


FRANKL'S "WILL TO MEANING" AS MEASURED BY
THE PURPOSE IN LIFE TEST IN RELATION
TO AGE AND SEX DIFFERENCES

by Augustine Meier, o.m.i.

Thesis presented to the School of
Graduate Studies of the University
of Ottawa as partial fulfillment of
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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Augustine Meier, born at Salvador, Saskatchewan, obtained the Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Ottawa in 1958. Having completed his theological training at St. Charles Scholasticate, Battleford, Saskatchewan, in 1962, he registered for the B.Ed. program at the University of Ottawa and obtained the B.Ed. degree in 1963. In 1970, he obtained the Master of Education degree with a concentration in Guidance and Counseling.

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INTRODUCTION

Dr. Viktor E. Frankl was born and educated in Vienna. He was spared by the Nazis until 1942 while being confined in Theresienstadt. He was sent to Auschwitz in 1944. His wife and his mother were executed by the Nazis in concentration camps. He survived these ordeals, always reflecting on the meaning of life, his own as well as that of his contemporaries. After the war he entered a career in psychiatry, emerged as a leader, and formulated a system, Logotherapy, in order to overcome the weaknesses found in the then prevalent psychological theories. He now heads the neurological department of the Poliklinik Hospital in Vienna.

Through his early professional contacts with both the Freudian and Adlerian schools of thought, Frankl realized that the basic weakness in their theories was the concept of the nature of man. This concept as defined by the two schools, Frankl thought, was inadequate to describe man in his totality. Actual life was seen as separated from philosophical concepts.

Frankl's personal experiences as a student in secondary and graduate school, his experiences as director of the Youth Advisory Centers established on university campus for distressed young people, and his experiences in

the four concentration camps during World War II served to test and solidify his theories. Frankl became increasingly dissatisfied with the narrowness of the psychiatric orientation around him. What was needed was to understand man in his totality, and Frankl set out on a career in psychiatry where he introduced concepts of meanings and values into psychiatric thought.

The new view of man envisioned by Logotherapy sees man not only as a physiological and psychological being, but also, and more importantly, as a spiritual being. Rooted in his spiritual nature are to be found man's basic characteristics, namely, his freedom, responsibility and his capacity to search for "meaning in life." Frankl considers "will to meaning" as the primary motivational force in man. He believes that all reality has meaning and that life never ceases to have meaning for everyone. "Meaning in life" is not something that can be given, but must be discovered individually. Man achieves meaning by the discovery and actualization of values and goals.

Enthusiasm over Frankl's theorizing has resulted in the construction, by Crumbaugh and Maholick, of a Purpose in Life Test. Since the development of the test, a number of researchers have employed it to explore, assess and compare the level of purpose in life of people of various normal and non-normal groups. Other studies investigated

the relationship of Purpose in Life Test scores to numerable test variables.

Although Purpose in Life Test scores have been compared to numerable test variables, and the scores of normal subjects have been compared to those of non-normal subjects, there has as yet been no study that directly investigated the relationship of sex and age to Purpose in Life Test scores. From a review of the research studies in which reference was made to age and sex, the relationship of these variables to Purpose in Life Test scores is not clear.

The purpose of the present research is to investigate the relationship of sex and age to Purpose in Life Test scores and thus, indirectly, to meaning found in life. If meaning in life is something that is to be discovered, as Frankl theorizes, it may well be that age is a contributing factor.

The first chapter of this dissertation presents a review of the literature which gives the basic theoretical and experimental background to the present investigation. Included in this chapter is a discussion of the historical development of Logotherapy, a presentation of its basic concepts as they relate to the dissertation, and a critique of logotherapeutic concepts. A discussion of research studies based on Frankl's concepts is then

presented and the chapter concludes with a presentation of the basic hypotheses of this study.

The experimental design is presented in chapter two. This includes a description of the measuring tools and the procedure of test administration and scoring. Chapter three presents and discusses, in terms of Frankl's theory, the results of the study. Finally, implications for further research are offered.

The appendices contain the tools which were used to measure "will to meaning."

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The purpose of the present study is to investigate the relationship of age and sex to the achievement of "will to meaning" as measured by the Purpose in Life Test. The Purpose in Life Test, designed by Crumbaugh and Maholick and used in the present study, is based on the concept of "will to meaning" as defined by Frankl. In order to understand how the concept of "will to meaning" is used both by Crumbaugh and Maholick and by the researcher of the present study, it is necessary to present and discuss Frankl's theory, especially as it relates to his concept of man, and to the concept of "will to meaning."

Chapter one has as its purpose to present the theoretical foundations of Frankl's Logotherapy as they relate to the present study. The first part will treat the historical roots of Frankl's Logotherapy in context of the inadequacies of the psychodynamic theories of Freud and Adler and the inadequacies of the self-actualization theories of Maslow, Goldstein and Rogers. Section two deals with two basic concepts of Logotherapy, namely, its concept of man, and the concept of "will to meaning," which is considered by Frankl as the primary motivational force in man. The third section offers an evaluation of some of Frankl's

concepts. The empirical studies based on Frankl's theorizing as it relates to the "will to meaning" will be presented in section four. The last section summarizes the review of literature and states the basic hypotheses of this study.

1. Historical Roots of Frankl's Logotherapy.

Viktor E. Frankl formulated Logotherapy because of his dissatisfaction with the philosophical assumptions underlying the theory on the nature of man and because of the inadequacies of Freud's Psychoanalysis, Adler's Individual Psychology and the Self-actualization Theories. Frankl is not alone in expressing a dissatisfaction with the prevalent psychological theories but belongs to a larger group of psychologists and psychiatrists which includes such names as: Eugene Minkowski of Paris, Erwin Straus and V. E. von Gebattel of Germany, Ludwig Binswanger, M. Boss and Roland Kuhn of Switzerland, J. H. Van Den Berg and F. J. Buytendijk of Holland and Rollo May and Adrian Van Kaam of United States.¹

¹ Rollo May, "The Origins and Significance of the Existential Movement in Psychology," in Rollo May, Ernest Angel, and Henri F. Ellenberger (eds.), Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1958, p. 3-36.

The unique character of this movement is that it was not started by one man, nor by one school of psychology. Rather, psychologists and psychiatrists from various parts of the European continent, and from various schools of psychology spontaneously became dissatisfied with the prevalent psychological systems, and searched for a new approach to understand man.

Frankl, who is part of this existential movement, sees the inadequacies of Freud's Psychoanalysis, Adler's Individual Psychology, and the Self-actualization theories reflected in three basic areas, namely: in the philosophical view of man, in the general nature of psychic illness and in the goals set for psychotherapy.²

Frankl criticizes three psychoanalytical concepts, namely: pan-determinism, homeostasis and reductionism. According to Frankl, psychoanalysis thinks of man as being determined and directed to activity by his innate drives and instincts. To a very large extent, man has lost the capacity to rule his behavior. Frankl vehemently rejects such a concept of man, which disregards his capacity to take a stand toward any condition whatsoever. He states that:

² Viktor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, New York, Knopf Co., 1966, p. 5.

[...] man is not fully conditioned and determined, but rather determines himself whether he succumbs to conditions or defies them. In other words, man is ultimately self-determining.³

Man does not simply exist, but he always decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment. Frankl posits this capacity of man to rise above human conditions and to transcend them as a main feature of human existence. Frankl does not deny that man is subject to conditions and determinants. However, he says that man is "always free to take a stand to whatever he might have to face [...] he is never fully determined, he is not pan-determined."⁴

Frankl criticizes the principle of homeostasis which interprets man as a "being for whom reality serves as nothing but a mere means to an end of satisfying needs, reducing tension and/or maintaining equilibrium."⁵ According to logotherapeutic concepts:

[...] man is not primarily interested in any psychic conditions of his own, but is oriented toward the world, toward the world of potential meanings and values, which so-to-speak are waiting to be fulfilled and actualized by him.⁶

³ Viktor E. Frankl, "Basic Concepts of Logotherapy," Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 3, No. 9, 1962, p. 116.

⁴ -----, "The Concept of Man in Logotherapy," Journal of Existentialism, Vol. 6, No. 21, 1965, p. 54.

⁵ -----, "Beyond Self-actualization and Self-expression," Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1960, p. 6.

⁶ Ibid., p. 7-8.

In this regard, Logotherapy replaces the pleasure principle by the principle of "will to meaning." Frankl likens the pleasure principle to the principle of reducing tensions in that both avoid displeasure. However, Frankl states that pleasure seeking cannot be a primary tendency in man. Pleasure is thought of as a side effect of the achievement of a task or in the fulfillment of meaning. Frankl states that "if one really attempts to gain pleasure by making it his target, he would necessarily fail for he would miss what he had aimed at."⁷

The third Freudian concept disputed by Frankl is what he refers to as reductionism, or in psychology as psychologism. Reductionism in psychology wants to reduce and then define man by the manifestations under study through a psychological approach or method exclusively. Thus, human phenomena are reduced to sub-human phenomena. Frankl, speaking from his experiences as a prisoner in four concentration camps and from clinical work, presents cases which challenge psychologism, and which show that an individual's problem can also be spiritual in origin.⁸ In Frankl's thinking, the spiritual aspect of man and the

7 Ibid., p. 10.

8 Within the frame of reference of Logotherapy, "spiritual" does not have a primarily religious connotation, but refers to the specifically human dimension of man.

psychic aspect of man must be considered apart because both represent dimensions that are essentially different. To reduce the spiritual aspect of man to psychic phenomena is to fall a victim to psychologism. It is against such reduction of human phenomena to "nothing but-ness" that Frankl is strongly committed.⁹ What is needed in such a case, Frankl says, is to meet the patient squarely, to attack the spiritual or philosophical problem, and not to reduce the philosophical problem to a psychological problem. To do this, a psychotherapy in spiritual terms is needed. Frankl offers his new procedure, Logotherapy, to meet the requirements. Logotherapy is to supplement, not replace, psychotherapy.¹⁰

In addition to the inadequacies in the theory on the nature of man, Frankl also views Freudian theory as being inadequate in its concept of psychic illness and in its concept of the goal of psychotherapy.

Psychic illness, in Freudian thinking, is explained in terms of sexuality or, more generally, in terms of the libido.¹¹ According to Frankl, pan-sexualism tries to explain all of psychic reality in terms of sexuality because

⁹ Mary Hall, "Interview Viktor E. Frankl," Psychology Today, Vol. 1, No. 9, 1968, p. 57-63.

¹⁰ Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. 17-18.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 6.

it recognizes only the sexual content of psychic strivings. With such an interpretation, eventually all of psychic energy is equated with the libido. To restrict psychic reality to sexuality limits the insight regarding the nature of psychic strivings.

The goal of therapy, in the Freudian sense, is also inadequate in Frankl's thinking. He sees the goal of psychoanalysis as helping the individual to "bring about a compromise between the demands of the unconscious on the one hand and the requirements of reality on the other."¹² It is seen as an attempt to adjust the individual with his private drives to the outer world, to form some sort of reconciliation with reality. The reconciliation is accomplished through the techniques of undoing the consequences of repression, reversing, that is, the process of making psychic material unconscious. It strives to conquer new territory for the ego from the dark domain of the id.¹³ Frankl says that psychoanalysis is right in stressing the conscious, but this in itself is too narrow, as it must be joined with the Adlerian concept of responsibility, because "being human means being conscious and being responsible."¹⁴

12 Ibid., p. 9.

13 Ibid., p. 4.

14 Ibid., p. 5.

Frankl readily sees two adverse consequences, that of depersonalization and devaluation of man, stemming from a Freudian view of man. Frankl feels that Freud has depersonalized man by reducing him to a mechanism driven by libidinal energy which is primarily sexual in nature, amoral and unconscious. Frankl sees in this that man's sole motivation and goal is the reduction of tension which is accomplished through the dynamics based on the pleasure principle.¹⁵

Frankl also states that psychoanalysis devaluates man in two ways. First of all, it seems to objectify the subjective factor, that is, the spiritual factor, in man because it treats a person as if he were an object. Frankl states that a person is a spiritual entity, a "subjective spirit," which does not lend itself to any form of "objectivization."¹⁶ Secondly, Frankl feels that psychoanalysis subjectifies objective factors, that is, objective values. A consequence of this subjectification is the levelling of all values as they are seen through the pleasure

¹⁵ Viktor E. Frankl, Das Menschenbild der Seelenheilkunde, Hippokrates-Verlag, Stuttgart, 1959, p. 11-12, translated in Donald F. Tweedie, Logotherapy and the Christian Faith, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Baker Book House, 1961, p. 45.

¹⁶ -----, Handbuch der Neurosenlehre und Psychotherapie, Urban and Schwarzenberg, Wien, 1957, p. 680, translated in Tweedie, op. cit., p. 49.

principle. All ethical precepts are destroyed and are no longer independent of the person, but are ethically relative and morally indifferent derivatives of unconscious instinctive needs.¹⁷

From the First Vienna School of Freud's Psychoanalytic Theory evolved Adler's Individual Psychology. Although Adler tried to avoid viewing man as a mechanism by presenting him as functioning for a purpose, Frankl believes that Adler's "will to power" is only slightly less deterministic than Freud's pleasure principle.¹⁸ Frankl feels that Adler mistakes the "will to power" as an end in itself, whereas it actually is a prerequisite for the attainment of a "meaning in life."¹⁹ Adler also uses a tension-reduction model of man and states that a person strives to reduce tension, brought on by feelings of guilt, by evading responsibility through the process of "arrangement."²⁰ This arrangement represents an effort by the

17 Viktor E. Frankl, Logos und Existenz, Amandus-Verlag, Wien, 1951, p. 80, translated in Tweedie, op. cit., p. 104.

18 -----, Das Menschenbild der Seelenheilkunde, p. 109, translated in Tweedie, op. cit., p. 43.

19 -----, "The Will to Meaning," The Christian Century (An Undenominational Weekly), Vol. 81, No. 17, 1964, p. 515-517.

20 -----, The Doctor and the Soul, p. 4.

patient to justify himself to society or to clear himself in his own eyes. Adler views this arrangement as a means to an end; he does not admit that psychic phenomena have an end in themselves. Frankl sees this as a shortcoming.

Frankl views Adler's concept of the goal of therapy to be inadequate. Although he approves of the idea of demanding "of the courageous reshaping of reality,"²¹ he sees this as short of the goal. Frankl sees the final requirement as fulfillment, as the realization of the value-potentials of each individual.

In summarizing his criticisms of Psychoanalysis and Individual Psychology, Frankl sees Freud's pleasure principle and Adler's drive for social status as complementary, but not complete aspects of human functioning as they describe only a portion of man. He sees the status drive and the pleasure principle as mere derivatives of man's primary concern, that is, the "will to meaning," as he calls "the basic striving of man to find and fulfill meaning and purpose."²²

Frankl justifies his position by stating that pleasure, rather than being an end of man's striving, is

21 Ibid., p. 9.

22 Viktor E. Frankl, "Self Transcendence as a Human Phenomena," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1966, p. 98.

actually the effect of meaning-fulfillment. Similarly, power, rather than being an end itself, is actually the means to an end. Consequently, Frankl considers both happiness and success as mere substitutes for fulfillment, and the "will to power" and the "will to pleasure" as mere derivatives of the "will to meaning."²³

Having evaluated the psychodynamic systems of Freud and Adler, Frankl turns his attention to the self-realization and self-actualization theories. Even though these theories emphasize the intentional or striving aspects of man, Frankl denies that they can be a sufficient ground for motivational theory. Frankl feels that self-realization or self-actualization is another phenomenon which can be realized only as a side effect in fulfillment of meaning.²⁴

Frankl states that self-actualization is neither man's ultimate destination nor his primary intention. Self-actualization, like happiness, is an effect, the effect of meaning-fulfillment. Only to the extent to which man fulfills a meaning out there in the world, does he fulfill himself. Frankl traces excessive concern with self-

²³ Viktor E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, New York, World Publishing Co., 1969, p. 36.

²⁴ -----, "The Will to Meaning," p. 515-517.

actualization to a frustration of the "will to meaning."
He compares the effect of this concern to that of a hunter
and a boomerang:

As the boomerang comes back to the hunter who has
thrown it only if it has missed its target, man,
too, returns to himself and is intent upon self-
actualization only if he has missed his mission.²⁵

Frankl feels that the theorists of self-realization
err in that they maintain that man's primary drive is to
actualize his potentialities, that he need not contend with
the actualization of values and goals. Frankl maintains
that self-actualization must be concerned with values and
goals because the potentialities to be actualized are not
indifferent possibilities, but exist here and now. It is
the challenge of life to choose values and goals to be
actualized.²⁶

Summing up his dissatisfaction with the past
theories of motivation and concepts of man, Frankl states:

²⁵ Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and
Applications of Logotherapy, p. 38.

²⁶ -----, "Beyond Self-actualization and Self-
expression," p. 5-20.

It appears [...] that those theories of man which are circumscribed by the individual himself, whether based upon the reduction of his tension as in homeostasis theory, or the fulfillment of the greatest number of immanent possibilities as in self-actualization, when weighed, are found wanting. It is the contention of the author that an adequate view of man can only be properly formulated when it goes beyond homeostasis, beyond self-actualization--even beyond man himself!--to that transcendent sphere of human existence in which man chooses what he will do and what he will be in the midst of an objective world of meaning and values.²⁷

Because of his dissatisfaction with the prevalent systems of psychology, Frankl expressed the need to formulate a more complete concept of man. Frankl's attempt to formulate a more complete concept of man led to the Third Viennese School of Psychology--Logotherapy. These concepts will now be presented in the following section.

2. Basic Concepts of Logotherapy.

In his attempt to present a new psychology of man, Frankl envisioned a broader and what he thought to be a more complete concept of man and introduced "will to meaning" as an explanation for the primary motivational force in man.

The basic concepts of Frankl's new psychology will now be presented. The first part presents Frankl's concept of man, while the second part treats the concept of "will to meaning."

²⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

A. The Concept of Man

The discussion on the concept of man will be presented in two parts: the first part will treat Frankl's concept of the tripartite nature of man, and the second part will present man's three basic characteristics.

Frankl approaches the psychophysical problem of man by a system which he calls "dimensional ontology."²⁸ This system denotes Frankl's concept of man as being comprised of three dimensions; namely, the somatic, the mental and the spiritual. Frankl's discussion of the somatic and mental dimensions of man are not of great importance here since they follow the traditional theories.²⁹ However, in logotherapeutic theory of man, the spiritual dimension is of central importance. It is the spiritual which truly constitutes the person. Frankl arrives at the concept of the spiritual dimension of man by the fact that man has an intrinsic capacity to take a stand to his own somatic and psychic conditions and determinants. By rising above the level of the somatic and the psychic, man enters,

²⁸ Frankl's theory should not be confused with Nicolai Hartmann and Max Scheler's theories on ontology and anthropology, respectively. Confer, Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, p. 22.

²⁹ Viktor E. Frankl, Der Unbedingte Mensch, Verlag Franz Deuticke, Wien, 1949, p. 39-41, translated in Tweedie, op. cit., p. 53-55.

what Frankl calls, the realm of the genuinely human which is constituted by the dimension of the spirit, or the noölogical dimension. In logotherapeutic theory, neither the somatic nor the psychic alone constitute the genuinely human; rather they represent only two aspects of the human being.³⁰ Frankl says that while it is proper to say that one has a body, or a psyche, he must say that he is a spiritual being. This must not be misconstrued as spiritualism, or as the converse of materialistic monism. Frankl states that homo humanus is at home, not first of all in the third or spiritual dimension, but in the "tridimensionality of body, psyche and spirit."³¹

Frankl speaks of dimensions of personality, rather than of layers or strata in order to stress the human co-existence of anthropological wholeness and unity on the one hand, and ontological differences on the other hand. By anthropological wholeness and unity Frankl means that man is not composed of somatic, psychic and noetic components, and by ontological differences he wishes to indicate that the somatic, psychic and noetic modes of being are

30 Viktor E. Frankl, "The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis and Logotherapy," Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1959, p. 157-165.

31 -----, Handbuch der Neurosenlehre und Psychotherapie, p. 670, translated in Tweedie, op. cit., p. 56.

qualitatively rather than quantitatively different from each other. This coexistence of both unity and multiplicity in man, Frankl believes, is taken care of by his theory of "dimensional ontology."³²

In order to show how the true perception of man's nature may become distorted when viewed outside of the spiritual dimension, Frankl postulates two laws of dimensional ontology.³³ The first law reads: "One and the same thing projected into different dimensions lower than its own, yields contradictory pictures."³⁴ Frankl illustrates this as in Figure 1. He says that if a cylindrical object, as a cup, is taken and projected out of its three-dimensional plane, it yields a circle in the first instance, and a rectangle in the second instance. These pictures contradict one another and distort the correct perception of the cup.

The second law of dimensional ontology reads: "Different things projected into one and the same dimension lower than their own, yields ambiguous pictures." Frankl

³² Viktor E. Frankl, "The Concept of Man in Logotherapy," Journal of Existentialism, Vol. 6, No. 21, 1965, p. 55.

³³ Ibid., p. 55-56.

³⁴ The term "lower" as used by Frankl in this context refers to a less inclusive and less encompassing dimension. Refer to: Frankl, Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, p. 26.




Figure 1.- Diagrammatic Illustration of the First Principle of Dimensional Ontology.

Viktor E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, New York, World Publishing Co., 1969, p. 23.

illustrates it as in Figure 2. In this case, three objects, a cylinder, a cone and a sphere depicted as three circles, cast shadows upon the horizontal plane. These shadows are indiscriminate, interchangeable and ambiguous insofar as it cannot be determined to which of the three objects a shadow belongs.

Applying the first principle of ontological dimension to man, Frankl says that we can either project him into the biological plane or into the psychological plane. The result is a contradiction between the two projections of man, and also of the noölogical dimension of man. However, Frankl says that the two contradictory perceptions of man do not contradict the oneness of man because the problem stated in such a way is unsolvable.

In applying the second principle of man, Frankl takes the example of Dostoevsky and Bernadette Soubirous. If both are projected into the plane of psychiatry, Dostoevsky is nothing but an epileptic, and Bernadette Soubirous is nothing but hysteric hallucinations. Whatever the two persons may be apart from their pathologies is not accessible to psychiatry. In either case, there is a distorted perception of the person.

Having dealt with the tripartite nature of man, the discussion will now consider three basic characteristics of human nature as described by Logotherapy. The basic




Figure 2.- Diagrammatic Illustration of the Second Principle of Dimensional Ontology.

Viktor E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, New York, World Publishing Co., 1969, p. 24.

characteristics, namely, spirituality, freedom and responsibility, derive from the spiritual or noetic dimension of man. They are irreducible and indeducible phenomena,³⁵ neither analyzable nor synthesizable--they are just there.

Spirituality is derived from what, in Logotherapy, is called the "spiritual unconscious." Frankl states:

Unconscious spirituality is the origin and root of all consciousness. In other words, we know and acknowledge, not only an instinctive unconscious, but rather, also a spiritual unconscious, and in it we see the supporting ground of all conscious spirituality. The ego is not governed by the id; but the spirit is borne by the unconscious.

Spirituality, says Frankl, is discovered phenomenologically, not empirically. It is revealed initially in immediate self-consciousness and later in the conceptual ability of man. From the "spiritual unconscious" emerge the following three intuitive moments: conscience, which enables the individual to apply ethical principles to his unique behavior; love, which grasps the unique possibilities of the personality of the beloved; and esthetic conscience, which guides artistic achievements. These essentially emotional and non-rational intuitive moments are unconscious

³⁵ Frankl, Das Menschenbild der Seelenheilkunde, p. 99, translated in Tweedie, op. cit., p. 56.

³⁶ -----, Handbuch der Neurosenlehre und Psychotherapie, p. 67⁴, translated in Tweedie, op. cit., p. 56-57.

in the sense that they cannot be reflected upon, objectified or analyzed by the self.³⁷

The spiritual dimension distinguishes man from the animals. The animals, in a real sense, are their biological and instinctive drives, whereas man merely has them. Since the spiritual entity is not a materialistic entity, it is found neither inside nor outside the body. Frankl asserts that the spiritual is with other objects and persons in the world. Through the spiritual dimension, man can have transpatial and transtemporal reference to a distant or departed loved one.

In discussing the spiritual dimension of man as it relates to the outside world, Frankl, in opposition to some modern epistemologists, makes two points. First, he states that man is not removed from his ontological relationship to the world of objects. Frankl states:

The subject by its cognitive act is capable of approaching the object, and thereby, establishing that cognitive closeness to the things in the world which I have called "being with (Bei-sein) the object."³⁸

In addition to attributing a cognitive power to the spiritual dimension of man, Frankl, secondly, asserts the reality of the objective world. By this he means that in

37 Ibid., p. 675-676.

38 Frankl, "Beyond Self-actualization and Self-expression," p. 15.

every act of cognition there is the objectivity of the object. The subjective segment of the world, grasped by man, is cut from an objective order.³⁹

The spiritual dimension, according to Frankl, is most fully revealed in man's existence through his freedom and by his responsibility.⁴⁰

Freedom is the ground for man's special modes of existence which are distinctive of his species and separate him from the animals. Freedom means freedom in the face of three things: the instincts, inherited disposition and environment.

By his capacity to emerge from these three factors, man proves himself to be truly human.⁴¹ It is here that man's freedom is within limits. Although he is not free from conditions which are either biological, psychological or sociological in nature, man is always free to take a stand towards these conditions, that is, he may accept or

39 Ibid.

40 The term "existential" may be used in three ways: to refer to (1) existence itself, i.e., the specifically human mode of being; (2) the meaning of existence; and (3) the striving to find a concrete meaning in personal existence; that is to say, the will to meaning. Confer: Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, An Introduction to Logotherapy, New York, Washington Square Press, 1960, p. 159.

41 Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. xix.

reject the conditions, or rise above them.⁴² Through his freedom, man is not only able to detach himself from the world, but he is also capable of self-detachment. Frankl insists that man's freedom is not only from something, but in addition and, most importantly, he is free for something. This concept, according to Logotherapy, leads to the third existential characteristic of man, namely, responsibility.

Frankl considers freedom to be the subjective aspect of a total phenomenon and, as such, it is still to be completed by its objective counterpart, responsibility. The freedom to take a stand is never complete if it has not been converted and rendered into the freedom to take responsibility. The specifically human capacity, to will, becomes meaningful when it is complemented by the objective counterpart, to will what I ought. Man is responsible to actualize values and meanings, which world of values and meanings can be rightly termed logos. However, man is free to be responsible.⁴³ Man's responsibility, according to Frankl, is dictated by his conscience. Conscience is immediate, intuitive and absolute. According to Logotherapy, it is basically unconscious and non-rational

⁴² Viktor E. Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, Selected Papers on Logotherapy, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1967, p. 3.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 63-64.

because it is pre-logical, that is, it is prior to any rational reflection. It is not a universal moral law, but an individual law which comes to light in the concrete situation of a specific person.⁴⁴

Frankl stresses the way in which responsibility complements the concept of freedom. In addition to freedom from something, there is freedom for something, which gives rise to responsibility. Responsibility means responsibility for something and to something. An individual is responsible for the fulfillment of the specific meaning of his own life; he is responsible to something, be it society, humanity, mankind, his own conscience, or God.⁴⁵

Having treated the tripartite nature of man and the three basic characteristics of his noetic nature, the following section will present man's striving to find "purpose in life."

B. The Concept of "will to meaning," which represents a basic striving of man to find an fulfill meaning and purpose in life, is central to Frankl's theory. Man's

44 Viktor E. Frankl, Der Unbewusste Gott, Amandus-Verlag, Wien, 1949, p. 83, translated in Tweedie, op.cit., p. 62.

45 -----, "The Will to Meaning," p. 517.

ability to strive for meaning is rooted in his noetic nature. This section presents, in Frankl's theory, the notion of meaning, its characteristics, and the manner of achieving it.

Frankl speaks of a "will" to meaning, and of a "striving towards" meaning instead of a "drive towards" meaning. Frankl feels that it is not legitimate to speak of the "will to meaning" as a drive in man because if this were so, man would be seen as being basically concerned with restoring his inner equilibrium, and with fulfilling meaning not for its own sake, but rather for his own sake. To illustrate how "will to meaning" is different from a drive, Frankl refers to the actual state of affairs as to what goes on in man when he is oriented toward meaning. He says that man is pushed by his drives, but pulled by meaning. This implies that man is always free to decide whether or not he will achieve fulfillment of his striving for meaning.⁴⁶

Frankl's emphasis on a will to meaning refers to the fact that he thinks that there is freedom involved, that man is free to choose between accepting or rejecting a possibility of finding a "meaning in life." Frankl

⁴⁶ Viktor E. Frankl, "Self-transcendence as a Human Phenomenon," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1966, p. 97-106.

clarifies the definition of "will to meaning" when he states that there cannot exist any such thing as a moral drive or even a religious drive in the same manner as we speak of man's being determined by basic instincts. Man is never driven to moral behavior; in each instance, he decides to behave morally for a cause to which he is committed, to a person whom he loves, or for the sake of his God.⁴⁷

Man's freedom to accept or reject a possibility of finding "meaning in life" must not be confounded with arbitrariness, but must be interpreted in terms of responsibility. Frankl states that man is responsible for giving the right answer to a question, for finding the true meaning of a situation; that is, he must seek them conscientiously. Ultimately, Frankl states, man in his search for meaning is guided by his conscience, which is the intuitive capacity of man to find out the meaning of a situation. Frankl illustrates the responsibility of the conscience to accept or reject a possibility of finding meaning by the following example:

⁴⁷ Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 101-102.

The statement, "seven plus seven equals ...", is a system in which there is a gap. It is possible to fill the gap in various ways. The one completion--fourteen--corresponds to the situation, it fills the gap, and is structurally demanded in this place. It does justice to the whole. Other completions, such as fifteen do not fit. We have here the concepts of the demands of the situation, the 'requiredness.' 'Requirements' of such an order are objective qualities. Frankl sees the conscience, in terms of finding meaning and using possibilities, similar to this.⁴⁸

"Purpose in life," for Frankl, is not something that can be given, rather it is something that must be found or discovered.⁴⁹ Frankl says that life is given meaning by the discovery and actualization of three categories of values: creative values, experiential values and attitudinal values.

Creative values refer to what man gives to the world in terms of his creations. What is important here is not the radius of his activity, but whether he in fact fills the place in which he happens to have landed. In order to achieve meaning, man needs only to master the concrete tasks presented to him by his occupation and family life.

⁴⁸ Frankl, Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, p. 63-66.

⁴⁹ -----, "Logotherapy and Existential Analysis: A Review," American Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1966, p. 252-260.

Experiential values, as defined by Frankl, refer to what man takes from the world in terms of encounters and experiences. Meaning can be given to life by realizing experiential values, by experiencing the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, or by knowing one single human being in all his uniqueness, which means to love him.

But even a man who finds himself in the greatest distress, and is unable to actualize creative and experiential values, can still give his life meaning by the stand he takes towards his fate or stress which he cannot change. By taking his unavoidable suffering upon himself, he may yet realize values--attitudinal values--and find meaning in his life.⁵⁰

The meaning that a person discovers for himself, Frankl states, is not entirely subjective nor entirely relative in nature. Frankl rejects the idea that meanings and values are invented by man and are mere projections of man on things that are neutral. Meanings are objective in that they are derived, through cognition, from the objective reality in which man is entangled and engaged. The only thing that is subjective about meanings is the perspective through which we approach reality. Neither are

⁵⁰ Frankl, Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, p. 70-71.

meanings entirely relative in nature. Meaning is relative, Frankl states, in that it is related to a specific person who is entangled in a specific situation. But he would sooner say that meaning is unique, rather than say it is relative. Because meanings are unique, there is no such thing as a universal "meaning in life." The meanings that are shared in common by a society, Frankl calls values. But values become meaningful or meanings for an individual only if he has accepted them as his goals.⁵¹

The "will to meaning," Frankl states, is fact, not faith. As evidence for its presence, he refers to his experiences as a prisoner in the concentration camps and as a clinician. As further evidence to his conviction, he cites the result of an opinion poll conducted in France. The results show that eighty-nine per cent of the people polled expressed that man needs "something" for the sake of which to live, and sixty-one per cent conceded that there was something in their own lives, or someone, for whose sake they were ready to die. Frankl repeated this poll among his patients and personnel at his clinic in Vienna, and the results were practically the same as in the French poll, the difference being only two per cent.⁵²

51 Ibid., p. 50-62.

52 Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 99-100.

According to Logotherapy, the "will to meaning" is the primary motivational force in man, yet not all people find a purpose for their lives. There are many people, Frankl states, who suffer from a sense of meaninglessness and emptiness, from what he calls an inner void. This condition, which Frankl calls existential vacuum, is thought to be a consequence of many facts, including: (1) a planless day-to-day attitude toward life; (2) a fatalist attitude toward life; (3) collective thinking or conformity; and (4) fanaticism. Ultimately, however, all four symptoms can be traced back to man's fear of responsibility and his escape from freedom. Frankl thinks that a person can cope with existnetial vacuum by espousing a sound philosophy of life which will show that life holds a meaning for each and every man.⁵³

This concludes the presentation of the basic concepts of Logotherapy as they are related to the present study. To be treated next are the research studies undertaken to investigate the "will to meaning" in reference to Frankl's theorizing. However, before discussing the research studies, a critique of Logotherapy will be presented.

The general theory of Logotherapy has been hailed by some psychologists and pschiartrists as a fresh and a more

53 Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. xvi-xviii.

realistic view of man. Nevertheless, there are some, even those who accept much of Logotherapy, who are critical of certain aspects. The following section will discuss these criticisms.

3. A Critique of Logotherapy.

Our source for the evaluation of Logotherapy will come primarily from professional literature. The possible weaknesses of Logotherapy, rather than its positive aspects, will be emphasized because the latter are better known.

The criticisms surrounding Frankl's theory of Logotherapy center around three major areas; namely, its content, terminology and its theoretical base.

The Adlerians think that the Third Viennese school of Frankl is not qualitatively different from their own; in fact they consider Adler to be the founder of an existential psychology. Content-wise, the Adlerians see no qualitative difference between their school and the theory of Logotherapy as enunciated by Frankl. The Adlerians consider Adler's concept of meaning in life to be more realistic than that of Frankl's because it is based on a kind of a natural law. They think that Frankl, in his over-concern that people acquire a meaning for their lives, forces people to accept parareligious attitudes. Frankl is accused of being an existential-romantic in believing that

meaning for life will follow if the person is responsible to life. They consider Frankl's theory more applicable for the depressed to teach them the art of suffering. Frankl's theory is considered to start from the great loneliness of the dying, in that they should die more easily; whereas Adler's theory which is thought to be more wholesome, starts from education in that the child is to be formed so that he may fulfill in his individual manner the demands of the law of social relatedness.⁵⁴

A second criticism from the Adlerian school concerns Frankl's criticism of the concept of "will to power." They think that even though Frankl criticizes this concept, his writings nevertheless are similar to it:

It is a peculiarity of man that he can only live by looking to the future...sub specie aeternitatis (...). Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual (...). For what is demanded of a man is...the actualization of specific tasks in this world--and only to the degree to which he accomplishes this actualization will he also fulfill himself.⁵⁵

The second area of Frankl's theory that has received much criticism is his terminology. Generally

⁵⁴ Ferdinand Birnbaum, "Frankl's Existential Psychology from the Viewpoint of Individual Psychology," Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1961, p. 162-166.

⁵⁵ Rowena R. Ansbacher, "The Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy," Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1959, p. 236-237.

speaking, his terms are found to be vague and illusive, "mystical and confused."⁵⁶ It should be remembered, however, that most of the criticisms discussed relate to Frankl's earlier works and that since these criticisms were made, Frankl has made attempts to clarify some of his concepts.⁵⁷

Some of the specific terms of Logotherapy criticized in professional literature include the following: meaning, responsibility, freedom and existence.

Maslow questions whether Frankl, in using the term meaning, describes anything different than the terms values, purposes or ends as used by Goldstein and Rogers.⁵⁸ Maslow thinks that as things stand now, different theorists use these and similar words in an overlapping or synonymous way.

Speaking in the same vein, Tweedie thinks that Frankl's basic concept of "will to meaning" requires further phenomenological clarification. Tweedie states that some persons do seem to function with a meaning and value system that is inherently one of pleasure and/or power

⁵⁶ Edith Weisskopf, "Some Comments on a Viennese School of Psychiatry," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1955, p. 702.

⁵⁷ Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, p. 50-71.

⁵⁸ A. H. Maslow, "Comments on Dr. Frankl's Paper," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1966, p. 107-112.

orientation.⁵⁹ Others, on the other hand, become frustrated because they do set meaningfulness as a goal of action and find themselves unable to actualize meaning. Tweedie attributes this differential setting of goals to the fact that meaning serves no better as an end in itself than does pleasure or self-actualization. Tweedie is of the opinion that perhaps it is being which sets the pace for meaning, rather than vice versa.

A second concept of Frankl's theory that has received much criticism is that of responsibility. Frankl states that man has the responsibility to bring meaning to his life by carrying out the tasks imposed by life. Arnold and Gasson suggest that Frankl is not too clear in the use of the term responsibility.⁶⁰ They state that it is hard to tell whether responsibility means moral accountability or simply physical responsiveness.

In addition, the authors question whether man's responsibility towards his life is as evident as Frankl would have him believe. They see man as having no choice

⁵⁹ Donald F. Tweedie, "Discussion on Dr. Frankl's Paper," in Erwin W. Straus (ed.), Phenomenology: Pure and Applied, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1964, p. 60-61.

⁶⁰ Magda B. Arnold and John A. Gasson, "Logotherapy and Existential Analysis," in Magda B. Arnold and John A. Gasson (eds.), The Human Person, New York, Ronald Press, 1954, p. 462-492.

in the selection of his parents, nor in the choice of the environment in which he was born. The authors argue that man is responsible for his life because he was created for a purpose. Arnold and Gasson suggest that the primary thought that should arise from man's awareness of his existence is the opportunity that it affords and not the task that it imposes. The authors differ from Frankl in this regard, and contend that the primary question is not the one that Frankl imagines life puts to man, but rather the questions that man puts to life: What is there in life for me? Why am I here? Why am I living?

Arnold and Gasson further contend that responsibility "implies not only an obligation and someone to discharge it; it also implies someone or something to which one is bound."⁶¹ The authors state that the one to which a person is bound cannot be life, but the giver of life because the gift is not its own purpose. The authors contend that it is the creature's God which gives ultimate meaning.

Arnold and Gasson, again, see Frankl's explanation of freedom wanting. Freedom according to Frankl means not a freedom from but a freedom for. In the mind of Frankl, freedom is the freedom to realize values. The authors pose the question: "But why are creative, experiential, and

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 484.

attitudinal values preferable to other values that have been held dear by human beings, such as power, prestige, and pleasure?"⁶² Arnold and Gasson contend that a philosophy that assumes an hierarchy of values and the supremacy of objective over subjective values must answer the question of how the supremacy is founded. The authors feel that Frankl has failed to do this, and would like him to elucidate this aspect--to explain what created the values, what established their hierarchy and what has given man the disposition and the obligation to realize objective values.

The fourth term in Frankl's theory that has received some criticism is that of existence. Arnold and Gasson⁶³ state that Frankl, like most existential writers, interprets the term existence in his own way. From the context of Frankl's writings, the authors understand existence as comprehending the individual, the objective situation and the challenge that the situation presents to the individual. The challenge, according to Arnold and Gasson's interpretation of Frankl, is inescapable--it must be taken up--and to it the individual must respond correctly under the pain of annihilation or disintegration. All of this, according to the authors' interpretation of Frankl's theory, is considered

62 Ibid., p. 486.

63 Ibid., p. 487.

fundamental fact, primary and self-evident, first principles. Arnold and Gasson disagree, and state that Frankl has made assertions which are unproven. The authors say that even though we cannot deny that there is a challenge in life, we can be skeptical that challenge is the stuff out of which existence is made. In the same way, one can be skeptical about the ineluctability of the demands made by this challenge. Granted that each individual will solve his problems in his own way and is responsible for them, yet Arnold and Gasson find it difficult to deduce the absoluteness of the challenge from the relativity of life's tasks. Why can't the challenge also be relative?

The third area of Frankl's theory that has been subjected to criticism is its theoretical base. Some authors question the soundness of the presuppositions on which Frankl's theory rests. Frankl states that "a real human person is not subject to rigid prediction. Existence can neither be reduced to a system nor deduced from it."⁶⁴ Pervin⁶⁵ disagrees with Frankl's reasoning, and argues that there is no need to deny that man's behavior can be predicted because an individual is unique and free. Pervin

⁶⁴ Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. 169.

⁶⁵ Lawrence A. Pervin, "Existential Psychology and Psychotherapy," American Psychologist, Vol. 15, No. 5, 1960, p. 305-309.

asks the question as to whether it means that because the individual is free and unique, that behavior must be unlawful and unpredictable? He thinks not. He says that even if some behavior is lawful, then it can be predicted. Pervin cautions against unrealistic generalizations and abstractions.

Further criticisms on Frankl's theory can be found in Cavanagh's work.⁶⁶ Since these criticisms are not directly related to the present work, they will not be discussed.

This concludes the critical evaluation of Frankl's theory. The next part of this paper will present and discuss the empirical studies that investigated the "will to meaning" as defined by Frankl and as measured by the Purpose in Life Test.⁶⁷ The PIL, used by the author in the present study, was specifically designed by Crumbaugh and Maholick⁶⁸ to measure what Frankl refers

66 Michael E. Cavanagh, The Relationship between Frankl's "Will to Meaning" and the Discrepancy between the Actual Self and the Ideal Self, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ottawa, Ontario, University of Ottawa, 1966, p. 49-56.

67 We will now refer to the Purpose in Life Test as PIL.

68 James C. Crumbaugh and Leonard T. Maholick, "An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Noögenic Neurosis," Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1964, p. 200-207.

to as "meaning in life". The score on the PIL can be thought of as an approximation of "meaning in life". In the review of the empirical studies, interest will be focused on the relationship of the achievement of "meaning in life" to age and sex differences as measured by the PIL. The construction of the PIL, with the validation and reliability studies, will be discussed in detail in chapter two of this paper.

4. Empirical Studies Based on Frankl's Theorizing.

The studies to be discussed are classified into three groups: studies that present data regarding the relationship of sex differences to the "will to meaning" as measured by the PIL; studies that present data as regards to the relationship of age differences to "will to meaning" as measured by the PIL; and studies that present data as to the relationship of the interaction of sex and age to the "will to meaning" as measured by the PIL. There are no studies that directly investigated the relationship of either sex or age or the interaction of sex and age to "meaning in life" as measured by the PIL. The findings that are available are either from secondary investigations in the studies undertaken, or are deduced from data obtained

in those studies.

(a) Relationship of Sex and PIL Scores.- Crumbaugh and Maholick, in the validity study on the PIL, used subjects divided into five groups. Two of the groups were composed of non-patient subjects, mostly junior and senior students from two universities. Both groups were divided according to sex to investigate differences on PIL scores. In the first group, PIL scores of 122.86 and 126.50 with standard deviations of 10.04 and 12.90 were observed for the males and females, respectively. The second group of subjects, again being comprised of junior and senior students, but from another university, had PIL scores of

116.14 and 117.84 with standard deviations of 13.17 and 15.04 for the males and females, respectively. In both instances, the females tended to score higher than the males. The authors claimed that these differences were not significant but suggestive.⁶⁹

In a subsequent study, Crumbaugh, using 1151 subjects from various non-patient and patient groups, observed a PIL score of 108.68 and 104.10 with standard deviations of 18.10 and 19.66 for males and females, respectively.⁷⁰ In this study, the order was reversed in that the males scored higher than the females. However, the differences were not significant, but suggestive.

Results similar to those of Crumbaugh and Maholick were reported by Nyholm.⁷¹

Murphy, in his study on the comparison of PIL scores of groups divided according to choice of life object, also failed to find significant differences between the PIL scores of males and females.⁷² He reported PIL scores of

69 Crumbaugh and Maholick, op. cit., p. 203-204.

70 James C. Crumbaugh, "Cross-validation of Purpose-in-Life Test Based on Frankl's Concepts," Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1968, p. 74-81.

71 S. E. Nyholm, A Replication of a Psychometric Approach to Existentialism, unpublished Master's thesis, Portland, Main, University of Portland, 1966.

72 Leonard Murphy, Extent of Purpose-in-Life and Four Frankl-proposed Life Objectives, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ottawa, Ontario, University of Ottawa, 1967, p. 104-105.

117.90 and 114.72 with standard deviations of 12.59 and 16.72 for males and females, respectively. Even though he did not find differences when subjects were grouped according to sex, Murphy implied that there may be inter-group differences when subjects are divided according to sex. This is implied by Murphy's suggestion that age and sex differences according to object choice should be one area of research.⁷³

The only study to date that has reported a significant difference in scores on the PIL when subjects were divided according to sex, is that by Doerries.⁷⁴ Although Doerries did not report the mean PIL scores for males and females, he did report that women had significantly higher PIL scores than men.

(b) Relationship of Age to PIL Scores.- There have been no studies reported that directly compared age differences to PIL scores. Reviewing the literature in an attempt to extract information as to the relationship of age to PIL scores is complicated by the use of such age groups as: students, undergraduates, graduates, seminarians, trainees and professionals. There is only one study,⁷⁵ using a

73 Ibid., p. 105.

74 Lee E. Doerries, "Purpose in Life and Social Participation," Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1970, p. 50-53.

75 Murphy, op. cit., p. 86.

normal population, that derived PIL scores from groups divided according to chronological age.

Nevertheless, some tentative hypotheses can be stated as to the relationship of age to mean PIL scores when groups, divided according to age, are compared. Using the three general categories of undergraduate, graduate and professional groups, the following can be deduced. Crumbaugh and Maholick⁷⁶ obtained mean PIL scores of 116.84 and 124.78 with standard deviations of 14.00 and 11.80 for undergraduates and graduate students, respectively. Cavanagh⁷⁷ obtained similar results when he compared undergraduate and graduate students. In his case, the mean PIL scores were 112.10 and 119.10 with standard deviations of 16.52 and 12.11 for undergraduate and graduate students, respectively.

If seminarians and "sisters in training" (trainees), because of age similarities, are considered as graduate students, then we would have additional data which are similar to that previously obtained for the graduate group. Mean PIL scores of 119.20 and 119.27 with standard

76 Crumbaugh and Maholick, op. cit., p. 203.

77 Cavanagh, op. cit., p. 85.

deviations of 10.44 and 10.02 were obtained for seminarians⁷⁸ and "sisters in training,"⁷⁹ respectively.

This information suggests that the mean PIL scores vary for undergraduate and graduate students. However, this suggestion is further complicated by the different mean PIL scores obtained in research studies for undergraduate students. Mean PIL scores of 98.39, 103.28, 108.45, 112.1 and 116.84 with standard deviations of 16.84, 13.98, 16.52 and 14.00 for the last four PIL scores listed were reported for undergraduate students by Shean,⁸⁰ Doerries,⁸¹ Crumbaugh,⁸² Cavanagh⁸³ and Crumbaugh and Maholick,⁸⁴ respectively. Cavanagh alone reported a mean age (21.7 years) of the undergraduate population. The differences in the mean PIL scores reported may well be a function of age and the interaction of age and sex.

78 Ibid., p. 85.

79 James C. Crumbaugh, Sister Mary Raphael and Raymond R. Shrader, "Frankl's Will to Meaning in a Religious Order," Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1970, p. 206-207.

80 Glenn D. Shean and Freddie Fechtmann, "Purpose in Life Scores of Student Marihuana Users," Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1971, p. 112-113.

81 Doerries, op. cit., p. 50-53.

82 Crumbaugh, op. cit., p. 78.

83 Cavanagh, op. cit., p. 85.

84 Crumbaugh and Maholick, op. cit., p. 203.

As regards the third group, the professionals, Crumbaugh's study obtained a mean PIL score of 118.90 with a standard deviation of 11.31.⁸⁵ This mean PIL score appears to be relatively higher than that for the undergraduate students, but similar to that of the graduate students. Yarnel, on the other hand, working with air force men (mean age of 28.3 years), reported a mean PIL score (110.03 and S.D. of 12.70) which resembled more that of the undergraduate students.⁸⁶

From the above studies it is suggested that age is related to variations in PIL scores. This suggestion is supported by Murphy's study. When Murphy completed his study on the relationship of subjects grouped according to life objectives to variations on PIL scores, he redivided the subjects into four age groups to test for age differences on PIL scores. From his study he obtained scores of 110.63, 119.26, 117.55 and 121.21 with standard deviations of 16.09, 11.69, 15.53 and 13.80 on the PIL for the age groups 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59, respectively.⁸⁷ Murphy states that the youngest group, those in the age

⁸⁵ Crumbaugh, op. cit., p. 78.

⁸⁶ Thomas D. Yarnell, "Purpose-in-Life Test: Further Correlates," Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1971, p. 76-79.

⁸⁷ Murphy, op. cit., p. 107.

range between 20-29, "obtained a PIL mean that was significantly lower than the means obtained by the three older groups. No significant difference in means between the three older groups was found."⁸⁸ On the basis of these data, Murphy suggests that the extent to which "purpose in life" is discovered may be related to age.

(c) Interaction of Age and Sex.- There are no studies that directly investigated the relationship of the interaction of age and sex to variations in PIL scores. Murphy's study, however, is helpful to postulate hypotheses as to the possible relationship. Murphy reported that his study failed to find a significant difference when subjects were grouped according to sex. However, he did find differences when the same subjects were grouped according to age. As a result of these two findings, it is suggested that there may be inter-group differences when subjects are divided according to age and sex.

This implication is based on the analysis of his sampling. Although the total number of males and females for the study was comparable, being 116 and 110, respectively, yet the number of males and females for each of the groups was not comparable. For example: for the age groups 18-19, 20-29, 40-49 and 60-69, the number of males were:

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 116-117.

0, 31, 32 and 2, respectively, whereas the number of females were 5, 42, 16 and 2, respectively.⁸⁹ If there are age differences, as Murphy suggests, then the unequal distribution of subjects for the age groups may well have affected the results when the subjects were grouped according to sex. Any inter-group or sex differences may well have been concealed beneath the unequal distribution of subjects among the age groups.

This brings to a conclusion the discussion of the empirical studies related to Frankl's theorizing on "will to meaning" and age and sex differences. The purpose of the present research is to test Murphy's implication that intensity of "meaning in life" may vary according to age, sex and/or age-sex differences.

In the last part of this chapter, the material presented so far will be summarized, and the basic hypotheses will then be presented.

5. Summary and Basic Hypotheses.

Present-day psychology is characterized by a new movement, that of existentialism, of which Frankl is one of the strongest proponents. Frankl maintains that the basic principle of motivation is the "will to meaning," that is,

89 Ibid., p. 86.

the search for reasons or goals around which to integrate one's life. The new movement in psychology is characterized by its insistence that man has freedom and responsibility to find meaningful goals for himself.

Research related to Frankl's theory has concerned itself mainly with the concept of "will to meaning." A questionnaire has been designed to detect the presence or the absence of "will to meaning." Researchers interested in the concept of "will to meaning" have used the Purpose in Life Test in order to empirically investigate the "will to meaning." Analysis of the data obtained from the studies indicates that persons may vary according to age and sex, or both, as to the extent to which they have found meaningful goals around which to integrate their lives. By the use of the Purpose in Life Test, differences in "will to meaning" have been noticed for certain groups.

The purpose of this research is to carry further the work already begun and test for differences in "will to meaning" by using age and sex as independent variables. The null hypotheses of the present study can be stated as follows:

1. When a combined sample of male and female subjects is divided into five age groups, there are no significant differences among the group means on a measure of meaning in life.

2. When a combined sample of male and female subjects is divided into two groups on basis of sex, there are no significant differences between the group means on a measure of meaning in life.
3. When a combined sample of male and female subjects is divided according to age and sex: five age sub-groups per sex, there are no significant differences among the age-group mean scores of each sex; nor is there any interaction between age and sex on a measure of meaning in life.

In the following chapter, the sample, the tools, and the experimental design used to test the null hypotheses are presented.

CHAPTER II

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The purpose of this chapter is to present the experimental design of the present research study. The chapter begins with a discussion of the method of sampling. The tools used and the method of administration and scoring of the questionnaires are then presented. The chapter concludes with a description of the technique used to analyze the data.

1. The Sample.

The sample of the research study consists of two hundred subjects, heterogeneous for age and sex grouped in the following way:

Adolescents, aged 13-15
Post adolescent student groups, aged 17-19
Young adult workers, aged 25-35
Group in which there is a change of life,
aged 45-55
The retired group, aged 65 and over.

Each of the above five groups consists of forty subjects divided equally into males and females. The five age groups were chosen because, developmentally, they appear to constitute distinct age groups.

Eligible subjects, for the present study, were people listed on the parish records of ten churches. Being

listed on the parish records means that they belong to a specific parish or church and attend that church, if they do attend church.

Subjects were selected from parish records in order to control for the effects that the choice of a specific life objective may have on the Purpose in Life Test score.¹ It is true that for people who choose God or another person as a life objective, there is likely to be no significant difference in the scores on the PIL. However, from Murphy's study, we cannot say that people who choose either to work for a cause or society will not score significantly different from the subjects who choose either God or another person as a life objective. Presumably, subjects who are listed on parish records will choose either God or another person as their life objective and, in this way, the effects that the choice of a specific life objective may have on the score on the PIL will be controlled.

Since in Crumbaugh's study "purpose in life" did not relate to educational level, nor to economic background, it was not felt necessary to control for these factors in the present study.²

1 We will now refer to the Purpose in Life Test as PIL.

2 James C. Crumbaugh, "Cross-validation of Purpose-in-Life Test Based on Frankl's Concepts," Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1968, p. 80.

2. The Tools.

The tools used in the present study were the Frankl Questionnaire and the Purpose in Life Test. They will now be discussed.

(a) The Frankl Questionnaire.- Frankl originally devised a questionnaire to obtain "purpose in life" information. As such, it was an informal series of thirteen questions to estimate the presence of existential vacuum. The questionnaire was intended to be qualitatively interpreted by clinicians. The questionnaire, as it is now used, is a six-item questionnaire which the subject answers by selecting an appropriate response from three choices provided; for example:

Do you feel that your life is without purpose?

1	2	3
frequently	seldom	never

The subjects circle the qualifier which best describes their feeling to the specific question.³

Crumbaugh and Maholick quantified the six items that are now used and called it the Frankl Questionnaire.⁴ They

³ A copy of this questionnaire is in Appendix 2, attached to the Purpose in Life Test as Part B.

⁴ We will now refer to the Frankl Questionnaire as FQ.

found that scores on the quantified questionnaire showed a significant difference between a group of seventy-one non-patients and a group of sixty-five patients.⁵

Crumbaugh and Maholick did not report reliability data on the FQ. However, Cavanagh⁶ and Murphy⁷ reported a test-retest reliability of .83 and .75, respectively.

The FQ has been used in previous studies to validate the PIL. These correlation studies will be treated during the discussion of the PIL.

It should be emphasized that the FQ is an instrument intended to measure what Frankl means by "purpose in life." Research considered in the following section provides evidence of its validity.

(b) The Purpose in Life Test.- The second tool used in this research study, the Purpose in Life Test, was devised by Crumbaugh and Maholick in an attempt to quantify

⁵ James C. Crumbaugh and Leonard T. Maholick, "An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Noogenic Neurosis," Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1964, p. 202.

⁶ Michael E. Cavanagh, The Relationship between Frankl's "Will to Meaning" and the Discrepancy between the Actual Self and the Ideal Self, unpublished doctoral dissertation presented to the Faculty of Psychology and Education of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1966, p. 81.

⁷ Leonard Murphy, Extent of Purpose-in-Life and Four Frankl-proposed Life Objectives, unpublished doctoral dissertation presented to the Faculty of Psychology and Education of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1966, p. 88.

Frankl's concept of "meaning in life."⁸ The test was specifically designed to evoke responses believed related to the degree to which the individual experienced "purpose in life." The items within this attitude scale were arrived at in an a priori manner from the existential literature and particularly from Frankl's Logotherapy.⁹

The structure of all items follow the pattern of a seven-point scale as follows:

1. I am usually:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
completely bored			neutral			exuberant enthusiastic

The subject rates himself on each item. The score on the test is the sum of the ratings of the total number of items. Originally, the test consisted of twenty-five items.

Crumbaugh and Maholick conducted a pilot study and, of the original twenty-five proposed items, half were discarded. New items were substituted, and thus a revised 25-item scale was constructed. After item analysis, three items were discarded, leaving a 22-item scale.

In an attempt to validate the PIL, Crumbaugh and Maholick theorized that if their scale were valid, it should be able to distinguish between patient and non-patient

⁸ Crumbaugh and Maholick, op. cit., p. 200-207.

⁹ Ibid., p. 201.

groups, assuming that the non-patients would score higher on the PIL than the patients. Accordingly, they tested five groups, ranked according to their theorized levels of "purpose in life." In a descending level of "purpose in life," the groups were: graduate students, undergraduate college students, out-patients of private psychiatrists, out-patients of a clinic and hospitalized alcoholics. The results showed a significant difference between the scores obtained by non-patients and patient groups, and there was a progressive decline in scores for each group in accord with the theorized declining level of "purpose in life." In this study, the PIL was found to predict who were patients and who were non-patients with sixty-five per cent accuracy for women and seventy-five per cent accuracy for men.

The authors of the above study found a correlation of .68 between the total PIL and FQ scores. From these data they concluded that the PIL and FQ were essentially measuring the same function which Frankl describes as "purpose in life."

In a later and in a more important study, Crumbaugh attempted to cross-validate the previous PIL findings and to apply the test to further categories of subjects.¹⁰ This

¹⁰ Crumbaugh, op. cit., p. 74-81.

project included a total of 1151 subjects who were classified into four normal groups and six psychiatric population groups. The four normal population groups consisted of successful business and professional personnel; active and leading Protestant parishioners; college undergraduates; and indigent non-psychiatric hospital patients. The six psychiatric groups were comprised of neurotics and out-patients; hospitalized neurotics; hospitalized alcoholics; hospitalized Negro schizophrenics; hospitalized schizophrenics; and non-schizophrenic psychotics.

A revised 20-item form of the PIL was constructed in order to avoid negative scoring of two items. A Pearson r of .995 was found between the two forms from fifty subjects of the neurotics and out-patient group. The revised 20-item form of the PIL was administered to all of the subjects. Using the 225 cases from the earlier study, the test was rescored for the twenty items. In addition to the PIL, a Minister's Rating Scale for Parishioners was used by the participating ministers for the active and leading Protestant parishioners group, and participating therapists were asked to score the PIL as they thought subjects of one group of patients would score them.

The author then predicted, on the basis of his theorizing, that the ten groups of subjects taking part in the experiment would differ in their mean PIL scores in a

descending order. He predicted that the successful business and professional personnel group would have the highest mean PIL score and that the mean PIL scores would decrease so that the non-schizophrenic psychotics would have the lowest mean PIL score. This confirmation, he felt, would add to the construct validity of the PIL. He also predicted that the PIL scores would correlate with the therapists' ratings of patients on the PIL and with the ministers' ratings of the active and leading Protestant parishioners group on the Minister's Rating Scale. Confirmation of these predictions should demonstrate concurrent validity of the PIL.

In this study Crumbaugh predicted correctly the order of the means of the four normal groups but was less accurate in predicting the means of the psychiatric populations. The schizophrenic groups scored unexpectedly high. However, this high score is in keeping with logotherapeutic theory, for as Frankl says, schizophrenics would be expected to score high due to their tendency to see purpose and deeper meaning even behind the most trivial events even though to the external eye this meaning is shallow, inadequate, distorted and unsatisfactory.

The therapists' ratings of the degree of purpose and "meaning in life" demonstrated by the patients, and the ratings of the ministers of the degree of purpose and "meaning in life" exhibited by their participating

parishioners correlated .38 and .47, respectively, with the PIL scores (Pearson product-moment). However, Crumbaugh and Maholick consider these results to be in "line with the level of criterion validity which can usually be obtained from a single measure of a complex trait."¹¹

Crumbaugh and Maholick's validity studies of the PIL were supported in part by the studies of Cavanagh and Murphy. Using the PIL, Cavanagh was able to discriminate groups through declining scores in accordance with difference in theorized levels of "purpose in life."¹² Both Cavanagh and Murphy correlated the PIL with the FQ and obtained correlations of .68 and .59, respectively.¹³

The reported reliability of the PIL in the Crumbaugh and Maholick study was a split-half reliability of .81 corrected by the Spearman Brown formula to .90. In the study by Crumbaugh, a split-half correlation of .85 corrected by the test-retest method was reported. Cavanagh and Murphy reported test-retest reliability scores of .79 and .90 for their respective studies.

Many authors, including Crumbaugh and Maholick, have studied the PIL in relation to other variables. Crumbaugh

¹¹ James C. Crumbaugh and Leonard T. Maholick, The Manual of Instructions for the Purpose in Life Test, Chicago Plaza, Illinois, Psychometric Affiliates, 1969, p. 2.

¹² Cavanagh, op. cit., p. 84-87.

¹³ Ibid., p. 81-87; and Murphy, op. cit., p. 99-100.

and Maholick found correlations of .39 and -.30, respectively, between the PIL and K and D scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). These correlations are significant at the one per cent level of confidence. Crumbaugh and others found significant correlations between Srole Scales of Anomie and the PIL. The Srole Scales of Anomie are intended to measure meaningfulness of life. It has several sub-scales as Valuelessness, Hopelessness and so on. Crumbaugh and Maholick justified the significant correlations of the PIL with the Scales of Anomie by the fact that there is an overlapping between the PIL and the Scales of Anomie. Other studies have generally failed to yield significant results. For further studies, the reader is referred to the bibliography contained in the Manual of Instructions for the Purpose in Life Test.

Regarding the studies in which some relationships were found between the PIL and other variables, Crumbaugh and Maholick consider their relationships involving personality traits rather than psychiatric syndromes. The authors state:

It should be noted that all of the relationships to PIL scores presently reported involve personality traits rather than psychiatric syndromes or psychodiagnostic categories. (A possible exception is the MMPI Depression Scale which represents both a symptom and a syndrome.) This fact, plus the obtained high relationship between the PIL and Frankl's questionnaire, and the PIL's highly significant separation of patient and non-patient populations, suggests that the PIL does measure, as intended, a new factor (existential vacuum) which is the essential ingredient of a new neurosis (noogenic neurosis).¹⁴

The studies by Crumbaugh and Maholick and authors who have used the PIL in their investigations, suggest that this tool is a reliable and valid research instrument when used to study "purpose in life" as defined by Frankl. On the basis of these studies, the PIL is used to investigate for age and sex differences in "purpose in life" scores.

The next part of this paper discusses the experimental method used in the present study.

3. Experimental Method.

The presentation of the experimental method includes a discussion of the method of subject selection, the formation of testing groups, and the administration and scoring of the tests.

¹⁴ Crumbaugh and Maholick, op. cit., p. 3.

The subjects for this study were selected from two churches each, of five denominations, in the city of Regina, Saskatchewan. The five denominations, which represent the predominant religious affiliations in the city of Regina, were the following: Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Roman Catholic and United Church.

In selecting the subjects for the research study, the first step was to place the names of all the churches from the five denominations into five separate groups. From each of the groups the names of two churches were drawn. The pastors or ministers of the selected churches were then asked if they would collaborate in the study. Because two clergymen were unable to take part in the study, two other churches were selected in order that each of the five denominations were represented by two churches.

Having selected the ten churches that would take part in the research study, the pastors (or ministers) were then personally visited in order that more details regarding the study could be given to them. With their help, the twenty subjects from their congregation who would take part in the study were selected. The method used to select the twenty people was the same for each church and consisted in locating from the parish lists the people of the five age-sex groups. Once the potential subjects were placed into the five age-sex groups, two subjects were selected from

each of the ten groups. The formula used to select these subjects was to divide the total number that comprised each group by two, and the resultant number and its double indicated which subject on the parish list was an eligible subject for the study. To illustrate by example: if there were ninety-two people on a parish list who belonged to the twenty-five to thirty-five age group, then subjects who numbered forty-one and ninety-two would be eligible subjects. Having selected the potential subjects, the names of the subjects, with their addresses and telephone numbers, were obtained from each of the pastors so that each subject could be personally contacted by the researcher.

Before any of the subjects were individually contacted, an announcement prepared by the researcher was read by the pastor in his church. The content of the announcement was to the effect that a graduate student was asking some people from the parish to take part in a research study, and that the pastor of that church personally supported the study.¹⁵

Following the announcements in the churches, the researcher contacted, by telephone, each of the subjects. The subjects were informed as to the nature of the study and the time it would take to answer the questionnaire.

¹⁵ A copy of this announcement is in Appendix 1.

They were given an example of the type of questions they were expected to answer and the time and place of the testing session. Finally, each subject was requested, if possible, to attend two meetings, one week apart, to obtain data for the test-retest reliability studies of the PII and FQ.

Of the two hundred subjects contacted, twenty-four were unable to take part in the study. Substitutes were provided similar in age, sex and church affiliation.

Not all of the two hundred subjects were able to attend either the first or the second of the two group meetings for test administration. To accommodate these subjects, who numbered thirty-seven, the researcher met them at their homes. At this time, the researcher discussed the instructions of the test, which were the same as for group administration. A questionnaire, with a stamped and self-addressed envelope, was left with each of these subjects to be returned by mail.

To analyze the questionnaire data on the basis of the ten experimental groups, special answer sheets were prepared which requested information related to age, sex, education, church affiliation and occupation.¹⁶

¹⁶ A copy of the answer sheet is in Appendix 3.

The administration of the questionnaires followed a standard format. The two testing sessions arranged at weekly intervals took place in parish halls or in schools. In the administration of the questionnaires, the researcher was aided by five previously instructed assistants.

Each subject was given a code number. The reason for their use was to match answer sheets of subjects for the test-retest reliability study and also to keep a record of those present and absent for the testing session. Each subject was asked to place his code number on the answer sheet. On the sheet containing the code number, there was a space where the subject could write his name. The code numbers were then picked up, with the names of the corresponding subjects, and placed in an envelope to be returned to the subjects during the following testing session. The researcher explained to the subjects the reason for writing their names on the form containing their code number.

When the people arrived at the testing room, and were seated, the examiner again explained the purpose of the testing program, assured them that privacy would be respected, and encouraged them to answer the questions as honestly as possible because therein rested the validity of the research study. After the preliminary remarks, the examiner proceeded to hand out the test booklets with the accompanying answer sheets. The instructions for both tests

were then read. The instructions, which appeared on the cover the test booklet, were worded as follows:

Together with this booklet you should have a separate answer sheet. On the answer sheet you have places wherein you are asked to write your code number, and indicate the sex and age group to which you belong. Please fill in this information right now.

On the following pages of this booklet there are statements the format of which resembles the following:

Thinking makes me:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
terribly irritable			neutral		wonderfully fulfilled	

For each of the statements, please indicate beside the appropriate item number on your answer sheet, the number of the statement rating which makes the statement most nearly true for you. Note that the rating numbers always extend from one extreme feeling to its opposite kind of feeling. If an extreme feeling best describes you on a given statement, your answer would be 1 or 7. If you are somewhere between an extreme feeling and neutral, your answer would be 2 or 6, or 3 or 5, depending on whether you judge yourself nearer the extreme or nearer neutral. Neutral implies no judgment either way. Try to use the neutral rating as little as possible.

When you have finished Part A, go right on to Part B. Please try to give an accurate answer for every statement, but do not puzzle too long over any statement.

Remember, that there are no right or wrong answers. Each person is different and has only to say what is true for him.

If at any time you have questions concerning the procedure or items on the test, do not hesitate to ask immediately.

Do not skip any questions.

Since these booklets will be reused, please do not mark them. Write your answers on the separate answer sheet.

Both the PIL and the FQ were hand scored. The scoring of the tests consisted in adding the numbers corresponding to item ratings.

4. Techniques of Analysis.

The statistical techniques used to analyze the data are described in this section. The data were analyzed in order to study the validity and reliability of the instruments used and to investigate for significant differences of mean scores when the subjects were divided into groups according to age and sex.

First, the PIL was studied for test-retest reliability, using the responses from fifty-seven subjects who took the same questionnaires twice, one week apart. The Pearson product-moment coefficient was computed for the test-retest reliability study of the PIL. It may be noted that Cavanagh and Murphy performed a test-retest reliability study of the PIL and the FQ, but Crumbaugh and Maholick used a split-half reliability study technique.

The Pearson product-moment coefficient was also used for the validation of the PIL using FQ as a criterion. For this analysis the responses from all two hundred subjects were used.

In the present research, age and sex differences in PIL and FQ scores were the two factors studied as dependent variables, using a two-factor analysis of variance. The PIL and the FQ were analyzed separately.

Whenever significant differences were found in the analysis of variance, the Tukey test was used as a post hoc procedure. The Tukey method was chosen because its assumption of equal sample size could be met, and because it has the greatest power for testing differences of paired mean scores. The formula used is as follows:

$$q = \frac{M_j - M_i}{\sqrt{MSe/n}}$$

where M_j indicates the mean scores compared; MSe represents the mean of the sum of squares of the error term and n means the total number of subjects of the research study.

Having analyzed the data on the basis of age and sex differences, the data were then analyzed on the basis of religious affiliations and educational levels. This is not a part of the original research study, but since each group was represented by an equal number from each of the five religious denominations, and because information as to the educational backgrounds of the subjects was available, it was felt that this further analysis could be performed, using analysis of variance as described above.

Having discussed the selection of the sample, the tools used in the research study, and the experimental method, the results of this study will be presented and discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The first section of this chapter deals with the reliability of the instruments, and the second presents the results of the analysis of the data. A discussion of the results is presented in the last section.

1. Reliability of the Instruments.

Test-retest reliability of the two purpose-in-life tests (the Purpose in Life Test and Frankl Questionnaire) was based on the responses of fifty-seven subjects. The time interval between the first and second administration of the tests was one week.

Reliability for the Purpose in Life Test (PIL) computed by the Pearson r formula was .83 ($p < 0.01$). The Frankl Questionnaire (FQ) showed a reliability of .66 ($p < 0.01$). Cavanagh¹ and Murphy² had reported Pearson r correlation coefficients of .79 and .90, respectively, for the PIL and correlation coefficients of .83 and .75, respectively, for

1 Michael E. Cavanagh, The Relationship between Frankl's "Will to Meaning" and the Discrepancy between the Actual Self and the Ideal Self, unpublished doctoral dissertation presented to the Faculty of Psychology and Education of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1966, p. 81.

2 Leonard Murphy, Extent of Purpose-in-Life and Four Frankl-proposed Life Objectives, unpublished doctoral dissertation presented to the Faculty of Psychology and Education of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1966, p. 88.

the FQ. Cavanagh's time lapse was three weeks, and Murphy's was three to six days as compared to the one week for the present study. Cavanagh had a large proportion of non-normals in his sample of 210 subjects, while Murphy's sample of 226 subjects and the present study were composed entirely of normals. However, Murphy's sample was composed almost exclusively of adults, whereas the present study had a large percentage of subjects twenty or under. The reliability coefficients found, though not high, appear to be adequate for the study of group differences.

In validating the PIL, Crumbaugh and Maholick used the FQ as criterion. Even though it was not the central purpose of this research study, the author assessed the congruent validity of the PIL by using the FQ as criterion, based on the responses of the two hundred subjects. The result was a Pearson r correlation coefficient of .56 ($p < 0.01$). This differs significantly when computed according to the Fisher method,³ at the .05 level of significance, from the coefficient of .68 reported by both Crumbaugh and Maholick⁴ and Cavanagh.⁵ However, it does not differ

³ Henry E. Garret, Statistics in Psychology and Education, New York, David McKay Company, Inc., 1966, p. 241-243.

⁴ James C. Crumbaugh and Leonard T. Maholick, "An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Noogenic Neuroses," Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1964, p. 204.

⁵ Cavanagh, op. cit., p. 82.

significantly from the correlation coefficient of .59 reported by Murphy.⁶

The differences in the results of the three studies can be explained in terms of sample differences. Non-normal subjects, part of the sample in both the Crumbaugh and Maholick and the Cavanagh studies, are a more heterogeneous sample than the subjects of the present study. It is to be expected that greater homogeneity should reduce correlations between tests taken by members of this sample.

2. Comparison of Mean Scores on the Purpose in Life Test.

(a) Scores Obtained on the PIL by Age-Sex Groups.- The subjects were grouped according to age and sex, and means (M) and standard deviations (SD) were computed for each of the groups. These data are presented in Table I.

Having determined the mean scores on the PIL from ten groups of subjects divided according to age and sex, the Levene Test was applied to test for homogeneity of variance. The result of the Levene Test was an F-ratio of .67 as compared to the Critical F-ratio of 1.98 at the .05 level of significance. The Levene Test indicated that variance was sufficiently homogeneous to continue analysis of data.

⁶ Murphy, op. cit., p 100.

Table I.-

Means and Standard Deviations Obtained on the PIL from Ten Groups of Subjects Divided according to Age and Sex.

Sex	Age Group	N	Mean	SD
Male	13-15	20	105.00	12.98
	17-19	20	99.40	14.63
	25-35	20	111.35	13.41
	45-55	20	113.90	10.77
	65 over	20	109.40	13.23
Female	13-15	20	108.75	14.88
	17-19	20	103.25	16.16
	25-35	20	109.65	13.11
	45-55	20	108.35	13.93
	65 over	20	116.40	13.55

The means of the groups, varying according to age and sex, were tested for significant differences by a two-way analysis of variance. Results of this analysis are presented in Table II. The means on the PIL showed significant differences between the age groups, but no significant sex differences were found, nor was there a significant age x sex interaction.

Since only age differences were significant on the PIL scores, the data were reorganized into age groups. Table III presents the mean and standard deviations of the scores of five age groups on the PIL. The differences between means and the level of significance for post hoc comparisons on the PIL are presented in Table IV. In the post hoc comparisons, the mean PIL score of the 13-15 age group differed significantly from the mean PIL scores of the 17-19 ($p < 0.01$), 45-55 ($p < 0.05$) and 65 and over ($p < 0.01$) age groups. The mean PIL score of the 17-19 age group differed significantly ($p < 0.01$) from the mean PIL scores of all the other age groups. However, the mean PIL scores of the 25-35, 45-55 and 65 and over age groups did not differ significantly from each other. The discussion of these results and other related points will be the topic of section three. However, before proceeding to section three, the data pertaining to the relationship of educational levels and specific religious denominations to PIL scores will be presented.

Table II.-

Comparison of the PIL Scores Obtained by Groups Divided
According to Age and Sex Using a Two-factor,
Fixed-effects Analysis of Variance.

Factor	df	SS	MS	F	Signi- ficance
Sex	1/190	108.05	108.05	0.54	n.s.
Age	4/190	3374.47	843.62	4.25	<0.01
Age x Sex	4/190	1007.75	251.93	1.27	n.s.

Table III.-
Means and Standard Deviations of PIL Scores for Five
Age Groups.

Age Group	N	M	SD
13-15	40	106.87	14.06
17-19	40	101.32	15.53
25-35	40	110.50	13.29
45-55	40	111.12	12.75
65 over	40	112.90	13.83

Table IV.-

Comparison of Mean PIL Scores Obtained by Ten Groups of Subjects Divided according to Age, Using the Tukey Test.

Age Groups Compared	df	Difference Between Means	Significance
13-15 & 17-19	5/195	5.61	< 0.01
13-15 & 25-35	5/195	3.67	n.s.
13-15 & 45-55	5/195	4.29	< 0.05
13-15 & 65 over	5/195	6.09	< 0.01
17-19 & 25-35	5/195	9.29	< 0.01
17-19 & 45-55	5/195	9.89	< 0.01
17-19 & 65 over	5/195	11.69	< 0.01
25-35 & 45-55	5/195	.63	n.s.
25-35 & 65 over	5/195	2.43	n.s.
45-55 & 65 over	5/195	1.79	n.s.

(b) Educational and Religious Variables Relative to PIL Scores.- Crumbaugh⁷ pointed out in his study that the educational and socioeconomic backgrounds of the subjects were not reflected on the PIL scores. Since Crumbaugh's study comprised mostly non-normal subjects and, whereas the present study consists of normal subjects, the researcher compared mean PIL scores of subjects grouped according to educational backgrounds. The N, mean and standard deviation of each group, divided according to educational background, are presented in Table V, and the results of the analysis of variance are presented in Table VI.

Ninety-six subjects, 42 females and 54 males, were compared on the basis of educational background. All subjects were taken from the three oldest age groups. The ninety-six subjects were divided equally into three groups. The first group consisted of those subjects who had a grade 9 or less education; the second group consisted of thirty-two subjects who had from grade 10 to grade 12 education inclusive; whereas the thirty-two subjects in the third group consisted of those who had at least one year of post-secondary education.

⁷ James C. Crumbaugh, "Cross-validation of the Purpose-in-Life Test Based on Frankl's Concepts," Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1968, p. 80.

Table V.-

Means and Standard Deviations of PIL Scores Obtained by
Three Groups Differing According to Educational
Background.

Grade Level	N	M	SD
Grade 9 or less	32	109.41	16.09
Grades 10-12	32	114.06	11.29
One or more years post- secondary education	32	115.28	8.65

Table VI.-

Comparison of the PIL Scores Obtained by Groups Divided According to Educational Backgrounds Using a One-factor, Fixed-effects Analysis of Variance.

Source	df	SS	MS	F	Signi- ficance
Between	2	914.52	457.26	2.94	n.s.
Within	93	14460.81	155.49		
Total	95				

The results of this study, which are presented in Table VI, are compatible with those obtained by Crumbaugh in that neither study obtained a significant relationship of PIL scores to educational level.

In addition, the present study compared mean PIL scores of subjects grouped according to five religious denominations. The N, mean and standard deviation for each of the five groups divided according to religious denomination are presented in Table VII, and the results of the analysis of variance of the PIL scores are presented in Table VIII.

The results as shown in Table VIII indicate that religious differences as defined in this context are not significantly related to variations in PIL scores. The implications of these findings will be considered in the following section in which the results of this study are discussed.

3. Discussion of Results.

This study, like that of Murphy's and Crumbaugh's, failed to find sex differences on PIL scores, therefore the hypothesis which states that there are no significant differences between the group means on the PIL when subjects are divided according to sex, is not rejected. Should this trend continue in further studies, it may lead to the

Table VII.-

Means and Standard Deviations of PII Scores Obtained by Five Groups Differing According to Religious Denomination.

Religious Denomination	N	M	SD
Anglican	40	112.50	15.85
Baptist	40	109.67	12.22
Roman Catholic	40	103.17	16.15
Lutheran	40	108.83	12.75
United Church	40	108.55	13.56

Table VIII.-

Comparison of the PIL Scores Obtained by Groups Divided
According to Religious Denomination Using a
One-factor, Fixed-effects Analysis of
Variance.

Source	df	SS	MS	F	Signi- ficance
Between	4	1831.79	457.95	2.21	n.s.
Within	195	40346.12	206.90		
Total	199				

conclusion that sex and PIL are not related variables. Such a conclusion would be compatible with Frankl's theory which states that all people are capable of finding meaningful goals around which to orientate their lives, implying that it will be true for members of both sexes.

There was no evidence found in the study to suggest age x sex interaction in relation to PIL scores. This part of the basic hypothesis was not rejected.

The hypothesis which states that there are no significant differences among group means on the PIL when subjects are divided according to age, was rejected. The analysis of variance using PIL scores as dependent variable showed age to be a significant factor. Post hoc testing showed that the age group of 17-19 years differed significantly from all other age groups, and that the 13-15 age group differed significantly from all age groups except the 25-35 age group.

Previous studies failed to find a relationship of age to variations in PIL scores. However, this failure of previous studies by Crumbaugh and Maholick, Cavanagh and Murphy is not in conflict with the results of the present study. In the previous studies the subjects consisted largely of adults; that is, subjects who were twenty years of age or older. When the subjects of the present study are limited to include only those who are twenty years of

age or older, no significant differences are found on the PIL scores. Thus, the present study, rather than conflict with, extends the findings of earlier studies.

It may be noted, through visual inspection, that the 17-19 age group with a mean of 101.32 had the lowest mean; and that the 13-15 age group with a mean of 106.87 had the second lowest mean. Beginning with the age group of 25-35, the mean scores on the PIL increase from 110.50 to that of 112.90 for the 65 and over age group. The PIL mean scores are initially higher, then drop and subsequently rise, so that by age 25 they have reached a higher level than the initial value. This mean value is maintained for the rest of the life span.

This study obtained data to show that age differences are related to variations in PIL scores. These results may be interpreted in terms of the extent to which meaningful goals around which to orientate one's life are found.⁸ Reference may also be made to Frankl's theory regarding the acquisition of meaning through the actualization of values,⁹ and to life's concrete situations. The two approaches just mentioned will serve as reference points

8 For the general interpretative rationale of the results discussed in this section, confer: Murphy, op. cit., p. 116-118.

9 Viktor E. Frankl, Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, New York, World Publishing Co., 1969, p. 70-71.

in the following discussion on the relationship of age differences to variations in PIL scores as observed in the present study.

The present study shows that the 17-19 age group, which has the lowest mean score and the greatest variability of all the age groups, differed significantly from all the other age groups. It is hypothesized that the 17-19 age group is, because of its re-evaluation of introjected values and ideals, experienced disillusionment with interpersonal relations and the felt positionless state of their lives in our society, expected to have the lowest mean score on a "purpose in life" test.¹⁰ The 17-19 age group, in our present society, can experience creative values only to a limited degree and, because of their re-evaluative phase in life, can feebly resort to attitudinal values. Experiential values are also at a premium as a result of the disillusionment experienced in interpersonal relationships with adults and peers. This, then, in reference to Frankl's model, leaves the 17-19 age group with a low "purpose in life." In a sense it could be said that the 17-19 age group suffers from characteristics similar to noogenic neurosis.

¹⁰ Elizabeth B. Hurlock, Developmental Psychology (3rd ed.), Toronto, McGraw-Hill Co., 1968, p. 391-511; and Viktor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, From Psychotherapy to Logotherapy (2nd ed.), New York, Bantam Books, 1965, p. 84-85.

The youngest age group of the present study, namely the 13-15 age group, had the second lowest mean score but differed significantly from all other age groups with the exception of the 25-35 age group. The 13-15 age group is presumed to be living on the momentum of introjected values of their parents and from society in general.¹¹ Re-evaluation of values is only beginning, if it has begun at all. Also the subjects of this group are at a time in their lives when they are confronted with new experiences as related to interpersonal relationships and group social activities. To some extent they discover and actualize experiential values. Because they can resort to two levels of values, they are able to maintain a relatively high, but significantly lower level of meaning than the 45-55 and 65 and over age groups. They can attain a level of meaning that is significantly higher than that experienced by the 17-19 age group.

The 13-15 age group and the 25-35 age group have similarities in that both are at one side or the other of the 17-19 age group. In the one case, it is the situation before re-evaluation of ideals, values and position in life, and in the other case it is after this re-evaluative phase in life. In short, then, because the 13-15 age group has

11 Hurlock, op. cit., p. 359-378.

access to experiential values in particular, it is capable of finding "meaning in life," though less so than that found by older age groups.

Theoretically, the 45-55 age group is expected to be in a second adolescence and, therefore, to show a significant difference from the other age groups with the exception of the 17-19 age group, on the PIL scores.¹² Developmentally, the 45-55 age group is entering a change in life and therefore is expected to evaluate its progresses, achievements, goals and values in life.¹³ But the fact that the 45-55 age group scored as high as the 25-35 age group indicates that perhaps, through its activity, that is, by being involved with a career and with raising families, the impression of a more intense "meaning in life" is given than what it is in actuality. Through the actualization and discovery of creative values, this age group appears to derive "meaning in life."

Evidence from this study shows that the 65 and over age group has achieved a relatively high degree of "meaning in life." It shares this in common with the 25-35 and the 45-55 age groups. But unlike the 45-55 age group which, it is theorized, derives its meaning from the discovery and

12 Ibid., p. 671-766.

13 Ibid.

actualization of attitudinal values. This fact is in large part substantiated by the concrete situations of the 65 and over age group which is constituted largely of retired people.

The findings of this study, which indicate that age differences are related to variations in PIL scores, are in accordance with developmental psychological theory. Developmental psychologists state that adolescence is a crucial stage in the development of personality. It is at this time that the many dimensions of personality, including a philosophy of life, are developed and integrated.¹⁴

It is believed that the adolescent undergoes a re-evaluation of ideals and goals, that he searches for a place in this world, and that he strives to find and understand himself.¹⁵ The adolescent becomes less sure of his goals and "purpose in life." According to the evidence of this study, it appears that the adolescent begins with relatively basic stable goals which he enjoys at the 13-15 age level. However, when he reaches the age of 17-19, he encounters a crisis and his previously adhered-to values, goals and meanings become less functional. As he resolves this crisis, he emerges with a relatively stable philosophy of life and

¹⁴ Justin Pikunas, Psychology of Human Development, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961, p. 214-233.

¹⁵ Hurlock, op. cit., p. 671-766.

acquisition of meanings which he enjoys throughout the years of his life. The relative, though significant, different mean score of the 17-19 age group, with the subsequent high scores of the three older age groups on the PIL, is in accordance with developmental psychological theory.

The failure of this research study to find evidence to show that the 45-55 age group does not differ significantly from the 25-35 age group is of interest. Theoretically, with basis in developmental psychology, it is presumed that the age group of 45-55 should differ significantly from the 25-35 age group because of the re-evaluation demanded in this phase of life. The failure of the PIL to provide evidence to significantly distinguish these two age groups from each other suggests that the PIL measures something different than the depression and anxiety associated with the 45-55 age group.¹⁶

This inconsistency between the PIL scores and developmental theory can perhaps be explained by the fact that the PIL may be measuring only the periphery of meaning, whereas developmental theory's reference to meaning may be more related to an ultimate meaning. By being involved with the discovery and actualization of creative values, the appearance of intensive meaning is given. Also it may be that the

¹⁶ Ledford J. Bischof, Adult Psychology, New York, Harper and Row, 1969, p. 203-206.

anxiety and depression associated with the 45-55 age group may be more psychic in origin than philosophical. If this is the case, then the evidence of this study would support Frankl's idea that the anxiety created by loss of values is different from that caused by psychic conflict. This would appear to give support to Frankl's theory of noogenic neurosis which, as he states, is related to conflict in value systems.

One last note regarding the relationship of age differences to variations in PIL scores is the difference in the variability of the 17-19 age group. This fact might reflect the large variation among adolescents in almost all areas of personality development.

Two secondary results from this research study indicate that the educational background and the religious affiliation of the subjects are not related to variations in the mean scores on the PIL. The former observation is similar to that of Crumbaugh who, in a previous study, also failed to find evidence that significantly related the level of education to variations in PIL scores.

In his study, Murphy found evidence to show that people who had chosen God and another person as their life objective did not differ significantly in their scores on the PIL. Both groups found equal meaning for their lives. In the present study, subjects were taken from five different

religious denominations. The subjects were divided equally for religious denominational differences into the ten age x sex groups. The subjects for the study varied from regular church attenders to once-a-year attenders or less. The inability to find evidence to show that subjects differ on the PIL scores on the basis of religious differences gives support to Frankl's idea that God, as experienced by different religious affiliations, can give equal meaning to subjects.

This brings to an end the presentation and discussion of results. Before terminating this paper, some areas that would be of interest for further study are suggested.

In the foregoing discussion of the results of this study, reference was made to the possibility of the discovery and actualization of creative, experiential and attitudinal values at various age ranges to explain the presence or absence of "meaning in life." It would be of interest to know to what extent various age ranges tend to discover and actualize one or more of the three levels of values theorized by Frankl. A second topic of interest would be to know to what extent the "will to meaning" that Frankl speaks of corresponds to the philosophy of life discussed by developmental psychologists. The evidence of this study suggests that what the PIL measures may show some commonality with what is meant by philosophy of life. Thirdly, it would be interesting to know the results on the

PIL of a comparative study of younger age groups. Developmentally, a picture of the emergence of the "meaning in life" may be arrived at. A last area is to know the extent to which noogenic neurosis found in adults has its roots in the failure to achieve a philosophy of life or meaning during their adolescent years. This hypothesis is suggested by the failure to obtain evidence to show that the 17-19 and 45-55 age groups have commonalities.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper reported on one aspect of Viktor E. Frankl's concept of "will to meaning," namely, its relationship to sex and age differences.

The literature was reviewed in order to present the relevant concepts of Logotherapy and to analyze the results of studies related to Purpose in Life Test (PIL) scores and sex differences. From the studies analyzed, there appeared to be some doubt as to the relationship of age and sex to PIL scores. This problem became the basis of this research and was defined in terms of the hypothesis that there are no significant differences among mean scores of the sex x age groups on the PIL.

In order to test the hypothesis, two hundred subjects, divided equally into five age groups, with each group again divided equally on the basis of sex, were used. The PIL and the Frankl Questionnaire (FQ) were administered to each of the subjects, while fifty-seven subjects had the same tests re-administered to them one week later.

The PIL mean scores for each of the groups were computed and compared for significant differences by the use of a two-way analysis of variance. The Pearson product-moment coefficient was used to study the validity of the PIL and the reliability of the instruments used.

The data, on the basis of their analysis, rejected in part the null hypotheses of this study. The analysis also suggested that the two measuring instruments used were sufficiently reliable. The validity of the PIL was given support by its correlation to the Frankl Questionnaire which was used as a criterion.

The results of the analysis led to the following conclusions. First, there is empirical data to show that age differences are related to variations in PIL scores, thus indirectly supporting Frankl's theory as it relates to the concept of discovery of meaning. Secondly, there was no evidence to suggest that sexes differ in intensity of meaning of life as measured by the PIL in keeping with Frankl's idea that all people are equally capable of finding similar intensities of meaning.

Secondary findings from the data of the present study were the following: There was no evidence to suggest that the level of educational background is related to variations in PIL scores. This result is in accord with that of Crumbaugh's research. Secondly, religious denominational differences did not relate to variations in PIL scores.

Some implications for further study arise from the present research. It may be of interest to know the extent to which various age groups resort to the discovery and actualization of creative, experiential and attitudinal

values in order to maintain "meaning in life." Secondly, it would be of interest to know to what extent the "will to meaning" may be identified with the development of a philosophy of life characteristic of the tasks of the adolescent years. Thirdly, it would be of interest to know to what extent the "will to meaning" changes from early adolescence to adulthood. A last area of interest would be the extent to which the noögenic neurosis described by Frankl is related to failure to develop a philosophy of life or to achieve meaning during the adolescent years.

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APPENDIX 1

CHURCH ANNOUNCEMENT

APPENDIX 1

CHURCH ANNOUNCEMENT

Announcement to be made to the Parishioners:

May 16, 1971

Within the next week, a graduate student from the University will phone several members of this congregation and invite them to take part in a study which he has undertaken. The student has discussed his work with me. Your participation in the research will require one hour of your time on two different occasions, one week apart. The nature of the study cannot be revealed at this time because it may affect the results; however, when the study has been completed, a report will be sent to me, and you, the congregation, will be informed of the results. The university student has assured me that all the names of those involved in the research will be kept confidential. As your pastor (minister), and because of the relevance of this research, I hope you will welcome the opportunity to participate in it, should you be asked.

APPENDIX 2

PURPOSE IN LIFE TEST AND
FRANKL QUESTIONNAIRE

APPENDIX 2

PURPOSE IN LIFE TEST AND
FRANKL QUESTIONNAIRE

Please do not write in this booklet.

Together with this booklet you should have a separate answer sheet. On the answer sheet you have places wherein you are asked to write your code number, and indicate the sex and the age group to which you belong. Please fill in this information right now.

On the following pages of this booklet there are statements, the format of which resembles the following:

Thinking makes me:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
terribly			(neutral)			wonderfully
irritable						fulfilled

For each of the statements, please indicate beside the appropriate item number on your answer sheet, the number of the statement rating which makes the statement most nearly true for you. Note that the rating numbers always extend from one extreme feeling to its opposite kind of feeling. If an extreme feeling best describes you on a given statement, your answer would be 1 or 7. If you are somewhere between an extreme feeling and neutral, your answer would be 2 or 6, or 3 or 5, depending on whether you judge yourself nearer the extreme or nearer neutral. Neutral implies no judgment either way. Try to use the neutral rating as little as possible.

When you have finished Part A, go right on to Part B. Please try to give an accurate answer for every statement, but do not puzzle too long over any statement.

Remember, that there are no right or wrong answers. Each person is different and has only to say what is true for him.

If at any time you have questions concerning the procedure or items on the test, do not hesitate to ask immediately.

Do not skip any questions.

Since these booklets will be reused, please do not mark them. Write your answers on the separate answer sheet.

PART A

1. I am usually:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
completely			(neutral)			exuberant,
bored						enthusiastic

2. Life to me seems:

7	6	5	4	3	2	1
always			(neutral)			completely
exciting						routine

3. In life I have:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
no goals or			(neutral)			very clear goals
aims at all						and aims

4. My personal existence is:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
utterly mean-			(neutral)			very purposeful
ingless without						and meaningful
purpose						

5. Every day is:

7	6	5	4	3	2	1
constantly new			(neutral)			exactly the same
and different						

6. If I could choose, I would:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
prefer never			(neutral)			like nine more
to have been						lives just like
born						this one

7. After retiring, I would:

7	6	5	4	3	2	1
do some of the			(neutral)			loaf completely
exciting things						the rest of my
I have always						life
wanted to						

8. In achieving life goals I have:
- | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|-----------|---|---|------------------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| made no progress whatever | | | (neutral) | | | progressed to complete fulfillment |
9. My life is:
- | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|---|-----------|---|---|--|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| empty, filled only with despair | | | (neutral) | | | running over with exciting good things |
10. If I should die today, I would feel that my life has been:
- | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|-----------|---|---|----------------------|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| very worthwhile | | | (neutral) | | | completely worthless |
11. In thinking of my life, I:
- | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|-----------|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| often wonder why I exist | | | (neutral) | | | always see a reason for my being here |
12. As I view the world in relation to my life, the world:
- | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|-----------|---|---|--------------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| completely confuses me | | | (neutral) | | | fits meaningfully with my life |
13. I am a:
- | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|-----------|---|---|-------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| very irresponsible person | | | (neutral) | | | very responsible person |
14. Concerning man's freedom to make his own choices, I believe man is:
- | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|-----------|---|---|---|
| 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| absolutely free to make all life choices | | | (neutral) | | | completely bound by limitations of heredity and environment |

15. With regard to death, I am:

7	6	5	4	3	2	1
prepared and unafraid			(neutral)			unprepared and frightened

16. With regard to suicide, I have:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
thought of it seriously as a way out			(neutral)			never given it a second thought

17. I regard my ability to find a meaning, purpose, or mission in life as:

7	6	5	4	3	2	1
very great			(neutral)			practically none

18. My life is:

7	6	5	4	3	2	1
in my hands and I am in control of it			(neutral)			out of my hands and controlled by external factors

19. Facing my daily tasks is:

7	6	5	4	3	2	1
a source of pleasure and satisfaction			(neutral)			a painful and boring experience

20. I have discovered:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
no mission or purpose in life			(neutral)			clear-cut goals and a satisfying life purpose

PART B

1B. Has your life a purpose?

3	2	1
frequently	seldom	never

2B. Do you feel that your life is without purpose?

1	2	3
frequently	seldom	never

3B. Can unalterable or unavoidable suffering have a meaning?

1	2	3
never	seldom	frequently

4B. Have you ever had suicidal thoughts?

3	2	1
never	seldom	frequently

5B. Have you ever entertained suicidal intentions?

1	2	3
frequently	seldom	never

6B. Have you ever attempted suicide?

3	2	1
never	seldom	frequently

APPENDIX 3

ANSWER SHEET

APPENDIX 4

ABSTRACT OF

Frankl's "Will to Meaning" as Measured by
the Purpose in Life Test in Relation
to Age and Sex Differences

APPENDIX 4

ABSTRACT OF

Frankl's "Will to Meaning" as Measured by the Purpose in Life Test in Relation to Age and Sex Differences¹

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship of age and sex differences to "will to meaning" as defined by Viktor E. Frankl and as measured by the Purpose in Life Test designed by Crumbaugh and Maholick. Frankl's statements and results of research studies that investigated "meaning in life" leads one to expect that "meaning in life" is related to age differences. The same cannot be said for sex differences even though one study noted sex differences on Purpose in Life Test scores.

To test the hypothesis, the Purpose in Life Test was employed with the Frankl Questionnaire as a criterion for validity. Two hundred subjects, divided into five age groups, with equal number of males and females, were used. The subjects were equally representative, on basis of age and sex, of five different religious denominations. All the two hundred subjects took the Purpose in Life Test and the Frankl

¹ Augustine Meier, Master's dissertation presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, March 1973, xi-112 p.

APPENDIX 4

Questionnaire, but fifty-seven of the 200 subjects took the test twice, one week apart.

The results of the study indicated that sex and interaction of sex and age do not relate to variations in the mean scores on the Purpose in Life Test, whereas differences in age do relate significantly. The evidence of this study suggests that "will to meaning" reaches a crisis at the late teenage years. Prior to this stage there was a relatively high "will to meaning". Following the lowered level of meaning achieved by the older adolescents, the "will to meaning" reaches a high intensity by the mid-twenties and this level is maintained throughout life. Religious affiliation and the level of educational background did not relate to variations in the mean scores on the Purpose in Life Test.

The data of the present research suggested several areas for further study. First, to what extent do the various age groups resort to the discovery and actualization of creative, experiential and/or attitudinal values in order to maintain "meaning in life"? Secondly, to what extent does the Purpose in Life Test measure that which is characteristic of the late adolescent years? Thirdly, to what extent does the "will to meaning," as measured by the Purpose in Life Test, change from early adolescence to adulthood? Lastly, how does noogenic neurosis in adults relate to the failure to develop a philosophy of life during the adolescent years?