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ROGERS' CONCEPT OF THE FULLY FUNCTIONING PERSON:
AN ADEQUATE PORTAYAL OF HUMAN FREEDOM?

By
Lina Di Blasio

THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN EDUCATION



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ABSTRACT

Carl Rogers, a leading figure in the Third Force Psychology, was keenly aware of the inadequacies of scientific psychology. He accurately observed that the main problem with psychology as a natural science is its approach, or philosophical presuppositions regarding the nature of the human being. For scientific psychology, persons are predetermined objects and human behaviour is nothing but causally determined reactions to external stimuli. In *Persons or science: A philosophical question* (1955) Rogers attempts to develop psychology into a human science. This science adopts a new approach, one which recognizes human freedom. From this new approach emerges his alternative view of the optimal human being, the fully functioning person. The purpose of this research is to explore the extent to which the Rogerian view of human freedom, as it is expressed in the concept of the fully functioning person, adequately establishes the specific difference between persons as free subjects and the determined objects of the natural sciences.

The method adopted for this study is philosophical analysis. We will first situate Rogers in the historical and philosophical context in which he was trained and educated and which led him to oppose scientific psychology (chapter I). Next, the analysis (chapter II) will focus on the distinctive features of Rogers' fully functioning person. The evaluation (chapter III) will confront Rogers' attempt to develop a science of persons with the work of researchers known for their

contribution in making psychology into a human science. These researchers are: Giorgi (1970), Luijpen (1962), and Strasser (1963).

The conceptual framework they share is existential phenomenology. The existential outlook is that with which Third Force Psychology identifies itself, and phenomenology is the alternative method to the scientific method. Rogers identified himself with this philosophical outlook and method and its view of the human being as a free subject. A philosophical analysis of the concept of the fully functioning person in light of the existential phenomenological description of the human being will allow us to see the extent to which Rogers fulfills his goal of establishing the difference between persons as subjects and the objects of science.

INTRODUCTION

Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person is an extension of his desire to create a human science as an alternative approach to the natural scientific psychology of his time. At the time Rogers arrives on the scene of American psychology, the discipline is dominated by the natural scientific approach. In his view, the experimental method is inadequate for the human sciences. In *Persons or science? A philosophical question* (1955), he argues that when the scientific method and approach, as they are used in the positive or natural sciences, are applied to the study of the human being, persons are dehumanized; that is, persons are reduced to objects bound by natural laws of cause and effect. Rogers explains that the methods of science in psychology thus fail to reveal crucial aspects of human beings. In other words, science, as it is conceived and practiced, can never describe the experiencing human subject as a valuing, aware, and responsible agent. The basic approach of science, i.e. its philosophical presuppositions on human nature, is therefore inadequate, for it fails to do justice to the essence of the human being as an experiencing person.

Along with the proponents of the Third Force Psychology, Rogers attempts to resolve this problem by proposing a changed view of science, "one which has, at its creative inception, process and tentative conclusion, a free and experiencing person" (Rogers, 1961, p. 224). He therefore places the subjective, existential, valuing person at the foundation of his alternative science; a science which

will treat the human being as a free, valuing and aware individual, rather than as a determined object. This approach will take into account the essence of the human person. Rogers' model of the healthy individual, the fully functioning person, is an expression of this new science of persons.

It is clear that Rogers contributes to the field of education by freeing the individual from a rigid value system that treats the person as a passive and dependent object. Rogers' contribution to the field of education and pedagogy is evident simply by the number (12) of dissertations which clearly support his theory¹ of therapy and personality (not including those for which an abstract is not provided). For instance, many dissertations between 1980 and 1990 support Rogers' therapeutic and learning principles and conditions of the person-centered approach in education. Examples of these dissertations are: McGuire-Cashman (1990) and Marti-Mascarell (1990) in curriculum and instruction; Ryan (1988) in health education; Herbert-Lewis (1988) in religious education; Agauas (1986) in adult education; Besser (1985) in philosophy of education; Utterback-Kienzle (1985) in secondary education; Pannier (1980) in guidance and counselling; Topper (1983) and Taylor (1980) in general psychology.

¹Rogers constantly refers to his model of therapy and personality by using the term theory, for example, see Rogers, C. (1959). *A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-centered framework* in Koch, S. (Ed.). (1959). *Psychology: A study of science* (Vol. 3) (pp. 184-256). New York: MacGraw Hill. Here, Rogers speaks of a theory of personality, a theory of the fully functioning person, and a theory of interpersonal relationships.

Other studies, however, have found weaknesses, particularly in Rogers' philosophical assumptions on human nature. For instance, Rubin (1985) in her Kantian critique of values and morals in education, questions the assumptions embedded in Rogers and other influential educators.

Similarly, this research emerges with more questions than answers. The thrust of these questions is: to what extent does the Rogerian science of persons, as contained in the key concept of the fully functioning person, distance itself from the naturalistic, scientific or deterministic view of the human being as it is found in experimental psychology? In other words, how adequate is the concept of the fully functioning person as a portrayal of human freedom and as a basis for transforming psychology into a human science?

Method

The method used to answer this question is philosophical analysis. The aim is to bring to light the philosophical underpinnings of Rogers' view of the person in order to describe the logical implications of these views. In chapter II we will analyze Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person, his portrayal of human freedom. The fully functioning person is characterized by the following qualities: openness to experience, creativity, a sense of freedom, and organismic valuing. For Rogers, these qualities are

different ways of expressing human freedom. They form the image of the psychologically free human being; a reality that cannot be studied by a natural scientific and deterministic approach and method.

The evaluation (chapter III) of Rogers' views will be done in light of works which are widely known for their contribution in making psychology into a human science. These are: Giorgi (1970), Luijpen (1962) and Strasser (1963). The conceptual framework they share is existential phenomenology, the approach and method Rogers also adopts. Rogers' portrayal of the person as a free subject and of a science of persons, is in some ways consistent with the existential phenomenological outlook. However, the analysis of the central elements of the fully functioning person and its corollaries shows that Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person stops short of capturing the key elements that existential phenomenology has to offer to research in the human sciences. In other words, Rogers stops short of underlining the specific difference between humans and lower forms of life. Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person retains much of the naturalistic and scientific view of the human being.

Contribution

This research could be a contribution to educational thought and practice in that it asks reasonable questions to a leading, if not the dominating, ideology in the field. This exercise in forgoing a

dogmatic approach for a critical view of Rogerian thought might encourage teachers to ask themselves whether and especially to what extent, their chosen model of human realization - be it Rogerian, Skinnerian, Piagetian - does justice to the nature and extent of human possibilities. If education must be concerned with teaching not what but how to think, then teachers must be encouraged to take the first step in autonomous thinking: asking pertinent questions.

However, it is impossible to ask a good question if one is aware of only a single dominant model. This research could also contribute to practitioners' thinking by offering them the views and work of researchers who have gained credibility in their quest for making psychology into a human science. The works of Giorgi (1970), Luijpen (1962), and Strasser (1963) do not offer ready-made techniques, but they could give reflective practitioners some guidance for evaluating models and techniques and using them with discrimination. The practice of education might be transformed if the guiding concept of freedom included its dialectical opposite, namely: destiny, facticity, and decentering, or what Murdock (1970) calls "deselfing" or opening up to what is over and above one's given immediate self.

CHAPTER I- HISTORICAL CONTEXT

It is important to understand the historical and intellectual context in which Rogers lived and was educated and which eventually led him to see a need for a science of the person. The object of this chapter is to look at the natural scientific orientation which dominated psychology in Rogers' time. It is Rogers' criticism of the natural scientific approach and method in traditional psychology and his desire for a human science which brought him to adopt the existential approach and the phenomenological method.

A. Scientific Psychology

Psychology, in its attempt to be scientific, broke away from speculative philosophy and adopted the approach and method of the natural sciences; that is, psychology borrowed the approach, concepts, techniques and methods of the natural sciences and applied them to the phenomenon of the human being (Giorgi, 1970, p. xii-xiii). Knowledge of the person is therefore considered to be the same as knowledge of physics, astronomy, chemistry, physiology and biology. In borrowing the method of the natural sciences, psychology implicitly accepted the underlying approach or philosophical presuppositions regarding the nature of the human being. In other words, psychology adopted the "fundamental viewpoint toward the human being and the world that the scientist brings, or adopts with respect to his work as a scientist, whether this viewpoint is made explicit or remains implicit" (Giorgi, 1970, p. 125-126). In accepting

the general presuppositions of the natural sciences, psychology also accepted the view that the scientific approach and method are the only reliable means for discovering knowledge about the human being and reality. Despite his initial training in the natural scientific approach, Rogers among others, recognized the limitations of this approach for the human sciences. He therefore critiqued the natural scientific orientation on the grounds that the person studied is viewed and treated as a determined object rather than a free subject.

1. A biographical note

When Rogers received his doctorate in clinical psychology in the mid-1920s, it had already been at least thirty years (1890) since psychology had broken away from philosophy and had adopted the approach and method of the natural sciences. Psychology experienced tremendous growth in the areas of testing, measurement, and experimental work with animals in the laboratory in the 1900s in the same way that the natural sciences had experienced success in the nineteenth century. Little work, however, had been done in the field of clinical psychology (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 63). It is not a coincidence, then, that in the 1920s Rogers was heavily trained in the scientific method, in addition to becoming quite adept in psychological testing and measurement. He was then led to believe in the value and importance of scientific research and evaluation (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 83-84), and spent a large part of his training in the testing, diagnosis, and treatment of problem children (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 67-68).

In the late 1920s, however, Rogers was exposed to a different orientation. Whereas his initial training at Columbia University emphasized measurement and statistics, the Institute for Child Guidance (New York), where he completed his practicum, emphasized emotions and personality dynamics. This, for Rogers, became a source of conflict which remained with him throughout his career as a clinician and researcher. He attempted to resolve this tension between subjective emotions and scientific objectivity by combining both approaches in his doctoral thesis. He argued for a combination of objective testing aimed at understanding the person from an external frame of reference, and sensitive interviewing for understanding the person's internal frame of reference (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 59). As it is well known, Rogers subsequently devoted a major part of his life subjecting the therapeutic methods he developed out of his personal experiences with his clients to the rigors of the scientific method, thereby combining the subjective world of psychotherapy with scientific investigation. In fact, he is considered a pioneer in the objective study of the therapeutic methods he developed. For clinical psychology, the idea of utilizing the experimental approach and method for studying the therapeutic process was new and was therefore considered a landmark. This opened the field of psychotherapy to scientific investigation (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 219,395).

However, for a reflective practitioner like Rogers, adopting an approach and method necessarily means accepting the underlying view of the person. In the mid-1950s, Rogers thus finds himself in serious conflict between the existence of the subjective realm of the human being and the objectivity of the natural sciences.

To get a better sense of Rogers' dilemma, we must go back to the heyday of scientific psychology, to positivism in its purest form. Traditional psychology was to be conducted according to the canons of the natural sciences. It was to be: 1) empirical; that is, the study of behaviour based on controllable observation which means that the phenomenon in question must be perceivable by the senses, 2) positivistic, operational, and quantitative, meaning that anything that is speculative is either excluded or translated into empirical and mechanical laws and expressed and defined in terms of mathematical equations, 3) deterministic and predictive in that causes are assumed to precede all phenomena (behaviour); if the causal situation is repeated, the phenomena will re-occur, and 4) objective, in the sense that a specific attitude is adopted by the researcher so as not to influence the results of the experiment through one's own personal idiosyncracies (Giorgi, 1965, p. 228-229).

During Rogers' time, the natural scientific option in psychology can therefore be characterized as an approach (philosophical presuppositions), a method (techniques and laboratory instruments), and a content (selected subject-matter); the method being the most important of the three since it was intentionally borrowed from the

natural sciences. The approach was adopted in a more indirect way since it is a natural concomitant of the specific method, and the content is a direct consequence of the chosen method since the method basically dictates that which will lend itself to scientific investigation. In psychology, the method therefore became a priority and the content was expected to follow; or what often happened, the content was made to fit the method, and when the phenomenon did not lend itself to the method, it was dismissed (Giorgi, 1970, p. 62).

The natural scientific approach therefore acquired a privileged position in psychology to the extent to which it became the criterion against which all findings were measured, even for those who professed a human science. The scientific approach eventually became no less than a dogma, claiming that "if psychology is to be a science, it must use the methods of science; that is, the natural sciences" (Giorgi, 1965, p. 230). Some psychologists hold the view that any domain is considered to be scientific as long as it is consistent with the natural scientific method (Giorgi, 1965, p. 230). In the 1940s, Rogers agreed with this view. He declared that psychotherapy is not an intuitive act but a scientific endeavor which could be measured and described (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 128). Psychology's commitment to science gradually became stronger, to the point at which its devotion to the method was stronger than its commitment to the phenomena it encountered. As Koch (1959) stated, "psychology was going to remain faithful to the scientific method, as it understood it, at all costs" (Giorgi, 1970, p. 63). The

academic environment in which Rogers was trained, was therefore dedicated to maintaining the natural scientific approach in psychology. It was in this atmosphere that Rogers was caught between the objective and deterministic view of the person as it was seen in natural scientific psychology and the view of the person as a free subject.

In 1955, the tension he felt over the years between the subjective and the objective led him to write a paper discussing this issue. Although Rogers had faith in the scientific method in psychology, he did see the limitations of this approach and became vocal about it. His views led him to become a pioneer, along with Maslow, of a "Third Force" in psychology variously known as humanistic, holistic or existential phenomenological psychology (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 245). This group criticized scientific psychology for being limited to the study of laboratory animals and for being overly concerned with the scientific method at the expense of studying typically human phenomena. They argue that the scientific approach has led to a view of the person which does not do justice to the human being. Rogers is quoted as saying: "(...) human behaviour is in some significant ways, something more than the behaviour of laboratory animals" (Milhollan, 1972, p. 96). Objections and questions of this nature became a continuous source of debate and discussion for many years among philosophers and psychologists alike.

2. Rogers' critique of scientific psychology

In *Persons or science? A philosophical question*² (1955; 1961), Rogers expresses his concern over the conflict between the approach and method of the natural sciences in which he was educated and which he says dominates psychology and the "(...) subjectively oriented existential thinking which was taking root (...)" within him (Rogers, 1961, p. 199). His doubts about the natural scientific approach are well summarized by the following questions he asked an audience at a conference in the 1970s: should "we continue to model psychology after an outmoded conception of physics which physicists tell us no longer exists? (...) Can our conceptions of the scientific process be broadened to make room for the creative parts of science and the allowance of subjective human experience as important data to study? (...) Can our departments change to accompany such a human science? (...) Dare we develop a human science?" (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 431). "Is psychology asking relevant questions such as questions of human values, growth, and helping relationships?" (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 256). In short, Rogers asks the same questions which proponents of psychology as a human science ask: should we apply the methods of the natural sciences to psychology in exactly the same way as the sciences or must an alternative approach be created? (Giorgi, 1970, p. 2).

Along with researchers and clinicians of the Third Force Psychology, Rogers argues that the natural scientific approach is

²In this study, I will be using the 1961 edition of this article as printed in Rogers, C. (1961). *On becoming a person*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

always concerned with an object; that is, an observable object. Science as it is conceived and practiced is never concerned with the experiencing subject who can feel, laugh, love, exercise freedom and attach meaning to his experiences. Science is therefore never concerned with human phenomena which are immeasurable and unquantifiable. Consequently, all phenomena that science attempts to study are made to fit the observable, measurable, and quantifiable criterion. Thus, when the natural scientific approach and method are applied in the social or human sciences, persons studied are reduced to natural objects or creatures bound by laws of cause and effect. Clinicians then work from this limited view of the person, a view of the person at its most primitive level, whose causes can and must be discovered and controlled. No distinction is made between unique human beings and lower forms of life (Rogers, 1961, p. 212-213). The natural scientific study of the person is therefore crude, insensitive, and superficial (Milhollan, 1972, p. 81). With its approach and method it can only study those aspects of human behaviour which are trivial and obvious; thereby giving us a view of the person which fails to account for the person's "complexity, uniqueness, and unpredictability" (Milhollan, 1972, p. 81-82). In other words, the natural scientific approach alone cannot lend itself to the study of typically human phenomena.

In Rogers' and the Third Force Psychology clinicians' minds, a science of persons requires a new approach, one that would take into account the fact of human freedom; the power to reflect upon and transform the material world, the capacity to choose and the

propensity to find and give meaning. Third Force clinicians adopt the approach of existential philosophy since the central tenet of the latter is human freedom. Working from the presupposition of human freedom, however, will require a new method of investigation. Phenomenology is considered as the best alternative to the empirical methods. Rogers is therefore willing to sacrifice scientific prestige and precision for the sake of working from an approach and developing methods which will do justice to the human being. A science of persons will thus be possible (Milhollan, 1972, p. 82).

The following section examines Rogers' science of the person, which he maintains is formulated along the lines of the existential-phenomenological trend and which builds the foundation for his concept of the fully functioning person (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 109-110).

B. Rogers' Quest for a Science of the Person

Rogers' contention is that if psychology is to become a human science it will have to acknowledge various ways of knowing that are equally valid and which reveal different and essential aspects of the human being. Section 1 is a description of three ways of knowing which Rogers considers as being important for research in psychology. Section 2 looks at Rogers' very model of the science of the person, an alternative view which emphasizes the leading place of the subjective in human scientific research.

1. Three ways of knowing for a science of the person

As any other science, a science of the person is based on the process of knowing, and all knowing consists in verifying hypotheses. Ways of knowing are therefore means of verifying given hypotheses. Rogers identifies three ways of knowing: subjective, objective, and interpersonal or phenomenological knowing (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 110).

Subjective knowing consists in referring to one's own internal frame of reference for checking an hypothesis. It is a return to one's experiencing to determine if "I love or hate this person" or whether "I am bored or not." By referring to one's flow of feelings, one can begin to conceptualize an answer. One's hypothesis becomes more and more differentiated as the individual approaches a more sharply defined meaning for the amorphous knowing that is present. An example is the individual in psychotherapy who searches for a word that will more accurately describe his experience, feeling, or perception. A sense of relief is typical when one has finally found a word which matches one's experiencing (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 111).

An important way of knowing then, is the formation of inner hypotheses, which are verified by returning to one's inner experience as the person lives in her subjective interaction with inner or outer events. This type of knowing is basic and permeates everyday life. It is rarely recognized today because, given the fact

that it is not publicly validated, it is not considered to be a perfect type of knowing. Nonetheless, argues Rogers, it is " (...) a deeply rooted organismic sensing (...)" on which all knowledge is built (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 112). Subjective knowing is the basis of the concept of the fully functioning person.

In objective knowing, hypotheses are checked from an external frame of reference: externally observable operations and a recognized reference group within the same domain. For instance, a researcher who states that he "knows" that the speed of a freely falling object is expressed by the formula $v = 32t$, means that other researchers have used the same procedures, have obtained the same results and all have concluded that this formula is an accurate expression of the physics of falling objects. The whole structure of science is based on this process which deals only with externally observable objects. To use this process then, one must treat all problems as publicly observable phenomena. In other words, this way of knowing transforms everything into an object or restricts itself to studying only the objective aspects of a problem. Objective knowledge requires that all operations and definitions be mutually accepted by a reference group. Therein lies the objective quality of the research (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 112-113).

The third type of knowing is interpersonal or phenomenological knowing. It is knowledge of human beings and higher organisms. Here, knowledge is not preoccupied with explaining from the outside, but with understanding from the inside. For instance, writes Rogers,

" (when) (...) I know that you feel hurt by my remark; (...) or (...) you hold certain religious beliefs (...)," it is because I have used my ability to empathically understand your internal frame of reference or your phenomenological field to check my hypotheses about what you feel or your private world of meanings (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p.115). The "I-You" style of communication is quite characteristic of the phenomenological- interpersonal way of knowing. One checks with the phenomenological field of another by either asking or observing the other person, or by creating conditions which will facilitate communication of the other's internal frame of reference. Rogers explains that the ability to check his empathic inferences against the phenomenal world of the other has allowed him to gain knowledge, which in turn, has led him to formulate general psychological principles related to personality change. As a clinician, he has thus gained access to unobservable subjective events which he has tested or verified in the same interpersonal manner. In Rogers' estimation, the phenomenological method provides scientific leverage in getting at the non-observable events which go on within the individual (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 115-116).

In Rogers' view these three ways of knowing are interdependent and form the means through which psychological knowledge is acquired. He asserts that any mature psychological science will make use of these three ways of knowing in appropriate relationship to the other two, for "(...) there is no royal road to scientific certitude, (...) a scientific methodology which will see us

safely through (...)" does not exist in the behavioural sciences (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p.115,117).

Rogers explains that the Third Force Psychology, of which he is an important advocate, is willing to use all the three methods in order to enrich and deepen psychology and to emerge with a concept of the human being at the properly human level. As Rogers declares, "individuals in this group do not seem to be afraid of using their subjectivity, their 'indwelling' in their professional experience, as an explicit basis for their hypotheses" (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 118). Although Rogers recognizes the importance of the objective stance, he, as a member of the existential phenomenological orientation, believes that interpersonal knowing is richer as a means for emerging with insights about human nature than an approach which is purely based on the external. This is one of the group's more important contributions to psychology. The use of subjectivity and phenomenological knowing as a basis in research has had some important and positive effects (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 118). The consequences of this new approach form an integral part of Rogers' alternative view of psychology as well as his view of the healthy human being, the fully functioning person.

2. Rogers' view of psychology as a science of the person

The phenomenological approach enables Rogers to account for all of the realities which are relevant to human experience. It is important to point out that this new method will preserve the advances and contributions of the natural scientific approach, but it will go beyond it. Rogers therefore remains faithful to his desire to combine all the ways of knowing that he differentiated (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 118-119). All channels of knowing will be used, not only the prescribed channels (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 120). Thus, rather than closing off certain psychological realities, this method "(...) will throw open the whole range of human experiencing to scientific study (...) in an effort to discover lawful and orderly relationships" between inner personal meanings (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 118-119). For Rogers, the whole range of human experiencing includes "(...) purposes, goals, values, choice, perceptions of self, perceptions of others, the responsibilities we accept or reject, the personal constructs with which we build our world, the whole phenomenal world of the individual with its connective tissue of meaning;" all of which are meaningless and closed off for natural scientific psychology (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 119). He explains that with such a phenomenologically based approach, one will be capable of testing variables that escape the experimental approach and methods, but which are highly significant in human experience (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 123). Psychology, based on the phenomenological approach will include the person's behaviour as

well as that person's own perspective, in addition to the observer's perspective.

This approach recognizes that "as human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a centre lying within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse" (Rogers in Wann, 1964, p. 118). The human perspective can no longer be denied for such a denial leads to absurdity. This, of course, leads to a view of the human being which is radically opposed to the view of the person as object in natural scientific psychology. It leads to a view of the person as a subject (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 118).

Rogers' first criterion then, for a science of the person is his emphasis on the leading place of the subjective in the use of science. He declares that science is a human endeavor; that is, science always begins with people, and knowledge is that which is subjectively acceptable. This knowledge can only be accepted by those who are ready to receive this new information. Rogers rightly points out that at the root of the scientific search there is always a personal value, thereby reaffirming the importance of the human factor in scientific research (Rogers, 1961, p. 216). More specifically, from the very initial stage of scientific research, is a particular person with a goal which has personal significance for him. Rogers explains that the scientist's search becomes an important part of his own lived experience. The researcher, then, does not just think about the

object under inquiry. "He lets his organism³ take over and react to it, both on a knowing and on an unknowing level. He comes to sense more than he could possibly verbalize about his field, and reacts organismically in terms of relationships which are not present in his awareness" (Rogers, 1961, p. 216-217). From this complete lived experience emerges a clearer formulation of what the scientist is searching. His search crystallizes into an hypothesis; "a statement of a tentative, personal, subjective faith." In other words, the scientist says: "I have a hunch that such and such a relationship exists, and the existence of this phenomenon has relevance to my personal values" (Rogers, 1961, p. 217).

Rogers explains that this is the initial and perhaps most important phase of scientific research. It has generally been ignored or dismissed by American psychologists. It has been shunned and conveniently forgotten because it does not fit the experimental approach, but nonetheless, insists Rogers, "It is indeed in the matrix

³Although Rogers consistently uses the term "organism" to refer to the human being, my reading indicates that he does not formally define this term. Rogers comes close to defining this term when he explains that when the person becomes aware of what he is actually experiencing, he "(...) becomes for the first time the full potential of the human organism, with the enriching element of awareness freely added to the basic aspect of sensory and visceral reaction (...) he is, in other words, a complete and fully functioning human organism" (Rogers, 1961, p. 105). For Rogers then, the human "organism" is defined by one's ability to return to sensory and visceral experience. It also appears to be synonymous with the "self" for Rogers explains: "(...) self-actualization is (...) to expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature, (...) all the capacities of the organism, (...) to the extent that such activation enhances the organism or the self" (Rogers, 1961, p. 35). These descriptions are close to the way Kinget defines "organism," i.e. organism refers to the physical and psychological aspects of the human being. In the context of psychology, however, the emphasis is on behaviour and experience (Rogers & Kinget, 1976, p. 31-32).

of immediate, personal, subjective experience that all science, and each individual scientific research, has its origin" (Rogers, 1961, p. 217).

The scientist must then verify his hypothesis with reality. Rogers explains that the methodology of science allows one to do this. The scientist can begin by stating his hypothesis in operational terms to avoid false conclusions. The scientist can also use control groups which will prevent her from drawing false inferences. In addition, the use of t-tests, correlations, critical ratios and a variety of additional statistical procedures will permit the researcher to draw reasonable inferences. Rogers explains that "scientific methodology is seen for what it truly is; a way of preventing me from deceiving myself in regard to my creatively formed subjective hunches which have developed out of the relationship between me and my material. It is in this context (...) that the vast structure of operationism, logical positivism, research design, and tests of significance have their place. They exist, not for themselves, but as servants in the attempt to check the subjective feeling, hunch or hypothesis of a person with the objective fact" (Rogers, 1961, p. 218). The researcher who utilizes these measures therefore has different philosophical assumptions regarding these measures. He uses these thoroughly objective designs for measuring the phenomenological world of the individual who is in a constant process of valuing, choosing, being and becoming (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 120).

Rogers points out that these tools of the scientific method are used by a person, a human being who decides which hypothesis to test, which statistical test to use, how to operationally define human phenomena, the selection of control groups, and so on. Once again, Rogers emphasizes the importance of the subjective in the phenomenological approach. Each decision that is involved is a subjective personal judgement "emphasizing that the splendid structure of science rests basically upon its subjective use by persons. It is the best instrument we have yet been able to devise to check upon our organismic sensing of the universe" (Rogers, 1961, p. 218).

The findings which emerge once all of the preceding steps have been followed can be used as stepping stones for future research. Rogers declares that the whole point of scientific research is to continuously emerge with a more reliable hypothesis, belief, or faith. The scientist's findings must then be communicated to others; this is referred to as intersubjective verification. It is a way of avoiding self-deception and unwarranted beliefs (Rogers, 1961, p. 219). However, only those who accept the scientific method as a reasonable and reliable means for testing one's beliefs and hypotheses, will accept the findings. And then again, a researcher will find acceptance of her findings only when there is a subjective readiness to believe on the part of others, even if they, too, accept the scientific method (Rogers, 1961, p. 220).

Rogers concludes that his new integration of science combines the human, subjective, experiential factor with the more objective scientific factor. He states that science, therapy and all other facets of life always begin from the same starting point which is "the immediate, subjective experience of a person (...) It springs from the inner, total, organismic experiencing (...) a phase of subjective living" (Rogers, 1961, p. 222). As a therapist, he can enter into a relationship in which each person lives his feelings and experiences, in an unreflective way rather than abstracting them. As a scientist however, he can also remove himself from the experience, observe and transform himself and/or others into objects of that observation. As the observer he can rely on those hunches which emerge from his lived experience. Science is therefore not an impersonal thing but simply the action of "(...) a person living subjectively another phase of himself" (Rogers, 1961, p. 223). A better and deeper understanding of any experience may come from actually living it or from observing it through the scientific perspective (Rogers, 1961, p. 223).

Rogers therefore re-perceives science, so as to include the researcher as a human being who holds values at the root of both the therapeutic relationship and the scientific relationship. In this way, a human science would essentially be an "I-Thou" relationship. One cannot deny the fact that in all relationships, scientific or not, there is a subject, a person. This is where Rogers wants to achieve a human science. Rogers wants psychology to be a person-to-person science (Rogers, 1961, p. 224).

How will this phenomenological-existential approach affect psychological theory? Rogers declares that the construction of theories will be more intimately connected to human existence and human experience. The new theories will add to the traditional physiological ones. Theory building will be more creative and free and will surpass the limitations of behaviorism and the whole natural scientific institution (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 126). Rogers declares that the human being "(...) has been enslaved by persons, institutions, (...) theories of psychological science. But he is firmly setting forth a new declaration of independence. He is discarding the alibis of unfreedom [he is] (...) not a puppet, not a slave, not a machine, but his own unique individual self" (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 130).

From his view of science emerges (in the late 1950s) Rogers' psychological model of the healthy personality, the fully functioning person. The fully functioning person is Rogers' model of the human being as a free and autonomous subject as opposed to the scientific view of the person as a determined object. It is Rogers' very portrayal of human freedom; that unique aspect of human existence for which he fought in opposing scientific psychology.

CHAPTER II- ROGERS' PORTRAYAL OF HUMAN FREEDOM

Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person is an outgrowth of his quest for a science of the person and is considered as his last major stage of constructing models (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 280). His later years were spent exploring new applications of principles and methods to other fields. Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person is the result of an effort to develop a conception of psychological health in concrete terms based on the assumption that the person is a free and experiencing human being. It is his desire to treat the person as a subject rather than a determined object or lower form of life (Kirschenbaum, p. 258, 280, 1979). This model, consistent with Rogers' desire for a human science, is connected to human existence and human experience at its healthiest. It is based on the optimum in human functioning as Rogers had seen it evidenced in the growth of the individuals he encountered in therapy. It is also based on the existential phenomenological perspective.

For Rogers, the fully functioning individual is characterized by the following qualities: existential living, openness to experience, creativity, a sense of freedom, and organismic trust. In short, the fully functioning person is "a person in the process of creating himself, a person who creates meaning in life, a person who embodies a dimension of human freedom" (Rogers, in Wann, 1964, p. 129). Those qualities are the very characteristics of the psychologically free individual. The characteristics of the fully

functioning person are thus different ways of expressing human freedom. The object of this chapter is to analyze Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person, his very portrayal of human freedom.

A. Existential Living

The Rogerian concept of existential living contains two qualities which describe the fully functioning person: openness to experience and creativity.

1. Openness to experience

The fully functioning person who is open to her experience freely accepts all stimuli without attempting to alter them in order to protect her self-structure. The polar opposite of the fully functioning person, on the other hand, is the defensive person, one who attempts to distort or block incoming stimuli that do not fit into her introjected self-structure. The self-structure is "the organized, consistent conceptual gestalt composed of perceptions of the characteristics of the 'I' or the 'me' and the perceptions of the relationships of the 'I' or 'me' to others and to various aspects of life together with the values attached to these perceptions. It is a gestalt which is available to awareness though not necessarily in awareness" (Rogers, in Koch, 1959, p. 200). Defensiveness or denial is a manoeuvre intended to protect oneself against incongruity between the self-structure and the experience. However, by altering real experiences, by avoiding inconsistency and conflicting self-images,

the person renders herself inauthentic (Rogers, 1961, p. 187-188; 1969, p. 242).

In the person who is open to her experience, however, each new stimulus is accepted as it is by the nervous system without any attempt to alter it by a defensive mechanism to protect the person's self-structure. Such a person feels free and secure enough to accept all experiences and stimuli whether they emerge from within the organism or in the environment (Rogers, 1961, p. 187-188; 1969, p. 242). The stimulus can be one of several things: the impact of a configuration of form, color, or sound in the environment on the sensory nerves, a memory trace from the past, or a visceral sensation of fear, pleasure or disgust. These stimuli freely permeate the nervous system without being altered by defense mechanisms. Thus, the mechanism of subception whereby the organism is forewarned of threatening experiences would be unnecessary in the subject who is open to her experience. Regardless of external evaluation, the authentic person lives all of her experiences completely (Rogers, 1961, p. 188; 1969, p. 242).

An example of an individual who is free and open to his experience is the case of a young professional man who has become more open to his bodily sensations and feelings. This person, explains Rogers, has come to the realization that he can become genuinely open to his organismic experience. He can be tired when he feels tired, feel pain when his organism is in pain, and freely and simultaneously experience love and annoyance toward his daughter.

In the same way, the person can fully live the variety of experiences which he encounters from one moment to the next. This does not necessarily mean that the person is aware of everything that is happening within himself. Rather, he lives whatever feelings happen to occur within him whether or not he is aware of them. The authentic person may therefore experience love, pain, and fear existentially and subjectively or he may abstract himself from his own subjective experience and realize "I am in pain", "I am afraid", or "I do love." Thus, the person has become so open to his own experience that anything that is organismically present is experienced fully and is readily available to awareness. Such availability to awareness, explains Rogers, is a good measure of the absence of barriers and the freedom experienced by the free subject (Rogers, 1969, p. 284).

In the fully functioning person, there is therefore a gradual move away from defensiveness and a move toward openness to experience. The person learns to listen to himself, and to fully experience what is going on within him. He can experience negative feelings such as pain and fear as well as positive feelings such as courage and tenderness. "He is free to live his feelings subjectively, as they exist in him, and also free to be aware of these feelings" rather than shutting them out (Rogers, 1961, p. 188; 1969, p. 284).

Because the fully functioning person is open to all of her experience, she lives existentially. To live existentially is to welcome and fully receive each new experience in a fresh new way. Incoming

stimuli are always new and have never existed previously in the person's experience. This makes for a very interesting and innovative way of life, for the free subject can never quite predict what she will be like from one moment to the next. Thus, her being at any given time, emerges out of the present moment she is experiencing (Rogers, 1969, p. 284). Life experienced in this manner is very fluid, very free. The person's self and personality flow out of unaltered, unjudged experience. Existential living is the discovery of the structures of experience in the process of living the experience (Rogers, 1961, p. 189; 1969, p. 285). The person therefore becomes a participant and an observer of his organismic experience rather than being its controller and manipulator (Rogers, 1969, p. 285).

Most adults, however, try to impose upon their experiences preconceived structures and judgements based on external evaluations. In this way, they allow themselves to be determined by external forces rather than affirming themselves as free, autonomous and independent subjects. The free and mature subject however, is open to what is going on in the present. This person shows no rigidity, no tight organization, but adaptability and the discovery of a structure in lived experiences (Rogers, 1961, p. 189).

Living in this existential way also implies the ability and the will to live in the present moment. Living in the here and now frees the person from constraints and inhibitions, opening her to a constant state of flux and freedom (Rogers, 1969, p. 285).

2. Creativity

The absence of constraints and inhibitions (or an atmosphere of freedom) associated with living in the present moment, is the key ingredient for creativity. In other words, the fully functioning person who lives in the here and now is a creative person. Such a person is not only capable of generating creative products. She can also live in an original way. This individual possesses the imagination and innovativeness necessary for constructive living regardless of time and culture. The creative person does not simply "adjust" to a given culture; she is far from being a conformist. Rather, the creative individual, despite a few possible misgivings about a culture in which she may find herself, would remain as she is and live according to that which would fulfill her deepest needs (Rogers, 1969, p. 290). Such a person, hypothesizes Rogers, would adapt to and survive any kind of environmental change because she has the inner resources and creativity necessary "to make sound judgements" to any situation. The creative person would, in other words, be a fit vanguard of human evolution (Rogers, 1969, p. 290).

The fully functioning person can creatively adapt and survive any kind of environmental change; he has learned how to learn (Rogers, 1969, p. 163). The capacity to learn releases constraints and increases one's freedom for it allows the individual to incorporate and expand on new and challenging learnings about ever-changing situations (Rogers, 1969, p. 164). In Rogers' views, learning presupposes openness to experience and creativity (Rogers, 1969, p.

104). In fact, learning requires curiosity; the person is compelled to understand the inner workings of whatever captures his interest (Rogers, 1969, p. 3). Learning involves the birth of new ideas, mastery of complicated skills, and the emergence of artistic creations. The person who has effectively learned how to learn is open to personal discoveries; he lives creatively (Rogers, 1969, p. 163).

Creative learning is the only significant learning. It consists in the personal discovery of something meaningful on the cognitive and emotional levels (Rogers, 1969, p. 40). Such learning has basically two elements, i.e. personal involvement and self-evaluation. Personal involvement means that the individual engages himself both cognitively and emotionally in the learning experience. Significant learning also influences present behaviour, attitudes and personality; it is therefore not limited to one's rational faculties. Real learning is a profound and pervasive "gut level" type of learning; it is creative and self-initiated (Rogers, 1969, p. 163).

The second and perhaps most important characteristic of significant learning is the element of self-evaluation. Rogers' profound trust in the organism has led him to declare that the individual must be trusted to evaluate his own goals, decisions and actions (Rogers, 1969, p. 75). The ability to evaluate oneself and one's learnings, explains Rogers, is a distinct aspect of the fully functioning person (Rogers, 1969, p. 96). Self-evaluation must be encouraged by either the therapist or the facilitator. When an individual is encouraged to evaluate herself she learns to become

responsible, independent, self-reliant and creative (Rogers, 1969, p. 158). When self-evaluation is encouraged, not only does the individual become more independent, his learnings about himself and the world tend to be more profound and meaningful (Rogers, 1969, p. 189). For Rogers then, a reliance on external evaluation is inimical to growth, independence and creativity (Rogers, 1969, p. 163). Rogers adds, however, that self-evaluation is accompanied with feedback from other sources such as the therapist or the facilitator in order to add a dimension of objectivity. Nonetheless the individual remains the final judge (Rogers, 1969, p. 201).

In sum, the fully functioning person is an individual who is open to her experience, lives existentially in the present, and feels free to adapt and change in a creative way. She is a person who has effectively learned how to learn. She is therefore a free human being who is capable of living in a fragile and constantly changing balance between the present and the flowing, moving, altering problems and facts of the future (Rogers, 1969, p. 170). These characteristics of the fully functioning person are basically different ways which express Rogers' conception of freedom, *the quality which distinguishes humans from lower forms of life.*

B. Freedom

The fully functioning person is also described as having two additional characteristics: a sense of freedom and the capacity to trust his own organism in the valuing process.

1. Sense of freedom

The fully functioning person is psychologically free to choose and to act on her choices. To choose and act freely is to experience an absence of constraint and inhibition. It is to experience a sense of personal power about one's life and to believe that the future is within one's control - not at the mercy of external forces. This feeling of freedom and of power allows the person to examine many options and feel that whatever she wants to do is within reach. She feels capable of doing anything she desires to do; she is *free* (Rogers, 1961, p. 191-192; Schultz, 1977, p. 34-35).

Psychological freedom, or a sense of freedom, is the freedom to choose one's own attitude in any given situation. Rogers explains that it is the kind of freedom which Viktor Frankl refers to in his experience of the concentration camp (Rogers, 1969, p. 268). This kind of freedom is therefore experienced as coming from within the human being; it is subjective and existential. It is about discovering inner meaning that comes from listening sensitively to what one is experiencing. This sense of freedom culminates in courageously living in the present, by one's own choices, and despite the

uncertainty of the unknown. Ultimately, the free person takes responsibility for what she chooses to become (Rogers, 1969, p. 269).

The person who has inner freedom recognizes that she is a free subject in the process of becoming rather than an object characterized by inertia and determinism. Such an individual who has her own thoughts, is unique and responsibly chooses herself, and may have either a multitude of alternatives or none at all. This however, is unimportant, for her freedom is always present regardless of external constraints. Freedom therefore "exists within the individual, something phenomenological rather than external, but nonetheless to be prized" (Rogers, 1969, p. 269).

This type of freedom can be discovered in the subjective person and allows her to live her potentialities courageously (Rogers, 1969, p. 269). For Rogers, that which allows the person to live his potentialities is the organismic valuing process. As we will see in the next section, the organismic valuing process, when it is trusted by the free subject, permits her to actualize herself and live in complete freedom.

2. Organismic valuing

The fully functioning person's sense of freedom is rooted in her capacity for organismic valuing. Trust in one's organism is perhaps the most important characteristic of the authentic person and the quality which describes human freedom at its best. In Rogers' view,

the healthy person experiences his organism as trustworthy for guiding him toward satisfying behaviours in each existential situation. Doing "what feels right" in organismic terms, is considered as an effective and reliable way of valuing and behaving (Rogers, 1969, p. 286).

Rogers' example of organismic valuing is the infant's valuing process. The healthier the person becomes, the more his "experiencing becomes open to him; the more his valuing process begins to assume many of the characteristics it had in infancy" (Rogers, 1969, p. 248). For instance, a child who enjoys pulling his sister's hair exhibits his organismic valuing process; for him, it is satisfying to hear his sister's crying. This is an operative value; i.e. in Rogers' terms, the tendency of any living beings to show preference, in their actions, for one kind of object or objective rather than another. Operative valuing need not involve any cognitive or conceptual thinking. It is simply the value that the organism selects. When the earthworm chooses the softside of a Y-maze instead of the rough side of the maze paved with sandpaper, it is indicating an operative value (Rogers, 1969, p. 241). Operative values are flexible and not rigidly held because they are based on the person's own organismic experiences.

The child's valuing process changes, however, when he is reprimanded for hurting his sister. The caretaker either tells him that he is a bad boy or slaps him on the hand. He is then denied love and affection. He learns "(...) that what feels good is often bad in the

eyes of others" (Rogers, 1969, p. 244). As this process is repeated, the child gradually perceives himself as bad. The next time he pulls his sister's hair, he thinks "I am a bad boy." He thus introjects or appropriates as his own an external value, one which does not emerge from within his own experiencing. Rogers refers to such introjected values as conceived values (Rogers, 1969, p. 243-244). Conceived values are rigid and inflexible. Contrary to conceived or socially imposed values, operative or - authentic - values are flexible; they change depending on whether they are experienced as self-enhancing. Authentic values are therefore tenuous, based on the person's immediate experience, and continually changing rather than being fixed, rigid, and externally imposed (Rogers, 1969, p. 249).

Organismic evaluation allows one to be in touch with all the available data in a given situation: social demands, personal needs, memories of similar situations, and perceptions of the uniqueness of the situation will be rightly evaluated by the organism. The organism will consider each stimulus, the needs and demands of the body, as well as the intensity and importance of those needs, in order to choose a course of action which will fulfill the individual's needs in a given situation. Rogers compares organismic evaluation to the workings of a giant electronic computer. Like the computer, the person's organism considers existential data and quickly indicates that action which would most efficiently satisfy the individual's needs at a given moment (Rogers, 1969, p. 286-287).

The person who is less than fully functioning, on the other hand, replaces her organismic valuing process by making one of the

following mistakes: 1. using non-existential data; that is, memories or previous learnings instead of actual experiences. These data, fed into the computation under the guise of actual experience compromise the organismic evaluating process; 2. using distorted data or incomplete data; that is, data that is either altered and fed into the computation, or data that is too threatening for the organism and thus inhibited from awareness. A reliance on these two types of data is responsible for erroneous behaviours. However, in the healthy, fully functioning individual, because computations are constantly being corrected, aberrant behaviours are rapidly and efficiently rectified (Rogers, 1969, p. 286-287).

The fully functioning person's valuing process is also highly differentiated. She will treat situations individually rather than rely on solid, monolithic and introjected values. As was previously discussed, the locus of evaluation is found within the individual rather than in external sources. The person's own experiences provide the individual with the necessary and pertinent feedback to deal with situations (Rogers, 1969, p. 249).

The fully functioning person then, clearly relies on a complex organismic selection process to determine her behaviour. She recognizes that her feelings, intuitions and experiences can be trusted for making value choices. In other words, her organismic experiences may be wiser, more sensitive, and more accurate than her intellect. The individual can therefore be honest with herself and say: "I feel that this experience is good; later, I will probably know

why it is good." (Rogers, 1969, p. 250). This process takes precedence over the conscious and rational faculties of the individual. The important thing is that the fully functioning person lives fully in and with each of her organismic experiences (Rogers, 1969, p. 288). The fact that the person may not have a clear-cut and rational sense of where she is going is unimportant, explains Rogers. The mere fact of being on one's way and moving forward is what essentially counts (Rogers, 1969, p. 287). Such a person knows that her organismic sensing can be used as stepping stones or assets for future growth. In addition, this form of self-acceptance is conducive to deeper and more meaningful relationships with other individuals (Rogers, 1969, p. 96).

Freedom from any kind of external evaluation and criticism promotes highly social behaviour, for one of the human being's greatest needs is that of affiliation and communication with others. An individual who is allowed to be completely herself will naturally and realistically become socialized. It is therefore useless to devise ways for controlling a person's aggressive impulses, since, if the individual is in a context where freedom and self-evaluation are encouraged, balanced, realistic and highly social behaviours will ensue (Rogers, 1969, p. 252-254).

The only control Rogers accepts is the natural organismic and internal balancing of one need against another and the discovery and emergence of behaviours which satisfy the most needs. Thus, the fully functioning person participates in the complex self-regulatory

activities of her organism on the psychological and physiological levels. This allows her to live harmoniously with herself and others. The authentic person would never experience the satisfaction of some needs (e.g., aggression, sex) at the expense of other needs (e.g., love, companionship) (Rogers, 1969, p. 291).

When persons use their power of organismic evaluation, they reject facades, pretence, and defensiveness, move away from oughts and other external imperatives, direct their own lives and make their own choices. They have a positive self-image and perceive their reactions as being worthy in and of themselves. Such persons also move away from set goals and learn to enjoy their own process of actualizing. More importantly, they become open to all of their experiences, reactions and feelings as well as those of others. This openness to experience is the person's most important personal wealth (Rogers, 1969, p. 253).

Briefly stated, the fully functioning person is a free subject, one who is open to her experience, is creative, lives in an existential way, experiences a sense of personal freedom and power, and can trust her organismic valuing process for determining which action she should take in each situation she encounters. The fully functioning person, we argued, is the outgrowth of Rogers' quest for a science of the person. Where scientific psychology treats persons as objects, this psychology claims to respect the human being's subjective freedom. We should now be in a better position to give some elements of an answer to our initial question: to what extent does

Rogers distance himself from the naturalistic view of the human being? How well does he capture the key elements which existential phenomenology has to offer to research in the human sciences? In other words, how adequate is the concept of the fully functioning person as a portrayal of human freedom?

CHAPTER III- AN ADEQUATE PORTRAYAL OF HUMAN FREEDOM?

Rogers sees that the existential approach and phenomenological method will allow psychology to restore the subject in his or her rightful place. But what, exactly, is that place? In this chapter, we will argue that the rightful place of the subject is in counterpart to the object. It will be our contention that the Rogerian concept of "subject" fails to take into account its vital, dialectical and relational opposite - the object. A second prominent notion in Rogers' portrayal of human freedom, is that of organismic valuing. Here again, the study of existential phenomenological insights suggest that Rogers' concept of valuing is limited.

A. Subject-Object Relationship

Thinking in a dialectical - not antithetical way⁴ - allows existential phenomenology to see that subject and object are at the same time opposites and complements. Subjectivism is the kind of reduction that the subject undergoes when it is cut from its necessary correlate, the object.

⁴Dialectical thinking sees how opposites complement each other, for example: knowing what is not-me helps one find who he or she is. Thinking in antitheses is thinking in basic dualism: black and white, right and wrong.

1. Subject or subjectivism?

The preceding chapter described how the concepts of openness to experience, existential living, creativity and organismic trust are all characteristics of human freedom. They are unobservable and hence subjective phenomena which Rogers describes and emphasizes in detail (Coulson & Rogers, 1968, p. 71). To briefly summarize, the fully functioning person is the person who can experience what is going on within himself in terms of bodily sensations and feelings in the here and now, without external constraints, inhibitions and evaluations. The person therefore lives in and trusts his own personal and subjective world of organismic experiences (Rogers, 1961, p. 187-189; 1969, p. 284, 290; Rogers in Koch, 1959, p. 191). These qualities are subjective in that they are based on the individual's personal experience. Rogers explains that a focus on the subjective allows one to understand and describe the human being from the inside and not simply "as a machine (...) an object or a determined sequence of cause and effect;" to see the person as an existing human being "with more to his life than can be compressed into a machine model." Rogers refers to this kind of outlook as phenomenological thinking (Coulson & Rogers, 1968, p. 71).

Phenomenological thinking gave Rogers access to the experiential world of the other. This ability to empathically understand the other person's internal frame of reference allows him to treat the human being as an experiencing subject, in a holistic way

rather than simply limiting himself to those things which are typically observable, measurable, and quantifiable (Giorgi, 1970, p. 185; Milhollan, 1972, p. 82). Rogers' recurring emphasis on the subjective, the phenomenal field or the private world of inner personal meanings is consistent with his desire to use the phenomenological approach. In his own way, he is saying, along with phenomenologists, that the life-world is the most fundamental frame of reference from which psychology must begin and with which it must always be connected so as to not distance itself from its source of raw data (Giorgi, 1970, p. 178). For Rogers, "it is (...) in the immediate, personal, subjective, experience that all science and each individual scientific research has its origins" (Rogers, 1961, p. 217). In returning to the experiences of the person, to his "feelings, values, and all that is found in the inner life," Rogers fulfills to a certain extent, his desire for a human science, one which views the human being as a free and experiencing subject.

Rogers' emphasis on the subjective experiences of the fully functioning person has, however, led him to assume that everything which comes from within the organism or the person is positive; whereas that which is external to the subject, i.e. parents, the school, the church and the rest of society, becomes a negative influence for the organism's free and spontaneous development as a human subject. Rogers is preoccupied with freeing the subject from external influences; for him, to say that the person is influenced by external forces is to return to the view of the human being as a determined object bound by outside and - necessarily adverse -

pressure. Organismic evaluation is self-evaluation, being in touch with one's own experiencing process, and moving towards self-enhancement (Rogers, 1969, p. 256). Rogers does not mention external criteria, standards or principles against which one is to evaluate oneself.

It is very telling that Rogers' example of organismic evaluation is the infant. Basic developmental psychology shows that the infant has no experience of what is "not me"; he lives in a totally self-contained world. For Rogers, the influence of significant persons - in this case, the mother - can only lead to a gradual forgoing of one's own healthy organismic evaluations for a rigid, uncertain, inefficient, externally based and introjected system of conceived, inauthentic values. The fully functioning infant grows into a dysfunctional adult, one who is unfree and determined by external influences (Rogers, 1969, p. 244).

The emphasis on subjectivity can also be observed in Rogers' description of the social character of the individual. He assumes that if the person is allowed to be completely herself, she will naturally, realistically, and spontaneously become socialized. In other words, if a person experiences non-punitive and non-evaluative environments, she will have no need or desire to resort to anti-social behaviour. The complex self-regulatory activities of her organism, on the psychological and physiological level, will allow her to live harmoniously with herself and others (Rogers, 1969, p. 291). The only thing that the healthy subject needs, then, is her own organism

to become a fully functioning individual. Here again, a sense of others and reality as other or "not me" is lacking.

Rogers' conception of external influences as being often coercive and therefore negative has led him to cross a dangerous *Rubicon*: that which separates "subject" from subjectivism. Subjectivism is the name given to "any theory conceived by reason of sheer preference or emotional need without regard for the demands of reality; it is the tendency of the individual to lock himself up in his own ideas and feelings, the inability to consider things from the objective viewpoint" (Strasser, 1963, p. 59). Although we would not go as far as saying that Rogers is incapable of considering things from the objective viewpoint, we are led to believe that, in his concept of human freedom, he has chosen to neglect certain facts of reality: the facts that, 1. objective standards, criteria, principles for evaluation, are the very factors that make the difference between rational fairness and arbitrary process; 2. there is every indication that it is natural for human beings to be social; historical experience strongly suggests that social harmony between humans is far from being as spontaneous a fact as order in a beehive. Defining the human being as a free subject therefore means establishing the dialectical relationship between the subject and the object in which he will discover himself by coming to terms with that which is other-than-himself.⁵ Erikson (1980) has aptly shown how human development

⁵In client-centered therapy, the facilitative conditions place the client in front of the therapist, but the therapist does not confront or act as an external influence, such as in psychoanalysis.

and mental health consist in establishing a relation between the self and ever-widening horizons of otherness.

2. The object: a necessary correlative

Existential phenomenology insists on the fact that the very concept of "subject" - if it is to avoid the pitfalls of subjectivism - requires the dialectical relation to its counterpart, the object (*objectare* : that which is thrown in front of or against). The human subject is subjected ("thrown under") or is open to the objective, due to the intentional (*in - tendere* : in tension) structure of human conscience. It is also "thrown under" or open to the objective because it is subjected to social facticity. Phenomenologists refer to this concept of openness to the world as intentionality .

a. Intentionality

Intentionality is a basic concept of existential phenomenology, one which describes the uniqueness of human consciousness and existence (Luijpen, 1969, p. 49-51). Intentionality refers to the fact that the human subject is always "in tension" between himself and the other, the world (Luijpen, 1969, p. 20-21). It expresses the fact that the person is not closed, fully self-sufficient and locked up in her own experiences. This is precisely what distinguishes her from things or lower forms of life. The human being is, to use existential jargon, "ex-isting," outside herself in the world (Luijpen, 1962, p. 18-19). To ex-ist as a free subject means to emerge from oneself, to

reach out beyond one's subjective experience (Luijpen, 1969, p. 38-39). The person therefore does not simply occur without being involved in a world; there is always a relation between the subject and the object or the outside world. The human being cannot exist in isolation, as an encapsulated thing in the same way as a vase on a table; progress in specifically human living necessarily means openness to ever-receding limits of realities that transcend the given, the here and now (Luijpen, 1969, p. 61).

In light of this fundamental insight, Rogers' view of human freedom in the fully functioning person appears to be inadequate because he emphasizes the person's own subjective experience to such extent that the external is either fused with the internal - as in spontaneous socialization - or considered oppressive and threatening to the subject. Because the Rogerian model fails to recognize the necessary function of the object, the fully functioning person is limited to revolving around his own experiences, unconnected to or adversely related to anything that is other than himself. The concept of the fully functioning person easily lends itself to misinterpretation: it can, and as Strasser (1963) has shown, does describe a person locked up in his own experiences, incapable of going beyond himself. Rogers' rejection of external influences and his assumption that the human being will spontaneously, freely and naturally develop into a healthy fully functioning person if he is left to his own resources and subjective experiences, causes one to question his view of human nature.

In effect, Rogers constantly explains human life in terms of lower organisms. The human being is like a plant or an animal which relies on natural laws and instincts for survival and development. Rogers is well-known for his constant use of agricultural analogies. For instance, the potato sprout describes the actualizing potential in human beings. Rogers depicts growth in humans, despite adverse conditions, in terms of the potato sprouts he discovered in a dark basement, "The conditions were unfavorable, but the potatoes would begin to sprout - pale white sprouts, so unlike the healthy green shoots they sent up when planted in the soil in the spring (...) In dealing with clients whose lives have been terribly warped, in working with men and women on the back wards of state hospitals, I often think of those potato sprouts" (Rogers, in Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 248). The analogy might have some merit; it might even have inspired Rogers. But one cannot help but cringe at its simplicity. The potato sprout analogy exemplifies the very downfall of analogical thinking: it does not give a clear concept. Although it does point to the nearest gender of the thing to be defined, it fails to underline its specific difference; that is, the difference that makes it another kind of thing. For a researcher whose avowed quest is to discover how psychology can be made into a science of human beings, not laboratory animals, analogical reasoning is clearly and profoundly inadequate.

b. Interdependence

The concept of interdependence (social facticity) refers to the fact that the human being is open and permeable, so to speak, to the other human beings that he encounters (Luijpen 1969, p. 152-153). The person is not as independent as Rogers would have him to be. Rather, he is deeply oriented towards others. Orientation to others assumes the form of opening-oneself-to, exposing oneself to, or being vulnerable to the other. The person is therefore "dependent" on someone else. Unlike Rogers' fully functioning person, she is not the original creator of anything (Strasser, 1963, p. 83-84). The world of human beings existed long before she arrived into it; she cannot exist as a person in it without others (Luijpen, 1969, p. 147-149). Consciousness of one's social facticity is part of the concept of objectivity. "Objectivity, (...) (is) a human attitude, (in which) free man (acknowledges the fact) of his orientation to and being normalized by (things and persons) which (are) not himself, (...)" It is the opposite of arbitrariness, prejudice and self-sufficient subjectivism "(Strasser, 1963, p. 85).

The person is therefore a being-through-others (Luijpen, 1969, p. 152). Only persons encounter one another; things hit one another; and animals face one another. Something is always left behind in each person's existence after the encounter. When persons participate in a dialogue, there is what Luijpen describes as, a "quasi-process of sedimentation" or social facticity. This occurs from the very moment of existence. For example, the way in which a person

eats, speaks, and greets others, is due to the fact that this person grew in the West and not in the Middle East (Luijpen, 1969, p. 152). A person's appreciation of values today is contingent upon the fact that he or she lives in the 20th Century. The human being is therefore influenced by his culture, and on a larger and more long-term scale by history (Luijpen, 1969, p. 149).

But to say that the human being is subjected to social facticity does not mean that he is the mere product of social forces; that his thinking, valuing and acting are nothing but results of the group's pressure. Rogers fails to recognize the fact that external influence is not the force exerted on a thing by another thing. The others' influence on the subject is unlike the influence of an object on another object because the human being has the unique ability to give meaning to her social facticity. Human action can be influenced or externally motivated; this does not mean unilaterally and deterministically caused (Luijpen, 1969, p. 152). Human freedom is the capacity to find and give meaning to facticity; to transform the objectively given.

Those who have made important inroads into psychology as a human science speak of situated freedom as opposed to a cosmic or absolute freedom. The human subject is involved in reality in a way that is non-existent in the being of things (Luijpen, 1962, 273; Strasser, 1963, p. 43). The human being projects himself ("throws himself forward") into the future. His life project is self-realization. As a matter of fact, human beings are the only animals who are

keenly aware of their incompleteness, of their need to be in dynamic relationship with things and persons that will offer them the "otherness" they seek. Rogers does address the person's potential for actualization, but he speaks of actualizing in such a way that the person is limited to revolving around his own experiences rather than going beyond them. The power to reach out of the here and now and the given is called the capacity for self-transcendence. This capacity - the power to emerge from the world of things and others where one is immersed - is a unique prerogative of human subjects (Luijpen, 1969, p. 152-153; Luijpen, 1962, p. 178).

How adequately does the concept of the fully functioning person capture the insights of existential phenomenology with regard to the objective component of human subjectivity? Rogers thinks in dichotomies, not in dialectics. To him, "objective" means "outside," inauthentic, unreal. He never gives a clear indication of seeing that object and subject are - like father and son, for example - correlative realities. This misunderstanding prevents him from discovering the exclusively human structure of conscience: intentionality, and the specifically human way of living together - social interdependence. The fully functioning person seems to lack the one specific human prerogative: the power of self-transcendence. How different, then, is the fully functioning person from the object of psychology as a natural science?

In view of this, the fully functioning person will never reach an authentic human existence because he is conceived as an isolated:

subjectivity "free" from all external influences, or from everything which does not emerge from himself. Such a view of the person is equivalent to the being of an object or lower form of life which is uninvolved in reality in its compact density and which lies "prostrated in what it is" (Luijpen, 1962, p. 273). The way in which analogical thinking is used in Rogers' concept of human freedom in the fully functioning person fails to establish the specific difference between humans and lower forms of life. Consequently, he does not remain faithful to his ambition of creating a human science.

B. Valuing in the Human Being

Rogers' quest for a human science, one which recognizes the person as a free and autonomous being, leads him to his concept of the organismic valuing process. Valuing at the organismic level, Rogers claims, will free the person from oppressive influences. Here again, does Rogers account for the very qualities that distinguish the human being from the rest of the animate world?

1. Organismic valuing: the essence of freedom?

Rogers' focus and emphasis on the organismic valuing process is his attempt to free the human being from the rigid, absolute and contradictory values or value systems that traditionally formed a part of his culture (Rogers, 1969, p. 240). Instead of being determined by introjected, false or conceived values, the fully functioning person relies on her organism, thus finding authentic,

operative values. Rogers' intention is to treat the human being as a free and autonomous subject capable of relying on his own organism for determining authentic operative values as opposed to being determined by external and introjected values (i.e. conceived values). The organismic valuing process releases the human being from confining values; it gives the person a strong sense of control over her life decisions.

But closer analysis and further reflection bring about the following question: could Rogers be settling into a kind of reductionism which fails to establish the specific difference between human choices and other organisms' expressed preferences? Why does Rogers insist on using the term "organism" or "organismic" for referring to human phenomena? This term, consistent with the materialist perspective, highlights the similarities between persons and the rest of animal and vegetable life, but fails to establish the specific difference between persons as self-conscious beings. The failure to recognize the difference between humans and animals is prominent in Rogers' example of organismic valuing in the earthworm. Here, analogical thinking leads to an error: if there is some likeness between earthworms' and human beings' choosing, it is a similarity that exists between things which are otherwise essentially unlike. Rather than looking at valuing in persons at the properly human level, Rogers chooses, in his analogy, to describe "valuing" at its lowest and most primitive level. The human being, like the earthworm relying on its organismic valuing process, chooses operative values as opposed to conceived, introjected values.

As has been pointed out in chapter two, these values are considered to be cognitive and conceptual, and therefore undesirable. The process of choosing values in humans is therefore brought down to a visceral inclination or preference (Rogers, 1969, p. 241-244, 249).

Another instance of reductionism is Rogers' elaboration of the organismic valuing process. This process, described in terms of an internal balancing of one need against another and the discovery and emergence of behaviours which satisfy the most needs, is indistinguishable from animal behaviour: an animal simply follows the impulse of the strongest need; a given impulse within certain conditions will lead to a certain behaviour. The animal's behaviour is therefore determined; it follows a certain course and can be expressed in the form of laws. Animals therefore are and remain an element of material nature (Luijpen, 1962, p. 303). If that is the situation of the fully functioning person, is he not basically determined? Does he not, like lower animals, remain an element of material nature? Surely, the human being partakes in the world of animals. Persons feel needs, wants, and bodily urges. The specific difference, however, between other animals and the human animal is that the latter can take a distance from his needs, wants and urges. He can choose among various ways of answering them - and he can choose not to answer them. The human being is not motivated by his drives. If and when a person simply and unreflectively does what her body tells her to do, she is bound by her bodily processes and basically a slave to her organismic experiences. This can be seen as the ultimate picture of unfreedom. Rogers' concept of the organismic

experience was intended to free the individual from social forces. Unfortunately, it results in a reduction of valuing, a typically human prerogative, to the level of the earthworm, or worse, to the mechanics of a giant electronic computer. Rather than describing a specifically human phenomenon at the properly human level, Rogers, through his analogical reasoning, chooses to describe the person's most integrated functioning in terms of his more basic and visceral level of functioning. Rogers limits his reflection on freedom to the most naturalistic aspects of the freedom found in lower animals. His conception of the organismic valuing process in the fully functioning person fails to include all aspects of human nature and especially those aspects which set humans apart from organisms.

These observations have led us to ask the following questions: if Rogers felt that the theories, models and methods derived from studying rats, pigeons and chicken scratches were irrelevant and inadequate for a human psychology in that they have led to a view of human nature based on determinism, why does he consistently return to the world of plants and animals to describe complex human phenomena and actions such as valuing and decision-making? Although Rogers' concept of freedom notes the difference between observable, measurable, quantifiable things and human beings, it still does not go far enough: it does not do justice to the difference between animal determinism and the human power to negotiate with natural determinism. It appears that Rogers commits the same mistakes he attributed to his adversaries, i.e. treating the human being as a determined object. In this, Rogers stops short of realizing

his original goal: a human psychology. It is the position of this research that a better integration of the concepts of existential phenomenology - Rogers' own philosophical option - could have given him, as it has given other researchers committed to developing psychology as a human science, a better grasp of the human being as a free and autonomous subject.

In a therapeutic situation, it might be very well indicated to liberate the client from neurotic rationalizations and unjustified social pressure. But Rogers extends the therapeutic paradigm to marriage, child rearing and teaching. In the heyday of permissiveness, the Rogerian concept of freedom (i.e. freedom *from*) has created serious practical problems. The problem with generalizing Rogers' therapeutic paradigm to education is that this paradigm takes pathology or neurotic functioning as a guide for healthy functioning (Nuttin, 1968 p. 235-239). Rogers aptly reminds the educator, like the therapist, that he must recognize and respect where the student is situated at the emotional, cognitive and psychological level. It is the very first step towards healthy functioning. Such unconditional acceptance of the student's organismic experience however, is not sufficient for guiding the student towards that which she is capable of becoming. The person has the potential for self-realization; but a potential is not a reality. People naturally grow into humanhood; that is not to say that they spontaneously become all that they can be. The educator thus serves as the "other" towards which the student is oriented and by which she is normalized. As Strasser has said, such is "(...) the opposite of

arbitrariness, prejudice, and self-sufficient subjectivism" (Strasser, 1963, p. 85). Flowers and all organic life develop spontaneously. People do not spontaneously become full human beings; they do not automatically learn specific human ways of being. They must, at some point, intervene in their own development.

2. A broader conception of valuing

The free human being is much broader than natural man. A more comprehensive view of the human being is needed; a view which includes the highest levels of human activity as well as the more basic forms of being. Such a view can be found in existential phenomenology; it has inspired the research of one of the proponents of psychology as a human science, namely Giorgi (1970, p. 94).

What exactly distinguishes human freedom from the freedom of the rest of the animate world? Existential phenomenology describes human freedom by first making a clear distinction between humans, animals and things: it declares that a thing can be explained in terms of its antecedents; that is, it is the result of processes and forces. A thing cannot rise above its antecedents; it is confined to the here and now (Luijpen, 1969, p. 266). In a similar way, lower forms of life are determined by natural laws such as instincts. They cannot transcend the present experience, their own here and now; they simply live in the immediacy of their experiences. Furthermore, the forces determining the being of a thing as well as the results are "blind" in that they are not aware of themselves as

forces and results. Things are simply what they are and nothing more; they are not for themselves and are not for other things, i.e. they have no meaning for themselves or for other things. They simply are without being aware of what they are, what they are not and what they exist for (Luijpen, 1962, p. 266-267).

Unlike other conscious organisms, the human being does not just experience things as they appear to him. One could say that human experience, in the final analysis, is tied to the meaning that the person finds in, or gives to, objects of the world. For example, the old rocker that my dog looks at with a blank gaze is, in my eyes, a precious memento of an adored grandmother. To me, the squeaks of this old chair bring back memories of my grandmother quietly drinking her cup of tea on her porch. In other words, the human subject has the capacity to reveal or give a third dimension: the depth of meaning to reality. This capacity to give meaning to reality indicates a higher level of consciousness, one which other conscious organisms do not have (Luijpen, 1962, p. 267).

a. The person as rational

The quality of the human being which allows us to say that he is free is rationality. Because of reason, the person belongs to himself: he shares with the gods the capacity to be *causa sui*, (his own cause). If human freedom was to be understood by means of analogy, it could be compared to the godly *hegemonikon* (hegemony) of reason. Be that as it may, experience itself shows that human beings - at least healthy human beings - are not merely the result of processes and forces. In other words, to be free at the properly human level, is to be rational; this is the aspect of the human being which distinguishes him from lower organisms; reason is what frees persons from necessity, processes and forces (Luijpen, 1962, p. 267-269).

Human rationality is the capacity to reflect, to choose and to answer to oneself and others. This is the essence of human valuing. Every free action or value choice is preceded by a standing back, so to speak, from the given situation, and by a conscious choice among various possibilities. Here, we see the pervading influence of objective reality and the impossibility for the subject to escape this objectivity by isolating himself within some "inner" (i.e. cut from "outer") experience. The subject's freedom is objectively a situated freedom. Human choices are therefore never absolutely free from facticity. It is a choice within a given situation (Luijpen, 1962, p. 299). This distance between what "is" and what "can be" emerges from the person's objective consciousness (Luijpen, 1962, p. 304).

Human consciousness is self-consciousness. In matters of valuing, animals are conscious of their needs; their consciousness is, so to speak, a non-judgemental witness of their state. While human beings also have this conscious-as-witness of themselves, they also have what is called conscience, the power to discriminate right from wrong. This could be called conscience-as-judge of the self. In moral matters, i.e. in matters of right and wrong, human valuing takes the form of judging oneself. It necessarily establishes a link with standards, criteria, principles that reach beyond the self. This objective moral consciousness explains why the person looks into the past, the present, and the future in a way that is impossible in lower animals. Conscience allows the person to describe reality as it is, as well as to have a forward view of how things ought to be. To be rational therefore implies the capacity to remove oneself from one's experiences; to take a distance, reflect, and choose values and actions accordingly (Luijpen, 1962, p. 269, 286). Human conscience, which implies moral decision-making, cannot, therefore, be identified with biological consciousness. To reduce moral decision-making to the level of biological and instinctive substructures is to speak of a rudimentary and primitive form of conscience. Personal conscience presupposes and emerges from its biological and instinctive substructures, but it is an error to assume that it is identical to these substructures (Luijpen, 1962, p. 287-288).

b. The person as having-to-be

Existential phenomenology presents the person as a project; a being who is constantly thrown beyond itself. The essential difference between lower forms of life and human life is that the specific attributes of humanity are not native endowments or entitlements; they are achievements. The human individual is born incomplete; his whole life task is to realize (make real) or actualize (make actual) himself. The human self is a potentiality that needs to be "real-ized" or "actual-ized."

This realization does not "happen"; it is the result of action - not behaviour - on the part of a free and responsible agent. The human being has this prerogative that goes beyond the level of organic life, he will not "just naturally" or spontaneously grow; persons must intervene in their own development. Human action is an intervention; the human subject can detach himself from the push and pull of natural process, and choose a course that goes beyond the appeal of the here-and-now (Luijpen, 1962, p. 304). Human action, unlike animal behaviour, is preceded by an objective evaluation of reasons for acting. Inasmuch as the person is incapable of such a reflection, the action is not authentically human and consequently not free (Luijpen, 1962, p. 304). The fact that human beings are a potentiality much more than a given; the fact that they spend their lives actual-izing the potential that they are, and the fact that they move beyond their instincts and the immediate appeal of the here and now indicate that it is inappropriate to use terms such as process and evolution for describing human existence (Luijpen, 1962, p. 305).

Rogers' concept of the organismic valuing process in persons is indistinguishable from the tendency-related behaviour of lower animals. In opposing the wisdom of the body to that of reason, and in basing complex moral decision-making on the givens of the here and now, Rogers minimizes the very quality which constitutes human freedom: objective consciousness and rationality. The fully functioning person remains immersed in her organismic processes and experiences. Rogers thus speaks of a very basic and primitive form of consciousness or awareness; he sees no place for conscience or human self-judgement.

c. The person as moral agent

For Rogers, two of the central fundamental outcomes of therapy and education are: 1. the person's feeling increasingly "unconditional positive self-regard;" i.e. perceiving oneself in such a way that "no self-experience can be discriminated as more or less worthy of positive regard than any other," and 2. "experiencing oneself as the locus of evaluation." This is achieved in part by the facilitator's non-judgemental attitude (Rogers, in Koch, 1959, p. 209; Rogers, 1969, p. 263).

Surely, in a clinical situation, it is critical that a person first stop putting increasingly demanding conditions upon herself before she can have a healthy self-esteem; for example, "I will feel good about myself when I am 20 lbs, thinner." Secondly, it is also

necessary that a person become the evaluator of her own life. The problem with the therapeutic paradigm when it is uncritically transposed to education and to moral education is that it reduces self-evaluation (conscience-as-moral-judge) to self-expression (conscious-as-witness). Consciousness or awareness is not conscience. While it might not be the therapist's role to pass judgement on his client's values, it is difficult to see how an educator - teacher or parent - can avoid evaluating the child's or the learner's behaviour and attitudes.

The facilitator's non-judgemental attitude and his blind trust in the organismic experience of the person does not and cannot lead him to ever challenge the person's interpretation of facts; he ultimately and uncritically accepts the person's account of things. He avoids all moralizing, criticizing, transmitting or promoting values. No evaluation in terms of "good" or "right" or "acceptable" or their opposites is given (Vitz, 1977, p. 84; Gow, 1980, p. 16). This attitude inculcates the idea that a healthy life consists in rejecting all objective standards, duties, denials, inhibitions or restraints in order to follow personal rights, opportunities for change, present wants, fulfilments, preferences, gratification and one's own life goals. There are basically no "rights" and "wrongs" (Vitz, 1977, p. 38; Gow, 1980, p.16, 82). The notion of unconditional self-regard in the fully functioning person is therefore in conflict with basic notions of moral conscience. The person is never required to justify the values she holds or to learn how to evaluate or to critically analyze her behaviour (Gow, 1980, p. 42). As Vitz rightly points out, Rogers'

theoretical principles, unrestrained by sensible limits and moral responsibility, allow and even encourage, the person to settle in a self-gratifying, narcissistic world (Vitz, 1977, p. 80). The fully functioning individual ultimately becomes the center of the universe and values depend on what feels or seems right or wrong to him alone; "good is what is good for me" becomes the guiding principle (Gow, 1980, p. 80-81).

The non-judgemental attitude, coupled with the belief that the person is intrinsically good and will develop spontaneously if left to her own resources, does not therefore consider that self-expression can and indeed has led to exploitation, or even sadism. Persons like Hitler or Manson led lives that were very coherent with personally-held values. The non-judgemental attitude fails to account for the fact that life has its limitations and that an awareness of these limitations and boundaries is the first step towards wisdom and moral decision-making (Vitz, 1977, p. 38). By advocating a return to the infant's way of valuing as an example of a fully functioning human being, Rogers does not recognize the negative experiences which are intrinsic to human nature. For example, the one-year-old's first jealousy, the first aggressions, the easy way children learn the concept "mine" and the difficult time they have learning the concept "yours", children's extreme self-centeredness, their capacity for becoming totally demanding tyrants - all this is ignored (Vitz, 1977, p. 85). Silence over such unpleasant realities and the constant message of "love and trust yourself and do your own thing" is, to a certain extent, responsible for the immediate appeal of the

therapeutic paradigm. But the last decades have shown a growing number of adults who break down when they eventually realize that not all is within their control, or that they cannot get what they want. After years of "doing their own thing" they find themselves alone, rootless, apathetic, and adrift. For those persons, psychology, i.e. therapy, has in fact, become a cult, which Vitz identifies as "the cult of self-worship" - all in the name of growth, autonomy, creativity, and getting in touch with one's organismic experience (Vitz, 1977, p. 45).

The idea of the intrinsically good and happy child, with negative influences coming from external sources is therefore simplistic and naive. Rogers never considers the fact that parents and society provide necessary, and positive influences, values, and healthy limits: love, respect for human and personal dignity, caring for others, duty, justice, loyalty, a healthy work ethic, truth, compassion, over and above the very constructive influence of home. These activities and influences are not only a source of healthy and pleasant experiences and character building for the child, they are also the everyday, positive, observable, and "sustaining activities and values of a normal child's daily life" (Vitz, 1977, p. 86).

In teaching children these values, caretakers and educators lay the foundation for critical thinking, an ability that persons will need all their lives. In effect, persons will always need to weigh and pass judgement on the exactness of facts, the validity of reasons, and the authenticity of values. They will have to examine issues in the light

of evaluative standards and not simply based on their preferences at any given moment. Persons need to acknowledge a core of objective values in order to evaluate their lives on the basis of these values. Such core values need not, as Rogers would believe, be imposed by indoctrination; in mature persons, they are critically analyzed in terms of historical, legal, philosophical, and psycho-social components (Gow, 1980, p. 163). All their lives, people will need to evaluate the extent to which ends are legitimate and establish a balance between means and ends. Whether they realize it or not, they will arrange values in a hierarchy and establish a set of standards (Gow, 1980, p. 96, 137). Surely, moral principles allow for extenuating circumstances; i.e. lying to conceal a Jew in Nazi Germany. This however, does not mean that there are no objective values and standards (Gow, 1980, p. 91-92).

Choosing values on the basis of individual preferences, needs, and wants alone results in the idea that all values are considered to be of equal value. Concretely speaking, everything becomes equally insignificant when all values are considered of equal value: "(...) Anybody's values are as good as anybody else's (...) good, bad, better, best become quite equivalent. There are no moral absolutes ... Man and his needs, his pleasures and fulfillments become the criteria of good and evil" (Gow, 1980, p. 157; Giroux, 1992, in press).

In sum, moral evaluation is "to make judgements about better and worse, good and bad, fit and unfit, sound and unsound, competent and incompetent (...). To avoid judgement (..) is not to be

sensitive and tolerant, it is escaping responsibility" (Gow, 1980, p. 226).

Rogers' depiction of human freedom leaves us with more questions than answers. What happens to the concept of subjectivity when it is detached from its necessary counterpart, objectivity, in the form of tension towards what is not the self, be it reality or other selves? What happens also, to the concept of human choosing, especially in moral matters, when the process of evaluation is illustrated through the tendency-related behaviour of lower organisms? If such is human valuing, how is one to evaluate the values for which Hitler lived and to which he gave his life?

CONCLUSION

Although Rogers acknowledged the value of the natural scientific approach in psychology, he also noticed its limitations. He observed that this approach led to certain assumptions about the nature of the human being which were not consistent with his view of the person; in effect, for scientific psychology, the human being is nothing but the result of processes and forces. Along with other well-known psychologists of the Third Force, Rogers adopts the existential view of man whose main tenet is that the human being is a free subject, possessing a personal power that allows him to transcend material determinism. His aim was to develop a science of the person, a science which, rather than treating the person as an object, affirms and recognizes him as a free subject.

Rogers' approach and method, existential phenomenology, enabled him to reach aspects of the human being which had been inaccessible to and thus dismissed by scientific psychology. This is how he was led to the concept of the fully functioning person, his portrayal of human freedom. Rogers' depiction of human freedom is his way of affirming the human being as a free subject as opposed to the traditional view of the human being as a passive locus of external forces.

Rogers' fully functioning person is characterized by different expressions of freedom; notably, openness to experience and organismic valuing. The purpose of this study was to examine whether or not, and to what extent Rogers succeeded, in his concept of the fully functioning person, in conceiving the person as a free subject, distinct from the determined objects of the natural sciences. In other words, how well did Rogers succeed in his original goal of establishing psychology as a science of the person?

The first part of our critique described how Rogers' eagerness to treat the fully functioning person as a free and independent subject led him to dismiss external influences. Rogers' thinking in dichotomies caused him to oppose the concepts of "subject" and "object", thus breaking the dialectical correlation that gives each concept its full meaning. In this, Rogers fails to understand the fact that when we define the human being as a free subject, it does not necessarily mean that we must renounce everything that does not

emerge from the person. By severing the dialectical ties between subject and object, Rogers overlooks the fact that human conscience is structurally intentional: in tension between the subject and everything that is other than the subject, the object. Human conscience is the free person's recognition of her orientation to and being normalized by something which is not herself; this is the opposite of self-sufficient subjectivism. Intentional conscience is the essential difference between humanity and the rest of created life.

The second part of our critique showed how Rogers, in order to free the human being from oppressive societal (conceived) values, hypothesizes that organismic experiences are wiser and more sensitive than the intellect. In returning to the pre-reflective or unreflective organismic experiences of the person, Rogers describes a process of valuing which neglects the decisive aspect of personhood and the difference it makes to have objective consciousness, judgment and to have to "real-ize" oneself.

Our analysis leads us to conclude that whereas Rogers rightly denounces scientific psychology's generalizations from laboratory animals to human beings, his constant use of analogies, borrowed from animal or vegetable life, as models of human freedom does not help him make inroads into a science of persons. These analogies cloud the specific difference between humans and lower forms of life. The Rogerian concept of freedom could be seen as a proper depiction of liberation or freedom from; but inasmuch as it is defined in terms of organic life, it is ultimately a concept of unfreedom.

These insights lead us to argue that the fully functioning person, determined by her immediate experiences and her organismic valuing process, is not the image of an authentically free human being. She is fundamentally indistinguishable from lower forms of life or the objects of the natural sciences. We thus conclude that Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person as his portrayal of human freedom is inadequate, for it fails to establish the specific difference between the free subject of the human sciences and the determined object of the natural sciences.

As far as education is concerned, followers and detractors of Rogerian thinking have made themselves widely heard during the last few decades; still, as has been noted, it receives wide attention. The time and effort that went into this study will have been well spent, indeed, if it could encourage practitioners to take a second look at any model; a look that uncovers its underlying vision of the person.

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