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AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANDROGYNY CONCEPT OF
SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION

by

WAYNE L. ASSAL

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Theology, Saint Paul University
Ottawa, Canada, in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the
Master's of Theology Degree

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INTRODUCTION

1. OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT

The role which human sexuality plays in providing meaning to human existence cannot be underestimated without encumbering human life with limitations which are, in the long run, detrimental to the development of that meaning.¹ Tremendous impact is felt individually and collectively, as a result of the manner in which a society decides to differentiate between the two different modes of human sexual being. For the individual, this societal decision effects role and interrelationship patterns. Collectively, it effects the types of role and relationship patterns which a society is willing to accept and promote.

Three models of sexual differentiation -- naturalist, environmentalist, and interactionist -- have been identified by Andre Guindon.² The naturalist model is basic biological determinism; the environmental is representative of social learning theory; while the interactionist model holds for the integration of both biological and social environment influences as the appropriate basis for sexual differentiation. Since each model has different ethical implications for sexual differentiation, some basic characteristics and consequences of these models will be reviewed, in Chapter I, as a preliminary step to the analysis which follows.

The analysis will involve an ethical assessment of the

validity of the claim that the concept of psychological androgyny represents an application of the interactionist model. This concept³ proposes that, independently, the biological and environmental models can adequately account for only a part of the creation of an individual's psycho-sexual identity. Furthermore, according to the psychological androgyny concept, the biological and environmental models place limitations on individual and societal development. By adopting a new perspective, androgynists believe that these developmental barriers may be overcome.⁴ The psychological androgyny concept attempts to remove these limitations, and other problems encountered in the application of the natural and environmental models, by uniting aspects of both of them. To do so it emphasizes that both differences and similarities are relevant to the discussion of the nature of human sexual relations.

To the extent that it is able to overcome the limitations and problems associated with positions originating from the naturalist and environmentalist models, the concept of psychological androgyny may be considered to be representative of interactionist thinking. The analysis which is presented here is oriented, therefore, to determining the extent to which the concept of psychological androgyny is representative of the interactionist model and, further, to an investigation of its ethical implications as a model of sexual differentiation.

2.OVERVIEW OF CONTENT PROCESS

The concept of psychological androgyny came into vogue,

most recently, in the early part of the Seventies following the publication of a book by Carolyn G. Heilbrun. Subsequently, it was specifically related to human sexuality by June Singer.⁵ Since then so many articles and related texts have been written about the concept that to speak of it in a general way would raise criticisms regarding the adequacy of the definition used. In order to avoid such criticism and for purposes of clarity and simplicity, the proposed ethical analysis will be applied to the conceptualization of psychological androgyny provided by Alexandra G. Kaplan and Mary Anne Sedney in their text Psychology and Sex Roles: An Androgynous Perspective. A review of the literature has indicated that the definition of androgyny which they present is representative of the mainstream view of the psychological concept. However, throughout the analysis reference will be made to alternative interpretations of psychological androgyny, where they are able to contribute to a clearer understanding of the concept.

In assessing the androgyny concept from an ethical perspective, the intention is to identify the ethical foundations which are, at least, implicit in the notion so that, first, the implications of these underpinnings in the area of male-female relations may be more clearly understood, and, second, that the model may be assessed as to its value for human development and understanding. In order to maintain the focus on the ethical implications of the concept, some of the more

scientific questions surrounding it, for example the question of the measurement of psychological androgyny or that of the historical development of the idea in the field of psychology, will not be addressed or will be briefly considered if required to clearly assess the concept.

Therefore, given the above limitations, the analysis will proceed in the following manner. In Chapter I some characteristics and ethical implications of the three models of sexual differentiation (naturalist, environmentalist and interactionist) will be outlined. Additionally, the conditions of the interactionist model, which the concept of psychological androgyny must satisfy to be accepted as interactionist, will be outlined.

In Chapter II the concept of androgyny which Kaplan and Sedney have proposed, referred to as a "life span development approach," will be introduced. Its reasoning will be examined by, first, differentiating psychological androgyny from other concepts of androgyny, identifying it in relation to some general notions of sexuality, and defining it in terms of the life span development approach. Next, specific components of the concept and characteristics of androgynous persons will be investigated. This will be followed by an examination of the influence exerted on the development of individual psychological sex by both biology and environment from a life-span perspective. Concepts discussed in this section will be taken up again in the assessment of the life span approach presented

in Chapter III.

A three-part assessment of the androgyny concept will be undertaken in Chapter III. First, the response of Kaplan and Sedney to various criticisms of the androgyny concept will be reviewed. Second, the relationship of the life-span approach of Kaplan and Sedney to Kohlberg's cognitive and moral development theory will be discussed in order to identify the level of cognitive and moral development implied in Kaplan and Sedney's psychological androgyny concept. It is believed that this will provide some insight into the philosophical and ethical foundations of their approach. Finally, the concept's ability to satisfy the criteria of the interactionist model, which will be established in Chapter I, will be assessed. A brief summary will conclude the chapter.

To sum up the analysis of the androgyny concept, two aspects will be considered in a brief Conclusion. First, the philosophical limitations of the concept will be considered, in an attempt to identify the cause of the language problems encountered by Kaplan and Sedney in attempting to explain the concept. Additionally, a philosophical orientation which might offer some language alternatives useful in expressing the androgyny concept will be suggested. A more detailed analysis of this philosophical approach will be presented in an Appendix. Second, a possible theological application of the androgyny concept will be considered. This will be followed by a short summary statement concluding the paper.

CHAPTER I: MODELS OF SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION

This chapter will summarize the characteristics and ethical implications of the three models of sexual differentiation which Andre Guindon has identified. As this paper originates from a seminar undertaken within the context of Guindon's research, and concerns itself with only a part of his three-model hypothesis, I will not attempt to reevaluate his hypothesis regarding the existence and structure of these models, nor discuss the broader topic of sexual differentiation. However, since my research has been conducted within the context of Guindon's, I believe it is important to identify, and appropriate to employ his hypothesis and ethical criteria. As indicated in the Introduction, criteria for assessing the androgyny construct will also be outlined in this part.

To analyze the ethical implications of psychological androgyny by assessing the degree to which it satisfies the conditions of the interactionist model is a move from the particular to the general. That is, the characteristics and implications for sexual differentiation of the androgyny concept will be the same, generally, as those of the interactionist model. Since the interactionist model is proposed as an improvement over the natural and environmental models, it seems appropriate to begin the assessment of psychological androgyny with a general overview of the characteristics and implications of the three models. This will provide the basis

for establishing a first set of criteria (comparative) for assessing psychological androgyny's interactionist claim. Thus, the androgyny concept, should it satisfy interactionist conditions, will represent an improvement over the various modes in which both the naturalist and environmentalist models of sexual differentiation are expressed.

1. THE NATURALIST OR BIOLOGICAL MODEL

From the perspective of the naturalist model, differences between the sexes are determined biologically. Thus, there are two forms of human existence which are entirely different. The roles which men and women assume, and the manner of acting these out, bear no resemblance to one another, but are complementary or fulfilling of one another. Furthermore, the roles which society will allow men and women to assume become prescribed by custom or law. These roles are generally oriented to maintaining this complementary perspective.

Therefore, in this model, human abilities and activities are attributed to individuals based on the assumption that biological differences result in fundamentally different natures in men and women which can only be brought together physically. This conception raises concerns about the ability of men and women to function together for their own well-being and the well-being of society, since it provides no common basis for interaction and communication between them⁶. These concerns include the characteristics attributed to femininity and masculinity, regulations limiting masculine and

feminine behavior, and the problems associated with individual freedom of action oriented to personal and societal well-being in a social system in which performance is limited by stereotypical conceptions of feminine and masculine behavior.

The view is quite simplistic and easy to operate under: roles are defined by sex and societal order can be maintained if it reflects nature's (biology's) model.⁷ It has survived because the body is apparent and easily quantifiable, thus comparable, in terms of its actions and reactions. Such quantifiability has promoted the prioritizing of dissimilarities over similarities in differentiating between the sexes. Consequently, within each sex, similarities are prioritized over dissimilarities, while between sexes differences are reinforced. This, in turn, has led to a hierarchical conception of humanness.⁸

The consequences of this model -- patriarchal social systems and associated ideological assumptions⁹ -- has become the object of the feminist critique: women's exploitation by men; limitation of human potential (most specifically when one does not fit the "characteristics" of one's sex); and a dualistic view of human nature in which the difference between individuals is determined exclusively by exterior conditions (biology), while interiority (spirituality and psychology) is not considered as a basis of differentiation. Thus, for those who have not conformed to the model's blueprint, acceptance by others has been limited.¹⁰

2. THE ENVIRONMENTALIST OR CULTURE MODEL

The naturalist model has been criticized by feminists and social scientists. The concern of these critics has been the model's focus on difference and complementarity. Hence, they have concentrated on similarities in the behavior patterns of the two sexes. However, in differentiating between the sexes, they have emphasized interiority (individualism and psychology) and culture to the point of exclusion of all external (biological) factors.¹¹

Taking a more differentiated perspective, the model distinguishes between sex and gender. One's sex is biologically determined: a probability dependent upon chromosomal constituents; its function is limited to the role one plays in reproduction. Gender is a cultural, or social, construct concerned with the characteristics of masculinity and femininity.¹²

Three arguments are put forward in presenting this view. First, appealing to the sciences, it is argued that history demonstrates that the same feminine and masculine characteristics are not applicable, cross-culturally, over time. Second, since "sex" is biologically determined while "gender identity" is malleable, it is proposed that current experience should be examined to determine the characteristics of masculinity and femininity for a specific culture.¹³ The final approach of this position is to project a future in which sex differences are nonexistent; however, this projection generally fails to elaborate what this means in terms of relationship

between the sexes.¹⁴

Two problems are associated with this view. First, it suffers, as does the biological model, from dualism. However, instead of emphasizing the external over the internal, as in the biological model, its distinction between sex and gender results in the emphasis of the internal over the external. Consequently, it elevates reason over the biological nature of being and perceives alterity, the difference between individuals' modes of being, as an arbitrary social construct uninfluenced by individuals' bodily natures.¹⁵

Secondly, while the view promotes greater equality between the sexes, it tends to negate differences. This "unisex" view implies that anything which one wishes to say about the nature of one sex must apply, equally, to the other. That is, it must promote the humanity of all individuals or fail to be accepted as valid. Therefore, although this model attempts to overcome the limitations of the naturalist approach and its complementarist view of sex roles, its focus on sexual equality ignores or denies the fact of the existence of two sexes demonstrating different characteristics and modes of expression.¹⁶

Ethically, this approach presents both advantages and disadvantages as compared to the naturalist model. Three advantages are apparent. First, since sexual differentiation differs over time and across cultures, it introduces to the idea of sexual differentiation the notion of uncertainty in

our self-understanding. Second, it attempts to counteract the "one dominant sex" approach of the naturalistic model. Finally, through its acceptance of sexual equality it provides individuals greater freedom of sexual expression and, therefore, a fuller experience of their own humanity.¹⁷

Unfortunately the model also displays several disadvantages when viewed from an ethical perspective. Its individualist orientation is marred by a disavowal of human alterity, that is, there is little or no difference between individuals regardless of sex. An attempt is made to counteract this through the claim that the individual experiences alterity, or otherness, through her or his own possession of both feminine and masculine character traits.¹⁸ Secondly, in its effort to be objective, the model interprets human relations solely in terms of justice. It does not view love as relevant to these relationships. Consequently, it considers love to be unworthy of consideration. Thirdly, the devaluation of differences between the sexes which results from this view is indicative of its reductionist approach: that which is equal is the same.

A fourth disadvantage stems from this reductionist stance. Initially, the model holds that what is attributed as characteristic of masculinity and femininity will vary between cultures. However, the reduction of differences between the sexes to the equality of the same must transcend cultures to be valid. Thus, the model contradicts itself since it proposes,

initially, that understanding of sexuality is cross-culturally different. A fifth problem associated with the model is that reduction of the importance of biological sex to the determination of one's reproductive role separates the erotic, a fundamental element of sexuality, from human creativity. It thereby limits this creativity.

A final difficulty with the model, related to its failure to acknowledge human finitude, is its inability to express ideas related to the origin and meaning of creation. That is, undifferentiated humanity is capable of understanding neither the nature of its own finitude nor that of the Infinite from which it originates. On the other hand, the environmental model's approach to human differentiation tends to lead to an absolutized individualism. That is, with alterity considered to be experienced through the acknowledgement of one's masculine and feminine characteristics, experience of the finite Other is refused, as if unnecessary since the origin of these characteristics need not be considered. Consequently, the model fails to maintain the mystery of human sexuality which, it suggests, can be understood entirely in terms of environmentally induced behaviors.¹⁹

According to interactionists, these disadvantages negate any advances over the naturalist position which this model might have represented. Their research has led them to the development of an approach which attempts to overcome the shortcomings of both of its predecessors.

3. THE INTERACTIONIST MODEL

The interactionist model seeks to resolve the problems associated with the natural and environmental models. It tries to do so by maintaining the environmentalist critique of the naturalist model's sexual determinism, while simultaneously incorporating aspects of the naturalist model. More specifically, it must deal with the concept of "complementarity," which is negated by the environmentalists' abolition of sexual difference, and indicate, in a new way, how individuals are influenced by their relationships with others. To do this it focuses on both similarities and differences between the sexes.²⁰

The model is, therefore, characterized by the following features. First, it rejects the dualisms of the previous models. These are overcome by integrating their interior (biology) and exterior (culture, environment) viewpoints so that they are seen as equally important in differentiating between the sexes. In so doing the interactionist model acknowledges that while biology always affects us there is always uncertainty as to exactly how or what this effect is.²¹

A second aspect of the model is its recognition that, over time and across cultures, our understanding of biology's influence on the development of psychological sex changes. Thus, a plurality of definitions of what is masculinity or femininity are possible.²² Accordingly, the model does not privilege one mode of human being over another. It recognizes

two modes of being in the world having a common origin.²³ Therefore, in this model there is no indication of what is archetypically feminine or masculine and no prescriptive ethic for masculine and feminine behavior.²⁴

Given this openness to interpretation of sexuality, the model takes a developmental approach to human sexual meaning by framing the question about the importance of sexual differentiation in a new way. If, as the model suggests, the integration of similarities and differences is necessary for sexual differentiation to have meaning, then it must be decided if the human sexual task is to differentiate simply between male and female or whether it is to differentiate between the consciousness of female and male individuals. If the task is the former, then this is achieved at birth. However, if it is the latter, then one is concerned with a lifelong process of definition.²⁵

The interactionist model adopts the second approach. It points out that sexual differentiation becomes increasingly important for adaptation to one's culture as individuals age.²⁶ Adaptation occurs in a dialectical process of assimilation and accommodation in which one accepts and deals with similarities between the sexes up to a point at which one's identity is threatened. Once this point has been reached, self-preservation demands a shift in focus to that by which one is differentiated. This shift represents a reaffirmation of one's identity as female or male but at a new level of

self-understanding resulting from the integration of the acquired awareness of similarities into one's consciousness.²⁷

An apparent disadvantage or objection to the model arises from its view that biology's influence is uncertain. That is, it does not formulate archetypical conceptualizations of the feminine and masculine, and lacks a prescriptive ethic for male and female behavior. Consequently, those who seek definitive and clear answers to questions about the meaning of male and female, find that the model lacks clarity.²⁸ This lack of clarity results from the complexity of this model as compared to the natural and environmental views. However, the degree of complexity of the model should not be determinative of its value.

In fact, the preceding discussion indicates that the interactionist interpretation presents more advantages than disadvantages over the other two models. Furthermore, the objection regarding complexity can be answered. I will do so before itemizing the criteria for assessing the psychological androgyny concept's claim to be an interactionist interpretation.

The question of clarity and complexity concerns the mystery of human beings. Seeking definitive answers to questions of human sexuality assumes that human nature should not be a mystery; that, furthermore, it should be predictable in all instances over time. This desire to do away with uncertainty, which Emmanuel Levinas refers to as Western culture's orienta-

tion to control through reduction to the same²⁹, denies human potential by placing limitations on the freedom of men and women to choose the manner in which they will act out their sexuality.³⁰ It represents the approaches of the natural and environmental models and their respective views that the two human natures are either absolutely different or identical.

The developmental approach of the interactionist model opposes these limiting perspectives by acknowledging the reality of uncertainty surrounding sexuality. Since human self-consciousness is in an ongoing and dialectical process of development involving interrelationships, not only with others in one's own culture but also with individuals of different cultures, it can never be definitively understood at any one instant without limiting human potential. Therefore, in the view of the interactionist model, human mystery and the uncertainty regarding human action which it creates must be maintained as a basic fact of reality if human sexuality is to have meaning beyond biological distinctions apparent at birth.³¹

4. ETHICAL CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANDROGYNY CONCEPT

The psychological androgyny concept's interactionist orientation will be assessed under two sets of ethical criteria. Concerned with the content of a model, the first set is comparative. Drawn from Chapter One's presentation of Guindon's three models of sexual differentiation, it is com-

prised of the improvements which an interactionist model ought to achieve over the problems associated with the natural and environmental models. The second group of criteria considers the contribution of an interactionist model to an improved sexual fecundity. Concerned with the moral orientations and implications of models claiming to represent interactionist interpretations, they have a qualitative orientation.

A. Comparative Criteria

The previous discussion of the three models of sexual differentiation provides four criteria which the androgyny concept, or any mode of the interactionist model, must satisfy in order to present an improved conceptualization of sexual differentiation. The first criterion represents the basic stance which all interactionist approaches must assume: the influence of both biological and environmental factors, and not simply the one or the other, must be considered in an improved conceptualization of sexual differentiation. The remaining three criteria follow, as expansions or consequences of, the first.

1. An Holistic, Creative and Differentiated Conception of Human Nature: In order to overcome the biological model's dualistic, and the environmental model's reductionist, or "unisex", orientation to human nature, an interactionist viewpoint must demonstrate an holistic conception of human nature. This means that, in the belief that a broader perspective will be able to over-

come the limitations on creativity which result from the inhibiting social structures associated with the biological model's ideological assumptions, an interactionist model will define human creative potential in open-ended terms, rather than have it be determined on the basis of absolute differences between the sexes. Furthermore, drawing on the environmental model, an interactionist approach acknowledges the importance of similarities between the sexes. However, it does not reduce the importance of biological influences to the determination of reproductive roles, as this would represent a denial of basic sexual difference and the mystery of humanity. Therefore, interactionist views must demonstrate that the interplay of differences and similarities, that is, of biological and environmental influences, leads to a continuing development of human sexual potential. This potential can never be definitively understood; so, it retains its mysteriousness.

2. Promotes Equality Between The Sexes On The Basis Of Their Common Human Nature: In the biological model the constituents of masculinity and femininity are considered to be absolutely different and fixed. Male and female sex-roles are determined on the basis of these characteristics. In opposition to this, the environmental model suggests that the constituents of masculinity and femininity cannot be so easily identif-

ied; that, aside from their reproductive roles, men and women are able to carry out any role for which their cultural environment prepares them. Interactionist orientations, on the other hand, recognize that, since men and women ought to be differentiated on the basis of the interplay between biological and environmental influences, over time and across cultures concepts of the characteristics of masculinity and femininity will differ. In recognition of this, the approach adopts the view that many definitions of the constituents of masculinity and femininity, and of the potential of women and men, are possible. Therefore, an interactionist approach will not privilege one mode of being human over another. Rather, to promote the equality of the sexes, it will acknowledge male and female as equal, but different, modes of being in the world, a result of their common, bisexual origin and nature. Thus, in recognition of the inherent mystery of human nature, an interactionist orientation will provide neither an indication of what is archetypically feminine or masculine, nor a prescriptive ethic of appropriate male and female behavior.

3. Equal Consideration Of The Requirements Of Both Love And Justice: Both the biological and environmental models interpret human relations exclusively, that is, from either a love or a justice perspective. In the

case of the first, given the prescriptive content of an absolute differentiation between masculinity and femininity, the focus is on the constituents of correct, "right", or complementary sexual behavior. As a result, the biological model fails to recognize a relationship between freedom of action and human well-being. The reductive and individualistic approach of the environmental model, on the other hand, assumes a position which requires that that which is said about, or applied to, one sex must also be true, automatically and equally, of the other. Consequently, the environmental model fails to acknowledge the possibility of differentiating between different modes of male and female action, interpreting all action solely in terms of justice, that is, individual "rights." To move beyond the limiting exclusiveness of the biological and environmental approaches, interactionist models must consider both love and justice as constitutive elements of the freedom of action required for human interpersonal relations and well-being. This can only be done through equal consideration of both difference and similarity, the demands of love and justice, in differentiating between the sexes.

4. A Developmental Approach To Moral Growth: Both the biological and environmental models present limited conceptions of the nature of moral development. By

limiting male-female interactions to complimentary sex-roles, the biological model also limits the importance of the influence which the development of psychological sex has on an individual's moral development. On the other hand, the environmental model's failure to differentiate between the sexes leads to a failure to seriously consider the relationship between the development of a sexual identity and the nature of moral development. Due to these limitations, both the environmental and biological models do not seriously consider either the relationship between sexual and moral development or the contribution to the latter resulting from interpersonal relationships between the sexes. An interactionist orientation attempts to go beyond these limitations by interpreting human sexuality from a developmental perspective, that is, one which considers sexual development to be an important aspect in the process of identity creation and social assimilation. In doing so, interactionist interpretations promote the view that, freed of the restrictions on action resulting from the biological interpretation, an individual's moral development is enhanced through male-female relations. On the other hand, by retaining a differentiated view of humanity, interactionist interpretations recover the mystery of the relationship between humanity and creation, which is dismissed by the environmental

model's reductionism.

B. Qualitative Criteria

The second set of criteria to be used in assessing the androgyny concept's claim to be an interactionist interpretation can be drawn from Guindon's The Sexual Creators (Part I). These qualitative criteria are differentiated from comparative criteria in terms of orientation. Comparative criteria are concerned with the content of an interactionist model; qualitative criteria are concerned with the moral content and implications of that model. That is, qualitative criteria are oriented to assessing whether a model of sexual differentiation promotes relationships between men and women which have a greater potential for sexual fecundity or for an abundance of sexual creativity. Furthermore, these criteria define whether a model promotes relationships in which men and women will have the ability and freedom to create and act out a sexual identity appropriate to themselves. Assuming its acceptance, such situationally appropriate action will contribute to the development of the individual as well as to the development of others and the society as a whole. These qualitative criteria are:

1. **Improved Integrative Potential:** To be considered interactionist, the androgyny concept must show that considering the influence of both biology and environment, or internal and external factors, opens our understanding of sexual differentiation in ways which

will allow women and men to better integrate their potential for living a sensuous and tender life. Since human life is "something which is inextricably sensuous and tender" such integration results in a "certain quality of life which is... wholly human."³² It should be noted that, in the analysis of the psychological concept of androgyny to be undertaken in Chapters II and III, the terms "sensuous and tender" will be considered to equate to Kaplan and Sedney's use of "agency and communion" or "instrumental and expressive" behavior.³³

2. Greater Relational Quality: In the belief that relationship is constitutive of human subjectivity and growth, an interactionist model must demonstrate that, because its interpretation promotes a higher degree of identity formation in individuals, it leads to an improvement in the quality of interpersonal relationships. This qualitative improvement results from the growth in acceptance of responsibility for development, one's own and that of others, associated with a higher degree of identity formation. In an interactionist interpretation, an individual should be free to translate these developments into an improved ability to experience relationship with others.³⁴
3. Improved Quality of Love Developing Individuals' Positive Potential: The foundation of interpersonal rela-

tions is love and trust. Through loving relationships individuals discover and develop their potential. Therefore, an improved understanding of sexual differentiation must also lead to an improved quality of love between people. This kind of improvement promotes full development of human potential, that is, the authentic well-being of persons leading to a more effective balancing of an individual desires and achievements. In this respect an interactionist interpretation must show that it not only enhances the humanization of the person, promoting her or his dignity, but also provides the individual with an enhanced ability to care for others. This ability is acquired because interactionist approaches consider individual's capable of experiencing and understanding the characteristics of both masculinity and femininity. It results in the creating and strengthening of the bond of love and trust which exists between people.³⁵ Cyclicly, this bond further enhances the individual's ability to develop his or her positive potential.

4. Promotes Improved Social Interaction and Sexual

Responsibility: An improved notion of sexual differentiation must also improve understanding of the role and significance of sexuality in social and historical development. An interactionist perspective must demonstrate how this improved understanding will result in

better individual self-understanding of sexual identity, allowing the individual to act out her or his sexuality in a more responsible fashion, one appropriate to her or his socio-cultural context. The implication of this requirement is that sexuality is a language, a means of expressing ourselves to others and of responding to them responsibly. As such it is spoken within a specific social and historical context. Thus, an interactionist interpretation must improve on our ability to function in these social interactions. This would be seen in an improvement in the language of our sexual expression, which includes both our activity as individuals expressing a sexuality and the expression of our understanding of these activities. Furthermore, this improvement in the language of sexual expression must be sufficiently adaptive to give individuals the freedom to create a responsible sexual response, one appropriate to his or her circumstances, in a socio-historical context constituted by the uncertainty of rapid change.³⁶

Having distinguished between the models and indicated the basis upon which psychological androgyny will be evaluated, it is now possible to begin the analysis of the concept as presented by Alexandra Kaplan and Mary Anne Sedney in Psychology and Sex Roles: An Androgynous Perspective. Should it fail to meet the requirements of the interactionist model,

the assessment will conclude by assigning the concept to one of the other models outlined above. The analysis of Kaplan and Sedney's concept of psychological androgyny will be undertaken in Chapter II; the assessment in Chapter III.

CHAPTER II: THE LIFE SPAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO ANDROGYNY

In this chapter Kaplan and Sedney's conception of psychological androgyny will be analyzed. A three part presentation will be undertaken. First, psychological androgyny will be defined by differentiating it from other androgyny concepts and by situating it within its discipline. Next, the components of the definition and characteristics of androgynous personalities will be examined. A third part will examine Kaplan and Sedney's view of the influence of biological and environmental factors on individual development.

1. DEFINING ANDROGYNY

Kaplan and Sedney take several approaches in attempting to define and differentiate psychological androgyny. The discussion in this section summarizes these without following their order of presentation. First, the psychological concept will be distinguished from religious and literary versions of androgyny. Next, their concept will be differentiated from other "sex-based" psychological concepts. Finally, the concept will be defined and the "life span" approach introduced.

A. Distinguishing Between Religious, Literary and Psychological Androgyny

In the third chapter of Psychology and Sex Roles, Kaplan and Sedney discuss the development of the idea of androgyny in mythology and literature. This analysis has three results. First, it demonstrates that the psychological concept has not developed in a vacuum, that is, it has historical and cultural

roots. Second, these roots provide models from which today's androgyne may draw behavioral examples. Third, it separates the psychological concept from the mythological and literary versions.

Before beginning to review this material it is important to note two factors influencing their interpretation. That is, their equating of "mythology" with religion and the favouritism which they demonstrate for the Eastern view. First, the authors' definition of "mythology" includes anything they consider to be "non-scientific." More specifically, it must be interpreted as meaning "religious" views of androgyny as their discussion of the mythological origins of the concept focuses on its presence in "Eastern and Western Religions." According to Kaplan and Sedney, all cultures have traditionally interpreted reality in dualistic terms. From this interpretation the religions of the East have developed "a vision of an absolute that transcends the dualities of everyday life" in which "gods reflect both masculine and feminine principles."³⁷ In their view, the Judeo-Christian religions of the West have assigned these dualities to the "absolute" as well. This assignment accounts for "Cultural differences [which] occur...in the conclusions drawn from... experience within a dualistic world"³⁸ and is why, as the authors point out in the introduction to Chapter Three, "Androgyny, although certainly not endorsed by a majority of the population, is a concept that impinges in one way or

another on most people's thinking about sex roles."³⁹

The second point to be noted is Kaplan and Sedney's preference for the Eastern interpretation of duality. Their support for this interpretation, more implied than stated,⁴⁰ stems from its integrative approach to the feminine and masculine principles. This view agrees with the "broad" definition of androgyny which is used in this chapter in order to relate the psychological concept of androgyny to its historical and cultural roots in mythology.

These roots are to be found, partly, in the religious traditions of the East and West. Two aspects of religion are examined: creation myths and the idea of religious enlightenment. Following Singer's four stage interpretation,⁴¹ Kaplan and Sedney hold that while the creation myths of both religious traditions present androgynous aspects and view reality as a totality shattered by creation, the resulting dualistic perspectives are interpreted differently. In the East this dualism is restricted to "immediate" reality while "ultimate" reality remains united, so that its "gods reflect both masculine and feminine principles."⁴² After Creation, Western interpretations assign this dualism to both realities. Therefore, differentiation between the masculine and feminine principles is paramount. However, the point which the authors wish to draw out from their discussion of creation myths is not the difference in interpretation but the common element:

The more enduring theme is not that of a differenti-

ation between the sexes, but rather that of the Primal Androgyne, an image of the potential wholeness toward which all beings strive.⁴³

Therefore, in the opinion of Kaplan and Sedney, the different interpretations of the East and West have resulted in the East's maintaining a more unified orientation toward the understanding of the masculine and feminine principles. They emphasize this distinction in orientations through their discussion of the different approaches taken towards the notion of enlightenment. In the East, higher levels of enlightenment can be attained only if the masculine and feminine principles are integrated. In the dualistic tradition of the West, however, the association of such integration with mysticism and heresies has led to the suppression of androgynous concepts. Here again, however, the discussion is not oriented to emphasizing differences but to the fact that both Eastern and Western religions have incorporated androgynous visions:

As with the myths of creation, the paths to fulfillment in the Eastern religions contain explicit elements of an androgynous vision. In western religions, androgynous aspects are far more subtle, and are downplayed; yet they are present. The role of androgyny in the seeking of the highest good demonstrates once again the prominence held by androgyny in religious beliefs.⁴⁴

Through their discussion of androgynous themes in religion, Kaplan and Sedney demonstrate that the idea of androgyny is not without historical and cultural relevance and also that, within that context, it is associated with ideas related to wholeness and enlightenment. The second aim of the chapter -- to identify models of androgynous behavior -- is accomp-

lished through the authors' survey of androgynous themes in literature. Dividing literary history into four periods - Classical Greek, Medieval, Elizabethan (Shakespearean), and Modern (the Novel; Bloomsbury Group) -- Kaplan and Sedney contend that androgyny, as it appears in literature, is a universal and recurring theme. Its appearance takes many forms and suggests many attributes of androgynous behavior including: female characters symbolizing all of humanity; characters demonstrating that for a united (whole) civilized existence the coexistence of masculinity and femininity is required; characters indicating that, in addition to the fact that biological appearance and not biologically determined personality traits differentiates the sexes, the balancing of masculine and feminine characteristics is required for the development of true humanity; and, finally, characters who show that androgyny is "a way of life and...a quality of mind."⁴⁵

From this survey, the authors suggest that models for androgynous action can be drawn from literature. They note, however, that care must be taken in extracting them since the literary models contain some behavioral characteristics which do not conform to their view of androgyny. In addition, they indicate that two major themes are addressed by writers employing androgynous characters:

first...the search for wholeness -- the integration of the masculine and the feminine...within...the self ...The second...is the woman as tragic hero, who places personal integrity and individual choice above societal sex-role expectations.⁴⁶

Therefore, Kaplan and Sedney see two links between the psychological and literary conceptions of androgyny:

First, both emphasize the integration of feminine and masculine characteristics...Second, both models point to the importance of consciously choosing among recognized options and of controlling one's own fate as central dimensions of the androgynous personality.⁴⁷

The third purpose of the chapter, distinguishing psychological androgyny from androgyny in religion and literature, is accomplished in several summary statements by the authors. With regard to the distinction between the religious and psychological views they indicate, first, that the definition which they employ to discuss androgyny in religion is applied

more broadly than in other chapters of this book. Here, its use derives from Singer's formulation: it stands for conceptions of unity-totality in which the integration of sex-role components is prominent but not exclusive. The unity of the sexes is understood here more symbolically than literally; it serves as metaphor for broader notions of totality or wholeness.⁴⁸

Secondly, as previously indicated, in distinguishing psychological androgyny from the literary model, Kaplan and Sedney indicate that literary model characters often display behavioral traits inconsistent with their conception of androgyny. These inconsistent traits fall outside of the category of the "socially desirable" which "excludes extremes of femininity and masculinity such as incapacitating helplessness or brute aggression."⁴⁹ This distinction indicates that whereas the literary model emphasizes "behaviors", the psychological model is more concerned with "motivations".

Thirdly, in describing the relationship between their own

definition (see the following section) and that of "religious traditions", they state that in the latter

androgyny is more a state of being than a mode of interacting with the real world. It is a central aspect in the path to personal fulfillment...not to material or interpersonal success within this world.

In religious representations of androgyny, "effectiveness" would have to do with transcendent goals, and not with worldly accomplishments. "Situational appropriateness" would be seen in terms of the pursuit of enlightenment, not in terms of response to environmental demands. Therefore, although the religious traditions speak clearly to the importance of androgyny as a mythic representation, they say little to the utility of behaving androgynously in this world.⁵⁰

Finally, Kaplan and Sedney indicate that as a consequence of the dualism inherent in the religious and literary viewpoints, androgyny remains in tension: a state of being to be achieved and not a way of acting, now, in the world:

Neither the religious nor the literary portrayals of androgyny, however, speak to the effective, socially adaptive use of androgynous characteristics within everyday life. In fact, within both of these disciplines, there seems to be a tension between achieving an androgynous state of being and behaving in an androgynous fashion...In neither the East nor the West were the androgynous religious concepts translated into an androgynous way of life. Within literature, the tension that frequently emerged was between androgynous motivations and solutions that were at times not androgynous.⁵¹

This dualistic orientation is directly opposed to the unitive approach of the psychological model.

From the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that although the idea of androgyny has an historical and cultural past, Kaplan and Sedney differentiate psychological androgyny from these religious and literary interpretations on four

counts. First, these interpretations employ a broader definition than that used to define psychological androgyny. Next, the literary models tend to demonstrate socially unacceptable behavior traits. Third, both the religious and literary perspectives describe a state of being rather than a manner of acting in the world. Finally, and consistent with the third basis of differentiation, their dualistic orientation opposes the psychological concern for unity or wholeness which Kaplan and Sedney stress as the function of the psychological model.

B. Further Distinctions: Androgyny and Other Sex-Based Psychological Concepts

In the Chapter One presentation of their definition of psychological androgyny, Kaplan and Sedney make some further terminological distinctions oriented to differentiating psychological androgyny from other concepts of sexuality. Specifically, they distinguish between "Three primary aspects of sex roles...biological sex, gender identity and sex role identity, or...psychological sex"⁵² on which psychologists base their interpretation of the meaning associated with sexual differentiation.

"Biological sex" differentiates on the basis of one's physiology and resulting reproductive role. "Gender identity" concerns the acceptance of one's biological sex and its implications without prescribing "personality or behavioral characteristics that would be associated with one sex or the other."⁵³ "Psychological sex", on the other hand, does consider personality and behavior features. These character-

istics fall into three general classifications (masculine, feminine and androgynous) but are unrelated to individual modes of sexual expression and acceptance of gender identity. "Psychological sex", therefore, is the focus of Kaplan and Sedney's discussion of androgyny:

The presence of these attributes...would not discount ...primary identity...both women and men could evidence characteristics that draw from both the feminine and the masculine stereotypes. These individuals, with an androgynous psychological sex, would remain clear about their gender identity as females or males.⁵⁴

The "three primary aspects of sex roles" can be equated to Guindon's three models of sexual differentiation, as outlined in Chapter I. Differentiation on the basis of "biological sex" is the premise of the natural model, while achieving a "gender identity," defined above as "comfort with and acceptance of one's biological sex", parallels the process suggested by social learning theory and the environmental model. The concern of those psychologists focussing on the idea of "psychological sex" and consideration of the importance of a "cluster of personality and behavior traits" reflects the interactionist model's interest in the implications of the interaction of biological and environmental influences.

C. Psychological Androgyny Defined

This analysis suggests that Kaplan and Sedney's approach displays a "psychological sex" orientation and, initially, identifies them with the interactionist perspective. Examining their definition of androgyny will help to verify this

initial impression. This definition is introduced by an analysis of the origin, nature and implications of stereotypes. A review of Kaplan and Sedney's interpretation of stereotypes in the psychological androgyny concept will be presented in a following section. An initial conclusion which can be drawn from their discussion is that they have little difficulty with the concept of, or need for, stereotypes. They are concerned, however, with the implications arising from the understanding of stereotypes proposed by alternative psychological interpretations of sexuality. They consider these views to be rigid in their belief that "there is a direct link between personality attributes and sex" and that, consequently, "men and women... [have] distinctly different personalities."⁵⁵ This concern is indicative of the authors' interpretation of the role which androgyny must play in relation to such stereotypes and, thus, of the orientation of the psychological model. It is summarized in the following statements:

Assumptions about stereotypical male and female characteristics...begin to break down when applied to actual people...Many people seem androgynous...think of themselves as androgynous. Yet these people have routinely been left out of the psychological thinking about females and males, as they are left out of the stereotypes...[T]here need not be a direct link between sex and personality, and therefore...personality differences between the sexes may not be nearly as distinct as is commonly believed. Rather than existing separately, masculinity and femininity may be able to coexist within individual persons.⁵⁶

Following this discussion of stereotypes, Kaplan and Sedney begin to define androgyny as "...the combined presence of socially valued, stereotypic, feminine and masculine char-

acteristics" in one individual. Prior to analyzing the definition in terms of its "components" and "premises", it is possible to provide some initial indications of the general orientation of the concept.

As well as being opposed to stereotypical rigidity, the androgyny concept is proposed as an holistic interpretation concerned with the "well-being" of individuals and, by extrapolation, society. It holds that in differentiating between individuals, the totality of a person's life experience, incorporating her particular "personality, behavior and life-style", must be considered. It is the authors' belief that by interpreting sexuality using this approach, its application will result in the development of "healthier, more adaptable, or better adjusted" individuals. Finally, it must be noted that Kaplan and Sedney's definition of androgyny is open ended; they do not provide a "blueprint" of the androgynous individual. To do so, they acknowledge, would be to create a new stereotype. As an alternative they suggest that "what is and is not consistent with the model of androgyny...can contain great room for diversity."⁵⁷ They then proceed to define what is "consistent" with the androgyny concept in terms of the "Components of an Androgynous Personality" and the "Premises Underlying the Theoretical Construct of Androgyny". These components of the concept will be discussed once the

final aspect of Kaplan and Sedney's definition of androgyny, the "life span" perspective, has been introduced. Following that discussion, a further definition of the psychological concept of androgyny will be offered.

D. Defining the Life-Span Development Approach to Psychological Androgyny

The life-span component of Kaplan and Sedney's definition of psychological androgyny is not introduced until the seventh chapter of Psychology and Sex Roles. To do so the authors go back to their Chapter One discussion of the "three primary aspects" of sex roles used by psychologists in differentiating sexuality. As indicated above (see 1.B.), the basis for distinguishing between these approaches was their orientation in interpretation towards a natural, environmental or interaction basis. However, Kaplan and Sedney's Chapter Seven discussion is carried out in terms of theories of sex-role development in psychology and not the parallel "three primary aspects" as in Chapter One. These theories -- psychoanalytic, social learning and cognitive development -- share a central concept: identification. That is, "the process...by which a person takes on some of the characteristics of another and makes them a part of her or his own personality."⁵⁸ Unfortunately, in the authors' view, they share a weakness. All three propose that sexual development and differentiation are carried out in the years leading up to adolescence: "Sex-role development has been defined as the development of "appropriate" sex roles and, hence, has not extended beyond early childhood."⁵⁹

Kaplan and Sedney, recognizing that "people do not remain children,"⁶⁰ point out the need for a model which overcomes this difficulty (one among several which the authors associate with the three psychological theories). They propose that this model would consider development beyond childhood in order to help individuals create a sexual identity which contributes to their ability to function well in an increasingly complex life. In their opinion

To stop the analysis of sex-role development at the polarized stage [adolescence] is akin to endorsing this stage as the adult norm, which is not accurate [since]...Adult life experiences can enlarge the concept of self beyond traditional sex-role labels.⁶¹

This approach, which the authors refer to as either the "life-span" or the "alternative" approach, incorporates both a stage and an age perspective to sexual development. They call on two conceptions of stage development, one by Jeanne Block and the other by Hefner, Rebecca and Oleshansky,⁶² to support their claim to development of psychological sex beyond childhood. To support their contention of development across age groups they refer to the work of Carl Jung who "noted that the middle years of life witness a return to the opposite-sexed traits that were rejected in childhood..."⁶³

The model which the authors propose has four implications for the androgyny concept. Initially, it raises questions about the nature of social environment influences on psychological sex, that is, questions regarding sex-role development which go beyond those asked by the traditional models. For

example, "How far can people go in sex-role development, and what factors facilitate full development?"⁶⁴ Second, the model is based on the assumption that women and men "can be psychologically similar, and that some people can move beyond the stereotypes of childhood."⁶⁵ Thirdly, it emphasizes "the ways in which children and adults can learn behavior that is flexible...situationally appropriate, and that represents the integration of femininity and masculinity."⁶⁶

The fourth implication, the possibility that sex-role development is linked to other aspects of development, is extremely important for the current analysis. It rests on the authors' association of the life-span model with Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory, clearly stated in the following paragraph:

Kohlberg's theory and the life-span perspective on sex-role development receive support from the fact that, despite parental efforts, children sometimes seem to be in a stereotypic stage of development. Perhaps stereotyping in children is only a reflection of cognitive simplicity. Androgyny may develop with cognitive complexity later in life. Kohlberg, however, does not really consider the implication of his model for development beyond the stereotypes. In actuality, the life-span perspective is not so much a different view as an extension of Kohlberg's model beyond childhood.⁶⁷

This is an important association for the current research because cognitive-development theory is further associated, by Kohlberg, with moral development. This further association will play an important role in the analysis which follows in Chapter III, where the relationship between Kaplan and Sedney's concept and Kohlberg's theories will be discussed in

greater detail.

Thus, the life-span perspective proposed by Kaplan and Sedney is a "stage" oriented approach to sexual development in which individuals move from an awareness of a gender identity as boy or girl, to the acquisition of a stereotyped sex role conforming to social norms. This is followed by a third, introspective, stage leading to the development of the individual's psychological sex. In this development, rigid sex roles are modified through the integration of personal values and notions of the kind of individual one wishes to be. The fourth stage reflects an increase in uncertainty in psychological sex, resulting from the recognition that stereotypical differentiation fails to account for one's experience and growing awareness that one is neither totally feminine nor totally masculine in one's actions. The final stage, the integration of masculine and feminine traits, results in an individually defined sex-role and is considered by the authors to be the androgynous stage.⁶⁸

In addition, the life-span approach is also age oriented. The return to previously rejected "opposite-sexed traits", pointed out by Jung, indicates that with age it is possible to extend one's understanding of sex-roles through the integration of experience into one's gender identity. Consequently, a new level of psychological sex is created which enhances one's ability to deal with increasingly more complex life situations. It is the authors' view that this newly created

psychological sex represents androgyny:

"In other words, rather than simply maintaining a polarized view of one's sex role, or rather than changing to the other pole, perhaps adults in mid- to late life move closer to androgyny, toward a greater integration of so-called feminine and masculine aspects."⁶⁹

This combination of a stage and age orientation to sexual differentiation represents, for the authors, an improvement over earlier approaches since it allows for development beyond childhood. The life-span model is, therefore, adult oriented:

The traditional and alternative models of sex-role development...differ in the predictions they make... The predictions derived from the alternative model would focus on adult rather than child behavior... Within this model, a stage of sex-typing is not inconsistent with the eventual development of androgyny."⁷⁰

2. EXPLORING THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ANDROGyny

Having presented the author's definition of, and approach to, androgyny, the breadth of the definition can now be explored. A two part approach will be taken. First, their definition will be discussed in terms of the content and meaning of its component terms. Second, the characteristics associated with androgynous persons will be analyzed. These include a "broad repertoire of responses", "flexibility of response", and "effectiveness".

A. The Components of Androgyny

The authors' initial definition of androgyny contains three component terms: "stereotypic"; "socially valued"; and the "combined presence of masculine and feminine characteristics". The first two are considered by the authors to be

"delimiting" elements since "not all components of femininity and masculinity are included in this definition of androgyny."⁷¹ The third component is concerned with the manner in which the feminine and masculine traits are integrated by individuals.

1. Stereotypic

Stereotypes are defined by Kaplan and Sedney as a "simplified and standardized conception or image invested with special meaning and held in common by members of a group."⁷² They indicate two sources for sexual stereotypes:

First is the belief that there is a direct link between personality attributes and sex. By knowing nothing more than someone's sex, it is considered possible to describe a number of characteristics that that person might reasonably be expected to have. Second, men and women are seen as having distinctly different personalities.⁷³

While they acknowledge that stereotypes are problematic in that they "break down when applied to actual people,"⁷⁴ the authors view them as necessary to the psychological concept in order to guarantee that "the characteristics included are commonly acknowledged to represent masculinity and femininity."⁷⁵ They point out, secondly, that rather than representing the way in which women and men actually act, stereotypes, as used in the psychological construct, reflect the expectation which others have of how an individual should act. They insist, therefore, that the stereotypes must retain their abstract nature:

not...what women and men do, but rather the abstract clusters of traits that have been labeled feminine

and masculine...We are asking you to...think of femininity and masculinity more abstractly, as labels that are used for people's expectations about the behaviors of women and men.⁷⁶

Keeping in mind the abstractness of Kaplan and Sedney's notion of the stereotypic helps to understand their explanation of the phrase "clusters of traits". This explanation draws on two psychological approaches describing the foundations of human interaction. The first of these, developed by David Bakan,⁷⁷ defines two basic forms of human interaction: agency and communion. In the second, fostered by Parsons and Bales,⁷⁸ the terms instrumental and expressive describe the same basic tendencies. Agency and instrumentality are generally associated with maleness and imply either "individual advancement" and "preservation" or "goal achievement" resulting from "a cognitive emphasis on purpose and accomplishment."⁷⁹ Communion and expressiveness are, similarly, related to "supportive and affective" relationships with others, both individually and communally, demonstrating "concern for the well-being of others and an emphasis on caretaking."⁸⁰

Implicit in the relationship which Kaplan and Sedney create between the two-fold function of stereotypes in the androgyny concept, that is, the guarantee of using accepted masculine and feminine characteristics and their abstract nature, and the two conceptions regarding the nature of the "clusters of traits" (Bakan; Parsons and Bales), is the suggestion that an individual may demonstrate both agentic and communal characteristics. This conclusion, which will be

more apparent in the following section's discussion of "Combined Presence", is supported by Bakan:

Later in this essay, I deal with the matter of sex differences and point out that, although the agency and the communion features are present in both males and females, agency is greater in males and communion greater in females.⁸¹

This relationship introduces one of three conclusions that may be drawn from the authors' analysis of the use of stereotypes in the androgyny concept. That is, "The potential for integrating sex-typed attributes is a central component of the construct of androgyny."⁸² The second conclusion is that "traits commonly associated with males or females... may vary more as a function of psychological sex than of biological sex."⁸³ The final conclusion is that

The possibility of effectively expressing androgynous characteristics is affected by culturally based expectations and values regarding appropriate behavior for members of each sex. These cultural components are reflected in prevailing myths about men and women, in the institutional structure of society, and in stereotypes about the behaviors of women and men.⁸⁴

ii. Socially Valued Characteristics

The second delimiting factor in Kaplan and Sedney's definition of androgyny concerns the degree to which an individual demonstrates stereotypic action and response. It results from the androgyny concept's concern with individual "well-being". In the androgyny concept, "dysfunctional traits," those related to the extremes of the masculine and feminine stereotypes, are considered unacceptable:

our view of androgyny...encompass[es]...only socially desirable characteristics. This... specifically ex-

cludes extremes of femininity and masculinity such as incapacitating helplessness or brute aggression.⁸⁵

Several questions arising from this delimiting factor are acknowledged by Kaplan and Sedney. The first concerns individual ability to express both masculine and feminine traits adaptively, that is, in a socially valued manner, without showing the "maladaptive aspects" of the stereotypes. Second, can the individual "balance" masculine and feminine traits?

In contemporary Western society, [where] greater value is placed on masculinity than on femininity... If a person expresses only socially valued traits, might these weigh more heavily on the masculine side than on the feminine?⁸⁶

The final question, not raised directly by the authors but implicit in their subsequent discussion of the measurement or "operational concept" of androgyny, concerns the problem of who is to decide which traits are, or are not, socially valued.

The authors' response to the first question, concerning adaptive and dysfunctional behaviors, is succinct: "People have carried masculinity and femininity to socially devalued extremes, but such extremes would not be incorporated into the construct of androgyny."⁸⁷ The second question, concerning the balancing of masculine and feminine traits, is answered in Kaplan and Sedney's discussion of "combined presence"; this response is reviewed in the next sub-section.

Their response to the question of who decides what is, or is not, socially valued must be drawn out from their analysis of research attempts to measure androgyny in individuals.

Three indications are given; one is general, while the remaining two are specific. The general rule is that what is considered socially valued should be culturally determined:

the best criterion for item selection in most androgyny measures [sex-role inventories] is socio-cultural definitions of femininity and masculinity...The newer tests...reflect consensually validated stereotypes of masculinity and femininity, rather than the extent to which traits are endorsed by men or women.⁸⁸

The second and third indicators are more specific. Citing Bem's research, the authors point out that in establishing the "social desirability" of characteristics for masculinity and femininity for her Sex Role Inventory "college students... indicated on a seven point scale the extent to which each of 400 personality characteristics were desirable for males and females."⁸⁹ The third indicator is drawn from the methodologies of other androgyny researchers who have selected character traits from previously developed sex-role inventories, and have had these judged, for example, on the basis of "how ideal each was for members of both sexes and of how typical each was for one sex or the other."⁹⁰ However, Kaplan and Sedney have, generally, not indicated who these judges were, although, in one instance, they say that the judges were "students."⁹¹

It may be concluded, therefore, that the function of the "socially valued" delimiting factor is to reinforce the abstract nature of the stereotypes, as outlined in the previous section. This is apparent from the exclusion of extremes of stereotypical behavior from the androgyny concept. To accept

these extremes would be to reify the abstract notions of masculinity and femininity, or agency and communion, which is precisely what the androgyny concept seeks to overcome. Stated alternatively, acceptance of "dysfunctional traits" would discredit the notion of "well-being" which the authors associate with the androgyny model.

iii. Combined Presence

As indicated in the previous sub-section, the inclusion of only "socially valued" traits in the components of androgyny raises the question of individual ability to "balance" feminine and masculine traits. Kaplan and Sedney indicate that, in androgyny research, two approaches to explaining "combined presence" have developed. The first is "dualistic" and is related to the religious and mythological views of androgyny discussed previously. In this approach, the individual is regarded as having both feminine and masculine characteristics. These exist, and are expressed, separately. So, at any particular time, either masculine or feminine characteristics will be expressed depending on the situation and the individual's choice of response:

A person who reflects this dualistic model would express both feminine and masculine traits, but at different times. She or he might disagree forcefully and assertively with a colleague on a major issue of program development, but act comfortingly and caringly toward that same person's distress over a personal problem. Bem describes the dualistic model of androgyny as the capacity "for an individual to be both assertive and compassionate, both instrumental and expressive, both masculine and feminine..."⁹²

The second approach, which Kaplan and Sedney refer to as

a "hybrid" perspective, holds for the "integration" of feminine and masculine traits within the individual. Here, there is a "blending" of response to situations and individuals. Androgynous individuals display, simultaneously, both masculine and feminine characteristics. Their response is

characteristically neither masculine or [sic] feminine, but...results from the combination of the two... [The] newly created [action/response]...resembles the stock of neither parent, [that is, the masculine or the feminine,] but has combined aspects of both to create a new variety [of action] with its own, unique characteristics.⁹³

Kaplan and Sedney believe the hybrid approach "to be more advanced or sophisticated"⁹⁴ and, while they do not state this explicitly in Chapter One, it is apparent from their Chapter Seven discussion of the "life span" approach that it is the interpretation they favour:

In other words, rather than simply maintaining a polarized view of one's sex role, or rather than changing to the other pole, perhaps adults in mid- to late life move closer to androgyny, toward a greater integration of so-called feminine and masculine aspects.⁹⁵

However, given that in their developmental approach the individual can move beyond stereotypical action with age and experience, they note that an "androgynous personality might develop sequentially, from a dualistic to a hybrid mode..."⁹⁶

In outlining the hybrid model, Kaplan and Sedney note a problem which is extremely important in the discussion of "language difficulties" which follows in the Chapter III presentation of "Criticisms" of the psychological concept of

androgyny and for some suggestions, regarding philosophical and theological concepts, to be made later in this paper. The problem concerns a "clumsiness in describing the individual whose behavior is consistent with the hybrid model of androgyny...due, in part, to the lack of readily available terminology for identifying,"⁹⁷ or describing, the newly created androgynous action. Clearly, Kaplan and Sedney point to a serious problem of language and, thus, to a problem in androgyny's philosophical foundations:

The absence of such labels is not a minor issue, because societies develop words to identify objects or characteristics that are important to them. If we had labels for such hybrid qualities, our awareness of them could increase, and they would then probably occur more often.⁹⁸

Before moving on to a discussion of the characteristics of androgynous persons in the "life-span" approach, some conclusions regarding the nature of the three "components" of androgyny can be made. Following on their developmental approach, based in Kohlberg's stage theory, the "stereotypical" is a necessary component for two reasons. First, the stereotypes provide the basic framework from which are drawn the characteristics of femininity and masculinity which the androgyne integrates in order to create the new "hybrid" personality and response. Secondly, stereotypes are the basis for differentiating between androgynous and non-androgynous ("stereotyped") individuals. As shall be discussed later, this distinction has implications for "moral development".

The second component, "socially valued", seeks to maintain

the concept as one of "well-being" by excluding from the definition of androgyny "dysfunctional" traits drawn from the stereotypes. Furthermore, what is "socially valued" is culturally determined. This general rule allows the concept to be adapted to, and adopted by, any society. Consequently, androgynous action is available to all individuals seeking to overcome the "stereotypes" of their specific cultures.

The final defining component, "combined presence" of masculine and feminine traits, provides the psychological concept with a basic dynamism which sees individuals in a continual process of advancing new forms of action and response as they move, developmentally, forward. In addition, "combined presence" must take the "hybrid" approach in order to ensure the "uniqueness" of the individual: "The newly created hybrid strain...has combined aspects of both to create a new variety with its own, unique characteristics."⁹⁹

Taken together, then, the three components indicate that feminine and masculine stereotypes are not to be undervalued but "socially valued" and integrated in such a way as to create "unique" individuals. Such individuals will act in new ways defined by the following characteristics.

B. Characteristics of Androgynous Individuals

Four characteristics of androgynous individuals are suggested by Kaplan and Sedney. They describe these as "premises underlying the theoretical construct of androgyny" which account for "its transition from...a combination of stereotypic,

socially valued feminine and masculine traits to...a model of well-being..."¹⁰⁰ Three premises are indicated directly: "the presence of a broad repertoire of responses, flexibility in response to situational demands, and effectiveness in dealing with the environment."¹⁰¹ A fourth premise is indirectly indicated through the authors' discussion of "Androgyny and Emotional Adjustment" (pp.27-29). While they do not list this premise with the other three (see pp. 9-11), it is discussed along with "Androgyny and Flexibility of Behavioral Repertoires" in a section titled "CHARACTERISTICS OF SEX-TYPED AND ANDROGYNOUS PEOPLE" (pp. 24-29). The style of the presentation is similar to that used in the discussion of the three premises listed previously.

i. Broad Repertoire of Responses

Freeing the individual from the necessity of stereotypical response, through the integration of feminine and masculine characteristics, should lead to the development of alternative courses of action/reaction in any scenario. These choices would not be available to non-androgynes; their responses would be limited to the stereotypical. Thus, this premise implies greater freedom of choice through its association with alternative courses of action.

ii. Flexibility in Response to Situational Demands

Resulting from the conditions of the first premise is the individuals' ability to act or respond to a situation in a manner which "feels" appropriate for her- or himself. This is opposed to the stereotypical action or response which is lim-

ited by its "appropriateness". "Feels", in the authors' explanation, implies both the acceptance of responsibility and the use of reason; it represents the integration of agentic and communal aspects in an individual:

Flexibility in response to situational demands requires the capacity to assess a situation and to determine the most appropriate response...[to] consider whether doing [a specific thing]...felt right...at that time, and whether such a reaction would be acceptable to the other person. They would have the capacity to respond as described, but they would use this capacity judiciously.¹⁰²

Kaplan and Sedney support the claim to "flexibility in response" with laboratory research conducted by Bem. They note, however, three problems associated with this research which limit its general applicability and indicate that

Situational appropriateness...is often determined by one's own standards, as well as by societal rewards. The androgynous person would take both of these factors into account, an aspect not reflected in Bem's studies on response flexibility.¹⁰³

The first problem which they note is that the research was carried out "within a laboratory setting."¹⁰⁴ Thus, it lacks realism. Next, the use of different subjects for different tests calls into question the consistency which supposedly androgynous individuals demonstrate in response to various situations. Finally, there are biases in Bem's studies.

For example,

in the forced-choice situations, it was always the non-sex-appropriate option that was given the high financial reward. However, in real life, it is unlikely that this would always be the case. Androgynous behavior does not necessarily meet with praise and encouragement. Thus, the androgynous person

might choose a feminine or masculine response because it seems more appropriate, rather than because it offers the highest reward.¹⁰⁵

The analysis indicates, therefore, that the second premise is oriented to greater freedom of individual action.

iii. Effectiveness

The "effectiveness" premise is concerned with the degree of "success" which an individual achieves in her or his interactions with others. Success here is to a certain extent dependent on the acceptance of the androgyne's actions by others. It is determined by either the androgyne's personal standards of success or the success standards of others. The androgyne must choose which standard he or she is willing to accept:

These are not necessarily opposing positions, but they can be. Because androgyny runs counter to cultural expectations about women and men, there is an inherent tension between androgyny and prevailing norms. This tension need not inhibit the androgynous person, but its existence should be taken into account.¹⁰⁶

Running "counter to cultural expectations" is the first implication of the "effectiveness" premise. The second is that effectiveness may be blocked by experience. Although "freedom of choice" may be limited by previous choices or misconceptions of one's identity, one always retains the potential for androgynous behavior:

Personal factors may also inhibit one's ability to recognize and pursue a consciously chosen way of life ...None of these factors is insurmountable in any absolute sense...the "freedom of choice" consistent with an androgynous personality is not equally available to all. People with very similar androgynous personality characteristics may face vastly different

situations when attempting to act on the basis of these traits.¹⁰⁷

The final implication of the "effectiveness" premise, that the individual acts according to her or his own values or standards to choose a role based on an evaluation of "the pros and cons of available options,"¹⁰⁸ will be important in the discussion of the philosophical foundations of the androgyny concept which follows. It should be noted here, however, that Kaplan and Sedney give no indication of how these standards or values are formed, nor the basis for determining which role is "the most desirable...at that time."¹⁰⁹

iv. Androgyny and Emotional Adjustment

This premise is concerned with the level of emotional adjustment demonstrated by androgynous individuals. It suggests a greater degree of adjustment for androgynes than for those conforming to stereotyped action and response. The premise is not strongly supported by Kaplan and Sedney since available research indicates that it does not hold true in all cases. That is,

when differences are found, masculine males and androgynous females are likely to score higher in emotional adjustment than their same-sex counterparts.¹¹⁰

However, two factors lead the authors to conclude that the results are not conclusive and may be subject to change. First, the authors critique the study which they refer to in discussing emotional adjustment because of its focus on "agentic qualities" to the virtual exclusion of "communal" traits and the manner in which it evaluated "sexual intimacy."¹¹¹

Secondly, they point out that the approach of the study reflects values apparent in society. Therefore, the results, while no surprise, do not suggest that different results would not be obtained if different values were operative:

The effect of being androgynous in contemporary society, however, seems related to whether one is male or female. In at least one study, emotional adjustment was associated with androgyny in females, but with masculinity in males. This is consistent with other findings...Because of the value base of contemporary society, androgyny may lead to well-being more often for females than for males. This conclusion, however, can be tempered by two additional considerations. First, one can choose to be involved in settings where feminine as well as masculine attributes are valued...Second, one can look to personal fulfillment as well as to external rewards for satisfaction.¹¹²

Kaplan and Sedney are, therefore, willing to hold to the premise of "greater emotional adjustment" in androgynous persons since, if the value base were changed, "we can expect androgyny to be more closely associated with emotional adjustment for both males and females..."¹¹³

Together these four premises form the authors' conception of androgyny as a concept of "well-being". It includes freedom of choice, freedom of action, and success in terms of effective action. It may be retarded by an individual's previous experience. From an androgynous perspective, "well-being" may mean acting in ways which are "countercultural" but which respond to one's own values as opposed to the stereotypical values of society.

The discussion of the components of androgyny and the characteristics of androgynous persons indicates that, as a

model of "well-being", the psychological concept is concerned with individual development throughout the life-span. It views this development as moving from an acceptance of stereotypes, including their dysfunctional and limiting traits, to their replacement by self-determined actions reflecting the integration of agentic and communal, or masculine and feminine, "socially valued" characteristics. The freedom of action resulting from this integration, due to its newness, implies both greater freedom of choice and increased acceptance of responsibility for one's choices. To some extent this freed-up action will appear countercultural due to its rejection of stereotypical responses. However, it is expected that it will result in increased effectiveness, reflected in a more successful emotional adjustment.

Having examined in detail the definition of androgyny proposed by Kaplan and Sedney, it is now possible to begin an analysis of the psychological concept in terms of the roles played by the two basic components of the interactionist model, biology and environmental influences, in Kaplan and Sedney's life-span development approach to psychological androgyny.

3. BIOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT: INFLUENCES ACROSS THE LIFE-SPAN

As factors influencing sexual differentiation and the development of sex roles, biology and environment are discussed by Kaplan and Sedney in the final three parts of the book. Part II discusses biological influences, while Parts III and

IV present environmental, or socializing, influences. In both cases, the arguments are structured to support the authors' contention that both of these factors influence the ongoing development of individuals' psychological sex across the life-span. The life-span view of psychological androgyny, therefore, represents a dynamic, pluralistic approach to sexual differentiation.

Following Bakan's interpretation, Kaplan and Sedney propose that biology predisposes individuals to either agentic or communal behavior, rather than predetermining psychological sex and sex role.¹¹⁴ These predispositions have subsequently been reified and stereotypically associated with preconditioned male and female behaviors. As such they limit the potential development and expression of the psychological sex of both women and men.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, environmental factors, when oriented to overcoming the influences of biological predispositions, can promote development beyond the stereotypical. Such development is considered by Kaplan and Sedney to be androgynous.¹¹⁶

Biological and environmental influences can be differentiated and discussed independently. Kaplan and Sedney believe, however, that their effect is so interwoven that it prohibits an exact determination of the extent to which either one of them actually affects the development of psychological sex in women and men, both individually and as groups.¹¹⁷ This close interaction prohibits any suggestion that either one of them,

independently, can determine one's psychological sex.¹¹⁸

With this overview in mind, the analysis of Kaplan and Sedney's interpretation of the interaction of biology and environment in shaping the development of psychological sex will begin by examining how their discussion is structured to support the life-span view. Next, their arguments about the role which each of the two factors play in influencing the development of psychological sex will be reviewed. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn regarding Kaplan and Sedney's view of biological and environmental influences.

A. Emphasizing the Life-Span Approach

The structure of the discussion presented by Kaplan and Sedney to argue for the combined influence of biology and environment demonstrates their cognitive development, life-span orientation. Excluding sections of the book which are not immediately relevant to the present discussion, both factors are presented in two parts. Biological influences are discussed in two time frames. First, from conception to adolescence, the time period during which gender identity is established and stereotypical gender roles assumed.¹¹⁹ Second, from adolescence through adulthood, the period during which a more highly individualized and differentiated psychological sex is thought to be developed and acted out.¹²⁰ Environmental factors are discussed in terms of those within the family and those which arise outside of the family. However, in order to support the life-span perspective, the

authors divide these internal and external influences into those which are influential up to and during adolescence, that is, during the period of "socialization" which includes the development of gender identity, and those which are in effect during adulthood and which have a greater influence on the development of psychological sex. Thus, the influence of both biology and environment are discussed in terms of their effects at different ages of development. Kaplan and Sedney associate these age differentiations with Kohlberg's stages of cognitive development which, as discussed previously, is the foundational theory on which the life-span view is built.

By dividing the presentation in this manner, Kaplan and Sedney accomplish two things. First, they demonstrate that, across the life-span, both biology and environment influence psychological sex, or the ability to act in an androgynous, masculine or feminine manner.¹²¹ Which factor will be most influential cannot be determined, since the combination of the factors differs between individuals depending upon the specific environmental influences experienced in relation to the general, wide ranging, pattern of biological change which occurs during the human life-span.¹²²

The division of the presentation also establishes the life-span approach as an extension of Kohlberg's stage theory of cognitive development. This theory has been criticized by Kaplan and Sedney for its failure to consider development beyond adolescence.¹²³ That is, Kohlberg's stages of cogni-

tive development were, initially, based on studies of male children and adolescents.¹²⁴ Kaplan and Sedney's extension consists in considering development beyond adolescence and into adulthood. Thus, they associate, at least implicitly, stages of development with age.¹²⁵ The structure of their presentation supports this contention: biology predisposes individuals to agentic and communal behaviors which environmental influences fail to overcome in the period between birth and adolescence. This is seen in the tendency of many children to develop a stereotypical psychological sex by the time they reach adolescence.¹²⁶ As the adolescent moves into and through adulthood, different environmental factors begin to effect, in different ways, the individual's development. These factors present an opportunity for development beyond a stereotypical psychological sex and sex role.¹²⁷ Such an extension can be made within cognitive-development theory, in which Kohlberg initially made no relationship between stages of development and age, because criticism and subsequent research led him to consider an age and stage relationship, most specifically in the distinction between "conventional" and "post-conventional" behaviors.¹²⁸ To support the extension, Kaplan and Sedney go outside of cognitive development theory. They refer to the work of Carl Jung who, they indicate

noted that the middle years of life witness a return to the opposite-sexed traits that were rejected in childhood: women can reclaim their masculine selves, and men their feminine sides.¹²⁹

The relationship between Kohlberg's and Kaplan and Sedney's approaches will be reconsidered in the Chapter III assessment of Kaplan and Sedney's conception of psychological androgyny.

B. Biological Influences

Kaplan and Sedney limit their definition of biology to a consideration of the effects of sex hormone changes on development.¹³⁰ These effects are examined on a stage basis: prenatal; birth to adolescence; and adulthood.

The presentation of prenatal development follows the effects which hormonal changes have on the fetus. Initially undifferentiated, the fetus has a bisexual potential dependent upon chromosomal makeup for its differentiation as male or female. Differentiation results from the release of female and male sex hormones. While each fetus has the same hormones, chromosomal pattern determines the quantity of each which is present in the individual fetus. The different quantities account for the development of male or female genitals and the composition of internal organs. Fetal differentiation is, therefore, quantitative and not qualitative. In addition, the fetus retains the hormones of both sexes once differentiation has been accomplished. Thus, from conception, individuals have a bisexual potential.¹³¹

Normal fetal development results in the birth of a child whose sex of assignment, as female or male, can be easily determined by external examination of the genitals. Creating a gender identity and acting out a psychological sex appropri-

ate to their sex, generally, present little difficulty for these children. However, abnormal development may result in the need for a child's sex of assignment to differ from that which her or his genital (biological) development suggests. Assuming appropriate medical treatment and parental care, Kaplan and Sedney report that, generally, these children also experience little difficulty in establishing a gender identity and acting out a psychological sex appropriate to their sex of assignment.¹³² From these observations Kaplan and Sedney conclude that bisexual potential continues after birth.¹³³

The gender identity and psychological sex created by children, in the period up to and including early adolescence, generally follows the biological predisposition to stereotypical, agentic and communal, activities described by Bakan. However, Kaplan and Sedney believe that this should not be interpreted to mean that bisexual potential, the integration of agentic and communal character traits or androgyny,¹³⁴ is lost at birth.¹³⁵ Rather, environmental influences begin to effect development immediately at birth (with sex of assignment and parental nurturing appropriate for the sex assigned, for example). Kaplan and Sedney believe that these influences can either promote stereotypical behaviors along the biologically predisposed, communal or agentic patterns, or can promote the development of the bisexual potential, or androgyny.¹³⁶ They contend that the overcoming of biological predispositions¹³⁷, that is, the development of androgynous behaviors,

does not prevent the establishing of appropriate gender identities nor should it limit the development of psychological sex.¹³⁸ In addition, it does not reduce the relevance of the ongoing influence of biology in the continuing development of psychological sex.¹³⁹ However, Kaplan and Sedney emphasize that androgynous development will only occur if its expression is culturally stimulated through encouragement and acceptance:

there seems to be little evidence that biological conditions preclude the capacity for flexibility and situationally appropriate reactions that are consistent with the construct of androgyny ...present findings indicate that both sexes are capable of assertive [agentic] or parental [communal] responses, but that compensatory training may be necessary to offset the effects of biological predispositions. However, ...members of each sex are still encouraged to reinforce rather than compensate for possible biologically based potentials. Thus, current social conditions are working against the development of one's androgynous potential.¹⁴⁰

By examining changes in the reproductive system, Kaplan and Sedney demonstrate that biological influences continue across the life-span, that is, from early adolescence through adulthood. However, these never limit the bisexual or androgynous potential which individuals have from birth.¹⁴¹ Following their feminist perspective,¹⁴² they focus primarily on changes to women's reproductive systems. However, the presentation is not exclusivist. The authors incorporate into the discussion the limited research about "the relationship between reproductive biology and men's moods and behaviors in each of these three phases."¹⁴³ The phases referred to are the three phases of the reproductive cycle: menstruation;

pregnancy and childbirth; and menopause or the climacteric. These phases are the focus of their discussion.

In addition to establishing a claim for the life-span influence of biology, Kaplan and Sedney, in their discussion of changes in the reproductive system, propose that the development of bisexual or androgynous potential is not limited, and may be enhanced, by them. To demonstrate this they argue against four assumptions of biological predeterminism. These are:

women are controlled by their reproductive biology ...this biological control hinders women's capabilities...women therefore need to be protected from the harmful effect of their reproductive biology...[and] men are not similarly influenced by their reproductive biology."¹⁴⁴

The arguments to refute these assumptions indicate that while both women and men are affected by changes in their respective reproductive systems, these biological changes do not limit androgynous potential. Acknowledging that, at each phase of reproductive development, changes in sex hormone levels cause mood changes in women,¹⁴⁵ Kaplan and Sedney note research which indicates that comparable changes in sex hormone levels, and related mood shifts, occur also in men, but not to the same degree and not always directly related to physiological changes.¹⁴⁶ However, they contend that these mood changes do not lead to the development of behaviors detrimental to task performance in women or men,¹⁴⁷ nor do they limit potential androgynous development for either sex. Rather, any such limitations result from environmental

influences:

Each stage has some effect on women's moods (and perhaps men's too), based on the major bodily changes that are occurring. However, the extent of the effect, and the effects of mood on behavior largely depend on cultural climate.¹⁴⁸

From Kaplan and Sedney's discussion of changes in the reproductive systems of women and men, several conclusions may be drawn about biology's role in the androgyny construct. First, biology is an important element in sexual differentiation: "The fact that only women can bear children serves as a profound distinction between the sexes."¹⁴⁹ Second, as the authors have demonstrated in the review of reproductive system development, biology plays a role across the life span, not simply prenatally. Finally, drawing from the authors' conclusion that changes in the reproductive system do not limit performance, there is no basis for the contention that biology limits the potential for androgynous development with which individuals are born, that is, biological predispositions can be overcome by environmental influences.

Another aspect of biological influences which Kaplan and Sedney address is the current dichotomization of sexual behavior, along lines set by biological predispositions, into stereotyped agentic roles for men and communal roles for women. This dichotomization is gender based and indicates the existence of different value bases for men (be sexual) and women (be asexual), although these are controlled by men in both instances.¹⁵⁰ While this dichotomization may be considered an

environmental influence on the development of psychological sex, it stems from misconceptions of the biological predispositions. Kaplan and Sedney identify three outcomes of this dichotomization which are relevant to the analysis of the implications of the psychological androgyny construct. First, the result of dichotomization is that

both men and women are "objectified" by members of the other sex in terms of their sexual desirability ...[so that, secondly,] sex has become more a power game than a part of a mature, fulfilling relationship.¹⁵¹

The third consequence, the most important to the discussion of implications, is that

Both men and women are victimized by these current sexual arrangements. This victimization takes the form of denying to members of both sexes the opportunities to express both the agentic and communal aspects of their personality within an intimate relationship. The fusion of sexuality and intimacy [is] ...the acknowledgement of the emotional component of their sexual relationships...¹⁵²

According to Kaplan and Sedney, this "victimization" by social constructs can be overcome by the adoption of an androgynous perspective:

A person with this perspective would not assume patterns of sexual behavior to be dichotomized on the basis of gender. In an androgynous sexual relationship, there would not necessarily even be two distinct roles. Rather, personal needs and desires, combined with situational exigencies, would shape the pattern of sexual responses. Each person would be able to feel a measure of control over her or his sexual behavior, while still respecting the wishes and needs of her or his partner. Sexual behavior would not necessarily be divorced from sexual feelings, and people would not feel a split between giving and receiving in sexual relationships. Personal satisfaction, combined with an appreciation of the

partner's desires would be salient for both men and women.¹⁵³

The arguments presented by Kaplan and Sedney demonstrate their belief that, since biological differentiation is quantitative and not qualitative, and since it gives a bisexual potential to individuals, we are biologically oriented to the integration of agentic and communal character traits, not to their separation into stereotypical behaviors.¹⁵⁴ The process of accomplishing this integration might span an individual's lifetime depending on the impact which environmental influences have in developing her or his psychological sex. The view is offered in response to the nature-nurture debate in which the interaction of biological and environmental factors is denied in favour of either a strict biological determinism, by which we are limited to stereotypical agentic or communal forms of expression, or an environmental determinism, in which biological differentiation is denied in favour of differentiation on the basis of learned social structures.¹⁵⁵ The conclusion is warranted by the authors' insistence that: as a quantitative and not a qualitative factor of differentiation, biology represents one influence interacting with others in sexual differentiation; the extent of this interaction cannot be measured; biology's influence is felt across the life-span and not only from conception to birth; and finally, that while biology influences the development of psychological sex it ought not limit it to current cultural conceptions of the acceptable.

C. Environmental Influences

Kaplan and Sedney's presentation of environmental influences effecting the development of psychological sex follows the structural pattern outlined above: influences on development up to and including adolescence are discussed before influences active during adulthood. In both cases, the presentation is divided between factors influencing from inside and outside of the family. Kaplan and Sedney make this distinction because currently dominant psychological theory (including psychoanalytic, social learning, and cognitive development) "postulates that a great deal of sex-role behavior is learned within the family."¹⁵⁶ For the period up to adolescence, the discussion is concerned with the development of gender identity and psychological sex. In the discussion of environmental factors operative during adulthood, the concern is the extent to which these factors promote the integration or separation of agentic and communal character traits. After reviewing Kaplan and Sedney's discussion of these concerns, a concluding summary will be presented.

In their presentation of family influences on sex-role development, Kaplan and Sedney contend that parents' ability to influence the development of their children's psychological sex is limited by the tendency of children to ignore such influences and adopt stereotypical behaviors as a part of the process of creating their gender identity.¹⁵⁷ However, development of androgynous behavior might be easier in adulthood

because of parental influences in this direction during childhood. Thus, while not apparent in childhood, the effects of these influences may become apparent in adulthood.¹⁵⁸

The discussion of environmental influences originating outside of the family unit and effecting early development of psychological sex follows the authors' feminist orientations. The specific factors dealt with include the media, the education system, the nature of communication, and friendship.

Kaplan and Sedney indicate that "no direct link between sex-typed media, schools, language, friendship, and children's actual adoption of sex-typed behavior" has been identified.¹⁵⁹ However, out of their feminist orientation, they suspect "that some influence is exerted, in the direction of increasing sex-role stereotypic attitudes and behavior."¹⁶⁰ This conclusion supports their earlier observation that parental influence on the development of psychological sex is limited, and leads to their further conclusion that, since the degree of influence exerted by environmental factors, both external and internal to the family unit, is limited and indirect then

rather than succumbing directly to others' pressure for sex-role socialization, children (and adults) form a concept of themselves as female or male (or potentially androgynous) and then develop behaviors to conform to that self-definition. If this is true, then perhaps the messages about sex roles conveyed through the culture operate by being available for people to incorporate them into their notions of sex roles. These cultural agents provide information... regarding the content of a particular sex role.¹⁶¹

Consequently, the degree to which these environmental factors influence childrens' sex-role development cannot be accurately

identified since it is possible that these influences are latent, becoming apparent only as the child continues to develop and act out a psychological sex.

In addition to noting Kaplan and Sedney's general conclusion regarding the influence of environmental factors outside of the family, their discussion of "Communication" (Chapter Eight) contains information pertinent to the assessment of the psychological concept of androgyny. In particular, the authors point out, first, the importance of language "as an agent ...for social change," and, second, that "words...reveal thinking..."¹⁶² What is important here, for the discussion which follows in the Conclusion, is the acknowledgement of the importance of language, by which Kaplan and Sedney, at least indirectly, reintroduce the problem of philosophical foundations. As the problem of philosophical foundations will be discussed in the Conclusion, it is only necessary, here, to note the continued attention which Kaplan and Sedney give to language in explaining psychological androgyny.

In assessing the impact on the development of adolescent psychological sex of the various environmental factors, Kaplan and Sedney focus on "the validity of some prevailing myths and stereotypes regarding psychological differences between the sexes"¹⁶³ in the areas of cognitive ability, achievement motivation, self-esteem, emotionality, and interpersonal interactions. This assessment has two functions. First, it indicates "to what extent biology and culture [environment]

combine to produce women and men who are "different."¹⁶⁴ Second, it identifies those areas which may present greater difficulty for the development and expression of androgynous behavior since, in an acknowledgement important to the review of criticisms directed at the concept of androgyny to be undertaken in the Chapter III assessment of the construct, the authors point out that "The road to androgyny is not the same for women and men in this culture..."¹⁶⁵

Based on their survey, Kaplan and Sedney conclude that some sex differences in behavior do exist in the areas being investigated.¹⁶⁶ While some of these differences are the result of biological predispositions in females and males, they are not significant enough to warrant the limitation of sex roles resulting from current stereotyped conceptions. Environmental factors, both internal and external to the family unit, do influence the development of psychological sex in adolescence, but they do not limit individuals of either sex in their ability to perform in the areas investigated. Consequently, there is no reason to conclude that environmental factors should limit behavioral development along the lines of "the stereotyped expectations that [currently] restrict options for women and men."¹⁶⁷ In fact, the investigation demonstrates that

females and males are more alike than they are different...even findings of sex differences do not imply that every female is different from every male on that variable. Findings of sex differences reflect only average differences.¹⁶⁸

Kaplan and Sedney indicate four additional factors, related to the interpretation of data, which may account for some sex differences: "masculine bias" in the research; situational influences on behavior; the difficulty of differentiating between "causal factors" (biological and experiential influences); and the value-basis of the interpretation.¹⁶⁹ Having accounted for the sex differences discovered in the various studies which they have reviewed, and in addition to their observations regarding the effect of environmental factors on the development of gender identity and psychological sex, Kaplan and Sedney conclude that while the development of androgyny may be different for women than for men, neither are limited in their potential to develop androgynous behaviors:

perhaps if cultural messages provided children with more flexible examples of what it means to be girl-like or boylike, children could more readily incorporate these more flexible concepts into their sex-role identities. Less stereotyped cultural messages can provide individuals with information about non-stereotypic options.¹⁷⁰

Moving to environmental factors effecting adult psychological sex, Kaplan and Sedney examine adult sex roles following the two-part presentation of factors within and outside of the family. The discussion focuses on the nature of sex role stereotypes, their consequences for further development, and suggestions for overcoming their limitations. These suggestions represent movements toward androgynous behavior.¹⁷¹ Kaplan and Sedney conclude that environmental factors influence, but should not limit, the development of psychological

sex. Individuals retain the freedom to continue to develop stereotypical masculine, feminine or androgynous modes of expression, despite the propensity in adolescence to develop stereotypical behaviors. Thus, environmental factors do not prohibit development towards androgyny. However, while some adult experiences influence androgynous development, society's stereotypical view towards male and female sex roles may make the expression of an androgynous psychological sex more difficult.¹⁷²

In discussing "adult sex roles" the first influential environmental factor to be examined is their historical development within the family. Maintaining their feminist orientation, Kaplan and Sedney conclude that in the current conception of these roles the view of labour continues to include the division between family and work (employment) which developed during the Industrial Revolution.¹⁷³ In this conception women are assigned the role of family caretaker and men that of family worker or provider and protector. Within the family, this separation of roles has been carried further, often leading to a view of marriage in which female and male sex roles are seen as "complimentary". Such role divisions do not promote androgynous development and may create problems for intimacy between couples, thus defeating one of the goals of marriage.¹⁷⁴

Kaplan and Sedney present two factors within the family which tend to offset the limitations of current conceptions of

family sex roles and promote androgynous development. The first is the influence of parenthood which, they suggest,

foster[is] the development of androgyny...parenthood is a growth experience since parents are forced to reconcile their own seemingly disparate characteristics such as strength and tenderness, independence and sensitivity, courage and gentleness...[that is, to] recognize...the expressive [communal] and instrumental [agentic] functions...¹⁷⁵

The second suggestion is a return to pre-Industrial Revolution conditions in which family and work roles were not separated. Studies have shown that such a change would not damage the development of gender identity and psychological sex in either children or adults:

Overall, then, the consequences of maternal employment to the child seem to be positive... Costs and benefits to children from paternal employment may be similar to those of maternal employment... [Therefore,] combining work and home roles of both women and men is detrimental to neither their psychological well-being or their interactions with their children.¹⁷⁶

Kaplan and Sedney suggest that the positive aspects of family roles could be enhanced, and their limitations offset, if current stereotypical family constructs were replaced by a return to pre-Industrial Revolution conceptions in which family and work roles were not separated. From an androgynous perspective, such a return would promote fuller development of psychological sex. Kaplan and Sedney conclude, therefore, that family influences on the development of adult psychological sex need not hinder, and may promote, androgynous expression. However, such expression can be limited by a fixation on stereotypical conceptions of men and women's behaviors.

Because of the importance of employment in the development of self-identity, self-esteem, and social status, Kaplan and Sedney examine the influence of work environments on the development of psychological sex. They believe that work can have either a positive or negative influence on the creation of self-identity and esteem, thus either enhancing or limiting opportunities for flexibility in self-expression.¹⁷⁷ Factors influencing the development of psychological sex in the work environment include: organizational structures and attitudes; interpersonal relationships including those with other employees, peers and family members; and the "internal-ization" of these two influences.

In a manner similar to the division of labour in the family, current organizational structures, and consequently opportunities for individual development and expression, are divided along stereotypical lines in which the agentic qualities of rationalism and efficiency are favoured over communal qualities of emotionalism and caring. Consequently,

it seems that neither the corporate nor the home setting provides a context for work that supports development of options, flexibility, choice and opportunities to engage in work that is meaningful, satisfying, and respected. Under such conditions, the goals of androgyny -- flexibility, integration of masculinity and femininity, situational appropriateness and broad repertoire -- would be difficult to attain.¹⁷⁸

While data on the influence of "interpersonal factors" in the workplace is limited, Kaplan and Sedney conclude that they, too, are oriented to maintaining stereotypical behaviors within the organization: "current occupational structure is

self-perpetuating because people are discouraged from moving into fields dominated by the other sex."¹⁷⁹ The final workplace influencing factor, "internalization", is perhaps the most powerful, and yet the least assessable, since it implies that, "If only to preserve a sense of personal integrity and control, people often respond to external barriers by changing their goal to one that is more attainable."¹⁸⁰ That is, accepting external limitations may lead to a shutting-off of (internal) abilities.

The stereotypical division of labour apparent in family roles is also visible in conceptions of work roles. Thus, the three influencing factors of the work environment place limitations on the development and expression of psychological sex, perpetuating "the process of sex role socialization begun during childhood."¹⁸¹ Furthermore, for the work environment to be able to contribute to sex role development beyond the stereotypical, which according to Kaplan and Sedney would represent development towards androgyny, the addition of "female-valued [communal] characteristics...to the male-valued [agentic] characteristics...that seem to dominate in much of the workplace" would be required.¹⁸²

The final aspect of Kaplan and Sedney's examination of environmental factors influencing development includes their own evaluation of the psychological concept of androgyny. Most of the ideas in their discussion will be explored in the assessment carried out in Chapter III and will not be dealt

with here. However, Kaplan and Sedney's assessment incorporates a discussion of the potential benefits of an additional environmental factor, psychotherapy, on development beyond stereotypical behavior, that is, towards androgyny. These benefits are assessed in terms of psychological androgyny's basic premise that "androgyny is associated with well-being."¹⁸³ In addition, the discussion focuses on an extremely important idea for the psychological concept of androgyny: the nature of individual and societal change and the role which androgynous development can play in such change. More specifically, the discussion focuses on the relationship of the individual to society and the relationship of individual change to societal change. Here, Kaplan and Sedney stress two factors influencing individual change: "...personal feelings ...[and] others' judgments about one's feelings."¹⁸⁴

By "well-being" Kaplan and Sedney mean "relative freedom from stress and perceptions of personal power."¹⁸⁵ While the desire to move, and the movement, towards an androgynous psychological sex may empower the individual, the social or cultural constraints of the environment may limit the ability to act out these behaviors in adulthood.¹⁸⁶ Such limitation may create stress in individuals making the attempt. The role of psychotherapy, according to the authors, is to help individuals deal with this stress by serving

as a vehicle for resocialization in the direction of androgyny. Through some of the same processes that help induce social conformity in clients, therapists

can also help clients to move beyond conformity in an effective manner...For those who already have a broad repertoire of feminine and masculine characteristics, therapy can help them learn to read situation cues so that they can respond appropriately.¹⁸⁷

That is, "to move...in an effective manner" and "respond appropriately," is to act without creating stress, or to minimize the stress created, between one's desires and "personal feelings...[and] others' judgments about one's feelings."¹⁸⁸

Regardless of the influence which therapy may have on the movement of an individual's psychological sex beyond the stereotypical, development toward androgyny will require both individual and societal change.¹⁸⁹ For the individual, development towards androgyny may create conflicts with societal structures and values; such conflict may be damaging to individual well-being.¹⁹⁰ For the society, movement towards androgyny will require

a fundamental change in values, reflected in economic, legal and social changes...[in which] the communal elements of existence [would] be regarded highly enough so that individuals would be free to enjoy androgyny. Androgyny cannot flourish unless communal values are given as much emphasis as agentic ones.¹⁹¹

This assertion of the need for societal change is important because it, once again, points to the philosophical problems which Kaplan and Sedney have noted throughout their presentation of the androgyny construct.

Thus, according to Kaplan and Sedney, an adult seeking to overcome the limitations to the development of her or his psychological sex, which result from the stereotypical expectations of the various environmental factors in the family and

workplace, must expect to deal with the conflict and resulting stress of androgynously oriented behavior.¹⁹² While the impact of this conflict and stress may be lessened by the use of therapies, it will continue until society changes its value structure to promote individual change and the development of psychological sex beyond the stereotypical. However, such potential conflict should not discourage androgynous development since "...the full range of the potential benefits to be derived from androgyny are impossible without...fundamental social change"¹⁹³ and its accompanying conflict.

From this summary of Kaplan and Sedney's presentation of environmental influences on the development of gender identity and psychological sex, we may conclude that they believe these influences can be oriented to promoting either a stereotypical or an androgynous psychological sex. Examination of environmental factors, both internal and external to the family, indicate that overcoming biological predispositions does not limit performance in either the family or the workplace. Rather, their examination has shown that more similarities than differences exist between men and women. Furthermore, neither adolescent development of stereotypical gender identity and psychological sex, nor the fact that androgynous development may be different for women than for men, necessarily limits the possibility of integration of agentic and communal traits. In Kaplan and Sedney's view, the environmental factor generating the greatest limitation on androgynous

potential is society's stereotypical expectations, as seen in its current perceptions, and related constructs, of family and work structures. For androgynous development to occur, these perceptions and constructs must change.

D. The Interaction of Biology and Environment

What then do Kaplan and Sedney indicate is the relationship of biology and environment as factors influencing the development of psychological sex which allows them to propose that the life-span view is a dynamic and pluralistic approach? First, biology does not predetermine behavior; it predisposes individuals to act in both communal and agentic ways. The extent to which an individual displays either of these orientations results from a quantitative, and not a qualitative, difference in hormonal composition. It is this difference which bestows a bisexual potential on individuals, which they retain throughout their life-span. Second, environmental influences can either reinforce the biological predisposition towards what have become expected (stereotypical) behaviors or they can influence the development of a psychological sex which enhances the bisexual potential, that is, androgyny. Third, both biological and environmental factors are influential across the life-span. However, since the extent of the influence of either one of these factors, in any individual, cannot be determined, at no time can either of them be said to prohibit the development of one's bisexual potential.

Because it perceives the development of psychological sex

as a life process in which biological influences are interwoven with individual experience, or environmental influences, in the development and expression of a bisexual potential, Kaplan and Sedney's life-span approach can be seen as dynamic. The view can be said to be pluralistic because it holds that the quantitative nature of biology's influence, with its resulting differences in sex hormone composition between all individuals, not simply between females and males, makes it impossible to determine how environmental factors will effect individual development of the bisexual potential. Thus, society ought to expect not only differences in psychological sex between the sexes, but also differences within the sexes.

CHAPTER THREE: ASSESSING THE LIFE SPAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO ANDROGYNY

Having identified the characteristics of an interactionist approach to sexual differentiation, criteria for assessing the degree to which various approaches to sexual differentiation demonstrate interactionist tendencies, and the basic components of Kaplan and Sedney's life span approach to the psychological concept of androgyny, it is now possible to assess the extent to which the androgyny concept represents an interactionist conception of sexual differentiation. The assessment will be followed by a brief chapter summary.

Assessment of the androgyny concept will be carried out in three steps. First, some criticisms of the concept will be reviewed. This review will include Kaplan and Sedney's response to these criticisms, expressed in terms of the life-span development approach. Second, some broad implications of the relationship between Kohlberg's stage theory of cognitive and moral development and the life span development approach will be discussed. Finally, an evaluation will be made of the androgyny concept's ability to satisfy the two sets of criteria of Guindon's interactionist model.

1. RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF THE CONCEPT

Rather than surveying all of the criticisms which have been directed at the androgyny concept, I will consider those that appear to be the most important in terms of the concept's ability to satisfy interactionist criteria. Of these criticisms, the most important concerns the androgyny concept's

idealistic orientation, that is, its dependence on stereotypical character traits. Related to this issue are a variety of problems regarding the measurement of androgyny and the concern that androgyny places greater demands for change on women than it does on men.¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, Kaplan and Sedney have pointed out an additional problem: the inability to find vocabulary adequate to express the ideas of the concept.¹⁹⁵

All of these criticisms point to problems in the philosophical foundations of the concept. This position is supported by Kathryn Pauly Morgan:

It is clear from this brief discussion of the androgyny literature that many important philosophical assumptions underlie the assertions of the androgynists. What is also clear is that there is very little agreement on those philosophical assumptions.¹⁹⁶

Therefore, while limiting my present review of the criticisms to their statement and the response of Kaplan and Sedney, I will return to the issue of philosophical foundations in the Conclusion of the paper, where a philosophical orientation which might contribute to the resolution of these problems will be suggested.

Androgyny research has been criticized for its idealistic orientation, its associated selective use of positively valued stereotypical character traits to define the content of androgynous behavior, and its attempts to measure the degree to which individuals demonstrate androgyny. In addition, (Western) research results, indicating that those traits which appear to be most positively valued are associated with mascu-

line behavior, have led to the criticism that androgyny requires women to undergo greater behavioral changes than it requires of men. These criticisms are interconnected. Rather than deal with many authors and articles, two articles by Kathryn Pauly Morgan - "Androgyny: A Conceptual Critique" and "The Androgynous Classroom: Liberation or Tyranny?"¹⁹⁷ - will be taken as representative of the mainstream of criticisms of the concept. They will be used as the basis for the discussion of these criticisms.

The specific criticisms which Morgan makes are that, as a concept of well-being, "androgyny is an illusory ideal"¹⁹⁸ and that its "implementation... leads to sex-role tyranny."¹⁹⁹ These conclusions are based on her observation that "major conflicts arise with respect to the content of androgyny. Defining it in terms of "most valued traits" generates a plurality of definitions."²⁰⁰ These criticisms refer to the use of stereotypical character traits to define the content of androgyny and to allow for its measurement in individuals. The problem with the use of these traits, according to Morgan, is that

Although the empirical and historical evidence suggests that these stereotypes are inherently variable, placing them in an instrument such as the BSRI freezes them in time. This carries with it the reactionary suggestion that these stereotypes are naturally given, permanent definitions of what constitute, necessarily, masculinity and femininity. Thus, at the very time that we are trying to de-code personality traits, we find ourselves...having to sex-code many...human characteristics in order to measure androgyny...This is a pragmatic paradox which...is

generated as soon as we try to operationalize ["referring to all inventory-like measuring devices.²⁰¹] the notion of androgyny.²⁰²

Thus, Morgan is concerned that, because of its idealistic orientation and its use of stereotypical character traits for purposes of psychological assessment, androgyny will fail to achieve its conceptual orientation: the 'de-coding' of human characteristics and sex-roles. The "tyranny" resulting from this failure will be "a monolithic pattern of human development."²⁰³

While Morgan does not address the issue of androgyny's requiring a greater change in women than in men, I believe that the idea expressed in her use of the terms "tyranny" and "monolithic" is comparable to the conclusions drawn from research indicating that those traits most positively valued by (Western) society have a masculine or agentic orientation. These results are interpreted as indicating that androgyny requires greater change in the behaviors of women than that of men.²⁰⁴ The conclusion to be drawn, I believe, is that Morgan fears the creation of an androgynous stereotype.

Kaplan and Sedney defend the use of positively, or socially, valued stereotypical character traits for purposes of defining the content of the psychological concept of androgyny. As previously discussed, stereotypical traits must be used if the content of androgyny is to incorporate culturally determined and positively valued traits of both masculinity and femininity. These traits must be positively, or socially,

valued in order to maintain the concept's defined orientation to "well-being" and its cultural adaptability.

To the criticism that the use of stereotypes leads to "tyranny" and "monolithic patterns of human development", I believe there are two responses. The first concerns an inconsistency in Morgan's argument. The second is found within Kaplan and Sedney's "hybrid" notion of the "combined presence" of these traits promoting "uniqueness" of human action in the androgynous individual²⁰⁵, and is supported by their discussion of environmental influences on the development of androgynous behavior.

First, Morgan's conceptual error. Morgan believes that the use of stereotypes results in "major conflicts...with respect to the content of androgyny. Defining it in terms of "most valued traits" generates a plurality of definitions."²⁰⁶ That is, there will be many definitions of what constitutes androgynous behavior. Yet, since it promotes pluralistic behavior, this is what androgyny proposes should be the case. On the other hand, Morgan also "...believe[s] that the ideal and implementation of androgyny leads to sex-role tyranny...to a monolithic pattern of human development".²⁰⁷ Morgan's two statements are contradictory: How is it possible for a "plurality of definitions" to result in "monolithic...development"?

Morgan's confusion over the use of stereotypes in the psychological androgyny concept is symbolic of the philosophical problems which arise when a concept which accepts that an

element of change and uncertainty is inherent in plurality is suggested as the replacement for one which promotes the stability of the stereotypical in the face of uncertainty. The contradiction in Morgan's two statements may indicate that those who reject androgyny on the basis of its use of stereotypical character traits are, in fact, rejecting the mystery of androgynous human behavior in favour of the stability of stereotypical human behavior.

The second response to Morgan's criticisms regarding the use of stereotypical character traits is found in Kaplan and Sedney's "hybrid" conception of the idea of "combined presence". While they believe that stereotypical traits provide a means to distinguish between androgynous and non-androgynous individuals, Kaplan and Sedney acknowledge the criticisms which have been made by Morgan regarding the paradoxical relationship between the theoretical concept of androgyny and its operationalization. In fact they point out that while "sex-role inventories...may measure a person's potential for androgyny" they do not indicate "whether the person is behaving androgynously."²⁰⁸ However, they believe that the conflict is only apparent and is overcome if the abstract nature of the stereotypes is maintained.²⁰⁹ That is, they believe that the weakness of current procedures for testing and measuring androgyny does not negate the value of the concept, but indicates that the techniques of measurement of androgyny are still in the developmental stage:

We would suggest that, in addition to measuring androgyny, psychologists should emphasize in-depth description of androgynous people, with special attention to the effect of social context. Such studies might provide useful guidelines that could diminish some of the existing confusion about the most appropriate ways to measure androgyny.²¹⁰

Kaplan and Sedney's response to Morgan's criticisms indicates that the use of stereotypical character traits is necessary to define the content of androgynous behavior. However, in the case of measurement of androgynous behavior, it is not the degree to which the stereotypical traits are present in the individual's behavior, but the extent to which these traits have been combined to create a new ("hybrid") personality and behavioral pattern, which is being assessed. Since this approach to measurement was evolutionary, Kaplan and Sedney have indicated that its problems might be resolved over time, but only after more information about androgynous behavior had been obtained. Gleaned, for example, from the application of the descriptive techniques which they recommended.

Further support for this view is found in Kaplan and Sedney's discussion of the effects of environmental influences on androgynous behavior. Their response to the claim that androgyny requires greater change in women than in men was that, while the androgynous development of women may differ from that of men, this difference does not limit either sex's potential for androgynous behavior.²¹¹

An additional justification of Kaplan and Sedney's use of stereotypical character traits is found within the structure

of the life span developmental approach itself. It views stereotypical behavior, including both positive and negative character traits, as a stage in the process of androgynous development. Androgynous behavior, on the other hand, rejects the negative traits and by this rejection incorporates the notion of "well-being".²¹² The significance of this developmental approach, for purposes of evaluation of the androgyny concept, will be discussed in the following section.

2. THE LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH AND KOHLBERG'S STAGE THEORY OF COGNITIVE AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

In Chapter II the relationship between the life span development approach and Kohlberg's theory of cognitive development was introduced. The conclusion reached there was that in extending Kohlberg's theory, Kaplan and Sedney had related his stages of cognitive development to age groups, something which Kohlberg's later research had acknowledged as a possibility, at least in terms of the understanding of "conventional" and "post-conventional" behaviors.²¹³ Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory is related to his moral development theory. It has a stage orientation which distinguishes between conventional and post-conventional patterns of moral decision making.²¹⁴ In addition, Kohlberg has related sex-role development to both cognitive and moral development.²¹⁵

Therefore, prior to undertaking the assessment of the ability of the life span development approach to androgyny to satisfy the interactionist criteria established in the opening Chapter, I will consider Kohlberg's distinction between "con-

ventional" and "post-conventional" moral development. My intention is to establish a relationship between level of moral development and androgynous behaviour. This will be accomplished in two stages. First, to identify the level of cognitive and moral development which androgyny represents, a comparison will be made of the content of Kohlberg's conventional and postconventional moral stages and Kaplan and Sedney's characterization of androgynous behavior. This discussion will focus on the four premises which they believe represent the foundations of their concept. Second, to explore the importance of the stage of development which androgyny represents, a short discussion of the relationship between cognitive and moral development, as established by Kohlberg, will be presented. This exploration may provide some insight into the question of the disparity between the number of persons who score as androgynous on sex-role inventory tests and the significantly fewer number who actually demonstrate androgynous behavior.

A. Androgyny as Postconventional Behavior

Kohlberg's developmental theory combines philosophical and psychological concepts in order to define the content of universal stages of moral development. Development implies progression from one stage to the next; one representing a greater degree of integration, or maturity, in thought, understanding, and action:

...we define development as "to make active, to move

from the original position to one providing more opportunity for effective use; to cause to grow and differentiate along lines natural to its kind; to go through a process of natural growth, differentiation, or evolution by successive changes." This definition suggests an internal standard of adequacy governing development; it implies that development is not just any behavioral change but rather a change toward greater differentiation, integration and adaptation.²¹⁶

Applied to levels and stages of development, "greater" means "better."²¹⁷ Of particular interest to the assessment of androgyny is the distinction which Kohlberg makes between Stages 3 and 4 "conventional" and Stage 5 and 6 "postconventional" levels of development. A comparison of the characteristics of these stages with the four premises underlying Kaplan and Sedney's concept of androgyny should provide a broad indication of the level of moral development implicit in their conception.

The Conventional level of moral judgment contains two stages. Kohlberg identifies Stage 3 as "The Stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Conformity", and Stage 4 as "The Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance." At these levels, the content of individual action is defined by an unprincipled moral orientation in which

The right is [either] playing a good (nice) role, being concerned about the other people and their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations [Stage 3, or Stage 4]...doing one's duty in society, upholding the social order, and maintaining the welfare of society.²¹⁸

In addition, the individual views relationships as either

shared feelings, agreements, and expectations, which take primacy over individual interests [Stage 3, or Stage 4]...A person at this stage takes the viewpoint of the system, which defines roles and rules. He or she considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.²¹⁸

In discussing development Kaplan and Sedney do not use the terminology of Kohlberg's levels and stages. Rather, they discuss development in terms of stereotypical and androgynous behavior. At the same time, their discussion of stereotypical behavior is limited. However, by pulling together several statements from two parts of the book, it is possible to arrive at an indication of their view of the role of stereotypes and the level of cognitive development which they indicate in the life-span perspective. First, they provide the following dictionary definition of the stereotypical:

a "simplified and standardized conception or image invested with special meaning and held in common by members of a group."²¹⁹

They next indicate that, as applied to androgyny and sex-roles, stereotypes

ensure...that the characteristics included are commonly acknowledged to represent masculinity and femininity...more abstractly [conceived]...as labels...used for people's expectations about the behaviors of women and men.²²⁰

Furthermore, in terms of the stereotype's place in development, they suggest that a

person moves from the awareness that she or he is a girl or boy to acquisition of a stereotyped sex role at the same time she or he is conforming to general society-defined roles.²²¹

Next, Kaplan and Sedney indicate that, in terms of a life-span

perspective

The alternative model is based on the assumption that males and females can be psychologically similar, and that some people can move beyond the stereotypes of childhood...Within this model, a stage of sex-typing is not inconsistent with the eventual development of androgyny.²²²

Finally, at the end of their Chapter Seven, Kaplan and Sedney summarize their view of the relationship between stereotypes and cognitive development. From their perspective, in which the life-span development approach has a stage orientation, stereotypes reflect "cognitive simplicity."²²³ On the other hand, psychological androgyny reflects the possibility of movement beyond stereotypical conceptions. This movement is viewed as a result of the integration of "other aspects of development"²²⁴ leading to "cognitive complexity later in life."²²⁵ Associated with this cognitive development is a complexification of "conceptions of sex roles."²²⁶ This is, I believe, the meaning of "a change toward greater differentiation, integration and adaptation" in Kohlberg's definition of development given above. This suggests that Conventional, Stage 3 and 4, moral judgments, as defined by Kohlberg, are oriented to what Kaplan and Sedney consider to be a stereotypical conception of role-taking.

Kohlberg also identifies a "transitional" level of moral judgment between the conventional and postconventional. While postconventional in its orientation, the moral judgements of this stage remain unprincipled. Somewhat isolationist, it is characterized by choices which are

personal and subjective...based on emotions, [and in which] conscience is seen as arbitrary and relative, as are ideas such as "duty" and "morally right."²²⁷

In addition, the individual's social perspective is of

standing outside of...society and considering himself as an individual making decisions without a generalized commitment or contract with society. One can pick and choose obligations, which are defined by particular societies, but one has no principles for such choice.²²⁸

Although Kaplan and Sedney might not consider this level of moral judgement to represent stereotypical behavior, they would also not be likely to consider it to be androgynous. Support for this conclusion is found in Kaplan and Sedney's description of the stages of the life span approach. They include a (fourth) stage reflecting "an increase in uncertainty in psychological sex," which they do not consider to represent androgynous behavior.²²⁹ Additional support comes from the limiting of androgynous behavior to that which is "socially valued.". The exclusion of "dysfunctional traits"²³⁰ is clarified in their discussion of androgyny in Greek literature. In differentiating their interpretation of androgyny from that of Heilbrun, through a discussion of the motivations leading to some rather "destructive behavior," they point out that

these characters...are not portrayed simply as murderous beings...Rather, using carefully reasoned moral principles, they act deliberately. They do what they feel they have to do and are prepared to bear the consequences, even death. If one considers such reactions "socially desirable," then these characters are indeed androgynous.²³¹

The implication of Kaplan and Sedney's analysis is that andro-

gynous action is based on moral principles. Therefore, since Kohlberg's transitional level of moral judgment remains unprincipled, it cannot be androgynous.

At the postconventional level, which includes Stages 5 and 6, or Stage 5 having A and B sub-stages,²³² and which Kohlberg refers to as "The Stage of Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility" and as "The Stage of Universal Ethical Principles" (Stages 5 and 6 or 5 A and B, respectively),²³³ the individual's moral decisions are based on universal principles under which

The right is upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group...[That is,] being aware of the fact that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to one's group. These "relative" rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights such as life, and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.²³⁴

Alternatively, it may be said that the individual,

Regarding what is right,...is guided by universal ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals. These are not merely values that are recognized, but are also principles used to generate particular decisions.²³⁵

In summarizing postconventional morality's social orientation, Kohlberg points out that the individual

considers the moral point of view and the legal point of view, recognizes they conflict, and finds it dif-

difficult to integrate them...[Thus, the] perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the basic moral premise of respect for other persons as ends, not means.²³⁶

In Chapter One, Kaplan and Sedney outline three "Premises Underlying the Theoretical Construct of Androgyny." These include: "Broad repertoire of responses...Flexibility in response to situational demands...[and] Effectiveness." In addition, my analysis has shown a fourth premise or characteristic of androgynous individuals.²³⁷ It suggests that androgynes will demonstrate a greater degree of emotional adjustment than individuals operating from a conventional orientation. An analysis of these premises indicates that the "wider range of possible reactions for any situation" which the "broad repertoire of responses" allows is comparable to Kohlberg's belief that, at the postconventional level, individuals act according to principle and not always according to laws and social conventions, although these would normally be upheld.

In Kaplan and Sedney's analysis, "flexibility of response to situational demands...requires the capacity to assess a situation and to determine the most appropriate response... [An individual] would use this capacity judiciously."²³⁸ This is comparable to Kohlberg's statement that, at the postconventional level, when laws violate principles, one acts in accordance with principles.

The effectiveness premise, however, does not seem to fall within the framework of postconventional moral judgment. Rather, the androgyne's effectiveness seems to place an onus

on others to accept androgynous behavior. This is the implication of Kaplan and Sedney's statement that

Effectiveness...is in part influenced by the reactions of others...[It] can depend on other people's willingness to accept the androgynous individual, who may not respond as they expect based on that person's sex.²³⁹

In addition, Kohlberg's moral development theory employs a Rawlsian interpretation of justice in which

reversibility...[is] the ultimate criterion of justice...At the highest level of moral reasoning, reversibility implies a conception of justice as "moral musical chairs," a conception which requires each person to systematically take the position of everyone else in the situation...²⁴⁰

The implication for androgynous behavior, which Kaplan and Sedney must accept due to their claim that the life-span development approach is an extension of Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory, is that the androgyne must also be willing to accept the actions of others; willing to accept others as ends and not means. As shown above, Kohlberg believes this to be characteristic of postconventional behavior.

In my Chapter II discussion of the "Characteristics of Androgynous Individuals," I indicated that the fourth premise of the androgyny concept, which suggests that androgynes would demonstrate a greater degree of emotional adjustment, was not strongly supported by Kaplan and Sedney due to the weaknesses of the evidence supporting it. However, Kaplan and Sedney do include this premise in their concept. In terms of the relationship between Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory and the androgyny concept's suggestion of a higher level of cogni-

tive and moral development, I believe that the premise has been accounted for in the previous discussion of androgyny as postconventional behavior. I indicated there that since, according to Kohlberg, higher stages represent "a change toward greater differentiation, integration and adaptation,"²⁴¹ then the acceptance of androgyny as postconventional development means that the androgyne should demonstrate a greater degree of emotional adjustment, a result of a higher level of "differentiation, integration and adaptation," than would individuals operating at a conventional (stereotypical) level.

The preceding comparison indicates that the content of Kohlberg's levels and stages of development and the premises underlying Kaplan and Sedney's life-span development approach to androgyny are in rough agreement at Kohlberg's postconventional level. Thus, androgynous action indicates movement beyond the conventional or stereotypical, to the postconventional level, where the individual's choices are principled. However, two additional points must be considered. First, when and how does this movement occur. Second, what accounts for the disparity between the number of individuals who score as androgynous on sex-role inventory tests and the number of individuals who exhibit androgynous behavior. These questions will be addressed in the following section in which the relationship between cognitive and moral development in Kohlberg's theory will be briefly discussed.

B. The Cognitive-Moral Development Connection

Kaplan and Sedney's analysis of androgyny is carried out as an extension of Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory; it does not deal with his concepts of moral development. Thus, the previous analysis is somewhat inadequate to support the claim that androgyny represents postconventional moral reasoning. Furthermore, Kaplan and Sedney's claim that androgyny develops across the life-span must be shown to be in agreement with Kohlberg's ideas concerning the relationship between age and stage of development. Therefore, this section will begin with a brief discussion of the connection which Kohlberg makes between cognitive and moral development. This will be followed by a brief analysis of Kohlberg's view of postconventional development as an adult stage. In addition to providing support for the analysis of the previous section, this discussion may also yield an indication of why fewer individuals act androgynously than score as androgynous in sex-role inventory measures.

The connection which Kohlberg makes between cognitive and moral development can be best expressed through a review of his own statements. Two of these statements should suffice to indicate his orientation. For example, a study conducted with several colleagues found that

The results regarding the relationship between level of logical reasoning and level of moral reasoning can be summarized most succinctly in the following conclusion: while the individual's logical operational thought structures determine the construction of his

logical concepts, these structures only "inform" the construction of his moral concepts. In particular, the data support the hypotheses that formal operations are a logical operational prerequisite to the emergence of principled moral reasoning but do not in themselves guarantee the emergence of principled reasoning.²⁴²

This conclusion is more fully expressed in the next statement, which also provides an indication of an interactionist orientation in Kohlberg's work.

The psychological assumption that moral judgment development involves cognitive development is not the assumption that this is an increased "knowledge" of rules found outside the ...[individually, in his or her culture and its socialization agents...]. By insisting on the cognitive core of moral development, I mean rather that the distinctive characteristics [sic] of the moral is that it involves active judgment... Judgment is neither the expression of, nor the description of, emotional or volitional states, it is a different kind of function with a definite cognitive structure...

My cognitive hypothesis is, basically, that moral judgment has a characteristic form at a given stage and that this form is parallel to the form of intellectual judgment at a corresponding stage. This implies a parallelism or isomorphism between the development of the forms of logical and ethical judgment. By this I mean that each stage of moral judgment entails a new set of logical operations not present at the prior stage...

This provides an explanation for the fact that movement in moral thought is usually irreversibly forward in direction, an explanation that does not require the assumption that moral progression is wired into the nervous system or is directly caused by physical natural forces. It also helps explain why the step-by-step sequence of stages is invariant. The sequence represents a universal inner logical order of moral concepts, not a universal order found in the educational practices of all cultures or an order wired into the nervous system...

But the isomorphism of cognitive and moral stages does not mean that moral judgment is simply the application of a level of intelligence to moral problems. I believe moral development is its own sequential process rather than the reflection of cognitive development in a slightly different content

area...Although moral stages are not simply special applications of logical stages, logical stages must be prior to moral stages, because they are more general. In other words, one can be at a given logical stage and not at the parallel moral stage, but the reverse is not possible.

To summarize, there is a one-to-one parallelism or isomorphism between cognitive and moral stages, but this correspondence does not mean high or perfect empirical correlation between the two...

These findings support what we all know: you have to be cognitively mature to reason morally, but you can be smart and never reason morally.²⁴³

This statement supports the position taken in my analysis of the previous section. I suggested there that, by assuming Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory, Kaplan and Sedney imply a level of moral development. Furthermore, I suggested that their analysis implied that they consider androgyny to represent a postconventional level of moral development, since it represents a movement beyond the conventional (stereotypical) level of cognitive development. This position is affirmed by the references to Kohlberg, outlining the relationship between cognitive and moral development, which I have just made. That is, Kaplan and Sedney suggest that androgyny represents cognitive development beyond the stereotypical and into the postconventional level. Postconventional cognitive development suggests, according to Kohlberg, the possibility of postconventional moral development. In addition, the content of the three premises, which Kaplan and Sedney say ground their androgyny concept, has been shown to be comparable to the content of Kohlberg's postconventional level of moral reasoning. Thus, Kaplan and Sedney's notion of androgyny implies, at

least, the possibility of postconventional moral reasoning.

In addition to the possibility of postconventional moral reasoning, Kaplan and Sedney's approach views androgyny as an adult stage of cognitive-development.²⁴⁴ Kohlberg's analysis, which suggests that postconventional development may be an adult stage requiring the integration of the influence of specifically adult experiences, tends to support Kaplan and Sedney's suggestions about androgyny. That is, androgyny is a specifically adult stage of cognitive-development; it may be achieved in adulthood, if the individual is able to integrate specifically adult experiences in a manner leading to movement beyond stereotypical or conventional behavior, through a transitional level, and on toward postconventional development. Furthermore, androgynous development implies the possibility of the development of postconventional moral judgment and action.²⁴⁵

This discussion suggests that Kaplan and Sedney intend androgyny to include the possibility of postconventional cognitive understanding and moral judgment. At the same time, it suggests a possible answer to criticisms about the disparity between the number of individuals who score as androgynous on sex-inventory tests and the number who actually demonstrate androgynous behavior. Kaplan and Sedney have attempted to account for this disparity by suggesting that testing methodology may be lacking due to the newness of the subject.²⁴⁶

However, the disparity might also be accounted for by con-

sidering the distinctions which Kohlberg makes between the development of cognitive reasoning and the development of moral reasoning, and between the A and B substages of the levels of development. As indicated above, cognitive-development is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of moral development, but the reverse does not hold true. In addition, the distinction between the A and B substages represents the distinction between "moral thought and moral action" at any level of development.²⁴⁷ Finally, Kaplan and Sedney consider androgyny to signify postconventional reasoning. Therefore, it would be possible for an individual to achieve a substage A postconventional level of reasoning and moral judgment, which Kohlberg indicates is heteronomous,²⁴⁸ and be scored as androgynous, but remain unable to act on this level because sub-stage B reasoning and/or moral judgment, which Kohlberg indicates has "an orientation of autonomy, mutual respect, and reversibility,"²⁴⁹ have not yet been acquired. Thus the individual might score as androgynous but not act in a manner considered to be androgynous.

The analysis of this section suggests, therefore, that by their association of the androgyny concept with Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory, Kaplan and Sedney have implicitly identified it also with Kohlberg's theory of moral development. It suggests, furthermore, that a comparison of the content of cognitive-development theory's levels of moral judgment with the underlying premises of Kaplan and Sedney's

androgyny concept indicates that they consider androgyny to be an adult stage of development in which the individual moves into the postconventional level of cognitive development. This movement represents the possibility of the development of postconventional moral judgment; however, this stage may not be achieved by all individuals demonstrating androgynous thought. This final point suggests the possibility that the discrepancy between the number of individuals scoring as androgynous on sex-role inventory tests and those actually displaying androgynous behavior may result from a lag between the development of postconventional cognitive reasoning and postconventional moral judgment and action.

3. ANDROGYNY AND GUINDON'S INTERACTIONIST CRITERIA

The previous section discussed Kaplan and Sedney's androgyny concept in terms of its relationship to Kohlberg's cognitive and moral development theory. The current section will assess their concept's ability to satisfy the two sets of interactionist criteria established in Chapter I. Drawing on the second chapter's analysis of Kaplan and Sedney's concept, and on the analysis of the cognitive-development orientation of their life-span approach, presented in this chapter, the assessment will consist of a summary indicating how a particular criterion has been satisfied. The review will follow the order of presentation used in Chapter I, and will conclude with a general statement about the androgyny concept's ability to satisfy interactionist criteria.

A. Comparative Criteria

i. An Holistic, Creative and Differentiated Conception of Human Nature

To improve on the biological model's dualistic and limited view of the creative potential of human sexuality, and, simultaneously, to address the environmental model's reductionist orientations, its failure to differentiate between the two forms of humanity, and its subsequent denial of human mystery, an interactionist orientation must have an holistic, creative and differentiated view of human nature. This will be achieved by showing that both biological and environmental factors, both difference and similarity, influence the development of human sexual potential. However, an interactionist orientation will hold that the degree of influence exerted by either factor, at any specific time, cannot be determined. Therefore, human sexual potential retains its mysteriousness.

This criterion has been shown to have been satisfied in Chapter II's, Section 3 discussion of the life-span approach to the influence of biology and environment.²⁵⁰ There, I indicated that, in Kaplan and Sedney's view, while biological (primarily hormonal) influences may predispose individuals to either agentic or communal behavior, it is only through the influence of environmental factors that the reification of these behaviors into masculine and feminine stereotypes can occur. It is this reification which limits the potential development of psychological sex and sex roles. Furthermore, Kaplan and Sedney believe that, rather than orienting indivi-

duals to one or the other of the predispositions, the presence in each of us of both masculine and feminine hormones indicates that biological influences can be interpreted as directing us to the integration of our agentic and communal natures. They further suggest that environmental influences may be used to overcome or re-enforce biological predispositions. Kaplan and Sedney conclude that biological forces, in the form of hormonal changes, and environmental factors, which begin immediately at birth with the declaration of biological sex, influence the development of psychological sex throughout the life-span. However, the extent to which these influences are interacting in any one individual, and at any particular time, is not easily determinable. Consequently, an individual's actions hold an aspect of uncertainty or mystery, which is acted out in a continuous creation of sexual identity. This mysteriousness or uncertainty represents the freedom required to provide the individual with the possibility of a moral development.

ii. Promotes Equality Between The Sexes On The Basis Of Their Common Human Nature

The restrictions on action associated with the biological model's absolute differentiation between the sexes, and the resulting bias in social structures which favour one sex over the other, must be replaced in an interactionist orientation. So also must the environmental model's failure to differentiate between the sexes and its failure to acknowledge the mystery of the individual. In an interactionist interpretation

this will be accomplished by accepting three ideas. First, the constitutive characteristics of masculinity and femininity change over time and across cultures. Second, a plurality of conceptions of the content of these characteristics are possible. Finally, and consequently, one mode of being human should not be privileged over the other. In an interactionist approach, differentiation will be based on the interplay of biological and environmental influences as a means of acknowledging that male and female are equal modes of being, having a common origin and nature. In taking this position interactionist approaches recognize and promote human nature's mystery by recognizing that, being different and equal, there can be no absolutizing of what constitutes masculine or feminine behavior.

In Kaplan and Sedney's presentation of the androgyny concept this criterion's requirement of a common human nature is satisfied through their claim that, biologically, human beings possess a fundamental bisexual potential. This potential is initiated with conception and retained from birth to death, despite the fact that during fetal development hormonal activity not only determines one's sex but predisposes one to particular action choices. However, this predisposition does not remove the influence of the opposite sexual potential. Additionally, differentiation, discussed by Kaplan and Sedney in terms of an individual's ongoing creation of her or his psychological sex, is enhanced or limited by environmental influ-

ences. Once again, however, bisexual potential is retained. Given the opportunity, it may lead to the reintegration of the predispositions, but at a psychological as opposed to a biological level. Kaplan and Sedney discuss this possibility in terms of the androgyne's "hybrid" approach to action.

As well as accounting for a fundamental or common human nature, bisexual potential also provides an indication that Kaplan and Sedney's androgyny concept is concerned with the equality of the sexes. They believe that, given a common bisexual potential, individuals are capable of carrying out the same roles, although not necessarily in the same manner. This is the orientation of their discussion of the influence of ongoing biological development across the life-span and of environmental factors within and outside of the family, in the workplace, and in society at large. These factors continually influence the creation of sexual identity and role performance, but do not prohibit individuals of either sex from acting out whatever role choices they might decide to pursue. In fact, the integration of the influence of both of these types of factors, that is, the development of bisexual potential, is believed to enhance the individual's ability to undertake a variety of role choices, regardless of her or his gender.

iii. Equal Consideration Of The Requirements Of Both Love And Justice

The biological and environmental models interpret human relations in exclusivist terms. The biological model's love perspective limits female and male role-taking on the basis

of their complementarity. This complementarity is required to compensate for the absolute difference in the natures of the two sexes. On the basis of the similarity between the sexes, the environmental model's reductive and individualistic view leads to the interpretation of all forms of action in terms of justice and individual rights. Consequently, it does not differentiate between male and female forms of expression. On the hand, an interactionist approach will consider both love and justice as constitutive aspects of the freedom of action needed for individuals to be able to participate in the positive interpersonal relations necessary for their well-being. On this basis, it will incorporate a consideration of both similarity and difference, that is, justice and love, into its approach to sexual differentiation.

Kaplan and Sedney's androgyny concept meets this criterion's requirements by, first, adopting a bisexual orientation to human nature and, second, by the related expression of human action in terms of two predispositions identified, following Bakan, as agentic and communal. These predispositions can be said to demonstrate, respectively, a justice and love orientation: the agentic is individualistic, rational and instrumental, and oriented to justice; the communal is associated with love or caring and emotion. In Kaplan and Sedney's conception of androgyny males and females, conceived with a bisexual potential, possess both agentic and communal characteristics. They are differentiated at birth on the basis of

biology and environment through the process of sex of assignment which, in Kaplan and Sedney's analysis, becomes a first instance of the application of the psychological androgyny concept. However, the creation and expression of gender identity and psychological sex is a lifetime process leading to various levels of integration of the influences of biological and environmental factors on the predispositions. In this process of integration, individuals retain both predispositions. For this reason, the model suggests that actions should be assessed on the basis of both justice and love. Such an assessment would be grounded in the belief that there are a number of ways of responding to each set of circumstances, that each individual represents a different integrative possibility, and that, consequently, each individual's actions must be considered in terms of both justice (agency) and love (communality).

This interpretation of Kaplan and Sedney's presentation is supported by their discussion of the components and characteristics of androgynous behavior. According to their definition, androgynes, having moved through a stage defined by the stereotypical behaviors necessary for the initial creation of a gender identity, would develop a psychological sex and would act out only "socially valued behaviors", eliminating those representing the extremes of agentic or communal behavior and integrating or combining the two predispositions into a hybrid form of action. This form of action, freed from the rigidity

of stereotypes but informed of and by its environment, contributes to the "well-being" of the individual. Its contribution is seen in the characteristics attributed to androgynous behavior by Kaplan and Sedney. These include: broad repertoire of response; flexibility of response to situational demands; improved effectiveness of action; and better emotional adjustment. Thus, Kaplan and Sedney's model satisfies the justice aspect of the criterion by limiting androgynous action to that which is socially valued. It satisfies the love aspect of the criterion by promoting the freedom of action associated with the integration of the communal and agentic predispositions and the sense of well-being which results from the hybrid form of action arising from the integration.

On the other hand, the extent to which Kaplan and Sedney's androgyny concept is able to satisfy this criterion appears limited by its association with Kohlberg's approach, which has been critiqued by Gilligan and others because of its overemphasis on justice and rights.²⁵¹ Kaplan and Sedney do indicate that it is their intention to go beyond Kohlberg by extending the consideration of sexuality across the life-span²⁵² and by adopting alternative perspectives on male-female differentiation and interaction, for example, the agency-communion approach of Bakan and the "sex-role transcendence" concepts of Hefner, Rebecca, and Oleshansky.²⁵³ However, in pointing out the problems which they experienced in finding language suitable to the expression of the androgyny concept, they

indicate that they may have failed to go beyond the utilitarian and justice orientation of Kohlberg's analysis. This problem will be addressed in my Conclusion where I will consider the philosophical orientations of Kaplan and Sedney's analysis. Therefore, while Kaplan and Sedney present their model as one which satisfies the demands of justice and love, the degree to which they are able to satisfy the love requirement is questionable.

iv. A Developmental Approach To Moral Growth

Implicit in the biological model's prescriptive orientation, in which male and female behavior follows stereotypical courses of action, is the view that moral development is the ability of the individual to adopt these specified courses of action. In the case of the environmental model, a failure to differentiate between the sexes leads to a further failure to consider differences in the nature of male and female moral development. Consequently, both models fail to adequately account for the contribution to moral development of relationships between the sexes. An interactionist interpretation, on the other hand, understands that these relationships represent an important element in moral growth. Furthermore, interactionist conceptions view both the creation and acting out of one's psychological sex and moral growth from a developmental perspective. That is, as a process of refinement in which the individual continually creates and assimilates, re-creates and re-assimilates, new understandings of his or her identity. In this process, relationships between the sexes are thought

of in terms of their contribution to individual development.

Kaplan and Sedney's psychological androgyny concept satisfies the criterion's requirement of a developmental orientation by basing itself in Kohlberg's cognitive-development approach. That approach has been shown to be associated with Kohlberg's perspective on the nature of moral development. While moral development is not considered by Kaplan and Sedney, Kohlberg has suggested a relationship between cognitive and moral development. As I have indicated earlier in this chapter, he also relates these two types of development to sexual development. The psychological androgyny concept's ability to satisfy this criterion's developmental requirement is further supported by Kaplan and Sedney's adoption, following Block, Hefner et al, and others, of a life-span perspective on the development of psychological sex. In addition, the importance of relationships between the sexes plays an important part in their analysis of the nature of the development of sexual identity. This is seen in their discussion of the effects of environmental influences, most specifically those dealing with marital and family relations and those considering the influence of friendship. Another example of Kaplan and Sedney's developmental approach is found in their adoption of Hefner et al's combined life-span and stage orientation to development. This counteracts a weakness in the stage orientation of Kohlberg's theories: while they are stage oriented they do not employ a life-span perspective of

the process of creating one's psychological sex.

Kaplan and Sedney do not address moral development issues. However, by associating their analysis with that of Kohlberg they provide a basis for suggesting that their moral development approach might approximate his. Chapter II's analysis of Kohlberg's models of cognitive and moral development indicated that, while Kohlberg is developmentally oriented, his emphasis on justice and other utilitarian concepts, combined with his failure to consider love as an important consideration in moral development, indicates that his moral development theory fails to satisfy Guindon's interactionist criteria. I suggest that Kaplan and Sedney's adoption of the model of Hefner et al represents an attempt on their part to overcome the limitations of Kohlberg's approach. These limitations will be discussed further in the philosophical considerations to be undertaken in the Conclusion.

B. Qualitative Criteria

Satisfying the comparative criteria of the previous section demonstrates that the content of a particular concept is similar to that of Guindon's interactionist approach. Qualitative criteria, on the other hand, are intended to assess moral implications: the extent to which models claiming to represent interactionist interpretations are able to promote greater sexual fecundity or creativity. The criteria suggest that interactionist interpretations must generate greater individual freedom to act out a sexual identity appropriate to the

individual and to the society in which she or he lives.

Four qualitative criteria were introduced in the first chapter's analysis of Guindon's interactionist model. Assessment of the ability of Kaplan and Sedney's psychological androgyny concept to satisfy these criteria will follow the order of criteria presentation introduced in Chapter I.

i. Improved Integrative Potential

This criterion requires that, in differentiating between the sexes and in attempting to understand the nature of individual action, an interactionist approach consider the continuing impact of both biological and environmental influences. Differentiating on this basis would lead to new understandings of male and female roles which would supercede the stereotypical conceptions of the biological model, while continuing to differentiate between female and male modes of action. As a result, an improved integration of sensuality and tenderness in the lives of individual men and women would be stimulated. This integration would open the individual to the possibility of a more wholly human experience of life, which in turn creates the possibility for further development, or improvement, in the nature of female-male relations. Thus, improved integration would represent an improved quality of life.

In Kaplan and Sedney's conception of androgyny this criterion is satisfied in the notion of "hybrid" action which the androgyne develops by integrating the two biological predispositions. They propose that while biology predisposes individuals to either an agenticly or communally oriented sexual

identity, the acting out of this identity is influenced by environmental conditions. An androgynous personality develops when environmental influences promote the integration of the two biological predispositions. Superceding the dualistic notions of complementarity presented by the biological model, new ways of acting out individual identity result from this integration.

The environmental factors stimulating this integration are relational. They are discussed in terms of interactions with others both within and outside of the family unit. For example, Kaplan and Sedney suggest that the development of hybrid, or androgynous, forms of action is highly influenced by the experiences of pregnancy, childbirth and parenthood. These experiences are impressive in terms of their ability to stimulate the individual's awareness of her or his opposite predisposition. Furthermore, Kaplan and Sedney suggest that, in the process of creating a hybrid personality through the integration of the predispositions, the concepts of masculinity and femininity take on a new meaning for the androgyne. This new understanding overcomes the dichotomization of sexual behavior which results in the "objectification" of men and women. As a result,

[s]exual behavior would not necessarily be divorced from sexual feelings, and people would not feel a split between giving and receiving in sexual relationships. Personal satisfaction, combined with an appreciation of the partner's desires would be salient for both men and women.²⁵⁴

Consequently, an improved integration of sensuality and tend-

erness, an improved quality of life, would result.

ii. Greater Relational Quality

Interactionist approaches must demonstrate that they lead to improvements in the quality of relationships experienced between individuals. These improvements result from individuals' developing a greater degree of self-awareness, that is, from identity formation leading to a greater acceptance of responsibility for development, both one's own and that of others.

Because Kaplan and Sedney's developmental approach takes into consideration the combined influence of environmental and biological factors promoting the reintegration of the two basic biological predispositions, it is able to satisfy the requirements of this criterion. The progressive reintegration of the two predispositions, the life-span development of an individual's hybrid or androgynous psychological sex, is no longer strictly biological in nature. It is stimulated by a variety of environmental influences, occurs at a cognitive level, and has related moral implications.²⁵⁵ Consequently, degree of identity formation varies between individuals.

The cognitive and moral components of Kaplan and Sedney's analysis are found by reviewing the "components of androgyny" and the "characteristics of androgynous individuals" outlined in my analysis of Kaplan and Sedney's concept in Chapter II,²⁵⁶ and by relating these to the discussion of the connection between their androgyny concept and Kohlberg's cognitive and moral development theories presented in Chapter III.²⁵⁷

These components and characteristics indicate that, for Kaplan and Sedney, the individual's reintegration of the two biological predispositions provides the possibility for a more complete development of natural human potential, or identity, including both the feminine and masculine aspects of human nature, at both a cognitive and moral level.

The hybrid personality which results is more competent in interacting in its environment, that is, with other individuals. That this is Kaplan and Sedney's intention can be seen by reviewing the experiences, or environmental influences, which they indicate are most influential in this adult-development process of reintegration. These experiences, including marriage, pregnancy, and parenthood, are relationally oriented. Consequently, Kaplan and Sedney imply that male-female relations are important factors in the development of an androgynous psychological sex.²⁵⁸ For Kaplan and Sedney, the reintegration of the two biological predispositions defining human nature represents the development of the full potential of that nature, or androgyny. It is promoted through female-male relations. In turn, an individual's ability to participate in these relationships is enhanced as a result of his or her ongoing cognitive and moral development, considered in terms of the individual's growing self-awareness, in which the needs of the self and others are considered.

Thus, in Kaplan and Sedney's approach, higher levels of identity formation lead to greater freedom of action, or ex-

perience of human potential (the hybrid notion of action).

This freedom may lead to increases in relational ability and growing acceptance of responsibility for the self and others, discovered as a result of interactions with those others.

iii. Improved Quality of Love Leading to the Ongoing Development of the Positive Potential of All Individuals

Building on the preceding one, this criterion requires interactionist model's to view love and trust as the foundation of relationship. They are essential if relationship is to promote the development of individuals' self-awareness and potential. Consequently, an interactionist approach holds that improved comprehension of sexual differentiation will lead to an improvement in the quality of love between people and, subsequently, to a fuller development of human potential. Development of potential would mean that the well-being of the individual would be enhanced by an improvement in the balance between his or her desires and achievements. Furthermore, an interactionist model must demonstrate that enhanced humanization of the individual promotes human dignity by provoking an enhanced ability to care for others in the individual, because she or he is capable of integrating both the masculine and feminine aspects of experience and understanding. Consequently, the possibility of creating the reciprocal bonds of love and trust between people, which enhance the individual's ability to develop his or her positive potential, is created.

In discussing the previous criterion, I indicated that Kaplan and Sedney's approach was relationally oriented. I

provided examples from their discussion of environmental influences on the development of psychological sex which supported this position. These examples, drawn primarily from experiences within the family, including marriage, pregnancy, childbirth and parenthood, demonstrate that love and trust, the foundations of family life, are an integral part of Kaplan and Sedney's understanding of androgynous relationship.

In Kaplan and Sedney's stage and cognitive-development orientation, relational experiences stimulate the individual's awareness of the potential of his or her bisexual nature, providing him or her with a basis for acting out his or her full human potential. That is, their position suggests that a better balancing of agentic and communal predispositions may result from the integration of these experiences. Integration, defined as either a refinement of current stage understanding or a movement to a higher stage of development in individuals' understanding of themselves and others, allows for the possibility of an improved quality of love. In either case, fuller development of human potential, the enhancement of individual well-being by more effectively balancing desires and achievements, results from the integration of the experience of these loving relationships. In their analysis this type of development is summarized in the four characteristics of androgynous individuals. The third of these, "effectiveness," indicating a greater degree of success in interactions with others, capsulates their position. 259

A final aspect of this criterion is the requirement that an interactionist model must demonstrate that by promoting the humanization of the individual, the development of well-being and dignity, fosters an enhanced ability to care for others. This, in turn, helps to create and strengthen the bonds of love and trust between people. Evidence that Kaplan and Sedney's androgyny concept satisfies this condition is found in their discussion of the dichotomization of sex-roles resulting from the natural (psychoanalytic) and environmental (social learning) models of differentiation. They believe that these models have resulted in the objectification of men and women as players in a power game. The resulting victimization of women and men

takes the form of denying to members of both sexes the opportunities to express both the agentic and communal aspects of their personality within an intimate relationship. The fusion of sexuality and intimacy [is]...the acknowledgement of the emotional component of their sexual relationships...²⁶⁰

The intent of their model of psychological androgyny is to overcome this dichotomization in order to promote human dignity:

A person with [an androgynous] perspective would not assume patterns of sexual behavior to be dichotomized on the basis of gender. In an androgynous sexual relationship, there would not necessarily even be two distinct roles. Rather, personal needs and desires, combined with situational exigencies, would shape the pattern of sexual responses. Each person would be able to feel a measure of control over her or his sexual behavior, while still respecting the wishes and needs of her or his partner. Sexual behavior would not necessarily be divorced from sexual feelings, and people would not feel a split

between giving and receiving in sexual relationships. Personal satisfaction, combined with an appreciation of the partner's desires would be salient for both men and women.²⁶¹

These citations indicate that Kaplan and Sedney believe that the developing integration of the communal and agentic predispositions of an androgynous psychological sex enhances human dignity and encourages the development of a caring nature in individuals. Consequently, occasions for creating and strengthening the bonds of love and trust between will be increased.

iv. Promotes Improved Social Interaction and Sexual Responsibility

According to this criterion, an improved understanding of sexual differentiation should lead to a better understanding of the importance of sexuality in social and historical development. An interactionist approach must show how it leads the individual to an improved understanding of his own sexual identity. It must also demonstrate that it promotes more responsible action in regard to that identity, without limiting individual freedom to create sexual responses appropriate to the personal situation in which the individual must act. It thus recognizes that this "situation" is found in a socio-cultural context of uncertainty. Furthermore, interactionist interpretations view sexuality as a language of social interaction. Consequently, they must result in improvements in the language of sexuality, defined as speech about, and the action used to express, sexuality. In doing so they must continue to preserve individual freedom of sexual expression.

Kaplan and Sedney propose that the life-span development model represents an improvement in understanding over the natural and environmental approaches because it represents a more holistic orientation, that is, one which considers the influences of both biology and environment on the development of sexuality. In addition, by extending Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory to the development of psychological sex and sex roles across the life span, Kaplan and Sedney believe that they have overcome a major weakness of the psychoanalytic, social learning, and cognitive-development approaches to sexual differentiation. These all exclude consideration of adult development of psychological sex and sex roles, in the belief that this development stops at adolescence.²⁶² Kaplan and Sedney indicate that in overcoming the stereotypical rigidity of the psychoanalytic and social learning models, and the truncatedness of Kohlberg's original position, the psychological androgyny model promotes the "well-being" of individuals and society.²⁶³ Thus, their concept presents an improved understanding of sexual differentiation, one focussing on both similarities and differences, as opposed to those models which focus exclusively on difference, and those which eliminate it from consideration. In addition, the attempt to overcome the limitations of previous interpretations, while at the same time drawing on their strengths, indicates their acceptance of the importance of historical development in the understanding of sexuality.

The second aspect of this criterion requires an interactionist approach to be oriented to an improved understanding of individual sexual identity and to more situationally responsible action in relation to sexuality. The life-span development approach presented by Kaplan and Sedney suggests that individual sexual identity is in an ongoing state of development. This development is cognitive. It consists of the integration into understanding of experience (environmental influences) and biological (primarily hormonal) influences leading to the development of higher levels and stages of understanding. My previous analysis indicated that the cognitive and moral development orientation of Kaplan and Sedney's model, acquired through their having presented their view as an extension of Kohlberg, calls for increasingly more responsible sexual action. This is accomplished by defining as androgynous action only positively valued, culturally appropriate character traits which, according to Kohlberg's approach, ought to be acted out on the basis of moral principles demonstrating increasingly more rational and more caring ability.²⁶⁴ Thus, while there may be limitations to their approach, the life-span extension of the cognitive-development approach allows Kaplan and Sedney to satisfy both the requirement for an improved understanding of sexuality on the part of the individual and the requirement for more situationally responsible action.

An additional aspect of an interactionist orientation is

that it promotes improved social interaction. This ought to be apparent in an improvement in the language of sexuality. This language includes both speech about sexuality and the actions associated with individual expression of sexuality. The psychological androgyny concept suggests that improved social interactions result when individuals are allowed to develop and express their sexual identity in ways which acknowledge their natural bisexual orientations. How any individual will express this identity is the result of a combination of factors, including biological predisposition, environmental influences, cognitive and moral development, and age. This is the intention of the "hybrid" conception of androgynous action. Thus, Kaplan and Sedney's stage approach to development, combined with their adoption of the hybrid model of integration of communal and agentic orientations, implies that individual development results in an improved language of sexuality (speech and action).

As individuals develop the ability to improve their use of sexual language, society's understanding of this language will change, creating a dynamic relationship between the development of individual and societal understanding. As a contribution to this dynamic development, Kaplan and Sedney suggest several terminological distinctions which they believe help to clarify sexual language. The most obvious of these is the term androgyny itself. Broadly enough defined, it is applicable, in a very general way, to most people because it

incorporates both the conventional, or stereotypical, and postconventional stages of development, which all humans may experience. On the other hand, applied to specific individuals, it defines a form of action indicating the integration of a natural (biological) bisexual predisposition. Three other examples provide an indication of the variety of terminological changes which might result from the adoption of the androgyny model. First, the terms agency and communion might be substituted for male and female, in some aspects of discussions, thus reducing the emphasis on stereotypical conceptions. Second, greater consideration might be given to the idea of our basic bisexual nature, rather than concentrating on the absolute dichotomizing of communal and agentic traits. Finally, distinguishing clearly between biological sex, gender identity, and psychological sex will help to clarify speech about sexual differentiation at a foundational level. Kaplan and Sedney suggest that using this type of terminology will improve the language of sexuality, opening up discussion of, and interaction in, interpersonal relations. On the other hand, they also discuss the difficulty which they experienced in coming to grips with the language to be used in expressing their psychological androgyny concept. As I have indicated throughout my analysis, this problem will be readdressed in the Conclusion to the paper.

The final aspect of the fourth criterion's requirements is that an interactionist approach must promote individual

freedom to create responsible sexual action choices, that is, appropriate to the individual's personal circumstances. These choices are made in a socio-historical environment characterized by uncertainty. This requirement is satisfied by Kaplan and Sedney's interpretation of the nature of the interaction of biology and environment in a cognitive-development, life-span perspective. This interaction is undefined; development occurs at a personalized rate, limited only by individual ability to integrate life experiences with biological predisposition. The cognitive orientation of this development suggests that, in the psychological androgyny concept, as the social context changes, the individual's "hybrid" character will allow her or him to better adapt to the situation than do others. This results from the greater "flexibility" and "effectiveness", the freedom of creative expression, which characterizes the hybrid actions of the androgyne.

C. Summary and Implications

The preceding analysis has reviewed Kaplan and Sedney's response to several important criticisms of the androgyny concept, the implications of the concept's cognitive-development orientation, and its ability to satisfy the criteria of Guindon's interactionist model. This analysis has indicated that Kaplan and Sedney's psychological androgyny concept satisfies the requirements of the interactionist approach to sexual differentiation. The concept meets both the content specifications of the comparative criteria, and the moral implica-

tion, or fecundity/creativity, requirements of the qualitative criteria.

In considering the effects of both biological and environmental influences on the life-span development of a person's psychological sex, or sexual identity, the model provides a more satisfactory understanding of sexual differentiation. It creates the possibility of developing new ways of integrating more communally oriented behaviors, that is, sensuality and tenderness, into relationship, thus improving the quality of individuals' lives. As well, the cognitive-development orientation of the model provides a means of adapting to shifts in cultural understanding of sexuality. Adaptability indicates that the model is culturally specific, able to account for cross-cultural differences in the understanding and interpretation of sexuality.

The model's developmental orientation applies not only to societal understanding of sexuality, but also to that of the individual. It promotes loving and trusting relationships as the foundation of the development of self-awareness and potential. From this foundational approach, the model holds that a better understanding of sexual differentiation improves the quality of loving relationships, supporting and promoting individual potential to achieve desired goals. Thus, the model promotes human dignity by emphasizing the importance of the development of human potential.

Recognition of sexual differentiation as an important

aspect of an individual's social integration, follows from the developmental orientation of Kaplan and Sedney's model of psychological androgyny. This orientation views the development of sexual identity, or psychological sex, as a continuous process of integration of environmental and biological influences. This development demonstrates increasing self-awareness and acceptance of responsibility, for the self and for others, as a result of a movement to higher stages and levels of understanding. This growth in self-awareness results in an improvement in the quality of relationships, that is, in the ability of individuals to function "effectively" in relationships. However, precisely when and how this increased self-awareness and acceptance of responsibility will be integrated and acted on by the individual is not predetermined. Thus, while freedom to act out a sexual identity appropriate to the individual will be enhanced, the inherent unpredictability of this action results from the mystery surrounding the particular integration achieved by each individual.

Finally, Kaplan and Sedney's ability to integrate ideas from previously polarized positions into the life-span, cognitive-development, stage approach suggests that the androgyny concept might represent an evolutionary step in the comprehension of the importance of sexuality in social and historical development. Its emphasis on a more complete integration of agentic and communal traits, taking place as the person moves through the stages of development and its expression of this

in the "hybrid" model of androgynous action, provide a better expression of the true nature of the influences of our biological origins and our environment. The hybrid model provides a foundation for acknowledging greater individual freedom in the expression of sexual identity. Together, the cognitive-development orientation of the concept and the hybrid approach provide a basis for suggesting that Kaplan and Sedney's psychological androgyny concept is oriented to improving social interactions through greater sexual creativity. Consequently, it represents an improved interpretation, one able to accommodate both individual and cultural change.

CONCLUSION

Chapter III's analysis indicated that Kaplan and Sedney's androgyny concept satisfies the criteria of Guindon's interactionist model. However, it was noted that while, from an ethical perspective, the concept represents an improvement on previous conceptions of sexual differentiation and fecundity, it is weakened by Kaplan and Sedney's philosophical orientations. This weakness was discussed by Kaplan and Sedney in terms of the language problems they encountered in expressing the fullness of their conception. This problem of language and philosophy will now be addressed. In addition, a possible theological application of the androgyny concept will be briefly considered.

1. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Kaplan and Sedney's androgyny concept satisfies the criteria of the interactionist approach. Consequently, its value to ethical analysis is found in its contribution to the understanding of sexual differentiation and, more generally, human development. My Chapter III analysis of the concept's ability to meet Guindon's interactionist criteria suggested that one form which this contribution has taken is found in Kaplan and Sedney's suggestion of some language improvements which may prove useful to the understanding of sexual differentiation. For example, the use of the terms agentic and communal, or instrumental and expressive, in place of masculine and feminine in some aspects of discussion. As well, the introduction

of the "hybrid" model of action as a way of expressing androgynous integration of the two biological predispositions adds an additional dimension to the expression of sexual differentiation.

However, as I have noted throughout this paper, Kaplan and Sedney indicate that they have experienced some problems in identifying language which adequately expresses the significance of the concept. I have also indicated that I believe that this problem results from the philosophical foundations of their analysis. These foundations will now be discussed and, in an attempt to further the understanding of the concept, a philosophical orientation which might contribute to the solution of Kaplan and Sedney's language difficulties, while supporting the fundamental structure of their concept, will be suggested.

The language employed in Kaplan and Sedney's analysis demonstrates a utilitarian orientation which may be the root of their difficulties. Examples are found in their assessments of the alternative courses of action which they suggest androgynes may choose. These courses of action are considered by Kaplan and Sedney to provide a better balancing of costs and benefits than courses of action resulting from the natural and environmental models. For example, in discussing androgynous action, they state that

Acting in accordance with one's own values has certain implications. It would mean that the person would shape the basic patterns of her or his life... [deciding to] choose a role through weighing the pros

and cons [costs and benefits] of available options and determining which is the most desirable for him or her at that time.²⁶⁵

An additional example is found in their Chapter 10 analysis of "Adult Roles in the Family." They indicate that their discussion does not intend to provide solutions to all the questions surrounding this issue. Rather they intend "to delineate some of the costs and benefits associated with variations of adult family roles."²⁶⁶

While I have provided but two examples of the use of utilitarian language by Kaplan and Sedney, others can be found in their discussion. In fact, this is consistent with the association of the life-span development model of psychological androgyny with the cognitive-development approach. My earlier discussion of this relationship indicated that Kohlberg had adopted a Rawlsian notion of universal moral principles having a utilitarian orientation based in rationalism and individualism.²⁶⁷ In addition, feminists have criticized Kohlberg due to his completely agentic conception of justice which, dominated by a justice as rights approach, ignores concepts of caring which would be derived from a more communal orientation. One of his major critics can be interpreted as suggesting the need for a separate system of justice for women, one whose orientation could be described as justice as caring.²⁶⁸

Therefore, although Kaplan and Sedney have identified an approach which is able to satisfy Guindon's interactionist criteria, its acceptance may be limited as a result of their

failure to move beyond the problems associated with the language, and consequently the moral implications, of Kohlberg's cognitive-development approach. Their endeavor to present a feminist interpretation of androgyny, one which integrates the cognitive-development approach of Kohlberg and the critique of feminists, so that both the agentic and communal orientations would be integrated into a justice system based on both caring and rights, is weakened due to their inability to find language capable of supporting the caring, or communal, aspect of their model. The importance of caring is ignored in the biological, environmental, and cognitive-development views of sexuality. Kaplan and Sedney's lack of success in finding language appropriate to express the content of their concept suggests the need for additional philosophical input. From such input new language might be drawn.

The validity of suggesting an alternative philosophical approach is further supported by problems associated with the content of substage 5B, as outlined in my Chapter III analysis of the relationship between cognitive and moral development, and the discussion of the stage and level of development represented by androgynous action. It should be noted that discussion of these problems supports the language difficulties discussed in the previous paragraph. At the substage 5B level of behavior the principled action of the individual is based on still higher levels of cognitive-development and on "universal ethical principles," rather than on principles of

"social contract or utility" as in substage 5A.²⁶⁹ Considered in terms of my Chapter III conclusion that androgyny approximates postconventional substage 5A cognitive and moral reasoning, my analysis suggests that the language difficulties met by Kaplan and Sedney in expressing the androgyny concept may result from an attempt to use the language of substage 5A reasoning and cognitive-development to describe the content of substage 5B reasoning. That is, Kaplan and Sedney are trying to use the language of justice, or "social contract or utility", to describe a way of being human which is based on ethical principles representing the intergration of justice (agency) and caring (communion).

This analysis suggests that the language difficulties Kaplan and Sedney have experienced can be seen to stem from the relationship between their life-span approach and the philosophical limitations of Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory. Since the ability of Kaplan and Sedney's approach to satisfy interactionist criteria is weakened by the language problems associated with this relationship, seeking an alternative philosophical orientation might provide a stronger basis for accepting the interactionist orientations of psychological androgyny.

Those interested in investigating the androgyny concept further, might gain from the philosophical approach of Emmanuel Levinas. It is not my intention to discuss the relationship of Levinas' philosophy to Kaplan and Sedney's life-

span androgyny approach. I suggest it because I believe that a similarity of intention exists between Levinas' philosophy, Guindon's interactionist approach, and Kaplan and Sedney's psychological concept of androgyny. A discussion of the relationship between the intentions of these authors is presented in an Appendix.

2. A POTENTIAL THEOLOGICAL APPLICATION

Having analyzed Kaplan and Sedney's androgyny concept in terms of the criteria of Guindon's interactionist model, it seems appropriate to briefly examine his orientations. This examination will be limited to one aspect of Guindon's analysis: its prophetic and covenantal orientations. These are found in Guindon's emphasis on the language of relationship. Two examples from The Sexual Creators should be sufficient to support this conclusion. The first appears in the discussion of marriage relationships, in a section titled "Covenant Love:"

Autonomous mutuality sets the condition and provides the interpersonal matrix without which sexual wholeness will never be achieved in any significant way. The conjugal sexual strategy must reckon on autonomous spouses who strive for a privileged union through affective mutuality. The quality of this "affection" which is being reciprocated by the spouses is not immaterial, however, for the attainment of the expected result. Here, also, the human good which is sought for the other, and for both to share, calls for this very precise affection which is known in the theological tradition as love of benevolence. In the case of spouses, though, this love, which pursues the most intimate sexual communion of which a man and a woman are capable, is itself further characterized. I will use the word "covenant" to designate this conjugal trait of love.

The word covenant is...of a higher anthropological, ethical, and theological quality than a juridical term such as "contractual." "Covenant"...has historical connotations which are lacking in the notion of contract. Covenant...is evocative of a joint venture, a journey, an event with a life of its own.²⁷⁰

The second example of Guindon's prophetic and covenantal orientation occurs in his discussion of celibacy as a form of "Prophetic Androgyny." While in this particular context Guindon applies this term to celibates, whose androgyny signifies an orientation to integration which is prophetic, he does not do so exclusively.²⁷¹ Given Kaplan and Sedney's interactionist orientation, which considers all individuals capable of androgynous behavior, it is possible to extend Guindon's conclusions regarding the prophetic nature of androgyny to all Christians, not only celibates. This would suggest that the androgyny concept has prophetic and covenantal implications which all Christians might wish to consider.

3. SUMMARY

The analysis of Kaplan and Sedney's presentation of the psychological concept of androgyny indicates that because of its ability to satisfy the criteria of Guindon's interactionist model of sexual differentiation, it represents an improved basis of understanding the development and expression of individuals' sexuality, sex-role choices, and, more generally, interpersonal relationships. Much of its improvement can be traced to its contributions to the language of sexuality, although it, too, fails, in the opinion of the authors, to find full expression in today's language and cultural context.

For this reason the language of Levinas' philosophy, which attempts to counter-balance the reductionism of the language of Western philosophy by a return to an earlier conceptualization, was suggested as a source of expression which might help androgynists in their attempt to overcome stereotypical conceptualizations. Finally, it was suggested that the androgyny concept, due to its prophetic and covenantal orientation, might be of value to Christians attempting to reorient their thinking about the nature of relationships in general, and sexuality in particular, in order to come to a clearer understanding of sexual responsibility in a world community characterized by change and uncertainty.

APPENDIX

EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND THE CONCEPT OF ANDROGYNY

1. PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATIONS

The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas may provide some useful language insights for presenting the concept of androgyny. Four reasons, all based in a similarity of intention between Levinas' philosophy, Guindon's interactionist approach, and Kaplan and Sedney's psychological conception of androgyny, lead me to suggest it. It is hoped that in supporting these reasons with some rather long quotations from Levinas' work, that the flavour of his philosophy will be tasted while, at the same time, the contention of a relationship between his intention and that of Guindon and Kaplan and Sedney will be supported.

First, Levinas' philosophical ethics is proposed as a corrective to the reductionism of Western philosophy,²⁷² including the stereotypical conceptualization of female and male role taking. This is apparent in the following text which appears in Totality and Infinity:

"...the philosophy of the biological itself, when it goes beyond the mechanical, falls back on finalism and a dialectic of the whole and the part. That the vital impulse propagates itself across the separation of individuals, that its trajectory is discontinuous, that is that it presupposes the intervals of sexuality and a specific dualism in its articulation, is not seriously taken into consideration. When, with Freud, sexuality is approached on the human plane, it is reduced to the level of the search for pleasure, without the ontological signification of voluptuosity

and the irreducible categories it brings into play ever being suspected...What remains unrecognized is that the erotic analysed as fecundity, breaks up reality into relations irreducible to the relations of genus and species, part and whole, action and passion, truth and error; that in sexuality the subject enters into relation with what is absolutely other, with an alterity of a type unforeseeable in formal logic, with what remains other in the relation and is never converted into "mine," and that nonetheless this relation has nothing ecstatic about it, for the pathos of voluptuosity is made of duality.

Neither knowledge nor power. In voluptuosity the Other, the feminine, withdraws into mystery. The relation with it is a relation with its absence, an absence on the plane of knowledge - the unknown - but a presence in voluptuosity. Nor power: there is no initiative at the birth of love... Sexuality is in us neither knowledge nor power, but the very plurality of our existing.

For it is as characteristics of the very ipseity of the I, the very subjectivity of the subject, that the erotic relation is to be analysed. Fecundity is to be set up as an ontological category...In existing itself there is a multiplicity and a transcendence. In this transcendence the I is not swept away...The fecundity of the I is its very transcendence. The biological origin of this concept nowise neutralizes the paradox of its meaning, and delineates a structure that goes beyond the biologically empirical.²⁷³

More succinctly, in Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo, he states that

all these allusions to the ontological differences between the masculine and the feminine would appear less archaic if, instead of dividing humanity into two species (or into two genders), they would signify that the participation in the masculine and in the feminine were the attribute of every human being. Could this be the meaning of the enigmatic verse of Genesis 1.27: "male and female created He them"?²⁷⁴

Thus, it has an immediate kinship with Kaplan and Sedney's psychological androgyny concept, which views androgyny as the integration of the masculine and feminine, representing a movement through stereotypical to postconventional behavior.

Consequently, the language of Levinas' philosophical approach may give an improved basis for explaining some of the ideas of Kaplan and Sedney's life-span, cognitive-development orientation to the concept of androgyny, without disrupting their interactionist orientation.

Second, as a relational philosophy, calling for an incremental, asymmetrical acceptance of responsibility for the self and others,²⁷⁵ Levinas' thinking is communally oriented.²⁷⁶ Its primary concern being the nature of alterity or otherness:

The alterity, the radical heterogeneity of the other, is possible only if the other is other with respect to a term whose essence is to remain at the point of departure, to serve as entry into the relation, to the same not relatively but absolutely. A term can remain absolutely at the point of departure of relationship only as I.²⁷⁷

Levinas' focus on an increasing acceptance of responsibility also places it in basic agreement with some of the relational aspects of Guindon's interactionist approach.

The third reason for suggesting Levinas' philosophy is its prophetic orientation. This orientation means that increased acceptance, or integration, of responsibility leads to the taking of a prophetic stance. This conclusion regarding the prophetic orientation of Levinas' philosophy is supported directly by Th. De Boer.²⁷⁸ Additionally, in the following quotations from a section titled "Witness and Prophecy" in Ch. V, "Subjectivity and Infinity," of Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas identifies prophecy, first, as a fundamental aspect of society and, second, as a key, but

ambiguous, element of language and communication:

"We call prophecy this reverting in which the perception of an order coincides with the signification of this order given to him that obeys it. Prophecy would thus be the very psyche in the soul: the other in the same, and all of man's spirituality would be prophetic.²⁷⁹

Thematization is then inevitable, so that signification itself shows itself, but does so in the sophism with which philosophy begins, in the betrayal which philosophy is called upon to reduce. This reduction always has to be attempted, because of the trace of sincerity which the words themselves bear and which they owe to saying as witness, even when the said dissimulates the saying in the correlation set up between the saying and the said. Saying always seeks to unsay that dissimulation, and this is its very veracity. In the play activating the cultural keyboard of language, sincerity or witness signifies by the very ambiguity of every said, where, in the midst of the information communicated to another there signifies also the sign that is given to him of this giving of signs. That is the resonance of every language "in the name of God," the inspiration or prophecy of all language.

By reason of these ambiguities, prophecy is not the makeshift of a clumsy revelation. They belong to the glory of the Infinite. That prophecy could take on the appearances of information circulating among others, issued from the subject or from influences undergone by the subject, starting with those that would come from its own physiology, or from its wounds or its triumphs -- that is the enigma, the ambiguity, but also the order of transcendence, of the Infinite. The Infinite would be belied in the proof that the finite would like to give of its transcendence; entering into conjunction with the subject that would make it appear, it would lose its glory. Transcendence owes it to itself to interrupt its own demonstration. Its voice has to be silent as soon as one listens for its message. It is necessary that its pretension be exposed to derision and refutation, to the point of suspecting in the "here I am" that attests to it a cry or a slip of a sick subjectivity. But of a subjectivity responsible for the other! There is an enigmatic ambivalence, and an alternating of meaning in it. In its saying, the said and being are stated, but also a witness, an inspiration of the same by the other,

beyond essence, an overflowing of the said itself by a rhetoric which is not only a linguistic mirage, but a surplus of meaning of which consciousness all by itself would be incapable. Here there is a possibility both of ideology and of sacred delirium: ideology to be circumvented by linguistics, sociology and psychology, delirium to be reduced by philosophy, to be reduced to signification, the-one-for-the-other, a mission toward another in the glory of the Infinite. Transcendence, the beyond essence which is also being-in-the-world, requires ambiguity, a blinking of meaning which is not only a chance certainty, but a frontier both ineffaceable and finer than the tracing of an ideal time. It needs the diachrony that breaks the unity of transcendental apperception, which does not succeed in assembling the time of modern humanity, in turn passing from prophecy to philology and transcending philology toward prophetic signification. For it is incapable of denying the fraternity of men.²⁸⁰

Levinas uses the terms "recurrence" and "substitution" to describe this orientation to responsibility:

In the traditional teaching of idealism, subject and consciousness are equivalent concepts. The who or the me are not even suspected. This one is a nonrelation, but absolutely a term. Yet this term of an irreversible assignation is perhaps dissimulated, under the outdated notion of the soul. It is a term not reducible to a relation, but yet is in recurrence...The term in recurrence will be sought here beyond or on the hither side of consciousness and its play... Nothing here resembles self-consciousness. It has meaning only as an upsurge in me of a responsibility prior to commitment, that is, a responsibility for the other.²⁸¹

Such responsibility is obsessive to the point of substitution:

Far from being recognized in the freedom of consciousness...the responsibility for the other, the responsibility in obsession, suggests an absolute passivity of self that has never been able to diverge from itself, to then enter into its limits, and identify itself by recognizing itself in its past... Responsibility for another is not an accident that happens to a subject, but precedes essence in it, has not awaited freedom, in which a commitment to another would have been made. I have not done any-

thing and I have always been under accusation -- persecuted...Responsibility for the others has not been a return to oneself, but an exasperated contracting, which the limits of identity cannot retain. Recurrence becomes identity in breaking up the limits of identity, breaking up the principle of being in me...Responsibility in obsession is a responsibility of the ego for what the ego has not wished, that is, for the others. This anarchy in the recurrence to oneself is beyond the normal play of action and passion in which the identity of a being is maintained, in which it is. It is on the hither side of the limits of identity. This passivity undergone in proximity by the force of an alterity in me is the passivity of a recurrence to oneself which is not the alienation of an identity betrayed. What can it be but a substitution of me for the others? It is, however not an alienation, because the other in the same is my substitution for the other through responsibility, for which, I am summoned as someone irreplaceable. I exist through the other and for the other, but without this being alienation: I am inspired. This inspiration is the psyche. The psyche can signify this alterity in the same without alienation in the form of incarnation...²⁸²

Additionally, Levinas states that

This recurrence can be stated only as an in-itself... as otherwise than being. To be oneself, otherwise than being, to be dis-interested, is to bear the wretchedness and bankruptcy of the other, and even the responsibility that the other can have for me. To be oneself, the state of being a hostage, is always to have one degree of responsibility more, the responsibility for the responsibility of the other.²⁸³

Consequently, Levinas describes the responsibility of substitution in terms of finite freedom:

The responsibility for another, an unlimited responsibility which the strict book-keeping of the free and non-free does not measure, requires subjectivity as an irreplaceable hostage. This subjectivity it denudes under the ego in a passivity of persecution, repression and expulsion outside of essence, into oneself...But in responsibility for the other for life and death, the adjectives unconditional, undecidable, absolute take on meaning. They serve to

qualify freedom, but wear away the substrate, from which the free act arises in essence...This finite freedom is not primary, is not initial; but it lies in an infinite responsibility where the other is not other because he strikes up against and limits my freedom, but where he can accuse me to the point of persecution, because the other, absolutely other, is another one...That is why finite freedom is not simply an infinite freedom operating in a limited field. The will which it animates wills in a passivity it does not assume. And the proximity of the neighbor in its trauma does not only strike up against me, but exalts and elevates me, and, in the literal sense of the term, inspires me. Inspiration, heteronomy, is the very pneuma of the psyche. Freedom is borne by the responsibility it could not shoulder, an elevation and inspiration without complacency...

But in the irreplaceable subject [i. e., hostage], unique and chosen as a responsibility and a substitution, a mode of freedom, ontologically impossible, breaks the unrendable essence. Substitution frees the subject from ennui, that is, from the enchainment to itself, where the ego suffocates in itself due to the tautological way of identity, and ceaselessly seeks after the distraction of games and sleep in a movement that never wears out. This liberation is not an action, a commencement...where the equality with oneself would be established in the form of self-consciousness. An anarchic liberation, it emerges, without being assumed, without turning into a beginning, in inequality with onself. It is brought out without being assumed, in the undergoing by sensibility beyond its capacity to undergo. This describes the suffering and vulnerability of the sensible as the other in me. The other is in me and in the midst of my very identification.²⁸⁴

I find Levinas' approach to be in agreement with Kaplan and Sedney's view of androgyny. Their integrative orientation has been previously established. The prophetic orientation of their approach is expressed in their discussion of "Change in the Social Context," and their "Conclusions" in their final chapter (see pp. 356-59). They suggest that, for androgyny to flourish, a society would require the integration of communal

and agentic values, not only on an individual basis but also on a society wide basis. Thus, the prophetic orientation of Kaplan and Sedney's concept of androgyny is found in its call for social change toward the integration of a caring attitude, that is, an assuming of responsibility for the other:

As long as the dominant forces in this society emphasize agentic values and deemphasize communal values, change toward androgyny under the assimilation model seems frustrating at best and impossible at worst. Without change in the broader spheres of society, individual change is problematic. Only through a fundamental change in values, reflected in economic, legal and social changes would the communal elements of existence be regarded highly enough so that individuals would be free to enjoy androgyny. Androgyny cannot really flourish unless communal values are given as much emphasis as agentic ones....[W]e have come to the conclusion that the full range of the potential benefits to be derived from androgyny are impossible without such fundamental social change... [T]he inherent tension between androgyny and current social structures needs to be recognized. Although there are potential advantages associated with androgyny, there are also disadvantages in the current climate. It may be useful to find alternative social structures within which to work. Those who elect to remain within traditional structures in the corporate, professional, and academic worlds, should be ready to face the continuing clash between androgyny and the prevailing social values.²⁸⁵

The fourth reason for suggesting that Levinas' philosophy might be of interest to androgynists is its interactionist orientation. This conclusion is drawn primarily from Levinas' analysis in a particular section of Totality and Infinity, "The I Of Enjoyment Is Neither Biological Nor Sociological" (pp. 120-21), although I believe it is supported by statements throughout the book:

The notion of the separated person which we have approached in the description of enjoyment, which is posited in the independence of happiness, is to be distinguished from the notion of person such as it is fabricated by the philosophy of life or race. In the exaltation of biological life the person arises as a product of the species or of impersonal life, which has recourse to the individual so as to ensure its impersonal triumph. The unicity of the I, its status as a conceptless individual, would disappear in this participation in what exceeds it.

The pathos of liberalism [the "sociological"]... lies in the promotion of a person in as much as he represents nothing further, that is, is precisely a self. Then multiplicity can be produced only if the individuals retain their secrecy, if the relation that relates them into a multiplicity is not visible from the outside, but proceeds from one unto the other...Pluralism is not a numerical multiplicity. In order that a pluralism in itself...be realized there must be produced in depth the movement from me to the other, an attitude of an I with regard to the Other...that would not be a species of relationship in general; this means that the movement from me to the other could not present itself as a theme to an objective gaze freed from this confrontation with the other, to a reflection. Pluralism implies a radical alterity of the other, whom I do not simply conceive by relation to myself, but confront out of my egoism. The alterity of the Other is in him and is not relative to me; it reveals itself. But I have access to it proceeding from myself and not through a comparison of myself with the other. I have access to the alterity of the Other from the society I maintain with him, and not by quitting this relation in order to reflect on its terms. Sexuality supplies the example of this relation, accomplished before being reflected on: the other sex is an alterity borne by a being as an essence and not as the reverse of his identity; but it could not affect an unsexed me...²⁸⁶

See also pp. 265-66 where Levinas states that "the relation between lovers" cannot be viewed as "a complementarity". Subsequently he discusses the integration of biological and social influences:

If biology furnishes us the prototypes of all these

relations, this proves, to be sure, that biology does not represent a purely contingent order of being, unrelated to its essential production. But these relations free themselves from their biological limitation. The human I is posited in fraternity: that all men are brothers is not added to man as a moral conquest, but constitutes his ipseity. Because my position as an I is effectuated already in fraternity the face can present itself to me as a face. The relation with the face in fraternity, where in his turn the Other appears in solidarity with all the others, constitutes the social order, the reference of every dialogue to the third party by which the We...encompasses the face to face opposition, opens the erotic upon a social life...²⁸⁷

This interactionist orientation in Levinas' philosophy is an important factor in the formulation of the suggestions made in the Conclusion where consideration was given to the implications of the prophetic orientation of the life-span androgyny concept.

These four reasons for suggesting Levinas' philosophy are intended to indicate an affinity between the approaches of Levinas, Guindon, and Kaplan and Sedney. Levinas' approach contrasts with the philosophical orientation of the West. Its anti-reductionist stance is similar to the intention of Kaplan and Sedney's concept and Guindon's interactionist model. What specific contributions this philosophical orientation might make to the overcoming of the language difficulties which Kaplan and Sedney have identified, cannot be determined without a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the work of these authors. I suggest it only as a possible avenue of further exploration for those interested in a clearer understanding of the psychological

androgyny concept.

2. SUMMARY AND THEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION

Levinas' philosophy is offered as a corrective to Western philosophy's reductionist orientations.²⁸⁸ While he denies any theological content in his philosophical analysis, he does acknowledge the influence of his Jewish background on its formation and formulation.²⁸⁹ Given this influence, and the resulting prophetic orientation of Levinas' approach, it is not surprising that several authors have noted that the idea of covenant is a central element of his philosophy.²⁹⁰ Given the similarity between the prophetic orientation of Levinas' philosophy, Guindon's interactionist model of sexual differentiation, and Kaplan and Sedney's approach to psychological androgyny, it is possible to suggest, as I have done in my Conclusion, that Guindon's interactionist model and, indirectly, due to its interactionist orientation, Kaplan and Sedney's psychological androgyny concept, share Levinas' covenantal orientation. Given this relationship, it would be interesting to consider how the application of the psychological androgyny concept to the interpretation of both the Old and New Testament might contribute to our understanding of Scripture. An example of such an application is found in Levinas:

all these allusions to the ontological differences between the masculine and the feminine would appear less archaic if, instead of dividing humanity into two species (or into two genders), they would signify that the participation in the masculine and in the

feminine were the attribute of every human being. Could this be the meaning of the enigmatic verse of Genesis 1.27: "male and female created He them"?²⁹¹

The possibility of this type of application of the androgyny concept is also supported by Guindon. In The Sexual Creators, in a section titled "Prophetic Androgyny" (pp. 213-18), he discusses the concept of androgyny in relation to celibate life. His language is very similar to that of Levinas in the previous quotation:

Successful androgynous celibates stand in the midst of the Christian community as a living witness to the extraordinary human potential of each human person created male/female in God's image. Moreover, because the feminine and the masculine are reconciled in their personalities they are the prophetic signs of the eschatological reconciliation of all in Christ in whom "there are no more distinctions between [...] male and female" (Ga 3: 28). The practice of androgyny establishes a humanity reconciled in its most fundamental difference.²⁹²

Exactly how the concept might influence the interpretation of Biblical texts will be left to others to determine.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. "...if there is no meaning to sex, absolutely everything goes and there is no rational way of establishing what is right and what is wrong." Andre GUINDON, The Sexual Language: An Essay in Moral Theology (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1977), p. 8.

Additionally,

"...general codes of sexual behavior cannot adjust to the multiple variations of personal situations and so as systems they become absolutist. Each exception represents a threat to its credibility and efficacy...As opposed to pre-made sexual codes received from without and transmitted from one generation to the next, sexual meaning is an original human achievement which has to be re-invented, reformulated, and relived by each generation and, to some extent, by each human person...[Therefore]..."sexual meaning" as a moral reality can never be conceived as some kind of pre-made substantial entity, enjoying a life of its own and independent from the real human subjects which give it existence." Andre GUINDON, The Sexual Language: An Essay in Moral Theology (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1977), pp.35-36 and 41.

Also,

"Sexuality is that which gives human beings an interpersonal and social history and that which makes them responsible for its development...By their sexuality, human beings are also differentiated from one another and they interrelate among themselves following a complex development sequence...By their sexuality...human beings establish intimate, but socially significant covenants with each other following elaborate cultural norms. Thus, culture permeates their sexual self. Their sexual behavior, in turn, permeates the whole fabric of their culture." Andre Guindon, The Sexual Creators: An Ethical Proposal for Concerned Christians (Lanham, Md., University Press of America, 1986), p. 34.

Finally:

"...sexuality is highly determining for human beings: it differentiates them, it particularizes them, it individualizes them." Andre GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, p. 71.

2."The three major trends of the psychology of sex differences over the years can be interpreted dialectically. The original position understands the differences in terms of nature, the genetic, the innate, the biological, the instinctive. This was contradicted by a view in which nurture, the environmental, the acquired, the psychological, the learned, are everything. The clash of these competing positions has brought about the formulation of a contemporary theory of psychosexual differentiation in which the

- basic proposition is not a dichotomization of genetics and environment, but their interaction." GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, pp. 213-14.
3. While psychological androgyny is often referred to as a "model" in the literature, for purposes of clarity I have chosen to refer to it as a "concept" in order to differentiate it from the term "interactionist model".
 4. Alexandra G. KAPLAN and Mary Anne SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles: An Androgynous Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.; 1980). See Chapter Seven where they discuss the "major theories of sex-role development," their "limitations," and their "implications...for androgynous development." (page 179). On page 191 they point out that the three major theories have "limited their explanation to the development of sex-role stereotypic behavior... and, hence, ha[...vel] not extended beyond early childhood." In addition, by extending the analysis into adulthood they believe that "the goal of sex-role development becomes a balance between agency and communion rather than the attainment of a rigid, sex-typed identity" (page 192). In addition, they suggest that "Examination of the process by which sex roles develop in adulthood is only beginning, but it has exciting implications for those interested in the expression of androgyny." (page 194)
 5. Carolyn G. HEILBRUN, Toward a Recognition of Androgyny (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) and June SINGER, Androgyny: Toward a New Theory of Sexuality (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976).

CHAPTER I

6. Andre GUINDON, Lecture I, Faculty of Theology, St. Paul University, Ottawa, September 20, 1989. These comments are drawn from notes taken in the series of lectures and discussions constituting the Seminar in Moral Theology (THO 7245, Models of Sexual Differentiation: Ethical Implications) for the 1989-90 academic year.
7. "For such a simplistic mentality, sexuality is reduced to the size of its most outward and tangible element, genitality." GUINDON, The Sexual Language, p. 25.
And,
"But in this heavy reliance on raw physical realities, it is again the case that code moralists and most contemporary sexologists exhibit their common primitivism with its mimetic consciousness. Human life is but a replica of anatomic realities and the biological processes observed in the surrounding environment". GUINDON, The Sexual Language, p. 114.
8. Pleck, Joseph H., "How Psychology Constructed Masculinity: Theory of Male Sex Role Identity," in V. Patraka and L.A. Tilly, Feminist Re-Visions: What Has Been and Might Be (Ann Arbor, Mich.: U. of Michigan, 1973. On page 187 Pleck indicates that the concept of sex typing has a "more important

- application" than the discussion of sex differences:
 the more important application of the concept of sex typing is to within-sex differences among individuals. Here, it describes that range of variation which exists among men, and among women, in the extent to which each individual has culturally-denied "masculine" and/or "feminine" traits. In this latter context, the "development of sex typing" refers to the processes by which boys become masculine and girls feminine.
9. "Based on anatomical differences, the naturalistic position has the tendency to posit two human natures and to interpret femininity and masculinity as two different natural products characterizing, respectively, women and men. Since a "nature" is taken to be the specific form of each living thing and the basic principle of its operations, men and women are seen as enjoying different and irreconcilable characteristics, roles, functions, and mystiques. Whether they speak from a feminist or a masculinist context, the authors who entertain this notion have the tendency to indulge in "pseudospeciation," an operation which consists in considering groups which differ from one's own group as pseudo-species and, therefore, as imperfectly human. This trend has focused on superiority and subordination." GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, p. 214.
 10. "Besides a fashionable tolerance towards others, there is here a mentality very similar to taboo. Because of the pressure to conform, one feels he must voice peer-group sexual codes, though in his own humanness, he knows better and mutters to himself secretly that these are insane." GUINDON, The Sexual Language, p. 29.
 11. "During the first half of this century nurture took over from nature. It became fashionable to think that genes, hormones, and gonads had little to do with it all...The main result of this environmentalist position was to challenge attempts to structure and to define femininity and masculinity in essentialist and universal terms. The immediate and far-reaching ethical consequence was to guard us from too glibly discerning the allegedly cross-cultural and meta-historical "natural law" requirements of each gender. By its excessiveness, though, this position leads to a kind of cultural relativism and arbitrariness which seems suspicious to most researchers today." GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, pp. 214-15.
 12. According to this model, "Males and females can be transformed into nearly anything society makes them to be. "Gender" which indicates masculine and feminine becomes detached from "sex" which makes males and females." GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, p. 214.
 13. Responding to his own question ("how do we go about defining or re-defining sexual meaning?"), GUINDON in The Sexual

- Language indicates that the "positive sciences" [representative of the environmentalist model] which measure the existing man cannot go about this task alone... Their attitude before the impending crisis of changing cultural models [represents a...retrospective method...a reading of the future in terms of the already-made, visible, tangible, measurable past and present. One simply prolongs rates and curves and then forecasts the future as emerging ineluctably from present trends." (p. 21)
14. Andre GUINDON, Lecture I, Faculty of Theology, St. Paul University, Ottawa, September 20, 1989.
 15. Speaking of the social sciences and their orientation to measurement Andre GUINDON indicates, on page 16 of The Sexual Language, that they have no means whatsoever to appraise "human acts", those acts which both arise from, and shape, man's long-term project, his life-purpose, his humanness. But by mere scientific determinations, man himself is reduced to a bundle of drives [psycho-social motivations]..."
 16. GUINDON, Lecture I.
 17. GUINDON, Lecture I.
 18. Referring to Alfred C. Kinsey as an example of the environmentalists' overly rationalistic approach, GUINDON, on page 17 of The Sexual Language points out that Kinsey's whole investigative method presupposes the pervasive idea that each individual is sexed in himself, independently from any encounter with the other sex. To activate one's own sexual function...is the realization of one's sexuality." Additionally, on page 215 of The Sexual Creators, he states that "At the limit, we would all be unisex solitudes faced with the Promethean task of becoming human each for ourselves or, worse, each against the other. In the first instance, we have a case of solipsism that violates the relational character of the sexual language. In the second, we are dealing with perversion that contradicts the loving quality of sexual fecundity." (p. 215)
 19. The second to sixth disadvantages are drawn from GUINDON, Lecture I.
 20. On page 216 of The Sexual Creators GUINDON states that This third position represents an effort to account theoretically for the sum of ever increasing findings concerning the uterine and extrauterine processes of sexual differentiation with different stages of core gender identity establishment... This life-long process of sexual differentiation

and integration seems to represent a passage from the more peripheral to deeper and deeper levels of human relational existence. It progresses through a series of movements between a pole of similarity (males seek masculinity and females femininity) and a pole of dissimilarity (males open up to femininity and females to masculinity).

21. On page 119 of The Sexual Language GUINDON states:

The fact is that anatomical structures are ambivalent. Raw traits, such as the presence or absence of a phallus can therefore never be considered as destiny. Few contemporary authors who deal with this arduous problem of man-woman differentiation are content with biological data because the inferences drawn from them can too easily fall prey to an easy psychologism.

Subsequently (page 127), but without indicating precisely how biology influences us, he states that

biological elements, along with their necessary, accompanying psychological changes constitute an inalienable substratum for gender identification. It is hardly conceivable, except in a "spiritualistic" or a "corporealistic" view of humanity, that these have no influence on one's way of existing as a sexed being and that, in turn, one will not express his sexed personality with and through these structures. The concrete elaboration of a gender identity is a human achievement, the result of human choices and human conditioning. Yet these have a bodily "situation" which can be denied only at the cost of normality."

22. See GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, pp. 215-16 where he notes

Today a majority of researchers are working within an interactionist paradigm. It postulates that nothing we are and do is exclusively the work of nature alone or of culture alone. Everything is human construction in an interaction between a human organism and its environment. Some researchers place stronger emphasis on physiological determinants of gender differences throughout life. Others lay primary responsibility for the final determination for psychosexual differences upon social conditioning...But everyone agrees, in this position, that one is not without the other.

23. The model "postulates that man and woman enjoy the very same human nature in two persons created to relate to one another." GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, pp. 216.

24. Andre GUINDON, Lecture II, Faculty of Theology, St. Paul University, Ottawa, September 27, 1989.

25. GUINDON, The Sexual Language, p. 146. He states that:
Each person, following the rhythm of his own in-

tensity and characteristics, undergoes a kind of sexual dialectical progression. This journey starts with an infantile polymorphous sexuality, a sort of polysexuality which is still extremely plastic and open to much imprinting. There follows a stage of sexual dichotomy where an often extreme "spiritualization" of tenderness during late childhood gives way to a clear genitalization of sensuality during early adolescence. The third stages is the long road towards sexual integration where, hopefully, a new unity will be found in a purposeful personality."

26. GUINDON, The Sexual Language, pp. 158-59:

Something extremely strange happens to a young person in his early teens...He is faced with this hard world of ours. [In] This mutation ...his whole being is shaken...The "crisis"... beget[s]...results...Crossing the threshold of moral life and acquiring the ability to take responsible decisions concerning one's sexual behavior is itself a growing process. Only over a certain span of time will this bodily and spiritual shift be sufficiently underway for a real heterosexual project to be delineated.

27. See Note 25 where this process is described.

28. GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, p. 77:

To conjure up an "ideal model" of sexual language which ought to be taught to others is a mirage. If sexual knowledge can be disseminated and sexual values can be discussed with a certain degree of objectivity, the modalities of a fecund sexual language cannot merely be imparted to others. We can only speak our own, individualized, culture-imbued, time-bound sexual language to other persons who will in turn, within their immediate socio-cultural environment, invent the form of their own sexual response. If there is such a thing, therefore, as a universality of sexual language, it cannot be one imposed from on high and, once learned, "applied" ...to each individual situation.

29. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, transl. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). On pages 46-47 Levinas states that

Heidegger, with the whole of Western history, takes the relation with the Other as enacted in the destiny of sedentary peoples, the possessors and builders of the earth. Possession is preeminently the form in which the other becomes the same, by becoming mine...Ontology becomes ontology

of nature, impersonal fecundity...A philosophy of power, ontology is, as first philosophy which does not call into question the same, a philosophy of injustice...Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains...tyranny... Being before the existent, ontology before metaphysics, is freedom... before justice. It is a movement within the same before obligation to the other.

30. GUINDON, The Sexual Language, pp. 16-17:

But, even if it owes a great deal to all the approaches exemplified by the positive sciences of man, the ethical approach cannot be satisfied with them. By their practice of precise measurement, these sciences tend to make us believe that they offer a comprehensive understanding of man; with the magic net of diagrams and statistics, man is at long last adequately, if not absolutely, circumscribed and so exhaustively defined. A good number of scientists do not seem to realize that the "measureable man" is the man-object, the faceless, indeed, the disfigured man, man without his humanity, man deprived of his irreducible originality...Confined within their own methods, these sciences have no means whatsoever to appraise "human acts", those acts which both arise from, and shape, man's long-term project, his life-purpose, his humanness. But by mere scientific determinations, man himself is reduced to the mere sum of his economic and social relation, or to a bundle of drives, or to being a simple toy in the hands of impersonal and oppressive systems...The moralist...is the one who holds that man cannot be reduced to the status of a result. He professes that man keeps the initiative of meaning and that he is always less of a man for not doing so.

31. This is what is implied, I believe, by GUINDON in The Sexual Language, p. 124, where he states that

The basic insight provided by field workers such as Mead, Money and the Hampsons concerning cultural significance of gender definitions and their establishment must be kept. Being a man or a woman was not, in the Chambuli society of a quarter century ago, what it was in our culture. Yet a typical masculine and feminine identity did exist there just as one existed here. This identity is now changing there, as here.

And on p. 130,

Even if we could say that human society is a sort

of necessity for "human nature", it is not precontained with its implications in that concept. Nothing much is gained by saying that "society" is inscribed in "nature" apart from the calling attention to the fact that it should exist. The same hold true, it seems to me, for masculinity and femininity. Man and woman should exist in their differentiation, but we cannot deduce "how" merely by meditating on "human nature". A moralist can only say that men and women, especially in a couple situation, are mutually responsible and challenging for each other. Through ongoing sexual dialogue, the right modalities of heterosexual reciprocity are discerned and established.

32. Guindon, The Sexual Creators, p. 68.
33. Guindon, The Sexual Creators, pp. 61-68.
34. Guindon, The Sexual Creators, pp. 68-72.
35. Guindon, The Sexual Creators, pp. 72-74.
36. Guindon, The Sexual Creators, pp. 74-78.

CHAPTER II

37. Alexandra KAPLAN, and Mary Anne SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles: An Androgynous Perspective (Boston, Little-Brown, 1980), p. 57.
38. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 57.
39. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 55.
40. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 55-56. In introducing religious orientations to androgyny, Kaplan and Sedney indicate that "androgyny has been so much more important in Eastern religions", and on page 61 they indicate that unifying the "masculine and feminine principles in order to reach highest levels of enlightenment" is a key feature of the Eastern approach. They also note (p. 56) that androgyny has been downplayed in the Western religions in favour of an emphasis on "patriarchy".
41. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 57.
42. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 57.
43. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 58.
44. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 61.
45. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 73.
46. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 74-75.
47. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 66.
48. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 57.
49. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 65-66.
50. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 64.
51. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 75.
52. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 11.
53. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 11.
54. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 11.

55. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 3.
56. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 5.
57. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 6. This interpretation is based on the authors' introduction to the section titled "The Theoretical Construct of Androgyny" on pp. 5-6.
58. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 180.
59. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 191.
60. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 191.
61. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 194.
62. See Jeanne H. BLOCK, Sex Role Identity and Ego Development (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1984) and Robert HEFNER, Meda REBECCA, and Barbara OLESHANSKY, "Development of Sex-Role Transcendence," in Human Development, 18 (1975), pp. 143-158. In addition to the articles cited by Kaplan and Sedney also see Meda REBECCA, Robert HEFNER, and Barbara OLESHANSKY, "A Model of Sex-Role Transcendence," in Alexandra G. Kaplan and Joan P. Bean, eds., Beyond Sex-Role Stereotypes: Readings Toward a Psychology of Androgyny (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1976), pp. 90-97.
63. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 193.
64. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 194-95.
65. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 195.
66. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 195.
67. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 207.
68. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 192-93. Their presentation here is directly influenced by their employment of the models of BLOCK and HEFNER, REBECCA, and OLESHANSKY (See note 62).
69. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 193-94.
70. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 195.
71. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 6.
72. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 3.
73. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 3.
74. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 5.
75. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 6.
76. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 6.
77. See David BAKAN, The Duality of Human Existence: An Essay on Psychology and Religion (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966).
78. See T. PARSONS and R.E. BALES, Family Socialization and Interaction Process, (Glencoe, Ill.; Free Press, 1955).
79. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 7.
80. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 7.
81. BAKAN, The Duality of Human Existence, p. 20.
82. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 7.
83. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 30.
84. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 30.
85. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 65-66.
86. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 7.
87. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 7.

88. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 13.
89. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 14.
90. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 14.
91. See the discussion of the PRF-ANDRO scale on page 16 of
KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles.
92. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 7-8.
93. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 8.
94. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 8.
95. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 193-94.
96. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 9.
97. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 8.
98. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 8.
99. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 8.
100. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 9.
101. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 9.
102. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 9.
103. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 27.
104. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 27.
105. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 27.
106. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 10.
107. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 10-11.
108. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 10.
109. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 10.
110. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 28.
111. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 28.
112. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 29.
113. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 29.
114. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 108.
115. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 235.
116. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 108.
117. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 108-10.
118. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 81, 82,
and 110.
119. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 191-92.
120. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 190.
121. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 139.
122. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 109.
123. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 190 and
207.
124. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 192.
125. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 190.
126. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 206 and
207.
127. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 207.
128. See the following articles in which Kohlberg discusses
the possibility of a stage-age relationship: KOHLBERG,
LAWRENCE, "Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral
Development Revisited," Chapter 8 in Paul B. Baltes and
K. Warner Schaie (Eds.), Life-Span Developmental
Psychology: Personality and Socialization (New York:
Academic Press, 1973), pp. 179-204; KOHLBERG, LAWRENCE

and KRAMER, R. "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development," in Human Development, 12 (1969), pp. 93-120; KOHLBERG, LAWRENCE with HIGGINS, Ann "6. Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Development Revisited -- Again," in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. II, The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 426-97.

129. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 193.
 130. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 79.
 131. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 84-89.
 132. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 96, 97, and 98.
 133. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 96.
 134. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 108.
 135. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 96.
 136. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 210.
 137. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 108.
 138. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 95.
 139. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 106.
 140. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 108.
 141. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 139.
 142. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 38.
 143. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 112.
 144. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 112-13.
 145. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 120, 134, and 135.
 146. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 124, 134, and 135.
 147. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 124, and 139.
 148. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 139.
 149. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 133.
 Unfortunately men are not in a position to make a comparable statement supporting their own biological importance. The innovation of artificial insemination makes the comparable male statement, "The fact that only a man can physically impregnate a women serves as a profound distinction between the sexes," invalid, since the presence of a male person is no longer required; to complete the insemination process, any human sperm will do. No wonder opposition to this technique exists: until the innovation of a technique which will allow men to bear children, a threat to male power will be felt by some men.
150. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 140-43.
 151. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 145.
 152. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 145.
 153. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 140-41.
 154. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 108-09.

155. I have concluded this from KAPLAN and SEDNEY's review of "THEORIES OF SEX-ROLE DEVELOPMENT," in Psychology and Sex Roles, pp.180-95, in which they discuss Freud's Psychoanalytic (Naturalist), Mischel's Social Learning (Environmentalist), and Kohlberg's Cognitive-Development (Interactionist) orientations. Their "Alternative" view is offered as a response and extension of these theories.
156. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 191.
157. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 205.
158. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 207.
159. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 233.
160. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 233.
161. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 233.
162. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 224.
163. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 235.
164. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 235.
165. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 235.
166. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 266.
167. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 235.
168. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 267.
169. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 267-68.
170. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 233.
171. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 271 and 285.
172. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 340-41.
173. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 273.
174. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 283.
175. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 291.
176. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 294-95.
177. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 305.
178. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 323.
179. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 328.
180. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 329.
181. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 331.
182. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 331-32.
183. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 338.
184. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 336.
185. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 340.
186. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 359.
187. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 351.
188. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 336.
189. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 258.
190. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 356.
191. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 358.
192. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 356.
193. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 358.

CHAPTER III

194. The following articles and text references are representative of those in which the androgyny concept is critiqued in terms of the three problems associated with the andro-

- gyny concept. **(A)USE OF STEREOTYPES:** Cynthia SECOR, "Androgyny: An Early Reappraisal," in Women's Studies, 2 (1974), pp. 161-169; Nancy Topping BAZIN and Alma FREEMAN, "The Androgynous Vision," in Women's Studies, 2 (1974), pp. 185-215; David M. HARRINGTON and Susan M. ANDERSON, "Creativity, Masculinity, Femininity and Three Models of Psychological Androgyny," in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, No. 4(1981), pp. 744-757; Rosemary Radford RUETHER, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), pp. 111. **(B)PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT:** Jeffrey A. KELLY and Judith WORELL, "New Formulations of Sex Roles and Androgyny: A Critical Review," in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 45 (6, 1977), pp. 1101-15; Jeffrey A. KELLY, Wyndol FURMAN, and Veronica Young, "Problems Associated With the Typological Measurement of Sex Roles and Androgyny," in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46 (6, 1978), pp. 1574-76; Anne LOCKSLEY and Mary Ellen COLTEN, "Psychological Androgyny: A Case of Mistaken Identity?," in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37 (6, 1979), pp. 1017-31; Bernice LOTT, "A Feminist Critique of Androgyny: Toward the Elimination of Gender Attributions for Learned Behavior," in Clara Mayo and Nancy M. Henley, eds., Gender and Nonverbal Behavior, Springer Series in Social Psychology (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981); Delroy L. PAULHUS and Carol Lynn MARTIN, "Functional Flexibility: A New Conception of Interpersonal Flexibility," in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55 (1, 1988), pp. 88-101; Mary Anne SEDNEY, "Comments on Median Split Procedures for Scoring Androgyny Measures," in Sex Roles, 7 (2, 1981), pp. 217-222; Mary Anne SEDNEY, "Conceptual and Methodological Sources of Controversies About Androgyny," from a manuscript published in R.K. Unger, ed., Images of Gender (Farmingdale, N.Y.: Baywood Press, 1989). **(C)GREATER DEMANDS FOR CHANGE FROM WOMEN:** Alfred B. HEILBRUN, JR., "Gender Differences in the Functional Linkage Between Androgyny, Social Cognition, and Competence," in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41 (6, 1981), 1106-18; Warren H. JONES, Mary Ellen O'c. CHERNOVETS, and Robert O HANSSON, "The Enigma of Androgyny: Differential Implications for Males and Females?," in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46 (2, 1978), pp. 298-313.
195. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 8.
196. Kathryn Pauly MORGAN, "Androgyny: A Conceptual Critique," in Social Theory and Practice, 8 (3, Fall, 1982), pp. 253-54. Addition support for the idea that androgyny suffers from philosophical limitations is found in the following articles: Edward E. SAMPSON, "Psychology and the American Ideal," in Journal of Personality and Social

- Psychology, 35 (11, November 1977), pp. 767-82; Ellen LENNEY, "Androgyny: Some Audacious Assertions Towards Its Coming of Age," in Sex Roles, 5 (6, 1979), pp. 703-19; Kathryn Pauly MORGAN, "The Androgynous Classroom: Liberation Or Tyranny?," in Philosophy of Education 1980 (Champaign, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1980), pp. 245-55; J.G. MORAWSKI, "The Troubled Quest for Masculinity, Femininity, and Androgyny," in Phillip Shaver and Clyde Hendrick, eds., Sex and Gender vol. 7 of Review of Personality and Social Psychology (Newbury Park: Sage Publications and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, 1987), pp. 44-69.
197. See Kathryn Pauly MORGAN, "The Androgynous Classroom: Liberation Or Tyranny?," in Philosophy of Education 1980 (Champaign, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1980), pp. 245-55 and "Androgyny: A Conceptual Critique," in Social Theory and Practice, 8 (3, Fall, 1982), pp. 245-83.
 198. MORGAN, "Androgyny" A Conceptual Critique," p. 273.
 199. MORGAN, "The Androgynous Classroom: Liberation Or Tyranny?," p. 252.
 200. MORGAN, "Androgyny: A Conceptual Critique," p. 254.
 201. MORGAN, "Androgyny: A Conceptual Critique," p. 261.
 202. MORGAN, "Androgyny: A Conceptual Critique," p. 252.
 203. MORGAN, "The Androgynous Classroom: Liberation or Tyranny?," p. 252.
 204. See Note 194 which lists several articles making this claim.
 205. See my analysis of "The Components of Androgyny," in Chapter II.
 206. MORGAN, "Androgyny: A Conceptual Critique," p. 254.
 207. MORGAN, "The Androgynous Classroom: Liberation or Tyranny?," p. 252.
 208. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 24.
 209. See my discussion of the "Stereotypic" component of androgyny in Chapter II.
 210. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 24.
 211. See the analysis of "Environmental Influences" in Chapter II where I have analyzed their presentation of "some prevailing myths and stereotypes regarding psychological differences between the sexes."
 212. It is conceivable that the process of rejecting the negatively valued traits is the recognition of one's opposite sex orientations, and their integration into the actualization of one's bisexual orientation, i.e., androgynous behavior.
 213. See "Emphasizing the Life Span Approach" in my Chapter II discussion.
 214. Lawrence KOHLBERG, "The Relation of Logical Operational Development To The Development of Moral Judgment, in Kuhn et al, The Development of Formal Operations in Logical and Moral Judgment, pp. 137-59.

215. Lawrence KOHLBERG, "A Cognitive-Developmental Analysis of Children's Sex-Role Concepts and Attitudes" in Eleanor E. Maccoby (ed.), The Development of Sex Differences (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 82-173.. In this article Kohlberg discusses sex-role development in terms of cognitive development, but without discussing levels and stages. My extension of his discussion to include moral development is based on his statements on p. 111, to the effect that his "approach...assumes that the cognitive learning of sex-role concepts leads to the development of new values and attitudes ...", and on p. 123 where he indicates a relationship between cognitive and moral development:
 The moralization of sex-role stereotypes, along with the moralization of all sorts of stereotypes, appears to increase in the years five to eight...At later ages, moral principles...tend to be distinguished from conventional stereotypes, so that conventional sex-role stereotypes tend to lose their moral quality. This is another reason why parents' sex-typing is less rigid than that of their children.
216. Lawrence KOHLBERG with Charles LEVINE and Alexandra HEWER, "The Current Formulation of the Theory" in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. II, The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 279. Also see Kohlberg's discussions of his concept of stages, stage order and stage movement in Lawrence KOHLBERG, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development," in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 120-22, and 133-36.
217. Lawrence KOHLBERG, "Justice as Reversibility: The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment," in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 190-93.
218. Lawrence KOHLBERG, "Appendix. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 410-11. See also "Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Development Approach," Chapter Two in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 2, The Psychology of Moral Development, Table 2.1, pp. 174-76, and "Appendix A: The Six Stages of Justice Judgment," pp. 621-39 of the same volume.
219. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 3.

220. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 6.
221. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 192.
222. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 195.
223. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 207.
224. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 208.
225. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 207.
226. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 208.
227. KOHLBERG, "Appendix. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," p. 411.
228. KOHLBERG, "Appendix. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," p. 411.
229. This is concluded from my Chapter II discussion of the life-span approach proposed by Kaplan and Sedney, which was presented in the section titled "Defining the Life Span Development Approach to Psychological Androgyny."
230. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 6, and 65-6.
231. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 66.
232. See Lawrence KOHLBERG with Charles LEVINE and Alexandra HEWER, "The Current Formulation of the Theory," in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. II, The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 225 and 250-74 for a discussion of Kohlberg's revision of his Stages and the reassignment of certain aspects of Stage 6 to the Sub-stage B category.
233. KOHLBERG, "Appendix. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," p. 411-12.
234. KOHLBERG, "Appendix. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," p. 411-12.
235. KOHLBERG, "Appendix. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," p. 412.
236. KOHLBERG, "Appendix. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," p. 412.
237. See the discussion of "Characteristics of Androgynous Individuals" in Chapter II.
238. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 9.
239. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 10.
240. KOHLBERG, LEVINE and HEWER, "The Current Formulation of the Theory," p.310.
241. See my discussion on pp. 92ff.
242. Deanna KUHN, Jonas LANGER, Lawrence KOHLBERG, and Norma S. HAAN, "The Development of Formal Operations In Logical And Moral Judgment" in Genetic Psychology Monographs, 95 (1977), pp. 157.
243. KOHLBERG, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development," pp. 136-38.
244. See the discussion in Chapter II, Section D, "Defining the Life-Span Development Approach to Psychological Androgyny", where I conclude that Kaplan and Sedney's

- life-span approach views androgyny as an adulthood development.
245. See, for example, Lawrence KOHLBERG with Ann HIGGINS, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Development Revisited -- Again," in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. II, The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 437, 451, 455-60, 480, and 490-94. See also Lawrence KOHLBERG, "Stages and Aging in Moral Development -- Some Speculations," in The Gerontologist, 13 (1973), pp. 497-502. On p. 500 he states: "With regard to adulthood stage-change, our own longitudinal work does not extend beyond the age of 32. However, the work does demonstrate the existence of new stages developing only in adulthood."
 246. See the discussion, in the "Criticisms and Responses" section at the beginning of this chapter, regarding measurement problems and the use of stereotypes in the androgyny concept.
 247. KOHLBERG, LEVINE and HEWER, "The Current Formulation of the Theory," p.213. See also pp. 214, 225, 251-57, and 260-61.
 248. KOHLBERG, LEVINE and HEWER, "The Current Formulation of the Theory," p.214.
 249. KOHLBERG, LEVINE and HEWER, "The Current Formulation of the Theory," p.214.
 250. See my pp. 58-82, "Biology and Environment: Influences Across the Life-Span."
 251. See, for example, Carol GILLIGAN, "In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and of Morality," in Harvard Educational Review, 47 (4, 1977), pp. 481-517; Carol GILLIGAN, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1982); and Carol GILLIGAN and John Michael MURPHY, "Development from Adolescence to Adulthood: The Philosopher and the Dilemma of the Fact," in Deanna Kuhn (ed.) New Directions For Child Development: Intellectual Development Beyond Childhood (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass Inc., no. 5, 1979), pp. 85-99.
 252. See Chapter II, "Defining the Life-Span Development Approach to Psychological Androgyny" which discusses Kaplan and Sedney's extension of cognitive-development stage theory across the life-span, following Block's model.
 253. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles. For their use of Bakan see pp. 6 and 51; for Hefner, Rebecca, and Oleshansky see pp. 192-93.
 254. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 141.
 255. While these moral implications are not discussed directly by Kaplan and Sedney, my analysis earlier in this chapter outlined the relationship between the cognitive and moral aspects.

256. See my pp. 43-57.
 257. See my pp. 90-105.
 258. See my pp. 74-76.
 259. See my pp. 54-55.
 260. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 145.
 261. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 140-41.
 262. See the Chapter II discussion "Defining the Life-Span Development Approach to Psychological Androgyny," in which Kaplan and Sedney's view of these theories is discussed. In addition Chapter III's analysis indicated that the need to extend consideration of both cognitive and sexual development beyond childhood has been accepted by Kohlberg (see Note 245 for specific instances of this recognition).
 263. See my pp. 34-35.
 264. Lawrence KOHLBERG with Charles LEVINE and Alexandra HEWER, "Synopsis and Detailed Replies to Critics" in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. II, The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages, (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1984). For example, in his response to Gilligan and Lyons on pp. 343-44 Kohlberg holds that his moral theory incorporates both a justice (rational) and a caring orientation in decision making.

CONCLUSION

265. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 10.
 266. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, p. 271.
 267. See my p. 98.
 268. I introduced this aspect of the response to Kohlberg's theories in Chapter III's assessment of the androgyny concept's ability to meet interactionist criteria. In the analysis of the third comparative criterion, "Equal Consideration of the Requirements of Both Love and Justice," and pointed out that it represented a limitation on the extent to which the criterion was met by the androgyny concept of Kaplan and Sedney. See Note 251 for material critiquing this aspect of Kohlberg's work.
 269. See Lawrence KOHLBERG, "Justice as Reversibility: The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment"; and "Appendix. The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," in Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco, Cal.: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 190-226, and 409-12.
 270. GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, pp. 100-101.
 271. GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, p. 79.

APPENDIX

272. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburg, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 43: "Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by the interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being."
273. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, pp. 276-77.
274. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo, Tr. by R.A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1985), pp. 68-69.
275. Edith WYSCHOGROD, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 165ff, 178, 183, and 187.
276. Edith WYSCHOGROD, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics pp. 150, 163, and 172.
277. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, p. 36.
278. Th. DE BOER, "Beyond Being. Ontology and Eschatology in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas," Philosophia Reformata 38 (Jaargang, 1973). On p. 21 he indicates that he is discussing "The consequences of Levinas' prophetic philosophy."
279. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, transl. by Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 149.
280. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, pp. 151-52.
281. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 103.
282. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, pp. 114-15.
283. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 117.
284. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, pp. 124-25.
285. KAPLAN and SEDNEY, Psychology and Sex Roles, pp. 356-59.
286. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, pp. 120-21.
287. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, pp. 279-80.
288. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. See "Metaphysics Precedes Ontology" and Transcendence As The Idea of Infinity," pp. 42-52.
289. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo, pp. 19-33. Also see Emmanuel LEVINAS, Difficile Liberte: Essais sur le Judaisme, (Collection "Presences de Judaisme") (Paris: Michel, 1963), pp. 15-80; and P. N. LAWTON, "A Difficult Freedom: Levinas' Judaism," IN Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (JAARGANG, NR.

- 4, DECEMBER 1975), p. 681 where he states that "Emmanuel Levinas' notion of the meaning of Judaism...informs all his thought."
290. Th. DE BOER, "Beyond Being. Ontology and Eschatology in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas," p. 18. Also see Marc FAESSLER, "L'Intrigue de Tout-Autre: Dieu Dans La Pensee D'Emmanuel Levinas," Etudes Theologiques et Religieuses 1980, pp. 515-18, Section 5, "Dire sans dit -- prophetisme -- Revelation," where the prophetic and covenantal orientation of Levinas' philosophy is discussed. See particularly note 32 (p. 516) where the prophetic orientation is expressed directly. In addition see Chapter VII, "Philosophy and Covenant," in Edith WYSCHOGROD, EMMANUEL LEVINAS: THE PROBLEM OF ETHICAL METAPHYSICS. On p. 185 she states that "The ideal in which man enters a direct relation with God [covenant] as opposed to a relation with God through a mediatory earthly sovereign is a perennial motif of Jewish thought." On p. 187 she states that "Messianism is thus not the conviction that a historical savior will appear upon the scene but a universal recognition of responsibility." I believe that Levinas' prophetic and covenantal orientations are implied in her statements.
291. Emmanuel LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo, pp. 68-9.
292. GUINDON, The Sexual Creators, pp. 217-18.

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SUMMARY:

AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANDROGYNY CONCEPT OF
SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION

Professor Andre Guindon has identified three models of sexual differentiation. These are: natural or biological; cultural or environmental, and interactionist or bio-environmental. Ethically, the interactionist model, developed by integrating elements selected from its two predecessors, is suggested as a conceptual improvement leading to a better understanding of sexuality, sexual differentiation, and sex-role choices, or, more generally, to an improvement in human relationships. This thesis, conducted under the umbrella of Professor Guindon's research, sets out to determine the extent to which the psychological concept of androgyny, as presented by Alexandra G. Kaplan and Mary Anne Sedney in Psychology and Sex Roles: An Androgynous Perspective, satisfies the requirements of an interactionist approach as defined by Professor Guindon.

Chapter I differentiates the characteristics and ethical implications of the three models in order to establish two sets of ethical criteria which must be satisfied by any approach to sexual differentiation claiming an interactionist orientation. The first set of criteria, concerned with a model's content, is comparative; the second set is qualitative, investigating the ethical implications of approaches to sexual differentiation.

In Chapter II the content of Kaplan and Sedney's model is outlined. This process examines their definition of androgyny

by differentiating it from other androgyny concepts, identifying its foundational assumptions and the characteristics of androgynous individuals, and considering the effects of biological and environmental influences on the development of an individual's psychological sex. As part of this analysis, the relationship of Kaplan and Sedney's life-span approach to Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory is introduced.

In Chapter III, analysis of the interactionist orientations of Kaplan and Sedney's approach begins with an examination of their response to various criticisms of the concept. Following this, the relationship between their approach and Kohlberg's cognitive and moral development theory is examined more fully to identify some ethical implications to be used in the final assessment of the approach's ability to satisfy the interactionist criteria established in Chapter I. This final aspect of the assessment, in which Kaplan and Sedney's psychological approach to androgyny is found, with some limitations, to satisfy interactionist criteria, concludes the chapter.

The Conclusion discusses the major weakness of the model, identified by Kaplan and Sedney as an inability to find language rich enough to adequately express the concept. However, the weakness actually lies in the philosophical orientations of their model, arising from its association with the utilitarian orientations of Kohlberg's theories. The problem of language indicates the problem of expressing concepts of love

and justice in a model based on a philosophical approach based solely on a justice as rights orientation. As a possible source of language adequate to express the full meaning of the androgyny concept, the philosophical approach of Emmanuel Levinas, oriented to expressing both communal (love) and agentic (justice) concepts in terms of human relationships, is suggested. Finally, a possible theological application of the concept is considered.