Sales Results Obtained in Montreal and Quebec	175
22	Fifth Victory Loan - Public Opinion Poll	180
23	Seventh Victory Loan - Public Opinion Poll	183
24	Cumulative (March 7, 1942-January 31, 1945) Percentage of \$50 and \$100 Denomination Bonds Resold to Banks by Quebecers in Comparison with Percentage of Original Purchases Made in Quebec	186
25	Summary of Canadian Red Cross Campaign Results	189
26	Results of Canadian War Services Fund Campaign	191
27	Results of Wartime National Salvage Campaign	193
28	Wartime Growth of Red Cross Membership in Canada	194
29	Growth of Membership of Knights of Columbus in Quebec, 1930-1950	195

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Description	Page
1	Operational Sections of National War Finance Committee	35
2	Administrative Organization of National War Finance Committee	36
3	National Salvage Division	50
4	Citizen's Committee (Model Plan)	52

ABBREVIATIONS

CFCQ - Comité de la France Combattante de Québec

CFRC - Canada, France Relations Committee

CUARF - Canadian United Allied Relief Fund

CWSF - Canadian War Services Fund

DNWS - The Department of National War Services

IODE - Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire

NRMA - National Resources Mobilization Act

NWSFAB - National War Services Fund Advisory Board

WIB - Wartime Information Board

YM(W)CA - Young Men's (Women's) Christian Association

INTRODUCTION

This is the story of a major aspect of Quebec's contribution to Canada's war effort from September 1939 to May 1945. Yet our approach is in certain respects unconventional. This is not a military history; that aspect of the war has been dealt with elsewhere.¹ Neither is it primarily chronological, although a table of salient dates has been provided. Rather it aspires to convey, both quantitatively and qualitatively, an account of the war years in the province of Québec at the voluntary level.

In his collection of articles, Le Québec et la Guerre, Jean-Yves Gravel regrets that "il existe peu d'articles de synthèse sur l'effort de guerre des Québécois".² Although this study does not limit itself solely to the voluntary efforts of the "Québécois", it nonetheless attempts to fill a gap in the historiography of the Second World War in Canada by touching in detail upon subjects which heretofore have been overlooked by Canadian historians.

¹For Quebec's military role see Jean-Yves Gravel, ed., Le Québec et la Guerre (Montreal: Editions du Boréal Express, 1977). A veritable tour de force in research is Charles Stacey's Arms, Men and Governments, The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970). J.L. Granatstein's Canada's War The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University, 1975) offers an overview of the politico-military scene during the War.

²op. cit., p. 16.

In any modern war, a country's effort may be gauged on two planes. First, there is the inevitable set of compulsory duties, with which one fails to comply only at the risk of being penalized. The two most obvious examples of these are enforced military service, or conscription; and the constraints imposed on consumer purchases of food and materials - in other words, rationing. In such cases, the fears, appetites, even personal liberties of the individual must be subordinated to the state's major aim; that is, winning the war. On the other hand, there is that multiplicity of benevolent organizations and funds along with their drives and campaigns, which either directly or indirectly affects a country's capability to fight a war, and whose success depends on voluntary contributions of money, goods and services. As such, this level of participation is a meaningful indicator of a people's patriotic ardor and enthusiasm for, if not endorsement of, the cause. Thus, during the Second World War, although it was considered to be one's patriotic duty to buy war bonds, their purchase was not required by law, nor was the contribution of donations to relief or auxiliary service organizations, or to war charities in general. Moreover, the onus was on the individual to determine the amount of his contribution. In considering this, one would do well to keep in mind that while the soldier's sacrifice is the greatest of all in war-time, wars are nonetheless not fought by soldiers alone.

I hope that this study of the voluntary effort in

the province of Quebec will lend itself to a unique understanding of the war years in Canada, and of how Canadians differed in their perception of the war. My primary purpose is to delve into the question of the nature and extent of the response of the people of Quebec to a national need. That need and the apparatus organized to see that these needs were met are the subject of Chapter One of this study.

At the same time, I feel that the historian must consider some of the effects that adverse public opinion has on the voluntary dimension of war. For instance, we do know that the majority of people in Quebec were unalterably averse to coercion; that in the plebiscite on conscription held in April 1942, fifty-six of sixty-five constituencies voted "non", and that two in particular, Beauce and Dorchester, did so by a majority of 97 per cent;³ that the nine constituencies that voted "yes" were situated on the Island of Montreal, and that all had anglophone majorities;⁴ that J.A. Cardin, who after Ernest Lapointe's death in November 1941 was left along with Charles "Chubby" Power as one of only two Quebec Cabinet Ministers, resigned in opposition to the deletion of Section 3 of the National Resources Mobilization Act, which had precluded the dispatch of conscripts for overseas duty.⁵ We also know that the

³ Le Devoir, April 28, 1942, p. 6.

⁴ J.L. Granatstein, "Le Québec et le Plébiscite de 1942 sur la Conscription," in Revue Historique de l'Amérique Française, XXVII (June 1973), p. 61.

⁵ Canada, Statutes, 1939-40, National Resources Mobilization Act Amendment Act, July 1942. Before Royal Assent, the NRMAAA was known as Bill 80.

discontent of many in Quebec over conscription, and the extent of Canada's war effort in general, gave birth in 1942 to the ostensibly pan-Canadian Bloc Populaire Canadien, under the leadership of Maxime Raymond, Liberal Member for Beauharnois-Laprairie. The Bloc was essentially a politicized Ligue Pour La Défense du Canada which had been formed to urge Canadians to vote "non" in the plebiscite. Raymond, described by l'abbé Groulx as "le nationaliste le plus en vue, et dont la réputation ne cesse de grandir,"⁶ was probably the most vocal Quebec politician against what were, in his mind, excesses in Canada's war effort.⁷ From this one may reasonably suspect that politics and the public's willingness to contribute are forces not always running independently of each other, but rather are mutually complementary. Indeed, politics as well as those individuals who either directly or indirectly conducted the voluntary effort in Quebec, are the subjects of Chapter Two.

The Canada-France Relations Committee was part and parcel of the voluntary war effort in Quebec, and for this reason has been given special consideration in this study. Controversy surrounded the formation of the CFRC, which was that member of the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund devoted

⁶Lionel Groulx, Mes Mémoires, Vol. 3, (Montreal: Fides, 1972), p. 118.

⁷For a first-hand elucidation of the Bloc's view of the war and world affairs in general see Maxime Raymond, "What does the Bloc Populaire stand for?" Maclean's, January 1, 1944.

to providing aid to France and Frenchmen. Vexingly bound up in this was the simmering feud between Free French and Vichy supporters in Quebec. Thus, Chapter Three may be of special interest to those wishing some insight into the sentiments of French Canadians vis-à-vis France.

A problem encountered in such a study is how to determine what can properly be attributed to French Canadians and English speaking Canadians. In the case of Quebec, one must necessarily establish at the outset the composition of the province's population. Indeed, if there was one characteristic which set Quebec apart from the other provinces during the war it was a high level of ethnic and religious homogeneity. In 1941, of a total population of 3,331,882, 82 percent or 2,717,287 Quebecers claimed French as their mother tongue and 14 percent or 468,996 claimed English.⁸ With respect to religious denomination, 87 percent (2,894,621) of Quebecers were Roman Catholic, while the next largest group, the Anglicans, counted only 5 percent of Quebecers (162,056) as members.⁹ Furthermore, if a county-by-county scrutiny is made, there were no exceptions to the strong majority of Roman Catholics.¹⁰ However, from the linguistic

⁸Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada 1941, Vol. 2 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944) p. 759.

⁹Ibid., p. 527.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 527-535.

point of view, there were only two exceptions to the rule of Francophone majorities: the counties of Brome on the American border; and Pontiac, which shares its border with Ontario.¹¹

The question may fairly be asked therefore, as to how one avoids confusing the voluntary achievements of anglophone Quebecers with those of francophone Quebecers. Fortunately, without making premature conclusions, one may partially respond to this question. In terms of population alone, Quebec is not only a French-Canadian province but the home of French Canadians in general. The city of Montreal poses the only serious challenge to this statement. During the war, this city, which held 65 percent of Quebec's anglophones¹² was the commercial centre of Canada. In the main, anglophones held the reins of finance. Thus, we are furnished, before embarking on this study with three significant facts. Given its heavy anglophone concentration, it might therefore be more understandable if Montreal shows a higher per capita level of voluntary participation than other parts of the province. In addition, it might also be easier to whom to attribute such success. However, such an hypothesis is based solely on one's ability to give, and discounts completely the other element of any voluntary donation or purchase: the willingness to give. At this

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 759-765.

¹² Census of Canada, Vol. 2, p. 764.

point it should suffice to say that I recognize the challenge; the unavoidable difficulty of distinguishing between the voluntary war effort of two large groups within one province. After all, in a study such as this, one man's achievements should not fairly be another's credit. Therefore, the problem of accountability has to be met and is handled more fully in Chapter Four, where a sufficient body of statistics, with respect to Victory Loan results, is available to facilitate its resolution and where I will attempt to discern which results may reasonably be attributed to anti-war, anti-conscription sentiment in Quebec.

Necessarily, this study has had to limit itself to the larger beneficiaries of the voluntary war effort, such as the eleven war loan campaigns and the Red Cross campaigns. It is my firm conviction that this approach to an unavoidably difficult problem - that of selection - does not detract from the worthiness of conclusions; indeed, by avoiding the inclusion of countless small and isolated funds and organizations, I feel that I have added to the comprehensibility and cohesiveness of this study.

It is hoped that this account of the war years in Quebec will make it evident that that province's voluntary effort was not only a convincing demonstration of patriotism, but above all, a sign of faith in a Canada that presented special challenges for French Canadians. Indeed, government and benevolent organization alike, for the success of the voluntary effort, had to be cognizant of one immutable

verity: Quebec was not a province like the others. To ignore this was to tempt failure.

CHAPTER I CANADA AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
CANADA 1939-1945: THE GROWING NEEDS OF A
COUNTRY AT WAR

One of the most striking features of the war for Canada was its continually escalating demands on the armed forces, on the economy and on the daily life of each Canadian. These demands were to be met in large measure by the voluntary effort of Canadians in every province of the Dominion. In the process, Canada was to prove its mettle as a fighting nation as well as one which could make the necessary sacrifices when required.

Events subsequent to Neville Chamberlain's "Peace in our Time" made evident the fallacy of the British anticipation of a "limited war".¹ The capitulation of France in the spring of 1940 demonstrated the serious threat that was now so earnestly posed to the continued existence of the Empire and Commonwealth. At once, Canada was confronted by a military and a political problem. For French Canadians there was little congruency between the defence of Canada and the defence of Europe. Nevertheless, it soon became clear to Mackenzie King and his government that the

¹For a summary of what would be required for an on-coming war with Germany as seen through the eyes of the Chiefs of Staff see Memorandum of August 29, 1939, "Canada's National Effort In The Early Stages of a Major War", in Canada, External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 6 (1936-1939) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1972), pp. 1268-71.

"moderate war"² which had been so essential to Canadian unity in that French Canada did not feel that a greater effort was warranted, was not entirely adequate if the most grievous disaster were to be avoided by the Allies.

It had heretofore been hoped that this war would not require the effort and human sacrifice, with their economic and political costs, such as had been demanded twenty-five years previously. As J.L. Granatstein has chosen to put it,

This war was to be different from 1914; there would be no conscription crisis, no racial disunity, no hysteria, no vast expenditure of blood and treasure. Canadians were virtually obliged to participate, but we were not obliged to participate to the last man and the last dollar.³

For the sake of all belligerents, such a state of affairs, if it could have been maintained, would have been more desirable than that which followed, for after May 1940, the extent of Canada's war effort was no longer restrained by financial limitations.⁴ Concomitantly, the cash requirements of the Canadian Government were to soar so that by 1942, expenditures for war purposes bore little resemblance to those of even 1940.

Of course, such a surge in expenditures placed severe pressure on the federal government's financial

²The term has been borrowed from C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 8.

³J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War, p. 19.

⁴C.P. Stacey, op. cit., p. 32.

WAR EXPENDITURE IN RELATION TO WARTIME CASH REQUIREMENTS

Table 1

Millions of Dollars	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945 (approx)
<u>Fiscal Years Ending March 31</u>						
<u>Direct War Expenditure</u>						
<u>Depts. of National Defence</u>						
- Army	73.3	380.3	511.2	1038.2	1328.9	1261.8
- Navy	13.2	88.2	129.4	210.2	369.5	417.1
- Air	37.7	176.3	370.6	617.2	930.7	1259.5
Expansion of Industry	----	77.9	247.8	669.7	665.2	176.0
Other Direct War Expenditures	7.3	29.5	72.9	189.3	367.6	489.9
<u>War Advances</u>						
Rail and Merchant Marine	9.1	16.5	15.7	2.9	18.3	16.8
War Supplies Limited	----	----	-36.5	119.6	-11.9	-71.2
Other Government Corporations	----	9.9	24.7	48.8	62.9	-26.9
Allied Governments	----	34.0	72.2	56.4	205.4	81.6
- Air Training	1.3	6.4	7.4	-21.7	66.5	5.5
- Other						
<u>Financing of Allied Governments</u>						
Redemption in Advance						
of Maturity						
- Dominion Bonds Payable in Sterling	72.6	75.9	149.8	2.7	.4	.4
- C.N.R. Bonds Payable in Sterling	----	93.6	203.3	61.1	2.1	1.0
Repatriation Via Bond Holding Account	6.3	11.5	11.7	8.6	----	----
Special Loan to Britain	----	----	----	700.0	-42.4	-55.1
Loans to Foreign Exchange Control Board	----	325.0	400.0	-325.0	185.0	265.0

Table 1 (Continued)

Fiscal Year Ending March 31	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945 (approx)
F.E.C.B. Reqts. Temporarily Financed by B. of C.	---	69.0	206.9	-275.9	---	---
Increase or Decrease in Foreign Cash Balances	25.2	19.1	15.8	74.9	-137.0	107.4
Gift to Britain	---	---	---	1000.0	---	---
Expenditure Under U.N. Mutual Aid Act	---	---	---	---	912.6	803.3
(includes U.N.R.R.A.)						
TOTAL WAR REQUIREMENTS	246.0	1413.1	2402.9	4177.0	4923.8	4732.1
Other Expenditures	474.7	405.4	444.7	504.0	578.2	630.7
Loans and Investments	42.7	31.0	38.1	64.2	131.5	237.7
TOTAL CASH REQUIREMENTS	763.4	1849.5	2885.7	4745.2	5633.5	5600.5
WAR EXP. AS % OF CASH RQTS.	32%	76%	83%	88%	87%	84%

⁵BCA, Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Public Borrowing Operations from September 1939 to December 1945. Issued by National War Finance Committee, December 1945, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946) p. 10.

resources. By the end of 1943, cash requirements as outlined in Table I reached 50 per cent of G.N.P.⁶ By contrast, at no time during the first war did wartime expenditure ever approach this figure;⁷ but it had been one of the unfortunate realities of the first war that inflation ran rampant to such a degree that by 1918, wholesale prices were up 100 per cent over those of 1914, while after the cessation of hostilities, a severe economic recession set in.⁸ Now it was hoped that with the experience gained, the best of both worlds could be had: minimum inflation along with the availability of financial resources in whatever quantities were necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.

Vested with its wartime emergency powers in fiscal matters, the federal government had a number of revenue sources at its disposal, by far the most productive being taxes on incomes and profits. Of these, the common Canadian was made to bear the heaviest burden; personal income taxes rose steadily throughout the war years. Yet, increased taxation could not meet the government's needs completely. In addition to the conventional borrowing of funds from the Bank of Canada and the chartered banks as detailed in the following tables, appeals to the Canadian public by the government were relied on to an increasing extent in order

⁶ Benjamin H. Higgins, Canada's Financial System in War, Occasional Paper No. 19, Our Economy in War, Financial Research Program, National Bureau of Economic Research (New York: April 1944), p. 3.

⁷ Ibid, p. 2.

⁸ Ibid, p. 2.

to meet the growing cash requirements brought on by an escalating war.

The willingness of each Canadian to place his dollars at the service of the federal government was essential to the war effort. This is borne out by the fact that 50 per cent of Canada's total war requirements (Table 1) were met by public borrowing for war purposes (Table 3). And public borrowing was accomplished through the sale of bonds, savings certificates, and savings stamps. Yet aside from the immediate need for additional funds due in large part to increased armaments production and generally for the outfitting of Canada's expanding ranks of servicemen, the war placed rising demands on what may collectively be referred to as the auxiliary service organizations whose ministrations to sailors, flyers, soldiers and members of the Merchant Marine cannot be overestimated.

Upon the outbreak of war, each of the Canadian Legion, Salvation Army, the Knights of Columbus, the Navy League, and the Young Men's and Women's Christian Associations mobilized its own war service organization and placed it at the service of the Departments of National Defence: Army, Navy and Air Force.⁹ A non-sectarian, non-political organization of Canadian ex-servicemen, the Canadian Legion provided educational and other services to members of the armed forces. Both the YMCA and the YWCA concerned themselves with the spiritual, educational, physical

⁹PAC, RG 14, D-2, Vol. 487, Sessional Paper 82B. Department of National War Services, Annual Report 1945, p. 9.

Table 2 TOTAL WARTIME REVENUE¹⁰

Millions of Dollars	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945 (approx)
Fiscal Years Ending March 31						
Income Tax on Individuals	45.4	75.9	189.5	453.9	813.0	767.8
National Defence Tax	----	27.7	106.6	80.2	.4	-----
Corporation Income Tax	77.9	131.6	185.8	348.0	311.4	276.4
Excess Profits Tax	----	24.0	135.2	454.6	468.7	465.6
Excise on Liquor and Tobacco	63.1	92.2	115.8	172.1	204.7	222.7
Other Taxes and Excise Duties	38.2	53.4	147.7	181.0	201.3	218.2
Sales Tax	137.4	179.7	236.2	232.9	304.9	209.4
War Exchange Tax	----	61.9	100.9	94.6	118.9	98.2
Customs Import Duties	104.3	136.8	142.4	119.0	167.9	115.1
Special Excise Tax on Imports	2.0	1.0	.9	.5	.5	.5
Other Ordinary Revenue	16.2	20.4	23.7	32.8	34.3	30.2 ^b
Special Revenue	.2	3.0	16.9	19.2	100.6 ^a	356.3 ^b
Total Revenue	484.7	801.6	1401.6	2186.8	2726.6	2760.4
Includes Refundable Portion of Personal Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax to be Paid After War	(-----)	(-----)	(-----)	70.0	155.0	219.3

a. includes refund of \$98.9 million of miscellaneous war expenditures from previous year.

b. includes refund of \$352.9 million of miscellaneous war expenditures from previous year.

¹⁰ BCA, Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Public Borrowing Operations from September 1939 to December 1945, p. 11.

Table 3 TOTAL WARTIME BORROWING¹¹

Million of Dollars	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945 (approx)
Fiscal Years Ending March 31						
<u>From Public For War Purposes</u>						
War Savings Certificates, Stamps and non-Interest Bearing Certs. (Net)	-----	58.0	84.8	59.0	48.4	31.0
War Bonds and Victory Bonds (net) a,b.	200.0	300.0	1575.4	990.5	2680.3	2892.0
Total Public Borrowing For War Purposes	200.0	358.0	1660.2	1049.5	2728.7	2923.0
<u>Other Borrowing</u>						
Other Public Borrowing (Net) ^b	50.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Treasury Bills (Net) ^b	-----	75.0	40.0	30.0	60.0	20.0
Bank of Canada (Net) ^b	-----	250.0	-----	100.0	-----	-----
Chartered Banks (Net) ^{b,c}	200.0	250.0	-----	820.0	170.0	210.0
Funded Debt Payable in London, Re: Repatriation (Net)	-2.2	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Funded Debt Payable in New York (Net)	-.2	-.4	-10.0	-4.1	-115.3	-1.0
Exchange Temporarily Placed With Bank of Canada by F.E.C.B.	-----	69.0	206.9	-275.9	-----	-----
Government Annuities, and Insurance & Superrannuation Funds	22.0	20.8	28.1	24.4	30.6	36.8
Interest Due and Outstanding and Outstanding Cheques	9.4	8.5	27.1	43.5	-18.0	61.9

Table 3 (Continued)

Fiscal Years Ending March 31	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945 (approx)
Reserve, Canadian Wheat Board Other Liabilities	-25.0 1.4	-10.5 9.1	7.9 15.8	-6.7 26.0	-3.0 86.8	-8.8 74.9
Total Other Borrowing	254.4	692.5	315.8	757.2	211.4	393.8
Total Net Borrowing	454.4	1050.5	1976.0	1806.7	2939.8	3316.8
Public Borrowing for War Purposes As % of Total Net Borrowing	44%	34%	84%	58%	93%	88%
As % For Six Years 1940-45	67%					

- a. Bonds listed are those refundable in Canada only.
- b. Net of conversions and renewals. Equal to cash sales.
- c. Includes Deposit Certificates.
- d. Bonus redemption for 1st War Loan and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Victory Loans not included.

11 PAC, RG 14, D-2, Vol. 491, Sessional Paper 176A.
 BCA, Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Public Borrowing
 Operations from September 1939 to December 1945, p. 11 & pp. 23-25.

and social needs of Canadian servicemen. The Salvation Army's wartime work was conducted under its Red Shield War Services Organization. The Knights of Columbus, a fraternal Catholic benefit society, operated its celebrated Army Huts and due to its large following in Quebec was entrusted to provide a large part of its services to military camps in that province. Finally, the Navy League provided hostels for naval ratings and merchant seamen.

These six organizations were not the only ones providing for the various needs of the armed forces. They were however the only ones to be recognized by the Defence Departments for the purpose of assigned duties,

all of which had to do with the war effort and, generally, for the moral and physical well-being of the members of the Forces, including the operation of canteens, reading, refreshment, rest and recreation rooms, cinema, theatrical and other amusements, sports, educational courses, personal services, etc.¹²

Furthermore, their costs, part of which had to be assumed by the public, rose along with those associated with the war. Table 4 outlines the budgets and public and government funding of these organizations.

Considering the government's reliance on them to keep the morale of the forces at a high level, these six organizations were undeniably an important part of the general war effort. Due to this, and partially as a means

¹²PAC, RG14, D-2, Vol. 453, Sessional Paper 328A.

of doing away with the uncertainty of public appeals, responsibility for their budgets began to be assumed by the Public Treasury in March 1942.¹³ Previously, public subscriptions through nationwide appeals were the mainstay of all the auxiliary service organizations except the Navy League.

Because of its unprecedented financial requirements, the federal government depended most on a successful voluntary effort. Aside from the government, the Canadian Red Cross was the organization whose successful performance of war work hinged to the greatest extent on public subscriptions and participation. Just as the six auxiliary service organizations filled the direct needs of the Departments of Defence, the Red Cross, at the request of the federal government, agreed to handle the shipping of all goods destined from the hundreds of voluntary wartime societies to civilians and soldiers abroad.¹⁴ All Canadian servicemen in enemy prison camps or on active duty, as well as civilian casualties in invaded countries were to be the recipients of these shipments, which included relief parcels. The production of these are included in Table 7. The other extensive activities of the Red Cross itself included blood-donor clinics and emergency home-nursing courses.

¹³The procedure was established by Order in Council P.C. 2199, March 20, 1942.

¹⁴PAC, RG14, D-2, Sessional Paper 82B, Department of National War Services, Annual Report 1945, p. 13.

Table 4
PUBLIC SUBSCRIPTION TO AUXILIARY SERVICE
ORGANIZATIONS 1940-1942¹⁵

Year	Canadian Legion	Knights of Columbus	Salvation Army	Y.M.C.A.	Y.W.C.A.	Navy League	Total
1940	683,172	278,667	37,892	985,063	-----	-----	1,984,794
1941	968,546	822,079	1,810,075	2,142,257	268,126	-----	6,011,083
1942	131,756	106,192	177,316	332,692	76,418	-----	824,374
Public Sub. Govt. Grnt.	(1,373,222)	(973,626)	(856,849)	(2,075,788)	(188,000)	(200,000)	(5,667,485)
Total Public Sub	1,783,474	1,206,938	2,025,283	3,460,012	344,544	-----	8,820,251

Table 5
GOVERNMENT GRANTS BY FISCAL YEAR (1941-45)
TO AUXILIARY SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS¹⁶

Fiscal Year Ending March 31	1942	1943	1944	1945	Total
Canadian Legion	300,000	1,569,891	3,042,116	4,945,616	9,857,623
Knights of Columbus	200,000	998,626	1,860,072	2,573,522	5,632,220
Salvation Army	-----	1,231,849	1,632,795	2,376,886	5,241,530
Y.M.C.A.	500,000	2,375,788	3,309,556	4,001,690	10,187,034
Y.W.C.A.	75,000	183,000	381,000	541,268	1,180,268
Navy League	100,000	140,000	200,000	529,745	819,745
Total	1,175,000	6,499,154	10,425,539	14,968,727	32,918,420

¹⁵PAC, RGL4, D-2, Vol. 453, Sessional Paper 328. RG 44, Vol. 11, Final Report, Department of National War Services, Appendix 13.

¹⁶Ibid., Appendix 16.

Table 6 WARTIME BUDGETS OF AUXILIARY SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS¹⁷

	1942	1943	1944	1945	Total
Canadian Legion	1,624,332	3,286,502	4,091,028	3,738,724	12,740,586
Knights of Columbus	1,076,811	1,782,792	2,437,457	2,024,263	7,321,323
Salvation Army	1,170,694	1,928,904	2,361,377	1,787,529	7,248,504
Y.M.C.A.	2,527,154	4,076,560	4,935,464	3,480,520	15,019,698
Y.W.C.A.	335,607	520,787	591,683	455,982	1,904,059
Navy League	281,119	361,873	423,337	211,846	1,278,175
Total	7,615,717	11,957,418	14,840,346	11,698,864	46,112,345

¹⁷ Ibid, Vol. 10, "Notes on Work of National Organizations, April 2, 1945".

Table 7
WARTIME RED CROSS PRODUCTION OF PARCELS
AND BLOOD DONATIONS¹⁸

	Number of Parcels Packed	Number of Blood Donations Through Clinics
1940	-----	5,325
1941	646,704	33,981
1942	2,371,440	181,091
1943	4,702,112	536,311
1944	5,480,312	1,033,701
1945	3,110,024	548,124
Total	16,310,592	2,388,553

Table 8
CANADIAN RED CROSS WARTIME EXPENDITURES
AND REVENUES¹⁹

	Expenditures	Public Subscriptions to Nat'l Red Cross Drives	Other Revenue (Includes Other Voluntary Contributions)
1939	613,950	3,629,122	35,000
1940	2,436,582	5,677,000 (Approx)	4,176,223
1941	6,777,929	No Campaign	4,630,760
1942	12,722,736	9,978,615	6,128,221
1943	21,006,718	11,264,792	11,919,572
1944	26,382,237	12,133,460	14,248,777
1945	23,640,615	12,888,164	15,909,065
Total	93,580,767	55,571,153	57,047,618
Total Revenues Of Which Voluntary Contributions		112,618,771	
		80,647,874 (72%)	

¹⁸PAC, RG44, Vol. 1, The Canadian Red Cross Society, "Activities and Accomplishments".

¹⁹LCRS, Annual Report, 1939-1945. PAC, RG44, Vol. 1, "The Canadian Red Cross Society, Activities and Accomplishments".

Again, the escalation of the war and the misery and human suffering it created for soldier and civilian alike, forced increasing responsibilities onto the shoulders of the Canadian Red Cross Society, both in material and monetary terms.

Government fund-raising campaigns, the auxiliary services, and the Red Cross shared at least two things in common. First, they were nationwide, thus creating the need for voluntary contributions from each and every province, Quebec included; second, they were the most visible symbols-aside from the military itself-of Canada's war effort. But there were literally thousands of other smaller funds located here and there, which devoted their voluntary efforts to a number of important support activities. These involved such diverse projects as collecting magazines for servicemen, collecting salvage for war industry, the holding of fund-raising bazaars, and the work of women's auxiliaries.

Under the War Charities Act of 1939,²⁰ "any fund having for its object, or among its objects, any purpose, charitable or otherwise, arising out of or connected with the war" was obligated to register with the Registrar of War Charities of the Department of National War Services. It is interesting to note the growth of these funds in both numbers and revenues (Table 9) - granted the latter is only one indicator of the quality of their functions - after 1942.

²⁰Canada, Statutes, 1939-40, The War Charities Act, C. 10.

Table 9 RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF
WAR CHARITY FUNDS²¹

Year	Number of Funds Reporting	Revenues ^a	Expenditures ^b
1942 - As at Jan. 12/43	1,600	26,440,329	17,568,362
1943 - As at Dec. 31/44	3,067	42,757,210	34,250,253
1944 - As at Oct. 18/45	3,136	44,984,243	37,730,775

a. Includes receipts later donated to other registered funds.

b. Includes Bonds and Capital Investments.
Excludes money held in Trust.

²¹PAC, RG44, Vol. 11, Final Report, Dept. Nat'l. War Services, Appendix 38.

It should be evident that escalation of the war did not translate into increased costs for the federal government alone. The Red Cross, the auxiliary service organizations, and the many separate war charity funds came to feel and meet growing demands for their services. Thus, we have established that there indeed was a crucial need for a voluntary effort in this country. Moreover, the need had to be filled by all Canadians and in every province.

* * *

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S DIRECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE VOLUNTARY WAR EFFORT

Appeals to the public, either in times of peace or war, are dependent on the play of two major factors: the donors' will to give and participate, and the recipient's manner of solicitation. The latter has a direct bearing on the former. Yet, in the final analysis, it is obviously the individual contributor who determines the success or failure of public appeals. And one may rest assured that the life of the voluntary effort depended on continued success for its longevity.

The Second World War undoubtedly belonged to Canada and not just to Europe. This became increasingly evident as the war progressed,²² with German U-boats scoring victories

²² Although a discussion of Axis war aims with respect to North America is not within the scope of this study, it is more than possible that the most serious consequences would have followed an Allied capitulation. William Shirer offers a somewhat fanciful but engaging hypothesis in "If Hitler had won W.W. II," Look, December 19, 1961, pp. 28-36.

in the St. Lawrence River, and Japanese incursions in the Aleutian Islands. The question for Canada as it was for Europe, came to be one of not just winning the war, but of survival. Thus, in this country, if the desired results could not be obtained on a voluntary basis, other means would have to be resorted to.

The federal government, dictator of Canada's war effort, was necessarily the greatest recipient of the fruits of voluntary appeals. At the outset the groundwork was laid by which others would be given to understand that government fund-raising activities were to have precedence over other appeals. However, faced with the realization that this war was going to require unprecedented amounts of money, men and services, Ottawa had to confront the growing challenge of how to raise such amounts from a near static population, while allowing room to other organizations involved in war work, to raise their own requirements from the public. However, in war time, in so far as governments permit and the key word here is "permit" - a portion of the war effort to be fulfilled voluntarily, the onus on the people is that much more critical. Certainly this may be said for the people of Canada and Quebec.

Léopold Richer, writing on the Victory Loan drives in Le Devoir, questioned Ottawa's policy of having Canadians participate in the war on a voluntary basis. Richer's appraisal of the voluntary effort was essentially correct when he stated that Canada was involved in total war; that

one was as free to contribute as he was not to contribute; and that if the latter line were followed some form of compulsion might be employed. Therefore, argued Richer, the voluntary effort was in effect obligatory. One suspects that the contradiction of terms would be apparent only to those who indeed did not wish to contribute. However, Richer's concluding suggestion illustrated that wisdom in these matters was the monopoly of no one and the possession of few:

L'on devrait cesser d'employer des expressions qui ne correspondent plus à la réalité. Le régime du volontariat en notre pays, est en train de se transformer en fumée. Puisqu'il en est ainsi, pourquoi ne pas l'admettre? Les choses n'en iraient pas plus mal.²³

Perhaps Robert Rumilly took Richer's comments to heart when twenty six years later he wrote of the Victory Loans as a "fiasco".

Les ministres talonnent les sous-ministres, qui talonnent les chefs de service. L'administration québécoise doit surclasser celles des autres provinces, chaque service doit surclasser les autres services.²⁴

Rumilly seems to take the self-satisfied attitude that the loan campaigns were a scurrilous, unscrupulous exploitation of the masses, with emotion-provoking consequences: "La femme et les enfants se priveront encore des chaussures ce

²³Le Devoir, March 9, 1942, p. 1.

²⁴Histoire De La Province De Québec, Vol. XXXVIII, La Guerre De 1939-1945. (Québec: Fides, 1968), p. 223.

mois-ci."²⁵

To be sure, as Richer and Rumilly infer, the wartime loan campaigns were in a sense the exploitation of Canadians for voluntary purchases. After all, just as the war effort of Canada as a State was not one of convenience, neither could the public's. In this sense, Quebec could not and would not be permitted to absent itself. On the other hand, it would seem that unless a government, or for that matter, any organization which conducts nationwide appeals takes into consideration the peculiarities of the various groups in that nation, the desired results will not be realized. In the case of Canadian Government wartime public borrowing, the government, apart from immediate financial exigencies, was bound politically as well to orchestrate its appeals with a view to getting the greatest response. If this were done with intelligence, the benefits would be twofold: fulfillment of the direct need, and the elimination of a potential disruptor of national unity; that is, the slander of French Canadians. For to level criticism at only one party for the failure of a campaign would be unjust. After all, charges during the first war that French Canadians were not enlisting in sufficient numbers had given rise to a hardening of attitudes and the most undesirable of ramifications in Quebec.

The conscription crisis of 1917 was continually

²⁵ Ibid., p. 223.

present in the minds of Prime Minister Mackenzie King and the members of his Cabinet. Moreover, there was no guarantee that the conscription issue would not raise its nasty head again. Brooke Claxton, a prominent Liberal member from Montreal, and later, a Minister of Health and Welfare, and Defence, gave his appraisal of the problem.

What is alarming about the situation is that speeches by General La Flèche and others giving the impression that French Canadians are enlisting in equal proportions have created expectations which will boomerang against the Provinces and turn the conscription cry against Quebec when the true state of affairs is found out. Even now such speeches are distorted by conscriptionists as evidence that Quebec will gladly accept conscription. Any way you look, there is trouble ahead.²⁶

This war would test the King Government's ability to deal with the threats to national unity. The early years of the war gave it time to test and refine its methods of approach to the voluntary war effort, while in the process, encountering some admittedly mixed reactions. As L. R. Tremblay, Liberal member for Dorchester chose to comment,

We...have confidence in the Government, but the facts show that the Administration is indifferent if not ill-disposed towards the French Canadians. Some action on the part of the Government is therefore necessary at this time if it is desired to spare the Canadian people the injustices which so gravely imperilled our national unity some twenty years ago.²⁷

²⁶ PAC, RG 2-18, file W20, Claxton to King, October 29, 1941.

²⁷ PAC, RG 2-18, file W26, Tremblay to King, July 19, 1941.

Fortunately for all Canadians it will be seen that the government was generally willing to learn from its early shortcomings in promoting Canada's voluntary effort. Given the stakes, one could not be satisfied with much less. Yet in each province, Canada's war effort and the public sustenance of which it was in so much need, was promoted by economic, political and religious elites, as well as the six war service organizations, the Red Cross and the other organizations engaged in war work. In Quebec, where suspicion, reservation and even hostility were encountered to a greater degree than in any other province, the work of these groups was that much more crucial.

From the outset of the war, Ottawa faced the considerable problem of co-ordinating its war financing programmes with those of other organizations. Given the reality that wartime finance should have priority in the overall voluntary scheme, it will come as no surprise that the federal government in effect dictated and enforced this co-ordination, mainly through the authority of two Departments: the Department of Finance, which had administered the three War and three Victory Loans of the first war; and that of National War Services, expressly created because of the war. Inherent in the efforts of these two Departments to co-ordinate and set guidelines for appeals to the public was the realization not only that money was not available in unlimited quantities but that discretion had to be exercised.

The Department of Finance

Responsible for Canadian economic and fiscal policy, the Department of Finance once again was faced with the wartime task of raising unprecedentedly large amounts of money through taxation and public borrowing, and in such a way as to avoid the adverse economic effects of the first war. Thus the power wielded by the two wartime Ministers of Finance, John Layton Ralston and his successor James L. Ilsley was immense. Their public borrowing programmes were of the highest priority. The most salient example to support this contention was the assumption by the Treasury of the budgets of the auxiliary war services beginning in 1942. Such a measure was undertaken because of the fear that Victory Loan and War Savings campaigns would suffer at the hands of too many national charitable appeals.²⁸

That the government had immense cash requirements has already been established. The purpose here is to trace those fund-raising programmes which were directed towards individuals and groups, upon whom these same programmes depended for success. In retrospect it is clear that during the war, the Department of Finance under Ralston and then

²⁸ PAC, RG 14, D-2, Vol. 487, S.P. 82B, Department of National War Services, Annual Report 1945, p. 10. The two initial wartime public bond flotations will be referred to as "War Loans" as opposed to "war loans", which refers to any of the wartime bond drives, whether they be Victory Loans or War Loans. In all, there were eleven public bond campaigns during the war: two War Loans and nine Victory Loans.

Ilsley, in order to achieve its goals, went through a process of evolution of structure and of rationale.

Naturally, the intensity of war financing endeavours increased with Canada's involvement in the war. Thus the predecessors of the Victory Loans, the War Loans, were modest by comparison. Victory and War Loan details are found in Table 10. War Savings Certificates and Stamps, and non-interest bearing certificates - for the number of Canadians who wished to lend their money without interest - were introduced at different times, and together with the loans made up total wartime public borrowing.

Aside from their relatively large objectives, the two War Loans differed only slightly from pre-war government loans. In itself, this may be evidence enough that Ottawa did not yet expect to commit Canada totally to the war. The chief difference between the War Loans and pre-war loans was that a Special Names list, composed of the names of individuals, groups and financial institutions, which might be expected to make purchases of at least \$25,000, was compiled.²⁹ The Specials Names list was later extended to the Victory Loans and in fact, during the war, Special Names purchases furnished the largest portion of sales.

To help promote the War Loans and to compile statistics, War Loan Committees, composed of leading members of various communities were established in each province,

²⁹ BCA, Statistics and Information of Dominion Government Public Borrowing Operations , p. 5.

Table 10 CANADA'S WARTIME PUBLIC BOND ISSUES

Detail.	First War Loan	Second War Loan	First Victory Loan
Period of Offering:			
Opening Day	January 15, 1940	September 5, 1940	June 2, 1941
Closing Day	January 14, 1940	September 21, 1940	June 21, 1941
Objective:			
Cash	\$200,000,000	\$300,000,000	\$600,000,000
Cash and Conversion			
Applications Received: (a)			
Cash	\$320,266,100	\$342,247,100	\$738,766,350
Conversion	53,300,000	29,945,700	102,717,500
Total	373,566,100	367,192,800	841,483,850
Final Allotment: (a)			
Cash	\$200,000,000	\$300,000,000	(b)
Conversion	50,000,000	24,945,700	(b)
Total	250,000,000	324,945,700	(b)
Number of Subscriptions	178,363	150,890	950,378
Details of Issue:			
Interest Rate	3 1/2%	3%	2%
Date of Maturity	Feb. 1, 1948-1952 ^(c)	October 1, 1952	15/6/51 15/12/46
Issue Price	100% plus acc.int.	98.75% plus acc. int.	100% 99%
Callable On and After	Feb. 1, 1948.		1950
Price Callable	100% (48-50), 100.5% (51) 101% (52)		101%
Details of Allocation: (d)			
Short-Term			194,382,769
Long-Term			647,101,081
Mid-Term			

Table 10 (continued)

Detail	Second Victory Loan	Third Victory Loan	Fourth Victory Loan
Period of Offering:			
Opening Day	February 16, 1942	October 19, 1942	April 26, 1943
Closing Day	March 7, 1942	November 7, 1942	May 15, 1943
Objective:			
Cash			\$1,100,000,000
Cash and Conversion	\$600,000,000	\$750,000,000	
Applications Received: (a)			
Cash	\$845,360,300	\$991,322,250	\$1,308,985,500
Conversion	152,143,000		
Total	997,503,300	991,322,250	1,308,985,500
Final Allotment: (a)			
Cash	(b)	(b)	(b)
Conversion	(b)	-	-
Total	(b)	(b)	(b)
Number of Subscriptions	1,681,600	2,040,274	2,669,111
Details of Issue:			
Interest Rate	3%	3%	3%
Date of Maturity	1/3/54	1/11/56	1/5/57
Issue Price	100%	100%	100%
Interest Rate	2 1/2%	1 1/2%	1 1/2%
Date of Maturity	1/3/45	1/5/56	1/11/46
Issue Price	100%	100%	100%
Callable On and After	1952	1953	1954
Price Callable *	101%	101%	100%
Details of Allocation: (d)			
Short-Term	57,250,973	144,237,387	197,525,912
Long-Term	670,015,445	847,084,863	1,111,459,588
Mid-Term	270,096,882		

Table 10 (continued)

Detail	Fifth Victory Loan	Sixth Victory Loan	Seventh Victory Loan
Period of Offering:			
Opening Day	October 18, 1943	April 24, 1944	October 23, 1944
Closing Day	November 6, 1943	May 13, 1944	November 11, 1944
Objective:			
Cash	\$1,200,000,000	\$1,200,000,000	\$1,300,000,000
Cash and Conversion			
Applications Received: (a)			
Cash	\$1,383,275,250	\$1,407,576,650	\$1,517,642,700
Conversion	188,036,300		144,821,200
Total	1,571,311,550	1,407,576,650	1,662,463,900
Final Allotment: (a)			
Cash	(b)	(b)	(b)
Conversion	(b)	(b)	(b)
Total	(b)	(b)	(b)
Number of Subscriptions	3,009,109	3,077,123	3,307,733
Details of Issue:			
Interest Rate	3%	3%	3%
Date of Maturity	1/1/59	1/6/60	1/2/62
Issue Price	100%	100%	100%
Interest Rate	1 1/2%	1 1/2%	1 1/2%
Date of Maturity	1/5/47	1/3/48	1/1/48
Issue Price	100%	100%	100%
Callable On and After	1956	1957	1959
Price Callable	100%	100%	100%
Details of Allocation: (d)			
Short-Term	373,500,756	236,754,393	216,286,554
Long-Term	1,197,810,794	1,170,822,257	1,446,177,346
Mid-Term			

Table 10 (continued)

	Eight Victory Loan	Ninth Victory Loan
Detail		
Period of Offering:		
Opening Day	April 23, 1945	October 22, 1945
Closing Day	May 12, 1945	November 10, 1945
Objective:		
Cash	\$1,350,000,000	\$1,500,000,000
Cash and Conversion		
Applications Received: (a)		
Cash	\$1,568,927,350	\$2,022,473,800
Conversion	1,568,927,350	2,022,473,800
Total		
Final Allotment: (a)		
Cash	(b)	(b)
Conversion	-	-
Total	(b)	(b)
Number of Subscriptions	3,178,275	2,947,636
Details of Issue:		
Interest Rate	3% 1 1/2%	3% 1 1/2%
Date of Maturity	1/10/63 100%	1/9/66 100%
Issue Price	100%	100%
Callible On and After	1959	1961
Price Callible	100%	100%
Details of Allocation: (d)		
Short-Term	265,305,615	N.A.
Long-Term	1,303,621,735	N.A.
Mid-Term		

- a) Includes Newfoundland, Overseas, Government Accounts and Banks (on own account) Applications. All Applications Allotted in Full. 20% of First War Loan Redeemed by Drawings By Lot on February 1, of Years 1948 to 1952. Figures are Approximate.
- b)
- c)
- d)

Source: PAC RG 19, Vol. 588 File 155-ID. BCA Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Public Borrowing Operations from September 1939 to December 1945, Issued by National War Finance Committee (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946).

with Provincial Treasurers acting as their chairmen. The chairmen were in turn among the forty members of the central Committee in Ottawa. It should be noted that it was a government policy to have as many people and classes as possible buy war loan securities.³⁰ To help meet this objective, certificates of as little as fifty dollars were available and since, in contrast to the Victory Loans, the limited overall objective set a limit on the maximum issue, Special Names subscriptions in both War Loans were scaled down to give preference to small and moderate subscriptions.³¹

The two War Loans allowed the government first, to investigate the potential of its market for future loans, and also to devise methods of pursuing Ottawa's two-headed economic aim, which by mid- 1940 was concisely formulated: obtaining the money to meet war requirements while avoiding wartime and post-war inflation. Wage and price controls to the contrary, inflation was one of those economic malaises which could be restrained only if appropriate supportive measures were taken; in this case, the withdrawal of cash from circulation by means of encouraging as many Canadians as possible to purchase bonds and certificates.

The imposition of wage and price controls in Canada

³⁰ Montreal Star, January 18, 1940, p. 5. This policy was re-affirmed by the Treasury Board in 1943: "That it is desirable in the public interest that as many persons in Canada as possible should have an opportunity of purchasing war loan securities." PAC, RG 19, Vol. 607, file 155-86, Minute of Meeting of May 19, 1943.

³¹ Montreal Star, January 18, 1940, p. 5.

during the war was a radical departure from the normal rules of supply and demand. Yet the reality of the times was that there was a changeover of industry from consumer to war production. Unless consumer demand decreased accordingly, such controls would be subjected to serious pressures. The most effective manner of decreasing consumer demand would be to withdraw cash from circulation and this was accomplished through taxation and borrowing from the public in order to effect a reduction in civilian consumption equivalent to government demand for goods and services. Naturally, the public would purchase bonds, certificates etc. only to the extent that their money was not spent elsewhere. Thus, the task was to encourage such purchase by Canadians through "genuine" savings, which in a Department of Finance paper of February 1942 were defined as those which originated through the postponement of current civilian consumption of goods and services.³²

The success of the First War Loan influenced the government's decision to embark on a programme of encouraging regular voluntary savings through the purchase of War Savings Certificates and Stamps,³³ first offered in May 1940. To promote their sale, a central War Savings Committee (as opposed to the War Loan Committee) was formed under the auspices of the Department of Finance. The WSC directed provincial

³²PAC, RG 19, Vol. 592, "National War Finance Committee, Background for Operations", February, 1942.

³³PAC, RG 19, Vol. 2689, Ralston Papers, Memo: Savings Certificates, February 15/1940.

committees which in turn oversaw the operations of local committees. Directed towards Canadians with lower incomes, who it was hoped would become regular savers, certificates were issued in denominations as low as \$5.00 and no higher than \$500.00, with a subscription limit of \$600.00 per person per year.³⁴ Certificates, sold at 80 percent of face value to yield 100 percent in seven and one-half years, could be purchased on an instalment basis by the purchase of 25¢ stamps which when accumulated in sufficient numbers could be traded in.³⁵ Two other methods of purchase were through the employer and employee plan, where weekly deductions of as little as 25¢ and not more than \$10.00 were made from paychecks; and the bank pledge plan for those who wished to have regular sums deducted from their accounts.³⁶

The First Victory Loan, in addition to being the successor to the two War Loans, marked the changeover from the competitive to the co-operative method of selling bonds. The War Loans, in competition with other bond flotations on

³⁴PAC, RG 3, Series 13, Vol. 24, Booklet-"What Are War Savings Certificates?"

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶The War Savings plan was an adaptation of the theory formulated by a group of economists headed by John Maynard Keynes. The rationale behind this concept was that regular war savings, in addition to offering the purchaser a return on his money as well as a feeling of contributing productively to the war effort, would reduce consumer demand while of course providing the government with regular sums of money. PAC, RG 19, Vol. 2714, Ilsley Papers. Memo re: War Savings, March 21, 1941.

the financial markets were directed by the Bank of Canada as Fiscal Agent for the Dominion Government. The Bank of Canada in turn was assisted by a Special Advisory Committee consisting of representatives from investment dealers and chartered banks.³⁷ For the First Victory Loan, Ilesley appointed a central Victory Loan Committee in Ottawa which directed counterparts in each province. Each province was divided into canvassing units, of which Quebec had 137 throughout the Nine Victory Loan campaigns.

Ilesley had succeeded Ralston as Finance Minister in July 1940, a month after the simultaneous introduction of non-interest bearing bonds and War Savings Certificates. While Ralston went on to gain notoriety and a premature demise as Minister of Defence in 1944, Ilesley oversaw the operations of the Department of Finance for most of the war years and proved himself to be more than capable of dealing with the unconventional challenges posed by the war. He was both a resourceful and energetic administrator.

Few would deny that the sale of war bonds in general would not have been so high if they were sold entirely on their own merits. Rather, a government's, and in this case Ilesley's, success would be partly judged on the methods he employed to create an atmosphere which was conducive to the success of his Department's public borrowing programmes in Quebec.

³⁷BCA, Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Public Borrowing Operations p. 5.

Credited with the dubious distinction of being "the man who taxed Canadians as they had never been taxed before, and almost made them like it,"³⁸ Ilsley was also an astute politician. Although at times he showed a lack of understanding of the forces which threatened to disrupt national unity, he seemed able to evoke patriotic symbols with more or less effect whether his audience was in French or English Canada.

Ilsley's campaign to promote the Second War Loan took him to Timmins, Ontario, where he proclaimed,

This country stands, with the rest of the Empire, at Britain's side. (his italics). Her defence is our defence, her cause our cause. This is no romantic illusion but sober truth. Britain is our fortress, the British Navy our shield. With the British people we have not only the bonds of common understanding, institutions and trade. She is defending the free, democratic civilization which is our own way of life. She is defending us.³⁹

A year later, in Quebec City, he used a slightly different approach, yet it was meant to provoke the same patriotic response:

It is appropriate that we should meet in these critical times in this historic city, which provides so many illustrations of those distinctly Canadian institutions which we are now striving to defend -- friendly co-operation of two great races on a plane of equality in government, in

³⁸C.P. Stacey, op. cit., p. 37.

³⁹PAC, RG 19, Vol. 606, File 155-79A-1, "Canada's Second War Loan," September 4, 1940.

society and in the markets of trade, freedom of the press speech, worship Living as they do in greater proximity to the shores of war-torn Europe, the people of Quebec may perhaps have a keener appreciation than most Canadians of the dangers which threaten our continent and our civilization. Peace-loving as they are, they may have heard more clearly the cry of conquered France, crushed and bleeding under the heel of a foreign despot.⁴⁰

No doubt the French-Canadian journalists of Ilsley's audience were touched by the speaker's attempt to relate the war intimately to the values and symbols dear to their readers.

Thus, up to the end of June 1941, Canada's wartime public borrowing operations were administered on one hand by the War Savings Committees, which at their peak numbered 2,400,⁴¹ and the War Loan and Victory Loan Committees on the other which oversaw respectively, the two War Loan and First Victory Loan campaigns. Since for all intents and purposes, their structural evolution had reached its culmination, it seemed a logical move to amalgamate the Victory Loan and War Savings separate groups into one comprehensive organization. This was done in January 1942 with the formation of the National War Finance Committee (Figure 1).

The success of the NWFC in carrying out its many crucial responsibilities may be attributed to its efficiency,

⁴⁰PAC, RG 19, Vol. 313, File 101-58-102, Address to the Canadian Weekly Newspapers Association, August 15, 1941.

⁴¹BCA, Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Borrowing Operations, p. 5.

Figure 1

OPERATIONAL SECTIONS OF NATIONAL
WAR FINANCE COMMITTEE⁴²

Special Names	Payroll Savings	General Sales
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - directed to those believed capable of purchasing \$25,000 or more of bonds - for most part consisted of insurance companies, business firms and corporations - to lesser extent: government accounts, individuals, hospitals, pension funds, unions, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - canvass of employees in industrial and commercial establishments with to or more employees (25 in Alberta, Saskatchewan, P.E.I., New Brunswick and Manitoba also covered 1) Armed Forces 2) C.N.R. employees 3) C.P.R. employees 4) Civil Service <u>Note:</u> Second Victory Loan Campaign marked first intensive effort to sell bonds to employees. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - door-to-door canvass, farm-to-farm canvass, and canvass of small businesses and factories. Plans of Purchase: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Cash b) Monthly Savings c) Deferred Payment

- advertising and promotion of NWFC sales operations.

- in co-operation with Canadian Publishers War Finance Publicity Committee. Representing all publishers in Canada, it was established in the Fall of 1940 as an advisory body to the Minister of Finance.

- 1) Advertising Committee - preparation of paid advertising.
- 2) News and Feature Committee - co-ordination of news and feature stories.
- 3) Joint Contact Committee - liaison between CPWFPC and Public Relations Section of NWFC.
- 4) National Radio Committee.

- Canadian Motion Picture Industry and National Film Board published additional aid and advice.


Note: CPWFPC and NRC had French language representatives.

⁴² BCA, Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Public Borrowing Operations

and its operational and administrative soundness.

The responsibility of carrying out one of the fundamental policies of the NWFC, which was to "saturate" all publicity media through paid government advertising, solicit advertising support from commercial organizations and arrange special events suitable for extensive news and feature coverage,⁴³ was given to the Public Relations Section.

Figure 2 ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL WAR FINANCE COMMITTEE⁴⁴



⁴³ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁴ PAC, RG 19, Vol. 592, File 155-30-0-3, "National War Finance Committee".

From Figure 1 it is evident that elaborate provision was made to appeal to as many Canadians as possible, with a range of securities obtainable through a variety of purchase plans. Meticulous planning for each bond campaign; elaborate promotional projects, such as parades, publications, and speeches;⁴⁵ the setting of publicized objectives for every province, locality, factory and place of business: these were the ingredients of success. Besides making an investment, Canadians were able to sell their bonds whenever they wished, a factor which for Ilsley occasionally caused serious concern. As Canadians were reminded time and again.

When you buy Bonds [SIC], you are helping win the war, and to fight the home front battle against inflation. When you sell your Bonds you are withdrawing this help Unless it is absolutely essential to sell your Bonds - it is your patriotic duty and in your own best interest to 'keep your savings in uniform' for the duration.⁴⁶

⁴⁵A discussion of the opinions of French Canadians with reference to the bond campaigns will come later in this study. In the United States a radio speech of one or two minutes length, played at repeated intervals featuring Kate Smith was used to promote the U.S. bond drive of September, 1943. The results of questionnaires sent to selected listeners are discussed in Robert K. Merton, Mass Persuasion, The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive, N.Y., 1946.

⁴⁶PAC, RG 19, Vol. 588, File 1D, The Question and Answer Book - Canada's Victory Loan, 3rd Edition, p. 7. A three-quarter page ad in the Montreal Star was more to the point:

Let's be brutally frank. The man or woman who buys a Victory Bond or Certificate to save face, then sells it - except in cases of dire necessity - is a welsher.

August 28, 1942, p. 16.

Despite the obvious indispensability of war finance and specifically, public borrowing, to the Canadian war effort, the Department of Finance was certainly not the only recipient in the overall voluntary scheme. It is for that reason that we now turn to the activities of the Department of National War Services.

The Department of National War Services

This Department was established in July, 1940 under the direction of James G. Gardiner of Saskatchewan who at the same time held the Agriculture portfolio. The new Department's original purpose was to administer national registration under the National Resources Mobilization Act, and to oversee the co-ordination and organization of all voluntary war services. The direction of existing public information services was also its responsibility.⁴⁷ As the war progressed, the duties of this new Department increased. It was not until the end of 1942, however, that it began to devote most of its energies to matters pertaining to the voluntary effort.

Responsibility for administering the War Charities Act was transferred to the DNWS from the Secretary of State in August, 1940.⁴⁸ The following month, four divisions

⁴⁷PAC, RG 44, Vol. 10, "Confidential Section - Voluntary and Auxiliary Services Division - Department of National War Services," p. 27.

⁴⁸Order in Council, P.C. 3859.

were created in the Department: Human Resources, Publicity, Material Resources and Voluntary and Auxiliary Services.⁴⁹

A reorganization was undertaken fourteen months later which resulted in the dropping of the first three divisions and the addition of five others: National Registration, Mobilization, Public Information, Women's Voluntary Services, and Salvage.⁵⁰ With the transfer of the Department of Labour of jurisdiction over the NRMA in March 1942, and the transfer of responsibility for public information to the new Wartime Information Board in September, the Voluntary and Auxiliary Services Division (commonly referred to as the War Charities Division) became the Department's mainstay.

The Wartime Information Board, which was to become such a powerful instrument of propaganda, came about as a result of Mackenzie King's dissatisfaction with the DNWS' performance in this important function.⁵¹ The role of the WIB in the voluntary war effort in Quebec will be discussed in chapter two.

The main co-ordinating body of the DNWS was the National War Services Funds Advisory Board created in

⁴⁹Order in Council, P.C. 4748, September 13, 1940.

⁵⁰Order in Council, P.C. 8488, October 31, 1941. These are included to give some indication of the breadth of the Department's activities. Before the end of the war, other branches and Divisions had been created.

⁵¹C.P. Stacey, op. cit., p. 124. Nonetheless, a major reorganization in 1942 brought the various branches of censorship under the DNWS' direction. PAC, RG 14-D2, Vol. 487, S.P. 82, Annual Report 1944, pp. 16-17.

December 1940. Under the direction of the Voluntary and Auxiliary Services Division, it was chaired by C.L. Burton of Simpson's. The impulse for the creation of this board came from a meeting of the auxiliary service organizations, where it was decided that their appeals would best be co-ordinated by an independent governmental body.⁵² Briefly, the Board was to advise the Minister on matters pertaining to public appeals by national organizations, the most preferable dates for the holding of such appeals, and generally, their usefulness to the war effort. It was also the Board's duty to supervise the budgets and expenditures of the six auxiliary services mentioned earlier, once they were supported by government grants in 1942.⁵³

The appeals of five of the auxiliary service organizations: the Knights of Columbus, the YMCA, the YWCA, the Canadian Legion and the Salvation Army, were combined in 1941 at the urging of the government to create the Canadian War Services Fund. Eventually, their heavy reliance on public contributions was relieved by large government subsidies.

Previous to the combined campaign of March 1941, each of the war service organizations launched separate appeals. Indeed it was precisely due to these separate appeals that

⁵²PAC, RG 44, Vol. 10, "Notes on Work of National Organizations," April 2, 1945.

⁵³PAC, RG 14-D2, Vol. 487, S.P. 82B, Annual Report 1945, pp. 8-9.

the Fund was created. A minor crisis had occurred towards the middle of 1940 when the YMCA, the Salvation Army, and the Canadian Legion decided they were in need of funds at the same time that the Red Cross, the YWCA, the Navy League, the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire and the Canadian Jewish Congress' war service organization prepared to go to the public.⁵⁴ Joseph Thorson, Gardiner's successor, had the various organizations meet in Ottawa on a number of occasions to discuss the possibility of launching one common drive.

From the beginning, the Red Cross quite correctly made it clear that since in the eyes of the public it occupied a special place, it would not sacrifice its independence by joining in a common appeal.⁵⁵ The society had at the outset of the war established the policy that permits to use the Red Cross name in advertisements for fund-raising would not be issued unless it received at least 50 per cent of net proceeds.⁵⁶ Although the Red Cross was successful in preserving its identity, if not its complete

⁵⁴War Services of Canadian Knights of Columbus 1939-1947. A History of the Work of the K. of C. Canadian Army Huts, 1949, pp. 16-17. For the work of the YMCA see Alan M. Hurst, The Canadian YMCA in World War II. A popularly written account of the work of the Salvation Army has been produced by Scott Young, Red Shield in Action, A Record of Canadian Salvation Army War Services in the Second Great War, (Toronto: F.F. Clarke, 1949).

⁵⁵La Presse (Montreal), October 18, 1940, p. 12.

⁵⁶LCRCS, Despatch, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1, 1940, p. 3.

independence, Thorson, at least until July 1941⁵⁷, tried with some success to persuade it "in the public interest" to change its mind. The Red Cross agreed to abstain from holding its appeal of 1941. Moreover, although a Canadian War Services Fund appeal had been planned for 1942⁵⁸ - the first took place in March 1941 - the federal government, deciding it would be best to leave the field open for the two Victory Loans held that year, cancelled it.⁵⁹ Hence, the subsidies made to the six auxiliary service organizations,⁶⁰ including the Navy League.

Later on in the war another challenge to the Department and the NWSFAB in particular, was the growth of the so-called Allied Relief Organizations, each of which was devoted to aiding the civilians and soldiers of a specific Ally.

⁵⁷ PAC, RG 44, Vol. 5, Thorson to Judge P.H. Gordon (Chairman of R.C. Executive Committee) July 28, 1941.

⁵⁸ The Canadian War Services Fund appeal of 1942 originally was to include the Red Cross, the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire, and possibly the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Order of St. John (St. John Ambulance).

⁵⁹ War Services of Canadian Knights of Columbus, p. 19.

⁶⁰ When the large objective of the 1942 drive became known to Minister of Finance Ilesley, he wanted to fund them through the Public Treasury, as the 40 per cent income tax deduction for donations, which had been requested for contribution by the Department of National War Services, would have been tantamount to funding at any rate. PAC, RG 44, Vol. 7, T.C. Davis (Deputy Minister of Finance) to W.C. Clark, January 31, 1942.

Three of the Allied Relief Funds - Greek, Russian and Chinese - had been permitted to undertake their own separate appeals. The Chinese and Russian groups together had grossed \$5,000,000 in 1943 alone.⁶¹ The formation of other relief groups naturally was accompanied by their desire to raise funds in like manner.⁶² Thus was the dilemma posed for General Louis La Flèche, who had succeeded Thorson in October 1942, and again, a minor crisis precipitated the formation of a fund for a joint public appeal; in this case, the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund, which went to the public in the spring of 1945.

La Flèche was Mackenzie King's answer to the unsatisfactory performance of the Department of National War Services, which the Prime Minister had envisaged as one which "could bring all voluntary organizations together and give them proper direction in the war effort".⁶³ La Flèche had been military attaché at the Canadian Legation in Paris before the armistice in 1940 and then Deputy Minister of National Defence, later to become Deputy Minister of the DNWS. Mackenzie King, in his own words, wanted La Flèche to "help to mould public opinion."⁶⁴ It will be seen that along with those of a number of other politicians from

⁶¹PAC, RG 14, D-2, Vol. 487, SP 82A, Annual Report 1943, p. 19.

⁶²PAC, RG 44, Vol. 55, Memo: "Organization of the National Appeal for Relief."

⁶³J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 1, 1939-1944 (Toronto: U. of T., 1960), pp. 442-443.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 442-443.

Quebec, La Flèche's services turned out to be indispensable to unity between English and French speaking Canadians.

The Canadian United Allied Relief Fund was "a body set up on behalf of the Government to deal with an inconvenient situation,"⁶⁵ the situation being that all funds were staging their own campaigns. In November 1943, La Flèche called together representatives from the various relief organizations.⁶⁶ Out of this meeting came a manifesto, which among other things, stated two aims: first, of having a single campaign, and second, that the campaign should be staged jointly with the Red Cross.⁶⁷ Again, including the Red Cross, ever-jealous of its autonomy, to associate with the CUARF was a formidable undertaking, one which did not bear fruit until the end of 1944. The problem revolved around the refusal of the Red Cross to deal with the CUARF as a body when it came to purchases and shipments of supplies, but only with the individual member funds, which by then numbered twelve:

- 1) Belgian War Relief Fund
- 2) Chinese War Relief Fund

⁶⁵PAC, RG 44, Vol. 55, Memo: "Organization of The National Appeal for Relief".

⁶⁶On May 1944 yet another division, that of Voluntary War Relief, was created to co-ordinate the relief activities of government departments and intergovernmental agencies. Such a development was in keeping with the growth of relief activities in anticipation of the liberation of Europe.

⁶⁷PAC, RG 44, Vol. 3, "Report of Meeting of delegates...., "November 15, 1943.

- 3) Czeckoslovak War Charities Fund
- 4) Canada-France Relations Committee
- 5) Greek War Relief Fund
- 6) Luxembourg Relief Fund
- 7) Netherlands Relief Fund
- 8) Norwegian Relief Fund
- 9) Canadian Friends of Poland
- 10) Canadian Aid to Russia Fund
- 11) Canadian Friends of Yugoslavia
- 12) Denmark Relief Fund

The special consideration and privileges accorded the Red Cross were an indication of the high place it held in the eyes of the Canadian Government. In order to carry out Ottawa's request to handle the shipping of goods from all voluntary societies to Canadian Forces abroad, prisoners of war and overseas civilians, the Red Cross had been issued a blanket export permit,⁶⁸ an exceedingly rare privilege. Also, by special arrangement, the hundreds of Red Cross branches across Canada were not required to register under the War Charities Act.⁶⁹ For the CUARF, co-operation from the Red Cross was a logical arrangement. Not only would a joint appeal solve the ever-present problems created by multiple appeals, but the Red Cross Societies of the liberated

⁶⁸ PAC, RG 14, D-2, Vol. 487, SP 82B, Annual Report 1945, p. 13.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

countries could be relied upon to distribute relief shipments to the greatest effect.

For its part, the Red Cross, which was willing to make the national appeal for relief part of its own annual appeal, thereby necessitating an increased overall objective, nonetheless insisted that it be a distinctly Red Cross appeal and that it hold and disperse the funds so raised in accordance with the wishes of individual CUARF funds.⁷⁰ By November, it was clear that the directors of the CUARF, W.M. Birks and L.L. Burpee, would not be able to gain any more concessions and as a last resort, appealed to La Flèche⁷¹ to use his influence.

It should be noted that in wartime, governments have tools at their disposal to persuade, and failing that, to coerce voluntary funds to alter their aspirations for the sake of the national interest. Registration under the War Charities Act carried obligations as well as privileges, some of the former being yearly registration supported by information concerning the nature of proposed appeals and the amount expected to be raised, and yearly audited financial statements. The Minister of National War Services was the ultimate arbiter of whether to accept or reject an application for registration. Now, during the formative

⁷⁰ PAC, RG 44, Vol. 55, "Organization of The National Appeal for Relief."

⁷¹ Ibid.

period of the CUARF, the registration of a number of funds had lapsed and applications for renewal were being received, while new funds were applying for the first time.⁷² Thus, the NWSFAB, through La Flèche, wielded a great deal of leverage in bringing these funds together, thereby enforcing its policy of forming a united relief fund.

Not that any great hostility was encountered from the relief funds; but in order to offset such a possibility, the separate identities of the funds were maintained by their separate registration under the War Charities Act, while the CUARF was itself registered in September, 1944.

There was only one Allied Relief Fund member which caused a number of serious problems for La Flèche. Unlike most of the other funds, the Canada-France Relations Committee represented an attempt, ultimately successful, to bond together the several French relief organizations, which had heretofore differed in their political sympathies. Indeed, the problems encountered in the formation of this fund are related to the Vichy-De Gaulle question as it evolved in Quebec, and they will be dealt with in Chapter Three.

Between the Red Cross and the CUARF, an arrangement was finally worked out whereby the former, in its appeal in March 1945 would include an Allied Relief objective of

⁷²PAC, RG 44, Vol. 32, Department directive, Deputy Minister Payne to Organization Heads, November 13, 1943.

\$9,000,000, to be expended in accordance with the wishes of the central and member funds.⁷³ As \$9,000,000 was not sufficient for the operation of these funds, the considerable restraints imposed in September on their fund-raising activities⁷⁴ outside of the combined CUARF appeal were somewhat relaxed. By comparison, those which were occupied with aid to Great Britain and the Commonwealth, such as the Queen's Canadian and Spitfire Funds (which were permitted to function independently of the CUARF), had been limited only by the usual War Charities Act regulations.⁷⁵ Clearly, then, funds established for the aid of Britain were favoured.

The other major activity of the Department of National War Services which was dependent on the voluntary effort, was the collection, beginning in April 1941, of salvageable materials such as metals, waste paper, rags,

⁷³The breakdown was as follows:

Belgium	300,000	Greece	1,000,000
Russia	2,200,000	Netherlands	250,000
France	1,100,000	Norway	250,000
China	1,250,000	Luxemburg	25,000
Czeckoslovakia	450,000	Poland	1,100,000
Denmark	100,000	Yugoslavia	600,000

PAC, RG 44, D-2, Vol. 487, SP 82B, Annual Report 1945, p. 18.

⁷⁴PAC, RG 44, Vol. 32, Department Directive, Payne to Organization Heads, November 13, 1948.

⁷⁵PAC, RG 44, Vol. 32, Pifher (Director of Voluntary & Auxiliary Services) to Payne, March 22, 1944. It should be noted that there were a number of smaller groups interested in civilian overseas relief. In Quebec Province there were 23 as of May, 1945. It is to be assumed that they donated their proceeds to one or other of the CUARF funds or to the Red Cross.

RG 44, Vol. 49, "List of Quebec Societies Interested in Civilian Overseas Relief".

rubber, glass, fats and bones. The proceeds raised through their sale to war industry was intended to aid the work of the auxiliary services in areas outside of military camps. The collection and disposal of salvage was undertaken by voluntary salvage committees in every locality in Canada. In Quebec, the effectiveness of wartime salvage operations was handicapped by some unique problems and will be examined in Chapter Four.

The great need for volunteer workers during the war was largely filled by the Division of Women's Voluntary Services, while the co-ordination of the voluntary effort of individual communities was made possible through the formation of Citizens' Committees. These may be considered as one of the mainstays of civilian participation. They were conceived as a plan to enhance civilian morale as well as a means of satisfying the needs of off-duty servicemen.⁷⁶


The three main objectives of these committees, as outlined by La Flèche, were to co-ordinate all war service activities in the community to ensure that the organizations may work as a unit; to make maximum use of existing peacetime organizations (i.e. YWCA, IODE etc.), and to initiate and promote voluntary war services; to advise the DNWS upon request, on matters of registration under the War Charities Act.⁷⁷ Their actual functions were many, and varied as is evidenced in Figure 4.

⁷⁶PAC, RG 14, D-2, Vol. 487, SP 82B, Annual Report 1945, p. 11.

⁷⁷PAC, RG 44, Vol. 24, La Flèche to Athlone, July,

Figure 3

NATIONAL SALVAGE DIVISION 78



When these committees were inaugurated under Thorson in February 1942, they were to be financed totally through the sale of salvage.⁷⁹ This had to be augmented by grants-in-aid as advised by the NWSFAB.⁸⁰ As of May 1944, out of 44 Citizens Committees in Canada, 35 were in Ontario and 5 in Quebec; at Trois Rivières, Sherbrooke, Quebec, St. Hyacinthe and Montreal.⁸¹

The presence in Canada of widespread willingness both to organize and contribute during the war, made response by the government imperative if this willingness were to be funneled into the most productive channels. The creation and subsequent growth of the Department of National War Services was just such a response.

In the final analysis, the voluntary effort in Canada was regulated by the federal government, and specifically, by the Departments of Finance and National War Services. We thus have a standard national framework by which one province's performance can be analysed. By the same token, the voluntary effort in Quebec must necessarily be related to that of the other provinces in order to be able to arrive at judicious conclusions. This is done in the final chapter of this study.


⁷⁹PAC, RG 44, Vol. 24, Pifher to La Flèche, March 24, 1943.

⁸⁰Ibid., La Flèche to Athlone, July, 1943.

⁸¹Ibid.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE '82
(Model Plan)

Figure 4



Just as Canada's war was a national undertaking, so was the voluntary effort. It was the duty of Canadians collectively to meet national needs and objectives. There were many Canadians however, whose duties were especially onerous in that they were directly involved with the administration and promotion of the voluntary effort. And there were others whose moral support can not be overlooked. It is with this in mind that we pass from an overview of the national voluntary effort to a discussion of how it progressed in Quebec.

CHAPTER II LEADERSHIP, PROPAGANDA, AND ADMINISTRATION:
QUEBEC'S PREDISPOSITION TO A VOLUNTARY
WAR EFFORT

In times of crisis, public opinion becomes even more crucial than in times of tranquility. To render it favourable to a cause is to make it conducive to appeals for participation. Conversely, lack of support, criticism, and even hostility to a cause by the public, handicaps those whose efforts are dedicated to seeing it through to success. Of course, there will always be individuals who despite their neutrality or disapproval, will choose to support the cause out of a sense of duty. Consequently, they may well be regarded as supporters. By analogy, while the calculating investor studies political and economic factors before committing his money, the conscientious investor will do it on faith alone.

Certainly, the above applies to the province of Quebec during the Second World War. Suspicion and animosity toward Canada's participation in the war generally were stumbling blocks encountered during the early years of the war, both in the House of Commons and in the streets. Economic and military manpower measures became symbols of Canada's commitment to total war. The task of politicians and religious and business leaders as well as Ministers of the Crown, was therefore made more onerous. They had to secure if not the concerted support then at least the good will of Quebecers,

for the war effort in general, and concomitantly the voluntary effort. This chapter will determine the attitudes of these leaders and attempt to explain the factors which either favoured or militated against their efforts to gain the support of the people of Quebec for Canada's war.

The war years may be seen as one endless harangue of the general population for purchases and contributions in money, in kind and in time. It is also the aim in this chapter then to isolate those appeals which were both nationwide and extensive enough to facilitate an examination of the methods and approaches they adopted in the province of Quebec. At the same time, in order to make more comprehensible a situation that was often disjointed and confusing, the role of government propaganda, and the support which government policies found in Quebec will be discussed. Their success in offsetting the ever present suspicion and adverse opinion in Quebec would benefit all facets of Canada's war.

Quebec, predominantly French-speaking and Roman Catholic, presented some unique problems for those attempting to elicit popular response for the voluntary war effort. How they conducted their appeals to Quebecers; whether they realized that national appeals would have to be altered in Quebec: these are the considerations which would determine their success. Failure of the promoters of the voluntary war effort to recognize that Canadians were not all alike, could potentially prejudice public opinion in Quebec, if not

against, then at least away from the cause. On a practical level, appealing to French Canadians with the use of symbols calculated to evoke a greater response made good business sense. Predictably, this good business sense was not always present.

The voluntary effort, then, was obviously dependent on many factors for success. Necessarily, there is in war, and for that matter, in peace, a congruity between political and social forces, public opinion, and the willingness to participate. The willingness to contribute, naturally was affected by other than direct publicity and promotion, by which is meant radio speeches, publications and newspaper advertising. Indirectly, the attitude of French Canadians to the war, and the way it was being fought, would either aid the voluntary effort or if opinion were adverse, impair it.

Some historians, such as Mason Wade have claimed, that in Quebec there was no popular support for the doctrine widely held by Canadians that the defence of Canada began in Europe.¹ Indeed, there was no widespread belief in Quebec that Canada was directly threatened. Many French Canadians had been nurtured by the isolationist preachings of Henri Bourassa - variously a Liberal Independent in the House of Commons, and since 1910, editor of Le Devoir of Montreal - and his disciples Maxime Raymond - like Bourassa, a Liberal

¹op. cit., p. 934.

Independent - and André Laurendeau of L'Action Nationale. According to Bourassa, Canada should stay out of European wars. As might be expected, most of the English-speaking population of the province was favourable to having Canada come to Britain's aid in this second war with Germany. Yet French Canadians did not feel the same urgency as their English-speaking fellow-citizens. Little delight was taken in the fact that Canada was part of a world-wide empire, one which was now threatened with destruction. On the contrary, Canada was their one and only home, and thus the only one worth defending. Throughout the war, the battle between participationists and those who may be termed nationalist-isolationists, was an ongoing one in Quebec. In the final analysis, victories were gained on both sides: Canada and its allies won the war; Quebec gained a new but short lived political party, Le Bloc Populaire, which was to be French Canadian in Quebec and ostensibly Canadian in Ottawa.

The French Canadians form on the whole a moderate society. Some needed to know little more than that Crown and Empire were at war to convince them of the necessity of participation. Most realized that as a group they were a minority in Canada, and that the majority felt a special attachment to Britain, an attachment which manifested itself in the urge to defend. Thus, given the reality of the majority's sentiment, most French Canadians realized that despite their inclination to the contrary, Canada would

inevitably have to go to war, and national unity would depend not only on their consent, but on their help. However, participation would not be lent unconditionally.

In September 1939, the approval of French Canada for the country's participation in the war was obtained as a trade-off. Mackenzie King and his Cabinet knew the extent to which conscription had alienated French Canadians from other Canadians in 1917. Now, much faith was placed in King's promise that "No such measure will be introduced by the present administration".² Such a statement was politically, temporarily expedient, but would cause many misgivings during the war. Yet it stands as probably the best response to Canada's first crisis at this time. It was absolutely essential to preserve Canada's unity in time of war.

Quebec's three Ministers in Ottawa - Ernest Lapointe (Justice), Charles (Chubby) Power (Defence-Air), and P.J.A. Cardin (Public Works) - would see to it that conscription for overseas service would not be imposed in Canada. All were seasoned Liberals and all did their utmost, short of advocating conscription for overseas service, to encourage Quebecers to help their country win the war. In referring to King's pledge, Lapointe declared that "the whole of Parliament is bound by the promise as made".³ Cardin's resignation shortly after the plebiscite

²Cited in J.L. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World War 1939-1945 (Toronto: Ryerson, 1969), p. 19.

³Cited in Granatstein, Canada's War, op. cit., p. 7.

of April 1942 was due to the deletion in the National Resources Mobilization Act of the last legal obstacle to the dispatch of conscripts overseas. Thus, in 1939, there was a tacit understanding that Canada would go to war, but without conscripting her manpower to fight overseas and without subordinating the Canadian economy to the war effort.

The Quebec election of October 1939 was fought over the issue of participation. Maurice Duplessis, former Conservative, and since 1936, the leader of Quebec's Union Nationale government, declared that a vote for his Liberal opponent, Adélard Godbout, would be a vote not only for participation, but for conscription as well.⁴ Meanwhile Lapointe, Cardin and Power had taken this election to be a vote of confidence in themselves; and in this King was of the same view.⁵ Yet, contrary to King's advice,⁶ they declared they would resign, should Duplessis win. Thus, Quebecers had a grave decision thrown squarely into their laps. The choice was enunciated by Lapointe:

la province va avoir l'occasion de dire
si elle veut nous garder sa confiance
ou la donner aux amis du premier
ministre de la province du Québec.⁷

But by including the fatal word "participation" in his platform, Duplessis had made a grievous mistake.

⁴ Le Devoir, October 3, 1939, p. 6.

⁵ Granatstein, Canada's War, op. cit., p. 29.

⁶ Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 35.

⁷ Robert Rumilly, Duplessis et son Temps, Vol. I (Montréal: Fides, 1973) pp. 535-6.

Although he may have been carried away by evil spirits, in the liquid sense,⁸ the election was made tantamount to a vote for or against Canada's war effort. The Liberals were to seize upon this, and their appraisal was essentially correct: "... pas de participation, pas de representation."⁹

In a war which would continue to see Canada's participation regardless of the outcome of the election, and regardless of French Canadian opinion, the French Canadian majority in Quebec - a minority in Canada - would be extremely vulnerable. As Lapointe put it:

Mes collègues et moi, qui représentons la province dans le gouvernement du pays avons besoin de la confiance et de l'appui de nos compatriotes pour garder l'autorité nécessaire à la défense de leur intérêts.¹⁰

Indeed, the editors of L'Action Catholique of Quebec were probably correct when upon the Liberal victory, they declared that this was not a passionate demonstration of loyalty, but a fight against efforts to impose conscription.¹¹

Canada's first wartime crisis was resolved in Godbout's favour. A participationist, yet an anti-conscriptionist, Godbout's attitude, as shared by so many French Canadians, was that opposition to conscription was

⁸Conrad Black, Duplessis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977) p. 209.

⁹Leslie Roberts, Le Chef (Montréal: Editions du Jour, 1963), p. 59.

¹⁰Cited in Rumilly, Duplessis et Son Temps, Vol. I, p. 532.

¹¹Charles T.S. Faulkner, "For Christian Civilization" The Churches and Canada's War Effort, 1939-42, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1973, University of Chicago, p. 60.

not incompatible with support for Canada's war effort. Indeed, Godbout was one of King's greatest assets in Québec. First elected to the Québec Assembly in 1929, he had been for a short time, upon Louis-Alexandre Taschereau's resignation in June 1936, Québec's Premier. Godbout and his efforts to counteract adverse opinion and to promote the voluntary effort can not be overlooked. Yet Godbout was not alone in attempting to strengthen Canadian unity in war. Suspicion of Ottawa, bitterness at not being considered as Canadian as anyone else: these were the obstacles that had to be overcome. It was to be a long ordeal, fraught with dangers as well as blessed with victory, and one that was not the preserve of politicians alone.

The Catholic Church was a pervasive force in Québec. Looked to for guidance in both temporal and secular matters it was a sustaining influence in times of optimism as well as in times of despair. In this period of uncertainty, a crucial role fell to the Primate of the Catholic Church in Canada since 1933, Rodrigue Cardinal Villeneuve. Villeneuve was the only figure in Québec who could claim the greatest allegiance, an allegiance which cut through political and social class. Canadians may attribute Villeneuve's and the hierarchy's endorsement of the war effort to one underlying belief; that national patriotism and religious devotion are not necessarily incompatible. And according to the terms of reference Villeneuve frequently chose to adopt, Canada's war, a just war, and the patriotism which was needed to see it

through, was indeed a function of Christian faith.

In the spring of 1935 Villeneuve delivered an elucidating discourse¹² which struck at the core of an ongoing controversy for French Canadians: to whom should one's loyalty be directed in Canada, province or country? Canada, said Villeneuve, endowed with supreme political authority over the provinces, was in a strict sense "la patrie". Quebec, as a province with autonomy in legally delineated spheres, furnished a centre of patriotic duty which was at once stronger but more limited.¹³ For those whose fears and suspicions inhibited their willingness to commit themselves to a patrie which was untried and largely unknown, Villeneuve offered thinly veiled scorn

Peut-être, là-dessus, faudrait-il cesser de nous lamenter comme des enfants, et prendre notre place comme des hommes, non point seulement dans la province de Québec, dont nous sommes, mais dans le Canada, au total, dont nous sommes aussi quel que puisse être l'avenir.¹⁴

Villeneuve also touched upon the theme of survival through activity and constructive work. Indeed, he would often draw the parallel between constructive work and support for Canada's war effort.

There is a marked continuity between the underlying philosophy of Villeneuve's comments in 1935 and his attitude

¹²Le Cardinal Villeneuve, "Devoir et Pratique du Patriotisme". Discours prononcé au Château Frontenac sous les auspices de la Société St-Jean Baptiste de Québec, le 25 juin, 1935. Tract No. 10 de L'Action Catholique, Québec.

¹³Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 22.

towards the war. Basic to this was that duly constituted authority, whether it be religious or political, should be recognized if not obeyed. Villeneuve warned that those who doubted their leaders were lacking in discipline.¹⁵ The more prominent French Canadian nationalist politicians - Maxime Raymond, René Chaloult, Wilfrid Lacroix, Ligouri Lacombe - and their party, Le Bloc Populaire Canadien, which was formed late in 1942, conceptually could disagree with little of Villeneuve's arguments, except on one crucial point: that where Villeneuve would leave decisions to higher authorities so long as coercion or overseas conscription were not adopted, the others were not as tolerant and would impose limits on the extent of Canada's war effort. In their quest to restrain Canadian participation, they were mirroring the fears of many of their Quebec constituents.

There were three ways in which French Canadians could learn the views of their Cardinal: through the radio, in the Quebec based L'Action Catholique, and indirectly, from the pulpit. L'Action Catholique, the largest daily in Quebec City, had a circulation of 59,640 in 1940.¹⁶ Edited by laymen of fervent Catholic faith, this paper might be expected to conform with the views of the hierarchy. As a token of direct clerical involvement, Villeneuve appointed a

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 25.

¹⁶ André Beaulieu, Jean Hamelin, eds., Les Journaux Du Québec De 1964 à 1964, no. 6, Cahiers de l'Institut D'Histoire (Québec: Laval, 1965), p. 173.

priest to work in the offices of the paper to provide editorial counsel.¹⁷ The major means of communication between the hierarchy and lower clergy was La Semaine Religieuse, a weekly newsletter which during the war included Villeneuve's speeches and directives in support of war loan and certificate purchases, Red Cross drives, salvage campaigns, and other activities associated with the voluntary effort.

In 1939 there was widespread agreement in Quebec as in the rest of Canada, that together, Hitler and Nazism were the greatest evil of the time. Yet in Quebec there was disagreement as to how Canada should respond to this evil. For the five weeks preceding the commencement of war, L'Action Catholique indulged in what may be termed wishful thinking. Canada and Europe were separated by 3,000 miles of ocean; there was little reason to send Canadian troops into battle. However, after Canada declared war on September 9, the paper's line was typical of its origins: although it would have been preferable that Canada remain neutral, the decision of the highest political authority of the country, the House of Commons, had to be honoured.¹⁸ At best this was a reserved attitude to Canada's war. Yet, a poll conducted by member Georges Héon of Argenteuil revealed that it corresponded closely with that of his

¹⁷ Faulkner, op. cit., p. 35.

¹⁸ Faulkner, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

constituents. Twenty per cent of those polled favoured complete isolation while sixty-five per cent were for "co-operation within our means and resources, preferably by the extension of credits, gifts of provisions and foodstuffs, and the manufacture of planes and munitions".¹⁹ Thus it would appear that in September 1939, when no one, not even the government was quite sure of what the war had in store, Quebec's endorsement was assured but qualified.

For his part Villeneuve, at the very beginning of the war declined to voice his view one way or another and was conspicuously neutral during the election of 1939. However, other religious leaders - Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish alike - endorsed the National Resources Mobilization Act. Catholics were bound to obey it on the grounds that it was a Christian's duty to obey measures which had been duly passed by legally constituted authority.²⁰

Meanwhile, Canada held its First War Loan in January 1940. As could be expected, Lapointe exhorted his fellow Quebecers to buy, employing phrase and term calculated to secure the greatest response, and which were to become familiar as the war progressed. In one radio talk he declared,

Vous souscrivez librement au premier emprunt de guerre, avec la conscience de prendre les armes sur le front

¹⁹ Mason Wade, op. cit., pp. 921-2.

²⁰ Faulkner, op. cit., p. 106.

économique, pour soutenir les colonnes intrépides de nos alliés sur les champs de bataille. Mes compatriotes de la province de Québec ont prouvé tant de fois la qualité de leur patriotisme que je les félicite d'avance et les remercie de "mettre leur argent au service de la liberté".²¹

Upon the completion of this successful campaign, the people of Quebec were congratulated by French Canada's senior Senator, Raoul Dandurand, who praised the farmers and workers of his province.²² Such wartime publicity was good for morale, and when conscription for service within Canada was introduced in June, 1940, a period began where the efforts of Quebec's political and religious leaders would be devoted increasingly to countering the efforts of those who attempted to arouse hostility to the measure. It also marked the beginning of Cardinal Villeneuve's involvement in the war.

Stating that

The powers conferred.... may not be exercised for the purpose of requiring persons for service in the military, naval or air force outside of Canada and the territorial waters thereof.²³

Section 3 of the NRMA was the only redeeming quality of an act which otherwise aroused hostility especially from within the Quebec National Assembly. Member for Lotbinière, René Chaloult introduced a motion of protest. Although the

²¹ Le Devoir, January 15, 1940, p. 8.

²² Montreal Star, January 18, 1940, p. 5.

²³ Canada, Statutes, 1939-40, National Resources Mobilization Act, c. 13, June 21, 1940.

motion was handily defeated in a Liberal Legislature,²⁴ Godbout, realizing its divisiveness protested that "Jamais le temps n'a été plus inopportun pour parler de désunion....."²⁵

The lesson was lost on no one that war was a bloody and tragic business. While the likes of the Chaloult motion could be attributed to an ignorance of, if not the nature of wars in general, then at least the nature of this war, it revealed what might be termed Quebec's hard core paranoia of coercion.²⁶ One suspects that Chaloult was also voicing a feeling of inferiority bred by past injustices and which was felt by so many other French Canadians. Canada's war would have to appeal to all Canadians, French or English, if an effective effort were to be assured. Unless those in high places could convince French Canadians that the war was theirs, pacifism or hostility might be expected. Isolationist sentiment made the attainment of this ideal more difficult,²⁷ and more to the point, boded badly for a successful voluntary war effort.

²⁴Le Devoir, June 20, 1940, p. 6. The vote was 56 to 13.

²⁵Ibid., June 19, 1940, p. 3.

²⁶For a study of Quebec's effort in the first war see Elizabeth Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec 1914-18 (New York: Columbia, 1937).

²⁷Since the NRMA was for service within Canada, Raymond supported it. Wade, op. cit., p. 943.

In May, Villeneuve had declared Sunday the 26 as a day of common prayer for the "juste cause" of Canada, the Empire, and their allies. This was in accordance with the call of King George VI. It was also the beginning of an undeclared MacKenzie King - Villeneuve alliance which was to serve the cause of national unity until the end of the war and provide needed benefits for the voluntary effort.

Using what came to be a familiar line of reasoning, Villeneuve, during the Second War Loan campaign, told his listeners in a radio talk of September 16, that to buy government securities was

le moyen efficace d'exercer la justice et de protéger le droit. Et voilà à quelles pensées j'invite mes compatriotes, leur répétant ce que je leur disais naguère que si l'Eglise est contre la guerre, elle n'est point contre la défense du droit.³¹

Villeneuve's bearing was one of aggressive defence of justice and righteousness. He had few illusions that this defence required weapons and manpower. For those who were of the persuasion that to buy war bonds only prolonged the bloodshed, Villeneuve had thinly veiled scorn: "C'est là la raisonnement de pacifistes naïfs ou pervers, qui n'ont que

²⁸ Le Devoir, June 19, 1940, p. 7.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

³⁰ Elizabeth Armstrong, French-Canadian Opinions on the War, January 1940-June 1941, Contemporary Affairs Series, Book 12 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1942) p. 17.

³¹ Semaine Religieuse de Québec, Vol. 53, No. 35, May 1, 1941, p. 549.

de pitié pour les malfaiteurs...."³²

It is ironic that in the midst of these activities, which stemmed from a genuine conviction that the war was not the usual race for one-upmanship, Villeneuve and Archbishop Joseph Charbonneau of Montreal found themselves having to defend themselves from attacks coming from within English Canada.

Rumours had abounded in Ontario that a separatist movement led by the Church was in the offing. During a speech in Toronto to the Empire and Canadian Clubs, Villeneuve took the occasion to dispel these "ridiculous rumours". Moreover, he declared that

The Church in no way admits that patriotism should be love of isolation, that it should be confined to one village, town or province; no, it should extend to the whole of Canada and should be accompanied by a vivid feeling of loyalty to our Sovereign King George VI.³³

Yet the stakes extended beyond national borders:

For God or against God is the terrible alternative which shall decide the destinies of mankind, and the Pope appealed to individuals and nations to put aside narrow individualism and unite to ward off the dreadful peril which threatened Christianity.... Alas! These prophetic words of the Pope were unheeded, one country after another fell into the hands of our formidable enemies, and today the British Empire and the United States are left almost alone to save Christian civilization and democracy.³⁴

³² Ibid., p. 4.

³³ Semaine Religieuse de Québec, Vol. 53, No. 35, May 1, 1941, p. 549.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 551.

The voluntary effort benefited from the frequent interjections of Villeneuve. His promotion of the War Loans has been noted. One other member of the hierarchy, Archbishop Charbonneau of Montreal, was equally supportive. During the National War Services Fund drive of March-April 1941, Charbonneau instructed his clergy to urge their parishioners to make donations and to inform them that boy scouts would be at the church doors to collect their donations after Sunday Mass.³⁵ During the Salvage campaign of the same month in Quebec City, Villeneuve authorized the Chambre de Commerce des Jeunes de Québec to request the co-operation of parish organizations.³⁶ In this respect, Church collections, exempted as they were from registration under the War Charities Act,³⁷ provided a convenient and important canvassing tool for organizations soliciting outright donations.

Throughout the war, the hierarchy showed itself willing to accede to requests by the Ministers Ralston, Ilsley, La Flèche, and for that matter, by any organization which desired letters of recommendation, or the use of its name on honorary committee lists. The enlistment of the support of the higher clergy may be exemplified by Ilsley's despatch of letters during the Second Victory Loan, asking

³⁵ La Presse, April 6, 1941, p. 10.

³⁶ Semaine Religieuse, Vol. 53, No. 35, May 1, 1941, p. 547.

³⁷ Montreal Star, November 10, 1939, p. 14.

that February 22, 1942 be set aside as Victory Loan Sunday. Directives were then distributed to the individual parishes. In one of his Circulaire au Clergé, Monseigneur A.O. Comtois of Trois Rivières requested,

Pour aceder à la demande qui nous est faite, vous feriez bien d'annoncer en chaire, le dimanche, 22 février, le nouvel emprunt de \$600,000,000 qu'on va bientôt lancer dans le public et d'inviter vos ouailles à y souscrire, attendu que chacun doit faire sa part pour la victoire.³⁸

Such support by the individual Bishops and Archbishops of Quebec aided the voluntary effort. There were some who stressed that despite economic hardship, it was still a duty to aid Canada's war effort, as during the Fourth Victory Loan (April-May, 1943) when the Bishop of Amos in Abitibi reminded his parishioners that although their region was not rich, its people nonetheless had a tradition of living up to its responsibilities.³⁹ Of course, a number of priests were hostile to the war and the policies used to pursue it. Later on we will gain some idea of the extent of this disaffection, as will become apparent through the eyes of a Montreal advertising executive.

The work of the Catholic Church in Canada in lending its moral, and in the case of church collections, direct support to the voluntary effort, was shared by the other

³⁸ PAC, RG 19, Vol. 2706, Ilsley Papers, (dated January 26, 1942.

³⁹ L'Action Catholique, April 28, 1943, p. 4.

major faiths in Canada. Occasionally, complications of a technical nature arose in attempting to have the leaders of these faiths act jointly. During the First Victory Loan, Villeneuve, along with the Moderators of the United and Presbyterian Churches, the Primate of the Church of England and a representative of the Jewish faith, were asked by the Department of Finance to make a radio speech on Victory Loan Sunday, June 8, 1941. Villeneuve's reply was that he would be able to make only a short message. This led the Deputy Minister of Finance, T. C. Davis, later Canada's Ambassador to Peking, to suggest that since one short message in the midst of four speeches would seem rather odd, that a recording be made that did "not sound recorded".⁴⁰ Villeneuve indeed agreed to make a recorded speech of six minutes length.⁴¹ In Quebec, Christians and Jews alike saw the war as a cause of divine significance; the former for the survival of Christian civilization, the latter for much the same reason, but in different terms.

Montreal held 96 per cent of Quebec's 66,000 Jews. The Canadian Jewish Congress, with its central committee in Montreal, had its own War Efforts Committee under the chairmanship of Samuel Bronfman. Bronfman and his family were intensely involved with all facets of the war in Canada. In a nationally distributed newsletter to promote the sale of Victory Bonds among Canada's Jews, Bronfman used terms

⁴⁰ Pac, RG 44, Vol. 27, Davis to Rev. Nicole (Secretary) May 19, 1941.

⁴¹ Ibid., Villeneuve to Davis, May 19, 1941.

which might just as well have been heard in a Villeneuve speech:

For it is not simply bonds that are being offered; it is rather an invitation to the citizens of Canada, to participate in yet an additional manner, in the holiest venture of our history.⁴²

That this was a war to save Christian civilization was shared by the Protestant faiths. Yet, the latter's interpretation was based on the belief in individualism and freedom, heavily tainted with the British tradition, while the Catholic interpretation evolved around the love of an order which was one of the basic foundations of French Canadian society.⁴³ Maintenance of this order was dependent upon co-operation with the state, with its recognized position in the scheme of worldly authority. By extension, the activities of the state in its efforts to win the war were worthy of support. This included any voluntary cause associated with the war.

We might consider some of the other motives which influenced Villeneuve in his policy of endorsing the Canadian war effort. Villeneuve recognized that in times of war, individuals had to make sacrifices and undergo privations. In this sense, the voluntary effort accorded closely with Christian ideals such as charity and moderation. The war savings programme fit these ideals on both the theoretical

⁴² Ibid., RG 44, Vol. 5 (dated May 29, 1941).

⁴³ Faulkner, op. cit., p. 226.

and practical planes, for they appealed to persons to put excess funds at the service of their country, and discouraged frivolous spending on consumer goods (Villeneuve was among the most steadfast proponents of curtailment of wartime sales of liquor and beer), and after the war would aid in the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. These were all enunciated in a communiqué to the people of the archdiocese of Quebec:

.... Les institutions d'épargnes entre elles sont parmi les meilleurs sauvegardes des bonnes moeurs et de l'ordre public. Et de tout temps, dans l'histoire de la chrétienté, on a vu l'Eglise s'en préoccuper..... Car, des motifs empruntés à la morale chrétienne peuvent relever cette sagesse humaine de l'économie à la tempérance, c'est-à-dire au bon usage des choses sensibles. 44

Underlying these precepts was the hope that Canadian society might better itself in this test of moral strength. It will be seen that this hope might explain the hierarchy's initial favoritism toward the Vichy régime after the fall of France in June 1940, and why such favoritism did not necessarily contradict an intense méfiance for Nazi Germany. As late as July 1, 1939, Villeneuve had been to France. While rejecting the charge that France had shunned Catholicism, he expressed disappointment over the evident religious apathy in that country.⁴⁵ In the Cardinal's mind, this was surely a retrograde state of affairs. In Canada, that Church

⁴⁴ Semaine Religieuse, Vol. 53, No. 25, February 20, 1941, p. 394.

⁴⁵ Faulkner, op. cit., p. 48

sided with State in war made for a formidable alliance; one which gave religious significance to Canada's participation, and one which was instrumental in having Québec participate in Canada's voluntary war effort. Meanwhile, the State was developing its own techniques for arousing public enthusiasm.

Government propaganda was disseminated for two purposes during the war: to arouse general enthusiasm through propaganda, and to publicize specific activities and programmes, such as military recruiting and war bond campaigns. The dissemination of information to the public underwent a process of trial and error which culminated in the formation of the Wartime Information Board.

Public information, originally the responsibility of a Cabinet committee,⁴⁶ was a division of the Department of National War Services until the formation of the WIB in September 1942. The WIB was responsible to the Prime Minister himself. Aside from Mackenzie King's own displeasure with the public information operations of the Department of National War Services, the WIB also received its impetus from a report presented to him by Charles Vining, an expert in the field of public relations, and as recently revealed, the man responsible for many of Britain's Security operations in Canada.⁴⁷ Vining reluctantly agreed to chair

⁴⁶Stacey, op. cit., p. 114.

⁴⁷William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid. The Secret War (New York: Ballantyne, 1976), p. 294.

the Board⁴⁸ whose establishment he had recommended, passing the chairmanship on to the President of the University of New Brunswick, N.A.M. MacKenzie in January 1943. Philippe Brais, Government Leader in the Legislative Council of Quebec, and intensely involved in many facets of the voluntary effort, was chosen Vice President. As such, he furnished valuable advice with respect to the Board's functions in Quebec. The Board itself consciously avoided indulging in propaganda that might lead people to believe that it was little more than a Liberal front. Thus the emphasis was placed on objectively using its powers to aid Canada's war effort. The establishment of the WIB represented the total mobilization of the government's propaganda apparatus, whose scope and methods had previously been conducted on a limited scale. Moreover, from the beginning of the war, public information agencies addressed themselves to a basic reality of Canadian life; that English was not the only language spoken and understood in the country.

The Directorate of Public Information contained a French language section which occupied itself with the publication of pamphlets and booklets to build public morale and to promote such activities as the collection of salvage. The section's activities extended to all strata of Canada's French speaking population. In June 1940, 200,000 pamphlets

⁴⁸Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 439

containing excerpts of speeches by federal Cabinet ministers were distributed to Quebec's schools.⁴⁹ In April 1941, 725,000 copies of a booklet entitled Héros d'Hier et d'Aujourd'hui, which depicted the exploits of the heroic Dollard Des Ormeaux, whose policy in English translation was "go out and fight the enemy", were distributed.⁵⁰ The above were calculated to create a favourable climate of opinion toward the war and to allow French Canadians to identify Canada's war effort with the courageous endeavours and sacrifices of their heroes of years gone by. From a study of wartime propaganda it is also evident that efforts increased in intensity during times of national crisis, such as during the holding of the plebiscite on conscription for overseas service.

During the plebiscite campaign of April 1942, the federal government possessed, in the form of the Office of Public Information, a powerful instrument of persuasion. It was used to such effect, especially in April, when the total quantity of printed materials distributed increased drastically.

⁴⁹ PAC, RG 36/31, Vol. 2, "French Department Propaganda".

⁵⁰ Ibid., Report of the Activities of the Office of the Director of Public Information, April 1, 1941-February 28, 1942.

Table 11 FRENCH LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS OF
THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION⁵¹
(March-May 1942)

Month (Releases)	No. of Pieces		
	Fillers and Posters	Pamphlets	Total
March (144)	17,383	163,941	273,718
April (173)	19,007	152,941	990,305
May (165)	18,279	60,544	193,217
			455,042
			1,162,253
			272,040

The tactic of intensifying publicity efforts in April⁵ was an obvious attempt to win affirmative votes in Quebec for the government's request that it be relieved of its no-conscription promise. In the final analysis, it may have helped. However, government efforts to gain support through a "yes" vote in Quebec were for naught, and it became clear that wartime propaganda, to be effective could not be the sole preserve of government. Thus, the WIB was to enjoy the assistance of lay and religious leaders alike.

During the month preceeding the plebiscite, a letter, remarkable for its articulate commentary on a wide range of aspects of the war in Quebec, was sent to King by E.W. Desbarats, General Manager of Desbarats Advertising of Montreal. Because of its value as a telling document of the time, it has been included here in its entirety.

⁵¹ Ibid., Memo: re: activities "The French Section".

Déar Sir:

The results of the latest Gallup Pool [sic] shows [sic] clearly that Québec Province will vote - NO - in the coming plebiscite.

The writer is in frequent contact with business men, farmers, religious institutions, working class people, and in the course of the last few months has been checking up on their attitude towards the war, and finds that they are taking the stand indicated by the Gallup pools [sic] because ignorance, misinformation and enemy propaganda are doing their work only too well.

IGNORANCE - French-speaking Canadians see few illustrated papers that really show what is happening in other countries, nor do they follow the newsreels as do their English-speaking brothers. French language newspapers are giving the general news of the war, but seem to publish far less information matter of a general nature than the English language publications. The result being that many French Canadians are quite ignorant of what has happened in other parts of the world, and of the events leading up to the present war. 'C'est la guerre des anglais, ils l'ont voulu, qu'ils s'arrangent tout seuls, ce n'est pas notre affaire'.

MISINFORMATION - Many French Canadians are still thinking of warfare as it was waged in past centuries, and are firmly convinced, that if an enemy did invade Québec, he could be repelled by a Levée-en-masse. They have a very feeble idea of the training and equipment needed to win a war under modern conditions of aerial and armored fighting. The French Canadian has been taught in school that England was the enemy in 1760, and as far as one can see, many parish priests and higher member [sic] of the clergy and religious orders still encourage that viewpoint, and furthermore teach that Fascist rule would serve Canada better than our present democratic government. Our young people in school and college have had this false doctrine hammered into them for quite some years.

ENEMY PROPAGANDA - Fascist and Nazi propaganda has been doing a job in Québec for some years. Men have come into our office with their pockets full of pro-nazi, anti-Jew literature. My sons at college have been considered as communistically inclined because they do not subscribe to the doctrine that Franco is a saint and that the Fascist corporative state is the cure for all our economic ills.

Many sections of the church in Québec seem to have been well sold by this Fascist propaganda. Even in suburban churches there are curés who carefully state that no money is to be given to any cause or collection not formally approved by himself. And this warning has been given from the pulpit immediately before last year's Red Cross, and War Savings Certificate drives, and again before this year's Victory Loan - without such approval being given.

The success of Nazi propaganda is also shown in the increasing enmity shown towards Jews and in the widespread belief that Jews are responsible for the present and past wars. (Most of the windows broken in the recent riots were on St. Lawrence Blvd.).

Now, Mr. King, is it not time to start to educate Québec to the actual facts of the case by an intelligent propaganda campaign of our own. An advertising and publicity campaign to convince Québec -

- that our democratic government is worth fighting for,
- that we are menaced by Nazi aggression,
- that only by staying as a free partner in the British Commonwealth can the French Canadian continue to enjoy freedom of religion and the right to have his language considered as of equal importance with English,
- that it is better to have the state as your servant as in the democratic form of government, than to be the slave of the state as in Europe.

To put over these points properly would probably take years - using the movies, radio and the press. But to do a job quickly, the following course should bring results.

Frequent and powerful advertisements in the daily and weekly press of the province - especially in such papers as *Le Devoir* and *L'Action Catholique* which are extensively read by the clergy - featuring if possible, clear and unequivocal statements by Cardinal Villeneuve, as head of the church in Canada, such ads would go a long way to bring the clergy in line and enlist their aid in selling the above ideas to their parishioners.

As Prime Minister of Canada, would you not consider it immensely worth while sic to make a serious and determined endeavour to swing public opinion in Québec - BEFORE the plebiscite, and thereby head off a most serious threat to Canadian unity and to the success of Canada's war effort.

We would be more than glad to put our services at your disposal to accomplish this work.⁵²

Clearly, the task of countering negative attitudes in Quebec was formidable.

Despite the fact that it did not speak for the majority of Quebecers, the Desbarats letter was a perfect commentary on the conflicting forces in that province, whose only result would be to detract from a unified effort. For his part, King had copies of the letter forwarded to then Minister of National War Services, Joseph Thorson, the Secretary of State, who directed the plebiscite; and Louis

⁵²Ibid., RG 36/31, Vol. 16, File 8-53-1, Desbarats to King, March 17, 1942.

St. Laurent,⁵³ who after Ernest Lapointe's death, in November 1941, was persuaded to join the government as King's Quebec Lieutenant. In August, Desbarats dispatched a similar letter to Charles Vining.

The breadth of activities of the WIB which included films, speeches and radio plays, testifies to its having taken some of Desbarats' suggestions to heart. It should also be noted that the latter's letter seems to have made a significant impression on King, and must surely have contributed to the evolution of government policy with regard to public information and propaganda. Not surprisingly, deficiencies in these areas had been perceived by others besides Desbarats. One was John Grierson.

An English pioneer film maker, Grierson, became manager of the WIB in January 1943 while retaining his position as Government Film Commissioner, and concomitantly, chief executive officer of the National Film Board.⁵⁴

The second war saw Canada make extensive use of the medium of film. Under the National Film Act of May 1939, all government departments were required to use the new organization for any projects requiring the production and distribution of films.⁵⁵ A close working relationship existed between the Film Board and the WIB.

⁵³ Ibid., H.R. Henry (Secretary) to Desbarats, March 19, 1942.

⁵⁴ Montreal Star, January 28, 1943, p. 1.

⁵⁵ Canada, Statutes, 1939, The National Film Act, c. 20, May 2, 1939.

In a paper presented in October 1942 to Arnold Heeney of the Privy Council Office, Grierson stated his contention that horror stories were of definite value in the overall scheme of public information. There had been an emphasis on this approach by the Office of Public Information. In November 1941, 265,000 copies of a pamphlet entitled Qui Veut L'Ordre Nouveau which illustrated conditions in Nazi-occupied territory, had been distributed. The Department of Finance had also relied to a considerable degree on this type of advertising, and as will be seen, encountered criticism over it. Although Grierson, recognized the value of the horror approach in the overall scheme of the war effort, he at the same time argued that appeals to sentiments other than that of fear would be of immense effectiveness:

A 'horror' program followed by an appeal from the Minister of Finance may increase the sale of war savings stamps or contributions to a Victory Loan Campaign. But the effects of such propaganda seldom go beyond creating a general disposition to follow the lead of the government more willingly. It fails to impart to people a positive desire to expand the scope of their activities; it does little to heighten their own initiative; it fails to inspire their total psychological participation. Such propaganda, as a result, is failing to achieve total mobilization for total war.⁵⁶

Grierson envisaged propaganda as a positive tool, not one

⁵⁶ Ibid., RG 2-18, Vol. 42, File D-27-7, Grierson to Heeney, October 26, 1942. "Notes on the Psychological Factor in Administration and the Relation of Public Information to Public Morale", p. 2.

which solely employed intimidation to gain results. The following contention, as put forward by Grierson, could be applied neatly to the case of Quebec:

No system of administrative controls however technically unassailable, will succeed in producing maximum co-operation and efficiency unless there is present, among those to whom the controls are intended to apply, the willingness to co-operate, the spontaneous desire to increase their contribution to the war effort.⁵⁷

The new propaganda, while relating to Canadians as a whole, would take into account the special interests of the various cultural and social groups of which Canada was composed. The WIB devoted more of its energies to a policy which incorporated the fundamentals of Grierson's and Desbarats' suggestions.

The French Language operations of the WIB were extensive. By November 1943, this special section included an Executive Officer, French Language Press Contacts, and a Radio Activities co-ordinator.⁵⁸ The French News Branch was concerned primarily with stimulating and expanding the flow of information to the French-speaking population of Canada. This was partially accomplished through the translation of editorials appearing in English newspapers. Some of the translated editorials were "Le Canada et le

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., RG 36/31, Vol. 1, File 1-2-20, WIB Estimates 1944-1945, May 20, 1943.

Commonwealth" from the London Times, and "La collaboration de la France est nécessaire à la reconstruction de l'Europe" by Walter Lipmann; while feature articles as varied as "Amitié Durable", and "Anniversaire de la naissance d'Abraham Lincoln" were distributed to and widely reproduced in French weeklies and dailies.⁵⁹

The Branch also lent assistance to other branches of the Board and the C.B.C. in formulating policy toward Quebec and other French Canadian centres. Collaboration with the CBC resulted in the airing of weekly programmes such as "Les Yeux Sur L'Europe", based on clandestine and official information on conditions in occupied Europe. It is worthy of note that the French News Branch also aimed to promote a better understanding of French Canada in the United States as well.⁶⁰

From an examination of the French Language operations of the WIB, it is clear that in pursuing the fundamental aim of helping Canadians to understand each other, as many interests as possible were appealed to. This was intended to elicit a

⁵⁹PAC, RG 36/31, Vol. 2, French Language Operations, March 1944.

⁶⁰Ibid., Vol. 2, Report on Activities of Executive Personnel, March 1, 1943 - February 29, 1944. In October 1942, the Archbishops of Vancouver (W.M. Duke), Toronto (J.C. McGuigan), Edmonton (J.H. MacDonald), Halifax (J.T. McNally), Ottawa (Alexandre Vachon), Montreal (Joseph Charbonneau), St. Boniface (Georges Cabana), and Moncton (Norbert Robichaud) joined with Villeneuve in affixing their signatures to a communiqué condemning a Life magazine article which gave the impression that Quebec was a backward province, rife with clericalism. L'Action Catholique, October 30, 1942, p. 3.

more enthusiastic response to Canada's war effort.

Effective wartime propaganda has necessarily to counteract the fears and doubts of civilians as to the character of the world after the end of hostilities. People have to have the moral validity of their values re-affirmed, and have to be reassured that their efforts will produce benefits beyond the immediate objective of victory. Thus, a special series of articles under the title "Demain" were also sent to French dailies and weeklies, and dealt with such topics as "Le Canada-Puissance internationale", "Nourrir le monde", and "La Politique d'aide mutuelle".⁶¹ Prominent speakers were enlisted to travel mainly in Quebec. There was also collaboration between the National Film Board and the French News Branch, which resulted in a film circuit embracing twenty classical colleges in Quebec. Films depicted highlights of the war.⁶² The WIB furnished assistance to other government agencies such as the National War Finance Committee, in March 1943, when four of the French-speaking survivors of the ill-fated Canadian warship, *Louisbourg*, which had been sunk in the Gulf of St. Lawrence made appearances in support of the Fifth Victory Loan. The WIB did not ignore the importance of the Catholic faith in the lives of French Canadians. A semi-monthly newsletter,

⁶¹Ibid., French Language Activities, April 1944.

⁶²Ibid., Report on Activities of Executive Personnel, March 1, 1943-February 29, 1944.

Nouvelles Catholiques, was distributed to French-speaking Catholic families.

After the formation of the WIB, several organizations sprang up which were composed of French Canadians and were devoted to promoting national unity. Involved with these were such people as Jean-Charles Harvey, founder of the anti-fascist Le Jour; and T.D. Bouchard, Quebec's Minister of Roads and founder of L'Union Démocratique in January 1943. There were in fact charges that the activities of these two men, and those of another prominent antagonist of the French Canadian nationalists, l'Abbé Arthur Maheux, were a front from the WIB.⁶³ Maheux did in fact receive more than moral support from the Board on his speaking tours of Canada and the United States, where he gave speeches and talks on Canada in both English and French.⁶⁴ By the same token, L'Union Démocratique received collaboration from the WIB.

Meeting as it usually did in the Senate Smoking Room, the Board heard from Philippe Brais the suggestion that it subsidize Bouchard's new organization, L'Union Démocratique.⁶⁵

⁶³Wade, op. cit., p. 965.

⁶⁴PAC, RG 36/31, Vol. 2, French Language Operations, February-March 1944. Maheux reported that "Mr. Scarfe, director of the Harvard University Press, has asked that I write a complete book (not less than 70,000 words) on the subject (Canada); they would public it".

⁶⁵Ibid., Vol. 1, File 1-2-13, WIB-meeting No. 15, June 14, 1943. As outlined in its application form for prospective members the four aims of L'Union Démocratique were:
1) to cement national unity

At the same time, Brooke Claxton - Member from Montreal (St. Lawrence - St. George) and later to become Canada's Minister for Defence - who so often sat in on Board meetings, suggested that a number of English-speaking Canadians who could speak French tour Quebec under the auspices of the new organization.⁶⁶ Although the Board decided that it would not be "prudent" to offer public funds to such unofficial groups, it did render other material aid.⁶⁷ As noted earlier, the WIB was supposed to be an agency whose activities were overt. The decision regarding L'Union Démocratique appears to have affirmed this policy.

The fact that the WIB paid special heed to the reality that all Canadians were not alike was an indication of sensitivity on the part of Canada's wartime government. Yet the WIB and its predecessor the Office of Public Information could do little more than create an atmosphere

65 (Continued)

- 2) to combat any movement which seeks to hinder the Canadian war effort
- 3) to add the support of a small but genuinely patriotic group to the war efforts of Canada and the United Nations with the purpose of hastening total victory over the aggression of Nazism and Fascism
- 4) to be informed of deliberations preceeding any European peace treaty so that Canadian ideals as embodied in the Atlantic Charter are respected and upheld, and so that this war might not have been fought in vain.

Ibid., Vol. 1, File 1-2-15, "L'Union Démocratique du Canada Français".

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

of public opinion that was conducive to greater participation in all facets of Canada's war effort. For a more direct assessment of the public's receptivity to making a voluntary effort, one need look at the activities of those organizations which had specific voluntary requirements. In other words, while the aims of the WIB were in the main, general, those of the Department of Finance were narrowly defined, and required fulfillment at certain specific periods. It is to the latter's programmes of publicity that we now turn.

Despite the success of the First War Loan, (January 1940), Colonel Ralston encountered criticism over the fact that the actual bonds were printed in English only. When asked by Senator Raoul Dandurand,⁶⁸ about the feasibility of printing bilingual bonds, Ralston replied that there did not appear to be any demand for them, and that the extra costs involved were not warranted.⁶⁹ This decision was later reversed. However, when Wilfrid Lacroix, staunch defender of French Canadian interests in the House, and later a member of Le Bloc Populaire Canadien, discovered that bilingual bonds would not be ready until two months after the English ones, he demanded immediate corrective action.⁷⁰ A week later, the secretary treasurer of the

⁶⁸ Ibid., RG 19, Vol. 2689, Ralston Papers, Dandurand to Ralston, February 15, 1940.

⁶⁹ Ibid., Ralston to Dandurand, February 19, 1940.

⁷⁰ Ibid., Lacroix to Ralston, May 7, 1940.

Ottawa based credit union, L'Union St. Joseph du Canada - 510 of whose 610 branches were located in Quebec - which had purchased \$75,000 of bonds, seemed to speak the minds of many when he wrote,

Il eût été si facile d'éviter ce malentendu en donnant au public, dès d'abord, des titres bilingues. C'est une solution si simple qu'il paraît difficile de croire qu'une simple fonctionnaire n'y ait pas songé.⁷¹

In such circumstances, diplomacy is called for, and in this case Ralston was up to the task.

I wish to state that no official of the Department of Finance would ever be guilty of slighting or ignoring the French Canadian population of Canada. I am confident that my officials realize, as well as I do, the importance of national unity in Canada, especially at the present time of stress.⁷²

Bonds for subsequent loans were printed in both French and English.

Such incidents, occurring during the first months of the war, perhaps could be blamed on inexperience or an administrative lapse. However, Ralston's successor, Ilsley, despite his proven powers of organization and resolve in times of crisis, also showed an occasional lack of awareness.

In soliciting the help of French Canadians to form local loan committees, one might reasonably expect the Minister of Finance to take measures to ensure that letters

⁷¹Ibid., Hector Ménard to Ralston, May 15, 1940.

⁷²Ibid., Ralston to Ménard, May 17, 1940.

to these individuals were drawn up in French. This, however, was not always the case, although there were commendable attempts to respond, as evidenced by the reply of Quebec's most prominent labour leader, Alfred Charpentier, president of La Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada:

I have been very much honoured in receiving your letter of March 27th, inviting me to become a member of the New National War Loan Committee, you are setting up.

Thanking you for the honour you do me, to represent on that Committee my Section of Labour, I accede promptly to your request.⁷³

Upon the formation of the National War Finance Committee immediately preceding the Second Victory Loan, (February-March, 1942), Ilsley sent letters to every Member and Senator requesting them to assist their local War Finance committee. For the Third Victory Loan, such a letter was not sent because the one for the previous loan was "not entirely successful and some minor irritations arose".⁷⁴ It is possible that the "irritations" arose out of someone's shortsightedness in the Department in that letters were printed only in English. This contention is supported as one notices that for the fourth and presumably for subsequent Victory Loans, those on the mailing list who

⁷³ Ibid., Vol. 609, File 155-81-1-2, Charpentier to Ilsley, March 29, 1941.

⁷⁴ Ibid., Vol. 2707, Ilsley Papers, D.B. Mansur of NWFC to Ilsley, March 24, 1943.

were to receive letters in French, were seen to have check marks dutifully placed beside their names.⁷⁵

We have noted that one factor which more than any other might militate against a successful voluntary effort in Quebec, was the memory of coercion employed with respect to conscription during the first war. Ilesley was apprised of this fear by member D.L. Duguay in his reply to the Finance Minister's request that he aid the local War Finance Committee. Duguay, while stating his willingness as a good Liberal to do all in his power, felt that there was one thing Ilesley should not lose sight of:

La peuple a encore à la mémoire toutes ces déclarations formulées par les chefs du Parti Libéral, et si vous trouvez que dans Québec l'activité semble un peu moins grande qu'ailleurs, vous devez vous rendre compte par vous-même à quoi en attribuer la cause.⁷⁶

Conscription, albeit for service within Canada, had come into force in June 1940 and was evidently not accepted with equanimity in Quebec. Moreover, the publicity directed toward the French-speaking population of Quebec by the Department of Finance during the early years of the war was not very successful in counteracting these detractors and in some cases was counterproductive.

With respect to advice from the public on matters

⁷⁵ Ibid., Vol. 2710, Ilesley Papers.

⁷⁶ Ibid., Vol. 2714, Ilesley Papers, Duguay to Ilesley, February 5, 1941.

of publicity, Ilsley received his fair share. One individual, a Mr. West from Montreal, carried on a spirited correspondence with Ilsley and his staff, criticizing their approach to publicity. Somewhat over-stating his case, West gave the following rendition of what he had seen and heard:

Do you wan't [sic] to see a German cruiser at Quebec shelling the Basilica, whilst planes diving low machine gun women and children on the roadside as they try to escape to Trois-Rivières and beyond. Homes destroyed, farms abandoned and ruined even the Boswell Brewery in danger [sic]. To Avoid [sic] these things you Must Buy War Savings Stamps [sic]. It's a sporting chance that you get your money back but WE DOUBT IT [sic].⁷⁷

For all its eccentricity, the West correspondence was remarkable in that the suggestions he made closely approximated those made by John Grierson two years later.

The whole approach to the selling of bonds has got to be de-iced, not the orthodoxy of finance itself - that will come fast enough. The Government if it has to be a sales agency must be humanized - trite platitudes are all washed up. I fail to say [sic] how any human dignity could be sacrificed by a little more unbending, more informative truth, instead of repetition after repetition.⁷⁸

The approach to selling bonds was also criticized because the general population was not made to feel that it was benefitting by its purchases. In a letter to Mackenzie King, West had claimed that in Quebec distrust of "the Government"

⁷⁷ Ibid., Vol. 606, File 155-79M, West to J.C. Nelson (Chairman, War Savings Committee) West's letterhead referred to him as a consultant in matters of Public Relations, Industry and Finance.

⁷⁸ Ibid., West to Ilsley, September 16, 1940.

coupled with what amounted to a lack of incentive, was counterproductive.

Now here is the reaction from an actual personal experience, last Friday morning a French Canadian lady of about 45 years old, [sic] told me that her Bank Manager had informed her that there was to be a capital levy, she had withdrawn her MOTHERS [sic] savings, a woman of 80, and had a large amount of cash in \$100 bills with her and how could she conceal the money - she desired to put it in a tin can and hide it in the country - I advised against that, on the ground it may be lost stolen or destroyed - why not consult a reliable financial house and see what they said about Government bonds, oh no that wouldn't do [sic], a bond would be seized by the Gov't [sic] the same as cash.....⁷⁹

One should keep in mind that this was a time of trial and error in government efforts to devise the most effective propaganda and publicity techniques. The methods of appeal to French Canadians were inextricably bound up in this process. With war finance publicity, the two War Loans were the testing grounds, while the First Victory Loan (June 1941), with its Publicity Committee, put into effect some innovative yet not quite perfected techniques. With public information and propaganda, the culmination of this process of trial and error was the WIB; with the Department of Finance, it was the National War Finance Committee and its large publicity apparatus.

⁷⁹ Ibid., West to Mackenzie King, September 12, 1940.

Upon the completion of the First Victory Loan, the Dominion Publicity Committee undertook an analytical report of the methods used to approach the Canadian public. Remarkable for its conciseness, the report casts light on the problems created by lapses in administrative common sense in a country with two main language groups. One survey of the effectiveness of publicity materials revealed a marked disparity among those distributed in Quebec that were printed in French and those that were English. Also, for some reason, most literature reached wholly French districts too late to be distributed to any effect.⁸⁰ Based on the figures given in Table 12, there is little to indicate that the Department of Finance was taking sufficiently appropriate action to pursue its policy of having as many Canadians as possible buy government securities. Although in the aggregate, more materials were distributed to French-speaking Quebecers as a group, the per capita distribution of English materials was almost six times as great.

Moreover, before the Second Victory Loan, it appears that French publicity was largely based on the English. Material was conceived in English, translated into what was hoped to be "acceptable French", but with some undesirable results. The small amount of bilingual material distributed was unacceptable to the French Committees.⁸¹ It was also

⁸⁰ PAC, RG 19, Vol. 609, File 155-81-1-2, Publicity Committee Report, p. 13.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 12.

Table 12

EFFECTIVENESS (on scale of 100) OF FIRST
VICTORY LOAN MATERIALS IN CANADA 82
AND NUMBER DISTRIBUTED IN QUEBEC

Item	English		French	
	Effectiveness (Canada)	Number Distributed In Quebec	Effectiveness (Canada)	Number Distributed In Quebec
Canvasser's Kits	82%	2,532	67%	3,762
Auto Stickers	80%	3,700	45%	4,500
Poster Lobby Cards	66%	430	53%	280
One Sheet Poster	83%	11,600	53%	14,119
Poster Display Cards	67%	19,649	50%	19,116
Hangers	76%	13,081	60%	13,538
Blotters	78%	75,000	63%	167,184
Pay Envelope Enclosures	80%	390,000	50%	412,000
General Enclosures	62%	509,900	66%	413,200
Investors' Honour Certs	73%	137,600	50%	197,250
Industrial Poster (Picture of P.M.)	52%	5,000	44%	6,700
Speaker Manual	67%	1,200	65%	1,500
Honour Program Booklet	70%	7,000	67%	15,000
Sponsored Ad Folder	80%	N.A.	75%	N.A.
Illustrated Booklet	74%	10,000	67%	27,644
Worker's Letter (P.M.)	53%	67,000	58%	55,000
Ad Reprint Posters	72%	8,000	35%	16,000
Total	1,215 (71.5%)	1,261,690 (a)	969 (57%)	1,351,793
per capita distribution (Quebec)	--	2.7 (b)	--	.5 (c)

Table 12 (con't)

- (a) does not include small number of materials printed in English only or bilingual.
- (b) based on number in Quebec whose mother, tongue was English (Census 1941).
- (c) based on number in Quebec whose mother tongue was French (Census 1941).

82 PAC, RG 19, Vol. 609, File 155-81-1-2, Publicity Committee Report, Appendices D and F.

Figures based on responses by unit chairmen and organizers to questionnaire. In Quebec the following Foreign Language Ad Reprints were also distributed:

Chinese - 100	German - 150
Croatian-Yugoslav - 50	Hebrew - 800
Czechoslovak - 55	Hungarian - 100
Finnish - 55	Icelandic - 50
Polish - 105	Japanese - 200
Ukrainian - 300	

felt that the word "souscrivez", so often used in Red Cross, War Services Fund, and other charitable appeals, was inappropriate for war bond publicity. In proper usage, the word means "give", thereby leading some to believe they might not see their money again. The new word to be used was "acheter" - to buy. With regard to the problem of translation, the Report made its major recommendation:

With the exception of the English-language literature, advertising and posters, etc., the motion picture and other purely national matters - to be defined clearly to provincial committees as being exclusively national - cannot Quebec be regarded as requiring a special publicity approach that can be worked out by French Canadians? Could not the Quebec Committee....draft its own speaker's manual, its own honour - programme literature, its own booklets....arrange its own production and distribution....and in the vernacular, largely do its own stuff?⁸³

Curiously, Ilsley demurred on this recommendation. Presumably he found such an arrangement hard to accept, an anomaly in a system that was otherwise directed centrally from Ottawa, and which made no great effort to recognize the French fact in Canada. In summary, the Department's method of appeal to French Canadians was in need of improvement. Moreover, some of its faults could have, with care, been eliminated.

By the Fourth Victory Loan, the publicity situation in French Canada as evidenced in Table 13 improved to the point where its effectiveness bore no resemblance to that of the First Victory Loan.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 12.

Table 13

EFFECTIVENESS OF FOURTH VICTORY
LOAN CAMPAIGN MATERIAL ⁸⁴

	English Canada	French Canada	Total Canada
<u>Soliciting Materials</u>			
Good	85%	90%	87%
Fair	12%	8%	11%
Poor	3%	2%	2%
<u>Distribution</u>			
Received Full Allotments - Yes	87%	87%	87%
- NO	13%	13%	13%
Supplies Adequate - Yes	85%	90%	87%
- NO	15%	10%	13%
Arrived in Good Time - Yes	93%	90%	92%
- NO	7%	10%	8%
<u>Prominent Speakers</u>			
Heard in District - Yes	98%	90%	96%
- NO	2%	10%	4%
Created Interest - Yes	95%	94%	95%
- NO	5%	6%	5%
Sales Appeal - Yes	86%	94%	88%
- NO	14%	6%	12%
Publicized Enough - Yes	61%	83%	68%
- NO	39%	17%	32%

⁸⁴BCA, "An Analysis of the Public Relations Survey on behalf of the N.W.F.C." Fourth Victory Loan.

To aid the Department of Finance's objectives in Quebec, photographs and drawings in advertisements depicted scenes typical of French Canada. Examples of these were found in French-language newspapers. Some were meant to instill fear, others, faith and courage: from the silhouetted Nazi with a bayonet poised over a sleeping girl along with the plea, "Protegeons nos Berceaux",⁸⁵ to the warning "La Terre qui nous nourrit est menacée!"⁸⁶ to the picture of the elderly French Canadian woman, clutching her rosary, supplicating "Dieu protège nos soldats".⁸⁷

As far as can be determined, imprudence by Ralston and Ilsley was more the exception than the rule, and was consistent with what might be expected in what was in many respects, an immature country. On the whole, it should be noted, the co-operation of the Members from Quebec was enormous. And this support of the war finance programmes was also voiced by such ardent anti-conscriptionists as Liquori Lacombe, Wilfrid Lacroix, and Jean-François Pouliot, which supports the contention that opposition to conscription was not necessarily incompatible with patriotism.

Upon learning that Ilsley planned to visit Quebec's industrial centres in August 1942 in order to promote the government's war finance activities, Maurice Gignes, Member

⁸⁵ Le Devoir, February 21, 1942, p. 9.

⁸⁶ Ibid., February 20, 1942, p. 7.

⁸⁷ Ibid., June 7, 1941, p. 9.

for Sherbrooke, pledged that he would assemble a large gathering from the Eastern Townships if Ilsley would stop at the major city of his riding. All that Ilsley would be required to bring was one of his departmental aides who could explain in good French to the French-speaking majority of the district, information on new tax changes.⁸⁸ Ilsley's visit was a success.*

Labour also voiced its support of the voluntary war effort. At its twentieth Congress in Hull in September 1941, Charpentier's group reiterated its support, adding that under a Nazi dominated régime the "rapprochement entre le capital et le travail" would not be realized, human rights would not exist, and unions would be banned.⁸⁹ At least once during the war, labour took out a full-page advertisement in a major french-language paper, urging workers to buy more bonds.⁹⁰

As for other campaigns such as the Red Cross, Canadian War Services Fund, and Salvage, French newspaper adver-

⁸⁸ Ibid., Vol. 2712, Ilsley Papers, Gigue to Ilsley, August 25, 1942.

* (see page 108 for the comments of Sherbrooke county's National War Finance Committee Chairman).

⁸⁹ Le Devoir, September 15, 1941, p. 2. At the same time, the Fédération voiced the hope that the Pope would be among the negotiators of the peace.

⁹⁰ La Presse, October 21, 1943, p. 57. The ad in question was sponsored by La Fédération du Travail du Québec, La Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques, Congrès Canadien du Travail, Conseil du Travail de Montréal, Conseil central des Syndicats nationaux de Montréal, Conseil des Métiers et du Travail.

tising was generally extensive. All of the above were mindful of the importance of soliciting the help of the leaders of all faiths. Indeed, Cardinal Villeneuve endorsed all campaigns. However, the Red Cross, at least during the early years of the war, suffered from the same handicaps as the Department of Finance. In this respect, such an organization, so dependent on its membership to carry out its work, was remiss in its efforts to enlist the support of French-speaking Canadians. One recalls the comments of L'Action Catholique which criticized the Red Cross for its failure to use French in its work, and for the lack of French Canadians on its fund-raising committees.⁹¹ In 1940, the official newsletter of the Red Cross, the Despatch, was distributed in the following numbers:

British Columbia	-	29,000
Manitoba	-	25,000
New Brunswick	-	23,200
Nova Scotia	-	11,400
Ontario	-	245,500
Quebec	-	16,300
P.E.I.	-	3,800
Saskatchewan	-	19,400 ⁹²

The reason for such a disproportionate distribution in Quebec is not difficult to discover; apart from the occasional article in French, the Despatch was an English publication.

The Red Cross was unfitted to promote a full voluntary effort in Quebec. Wartime membership rolls as well as

⁹¹Faulkner, op. cit., p. 71.

⁹²LCRCS, Annual Report, 1940, p. 4.

wartime Home Nursing and First Aid Training courses, where proportionately smaller enrollments were experienced/ reflected the difficulties in obtaining qualified French instructors.

However, the Red Cross Publicity Committee included Henri Gagnon of Le Soleil and l'Evenement, Pamphile du Tremblay of La Presse, Georges Pelletier of Le Devoir, and Letellier de St. Just of Le Canada.⁹³ Although, French advertising was extensive, it was in the other areas that the Red Cross was lacking.

* * *

War finance may be likened to any business venture. The marketing of bonds, certificates and stamps requires a certain amount of expertise; the kind which comes from experience in business matters. Naturally, in the formation of the National War Loan Committees, their provincial counterparts, and their successors, the national and provincial National War Finance Committees, prominent businessmen were asked to assist the Department of Finance. A selection of the names which composed the Quebec Committee for the First and Second War Loans is presented in Table 14. It gives an indication of the nature and experience of the help rendered by the financial élites of Quebec throughout the war. By far the majority of these men were seniors of society, having been in their late twenties or early thirties

⁹³Ibid., Despatch, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1940, p. 10.

Table 14. SELECTED NAMES - QUEBEC WAR LOAN COMMITTEE⁹⁴

Name	Year Born	Background
Hon. J.A. Mathewson	1890	Provincial Treasurer
W.F. Angus	1873	V.P., Dominion Bridge Co.
Major John Bassett	1886	President, Gazette Printing Co.
Sir Edward Beatty	1877	President, Canadian Pacific
Hon. Charles P. Beaubien	1870	Conservative Senator since 1915
Paul Beigue	1882	Consulting Engineer
Paul Bienvenue	1897	Managing Director, Catelli Foods
Allan Bronfman	1895	V.P., Distillers Corporation
Samuel Bronfman	1891	President, Distillers Corporation
Hon. Raoul Dandurand	1861	Senate Liberal Leader, 1931-1939
Norman J. Dawes	1874	National Breweries Ltd.
F.G. Donaldson	1872	General Manager, Montreal Trust
Huntley Drummond		President, Bank of Montreal
Pamphile R. DuTremblay	1879	President of <u>La Presse</u>
G. Blair Gordon	1900	Dominion Textiles
S.J. Hungerford	1872	President, Canadian Nat'l Railways
R.J. Jellet	1881	General Manager, Royal Trust Co.
Beaudry Leman	1878	President, Banque Canadienne Nationale
Lt. Col. Allan Magee	1881	President, Barclay's Bank of Canada
J.W. McConnell	1887	President, Montreal Star Publishing Co.
Ross H. McMaster	1880	President, Steel Co. of Canada
Herbert William Molson	1882	President, Molson's Brewery
John Stewart Norris	1874	President, Montreal Light, Heat and Power
Senator Donat Raymond	1880	Brother of Maxime. Businessman
Charles Fleetford Sise	1874	President, Bell Telephone Co.
Earle Spafford	1889	President, Imperial Tobacco Co.
Robert Wilson Steele	1884	President, Asbestos Corp.
Morris W. Wilson	1883	President, Royal Bank of Canada
Arthur B. Wood	1870	President, Sun Life of Canada
Hon. L.A. Taschereau	1867	Former Premier (1920-36)
Louis St. Laurent	1882	Corporation Lawyer
Joseph Arthur Simard	1888	President, Marine Industries
Alfred Charpentier	1888	Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques

⁹⁴ Names and most of occupations taken from Quebec Committee list, for Second War Loan, RG-19, Vol. 606; and for First War Loan, Vol. 3441, Ralston Papers. Others are taken from Who's Who.

when war broke out in 1914.

Most of the companies represented above, especially Sun Life which in Canada was the largest single purchaser, made large bond purchases during the war. Yet there is no evidence that such purchases were, in any way associated with the decisions to solicit their help. These men were recognized as leaders in the financial communities of Canada and Quebec. Consenting to have their names used for committees, honorary or otherwise, was done without recompense. Use of lesser functionaries of some of the large companies was also made by the Department of Finance, and in some cases this caused hardships. The exigencies of a war economy made demands at least as heavy as those of a peacetime economy upon blue and white collar workers alike. Ralston discovered this more than once in his attempt as acting Minister to appoint members to the War Savings Committees in August 1941. Ralston had requested the services of Edgar Genest, Sales Manager of Molson Breweries. The reply from the President himself, although not typical of most, which were favourable, nonetheless gives one an idea of the manpower problems encountered by industry.

For the moment we do not see how we can spare anyone of our heads of departments. In the last four months the Treasurer of this Company enlisted in the Navy, the Secretary in the Artillery, Our Chief Engineer, and we have no assistant, is working for Mr. H.R. McMillan in the work he has undertaken for the Government.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Ibid., Vol. 246, Molson to Ralston (Acting Minister) September 19, 1941.

It might also be noted that the political persuasions of the members of the Quebec War Loan Committee were varied, revealing a mix of Liberals, Conservatives and Independents.

* * *

In the foregoing chapter, the author has attempted to convey an understanding of the factors which served to promote the voluntary effort in Quebec during the war, and those which acted as a hindrance. In the process it has hopefully been made clear that national causes depend on the support of leaders whether they be religious, political or financial, and that success was conditional on the right decisions by those whose task was to direct the voluntary effort.

If men such as René Chaloult and Maxime Raymond had actually come out and openly told their supporters to boycott bond drives, they would not only have broken the law, but jeopardized their continued personal liberty as well. Indeed, after a speech he made in St. James Square in Montreal shortly after the plebiscite in which he warned that civil war would be a possibility if conscription for overseas service were imposed, Chaloult was charged with violating the Defence of Canada regulations. Although the court accepted his defence that his speech was made in good faith,⁹⁶ fair warning was given that all those who obstructed the war effort did so at their own risk. This is why so few prominent individuals

⁹⁶Montreal Star, August 3, 1942, p. 3.

in Quebec, not that there were many who thought it, came out and actually preached that to fight conscription, one need only boycott this or that aspect of the voluntary effort. Yet the possible ramifications of the plebiscite for war finance were not lost on Ilesley. Without specifying whether they were from French or English-speaking Canadians, Ilesley drew attention to the fact that several letters had been addressed to him by individuals who threatened to cease buying certificates and to boycott the upcoming Victory Loan if the plebiscite were not called off. His reaction to these was predictable:

their threatened action means nothing less than a strike against the state, a strike against our men in the armed forces, a direct sabotaging of the country's war effort.⁹⁷

The reaction was similar to that of the Prime Minister when he was informed in February 1943 that some working men were wearing "no beer - no bonds" buttons in protest against government - imposed curtailments on the sale of the brew. King was of the opinion that those wearing the buttons should be prosecuted for interfering with the war effort.⁹⁸ At the same time the chairman of the National War Finance Committee for the province of Quebec, E.A. Macnutt, confessed to Ilesley that he was "deeply concerned" over the effect of the workers' slogan on the Fourth and Fifth Victory Loans to be

⁹⁷Canada, Debates, February 4, 1942, p. 313.

⁹⁸Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 486.

held that year.⁹⁹ In the final chapter of this study, an attempt will be made to detect statistically any cases of passive resistance which may reasonably be attributed to the plebiscite.

At this point, a comment might be made regarding the temptation that the ruling Liberal Government might have had to use the war to further its own political ends. Clausewitzian theorizing aside, war is indeed politics and in any war between civilized states, politics cannot be dissociated from prosecution of the war itself. Nonetheless, Canada's wartime government, as evidenced in the objectivity of the WIB, and the varied political make-up of the War and Victory Loan Committees, made considerable efforts not to have people believe this was a Liberal war alone, but that primarily this was Canada's war. At times this was difficult to do, perhaps in Quebec more than any other province. However, it was all the more essential to the voluntary effort, as witnessed in a letter from one of the chairmen of the National War Finance Committee in Sherbrooke County to Ilsley, shortly after the latter's visit.

We here in Sherbrooke enjoyed your all too short visit and we tried as far as possible to keep out any tinge of politics, but it is rather difficult to do. However, I think we kept fairly well in the neutral panel. I think you will agree with me that politics and the sale of Victory

⁹⁹PAC, RG 19, Vol. 2708, Ilsley Papers, Macnutt to Ilsley, March 9, 1943.

Bonds, War Savings Certificate and Stamps, mix about as well as whisky and gasoline [sic] in a motor car.¹⁰⁰

Finally, a word might be said about Cardinal Villeneuve's role in the voluntary effort. For him to have adopted even a neutral posture might have engendered insurmountable obstacles. Later, during what must surely have been a crisis of conscience for the Cardinal - for he was opposed to conscription for overseas service - Villeneuve went so far as to accept King's decision in November 1944 to impose such a measure. Yet Villeneuve was not alone in understanding the political pressures which King was up against: the possibility of the resignation of several members of his Cabinet. This did not mean that Villeneuve, nor the French Canadians in Quebec favoured conscription - we know that the majority did not - but that they were willing to make sacrifices. As King recorded in his diary "(Villeneuve) would be glad to see what he could do in a helpful way"¹⁰¹. Indeed, that so many prominent individuals from Quebec were helpful, whether they were religious, financial or labour leaders, Cabinet Ministers or Members of Parliament, was the key to success for the province's voluntary effort.

¹⁰⁰PAC, Vol. 2712, Ilsley Papers, D.J. Sails to Ilsley, September 12, 1942.

¹⁰¹J. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 2, 1944-1945, (Toronto: U. of T., 1968), pp. 235-6.

CHAPTER III QUEBEC AND THE CASE OF THE CANADA-FRANCE
RELATIONS COMMITTEE

The existence of two French leaders after the capitulation of June 1940 - one de jure, at Vichy, the other the de facto leader of Free France residing in London, then Algeria - was symbolic of the rift which existed among Frenchmen. Such a rift extended to Quebec, where the debate evolved around the question of whether Pétain or Charles de Gaulle could best serve the needs and aspirations of the French. Pétain appeared to stand for a conservative and Catholic renaissance in France; de Gaulle seemed to stand for the Third Republic and the Allied cause. Thus the question in Quebec was not just that of continued existence of Christian civilization, but of which form this civilization should adopt. This essentially political dilemma extended to the voluntary effort, and specifically, French relief in Quebec where there developed bitter feelings between relief funds composed of Gaullist supporters, and the Canada-France Relations Committee which contained a number of Vichy sympathizers. The story of the formation of the Canada-France Relations Committee then, is fundamental to an understanding of the depth of disharmony which existed between the Free French and Vichyites in Quebec during the war.

As has been alluded to previously, one of the

unfortunate realities of the voluntary war effort in Quebec, was that due either to ineptness, indiscretion, or a lack of willingness to decentralize authority, the French Canadians, a vast reservoir of human potential, were not always appealed to in such a way as to elicit the greatest response possible.

With respect to French relief, Charles Donohue, one of the spokesmen for the Canada-France Relations Committee, succinctly outlined to La Flèche the situation in Quebec:

Comme vous le savez, il y a du ressentiment dans notre province de Québec du fait qu'Ottawa a permis des campagnes pour les Grecs, les Russes et les Polonnais, et n'a rien fait pour la France.¹

Thus, there was a need for a United French relief fund, a fund which would get most of its support from Quebec.

During the formative period of the Canada-France Relations Committee, the animosity, and later, insult felt by supporters of de Gaulle in Quebec due to their not being consulted, threatened to ruin the chances of France being able to benefit from any large-scale Canadian voluntary relief programme at all.

Although separated from France by 200 years of history, French Canadians possessed a feeling of kinship, and with it, concern over political and cultural developments in France. Along with this came disagreement over ideology, similar to that which existed in France, and largely

¹PAC, RG 44, Vol. 3, Donohue to La Flèche, October 22, 1943.

influenced by French citizens who lived in Quebec. This disagreement hampered the Minister of National War Services, Louis La Flèche's efforts to form a non-political organization, the Canada-France Relations Committee. Ultimately a member of the CUARF, it was dedicated to the aid of French civilians, regardless of political persuasion.

It should be made clear that in Canada the question of recognition or non-recognition of Vichy and/or de Gaulle made for two camps. Criticism of King for maintaining relations with Vichy was countered by favouritism in Quebec, which in turn was gradually transformed into disfavour, when Vichy's collaboration with Germany disillusioned those who saw France and its new constitution as the embodiment of Christian civilization.

Upon the adoption of the New French constitution, L'Action Catholique proudly proclaimed in a front page headline "La France devient pays corporatiste".² It was a telling indication of the hierarchy's hopes that France had been transformed from a country based on republicanism to one based on corporatist-Christian foundations. The four touch points of the new constitution: defence of the family, sovereignty of the state, authority with liberty, and a hierarchical organization of society run according to Christian morality, were in keeping with the essence of the papal encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno of 1931.

²L'Action Catholique, July 10, 1940.

As for Louis La Flèche, he probably more than anyone else could feel sympathy for those fighting French sympathizers in Quebec who felt that Canada-France was an upstart that payed little credit to what in their minds was four years of effort, courageously initiated at a time when in Quebec, Vichy enjoyed a great deal of support. Before the formation of Canada-France in 1943, La Flèche did not conceal his favoritism for the Free French. In July, 1942, during ceremonies commemorating the seizure of the Bastille he declared,

En ce jour où vous songez avec émotion
aux jours glorieux d'une France libre
et généreuse, aux jours où les populations
de France coulaient une paisible existence,
aux jours où le génie de la France
rayonnait à travers le monde, songez en
même temps à cette France Combattante,
belle, grande et admirable, qui combat
pour faire renaître l'autre France.³

It is to be noted that present at this ceremony were Montreal's Mayor Adhémar Raynault and Philippe Roy, Canada's former Minister in France, as well as such Frenchmen as Alfred Tarut, president of ~~La~~ Chambre de Commerce Française, Roger (Vicomte de Roumefort), General Manager, Crédit-Foncier Canadien, M.H. Daguerre, president of l'Association des Français libres de Montréal, and M.H. Ducros, president of l'Union Nationale française. Each of these men was involved with the cause of free France.

La Flèche's biases aside, he would have little

³Cited in La Presse, July 15, 1942, p. 13.

patience with those who would hamper his plan to organize something which was meant to transcend personal prejudices. As he made clear to P. Tudor-Hart, a prominent member of a Gaullist relief organization based in Quebec City,

I cannot be a party to any differences of opinion as between different groups of Old Country Frenchmen nor indeed of the followers of the different groups in Canada. Unfortunately, it seems that there is noticeable difference in view on this matter only in your City [sic].⁴

Thus, La Flèche would not willingly tolerate hindrances to success.

The controversies surrounding the formation of the Canada-France Relations Committee are more easily understood when seen against the backdrop of Canada's relations with France during the war, and the efforts of Gaullists and Vichyites to gain the support of French Canadians.

Canadian policy toward France was influenced on one hand by British policy, which hoped to avoid a rupture with Vichy, and on the other hand, the difference of opinions which existed in Canada. Canada's legal position was delicate. While limited recognition could be extended to de Gaulle's Comité Français de la Libération in London, recognition could not be total without treating European France as an enemy of Canada.⁵

On November 9, 1942, Canada withdrew recognition of the Vichy Government. The breaking off of relations between

⁴PAC, RG 44, Vol. 3, La Flèche to Tudor-Hart, February 10, 1944.

⁵Memo by Legal Adviser, July 21, 1940, Documents on Canadian External Relations. Vol. VII. 1974. p. 538.

Canada and France represented the culmination of two and a half years of suspicion weighed with political and military considerations in a policy which, though officially favourable to Vichy, was in effect favourable to de Gaulle. At an early date the Canadian Government had been advised to cut off communications between the French Legation at Ottawa and the Pétain government, while leaving the way open for the Legation to communicate with de Gaulle if it wished.⁶ The French - which is to say, Vichy - Ambassador to Canada, René Ristelheuber was advised that diplomatic (pouch and cypher) privileges were to be withdrawn. The grounds for such a measure were that Pierre Dupuy, who took over Georges Vanier's duties upon the latter's resignation as Ambassador to France in May 1941,⁷ had not been accorded the same privileges during his three visits to unoccupied France between August 1940 and September 1941.⁸

At a press conference on November 9, 1942, the day Canada withdrew recognition of Vichy, King was not yet ready to commit Canada to full recognition of de Gaulle. The

⁶Ibid., p. 538.

⁷Vanier, voicing his belief that "the Marshal's hand would be forced whenever it suited our enemy's convenience", added "I take this opportunity of expressing the opinion that the French people for whom my affection and admiration remain intact, were misled in June 1940 and are still misled by a weak and deluded Government, some members of which moreover are dishonourable. Minister to France to Prime Minister, May 17, 1941, Ibid., Vol. VIII, 1976, p. 569.

⁸Memo by Prime Minister, May 23, 1941, Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 573-574.

position of the Canadian Government was that there was no longer, either constitutionally or legally a government which represented the people of France, and that Vichy's willingness to collaborate with Berlin supported this contention.⁹ King was furnished with the ideal solution - severance of relations with Vichy - to what amounted to a heavy political problem, considering the concern with which developments in France were followed in Quebec's french-language papers. Now it was hoped that the justice of King's decision was apparent to all doubters, and that Canada was not declaring war on the people of France. The day after the conference, King wrote,

I have been rejoicing over the manner in which we permitted Vichy to become separated from Canada without severing any relations ourselves with the French people, or taking any diplomatic act in the conventional diplomatic manner, but simply taking the position that the Government at Vichy had ended as a French Government and was really a puppet government of Germany.¹⁰

All French consulates in Canada were subsequently closed.

If Vichy had been allowed to remain unencumbered by German demands for men and material, as well as by Pierre Laval's questionable dealings with the Germans, there is little doubt that the Catholic hierarchy would have persisted in its praise of the régime. In such a case, there would

⁹L'Action Catholique, November 10, 1942, p. 3.

¹⁰Pickersgill, op. cit., p. 428.

have been little to contradict Villeneuve's avowed support of Canada's war effort as a just cause, for Vichy France was ostensibly to have been independent of German pressure to collaborate. However, toward the beginning of 1941, L'Action Catholique began to share the widespread suspicion of the motives of Vichy's leaders. When in the spring of 1942, a rupture between Canada and Vichy seemed imminent, the paper voiced its hope that since due to German intimidation the French Government was not free, such an occurrence would not mean hostility to all Frenchmen.¹¹ Furthermore, the hierarchy maintained that Pétain was not a traitor, but a man of honour who himself had been betrayed.¹² Thus if the views of the hierarchy were to be summarized, the defeat of France, although an unfortunate occurrence, gave that country in its hour of peril, the opportunity to reform itself along corporatist-Christian lines. Provided Vichy's leaders exercised a staunch aversion to Nazi war aims, the hierarchy could support it.

Not so willing to have confidence in Vichy was the liberal La Presse, which with a circulation of 147,074 in 1940,¹³ was the largest French-Language daily in Canada. From the beginning it showed a marked preference for news originating from de Gaulle's Comité Français de la Libération

¹¹L'Action Catholique, May 13, 1942, p. 4.

¹²Ibid., November 12, 1942, p. 4.

¹³André Beaulieu, Jean Hamelin eds., op. cit., p. 142.

Nationale which was situated in London, then moved to Algeria in 1943, and which may be likened to a Free French Government in exile. The paper gave secondary coverage to Pétain's intention of transforming France into a corporatist society.¹⁴ La Presse was also one of the very few French-language papers to take note of the visit to Quebec in March 1941, of Reverend Georges d'Argenlieu, a member of de Gaulle's Imperial Free French Council as well as of the Carmelite order.¹⁵ D'Argenlieu's mission was to explain the Free French movement to Canadians and to urge all French sympathizers to unite to save France.¹⁶ During his stay, he visited Godbout and Villeneuve. Thus, from at least early 1941 de Gaulle sought to secure support in Quebec for the cause of the Free French. It is to a discussion of the state of French relief in Quebec that we now turn, keeping in mind that the main difficulty faced by La Flèche was resolving the problem of creating a non-political voluntary organization out of elements which it seems were largely political.

Deciding at an early date that he should be kept informed about developments regarding the Canada-France Relations Committee, La Flèche voiced his concern that the voluntary effort required to make it a success along with that of the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund, would be

¹⁴La Presse, March 3, 1941, p. 2.

¹⁵La Presse, March 24, 1941, p. 14.

¹⁶Montreal Star, March 12, 1941, p. 1.

threatened if political disputes between component committees got out of hand.

I am particularly concerned with what may happen in the future; the situation is one which might prove to be a fiasco whereas I think that if the situation is carefully and properly dealt with by all concerned, order may be brought about, the needs of many sufferers alleviated and again all concerned may do a very fine piece of good work.¹⁷

In December 1940, an abortive attempt was made to rally all Free French War Charity registrants around one central committee in Ottawa, with committees being formed in each province. Dr. William Vignal, de Gaulle's first official representative in Canada, was the initiator of this project. However, as contained in a National War Services reference paper,

Cooperation with this Department was poor. We have never been able to secure a financial statement from them. Since Dr. Vignal left Canada every effort has been made to secure information regarding their activities with no results.¹⁸

Vignal's group, France Quand Même, or Le Comité National Des France Libres, (hereinafter referred to as France Libre) had its registration cancelled in July 1942. The work of aiding de Gaulle's cause was carried on under the registration of

¹⁷PAC, RG 44, Vol. 10, Memo: La Flèche to C.H. Payne, (Associate Deputy Minister) July 23, 1943

¹⁸Ibid., Vol. 31, "Fighting French" Organizations.

separate funds, which derived their moral sustenance from La France Combattante, formed in London in July 1942 as the rallying symbol for all "patriotic" Frenchmen.

Created by the Comité Français de la Libération, La France Combattante sought

The union of all French nationals wherever they may be, and of French colonials, who joined together to collaborate with the United Nations in the war against their common enemies; a similar resistance to the Axis by French nationals who do not accept collectively the capitulation of Bordeaux, and who, by means at their disposal, contribute anywhere to the liberation of France by the common victory of the United Nations.¹⁹

Unfortunately, "French nationals" in Canada, in large measure, hindered the Department of National War Services' efforts to organize a united and distinctly Canadian French relief organization.

"Fighting French" War Charity registrants - those which sympathized with de Gaulle - as evidenced by France Quand Même had existed since the armistice in 1940. Outside of Quebec were found the France Libre Association Des Amis Des Volontaires Français at Brioux Saskatchewan, with receipts of \$1,606.00 to December 1942; a successful France Quand Même branch in Calgary with receipts of \$1,978; and France Combattante funds in Halifax, Ottawa, Edmonton, Vancouver and Winnipeg. Until the formation of Canada-France in the Fall of 1943, there were only two fighting French

¹⁹Cited in Montreal Star, July 14, 1942, p. 1.

organizations registered in Quebec: in Montreal (La Caisse de L'Assistance aux Oeuvres Françaises de Guerre); and in Quebec City (France Libre).

France Libre was headed by a Laval professor, André Simard. It received most of its support from Quebec City and the surrounding area, and had receipts totalling \$5,997 to December 1942. France Libre's counterpart in Montreal, La Caisse de L'assistance aux Oeuvres Françaises de Guerre, shipped supplies to French soldiers in London and Algeria and preferred as it were "to run its own show", and refused to co-operate with Vignal's France Quand-Même.²⁰ It is within this context of disharmony among organizations largely composed of Frenchmen in Canada that one should consider the problems with which La Flèche had to deal. His wish to be kept informed of all developments regarding Canada-France and the progress it was having enlisting the support of the fighting French, indicated that he understood the challenges with which he would be faced.

In August 1943, Canada extended full recognition to Le Comité Français de la Libération Nationale, which had recently moved to Algiers. In January of the following year, Georges Vanier was accepted by de Gaulle as Canada's ambassador. La Flèche, seriously wounded in France during the First World War, and holder of the coveted Légion d'honneur, held the plight of France and Frenchmen dear to

²⁰ PAC, RG 44, Vol. 31, "Fighting French" organizations.

his heart. Upon the move of the London committee to Algeria, a three-way correspondence transpired between himself, Vanier, and French representatives in Algeria, concerning the possibility of aiding the people of occupied France. The culmination of these deliberations was the Canada-France Relations Committee, which was registered under the War Charities Act in October 1943. Its president was the 73 year-old Conservative Senator, Charles Beaubien, a man who was involved in almost as many war-associated causes as existed. When Beaubien was forced to step down due to ill-health in 1944, the presidency was transferred to the Senate's speaker, 62 year-old Thomas Vien. He was to preside over the Committee's most critical period.

Those who were involved with Canada-France as it existed at registration in October 1943 are listed below.

THE CFRC (NATIONAL)

HEAD OFFICE: Banque de la Cité et du District de Montréal -
director - Thomas Taggart Smyth

Patron - Cardinal Jean Marie Rodrigue Villeneuve

Members of Committee

- Charles Beaubien - Montreal
- Emery Beaulieu - Montreal
- Hubert Biermans - Montreal
- Samuel Bronfman - Montreal
- C.L. Burton - President of Simpson's - Toronto
- Eugène Côté - Liberal M.P. - St. Hyacinthe
- Louvigny de Montigny - Ottawa
- Charles Donohue - Quebec
- Huntley Drummond - Montreal
- James Duncan - Toronto
- Pamphile du Tremblay - Montreal
- J.W. McConnell - Montreal
- Vicomte Roger de Roumefort - Montreal

- Anselme Samoïsette - Montreal
- Thomas Taggart Smyth - Montreal
- Dr. Charles Vézina - Quebec
- Alfred Tarut - Montreal²¹

(QUEBEC PROVINCIAL) * denotes those also
on National Committee

- Patrons - Sir Eugène Fiset, Lieutenant Governor
- Cardinal Villeneuve (also patron of National
Committee)
- General de Gaulle
- General Giraud

- Honorary Presidents - Adéïard Godbout
- Monseigneur Joseph Charbonneau
- Very Reverend John H. Dixon, Bishop
of Montreal

- Honorary Vice-Presidents - Adhémar Raynault
- Huntley Drummond*
- Morris B. Wilson
- Monseigneur Oliver Maurault
- Arthur Mathewson*
- Vicomte Roger de Roumefort*

- Presidents - Charles Beaubien*
- J.W. McConnell*

- Vice-Presidents - Senator A.K. Hugesson
- Senator Donat Raymond

- Honorary Treasurers - Beaudry Leman - President Banque
Canadienne Nationale
- George W. Spinney - Head of First
Victory Loan
Committee in Ottawa

- Honorary Secretaries - Lieut. Col. W.M. Leggatt - President,
Quebec Division, Red Cross
- Alfred Tarut²²

It became a source of great interest that for a
national organization, the CFRC's Quebec division should have

²¹PAC, RG 44, Vol. 3, Comité des Relations Canada -
France.

²²Ibid., Donohue to La Flèche, September 21, 1943.

the endorsement of such eminent personalities as Villeneuve and Generals de Gaulle and Giraud. Subsequent to the formation of the CFRC, another national list was presented, this time including the names of every Lieutenant Governor and Premier in Canada among its patrons and honorary presidents.²³ "Surely", reported one of La Flèche's Deputy Ministers, "such people should be reserved exclusively to head the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund nation-wide appeal as their support would go a long way towards making the said appeal a success".²⁴ Monopolism and provincialism then, were felt to be unfortunate side-effects of a well-intentioned endeavour.

With the Canada-France Relations Committee itself, then, there were those who tried to make it a Quebec only organization. Most of its donations in money and kind would come from the province of Quebec. This was taken for granted. However, it was not politically feasible to permit such an organization, which after all was supposed to be Canadian, to function as though it were exclusive to one province. Deputy Minister Browne, who was also director of the Division of Voluntary War Relief, continued,

the organizers of the CFRC may have forgotten the fact that their Committee is not a Province of Quebec Committee or an 'Old Country' French Committee but a Canadian Committee national in scope, created with the sole object

²³ Ibid., Browne to La Flèche, May 11, 1944.

²⁴ Ibid.

of helping destitute French Civilians in France and her colonies.. It follows, therefore that to be a success, the Committee should be headed by a group of gentlemen who are nationally known and representative of the different racial stocks of Canada.²⁵

Also, whether the CFRC was a provincial or national organization was a source of disagreement among its own members. At its meeting of April 10, 1944, one member, Thomas Taggart Smyth, had stated his view that Quebec should be treated like the other provinces, while Beaubien felt that since the National Committee was located at Montreal and that work had already begun in Quebec City as well as other villages and towns, the Quebec Committee should be treated differently.²⁶

Meanwhile, France Libre had suggested that since its membership in Quebec City was 5,000, and that since 1940 it had been aiding the cause of the Free French, it should be permitted to nominate some members of the CFRC. The list which it submitted is here given in its entirety, in order to obtain a partial answer to the question of who, in Quebec City at least, were Gaullist sympathizers. The names were:

Juliette Amyot - wife of industrialist Adjutor Amyot
 Père Georges Henri Lévesque - Dean, Faculty of Social Services, Laval
 Pierre de Varennes - lawyer
 Jean Rémillard - lawyer, Conseil du Roi (C.R.)
 Dr. J.L. Peticlerc - Professor, Laval; Chef de service at l'Hôtel Dieu

²⁵ Ibid., Browne to La Flèche, "Canada-France Relation Committee", May 11, 1944.

²⁶ Ibid., Vol. 48, "Minutes" de la deuxième assemblée du Comité Exécutif, Montréal, April 10, 1944.

Camille Pacreau - Professor, l'Institut Thomas;
Treasurer, Comité de La France
Combattante de Québec

Auguste Viatte - Professor, Laval; Co-President, CFCQ

Paul Langlois. - Secretary, CFCQ

Lorraine Bernatchez - President, Comité de La France
Combattante, Montmagny

Marie Tremblay - wife, Major General Thomas Tremblay,
Inspector General of Eastern Canada
for Selective Service

Valmore Bienvenue - Minister of Fisheries

L'Abbé Arthur Maheux - librarian, Laval; speaker
under auspices of WIB in
Canada and U.S.

Henri Bray - President, NWFC for Eastern Region of
Province of Quebec

P. Tudor - Hart - painter; member CFCQ

Jean-Pierre Després - Secretary, Senior Labour Council.

Pierre Chaloult - Secretary to Minister of Mines and
Labour and Vice-President of CFCQ

Vincent Brosseau - lawyer; Secretary to Minister of
Roads

Lucien Borne - Mayor of Quebec

Bernard Devlin - (C.R.); President, Canadian Club

Maurice Boisvert - (C.R.); Senior Assistant to
Attorney General

Dr. André Simard - Professor, Laval; Member, Royal
College of Surgeons; Co.
President CFCQ²⁷

Dr. Simard, also a spokesman for France Combattante, had supplied La Flèche with this list, but was told that he should contact Canada-France directly.²⁸

Indeed, Dr. Simard, took La Flèche's advice and wrote to Charles Taggart Smyth of Canada-France, from whom was received "une réponse très vague et qui ne résout rien".²⁹ With what amounted to a threat, Simard warned that in light of the fact that Canada-France drew few of its members from

²⁷ Ibid., André Simard to La Flèche, January 29, 1944.

²⁸ Ibid., La Flèche to Simard, February 8, 1944.

²⁹ Ibid., Simard to La Flèche, February 26, 1944.

those who had for four years been aiding France, France Combattante, with the support of Provincial Ministers and the City Council of Quebec, was ready to call its plight to the attention of the public. Simard closed by saying that pressure was on him to release his letter to the papers, but at his behest, it was not.³⁰

Two weeks after Simard submitted his list, Mr. Tudor-Hart, this time speaking for the umbrella organization, France Combattante, with which the two free French funds³¹ were affiliated but which itself did not as yet engage in actual relief work, wrote to La Flèche. Perhaps without knowing that Simard had already done so, he dispatched his own list. Although the list, which contained many duplicates - Simard, Chaloult, Borne, Bienvenue, Peticlerc, Bray, Brosseau, Lévesque, Maheux, Boisvert, Després, and Mesdames Tremblay and Amyot - was a symptom of the lack of co-ordination among the free French, it is nonetheless of value in that it rounds out our Survey of Free French sympathizers in Quebec City, many of whom were prominent in political and legal circles.

Telesphore D. Bouchard - Minister of Roads
 Albert Sévigny
 M.L.A. Richard - Deputy Minister of Hunting and
 Fisheries
 M.J. Hugues Fortier - Chief Judge, Cour de Session
 de la Paix
 Mr. Paul Desrochers - Vice President, Lagueux and
 Des Rochers Ltée (Stockbrokers)

³⁰ Ibid.

Dr. Edgar Couillard
 Arthur E. Penny - Editor-in-Chief, Chronicle
 Telegraph
 Joseph E. Barnard - editor, Le Soleil
 Harry Quart - owner, Central Printing Company
 W.Q. Stobo - President, Canadian Import Company
 Limited
 Guy Roberge - lawyer
 Wilfrid Girouard - Judge, Cours Supérieure du Québec
 Paul Lepage - manager, Station CKCU
 J. Narcisse Thivierge - manager, station CHRC
 Maurice Valiquette - manager, station CBU
 Philémon Garneau - alderman
 Wilfrid Samson - alderman
 Gérard Lacroix - Conseil du Roi³¹

Tudor-Hart stated that it was "for Montreal and not Quebec to furnish its own list".³² As far as is known by this author no such list exists for the Montreal membership of France Combattante. Regardless, it was in Quebec City that the controversy with Canada-France threatened to do the most damage to the cause of French relief. In this respect, the Tudor-Hart-La Flèche correspondence is illuminating.

Stating that he was a Canadian of English descent, born in the Province of Quebec, and a supporter of France Combattante, Tudor-Hart warned that Canada-France could receive the support of Le Comité Français de la Libération Nationale only if it represented

"those Canadians, who from the beginning, espoused General de Gaulle's policy of resistance and his call to Frenchmen to rally around him to continue the fight for humanity, the survivance [sic] of France and the maintenance of her pledge to her British allies."³³

³¹Ibid., Tudor-Hart to La Flèche, February 14, 1944.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., Tudor-Hart to La Flèche, February 8, 1944.

Although fully in accord with the concept of non-political French relief groups he made the charge,

The list of members of the Executive Committee of France-Canada for the Province of Quebec.... as first compiled, did not include a single name of those citizens of this Province who in the early stages of the movement risked their popularity and even their personal advancement by rallying disinterestedly to the cause of France-Libre. This cause they have supported morally, financially and in every way possible. On the other hand, at present the Executive Committee of France-Canada..... includes the names of many persons who were notoriously sympathetic to the Vichy government and gave it at least their moral support in the days of doubt and uncertainty. I have intentionally abstained from mentioning names, but there are at least six names on the Executive Committee.... that are no more acceptable to sincere Canadian supporters of France Combattante than are those of Peyroutin and Flandin.³⁴

When speaking of "six names" could Tudor-Hart have meant Villeneuve, Charbonneau, and Monseigneur Maurault who as members of the Catholic hierarchy in Quebec had sympathized with Vichy, and who were among the others listed with Canada-France (pp 12-13)? Or was Tudor-Hart, like others, confusing the National with the Provincial Committees? Indeed, he wished to know the relationship between the two and he seemed to touch on a point of fact when he voiced his suspicion that "Presumably a Committee is being formed for the Province of Quebec without any official notification or

³⁴Ibid., Tudor-Hart to La Flèche, February 8, 1944.

approval to the Committee of French-Canada in the city of Quebec".³⁵ La Flèche's reply to this was that although it was indeed a national committee, Canada-France would determine the composition of any provincial and regional committees it chose to establish. He added that he had indicated to Canada-France the advisability of including the names of France Combattante supporters on its Executive.³⁶

La Flèche's suggestion seems to have had effect. Charles Donohue of the CFRC regretted that the Minister of National War Services had to be involved in such wrangling, but reassured him that perhaps unity was possible: "J'ai raison de croire que vous ne serez plus désormais ennuyé, et que l'esprit de l'émulation remplacera l'esprit de scission".³⁷ He also enclosed a list of the Executive for the Quebec City branch of Canada-France, on which were the names of such France-Combattante supporters as Boisvert, Bouffard and Simard; Vézina as President and Tudor-Hart as co-Vice President. La Flèche also read, no doubt with relief, of "L'appui empressé que nous ont apporté le Cardinal et les Evêques, et la bonne volonté que nous trouvons chez tous les Curés...."³⁸ But was Donohue's inclusion of Tudor-Hart, by this time a veritable thorn in La Flèche's side,

³⁵ Ibid., Tudor-Hart to La Flèche, February 14, 1944.

³⁶ Ibid., La Flèche to Tudor-Hart, February 26, 1944.

³⁷ Ibid., Donohue to La Flèche, March 13, 1944.

³⁸ Ibid.

as Vice President merely an empty gesture? If so, it was a poorly calculated one, and La Flèche's hope that Tudor-Hart might now be satisfied with this arrangement, was rendered futile.

In fact, Tudor-Hart's patience was growing thin. His response to Donohue's gesture casts new light on the Canada-France - France Combattante controversy.

In point of fact, I was not consulted, therefore the question of being satisfied did not arise. There was of course no reason why I should be consulted or satisfied, UNLESS my name was 'used' [sic]. What has happened is that the Quebec Committee used my name, which has been published without my authority and without even my knowledge. My friends and acquaintances and the public were thus led to believe that I approved the composition of the Committee of which I only by chance learned of the existence.... The proceeding is, you will admit, to say the least, unusual.³⁹

Then La Flèche's integrity was called into question when Tudor-Hart made the disclosure that despite the Minister's claim that membership of provincial and regional committees was not his affair,

At a general gathering yesterday which I attended in order to obtain some information on the credentials, constitution and composition of this Committee, the Chairman revealed that he and his colleagues who purport to direct and control it had been first approached [sic] and suggested by General La Flèche. Here is a direct contradiction on a matter of fact.⁴⁰

³⁹ Ibid., Tudor-Hart to La Flèche, March 24, 1944.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Barring a misunderstanding on Tudor-Hart's part, any statements such as he claimed La Flèche made, may be granted as a bit of failed diplomacy on the part of the latter. To be sure, the entire affair by this time smacked of deceit and general unreasonableness on both sides, with La Flèche, so far without success, acting as arbiter. France Combattante, and its War Charity registrant in Quebec City, France Libre, obviously objected strongly to the membership of Canada-France as originally composed, and there was no solution to this quandary in sight.

Thus, the state of relief to France was in chaos. Whether one was a member of Oeuvres de Guerre, France Libre, or a supporter of France Combattante in general, he considered it an insult to work with Vichy sympathizers and took the rather pretentious attitude that his assistance could be had only at the price of certain concessions in membership. And this did little to further the ideal of a non-political French relief organization, the CFRC. On the other hand, La Flèche's uniquely all-Canadian project, demonstrated a lack of organizational savoir-faire itself. The membership of Canada-France was constantly fluctuating. This unsettled state of affairs was compounded by the fact that the Department, as required by law, had not received notification of changes in the National Executive Committee, and indeed discovered only informally that Senator Vien had become President.⁴¹ In his report of May 11, Browne

⁴¹Ibid., Report - Browne to La Flèche, May 11, 1944.

concluded that there was a lack of leadership within Canada-France. Three weeks later, the Deputy Minister, Browne had little encouraging news to offer:

I have come to the conclusion that as presently organized, or I should say disorganized, I cannot see how the Canada-France Relations Committee will be able to hold up its end when it joins other Funds in the projected United Appeal, particularly as you want the appeal to be made as soon as possible.⁴²

Preparations, however, were being made by the Department to put the CFRC into suitable shape so as to have it capable of joining the ranks of the CUARF. The task was considerable. Basic to a successful CFRC would be the co-operation of the Free French groups and ironically, the greatest success was achieved when it was almost too late. The ultimate credit for this goes to Browne, Gabriel Bonneau, Dr. Vignal's successor in Canada as the Free French representative, and Pierre Monnaeclay, the new French Consul in Montreal. But before enlisting their help, Browne had to solve the CFRC's own serious problems of organization.

Browne's approach was to be diplomatic.

I am satisfied that Col. Vien [sic] will welcome help and advice, provided it is given tactfully and in such a way that at the end of the interview, he will feel that they are his own ideas that he is going to put forward and not someone else's.⁴³

⁴² Ibid., Report - Browne to La Flèche, June 1, 1944.

⁴³ Ibid.

Aside from National and Provincial Committees, Brown foresaw the formation of a sub-committee for the Island of Montreal in addition to two large districts, each with responsibility for a number of towns and cities.

Montreal District

Sherbrooke	Hull
Sorel	Valleyfield
Ste. Hyacinthe	St. Jerome
St. Jean d'Iberville	Mont Laurier
Trois Rivières	Amos

Quebec District

City of Quebec	Murray Bay
Lévis	Tadoussac
Rimouski	Baie Como
Rivière du Loup	Chicoutimi
Gaspé	Roberval

Browne's hope for the future success of Canada-France was manifested in his admiration of Anselme Samoïsette, an apparently able administrator and planner, who had drawn up a comprehensive campaign plan, but was by now fed up with some of his colleagues who had "done absolutely nothing but talk".⁴⁴

Depending on the co-operation of church parishes, commerce, and industry, Samoïsette's plan anticipated the raising of \$2,000,000 in Quebec, \$1,000,000 in Ontario, and \$1,000,000 from the rest of the country.⁴⁵ If any cause could be expected to summon the greatest response of Quebec, France was it. Of total donations in the province, 100,000

⁴⁴ Ibid., quoted by Browne.

⁴⁵ Ibid. Vol. 37, "Comité des Relations Canada-France, Plan directeur d'une campagne de souscription nationale".

were to be of \$5.00, 100,000 of \$3.00, and 200,000 of \$1.00.⁴⁶

On the parish level, the help of benevolent societies such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society, Cercles des Jeunes, Enfants de Marie, etc., would be enlisted to call at homes for donations in kind, which Quebec was expected to contribute in large measure. School children in Montreal were expected to make 100,000 donations of .10¢ each and were to urge their parents to promise to donate something in kind, and to hold them to that promise by having it recorded on paper.

On the commercial and industrial level, the Knights of Columbus, Kiwanis, and according to Samoissette, La Chambre de Commerce de Montréal, La Chambre de Commerce des Jeunes de Montréal, the Retail Merchants Association, and La Fédération des Chambres de Commerce with eighty-five districts in the province, had promised their co-operation to collect food and drugs.⁴⁷ The only element that was lacking, aside from the CFRC's disorganization was the co-operation of France Combattante.

The influence of Bonneau and Monnaeclay and the leverage held by the Department of National War Services through the War Charities Act to refuse or cancel registration, finally resulted in the co-operation of France Combattante and through it, of France Libre and Oeuvres de Guerre. As leader of the organization which had the backing

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Vol. 3, Report - Browne to La Flèche, June 1, 1944.

of La Flèche, that is, the CFRC, Vien imposed conditions: that Canada-France would be left the initiative of all appeals to the public; that if a France Combattante Committee (such as France Libre and Oeuvres de Guerre) was permitted by the CFRC to collect funds for the civilian population of France, the proceeds would go to the CFRC.⁴⁸

In retrospect, La Flèche's repeated assertions that Canada-France was a Canadian organization and that "Canadians will not listen patiently to differences between Frenchmen"⁴⁹ had not been entirely just in the case of France Libre which Tudor-Hart emphasized was indeed a Canadian Committee.⁵⁰ Moreover, it is obvious that France Libre was not composed solely of Frenchmen in Canada, but had the backing of a number of prominent individuals from Quebec City. In the case of L'Assistance Aux Oeuvres Françaises de Guerre whose centre of support was in Montreal, however, La Flèche's implication held more truth, as its Consultative Committee included the French Consul-Genefal in Montreal, Monnaeclay, the French Commercial Attaché in Canada, the French Consuls of Winnipeg, Vancouver and Quebec, and the presidents of the French Chambre de Commerce in Canada, the Vétérans Français de la Grande Guerre, of l'Union Nationale Française and l'Amicale Française.⁵¹ Thus La Flèche's comments about

⁴⁸ Ibid., Vol. 37, Vien to Browne, November 28, 1944.

⁴⁹ Ibid., Vol. 3, La Flèche to Tudor-Hart, March 18, 1944.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Tudor-Hart to la Flèche, March 24, 1944.

⁵¹ Ibid., Vol. 7, "L'Association Aux Oeuvres Françaises De Guerre".

"Frenchmen" were not empty rhetoric.

It appears that the France Combattante affiliates, while their activities relating to civilian relief were subordinated to those of the CFRC, retained their separate identities. When Vien was satisfied that this arrangement was acceptable, he recommended that the Department of National War Services award a permit to La France Combattante of Montreal, whose new registration had been intentionally delayed pending the outcome of Vien's negotiations with de Gaulle's representative, Gabriel Bonneau.⁵² Fortunately for the French cause in Canada, Bonneau responded favourably to Vien's complaint that he and Canada-France were not getting satisfactory co-operation from the Free French funds in Quebec Province.⁵³

To study the formation of the Canada-France Relations Committee is to gain insight into the almost insurmountable challenges inherent in attempts to meld one non-political entity out of essentially political elements. The ultimate solution to this problem was to permit the "old country" relief funds to retain their separate registrations under the War Charities Act, provided of course they adhered to Vien's conditions. It was a solution consistent with a situation which was otherwise insoluble without coercion. Nonetheless, and this should come as no surprise, hard

⁵²Ibid., Vol. 37, Vien to Browne, November 28, 1944.

⁵³Ibid., Mémoire, November 17, 1944.

feelings continued to exist between Vichyites and Gaullists.

The case of Canada-France also illustrates the potency of individual egos engaged in philanthropic work. Charity in itself, it would seem, is small incentive for men of influence. Yet without the collaboration of elites, any grand design is slated for failure, while those same grand designs are sometimes undertaken to enhance one's career or personal self-esteem. Indeed, the efforts to promote the sale of bonds by one of the CFRC's prominent members, did not impress the eccentric Mr. West:

I am interested to know exactly what result [sic] was expected from the address of Taggart Smyth - his diction resembled a cockatoo with oyster shells in his mouth - and who on earth would listen to him unless his friends. [sic] Quite by accident I tuned in and as quickly tuned out. It is apparent, other than the speakers for the Government itself, that there are a whole lot of people seeking personal publicity, but they are NOT selling bonds. [sic] 54

La Flèche, as the evidence suggests, attempted to sooth individual sensibilities, in order to form a single national organization for a cause - France - that had previously been lacking in Canada, and later one which could stand on its own feet among the numerous other allied relief funds of the CUARF, which were immensely better organized. Even when it appeared that the impossible had been realized, there were

⁵⁴ Ibid., RG 19, Vol. 606, West to Ilsley, September 16, 1940.

constant attempts to form new French relief funds. This was exemplified in the Fall of 1944, by the attempt of Pamphile du Tremblay and Lucien Dansereau of La Presse to form a fund either to build a hospital in France or to raise money and goods for the French population. Vien's confidential comments on this matter do little to dispel one's initial suspicions:

..... il, convient qu'elle (La Presse) en ait le crédit et le prestige, et elle n'aimerait pas participer à une oeuvre à laquelle elle ne serait qu'affiliée, parce qu'alors elle perdrait beaucoup du mérite qu'elle s'attend recevoir du mouvement qu'elle préconise.⁵⁵

After World War I, a hospital had been created in France under the auspices of La Presse. The paper was confident that its planned fund would bring it both the praise of Frenchmen and the business of French advertisers. Vien, the President of the CFRC, however, could not see how he could make one exception to the rule of collaboration with Canada-France. Despite his respect for Dansereau and du Tremblay, Vien felt that this was a case of two men wanting to attach "deux plumes additionnelles à leur chapeau". Even his offer of the Presidency of Canada-France to du Tremblay and of Organizer to Dansereau did not sway them.⁵⁶ These

⁵⁵ Ibid., RG 44, Vol. 48, Memo: organisation d'une société de secours sous les auspices de la Presse, October 13, 1944, Vien to Browne (unsigned).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

men were persistent to the point of paying little heed to Browne's advice that the question of separately functioning funds had already been settled.⁵⁷ Again, the solution here was a compromise, with La Presse's Aide Aux Familles de France permitted to register as an affiliate of Canada-France.⁵⁸

The case of Canada-France also reflects the difficulty of applying universal regulations to a number of organizations. As soon as it was agreed that the CUARF would conduct its own appeal, La Flèche wanted all individual relief campaigns (to Greece, Russia, etc.) held in abeyance. However, complaints began to come in from all sides, involving accusations that some member funds were violating rules, and demanding to be allowed to conduct their own campaigns. Such complaints were received from Canada-France's Beaubien and Jean Bruchési, asking La Flèche why a Russian clothing appeal was allowed to be conducted.⁵⁹ Once again, a concession was made, this time with La Flèche telling Beaubien he could buy clothing with money on hand, and failing that, the money could be obtained, but discretely.⁶⁰ Of course, the essential theme in considering the formation of the Canada France Relations Committee is that it was a voluntary undertaking

⁵⁷ Ibid., Browne Memo, January 18, 1945.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Browne note, January 26, 1945.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Bruchési to La Flèche, January 7, 1944.

⁶⁰ Ibid., La Flèche to Beaubien, February 7, 1944.

of the federal government for the relief of France by Canadians, and that the controversy was centered in Quebec.

In the final analysis, the formation of the CFRC would not have materialized satisfactorily had it not been for the efforts of La Flèche and his Deputy Minister for Voluntary War Relief, Browne. After all the bickering, the outcome of this sordid controversy seemed to vindicate the motives, especially of La Flèche, who envisaged an organization that cut through ideology in its zeal to help people in need. He achieved at least qualified success although for perfectly understandable reasons, the Canada-France Relations Committee was to be a national organization and not confined to Quebec. It was nonetheless realized by La Flèche and the CFRC itself that most of its material and moral support would come from French Canadians.

The final composition of Canada-France which incorporated the names of many supporters of Free France from Quebec and Montreal, was a symbol of success. The sympathizers of France Combattante and a free France found themselves members of a group - the CFRC - whose aims, whether they wanted to believe it or not, were similar to their own.

CHAPTER IV RESULTS OF THE VOLUNTARY WAR EFFORT
IN QUEBEC: A QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE APPROACH.

From the foregoing chapters it should be apparent that the voluntary effort should not and cannot be dissociated from political and administrative factors. An individual's willingness to take part, endorse, or otherwise donate to a cause, is influenced by his perception of the cause. In this chapter, the actual results of the voluntary effort in Quebec will be examined and analyzed. In the process, other factors, indirectly related yet which might have acted either as a hindrance or a promotion of specific voluntary activities will be scrutinized. For instance, in some cases it will be possible to ascertain whether the outcome of the plebiscite of April 1942 led to passive resistance through non-participation in Quebec. It is also possible to test the quality of intentions to purchase war bonds by determining the number of \$50 and \$100 face-value bonds that were redeemed before maturity.

The author does not profess to have undertaken an exhaustive coverage of all bodies involved in the voluntary effort in Quebec, but has limited himself to a number of selected organizations which fulfill three basic conditions: they must be nationwide to make them more amenable to comparison by province; their results must lend themselves to

comparative statistical analysis; sufficient data must be available.

There are of course some aspects of the voluntary effort that cannot be seen in quantitative terms and thus will be treated differently and admittedly somewhat subjectively. The latter is done without regret and with the conviction that a people's voluntary achievements which are measured only in numbers, discounts their ability to contribute, and regardless of the size of the contribution, the thought which motivated that contribution.

Also, an attempt will be made to test the validity of that gauge of success for government and private organization alike; that is, the campaign objective. An attempt will be made to determine, if possible, whether they were too low or too high, and why they were so. Objectives are important from a technical standpoint, but are also potent publicity tools. If in Quebec, assuming equal conditions in the other provinces, the objectives were too low, one might seriously question their validity as an instrument based solely on material considerations. Mason Wade has written that

French Canada was largely left to do what it could or would in the war effort, without overzealous loyalism pointing a pistol at its head.¹

In that Quebec would not be coerced to give voluntarily,

¹Wade, op. cit., p. 940.

Wade's statement holds much truth. However, every province, as indeed every Canadian, was expected to participate to the extent his means permitted. If any one province were consistently to fall short - P.E.I. was the only province to fall short, and at that, only once - of its objective, it would surely have aroused notice, and perhaps, the ire of others.

Quebec is generally considered by French Canadian historians to have more than adequately lived up to its expectations in the purchase of war bonds. Indeed, it is a fact that that province, like the others, did not fall short of its total war loan objectives. The purpose here is to determine whether it was a valid objective, or one which was lowered in anticipation of failure. With reference to objectives, it is possible only to outline the NWFC's criteria for determining them. In establishing objectives, committees were advised to consider six things:

- 1) Objectives by province of the three Victory Loans of the first war (1917, 1918, 1919)
- 2) Results by province of the First and Second War Loans
- 3) Urban and rural population statistics
- 4) Income tax payments by province
- 5) National income figures by province
- 6) Bank deposit statistics by province if available.²

Clearly, committees had a number of variables at their disposal. Yet there existed no universal equation which incorporated these variables, and we must conclude

²BCA, "Objectives", dated March 18, 1941, Binder of First Victory Loan Organization..

that the setting of objectives was largely an arbitrary process, keeping in mind that once the NWFC and the Department of Finance came to an agreement as to the overall national objective, it was then divided between Special Names and General and Payroll divisions. The three divisions would then sub-divide their objectives among the provinces which in turn sub-divided theirs among their units.³

Thus the historian, lacking a definitive answer to the question of whether objectives were objectively or subjectively set, must turn to other methods in his quest to determine whether Quebec's performance in the Victory Loans compared with that of the other provinces. For the nine Victory Loans,^{*} then, the following results as expressed in Table 15 were obtained province-by-province, excluding Newfoundland, overseas purchases, and purchases by the federal government, and banks on their own account.

It is evident that with the exception of the Fifth and Sixth Victory Loans, Quebec stood on average about sixth among the provinces in terms of the percentage by which it surpassed its objective, and always outdid Ontario. The method used in Table 17 expresses actual cash sales as well

³ Ibid.

^{*}At the time of writing, there was no satisfactory body of statistics available for the First and Second War Loans. Interested parties might try the Bank of Canada archives at a later date, as some records are as yet not arranged so as to facilitate the researcher's work.

Table 15

VICTORY LOANS - CASH SALES AND OBJECTIVES⁴First

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)		
				S.N.	Others	Total
British Columbia	30,306,550	31,682,800	874,800	--	--	47.0
Alberta	7,993,000	12,426,900	217,300	--	--	16.5
Saskatchewan	2,333,450	10,587,950	-----	--	--	8.0
Manitoba	21,772,650	12,984,050	491,900	--	--	28.0
Ontario	228,051,950	125,503,500	10,611,350	--	--	312.0
Quebec	147,743,800	49,957,800	1,340,950	--	--	160.0
New Brunswick	4,479,850	7,978,900	-----	--	--	9.0
Nova Scotia	6,586,250	13,457,750	-----	--	--	18.0
P.E.I.	749,200	1,393,700	-----	--	--	1.5

Table 15 (continued)

Second

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)		
				S.N.	Others	Total
British Columbia	35,793,100	27,109,300	4,286,550	--	--	49.0
Alberta	7,909,950	13,893,500	1,878,050	--	--	16.5
Saskatchewan	3,393,700	12,006,800	1,123,800	--	--	8.0
Manitoba	26,296,150	13,461,350	3,559,800	--	--	28.0
Ontario	252,656,550	134,461,950	34,951,600	--	--	310.0
Quebec	167,088,700	47,559,050	16,075,750	--	--	160.0
New Brunswick	6,662,500	7,428,200	930,150	--	--	10.0
Nova Scotia	8,538,300	13,238,950	3,082,500	--	--	17.0
P.E.I.	489,950	1,429,450	37,150	--	--	1.5

Table 15 (continued)

Third

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)		
				S.N.	Others	Total
British Columbia	43,671,150	26,646,200	7,028,400	--	--	60.0
Alberta	11,573,500	13,256,700	2,891,700	--	--	20.0
Saskatchewan	4,366,400	11,793,600	1,579,000	--	--	13.25
Manitoba	32,877,300	12,990,500	4,850,950	--	--	37.5
Ontario	308,652,050	143,028,300	45,418,600	--	--	385.0
Quebec	197,221,200	50,580,850	24,394,500	--	--	200.0
New Brunswick	8,034,800	7,631,000	1,605,600	--	--	12.5
Nova Scotia	8,821,800	13,432,500	5,039,850	--	--	20.0
P.E.I.	503,500	1,421,050	125,000	--	--	1.75

Table 15 (continued)

Fourth

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)		
				S.N.	Others	Total
British Columbia	52,962,050	36,734,200	12,369,750	42.5	45.0	87.5
Alberta	13,604,000	20,578,350	4,871,850	11.0	22.0	33.0
Saskatchewan	6,006,200	18,322,000	3,082,200	4.0	18.0	22.0
Manitoba	40,475,500	18,603,250	6,928,550	32.0	24.0	56.0
Ontario	382,165,400	193,114,800	66,358,750	301.0	252.0	553.0
Quebec	256,938,500	67,739,800	36,018,300	193.0	100.0	293.0
New Brunswick	13,460,650	10,415,750	2,665,200	9.0	11.0	20.0
Nova Scotia	12,024,250	17,932,500	8,018,150	8.4	24.6	33.0
P.E.I.	666,400	2,228,100	213,450	.4	2.1	2.5

Table 15 (continued)

Fifth

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)	
				S.N.	Others Total
British Columbia	49,829,050	38,454,300	16,762,050	46.0	49.0 95.0
Alberta	12,480,400	22,681,850	6,987,400	11.6	25.4 37.0
Saskatchewan	5,799,150	22,989,950	4,053,900	5.1	21.4 26.5
Manitoba	39,667,350	21,511,300	8,722,100	35.5	25.5 61.0
Ontario	371,938,500	202,463,950	78,543,950	331.5	259.0 590.5
Quebec	274,007,400	80,055,700	46,980,750	222.5	103.5 326.0
New Brunswick	13,212,100	11,639,150	3,315,100	11.5	13.0 24.5
Nova Scotia	11,497,600	18,632,450	9,871,400	10.7	25.8 36.5
P.E.I.	662,300	2,210,000	349,000	.6	2.4 3.0

Table 15 (continued)

Sixth

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)		
				S.N.	Others	Total
British Columbia	50,159,000	40,316,750	16,999,800	46.0	49.0	95.0
Alberta	13,332,200	26,460,650	6,858,650	11.6	25.4	37.0
Saskatchewan	6,161,650	27,783,200	4,032,750	5.1	21.4	26.5
Manitoba	41,013,450	23,255,450	9,479,650	35.5	25.0	61.0
Ontario	357,943,850	207,721,850	81,710,850	331.5	259.0	590.5
Quebec	267,900,650	89,359,400	46,675,400	224.5	103.5	328.0
New Brunswick	13,878,800	12,998,300	3,746,950	11.5	13.0	24.5
Nova Scotia	11,972,750	18,394,900	10,034,250	8.7	25.8	34.5
P.E.I.	558,000	2,112,400	724,300	.6	2.4	3.0

Table 15 (continued)

Seventh

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)		
				S.N.	Others	Total
British Columbia	48,330,000	48,546,450	19,620,700	46.0	54.745	100.745
Alberta	13,694,850	32,682,650	8,613,000	11.6	31.7	43.3
Saskatchewan	6,651,100	39,102,000	4,801,300	5.1	30.255	35.355
Manitoba	39,644,850	30,287,850	11,616,950	35.5	31.1	66.6
Ontario	349,305,650	235,713,250	95,761,950	345.0	276.7	621.7
Quebec	267,890,250	106,453,100	57,355,800	238.0	130.4	368.4
New Brunswick	11,843,900	14,803,500	4,892,600	9.5	15.9	25.4
Nova Scotia	12,271,350	22,731,400	12,644,450	8.7	26.5	35.2
P.E.I.	1,146,350	2,413,250	857,900	.6	2.7	3.3

Table 15 (continued)

Eighth

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)		
				S.N.	Others	Total
British Columbia	49,516,200	54,614,700	19,991,250	41.4	59.5	100.9
Alberta	19,242,900	37,185,600	7,704,650	11.0	35.9	46.9
Saskatchewan	10,437,950	40,706,650	4,200,750	4.9	38.65	43.55
Manitoba	38,979,900	34,108,350	10,996,250	32.0	36.9	68.9
Ontario	333,026,350	265,948,150	93,446,100	310.5	293.7	604.2
Quebec	255,267,250	130,795,800	53,029,850	233.7	143.9	377.6
New Brunswick	12,046,500	17,115,850	5,250,700	8.6	17.0	25.6
Nova Scotia	12,434,750	26,132,850	12,682,150	8.3	29.75	38.05
P.E.I.	725,900	2,813,750	633,250	.5	2.7	3.2

Table 15 (continued)

Ninth

	Special Names	General Sales	Payroll Savings	Objectives (in millions)		
				S.N.	Others	Total
British Columbia	47,777,200	86,332,650	27,822,250	41.4	69.0	110.4
Alberta	13,520,850	46,374,450	11,933,600	11.0	40.0	51.0
Saskatchewan	9,763,500	47,773,750	6,928,800	4.9	40.0	44.9
Manitoba	45,632,050	47,320,200	16,612,000	35.0	41.0	76.0
Ontario	374,794,000	415,412,100	125,757,850	323.6	347.	670.6
Quebec	281,531,300	207,608,900	72,122,600	241.7	179.0	420.7
New Brunswick	11,444,100	22,627,400	7,602,750	8.6	19.0	27.6
Nova Scotia	11,796,300	34,251,200	16,716,000	8.3	31.0	39.3
P.E.I.	791,900	4,068,450	714,100	.5	2.8	3.3

⁴ BCA, Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Public Borrowing Operations, from September 1939 to December, 1945. Figures given are those which represent results before re-allocation of Special Names sales. Re-allocation of roughly twenty per cent of sales of Ontario and Quebec to the other provinces was devised as a fairer method of stating provincial Special Names results, since the head offices of many large corporate subscribers were located in Montreal and Toronto, yet derived revenues from the country as a whole.

When the total amount obtained for each province for each loan is calculated as a percentage of the total objective, the following is the result:

Table 16

TOTAL CASH SALES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OBJECTIVE

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que.	(Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	PEI
First Victory Loan	133.7	126.0	161.5	125.9	116.7	124.4	(7)	138.4	111.4	149.9
Special Names	--	--	--	--	--	--	(-)	--	--	--
Others	--	--	--	--	--	--	(-)	--	--	--
Second Victory Loan	137.3	143.5	206.6	154.8	136.1	144.2	(5)	150.2	146.2	130.4
Special Names	--	--	--	--	--	--	(-)	--	--	--
Others	--	--	--	--	--	--	(-)	--	--	--
Third Victory Loan	128.9	138.7	133.9	135.3	129.1	136.1	(4)	138.2	136.5	117.1
Special Names	--	--	--	--	--	--	(-)	--	--	--
Others	--	--	--	--	--	--	(-)	--	--	--
Fourth Victory Loan	124.6	123.7	150.2	126.5	127.0	133.1	(5)	149.6	143.2	166.6
Special Names	109.0	115.7	118.9	106.4	103.0	103.8	(8)	118.9	105.5	116.3
Others	116.8	119.7	134.6	116.5	115.0	118.5	(6)	134.3	124.4	141.5
Special Names	--	--	--	--	--	--	(-)	--	--	--
Others	--	--	--	--	--	--	(-)	--	--	--

Table 16 (continued)

B.C. Alta. Sask. Man. Ont. Que. (Standing) N.B. N.S. PEI

Fifth	Special Names	108.3	107.6	113.7	111.7	112.2	123.2	(1)	114.9	107.5	110.4
Victory	Others	112.7	116.8	126.4	118.6	108.5	122.7	(2)	115.0	110.5	106.6
Loan	Total	110.5	112.2	120.0	115.2	110.4	123.0	(1)	115.0	109.0	108.5

Sixth	Special Names	109.0	114.9	120.8	115.9	108.0	119.3	(4)	120.7	137.6	93.0
Victory	Others	117.0	131.2	148.5	128.4	111.8	131.4	(2)	128.8	110.2	118.2
Loan	Total	113.0	123.1	133.7	122.2	109.9	125.4	(2)	124.8	123.9	105.6

Seventh	Special Names	105.1	118.1	130.4	111.7	101.3	112.6	(6)	124.7	141.1	191.1
Victory	Others	124.5	130.3	145.1	134.7	119.8	125.6	(5)	123.9	133.5	121.2
Loan	Total	114.8	124.2	137.7	122.7	110.6	119.1	(7)	124.3	137.3	156.2

Eighth	Special Names	119.6	174.9	213.0	121.8	107.3	109.2	(9)	140.1	149.8	145.2
Victory	Others	125.4	125.0	116.2	122.2	122.4	127.8	(3)	131.6	130.5	127.7
Loan	Total	122.5	150.0	164.6	122.0	114.9	118.5	(8)	135.9	140.2	136.5

Ninth	Special Names	115.4	122.9	199.3	130.4	115.8	116.5	(7)	133.1	142.1	158.4
Victory	Others	165.4	145.8	136.8	155.9	156.0	156.3	(5)	159.1	164.4	170.8
Loan	Total	140.4	133.4	168.1	143.2	135.9	135.9	(8)	146.1	153.3	164.6

Table 17

NUMBER AND AVERAGE VALUE OF APPLICATIONS⁵

First

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	102,128	45,102	43,701	55,066	450,546	167,415	24,382	36,734	3,588
Number/Capita	.12	.06	.05	.08	.12	.05 (4)	.05	.06	.04
Special Names	654	222	88	697	3,754	2,985	247	248	43
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	46,340.3	36,000.5	26,516.5	31,237.7	60,749.1	49,495.4 (2)	18,137	26,557.5	17,423.33
General Sales	96,081	43,530	43,613	49,776	355,825	152,555	152,555	36,486	3,545
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	329.75	285.48	242.77	260.85	352.71	327.47 (6)	330.59	368.85	393.15
Payroll Savings	5,393	1,350	-----	4,593	90,967	11,875	-----	-----	-----
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	162.21	160.96	-----	107.10	116.65	112.92 (4)	-----	-----	-----

Table 17 (continued)

Second

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	139,425	81,963	74,742	104,273	818,636	339,049	36,363	82,087	4,975
Number/ Capita	.17	.10	.08	.14	.22	.22 (7)	.08	.14	.05
Special Names	757	249	132	544	3,026	2,357	333	256	32
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	47,282.83	31,766.87	25,709.85	48,338.51	83,495.22	70,890.41 (2)	20,007.51	33,352.73	15,310.94
General Sales	88,656	58,607	60,056	56,845	381,117	138,917	24,436	40,978	4,516
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	305.78	237.06	199.93	237.04	352.81	342.36 (2)	303.99	323.07	316.53
Payroll Savings	50,012	23,107	14,554	46,884	434,493	197,775	11,594	40,853	427
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	85.71	81.28	77.22	75.93	80.77	81.28 (3)	80.23	75.45	87.00

Table 17 (continued)

Third

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	164,623	88,664	79,873	118,651	956,553	465,476	44,829	107,961	6,493
Number/ Capita	.20	.11	.09	.16	.25	.14 (5)	.10	.19	.07
Special Names	603	239	174	455	2,722	2,429	312	315	33
Average Value Per Applications(\$)	72,423.13	48,424.69	25,094.25	72,257.80	113,391.64	81,194.40 (2)	25,752.56	28,005.71	15,257.58
General Sales	83,699	55,091	59,363	56,106	414,654	147,782	26,610	45,673	5,194
Average Value Per Applications(\$)	318.36	240.63	198.67	231.53	344.93	342.27 (2)	286.77	294.10	273.59
Payroll Savings	80.321	33,334	20,336	62,090	539,177	315,265	17,907	61,973	1,266
Average Value Per Applications(\$)	87.50	86.75	77.65	78.13	84.24	77.38 (9)	89.66	81.32	98.74

Table 17 (continued)

Fourth

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	229,821	128,786	127,184	158,719	1,159,790	606,540	63,887	150,520	9,555
Number/ Capita	.28	.16	.14	.22	.31	.18 (5)	.14	.26	.10
Special Names	512	224	219	499	2,629	2,472	331	335	49
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	103,441.50	60,732.14	427,425.57	81,113.23	145,365.31	103,939.52 (2)	40,666.62	35,893.28	13,600.00
General Sales	106,638	77,400	92,014	79,189	499,305	184,539	34,381	59,329	7,548
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	344.48	267.87	199.12	234.92	386.77	367.08 (2)	302.95	302.26	295.19
Payroll Savings	122,671	51,162	34,951	79,031	657,786	419,529	29,175	90,856	1,958
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	100.84	95.22	88.19	87.67	100.88	85.83 (9)	91.35	88.25	109.01

Table 17 (continued)

Fifth

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	274,256	154,743	139,393	175,171	1,266,525	669,187	74,422	160,983	10,504
Number/Capita	.34	.19	.16	.24	.33	.20 (5)	.16	.28	.11
Special Names	493	195	191	503	2,613	2,253	317	319	39
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	101,073.12	64002.05	30,362.04	78,861.53	142,341.56	121,618.91 (2)	41,678.55	36,042.63	16,982.05
General Sales	115,931	82,847	97,139	82,773	523,775	204,956	37,468	60,461	7,367
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	331.70	273.78	236.67	259.88	386.55	390.60 (1)	310.64	308.17	299.99
Payroll Savings	157,832	71,701	42,063	91,895	740,137	461,978	36,637	100,203	3,098
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	106.20	97.45	96.38	94.91	106.12	101.69 (4)	90.49	98.51	112.65

Table 17 (continued)

Sixth

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	270,082	156,169	143,992	180,832	1,243,387	667,477	79,179	165,326	13,225
Number/Capita	.33	.20	.16	.25	.33	.20 (5)	.17	.29	.14
Special Names	466	193	205	458	2,330	2,104	271	309	36
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	107,637.34	69,078.76	30,056.83	89,549.02	153,623.97	127,329.21 (2)	51,213.28	38,746.76	15,500.00
General Sales	114,877	87,543	102,584	84,816	508,175	206,578	39,250	61,736	7,848
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	350.96	312.98	270.83	274.19	408.76	432.57 (1)	328.90	297.96	269.16
Payroll Savings	154,739	68,433	41,203	95,558	732,802	458,795	39,388	103,281	5,341
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	109.86	85.61	97.88	99.20	111.49	101.73 (4)	95.13	97.15	135.61

Table 17 (continued)

Seventh

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	287,788	169,914	156,557	195,164	1,312,515	729,249	90,140	180,230	13,928
Number/ Capita	.35	.21	.17	.27	.35	.22 (5)	.20	.31	.15
Special Names	463	175	214	342	2,276	2,056	251	279	26
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	104,384.45	78,256.29	31,079.91	115,920.61	153,473.48	130,296.81 (2)	47,186.85	43,983.33	44,090.38
General Sales	124,562	95,284	113,376	90,363	543,063	244,654	43,299	64,557	7,938
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	389.74	343.00	344.89	335.18	434.04	435.12 (1)	341.89	352.11	304.01
Payroll Savings	162,763	74,455	42,967	104,459	767,176	482,539	46,590	115,394	5,964
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	120.55	115.68	111.74	111.21	124.82	118.86 (4)	105.01	109.58	143.85

Table 17 (continued)

Eighth

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	274,361	162,791	147,095	186,390	1,270,436	685,526	87,039	176,759	12,183
Number/Capita	.34	.20	.16	.26	.34	.21 (5)	.19	.31	.13
Special Names	468	178	206	299	2,043	1,874	204	232	32
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	105803.85	108106.18	50669.66	130,367.56	163008.49	136,215.18 (2)	59,051.47	53,598.06	22,684.38
General Sales	126,182	96,311	109,529	90,843	542,113	250,326	42,112	64,258	7,640
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	432.81	386.10	371.65	375.46	490.58	522.50 (1)	406.44	406.69	368.29
Payroll Savings	147,711	66,302	37,360	95,248	726,280	433,326	44,723	112,269	4,511
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	135.34	116.21	112.44	115.45	128.66	122.38 (4)	117.40	112.96	140.38

Table 17 (continued)

Ninth

	B.C.	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que. (Standing)	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.
Total Number of Applications	266,054	155,876	137,060	179,900	1,194,762	664,993	84,191	143,347	10,022
Number/ Capita	.33	.20	.15	.25	.32	.20 (5)	.18	.25	.11
Special Names	485	187	194	319	2,198	2,014	236	197	26
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	98,509.69	72,304.01	50,327.32	143,047.18	170,515.92	139,787.14 (3)	48,491.95	59,789.70	30,457.69
General Sales	131,719	89,555	98,470	89,918	571,314	285,708	42,954	59,934	7,299
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	655.43	517.83	485.16	526.26	727.12	726.65 (2)	526.78	571.48	557.40
Payroll Savings	133,850	66,134	38,296	89,663	621,250	377,271	41,001	83,216	2,967
Average Value Per Applications (\$)	207.86	180.45	180.46	185.27	202.43	191.17 (5)	185.43	200.87	264.78

⁵ The population figures used to calculate number of applications per capita are taken from the 1941 census:

P.E.I.	- 95,044	N.B.	- 457,401	Ont.	- 3,787,655	Sask.	- 895,992
N.S.	- 577,962	Que.	- 3,331,882	Man.	- 729,744	Alta.	- 796,169
						B.C.	- 817,861

as the number of applications^{*} received as functions of the population of Quebec. The same approach will be used to express sales of War Savings Certificates and Stamps in Table 18.

The number of Victory Loan applications per person reflects the level of participation without regard to the quality of that participation. Yet, on this score alone, Quebec stands mid-way among the other provinces. Not surprisingly, given the heavy concentration of corporate head offices in Montreal, the value of Victory Loan Special Names purchases in Quebec, with one exception, ranked consistently second to Ontario throughout the war. More indicative of the performance of the average Quebecer, however, is the value of General and Payroll purchases. In the case of General sales, Quebec, with one exception, ranked either first or second, while Payroll sales placed Quebec mid-way among the other provinces. On one of two occasions (the Third Victory Loan) where Quebec ranked ninth, only \$.27 separated it from Saskatchewan. A scrutiny of Certificate and Stamp sales reveals that Quebec's performance per capita was not as great as in the Loans. One plausible explanation for this is that individuals preferred to invest their money in bonds. However, any discussion of bond, certificate and stamp sales is incomplete unless reference is made to the population's ability to buy.

^{*}Bonds were ordered on application forms on which the purchaser indicated the denomination and number of bonds desired.

WAR SAVINGS CERTIFICATE AND STAMP SALES (\$)⁶

Table 18

Certificates	WAR SAVINGS CERTIFICATE AND STAMP SALES (\$) ⁶									
	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.	
1940 per capita	121,244 1.28	1,304,548 2.26	843,376 1.84	4,636,928 1.39	11,268,840 2.98	1,955,600 2.68	1,630,424 1.82	1,723,388 2.16	2,956,760 3.62	
1941 per capita	410,763 4.32	5,486,115 9.49	2,941,600 6.43	20,260,197 6.08	53,260,153 14.06	7,546,510 10.34	5,271,034 6.33	6,277,704 7.88	9,435,420 11.54	
1942 per capita	664,223 6.99	9,163,706 15.86	5,113,463 11.18	37,101,365 11.14	93,508,501 24.69	12,661,318 17.35	7,955,085 8.88	10,179,400 12.79	15,102,959 18.47	
1943 per capita	908,771 9.56	13,248,414 22.92	7,350,727 16.07	51,962,924 15.60	124,323,217 32.82	17,424,602 23.88	11,003,710 12.28	14,067,012 17.67	20,201,847 24.70	
1944 per capita	1,118,465 11.77	16,680,358 28.86	9,093,285 19.88	62,988,450 18.90	150,670,303 39.78	21,247,646 29.12	13,757,942 15.35	17,512,440 22.00	24,574,235 30.05	
1945 per capita	1,264,681 13.31	19,437,834 33.63	10,502,457 22.96	771,956,130 21.60	171,985,425 45.41	23,980,690 32.86	15,806,718 17.64	19,986,480 25.10	28,139,521 34.41	
Total Sales per capita	4,488,147 47.22	62,321,575 107.83	35,844,908 78.37	248,907,994 74.70	664,989,439 159.65	816,360 116.23	55,424,913 61.86	69,746,424 87.60	100,410,742 122.77	
Start- ing	9	4	6	7	1	3	8	5	2	

Table 18. (continued)

Stamps	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.
1941 per capita	57,690 .61	929,824 1.61	675,310 1.48	3,161,061 .95	8,270,002 2.18	1,069,958 1.47	790,690 .88	778,812 .98	1,235,240 1.51
1942 per capita	95,006 1.00	1,526,451 2.64	1,108,325 2.42	5,188,249 1.56	13,573,990 3.58	1,754,226 2.40	1,297,700 1.45	1,278,172 1.61	2,027,383 2.48
1943 per capita	160,039 1.68	1,287,855 2.23	1,589,220 3.47	7,110,980 2.13	18,815,620 4.97	2,579,977 3.40	2,114,402 2.36	1,963,569 2.47	2,985,210 3.65
1944 per capita	209,233 2.20	2,921,827 5.06	1,966,071 4.30	8,547,918 2.57	23,260,479 6.14	3,723,356 5.10	2,954,682 3.30	2,954,682 3.71	3,872,311 4.73
1945 per capita	257,265 2.71	3,316,290 5.74	2,264,619 4.95	9,576,727 2.87	26,309,916 6.95	3,728,392 5.11	3,603,916 4.02	2,773,264 3.48	4,530,679 5.54
Total Sales per capita	779,231 8.20	9,982,247 7.27	7,603,545 16.62	33,584,935 10.08	93,230,005 24.61	12,204,911 17.00	10,761,389 12.01	10,047,891 12.62	14,650,822 17.91
Standing	8	9	4	7	1	3	6	5	2

⁶BCA, Statistics and Information on Dominion Government Public Borrowing Operations from September 1939 to December 1945.

Besides distinguishing between results and capacities, we might also attempt to ascertain which purchases were derived from Quebec's English-speaking population and which were derived from its French-speaking population. In doing this, the author is addressing himself to the problem outlined in the introduction of this study. First of all, it is appropriate to discover the province-by-province and per capita per annum distribution of incomes.

It is the author's contention that the personal income figures given in Table 19 do not reflect the disparity in incomes which existed in Quebec. This is borne out by an examination of results obtained by each of the four main charitable campaigns held yearly in the Montreal area. These were of the Welfare Federation. The value of donations received by each in 1944 was as follows:

	Welfare Federation	Jewish Federation	Catholic Federation	French Federation ⁷
Total Money Collected	\$ 937,000	\$ 321,000	\$ 233,420	\$ 668,293
Average Value/Donation	\$ 6.55	\$ 6.32	\$ 3.03	\$ 1.08

As might be expected, by far the majority of contributors of the French Federation were French Canadian, while donors to the others were of mixed backgrounds. ⁸ The low average value of donations to the French Federation indicates

⁷ Montreal Star, January 20, 1945, p. 3.

⁸ The statement is based on subscriber lists appearing in local newspapers, i.e. the Montreal Star, October 27, 1941, p. 3.

Table 19
WARTIME PERSONAL INCOME (\$) - PROVINCIAL AND PER
CAPITA DISTRIBUTION PER ANNUM⁹

	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Que. (Standing)	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.	Canada
1939 Total	21	161	109	1,072	1,746	253	280	272	377	4,291
Per Capita	220.94	278.57	238.30	321.74 (6)	460.97	346.70	312.50	341.64	460.96	372.91
1940 Total	21	191	127	1,218	2,042	289	296	317	425	4,926
Per Capita	220.94	330.47	277.66	365.56 (6)	539.12	396.03	330.36	398.16	519.65	428.10
1941 Total	24	230	149	1,467	2,510	343	299	342	509	5,073
Per Capita	252.51	397.95	325.75	440.29 (5)	662.68	470.03	333.71	429.56	622.36	510.40
1942 Total	30	285	183	1,775	3,026	433	566	521	648	7,467
Per Capita	315.63	493.11	400.09	532.73 (7)	798.91	593.36	631.70	654.38	792.31	648.93
1943 Total	35	338	213	2,021	3,375	471	477	485	755	8,170
Per Capita	368.24	584.81	465.67	606.56 (6)	891.05	645.43	532.37	609.17	923.14	710.02
1944 Total	38	364	227	2,125	3,592	510	674	590	783	8,903
Per Capita	399.80	629.80	496.28	637.78 (7)	948.34	698.88	752.24	741.05	957.38	773.73
1945 Total	44	387	254	2,240	3,764	520	540	556	836	9,141
Per Capita	462.93	669.59	555.31	672.29 (6)	993.75	712.58	602.68	698.34	1022.18	794.41

Note: Totals are in Millions of Dollars

⁹ BCA, Statistical Summary, 1950 Supplement, Research Department, Bank of Canada, p. 66.

Sums include 1) interest, dividends and net rental income; 2) salaries, wages, net agricultural income; 3) social insurance contributions and government pension funds; 4) transfer payments from governments to individuals.

lack of money, disinterest, or both." As evidenced by the large number of donations - approximately 620,000 - we may discount the second and therefore the third possibilities. Thus, we may venture so far as to say that French Montrealers at least were of more modest means than other Montrealers. However, when a unit by unit* examination of Victory Loan objectives and results is undertaken, with the same alternatives given, such a statement is not so easily made, as it is not possible to know exactly what proportion of purchases were by Francophones and what proportion by Anglophones. However, attention should be drawn to the fact that Quebec as a province fell short of its First Victory Loan combined General Sales and Payroll Sales objective by more than twenty-five per cent (Table 20). The objective for these two divisions was lowered by forty per cent in the following loan, and did not exceed that of the first until the Fourth Victory Loan, as indicated in the following table. This alone indicates that those responsible for establishing objectives either grossly underestimated effects of anti-war feeling on government fund-raising activities, or overestimated the ability of the general population to buy.

Given a comparison of results obtained in the two largest cities, Montreal and Quebec, in General and Payroll

*For organization of regions, divisions and units, see Appendix I.

Table 20
 QUEBEC - SALES AND OBJECTIVES OF SPECIAL NAMES
 AND OF GENERAL AND PAYROLL SECTIONS COMBINED¹⁰

Northwestern Region

Special Names Objective	Percentage Obtained	General and Payroll Sales Objective	Percentage Obtained
First	116.3	7,000,000	88.9
Second	130.5	4,800,000	153.5
Third	134.7	6,250,000	139.5
Fourth	164.8	11,750,000	102.7
Fifth	126.4	12,000,000	125.8
Sixth	139.7	12,000,000	131.1
Seventh	143.3	15,250,000	143.7
Eighth	127.8	17,725,000	132.1
Ninth	122.5	22,000,000	184.9

Eastern Region

First	115.3	8,610,000	78.7
Second	121.4	5,200,000	147.6
Third	124.9	6,750,000	137.9
Fourth	140.8	12,750,000	112.2
Fifth	126.0	14,300,000	128.2
Sixth	137.1	14,300,000	142.2
Seventh	116.3	19,400,000	132.3
Eighth	108.5	21,700,000	120.9
Ninth	144.5	27,000,000	157.4

Table 20 (continued)

South Shore Region

	Special Names Objective	Percentage Obtained	General and Payroll Sales Objective	Percentage Obtained
First	7,380,600	117.7	10,275,000	87.4
Second	5,405,000	132.9	7,000,000	148.4
Third	6,140,000	169.3	9,000,000	145.5
Fourth	7,761,000	148.9	17,500,000	105.4
Fifth	8,660,000	133.5	18,400,000	128.3
Sixth	8,660,000	146.3	18,400,000	130.2
Seventh	9,060,000	145.1	22,750,000	133.6
Eighth	8,700,000	147.6	25,675,000	123.9
Ninth	8,675,000	144.0	31,000,000	163.3

Island of Montreal

First	63,525,000	226.5	49,115,000	67.4
Second	99,265,000	153.5	28,000,000	136.4
Third	122,755,000	138.8	36,000,000	120.3
Fourth	168,889,000	131.1	58,000,000	101.5
Fifth	195,058,000	122.4	58,800,000	119.0
Sixth	197,640,000	116.8	58,800,000	129.2
Seventh	209,955,000	109.8	73,000,000	117.5
Eighth	206,300,000	107.0	78,800,000	129.8
Ninth	213,025,000	113.5	99,000,000	146.8

10 BCA, Neuvième Emprunt De La Victoire.

purchases, we may progress one step further in our goal of distinguishing Anglophone from Francophone participation in the Victory Loans, and in accounting for any disparities between the two. In the process, it may be possible to further test the theory that disparity of incomes explained the disparity of results received from English and French Canadians.

For each and every Victory Loan, Montreal, on the basis of General and Payroll sales, was the source of purchases out of proportion to its population. The question then arises, if donations to the French Federation of Charities were on the average far lower than donations to the other three in Montreal, how is it that the loans were so heavily subscribed in Montreal? Perhaps one reply to this dilemma lies in the large number of Quebecers in Montreal whose mother tongue was English. Based on the 1941 census, the Island of Montreal contained over sixty-five per cent of the province's Anglophones. Further, over twenty-seven per cent of the city's population was Anglophone. Conversely, Quebec County, of which Quebec City composed seventy-five per cent of the population, was ninety-eight per cent Francophone.

The author's purpose is not to indulge in the popular and emotional issue of socio-economic disparities between the English and French in Quebec, but simply to explain Victory Loan results in the light of there being two large linguistic groups in the province whose purchases of bonds are otherwise

Table 21 COMPARISON OF GENERAL AND PAYROLL SALES RESULTS
OBTAINED IN MONTREAL AND QUEBEC

Island of Montreal	First (a)	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth	Ninth
Result As Per Centage of Prov. Total	33,138,200 60.1 (C)	38,191,900 60.0	43,320,200 57.8	58,926,500 56.8	69,977,350 55.1	75,996,500 55.9	85,794,100 52.4	102,326,850 55.7	N.A.
Population As Per Cent of Provincial Total Population	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	

Table 21 (continued)

Quebec City

	First (a)	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth	Ninth
Result	2,746,250	2,979,100	3,951,000	6,113,350	7,417,700	7,900,450	8,708,700	6,035,150	N.A.
As Per Centage of Prov. Total	5.0	4.7	5.3	5.9	5.8	5.8	5.3	3.3	
Population As Per Cent of Provincial Total Population	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	

a - First Loan Results include conversions.

b - Based on Average Population (155,000) of Quebec during 7th, 8th and 9th Loans. Obtained from figures used by Quebec Division of NWFC.

c - Takes into account total First Loan conversions.

11 Results are those obtained by Quebec NWFC and are approximate, non-finalized totals.
 BCA, Neuvième Emprunt De La Victoire, Comité Des Finances De Guerre - Section de la Vente Général, Province de Québec, (bilingual).

difficult to determine. At this point it is safe to contend that on average, purchases by Anglophones were greater in value than purchases by Francophones. In Montreal at least, this may be attributed to a disparity of means, and in Quebec City, which was almost totally Francophone but which did not pass six per cent of total General and Payroll sales in the province, the claim may also hold true. Finally, the same claim may be applied to Quebec as a whole, that the means of Francophones were not as substantial as those of Anglophones, given the fact that of 2,060,082 (62%) Quebecers who lived outside of Quebec City and the Island of Montreal, 1,800,228 (89%) were Francophone, and that this area never furnished more than 42.3 percent of sales. However, as was noted previously, General and Payroll Sales in Quebec in the First Victory Loan fell short of projections, and at that, in all four regions of the province. This question needs further consideration.

If we may be permitted to return to the subject of objectives, there existed no universal equation to determine them. One may reasonably assume that they were determined with consideration for the given market's disposable income, that is, the market's ability to make bond purchases. There is no reason to conclude that organizers were so in error as to miscalculate the First Victory Loan's General and Payroll objective to such an extent that not one region in Quebec attained even ninety per cent. As noted earlier, subsequent objectives were lowered until the fourth loan.

Thus, assuming the competence of organizers to determine objectives, the answer must lie elsewhere, specifically, within the market itself. We have already alluded to the disparity of incomes between English and French speaking Quebecers as an explanation of results in Quebec and Montreal, as proportions of provincial results. However, this discounts the markets' actual inclination to buy, as well as factors such as numbers of individuals canvassed. These can be discovered though the polls and surveys conducted at various times during the war.

Upon completion of the Fifth Victory Loan, a public opinion poll was taken on behalf of the NWFC.¹² Results were given according to five geographic regions: the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia. Results given for Quebec were those obtained from the province's Francophone population only, while Quebec's Anglophones had their results included with Ontario's. Here, we will consider the responses of Quebec - given in Table 22 - in comparison with those from Canada as a whole, for the following questions: consciousness of loan details; the attitude of the public to bond purchases prior to the salesman's visit; the extent to which the public purchased bonds, and the source of those purchases; the public's appraisal of the salesman's behaviour; the public's knowledge of interest rates, denominations, etc.

¹²BCA, Poll of Canadian Public Opinion Upon Completion of Canada's Fifth Victory Loan Campaign.

At the outset, it should be noted that at least until the Seventh Victory Loan, the percentage of French Canadians approached for bond purchases was lower than the percentage of other Canadians. For the Fourth Victory Loan, fifty-six percent of Francophone Quebecers were approached, while a slight improvement to sixty-five percent coverage was obtained in the Fifth.¹³ Yet in the Seventh, while coverage, this time given for all of French Canada, improved to seventy percent, it was still short of the eighty-one percent coverage of English Canada.¹⁴ Considering, as indicated below, that Francophone Quebecers were on the whole less aware of details concerning the bond drives and the bonds themselves, they were less inclined on their own initiative to approach their bankers in order to make purchases, and thus, greater coverage by salesmen may have made a successful record even more so.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., Public Opinion Survey on Seventh Victory Loan (French and English), December 1944.

D. THE PUBLIC'S APPRAISAL OF SALESMAN'S BEHAVIOUR (asked of those who purchased bonds from salesman - (percentage of those canvassed who responded in the affirmative)

- 1) Well-informed?
- 2) Pleasing and courteous?
- 3) Aggressive and persistent?
- 4) Suggested larger purchase?
- 5) Did you make larger purchase?
- 6) Suggested instalment purchase?
- 7) Did you make instalment purchase?
- 8) Number bought per person?
- 9) Did he suggest others in family buy?
- 10) Others in family bought?
- 11) Left lapel insignia?
- 12) Wore lapel insignia?
- 13) Length of interview (Minutes)?

Questions:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Quebec	94%	97%	21%	66%	15%	61%	31%	1.4	59%	23%	88%	69%	18.8
All Canada	90%	90%	28%	48%	12%	57%	29%	1.3	42%	25%	75%	49%	17.3

E. EXTENT OF PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE REGARDING INTEREST, DENOMINATIONS, ETC.

If you owned a \$100 Victory Bond, and you needed money in a hurry,

- 1) Could you borrow from your bank on the strength of this bond?
- 2) (If "Yes") up to which amount could you borrow on this \$100 bond?
- 3) Could you convert your bond into cash?
- 4) (If "Yes") How much cash could you realize on a \$100 Victory Bond?

5) In which denominations are Victory Bonds available?
 a) \$50 b) \$100 c) \$500 d) \$1,000 e) \$5,000
 f) \$10,000 g) \$25,000

6) What rate of interest do Victory Bonds bear?
 a) 3% b) 1 1/2%

7) How do you collect interest on Victory Bonds?

Questions:	1	2	3	4	5(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
Quebec	77%	64%	71%	60%	65%	65%	45%	37%	11%	11%	6%
All Canada	91%	69%	88%	75%	86%	78%	59%	51%	16%	14%	9%

Questions:	6(a)	(b)	7
Quebec	61%	1%	59%
All Canada	72%	1%	78%

There are two particularly noteworthy aspects to the Fifth Victory Loan opinion poll. For those in Quebec who purchased their bonds through salesmen, those salesmen were thought of more highly than their counterparts in the rest of Canada. Secondly, - and this is found in a section of the poll not covered in this study - those in Quebec who bought bonds, bought more (1.4 vs. 1.3) than other Canadians, which might indicate greater enthusiasm among those who indeed purchased bonds. However, these poll results can only be related to purchasers per se and do not take into account the opinions of those who did not purchase. There is one other disturbing statistic in this poll; fewer Francophone Quebecers purchased bonds than people in other parts of Canada, as evidenced in Section C. From the results obtained in the Seventh Loan opinion poll, it is clear that the reason for this was not so much passive resistance but lack of money, which supports the previous contention about disparity of incomes.

Table 23 SEVENTH VICTORY LOAN - PUBLIC OPINION POLL

A - Did you subscribe to the Seventh Victory Loan?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
French Canada	55%	45%
Total Canada	69.7%	30.3%

B - Did you buy more Victory Bonds in the Seventh Loan than in the Sixth?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
French Canada	45%	55%
Total Canada	42%	58%

C - (If yes) What was the principal reason which prompted you to increase your subscription?

- 1) Increased income, better job
- 2) More patriotic, end war quickly
- 3) Investment, future purchases
- 4) Better salesmanship
- 5) Everyone else did at factory and office

Questions:	1	2	3	4	5
French Canada	42%	32%	23%	2%	1%
Total Canada	42%	36.2%	18.8%	2.0%	1.0%

D - (If "No" in B) What was your principal reason for not increasing your subscription?

- 1) No money, no extra cash
- 2) Oversubscribed before, now buying certificates
- 3) Was not convinced of need
- 4) Not approached
- 5) Unsympathetic toward government, war

Questions:	1	2	3	4	5
French Canada	90%	7%	-	-	3%
Total Canada	77.4%	19.6%	0.7%	0.7%	1.6%

E - To which main factor do you attribute the success of the Seventh Loan?

- 1) War trend, end it quickly
- 2) Patriotic, gratitude
- 3) Good investment, saving
- 4) War effort, sacrifice
- 5) Surplus money
- 6) Better organized
- 7) Canada needs money

Questions:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
French Canada	25%	13%	17%	8%	8%	27%	2%
Total Canada	37.6%	13.7%	13.5%	8.0%	8.7%	14.4%	4.1%

F - Have you any further comment to make which you think might be of interest to the Victory Loan people?

- 1) Campaign money wasted
- 2) Campaign well done
- 3) Willing to have more loans
- 4) Salesmen good
- 5) Need smaller bond denomination
- 6) Need more radio programmes and shows
- 7) Need more salesmen
- 8) Make buying compulsory
- 9) Stress value of bonds in post-war period

Questions:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
French Canada	21%	24%	9%	12%	2%	25%	3%	4%	-
Total Canada	42.0%	23.3%	9.7%	6.4%	3.4%	9.6%	2.3%	2.6%	0.7%

That three per cent of French Canadians declared they were unsympathetic to the war effort - Question D5 - is perhaps remarkable in that the figure was not higher. Moreover, it should be noted that throughout the war years, there is only one perceptible case that may reasonably be construed as passive resistance to war finance programmes in Quebec.

This occurred in stamp sales in May 1942, the month following the plebiscite. In Quebec, sales dropped fifty-eight percent from those in April, as opposed to decreases of seven, two, and seven per cent in Prince Edward Island, Ontario and British Columbia respectively.¹⁵ Also, on the basis of \$50 and \$100 denomination bonds resold by the public to banks, Quebecers demonstrated a rate that was slightly higher than Quebec's sales as a proportion of total cash sales in Canada.

Thus, resales in Quebec as a proportion of total resales were slightly higher than original purchases as a proportion of total cash sales. The reasons for this are probably two: changed financial circumstances necessitating the availability of ready cash; some chose to sell their bonds as a sign of quiet revolt against the federal government's wartime policies.

¹⁵BCA, Statistics and Information, op. cit., p. 89.

Table 24

CUMULATIVE (March 7, 1942 - January 31, 1945)
 PERCENTAGE OF \$50 AND \$100 DENOMINATION
 BONDS RESOLD TO BANKS BY QUEBECERS
 IN COMPARISON WITH PERCENTAGE
 OF ORIGINAL PURCHASES MADE IN QUEBEC¹⁶

Loans	Proportion of Quebec Resales to Total Resales		Proportion of General & Payroll Sales from Quebec
	\$50 Denomination	\$100 Denomination	
First	17.89%	18.24%	18.35%
Second	25.91%	19.04%	18.91%
Third	26.27%	21.15%	20.06%
Fourth	26.12%	21.01%	19.72%
Fifth	24.61%	22.64%	21.31%
Sixth	28.15%	23.58%	21.64%
Seventh	26.74%	22.48%	22.14%

¹⁶ Statistics on resales obtained from PAC, RG 19, Vol. 588, File 155-1D.

To summarize our analysis of the results of the various war finance programmes in Quebec, we may say that on the whole, based on objectives, they were, with perhaps the exception of the First Loan General and Payroll Sales results, an unqualified success. In terms of numbers of applications per capita and average value of applications, Quebec ranked at times at the head of the other provinces and seldom at the bottom. Although we may conclude that Francophone Quebecers on average did not spend as much money on their bonds purchases, this may largely be explained by disparities in personal income, less than adequate coverage of the French Canadian market, and finally, lack of sympathy for the government and the war, albiet at a lesser degree than might have been expected. With greater coverage by salesmen, there is no doubt that at least the loan results could have been improved. This point cannot be too strenuously laboured, for when asked to mention which aspects of salesmanship were considered to be particularly ineffective, during the Seventh Loan, only forty-nine per cent of French Canadians versus sixty-nine per cent of English Canadians said they had been subjected to unethical sales pressure, while twenty-three per cent of French Canadians as opposed to six percent of English Canadians claimed that salesmen did not return to make closing sales.¹⁷

¹⁷ BCA, Public Opinion Survey on Seventh Victory Loan, December 1944.

The results obtained by the non-governmental recipients of the voluntary effort were not inconsistent with the income figures given in Table 19. This holds true for the Red Cross campaigns as well as for the Canadian War Services Fund Campaign, which was held in 1941. Their results are given in Tables 25 and 26.

If it were not for problems encountered by a number of Salvage Committees in Quebec, the province's overall standing - on the basis of pounds per person collected - of fifth place may have been higher. Rural committees especially, appear to have had difficulty collecting waste paper in sufficient quantities so as to make such collection economical. With what appears to have been a typical case among Quebec committees, the Salvage organizers in Mont Joli claimed that only very small amounts of waste paper could be collected due to the fact that what little paper people possessed was used either as fuel for stoves or for wrapping parcels in stores.¹⁸ Other problems of a general nature included a lack of storage facilities, gasoline shortages due to rationing, and localities too poor to offer suitable salvage.¹⁹ Of course, there always existed a certain amount of non-cooperation among the population, whose good will was often tried by a demanding voluntary effort. As the organizer in Mont-Joli complained to La Flèche, one had to

¹⁸PAC, RG 44, Vol. 11, Roger Charbonneau (Provincial Supervisor) to J.F. McCallum (Acting Director of National Salvage), October 26, 1944.

¹⁹Ibid., Charbonneau to McCallum, October 17, 1944.

Table 25 SUMMARY OF CANADIAN RED CROSS CAMPAIGN RESULTS

	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.
1939 (Nov. 13-22)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Objective	18,000	140,000	68,000	960,000	2,600,000	317,000	229,000	360,000	308,000
Result (\$)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Per Centage of Objective	.19	.24	.15	.29	.69	.43	.26	.45	.38
Per Capita Donation (\$)	8	7	9	5	1	3	6	2	4
Standing									

1940 (Aug. 23-Sept. 2)									
Objective	15,000	200,000	120,000	1,000,000	2,400,000	300,000	200,000	300,000	500,000
Result (\$)	27,500	217,500	127,500	1,230,000	2,790,000	355,000	190,000	232,000	507,000
Per Centage of Objective	183	109	106	120	116	118	95	77	101
Per Capita Donation (\$)	.29	.38	.28	.37	.74	.49	.21	.29	.62
Standing	6	4	7	5	1	3	8	6	2

1941 NO CAMPAIGN									
1942 (May 11-17)									
Objective	40,000	350,000	200,000	2,000,000	4,300,000	600,000	260,000	350,000	900,000
Result (\$)	73,369	380,178	220,000	2,175,000	4,477,327	708,331	453,000	560,000	931,410
Per Centage of Objective	183	109	110	109	104	118	173	160	103
Per Capita Donation (\$)	.77	.66	.48	.65	1.18	.97	.51	.70	1.14
Standing	4	6	9	7	1	3	8	5	2

Table 25 (continued)

	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.
1943 (March 1-6)									
Objective	50,000	350,000	200,000	2,250,000	5,000,000	600,000	350,000	400,000	800,000
Result (\$)	98,884	446,000	255,847	2,300,000	5,202,620	804,805	480,000	657,511	1,005,125
Per Centage of Objective	197	131	128	102	104	134	137	164	125
Per Capita Donation (\$)	1.04	.81	.56	.69	1.37	1.10	.54	.83	1.23
Standing	4	6	8	7	1	3	9	5	2

	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.
1944 (Feb. 25-March 15)									
Objective	50,000	350,000	200,000	2,250,000	5,000,000	600,000	350,000	400,000	800,000
Result (\$)	111,000	512,000	273,597	2,467,063	5,294,645	933,695	650,000	716,000	1,175,450
Per Centage of Objective	222	146	136	109	106	155	186	179	147
Per Capita Donation (\$)	1.17	.89	.60	.83	1.40	1.28	.73	.82	1.44
Standing	4	5	9	6	2	3	8	7	1

	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.
1945 (March 5-21)									
Objective	50,000	350,000	200,000	2,250,000	5,000,000	600,000	350,000	400,000	800,000
Result (\$)	117,939	500,000	283,909	2,526,831	5,590,098	1,012,387	675,000	838,000	1,343,000
Per Centage of Objective	236	143	142	112	112	169	193	209	168
Per Capita Donation (\$)	1.24	.87	.62	.76	1.48	1.39	.75	1.05	1.64
Standing	4	6	9	7	2	3	8	5	1

Table 26

RESULTS OF CANADIAN WAR SERVICES FUND CAMPAIGN²⁰

	Sask.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	N.S.	N.B.	Alta.	B.C.	P.E.I.
Amount Subscribed (\$)	411,501	1,564,069	3,035,616	401,090	393,847	245,082	365,557	610,173	56,442
Per Capita Donation (\$)	.46	.47	.80	.55	.68	.54	.46	.75	.70
Standing	8	7	10	5	4	6	8	2	3

²⁰ RG 44, Vol: 5, Canadian War Services Fund; Memorandum re Campaign and Administrative Expenses to December 31, 1941.

contend with the

indifférence de la population à coopérer dans le ramassage de rebuts, tant ils sont fatigués, énervés et désabusés des mille demandes de coopération et de travail bénévolé qui leur sont faits de tout bord et tout côté.²¹

At the time of this letter, Canada had just entered its sixth year of war.

The success of the voluntary effort may also be measured from the point of view of the strength of membership of the voluntary organizations themselves. One obvious choice would be the Red Cross, the largest single voluntary organization in Canada. From Table 28 it is apparent that the increase in membership in the Junior Red Cross did not approach that of the Senior Red Cross, probably because in Quebec there were many religiously-based youth movements already undertaking voluntary war work.

Yet, when one examines the accelerated rate of growth of a group with deeper roots in Quebec, such as the Knights of Columbus (Table 29), such growth may be attributed to the Knights' involvement with auxiliary war services.

* * *

The results of the voluntary effort in Quebec collectively constitute an objective dimension to this study in that they represent the end product of an undertaking that gauged its success by tangible and concrete evidence.³

²¹ Ibid., C.B. Beaudet to La Flèche, October 17, 1944.

Table 27

RESULTS OF WARTIME NATIONAL SALVAGE CAMPAIGN

For Twenty-Seven Months - May 31, 1941 to July 31, 1943			
	Materials Collected (lbs)	Lbs. per capita	Standing
P.E.I.	2,620,917	27.6	4
Nova Scotia	7,339,123	12.7	9
New Brunswick	8,277,099	18.1	6
Quebec	60,085,644	18.0	7
Ontario	203,986,560	53.9	2
Manitoba	39,588,995	54.2	1
Saskatchewan	15,935,908	17.8	8
Alberta	21,268,774	26.7	5
British Columbia	26,609,000	32.5	3

For Forty-Nine Months to May 31, 1945			
P.E.I.	2,758,481	29.0	7
Nova Scotia	14,579,423	25.0	9
New Brunswick	13,654,444	29.9	6
Quebec	107,781,968	32.3	5
Ontario	362,015,023	95.6	1
Manitoba	64,672,758	88.6	2
Saskatchewan	25,509,673	28.5	8
Alberta	36,217,593	45.5	4
British Columbia	38,943,379	47.6	3

Difference - July 31, 1943 to May 31, 1945			
P.E.I.	137,564	1.5	9
Nova Scotia	7,240,300	12.5	6
New Brunswick	5,377,345	11.8	7
Quebec	47,696,324	14.3	5
Ontario	158,028,463	41.8	1
Manitoba	25,083,763	34.4	2
Saskatchewan	9,573,765	10.7	8
Alberta	14,948,819	18.8	3
British Columbia	12,334,379	15.1	4

Table 28 WARTIME GROWTH OF RED CROSS MEMBERSHIP IN CANADA 22

Junior Red Cross		P.E.I.	Alta.	B.C.	N.S.	Sask.	N.B.	Man.	Que.	Ont.
1939	Branches	616	901	951	1,064	1,080	1,165	1,188	1,748	5,417
	Members	15,974	23,631	26,855	32,004	39,472	33,262	32,509	51,720	166,403
1940	Branches	616	1,161	1,077	1,574	3,768	1,206	1,459	1,823	6,974
	Members	15,981	29,433	30,995	48,877	106,813	33,664	45,174	52,601	221,164
1941	Branches	620	1,532	1,618	1,328	5,161	1,328	2,201	2,029	9,484
	Members	15,993	40,265	60,089	35,676	138,865	35,676	62,980	57,904	294,032
1942	Branches	617	1,988	1,633	2,241	5,231	1,294	2,457	2,087	10,672
	Members	15,759	49,825	51,867	70,495	139,960	34,851	68,240	60,280	334,420
1943	Branches	621	2,084	1,516	2,291	4,685	1,274	2,572	2,094	10,967
	Members	15,988	53,832	53,783	69,699	95,170	34,139	70,170	60,141	340,302
1944	Branches	612	2,027	1,766	2,255	4,783	1,431	2,572	2,118	11,912
	Members	15,348	53,131	58,096	67,181	108,578	38,015	70,170	60,002	370,465
1945	Branches	585	1,693	2,137	2,276	4,900	1,487	2,580	2,147	11,980
	Members	13,127	42,225	67,384	67,696	110,982	38,902	69,767	60,797	371,344

Senior Red Cross		P.E.I.	Alta.	B.C.	N.S.	Sask.	N.B.	Man.	Que.	Ont.
1940	Branches	7	361	98	98	871	96	281	165	451
	Members	6,600	61,510	114,580	45,469	100,000	29,870	90,000	113,412	500,000
1941	Branches	7	376	98	97	916	101	296	184	463
	Members	6,600	77,230	114,000	10,157	100,000	30,000	87,000	133,449	500,000
1942	Branches	7	390	97	100	954	97	311	185	456
	Members	15,000	78,000	151,759	37,000	125,000	75,000	70,000	190,000	497,544
1943	Branches	7	389	97	100	944	97	316	193	459
	Members	18,000	100,000	165,000	60,000	125,000	95,000	105,000	235,000	950,000
1944	Branches	7	395	96	93	876	97	315	197	465
	Members	25,000	100,000	210,333	95,000	60,715	60,000	100,000	240,000	950,000
1945	Branches	7	375	96	92	881	82	310	310	465
	Members	28,000	100,000	245,489	100,000	140,000	50,000	110,000	110,000	1,000,000

22 LCRCs, Annual Reports.

PERCENTAGE OF GROWTH BASED ON
HIGHEST OVER LOWEST NUMBER OF BRANCHES AND MEMBERS

	P.E.I.	Alta.	B.C.	N.S.	Sask.	N.B.	Man.	Que.	Ont.
Junior Red Cross									
Members	22	128	151	120	255	17	116	18	123
Branches	5	131	125	115	384	28	117	23	121
Senior Red Cross									
Members	324	55	115	884	131	218	57	112	101
Branches	0	9	2	9	10	5	12	107	3

Table 29

GROWTH IN MEMBERSHIP OF KNIGHTS²³
OF COLUMBUS IN QUEBEC, 1930-1950

	No. of Councils	Assured Members	Associate Members	Total
1930	56	5,681	11,157	16,838
1935	60	6,029	8,325	14,354
1940	73	7,909	9,855	17,764
1945	103	13,734	27,797	41,531
1950	161	19,899	42,607	62,506
Per Centage of Change Over Previous Five Years				
1930	-	-	-	-
1935	26	6	-25.4	-15.
1940	22.	31.	18.	24.
1945	41.	74.	182.	134.
1950	56	45	53.	49

²³ Figures are taken from Jean-Charles Drolet, L'Ordre Des Chevaliers De Colomb, Centre d'études et de recherches historiques du Saguenay, Chicoutimi, 1968, p. 184.

The war loan campaigns, with the close to seven billion dollars of new money they raised for wartime expenditures, are clearly the strongest source of statistics on which to base our conclusions. Yet, the simple fact that Quebec was successful in attaining and surpassing its overall objective fails to differentiate between Francophone and Anglophone General Sales and Payroll purchases. In comparing results from Quebec and Montreal, the author has made and supported the contention that the Francophone purchase was smaller on average than the Anglophone, the reason for this being largely a disparity of incomes between the two, which was not reflected in provincial personal income statistics. However, whether or not Francophones were purchasing at a level consistent with their ability to do so, is another question altogether. After examining the opinion polls made for the National War Finance Committee, we may infer that indeed they were doing so.

In terms of per capita donations, Quebec acquitted itself better in the Red Cross, Canadian War Services fund, and Salvage campaigns than might be expected, again taking into consideration the per capita, per annum personal income figures cited earlier which ranked Quebec in seventh place. We also saw how war work augmented the ranks of the Knights of Columbus in Quebec, where the Catholic organization traditionally enjoyed a strong base of support.

On the negative side, and this was to be expected, anti-war and anti-government sentiment was probably reflected

in the disproportionate redemption of \$50 and \$100 denomination bonds before maturity, with respect to total General and Payroll Sales made in Quebec. However, one mitigating factor may have been that a disproportionate number of Quebecers felt they had to cash their bonds in in order to satisfy an acute need for money. One is reminded of the Seventh Victory Loan opinion poll where 90 per cent of French Canadians (Question D) who did not buy bonds stated they had had no extra cash, as opposed to 77.4 per cent in Canada as a whole.

An effort has been made to qualify the statistics given in this chapter. In terms of per capita contributions, Quebec certainly did not place first in the voluntary effort during the war. However, in terms of the ability to contribute, Quebec performed at least as well as the other provinces.

CONCLUSION

The Second World War was for Canada a test of strengths as well as weaknesses. When in September 1939, the government of Mackenzie King committed this country to a conflict which at that time was an unknown quantity, it was bound to deal with whatever rigours national unity might be subjected to.

Canada entered the war on Britain's side ostensibly as a united nation. Yet this conflict between world powers at once set the stage for a political ordeal which saw dissension among Canadians themselves. All the better reason to consider the story of Quebec's role in the voluntary war effort. Not only does it offer a unique historical perspective of the war years in Canada, it also serves as an affirmation of the worthiness of a country whose very existence is subject to constant stress.

To select one province and then to dwell on its role in the voluntary war effort has admittantly been no minor challenge. Objectively speaking, Quebec is just another province of Canada. From the subjective standpoint, however, it is not just another province but the home of French Canada. Thus, the dilemma posed by this study was as follows: how does one judge the efforts of a province, the large majority of whose population speaks French, yet which is situated in a country where the majority speaks English.

The foregoing dilemma has been dealt with in three ways. First, a statistical comparison of results with the other provinces has been undertaken. Second, is the attempt to differentiate between results which may reasonably be attributed to each of the two main language groups in Quebec. Third, the author has sought answers, where pertinent, to the question of why results were as they were. Unavoidably, the author has relied to a great extent on statistics.

However, he has also taken stock of the reality that the voluntary effort of a province such as Quebec transcends merely quantitative considerations. It also cannot be considered in complete isolation from the national voluntary effort. Yet the focus has been on Quebec.

As the Second World War escalated, a definite and growing need for widespread voluntary participation was demonstrated. The Federal Government, primarily through the Department of National War Services under Ministers Gardiner, Thorson, and La Flèche, established the rules and regulations by which the various voluntary organizations had to conduct themselves. From a legal standpoint, the most noteworthy symbol of Federal direction and control was the War Charities Act whose enforcement fell to the Department of National War Services. Anyone undertaking the raising of money or material for any purpose connected with the war was required to register as a war charity and to submit annually statements as to revenues and expenses.

The large wartime cash requirements of the Federal

Government itself were the responsibility of the Department of Finance and its two wartime Ministers, Ralston and Ilsley. These requirements would not have been equitably filled without the reliance on individual and corporate pocket-books. The methods employed by the Department to raise cash-war bonds and war savings certificates and stamps - were the most visible and frequent symbols of the voluntary effort in Canada during the war.

Thus, the Canadian Government, at the outset, moved to establish a national framework that would facilitate the prosecution of war on the voluntary level through clearly delineated lines of competence and authority. It is against this national framework that the voluntary effort of any one province must be considered.

Quebec, according to its abilities, satisfied what was expected of it as well as any other province. At the same time it became evident that there existed a marked disparity of means between anglophone and francophone Quebecers, which largely explains the difference in per capita war loan purchases between Montreal, with its large anglophone population, and Quebec City, which was almost totally francophone. Indeed, the difference between the two cities in itself serves to reinforce the original contention.

In other voluntary activities, such as the Red Cross campaigns, Canadian War Services Fund drive, and the collection of salvage, Quebec generally ranked seventh on a per capita basis, which was consistent with the province's

rank with respect to per capita annual income.

The fact that Quebec's voluntary war effort was a success is perhaps startling in itself. At once one is faced with the task of explaining the anomaly of how a province, the majority of which was so unalterably opposed to conscription for overseas service, but whose hopes were dashed in June 1940 and late 1944 with its actual implementation, would nonetheless fulfill the demands made upon it.

Not that anti-war, anti-conscription sentiment was not ably represented in Quebec. Indeed it was, first with La Ligue Pour La Défense du Canada, then with its politicized successor, Le Bloc Populaire Canadien. Also, Maurice Duplessis' Union Nationale and Adélard Godbout's Liberals were against conscription for overseas service, which is understandable considering this accorded with the sentiments of most Québécois. However, as mentioned earlier, if the leader of the Bloc Populaire, Maxime Raymond, or its other prominent members such as Liguori Lacombe, Wilfrid Lacroix, or René Chaloult had ever counselled the party's supporters not to support this or that aspect of the voluntary effort, their days of freedom would have been numbered. Yet Québécois, like other Canadians, were not constrained by law to participate in the voluntary effort and the fact that no one could campaign against it does not explain adequately the reasons for success. Those reasons must be sought elsewhere.

The author holds the strong conviction that despite

the expressed wishes of Quebecers that conscription not be enacted, there was a fundamental understanding in Quebec during the war that the greater the voluntary effort, the greater the chances of Canada emerging victorious. In other words the voluntary effort was seen as a means of prosecuting the war, and although one's attitude to Canada's methods of raising military manpower might be reserved, the way was nonetheless open for one to contribute to victory by voluntary means. Also, one's anti-conscriptionism was not necessarily incompatible with patriotism. There is no better way to illustrate this than by bringing to light the fact that although most of Maskinongé's villages were on a list of 500 municipalities which had adopted anti-conscription resolutions,¹ the mayors of all of the county's villages were on local loan committees.² Of course there were some who chose to boycott the voluntary effort either out of lack of sympathy for the war in general, or more plausibly, anger that conscription had become a reality. However, the fact that results were not inordinately below expectations points to some revealing aspects of wartime Quebec. Considering that the approaches used to elicit a response in Quebec were not always effective, one realizes that results indeed could have been even higher. Viewed from another perspective

¹Le Devoir, June 18, 20, 1942, p. 2.

²La Presse, October 14, 1942, p. 11.

one is surprised that the results of the voluntary effort were not less positive.

As noted earlier, French-language publicity material for the First Victory Loan was not used to the greatest effect. Most of it arrived at loan committees too late. Consequently, the poll taken of the opinions of committee members showed a marked disparity in effectiveness between English and French-language publicity material. In itself, such an error was a source of national disunity because it undermined the efforts of others to convince French Canadians that they were as Canadian as anyone else. There was also the occasional lack of tact on the part of federal authorities, including Ministers of the Crown. One case of the arousal of hard feelings that has not been mentioned centred around the launching of a corvette, the Trois Rivières, at Sorel during the summer of 1942. It was to be equipped by the people of Trois Rivières through the purchase of war savings certificates and stamps. In November it was learned by the town's inhabitants that their corvette was anchored in Halifax sporting the name "Three Rivers". As L'Action Catholique pondered, "Pourquoi a-t-on débaptisé ce qui avait été baptisé en français, pour le rebaptiser en anglais?"³ To those who might brush this incident off as a minor detail, challenged L'Action, had it not been just a detail when recently, French-language ads had been placed

³November 28, 1942, p. 4.

in Toronto streetcars? And did that not create an uproar?

L'Action closed with the question: who best serves national unity, those who go out of their way to change the name of a French town into English, or those who continue to equip their corvette according to their promise?

Apparently, it was sometimes hard enough for Quebecers to convince other Canadians that they were helping to win the war let alone having to fight other Canadians on their own soil over the naming of a naval ship. Thus the French Canadian was faced with a number of challenges, and it would appear that faith alone sustained him in his efforts. And this faith was reinforced by his religion.

The Catholic Church saw this war not as a crusade to convert, but rather as one to preserve Christian civilization. The hierarchy's support of the general war effort and Cardinal Villeneuve's frequent letters urging his congregation to get out and give cannot but have aided the voluntary effort.

This study also devoted considerable attention to the formation of the Canada-France Relations Committee, a voluntary organization whose aim was to succour the suffering of France and Frenchmen. Although French Canadians could not be expected to feel the same attachment to France as English Canadians to England, the division between Vichy and de Gaulle supporters in Quebec at once pointed up the conflict of perceptions of France with relation to nationality and religion. The case of the CFRC is also important in that

it concerns a voluntary activity where Quebec understandably contributed more than the other provinces.

Finally, opinion polls support the suspicion that all was not done that could have been to secure Quebec's widest possible participation. It was not until the Seventh Victory Loan that coverage of French Canadians by agents was as extensive as in English Canada. It was Canada's war and the success or failure of the voluntary means of fighting that war would depend on how people were appealed to in order that they might identify the challenge and struggle as being their own.

It would appear that despite the trial and error of publicity, the inability of some organizations to communicate effectively with francophones, and the disappointment of having conscription implemented in spite of declared pledges to the contrary, the Québécois indeed saw Canada's war as being their own.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1939 May - National Film Board created by Act of Parliament
- September - Canada declares war on Germany.
- War Charities Act passed placing supervision of war charities under Secretary of State.
- October - Adélard Godbout's Liberals are victorious over Maurice Duplessis and the Union Nationale.
- November - Canadian Red Cross Society holds first wartime campaign for donations.
- 1940 January - General Louis R. La Flèche appointed military attaché to Canadian Legation in Paris.
- March - First War Loan is held.
- Liberals win Federal Election.
- May - La Caisse de L'Assistance aux Oeuvres Françaises de Guerre founded in Montreal.
- War Savings Certificatés and Stamps offered for first time.
- June - National Resources Mobilization Act passed calling for military service within Canada.
- Layton Ralston appointed Minister of Defence.
- France capitulates.
- Canadian Ambassador Georges Vanier leaves France for London.
- July - James Ilesley appointed Ralston's successor as Minister of Finance.
- Department of National War Services inaugurated with James Gardiner as First Minister.
- Pétain Government promulgates new French "Corporatiste" Constitution.
- August - Responsibility for War Charities Act transferred from Secretary of State to Department of National War Services.
- September - Second War Loan is held.
- Red Cross holds second wartime campaign (August 23-September 2).
- October - General Georges Vanier goes to Canada on leave of absence. Pierre Dupuy, First Secretary of Staff of Canadian Legation to France, assumes Vanier's duties.

- December - National War Services Fund Advisory Board established.
 - France Quand Môme registered under War Charities Act.
 - Unsuccessful attempt by Dr. Vignal of France Quand Môme to rally all "free French" groups around central committee in Ottawa.
- 1941 January - Salvage Division of Department of National War Services established.
- March - National War Services Fund campaign is held.
- April - Nation-wide salvage collection begins.
- May - General Vanier resigns as Ambassador to France.
 - Cypher and pouch privileges are withdrawn from French Legation in Ottawa.
- June - First Victory Loan is held.
 - Donald Thorson succeeds Gardiner as Minister of National War Services.
- August - Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt sign Atlantic Charter, which sets forth list of common Allied war aims which include recognition of territorial sovereignty of conquered nations.
- October - Women's Voluntary Service Division of Department of National War Services established.
- November - Division of Public Information established.
- December - Justice Minister, Ernest Lapointe, dies.
 - France Libre founded in Quebec City.
 - Louis St. Laurent becomes Justice Minister.
 - Hong Kong surrenders with heavy loss of Canadian lives.
- 1942 January - National War Finance Committee established.
 - Declaration of the United Nations, setting forth Allies' war aims, signed by 26 states.
- February - St. Laurent elected in Quebec East by-election.
 - Second Victory Loan held (Feb. 16-March 7).
 - Thorson inaugurates Citizen's Committees.
- March - Order in Council 2199 sets procedure by which accountable grants made to auxiliary service organizations.
- April - Nation-wide plebiscite on conscription held. Province of Quebec votes overwhelmingly in the negative.
- May - Third wartime Red Cross campaign held.
- July - France Combattante formed in London.
 - National Resources Mobilization Act Amendment Act (Bill 80) presented and passed (August 1), thereby releasing government from promise not to conscript men for overseas service.

- P.J.A. Cardin, Minister of Public Works, resigns.
- September - Wartime Information Board inaugurated with Charles Vining as first Chairman.
- October - Bloc Populaire Canadien founded by Maxime Raymond and others.
- Louis R. La Flèche appointed Minister of National War Services.
- November - Canada withdraws recognition of Vichy France.
- La Flèche wins Outremont by election.

- 1943 January - President of University of New Brunswick, N.A.M. Mackenzie, succeeds Charles Vining as Chairman of Wartime Information Board.
- John Grierson becomes manager of WIB.
- March - Fourth Red Cross campaign held.
- April - Fourth Victory Loan held.
- August - Canada recognizes Comité Français de la Libération Nationale formed in London and later moved to Algeria.
- General Vanier appointed Canadian Ambassador to CFLN in Algeria.
- October - Fifth Victory Loan held (Oct. 18-Nov. 6).
- Canada-France Relations Committee registered under War Charities Act.

- 1944 January - General de Gaulle receives Vanier as Canadian Ambassador.
- February - Fifth Red Cross Campaign (February 25-March 15).
- April - Sixth Victory Loan held (April 24-May 13).
- May - Division of Voluntary War Relief of Department of National War Services established.
- June - D-day Allied forces invade France.
- August - Godbout loses Quebec election to Duplessis.
- Bloc Populaire wins four seats.
- De Gaulle enters Paris on city's liberation.
- September - Canadian United Allied Relief Fund registered under War Charities Act.
- October - National War Services Fund Advisory Board recommends auspices of Red Cross be used in meeting Allied Relief requirements of 1945.
- Seventh Victory Loan held.
- Canada recognizes de Gaulle administration as Provisional Government of France.
- November - Conscripts sent overseas.
- Charles "Chubby" Power has resignation accepted by Mackenzie King.

- 1945 March - Sixth Red Cross campaign includes portion
of Canadian United Allied Relief Fund
requirements in objective.
- April, - Eighth Victory Loan held (April 23-May 12).
May - Victory in Europe.
- July - Liberals win Federal election.
- August - Victory over Japan.
- October - Ninth and last Victory Loan held
(October 22-November 10).

Appendix I

VICTORY LOANS - REGIONS AND UNITS OF QUEBEC

Eastern Region a

<u>Unit</u>	<u>County</u>		
011	Kamouraska	031	Roberval
012	Rivière du Loup	032	Chicoutime
013	Rimouski	033	Lac St. Jean
014	Matane	034	Saguenay
015	Bonaventure	035	Charlevoix-Baie St. Paul
016	Gaspé North & South	044	Québec County
017	Matapédia	045	Montmorency
018	Temiscouata	046	Portneuf
021	Beauce	041	Quebec City
022	Bellechasse	042	Quebec City
023	Dorchester	043	Quebec City
024	Lévis	047	Quebec City
025	L'Islet	048	Quebec City
026	Lotbinière	049	Quebec City
027	Montmagny		

South Shore Region b

051	Arthabaska	071	Bagot	091	Valleyfield
052	Compton	072	Drummond	092	Beauharnois
053	Frontenac	073	Richelieu	093	Chateauguay East
054	Mégantic	074	St. Hyacinthe	094	Chateauguay West
055	Nicolet	075	Verchères	095	Huntingdon
056	Wolfe	076	Yamaska	096	Vaudreuil-Solanges
061	Brome	081	Chambly		
062	Missisquoi	082	Iberville		
063	Richmond	083	Laprairie		
064	Shefford	084	Napierville		
065	Sherbrooke	085	Rouville		
066	Stanstead	086	St. Jean		

Northwestern Region c

101	Champlain	121	Argenteuil
102	Maskinongé	122	Labelle
103	Shawinigan	123	Pontiac
	Falls	124	Papineau
104	Trois-Rivières	125	Gatineau
105	Grand'Mère	126	Hull
106	La Tuque	127	Témiscamingue South
		128	Témiscamingue North
		129	Gatineau South

Northwestern Region (Cont.)Unit County

111	Berthier County		
112	Joliette		
113	L'assomption		
114	Montcalm	131	Noranda-Rouyn
115	Terrebonne	132	Val D'Or
116	Deux Montagnes	133	Amos-Lasarre
117	Laval		

Island of MontrealUnit

141		171	191	211
142		172	192	212
143		173	193	213
144		174	194	214
145		175	195	215
		176	196	216
151		177	197	
152				221
153		181	201	222
154		182	202	223
155		183	203	224
		184	204	225
161		185	205	226
162		186		
163		187		
164				
165				

- a - St. Anne-des-Monts and Cap-Chat, normally in Gaspé North, were included in Matane Unit.
- Matapédia Parish, normally in Matapédia County, was included in Bonaventure Unit.
- Charlevoix was divided between Units 034 and 035.
- The English-speaking population of Sillery was included in Unit 043 while the French-speaking population was included in 044.
- b - City of Valleyfield is in Beauharnois County.
- c - Gatineau and Témiscamingue Counties are each divided into two units.

Source: BCA, Neuvième Emprunt De La Victoire, Comité National Des Finances De Guerre, Section De La Vente Generale, Prov. de Québec.

Appendix II

FRENCH AND FRENCH-CANADIAN WAR
 CHARITIES IN QUEBEC REGISTERED BEFORE MAY 1945

<u>Title</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date First Registered</u>	<u>Date De-registered</u>
COMITES DE RECUPERATION DE:			
Baie St. Paul	Baie St. Paul	14/08/43	14/08/44
St. Georges de Beauce	St. Georges de Beauce	7/7/43	7/7/44
Warwick	Warwick	16/11/42	16/11/43
Loretteville	Loretteville	22/05/43	30/10/44
Ile d'Orléans	Montmorency	31/05/43	30/10/44
L'Islet	L'Islet	31/05/43	31/05/44
Chambord	Chambord	3/11/42	1943
Acton Vale	Acton Vale, Bagot	5/10/42	28/05/46
Abitibi & Amos	Amos	28/10/42	26/12/45
Almaville	Almaville	14/10/43	30/01/45
Amqui	Amqui	18/12/42	1/03/45
Armagh	Armagh Station	5/02/44	16/01/46
Ayers Ltée	Lachute Mills	11/01/44	4/04/45
Batiscan	Batiscan	25/08/43	25/08/44
Beauport	Beauport	27/04/44	26/06/45
Beaupré	Beaupré	11/08/43	4/02/46
La Cote de Beaupré	St. Louis de Courville	13/10/42	1944
Cabano	Cabano	13/11/43	14/12/45
Mont Rolland	Mont Rolland	15/06/42	July/44
La Ville de Nicolet	Nicolet	19/05/42	22/03/46
Ste-Agathe	Ste-Agathe	25/06/42	25/06/44
Ste-Agricole	Ste-Agricole	13/08/41	23/06/42
Trois Pistoles	Trois Pistoles	28/07/42	25/01/46
Trois Rivières	Trois Rivières	26/12/41	30/01/46
Victoriaville	Victoriaville	22/09/42	29/09/45
Cap Chat	Cap Chat	10/11/43	1944
Carleton	Carleton	14/10/42	15/12/44
Causapscal	Causapscal	24/7/43	1944
Chambly	Chambly Canton	1/12/42	29/1/46
Chambly-Bassin	Chambly Bassin	10/08/43	18/10/44
Coaticook	Coaticook	23/10/42	13/10/45
Contrecoeur	Contrecoeur	6/10/42	31/1/44
Cowansville	Cowansville	2/2/44	23/8/45
Dorion	Dorion Vaudreuil	27/4/43	1944
Vaudreuil			
Ile Maligne	Ile Maligne	10/1/44	10/12/45
Grenville	Grenville	3/1/44	14/12/44
Jonquièrre	Jonquièrre	20/5/42	13/10/45
Lac Megantic	Lac Megantic	21/06/43	8/01/46
Lachine	Lachine	27/1/43	30/01/45

La Patrie	La Patrie	14/10/42	19/12/44
Laterrière	Laterrière	2/12/42	29/04/44
Lauzon	Lauzon	12/08/43	14/03/46
La Tuque	La Tuque	6/12/43	23/08/45
Laval des Rapides	Laval des Rapides	19/10/42	15/12/44
Lévis	Lévis	6/08/43	23/02/46
La Cité de Longueuil	Longueuil	18/07/44	19/02/46
Makanik	Makanik	16/11/42	16/11/44
Maniwaki	Maniwaki	8/09/43	9/08/45
Marieville	Marieville	6/10/42	6/10/44
Maskinongé	Maskinongé	14/10/43	17/12/45
Matane	Matane	30/07/42	14/06/45
Mont-Joli	Mont-Joli	29/07/43	23/02/46
Montmorency	Village Montmorency	06/11/44	20/10/45
La Ville d'Outremont	Ville d'Outremont	21/12/42	03/12/45
Québec	Québec	28/04/43	25/05/46
Richmond	Richmond	6/11/44	26/12/45
de Rigaud et Environs	Vaudreuil	10/04/43	10/04/44
Roberval	Roberval	11/01/44	06/03/45
La Garre	La Garre	19/10/42	24/02/48
Senneterre	Senneterre	28/10/42	1943
Soulanges	Coteau Landing	13/08/43	13/08/44
Ste. Anne de La Perade	Ste. Anne de La Perade	25/08/43	25/08/44
St. Bruno, Lac St. Jean	St. Bruno	31/01/44	29/05/45
St. Camille	St. Camille	10/11/43	10/11/44
St. Casimir	St. Casimir	23/08/43	04/02/46
St. Constant	St. Constant	19/10/44	20/10/45
St. Eustache	St. Eustache	17/02/45	30/10/44
L'Ecole St. François	Pointe Gatineau	05/02/44	24/04/45
St-Gabriel de Brandon	St-Gabriel de Brandon	09/10/42	17/12/45
St. Hyacinthe	St. Hyacinthe	02/02/42	04/02/46
St. Henri	St. Henri (Comté Lévis)	10/11/43	30/01/45
St. Jacques	St. Jacques, Montcalm	29/09/43	29/09/44
St. Joseph de Beauce	St. Joseph de Beauce	21/10/43	11/10/44
St. Lin	St. Lin	13/11/43	30/01/45
St. Maurice	St. Maurice	07/09/43	24/02/45
St. Narcisse	St. Narcisse	10/11/43	30/01/45
St. Pamphile	St. Pamphile (Comté l'Islet)	31/05/43	1944
St. Remi de Napierville	St. Remi de Napierville	22/10/43	19/12/44
Ste. Rose du Dégelé	Ste. Rose du Dégelé	13/11/43	08/02/45

St. Sauveur	St. Sauveur	08/01/45	31/01/46
Sté. Scolastique	Sté. Scolastique	03/12/43	06/03/45
St. Tite	St. Tite	06/10/42	17/12/45
St. Vincent de Paul	St. Vincent de Paul	08/02/44	12/04/45
Yamaska	Yamaska	10/11/43	30/01/45
Rimouski	Rimouski	29/10/42	22/11/44
L'Assomption	L'Assomption	17/12/41	24/02/45
Bagotville	Bagotville	31/03/42	30/10/44
Beauharnois	Beauharnois	08/10/42	31/01/46
Beauceville	Beauceville	18/08/42	25/10/44
Berthierville	Berthierville	29/05/42	25/03/46
Chicoutimi	Chicoutimi	21/02/42	23/04/46
Dolbeau	Dolbeau	21/08/42	01/03/46
Gracefield	Gracefield	22/08/42	22/08/44
Grand Baie	Grand Baie	31/03/42	30/10/44
Hull	Hull	14/02/42	19/02/46
Iberville	Iberville	08/01/42	31/01/46
Joliette	Joliette	16/12/41	22/03/45
L'Epiphanie	L'Epiphanie	27/07/42	13/10/45
Kenogami	Kenogami	31/03/42	31/03/43
Louiseville	Louiseville	30/05/42	20/10/45
Montebello	Montebello	21/02/42	19/02/46
Mont-Laurier	Mont-Laurier	21/08/42	21/08/44
L'Est de Montréal	Montréal	09/05/41	06/09/41
Noelville	Noelville	24/08/42	24/07/45
Pierceville	Pierceville	30/07/42	06/12/45
Plessisville	Plessisville	18/08/42	08/02/45
Pointe-Aux- Trembles	Pointe-Aux- Trembles	19/03/42	08/02/45
Port Alfred	Port Alfred	31/03/42	29/03/44
Portneuf	Portneuf Station	31/7/42	22/03/45
Princeville	Princeville	19/08/42	1944
Richelieu	Richelieu Village	19/08/42	1943
Rivière du Loup	Rivière du Loup	11/02/42	16/01/46
Ste. Anne de La Pocatiere	Ste. Anne de La Pocatière	11/07/42	09/01/46
St. Félicien	St. Félicien	23/09/42	30/10/44
St. Jérôme	St. Jérôme	31/03/42	22/05/44
St. Joseph d'Alma	St. Joseph d'Alma	19/05/42	15/12/45
Ste. Marie de Beauce	Ste. Marie de Beauce	18/08/42	25/10/44
St. Pacome et Environs	St. Pacome	13/07/42	25/02/44
Ste. Therese de Blainville	Ste. Therese de Blainville	25/06/42	25/05/45
Sillery	Québec	16/09/42	17/12/45
Sorel	Sorel	19/03/42	26/02/46
Terrebonne	Terrebonne	31/07/42	29/06/43
Thetford Mines	Thetford Mines	17/12/41	30/01/46
Thurso	Thurso	15/04/42	1943

IMPERIAL ORDER OF DAUGHTERS OF THE EMPIRE (Chapter Funds)

de Gaspé	New Carlisle	18/12/39	07/02/48
de Laval	Sherbrooke	11/04/40	03/03/48
de Salaberry	Richelieu	05/01/40	12/02/48
Don de Dieu	Quebec	20/05/40	06/04/48

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS WAR CHARITIES

La Caisse D'Auxiliaire Féminin	Montreal	21/09/42	29/08/46
La Caisse Auxiliaire de la Division Cartier de la RCNUR	Montreal	22/11/40	02/07/47
La Caisse Auxiliaire de L'amicale des Officiers du 22ième Bataillon F.E.C.	Montreal	23/03/40	30/01/47
La Caisse Auxiliaire du Régiment de St. Hyacinthe	St. Hyacinthe	28/02/40	20/04/46
La Caisse Auxiliaire du premier Dépôt Canadien de Convalescents	Montreal	21/03/40	N.A.
La Caisse du Comité de Protection Civile et de Récupération de la Ville St. Pierre	St. Pierre	18/05/42	28/11/44
La Caissè du Comité des Soirées de Nos Soldats	Montreal	06/09/44	07/01/46
La Caisse de Secours de Guerre de St. Hilaire	St. Hilaire	09/03/42	March/43
La Fédération Des Femmes Canadiennes Françaises	Ottawa (Quebec branches: Rouyn-Noranda Buckingham)	28/02/40	11/02/47
L'Aide Aux Evacuées d'Alsace-Lorraine	Montreal	15/03/40	01/05/41
L'Aide Aux Soldats, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal	Montreal	21/12/39	11/03/47
L'Aide Aux Soldats, Le Régiment de Chateauguay	Montreal	07/03/40	09/12/46
L'Aide Aux Soldats, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve	Montreal	09/12/39	11/02/47
L'Aide Aux Soldats, La Société St. Jean Baptiste de Montreal	Montreal	24/06/40	June/41
L'Aide Canadienne Aux Combattants de Langue Française	Quebec	23/07/41	July/42

Caisse de Secours aux Etudiants victimes de la Guerre	Montreal	30/5/44	10/09/47
Comité Relations Canada France	Montreal	15/10/43	19/01/48
L'Association des Employées Du Canadien-National Pour Services De Guerre, Région du Bas St. Laurent, de Matapédia, et de la Baie des Chaleurs	Mont Joli	09/05/41	N.A.
Dames Auxiliaires de Megantic	Mégantic	N.A.	19/12/47
Dames Auxiliaires du Régiment de la Chaudière	Quebec	N.A.	19/02/47
La Caisse de Secours des Dames Auxiliaires du District Militaire No. 5	Rimouški	06/08/43	19/12/43
Fonds de Secours aux Victimes Belges de la Guerre	Montreal	14/06/40	28/01/48
Caisse de Cigarettes d'Ottawa-Hull	Hull	27/10/41	N.A.
Comité d'Entr'aide aux Mobilises Français	Montreal	01/02/40	Feb./43
France Libre	Quebec	09/12/41	28/01/48
France Quand Même	Montreal	19/12/40	11/07/42
Comité National des Français Libres			
Fonds de Secours de La France Combattante	Montreal	15/01/45	02/05/46
La Caisse Du Comité Auxiliaire Des Combattants de Matane	Matane	20/01/43	07/02/46
La Comité de Rétablissement de Hull	Hull	23/06/45	
Le Tambour Major	Montreal	11/20/42	22/03/45

SOURCE: War Charity Registers, RG 44, Vols. 66-73.

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