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**Exploring the militarization of Palestinian society:  
Cynthia Enloe's framework of militarization and Palestinian children**

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**Exploring the militarization of Palestinian society:**  
**Cynthia Enloe's framework of militarization and Palestinian children**

Inbal Solomon

Submitted to the Department of Criminology,  
University of Ottawa, in partial fulfillment  
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## ABSTRACT

Recent literature has assessed the particular circumstances of Palestinian children, generally attempting to conceptualize them as either politically-charged and violent, or as marginalized citizens, victimized by dominating Israeli practices. This research attempts to broaden these conceptualizations, by exploring the relevance of Cynthia Enloe's (2000) concept of militarized maneuvering. Enloe postulates *inter alia* that militarization is a process which involves the obfuscation of the military's problematic nature for civil society and the almost taking for granted of military's (often violent) strategies; it occurs as societal conditions, discourses, definitions, attitudes, thoughts and expectations are produced (and re-produced). This thesis has employed an inductive qualitative study to explore the means through which Palestinian children may progress through the process of militarization, employing a coding approach to data analysis. It has studied *Identity Card (1964)*, considered to be the "Palestinian national poem", written by "the Palestinian national poet", Mahmoud Darweish and has drawn reference to secondary literature detailing the impacts of the newly-constructed Israeli Separation Barrier on Palestinian populations. Palestinian populations may undergo the process of militarization through some of the available nationalist poetry, which offers discourses commemorating the historical connection of Palestinians with the land lost in 1948, and emphasizes the need for steadfastness, nationalism and resistance. This thesis has found that the barrier is a force which both directly and indirectly militarizes children's social conditions, exemplifying past (perceived) victimization, obstructing daily life, and oppressing Palestinians' future nation. It may also be interpreted to reinforce the desire for resistance, and therefore potentially garner support for militarized retaliatory acts against Israelis. This approach has illuminated an important and unexpected finding; the two seemingly disjointed realms of Palestinian society are undergirded by the abstract themes of collective memory and nationalism, suggesting that these are significant elements to the study of the militarization of Palestinian society, thereby offering a means to broaden the aforementioned traditional conceptualizations of Palestinian children.

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## INTRODUCTION

In speaking about the Arab-Israeli conflict, former Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir once said, "peace will come when the Arabs love their children more than they hate us" (Mabuchi, 2003: 4; originally quoted in 1957). She implied that Arab children are socialized to hate Jews and consequently, violently self-sacrifice for their homeland of Palestine. Academic literature from the last several decades has provided context for this assertion, with some researchers implicitly supporting this claim, arguing that Palestinian youth are manipulated by their government, education system and their own families, the whole of which compel and exploit their children into political and sometimes violent activities (Weinberg, et. al., 2003; Burdman, 2003; Post, et. al., 2003). Some authors have even labelled Palestinian youth who participate in acts of violence and/or civil disobedience as "child soldiers" (Veerman and Levine, 2001; Rosen, 2005). However, the applicability of this title to the situation of Palestinian youth is highly contentious. Others have conceptualized children who participate in violent acts against the Israeli Army and citizens as social agents who are aware of their politically-marginalized status, and are thus actively rebelling against its manifestation (Sirasjait, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). Given the occupation of their (and their ancestors') lands, the children have become active protesters of their situations, attempting to defy broader social inequalities (Usher, 1991; Kuttab, 1988; Darweish, 1989).

While there is widespread debate over the precise definition of child soldiers, a recent international declaration has broadened the concept to encompass "child[ren] associated with an armed force or an armed group", defined as:

any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities (Paris Principles, 2007: 7).

However, Palestinian children's involvement in the 60-year Arab/Israeli armed conflict has primarily been spontaneous and unaffiliated with a specific state or insurgency group

(Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 298). Many have mobilized their resistance to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories by “arguing with [Israeli] military officers, throwing stones, writing graffiti on walls, [and] carrying the Palestinian flag” (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1120-1121). These subtle acts are often not pre-organized nor do they consist of an explicitly identifiable cohort of youth. Most often, the youth’s participation is unplanned, impulsive and contingent on the context, location and daily mood of the youth (Cairns, 1996; Sirasjait, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). Yet, the acts of (sometimes armed) rebellion conducted by Palestinian adolescents must not be overlooked in research because of their inability to clearly fit within traditional conceptualizations of other mobilized youth.

Given the contentious and problematic nature of using the concept of “child soldiers” or “child[ren] associated with fighting forces or an armed group”, with regard to Palestinian children, this research will employ the term: “militarized” children. Militarization need not be solely associated with a military, claims Cynthia Enloe (2000: 2), arguing that “militarization is never simply about joining the military. It is a far more subtle process.” For this thesis, militarization is defined as a subtle process through which civil society can be mobilized to take for granted the military and/or armed groups, their strategies and rationales, including the societal prioritization of military endeavors over other social issues and the bestowing of “super-citizenship” upon those enlisted and their families (Enloe, 2000). According to Enloe, (1983: 9-10) the process of militarization occurs on two dimensions: the material and ideological levels of society. Materially, militarization progresses as the military institution “encroaches” on civilian spheres of life. Concurrently, militarization involves an ideological component, and can be seen in the degree to which military rationales and strategies “are acceptable to the populace, and become seen as ‘common-sense’ solutions to civil problems” (Enloe, 1983: 9-10). Employing this concept, therefore, broadens the traditional conceptualizations of societies in armed conflict. It is ever-present and is embedded in such things as “the dynamics of memory... hero-worship, [and] cinematic imagery... [In fact,] the list of what can be militarized is virtually endless” (Enloe,

2000: 4). Enloe (2000: 5) argues that any object or person may become militarized; entertainers whose purpose is to lift the morale of military troops and toys that allow children to turn violence into play are examples of forces that can “maneuver” civilians through the process of militarization.

In Enloe’s (2000) view, militarization occurs at the level through which societal conditions, discourses, definitions, attitudes, thoughts and expectations are produced (and re-produced), and becomes more pronounced when societal organization towards violence becomes normalized. For example, when societies come to align their understanding of “security” with military discourse, which constructs a distinct and omni-present enemy that necessitates the cooperation, hyper-vigilance and mobilization of ordinary citizens against this “common enemy”, the militarization of that society is progressing (Enloe, 2000). Moreover, militarization depends on the obfuscation of the military’s problematic nature for civil society and the almost taking for granted of military values, including the proliferation of an “us” versus “them” discourse, the equation of “super-citizenry” with military participation and the bestowing upon soldiers the titles of “our boys (and girls)” (Enloe, 2000). Moreover, Enloe explains that even challenges to the military institution can be considered militarized, and provides the example of the “gays in the military” debate in the United States during the mid-1990s. She argues that in demanding inclusion into the military, protestors of the U.S. Armed Forces policies did not challenge the undergirding principles of the military, but merely challenged the institution to “open [its] doors a bit wider”, therefore, in effect ideologically-equating the military to any other public institution (Enloe, 2000: 15).

According to Enloe (2000), the effects of militarization on individuals and collectivities of people is made possible through the subtle (and sometimes more overt) “maneuvering” of these people into positions which support the military ideals (Enloe, 2000). For Enloe, maneuvering society involves the manipulation and exertion of (sometimes political) control, over those populations not traditionally associated with soldiering. Enloe (2000) explains that maneuvering

is the means through which the process of militarization progresses. She provides examples of maneuvers, which can range from overt policies to subtle cultural messages to social conditions, all of which serve to help guide people through the process of militarization or “maneuver” them through this process. The concept of maneuvering helps to highlight that militarization is not a “cause-and-effect” phenomenon, but rather is more akin to a process through which people are negotiating, and thus, is a process into which they can contribute. In this way, maneuvering is something that can both happen *to* people, and something with which they can *engage*.

Enloe’s perspective is very relevant to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, as it allows us to broaden the focus of analysis and therefore shy away from finding fault with one side of the conflict or the other. Indeed, a large number of analyses of the conflict (as has been evidenced, for example, by the aforementioned dichotomous perspectives on children) have explored the current political developments in the region, laying blame on either Israelis or Palestinians. Employing the concept of militarization allows for an exploration of the potential culpability of both sides of the conflict, by allowing me to highlight both Israelis’ and Palestinians’ contributions to the militarization of Palestinian society, and has in turn, helped to fuel the intense continuation of the hostilities. Moreover, the concept allows us to explore the subtleties of militarization and maneuvering, an area requiring attention particularly in the post-conflict period, particularly as militarization is understood to encroach upon and interweave various aspects of civilian life, including societal conditions and discourses. Indeed, militarized social conditions and discourses, including the demarcations of “us” and “them”, resentment for wrongdoings committed by the “other”, and the often-contradictory claims by each side that they had been victorious in the hostilities, often persist following the dissipation of the formal hostilities (Brocklehurst, 1999; 2006; Feldman, 2002). For instance, post-conflict peace negotiations are not solely about the cessation of violence and the signing of official documents. Understanding the conflict’s residual social impacts and tensions upon society can help to

provide a broader overview of the conflict, and its impacts on populations. For example, exploring a society's interpretation of the past and the roots of their nationalistic aspirations and the ways in which these can infuse more informal social spheres can provide the framework to explore the ways in which these conditions and discourses can linger following the conflict. Exploring the realities of militarization and maneuvering can assist in this process.

The modern conflict over the land (arguably) began with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and the subsequent exodus, expulsion or resettlement of over 1.3 million Arabs who had previously lived alongside the Jewish population in historical Palestine or in territories controlled by neighbouring Arab states (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 217). The Jews and Arabs have contradictory discourses and paradigms regarding this event. It has been hailed as a historical victory by the Jewish population, marking "an alchemic change from wandering [Jewish] devotee to local patriot" (Anderson, 2006: 149). The Arabs, on the other hand, have termed this event as "Al-Nakba", or "the catastrophe". It was the:

moment when a part of the Palestinian people became homeless; after which they could never feel at home...[it was] the starting point for a plurality of experiences which can be grouped together under the rubric, 'The Consequences of Al-Nakbah' (Sa'di, 2002: 185-6).

Accordingly, the resulting Palestinian discourses are a salient feature of today's Palestinian population and this may serve to help today's children undergo a process of militarization, as conceptualized by Enloe (2000).

### **Approach to Thesis**

The main goal of this thesis is to provide a possible understanding of Palestinian youth's militarization by studying "the Palestinian national poem" (Mir, 2003) as a force through which militarized maneuvering may permeate, and framing this within literature available on the Separation Barrier, which is currently under construction in the West Bank. Two important research questions are addressed:

- 1) *Can Palestinian society be considered militarized according to Enloe's (2000) conceptualization?*

2) *If so, through which means can Palestinian children be maneuvered through the process of militarization?*

In answering these questions, this study aims to highlight the means through which Palestinian society, including its children, may potentially be “maneuvered” through the process of militarization (Enloe, 2000)<sup>1</sup>. In doing so, it centres on a thematic assessment of one piece of poetry, which is the most popular form of Palestinian writing (Ashrawi, 1978; McKeen-Paramenter, 1994). This research focuses on a piece that has been termed the “Palestinian national poem” (Mir, 2003), entitled *Identity Card (1964)*, and written by the “Palestinian national poet”, Mahmoud Darweish (Antoon, 2002; Abdel-Malek, 2005; Huri, 2006). Poetry is particularly salient to this research because it is an important component of children’s education in the Palestinian territories (Brown, 2001; Adwan, 2004). These themes will be assessed through coding and inductive analysis. Moreover, this research draws upon a literature review on the newly-constructed Israeli Separation Barrier<sup>2</sup>, which currently bisects present-day Israel from the West Bank Palestinian territory, in order to help explore the process of militarization in Palestinian society. Conceptualizing the Palestinian children’s mobilization in terms of militarized maneuvering, therefore allows me to study the broader social dimensions through which militarized conditions, discourses, definitions, thoughts, attitudes and expectations may be produced. However, given that I did not interview Palestinians, it is immensely challenging to speak of their definitions, attitudes and expectations. Instead, this research has focused on the exploration of militarization through social conditions and social discourses. The coupling of these two potential realms of militarization (the Palestinian national poem and the Separation

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<sup>1</sup> Importantly, some authors have already touched on some of the ways in which Israeli children may be militarized, including through media outlets, educational programming and via recreational activities (Rowland and Frank, 2002; Gor, 2003; Kriener, 2006). Therefore, studying the militarization of Israeli children is no less pertinent than the study of Palestinian children. However, given the lack of a formalized army in the Palestinian territories, the study of the possible subtle maneuvering of Palestinian society into militarization is significantly interesting.

<sup>2</sup> The construction has been given several names, from “Security Fence” (Ministry of Defense, 2007) to “Apartheid Wall” (Usher, 2006). This research will employ the term “Israeli Separation Barrier”, as this term connotes the least ideologically-laden term. As well, this term is the one employed by international agencies, such as the United Nations (2007) and the World Bank (2004).

Barrier) will highlight the subtle (and sometimes overt) social conditions and cultural discourses which may be understood to maneuver Palestinian children through the process of militarization.

The concept of “maneuvering” will allow an exploration of the means through which children may undergo the process of militarization, according to Enloe’s conceptualization. Therefore, the major themes of the data will be assessed through Cynthia Enloe’s concept of maneuvered militarization, to explore the ways in which the social contexts of Palestinians may be understood to indirectly infuse children’s upbringing, and potentially mobilize and justify Palestinian resistance, and therefore in turn, fuel the dialectical process of militarization (Enloe, 2000).

Again, it is important to re-emphasize that the relationship between militarization and poetry, militarization and the Separation Barrier and the militarization of children is not a linear one nor a “cause-and-effect” phenomenon. Instead, militarization is a subtle and long-term process which is arguably ongoing and ever-pervasive, emerging in various social and cultural realms, including such things as poetry. In this way, it is hoped that, in highlighting the case study of Palestinian children, a more subtle and often overlooked form of the militarization of youth will be highlighted, and subsequently contribute to literature on children’s involvement in conflict zones, particularly in a way that contradicts traditional dichotomous understanding of youth as either victims or perpetrators in contexts of armed conflict.

This research ultimately highlights that, Palestinian society can be considered “militarized” according to Enloe’s conceptualization. Moreover, although the study’s methodology precludes the ability to generalize or make definitive conclusions, the analysis ultimately points to the militarized maneuvering of Palestinian children. This maneuvering is manifested through the detrimental implications of the Separation Barrier, and through the availability and prominence of Palestinian nationalist poetry, which has been considered a component of Palestinian children’s upbringing (Collins, 2004; Hammer, 2005). Importantly, however, comparing the literature on the Separation Barrier and the themes emerging from the

poem, an important (and unexpected) feature of Palestinian militarization has been highlighted: integral to attempting to understand the militarization of Palestinian society is the consideration of the elements of collective memory and nationalism.

The prevalence of militarizing maneuvers in Palestinian society is a particularly relevant field of inquiry because children currently comprise over 50% of the Palestinian population (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1102; Sirasjait, 2004: 212; Alzaroo and Lewando-Hunt, 2003: 168). Accordingly, any social exploration of Palestinian society should include an analysis of its children. Given this proportion of Palestinian children, and trajectory of the trans-generational transmission of *Al-Nakba*, there is little value in claims that, with the passing of generations, the hostilities between the two nations will dissipate, fostering the political will for peace negotiations. It is hoped that this research will contribute a small avenue for a more in-depth understanding of the Palestinian-Israeli context, and will facilitate future research into the militarization of both Palestinian and Israeli youth.

This field of study is particularly relevant to criminology, particularly as it highlights the subtleties of militarization. In an era of continued efforts to uproot "terrorism", this thesis explores the ways in which policies and practices of oppression, coupled with social agitation among marginalized populations in effect, may yield the opposite result, making First World nations even less "secure". In this way, it is hoped that this research illuminates the problematic nature of means through which the western world strives for security, and contextualizes the situations in which militarization may permeate. Moreover, given that militarization is a process premised, in part, on the obfuscation of civilian and combatant statuses, criminology ought to engage in research on the ways in which militarization has seeped into realms traditionally conceptualized as "civilian". As well, with international attention increasing on the involvement of youth in contexts of armed conflict, criminology ought to be concerned with the subtle nature of their participation. While the socio-legal implications of children's involvement in armed conflict as combatants has been gaining academic attention, so too should the focus turn to the more

indirect means through which children may experience conflict situations. In this respect, and as will be further explored in this research, Palestinian children provide an interesting example of the complexities of youth's involvement in situations of armed and political conflict.

Having been born in Israel, I make no claims of neutrality in my research. Yet, my inherent connection to the ongoing developments fuels my interest in Arab-Israeli conflict and its implications on children. In fact, it is Golda Meir's aforementioned powerful and telling quote which first prompted my decision to begin on this line of inquiry. Since first reading this statement in the relative comfort of my Toronto-area secondary school, I have been fascinated by its implied argument and have therefore delved into research on Palestinian children's situation at every possible research opportunity, from high school compositions to undergraduate research papers. Yet, the ongoing development of the Separation Barrier solidified my resolve to approach this topic, once again, in post-graduate research. I am deeply committed to these issues and am grateful to have been able to explore this topic comprehensively in my research. My firm belief is that when each side of the conflict begins to acknowledge the other's perspective, profound changes to cultural biases, political approaches and future prospects can emerge. I consider this thesis to be yet another personal step towards understanding the other's point of view and sincerely hope that it will inspire other explorations into the complexities of the conflict, and contribute to an already-robust literature on the "gray" areas of this historical, religious, political and cultural conflict.

Throughout this research project, I felt it necessary to reflect on my own Israeli identity. In fact, one of my earliest recollections of my own life in Israel exemplified the contentious debates about the conflict in Israeli society. As a 6-year-old child, I remember overhearing on the radio about a military confrontation in which the Israeli Army had fatally-wounded two Palestinian militants. My extremely naïve reaction was to take comfort in this news, explaining to my inquisitive mother that now, there would be "two less people to drive us to the sea", a message that, I now recognize, was reinforced in various realms of my upbringing in Israel,

such as school, the media and numerous other informal social spheres. As the years progressed, my family moved to Canada and I became extremely involved in various Israel-advocacy campaigns and actually led university workshops on how students could defend the nation in what was generally becoming an increasingly hostile and antagonistic anti-Israel environment on campus. I devised my own advocacy slogan to counter this hostility, arguing with students that "if the Palestinian peace movement was as strong as the Israeli peace movement, the conflict would have been over long ago."

However, this research experience has taught me the importance of being critical to the advocacy line that I, myself, had authored. Much like my challenge to Golda Meir's aforementioned quote, I learned how surprisingly easy it was to lay blame at the feet of one group or another and how such claims can be seen to disregard the social conditions (and realities) of both Israelis and Palestinians. In this way, I attempted to provide an exploration that highlights a few of the important social conditions and discourses implicated in this longstanding and volatile conflict.

While my interest and previous research on this context (as well as my own personal experience as an Israeli) has shown me how incredibly-laden notions of children's education, naming, and national holidays are, throughout this process I began to uncover and explore the magnitude of this phenomenon. Therefore, I tried to de-centre my own perspective and try to gain a better understanding of the "Other". Indeed, I've learned a great deal about Palestinian society throughout this process, particularly on some of the ways in which Israeli society has been conceptualized and some of the more nuanced ways through which Palestinians may resist. Moreover, I have recognized that there are indeed, a myriad of developments in this conflict, and while there have been both peaks and valleys in terms of the political progress, what I have found especially interesting is children's involvement in the conflict, particularly as, with the passing of generations, it seems as though children's involvement in the conflict has

been becoming (albeit subtly) more salient (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003; Champagne and Abu-Saad, 2006).

Importantly, given the large percentage of children in Palestinian society I felt it was crucial to include them as a focus of analysis. In particular, I tried to look at how poetry may subtly contribute to children's militarized maneuvering. Focusing on children allows me to explore the potential continuity of the militarizing process, particularly as there has been significant evidence that the experience of Al-Nakba is being transmitted to younger generations and is part of the socialization of Palestinian children (Basta, 2000; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003; Post et. al., 2003; Shemesh, 2004; Collins, 2004; Hammer, 2005; Meital, 2006).

Finally, while this thesis has highlighted that militarization can be considered an ever-present phenomenon in Palestinian society, several challenges were faced in applying this concept to the Palestinian context and deciphering the findings. Firstly, I have recognized, and been forced to contend with, the challenges posed in applying abstract concepts, such as militarization, maneuvering and militarized dissent (Enloe, 2000) to real-life, practical situations. For example, it was rather exhausting to describe occurrences of militarization in Palestinian society particularly as the concept invokes several definitions, including the diffusion of boundaries between civilians and soldiers, the encroachment of the military institution on civilian life, and the organization of populations into normalizing the military (and/or armed groups) and its activities. Given these complex components of militarization, operationalizing the key concepts of this research has been a particularly challenging endeavour and ultimately has demonstrated the broad nature of Enloe's conceptualization and its limitations. Moreover, Enloe herself describes militarization in various political contexts and geographical locations and highlights that the process of militarization plays out differently according to the context in which it is studied. However, little is provided in the way of tools to assess this cultural uniqueness, and as Enloe does not describe the Palestinian context, I was left to apply the concept according to my own understanding of militarization and maneuvering. Nonetheless, I found that

the concept of militarization allowed me the framework to attempt to step back from a value-laden approach to exploring the Palestinian context and broaden the scope of analysis to one less interested in fault-finding.

Additionally, while this thesis discusses the direct and indirect means through which militarization may progress, demarking the particular juncture at which point a militarizing maneuver can be considered “direct” or “indirect” has been a difficulty. For example, *Identity Card*, it can be said to offer be said to both directly and indirectly maneuver Palestinian militarization, although the indirect maneuvers can be more readily apparent. Lastly, as previously mentioned Enloe’s theory of militarization is extremely nuanced, complex and innovative, and has sparked poignant and novel academic research, highlighting examples of militarization in specific societies. However, contouring her over 300-page book to fit the confines of a masters thesis has been a significant challenge, particularly as I have tried to incorporate as much of Enloe’s work as possible into the theoretical framework guiding the exploration of Palestinian militarization. In this way, I invite readers and future researchers to study Enloe’s extraordinary work, and engage with militarization at both the conceptual and practical levels of research.

### **Overview of Thesis:**

Chapter one begins by discussing Enloe’s conceptualizations of “militarized maneuvering” and the “militarization of dissent”, and solidifies and operationalizes the key concepts in this work. The second chapter provides a general overview of the 60-year conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, with significant focus on the rise of Palestinian nationalism. Chapter three explores literature on the Separation Barrier, on which construction began in 2002. This chapter includes information on both the direct and indirect effects of the barrier on Palestinian populations, and discusses some of the ways in which the barrier may be understood as a force which may maneuver the militarization of Palestinian children’s lives. The fourth chapter discusses the thesis methodology, including a description of the methods of data

collection and analysis. The fifth chapter highlights the main source of data, that is, the aforementioned poem entitled "*Identity Card*", written by the "Palestinian national poet" (Antoon, 2002; Abdel-Malek, 2005; Huri, 2006; Urban, 2006), Mahmoud Darweish in 1964. This poem has been considered to be the "the perfect inaugural statement for a movement attempting to speak and act in the name of a newly diasporic community of refugees, dispossessed peasants, and angry students" (Collins, 2004: 58), and as such, has been included in the analysis of the potential forces maneuvering children through the process of militarization. Chapter six provides a comparison of the emerging themes from the data, comparing these to the literature on the Separation Barrier. This helps to frame the data within Enloe's concept of militarized maneuvering, and yields important findings on the potential relevance and potency of collective memory and Palestinian nationalism. The final chapter discusses the implications of this research both for national (Israeli and Palestinian) policy, for criminology, and for future research in this field.

## CONCEPTUALIZING MILITARIZED MANEUVERS

### Enloe, Militarization and Maneuvers

In her latest work, entitled Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives, Cynthia Enloe (2000) challenges her readers to broaden their understanding of the military as a stand-alone institution, and to include its presence in people's daily lives. She describes the "myriad" of ways through which the military simultaneously depends on and marginalizes groups of civilians, particularly women, for its own proliferation. She argues that in general, militaries *require* and elicit the participation, support, and trust of women in order to ensure their own and their soldiers' sustainability and efficiency (Enloe, 2000: xiv). In order for the military to successfully achieve its aims, it classifies groups of women into distinct and hierarchical, yet implicit, categories including military wives, military prostitutes, military mothers, military nurses and female army recruits. Each group of women is tasked with a role for supporting the military and its soldiers. Despite being an institution primarily aimed at *men*, the military *needs* women "to boost morale, to provide comfort during and after wars, to reproduce the next generation of soldiers, to serve as symbols of the homeland worth risking one's life for, [and] to replace men when the pool of suitable male recruits runs low" (Enloe, 2000: 44). According to Enloe, in formulating and promoting feminized roles for women, the militaries essentially "embrace" a variety of women into a military's fold.

Drawing on examples from the United States, Britain, South Africa, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Israel, Serbia, Kosovo and Rwanda, Enloe highlights the founding argument of her work; that is, when feminists from around the globe "have followed the bread crumbs of privileged masculinity, they have been led time and again not just to the doorstep of the military, but to the threshold of all those social institutions that promote militarization" (Enloe, 2000: 33). In this way, explains Enloe, the militarization of whole societies *accompanies* the militarization of women. The militarization of societies involves subtle efforts or "maneuvers" to control the military support of civilians, or rather, obscure the problematic nature of the military as an

institution. Enloe provides a nuanced and highly relevant concept for assessing the distinct reality within which many populations of women live. Building on her innovative theory, and this thesis aims to highlight children as part of the mix of populations undergoing the process of militarized maneuvering. This chapter describes Enloe's conceptualization of militarization. In particular, it highlights the concept's components and discusses the ways in which it is applicable to lives of children globally.

### **Understanding Militarization: "How do they Militarize a Can of Soup?"**

*For several years I kept a can of Heinz tomato and noodle soup on the kitchen counter. I had bought it in a London supermarket... The Heinz chefs had added little pasta bits to the condensed tomato soup. But instead of the usual alphabet letters, the soup designers had cut their pastas into the shape of Star Wars satellites... The designers and dietitians sitting around the corporate table probably tried to imagine a typical mealtime in the household of a busy woman. Tomato soup is healthy. But a mother has to get a child to eat the healthy meal she prepared. Sometimes that can be a challenge. Little a, b, and c's might not be sufficiently enticing to a frenchfriesandcoke-lusting child. But add little space weapons. Maybe that would get the young diner to dig the spoon down deep into the mealtime soup bowl. Everyone would be happy – the vitamins-phobic child, the harried mother, and the soup company (Enloe, 2000: 1-2).*

Militarization, as explored by Cynthia Enloe (2000), is a complex process involving the military's "subtle maneuvering" of societies to support or take for granted the military's continuation of the business of "war-waging". Militarization is thus broadened from being confined solely within the specific realm of militaries. It is understood to occur at the level in which the societal conditions, discourses, definitions, attitudes, thoughts and expectations are produced (and re-produced), and becomes more pronounced when societal organization towards violence (or the acceptance of violence) becomes normalized (Enloe, 2000; Orr, 2004). Indeed, Geyer (1989: 79; emphasis added) has defined militarization as the "contradictory and tense social process in which *civil society* organizes itself for the production of violence." This process is facilitated by the obfuscation of the traditional boundaries between combatant and civilian statuses (Enloe, 2000; Feldman, 2002; Adelman, 2003). This diffusion of boundaries involves both:

a material and an ideological dimension. In the material sense it encompasses the gradual encroachment of the military institution into the civilian arena... [while t]he ideological dimension... is the degree to which such developments are acceptable to the populace, and become seen as 'common-sense' solutions to civil problems (Enloe, 1983: 9-10).

Accordingly, militarization seeps into society, to encompass realms not traditionally associated with soldiering, combat, war-waging or even peace-keeping (Enloe, 2000).

Enloe (2000: xi) explains that "the military [itself] is only one part of militarization", particularly as, any object or person may become militarized. For example, entertainers whose purpose is to raise the morale of military troops and toys that allow children to turn violence into play exemplify forces of militarization (Enloe, 2000: 5). Enloe argues that "many people can become militarized in their thinking, in how they live their daily lives, in what they aspire to for their children or their society, without ever wielding a rifle or donning a helmet" (Enloe, 2000: 2). According to Enloe, the subtle infusion of militarization into these realms provides a framework for reinforcing the military and its ideals in civilian life. When the military's institutions, values, (often violent) actions or rationales become accepted or normalized within a society and/or among groups of people within that society, militarization is succeeding. The very subtleties of militarization permeate the daily lives of individuals, making them more accepting of, and reliant upon, "militaristic ideals", including the importance of military endeavours, the patriotic superiority of those enlisted and their families, and the military's status as representative of the broader state (Enloe, 2000).

Other authors have concurred with the notion that militarization is indeed a "process" that is continuously reproduced within one's society. For example, the process of militarization permeates in one's culture through "a variety of rites (e.g., parades) and sites (e.g., museums), resulting in the naturalization of militarism" (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, 1999; cited in Adelman, 2003: 1124). Additionally, building on Geyer's (1989) and Enloe's (2000) understanding of militarization, Jackie Orr (2004) argues that engaging public support in militaristic pursuits requires the continuous "militarization of civilian psychology – that is, the psychological

reorganization of civil society for the production of violence” (Orr, 2004: 451). Furthermore, Orr (2004: 452) argues that recent political discourse emphasizing the necessity of civilian vigilance in the face of the omni-present threat of “terrorism” in effect, “induc[es]... the entire U.S. citizenry into the ranks of military combatants”, blurring the boundaries between civilians and soldiers. This phenomenon results in the proliferation of the “civilian-soldier”, an individual who is influenced into mobilization by the military, and thus undergoes the process of militarization (Orr, 2004). This process of militarization relies largely on the ability of states and their armed forces to “maneuver” their citizenry into taking the military for granted, and/or accepting the military’s rationale for its actions and policies.

### **The Politics of Maneuvering**

The effects of militarization on individuals and collectivities of people is made possible through the subtle (and sometimes more overt) “maneuvering” of these people into positions which support the military ideals (Enloe, 2000). For Enloe, maneuvering is the means through which militarization happens and involves the manipulation and exertion of (political) control, over those populations not traditionally associated with soldiering. In her work, Enloe (2000: xiii) discusses the “efforts that the military and their civilian supporters have made in order to ensure that... groups of [militarized] women feel special and separate”, obscuring the patriarchal nature of the military. For example, societies generally regard military wives, particularly those who have become military widows, as having contributed the ultimate sacrifice to the collective nation (Enloe, 2000). Also, entire societies are encouraged to see soldiers as a collective group of “our boys”, necessitating the (re-) alignment of the definitions of “national security” and “defense” with those of the military (Enloe, 2000). In this way, the dependence upon the military, as well as a reliance upon its ideals and values, contributes to the process of militarization. In other contexts, militaries have exhibited overt control over women, militarizing their lives insofar as the latter become dependent on the militaries for employment. For example, the stationing of militaries in foreign countries has facilitated a niche-market for “military prostitutes”

to meet the ever-growing demands associated with the mass stationing of male soldiers (Enloe, 2000). The military impacts the daily lives of local women, as its presence facilitates the relocation of these women (who incidentally prior to the army's arrival had not worked in the sex trade) from remote villages to areas surrounding military bases (Enloe, 2000). Additionally, the military continues to enact policies and practices which subordinate these local women to its might. For example, acknowledging the inevitability (and oftentimes necessity) of these women and their work in boosting soldiers' morale, the dominating militaries have enacted policies to medically monitor these women for sexually-transmitted diseases (Enloe, 2000). The women are forced to undergo invasive examinations in order to maintain their "acceptability" and therefore, their "employment" on the base (Enloe, 2000). These policy efforts at normalizing the military and the values upon which it is founded therefore become one means of militarized maneuvering, influencing a reliance upon a military or, at least, obfuscating the problematic nature of military institutions and ideologies (Enloe, 2000).

Keeping groups of women separate and organized into hierarchical social categories helps facilitate de-fragmentation among these women, leading them to focus on their individual role and social position within the military and lessening the likelihood that these women will mobilize around the patriarchal underpinnings of these policies and subsequently challenge the military as an institution. For example, the military depends on female soldiers to see themselves as unique and their contribution to the military as superior to that of military wives, and depends on military wives to regard themselves as superior to "women working in the discos around a military base" (Enloe, 2000: xiii). Each of these maneuvered positions held by women helps to obfuscate the problematic and patriarchal nature of the military institution. In this way, the "maneuvers" become the channels through which populations can become controlled by militaristic values and strategies, potentially leading them to normalize the mobilization for the production of violence.

However, as previously stated, this maneuvered control of societies need not be completely of a totalitarian nature. Enloe (2000: 10) explains that “militarizing maneuver can look like a dance, not a struggle, even though the dance may be among unequal partners.” Policy decisions, social pressures, subtle cultural messages, the media, educational systems and fashion are all realms through which maneuvers may interweave. Each sphere could contribute to a society’s militarization insofar as they contribute to the normalizing of militaries, their values and their institutions. Enloe (2000: 45) provides an interesting example of a militarizing maneuver which encourages some women to participate in military activities. She states that “in the long history of the militarization of women, the newest maneuver has been to camouflage women’s service to the military as women’s liberation”, allowing women to enter military fields, which have traditionally been reserved for (and promoted towards) men (Enloe, 2000: 45). Women’s “liberation” therefore, takes the form of a militarizing maneuver insofar as the military, and its patriarchal ideology is embraced as a (potentially) liberating outlet for women, thereby encouraging militarized participation and concealing the military’s inherently patriarchal nature (Enloe, 2000: 131). Such maneuvers have dual (yet, mutually-supportive) functions: they provide the militaries with public support (in this case, praise for democratizing military recruitment), while simultaneously silencing potential public dissent.

### **The “Militarization of Dissent”: The Business of Resisting**

According to Enloe, when the military institution is opposed, the strategy of challenging the military may, in and of itself, exemplify the process of militarization. Although she does not elaborate too greatly on this idea, Enloe (2000: 4) argues that the militarizing process exists even when the military is facing resistance from collectivities of people. Effectively, those challenging the military can “generate an equally militarized response, apparently based on the assumption that the only effective response to official militarism is the militarization of dissent.” For example, while de-militarization involves the “active reversal of the economic, cultural, and political mobilization for war” (Geyer, 1989: 66), many opponents of military ideologies,

particularly those who advocate against bestowing “super-citizenship” upon military personnel “have themselves adopted hypermilitarizing modes of protest” (Enloe, 2000: 4). For example, Enloe explores the “gays in the military” debate that ensued in the U.S. during the 1990s, and argues that challenging the military by pursuing, through protest, the admission of homosexuals into the military has “scarcely disrupted” militarism and in effect, itself became “militarized through the very act of pressuring the military to open the doors a bit wider” (Enloe, 2000: 16; 15). In fact, when gay rights activists protested against the military’s discrimination against homosexuals, they became militarized insofar as many failed to recognize and call into question the problematic nature and ideology of the military (Enloe, 2000). Accordingly, proponents of the “gays-in-the-military” camp have “paid little attention to the special character of the military in world affairs and instead ha[ve] treated the military as if it were a public institution no different from a hospital, a fast food franchise, or a legislature” (Enloe, 2000: 29). In this way, the dissenters of the military may themselves, become embraced within the militarizing process.

### **Expanding Enloe’s Conceptualization**

Enloe provides an exceptionally novel and nuanced perspective on the military’s intrusion into individuals’ public and private lives. In widening the lens through which militarization can be assessed, Enloe provides sociologists, criminologists and political scientists a new realm of exploration. Her description of militarization as a process involving subtle (and sometimes overt) maneuvering contributes extensively to the understanding of the military as a force that is not necessarily bound by institution, administration and physical space. Her ideas speak to the reality within which significant populations of women live, as well as explore and give voice to populations often marginalized in the military’s victory stories. She discusses the ways in which the process of militarization permeates every aspect of societies’ existence in such subtle ways, that the military (and its ideals) become normalized. Framed in this way, militarization, maneuvering and dissent come to be understood in terms much more fitting to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, whereby these concepts allow for a unique and academically-rich realm of study of

the ways in which the military has become a largely taken for granted institution. As such, the concept of militarization provides a means for exploring populations in contexts of armed conflict that extend beyond the traditional perpetrator/victim dichotomies. More importantly, however, Enloe's analysis, academic contribution, arguments, and perspectives are largely rooted in the actual experiences of women and societies undergoing the process of militarization. Yet, the aforementioned maneuvering of women is just one example of the process of militarization, as many facets (and populations) of society can be (and indeed, are) maneuvered. This research borrows the concept of militarized maneuvering and builds on Enloe's enormous contribution by assessing the ways in which children too, may become impacted by militarization and may become involved in the process of militarized maneuvering.

Additionally, while Enloe provides a novel framework for understanding the militarization of society, this research expands on her conceptualizations of militarization, maneuvering and militarized dissent to discuss the process of militarization as both a social condition and social discourse, as well as provides some examples of militarization as an act of resistance. Although Enloe does not specifically employ these terms, her exploration of the various venues through which militarized maneuvering permeates, allows us to assess the political, cultural, economic, and spiritual (Adelman, 2003) conditions under which militarized populations live. As a social condition, militarization permeates almost every aspect of one's existence, involving the "political, social and cultural aspects of society", including one's family, education, recreation, community, occupation (or lack thereof) and social networks in ways which "socialize" the public to "issues of nationalism and patriotism" (Reagan, 1994: 46). Yet, in order to exude militarized social conditions, these overlapping and socializing spheres of society must materialize in ways that "would result in the quiet acquiescence in the transfer of power from civil society to the military" (Laswell, 1941; cited in Reagan, 1994: 45).

Yet, whereas Enloe (2000) largely explores the direct policy initiatives that shape the militarization of society, Reagan (1994: 46) highlights that "it is society itself that creates,

advocates and perpetuates the... [discourses] that are a necessary component in the militarization of society.” This research addresses the ways in which the process of militarization may be facilitated by the presence of a foreign military, and in turn highlights some ways in which social conditions, including societal discourses, may further maneuver citizens through the process of militarization. In this way, it draws upon Enloe’s concept of militarized maneuvering and discusses this phenomenon as a social condition, including social discourses, as well as a process implicated in resistance to the military.

### **Militarization as a Social Condition**

Militarization is implicated in both overt acts (i.e., military war-waging and subsequent armed resistance) and societal conditions, indicative of particular discourses and policies, which are bestowed upon and continue to be reproduced by a population. Exemplifying the latter case of militarization, Enloe (2000) explores how the historical presence of U.S. army forces stationed in foreign countries gave rise to a local economy of goods and (sexualized) services to supply the demands of the new “clientele”. As previously stated, these foreign societies, and their citizens, therefore experienced the process of militarization as they adapted to the U.S. military’s presence and shaped their provisions of goods and services according to the military’s needs. Indeed, Lutz (2002: 723) explains that militarization “involves an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institutions in synchrony with military goals.” For example, during the Korean War in the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. army bases welcomed local prostitutes, creatively terming them “local national guests” to “service” the soldiers (Enloe, 2000: 65-68). Concurrently, however the military had also introduced several policy measures to ensure “trouble-free”, and therefore militaristically-efficient, bases. The women became subject to routine and invasive health examinations to ensure that they had not contracted any sexually-transmitted diseases, and thus could not transmit such diseases to the soldiers (Enloe, 2000: 91). As such, the women’s health and employment conditions became subject to calculated military domination, which specifically

aimed to increase or sustain the military's efficiency, thereby implicating the women in the process of militarization. In this way, an occupied society need not necessarily engage in acts of "militarization" in order to be considered militarized. Therefore, the maneuvering (or providing financial incentive to those who do) of the host society's social environment to support the military's effort is but one example of the process of militarization.

Other authors have highlighted a host of other social realms through which militarization may permeate both in times of conflict and in the post-conflict period. For example, Adelman (2003) explores the ways in which domestic violence is a sphere through which militarization may be reproduced. Adelman (2003: 1135) explains that militarized men, particularly soldiers, often transfer their learned "norms of domination and violence" to the domestic sphere. Concurrently, militarized social conditions, particularly in times of warfare, affect the responses to domestic violence, as both state and societal attention (and resources) focus on victims of national security and political violence over victims of domestic violence (Adelman, 2003: 1143). In this way, the prioritizing of militaristically-defined victims and perpetrators continues to maneuver societies, particularly ones far from direct combat, through the process of militarization.

The realm of popular culture has also been infused with militarization. For example, Lutz (2002: 724) explains that films, media images, television shows and other venues for entertainment have featured images of soldiers as heroes, "assert[ing] that war builds character, makes men, and grants freedom to the nation and a kind of supercitizenship to those who wage it." For example, in the United States the "press has [been] militarized" wherein war has become a "new commodity" to which consumer culture can aspire (Lutz, 2002: 731). Likewise, authors have argued that in the U.S., the government, academics and corporate mass media have "all mobilize[d] in an effort to 'bring public psychology into conformity with the requirements of national security policy'" (Oaks, 2004: 33; cited in Orr, 2004: 464). Under militarized social conditions, the political discourse falls in line with the military discourse, promulgating *inter alia*

“discipline, diplomacy and mission effectiveness” (Enloe, 2000: 105). In this way, despite civilians not overtly participating in combat, they too, become subjects of militarization by virtue of living under militarized social conditions.

These conditions persist in the eras following political and armed conflict as well. For example, Feldman (2002) explains that in the wake of political conflict even crime has become militarized. He highlights that “the weaponry that currently fuels the crime wave in South Africa is mainly recycled apartheid-era military hardware originating with the state’s arming of paramilitary surrogates to fight the African National Congress” (Feldman, 2002: 292). Residual instruments of war, therefore still retain use in the post-conflict period, allowing for the blurring of boundaries between civilian and combatant. Enloe (2000) highlights another phenomenon which has been militarized in a post-conflict setting: the proliferation of sex-tourism. She explains that “[i]n many parts of the world... the presence of brothels for male soldiers has laid the groundwork for the development of brothels for male tourists... [Therefore,] militarism and tourism... may be bound together as cause and effect” (Enloe, 2000: 68). These are just some examples of the ways in which militarization can infuse the social conditions of a society thereby militarizing its citizenry.

Yet, according to Enloe, military policy-makers rely on a society’s inability to deduce the connection between these militarized social conditions and the military as an institution, as the lack of public association between these phenomena helps to obscure the problematic nature of the military and thus bestows upon it an implicit acceptance.

### **Militarization as Resistance and the Militarization of Dissent**

Although not specifically addressed by Enloe, militarization can also be conceptualized as an act of resistance. In keeping with Geyer’s (1989: 79) definition of militarization as the “contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence”, this research addresses militarized resistance as *the organization of societies or groups of people against a military*, particularly if that mobilization is of a violent nature.

Insurgency groups have time and again relied on violent militaristic tactics of warfare and combat to oppose their national or foreign militaries' presence (and hyper-presence). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka (Keairns, 2003; Höglund, 2005), the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (Richards, 1999; Denov, 2006; Denov and MacLure, 2007), the Basque group ETA in Spain (Beck, 1999; Sheppard, 2002; Zirakzadeh, 2002), the Shining Path in Peru (Zirakzadeh, 2002), and the Irish Republican Army (Alonso, 2001; Cairns, 1996; Brocklehurst, 2006) *inter alia* have all relied on tactics of violence to achieve their political aims, despite no formal affiliation with the national army or state to which they are opposed. The violence exhibited by these groups frequently involves "armed campaigns" (Alonso, 2001), often in the form of car bombs (Alonso, 2001; Shepard, 2002), gun-fighting (Richards, 1999), and acts of revolutionary warfare (Höglund, 2005). Each of these activities highlights the importance of broadening traditional conceptualizations of armies, and therefore the potential agents of militarization, beyond a sole focus on militaries. In this way, armed groups can also be considered a source maneuvering the process of militarized maneuvering. Their acts of resistance are militarized insofar as they are of a violent nature and/or mobilize public support (in subtle and/or overt ways) for the production of violence. Often these groups cloak themselves in a "revolutionary" flag, arguing that they represent the marginalized sectors of a society (Enloe, 2000). However, without discussing the legitimacy of these revolutionary movements, it is important to recognize that these groups nonetheless maneuver political, economic and social support within sectors of their respective populaces.

While resistance can be conceptualized as overt activities, such as militant acts by insurgency groups against a dominating society and its military, the concept of the "militarization of dissent" couples both Geyer's (1989) emphasis on civil society's organizing for violence, and Enloe's (2000) notion of subtle militarized maneuvering. In this way, it addresses more subtle forms of militarized resistance, as these may support or even facilitate the revolutionary tactics of the more overt insurgent groups.

Scott (1985: 301) explains the subtleties of this support and argues that often, communities' perseverance in the face of perceived (or actual) annihilation can be considered a form of resistance, as the common aim of the marginalized in society is "not directly to overthrow or transform a system of domination but rather to survive... within it." Therefore, militarized resistance can be more subtle, seeping its way into the public as well as private spheres of a society. In its more subtle forms, "resistance includes *any* act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are *intended* either to mitigate or deny claims... made on that class by superordinate classes... or to advance its own claims... vis-à-vis those superordinate classes" (Scott, 1985: 290). For example, Scott (1985: 241) explores the resistance exhibited by the working classes in the pre-industrial era, and argues that acts of resistance included "arson, sabotage, boycotts, disguised strikes, theft and imposed mutuality among the poor." Essentially, for Scott (1985), solidarity among marginalized classes falls within the rubric of resistance. On the other hand, marginalized classes may engage in symbolic resistance by negating the powerful body's rule in a "social space", for example in the privacy of one's home, where "the definitions and performances imposed by domination do not prevail" (Scott, 1985: 328). Yet, when this subtle resistance can be mobilized to provide social support for the exertion of violence, the process of militarization is nonetheless progressing. In this way, support for resistance groups also becomes a commodity which can be maneuvered from a populace. Therefore, while militaries often enact policies in an attempt to obfuscate the problematic nature of their institutions, so too can insurgency groups divert public attention from the problematic and violent nature of their activities, and consequently garner collective support from segments of a population.

### **Militarization and Children**

While Enloe describes the maneuvers which militarize women, the focus of this research addresses the ways in which maneuvers can impact entire populations, including children, particularly those living in conflict zones. Accordingly, it discusses the relationship between

militarization and children, both within their social conditions, as well as within their overt and more subtle acts of resistance. Children are particularly relevant to the study of militarization because they are often the most excluded populations from academic research on militaries. Yet, historical evidence asserts that children's longstanding association with the military dates back to the Middle Ages (Shahar, 1990; Cairns, 1996; Orme, 2001). In recent years, the proliferation of small arms has increased the "effectiveness" of children on the frontlines, and has made the recruitment of children into combat more "profitable" and "efficient" for armed groups, who take advantage of children's "agility" and "suggestibility", and the overall economic hardships experienced by the society within which these children live (Maçhel, 1996; Brett and McCollin, 1998; Singer, 2005; Rosen, 2005; Wessells, 2006). Concurrently, however, the children who are not actively soldiering in an armed conflict, but nonetheless provide coerced, yet indirect, support are often overlooked. In actuality, children are very much part of militarized societies, and often experience a similar subtle process of militarization that Enloe (2000) attributes to women. In this way, and because of their unique circumstances, this research turns its attention to young people, highlighting some of the ways in which children have been maneuvered (and are in turn, actively maneuvering) through the process of militarization.

### **The Militarization of Children's Social Conditions**

As previously noted, the process of militarization may infuse a society's social conditions, and may be seen in the increasing encroachment of the military upon civilian populations (Enloe, 1983; 2000). This phenomenon may garner support for, or obfuscate challenges against militarized ideals. However, in marginalized societies, militarized maneuvering may become even more overt, as a national or foreign (but ever-present) military may directly impose the dependence of the local populations upon its' policies, strategies and agendas. In this way, children as members of a militarized society cannot be spared from the military's influence. In such societies, children's militarization comes to represent the ways in which they become dependent on the military's policies in their daily lives. The military may

hinder children's movement, separate families, ration children's social interactions, and obstruct the provision of healthcare and education (Cairns, 1996; Brocklehurst, 2006; Wessells, 2006). Concurrently, children may experience the process of militarization through their television programs, toys, games and educational content (Reagan, 1994).

While some authors consider the infusion of military ideals into children's education and recreation as a form of militarized indoctrination (Burdman, 2003), using the framework of children's militarized maneuvering highlights that often this approach is not conducive to an exploration of children's realities, and may actually obscure the subtle ways in which children may be "nudged" into militarization (Enloe, 2000). As noted by Enloe (2000), militarization is *subtle* and only in its extreme forms, does militarization involve total control over a population. In fact, "if militarized beliefs and values already are rooted in a society, the military itself may only have to provide legitimation, an encouraging nudge here, a supportive nudge there" (Enloe, 2000: 171). Part of this nudging involves the clear demarcation of "us" (good) and "them" (evil), a theme which often permeates children's play, education and often daily lives, often facilitating militarization (Reagan, 1994). Accordingly, if militarization often involves the creation of a common enemy, then social spheres which provide legitimation or support for this view may be seen as militarized, and in turn, continue to shape children's militarized social conditions.

### ***Militarizing Education:***

Militarization may infuse the content of children's education, particularly when schools "socialize children to look upon soldiering [or involvement in militant groups] as an attractive career prospect" (Enloe, 2000: 242). Gor (2003: 178) refers to the mobilization of children's "thinking and emotional readiness to accept the use of power as answers to political problems" as "militaristic education." Referring specifically to Israeli education, Gor (2003) argues that the content of education is framed by the discourse of "preparedness", given the numerous historical threats to Israel's existence and the consistent, yet subtle, existential undertone prevalent in Israeli society. For example, given the repeated annihilation-threatening wars Israel

has fought with its Arab neighbours, the messages of Israeli education center on remaining nationally steadfast and resisting victimization (Gor, 2003). As well, with the memory of the collective trauma of the Holocaust still looming in the minds of Israeli educators and administrators, Israeli Independence Day is celebrated by teaching children:

that Arabs wanted to throw us into the sea and that the armies of all seven Arab states surrounding us invaded Israel. The day is celebrated in kindergarten as a military holiday. Kids visit military camps and teachers display flags of various military corps" (Gor, 2003: 179).

Such education may be understood as maneuvering children's support for the Israeli military, which has time and again, been posited as protecting the citizenry and fighting off Israeli annihilation. Gor (2003: 180) argues that the potential and omni-present threat of annihilation has been "emotionally imprinted" into the minds of Israelis, and therefore colours the ways in which education is delivered.

As well, the education provided to children may contribute to the already-present and socially-constructed "enemy", further exacerbating cultural cleavages. Research has shown, for example, "that children's perception of differences between the communities can be concretised, unwittingly or intentionally by the school's teaching environment" (Brocklehurst, 1999). Others argue that politicized education, featuring the construction of a particular cultural enemy helps to sensitize youth to any future hardships, political or otherwise, later imposed on this marginalized group (Reagan, 1994; Cairns, 1996). Cairns (1996: 107) provides an example of this phenomenon in his discussion of the early infusion of Nazi ideology in the teaching afforded to German pupils just prior to the Second World War. As the Nazi government took control of the German political system, the party systematically changed the content of children's schoolbooks and mandated pledges from teachers, promising to educate children according to Nazi ideology (Cairns, 1996). This perpetuated the already prevalent animosity towards Jews and others considered "genetically-inferior" in the German society of the time (Cairns, 1996). Moreover, even if children recognized the oppressive nature of this education, their attempts at dissent may be stifled by peer-pressure and by the children's subordinate

position within the classroom. Indeed, Brocklehurst (1999) argues that children's "position as consumers of information, in a hierarchal relationship with... [an] institution is not conducive to their questioning of received bias." In this way, children may be socialized into the dominant ideology and therefore maneuvered into accepting the construction of the "enemy", so prevalent in militarized societies (Enloe, 2000).

Alternative or grass-roots schools that are implemented by community members may also militarize children's social conditions. For example, political strife in both Palestine and South Africa during the 1980s fostered "the development of [a] people's education which provided an opportunity to politicize young people and to emphasize the liberation struggle" (Adam, 1990; cited in Cairns, 1996: 128). Entire networks of people therefore, become involved in the militarized maneuvering of children: the teachers, who are often simply local members of the community, the parents who send their children to such educational outlets, and the community at large who support this system (Usher, 1991). This information implicates several groups and social outlets in the militarized education of children.

### ***Militarized Maneuvering in the Private Sphere:***

The militarized education of children also extends beyond the realm of state institutions and has entered into children's homes. The infusion of militarization into the domestic sphere (Feldman, 2002) continues to shape the militarized social conditions under which children live, thereby possibly promoting acceptance of armed resistance (Brocklehurst, 1999). For example, in Northern Ireland, the central heroes of children's stories were often political leaders and martyrs who were killed during the struggle for Irish nationalism (Brocklehurst, 1999). For example, Brocklehurst (1999) explains that in Northern Ireland, folk stories offer "[v]ivid constructions of heroes, demonisation of the enemy, and polarisation of good and bad, 'us' and the 'other'... [These] have been typical of children's stories" told by their parents and communities. As well, the domestic atmosphere may further solidify the militarized education of children. For example, Brocklehurst (1999) has noted that, in Northern Ireland, 80% of

republican children have fathers and brothers involved in the republican movement, a phenomenon, which she argues, exemplifies the transmission of republicanism as a “hereditary tradition”.

Yet, the maneuvering of children’s militarization in the domestic sphere may also involve more subtle cues. For example, Cairns (1996: 126) explains the particular potency that exists in the act of naming a child, arguing that “naming the child is a politically symbolic act and may be instrumental in constructing the child’s political views from birth.” In fact, “politically-active” families in South Africa often chose to name their children after political leaders in the African National Congress (Cairns, 1996: 126). Likewise, in Northern Ireland, the naming of children continued to subtly fuel “the troubles” by further demarking citizens into the two rival factions; children’s names were decided upon to explicitly indicate whether the child was Protestant or Catholic (Cairns, 1966: 126). Such divisions continue to fuel community-wide militarization, as children are taught that belonging to and supporting “our” community requires the negation of and (militarized) domination over the “other.” Indeed, Brocklehurst (1999) argues that “[t]he ‘internalising’ of the enemy into civilian life... contributes to community-wide blame and desire for retaliation and necessarily makes children’s homes and families part of the battleground.” In this way, both the public and private lives of children become militarized when militarization infuses the social conditions of a society.

### ***Militarizing Children’s Play and Recreation:***

Children’s play and recreational time has also been militarized throughout history and in various different contexts. For example, Orme (2001) explains that in Medieval Europe, hunting became an acceptable and encouraged pastime for children. Moreover, a “1512 statute of Henry VIII... laid down that all men with boys in their houses, aged between seven and seventeen, should provide them with a bow and two arrows, and bring them up to shoot... [as] a kind of military training” (Orme, 2001: 183; 182). Additionally, Reagan (1994) argues that “war toys”, defined as “toys evok[ing] images of the military, battle situations or war in general” and films

“with patriotic or war themes... are part of the process of militarization” (Reagan, 1994: 49; 52). These games and toys introduce the notion of violence to children, allowing them to incorporate militarization into their play. Indeed, Marten (2004) highlights that in the U.S. Revolutionary War, children’s play and literature centered on supporting their “side” of the conflict, with many engaging in role-playing as soldiers.

As well, Brocklehurst (1999) explains that in Northern Ireland, children’s “popular songs and games clearly express[ed] violent animosity.” Children also joined their parents in nationalist parades, wherein they participated in “pseudo-military displays” (Brocklehurst, 1999). In attempting to militarize and gain public support for the war in Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have spearheaded “[p]ublic displays of war paraphenilia, posters of heroes, speeches, videos and heroic songs... to invoke patriotic feelings in children and create a cult of martyrdom” (Hogg, 2006: 9). As well, children themselves may also influence the social conditions of their play by widening the social gap between themselves and their perceived “enemy”. For example, Brocklehurst (1999) highlights the taunts with which children attack each other in order to further distinguish themselves from the “other”. She found that “[c]hildren aged eleven for example have been pressured at school by other boys to join the *Junior Orange League* [a loyalist organization], join in anti-Catholic games and not to speak to Catholics” (Brocklehurst, 1999). Any perceived transgression of these social demarcations may lead one to be ostracized as a “Fenian lover”, that is a member of *Sinn Fein*, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Brocklehurst, 1999). This play is further helped by popular television shows. For example, Hesse and Mack (1991: 148; cited in Reagan, 1994: 47) suggest that historically, “television cartoons have some impact on the child’s identification of an enemy, and that ‘most of the cartoon shows... implicitly introduce[d] children to the superpower struggle between virtuous and righteous Americans and godless, evil communists’.” Therefore, children’s recreational time may further maneuver their acceptance of broader societal discourses,

allowing them to become more accepting of militarization and normalizing the political violence within their society.

Additionally, scouting organizations have been noted as one form of recreation through which children's play may become militarized. For example, Boy Scouts in Western Europe and the United States operated as a mechanism of militarized social organization as "they aimed to help discipline young people and make them socially useful" (Stearns, 2006: 86). Children's scouting activities have historically centered on a military-style format. For example:

scouts were organized into troops, and sub-divided into patrols; they wore uniform, had parades and did a little drill, they were led by officers, scoutmasters, patrol leaders [and] corporals... [Scouts] also... carried dispatches, went on trek... and fought mock battles (MacDonald, 1993: 187).

Therefore, as children's play is shaped by military ideologies and strategies, the violent means of militaries and/or insurgency groups may become normalized for children.

### **The Act of Militarizing Children: Overt Practices**

*To the eight-year-old or the twelve-year-old boy, the army is offered up as a surrogate family, a provider of food and protection; a rifle is presented as his new sibling. Football games have been turned into recruiting grounds (Enloe, 2000: 243).*

The discussion will now turn to the mobilization of children for the support of violence and militarized strategies, particularly as for Brocklehurst (1999), the militarization of children is "a cumulative process which begins with their acceptance of violence as a political means and ends with their mobilization." While, as this research demonstrates, this mobilization may be overt or subtle, Feldman (2002: 289) explains that "[w]hether we are talking about involuntary child soldiers or a voluntary youth resistance movement, we must recognise that both forms of mobilization can arise in similar conflict situations and represent analogous crises." Accordingly, both the subtle and overt participation of children in militarized resistance, represent the "displacement [of children] from the spaces in which they could be children, the everyday life spaces of familial nurturance, play spaces of peer socialization and sites of both informal and formal learning" (Feldman, 2002: 289).

Although this research explores militarized resistance as a broad phenomenon, it is important to recognize that there are both *subtle* and *overt* forms of mobilization. Yet, concurrently, it is also important to note that “overt” and “subtle” forms of mobilizations are not mutually-exclusive. Current literature highlights that children’s militarization is fluid, often encompassing both forms of participation (Brocklehurst, 1999; Usher, 1989; Cairns, 1996; Maçhel, 2001; McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Wessells, 2006). Children may participate in overt militarization when they become what Feldman (2002) has termed, the “authors of [the] violence.” For the purposes of clarifying the various forms of resistance or “militarization of dissent” in which children can participate, this chapter will define overt forms of militarization as instances in which children become directly associated with (either government or insurgency) fighting forces, as active combatants, or as medical, technical and/or domestic support. As such, overt militarization will focus on the most definitive forms of children’s activities within fighting forces, and center on the aforementioned internationally-accepted definition of a “child[ren] associated with fighting forces”, recognized as:

any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities (Paris Principles, 2007: 7).

In focusing on children associated with fighting forces, the phenomenon of militarized activities can be explored.

Worldwide, the phenomenon of children’s association with fighting forces has reached estimates of 300,000 combatants (Brett and McCallin, 1998; cited in Maçhel, 2001: 7), fighting in “33 on-going or recent armed conflicts in almost every region of the world” (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Exemplifying the sheer magnitude of this practice, Wessells (2006: 2) argues that “[if] these children stood side by side, locked their hands and spread their arms, they would form a human chain 250 miles long.” Despite international condemnation of the involvement of children under 18 in fighting forces (Optional Protocol, 2002), it has been found that children

*under 15* have been participating in armed conflicts, spanning geographically from Mexico to Papua New Guinea (Brett and McCollin, 1998). While a large number of these youth have endured abduction and forced conscription with fighting forces (Cairns, 1996; Maçhel, 2001; McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Denov and Maclure, 2006; Maclure and Denov, 2006; Denov and Maclure, 2007), some children have become involved in fighting forces out of frustration and disenfranchisement with their current social situations, many of which have been plagued with extreme poverty, unemployment, and severely limited educational opportunities (Maçhel, 2001; Wessells, 2006). Indeed, for many children worldwide, “[s]oldiering is often attractive... because it provides meaning, identity, and options civilian life does not afford” (Wessells, 2006: 4). At times, the recruitment or enlistment of children into fighting forces receives community approval and “[c]hildren mobilised and militarized are narrated as sacrificial victims to a variety of just causes” (Feldman, 2002: 291). Therefore, children’s entry into these groups, symbolizes their induction into the process of overt militarization.

However, children’s association with fighting forces, that is, the extent of their militarization includes more than their participation in combat roles. In fact, “depending on the context, child soldiers may serve as sentries, bodyguards, porters, domestic labourers, medics, guards, sex slaves, spies, cooks, mine sweepers, or recruiters” (Wessells, 1996: 8). For example, in the Iran/Iraq war, children as young as 13 were forced to join the militaries in order to stroll mine fields and assist soldiers in detecting unexploded sites (Cairns, 1996: 131). As well, paramilitary groups in Colombia often “use children called ‘little bells’ as an early warning system, deploying them to front lines to draw fire and identify traps” (Wessells, 2006: 17). Children’s greatest “assets” to military and insurgency groups center on their “small size”, “agility”, and “greater suggestibility”; in fact, “the greater suggestibility of children and the degree to which they can be normalised into violence means that child soldiers are more likely to commit atrocities than adults” (Brett and McCollin, 1998: 20; 25). For example, youth associated with the Khemer Rouge in the late 1970s in Cambodia, were often tasked with the violent duty

of interrogating and torturing political prisoners captured by the military (Ea and Sim, 2001: 31-32). Immersing the children into a “war-waging” environment therefore, may help children normalize the armed forces’ reliance on violent strategies.

However, children’s involvement with armed forces is not a new phenomenon, and in fact, has been historically evidenced. The earliest data on the overt militarization of children’s actions can be traced back to the children’s crusade of 1212, in which groups of young boys and girls joined French and German armies on a crusade to recapture the Holyland (Shahar, 1990; Cairns, 1996). Despite their resolve to conquer the Holyland, many of the children either died en route or were, upon arrival, sold into slavery (Shahar, 1990). As well, during the U.S. Civil War, militaries *relied* on children’s participation in the fighting forces. For example, “drummer boys” often followed armies and assisted the forces by signaling troop movements, delivered mail between troops, assisted military medics and created ditches to assist the combating battalions (Marten, 2004: 128). Although these boys were not supposed to come in harm’s way, some were indeed injured by shrapnel and even died in the armed confrontations (Marten, 2004: 137). The recognition of the “usefulness” of children in combat has therefore facilitated their continued strategic use by fighting forces. However, while children’s involvement in overt militarization has been historically evidenced, in recent decades, the proliferation of small arms has amplified the roles of children as active combatants, facilitating their increased participating in front-line combat (Maçhel, 1996; Brett and McCollin, 1998; Denov and Maclure, 2007).

Children who have been conscripted into fighting forces, particularly those involved in civil wars, have often been press-ganged into participation or have been abducted from their families (McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Maclure and Denov, 2006; Wessells, 2006; Denov and Maclure, 2007). Press-ganging involves “a group abduction wherein soldiers sweep through marketplaces or streets, rounding up youths like fish in nets, or raid[ing] institutions such as orphanages or schools” (Wessells, 2006: 40-41). Oftentimes, armed groups, such as the

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, abduct "any children who happen to be in their path" (Wessells, 2006: 38). Other children have been recruited through their religious educational institutions. For example, Wessells (2006: 15) notes that the Taliban in Afghanistan often recruited students in madrassas to join their ranks. This has been coupled with a "house-to-house" recruitment program, wherein parents are either threatened, or made to feel a "sense of duty" to volunteer a child to the greater cause (Wessells, 2006: 38). As well, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the main insurgency group in Sri Lanka, has promoted a "one family, one child formula", persuading families to volunteer a child for combat by exempting this family from LTTE-imposed taxation (Hogg, 2006: 10). In forcibly recruiting child soldiers, armed groups will often force the new recruit to kill a member of their family, thereby ensuring that ties with the child's family and community will be irreversibly severed (Wessells, 2006).

Other children are maneuvered into their militarized positions with armed groups through the "promise" of social and material benefits (Cairns, 1996; Rosen, 2006; Wessells, 2006). Wessells (2006: 46) has termed such incentives the "pull" factors of military recruitment, as they offer "positive rewards or incentives for joining armed groups." Children may be lured into joining armed forces when these groups may offer them benefits that are otherwise denied to the youth. For example, children may gain prestige and a sense of empowerment (Denov and Maclure, 2006; Maclure and Denov, 2006; Cairns, 1996), they may experience a sense of belonging to a broader community (Cairns, 1996; Maçhel, 2001; Feldman, 2002), and they may receive material rewards, such as education and financial support (Cairns, 1996; Wessells, 2006). As well, joining a fighting force may be their sole source of survival in the face of the murder of their family members (Rosen, 2006; Wessells, 2006) as the armed group may be their "only hope of [obtaining] food, medical support or protection from further attack" (Wessells, 2006: 47). In this way, the armed groups may offer their child recruits immediate benefits, which may entice them to join the group, and later continue to remain within its ranks.

Children who join resistance movements may further actively participate in their own militarized maneuvering, as they may experience “thrill” within their militarized activities (Cairns, 2006). For example, children’s maneuvering into violent modes of militarized resistance can be solidified through their association of social progress with violence. Brocklehurst (1999) explains that:

through violent participation, often initiated amongst themselves, children learnt that violence achieved results. Injuring a soldier and hijacking a bus gained praise and had heroic implications within a gang, thus enabling boys in particular to benefit socially from political violence.

For other children, remaining within the fighting force may be attributed to their experiencing the “physical power and respect achievable only through bearing a gun” (Delap, 2005; cited in Wessells, 2006: 51). In this way, participating in militarized activities may fuel children’s continued involvement in the fighting forces.

Additionally, the maneuvering of children into overtly militarized roles is a process which involves training (McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Denov and Maclure, 2007) and phases of initiation (Clarke, 1986; cited in Cairns, 1996: 132). For example, studying the ETA in Spain Clarke (1986: cited in Cairns, 1996: 132) has found that the

initial phase [lasting some weeks or months] the organization may try out the new recruit in various ways. Usually this entails asking him/her to carry out relatively innocuous tasks such as delivering political pamphlets... [Later] the recruit may be asked to... gather... intelligence or deliver... weapons... [T]he young person almost certainly grows in his or her commitment to the group and its ideals. This is because this period involves a person of learning by doing, during which core values are developed...

Likewise, Maclure and Denov (2006: 125) highlight that in the Sierra Leonean conflict, children were provided with “methodical” training about the “engag[ment] in armed conflict... and the perpetuat[ion] of mayhem and terror on behalf of the rebel movement” (Maclure and Denov, 2006: 125). For the youth involved with the Revolutionary United Front, violence became “a feature of daily interaction that inculcated deep-seated fear and unquestioning compliance among the young recruits” (Maclure and Denov, 2006: 126). Yet, for many of these youth, the years spent with the fighting forces, accompanied by their complete disconnection from their

families and communities, led them to be completely reliant on the rebel group for their survival, and eventually led them to view “their captors as sources of succour and guidance” (Maclure and Denov, 2006: 125). In this way, the youth were maneuvered and socialized into abiding by the ideology of the rebel group.

For some children, the combat training they receive mirrors the amalgamation of violence and play. For example, in her study on girl soldiers in Sri Lanka, Kearns (2003: 8) found that recruits of the LTTE were given “dummy guns” in order to normalize their interactions with firearms, allowing them to “graduate” to actual weaponry only once they have displayed fearlessness. As well, in this context, the girls were given cyanide-capsule necklaces to wear prior to embarking into battle; should they be captured by opposing forces, the girls were supposed to ingest this drug and spare themselves the horror of torture in captivity (Kearns, 2003). Interestingly, the capability of controlling their fate, albeit only in these rare instances, led the girls to “feel safe because it was a guarantee that the enemy could not capture them alive and abuse or harass them” (Kearns, 2003: 8). This apparent “consideration” for the new recruits helped to maneuver the girls’ trust of and dependence on the rebel group. Moreover, coupled with explicit indoctrination and socialization to equate brutality with pleasure, children in Sierra Leone, for instance, were often given alcohol, cocaine and gun powder to ingest by the RUF prior to embarking on a mission in order to de-sensitize them to the violence they were about to commit (Maclure and Denov, 2006: 127; Denov and Maclure, 2007: 9). Severed from their families, under continued threat of punishment, and often impaired by the ingestion of hallucinogenic drugs, the child soldiers in Sierra Leone’s rebel movement “gradually acquiesced to the rebel movement’s system of warlord clientelism... [and] came to regard the RUF as a surrogate family and themselves as *bona fide* RUF fighters” (Maclure and Denov, 2006: 128).

Children’s overt militarization often contributes to the “efficiency” and “effectiveness” of the groups with which they are associated, and therefore, children themselves proliferate the violence of the armed groups. Their vast roles supply armed groups with the resources

necessary for armed combat. As previously stated, child soldiers may become “sentries, porters, domestic labourers, medics, guards, sex slaves, spies, cooks, mine sweepers, or recruiters” (CSC, 2004; cited in Wessells, 2006: 8). They may also become active combatants, and frontline troops, as well as rising soldiers in the armed forces’ ranks (Cairns, 1996; McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Maclure and Denov, 2006; Wessells, 2006). However, children’s roles within armed forces are often “highly fluid and contextual, as children... perform multiple roles in the same day” (Wessells, 2006: 72); their roles also change over time, with the acquisition of new skills in the use of weaponry, and changes to the battle terrain (Wessells, 2006; Denov and Maclure, 2007). Paradoxically, children become one of the armed forces’ most *valuable* commodities, and their most impacted victims. In this way, children’s overt militarization, as well as both their roles within these fighting forces, support the overall production of violence, and foster the continuation of the armed conflict.

Importantly, one of the most distinguishing features of children’s association with fighting forces is the ways in which their sexual violence has been militarized. In some fighting forces, sexual access to girls becomes a privilege bestowed on “successful” male soldiers (McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Denov, 2006). As well, sexual violence against girl recruits is commonplace, as some authors have categorized sexual violence and abuse as unanimous experiences among girls associated with fighting forces in Africa (Maçhel, 2001; McKay and Mazurana, 2004). As well, many girl conscripts were forced to “marry” and become the “sexual property” of individual commanders of rebel forces (Maçhel, 2001; McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Denov, 2006). Therefore, sexual access to girls becomes vital to sustaining the morale of the male soldiers and encouraging brutality in exchange for advancement among the forces’ ranks and increased access to girls, thereby perpetuating further “mayhem” throughout armed conflicts (Maclure and Denov, 2006).

Children’s strict obedience to the armed group is maneuvered through constant threats of severe punishment for perceived infractions (Maçhel, 2001; Maclure and Denov, 2006;

Wessells, 2006; Rosen, 2006). Punishment for infractions, that is, behaviours considered to be challenges to the armed groups' command structure, are often severe and aimed at deterring any future dissent (Wessells, 2006). Anything from attempts at escape to crying can be considered an affront to the armed group (Kearns, 2003; Wessells, 2006). The most severe punishments include physical abuse, mutilation and murder (Maclure and Denov, 2006: 126).

Although children's militarization is most obvious through their armed participation as child soldiers, militarization also includes their participation (violently or otherwise) in a highly visible form of public disobedience. For example, Cairns (1996: 111) highlights that children in Northern Ireland were involved in (sometimes armed) "confrontations" with the Loyalist security forces. Similarly, in South Africa, children actively resisted against the imposition of apartheid policies by:

barricade[ing] streets, set[ting] up roadblocks of burning tyres, and ston[ing] police and other vehicles manned by whites that attempted to enter these [youth-imposed] no-go areas... [They organized] their own initiation rites by which youth attained a kind of political adulthood (Feldman, 2002: 297).

Many belonged to the political-activist organization, Young Lions of South Africa (Feldman, 2002; Smyth, 2003). In yet another context, during the First *Intifada* in the Palestinian territories, children organized bouts of stone-throwing against Israeli army forces and civilian vehicles, with different roles (i.e., distracting soldiers by lighting tires, warning the youth when soldiers were approaching) being self-imposed according to the child's age (Kuttab, 1988). The distinguishing feature making these forms of participation militaristically overt is that the youth in such contexts, are "at the forefront... rather than the followers" of the political violence (Cairns, 1996:112).

Moreover, children's militarization may continue in their later years, as sometimes, when "children get older... overt action gives way to more clandestine activities often involving highly organized guerrilla movements" (Cairns, 1996: 117). Brocklehurst (1999) provides an example for this argument, highlighting that in Northern Ireland, children's association with youth

organizations of the insurgency movements, assisted their later incorporation into the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In this way, such militarized activities often paved the way for more violent means of resistance later in life.

### **Children's Subtle Acts of Militarization**

As previously stated, the militarization of children involves both overt and subtle components, although these forms of mobilization are not mutually-exclusive. In this thesis, subtle militarization is situated along a continuum spanning from the militarization of children's social conditions to their overt mobilization<sup>3</sup>. This chapter provides a few examples of subtle militarized maneuvering, as it will be discussed in length and detail throughout this thesis, particularly as this concept applies to Palestinian children. Examples of children's subtle militarized acts can be drawn from historical accounts of children's resistance during the Second World War. For example, Coles (1967: 325) explains that throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, children engaged in unaffiliated acts of subversion: "they sang songs of protest in Danish schools; they helped derail German trains in Holland; and even murdered Gestapo agents in France." Despite a lack of affiliation with a specific armed group, these children's acts can be considered militarized, insofar as they may mobilize populations to normalize or take for granted (sometimes violent) political resistance. Another example is highlighted by Taras Kuzio (2006), who explores the political activism of Ukrainian youth, particularly via protest, advocating for the democratization of the state. Moreover, Kuzio (2006: 74) argues that:

[y]oung people have played a central role in three recent democratic revolutions. In Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, they provided much of the energy for the street protests. Youth in these four countries helped mobilize protestors, provided logistical support, and often formed the first wave of protesters themselves.

Additionally, children have also mobilized in protest against the British military incursions in the current war in Iraq, voicing skepticism over the rationales for military actions put forth by the

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<sup>3</sup> It is important to reiterate the challenge posed by trying to operationalize these concepts, particularly as there are very few studies contributing literature on the subtle militarization of children. Essentially, this research broadly defines children's subtle militarized acts as politicized activities wherein the children are not directly affiliated with an armed group.

British government (Cunningham and Lavalette, 2004). This subtle militarized dissent nevertheless proliferates the process of militarization, as the protests were aimed at a specific military mission, rather than at the rationales underlying the military as an institution. In this way, the necessity of the military remained an unquestioned social discourse. Assessing these examples highlights that militarized maneuvering can take on several confounding forms, shedding light on the need for additional exploration.

## THE CONFLICT, MILITARIZATION AND CHILDREN

### Brief History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is complex, highly contentious, and has assumed significant international attention. In fact, some have argued that in the past 60 years “the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and the conflict between Zionism and Palestinian Arab nationalism, remained one of the world’s most dangerous and intractable confrontation, steadfastly refusing to confine itself to the Middle East” (Abu-Khalil, 2005: 13). Arab nationalism is said to have begun in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries with the Arab populations of the Middle East revolting against their western Mandates (France and Britain) in an effort to establish self-governance and build independent nation-states (Rowland and Frank, 2002: 74; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). Some authors note that the Arab nationalist revolts against the British Mandate in Palestine was subdued by the “1915 [written] promise of sovereignty from the British...guarantee[ing] Arab independence and the land of Palestine in the event of an Allied victory” in World War I (Rowland and Frank, 2002: 74; Bickerton and Klausner, 1991). Others, however, explain that British High Commissioner Henry McMahon’s letter only alluded to British support for an Arab nation in Palestine, rather than explicitly endorsing this option (Abu-Khalil, 2005: 21). Nonetheless, the revolts quickly regained momentum with the Balfour Declaration in 1917, in which the British formally promised the Jews a homeland in Palestine (Gelvin, 2005: 81; Shipler, 1987: 11; Chatty and Lewando-Hundt, 2005: 12-13). The Arab nationalists refused to acknowledge this Declaration, arguing the previous British promise took precedence (Rowland and Frank, 2002: 75; Reuveny 2003: 353), and mounted the “Arab Revolt of 1936-1939”. This revolt involved “a futile series of riots and killings aimed at breaking the bonds of the British Mandate to block the coming of Israel” (Shipler, 1987: 11), and only succeeded in reaffirming the already-held British conviction that its Mandate was “not a viable form of government”. The ensuing uprisings led Britain to an eventual relinquishment of control over Palestine (Rosen, 2005: 109; Abu-Khalil, 2005: 22).

Following the Second World War, the British Cabinet decided to defer the “question of Palestine”, that is the future partitioning of the land, to the newly formed United Nations (UN) (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991: 66). The UN, in turn, created a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), comprised of 11 member nations (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Yugoslavia), who after intense debate, proposed a partitioning of the land into two sovereign nations, with Jerusalem remaining an international city under UN administration (Abu-Khalil, 2005: 28). However, when the UN finally voted in 1947 to partition the land, the Jews’ acceptance and the Arabs’ rejection of this division resulted in the 1948 war between Israel and its immediate neighbouring Arab states (Shipler, 1987; Gelvin, 2005; Chatty and Lewando-Hundt, 2005). Armistice agreements were eventually signed in January of 1949, wherein Israel had gained 78 percent of the land formerly known as Palestine (Mark et. al., 2003: 15). Moreover, this war displaced approximately two thirds of the Arab population of Palestine, leaving hundreds of thousands to seek refuge primarily in the West Bank of Jordan (named for its geographical location west of the Jordan River) and the Gaza Strip near Egypt (Shipler, 1987; Mark et. al., 2003; Chatty and Lewando-Hundt, 2005). The war resulted in another nationalist setback for the Palestinian Arabs, as the partition proposed by the United Nations “was less generous to the Jews than the final armistice lines that followed the 1948 war” (Shipler, 1987: 12) (please see appendix A). For Palestinians, this war and its ensuing displacement of Palestinians, came to be known as *Al-Nakba* (‘the catastrophe’), while Jewish Israelis celebrate their victory as their “Day of Independence” (Shipler, 1987; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003; Abu-Khalil, 2005).

Throughout the subsequent 19 years (1948-1967), “Israel embarked on a period of nation building that with generous Western support gradually transformed it into the most technologically advanced and heavily armed state in the Middle East” (Abu-Khalil, 2005: 31), while the Palestinians lived under varying conditions in Jordan and Egypt. The former rejected the idea of Palestinian autonomy within its borders, “banning the word ‘Palestine’”, and

absorbing 66% of the Palestinians as Jordanian citizens (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 219; 220). Egypt, on the other hand, “denied Gaza’s Palestinians even... limited opportunities for institution building and political participation (including citizenship)... Egypt did not annex it [Gaza], as the Jordanians had the West Bank, which reinforced a sense of temporariness - now prevailing for almost half a century” (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 229) (Please see appendix A for a visual timeline of the aforementioned events). For many Palestinians, this post-war period birthed a formalized effort to mobilize for the creation of their own independent state.

Although Arab desires for autonomy and sovereignty over British Mandated Palestine have been traced back to the early 1900s (Bickerton and Klausner, 1991), the formation of a formal Palestinian national organization and the Palestinian charter was actually initiated when the majority of Palestinians lived in exile (Rowland and Frank, 2002). In 1964, a group of young Palestinian activist leaders, led by the late Yasir Arafat, joined to form the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), ostensibly established to represent Palestinian refugees spanning from Egypt to Syria (Rowland and Frank, 2002: 124). These leaders devised and formalized the “Palestinian National Covenant”, which upon completion in 1968, solidified the Palestinian identity and its connection to the land (Rowland and Frank, 2002; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). Moreover, article 5 defines “Palestinians” as “Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 1947, whether they were expelled from there or remained. Whoever is born to a Palestinian Arab father after this date, within Palestine or outside it, is a Palestinian” (cited in Lukacs, 1992: 292). The Covenant subsequently became the “backbone” of the PLO, enshrining the Palestine National Council as the official “parliament” for *all* Palestinians (Rowland and Frank, 2002: 124; Katzman, 2003: 68).

The PLO attempted to unify the Palestinian people, particularly in light of the 1967 war between Israel and its immediate neighbours, which resulted in Israel's conquering of the Gaza Strip from Egypt and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan (Meital, 2005; Chatty and Lewando-Hundt, 2005; Collins, 2004; Mayer, 1994). One effect of the 1967 war has been the

occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by the Israeli government. However, the internal implications among Palestinians of this defeat were even more complex. Amal Jamal (2005) explores two significant impacts of the war on the Palestinian national movement. On the one hand, it resulted in the loss of Palestinian land, "which permanently disconnected the leadership of the national movement from a portion of its homeland and from a central and coherent part of its constituency" (Jamal, 2005: 14). While at the same time, the war of 1967 facilitated:

*a new era in Palestinian nationalism in which a new Palestinian elite began, for the first time after the dispersal in 1948, to systematically take the initiative away from Arab states and to organize the Palestinian people as the main force in the struggle for liberation.... [turning] defeat into opportunity... [consolidating] a new Palestinian identity, institutionaliz[ing] the PLO... [and shifting] the political arena from nation building to state building (Jamal, 2005: 15).*

In this way, Palestinians began formally organizing for the establishment of their own state's future.

Moreover, in retribution for Israel's capture of additional Arab land, the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched what they termed the "War of Attrition" in October 1973, which has been called the Yom Kippur War in Israel, for its coinciding with the Jewish "Day of Atonement" (Gelvin, 2005: 181). Many Palestinians earnestly hoped this war would lead to a return to their homeland, but the Arab armies proved "incapable" of continuing the war (Gelvin, 2005: 182). As the war's "tide turned against the Arabs", a UN-sponsored ceasefire became negotiable, eventually leading to the cessation of the armed conflict (Abu-Khalil, 2005: 52). This defeat and the subsequent "inner conflicts within the Palestinian resistance movement were devastating" both to the Palestinian people and to their collective desire for a homeland (Abdul-Rahim and Abuateya, 2005: 62).

Life under continued Israeli occupation, characterized by ever-expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, restrictions on water use and limited access to commercial markets, further aggravated the Palestinians (McDowall, 1998: 13). Despite the

Israeli policy of integrating the two economies, and the subsequent economic collaboration between the two peoples from 1967 until the early 1990, citizenship and residence issues were still governed according to the 1967 “Green Line”, that is “the ceasefire line of 1967”, with Israel still controlling the Palestinian populations through policy and practice (Brown, 2004: 505). During the occupation, the Palestinians became disenfranchised with the idea that their neighbouring nations (the Jordanian and Egyptian governments) could liberate Palestine on the Palestinians’ behalf, and this cynicism ignited a resistance movement which mobilized “the entire population [of both Gaza and the West Bank] within days” (McDowall, 1998: 13). Termed the *Intifada* (uprising), this movement, which lasted from 1987-1991, was characterized by “commercial strikes, demonstrations, stone throwing, and blocking main roads with rocks, metal blocks, and burning tires” (Kuttab, 1988: 20). As the *Intifada* slowed, Israel and the PLO began peace negotiations, despite the increasing expansions of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and the mounting violent attacks on Israeli citizens within Israel by Palestinian insurgency groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 439-443).


From 1991 to 1993, a series of bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbours were held in the United States, yielding a “secretly negotiated agreement” between Israel and the PLO, which is known as the 1993 Declaration of Principles (Abu-Khalil, 2005: 67-68). Importantly, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995, created 3 formalized Areas in the Palestinian Territories, each “varying [in] degree of Palestinian and Israeli control”<sup>4</sup> (Abu-Khalil, 2005: 69). However, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1996, by an Israeli right-wing extremist, was a significant setback in the peace process, which ultimately failed to move beyond the signed Interim Agreement, a document which included “Israel’s recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the agreement to grant full

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<sup>4</sup> Area A included “the seven major Palestinian towns, Palestinians would have complete control of [its] civil administration and security”; Area B included all other Palestinian communities, wherein “Israel would retain control of ‘overriding security responsibility’”; and finally, Area C, which included geographical segments of land such as “all Israeli settlements, military bases, and areas declared ‘state lands’”, to be governed in totality by the State of Israel (Abu-Khalil, 2005: 68).

autonomy to the Palestinians under the PLO leadership for five years” (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 440). In this way, the peace negotiations marked a significant achievement towards Palestinian statehood. However, a lack of specific plans and procedures in the “declaration of principles” ensured that little effective progress could be made towards Palestinian autonomy (Rowland and Frank, 2002: 156).

Successive Israeli governments have since been unable to reach similar agreements with the Palestinian leadership, and disillusionment with the prospects of an autonomous Palestinian state, in addition to perceived Israeli desecration of the Palestinian Holy Site, the Al-Aqsa Mosque by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, have birthed a new *Intifada*, termed the Al-Aqsa, or the Second *Intifada* (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 451-456). This second generalized “uprising” responded to incursions into the Palestinian territories by the Israeli government, and led to increases in suicide terror and violent attacks on Israelis (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 451-456). In fact, the defining feature differentiating this *Intifada* from its predecessor was the increased in violence with which the second *Intifada* has been characterized (Champagne and Abu-Saad, 2006). In response, in 2002, the Israeli government began construction of a Separation Barrier in the West Bank, which has effectively separated Palestinian towns, and often divided areas in one town from each other (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 453-454). It has affected the Palestinian populations economically, politically and socially, creating at least 50 geographically disconnected Palestinian pockets in the West Bank (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1103). Criticized by many in the international community and even Israeli non-governmental organizations, such as B’Tselem, for the hardships it has imposed on the Palestinian people (Trottier, 2007; Kirstein-Keshet, 2004; B’Tselem, 2006), the Israeli Separation Barrier is a 720-km cement and chain-linked fence (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Below is a brief timeline of the current general developments in the conflict:



At present, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are over four million Palestinian refugees, defined as “persons [and their descendents] whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, [and] who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict” (Hovy, 2005: 2). Of these, approximately 1.5 million live in the Middle East, with 400,000 living in Israel, 665,000 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and another 356,000 in the Gaza Strip (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: xxviii). However, as stated in the introduction, children disproportionately comprise this population, as approximately half of the Palestinian population is below 18 years of age (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1102; Sirasjait, 2004: 212; Alzaroo and Lewando-Hunt, 2003: 168). Given these large numbers of Palestinian youth, an exploration of the militarization of their society ought to be conducted.

### **The Historical Militarization of Palestinian Society**

As noted in the introduction, militarization is the “social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence” (Geyer, 1989: 79). It is a gradual process by which a person comes to be controlled by the military *or* comes to depend on militaristic ideas to secure its well-being (Lutz, 2002: 723). The militarization of an individual is a process which operates in tandem with the militarization of society; “the more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also *normal*” (Enloe, 2000: 3; emphasis added). Seen in this way, militarization incorporates more than combat and recruitment. It involves the incorporation of economic, political, and social elements, particularly as militarized

societies “develop specialized language, complex rituals, and social institutions to prepare individuals for physical sacrifice to the collective nation” (Adelman, 2003: 1138).

An example of this militarization can be seen in the first Palestinian *Intifada* which mobilized whole communities to support acts of disobedience against the Israeli Army (Kuttab, 1988; Darweish, 1989; Usher, 1991). In spite of the additional restrictions imposed by the Israeli military, many Palestinians were motivated by the ensuing strikes and demonstrations (Usher, 1991). In fact, many collected donations among their communities to supplement the incomes of those who took part in the strikes, which involved Palestinians’ refraining from working within Israel or supplying the Israeli public with agricultural goods (Darweish, 1989: 52). The general sentiment of the First *Intifada* centered on decreasing the reliance on Israeli commerce, and increasing Palestinian self-subsistence (Darweish, 1989). Palestinians actively re-evaluated their consumption, and began “economi[z]ing on food... [while cultivating] a system of self-sufficiency” (Darweish, 1989: 54), which in turn, became a force of resistance and mobilization that involved all generations of Palestinians (Kuttab, 1988; Darweish, 1989; Usher, 1991).

### **The Historical Militarization of Palestinian Youth**

Although Palestinian children have been involved in armed political conflicts and violent revolts since the 1830s (Rosen, 2003; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003), their centrality to resistance movements was most visible in their participation in the First Palestinian *Intifada* (Darweish, 1989; Kuttab, 1988). In fact, this *Intifada* facilitated the rise of the *Shabab* (mobilized young man), exemplifying that “the new activism was clearly in the hands of a younger generation” (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 106). Children as young as seven rolled “tires to the middle of the road, pouring gasoline on them, and then [set] them on fire” to hinder the flow of traffic, impacting Israeli mobility, while simultaneously disrupting and diverting the attention of Israeli soldiers (Darweish, 1989: 57). The youth also used homemade slingshots to pummel passing cars and Israeli Army outposts with stones, earning them the title of the “children of the

stones” (Kuttab, 1988: 19). In this way, children became distinguished as the “chief ‘vehicles for change’ in... [this] popular uprising against the military occupation” (Usher, 1991: 3).

Since the First *Intifada*, researchers have attempted to contextualize Palestinian children’s participation in resistance movements more specifically, but in essence have facilitated a contentious debate on Palestinian children’s experiences. Current literature on Palestinian children has tended to see them as victims of the Israeli occupation (Usher, 1991; Kuttab, 1988; Sirasjait, 2004; Darweish, 1989; Veerman and Levine, 2001), and as active protesters of the Israeli presence (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006), particularly as resisters of the injustices committed against their families (Usher, 1991). As well, academic literature has described Palestinian children as subjects of continual humiliation and second-class citizenship (Usher, 1991; Kuttab, 1988; Sirasjait, 2004), and as suffering from educational constraints, including school closures, and politicized education (Brocklehurst, 2006; Alzaroo and Lewando-Hundt, 2003).

Alternatively, some authors view the children as malleable by-products of a hate-filled society, taught by their family and environment to violently attack the Israeli army and civilians. These authors assess the youth’s political mobilization in terms of educational indoctrination, particularly through the basic course curricula (Burdman, 2003; Kreiner, 2006). Others hold political figures and familial socialization responsible for the youth’s involvement in the conflict, arguing that the children are mere victims of the socialization towards hate and/or the religious indoctrination (Post et. al., 2003; Rosen, 2005). Overall, these authors on Palestinian children attribute the youth’s participation to the restrictive conditions of the Israeli army, or the indoctrination of members of the Palestinian society, pointing to the influence of structural sources of support and incitement for the militarization of children.

However, all of these interpretations fail to acknowledge the complexities inherent in these children’s political involvement, which involves *inter alia* their ability to connect their Palestinian identity to their situation in more subtle ways. For example, children’s role playing

sometimes involves their “pretending to be Arabs and Jews trying to kill each other” (Sirasjait, 2004: 219), and “imitat[ing] local martyrs or heroic figures resurrected from Arabic folklore” (Usher, 1991: 10). This form of play often “allows [the] children to ‘make sense and interpret’ their experience of political violence as well as to ventilate emotions.... Children can re-enact events and also try out new roles and solutions” (Punamaki, 1993, cited in Cairns, 1996: 85). Offering a concurring viewpoint, Brocklehurst (2006: 172) explains that “[t]he essentialized, innocent, weak or victim child, found in nationalization discourse and security justifications is not... the same child who is encouraged to play war games – real or imaginary.” However, researchers who discuss the present situation fail to contextualize this play through the messages of militarization, based largely on *several* sources, and mediated through the children’s own political understanding and experiences (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006).

Furthermore, these authors fail to ground the current situation, particularly in terms of continued oppression, with the collective memory of the past victimization of *Al-Nakba*, a foundational premise of Palestinian discourse (Sa’di, 2002). For example, these studies rarely explicitly connect *Al-Nakba* and the current developments in the conflict as mutually reinforcing phenomena for the purposes of militarized maneuvering. Moreover, they fail to contextualize the multitude of forces maneuvering children through militarization, including those embedded within Palestinian society, and those originating from Israeli policies and practices.

In contrast, however, one study in particular, examines the ways in which children view, both semantically and ontologically, the Separation Barrier in various West Bank towns (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). Based on her study, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2006: 1101-1102) critiques the “traditional views of children as passive victims of political violence... [opting] instead to view children as agents of change and mobilization” by analyzing the children’s writing compositions, “focus group discussions, the children’s own photographs, and participatory observation”. Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2006: 1109) found that the children’s: narratives struggled between stressing their daily resilience and coping strategies, their

family members' actions and reactions, their community's and nation's suffering, and the international media bias that described the ISW [Israeli Separation Wall] as a security fence... the children perceived it as nothing short of oppressive.

In fact, throughout the study, the author found that the Palestinian "children were in a pendulum-like process between negotiating the presence of the ISW and searching for power in their nation's legacy and history" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1110).

Social memory has played a key role in the children's perceptions of their situations, as in their explanations, many "wove together many perceptual strands: the views of their teachers, classmates, and family members". Additionally, the youth constantly discussed their family histories of displacement (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1110-1111). While the study in question offers an interesting framework for analysis, little attention is given to the connection between Palestinian discourses and social conditions, and the militarization of Palestinian society. In effect, Shalhoub-Kevorkian's analysis focuses largely on children's resistance, rather than providing a discussion on the elements found within Palestinian society which may enhance children's mobilization. In addressing one way in which militarization is manifested within today's context<sup>5</sup>, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2006) essentially offers readers a perspective on the resistance and retaliatory *acts* by children, allowing these youth to describe their individualized experiences with the aforementioned barrier.

This thesis attempts to fill the current research gaps, which tends to generally focus on direct indoctrination or contemporary manifestations of the children's resistance. It provides information on the features of militarized maneuvering that are prevalent in these children's society, focusing on the very subtleties of the militarizing process, which fuels additional militarization in Palestinian society. In this way, it aims to assess the sources through which militarization permeates and discuss their potential for legitimating and encouraging resistance.

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<sup>5</sup> Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2006) however, does not frame her research within the militarized perspective, but rather highlights these children's inherent agency in resisting the Separation Barrier, and learning about the experiences of their grandparents.

## MANEUVERING PALESTINIAN SOCIETY: LITERATURE ON THE ISRAELI SEPARATION BARRIER

The militarization of Palestinian populations is enhanced by the newly-erected Israeli Separation Barrier, which maneuvers the daily dependence of Palestinian populations on Israeli military policies. Moreover, it is widely considered to be the most obstructive and unilateral Israeli policy towards Palestinian populations (Kirstein-Keshet, 2006; Pappé, 2006; Usher, 2006; Trottier, 2007). As a physical construct, undergirded by policy directives from the Israeli government, the barrier impacts the daily lives of Palestinians, stifling their freedom of movement both within the West Bank and into Israel, hindering the provision of basic human rights, including healthcare and education, and essentially complicating Palestinian self-subsistence by hindering the flow of goods and services to Palestinian populations (Trottier, 2004; Usher, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006; Kirstein-Keshet, 2006; B'Tselem, 2006).

Exploring the conflation of politics and militarization, Enloe (2000: 214; emphasis added) explains that oftentimes, "military maneuvers are designed to *address* political problems." Indeed, this chapter assesses the ways in which the barrier can be understood as a means to tackle political problems, thereby militarizing the social conditions of the Palestinian populations. Concurrently, however, the militarized social conditions offer Palestinians an avenue for what Enloe (2004: 11) has termed "the militarization of dissent", that is a response to militarization which, in and of itself, relies on militaristic ideals and strategies, such as active resistance, community mobilization and defiance of military policy.

This chapter first addresses the militarized maneuvering of Palestinians' social conditions by describing the physical characteristics of the barrier, discussing the competing rationales for its existence and calls for its deconstruction. It then explores some of the direct and indirect impacts of the barrier on Palestinian populations (with particular emphasis on children). Importantly, however, this chapter also addresses resistance as a form of militarization, particularly in light of the prevalent resistance to and defiance of the barrier (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006; Kirstein-Keshet, 2006). This latter section highlights the ways in

which children may take part in militarization through their participation in such resistance activities.

As a caveat, it is important to mention that a significant component of describing the Separation Barrier is the specific impacts it has on Palestinian populations. This includes references to statistics and anecdotal evidence implicated in the barrier's construction. Such information provides the relevant context for understanding the barrier's potential to contribute to Palestinians' militarized social conditions. Unfortunately, most of the academic literature and scholarly work assessing the barrier has merely described the barrier's general implications, and has rarely attempted to gather original data on the impact of the barrier on the general population. For this reason, this literature review includes several recently-published reports from field-embedded NGOs. As in many regions where conflict has erupted, few academics are willing or able to gather original data due to issues of danger and accessibility. Under such circumstances, local NGOs often provide the only available and accessible data. As such, NGO reports on the separation barrier, are especially important and will be drawn upon in this literature review as they help to explore the more salient and direct impacts of the barrier.

### **Deconstructing the Separation Barrier**

#### ***Physical Characteristics of the Separation Barrier:***

The physical characteristics of the estimated \$1.5 billion (Meital, 2005: 179) Separation Barrier vary significantly according to geographic locality through which the construction is routed. In the large areas where Palestinian and Israeli communities reside in close proximity, "the Barrier is a row of 25-foot high concrete slabs; other sections are comprised of an electronic fence, with electronic surveillance devices, a trench, barbed wire and a patrol road" (B'Tselem, 2006: 13) (please see Appendix B and C for images). In areas where it is, indeed, a fence, there are "dirt roads that... [are] dusted for footprints to track any infiltrators" (Rynhold, 2004: 62). Once complete, the Barrier stands 750km in length, an extension of 300 km from the Green Line separating the two jurisdictions (Rynhold, 2004; Pappé, 2006: 289).

Divided into five temporal phases of geographic routing, the barrier's construction has been contentious particularly as it trisects the West Bank and annexes large segments of land into Israel in order to maintain administrative and political sovereignty over Israeli settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (B'Tselem, n.d.; Usher, 2006). For example, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2004), less 20% of the barrier follows the "Green Line", the border which divides Israel from the West Bank land captured in 1967<sup>6</sup>. The remaining portion of the barrier is situated on Palestinian territory within the West Bank (Rynhold, 2004; United Nations, 2004). Some have argued that the barrier has "slid through the West Bank", in order to separate the region into three Palestinian cantons, separating:

Nablus and Jenin (delineated to the north and west by segments A, B and C); Ramallah and Salfit (carved out by phase C); and Bethlehem and Hebron (closed in by phase D). The Jordan Valley phase (phase E), the only one whose path has yet to be formally decided, will complete the cantons' encirclement to the east, leaving Jericho as an additional mini-enclave" (Lagerquist, 2004: 11).

While 43 fenced gates allow Palestinians to cross the barrier's checkpoints, the "security"-related delays which necessitate soldiers' checking for appropriate admittance documentation materialize in long lines of Palestinians eagerly waiting to cross the barrier to reach appropriate healthcare, agriculture, employment, schools and relatives barricaded on the other side of the barrier (Kirstein-Keshet, 2006; B'Tselem, n.d.); many destinations are situated only a few hundred metres away, yet the Palestinians are sometimes made to wait hours in order to reach them (Lagerquist, 2004; B'Tselem, 2006). Therefore, this physical structure partitions Palestinian land, heeding to the philosophical underpinnings of separation, and offering support to those who argue the barrier is a means through which Israeli politicians can realize their geographic and demographic hegemonic intentions (Ellis, 2004; Usher, 2006; Trottier, 2007).

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<sup>6</sup> It is important to reiterate the relevance of drawing from reports of field-embedded NGOs throughout this chapter, in addition to assessing peer-reviewed scholarly work, particularly as, on the whole, the latter does not include statistical data and anecdotal evidence. Without the inclusion of NGO reports, such relevant information on the physical characteristics and direct effects of the barrier could not have been garnered.

### ***Philosophy behind the Barrier: "Us Here, Them There":***

The separation of Israelis and Palestinians into distinctive "us here, them there" locales has predated the current Separation Barrier. In fact, this slogan was the "philosophical underpinning of the [1993] Oslo Accords", which sought to bring about a two-state solution to the ongoing conflict in the region (Lagerquist, 2004: 6). In many ways, this ethos undergirded the national-identity building efforts of both societies, particularly as the:

national community cannot be imagined without also imagining communities of foreigners which make 'our' culture unique: there can be no 'us' without a 'them'... Stereotypes become means of distinguishing 'them' from 'us': 'we' represent the standard, the normal against which 'their' deviations appear notable (Billig, 1995: 78-79; cited in Özkirimli, 2000: 200-201).

Indeed, these "stereotypes", or rather broad social perceptions of the "other", at times fueled by the political actions of Palestinians have fostered Israeli support for the barrier (Gavrillis, 2004; Meital, 2005). Although not completely uniform and cohesive, the Israeli public generally views the Separation Barrier as "an effective defense against terror... [whereby] failure to erect it would expose Israelis to terrorism, and state leaders would be held accountable" (Meital, 2005: 178). Therefore, physical separation became the primary solution for securing the safety of the Israeli populace, through ensuring that both those posing security threats to the Israeli public (Ben-Eliezer and Feinstein, 2007; Ministry of Defense, 2007), and those that are essentially a potentially and perpetually the dangerous "other" would remain geographically enclosed from opportunity to attack (Meital, 2005).

Indeed, the "solution" of a physical separation between Israel and the Palestinians was strengthened after the wave of suicide bombings, in the wake of the breakdown of Oslo Agreements (Meital, 2006). With no clear peace in sight, the (late) Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, commissioned a panel to discuss the possibility of constructing a physical obstacle between Israel and its Palestinian neighbours (Makovsky, 2004: 52; Usher 2006: 17). Unresolved during Rabin's tenure, this option was later taken on by several succeeding prime ministers, including Shimon Peres, Benjamin Netanyahu (who purposefully "shelved the plan")

and Ehud Barak (Makovsky, 2004: 54; Usher, 2006: 17), all of whom failed to bring the plan into fruition or negotiate a workable peace with the Palestinians. Ariel Sharon, the leader of Israel's then right of center *Likud* party and Ehud Barak's successor, initially advocated against the barrier, fearing it would necessitate the dismantling of Israel's settlements in the West Bank (Meital, 2006; Ben-Eliezer and Feinstein, 2007). However, while Sharon initially rejected the possibility of drawing borders which could later act as the basis for Israeli/Palestinian boundaries, mounting political pressure to "resolve" the violence associated with the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, from both left and right of the political spectrum, helped facilitate Sharon's change of political discourse (Usher, 2006: 19).

The barrier's construction, referred to as "Israel's most definitive effort at reshaping the West Bank to date" (Lagerquist, 2004: 5), began in June 2002 (B'Tselem, 2006). The barrier runs from north to south separating Israel and the neighbouring West Bank, encircling Jerusalem along its path (Israel and the Occupied, 2004). Israeli political leaders, as well as the majority of the Israeli public, "substantiated... [the barrier's construction] solely on the basis of security needs and the obligation of the government to protect the civilian population, given the background wave of acts of terror" and the unprecedented intensity of suicide bombings which characterized the Second *Intifada* (Meital, 2006: 182). Despite mounting international concern over the resulting hardships experienced by the Palestinian population, the Israeli Ministry of Defense consistently argued that the barrier is "a response to the threats posed to the State of Israel and [therefore] protect[s] its population from the threat of terror and criminal activity" (Ministry of Defense, 2007). Furthermore, the Israeli government argued that there has been a 30% decrease in the amount of infiltrating suicide bombers into Israeli territory between 2002 and 2003 (since the beginning of the barrier's construction) (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Concurring with this view, Gavrilis (2004) has argued that, rather than promoting hostility and distrust, the barrier might actually improve the situation between Palestinians and Israelis. He argues that the security offered to Israeli citizens by the barrier will allow the Israeli Defence

Forces (IDF) to ease some of its most obstructive checkpoints in the West Bank, “effectively transferring unprecedented authority to the Palestinians” (Gavrillis, 2004: 18). Whether or not this hypothesis will materialize, such future projections fail to take into account the *current* Palestinian resentment associated with the Separation Barrier.

Political theorists and researchers have highlighted the primary sentiments of the Palestinian population regarding the newly-erected physical separation that is - the connection between *Al-Nakba* (the ‘catastrophe’ of Israel’s establishment and the displacement of the Arab populations who inhabited the land) and the Separation Barrier (Lagerquist, 2004; Ellis, 2004; Pappé, 2006; Usher, 2006). Ellis (2004) has connected the two events, with the common thread of “ghettoization”, meaning the transfer, removal and confinement of the Palestinian population. Covered in a mural vividly depicting the land west of the barrier, to which Palestinian access is obstructed, Ellis (2004: 281) argues that the wall indeed, “means ghettoization ... [and for Palestinians] signals the end of Palestine.” The Palestinians overwhelmingly view the Separation Barrier as an extension of an “Apartheid ideology”, undergirded by the “fundamental Zionist objective: to get the land, without the people” (Farsoun and Aruri, 2006: 367). For Palestinians, the construction of the “racist separation fence” is interpreted as a “severe blow to human rights and... [as a] collective punishment of the Palestinian people” (Meital, 2005: 184). The barrier impacts all those along its route, regardless of their demographic characteristics or their level of political involvement.

Moreover, from the Palestinian perspective, Israel’s philosophy is oppressive, offering Israeli security at the expense of Palestinian human rights. They argue that the barrier “was designed to guarantee Israeli security while containing the Palestinians behind an impenetrable barrier, bristling with technology to detect the slightest untoward movement” (Bucaille, 2004: 155). For Palestinians particularly affected by the barrier, the security justification promulgated by the Israeli public, was merely a “paltry excuse” for the politically-motivated barrier, which they perceive as aimed at creating enclaves and Palestinian cantons, obstructing their current

access to healthcare, educational institutions and primary means of economic subsistence, effectively preventing a future (geographically-continuous) Palestinian state (Meital, 2005: 184). Others have argued that Israel's primary intention behind constructing the barrier, has centered on securing a form of annihilation within the region: demographic control (Usher, 2006; Lagerquist, 2004; Pappé, 2006; Bishara, 2006; Etkes, 2007).

***Militarized Control: The Politics of Demographics and Geography:***

Oftentimes, military maneuvers are designed to address the political control (or lack thereof) of a ruling body within a geographic region (Enloe, 2000: 214). However, the political control of a population may prove ineffective when demographic hegemony of the powerful political force is challenged by the rapid growth of the marginalized populations. In the Palestinian-Israeli context, both nations have been quite aware of the precarious nature of the demographic element of the conflict.

Calls for the preservation of a Jewish demographic majority (and therefore political control), advocated for by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, still permeate today (Bishara, 2002). With the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea currently numbering 10 million inhabitants, the Jewish contingent still retains a "slight majority" over its Palestinian counterpart (Usher, 2006: 20). However, it is estimated that by 2012 "parity" will exist between the Arab and Jewish populations in the region, and that by 2025, the Jewish population will face a "real existential threat" to their current social order, as the Palestinian Arabs will reach "ethnic supremacy" (Usher, 2006: 20). Usher (2006: 21) argues that this very threat is the catalyst for the Separation Barrier's annexation of vast geographic regions of the West Bank and the engulfing of entire Palestinian communities, numbering a total of 219,000 Palestinian residents (Lagerquist, 2004: 21). In fact, while prior to the barrier's construction settler populations doubled from 1992 to 2002 to reach 200,000 (Bishara, 2002: 143), the barrier helps to solidify Israel's demographic control as it segregates regions of the West Bank into various smaller enclaves in order to include within Israel the vast majority of existing Jewish

settlements in the West Bank (Lagerquist, 2004; B'Tselem, 2006; Usher, 2006). This maneuver secures geographic continuity between Israel and the settlements, and ensures that settler populations remain within Israel's boundaries, thereby strengthening Israel's demographic upper-hand.

Moreover, while Israeli government discourse centres on the *success* of the barrier (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004; Meital, 2006), Trottier (2007:126) argues that the barrier actually defies "military logic... [as] it often runs deep in valleys, instead of on the highest points... creat[es] real traps for soldiers... [and] includes fences where passage may be reduced, but still persists." Moreover, rather than directing attention to "suspicious" individuals, the barrier's restrictive checkpoints, "are generally imposed during the morning hours when people are trying to go to work or school, and that they are applied to the entire population including children, women and elderly people" (Brown, 2001: 509). Rather, Trottier (2007: 126) explains that the barrier is much more suited for police maneuvers, as it "allows complete control over a population's mobility... [whereby e]ntire towns can be effectively closed." The barrier effectively secures control of the Palestinian population thereby allowing militarization to permeate through the Israeli government's policies.

For their part, Palestinians are quite cognizant of this Israeli control and therefore perceive the barrier to be an inevitable "housecleaning of the West Bank" through demographic and geographic social control measures (Lagerquist, 2004: 21). Similarly to *Al-Nakba*, Palestinians perceive the barrier as an illegal land grab, which insults their nationalist aspirations, stripping them of the territory upon which a Palestinian state would one day be built. In this way, *Al-Nakba* and the barrier are connected through two prominent militarizing rationales: the deconstruction of Palestinian nationalism and the subsequent victimization of the Palestinians as a people. The physical presence of the barrier, particularly its characteristics and visibility, foster an ever-present militarizing maneuver through which Palestinians must resist or "negotiate" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006).

### ***Everyday Militarization: The Barrier's Presence in Everyday Palestinian Life:***

The barrier continues to affect the daily lives of the West Bank's Palestinians, a process of militarized maneuvering, insofar as the barrier permits the "gradual encroachment of the military institution into the civilian arena" (Enloe, 1983: 9). This "gradual encroachment" of Israeli military policy and constructions maneuvers the daily lives of Palestinians according to Israeli discourses of security and control. For example, access to East Jerusalem, which has obvious religious significance to Palestinians and is the "social and economic hub of the West Bank", has been severed by the barrier's path (B'Tselem, 2006: 31). East Jerusalem "is entirely swallowed by a subsection of phase A, its constituent neighborhoods and villages [are] being absorbed as isolated urban ghettos within Israeli Greater Jerusalem" (Lagerquist, 2004: 11). Religious observance, economic subsistence, and social mobility are therefore hindered, partitioning for Palestinians the areas into which they are permitted, and those from which they are excluded. Additionally, the barrier obstructs the West Bank residents' free-flow of travel into Jerusalem's "hospitals and other services, separating families and disrupting normal social life" (B'Tselem, 2006: 13). While some Palestinians are afforded access into these enclaves,

[c]rossing through the [barrier's] gates requires a permit, and many persons wanting to cross are listed as 'prevented' for varied reasons; most of the gates are open only a few hours a day, far fewer than are needed to meet the residents' needs; and residents must often wait a long time at the gates, sometimes because the gates do not open on time, and because of long lines (Farsoun and Aruri, 2006: 344).

This disruption has impacted several facets of Palestinian livelihood, including the separation of socially-and economically-dependent villages from one another, agricultural production, unemployment and poverty, the demographic makeup of the West Bank, access to healthcare, social services and education, and social mobility.

These obstructions to daily life, as well as the continual construction of this perceived symbol of oppression, perpetually reproduce a militarizing maneuver of social control by the Israeli army. However, the militarizing power of this maneuver is further enhanced by the barrier's resemblance (at least in effect) to *Al-Nakba*, wherein the barrier stands as a physical

manifestation of the historical experiences of separation, the inequality in power between Palestinians and their Israeli neighbours and the physical disconnection from the Palestinian homeland. Additionally, the militarized maneuvering of social control through the Separation Barrier become more evident when the structure's indirect and direct impacts on the Palestinian population are analyzed. Palestinian populations in the West Bank experience direct obstructions to their travel/transportation, separation from one primary means of subsistence: agriculture, and hindered access to healthcare and educational services. The barrier's indirect impacts include marginalization, rising unemployment, widespread poverty, restricted social mobility, effective "ghettoization", and nationalistic oppression. Through Enloe's conceptualization of militarization, it will become evident that these impacts may facilitate societal conditions in which the population may become more accepting of militarized (albeit, sometimes subtle) resistance.

### **Direct Impacts on Palestinians: The Militarization of Social Conditions**

#### ***Obstructions to Travel/Transportation:***

The barrier has created a relatively impenetrable border, through which access is based on Israeli control. In effect, Palestinians' travel both to Israel and within the West Bank is facilitated and (very often) hindered by Israeli army policies, maneuvering Palestinians into compliance and dependence of the Palestinians on Israeli military policies. For example, entrance into Israel and between artificial Palestinian enclaves is tempered by the 43 gates that run along the barrier's route; these include gates accessing agricultural production and transfer, checkpoints and gates for the movement of the general population (B'Tselem, n.d.). While several of the gates designated for the general Palestinian population are "open 12 hours a day without interruption" (B'Tselem, n.d.), obstructions to travel still remain, particularly as "Israel rejects about 25% of the applications to obtain entry permits into the 'seam area'" (Stephanini and Ziv, 2004: 7). The "seam" area refers to the region between the "Green Line" (the borders which resulted from the 1967 War) and the barrier's path (Gregory, 2004: 605) and is commonly

understood as containing between 3 and 5 kilometres of the land east of the Green Line (in the Palestinian Territories) (Usher, 2005: 35). In this way, Palestinians' travel is subject to the decisions of Israeli bureaucrats, who while issuing permits, are far removed from the actual situation.

Palestinians experience militarized social conditions insofar as their freedom of movement between territories is subject to Israeli military priorities, and control over Palestinian land falls primarily within the jurisdiction of the Israeli parliament. Palestinians are maneuvered to obey these policies in order to reach their desired destinations. Indeed, this "dance among unequal partners" (Enloe, 2000: 10) ensures that the Palestinian population can only negotiate their movement within the territory if they *follow the lead* of Israeli policies. An example of the barrier's obstruction on Palestinian movement can be seen through one East Jerusalem neighbourhood, which is directly impacted by the Separation Barrier.

Abu Dis is a Palestinian village straddling both the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While only 33% of this town is included within Jerusalem's boundaries, the remaining two-thirds "was not annexed [in the 1967 war] and is now considered part of the West Bank" (B'Tselem, 2006: 14). It had remained connected to Jerusalem in all aspects of "daily life with strong commercial, social and familial ties. All of this has been disrupted by the Barrier" (B'Tselem, 2006: 14). In fact, the area between Jerusalem and Abu Dis has been referred to as "a virtual no-man's land" (Taylor-Martin, 2006), making travel in and out of the village virtually impossible, and isolating the Palestinian residents (B'Tselem, 2006). For example:

although Abu Dis is only a few hundred yards away, getting to stores and Al-Quds University now requires an hour-long walk or a 25-mile drive...motorists have to take a circuitous route that skirts the Jewish settlement of Maaleh Adumim, home to 30,000 people and one of the West Bank areas Israel plans to keep (Taylor-Martin, 2006).

Given the newly enforced restrictions set out by the IDF, "even the dead need a permit to pass" the barrier's checkpoints (Kirstein-Keshet, 2006: 96). In this way, official Israeli policy which

prioritizes the geographic continuity of Israeli settlements and the “security” of the Israeli populace maneuvers Palestinians’ militarization in their daily lives.

***Disconnecting Palestinians from Agriculture:***

Agricultural production is the primary source of income for the Palestinian communities situated along the barrier’s route, a region which constitutes one of the most fertile areas in the West Bank (B’Tselem, n.d.; Rogers-Gessert, 2005). However, the barrier has dismantled the West Bank’s agricultural strongholds, wherein, upon its completion, “between 595,000 and 717,000 – a third of the West Bank population – stand to lose access to their cultivated land”, representing 33% of the West Bank’s population (Lagerquist, 2004: 13). In effect, the closure of businesses and agricultural facilities will be inevitable (Rogers-Gessert, 2005: 38). To add insult to injury, those whose lands are affected receive no compensation for their loss (Kirstein-Keshet, 2006: 89-90; Stephanini and Ziv, 2004: 8). Farming on the land to which Palestinian farmers currently have access has been essentially rationed, as Palestinians have seen reductions in the “number of gates through which farmers can enter their lands and... [these gates are open] for only short periods – up to 90 minutes total – two or three times a day” (Stephanini and Ziv, 2004: 8).

Moreover, the interruption and confiscation of water wells, which primarily serviced the agricultural economies (Trottier, 2004: 120), further aggravated the already-unstable Palestinian economy posing further hardships for Palestinian families and “depriving entire villages of most of their wealth” (Trottier, 2007: 125). Likewise, in the process of the Separation Barrier’s construction “local irrigation networks and water storage facilities have... been destroyed” (Lagerquist, 2004: 13).

Therefore, militarization permeates within the direct agricultural impacts of the barrier. For example, as with the case of Palestinian travel and transportation, Israeli policies, whether wittingly or unwittingly, create maneuvers to ensure the compliance of the Palestinian population, thereby limiting the latter’s self-sufficiency by way of agricultural production. This

agricultural self-sufficiency has, historically, been a benchmark of Palestinian identity, particularly as it signified a rejection of the dependence on Israeli goods (Kuttab, 1988; Usher, 1991). For example, the First *Intifada*, solidified the importance of self-subsistence for Palestinians, as the movement was primarily organized to disobey the Israeli occupation and curtail dependence on goods and services from Israel (Darweish, 1989; Usher, 1991). In effect, from 1987-1993, Palestinians had tried to limit their economy's reliance on Israel, as despite "buying cows from Israelis... [the Palestinians] managed to satisfy 80 percent of their [own] dairy needs – and animal husbandry" (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 300). A sense of nationalist pride was derived from the Palestinians' re-evaluation of their consumption, and "economi[z]ing on food... [while cultivating] a system of self-sufficiency" (Darweish, 1989: 54). Accordingly, Israeli policies which hinder Palestinian self-sufficiency solidify Israeli control and ensure Palestinians' economic dependence on Israeli goods and services.

Once again, this situation of Israeli control exemplifies Enloes' (2000: 10) claims that militarization resembles "a dance... among unequal partners", particularly as Palestinians' ability to support their families and communities depends on Israeli policies and practices. This situation is largely reminiscent of the 1970s and 1980s, wherein Israeli labour demand "drew labor from indigenous economic activities in the West Bank and Gaza... [and] the possibilities for self-sufficiency there [in the Palestinian territories] vanished. [The population] became a reservoir of cheap labor for Israel" (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 283-284). However, unlike the situation in decades prior, Israeli security concerns and resulting policies, such as the construction of the barrier, have sealed Palestinians off from the Israeli market (Stephanini and Ziv, 2004), virtually suffocating the Palestinian economy. Israeli policies and practices ensure that Palestinians can no longer support their families through employment in Israel, nor can they cultivate their own lands within the West Bank. The impacts on Palestinians' economic subsistence and their abilities to be self-sufficient, maneuver them into economic subjugation, further enhancing Israeli militarized control.

### ***Hindering Healthcare Provision:***

The barrier's route significantly hinders the provision of healthcare services to those along its route. As a result of this isolation, 26 local care clinics (Barghouti et. al., 2004: 37) have been effectively "ghettoized" (Ellis, 2004). As well, estimates indicate that, upon the barrier's completion, the number will likely rise to 71, out of the existing 500 clinics (Kirstein-Keshet, 2006: 90). The barrier restricts the provision of healthcare some to 425,000 (20%) of the West Bank residents (Barghouti et. al., 2004). This population includes "19,260 elderly people, more than 250 thousand ages below 15, [and] 105,642 children... under the age of five who need periodic vaccinations..." (Barghouti et. al., 2004: 24). Additionally, according to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, "on any given day, 40% of requests for entry on medical reasons are rejected" (Stephanini and Ziv, 2004: 7). In addition to the patients' impeded travel, the provision of prompt and appropriate healthcare services may be affected by the travel delays experienced by healthcare professionals; this "severely impair[s] the capacity of health institutions to provide services; and often health workers cannot visit communities to deliver preventive care" (Stephanini and Ziv, 2004: 9).

The unpredictable nature of barrier closures, the perceived disregard for Palestinian human suffering, and the helplessness with which the population must contend, assist in the breeding of militarized social conditions, as healthcare becomes a rationed resource, afforded to those who are not deemed threats to Israeli "security." The necessity of healthcare therefore becomes militarized as it is subject to the Israeli army's control and policy. Moreover, through Enloe's conceptualization, the maneuver of the barrier can be seen as re-militarizing society daily, as the direct impacts of the barrier do not evade the most vulnerable of Palestinian society; the obstruction of children, the elderly and those most in need of medical attention from appropriate services due to their potential "threats" to Israeli society, in turn, may yield resentment, and in effect create more hostility among the Palestinian population, thereby impeding the sense of safety Israeli policies are trying to ensure.

## **A Barrier to Education:**

Children comprise one of the most common and most vulnerable groups of victims of the barrier's oppression (Barghouti et. al., 2004). Throughout the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, and during the construction of the Separation Barrier, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) "shelled and attacked hundreds of schools, closed several, turning them into military bases, and hindered teaching at many others" (Jabr, 2004). The children's daily routines are filled with examples of the barrier's far-reaching implications. Its road closures and checkpoints create school attendance difficulties and delays (Usher, 2006; Nassar, 2006; Taylor-Martin, 2006). As of 2005, "3403 students and 33 schools... [were] affected by the Apartheid Wall, as the teachers [we]re not able to reach their schools... [and] many students [we]re prevented... [from reaching] the other side of the Wall... losing many school days" (Children Factsheet, 2005). However, while the challenges of checkpoints predated the barrier, they are further aggravated by the barrier's construction (Kirsten-Keshet, 2006).

In Palestinian society, education is considered a form of nation-building/community-building (Alzaroo and Lewando-Hundt, 2003: 178). It is often thought of as the liberating force from the marginalization and oppression which characterizes many Palestinians living in the West Bank, and as "a primary means of economic success, social integration, and an avenue for political liberation... [It is] a way of gaining control over their fate, a chance to build a future and an escape from passivity and dependence" (Alzaroo and Lewando-Hundt, 2003: 175). In hindering the availability of and children's access to education, the barrier's presence creates an environment wherein Israeli discourses and political decisions prevent children from obtaining the education necessary to improve their families' social and economic status (Kuttab, 1988; Darweish, 1989; Usher, 1991; Collins, 2004).

Additionally, as a constant source of strain on Palestinian education, the barrier makes educational success extremely difficult. For example, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2006: 1102) has pointed out that the barrier "cause[s] deterioration in the quality of education and increase[s] the

drop-out rate in schools.” The sporadic nature through which their access is permitted is especially troubling to observers on the ground: “from day to day the rules of passage change... schoolchildren and teachers are often delayed once again forced to wait in all weathers with no shelter” (Kirstein-Keshet, 2006: 94). This same procedure occurs once again at the end of the school-day (Nassar, 2006: 29). The sporadic nature of closures also ensures that scholastic routines are privy to the decisions and security measures imposed by the IDF. For example, in the northern regions of the West Bank (the areas in which the barrier has been completed) closures of the barrier’s checkpoints hindered students from finishing their school semester, as they were unable to reach campuses to complete the necessary final examinations (Students in Palestine, 2007).

In addition to obstructing children’s access to school, the barrier also changes the physical spatiality of educational institutions. For example, the barrier’s path has effectively bisected Al-Quds University’s campus in East Jerusalem, hindering movement from one end of campus to the next (Turpen, 2003: 61). As well, there are documented cases of children arriving at school “after the weekend to find that a 24ft concrete wall had been built through the playground, leaving the classrooms on one side and the football pitch and volleyball court on the other” (MacKinnon, 2005). Lacking alternative space for after school practices, recreational soccer leagues have been forced to disband (MacKinnon, 2005). The necessity of protecting the Israeli population from terrorism justifies (at least in IDF discourse) the strict imposition of military policies on Palestinian lives.

The barrier’s impacts fragment the Palestinian educational system, maneuvering children (through controlling their access to schooling) “into positions which make militarization possible” (Enloe, 2000: 296). In this way, children are maneuvered into dependence on military policies which dictate their access to schooling, materializing in their being “controlled by the military” (Enloe, 2000: 296). Insofar as the Separation Barrier and its supporting military policies

hinder the consistent and appropriate provision of education, these forces can be understood as militarizing education.

### **Indirect Maneuvers of the Separation Barrier**

Although this research has highlighted contradictory philosophies and impacts of the barrier on the Palestinian population, Enloe (2000: 289) asserts that in order to ensure a “successful” militarized maneuver, politicians must remain “ambivalent” in their military policies. The direct impacts of the barrier provide examples of sites of Palestinian society’s militarization through Israeli policies. However, the militarized maneuvering of Palestinian society might be seen more saliently when the indirect impacts, including restricted social mobility, “ghettoization”, poverty, and nationalistic oppression, of the barrier are explored.

### ***Restricted Social Mobility, “Ghettoization”, and Poverty:***

For Enloe (2000: xix) the control of a population by political and military forces is the primary factor implicated in the militarized maneuvering of a society. Within this context, the barrier extends Israeli control within the Palestinian territory, as it impedes on the daily lives of the population. This control fosters an implicit “ghettoization”, including “the sociological, political and economic consequences of enforced segregation that uses deprivation and power to maintain an untenable status quo” (Ellis, 2004: 273). The status quo in question refers to Israeli security by way of Palestinian oppression. The barrier’s contribution to an effective policing regime (Trottier, 2007), ensures that both sides of the barrier are “ghettoized”. Indeed, there are two unequal ghettos, with one being “the ghetto of the affluent and powerful and the other the ghetto of the subjugated and defeated” (Ellis, 2004: 285). As previously described, in the marginalized “ghetto”, economies have been eradicated, education has been effectively enclosed, and healthcare has been commodified. Brown (2004) has termed this phenomenon an “internal closure” of Palestinians, wherein the obstruction of Palestinian movement has posed grave human rights concerns. Additionally, neighbourhoods have been bisected, with some 49,000 Palestinians finding themselves on the “Israeli side” of the barrier in East

Jerusalem (Usher, 2006: 21). In effect, Palestinians have had to part with family members and friends, without knowing when they will reunite (B'Tselem, 2006; Taylor-Martin, 2006; Nassar, 2006). Concurrently, the barrier facilitates "parallel universes" between Palestinians and Israelis, as "the settler roads and settlements... now form a seamless whole with Israel, and the Palestinian areas... are physically cut off from each other" (Brown, 2004: 507).

Therefore, the 400 checkpoints and roadblocks of the barrier, which internally separate Palestinian villages, towns and refugee camps, led many Palestinians to conclude the barrier's aim is less to protect the Israeli population, and is more centered on "humiliat[ing] and harass[ing] the Palestinian civilian population for no apparent security reasons" (Ricks, 2006: 96). To Palestinians, the barrier provides an example of the dictates and geographic displacement of Palestinians according to Israeli whim as occurred during the 1948 war (*Al-Nakba*). This compartmentalization of populations ensures a social order in which restrictions to Palestinian movement become the necessary evil to (and price for) Israeli security.

This "divide and conquer" effect is typified within the Palestinians economic system as the barrier adds stress to an already-weak Palestinian economy. For example, in the Palestinian Territories, "depending on what measures are used, poverty... is estimated between 45-70% of the population. This is a wide variation, but the fact remains that a large proportion of the Palestinian population is poor, living under \$2.20 [US] per person per day" (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005). Poverty rate estimates approximate that it affects more than 2 million Palestinians, leading over 500,000 Palestinians to be completely reliant upon international aid (Barghouti et. al., 2004: 23). Moreover, the World Bank (2004: 16) estimated the Palestinian unemployment rate to be at 24%, with:

unemployment particularly affect[ing] the young and those with few skills. At the end of 2003, some 37 percent of young people seeking work could not find a job. Such high rates of unemployment among young people create fertile ground for discontent.

With soaring unemployment, geographical barriers to the agricultural economy, and a lack of alternative means for subsistence, many Palestinians are forced to relocate to other Palestinian

towns where employment might be readily available (Ellis, 2004; Barghouti et. al., 2004; Usher, 2006; B'Tselem, 2006). Therefore, inherent in the land confiscation practiced by Israel, is the coerced displacement of Palestinian populations from their West Bank communities, into others less directly impacted by the barrier's path. This practice infuses Palestinians villages, and their local economies, with increased populations which they may be unable to support. In this way, the Israeli army's policy maneuvers impact a greater number of Palestinians than those simply living along the barrier's path.

Aggravating the situation further, is the limited avenues of recourse for those who cannot afford to migrate, particularly as "[t]hose moving first are often families with property in nearby villages; in other words, people who have somewhere else to go" (Lagerquist, 2004: 22). In this way, those who are already in an economically-marginalized position are further disadvantaged by the barrier. The Israeli policies relating to land confiscation and the indirect impact of social movement create a situation wherein the Palestinian nation experiences perpetual "homelessness", a phenomenon which "has become part of the consciousness of exiled Palestinians" since migration during *Al-Nakba* (Sa'di, 2002: 183). The Israeli military's control over this movement and the reliance upon the dictates of militarized policies ensure the "sustaining" of militarization, particularly as the migration of Palestinians provides legitimacy for Israeli government discourse which prioritizes separation and points to the "success" of the barrier.

### ***Nationalistic Oppression:***

The barrier also indirectly impacts the nationalistic aspirations of the Palestinian people. In separating the people from the land they claim as their territorial homeland, IDF policies, undergirded by political and security-related rationales, "exclude the indigenous population as a national and political force" (Usher, 2006: 28-29). Roshwald provides an interesting definition of nationalism, as "the assertion of a community's claims of collective, bounded, territorial sovereignty *in the name of its distinctive identity*" (Roshwald, 2006: 3, emphasis in original).

Similarly, with territory and self-determination being so intricately connected to the Palestinian national consciousness (Sa'di, 2002; Barsamian and Said, 2003; Collins, 2005; Hammer, 2005), the populations' inability to self-govern access to basic services, coupled with the increasing confiscation of land, creates a situation where Palestinian nationalism is slowly being stifled. According to some, the barrier provides an example of the broader rationales undergirding the militarized maneuvering of the Palestinian people. Ellis (2004: 274) argues that "the battle against Palestinian self-determination and empowerment is ultimately the defining objective of Israeli state policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian people." A lack of geographical and political self-determination ensures Palestinians are dependent daily upon the Israeli army's policies and therefore perpetuates their militarized maneuvering.

Israeli policy makers have indeed realized, in the most definitive way, that the way to ensure national security is to separate from Palestinians – however, one element that makes this maneuver a militaristic one is the factor of control (Enloe, 2000: 37). Separation is conducted on Israeli terms, with arbitrary boundaries and closures. When the Israelis dictate the course of their neighbours' communities and their social mobility, they are in effect attempting to discipline the Palestinian population into compliance. Altering the physical landscape of the region, despite justifications highlighting the "temporary" nature of the barrier (Gavrillis, 2004; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), means that although Palestinians will be left to autonomously control their territory in the future, geographic and social continuity would have been so fractured that effective governance would be reduced to a minimum.

The demographic adjustments that will result from the barrier's construction may lead to an "out of sight, out of mind" mentality, wherein Palestinians will be forced to accept a "Palestinian State with Provisional Borders" (Usher, 2006: 22) without negotiation. In fact, as many Palestinians are "disposed and delegitimized, behind the Wall... [it seems as though Palestinians]", only hope of a future is to accept the superior spatial, temporal and historical

rights of their oppressors” (Kirstein-Keshet, 2006: 103). In this way, while the barrier divides and conquers the Palestinians’ territory, it also challenges the future of a Palestinian state.

This nationalistic oppression may become more profound when it is confounded with the unpredictable closures and other policy maneuvers of the Israeli state. Although the discourse of “temporariness” (Ophir, 2002) permeates through the Israeli explanations of, and accountability for the barrier, for Palestinians, the barrier provides an omni-present symbol of their historical marginalization. For example, Ophir (2002) argues that “temporariness” has always persisted unabated within Israel’s policy and discourse towards the Palestinians. Accordingly, “when the occupier plays with time and temporariness like this, everything – everything that moves, everything that lives – becomes dependent on the arbitrariness of the occupier’s decisions” (Ophir, 2002: 60). In this context, “temporariness” means the absence of a stabilized way of life for Palestinians. Since *Al-Nakba*, they have been under Egyptian, Jordanian, Israeli and (albeit in limited capacities) Palestinian Authority rule. Owing to the changing of political authority, the continued displacement of Palestinian populations, and the 60 years of conflict with the Israelis, the “post-*Al-Nakbah* [era] has always been associated with abnormality” (Sa’di, 2002: 186). Accordingly, the lack of national stability (Portugali, 1988) has meant the Palestinian nation has experienced continual maneuvering to comply with its militarily more powerful neighbour.

Concurrently, Palestinians are quite cognizant of the inequalities between themselves and their Jewish neighbours in the West Bank. The Jewish settlements situated in the West Bank remain connected to Israel through infrastructure, services and roadways (Brown, 2004), while, the 2.4 million Palestinians living within this region are “consigned... to a series of disconnected cantons – that is their homeland or ‘homelands’, none of them Palestine” (Usher, 2006: 14). These realities stifle the potential for the geographic continuity of a future Palestinian state, and therefore “every sign that the fence is getting closer ratchets up the tension” (Levy, 2003; cited in Gregory, 2004: 605).

Moreover, political inaction on the part of Palestinian politicians, who “claim to speak for the nation” (Özkirimli, 2000: 201), can also serve as a militarizing maneuver, insofar as it is interpreted as acceptance of the occupier’s policies and practices. For example, for some Palestinians, the lack of an initial Palestinian Authority (PA) reaction to the barrier further intensified their feelings of national deconstruction, and was symbolic of Palestinian fragmentation (Lagerquist, 2004). Initially, the PA refrained from taking a position on the barrier’s construction, particularly as the first phase of construction “closely follow[ed]...the Green Line... PA officials had not even made an effort to visit the affected areas” (Lagerquist, 2004: 25). In fact, those in the upper echelons of Palestinian society actually “‘benefited’ from a system that allowed selected Palestinian ‘VIPs’ to travel abroad between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (Brown, 2004: 506). Yet, as representatives of the “national interests” of the Palestinians, the lack of the PA’s response signaled to Palestinians the acceptance of and complicity with the Israeli army’s policies (Farsoun and Aruri, 2006).

In this way, the Separation Barrier’s effective control of Palestinian mobility, the oppressive policies of residency, and the obstruction of basic service provision, and the lack of formal admonishment by the Palestinian politicians, may influence the equating of nationalism with resistance and the proliferation of “Palestinism”, defined as “the political counterpart of Zionism” (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: xxviii). Palestinism is the “belief that the Arab population originating in the area of the Palestine mandate is distinct from other Arab groups, with a right to its own nation-state in that territory” (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: xxviii). The barrier, however, effectively deconstructs Palestinian nationalism, prompting the need to re-establish and reproduce itself. In this way, Palestinism can facilitate a maneuvering of resistance such that any proclamation of nationalism, including partaking in Palestinian traditions, protests, stone-throwing and obtaining an education to better advance national causes can fall within the rubric of patriotic citizenship (Shemesh, 2004; Ricks, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006).

## **The Impact of the Separation Barrier on Palestinian Children**

Children grapple daily with the realities of the barrier, particularly as it remaps the terrain in which they must negotiate their day-to-day living (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). As previously noted, the impacts on Palestinian children's education are vast, including delays in reaching educational institutions, school closures, timetable disruptions and the cessation of organized after-school recreational activities. Collectively, these impacts "make time unpredictable and unproductive" (Brown, 2004: 513), therefore creating a situation in which consistent educational instruction is unlikely.

According to the World Bank, education "is the single most important way of breaking the cycle of poverty, excessive population growth, and environmental degradation" (World Bank, 1992; cited in Assaf, 1994: 177). Indeed, in the Palestinian context, the population has "used education to raise public awareness, to enable people to critically understand their reality, and to liberate themselves economically, socially and politically" (Alzaroo, 2005:137). For this reason, great value is placed on education within the Palestinian territories (Farsoun and Aruri, 2006: 156). The lack of available and consistent education, resulting from the barrier potentially stifles Palestinian nationalism, and hinders children's educational and employment prospects for the future, ensuring that the Palestinian population remains largely dependent on Israel for its economic and social needs, thereby impeding on the development of an independent Palestinian state.

Like the rest of the population, children are confined within the ghettoized sphere of the West Bank's cantons. While Palestinian children have proven extremely connected to the physicality and geographic territory of Palestine (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006), theirs' is a life riddled with insecurity, hindering their development through socialization, and future prospects of education and employment. Severed from the physical land of Palestine, and continuously losing more and more of their territory to the encroaching barrier, children become alienated from the nationalistic upbringing so salient within their communities (Sehran and Tabari, 2005;

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006; Usher, 2006). The separation from the physical land of Palestine has particular importance to the children, insofar as the land represents “a site of fallen heroes”, offering nations a “path to spiritual renewal and patriotic inspiration” (Roshwald, 2006: 66). In fact, “the land constitutes a direct, concrete link to the nation’s past - an immutable past that serves forever as a source of inspiration and reassurance to the nation’s living” (Roshwald, 2006: 67). In this way, the nationalistic fervour so prevalent within Palestinian society, representing the very torch which transcends generations (Collins, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006), becomes another casualty of the barrier.

Verbalizing the oppression of the Separation Barrier, graffiti covers the concrete blocks. The writing spells out what Palestinian adults and children have consistently explained to researchers (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006; Ricks, 2006): “apartheid wall equals Zionist terrorists” (Taylor-Martin, 2006). For Palestinians, graffiti is a particularly salient method of national expression, as it:

intervenes in a power relationship... [it] affirms community and resistance... records historical events and processes, and registers memory. It provides political commentary as well as issues directives both for confronting occupation and transforming oneself in the process (Petreet, 1994: 155).

Importantly, children who walk extensive lengths to avoid road closures and checkpoints associated with the barrier are privy to these messages daily (MacKinnon, 2005). Statements equating Zionism with the forced removal of Palestinian populations reinforce the Palestinians’ resentment of the inequality between Jews and Palestinians, often fueling Palestinians’ frustrations by leading them to relive a collective hardship. In this way, the barrier stands as a physical manifestation of the 60-year separation of the Palestinians with the land they claim as Palestine, and offers a social condition in which militarization permeates the daily lives of Palestinian children.

As well, the barrier’s impacts invade the domestic sphere of these children’s lives. For example, the unstable economic situation has had tremendous impacts on the Palestinian

population, particularly the children, who are often forced to assist their families either financially and/or with household responsibilities, rather than attend school and/or recreational activities (Jabr, 2004). Moreover, there have been many instances in which children become “aware of the restrictions imposed on Palestinian employment and thus are discouraged from pursuing further education” (Sehran and Tabari, 2005: 53). On the other hand, some children have opted to seek employment “in order to reduce the ratio of dependents to earners in those families” (Farsoun and Aruri, 2006: 156). In this way, children’s lives become militarized and shaped by the Israeli army’s policies of exclusion and negation of Palestinian nationalism, in a way that impacts their daily existence.

Moreover, within the domestic sphere, girls are particularly militarized into feminine roles to support their fellow male Palestinians in their resistance. For example, many of the girls assumed their mothers’ role in the family, “extending the familial cloak over *shabab* [the mobilized young man] in hiding, feeding, and protecting them from the Israelis” (Ricks, 2006: 93). To the degree that these youth help sustain the resistance against the occupation, the Israeli Army and the Separation Barrier, they have been maneuvered into militarized positions. Indeed, Enloe (2000: 289) explains that “militarization does not occur simply in the obvious places but can transform the meanings and uses of people things and ideas” of society. Accordingly, blurring the boundaries between battlefield and home front provides increased spheres for militarized maneuvering, thereby shaping militarization into an omnipresent social negotiation in ways that seem “normal” and dutiful to the Palestinian nation.

### **Militarization as Resistance**

Thus far, the primary concern of this chapter has been the assessment of militarization as a social condition. However, Enloe (2000) explains that militarization often exemplified in political acts as well. In fact, Enloe (2000: 4) explains that official militarization (that is, militarization by a nation’s army) can yield “an equally militarized response, apparently based on the assumption that the only effective response to official militarization is the militarization of

dissent.” This section will highlight the ways in which militarization as resistance is seen within the Palestinian population, and address the subtleties and overt manifestations of these forms of militarizing maneuvers.

***Resistance in Light of the Separation Barrier:***

In policy and in practice, the “Othering” so laden in Israeli political discourse may elicit, and at times, demand Palestinian resistance and mobilization. In light of the apparent impacts of the Separation Barrier, resistance can become equated with the preservation of Palestinian culture, the promotion of a national narrative, and the continued re-building of communities and social services (Collins, 2004; Farsoun and Aruri, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006; Ben-Eliezer and Feinstein, 2007). When such resistance activities are framed within the discourse of Palestinian nationalism, they may become a militarizing maneuver, potentially laying the foundation for the (subtle and overt) acts of militarization. Therefore, militarization can be attributed to any act which in intent, or in effect, is subverting or mitigating Israeli control. In this context, militarization can be seen through Palestinian retaliation against Israeli soldiers and civilians.

Some Palestinians resort to violent and/or fatal forms of resistance. For example, some engage in armed and fatal attacks against settlers within the territories, while others take part in unspeakable acts of terrorism, including suicide bombings within Israel (Weinberg et. al., 2003; Rosen, 2005). The militarized violence occurs irrespective of the Israeli’s citizenship - foreign workers, Arabs, Israelis, children, the elderly and soldiers are all targets of such violence, and indeed, a great proportion of terrorism’s victims are from the lower socio-economic spheres of Israeli society (Weinberg et. al., 2003). Given the daily difficulties imposed by the barrier, “every police officer, every soldier or guard [has] become... the emblem of Israel’s supremacy and sovereignty” (Ben-Eliezer and Feinstein, 2007: 179). Israeli citizens, too, have become a target of Palestinians’ militarized activities (Weinberg et. al., 2003; Rosen, 2005; Meital, 2006). Moreover, such militarized resistance receives government approval from some Palestinian

politicians. For example, in article 13 of its 1988 Covenant, Hamas, the insurgency group and newly-elected Palestinian government, declares that “[t]here is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad” (Hamas: Charter, 2001: 342). Yet, militarized resistance can also take on more subtle forms, allowing the support for violence to permeate through more indirect channels.

As previously noted, Palestinians have engaged in demonstrations, nationalistic celebrations and patriotic holidays in order to subvert the barrier’s nationalistic oppression, a social condition within which they must negotiate their daily living (Grigorenko and O’Keefe, 2004; Zaatari, 2005; Ricks, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). Concurrently, resistance has also been seen through legal means, particularly as Palestinians have (successfully) challenged the barrier’s construction in Israeli courts. For example, in 2004, Palestinian villagers petitioned the Separation Barrier in Israel’s High Court of Justice; in its judgment for the Palestinian villagers, the High Court ruled that the state ought to reroute the barrier’s path (B’Tselem, n.d.). Accordingly, Palestinians interpreted this legal ruling as a site of successful resistance (Pappé, 2006). Other challenges to the barrier are even more subtle and may shy away from direct confrontation with the Israeli soldiers and citizens. For example, theatrical productions on the impacts of the barrier have offered one unique way of resisting the marginalization that results from the Separation Barrier.

### ***Militarized Resistance through Theatre:***

Indeed, one politically charged way of reiterating the Palestinian experience, thereby promoting militarized maneuvering, has been the mobilization and militarization of art. Theatre has been one particular site of militarization which may inform and facilitate resistance by both adults and children alike. For example, in one case, the writings of Palestinian girls experiencing the barrier were transformed into a theatrical production, entitled: “Our Diaries through the Wall”, allowing the girls to continuously reproduce and make meaning of their own and their families’ experiences under occupation (Ricks, 2006). These theatrical presentations allowed the girls to

re-negotiate meaning of the barrier's oppression through the telling and re-telling of their own experiences as well as those of older generations (Ricks, 2006). Therefore, the youth negotiated a history that precedes them to foster a present-day understanding of their oppression.

In terms of Enloe's (2000) conceptualization of militarization, the performance of these narratives could be understood as *re-militarizing* the play's audiences, by potentially mobilizing support for resistance and by possibly legitimating a vengeful response to the Palestinian experience (Enloe, 2000: 109). Indeed, Ricks (2006: 99) clearly articulates the impact of such theatrical productions in the process meaning-making: the productions "were transforming experiences for the Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Beit Jala high school girls, their teachers, and their parents." This example helps to broaden the understanding of the spheres through which militarization may permeate.

### ***Children's Resistance:***

Children can be mobilized into both subtle and overt resistance, yet their position in Palestinian society may be considered especially interesting. Often these children are viewed as "the armory of their community", wherein community members may encourage, legitimize, and act with indifference towards "youth's militancy... [seeing it] as a part of its defense against outside threats. Thus, it is an articulation of the community's interests" (Smyth, 2003: 84). Indeed, Enloe (2000: 171) explains that militarization need not involve "total control" of the population. Rather, "if militarized beliefs and values already are rooted in a society, the military itself may only have to provide legitimation, an encouraging nudge here, a supportive nudge there." The defiant "nudges" promulgated by the maneuvers of the barrier may have facilitated a (seldom violent) steadfast defiance of the Israeli military among Palestinian children. One Palestinian girl explained:

[W]e used to walk in the streets, even if we were under curfew without caring about the Israelis. We just walked in front of the tanks... Once I was on roller skates when they saw me and put that thing towards me, but instead of running away, I just stared at it, imagine!!!

I don't know how I did that!" (Nazi 2004, 106–7; cited in Ricks, 2006: 98).

Indeed, the frustrations, unpredictability, and asymmetrical treatment, associated with the barrier may have produced a mobilized rebellion. Reporters “on the ground” have noted the various ways in which Palestinian children have mobilized their resistance against the Separation Barrier. For example, some children have resorted to throwing rocks over the separation barrier, “assum[ing] there are Israelis on the other side of the wall” (Taylor-Martin, 2006). Other children have chosen to participate in demonstrations against Israeli hegemony (Zaatari, 2005; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006), the perceived undergirding principle behind the Separation Barrier (Usher, 2006). Protests have involved “hundred of Palestinian children [who] raised flags, pictures of late Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat, and paper models of Palestinian cities and villages. They also raised banners calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state...” (Zaatari, 2005). Additionally, in order to show nationalistic solidarity, some children wore traditional Palestinian clothing (Zaatari, 2005). In this way, solidarity in culture, language, and politics can be understood to “fertilize” (Enloe, 2000: 81) nationalistic awareness and mobilize resistance. The discourse of liberation may maneuver children into positions of resistance, prioritizing mobilization and (the act of) militarization as a civil duty and a nationalistic obligation.

Other children have resisted in more subtle ways, such as through the maintenance of their mental strength towards the barrier's impacts. Indeed, the concept of maintaining one's mental strength is embodied in the Arab concept of “sumud, [involving] steadfastness to the land, and to the national cause” both at the practical and ideological levels (Zuhur, 2005: 368). *Sumud*, or steadfastness, “require[s] intense emotional strength and pride in adversity” (Zuhur, 2005: 369), community connectedness in times of looming fragmentation, and “[e]nduring the humiliations imposed by the conqueror” (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 243). Exemplifying *sumud*, Suhaila, a Palestinian girl, argues that “by not feeling intimidated by their humiliation, we gain power; we maintain our pride and honor.” (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 11-17). In this way,

even children who do not actively mobilize against the barrier, can engage in resistance by protesting in a “social space” (their minds) “where the performances imposed by domination do not prevail” (Scott, 1985: 328). Therefore, what may seem to be compliance may actually be deliberate defiance and mobilization.

Indeed, children experience these restrictive measures as instigators of Palestinian “pride” and collectivity; restrictions are interpreted as challenges to overcome, either overtly or covertly (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). For example, some children have challenged the presence of the barrier by denying its legitimacy in discussions with family and friends, while others have partaken in the checkpoints’ long waiting queues (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006), a deferral of immediate resistance in favour of longer term goals. Concurring with this interpretation of resistance, Kirstein-Keshet (2006: 95) has explained that the mere presence of the barrier means that “crossing the wall, defying the military, becomes an act of resistance.”

Other forms of militarized resistance involve countering the “silencing” efforts of the barrier (Enloe, 2000). For instance, Cynthia Enloe (2000: 133) explains that “reporting” and “recording” are political activities which may militarize society and mobilize resistance in the pursuit of nationalism. Indeed, since militarization involves controlling a population through policy and practice and “suppressing information about that policy” (Enloe, 2000: 133), to make it seem natural or given, revealing what the government policy attempts to hide may provide an avenue for resistance. Recording and reporting can be understood as militarized political activities within Palestinian society. For example, as previously noted, Palestinian girls in one school in Bethlehem have collected their own histories, have recorded them and have transformed these narratives into “the[ir] greatest contribution to the Palestinian uprisings” (Ricks, 2006: 99). Ricks (2006: 93) interviewed a few of these girls and highlighted one salient example of the acceptance of resistance among these girls; one girl explains:

I found that writing the journal kept me busy at home during the closures, that it gave me a sense of ownership and even self pride about my family, my friends and countrymen and women. I began to feel that I was not alone in my fears when other girls read their journals

in class about the same experiences that I was having. I remember how confident I was in standing before all my friends reading my journal which I called 'my hero.'

The act of writing allowed these girls to resist their surroundings by documenting their hardships and recording the newly emerging history of the barrier (Ricks, 2006). In this way, recording and reporting the impacts of the barrier as a consequence of Israeli government policy may provide legitimacy for the mobilization of children towards resistance. These acts are militarized activities insofar as they may provide legitimacy for maneuvered resistance and may reinforce militarization on moral grounds.

One method of recording and reporting the present marginalization of Palestinians has been through education. Indeed, despite the Israeli policies hindering education, authors have highlighted the extensive political knowledge of Palestinian children, particularly their comprehension of the broader political contexts undergirding their situation (Usher, 1991; Collins, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). For example, Mahdi Hamdan, a 15-year-old student, explains that with the barrier, and the IDF's restrictions on Palestinian movement, "there's no normal learning, no normal education. Israel put the wall here to let us know they control us, to show there's nothing we can do to get our freedom or resist" (MacKinnon, 2005). Additionally, in his interviews with Palestinian children, for example, John Collins (2004) found that many considered it a national obligation to learn about their families' and nation's past. According to the "official' [Palestinian] nationalist narrative", the political socialization of children is obligatory for "national potency, development, and, eventually, independence" (Collins, 2004: 146). Children have, indeed, taken on the responsibility of educating themselves on the collective experiences of their nation, and have even intimately connected those experiences to the present-day encounters with the barrier (Collins, 2004; Hammer, 2005). In this way, the extensive knowledge of historical Palestinian geography and social composition allows children to "negotiate" their ghettoization in ways that "preserve their inner powers, [and] turn... the [Israeli Separation Wall] ISW into a new site of resistance" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1110).

Palestinians have continued to see Israel (and Zionism) as premised on the removal and annihilation of Palestinians from their homeland (Bishara, 2002). For them, "Al-Nakbah is a Palestinian event and a site of Palestinian collective memory. It connects all Palestinians to a specific point in time that has become for them the 'eternal present'" (Sa'di, 2002: 177). However, when the historical event re-materializes, through commemoration, it offers an "external aid" (Marti, et. al, 2001) to the collective memory of oppression, and Palestinian militarization may become more apparent. The barrier in effect, can be understood to provide the younger generation of youth with a physical example of the experiences of their ancestors, potentially offering a catalyst for mobilization, particularly as the *Al-Nakba* generation "is often accused [by following generations] of not doing enough to defend Palestine" (Sa'di, 2002: 186). Concurrently, Enloe (2000: 88) explains that "complicity is never easy to incorporate into one's memories", therefore, national traumas, configured as "badges of honour" (Searle-White, 2001) may be configured as more oppressive than they may have been at the time. Following this line of thinking, if Palestinian discourse focuses on Israel's historical forcible removal of the children's grandparents, then militarized resistance may be legitimated and may become normalized, encouraged and seen as a fitting response, to avenge the perceived oppression and its residual impacts. Accordingly, if collective memory provides the framework for understanding the Separation Barrier, nationalism may possibly provide the impetus for a maneuvered and militarized resistance to its existence.

### METHODOLOGY: RESEARCHING MILITARIZED MANEUVERS

This research has employed an inductive and qualitative methodological approach to study the ways in which Palestinian children may be understood as progressing through the process of militarization. Specifically, it draws from emerging themes from the "Palestinian national poem" (Mir, 2003) and broadly compares these to highlight militarization in Palestinian society as possibly both a social condition, as well as an act of resistance. The poem *Identity Card* (1964), written by Mahmud Darweish, an internationally recognized writer, considered by Palestinians to be "the Palestinian national poet" (Rowland and Frank, 2002: 167; Gelvin, 2005: 275; Alcalay, 1999: 99; Wieseltier, 1988: 15), provided the data for this research. The poem allowed for an exploration of some of the discourses which can work to "maneuver" children through the process of militarization (Enloe, 2000). Drawing from the literature obtained on the Israeli Separation Barrier, this data may guide an exploration of militarization within Palestinian society, and possibly shed light on the ways through which Palestinian children may be maneuvered, particularly when the militarization involves the acceptance of violent means of protest.

From the outset, obtaining data which could help shed light on Palestinian society's militarization was extremely challenging. Initially, I had hoped to interview Palestinian youth who have recently emigrated to Canada, but later decided that this endeavor would not provide me with enough context on the experiences of Palestinians who contend with everyday militarization, particularly those experiencing the impacts of the Separation Barrier, which is currently considered to be the largest impediment to daily life in the West Bank (Kirstein-Keshet, 2006; Usher, 2006; Trottier, 2007). The obvious geographic distance from the context in question limited the potential accessibility to Palestinian interview participants and/or field observation sites. I also thought of conducting a textual analysis of Palestinian educational curriculum, but found little in the way of available content in English. I then thought of assessing Palestinian folktales and documented lullabies (and found several appropriate and translated

sources) to see whether these included militarizing themes according to Enloe's conceptualization. However, through continued research, I came upon the particular potency and importance of poetry in Palestinian culture. However, given the confines writing a master's thesis, I could only realistically choose to study one poem. This led me to select the one deemed "the Palestinian national poem" (Mir, 2003), written by the "national poet of Palestine", Mahmoud Darweish (Rowland and Frank, 2002: 167; Gelvin, 2005: 275; Alcalay, 1999: 99; Wieseltier, 1988: 15). Through much deliberation and continued re-assessment of the relevance and availability alternative sources of data, I concluded that this source would provide the best academic compromise to exploring the discourses that can be implicated in the militarization of Palestinian society's, and particularly children's militarization. There are, however, many drawbacks of this approach, which will be addressed later on in the chapter.

### **Description of Data Source**

#### ***Poetry as a Site of Militarization:***

*Identity Card* is an extremely culturally-significant poem, written by the most prominent Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darweish (Rowland and Frank, 2002; Gelvin, 2005; Alcalay, 1999). This poem was analyzed as "natural documentation" that is, data "that is not 'researcher-provoked'", and not initially devised for the purposes of social research (Have, 2004: 88). Clarkson (2003: 80-81; 83) explains that poetry is a particularly relevant source of data as it "can throw light on human behaviour and the workings of society... [and] relate the life stories as remembered and interpreted by individuals" (Clarkson, 2003: 80-81; 83). Others agree with the knowledge-generating benefits of poetry, as it is:

evocative of particular moods, perspectives and interpretations. Their audience, no doubt, will find that aspects of what is said strike a chord with their own experiences or imagination... [allowing] powerful ways of getting a particular message across, more striking than conventional reports of what informants say (Seale, 1999: 176).

Accordingly, poetry has been assessed for its "secondary usage", by reframing the original document so that it is conducive to social science research, rather than its primary (intended)

use (Have, 2004). However, rather than focusing on the factual accuracy of the document, this thesis has recognized the inherent complexity of the socio-historical and political context in which the poem was written and has focused its analysis on the “internal meaning” of the poem.

A poem’s “internal meaning is characterized as ‘transient and ephemeral’ and as ‘intervening between intended and received meaning’” (Scott, 1985: 34; cited in Have, 2004: 92). In focusing on the internal meaning of the text, the research in question shies away from positivistic explorations of the text as representing an *a priori* reality. Rather, it recognizes that the text should be treated as one “unified object... [whereby] the task of the researcher is... to investigate ‘archaeologically’ as Foucault might say, the innumerable accidents and myriad twists and turns of human practice that have brought the text to its present form” (Prior, 2004: 320).

Indeed, the internal meaning of poetry is particularly pertinent within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, as the movement of Palestinians into exile in 1948, had birthed:

a folk culture [which was] conveyed by songs and ballads, poetry and narrative... form[ing] around three motifs: the praise and memory of the lost paradise from which the Palestinians were expelled, the bitter lament of the present, and the depiction of the imagined triumphant return (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 137).

In fact, poetry has been noted as both representative and evocative of Palestinian culture (Mayer, 1994; Rowland and Frank, 2002; Hammer, 2005), and has been posited as “the most popular and dominant genre in Palestinian literature, and the one closest to the people as a whole” (Ashrawi, 1978: 84). In this way, poetry seems to be a particularly useful source of data to assess some of the cultural discourses which may possibly reflect and contribute to the militarization of Palestinian society.

As the Palestinian national poet, Mahmoud Darweish sheds particular light on this aforementioned folk culture. Providing evidence of his popularity among Palestinians, Collins (2004: 63) argues that “many Palestinians can recite their favorite poems by Mahmud Darwish, probably the most outstanding Palestinian poet.” Darweish, however, is different from other

Palestinian poets in that “[h]e was not a Palestinian like most of the members of the PLO. He wasn’t from the diaspora. He remained [in Israel following *Al-Nakba*] and became an Israeli citizen... [Nonetheless h]e is known as one of the earliest of the so-called resistance poets” (Said, 2003: 161). In fact, Mir (2003: 123) argues that “[h]is nomadic existence exemplifies that of many Palestinians.” His influences and reach permeate into children’s lives, as his poetry has been incorporated into the educational curriculum, teaching youth the virtues of Palestinian nationalism and cultural identity (Brown, 2001; Collins, 2004; Adwan, 2004), and as it is a feature of Palestinian children’s cultural upbringing (Basta, 2000; Collins, 2004; Shemesh, 2004).

The selected poem has also been chosen because it has been particularly well-cited in the literature on Palestinian culture (Elmessiri, 1981; McKean-Paramenter, 1994; Caspi and Weltch, 1998; Mir, 2003; Barsamian and Said, 2003; Collins, 2004; Hammer, 2005). *Identity Card* (1964), which was written “roughly” around the investiture of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), has been hailed as the “perfect inaugural statement for a movement attempting to speak and act in the name of a diasporic community of refugees, dispossessed peasants, and angry students” (Collins, 2004: 58). This poem is “Darwish’s most frequently quoted poem in reference to his identity as a Palestinian Arab...” (Caspi and Weltch, 1998: 49), and is “considered *the Palestinian national poem*...express[ing] the poet’s distinctive voice, resistant tone and nationalistic stance” (Mir, 2003: 146; emphasis added). In fact, *Identity Card* is actually based on the poet’s own “experience of having to register at an Israeli office” (Said, 2003: 161). However, while it cannot be proven that this *particular* poem has made its way into the Palestinian educational curriculum, proof does exist that nationalist poetry and nationalist discourses are both significant components of the educational curriculum within the Palestinian Territories (Brown, 2001; Burdman, 2003; Collins, 2004; Adwan, 2004). In this way, this poem, as well as other poetry exhibiting similar themes, can be understood as a contributing factor to the militarization of Palestinian society, particularly its children.

The selected poem was sampled “purposefully” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), as it was deliberately chosen for its potential to highlight the internal meanings within some nationalistic and resistance poetry. This was done in order to assess the arising “categories, properties and dimensions” of codes from which, once analyzed, militarizing discourses may be viewed (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 183).

### **Data Collection**

In practice, I sifted through the data, initially coding each line of the poem, and later, conducted a broader comparison of the codes, as well as pre-analytic thoughts and memos, noted during the data collection. Each of these procedures will be discussed in the following section. However, while the analysis of such data often aims to building theoretical constructs (and their relationships) in order to provide an explanatory framework for a developing theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), this thesis has scaled back such ambitious endeavors and only sought to *explore* the phenomenon of the potential militarized maneuvering of the “national poem” within the Palestinian context.

### ***The Process of Data Collection: Coding***

Coding is typically the starting point of the data collection, wherein the aim is to “discover, name and categorize phenomena” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 181). Yet, given that the poem had already been chosen for its aforementioned popularity among Palestinian populations, “data collection” was considered to be an examination of the poem’s lines and the emerging themes. Coding of the poem *Identity Card* began with a *line-by-line* assessment, involving a “close examination of data, phrase by phrase... [asking] ‘what is the major idea brought out by this sentence or paragraph’” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 119-120). The translated poem was re-typed leaving room for coding and thematic thoughts in both margins. Coded categories were written on the left margin of the page and “pre-analytic remarks” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 67), such as preliminary themes, were written on the right hand margin (please see appendix D).

Charmaz (2003: 94) explains that line-by-line coding is particularly effective in increasing the transparency of the data collection and analysis, which in turn, assists in ensuring clarity and replicability in the data gathering and analysis. Additionally, line-by-line coding helped me to minimize the “imputing... [of my own] motives, fears, or unresolved personal issues to... [the] collected data” (Charmaz, 2003: 94). This process, according to Charmaz (2003: 95), also keeps the researcher from “going native”, which is “becoming so immersed in your respondents’ world-view that you accept it without question. Then you fail to look at your data critically and analytically.” In following the advice of Miles and Huberman (1994: 65), the data was read and re-read and continuous coding was conducted several times for the poem in order to enhance the “robustness of the data and [therefore] the quality of the research.”

While the choice of codes remains with the researcher, often using the documents’ own wording to signify a construct is helpful, and adds to the “transparency” (Charmaz, 2003) of the analysis. These codes, known as *in vivo* codes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), are labels that have been taken “directly from... [the] respondents’ discourse” (Charmaz, 2003: 100) or, as in the case of this research, directly from the poem.

The second step of this approach involved an analysis of the poem at a largely holistic level, wherein the emerging relationships among the codes, the use of repetition, and linguistic style were explored. Moreover, this stage involved the linking between categories and sub-categories involved looking for “cues” in the data as to the ways in which these categories and subcategories relate at an abstract level (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 125).

All of the codes garnered through the coding process were listed and compared them with each other, and compared to the memos noted during the initial coding process. Higher-order categories were then established within which these initial codes could be placed. To “verify” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) whether the codes identified in *Identity Card* were appropriately understood by the researcher, previous analyses of this poem were assessed. This secondary literature assisted me in understanding the nuances of the poem, thereby “filling

in poorly developed categories” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 187), and in framing the garnered codes within the broader socio-political context of the conflict.

The interpretive approach applied to the second stage of the methodology allowed me to conduct a broader assessment of the poem’s internal meaning, while the initial codes allowed me to closer examine the data in a clearer way than an initial holistic method would have allowed. Essentially, the initial codes garnered offered a means of “checking” my interpretation against the data. Once the codes were developed, they were compared to each other, and to the themes emerging from the literature on the Separation Barrier. In order to enhance the data analysis, memos were written throughout the data collection and analysis and were used to justify the thought-process behind the theory generation.

#### ***Memo-Writing:***

An important aspect this thesis was the recording and maintenance of memos throughout the research project. These included a sideline of notes and commentary, documenting the researcher’s “thoughts about the similarity of the emerging theory to established theories and concepts” (Rennie, Phillips, and Quartaro 1988: 144). The memos provided in this analysis (please see appendix D) allowed the clarification of thoughts and ideas, and ensured coherence in the coding process. The memos allowed me to *inter alia* “(a) interpret in-vivo material, (b) articulate metaphors, (c) examine the relationships among code categories, [and] (d) explain major code categories” (Eaves, 2001: 659). Accordingly, every code noted in the data, was assessed in the memos and questions regarding the efficacy and appropriateness of certain codes were considered. In this way, the memos assisted in articulating analysis of the data and clarifying the interpretive approach.

The memo-writing assisted in further questioning the “intended or assumed” meaning within the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 92), and allowed for an assessment of the theoretical propositions that arose in a way that increased the theory’s exploratory power. Indeed, when certain concepts did not fit within the conceptual categories that arose within the open coding, I

began to question the efficacy of those initial codes, and generate new codes which may better encapsulate the themes that had been developed. These memos (please see appendix D) have been incorporated into the discussion of the themes and the theoretical relationships developed throughout the poem's analysis.

The importance of memo-writing in this particular research project cannot be understated. The memos allowed me to clarify my assumptions about the selected concepts, and the titles given to the emerging codes within the data in a way that clarifies to the reader the thought process undergirding the conclusions drawn. This is particularly important given that I am a novice researcher, with little prior experience researching Palestinian culture and literature. It is hoped that the memos provided in appendix D help to frame my theoretical arguments in a way that justifies my reading of the militarization within the poem.

### ***Bringing in the Literature***

The data emerging from the poem was then analyzed for its militarizing internal meanings and discourses, and as the data was read and re-read common themes within the poem began to emerge. These emerging themes were then reflected upon, drawing reference to the literature on the Separation Barrier, in order to help frame an exploration of Enloe's conceptualization of militarized maneuvering in Palestinian society. For example, particular attention was paid to the ways in which collective memory was framed as a means to unite Palestinians, and nationalism was framed as an avenue for resisting the Israelis. In this way, the literature on the Separation Barrier helped to frame the data provided by the poem in a more holistic approach to discussing militarized maneuvering in Palestinian society.

### **Strengths of the Approach**

There are various strengths inherent within this chosen approach to data collection and means of analysis. For example, analyzing poetry can be understood to provide an interesting vantage point of the militarization of Palestinian society. Indeed, poetry as a source of research data is particularly useful, as it can be regarded as a source of "rich data... afford[ing] views of

human experience that etiquette, social conventions, and inaccessibility hide or minimize in ordinary discourse” (Charmaz, 2003: 88). In fact, it has been argued that poetry “provides us with a window into the feelings of characters, and it encapsulates the essence of events” (Ely et. al., 1997; cited in Hill, 2005: 95-96). Additionally, poetry has been understood to “give rise to ways of saying what might not otherwise be expressed” (Cahnmann, 2003; cited in Hill, 2005: 104).

It has also been argued that poetry lends itself to analysis, as a “‘poem’ is something you engage with at a deep level. It is not just a figurative transposition, but an emotional statement as well” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 110). Understanding these emotional statements, and developing an exploration which highlight their internal meanings, has provided the research an interesting perspective on the interplay of cultural discourses and militarization. Indeed, and fitting to the exploration of the Palestinian context, poetry has been noted as “is the most popular and dominant genre in Palestinian literature, and is the one closest to the people as a whole” (Ashrawi, 1978: 84).

Moreover, describing the culturally-sensitive knowledge emerging from the poem allows me to shy away from “taking sides” between Palestinians and Israelis, and provides the potential for describing one perspective (out of the myriad of possible perspectives) on this Middle Eastern conflict. Moreover, attempts were made to sidestep blaming one side or another for the proliferation of militarization, while at the same time highlighting one means through which militarized maneuvering may permeate within a society (Enloe, 2000).

Moreover, relying upon a more holistic approach to exploring *Identity Card*, coupled with the initial coding procedure, also helped to provide me with an important means of analyzing the poem. In fact, post-modern theorists posit that a sole emphasis on coding can yield theories which are “fragmented and decontextualized if discrete segments are coded and grouped with others under invented categories” (Coffey et. al., 1996; cited in Seale, 1999: 103). However, through a holistic approach, the data that has been fragmented during the initial coding, can be

more cohesively discussed and connected. Indeed, upon first glance, the codes of “resisting the other” and “connection to the physical land” appear to be referencing two different ideas. However, when connected by the theme of “collective memory”, the two codes seem to fit well within this analytical construct. In this way, coupling a first-level coding approach, with a second-level holistic analysis, allowed for more intricate data to emerge.

Additionally, given that the poem is “readily available” in the “public domain”, the access to and collection of the data is reasonably less complex than with other qualitative methods of inquiry (McTavish and Loether, 2002: 212). Therefore, assessing poetry ensures that “the data are not influenced by researcher interaction... giv[ing] the data a unique level of authenticity” (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006: 289). In this way, the data obtained is not limited by what is divulged to the researcher, a common difficulty faced with interviews and focus groups (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006), but rather ensures that the poet’s perspective comes to the forefront of the data. In this way, although there is potential for the researcher’s perspective to possibly influence the data’s analysis, using a source that was not produced or elicited for the purposes of the research, can increase the researcher’s confidence in the data obtained.

Furthermore, memo-writing has increased the research’s “auditability... [defined as] the ability of another researcher to follow the methods and conclusions of the original researcher” (Carpenter Rinaldi, 1995; cited in Chiovitti and Piran, 2003: 432). It therefore allows the research to be as transparent and clear as possible in both the process of data collection and the concurrent data analysis. This has been particularly important given this research’s inductive and exploratory nature.

### **Limitations of the Approach**

There are, however, several drawbacks within this approach to data analysis. Given the limitations of time and space in writing a master’s thesis, only one Palestinian poem written by one popular Palestinian poet was assessed. Clearly, such sampling cannot be used to generalize to the whole of Palestinian poetry, or even other “resistance poems”, and thus the

findings can only help explore this particular piece of literature. In this regard, the findings have been addressed as examples of only some of the themes currently seen within a much broader group of possibilities. This poem attempts to present one potential discourse, and this coupled with its popularity among Palestinians, has justified its inclusion within this research. *Identity Card* (1964) has also been included because it has been deemed “the national Palestinian poem” (Mir, 2003: 146), and the most *popular* poem of the “Palestinian national poet” (Antoon, 2002; Abdel-Malek, 2005; Huri, 2006; Urban, 2006). Importantly, however, the discussion of this particular Palestinian poem is aimed to encourage a continued assessment of poetry as a force potentially militarizing the social conditions of Palestinian children.

Another important limitation in conducting an analysis of Arabic pieces of writing is that they may have been mediated, and thus subtly altered, through their translation into English. For example, the Arabic nuances intended by Darweish may have lost their significance through the translation, or contrarily, the selection of certain English words may have led me to identify themes that were not intended in the initial writing of the poem. In order to mitigate this possibility, significant emphasis has been placed on previous analyses of *Identity Card*, particularly those written by Palestinians, in order to ensure that this interpretation falls in line with those more experienced with Palestinian culture and Arabic vernacular and nuances. In turn, this process has also strengthened and supported the coded constructs and their emerging theoretical relationships. Therefore, in providing a more holistic discussion of the findings, I have assessed the *themes* emerging from the text, in addition to the actual wording, and defer to the literature already written about this popular Palestinian poem to support the findings. Indeed, given that the chosen poem is particularly well-known in Palestinian culture (McKean-Paramenter, 1994; Mir, 2003; Said, 2003), I have found several assessments, including analyses of Darweish’s poetic intentions, use of metaphors and his linguistic style.

Moreover, despite the qualitative and inductive framework of this research, a method which does not focus on the validity or reliability of data (Have, 2004), it is important that the

credibility, referring to “the trustworthiness of the findings”, of the research is upheld (Chiovitti and Piran, 2003: 431). One method of increasing the analysis’ credibility would be to “check the generated theoretical construction against participants’ meaning of the phenomenon” (Chiovitti and Piran, 2003: 431). In this way, prior and continued research about *Identity Card* has allowed me to frame and compare the obtained data against what has previously been written about Mahmud Darweish’s poetry as both poetic and political enterprises (Antoon, 2002; Barsamian and Said, 2003).

Another challenge may center on the fact that “often [data, or group of data] contain more than one topic or theme” (Bailey, 1994: 309). However, rather than regarding this as a drawback of the research, the multiple themes were *incorporated* into the analysis in order to compare the various types of possible themes. As well, while all of the militarized themes might not have been covered within this analysis, it is hoped that the discussion of the “core” themes which arose have provided a vantage point on militarized maneuvering, prompting future research in the area.

Another drawback of this approach is that the interpretation of the data is subject to the researcher, rather than being *a priori* or objectively seen within the data. Slaughter et. al. (2007: 559) explain that “the interpretive process depends on the unique creative processes that transpire between the researcher and the data” (Slaughter et. al., 2007: 559). Concurrently, my being a novice researcher, and having had little experience with this cultural literature, has heightened the possibility for error. However, some authors have offered the novice researcher succour, arguing that in general (and even among more experienced researchers), “it is unlikely that two people will interpret data in the same way” (Cutcliffe and McKenna, 1999; cited in Slaughter et. al., 2007: 559). It is hoped that the detailed coding and memo-writing has allowed for the transparency in the data, and provided readers a clear indication as to the thought-processes and analytical steps of this research.

Another important drawback of this approach centres on the need to collapse several constructs into broader themes. This means that a prioritization of such themes is required, whereby one becomes a higher order theme, encompassing the others. In this way, the researcher is required to prioritize themes, increasing the likelihood that his or her personal biases may lead them to prioritize certain themes over others. However, it is hoped that the clear delineation of the themes chosen will provide a sufficient enough framework to justify the selection of the aforementioned themes. Justifying this approach, some authors have noted that each researcher will likely interpret theoretical sampling through his or her own individual perspective, and apply its principles slightly differently (Slaughter et. al., 2007).

Moreover, it is recognized that this research has been heavily influenced by the theoretical framework of Enloe's (2000) militarization, which is in and of itself advocates the application of the lens of militarized maneuvering to already-occurring phenomena. Therefore, the propositions made are posited as a set of perspectives among many potential analysis schemes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As such, this thesis hopefully, provides another avenue through which militarization may be studied, without excluding alternative interpretations.

Additionally, I have encountered several challenges to applying abstract concepts, such as militarization, maneuvering and the "militarization of dissent" to real-life, practical situations. For example, Enloe's conceptualization of militarization includes several defining components, including the encroachment of military values and strategies on civilian life, the blurring of boundaries between civilians and soldiers, and the organization of civil society to support or take for granted the military and/or armed groups. Indeed, most modern nations exhibit examples of these abstract definitions (Enloe, 2000) and it has been extremely challenging to focus on one component of Enloe's definition of militarization when studying the practicalities of its imposition on people's lives. Enloe has used various contexts to assess and exemplify her argument about the subtleties and pervasiveness of militarization, and despite her extremely

nuanced and poignant work, she has left academic following her lead with several academic options for defining and applying her concepts. In attempting to mitigate the disjuncture between the abstract and the practical and trying to study the infusion of militarization in the Palestinian context, I tried to highlight various instances of militarization, maneuvering and the “militarization of dissent”, and in no way make claims of applying her theory in its entirety. This research provides the very essence of exploratory work, and as such attempts to highlight only some of the examples of the dialectical and subtle process of militarization to the study of Palestinian society.

Finally, another drawback of the overall research pertains to the potential for researcher bias, particularly given my Israeli background. I have recognized that my Israeli background is an essential element which could pose a challenge to researching the “Other. My attempts at providing a forum for Darweish’s perspective may have led me to be more “forgiving” (in the analysis) of what could be considered blatantly anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic discourses. For example, the reference to the settlement of Jews on the land as representative of the “proliferation of weeds”, can be considered a statement of hatred, while I coded this concept under “positing natural versus unnatural”. While understanding that these codes may have led me to “forgive” arguably anti-Semitic undertones, I coded in this way in order to remain as close to Darweish’s wording as possible and in order to assess the nuances that seemed to repeat throughout the poem. Indeed, I noticed a significant amount of other codes positing this “natural versus unnatural” dichotomy, particularly in the references to the gloriousness of the land prior to Israel’s establishment and the barrenness and natural state that ensued following Israel’s creation. Additionally, using available literature, particularly an acclaimed Palestinian poem, and framing this within academic work previously describing and analyzing the poem, has helped alleviate some of the associated challenges. Additionally, Corbin and Strauss (1998: 97; emphasis in original) explain that “*it is not possible to be completely free of bias.*” Agreeing with this argument, Hermann (2001: 79) argues that:

in the study of violent conflict researchers of the pure *outsider* type – that is, those who base their views on a study of the situation from afar and on a basically unbiased scrutiny of facts – are a rare breed. The more common type of researcher is, in fact, an *involved outsider* – one who is personally connected to the conflict by virtue of belonging to one of the national, religious or ethnic groups involved in it, or because of an identification with a general political stance such as anti-racism, anti-colonialism or non-violence that is relevant to the analysis of the specific conflict.

Moreover, Hermann (2001) explains that the “insider/outsider” status of a researcher will likely impact every stage of the research, including the data gathering, analysis and dissemination of the findings, therefore, it is important to recognize that the resulting theory relies on “the researcher’s interpretation of the respondent’s perception of reality” (Ruth and Öberg, 1996; cited in Ruth et. al., 1996: 682). I have, indeed, recognized this potential bias, and have attempted to mitigate its impact on the data analysis by prefacing the exploratory nature of this work, and by providing clear justifications for my analysis throughout the discussion chapter. In this way, constant comparison of data and categories to each other allowed me to be more transparent in the research process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).

Moreover, Hermann (2001: 89) notes that when studying conflict zones, it is important to recognize that it is almost impossible for academics to remain without “preconceived values” and/or “emotions”. As previously stated, my connection to the conflict in the region actually *fuels* my interest in the topic and motivates an analysis of the militarized maneuvering of Palestinian children in order to better understand the realities within which many Palestinian children live. It is hoped that this research will further encourage studies on the militarization of Israeli youth as well.

## MILITARIZED MANEUVERING THROUGH POETRY

### Context: The Place of Poetry in Arab Culture

Poetry's cultural importance in Arab society dates back to the settlement of people in the Arabian Peninsula (Lyons, 1999). With the widespread discouragement of other forms of art, such as painting and sculpture, "out of fear of iconography and idol worship, which are strictly prohibited in Islam", poetry became a common feature of life in the Peninsula (Jayyusi, 1987: 2). However, during Islam's first forty years the art of poetry was grouped together with the marginalized arts by religious leaders in an effort to emphasize the importance of memorizing the Quran (Jayyusi, 1987). Yet, this trajectory soon waned and poetry became, once again, a central outlet in Arabic culture during the Umayyad period, which began in 660, "when the caliphs felt the need for personal publicity and for solidly entrenching the Umayyad dynasty" and decided this would be best achieved through poetry (Jayyusi, 1987: 2). Since that time, Arabic poets have become extremely influential in Arabic culture and politics, having regularly participated in the political arena, voicing the emotions of the general populace to the elite, and using their writing to commemorate past injustices and victories (Elmessiri, 1981; al-Udhari, 1984; Jayyusi, 1987; al-Musawi, 2006). Unique attention is given to the vernacular used by Arabic poets, who compose their work with their audience in mind, and as such, draw upon the daily language of the common people, referencing events and locations easily recognizable to the masses (Furani, 2004; Omer, 2005). The popularity of poetry was further strengthened through the composition and circulation of "oral poetry", which "was a normative practice in most spheres of Arab culture" (Caspi and Weltsch, 1991: 1). Oral poetry became popular with vast segments of Arabic society, and was "not necessarily linked to the aristocracy" (Caspi and Weltsch, 1991: 1). In this way, poetry provided the masses with a cultural outlet for voicing their frustrations, celebrating their victories, and solidifying Arabic society (Ashrawi, 1978; Elmessiri, 1981).

One key feature of Arabic poetry, in particular, is its ability to “construct”, “articulate” and “challenge” conceptualizations of “national identities in the Middle East” (Suleiman, 2006a: 1). In fact, Suleiman (2006b: 208) argues that “no account of Arab nationalism would be complete without understanding the contribution literature has made, and still makes to its articulation or its role in group mobilisation” (Suleiman, 2006b: 208). Given the importance of poetry to Arabic culture and society, this chapter attempts to describe one particular poem, written by the “Palestinian national poet” (Antoon, 2002; Suleiman, 2006b; al-Udhari, 1984; al-Musawi, 2006), and discuss its role in constructing, re-articulating, and challenging the nationalist ideals in a society undergoing the process of militarization.

### **Palestinians and Poetry: The Critical Connection**

The historical relationship between Palestinians and poetry has become one of the most often-cited examples of the mobilizing power of cultural writing. Even under the British Mandate (prior to the establishment of the State of Israel) Palestinian poets’ “commitment [to the Palestinian people, then known as the ‘Arabs of Palestine’] spilled directly into... political activity, some becoming prominent figures in the struggle against Jewish settlement and British rule” (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 58-59). Early Palestinian poets, including Ibrahim Tuqan, Abdul Rahim Mahmoud, and Abu Salma, began writing under the British Mandate and “mobilizing” poetics “against Zionist and British encroachments” (Furnani, 2004: 27). Similarly to the broader connection of Arabic culture and poetry, it has been argued that poetry “is the most popular and dominant genre in Palestinian literature, and is the one closest to the people as a whole... [P]oetry is viewed as an expression and tool of national solidarity and political consciousness” (Ashrawi, 1978: 84). In this way, poetry can be seen to hold a unique position in the articulation of Palestinian defiance against foreign rule.

Following the dispersal of the Arabs from Palestine in 1948, poetry provided a means of transferring emotional experiences of exile from one generation to the next, while simultaneously, commemorating Palestinian nationalism and highlighting the Palestinian voice

(Sa'di, 2002; Collins, 2004; Hammer, 2005). Accordingly, in the years following *Al-Nakba*, poetry provided one of the most salient means for fostering “the connection to and the longing for return to... [the] homeland from the great first generations to the descendants born in exile” (Hammer, 2005: 62-63). In fact, between 1948 and 1967, the latter of which resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the emergent poetry “reflected the shock of the uprooting and the years of disorientation, dispersal and hopelessness” of the Palestinian people (Hammer, 2005: 62). Additionally, the majority of this poetry was shared orally in more informal circles, such as festivals and weddings, thereby increasing its reach and attesting to its popularity among the masses (Ashrawi, 1978; Mir, 2003). These masses came to experience “one of the few fields of narrative or knowledge production open to the expression of Palestinian national identity” following *Al-Nakba* (Pappé, 2005: 83), in turn, poetry’s nationalistic tone has been associated with the overall “Arab national awakening” (Moreh, 1988: 167).

Through poetry, Palestinians were able to “fertilize” (Elmessiri, 1981) their nationalist aspirations, as well as demand recognition both as a people and a nation. Moreover, as the Palestinian national movement developed and became more tenacious in the late 1960s and early 1970s, poetry too, came to reflect more nationalistic discourses (Hammer, 2005). Concurrently, the nationalist undertones of poetry seemed to be coupled with the discourse of defiance and resistance (Moreh, 1988; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). In fact, Kanafani (1976), a prominent Palestinian writer, was the first to term this form of poetry “resistance literature” (cited in Antoon, 2002). Although Palestinian poets’ writing was generally well-respected prior to the 1967 war, following this significant shift in Palestinian governance, a new group of poets, termed the “Poets of Resistance” earned widespread popularity (Badawi, 1975; Bennani, 1976). On the whole, these poets’ message “is not one of despair, or defeat; on the contrary, without minimizing the difficulties they preach the need to continue the struggle” (Badawi, 1975: 222-223). Importantly, the rise of this nationalistic poetry at this time reflected the “national fervour” of the Palestinian people and solidified their resentment and despair with their dispersal from

the land (Kanafani, 1976: viii). In this way, Palestinian poetry continued to stir the emotions of the people, reflect Palestinians' despondency with their situation, allowed them to voice their commonalities in victimization and rally around calls for reclaiming the Palestinian future.

### **A Glance at the "Palestinian National Poet": On Mahmoud Darweish**

Mahmud Darweish is one of the most well-known Arab (let alone Palestinian) poets (McKean-Paramenter, 1994; Antoon, 2002). In fact, it has been argued that Darweish "would appear on nearly anyone's list of the best-known, most prolific, and most innovatory contemporary Arab poets" (al-Udhari, 1984: 7). Palestinians have bestowed upon him the title of the "Palestinian national poet" (Antoon, 2002; Abdel-Malek, 2005; Huri, 2006; Urban, 2006), as he has increasingly "emerged as the voice of the [nationalist] movement and the interpreter of its struggles" (Farsoun and Aruri, 2006: 123). His poetry, which has been translated into more than 20 languages (A Love Story, 2002: 67), is extremely wide-reaching, as many Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories, as well as those abroad in the diaspora can recite his poems from memory (Hammer, 2005: 63). Importantly for Palestinians, his poetry elevates the "local" Palestinian tragedy of displacement and national fragmentation to the "universal" level (al-Udhari, 1984: 8; Akash, 2000: 25), providing a platform for Palestinians and other Arabs to connect the experiences of *Al-Nakba* and life under Israeli occupation. Importantly, Darweish himself has personally undergone many of the hardships experienced by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, earning him respect and credibility among his people (al-Udhari, 1984; Antoon, 2002; Omer, 2005).

Darweish was born in 1942 in the Galilee village of Birweh and fled to Lebanon with his family in 1948, a pivotal move in his life, as this departure meant that Darweish was not included in the Israeli census of Arabs prior to Israel's establishment (McKean-Paramenter, 1994; Omer, 2005; Urban, 2006). Theoretically, this meant that Darweish could not receive Israeli citizenship and thus, was perceived as illegally trying to "infiltrate" Israel, when he and his family attempted to return a year after their fleeing (al-Udhari, 1984: 10). In trying to regain their legal status,

Darweish's family claimed that they had remained on the land both prior to and following Israel's establishment, but that they had settled in a Bedouin village in the country's northern region and had therefore been overlooked when the census was conducted (al-Udhari, 1984: 10). This claim proved to be successful and Darweish was able to obtain an Israeli identity card. However, he faced additional challenges in obtaining the travel documents necessary for traveling within the country (al-Udhari., 1984). This lack of documentation led to Darweish's arrest (and placement under house arrest) several times between 1961 and 1969s for violating Israeli travel policies (Muhawi, 1995; Alcalay, 2000; Urban, 2005).

Darweish was educated in Israel and later became a member of the Israeli Communist Party (Caspi and Weltch, 1998: 47). Throughout his education and into his employment as a journalist in Haifa, Darweish continued writing poetry. In 1971, frustrated with the ramifications of living under occupation, Darweish fled to Cairo and remained there for over 10 years (al-Udhari, 1984: 11). Yet, his popularity continued to intensify and he began to write for the Egyptian daily newspaper, *Al-Ahram* (Muhawi, 1995). He later moved to Beirut and earned additional notoriety when he became the chief editor of the scholarly journal *Palestinian Affairs*, and "was unanimously elected president of the Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists" (Muhawi, 1995: xiv). In 1995, Darweish returned to visit his mother in Haifa, where he was greeted by thousands of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs waiting to welcome their "national poet" home (Handal, 2005: 26). Since the visit, Darweish has moved to the West Bank city of Ramallah and continues to write and lecture, as well as edit the Ramallah-based scholarly journal *Al-Karmel* (Omer, 2005; Meital, 2005).

Given his vast accomplishments, Darweish has been distinguished by Palestinian society as both a "political" and "cultural icon" (Antoon, 2002: 67). In fact, his identity is conflated with the roles of both poet and political activist. However he has purposely never distinguished his work as one or the other (Omer, 2005: 72). Yet, Mir (2003: 130) cautions that separating the political from the cultural or artistic, in the Palestinian context, is futile (if not impossible), as

“resistance poetry in Palestine grew out of the conditions – political, economic, and cultural – that gave rise to resistance in all its aspects.” In this way, Darweish resides in both spheres resisting oppression and summoning the Palestinian nationalism in both domains.

As a political figure, Darweish had had both personal and professional bonds with the late Yasser Arafat, and even wrote many of the former PLO chairman’s public addresses (Antoon, 2002: 73). From 1987 to 1993, Darweish’s involvement in Palestine’s political sphere became more official. He became a member of the PLO Executive Committee, and authored the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s Declaration of Independence in 1988 (Antoon, 2002: 67). However, in 1993 he resigned his post in protest over the aforementioned Oslo Accords agreed upon by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat (A Love Story, 2002: 76; Handal, 2005: 26), arguing that he was “willing to accept the principles of the agreement with Israel, including the recognition of the Israeli state, but criticiz[ing] the concessions that Arafat and the mainstream made” (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 337). Yet, despite his resignation, he continued to garner support from the broader Palestinian populace (Handal, 2005). Today, Darweish continues to emphasize the need to end the occupation of the Palestinian Territories, “issu[ing] political statements on the anniversary of the Nakba, reiterating the rights of all Palestinians to self-determination, resistance to occupation, and return to their homes” (Antoon, 2002: 74).

As a “cultural icon”, Mahmoud Darweish’s interest in poetry dates back to his elementary school days (Omer, 2005). In fact, he published his first collection of poetry at the young age of nineteen (Omer, 2005: 72). Darweish’s poetry speaks to the Palestinian people as “many of his poems mirror the loss of homeland, the frustrations of being under siege, [and] of being occupied,” a fate experienced in some way or another by every Palestinian (Handal, 2005: 24). Therefore, his personal loss reflects the very essence of the loss experienced by the nation at large, allowing Palestinians to band together and “celebrate” their collective grief (Akash, 2000: 33). Importantly, Darweish purposely tries to ensure that his work is relevant to several generations of Palestinians. For example, in an interview conducted with Adam Shatz of the

*New York Times*, Darweish argues that his intention has never been to situate his writing within a concrete moment in time, but rather he had hoped his poetry would contain the fluidity, which can speak to many generations and varying social contexts (A Love Story, 2002). He attempts this by writing with “imagination”, arguing that “if you know how to fuse reality with the imagination, you can prevent your poem from falling into mere actuality” (A Love Story, 2002: 69).

Importantly, a significant element of his poetry centres on “preserving his Arab and Palestinian identity in what has become for him an imposing and largely non-Arab presence” (Bennani, 1976: 20). This general mood of self-assertion against the perceived threat of annihilation is still prevalent today, as it was in 1948, and in this way, his messages continue to resonate with younger and older Palestinians alike (Collins, 2004; Omer, 2005). Additionally, Darweish’s poetry has become even more popular with its reproduction in Arabic music. In fact, with the infusion of Darweish’s poetry in music, his popularity in the Arab world has soared, “parallel[ing] that of a Western rock star” (Massad, 2005: 190).

Moreover, Palestinian children have become very familiar with Darweish’s work. Children who live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, learn about the poet’s work in school, and are often made to learn his poems by heart (Akash, 2000). For those living in the diaspora (in the areas outside the Occupied Territories), Darweish’s poems have become a staple of their cultural upbringing, with many explaining that Darweish’s name is mentioned in familial and educational discussions about the Palestinians’ national identity (Hammer, 2005). Therefore, while these children are not privy to the daily experiences of Palestinians within the Territories, they do have an ability to connect to their “national and cultural identity” through his poetry (Hammer, 2005: 178).

Yet, Darweish’s work cannot be understood as exhibiting a monolithic message or tone, as over the years his poetry “has undergone such deep and stylistic intellectual changes” (Elmessiri, 1981: 78). However, given his critical place in Palestinian culture, his connection and

commonality with the Palestinian people, and his unwavering emphasis on Palestinian identity and nationalism within his writing, this thesis addresses one of his most famous poems understood to fall within the rubric of resistance poetry. Abu-Deeb (1997: 121) explains that Darweish's *Identity Card* can be understood as "rhetorical, strong, high, political, collective, [and] confident." As such, this poem will allow an analysis of the ways in which poetry may exemplify a potent force of militarization, commemorating the past and reinforcing the Palestinian narrative.

### **Palestinian Poetry and Militarization**

As previously mentioned, Enloe (2000: 2) argues that "many people can become militarized in their thinking, in how they live their lives, in what they aspire to for their children or their society, without ever wielding a rifle or donning a helmet." The militarization of citizens who are not directly involved in the armed fighting may involve subtle cues which "nudge" the populations into, at worst, relying on armed groups for protection, and at worst, merely taking for granted the armed groups' definitions of resistance and national security (Enloe, 1983).

According to Enloe (2000), the subtle cues can manifest in innumerable realms from fashion, to "town pride", to children's toys. This chapter includes cultural and nationalist poetry to this list of potential sources of militarization. Accordingly, Darweish's *Identity Card* is assessed for its inherent messages and the ways in which it may potentially contribute to the taking for granted of militarized ideals. This chapter assesses the ways in which one of the Palestinians' most prized cultural outlets, poetry, can contribute to the process of the "militarization of dissent" (Enloe, 2000). Interestingly, a common Arabic proverb succinctly explains part of Enloe's argument. It states that, "an intelligent person, from a mere nod will get the point" (Muhawi, 2006: 38).

Palestinian "resistance poetry" offers messages of cultural unification in the face of the oppression exerted by the Israeli "Other" (Ashrawi, 1978; McKean-Paramenter, 1994; Antoon, 2002). In fact, according to one prominent Palestinian writer, the most salient feature of

“resistance poetry” is its challenge to and defiance of “all Zionist beliefs” (Kanafani, 1976: xii). In fact, some argue that resistance poetry actually “helped restore and strengthen the spirit of nationalism and renewed resistance among the Arab people” (Frangieh, 2000: 226; cited in Mir, 2003: 130). For example, poems which discuss the fundamental connections Palestinians have to the physical land of Palestine purposely elaborate on descriptions of the Palestinian village, the desert and the agricultural landscape (Ashrawi, 1978; Elmessiri, 1981; McKean-Paramenter, 1994). In this way, poets insist on their people’s connection to the land prior to Israel’s establishment, and offer an argument to the early Zionists’ slogan, “a land without a people for a people without a land” (Urban, 2006: 79). These claims may help unite Palestinians against what they see to be a form of historical revisionism from which they have been excluded. Concurrently, re-invigorating the memory of Palestinians through direct reference to the basic components of Palestinians’ homeland allows them to remain unforgotten throughout the generations.

Likewise, another maneuver that resistance poetry offers Palestinians is its ability to “package the past”, that is to speak about and reiterate the past in new light (Coakley, 2004: 540; cited in Suleiman, 2006b: 210). While this “packaging” involves various functions, Suleiman (2006b: 210-211) has explored three particular salient functions relevant to Palestinian poetry:

The first, *reinforcement*, is intended to instill a sense of pride in past achievements... The second, *legitimation*... validat[es] the national enterprise, in the literary domain by endowing it with an authenticating geneology that links the past with the present in literary production... Finally, *inspiration*... relates to the destiny of the nation and aims to underline the message in the nationalist literature of the inevitability of a bright future for the nation.

But these functions can also be understood to extend community-connectedness a step further to encompass group mobilization. Indeed Palestinian “nationalist literature aims at mobilisation and political activism by bonding the present to the past for reinforcement, legitimation, and inspiration purposes” (Suleiman, 2006b: 226). In this way, nationalist literature, rather than being distinctly reflective of reality, is in fact “an exercise in acting on reality, of constructing it, to fashion it in a way that gives the nation literary form and socio-political substance” (Suleiman,

2006b: 226). Importantly, when this socio-political substance relies on a discourse of resistance, it can militarize a society, fashioning the construction of a common enemy and providing a justification for violent retaliation. Inclusion, community belonging, a shared history, and collective victimization interweave Palestinian literature, promoting group mobilization for the nation (Suleiman, 2006b). Concurrently, subtle militarized cues may emerge within the thematic content of the poems. For example, resistance poetry “fashions” the nation to look upon the past as a shared trauma, the present as a shared exile, and future as a shared fate (Hammer, 2005). In this way, poetry assists in reflecting the Palestinian collective memory, and solidifying the present and future course of the Palestinian nationalism.

Muhawi (2006) provides another perspective through which poetry may contribute to the defiance of the “Other”. He argues that the Israelis have employed a common strategy of “absentification” in which they completely negate the pre-existence of any indigenous group on the conquered land, essentially arguing that Palestine’s Arabs were, at best, a dispersed and fragmented population prior to Israel’s establishment (Muhawi, 2006: 34). According to Muhawi (2006: 35), the “simplest reversal [of this absentification] is to negate the negation by means of a heroic or mock-heroic affirmation”. One such means of achieving this reversal is through the “magnification of the Palestinian self” (Muhawi, 2006: 36). For example, a significant element of Darweish’s poetry is his insistence on the “preserv[ation of] his Arab and Palestinian identity in what has become for him an imposing and largely non-Arab presence” (Bennani, 1976: 20). This self-assertion is part and parcel of his views on the present circumstances of Palestinians which in turn, may help promotes group strength and commonality among the (currently) dispersed people and the fragmented Palestinian nation (Mir, 2003). Declaring their cultural uniqueness, opposition to occupation, and determination to remain undeterred in their nationalistic aspirations, in effect, challenges the discourse of early Zionists, and the Israeli monopoly of authoring history.

The Israeli public has also acknowledged the particular potency of Darweish's dissent against Israel in his writing. For example, in March 2000, the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) debated the possibility of incorporating Darweish's work into the Israeli high school curriculum. After the proposal was vehemently opposed, Israel's then Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, openly "declared 'Israel's not ready'" (Handal, 2005: 26). Alcalay (2000: 31) argues that Israel's incorporation of Palestinian poetry into its educational curriculum may have further reaching implications than simply providing a voice for the "Other". In effect, providing a forum for Darweish's resistance poetry "might mean giving up one little patch of [Israeli] victimhood." When asked to comment about the controversy of introducing his poetry within the Israeli high school curriculum, Darweish answered:

[t]he Israelis are extremely sensitive about giving any room to the Other. They want to maintain a monopoly over the memory of the land... They are afraid that when pupils realize there's another people with deep roots, they will discover the whole story of Zionism is false (A Love Story, 2002: 70-71).

On the other hand, to the politicians advocating against this proposal, Darweish's poetry stands as "damning evidence of the Palestinians' unwillingness to live in peace with the Israelis" (Antoon, 2002: 66), therefore, rationalizing the arguments against teaching Darweish's work to Israeli students. Yet, despite these dichotomous views of the meaning of Darweish's poems, their potency in voicing the Palestinian perspective is extremely important.

*Identity Card* provides this thesis a venue for assessing some of the subtle cues that may maneuver Palestinians through the process of militarization. This poem provides examples of the cultural messages prevalent in Palestinian society about the necessity of dissent and defiance, and the inherent connection of Palestinians to the land of their ancestors. Essentially, this poem helps shape the "ideological dimension" of militarization, that is "the degree to which such developments [i.e., the blurring of boundaries between combatants and civilians] are acceptable to the populace, and become seen as 'common-sense' solutions to civil problems" (Enloe, 1983: 9-10). *Identity Card* provides an example of the means through which the

militarization of dissent can be reinforced, and even “nudged” into being. Concurrently, given the widespread teaching of resistance poetry in Palestinian schools (Brown, 2001; Adwan, 2004; Omer, 2005), drawing from these poems will allow an analysis of the ways in which populations not traditionally associated with soldiering, such as children, may possibly be maneuvered through the process of militarization.

### On *Identity Card* (1964)<sup>7</sup>:

Put in on record.

I am an Arab.  
 And the number of my card is fifty thousand  
 I have eight children  
 And the ninth is due after summer.  
 What's there to be angry about?

Put in on record.

I am an Arab.  
 Working with comrades of toil in a quarry.  
 I have eight children  
 For them I wrest the loaf of bread,  
 The clothes and exercise books  
 From the rocks  
 And beg for no alms at your door,  
 Lower not myself at your doorstep.  
 What's there to be angry about?

Put in on record.

I am an Arab.  
 I am a name without a title,  
 Patient in a country where everything lives in a  
 whirlpool of anger.  
 My roots  
 Took hold before the birth of time  
 Before the burgeoning of the ages,  
 Before cypress and olive trees,  
 Before the proliferation of weeds.  
 My father is from the family of the plough  
 Not from highborn nobles.  
 And my grandfather was a peasant  
 Without line or genealogy.  
 My house is a watchman's hut  
 Made of sticks and reeds.  
 Does my status satisfy you?  
 I am a name without a surname.

Put in on record.

I am an Arab.  
 Colour of hair: jet black.  
 Colour of eyes: brown.  
 My distinguishing features:  
 On my head the 'iqal cords over *keffiyeh*  
 Scratching him who touches it.

My address:

I am from a village, remote, forgotten.  
 Its streets with name  
 And all its men in the fields and quarry.

What's there to be angry about?

Put in on record.

I am an Arab.  
 You stole my forefathers' vineyards  
 And land I used to till,  
 I and all my children,  
 And you left us and all my grandchildren  
 Nothing but these rocks.  
 Will your government be taking them too  
 As is being said?

So!

Put it on record at the top of page one:  
 I don't hate people,  
 I trespass on no one's property.  
 And yet, if I were to become hungry  
 I shall eat the flesh of my usurper.  
 Beware, beware of my hunger  
 And of my anger!

*Identity Card* (1964) has been widely considered one of Darweish's most popularized, and commonly-recited poems (Ashrawi, 1978; Muhawi, 1995; Pappé, 2005). This particular

<sup>7</sup> The English translation of this poem was obtained from Caspi and Weltsch (1998: 52-53).

poem has earned Darweish his symbolic membership into the conglomerate group of “resistance poets” (Muhawi, 1995: xxiv). In fact, Caspi and Weltch (1998: 49) argue that poem successfully highlights two inherently connected areas of the poet’s life: his identity as an Arab and his identity as a Palestinian. In an era of almost total Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian control of the regions in which Palestinians lived (the early 1960s), Darweish presented a speaker who expressed his cultural “pride” and “defiance” of the “Other” (Bennani, 1976: 20). Moreover, Antoon (2002: 67) argues that this poem “crystallized Palestinian resistance against Israeli erasure of their identity and history.” Yet, Caspi and Weltch (1998: 51) argue that unlike the “resistance poetry” following the 1967 war, *Identity Card* is not “couched purely in resistance poetry... [and the] land is not an afterthought, but essential to his [Darweish’s] poetic treatise.” It is the very linguistic “national spirit” of this poem which recaptures the Palestinian identity (al-Musawi, 2006: 25), earning this poem the distinction of the “Palestinian national poem” (Mir, 2003: 146). Therefore, this poem’s popularity and distinctive tone were the key reasons for its selection for analysis in this thesis.

### **Assessing Poetry Through the Lens of Militarization**

This section begins by broadly describing the emerging themes from *Identity Card*, assessed through the initial process of open coding, allowing for a broader and more contextualized analysis of the themes to ensue in the following chapter. These initial themes include: a) Individual and collective Palestinian steadfastness, b) Resisting the “Other”, and c) Nature and Palestinians’ connection to the physical land of Palestine. These themes may highlight the poem’s inherent militarized messages, and their potential contribution to maneuvering the population, particularly children, for whom such poetry has become a staple of their upbringing (Brown, 2001; Adwan, 2004; Collins, 2004; Hammer, 2005).

#### ***Individual and Collective Palestinian Steadfastness:***

One of the most salient themes that emerges from one of Darweish’s first popularized works is the theme of Palestinian steadfastness in the face of perceived Israeli annihilation.

Darweish demands on five separate occasions that his occupier recognize his Arab status. In declaring his identity, he challenges his occupiers to acknowledge his own, as well as his people's plight, demanding the recognition of his status in the face of potential erasure. In this way, Darweish asserts his resistance to what Kanafani (1968: 66; cited in Mir, 2003: 126) has termed Israel's "cultural siege."

According to Kanafani, the 'cultural siege' resulted from Israel's capture of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1967 war, and the subsequent "enacted rules and regulations to inhibit the development of any intellectual, let alone literary, production that might challenge Israeli authority or presumably pose a threat to its security" (Kanafani, 1968: 66; cited in Mir, 2003: 126). For example, Susan Slyomovics (1991: 28) argues that cultural plays performed in the Palestinian Territories in the 1950s and 1960s required scripts' approval by the Ministry of Interior's Committee of Censorship of Plays and Films, the Ministry of Education, and (unlike the plays performed within Israel) Military officials, as it was believed that plays have the ability to incite their audiences into mobilisation. As well, according to Israeli censorship rules, all newspaper articles appearing in Hebrew could have been freely translated into Arabic, while Arabic articles underwent screening and censorship (Slyomovics, 1991: 36, n7). For her, "Israel's policy of censorship is part of an expanding complex of military directives that restrict the circulation of ideas among Palestinian Arabs in Israel and the Occupied Territories" (Slyomovics, 1991: 32). In this way, Darweish's asserted steadfastness, coupled with the pride associated with his claim to "Lower not myself at your doorstep", seem to reverberate an air of defiance. Apparently, Darweish's experiences with the Israeli government, coupled with the injustices he perceives his people are experiencing fuels an anger that materializes in his defiance of this "Other".

Yet, concurrently, Darweish attempts to speak for his people, employing a first person vernacular. In fact, he repeatedly chooses the word "I", which has been considered *Identity Card's* "poetic center of gravity" (Abu-Deeb, 1997: 118). This choice was deliberately aimed at

"includ[ing] the masses who are suffering but whose pain the poet feels intensely and conveys to the world" (Ashrawi, 1978: 86-87). This language assists Darweish in asserting his (and his people's) steadfastness in an uncertain era, as Palestinians are fragmented, exiled and living as refugees. Indeed, Darweish explores his commonality with his people in his poem, claiming that he is not a child of aristocracy, but rather is a common worker more similar in lifestyle and experiences to the average Palestinian. His commonality with the people is further enhanced in his self-description, with the characteristics "Colour of hair: jet black", "Colour of eyes: brown" and "On my head the *'iqal* cords over *keffiyeh*" matching that of most Palestinian men.

### ***Resisting the "Other":***

Another salient theme within Darweish's poem is the explicit resistance of an "Other", an entity to which Darweish aims his defiance. He poignantly claims, "You stole my forefathers' vineyards". These are words that appear to challenge the Israeli discourse and construction of Middle East history, and attempt to place the blame on Israelis for the hardships currently (and since *Al-Nakba*) experienced by Palestinians. In using the discourse of theft, Darweish asserts that his occupiers are the wrongdoers, the ones who have committed the gravest of injustices against himself and his people, thereby legitimating the anger felt by Palestinians. The "Other" is constructed as an entity that primarily aims to silence and marginalize Palestinians based on the claim that Palestinians symbolically "trespassed" on the land. Yet, interestingly, Darweish has deduced the "Other" from an omni-powerful and omni-present nation, to a "singular, a personally defined entity" (Abu-Deeb, 1997: 123). In doing so, Darweish appears to challenge the authority and powerfulness of this "Other", placing it at the same level of symbolic strength as the Palestinian voice.

Moreover, in Darweish's last stanza he uses words fueled by fury and anger. He claims "if I were to become hungry... I shall eat the flesh of my usurper. Beware, beware of my hunger And of my anger!" This implies that Darweish's outrage with the Palestinians' current state is as natural as one's "hunger", apparently simultaneously necessitating and justifying the drastic

measure of “eating the flesh of his usurper” to satiate this need. The message seems to promote the naturalness of reclaiming one’s land, while concurrently highlighting a symbolically-violent means through which this can be achieved. Indeed, Darweish’s final words mobilize around the “here and now”, blatantly using “a lexicon of the popular struggle” to avenge the treatment of Palestinians (Suleiman, 2006b: 227). Suleiman (2006b: 227; emphasis in original) offers an interesting perspective on poetry which aims to connect past and present in such a way, arguing that it:

performs two contradictory rhetorical functions... it suggests the existence of *rupture* between the past and present, between the glories of the golden age and the traumas of the age of struggle. On the other hand... [it] suggests the possibility of *repair*, and the potential for the *continuity* of the past into the future, but it makes that conditional on overcoming the traumas of the present by cleansing the age of struggle from its debilitating failures.

Yet with the use of violent imagery, Darweish seems to offer one particularly militarized mode of dissent, and one particular trajectory for “overcoming” these past traumas. Through such language and use of the aforementioned imagery and messages, Palestinian readers are apparently offered subtle cues about the appropriateness (and necessity) of the violence inherent in the struggle.

The reiteration of personal and collective victimization is a highly salient feature in Darweish’s *Identity Card*. Darweish explicitly challenges:

You stole my forefathers’ vineyards  
And land I used to till,  
I and all my children,  
And you left us and all my grandchildren  
Nothing but these rocks.

For Darweish, the theft is not only directed at the individual, but rather at future generations of Palestinians who are left with “nothing but these rocks”. In this way, future readers of Darweish’s poem also come to encompass the populations on behalf of which Darweish speaks. Yet, rather than embodying a tone of disillusionment or sadness at the loss of his homeland, Darweish remains resolute, hopeful and at times even reliant on “a lexicon of the popular struggle” (Suleiman, 2006b: 227) to discuss his predictions for the future. Despite having been victimized,

Darweish remains proud and steadfast in his identity and claims for the land. He “beg[s] for no alms at your door, [Or] Lower[s] not myself at your doorstep.” Instead, he warns his oppressors that their provocations, symbolically described as the “touching” of his distinguishing Arab features, will garner the retaliatory response of being “scratched”. Yet, Darweish remains “patient within a country where everything lives in a whirlpool of anger”. The use of the word “whirlpool” implies an all-encompassing and omni-present force that consumes his environment. In his surroundings, Darweish is continuously reminded of the land he once occupied, and continues to challenge his oppressors with questions such as “Does my status satisfy you?”, and “What’s there to be angry about?” and upon addressing the land left to Palestinians he questions: “Will your government be taking them too As is being said?”. In these words, Darweish (almost sarcastically) challenges his oppressors, from a marginalized, yet steadfastly resistant position. As previously stated, Darweish’s words may be understood as legitimating resistance against the “Other”, positing it as a natural reaction to the invective and instigating experience of *Al-Nakba* and its consequences.

***Connection to the Physical Land of Palestine:***

*Identity Card*’s third salient theme centres on his connection to the physical land, claiming that the land currently inhabited by the “Other” is Darweish’s “forefather’s vineyards... And the land I used to till”. This connection to the physical land asserts his people’s historical narrative and exemplifies their perceived victimization. He implies that his existence on the land created a natural state of affairs, wherein the land was fertile and plentiful. This is contrary to the current unnatural state, which following the arrival of the Zionists, produced “the proliferation of weeds.” In this way, Darweish apparently implies that the Palestinian’s connectedness to the physical land is nothing but natural and exemplifies a state of purity which has been disrupted by the arrival of the Zionists, who not only exiled the Palestinian people, but also offended and overturned the natural state of the land.

Concurrently, Darweish references features of the physical land which have been understood to symbolize for Palestinians their connection to historic Palestine. For example, Darweish notes the "olive tree" in his poem, a Middle Eastern motif which "has evolved into a symbol of communal rootedness, identity, and resistance" (McKean-Paramenter, 1994: 74). Importantly, authors have argued that the physical characteristics of the olive tree are representative of the very features of Palestinian society, including the ability to survive with very little rainfall, the necessity of only a small space within which to grow, an exceptional adaptability to its environment, and an ability to provide subsistence to farmers (McKean-Paramenter, 1994: 74-75). Referencing this staple of Palestinian society allows poet to reiterate and re-capture "a steadfast bond between Palestinians and the land", allowing the land to become the Palestinians' "strongest ally" (McKean-Paramenter, 1994: 75; 79). Essentially, the referencing of the physical land reaffirms the connection between Palestinians and the land which Israelis currently inhabit and govern (McKean-Paramenter, 1994). Indeed, McKean-Paramenter (1994: 77) links the continued referencing of nature and the physical attributes of the land to a political argument, allowing Palestinians to reiterate their bond to the land (McKean-Paramenter, 1994: 77), therefore justifying claims that the natural state will only exist when Palestinians return to the land.

In noting the physical features of the land, Darweish is able to resist Israeli sovereignty over the land, albeit indirectly. For example, discussing the land's physical features seldom looks like an overt and defiant declaration, rather it appears almost "neutral", thereby allowing it to (albeit sometimes) by-pass the censorship of Israeli officials (McKean-Paramenter, 1994). In this way, Darweish delicately reclaims his people's innate connection to the physical land through less openly defiant language.

In his poem, Darweish describes the beauty of Palestine, its physical features and the barrenness with which Palestinians were left following Israel's establishment. Though he does not reference the event specifically, his words "You stole my forefathers' vineyards. And the

land I used to till” imply a reference to *Al-Nakba*, wherein the “catastrophe” has left Palestinians with “nothing but these rocks”. In *Identity Card*, the land once inhabited by the poet and his ancestors is presented as the eternal sanctuary of the Palestinian people, a treasure based on a natural order, which has been stolen. As such, it is posited as a “symbol... of a homeland worth risking one’s life for” (Enloe, 2000: 11). Framed in this way, Palestine apparently becomes a symbolic, yet historical site, which continues to transcend generations, reminding readers of the affronts committed both against the people and their land. As previously stated, Darweish implies that Palestinians’ connectedness to the physical land is inherently natural, and exemplifies a state of purity. According to Palestinian discourse, this sense of normalcy had been disrupted by the arrival of the Zionists, who not only exiled the Palestinian people, but also disrupted the land’s natural features (Barsamian and Said, 2003).

Important for the study of the militarization of children is that Palestinian nationalist poetry is a feature of both their educational curriculum (Brown, 2001; Adwan, 2004), as well as their political socialization and upbringing within the family (Collins, 2004; Hammer, 2005). The compounding exposure to these messages, coupled with the continuous iteration (and re-iteration) of the Palestinian experience of *Al-Nakba* may possibly help maneuver Palestinian children’s resistance, legitimating retaliation against the perceived (Israeli) aggressor. Moreover, connecting these aforementioned themes allows for a broader exploration into the potential militarizing maneuvers of Palestinian cultural writing, a topic which is discussed more comprehensively in the following chapter.

## **DISCUSSION: MANEUVERING POPULATIONS INTO MILITARIZATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND NATIONALISM**

The importance of Palestinian poetry and the detrimental effects of the Separation Barrier were discussed extensively in the previous chapters. This chapter describes the militarizing themes arising from the poem's data, framing these within the information found in the literature on the Separation Barrier, and then discusses their importance within the framework of maneuvered militarization. The themes are grouped under the following categories: 1) Collective Memory, 2) Resistance and National Mobilization, and c) the Confluence of Homefront and Battlefront. To garner these broader codes, each of the initial codes garnered from the poem, that is, *individual and collective Palestinian steadfastness*, *Resisting the "Other"*, and *connection to the physical land*, were compared to each other to assess their similarities and relationships. In this way, the initial codes which seemed most repetitive and salient were collapsed into broader and more-encompassing themes or categories. Throughout the analysis, examples were also drawn from the literature on the Separation Barrier in order to help explore these abstract themes (*collective memory*, *resistance and national mobilization* and *the confluence of homefront and battlefront*) and their practical examples within Enloe's conceptualization of militarized maneuvering. The chapter ultimately explores how these realms of militarization can be understood to reinforce one another, and discusses their potential contribution to militarizing Palestinian children's lives.

However, it is important to note that militarization is not considered to be a "cause-and-effect" phenomenon, but is rather addressed as a subtle and long-term process which is arguably ongoing and ever-pervasive. In this way, this chapter addresses, at an abstract level, the discourses which can be understood to infuse Palestinian society, and discusses their potential contribution to this ongoing and dialectical process of militarization.

## Themes from *Identity Card*

### ***Collective Memory:***

In *Identity Card*, Darweish continually reaffirms the collective discourse of his people in proclaiming the common experiences of the Palestinian people. He describes both the collective victimization of having their “forefather’s” lands “stolen” and the consequences of *Al-Nakba*, as well as Palestinians’ inherent connection to the this land. The themes of collective victimization and connection to the physical land, garnered through the coding process of the data collection and analysis can be logically encompassed in the “core” themes of *Collective Memory*, particularly as both of the aforementioned codes draw upon and reinforce the broad Palestinian experience of life prior to *Al-Nakba*, and the resentment which ensued following their displacement. The connection to the physical land and their subsequent expulsion explores and reiterates Palestinians’ narrative of collective trauma upon its loss. This in turn, may help to justify and legitimate collective and individual steadfastness as a means of resistance. The discourses emerging about Palestinians’ past, present and visions for the future, as outlined in the previous chapter, help to substantiate their inclusion under the core theme of “collective memory”. According to Misztal (2003: 7) collective memory can be defined as the “representation of the past, both that shared by a group and that which is collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to the group’s identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future.” Therefore, all three constructs of connection to the physical land (which can be understood to represent the past), individual and collective steadfastness (viewed as representing the present), and resisting the “Other” (conceptualized as the vision for the future) can be understood to fall within the theme of collective memory. Each coded construct helps to provide a context in which past trauma is commemorated, the present is explored and the future includes justifications for struggle and resistance.

In this way, Darweish apparently confirms the collective memory that is often reiterated by the *Al-Nakba* generation to their grandchildren, positing a dichotomous view of the situation

and "signifying Palestinians' relationship to the land through knowledge of it" (Davis, 2007: 61), and emphasizes the unjust nature of Palestinians' experiences of exile. Indeed, this dichotomy is an ever-present feature in the Palestinian national discourse, which argues that

[n]ormality ended with Al-Nakbah at both the individual and communal levels. Comparisons between pre- and post-Al-Nakbah are always in the backgrounds of any discussion or Thought on Palestine, and the preference is always for pre-Al-Nakbah life. Post-Al-Nakbah has always been associated with abnormality (Sa'di, 2002: 186).

This theme may possibly work to further maneuver the Palestinian consciousness through the process of militarization by contributing to the language of Palestinian victimization, and reiterating the Palestinian experience. It highlights that *Al-Nakba* is a victimization of the Palestinian collective, and is an affront which in itself encourages revenge and retaliation.

#### ***Resistance and National Mobilization:***

Given the popularity and potency of Palestinian poetry (Badawi, 1975; Bennani, 1976; Rowland and Frank, 2002; Hammer, 2005), Darweish's *Identity Card* offers a unique opportunity for reporting and recording the Palestinian experience. Enloe (2000: 133) argues that reporting and recording are "political acts". In the face of perceived attempts at Palestinian marginalization, both during *Al-Nakba* and in the following decades of policies, "existential issues" (Gur-Ze'ev and Pappé, 2003: 94) emerged, solidifying the threat of annihilation (figurative or otherwise) that many Palestinians experience. One venue for resisting the Israeli policies is to reiterate claims that prior to 1948, Arabs did, indeed, inhabit and cultivate the land. Darweish attempts to do this by exploring his own and his family's roots in the land, and has offered one possible venue for Palestinians to affirm their collective discourse. Encompassed in this broader theme are the coded constructs of connectedness to the land, resisting the "Other", and the iteration of individual and collective steadfastness.

Darweish, supported by the general popularity of Palestinian poetry, can be understood to strengthen Palestinians' arguments, highlighting their victimization by the "Other" their innate connection to the land, and the naturalness of resistance, given these experiences. He presents

the injustices committed, and urges his oppressors to record his identity, so as not to symbolically erase his existence. Recording one's identity can also conjure a sense of permanence in a volatile and ever-changing context of political conflict. In demanding that his identity is recorded, Darweish takes a personal and collective stand against the "Other", verbalizing the sentiments of his people. Enloe (2000: 6) argues that entertainers performing for military personnel can become militarized insofar as their performances are aimed at "sustaining the morale of male soldiers". In like fashion, resistance poetry can "help... restore and strengthen the spirit of nationalism and [foster a] renewed resistance among the Arab people" (Frangieh, 2000: 226; cited in Mir, 2003: 130). Recall that Roshwald (2006: 3; emphasis in original) provides an interesting definition of nationalism, as "the assertion of a community's claims of collective, bounded, territorial sovereignty *in the name of its distinctive identity*". Indeed, Darweish makes several implicit arguments for the restoration of the Palestinian nation, and provides the discourse which can be understood to urge the mobilization of Palestinians around steadfast nationalism and self-determination. This can possibly engender support for both overt and subtle resistance activities against Israeli targets, legitimating them as acts of collective preservation, retaliation for past injustices, and means of asserting Palestinian nationalism.

Darweish describes his anger as a natural by-product of his people's treatment, the "stealing" of their land, and the current circumstances which led him to "wrest the loaf of bread", and "the clothes and exercise books" in order to support his family. Importantly, the experiences described so vividly in *Identity Card* are framed as common experiences of the Palestinian people. As previously stated, the speaker of Darweish's poem implicitly elaborates on his commonality with the average Palestinian:

My father is from the family of the plough  
Not from highborn nobles.  
And my grandfather was a peasant  
Without line or genealogy...

Colour of hair: jet black.  
Colour of eyes: brown.  
My distinguishing features:  
    On my head the 'iqal cords over *keffiyeh*

Darweish's words and the commonness of his character may be interpreted to sustain the general morale of the Palestinian nation in its resistance against the "Other". Darweish speaks about a shared trauma, a shared exile and a shared fate among Palestinians, solidifying the Palestinian collective identity in an era filled with internal fractures among geographically dispersed and politically fragmented Palestinians (Khalil, 2005). In this way, reporting and recording can be understood as attempts to circumvent Israeli policies and practices of denying the "Other", while promulgating need for steadfastness in one's Palestinian identity, and quest for future nationhood, framing the latter as justified, should it involve violence.

Moreover, the poem maintains an aura of resistance and retaliation against the "other" in its mentioning of physical spaces in Palestine's landscape. A connection to and an articulation of the physical land is particularly important because, as "a site of fallen heroes", it has offered nations a "path to spiritual renewal and patriotic inspiration" (Roshwald, 2006: 66). In fact, "the land constitutes a direct, concrete link to the nation's past - an immutable past that serves forever as a source of inspiration and reassurance to the nation's living" (Roshwald, 2006: 67). Therefore, affronts to the physical land, such as the ones described by Darweish, can be interpreted as affronts to the whole Palestinian nation, potentially encouraging or "maneuvering" resistance and retaliation.

### ***The Confluence of Homefront and Battlefront:***

The construct of "the confluence of homefront and battlefront" is one that has arisen during the holistic process of data analysis and has been largely framed by secondary literature on the poem, and on resistance poetry in general. For example, Palestinian resistance poetry, particularly resistance poetry, has been said to offer its audiences three important features:

The first, *reinforcement*, is intended to instill a sense of pride in past achievements... The second, *legitimation*...validat[es] the national enterprise, in the literary domain by endowing it

with an authenticating geneology that links the past with the present in literary production... Finally, *inspiration*... relates to the destiny of the nation and aims to underline the message in the nationalist literature of the inevitability of a bright future for the nation (Suleiman, 2006b: 210-211).

*Identity Card* seems to exemplify these three functions in its description and “reinforcement” of the land’s glory prior to Israel’s establishment, implying Israel’s destruction of Palestinians’ homeland. Secondly, this poem explores the historical connection of one’s Palestinian ancestry has built with the land, thereby potentially legitimating and “authenticating” Palestinians’ current desires to reclaim the land. Finally, the element of inspiring a “bright future” for Palestinians is of particular importance to this poem, given that it describes so vividly the problem with which Palestinians are faced. However, when the means to achieve such a future involve the destruction of the “Other” or the symbolic “eat[ing] the flesh of my usurper”, the undertones of the poem can be said to militaristically maneuver its audiences to normalize resistance and retaliation. Importantly, and as previously stated, such poetry has become a salient feature of Palestinian children’s upbringing both within the home (Barsamian and Said, 2003; Collins, 2004; Hammer, 2005) and in their formal education in the school (Brown, 2001; Adwan, 2004). In this way, this poem can be understood as an element in encouraging the process of militarization in Palestinian children’s society, and therefore may be understood to further “nourish... the[ir] ambitions for revenge” (Korn, 2003: 19), by justifying violence as an appropriate response.

Although poetry is often taught to children in school, they often first learn poetry prior to attending an educational institution (Hammer, 2005). For example, some Palestinian youth interviewed by Juliane Hammer (2005: 178) have explained that they “considered these poems part of their upbringing as Palestinians.” This upbringing is further reinforced by the fact that in the Palestinian curriculum, “poems have to be learned by heart... [and] successful performance...gains the approval of teachers” (Burdman, 2003: 99-104). In this way, poetry provides one example of the ways in which children’s private and public spheres can become

confounded, particularly as it can be understood to permeate in various spheres of their lives. Given that poetry is such a powerful medium in Palestinian society, it can be understood to provide youth with a common thread, linking their own upbringing to that of their parents. Additionally, according to Hammer (2005), poetry remains a distinct means for transferring information, particularly highly emotional information from older to younger generations. For example, poetry “passes the connection to and the longing for return to... [the] homeland from the great first generations to the descendants born in exile” (Hammer, 2005: 62-63). In this way, poetry is a medium which infuses children’s private and public spheres, allowing militarized maneuvering to permeate their lives more extensively.

It therefore becomes important to assess the “internal meaning” of the *resistance of the other* theme emerging from this poem. For example, Darweish directly explicates his position on retaliation, offering a vivid image of retribution, which includes evocative and explicit language:

And yet, if I were to become hungry  
I shall eat the flesh of my usurper.  
Beware, beware of my hunger  
And of my anger!

This violent language, and its inherent tone of retaliation for injustices perceived by Palestinians, can be understood to help maneuver the society through the process of militarization by legitimating resistance as a natural response, and as one that is comparable to one’s hunger. Just as one cannot deny or resist the urge to satisfy his or her hunger, so too can one not ignore or dissuade their hunger for revenge against those who have offended their families, communities, land and future generations. In many ways, this theme may justify reliance on retaliation as natural and as deserving. Such wording may potentially help to “nudge” Palestinian populations, particularly children who are taught such poetry in school (Brown, 2001; Adwan, 2004), and in their homes (Basta, 2000; Collins, 2004; Shemesh, 2004) into relying on the armed groups’ definitions of resistance and national security, against an external and perceivably oppressive “Other” who has disrupted the natural order.

## Themes from the Literature on the Separation Barrier

The chapter on the Separation Barrier has explored the various ways through which Palestinian society (and its children) may be subjected to militarized policies and direct and indirect forms of militarization. The emerging themes from the literature explore the barrier's direct maneuvers, which are obstructions to travel and transportation, the disconnection of Palestinians from their agriculture, the hindrance of the provision of healthcare and education. Indirectly, the barrier restricts Palestinians' social mobility and perpetuates "ghettoization" and poverty, and oppresses their nationalism. This section discusses these effects in the context of militarized maneuvering, and draws on the aforementioned literature to discuss this research's findings.

### ***Collective Memory:***

The Separation Barrier can be thought of as reinforcing Palestinians' feelings of oppression and occupation, historically associated with the traumatic experience of *Al-Nakba*. Indeed, Palestinians view the barrier as part of the "continuum of [Palestinian] history" (Usher, 2006: 10). The barrier represents a "concrete manifestation of their victimisation. Palestinians' sense of identity... is now being reinforced by the separation fence" (Trottier, 2007: 125). The power imbalance, dictation of Palestinian life based on Israeli security whims, and impacts on daily life provide a means to call upon the collective memory of the Palestinian nation. As previously stated, collective memory can be defined as the "representation of the past, both that shared by a group and that which is collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to the group's identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future" (Misztal, 2003: 7). In this way, the collective memory of *Al-Nakba* comes to shape Palestinian identity, particularly as "it connects all Palestinians to a specific point in time that has become for them the 'eternal present'" (Sa'di, 2002: 177). Perhaps inadvertently, the Separation Barrier "preserves" (Sa'di, 2002) the past victimization of Palestinians, continuously reminding Palestinians of the historical affronts against their nation and collective identity.

The interpretation of past and present can, itself, be considered a militarizing maneuver. The referencing of collective memory arguably allows the Palestinians to build national unity, based on a common past and present identity (Misztal, 2003: 7) where no sovereign state exists. In fact, Enloe (2000: 218) explains that in the wake of full-fledged war-waging, militarization can also encompass the “capturing of collective memory.” This collective memory can be understood to “fertilize” the ground for any future resistance (Enloe, 2000), particularly when it draws its momentum from a collective victimization. Moreover, Searle-White (2001: 94) explains that in general, “we want to promote our own victimization and deny that of our opponents because victimhood confers power... [and] provides a sense of rightness... bolstering our public cause for the military...”. This denial of the “Other’s” victimization can be exemplified within some Palestinian discourses, as “there is still today in many Palestinian intellectual circles, a consistent effort to marginalize, if not normalize, the event [the Holocaust], and to present it as a Zionist exaggeration” (Hadawi and John, 1960: 1, 349-351; cited in Gur-Ze’ev and Pappé, 2003: 96).

Contrarily, Palestinians point to and draw from their own historical victimization of *Al-Nakba*, a trauma shared by the entire nation. Moreover, Palestinian discourse often solidifies past and present Israeli actions, interpreting them as affronts to Palestinian nationalism, exemplifying the ways in which “tragedies can become badges of honor” (Searle-White, 2001: 91). For example, Khalil (2005: 34) explains the ways in which Palestinian deaths in exile have been conceptualized, arguing that “all deaths in exile—regardless of their mode and condition—became a kind of martyrdom in the cause of the Palestinian nation.” When these badges facilitate a desire in the population to resist the silencing of current Palestinian nationalism, they may foster a situation in which “militarized resistance” may appear to be a viable means to reassert national aspirations in the face of apparent oppression. Within the discourse of retribution for victimhood, any action to avenge the “Other’s” wrongdoing provides an example of militarization (Enloe, 2000).

Furthermore, Searle-White (2001: 91-92) argues that national tragedies, are more likely than national triumphs to shape the nation's self-perception. These events become intertwined with people's collective memories and endow upon the aggrieved party a sense of "moral authority", whereby "being a victim gives... [one] the right to take action against... [his or her] enemies while blaming them for the violence at the same time" (Searle-White, 2001: 92). This interpretation of Middle East history lends support to Portugali's (1988: 158) claim that, "Palestinian national identity... is to a large extent a Zionist creation." The establishment of the Jewish state instilled in Palestinians a unification based on their common experiences of exclusion. Moreover, the barrier's exclusionary tactics may provide another means around which Palestinian populations may mobilize.

This nationalism and collective memory must be continuously reproduced within society, to assist history in transcending generations. In this case, the broad narrative centres on the victimization of *Al-Nakba* and its similarity to present-day experiences with the Separation Barrier. Indeed, Portugali (1988: 161) argues that "nationalism is an explication of a past history", yet when that history is primarily understood within the confines of oppression and tragedy, the ethos of a nation becomes intertwined with a victim status in which the desire for militarized revenge is "very common" (Searle-White, 2001: 95). However, if the two events (*Al-Nakba* and the Separation Barrier) are compared, one stark difference is made abundantly clear; while this argument remains disputed within the context of *Al-Nakba*, the Separation Barrier highlights that the deprivation of Palestinians' legitimate rights is "neither random nor self-inflicted" (Ellis, 2004: 282).

Furthermore, conceptualizing the barrier as a symbol of Palestinian oppression and separation from a historic homeland has not been reserved solely for the older generation of Palestinians. Children interviewed by Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2006: 1116) also thought of the barrier "as the symbol and material presence of the occupier—a malignant and diseased presence" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1116). They often discussed the barrier both in terms of

the general hardships imposed on the Palestinian people, as well as their personal experiences of the barrier's oppression (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1116).

Based on the recollections and stories of their elder generations, children have constructed their own connection between past and present. One Palestinian child, Mustafa (aged 17), who was interviewed by Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2006: 1111) explained the connection:

History repeats itself and events are repeated: the demolition, killing arrests; discriminatory separation and forced migration away from family, home and friends. How many martyrs should fall, how many injured should bleed, how many houses should be demolished, how many should be separated from their families? History repeats itself?

These connections between past and present highlight the undergirding principles of militarized maneuvering insofar as they mobilize children to avenge the past victimization of their elders and the current victimization of their families and friends. As previously discussed, the symbolic connection of the barrier to the historical oppression of Palestinians was premised in part on a militaristic organization of discourses about their families' pasts and an emphasis on (economic, emotional and physical) resistance in order to liberate their nation. A quote by Maha, a 16-year-old Palestinian girl explains this consolidation of past present and future:

They [the occupiers] created a prison of hopes, a wall against our development. When I look at the wall... I hear my grandfather's cries, my mother's fear and pain, my father's sense of failure, my teacher's helplessness and loss. But those feelings are the ones that will motivate me to go tomorrow to school... (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1121).

In this way, collective memory becomes one possible vehicle for militarized resistance. Yet, the education of children about this historical victimization, through their curriculum and through stories from their elders, as well as the present reinforcement of their marginalization by the barrier, provides a maneuver for the process of militarization.

On a practical level, the school closures and delays have relegated children, who are unable to attend school, with ample opportunity to internalize the collective memory and identity associated with *Al-Nakba*. For example, after analyzing the journal-writing of girls affected by the barrier, Ricks (2006:93) explains that the opportunity to spend more time with family at home, allowed girls to learn not only about "their [own] immediate and extended family and its

past, but also of their neighbors', school teachers', and classmates' personal past and present" (Ricks, 2006: 93). Sharing such information allowed the girls the opportunity to capture and "negotiate" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006) the collective memory of the Palestinians oppression within the context of the historical *Al-Nakba*. The children, unable to experience the *Al-Nakba* of their grandparents' generation, the seizure of occupied lands endured by their parents, and the *First Intifada* of their older siblings, have their own current and omni-present symbol of victimization, with which to contend; this experience transcends time, potentially producing a connecting thread between past and present Palestinian experiences. Therefore, the barrier can be viewed as a physical manifestation of the 60-year separation of the Palestinians with the land they claim as Palestine, offering a social condition in which militarization may permeate the daily lives of Palestinian children.

#### ***Resistance and National Mobilization:***

As previously explored, resistance takes on many subtle and overt forms in the face of Israeli policies which hinder Palestinian movement, ration basic services, and continuously encroach on Palestinian livelihood and daily subsistence. For example, Kirsten-Keshet (2006: 95), an observer of the daily hardships with which Palestinians must contend, explains that oftentimes, even "crossing the wall, [and] defying the military, become... act[s] of resistance." As well, acts of defiance and retaliation may also involve stone-throwing and other acts of violence (MacKinnon, 2005). However, both overt and subtle resistances are connected through the rubric of nationalism.

In many ways, opposing the military's policies, resisting a quiet acquiescence to the barrier's hardships, and appealing to the international community have become benchmarks of the Palestinian discourse, which promotes "Palestinism", that is "the political counter-part of Zionism" and the establishment of a Palestinian state (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003), as the only just reparation for the victimized people. Nationalism and historical victimization become the justifications for and facilitators of Palestinian mobilization. Entrenched within the Palestinian

discourse, is the notion that in asserting the right of Palestinians to their homeland, and to self-govern, they are defying the Israeli policies of suppression and oppression (Sa'di, 2002; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). In this way, the Separation Barrier for Palestinians can be considered symptomatic of the entirety of Israeli policies of excluding Palestinians from their homeland, thereby possibly providing the symbolic reinforcement to the continuous pursuit of Palestinian nationhood. The construction of the barrier further removes Palestinians from the territory they associate with the Palestinian nation. Until the barrier's construction, Palestinians in the West Bank could look westward and see the land from which they were kept. However, with the barrier's emergence, even this minute connection was severed, further distancing Palestinians from their steadfast intention of re-connecting with the land.

Steadfastness to the land is an important element of one's Palestinian identity, as "the doctrine of *sumud*, steadfastness to the land, and to the national cause, was the prevailing metaphor from 1948-1968... *sumud* required intense emotional strength and pride in adversity" (Zuhur, 2005: 368). In fact, one's *sumud* is often exemplified and "confirmed" in his or her ability to withstand the harsh conditions imposed by an oppressor (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 243). Importantly, the barrier has potentially provided Palestinians with a new and ever-present avenue to display their steadfastness. The barrier symbolizes for Palestinians the Israeli attempts to control their fate, the current vehicle of their marginalization and the negation of the Palestinians' national consciousness (Usher, 2006). For them, this construction has solidified the various Israeli government policies that have stifled the Palestinian national movement, and have kept the Palestinians dependent on the Israeli economy, and policies of security.

In this way, promoting Palestinian nationalism, through resistance activities, such as organized demonstrations, parades, cultural festivals, educational curriculum and the constant reiteration of the Palestinian past has helped to shape a resistance that negates the Israeli policies of control and confinement. Asserting Palestinian nationalism is so critical to Palestinians' resistance that those living in the Diaspora for the last 60 years, "are convinced

that feeling at home in a foreign land represents a betrayal” to their national steadfastness (Sa’di, 2002: 183). In this way, Palestine is posited as the only legitimate homeland for the Palestinians, promulgating resistance and nationalism as the main pillars of Palestinian patriotism. This trajectory has tremendous implications for children who may be “nudged” or maneuvered (Enloe, 2000) to equate militarized resistance with patriotism. For example, Wessells (2006) explains that inherent in Palestinians’ upbringing in the West Bank is resistance of and retaliation for oppressive Israeli policies and practices.

Palestinian children may be further maneuvered through the process of militarization through the confounding of nationalism with the collective memory of *Al-Nakba*. For example, a quite familiar discourse in the Palestinian national narrative centers on the frustration over the perceived complacency of Arabs during *Al-Nakba*. In fact, the children and grandchildren of the *Al-Nakba* generation are often critical of their ancestors for leaving the land in 1948, and “for not doing enough to defend Palestine” (Sa’di, 2002: 186). In this way, their frustration towards the current developments of the barrier, coupled with the benefit of hindsight of the treatment of their ancestors may facilitate attitudes more favourable to resistance against Israelis. Once again, Palestinians are faced with a force attempting to physically and ideologically fracture the Palestinian consciousness, leaving younger generations with important implications to consider. In this light, children may become more accepting of political decrees urging active resistance against the Israeli army, and/or may feel a personal responsibility to engage in resistance through more subtle ways, such as participating in national activities, negating the barrier’s existence or outright defying Israeli army policies (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). These resistance activities, and the ways in which they penetrate both the private and public spheres of young people is discussed in the next section.

### ***The Confluence of Home front and Battlefield:***

In terms of traditional military structures, the home front and battlefield have erroneously been mythologized as comprising two separate spheres (Enloe, 2000). According to Enloe

(2000: 126), the militarization of society involves the “disintegration of their boundaries”, allowing each concept to overlap to encompass populations that have not been traditionally considered militarized. According to Enloe (2000:125) this is most evident in situations of “Low Intensity Conflict” (LIC), such as the one characteristic of the Israeli-Palestinian context, rather than open warfare. The former depends *inter alia* on “a view of rural development projects as instruments of national security... [and] a presumption that civilians can be as dangerous as uniformed armed” forces and therefore as militaristically powerful (Enloe, 2000: 125). In the LIC afflicting the Palestinians and Israelis, this convergence between children’s battlefield (public sphere) and home front (private sphere) becomes evermore prevalent.

As previously stated, in the public sphere, the barrier’s “serious threat to the body of the [Palestinian] nation” has led children to “deny” its existence (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1114) and cross the checkpoints all the while maintaining a connection to their primary goal: education (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1120-1121). Other possible public acts of resistance (defined as resistance by the children themselves) included “reaching their schools, doing their homework, handling their fears by themselves, arguing with military officers, throwing stones, writing graffiti on walls, [and] carrying the Palestinian flag...” (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1120-1121). Moreover, it becomes clear that the young people need not necessarily be *recruited* to participate in the resistance. Often sporadically, they join “the collective resentment of their communities by engaging in street battles and throwing rocks, Molotov cocktails, and other missiles at their common enemies” (Smyth, 2003: 84). Their militarized resistance, therefore, may become both increasingly public and increasingly private.

Another public strategy for resisting the checkpoints of the barrier centered on girls engaging in “ululation”, which involves distracting of soldiers with high-pitched shrilling, while waiting at checkpoints for IDF screening (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1114). This distraction displayed resistance on two important fronts of the conflict. On the one hand, it challenged the oppressive and hegemonic rule of Israeli order, and on the other it provided the girls an avenue

to band together and resist as a collective group (Ricks, 2006). This latter form of resistance countered the Palestinians' perceived Israeli trajectory of fragmenting their consciousness and social connections (Usher, 2006).

While the children have been engaging in public resistance, it is perhaps their private resistance that proves essential to the proliferation of nationalism and the promulgation of collective memory. On the homefront, or the private sphere, militarization may seep into the children's discourse and identity through their often-unmitigated access to elderly family members, who may continue to reify the Palestinian collective trauma (Basta, 2000; Collins, 2004; Ricks, 2006). For example, as previously noted, school closures and the barrier's disruption to school attendance, confined many children to the domestic realm, inadvertently ensuring time for the discussion and promotion of the "Palestinian nation". If reporting is considered to be an act defying the Israeli marginalization of a nationalist Palestinian discourse, the "bonding... [of children] with their parents and siblings more closely ... [and] discuss[ions] of Palestine's past with their parents and grandparents" may have provided a safe space in which children could become more informed and therefore, more accepting of nationalism and resistance (Ricks, 2006: 93). In this way, the youth were "turn[ing] their homes into sites of liberation, [and] sites of resistance" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1120-1121). As such, children's private spheres can contribute to their maneuvering through the process of militarization, helping them strengthen their knowledge of the perceived injustices against their nation, discuss the resistance, and potentially "fertilize" militarized resistance.

### **Discussing the findings:**

#### ***Collective Memory in Poetry:***

The findings gleaned from the poem, in addition to a reflection upon the themes arising from the literature on the Separation Barrier, highlight that militarization may be mobilized by the reiteration of the Palestinian collective memory in order to gain support for Palestinian resistance. The re-telling of the *Al-Nakba* generation's victimization apparently happens in a

way which can be understood to “fertilize” (Enloe, 2000), normalize, and encourage resistance. It can provide a bi-polar outlook on the current conflict, pitting the “good” guys against the “bad” guys, in such a dynamic way as to equate resistance with steadfastness, an unwavering commitment to the land and the nation’s aspirations despite adversity (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003; Zuhur, 2005) and retaliation as a nationalistic responsibility. In fact, both poetry and the current experiences of the Separation Barrier can be understood to maneuver and “capture... [the nation’s] collective memory” (Enloe, 2000: 218) in a way that highlights their victimization and the justness of retaliation.

The poem, supported by the literature on the Separation Barrier, can be understood to help frame a social discourse which reinforces Palestinians’ collective memory. Recall that Misztal (2003: 7) defines collective memory as the “representation of the past, both that shared by a group and that which is collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to the group’s identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future.” *Identity Card* assists in the representation of the Palestinian past (that is, pre-*Nakba*), and provides a forum for commemorating this event and the subsequent similar experiences of Palestinians under decades of occupation. The poem’s commemoration of the beauty of the land and promotion of the Palestinians’ innate relation to its features further assists in fostering Palestinians’ identity. Likewise, the Separation Barrier and its undergirding implications of separation from the land, Israeli control of Palestinian movement and provision of basic services, and the stifling of Palestinian nationalism present to Palestinians their “present conditions”. These assist in shaping Palestinians’ “vision of the future” (Misztal, 2003: 7), in would-be militarized ways, particularly when retaliation is posited as the solution to realizing Palestinians’ aspirations. Retaliation, resistance and nationalism can become equated with Palestinian identity and may become the main features of the trajectory to establish the future Palestinian nation, potentially mobilizing the nation to rely on or take for granted militarized acts of resistance.

The commemoration of the collective memory of the separation from the land can be viewed as interweaving through both the current constructions of the Separation Barrier and through the description of the lost land in Darweish's *Identity Card*. Darweish's poetry and the current developments with the Separation Barrier reinforce each other. In many ways, Darweish's words are prophetic, foreshadowing the situation solidified by the barrier. As has been seen, the Separation Barrier can be interpreted to stand as an omni-present symbol of Palestinians' historical marginalization, and their 60-year separation from the land. It has offered the Palestinians a newly modernized experience of the disconnection from their land, in a way that has been clearly articulated by Darweish, who asks about the remaining land Palestinians inhabit: "Will your government be taking them too, As is being said?". These words are a potent prediction of the current experiences of Palestinians, allowing children who have learned about *Al-Nakba*, the apparent ability to re-experience the collective trauma endured by their ancestors and connect them to their current experiences under occupation.

Importantly, the lack of control over their fate and the lack of consultation seem to further aggravate the situation, stirring anger among Palestinians and possibly "nourish[ing] ambitions of revenge" (Korn, 2003: 19). Darweish offers the aforementioned question based on what "is being said", and similarly, in the barrier's planning stages, Palestinians were also not openly informed of its intended path, leaving them to rely on speculation and rumour (Trottier, 2007). Therefore, the effected populations were more likely to learn about the barrier through more informal means. For example, "maps were left in villages in a variety of ways, such as in plastic bags at the foot of a tree" (Trottier, 2007: 112). This abrupt and unpredictable system of construction "prevented Palestinians from understanding readily the full reality of the wall or fence and the impact it would have on them" (Trottier, 2007: 112). Neither did the Arabs of pre-1948 Palestine understand the ways in which their future generations would be imprinted with their experiences. Yet, linking these two perceived experiences (and all of the intermediate policies) under the rubric of Israeli oppression, or even as "consequences of Al-Nakbah" (Sa'di,

2002), may possibly help mobilize revenge and retaliation for these victimizations, and/or a reliance on armed insurgency groups' violence against the Israeli Army and society.

The undergirding principle between the poem and the existence of the Separation Barrier remains unequivocally similar: the marginalization of Palestinians by the encroachment of Israeli policies and practices only further separate Palestinians from their perceived historical homeland. Framed in this way, such discourse can be understood to help maneuver Palestinian society, including its children, through the process of militarization by connecting the policies and practices of the Israeli government as symbolic of their unwavering rule over Palestinians. One can imagine a situation in which a schoolchild, who is returning home from poetry lesson, comes to encounter the Separation Barrier and its associated lengthy checkpoints, obstructing his or her ability to reach home in a timely manner. In this way, the barrier helps to shape children's social conditions, including the political, cultural, and economic conditions (Adelman, 2002), thereby possibly fuelling the demarcation of "us" and "them". These demarcations may, in turn, help mobilize Palestinian populations around revenge and retaliation against the "Other". The subtle maneuver of drawing upon and commemorating the past victimization of Palestinians and its reinforcement (intentional or otherwise) in present-day experiences continuously reminds Palestinians of how they have been marginalized and may help maneuver them through these policies and into accepting armed groups' definitions and modes of resistance and retaliation.

***Resistance and National Mobilization:***

Drawing upon the literature on the Separation Barrier to frame the discussion of the poem's militarizing themes brings to light another important consideration, that is, the conceptualization of the collective group as a body which can be maneuvered through militarization. In the current context, the building of the Separation Barrier instigates deference to nationalism as the primary force undergirding Palestinian resistance. However, given that *Identity Card* was written in 1964, three years prior to the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and five years prior to the birth of the official voice of

Palestinian nationalism (the Palestinian Liberation Organization) Palestinian mobilization centred on a different force, mainly that of cultural steadfastness. This force included maintaining “intense emotional strength and pride in adversity” and “[e]nduring the humiliations imposed by the conqueror” (Zuhur, 2005: 369; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003: 243). Accordingly, Darweish referenced the collective group according to their ethnic (Arabic) composition. This re-affirmation of one’s identity and the subtle urging of populations’ commitment is largely representative of the general sentiments surrounding the effects of *Al-Nakba*, as “Al-Nakbah is associated with a rapid de-Arabization of the country” (Sa’di, 2002: 184). In this way, steadfastness in one’s Arabic identity symbolized for many their resistance against existential threats, and can be viewed as a mobilizing framework pre-dating official Palestinian nationalism. Addressing both Darweish’s *Identity Card* and the resistances against the Separation Barrier, it can be seen that theoretically speaking, Palestinian identity and Palestinian nationalism can be conceptualized interchangeably, with “identity”, prior to the formal establishment of the PLO, often standing in for current “nationalism”. In this way, the militarized maneuvering of the population can be seen to run as a common thread between both the findings from the poem and the literature detailing the impacts of the Separation Barrier.

The coupling of Palestinian nationalism and Palestinian identity implies that the desire for collective preservation, and potential (subtle and/or overt) retaliation were borne from the experience of *Al-Nakba*. These messages could potentially provide the symbolic legitimacy for Palestinians’ “act[ing] and think[ing] in ways that sustain” the armed resistance groups (Enloe, 2000: xiv). Accordingly, Darweish’s poetry can help in recording the Palestinian narrative, particularly in a way that rings true for Palestinians’ current experiences with the barrier. Palestinians may be quite aware of the dual discourses (both their own and the Israelis’) surrounding the past, present and future of the land. However, Darweish’s steadfast insistence on his identity, and the opportunity for resistance provided by the barrier, possibly allow Palestinians the ability to construct and reinforce their own collective identity by “positioning

more 'effectively'... [their] own narrative, interests, values, symbols, goals and criteria, while at the same time ensuring that those of the Other are marginalized, excluded or destroyed" (Gur-Ze'ev and Pappé, 2003: 93). Therefore, confounding national aspirations and the preservation of Palestinian identity as forms of resistance against the Israelis may produce and re-produce societal definitions that possibly legitimate retaliatory action. Palestinian discourse contends that, in offending their national pride, by exiling them from the land of their ancestors, and continuously subjecting them to marginalizing policies and practices (Sa'di 2002; Barsamian and Said, 2003) Palestinian society can be viewed as instigated to retaliate against their perceived oppressors.

For Palestinian children, these messages may possibly provide the legitimacy for the national movement, as they symbolize the embedded connection of their people to their steadfast identity and nationalism. However, more importantly, they may also potentially draw support for the armed groups' definitions of "national security", promulgating the need to prepare for resistance and retaliation, even if these involve violent means. In effect, referencing the need for steadfastness in one's Palestinian identity and urging of support for Palestinian nationalism may help "bring meaning" to these children's lives, potentially "stabiliz[ing]... [their] sense of identity and provid[ing]... [them] with a sense of being just and right" in their retaliatory tactics (Searle-White, 2001: 100). Drawing upon the long-standing history of Palestinian steadfastness, either in their identity or in their nationalism may leave them accepting of the tactics employed against their "enemies", particularly when they are purported to be for the benefit of the Palestinian nation. This exemplifies the ways in which "society itself... creates, advocates, and perpetuates the... [messages] that are a necessary component in the [maneuvered] militarization of society" (Reagan, 1994: 46). As well, Israeli policies provide a pervasive and ever-present example of the hardships experienced by Palestinians under occupation and may further reinforce the current demonizing messages prevalent in Palestinian society, possibly leading youth to normalize the resistance activities of their people.

According to Enloe, the normalization of such messages is the main feature of the pervasiveness of militarized maneuvering. For example, Enloe (2000: 36) argues that “women [for example] have so internalized the militarized sense of their duties, sources of pride, basis of anxiety that they have virtually no awareness that they have been maneuvered. They talk instead about ‘opportunities’ or ‘adventure’ or ‘love’ or ‘shame’ or ‘belonging’...”. Palestinian children too, can employ this discourse when discussing their responsibility of liberating the land lost, resisting the military and opposing their marginalization (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). What “transforms” discourses of nationalism and Palestinian steadfastness into militarizing maneuvers is “what is not made problematic: elevating a good soldier [or combatant] to the status of a good citizen” (Enloe, 2000: 18). While the “Palestinian national poem” can be understood to contribute to the social conditions which may perpetuate the militarized maneuvering of today’s children, as conceptualized by Enloe, their experiences with the barrier may possibly solidify their desires for resistance more acutely (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). The barrier may be viewed as reinforcing these subtle cultural messages and in turn, further perpetuating the subtle pervasiveness of militarization. The conglomeration of these messages can be understood to provide the social sphere through which militarization can succeed.

### ***The Confluence of Homefront and Battlefield:***

The discourse of liberation may maneuver children into positions of resistance, leading them to possibly prioritize mobilization and militarization (as an act) as a civil duty and a nationalistic obligation. These messages are further reinforced in today’s Palestinian society wherein:

[a]ll Palestinian children are made conscious from the earliest ages of their expulsion from ancestral lands and are brought up to believe that they are in a struggle to get their land back. Hardly a day in their lives will go by without this reminder, be it as a cause of their lives in so-called temporary settlements or because each adult or older sibling will refer to it (Basta, 2000: 43).

In this way, the subtle “nudging” towards militarization can be understood to begin in the children’s homes. This familial socialization possibly involves several generations of

Palestinians. Indeed, the experiences of the *Al-Nakba* are re-told by today's Palestinian grandparents, but whereas their discourse generally centres on the sadness of their exilic tragedies, their children, the parents of today's Palestinian youth, have generally promoted the "armed struggle... [as the method for] liberating the land" (Shemesh, 2004: 97). Moreover, like the women vying for recognition and empowerment through army service described by Enloe, Palestinian children can be viewed as having often internalized a sense of duty to retaliate on behalf of the Palestinian nation, as they have possibly come to think of their fight as the continuation of the one experienced by their grandparents decades prior (Shemesh, 2004). This highlights Brocklehurst's (2006: 173) contention that "[n]ationalization is channeled through the familial sphere". The obstruction of the barrier to children's education, as well as the accompanying opportunities to remain in the home, coupled with the availability of nationalist poetry, possibly provide the impetus for blurring the boundaries between the children's homefront and battlefield. Children can be understood to be maneuvered (at least symbolically) into the battlefield, as their sense of belonging to the Palestinian nation relies on their ability to incorporate their families' and the nation's discourses into their lives, and as they may learn to interpret individual challenges posed by Israeli policies and practices as affronts on the collective nation.

Therefore, the boundaries between homefront and battlefield disintegrate on two potential fronts. On the one hand, Israeli Army policies, which can be considered the force militarizing Palestinians' social conditions, infiltrate one's private sphere, creating a situation where the home becomes a safe haven, protecting Palestinians from recourse. Concurrently, the home also becomes a site of resistance, and as such, is potentially transformed by Palestinians into the battleground. Scott (1985: 301) explains that community resilience and subtle resistance become the pillars of "surviving" within a "system of domination". Moreover, Scott (1985: 328) notes that the private sphere is often a powerful "social space" within which to engage in mobilization, as "the definitions and performances imposed by domination do not

prevail". Indeed, the sharing of stories, poetry and other nationalistic songs, which commemorate the Palestinian collective memory and emphasize the need for retaliation may possibly maneuver children through the process of militarization by socializing them to "us" and "them" dichotomies, positing armed struggle as an effective means for achieving national liberation and for avenging Palestinians' lost honour in 1948 (Shemesh, 2004).

Moreover, the confluence of homefront and battlefield may affect Palestinian populations in two distinct ways. Firstly, it may reinforce the daily experiences of Palestinian children as similar to the stories profited by their elder generations. This, coupled with the benefit of hindsight of the situations with which their elder generations must contend may possibly foster the desire for revenge against perceived victimizations. Secondly, it may possibly set the groundwork for maneuvering the militarization of children from an early age, even prior to their coming in contact with the Palestinian educational curriculum. This curriculum, in time, can be understood to reinforce children's socialization in the home as the curriculum is often composed of assignments requiring children to reflect on the instances of national victimization experienced by their elder generations, elaborate on their ancestors village of origin within historical Palestine and look upon defense of their country as their "religious duty" (Adwan, 2004: 132-144). In this way, school, one's family, and peers may all be considered contributors to the maneuvering of these children to conceptualize categories of "us" and "them", and proffer revenge as a possible solution to the Palestinian plight. The social distance from "the Other", coupled with contentious descriptions of the perceived atrocities they have committed may mobilize children to possibly take part in or support the act of militarization "to avenge... their... allegedly lost honor" (Enloe, 2000: 109) and that of their ancestors.

Each generation of Palestinians has been recognized for its experiences under occupation. First, the *Al-Nakba* generation were those exiled from the land in 1948 (Sa'di, 2002), their children became known as the liberation generation (Shemesh, 2004), their older grandchildren were known as "the children of the stone" (Usher, 1991), symbolically leaving the

current generation of children to assume the torch from their elders. In this way, political education in the home can, in some ways, be considered a form of facilitating children's Palestinian rite of passage. Furthermore, to the degree that children become their grandparents' avengers (both in subtle and more overt forms) they can contribute to their own and their society's dialectical militarization, potentially lifting their elders' morale in the Palestinian cause and possibly providing them comfort that the quest for Palestinian nationhood will persist until realized.

The blurring of homefront and battlefield may facilitate children's introduction into the act of militarization. In fact, authors have highlighted the extensive political knowledge of Palestinian youth (Usher, 1991; Collins, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). Much of this knowledge is produced within their society, in media outlets, familial contexts, among their peers, and from the children's own experiences. This in turn, may help to shape the prevalence of their resistance, particularly when the children partake in subtle acts of resistance, which are somewhat safer from IDF retaliation. For example, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2006: 1119) allowed her child research participants one important means through which they may challenge their "Othered" position. She asked the youth to document their experiences with the barrier through photographs. In this research, one 17-year-old Palestinian girl explained the importance of documentation for countering oppression: "in this period, you need to have a camera, or a video camera with you to document all they [the Israelis] do to us. I always tell my fiancé that photographs are a very influential tool to politically criticize the occupation" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1119). In effect, these youth can be understood to resist the Israeli government by shifting the militarizing priorities of the Israeli state in reporting, recording and promoting their own experiences under occupation. Additionally, it has been found that the more acutely children experienced the oppression that accompanied the barrier, the "easier" it was for them to participate in resistance activities (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006).

Assessed in this way, the potential potency of militarized maneuvers through current policies, practices and cultural outputs in Palestinian society becomes apparent. Palestinian children are surrounded by mutually-reinforcing militarizing outlets within their society and may thus be understood as facing the maneuvering “dance” described by Enloe (2000). The three broader themes of the poem, in conjunction with the drawing upon of similar themes found in the literature on the Separation Barrier, that is *Collective Memory, Resistance and National Mobilization*, and *The Confluence of Homefront and Battlefield*, highlight that militarization (as conceptualized by Enloe) is embedded within Palestinian society. This potential maneuvered militarization can impact children both directly and indirectly through their social conditions, and through the legitimization of the “militarization of dissent”.

The data and literature gathered highlights that Palestinian society can be considered militarized (and militarizing) according to Enloe’s conceptualization. Moreover, it has been found that Palestinian children may possibly undergo militarization through both the direct and indirect implications brought on by their access to the “Palestinian national poem”, and by their experiences with the Separation Barrier. *Identity Card* has highlighted that children may be maneuvered through the militarizing force of poetry, which is a benchmark of Palestinian society, and a component of their education (Brown, 2001; Adwan, 2004) and their familial upbringing (Basta, 2000; Collins, 2004; Shemesh, 2004). The “Palestinian national poem” (Mir, 2003), *Identity Card*, provides children with potentially potent messages about their people’s natural connection to the historic land of Palestine and need for Palestinian steadfastness and resistance. Moreover, the barrier has been found to directly impact (or maneuver) children’s mobility, their society’s economy and the provision of their healthcare and education. Indirectly, the barrier maneuvers Palestinians’ “ghettoization” (Ellis, 2004), marginalizing their nationalistic aspirations for self-governance. These discourses, and experiences may, in turn represent the “myriad” of militarizing maneuvers (Enloe, 2000) which may normalize or obscure the problematic nature of the mobilizing of society for the production of violence (Geyer, 1989).

Unexpectedly, however, the discussion of *Identity Card* and the reflection upon the literature on the Separation Barrier exemplify that militarization is embedded within *several* social realms in Palestinian society. The commonality in themes from these two spheres of militarization highlight that an attempt to understand the militarization of (particularly) Palestinian society ought to include a consideration of the ways in which collective memory and nationalism have been maneuvered in the process of militarization. In this way, while Enloe (2000) explains that militarization involves various elements, and may permeate in various societies rather differently, this thesis, which explores seemingly disjointed realms, suggests that collective memory and nationalism are significant elements in study of the militarization of Palestinian society.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis has discussed the emerging themes from the “Palestinian national poem” (Mir, 2003: 146) and, drawing from the literature on the Separation Barrier, has framed these themes within Enloe’s conceptualization of militarized maneuvering. Importantly, the potential militarizing potency of the Palestinian “national poem” (Mir, 2003: 146) has been discussed as a possible lens on militarized maneuvering in the Palestinian context. This poem highlights the collective strength involved in remaining steadfast to one’s identity, the inherent connection of Palestinians to the land upon which Israel has been established, the construction and defiance of an enemy “other”, as well as the natural essence of the desire for retaliation. Moreover, the element of commemorating a collective Palestinian memory can be seen within the poem, as well as the apparent urging of national mobilization. The potential militarizing maneuvers may also be seen as the poem can be considered to confound both the private and public lives of children, that is the battle-front and homefront, highlighting the subtle and possible militarizing contribution made by *Identity Card*. Although, as previously mentioned, militarization is not viewed as a “cause and effect” phenomenon, these themes may help to shed light on the ways in which this subtle process may potentially exist in Palestinians’ social conditions and discourses.

Moreover, the literature on the Separation Barrier has contributed to this contextualization by offering information on the ways in which current political developments may contribute to the dialectical process of militarization. The barrier’s direct impacts, on Palestinian populations have included restrictions on movement, economic challenges, and obstructions to the provision of healthcare and education. Indirectly, the Separation Barrier appears to aggravate their social mobility, the already-widespread poverty, and appears to contribute to the oppression of nationalistic aspirations. Concurrently, this construction has offered one more means of potentially connecting or “maneuvering” Palestinian youth through the experiences of their grandparents and re-invigourating the Palestinian collective memory; it

provides a physical manifestation of their 60-year disconnection with the land. Therefore, the barrier provides youth with a forum for maneuvering militarized resistance, and a means for fostering militarization in the children's private spheres, by ensuring that each child personally experiences the separation from the land, and is provided with an opportunity to hear stories about Palestine their parents' and their grandparents' past. Together, these two realms can be understood to exhibit the means through which the abstract process of militarization may permeate within Palestinian society, thereby possibly offering context to the exploration of children's militarized maneuvering. However, although it is by no means a *causal relationship*, more original research needs to be conducted on the realities of militarization in Palestinian society. In this sense, this study provides a first and exploratory step towards such an endeavour.

An assessment of "the Palestinian national poem" (Mir, 2003) has highlighted the existence of militarizing discourse in some nationalist poetry, which is a significant component of both Palestinian children's education (Brown, 2001; Adwan, 2004), and their socialization within their homes (Basta, 2000; Collins, 2004; Shemesh, 2004). Therefore, Palestinian populations can be considered to experience militarization through the production (and re-production) and reinforcement of nationalist poetry, which commemorates the historical connection of Palestinians with the land, and emphasizes the need for Palestinian steadfastness, nationalism and resistance. Moreover, these discourses may hold even more weight when Palestinians, including children, become dependent on Israeli Army policies in their daily lives. For example, children are likely to be significantly affected by the Separation Barrier, as it directly impacts their mobility, their society's economy and the provision of their healthcare and educational services. Moreover, the barrier provides children with a new potential site for overt and subtle resistance (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). These perspectives provide a framework for exploring the militarization of Palestinian society, including its children, and highlight the "myriad" of ways

in which maneuvering may emerge within their social conditions, potentially garnering support for the militarized dissent of Palestinian populations (Enloe, 2000).

In addition to answering the aforementioned research questions, the discussion of *Identity Card* and the literature on the Separation Barrier help to frame an unexpected, yet integral, element of exploring Palestinian militarization. As noted in the description of the conflict's history, the intensity of the Palestinian militarization has fluctuated in the last 60 years, resembling a wave of peaks and valleys, intensifying according to the political developments of the day. We have seen that the experiences of older generations of Palestinians have been reiterated to children, and as such, collective memory can be viewed as having provided a pertinent force around which the Palestinian nation can mobilize (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). Moreover, we have seen the ways in which nationalism has been can be understood as proffering an important source of resistance. Therefore, the important feature uncovered by this research centres on the discourses surrounding Palestinian nationalism and the commemoration of collective memory. These commonalities bring to light the necessity of taking into consideration the discourses of collective memory and the quest for nationalism in conceptualizing and exploring Palestinian militarization.

Enloe (2000: 3) explains that “[m]ilitarization is such a pervasive process, and thus so hard to uproot, precisely because in its everyday forms it scarcely looks life-threatening.” The subtleties of this process have been discussed in depth throughout this thesis. However, we are far from being able to deduce concrete conclusions about the process of militarizing children's lives. The concept of militarization, as applied by this research, therefore, has proven a fruitful means for exploring a “third way” of highlighting the “grey areas” of children's contexts in situations of political and armed conflict. That is, approaching the study of children through the lens of militarized maneuvering has provided a framework for exploration which extends beyond “perpetrator/victim” dichotomies, and highlights the myriad of ways Palestinian children may negotiate or “maneuver” through situations of low intensity conflict, implicating both sides of this

conflict in shaping their social conditions and discourses. However, the concept is not without its flaws. As previously stated, the concept is extremely broad, encompassing *inter alia*, the diffusion of boundaries between combatants and civilians, the military's encroachment on civil society and the subtle maneuvering of collectivities of people to regard the militaries and/or armed groups and their activities as acceptable, normal and or "common-sense" (Enloe, 1983; 2000). Therefore, a challenge was posed in terms of attempting to operationalize this concept. Indeed, this research has found a vast number of examples of militarization in Palestinian society, largely due to the vagueness of this concept. Moreover, "militarization" and "maneuvering" are abstract and theoretical constructs, which provide a challenge in their application to real-life and practical situation.

Additionally, while Enloe discusses militarization in various social contexts and localities, she does not provide researchers with the tools to assess militarization in additional social or geographical contexts. Therefore, I was left to apply the concept of militarization and maneuvering according to my own understand of their dimensions, including the policies, social conditions and discourses which can influence populations to take the militaries and/or armed groups, their strategies and rationales for granted and normalize their activities. At the same time, militarization can be understood as a social process through which these populations must negotiate or "maneuver". Moreover, although I attempted to de-centre myself, as an Israeli, in this process, I may have in turn, forgiven some of the more value-laden sentiments of the Palestinian national poem, including seemingly anti-Semitic and anti-Israel rhetoric. I attempted to provide a more impartial discussion of the poem in order to explore the subtleties of this source of data, while at the same time, focus on the poem's own wording, attempting to limit my own interpretation as an Israeli in colouring my analysis. As noted above, this thesis is meant to provoke further inquiry into the pervasive and subtle contexts which can maneuver children's lives in general, particularly in contexts of armed conflict and low intensity conflict (Enloe, 2000).

## **Implications of Research**

### ***Implications for Future Policy:***

The historic trauma of *Al-Nakba*, and the continued abhorrent standards under which Palestinian live in refugee camps have been named by many as a significant obstacle to the progression towards peace (Sa'di, 2002; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003; Rosen, 2005, Gelvin, 2005). As this thesis has shown, these experiences can work to inform discourses that are still prevalent in Palestinian society. Therefore, there is little value in claims that, with the passing of generations, the hostilities between the two nations will dissipate, leaving room for an eventual resolution to the conflict. It is therefore hoped that this research contributes a small avenue for a more in-depth understanding of the Palestinian context, and facilitates further research into the militarization of both Palestinian and Israeli youth. Given the unique demographic disproportionality in the Palestinian population, with over 50% of the Palestinian population being under 18 years of age (Alzaroo and Lewando-Hunt, 2003: 168; Sirasjait, 2004: 212; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006: 1102), it is important to take into consideration the socio-political contexts of Palestinian children, particularly as within 10 years, these youth will be of voting age, capable of making significant political decisions about the future of their state. Should they continue to live under abhorrent conditions, these youth may possibly fertilize an insurmountable thirst for revenge and retaliation, a force with which Israeli society may be unable to negotiate, particularly given demographic projections of Palestinians largely outnumbering Israelis in the coming decades (Usher, 2006). Exploring these youth's current environments, and taking them into account in policy and practice can help to yield future progress towards a resolution to the 60-year conflict.

In terms of the practicalities of the conflict, the barrier and other foundationally oppressive policies in the West Bank have been noted as major impediments on the road to reconciliation. According to Etkes (2007) on the whole, Israeli policies abide by two contradictory tactics in dealing with future developments in the Middle East. On the one hand,

successive Israeli governments (supported by public opinion in Israel) have posited the need to continue development on settlements both east and west of the barrier, “although at varying degrees” (Etkes, 2007: 47). On the other hand, Israeli discourse has also postulated the need to relinquish more of the territory it currently controls (Etkes, 2007: 47). Enloe explains that contradictory policies and decisions on behalf of politicians are part and parcel of the maneuvers involved in militarizing a society, because these contradictions obscure the involvement of the military in people’s daily lives, making militarized maneuvering seem random and/or minute, rather than powerful and ever-present. In actuality, the ability of militaries and their supportive governments to create policies that directly impact the daily lives of civilians nonetheless, leaves the institution of the military unquestioned, and unobstructed by the increasingly-affected public.

In particular, the barrier has been postulated as a severe impediment to would-be suicide bombers, with the Israeli government estimating a decrease of 30% in violent attacks by Palestinians against Israelis since the beginning of the barrier’s construction (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Yet, Etkes (2007) argues that the barrier is at best a mechanism of deferring reconciliation between the Israelis and Palestinians as “the most the barrier can do is postpone confrontation with difficult and painful issues. It cannot do away with the need to tackle them” (Etkes, 2007: 47). Concurring with this view, Lochery (2006) argues that policy aimed at achieving peace ought to take into consideration “peace dividends”. These are economic development milestones which highlight for citizens of both nations the benefits that are attained when peace becomes a foreseeable reality (Lochery, 2006: 228). Israeli policy makers need to assess the detrimental effects of the barrier towards achieving these peace dividends as this structure will continue to hinder the flow of goods and services between Israel and a future Palestinian state, obscuring the achievement of “peace dividends” and potentially lending legitimacy (at least in discourse) to attacks against Israelis that are based on Palestinians’ economic frustrations. Accordingly, Lochery (2006: 234) highlights that the future deconstruction

of the barrier “would be the greatest sign that the process of bringing an end to the conflict had eventually succeeded.”

Theoretically speaking, the process of militarization posits significant challenges to a future Palestinian state, particularly when such a state is postulated by the collective memory of a nation, and a discourse of retaliation. In actuality, this may materialize into further difficulties uprooting subtle militarized discourse in Palestinian society, as the concept of retaliation and resistance through the development of a nation remain unresolved. Importantly, Searle-White (2001: 100) explains that “the conflicts continue because conflicts help us bring meaning to our lives, bring certainty to ambiguous situations stabilize our sense of identity and provide us with a sense of being just and right” (Searle-White, 2001: 100). Future policy ought to take into consideration the militarized ways in which this “sense of being just and right” materializes within society.

Moreover, Enloe (2000: 291) is far from fatalistic about the current state of militarization, arguing that “[w]hat has been militarized, can be demilitarized”, however she also warns that “[w]hat has been demilitarized can be re-militarized.” This fine balance can be said to interweave the militarized maneuvering of society. Much like the maneuvers described by Enloe (2000), which entice women to participate in the military as a form of liberation, drawing on the collective memory of a population, introducing the nationalistic narrative into their private and public spheres may work to maneuver support for violent resistance activities and may silence dissent against militarized acts. Importantly, the silencing of dissent is indeed a social and collective maneuver, in that it posits (perceived) dissent as support for “the Other”, and is therefore perceived as a lack of patriotism by an individual (Orr, 2004). As such, it is clear that studying militarization allows us to see the infusion of the military discourses in the daily lives of people, negating the paradigm that the military is bound by institution, administration and physical space, and is rather a dialectical force that can be reproduced within and by a society. Moreover, the abstract concept of militarization can be said to highlight that no matter which

political party is in power, a government and national discourse which equates soldiering with civic participation can continue to maneuver populations within society (Enloe, 2000).

This thesis also urges politicians to broaden their conceptualization of *de*-militarization as requiring more than just the removal of weaponry from a dissipated conflict. The notion of militarized maneuvering and its potential residual ripple effect within Palestinian society challenges researchers and policy makers to become creative in devising plans for demilitarization. Moreover, one ought to take into consideration that a formal agreement of peace “at the legal and diplomatic level does not mean an ending of personal enmity, discrimination, [and] injustice...” (Lochery, 2005: 226). In this way, militarized maneuvering lingers long after “official” peace is declared, and future policy, particularly in this context, ought to at least acknowledge the discourses of collective memory and nationalism prevalent in today’s society. As well, it is important to remember that demilitarization of one sector is futile unless it is accompanied by an equally-powerful demilitarization of its (Israeli) counterpart.

### ***Implications for Criminology:***

The field of criminology ought to engage more deeply with research topics involving political violence, social justice, children and armed conflict, as these are often situations in which criminal justice issues are extremely prevalent. The current international arena is facing an increased threat of “terrorism”, with many arising policies being imposed under the guise of necessity for “national security” (Kraska, 2006). Yet, this research highlights the backfiring effect that may accompany policies premised on achieving “security”, which may mobilize populations of agitated “enemies”, and possibly maneuver societies of people, in a myriad of ways, for the production of violence. Assessing the implications of these policies on collectivities of people will allow criminology to challenge the theories undergirding security policies, particularly as they infuse and militarize other realms of criminological inquiry, such as policing (Kraska, 2006). Enloe (2000) provides criminologists the ideological tools with which to unearth the implications

of militarized maneuvering in contemporary society, and criminology, as a field ought to focus additional attention to the subtleties through which militarization may permeate.

Additionally, criminological studies of armed and low intensity conflicts too, ought to include children within their realms of study. Children cannot be shielded from their surroundings, and as we have seen in other contexts, including Northern Ireland (Brocklehurst, 1999; 2006) and South Africa (Feldman, 2002), children may come to participate in the militarized activities of their respective societies without formal recruitment. The lack of formal recruitment in these cases, may remove militarized (rather than recruited) children from the international spotlight, marginalizing their experiences and deflecting international responsibility for attending to their unique circumstances. Whereas the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly prohibits the recruitment of children in armed conflict, little specific attention is paid to the subtle forces which can help children to participate in more understated ways. These subtleties are particularly important, as when they are geared towards an identifiable army, they can be understood to yield violent responses and may therefore possibly lead these children to become both casualties and perpetrators of the conflict. However, it is hoped that attention and research on the subtleties and 'grey' areas of children's experiences will help guide policies in ways which will be most beneficial to the youth on the ground.

Although this research is based on describing children's social surroundings through cultural discourses, highlighted by one particular piece of cultural writing, and through a description of current political developments, it is hoped that Enloe's perspective and its applicability to 21<sup>st</sup> century conflicts will inspire a closer examination of children's realities, based on interviews with both Palestinian and Israeli children to see the ways in which each group perceives their own, as well as the "other's" militarized maneuvering. Moreover, future research ought to include a more feminist analysis of the militarization of Palestinian (and Israeli) youth. For example, it would be interesting and pertinent to critical criminology to assess the militarization of children according to patriarchal divisions of duties, and to highlight the ways

in which boys and girls may be maneuvered to “fulfill different militarizing functions” (Enloe, 2000: 295). It is important to distinguish the different social conditions under which children live. For example, “[t]he essentialized, innocent, weak or victim child, found in nationalization discourse and security justifications is not, however, the same child who is encouraged to play war games – real or imaginary.” (Brocklehurst, 2006: 172). Engaging in interviews may help to shed light on additional discourses and understandings within societies undergoing conflict.

Finally, criminology, being a field which is largely concerned with bringing to the forefront otherwise marginalized voices (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004), ought to increase its consideration of assessing culturally-specific forms of knowledge production. For example, this thesis has explored the unique importance of Palestinian poetry for political organizing and for representing some of the discourses prevalent in one’s society. In this way, in studying marginalized populations, criminology may want to consider assessing the particular means through which those populations voice their concerns, as these may be quite different from the normative expectations of researchers.

### ***Implications for Future Research:***

It is hoped academics will broaden their exploration of militaries, and security studies to incorporate the subtleties of militarized maneuvering, which can be considered to have as salient an effect on populations as overt and violent resistance. Without addressing the subtleties of militarization, such as the venues through which militaries may obfuscate their problematic nature, peace negotiations may be seen as mere political statements, rather than changes in attitudes of the general populations following conflict.

According to Enloe (2000: 291) “militarization does not just happen: it requires decisions... by both civilians and people in uniform”, therefore future research ought to re-evaluate these decisions and highlight their implications on societies of people, particularly those in contexts of armed conflict. Research ought to recognize the daily impacts of militarized decisions, and the ways in which these may further perpetuate social fragmentation and

dichotomous constructions of the “other”, thereby potentially further fuelling the conflict. Moreover, research on the policies and practices of armed and/or insurgency groups will provide additional context on conflict-ridden areas and therefore increase the likelihood that national and international policies may assist in diffusing the conflict.


Concurrently, it is important to take into consideration that the discourse of resistance movements, that is groups retaliating against a foreign (or domestic) military, should not be accepted in a “monolithically uncritical fashion” (Benporath, 2002). Importantly, the militarized nature of these groups, demands that attention be paid to the operations and discourses of such organizations, in order to better understand the contextual difficulties within which children must “negotiate” their lives (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006). This will allow researchers to take into consideration how otherwise benign activities and situations may “nourish... the ambitions of revenge” (Korn, 2003: 19). Furthermore, given the unwavering permanence (albeit sometimes subtle) of discourse surrounding collective memory and nationalism, future research ought to focus on the ways in which armed groups may seize these discourses to garner public support for their (sometimes violent) activities. Moreover, future researchers may want to assess the ways in which the discourses of collective memory and nationalism have been mobilized by these armed groups.

Additionally, Enloe (2000: 294) explains that understanding militarization, its effects on societies and on populations requires an analysis that extends into “peacetime, or ‘the post-war era’.” In this way, it is hoped that research on contexts of armed conflict will continue even following the cessation of formal hostilities, particularly as militarization is a force which may be re-ignited and therefore it may possibly re-mobilize populations into armed conflict and/or resistance quite forcefully. This is particularly the case when a society’s prominent post-sovereignty social discourse centres on reconfiguring historical developments as “national humiliations”, which may potentially “[re-]inflame masculinised revenge” (Enloe, 2000: 299).

This research has highlighted the importance of maintaining an “analytical curiosity” about children’s contexts in situations of low intensity conflict (Enloe, 2000), particularly of the ways in which children may be surrounded by militarization in these contexts. For example, Brocklehurst (1999) contends that children’s involvement in Northern Ireland “is central to the implicit and explicit maintenance of a sectarian divide and its violently upheld physical and political boundaries.” Likewise, it is important for criminologists, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists to broaden their scope of analysis to further focus on contexts where significant political crimes against children are being committed. Importantly, Brocklehurst (2006: 173) argues that “including children in our analysis can broaden and enrich our understanding of conflict.” According to Brocklehurst (2006: 174) academic fields studying armed conflict are generally limited in their attention to children, wherein researchers are often “strained by the energy taken up by non-recognition and misappropriation” of children.

In this case, the sooner we can begin to understand the complexities within which Palestinian children live, as well as both the internal (Palestinian) and external (Israeli, Arab and international community) forces which can be understood to contribute to the maneuvering Palestinian children through the process of militarization, the sooner (and more saliently) Golda Meir’s claims about the indoctrination of youth, established in the introduction, that is that “peace will come when the Arabs love their children more than they hate us” (Mabuchi, 2004: 4; originally quoted in 1957), may be refuted. It is important to highlight that the militarization of youth involves several factors and sometimes may result as an unintended consequence of a military decision. In this context, the blame for the ongoing conflict cannot be placed solely on any one group, rather exploring each group’s involvement and culpability may prove more fruitful in challenging militarized maneuvering.

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
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**APPENDIX A: BRIEF TIMELINE OF THE BROAD HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT**




**APPENDIX B – CONCRETE SECTIONS OF THE SEPARATION BARRIER**



(Photo: Yoav Lemmer, in McGreal, 2003).

**APPENDIX C – FENCED SECTIONS OF THE SEPARATION BARRIER**



(Image: Ministry of Defense, 2007)

APPENDIX D: MEMOS AND OPEN CODING FOR *IDENTITY CARD*

	<u>CODE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>MEMO</u>
1	Demanding the recording/reporting	Put in on record.	
2	Self-assertion as Arab	I am an Arab.	Interesting that Darweish is asking his occupier to record his identity. <i>Does this imply a form of reversing cultural erasure?</i>
3	Member of a broader nation	And the number of my card is fifty thousand	He seems to challenge the paper representation of the individual. Analyses of this poem explain that Darweish is referring to his own experiences trying to obtain a national identity card within Israel. This lack of identity card, which is issued to every Israeli citizen, made it difficult for Darweish to obtain travel documents to Israel (that is, within the Green Line). In fact, in the early to mid 1960s, Darweish was arrested 3 times for traveling without the proper documents.
4	Connection to Family	I have eight children	Family has been noted as a particularly important concept in Arab culture
5	Growing family	And the ninth is due after summer.	<i>Does he imply that despite his current circumstances, his family continues to flourish?</i>
6	Sarcasm: anger	What's there to be angry about?	Darweish seems to speak to his occupiers, challenging them sarcastically.
7	Demanding the recording/reporting	Put in on record.	Second mention of asking his occupiers to record his identity... <i>an important theme?</i>
8	Self-assertion as Arab	I am an Arab.	
9	Collective physical labour	Working with comrades of toil in a quarry.	Implying collectivity of his people in contributing to the land prior to Israel's establishment.
10	Connection to family	I have eight children	
11	Wresting the basics of life	For them I wrest the loaf of bread,	Sense of having to, yet being unable to, provide for his family. This line also implies a sense of desperation.
12	Wresting the basics of life	The clothes and exercise books	These are components that will help his children will require to strengthen their future as well. Arab scholars have highlighted the unique importance of education to the culture, particularly as it represents the ability to be self-sufficient in the future.
13	Referencing nature and the physical land	From the rocks	Davis (2007) argues that referencing the physical land implies connection to it, through <i>knowledge</i> of it.
14	Not begging for	And beg for no alms at your door,	Not lowering self to his occupier,

	charity		asserting his pride and steadfastness, despite his marginalized position.
15	Asserting pride	Lower not myself at your doorstep	
16	Sarcasm: anger	What's there to be angry about?	Second mention of this sarcastic question...
17	Demanding the recording/reporting	Put in on record.	Third assertion demanding the recording of his identity. This seems to be a powerful message within this work.
18	Self-assertion as Arab	I am an Arab.	
19	Name without title	I am a name without a title,	He is a person without status. Analysts of this poem have argued that this statement is based on the challenges experienced by Darweish in being recognized as an Israeli citizen.
20	Patience	Patient in a country where everything lives in a	He seems to imply that he knows vindication is forthcoming, and that patience is required to attain restoration.
21	Whirlpool of anger	whirlpool of anger.	The previous word "patience" implies the author is in a state of waiting. Moreover, when this patience is coupled with the "whirlpool of anger" (next line) it seems as though the author is waiting for the anger to either subside or explode. Darweish uses "the lexicon of the popular struggle" (Suleiman, 2006b: 227) to describe his own (and his people's) current state of unrest.
22	Nature: roots	My roots	References his stability and connectedness to the physical land, using the metaphor of roots. This can help to re-ify Palestinians' connection to the historical land of Palestine.
23	Before time's birth	Took hold before the birth of time	Lines: 23-24 - Implying his (and his people's) connection is innate, natural and ever-present.
24	Before burgeoning of ages	Before the burgeoning of the ages,	Lines 22-25: The author seems to imply his (and his peoples') connectedness to the land, which he asserts predated the natural features of the region. Authors have discussed the importance of mentions of the physical land and have highlighted it's importance in asserting one's nationalism. The physical land connects members of a nation to one another, as it is often the "site of fallen [national] heroes" (Roshwald, 2006).
25	Nature: cypress and olive trees	Before cypress and olive trees,	Authors have highlighted that the olive tree, "has evolved into a symbol of communal rootedness, identity, and resistance" (McKean-Paramenter, 1994: 74). Other analysts of this poem explain

			that olive trees are important reference points because they can stand to be representative of the very features of Palestinian society: the ability to survive with very little rainfall, the necessity of only a small growth-space, an adaptability to the environment, and an ability to provide subsistence to farmers (McKean-Paramenter, 1994: 74-75). However, the context in which Darweish is using this term seems to be counter-intuitive, particularly as he claims that his people's connection to the land pre-existed the growth of the olive trees.
26	Unhealthy nature: the proliferation of weeds	Before the proliferation of weeds.	Palestinians seem to be referenced as "natural" to the land, whereas Jews are implied to be the "weeds"? The word "proliferation" also seems to imply an uncontrolled expansion of a particular force of nature. This referencing may also help to explore the ways in which Israelis can be conceptualized in Darweish's poem: toxic, over-expansive and parasitic. I am tempted to assume the author is referring to the establishment of the State of Israel, because one of the foundational arguments of Palestinians is that the land had been healthy and well prior to Israel's establishment.
27	Transcending from physical labourers	My father is from the family of the plough	Shift in tone: discussing his commonality with ordinary Palestinians. He is also providing his readers with some self-disclosure.
28	Commonality with Palestinians	Not from highborn nobles.	Lines 27-30: This helps the author relate to average Palestinians, particularly as authors have noted the tensions in Palestinian society between the hierarchal socio-economic classes. The upper classes are often thought of as being supported by the corrupt governing bodies of some PLO factions.
29	Lineage, peasants without status	And my grandfather was a peasant	
30	No line/ genealogy	Without line or genealogy.	
31	Home as a place to watch	My house is a watchman's hut	Lines 31-32: The author highlights the simplicity of his home. Interestingly, he seems to imply that he lives in a home that affords him the ability to keep watch over a potential enemy. The home seems to play a defensive and offensive role.
32	Sticks and	Made of sticks and reeds.	

	needs: simplicity		
33	Sarcasm: challenging marginalized status	Does my status satisfy you?	This highlights his hostility towards his status. He challenges his occupiers about the position and status they have imposed on him.
34	Name without surname	I am a name without a surname.	He is a person without the grounding feature of a last name. <i>Is he implying that this is his ontological reality, or that this is how the occupier views him?</i>
35	Demanding the recording/ reporting	Put in on record.	Fourth demand that his occupiers record his identity.
36	Self-assertion as Arab	I am an Arab.	
37	Jet black hair	Colour of hair: jet black.	Lines 37-40: a sort of "roll call" of his identifying features. This seems to be another way of establishing commonality with his audience, as the physical description the author provides of himself is typical of male Arabs. The author is allowing the audience to identify with him.
38	Brown eyes	Colour of eyes: brown.	
39	Features which describe him	My distinguishing features:	
40	Asserting Arab identity/ noting traditional Arab dress	On my head the 'iqal cords over keffiyeh	<i>Keffiyeh</i> is a common headdress for Arab men, traditionally worn to protect them from sun exposure and the flows of sand. This reference implies commonality with other Arab men, while at the same time, it references the bond between Arabs and the desert (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003).
41	Scratching those who touch	Scratching him who touches it.	Darweish implies potential harm to those who try to take his "Arabness" away. This is particularly pertinent, given that authors have noted that <i>Al-Nakba</i> is associated with the "de-Arabization" of the land (Sa'di, 2002). However, at the same time, Darweish implies that a painful response will only be aimed at those who instigate an affront on him – only through touching the <i>keffiyeh</i> , will one be "scratched".
42	Address: historical reference	My address:	
43	Remote, forgotten village	I am from a village, remote, forgotten.	Line 43-45: The author implies his ancestral village still exists, like himself and his nation, without having the status as that of his people – currently, it is inhabited by Israelis. Yet, in this section the narrative seems to be directed at his

			occupiers, who have “forgotten” about, or rather denied, the Palestinians’ plight. It seems as though the ability to name and give legal status to people and places, or rather the lack of this status is a central theme throughout the poem. Despite its lack of recognition, the village remains functioning, and its historical inhabitants, frustrated with their situation, remain resolved to continue their daily lives elsewhere. This seems to be related to Enloe’s conceptualization of “reporting and recording” as Darweish attempts to re-direct the audiences’ attention to what has been forgotten.
44	Streets without name	Its streets without name	
45	Men as physical labourers – physical investment in the land	And all its men in the fields and quarry.	What has also been forgotten is the physical investment of Arab men to the flourishing of the region.
46	Sarcasm: anger	What’s there to be angry about?	Again, Darweish seems to speak to his occupiers, challenging them sarcastically. He seems to list for his occupiers a number of justifications for his anger. <i>Is there an aura of persuasion (attempting to induce his occupiers to listen) or an aura of defiance?</i>
47	Demanding the recording/ reporting	Put in on record.	Fifth demand that his occupiers record his identity.
48	Self-assertion as Arab	I am an Arab.	
49	Land and livelihood stolen	You stole my forefathers’ vineyards	The author speaks to the “Other”, poignantly accusing them of seizing the land without legitimate authority. The author seems to be hostile towards the injustices he perceives were committed against his ancestors. It’s interesting that the poem, thus far, discussed Darweish’s current status, that is, the <i>result</i> of the theft of the land. Now he discusses the historical roots of his present circumstances. This temporal sequence might be an interesting theme to explore.
50	Unjustified theft, given his physical investment	And land I used to till,	In an additional affront, the land on which the Arabs of Palestine had worked and had invested their labour has been stolen.
51	Generations left	I and all my children,	Lines 51-53: Generations are left

	with nothing		without the land they considered to be theirs.
52	Prediction for grandchildren	And you left us and all my grandchildren	In referencing his "grandchildren", he is connecting his plight to that of future generations. In this way, he seems to reference a helplessness that is currently experienced by his people and offer a prediction for future generations of Palestinians. There seems to be a resolve to despair and a recognition of the helplessness his people currently experience and will likely undergo in the future.
53	Left with simple nature	Nothing but these rocks.	His people are left with nothing but the most basic elements of nature. That is, elements that cannot contribute to their prosperity. Oftentimes, rocks are overlooked components of one's environment (i.e., they provide no visual appeal and/or no service). <i>Is this what Darweish implies about his own surroundings – that they are of no benefit nor are they physically appealing?</i>
54	Political whims	Will your government be taking them too	Importantly, Darweish seems to speak to the Israeli people, rather than the government particularly responsible for their exile. <i>It is interesting to think about how he bypasses a challenge to the Israeli government, speaking to the Israeli public, while concurrently speaking for the Palestinian people.</i>
55		As is being said?	Darweish implies a lack of control or consultation with Arabs about the future of the land. Despite investing their physical labour and love in the land, the actual region's future remains out of their control.
56	Demand	So!	This seems to be a demand at one's attention, as this is the first use of an exclamation point in this work. Again, the tone of the poem changes to one characteristic of self-assertion, potentially attempting to break the helpless tone of the previous stanza. Here, it seems as though Darweish is less reminiscent, and rather opinionated about the future prospects of Palestinians.
57	Primary importance	Put it on record at the top of page one:	Lines 57-63: most importantly, Darweish highlights that he is not hate-filled, despite his experiences, but cautions that if he is instigated, he <i>will</i> retaliate in due course.

58	Not hating	I don't hate people,	
59	Not trespassing	I trespass on no one's property.	Using the wording of "trespass" implies that it is unlawful imposition onto someone else's property, however, Darweish seems to imply the "naturalness" of his people's claims to the land, and therefore the inapplicability of the term "trespass". Darweish maintains a strong tone in his arguments. <i>It would be interesting to consider how the issues of legitimacy and the authoring of history come into play in this militarizing discourse.</i>
60	Hunger	And yet, if I were to become hungry	Lines 60-63: <i>Is he implying violence?</i> His threats of "eating the flesh" of his occupiers is a rather vivid way of describing his intentions. It implies the most basic form of war, that is, there is no weaponry, just violence in its most basic form. Using the word "hunger" implies that this violence is somehow a necessary basic need. <i>It would be interesting to consider why these lines were placed at the very end of the poem.</i> He is once again, referencing the lexicon of the popular struggle.
61	Eating flesh	I shall eat the flesh of my usurper.	
62	Beware of hunger	Beware, beware of my hunger	
63	Beware of anger	And of my anger!	