

**The Long Grab:
Dispossession in Southeastern Kitchi Sipi Valley,
from Colonization to Financialization**

Christopher Bisson

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Doctorate in Philosophy degree in Political Science

School of Political Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Ottawa

© Christopher Bisson, Ottawa, Canada, 2024

This thesis is dedicated to the land, land protectors, and land workers.

Table of Contents

Table of contents.....	iii
Abstract.....	vii
Preface.....	ix
List of tables.....	xi
List of figures.....	xii
Legend.....	xiv
Introduction.....	1
Study area: Southeastern Kitchi Sipi Valley.....	2
Research questions and hypothesis.....	7
Research findings and contributions.....	11
An alternative theoretical framework.....	13
Outline of chapters.....	17
Part I - Identifying land grabs in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.....	21
Chapter 1: A literature review of land grabs on Turtle Island.....	22
Land grabs based on colonial conflict.....	25
Grounded normativity and Anishinaabe land relations	26
Land relations and mino-pimadiziwin.....	27
Land use practices.....	28
Possessive normativity and settler-colonial land distribution	29
Possessive individualism and imperial expansionism.....	29
Settler colonial relations with First Nations	31
The power of First Nations resistance to colonialism.....	33
Treaty misrecognition and attempted genocide.....	34
Land grabs based on agrarian change.....	36
Free land grants and simple commodity production.....	37
Deviation from the western European model of capitalist development.....	38
Commercial agriculture and agri-food monopolization.....	40
The agrarian question within the British settler colony.....	41
Settler-commercial agriculture and the global corporate food regime.....	42
Land grabs based on financialization.....	44
Neoliberal reforms and the deregulation land ownership laws.....	44
Inconsistent reforms of actually existing neoliberalism.....	45
Neoliberal farmland use and ownership reforms.....	46
Land grabs based on financial conflict.....	49
Scholarly debates surrounding the topic of financialization.....	49
Towards a theory of land grabs within settler-colonialism.....	51
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework - The long grab.....	54
Original accumulation and accumulation by dispossession.....	56

Original accumulation as an explanation for English enclosure.....	57
Accumulation by dispossession.....	57
Theoretical applicability of accumulation by dispossession.....	58
Inadequate focus on relations of production and reproduction.....	58
Conflation with ongoing processes of capitalist accumulation.....	59
Overgeneralization of local experiences of dispossession.....	60
Pre-capitalist development and subsequent moments of dispossession.....	61
Expanding original accumulation to include colonial dispossession.....	62
Settler colonialism as structure and process.....	63
Pre-capitalist imperatives for colonization.....	64
The spatial production of settler private property relations.....	65
Modes of production and the production of space.....	66
Abstraction of space to assert dominant class power.....	66
Ecological and social struggle over the production of space.....	68
Private property and the conflation of abstract and real space.....	68
The long grab and the production of settler-capitalist space.....	69
Chapter 3: Methodology - Mapping farmland distribution.....	74
Research questions and hypothesis.....	75
Critical cartography and farmland distribution mapping.....	78
Historical materialist research.....	85
Case study research.....	87
Case selection.....	87
Elite Interviews.....	89
Chapter 4: Empirical findings on farmland ownership.....	92
Farmland consolidation.....	93
Farmland ownership categories.....	103
Major farmland investors and investment locations.....	109
Chapter 5: Farmland Investment Company Case Studies.....	114
Walton International - Development-Oriented Farmland Investment.....	114
Company origins in the 1970s Alberta oil boom.....	115
Process of assetizing farmland.....	116
Farmland investments.....	119
Government and public relations.....	126
Bankruptcy and corporate restructuring.....	129
Local community impact.....	130
Bonfield Financial - Agriculture-Oriented Farmland Investment.....	131
Company origins in the 1990s Ottawa tech boom.....	132
Process of assetizing farmland.....	133
Farmland investments.....	137
Government and public relations.....	141
Competition with large-scale corporate farms.....	142
Part II - The long grab in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.....	148
Chapter 6: Colonial dimensions of the long grab.....	151
Contested concepts of authority and territorial sovereignty.....	153

Algonquin-Anishinaabeg laws governing land relations.....	154
Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land use practices.....	155
Algonquin-Anishinaabeg treaty relations.....	156
European Doctrine of Discovery.....	158
Imperial alliances and treaty misrecognition.....	160
Colonial merchant charter grants.....	161
French colonial stagnation under the seigneurial land system.....	163
English colonial expansion under the liberal land system.....	165
The Beaver Wars (1603-1701).....	167
The Seven Years War (1756–1763) and the fall of New France.....	170
The Royal Proclamation and the Crawford Purchases.....	171
Persistent misrecognition of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land title.....	174
Settler domination and attempted genocide.....	176
Territorial expansion of the Canadian settler state	177
First Nations resurgence and treaty renewal.....	179
Chapter 7: Commercial dimension of the long grab.....	181
Loyalist land grants and the Family Compact.....	182
Post-conquest economic crisis and political revolution.....	183
Neo-feudalism and the British colonial gentry.....	186
Settler land grants.....	190
Land speculation and squatter settlement.....	197
Land companies and the Family Compact.....	206
Timber barons and extractive land grants.....	208
The early timber boom.....	209
Timber expansion up the Kitchi Sipi Valley.....	211
Timber barons and the development of the Rideau Canal.....	213
Electrification and inland timber expansion.....	216
Decline of the timber industry.....	218
Liberal reforms and land use planning.....	219
Confederation and municipal government.....	221
Land use planning and boards of appeal.....	227
Public housing, mortgage policies, and urban sprawl.....	234
Regional planning and conservation policies.....	239
Agrarian change and the capitalist accumulation of farmland.....	249
Settler simple commodity production.....	250
Commercialization and industrialization of agriculture.....	255
Land shortages and territorial expansion.....	261
Public market protections for farmers.....	264
Chapter 8: Financial dimensions of the long grab.....	276
Neoliberal reform and regulatory capture.....	277
Farmer access to credit prior to neoliberal reforms in the 1970s.....	277
Post-war agricultural commodity boom.....	278
The Washington Consensus.....	279
Neoliberal globalization.....	281

Trade liberalization and supply management.....	283
Fiscal austerity, privatization, and deregulation.....	291
Corporate capture of land use regulatory institutions.....	298
Commodities speculation and market instability.....	300
Commodity trade liberalization and the global food regime.....	301
Agri-finance and commodity index funds.....	302
Global commodity market instability.....	303
Agrifood value-chains and regulatory capture.....	305
Value chains and regulatory modernization.....	305
Monopolization and regulatory capture.....	306
Financialization and the global land rush.....	307
Early farmland investment.....	308
Global economic crisis and the land rush.....	309
Financialization and farmland assetization.....	313
Farmland investment in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.....	319
Conclusion.....	321
The body of research.....	324
Contributions and limitations.....	328
Factors limiting farmland investment in the study area.....	330
The monopolization of farmland ownership by corporate farms.....	331
Land-use regulation and development-focused farmland investment.....	332
Urban expansion and agriculture-oriented farmland investment.....	333
Policy and community recommendations.....	334
The limits to existing land use and ownership policies.....	334
Domestic farmland ownership laws.....	334
Farmland use planning and regulations.....	335
Policy alternatives and community action.....	336
Public access to and analysis of land ownership information.....	336
Agri-food monopolies and reforms to Canadian competition laws.....	337
Limiting market conditions that promote farmland investment.....	338
Towards reconciliation through the self-governing commons.....	340
Future research and community action.....	341
The long grab in other settler colonies.....	342
Improvements in farmland mapping.....	343
First Nations-centred practices of farmland commoning.....	343
References.....	346
Appendix A: Ethics Approval Notice.....	389

Abstract

This thesis examines changes in the distribution of farmland in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi (Ottawa) Valley between 2000 and 2017. It originally hypothesized that financialization would be the leading cause of a recent wave of farmland grabs in the area based on the findings of existing literature, which observed that financial investment companies are primarily responsible for the phenomenon (Gheller, 2018; Sommerville, 2018; Le Billon and Sommerville, 2017; Desmarais et al., 2015). The land distribution study conducted for this thesis suggests that the farmland grabbing that recently occurred in the study area was primarily led by existing large-scale corporate family farms. This is different from the land distribution study of Desmarais et al. (2015), which showed that financial investment firms were the dominant actors recently engaged in farmland grabbing in Saskatchewan. This suggests that there are a variety of different actors involved in the recent farmland grab phenomena in so-called Canada that have not been studied, which invites deeper theoretical consideration of the broader political-economic processes at play. The thesis therefore presents a “long grab” theoretical framework to explain how different kinds of settler-capitalist elites are able to command large holdings of farmland in a particular area.

This thesis conducts case study and long-term historical materialist analysis of the development and evolution of farming and property rights in the study area to explain the absence of financial investment firms buying farmland. It identifies three key political-economic factors that limited farmland accumulation by investment companies: aggressive expansion of existing commercial farms, municipal land use policies aimed

at limiting urban sprawl, and the impact of urban growth on local farmland values. This analysis demonstrates that long-standing land conflicts inherent to settler-capitalist development influences what kinds of political-economic elites engage in farmland grabbing in a particular area.

KEYWORDS:

Land Grabs, Farmland, Critical Political Economy, Historical Materialism, Critical Cartography, Original Accumulation, Settler Colonialism, Agrarian Change, Financialization

Preface

I came to write about social relationships surrounding the land and water in Kitchi Sipi Valley out of a love and admiration for the watershed of my birth. It is a watershed that has been inhabited by the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg since time beyond memory and long before my life emerged and has been sustained through the colonial violence of the settler state that dominated the land and continues to marginalize its original peoples. I hold great gratitude and love for the land and the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg people but I also recognize that love and appreciation is not enough to make things right. I hope that this thesis contributes to the work of the countless community leaders and land defenders struggling to protect the land, water, and non-human beings and connect those who love the land to defend it and work together towards decolonization and land justice.

I would like to thank the many teachers who have helped me in my understanding of social science and ecology: Luc Turgeon, Susan Spronk, Paul Saurette, Claude Denis, André Lecours, Janique Dubois, Ryan Katz-Rosene, Matthew Paterson, Emily Regan Wills, Sophie Bourgault, Robert Sparling, Christopher Cooper, Ella Haley, Annette Desmarais, Cédric Jourde, Chris Huggins, Ajay Parasram, Heather Menzies, Patricia Ballamingie, Jill Wigle, John Milton, and Simon Dalby. Specifically, I am grateful for the gentle and insightful supervision of Marie-Josée Massicotte. This thesis was funded, in-part, through the Ontario Graduate Scholarship (two years) and the University of Ottawa (four years). The interviews conducted in this thesis were approved through the Office of Research Ethics and Integrity.

I am indebted to my academic peers who have struggled along with me through grad school: Hannah Wyile, Michael Wigginton, Alicia Martin, Xavier P-Laberge, Dane Degenstein, Valérie Lapointe, Miriam Hatabi, Philippe Martin, Golrokh Niazi, Ben Diepeveen, Kirsten Van Houten, Mohamad Ghossein, José Manuel Leal, Kaleb Earl, Éric Desrochers, Michael Murphy, Ebby L. Abramson, Calla Barnett, Diana Alima Cissé, and Monica Emond. I am especially grateful to Hannah Wyile and Siobhan Creelman for helping to copy-edit my work. I appreciate the support and insights I gained from fellow food sovereignty activists: Aabir Dey, Stephanie Hughs, Helen Jensen, Hugo Martorell, Rebecca Ivanoff, Tierra Stokes, David Catzel, Bob Wildfong, Nicole Davies, Cathy Holtslander, Katie Ward Chaisson, Coral Sproule, Ayla Fenton, Bryan Dale, Sarah Lévesque Walker, Amber Westfall, Moe Garahan, Phil Mount, Erin O'Manique among many, many more.

I would like to thank Jordan and Jamie who operated a market garden with us, especially when we were busy with young children and grad school. Isaac, Chelsea, Steve, and Brenda who we could always count on for friendship and chats about parenting, especially during COVID-19. Lana and her whole family who cared for our kids since they were babies. To my many new friends in the South Shore of Mi'kma'ki for giving me the sense of belonging and community I have dreamed of for a long time. My mother Debbie and father Alain and mother and father in-law Jerry and Karen for all their love, encouragement, and support. To my two wonderful children Eleanor and Félix for their love, patience, and brilliant questions that always encouraged me to explain my work more clearly. Most importantly, thank you to my wonderful spouse Kim for riding this roller-coaster of a time with me. For supporting me in completing this

program, raising two kids, surviving COVID-19, relocating to Mi'kma'ki, and making a home and garden for ourselves. None of this work could have been possible without you.

List of tables

<i>Table 1 - Key Concepts From the Interdisciplinary Literature on Land Relations</i>	<i>p. 43</i>
<i>Table 2 - Settler Colonial Modes of Production in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, 1500 to 2017</i>	<i>p. 91</i>
<i>Table 3 - Land Distribution Scenarios for Land-Owning Elites</i>	<i>p.96</i>
<i>Table 4 - Average CLO4 in Saskatchewan and Southeastern Kitchi Sipi Valley</i>	<i>p.112</i>
<i>Table 5 - CLO4 for the Municipalities of Ottawa, PR, and SDG Between 2000 and 2017 ...</i>	<i>p.113</i>
<i>Table 6 - Farmland Owned by Different Ownership Categories in Ottawa, PR, and SDG ...</i>	<i>p.116</i>
<i>Table 7 - Farmland distribution scenarios: results and identified scenario</i>	<i>p.118</i>
<i>Table 8 - Farmland holdings and production of the five largest farm corporations</i>	<i>p. 157</i>
<i>Table 9 - Net cash income among farms in so-called Ontario from 2001 to 2016</i>	<i>p. 284</i>

List of figures

<i>Figure 1 — Location of the thesis study area in the Kitchi Sipi watershed.</i>	<i>p.20</i>
<i>Figure 2 — Political-economic conflicts driving land grabs in the Kitchi Sipi Valley</i>	<i>p.71</i>
<i>Figure 3 — Acres of farmland owned by investment companies, 2000 to 2017</i>	<i>p.116</i>
<i>Figure 4 — Number of Farmland Property Owners, 2000 to 2017</i>	<i>p.118</i>
<i>Figure 5 — Actors included among the four largest farmland owners, from 2000 to 2017 ...</i>	<i>p.122</i>
<i>Figure 6 — Largest Agriculture-Focused Farmland Owners from 2000 to 2017</i>	<i>p.123</i>
<i>Figure 7 — Largest Development-Focused Farmland Owners, 2000 to 2017</i>	<i>p.124</i>
<i>Figure 8 — Walton International holdings in the southwest of Ottawa</i>	<i>p.136</i>
<i>Figure 9 — Bonnefield Financial’s holdings in eastern Ontario</i>	<i>p.152</i>
<i>Figure 10 — Political-Economic Dimensions of the Long Grab in the Kitchi Sipi Valley</i>	<i>p.161</i>
<i>Figure 11 — First Nations Travel Routes in Northeastern Turtle Island, 1600 CE</i>	<i>p.169</i>
<i>Figure 12 — European merchant charters in Turtle Island, from 1538 to 1670</i>	<i>p.175</i>
<i>Figure 13 — Social structure of land ownership in New France, 1534 to 1763</i>	<i>p.177</i>
<i>Figure 14 — English and French Settlement and Trade, 1670 to 1760.....</i>	<i>p.181</i>
<i>Figure 15 — Southern Algonquin-Anishinaabeg Land Dispossession, 1790 to 1890</i>	<i>p.191</i>
<i>Figure 16 — Social structure of land ownership in Upper Canada, 1763 to 1863</i>	<i>p.200</i>
<i>Figure 17 — Early Loyalist settlement in the Province of Quebec, 1790</i>	<i>p.206</i>
<i>Figure 18 — Eastern Upper Canada settlement expansion, 1810</i>	<i>p.208</i>
<i>Figure 19 — Eastern Upper Canada Settlement Expansion, 1850</i>	<i>p.239</i>
<i>Figure 20 — Eastern Upper Canada settlement expansion, 1830.....</i>	<i>p.213</i>
<i>Figure 21 — Land companies in northeastern Turtle Island, 1775-1867</i>	<i>p.220</i>
<i>Figure 22 — Eastern Ontario Settlement Expansion, 1870</i>	<i>p.271</i>
<i>Figure 23 — Eastern Ontario settlement expansion, 1890</i>	<i>p.273</i>

Figure 24 — Farms in so-called Ontario by Acreage Categories, 1996 to 2021p.283

Figure 25 — Major commodity prices in so-called Ontario, 2000 to 2017p.285

Figure 26 — Average Value of an Acre of Farmland in Eastern Ontario, 2000 to 2017 p.334

Legend

Abbreviations

CLO4 – Concentration of Land Ownership of Four Largest Companies

GIS – Geographic Information Systems

OMB – Ontario Municipal Board

NCC – National Capital Commission

RMOC — Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton

Algonquin-Anishinaabeg Terms

This thesis uses the endonyms (i.e names that communities use to refer to themselves), toponyms (i.e. place names), and concepts that are expressed in the works of contemporary Anishinaabe scholarship. This is done to contribute to recent efforts to challenge the way scholars have thought and wrote about the geography of Turtle Island (North America). Works from Anishinaabe scholars, like Coburn and Moore (2022), Simpson (2017; 2011), and Gehl (2017) demonstrates how to decolonize the ways one can write about the peoples and places of Turtle Island (North America). Their works, furthermore, make the unassailable assertion that settler scholarship in general needs to decolonize the way it represents the kindred and sovereign lands of Indigenous peoples. In this spirit, I have consulted the works of Anishinaabe scholars for toponyms, endonyms, and key concepts surrounding land relations. Many words have multiple ways that they are spelled from community to community. This non-comprehensive list provides Anishinaabe toponyms and endonyms that are used in this

thesis. Settler toponyms are used in this thesis either when an Anishinaabe toponym could not be found, are outside of the Kitchi Sipi Valley (Ottawa Valley), or when referring directly to the formal names of First Nations bands or government institutions.

First Nations words used in this thesis	Approximate English Translation
<u>Aki</u> (Anishinaabeg)	The Land
<u>Akikodjiwan</u> or Akikpautik (Algonquin-Anishinaabeg)	Chaudière Falls
<u>Anishinaabe</u> , Anishinabeg, Anishinaabeg, Anishinabek, Anishinaabek, or Nishnaabeg	The broader community of Algonquin, Ojibwe/Chippewa, Mississauga, and Nipissing nations
<u>Debwewin</u> (Algonquin-Anishinaabeg)	One's personal truth; heart knowledge.
<u>Enendagwad</u> (Ojibwe-Anishinaabe)	Law of the Orders
<u>Ginamadawinan</u> (Ojibwe-Anishinaabe)	Responsibility to others
<u>Haudenosaunee</u> , Rotinohshonni, Rotinonhsón:ni, or Rotinonhsyón:nih	Iroquois Confederacy
<u>Kanien'kehá:ka</u> , Kanien:keha'ka, Kanyen'kehà:ka, Kanyen'kehaka	Mohawk people
<u>Kitchi Sipi Valley/River</u> , Kitche Zibi, Kichi Sibi, Kitchesibi (Algonquin-Anishinaabeg)	Ottawa Valley/River
<u>Magtogoek</u> , Kitcikanii sipi (Algonquin-Anishinaabeg)	St. Lawrence River
<u>Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg</u>	Mississauga people
<u>Minoomin</u> (Anishinaabe)	Wild rice
<u>Mino-pimadiziwin</u> or Mnaamodzawin (Anishinaabe)	A good way of living that is achieved through a practice of keeping good relations.
<u>Nipissing-Nishnaabeg</u>	Nipissing
<u>Nishnaabemwin</u> (Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg)	Anishinaabe ways of knowing
<u>Odawa-Anishinaabeg</u>	Ottawa people
<u>Ojibwe-Anishinabek</u>	Ojibwe, Chippewa, Saulteaux people
<u>Algonquin-Anishinaabeg</u> , Omàmiwininiwak, or Algonquin Anishinaabeg	Algonquin people
<u>Onödowá'ga</u> or Onondaga	Seneca people
<u>Pasāpikahigani Sibi</u> (Algonquin-Anishinaabeg)	Rideau River
<u>Pimisi</u> (Algonquin-Anishinaabeg)	Eels
<u>Tenàgàtino Sibi</u> (Algonquin-Anishinaabeg)	Gatineau River
<u>Turtle Island</u>	North America
<u>Wendake</u>	Huronia
<u>Wendat</u>	Huron people

Introduction

In this thesis, I investigate a wave of financial land grabbing that took place between 2000 and 2017 in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi (Ottawa) Valley to understand if its occurrence represents a dominant new group of financial farmland owners. Land grabbing happens when wealthy individuals, private companies, or public institutions take exclusive private property control over significant portions of land inhabited by Indigenous peoples, peasants, or farmers through military, political, or economic means (GRAIN, 2008). I focus on farmland grabs in this thesis that are done by financial investment companies. This topic is important because many scholars have attributed financial farmland grabbing in Turtle Island to the difficulty that new farmers have been experiencing in gaining secure and just access to land, which farmer advocates have identified as a barrier to achieving food sovereignty (Desmarais et al., 2015; Holtlander, 2015; Smythe, 2015). Food sovereignty is a term used to characterize a food system where consumers and producers have control over production and distribution, instead of one where the interests of a regime of private companies seeking to maximize profits are prioritized (Nyéléni, 2007; Wiebe and Wipf, 2011). Research on the extent of land grabbing in general and its historical causes is therefore necessary to inform solutions to the problem of farmland inaccessibility and insecurity that inhibits food sovereignty (Desmarais et al., 2015; Holtlander, 2015; Smythe, 2015). There is currently little scholarship documenting and analyzing the extent of the farmland grab phenomenon in so-called Canada, which makes my research exploratory in nature. Within this thesis, I contribute new data and analysis on land grabbing in the Kitchi Sipi

Valley, new theoretical perspectives on its historical development, and some insights on what can be done to limit or even stop the practice. These exploratory contributions can help inform future research seeking to identify and explain land grabs in a settler-capitalist context.

Study area: Southeastern Kitchi Sipi Valley

This thesis focuses on land grabs that took place in the larger areas of farmland that are located in the southeastern portions of the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The entire region of the Kitchi Sipi Valley is the land belonging to the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquins). The valley has never been legally ceded or surrendered to the French, British, or Canadian governments (Algonquins of Ontario, 2013; Government of Ontario, 2013). This means that the contemporary instance of financial land grabbing is taking place on land that has already been grabbed and continues to be occupied.




Figure 1 — Location of the thesis study area in the Kitchi Sipi watershed. (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on Land cover locations from Google Maps, 2023; Kitchi Sipi watershed from Algonquins of Ontario, 2013)

Some of the farmland that is analyzed in this thesis is located in the thin strip of the Magtogoek (St. Lawrence) Valley that has been inhabited by various Anishinaabe, Haudenosaunee, and Wendat peoples. The Magtogoek Valley portion of the study area has most recently been inhabited by Kanien'kehá:ka (Mohawk) communities. The cadastral property maps that were available for this study are contemporary reflections of the colonial boundaries established through the settlement of Upper Canada rather than the watershed divisions that differentiated First Nations territories. The settler government in the late-1800s divided up the land into provinces, municipalities, and

counties in ways that mixed the inhabited lands of different First Nations. The City of Ottawa and the United Counties of Prescott-Russell are located entirely within the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The southern-half of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry, however, is located on lands inhabited by Kanien'kehá:ka communities (see Figure 1). These municipalities make-up the eastern-most and most farmed areas of so-called Eastern Ontario. My analysis in this thesis therefore extends somewhat beyond the Kitchi Sipi Valley in some places.

The Algonquins of Ontario¹ and the Government of Ontario have been in negotiation since 1983 to work out a comprehensive land claims agreement because of Canada's lack of legal title to the area (Algonquins of Ontario, 2013). Many within the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg community, however, disagree with either the terms of the agreement or the decision to settle any land claims at all (Canadian Press 2016). It is therefore still unclear if and how the foundational legal title to much of the study area will be resolved, which calls into question the way academic scholarship has represented the area. I opt therefore to deliberately represent the study area using Algonquin-Anishinaabeg place names wherever possible.

¹The Algonquins of Ontario are a group representing 10 communities seeking a land claim to the southern portion of the traditional Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) territory within the boundaries of Ontario (Algonquins of Ontario, 2013).

Positionality of the Author

I am a bilingual and bicultural French- and Irish-Canadian settler from a relatively affluent background who was born and mostly raised in the east-end of Ottawa in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. I grew up in a military family, therefore I have lived in many different places, most notably Goose Bay, Labrador where I graduated high school and met my spouse. I completed my postsecondary and graduate studies in geography, economics, and political science at Carleton University and the University of Ottawa. I, furthermore, have been a farm worker and operated my own market garden on rented farmland in the Ottawa Greenbelt. Part of my motivation to conduct this study was based on my personal struggles to gain secure and just access to farmland and to understand why it has become difficult for new farmers to do so. This dilemma led me to co-organize urban agriculture and permaculture initiatives in Ottawa in the late-2000s; first as part of the Umi Café workers cooperative community garden, and Permaculture Ottawa, and then with the Kitigànensag GSA Carleton community garden. From these efforts I found work in 2013 with Operation Come Home's community-supported agriculture (CSA) program at the Just Food start-up farm in the eastern part of the Ottawa greenbelt, which led me to start my own market garden through the start-up farm program at the same location. Tenant farming at a start-up incubator, with student debt, a mortgage, and a new baby—despite my relative privilege—proved practically impossible. This led my family and I to start looking for our own small farm property as we both worked public and non-profit jobs so that we could slowly accumulate enough savings, home equity, and equipment to eventually dedicate one of our livelihoods to farming. Farmland prices, however, proved prohibitively expensive for us to reasonably afford a

mortgage on even the most modest farm properties in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. Many start-up farms at the incubator faced similar challenges. So this research came from a place of wanting to understand why it has become so hard for so many new farmers to access farmland.

I was ultimately successful in achieving this goal by selling the house that my spouse and I owned in the east-end of Ottawa during the 2021 housing bubble and buying a one-acre property, large enough for a home and modest market garden in a small, rural community in Mi'kma'ki (Nova Scotia). It is therefore fair to say that I was privileged enough—despite my struggles—to gain secure access to farmland. It is also true though that I had to leave the watershed of my birth to access land, which despite my relative affluence amounts to a very small farm. It is also true that I was not able to gain just access to land, since the area where I now reside is unceded and unsurrendered Mi'kmaq land occupied under the misrecognized terms of the Peace and Friendship Treaties. This research therefore reflects a direct-if fraught agrarian struggle to gain secure access to land. This reflects the sentiment of Noël (2014), who argues that it is important for political researchers to understand their position as citizens within their own local politics. To be a good citizen as a political researcher it is therefore necessary to share the knowledge one produces in ways that are useful to the public to help resolve everyday political problems.

I attended the 2016 World Congress of the International Rural Sociology Association (IRSA) at Toronto Metropolitan University when I was first starting this Ph.D. program and looking to define the focus of my research project. There, I attended conference sessions on the study of “land grabbing” worldwide. This led me to wonder if

farmland where I lived was inaccessible to us because of the financial farmland grab phenomenon that I learned about, which brought me to focus my doctoral research on the subject of financial farmland grabbing in my area. I therefore contribute, in this thesis, what I have learned from the literature and what my research has found, which helps inform solutions to the problem of secure and just farmland access for new farmers in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

Research questions and hypothesis

Local news outlets in 2009 began reporting that Walton International—a Canadian farmland investment company—accumulated² large tracts of farmland in the west-end of Ottawa in 2006 by buying it from farmers who were looking to exit agricultural production (Business Wire, 2009). The coverage of these land grabs is what alerted me to the land grab phenomenon in Kitchi Sipi Valley. I wanted to know how much land investment companies were buying in my area, and why. Then, as I looked for answers about farmland investors, I spoke with other gardeners, farmers, and harvesters through the National Farmers Union, food security organizations, and the food studies community about their experiences finding and maintaining access to farmland. The settler and First Nations growers and harvesters I learned from impressed upon me a consciousness of and respect for the concept of land justice. Land justice is a concern for good social and ecological relationships around access to and activity on areas of land (Holt-Giménez, 2017). This can range from the injustice of colonial dispossession to the treatment and freedom of agrarian labour, and central to this thesis: who is

²The term “accumulate” is used here to signify an increase in the quantity of capital, but also debt, land, etc., that an individual or group possesses (Harvey, 2003)

allowed and able to access farmland? My focus in this thesis is therefore a question of critical political economy, researching why land distribution (i.e who controls what land) changes over time. Scholars on the land grab phenomenon have debated its causes, but have yet to come to an agreement over why it is happening within agrarian settler communities on Turtle Island resulting in recent waves of farmland dispossession and consolidation among settler farmers. Friedmann (2016), White et al. (2012), and Scoones et al (2013) have stressed the need for scholarship on land grabbing to undertake long-term, place-based research to understand the root causes and complications of this phenomenon in a given place. This thesis therefore looks at the recent land grab phenomenon in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley to understand its magnitude, key actors involved, ongoing political-economic processes involved, and the complications of the local historical context. These factors allow me to contribute new data and analysis broader to the project of explaining the recent farmland grab phenomenon in so-called Canada.

I offer this contribution to the land grab scholarship by answering three different questions:

1. How much farmland have investment companies bought in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017?
2. What are the political-economic factors that drive and complicate the land grabbing phenomenon in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017, and under which conditions do these factors arise?
3. How can we think about these contemporary cases of land grabs within the

historical context of settler-colonialism on Turtle Island from a land justice perspective?

This study predicted that the land grab phenomenon in the Kitchi Sipi Valley was being caused by the same process of financialization that has been found in other land grab studies in so-called Canada (Gheller, 2018; Sommerville, 2018; Le Billon and Sommerville, 2017; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Holtslander, 2015; Magnan, 2015; Martin, 2015). Financialization is specifically identified in this study as instances where explicit investment firms purchase farmland. My thesis statement was therefore as follows:

The recent wave of land grabs in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley is caused by the investment practices of finance companies as part of the broader process of financialization in agricultural production.

This hypothesis is tested through a combination of the cartographic and historical materialist methods briefly described in the section above. Financial investment companies are emerging as a dominant new landowner if: (1) farmland is consolidating around the top four farmland owners and (2) the largest category of farmland owners are farmland investment companies. The rise of financial actors as a dominant new landowner would mean that land distribution has departed from the dominance of commercial farms, which is a sector that was established through several centuries of settler colonial development in the region.

I answer the first question of this thesis by looking at changes in the pattern of farmland ownership in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017. I employ a similar cartographic methodology that has been used by Desmarais et al. (2015) to measure land grabbing. I mapped and analyzed 9,858 property reports within the study area. To see if farmland consolidation is taking place, I combined farmland holdings of the four largest companies as a proportion of the total survey calculated by year between 2000 and 2017, called a “concentration of the four largest owners” (CLO4) indicator (Desmarais et al., 2015). The farmland property sample was also coded into different ownership categories corresponding to different kinds of owners (i.e. private, corporate, public, etc.) and analyzed to determine the acreage of farmland owned amongst these categories. I answer the second question through a combination of two methods; the first being materialist analysis of historical changes in land distribution under settler regimes in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, and the second being the use of case studies on the two largest land investment companies operating in the study area. Finally, I respond to the third question by discussing the implication of my findings within a broader project of land justice. I use the findings from my critical cartographic and historical materialist analysis to inform a series of considerations for future research and recommended policy changes to limit the financial farmland grab phenomenon. In my recommendations I emphasize the importance of looking at non-financial landed elites in the study of farmland grabs in so-called Canada. I also suggest that farmers can organize self-governing farmland commons to create an alternative to private farmland markets and property ownership as a way to protect farmland from future grabs.

Research findings and contributions

The empirical findings detailed in this thesis demonstrates that the Kitchi Sipi Valley experienced farmland consolidation but it was not primarily driven by farmland investment companies. Farmland was largely concentrated in the hands of corporations, but the corporations that consolidated most land were predominantly large-scale, family-owned corporate farms rather than financial investment companies. The rate of consolidation among the four largest landowners in the study sample increased by a rate of 2.1% between 2000 and 2017 (an increase of 9,228.2 acres). Consolidation also took place mostly after 2009, when the number of owners in the sample suddenly went from a stable 0.15% rate of growth to a 2.83% rate of decline. Statistics Canada Agricultural Census data consulted for this research indicates that the post-2009 wave of farmer exits in Ontario was composed primarily of mid-sized farms, while the number of smallholder farms remained stable during the same period (Statistics Canada, 2022a).

These findings differ from the findings of Desmarais et al.'s (2015) similar study on farmland consolidation in Saskatchewan, between 2000 and 2014. They reported a higher rate of farmland consolidation at 12.4% primarily driven by farmland investment companies. I was able to identify three main political-economic factors that explain the different experience of farmland grabbing in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The first factor was the rush of farmland purchases by a number of aggressively commercial corporate farms that have been accumulating land since the 1970s. Farms that were vulnerable to being acquired by farmland investors, were already grabbed by large corporate farms. The second factor is that the City of Ottawa's land use policies limit

urban sprawl. These policies blocked farmland investment companies from profiting off of acquisition of farmland to be converted into pre-development land. The third factor was the impact of urbanization in diminishing the appeal of farmland areas for agriculture-oriented investors. Urban expansion appreciates farmland values above its agricultural value, which makes it unsuitable to be made into a farmland security.

The above three factors are the product of extensive settler land grants that were made in the early 1800s to establish the settler colony of Upper Canada. This established a large population of settler farmers who own their own land and operate with a large amount of independence from grain merchants and markets. Some of these farmers had or were able to accumulate the farmland and wealth necessary to expand production to become commercial farms who are entirely reliant on the market for their livelihoods. Commercial farms of all sizes in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley expanded into more capitalist-intensive and specialized commodities, like dairy production. Wartime price controls became popular among these farmers who mobilized for their reinstatement during the post-war period, which led to the establishment of supply management. Urban expansion during the post-war period also produced the conditions for a sector of real estate developers to grab land on the urban periphery for real estate subdivision development. Land use planning controls that were established in response to this urban sprawl, however, have limited the spread of development-oriented farmland investment (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8). The combination of these historical processes worked together to limit the appeal of farmland as a financial security in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley during the study period.

An alternative theoretical framework

I employ a Marxist historical materialist approach through a theoretical model that I call a “long grab”, which is based on a combination of scholarship on original accumulation and settler colonialism. Marxist geographer David Harvey (2003) argues that the recent dominance of financial investment companies over political and economic systems and institutions signals a new wave of land dispossession driven by the need to transcend contemporary limits to profit growth, which he terms “accumulation-by-dispossession”. Scholars of land grabbing in Turtle Island (Fairbairn, 2020; Magnan, 2017; McMichael, 2013) have attributed the establishment of farmland investment companies as the movement of a new frontier of rentier wealth accumulation into the sphere of agricultural production in North America, effectively dispossessing farmers of farmland ownership to secure continued profit growth for agribusiness and finance companies alike. My hypothesis therefore assumed that financialization—where investment firms buy farmland—would explain the occurrence of land grabs in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, based on the findings of existing scholarship on financial land grabs in so-called Canada (Gheller, 2018; Sommerville, 2018; Rotz et al., 2017). The findings of my farmland ownership survey, however, contradicted the theory, meaning that I needed to develop an alternative theory that explains the findings.

I contribute, in this thesis, some new considerations to the concepts of original accumulation and accumulation-by-dispossession to inform future study of land grabbing in settler colonial contexts. I highlight in the literature review chapter two local aspects of the land grabbing phenomenon that have not received enough attention in the literature. First, I review the development of private property relations in so-called

Ontario from the perspective of Indigenist and decolonial scholarship on settler colonialism. Second, I look at long-term historical materialist perspectives on the development of capitalist private property relations in the settler colonies of northeastern Turtle Island, and its impacts of colonial land use policy decisions at all levels of government on the practice of farmland grabbing today.

Here I use the terms “land distribution”—nested within the broader framework of land justice—to explain the land grab phenomenon, which comes from the agrarian political economy literature (Bernstein, 2010). I use this term in a similar way as many other scholars have written about agrarian struggles to connect local struggles over farmland access and control in my area to the politics of worldwide farmer and peasant movements engaged in a variety of struggles over different aspects of agrarian life (Kautsky, 1899; Chayanov, 1927; Johnson, 1981; Friedmann, 1978; 1986; Bernstein, 2010). The term land distribution is more appropriate for describing the ways of thinking, social norms, and practices of British settler colonial society on Turtle Island (North America), since British and Gaelic³ customary, neo-feudal, liberal, and radical schools of thought express a “possessive” understanding of their relation to the land (Macpherson, 1962; Blomley, 2004). Crown property grants, public works, private property markets, and even customary Gaelic *duthchas* (a clan chieftain’s sworn pledge to the land) (Menziez 2014) are effectively mechanisms that manage how land is possessed (social, public, and private).

³ I use the term Gaelic in this thesis instead of Scottish and Irish to differentiate between who was removed from the land and who came to control the land without evoking a sense of national unity. The establishment of feudal estates in Ireland and northern Scotland largely involved the removal of Gaelic-speaking clans engaged in traditional practices of transhumance and clan-based land tenure in favour of plantation-style livestock operations. Gaelic land was taken by the English monarchy and given to Scots (ie. Scots-speaking people from the southern lowlands of Scotland) and English lords who would also come to be known as Irish or Scottish (Menziez 2014; Foster 1988).

The norms and practices of social activity around land in many First Nations on Turtle Island, however, do not hold these qualities of land as a fixed possession. Algonquin-Anishnaabe scholars have challenged the way First Nations relations to the land are represented in this regard (Coburn and Moore, 2021; Gehl, 2017). It is therefore not accurate or appropriate to use the term “land distribution” when describing such systems of thought. The term "land relations" is instead used to describe Anishinaabe kinship relations to the land and specific systems of "grounded normativity". As Coulthard and Simpson (2016) explain, the latter is a system of social relations informed by ancestral knowledge developed over innumerable generations of peoples living on the land. Essentially, I make a distinction in this thesis between grounded normativity and “possessive normativity” in describing how different regimes and communities govern social relations surrounding the land. The concept of land distribution, in other words, reflects a colonial paradigm of possessive normativity, which is appropriate for describing the activities of the European settler colony but not for that of Anishinaabe peoples.

The fundamental conflict of explanation of land grabbing on Turtle Island is a core theme that I highlight from literature on settler land distribution and Anishinaabe land relations. The agrarian change literature, on the one hand, describes ways that settler farmers are unjustly losing the lands they possessed to land investors amounting to a kind of “large-scale land acquisition” or “land grab” (Clapp, 2019; Gheller, 2018; Sommerville, 2018; Le Billon and Sommerville, 2017; Magnan, 2017; 2015; Desmarais et al., 2016; 2015; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Smythe, 2015; Haley, 2013). The ongoing settler colonial process of Anishinaabe dispossession, on the other hand, is

foundational to the production, expansion, and reproduction of the farmland properties that food sovereignty scholars argue is being violently dispossessed (Simpson, 2021; 2017; 2011; Coburn and Moore, 2021; Starblanket, 2019; Gehl, 2017; 2014; 2000; D. McGregor, 2013; 2008). The conflict between Anishinaabe and settler-farmer accounts of dispossession is especially pronounced in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, where no valid process of colonial secession or surrender has ever taken place (Coburn and Moore, 2021; Gehl, 2017). I therefore put both processes of dispossession into conversation in this thesis to learn more about settler-colonial dynamics of land distribution. I then present a synthesis of these two accounts by arguing that both processes of dispossession—colonial and financial—are historically connected, and that understanding these connections can help us better understand how farmers and First Nations communities alike on Turtle Island (North America) are losing their control over the land.

I term this new framework the “long grab”, which describes an extended and ongoing, long-historical process of “original accumulation” resulting in the specific conditions of settler-capitalist private property relations in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. Original accumulation⁴ refers to a process of imposing capitalist social relations on non- and semi-capitalist societies (Marx, 1867; Luxemburg, 1911; Arrighi, 1994; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Wood, 2002; Harvey, 2003; Bernstein, 2010). This long grab illustrates the historical production, reproduction, and reformation of different moments of land dispossession that take place through the gradual development of capitalist private

⁴The term “primitive accumulation” was initially coined in English by Adam Smith to describe a now-discredited process where workers labour at different rates to accumulate the initial wealth used to capitalize early capitalist production. Karl Marx (1867) specifically used the German term *ursprünglich* in part eight of Capital volume one. English translations of this term have used both the “primitive” and “original” accumulation. Decolonial scholar Glen Coulthard (2014) has expressed a preference for the term “original accumulation”, therefore this thesis also uses it.

property relations within agricultural production. This concept is supplemented by the ideas of long-historical cycles within the international political economy from Arrighi (1994), Hart and Negri (2000), and Harvey (2003). It therefore describes a succession of regimes that rise and fall as political-ecological struggles unfold, each imprinting itself on the physical landscape. It is also influenced by Brenner's (1982; 1976) and Wood's (2002) explanation of the historical development of agrarian capitalism in England, as well as Glen Coulthard (2014) and Patrick Wolfe's (2006; 1998) explanation of the development and reproduction of settler colonialism in Turtle Island.

Outline of chapters

I have organized this thesis into two parts. Part I details how I surveyed farmland ownership in the study area. Chapter 1 details the literature review that I conducted for this thesis, covering scholarship from Anishinaabe knowledge keepers on their traditional system of land relations based in grounded normativity, critical scholarship on settler colonialism, and Marxist scholarship on agrarian change, financialization, and neoliberalism. I then put this scholarship into conversation in Chapter 2, which I use to develop the theoretical framework of the Long Grab. Here, I combine contemporary Marxist debates around the subject of original accumulation and decolonial debates about settler colonialism to better understand how the advancement and preservation of settler colonialism, and the development and reproduction of capitalism are sometimes mutually-reinforcing and sometimes at odds with one another. Conflicts over land between the colonial government and private companies over time produce locally-specific conditions that determine the success of farmland investment.

In Chapter 3 I state the thesis's research question, hypothesis, and method for

testing them. I describe the farmland distribution survey conducted through critical cartographic methods to measure changes in patterns of farmland distribution and determine the magnitude of financial farmland grabbing that has taken place. I also detail the historical materialist case study, and elite interview methods used to synthesize an explanation for results of the farmland distribution survey. Chapter 4 is the farmland survey results chapter. Here, I share land consolidation and ownership category data. It suggests that farmland ownership in the study area was consolidated between 2000 and 2017 predominantly by large-scale, family-owned corporate farms rather than financial investment companies, as predicted in the original research hypothesis. These results lead me to use historical materialist analysis and case study research in the second part of this thesis to explain why the study area did not experience the predicted levels of farmland investment.

Part II of the thesis looks at the history of the genesis and development of commercial agriculture in the Kitchi Sipi Valley with a focus on specific social, political, economic, and ecological factors that prevented farmland investment companies from accumulating more farmland in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley. In Chapter 5 I detail how the French and British empires, and later the Government of Canada, came to erroneously claim sovereignty over the Kitchi Sipi Valley and defended their supposed title to the land despite continuous letters of complaint sent by the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquins) to the colonial administrators. I then explain how the errors of the Crawford Purchase resulted in the Crown's precarious title to the land resulting in a degree of political risk inherent to investing in farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

In Chapter 6 I describe how the region was settled by British Loyalists in the

1800s, specifically the practice of making free land grants, initially to pay personnel for military and government services, but then more broadly to British and other European immigrants. I explain how the extensive granting of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land as so-called “free land” undermined the ability of gentry elites to implement capitalist social relations in agricultural production, instead resulting in a dominant group of simple commodity producing farmers operating with a relative degree of autonomy from the market. The continued political significance of farmers as landowners today and the inconsistent and fragmented layout of property surveys increases the cost of acquiring farmland in the area, reducing the profitability of such investments. The organized power of farmers was mobilized on several occasions to demand a dominion government and market protections. The chapter then describes how settler agriculture in the region developed through a process of capitalist accumulation, which has resulted in the formation of the value chain network of agribusiness corporations and commercial farms that has come to command most of the farmland in the study area.

In Chapter 7 I describe how financial investors became more involved in agrifood value chains through processes of financialization. Neoliberal reforms that made market-friendly reforms to finance, trade, and land use regulation allowed new kinds of investment companies to be created focused on securitizing agricultural commodities and farmland. I describe how these reforms led to the formation of farmland-focused farmland investment companies that were operating between 2000 and 2017 in the Kithceshibi Valley.

In Chapter 8 I delve deeper into the specific histories of the formation and growth of two farmland investment companies operating in the Kitchi Sipi Valley: Walton

International and Bonnefield Financial. One company focuses on acquiring farmland for real estate development, while the other invests in farmland to keep it in agricultural production. Both companies, however, have experienced very limited success investing in the region's farmland. I detail in this chapter the specific challenges that these companies have experienced accumulating farmland in the study area. In Chapter 9 I conclude the thesis by discussing the limitations to the study, implications of the findings, identifying this thesis's contributions to the literature, and future research that is needed to advance the study of land grabbing in so-called Canada.

Part I

Identifying land grabs in the Kitchi Sipi Valley

Chapter 1: A literature review of land grabs on Turtle Island

This chapter situates my work within the literature on land grabbing and identifies my theoretical contribution to the existing scholarly literature on the subject of land grabs in the settler colony. I do this to identify how land grabbing has been investigated in other parts of Turtle Island and understand what factors could be operating to create the land grab phenomena that took place between 2000 and 2017 in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. I consulted five bodies of scholarship that engage with the subject of land grabbing in settler colonies: Indigenist and decolonial Anishinaabe scholarship, scholarship on settler colonialism, scholarship on agricultural origins of capitalism, scholarship on financialization, and scholarship on neoliberalism. I have identified five specific political-economic conflicts that have emerged since the colonization of the Kitchi Sipi Valley. I take these five conflicts and theorize their relationships embodied in what I have called the settler-capitalist land regime, which is elaborated upon in Chapter 2.

The literature on land grabbing in settler colonies is a interdisciplinary network of scholars working in different fields under the umbrella of critical political economy and political ecology. This scholarly literature on land grabbing began to transition in 2015 from an initial stock-taking and fact-checking phase towards developing a broader theoretical understanding of the phenomenon (Akram-Lodhi, 2015; Friedmann, 2015; Hall et al., 2015; McMichael, 2014; Edelman, 2013; Margulis, et al. 2013; Sassen, 2013; Scoones, et al. 2013; Wolford, et al. 2013; Cotula, 2012; White et al., 2012; Kugelman et al., 2012; Zoomers, 2010).

The first theoretical work on land grabbing focused on the subject of “original

accumulation”, particularly David Harvey’s (2003) description of “accumulation by dispossession.” Harvey asserts that the land grab phenomenon—among other cases of dispossession—indicates a tendency within capitalism where economic elites are driven to appropriate capital and revenue sources owned by public and subordinate economic actors during periods of crisis to maintain continued profit growth. The literature also focused on theories of agrarian change originating with Karl Kautsky’s (1899) foundational idea of peasant differentiation, which explains how some peasants are able to accumulate wealth by gradually appropriating the land and labour of smaller peasants (Friedmann 2016; Akram-Lodhi 2015; D. Hall 2015; Kaag and Zoomers 2014; McMichael 2014; White et al. 2012; Bernstein 2010; Zoomers 2010; Brenner 2006). Some more recent scholarship has focused on processes of neoliberal reform and corporate capture of public institutions as a factor in land grabs (Albo and Fanelli 2019; Edelman et al. 2017; Zoomers, et al. 2017; Smythe 2015; Haley 2013; Margulis and Porter 2013; Wolford et al. 2013; Fairhead et al. 2012). Most recent scholarship, however, has focused on the role of financial investors, debt, and neo-rentier land ownership as the process driving land grabbing in rich countries, mostly in settler colonies (Ashwood et al. 2022; Fairbairn 2020; Ouma 2020; 2016; 2014; Ekers 2019; Bjørkhaug et al. 2018; Clapp and Isakson 2018; Sommerville 2018; Kish and Fairbairn 2017; Visser 2016; 2015; Isakson 2015; 2014; Lawrence et al. 2015; Sommerville and Magnan 2015; Gunnoe 2014).

The literature on land grabs in settler colonies has alluded to ongoing colonial processes as the original source of the landed wealth that is being grabbed by economic elites. It has not yet, however, given adequate attention to the political-

economic conditions created from ongoing settler-colonial struggles over land. Fortunately, there exists a well-developed field of scholarship that focused on understanding historical processes of settler colonialism (Manuel and Derrickson 2021; Pasternak et al. 2021; King et al. 2019; Kepkiewicz and Dale 2019; Starblanket 2019; Coulthard 2014; Gehl 2014; 2000; Geisler 2014; Rüeck 2014; Daschuk 2013; Wolfe 2006) and decolonization (Simpson 2021; 2017; 2011; Coburn and Moore 2021; Williams 2018; Gehl 2017; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Bannai and Commanda 2013; Horn-Miller 2013; Sunseri 2010; McGregor 2008; Bonaparte 2006).

In this chapter I will first look at Anishinaabe scholarship and the critical literature on settler colonialism to inform my theoretical understanding of historical processes that develop the political-ecological conditions that farmland investors faced in the study area between 2000 and 2017. I will then review topics within the literature on farmland grabbing from the settler-colonial perspective. I draw upon different concepts within these scholarly fields to inform the theoretical synthesis I develop in the next chapter. The different scholarly fields and key concepts are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 - Key Concepts From the Interdisciplinary Literature on Land Relations			
Land Relations	Literature	Key Concepts	Land Grab Conflict
Grounded Normativity	Anishinaabe	Mino-pimadiziwin	Colonial Conflict
Possessive Normativity	Settler Colonialism	Original Accumulation	
		Settler Colonial Reproduction	
	Agrarian Change	Simple Commodity Production	Agricultural Conflict
		Commercial Production	

	Neoliberalism	Public-interest Regulation	Rentier Conflict
		Private-interest regulation	
	Financialization	Debt-Financing	
		Land Assetization	

Land grabs based on colonial conflict

The first two fields of scholarship on land grabbing covers processes of dispossession based on colonial conflict. The conflict involves the existence of an First Nations exercising a system of land relations based in grounded normativity, which is confronted by the settler-colonial project of European empires. In this section I look at works of Anishinaabe scholarship to inform the specific ways of relating to the land and how it shapes patterns of habitation and land use. This conflict also involves the encroachment of a settler colonial power—in this case French, British, and Canadian companies and governments who are interested in appropriating the land to extend their sovereignty and develop a society that reflects the values of and benefits the interests of the colonizer. In this section I also look at works of scholarship that come from Indigenist and decolonial positions to understand how the project of establishing, developing, expanding, and developing a settler colonialism impacts the way settlement and land use is managed. The difference between Anishinaabe and colonial powers over ways of relating to the land and recognition of who holds sovereignty shapes the location and orientation of colonial settlement as well as the institutions that arise to govern land ownership and use.

Grounded normativity and Anishinaabe land relations

Coulthard and Simpson (2016) coined the term “grounded normativity” and they explain that it refers an,

“... ethical frameworks provided by ... Indigenous place-based practices and associated forms of knowledge. Grounded normativity houses and reproduces the practices and procedures, based on deep reciprocity, that are inherently informed by an intimate relationship to place. Grounded normativity teaches us how to live our lives in relation to other people and nonhuman life forms in a profoundly nonauthoritarian, nondominating, nonexploitive manner. Grounded normativity teaches us how to be in respectful diplomatic relationships with other Indigenous and non-Indigenous nations with whom we might share territorial responsibilities or common political or economic interests. Our relationship to the land itself generates the processes, practices, and knowledges that inform our political systems, and through which we practice solidarity” (Coulthard and Simpson, 2016, p. 254).

This concept informs my explanation of historical and ongoing settler-colonial conflicts over land in the Kitchi Sipi Valley and its impact on contemporary farmland distribution, elaborated upon further in Chapter 2. It is a common theme in the works of various Anishinaabe scholars, which informs their worldviews and politics (Starblanket 2019; Simpson 2017). They express a perspective of land relations emerging from the place-based traditions that produce a grounded normativity, from which a “moral right to land”

can be established (Coburn and Moore 2021).

Land relations and mino-pimadiziwin

Simpson (2017, 161)—a Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg (Mississauga) scholar uses the term “Aki” in reference to the space of co-constitutive relationships which “includes all aspects of creation: landforms, elements, plants, animals, spirits, sounds, thoughts, feelings, and energies and all of the emergent systems, ecologies, and networks that connect these elements”. The interconnected relationality that makes up this concept of the land informs a sense of innate sovereignty within the individual, which is governed autonomously⁵ through intergenerationally-shared knowledge and practices, known to the Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg (Mississauga) as “Nishnaabemwin” (Simpson 2017, 193). Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) scholar Lynn Gehl (2017, p. 22) refers to the outcome of this practice as “mino-pimadiziwin”, a network of relationships that supports good health and wellbeing of all creation. McGregor (2013) refers to a similar concept of “Enendagwad”, which translates to the “Law of the Orders” in English. She also shares the concept of “Ginamadawinan”, which draws from Enendagwad, to instruct how to conduct oneself responsibly in relation to other people and living beings. Coburn and Moore (2021) assert that such long-standing codes and practices of good relations embedded within the land of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) people demonstrates a “moral right to the land” that precedes and contradicts colonial claims of sovereignty over the land.

⁵The term “autonomy” is used in this thesis to signify an individual or group’s ability to act in their own interests without needing to fit within or serve the interests of another individual or group (Hardt and Negri 2000).

Land use practices

Simpson (2011, p. 43) and Gehl (2014, p. 53) details more specifically how Anishinaabe Law is therefore embodied as one's personal "debwewin" in the direct practices of the Anishinaabe people in everyday life and reproduced through the retelling of sacred stories, enacting a land ethic. In the winter, Anishinaabe communities are traditionally organized into groups of families at the height of land in the watershed for hunting and trapping. In the spring, Anishinaabe families then organize at the confluence of these headwaters to harvest geese and pimsi (eels). In the summer, Anishinaabe society traditionally gather at major confluence points in the watershed, like at Akikodjiwan (Chaudière Falls in Ottawa) to engage in trade and hold celebrations, religious and civil ceremonies, and national political deliberation through process of consensus. In some communities—like in Curve Lake, Ontario—the summer is also a time when communities could gather in great numbers for the harvest of Minoomin (wild rice) (L.B. Simpson 2017).

I understand these concepts to suggest that the social basis to relationships over land access in Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) communities emerges directly from the situation of human life within a broader network of ecological relations. This relationality constitutes a form of grounded normativity because it is informed directly by the wisdom gained from direct, lived experiences with the land. The long-standing continuity of livelihoods informed by these codes of good relationships – demonstrated through the health and abundance that was sustained in the landscape necessary to support human life – demonstrates Anishinaabe sovereignty and establishes their moral right to the land.

Possessive normativity and settler-colonial land distribution

This section describes settler colonialism in the French and British-colonized portions of Turtle Island as both an historical and ongoing process of imposing a system of possessive normativity into an area that is originally governed through a system of grounded normativity. The scholarship on settler colonialism emphasizes the importance of continuous practical challenges of dispossessing the grounded regime as foundational to the geography of colonial settlement. There have been many different models of social relations to the land in the history of Europe: customary clan systems, feudalism, pre-capitalism, and capitalism (Lefebvre, 1974). All of these models organize people on the land corresponding to rigid hierarchies in relation to the sovereignty of a noble or the crown, or private property ownership.

Possessive individualism and imperial expansionism

Macpherson (1962) describes the conflicts over land in England during the time of settler colonialism in Turtle Island (North America) as an historical movement towards “possessive individualism” drawing from both the Lockean concept of property as the product of one’s individual labour and Christian reformist ideas of individual free will. In relation to First Nations land relations, this seems to express what this dissertation calls “possessive normativity”. In other words, rather than the land serving as the basis of social relations, settler-colonial land relations places the interests of elite land-owning individuals as the focus of land relations. This revolution in the way of thinking about property ownership in England came at the same time as political-economic conditions

in Europe produced an imperative among imperial powers to expand their access to cheap resources and labour beyond the continent.

Luxemburg (1913) and Lenin (1933) argue that the free competition of European empires over resources gave rise to concentration of ownership and the need to territorially expand the area of proto-capitalist production. Harvey (2003), Hardt and Negri (2000), and Arrighi (1994) argue that territorial (i.e. state) and capitalist interests⁶ reinforce and challenge each other in cycles, which influences historical moments of political-economic transformations. The territorial power of the nation-state can only be exercised with the financial support of capitalist interests, which ties the crises and windfalls territorial and capitalist strategies together. They suggest that this results in a broad-scale order of land distribution that is directed through the conflicts between the state and capital interests and actions. One dynamic that they observe is the tendency for empires to pass through periods of expansion, consolidation, overaccumulation, and dissolution in long cycles spanning centuries. This suggests that European empires in the 1500s began to experience an imperative to establish settler colonies abroad to protect its interests of securing their political power and capturing new sources of wealth.

Settler colonial relations with First Nations

Settler colonialism is described by the literature consulted in this section as a process and structure of territorial domination by foreign powers driven by the desire to extract

⁶The term “interest” in this thesis means an individual or group’s collective goals and desires, such as one’s private interest in accessing food and shelter or an investor’s interest in maximizing the profits they make on an investment. It is also sometimes used to refer to a price one pays to borrow wealth from a creditor (Harvey 1996).

resources and wealth for the benefits of the colonial power (Pasternak et al., 2021; King et al., 2019; Wolfe 2006; Weaver, 2003). Its processes and structures serve as the foundation of sovereignty for the settler colonial state, validating claims of private property that underpins the colonial legal and political-economic apparatuses (Blomley 2004).

Pasternak et al. (2021), King and Pasternak (2019), and Weaver (2003) suggest that colonialism is based on the desire to extract wealth from the land, which drives the theft of land from Indigenous peoples for “extraction, development, and capitalist imperatives”. Wolfe (2006) suggests that the establishment of permanent settlement served to secure access to territory for commercial or geostrategic gain. In this sense, Kelm & Smith (2018) argue that settler colonialism is simply a variation on imperialism where settlers remain on the land dominated by imperial powers. King and Pasternak (2019) argue that the land base for settler colonialism is stolen through the deployment of a “spectrum of consent” involving selective moments of recognition and denial of sovereignty over land.

Much of the scholarship on settler-colonial capitalism—especially pertaining to the territorial expansion of capitalist social relations—draws on Marx’s (1867) theory of original accumulation, which involves bringing non-capitalist society and territory into capitalist social relations. Pflug-Back & Kesīqnaeh (2016), Ince (2014), and Coulthard (2014) argues that Marx’s conception of original accumulation could be reconsidered through the lens of colonial relations by examining histories of violent state dispossession prior to the emergence of a fully capitalist society. Therefore, Fullenwider (2018) suggests that this places the origin of settler-colonial political economy

foundationally on the project of pre-capitalist land theft. This would mean explaining how Indigenous labour was not historically employed as wage labour when they were dispossessed of their land, as theorized by Marx. Rather, as Wolfe (1998; 2006) explains, original accumulation in the settler colonies involved an important dual structure/process of removing Indigenous peoples from the land, and importing slave or cheap labour from other colonies to establish a semi-capitalist, neo-feudal society. Interventions by Fullenwider (2018) Pflug-Back & Kesīqnaeh (2016), Ince (2014), Coulthard (2014), Brenner (2006), and Wood (2002) suggest re-considering the role of the state in relation to colonial expansion prior to the emergence of capitalism in settler colonial contexts, which will be discussed further later (Chapters 2 and 5).

Wolfe (1998) and Weaver (2003) suggest that the settler colonies of the French and British are established in a series of steps that are shaped by the local societies they are colonizing. In all cases, Wolfe (2006) suggests that settler colonialism first requires imperial powers to establish military alliances and economic treaties with autonomous Indigenous nations to successfully establish their settler colonies. The next moment in the process of land alienation is where treaties become misconstrued by colonial powers as a moment of total cessation that gave the settler colony exclusive jurisdiction over treaty lands (Starblanket 2019: 452; Wolfe 1998, 27-8). Colonial powers then match the pressures of settler colonial expansion with direct actions of extermination amounting to genocide in order to gain favourable geostrategic dominance and control over trade routes and land (Daschuk 2013; Wolfe 1998, 27-8). Finally, surviving Indigenous peoples are assimilated and concentrated into reservations away from the settler regime of private property to appropriate more land and reinforce

the legitimacy of settler colonial sovereignty (Wolfe 1998, 28-9).

The power of First Nations resistance to colonialism

First Nations peoples are not passive subjects to these structures and processes. Land has sacred value to them, which is not willingly surrendered (Starblanket 2019: 452).

The settler colonial state has therefore had to dominate the land through practices of fraud and violence (Coulthard 2014). Practices of fraud entail the establishment of historical economic and territorial treaties, selectively interpreting these treaties to permit settlement on First Nations land, and then the renegotiation of modern treaties under the premise of absolute sovereignty over First Nations peoples within the settler-colonial state. Practices of violence entail the genocide of First Nations peoples through warfare, murder, misogyny, hunger, displacement, and assimilation. These combined practices of fraud and violence are used in relation to one another to gradually accumulate the territorial sovereignty needed to establish a settler colony.

The dispossession of land under French and British-occupied sections of Turtle Island involving fraud first begins with the establishment of treaties and alliances. Chamberlain (1996) and Pflug-Back and Kesīqnaeh (2016) explains that European powers entered into treaties with First Nations out of an anxiety for war and lawless chaos that could undermine their colonial ambitions and trade routes. The process of land accumulation by the British was formalized through the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which required the Crown to enter into a treaty agreement to gain more territory. Simpson (2011) and Gehl (2014) argue the Crown misconstrued and selectively used the Treaties to assert the power of its laws above and in the place of First Nations law

and politics, including the imposition of private property laws over recognized First Nations settlements (Moore, 2021; Gehl, 2014; Rüeck, 2014; DeVries, 2011; Weaver, 2003). As detailed by Coburn and Moore (2021), Gehl (2014), and DeVries (2011), persistent attempts to petition the British Crown over infractions to treaty agreements were largely ignored allowing squatter⁷ settlements to thrive. Furthermore, Monture-Angus (1995) and Sunseri (2010) assert that the Canadian government continues to misconceive First Nation sovereignty and law as deferred from and subservient to the Crown in both historical and modern treaties. Coulthard (2014) explains how First Nations peoples in so-called Canada today are required to seek recognition from various institutions of the Crown through the modern treaty process.

Treaty misrecognition and attempted genocide

Settler colonial accumulation of land was also historically accomplished through acts of violence. The most obvious form of such violence is warfare, such as the Beaver Wars, American Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812, which displaced, dispersed, and concentrated entire First Nations (Gehl, 2014; Simpson, 2014; DeVries, 2011; Sunseri, 2010; Barr, 2006; Weaver, 2003). When treaties and warfare were unsuccessful or not feasible, French, British, and Canadian powers resorted to genocide to dispossess land from First Nations. Daschuk (2013) emphasizes the important role of hunger and disease as a force employed intentionally and unintentionally by the French and British empires to establish and expand colonial settlement into the Great Plains. The intention of the Government of Canada and actions that took place at residential schools amount

⁷The identity of “squatter” and action of “squatting” in this thesis refers to settlers who live on land that have either informal or no property rights to (Clarke 2001).

to genocide and assimilation (TRC, 2015). Children were involuntarily separated from their families by Indian Agents, priests, and RCMP officers so that there will no longer be, as Duncan Campbell Scott, Minister of Indian Affairs from 1913 to 1932 said, “a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic” (Manuel and Derickson, 2021).

Wolf (2006; 1998) argues that Indigenous survival threatens the moral legitimacy of settler colonial sovereignty over the land, that he calls “dominion-without-conquest”. The project of forming domestic political legitimacy for the ruling elite leads the colonial state to force and confine surviving Indigenous peoples on reservations away from colonial settlement via policies like the Indian Act. This results in a simultaneous process of committing genocide against Indigenous peoples and ideologically constructing a narrative of settlers as the original, therefore legitimate, population in the territory. Narratives of empty (*terra nullius*), “improved”, and “profitably” used land organized as private property are employed to legitimize the theft of the Indigenous commons. This narrative falsely presents colonization as inevitable, justifiable, and complete action that renders a definitive end to Indigenous sovereignty. However, Indigenous peoples are not replaced entirely, they remain visible but are literally and figuratively concentrated in the margins of the settler colonial society, on their own land.

In the contemporary period, conservation narratives of “wilderness” are deployed to further alienate First Nations peoples of their land base. Braun (2002) argues that the concept of pristine wilderness in coastal British Columbia that environmentalists have fought to protect relies on a colonial conceptualization of ecology that erases First Nations peoples, past and present, from the landscape⁸. This economic and cultural

⁸The term “landscape” refers to the physical layout of natural formations, the built environment, and the

shift resulted in an increased social construction of space as “wilderness”, asserting a discourse differentiating between pure untouched nature and destructive human habitation, which must be separated. Leroux (2019) has pointed out a similarly recent practice resulting in the dispossession of First Nations territorial sovereignty through acts of settlers claiming First Nations identities based on false or exaggerated ancestry to gain access to hunting and land rights. This history of settler colonial dispossession has led Smith (2019), Kepkiewicz and Dale (2019), Rotz (2017), Coulthard (2014) and Geisler (2014) to stress the importance of seeing First Nations dispossession as central to the development of settler colonial private property in settler colonies.

The literature on settler colonialism explains how the development of a settler colony is not a single moment after which colonialism is over and settled. Rather, settler colonialism is a continuous process that needs perpetual reproduction through both direct physical force of the settler state and ideologically within the settler population.

Land grabs based on agrarian change

The next field of scholarship on land grabbing covers dispossession that occurs between actors within settler-colonial agricultural production. This conflict involves a contradiction between the interests of simple commodity producing farmers who sell certain amounts of their production to the market to sustain their agrarian livelihoods and commercial farmers who explicitly engage in capitalist production for the purpose of profit maximization. In this section I look at the literature on peasant differentiation and agrarian change to understand how struggles between different kinds of farmers shape

beings that live there.

the distribution of farmland within French and British settler colonies in Turtle Island.

The conflict between simple commodity producing farmers and commercial farmers therefore shapes land distribution by creating the conditions of agricultural monopolies that come to control vast holdings of farmland.

Free land grants and simple commodity production

Simple commodity production is when the owners of farmland work the land directly themselves and bring the commodities they produce directly to sell in the market (Friedmann, 1978; Johnson, 1981; Bernstein, 2010). It is a social group that is unique to British settler colonies that arose out of the historical practice of colonial powers making free land grants on the condition that the land is cleared and turned into productive homesteads. This kind of development is different from the way it did in England, where aristocratic lords owned the land and tenant farmers rented the land and faced the imperative to engage in commercial agriculture out of competition with other farmers over farm leases. Farmers who own their own land on Turtle Island were not automatically compelled into market production through dependence on the revenues from commercial production or wage labour to access land. Simple commodity producers therefore possess the ability to provide for themselves through subsistence production or barter through the local peasant economy because they control their access to farmland. Private farmland properties in the Kitchi Sipi Valley were originally established through free land grants. Any investigation into the distribution of farmland in the area therefore requires explanation of the historical origins and functional characteristics of private property.

Deviation from the western European model of capitalist development

The literature of private farmland properties consulted in this chapter suggests that the concept of private property rests on various sets of contradicting characteristics that result in consolidation. These contradictions arise from the different socio-political aspects of the concepts of private property that are evident in classical political economy on the distribution of private property (Von Thünen, 1826; Ricardo, 1817; Malthus, 1798; Smith, 1776; Rousseau, 1755; Locke, 1690; Hobbes, 1651), anarchist analysis on the formation of state oppression (Graeber, 2011; Scott, 1998; Bookchin, 1986; Kropotkin 1912; Proudhon, 1840), and Marxist analysis on the emergence of capitalism from agricultural production (Lenin, 1933; Chaynov, 1927; Luxemburg, 1913; Kautsky, 1899; Marx, 1867). In this section I focus on Marxist analysis on the creation of private farmland property by simple commodity producers.

Marxist and Marxist-inspired scholarship on farmland distribution in capitalist agriculture puts forward a theory that the emergence of capitalist agriculture came about in Europe as a result of socio-political transformations that took place in Europe from the 15th to 19th century. Lappé (1985), Massey (1980), Polanyi (1957), Hobsbawm (1962), Macpherson (1962), Thompson (1963), and Brenner (1976; 1982) combined demographic, technological, and institutional changes in agrarian production to identify an historical phenomenon of “enclosure” in England, where lords and bourgeois land owners organized and institutionalized a regime of land accumulation, which transformed common lands into private property under the logic of maximizing the land’s productive and profitable output.

Marxist scholars, however, have suggested that the emergence of capitalism in the French and British settler colonies of Turtle Island took place through a different process. Bernstein (2010), Weaver (2003), Wood (2002), Galbraith (1951), Sakolski (1932), Luxemburg (1913), and Marx (1867) explain how colonial expansion into Turtle Island took place through chartered corporations who were granted charters allowing them to fight wars, establish settlements, and grant land to settlers that created a relatively large group of farmers who owned their land and could engage in farming. Russell (2012), Clarke and Wood (2002), Darroch and Soltow (1995), Bleasdale (1981), Johnson (1981), and Friedmann (1978) suggest that this resulted in the formation of a distinct social group called “simple commodity producers”, which can be understood as labourers who are also the proprietor of the means of production (i.e. land).

Not all settlers, however, had access to land to become a farmer. Johnson (1981) argues that land price policies were also enacted to prohibit labourers from land ownership. This was done to establish a cheap reserve of wage labour for industrial development. Smith (2019), Penniman (2018), Daniel (2013), Baptist (2016) argue that selective granting of private property rights to specific groups of settlers resulted in the formation of a class of landless workers that many colonial elites saw as necessary for the development of commercial agriculture and industrial production. Private property also historically combined with structures of patriarchy to subordinate women’s labour—confined to household labour—to secondary status to market-oriented commodity production. Furthermore, Friedmann (1986) explains how gendered inequality over the ownership of private property (i.e. customs of inheritance) among French and British settlers transformed in the colonization Turtle Island resulted in men having access to

capital and women remaining dependent on their husbands who retained power over the finances of the family farm unit.

The literature on simple commodity producers in the French and British settlements of Turtle Island has detailed how the granting of free land to European settlers established a group of farmers who produced with a relative degree of autonomy from Imperial markets. They were able to participate primarily in market production when commodity prices were good and then fall back on mostly subsistence production during economic hardship. The flexibility of such farms suited the task of settler colonial expansion, which shaped land distribution through the practices of accumulating farmland to give out to families as inheritance. Simple commodity production among Upper Canadian settlers, however, found themselves immediately at odds with those who engaged in commercial agricultural production with larger land holdings for the explicit purpose of maximizing profits by specializing in staple commodities for imperial markets.

Commercial agriculture and agri-food monopolization

This subsection describes the formation, growth, and consolidation of commercial agriculture in French and British settler colonies on Turtle Island which started shortly after the founding of the Upper Canadian settlement in 1791. Commercial agriculture is a semi-capitalist or capitalist form of agricultural production that is oriented towards narrowly-specialized production. It involves capital-intensive technologies and wage labour to produce commodities that are often sold through international markets (Bernstien, 2010). The scholarship on agrarian change and global food systems

highlights the historical tendency within commercial agriculture towards the consolidation of ownership. This has resulted in the formation of large-scale, family-owned farms that own large expanses of farmland that require significant amounts of equipment and hired labour to operate.

The agrarian question within the British settler colony

Brenner (1982; 1976), Wallerstein (1974), Hobsbawm (1962), Polanyi (1957), Kautsky (1899) explain that private property-ownership among farmers results in an uneven division of landed wealth. Marx (1867), Kautsky (1899), Luxemburg (1913), and Lenin (1933) explain how capitalist production in agriculture inevitably reaches limits in profit growth because of competition with other producers, soil depletion, increasing input demand, and market saturation. This results in a “tendency for declining rate of profit” requiring a continuous struggle to increase production and reduce the cost of production. French and British commercial farmers in Turtle Island increased production by acquiring more land and investing their wealth in mechanization (i.e. tractors, threshers, balers, etc.). Russell (2012) elaborates that settlement in Upper Canada had a tendency towards westward expansion by relatively wealthy, commercial farming Anglo-Protestant settlers eventually resulting in the settlement of the Prairies. Russell (2012), Fraser and Rimas (2010) and Mitchell (1975) argue that the westward expansion of agricultural production resulting from the Dominion Lands Act overextended agricultural production to a scale that made it difficult to invest in the industrial modernization of production. This led to a general underdevelopment of Canadian agricultural production until the postwar period in the mid-1900s. Magnan

(2016) describes how World Wars I and II pressured Canada to create new institutions to stabilize food prices as a matter of national security. This resulted in a wave of investment in agricultural production. Mitchell (1975) argues that farming became increasingly reliant on large capital equipment, moving away from reliance on family labour who tended to exit farming. This resulted in consolidation of ownership and increased input costs that pressured farmers into taking on new debt. Increased levels of debt combined with depressed prices resulted in the phenomenon of the “cost-price squeeze”. This put a pressure on farms to increase their scale of production and assume a more capitalist business model. Small farms countered this by keeping production small, avoiding debt, and continuing to rely on their own labour. However, this created a reliance on their properties for retirement.

Settler-commercial agriculture and the global corporate food regime

Bernstein (2010), ETC Group (2015), Shiva (2016); Weis (2013; 2007), White et al. (2012); Fraser and Rimas (2010), and Prudham (2007) explain that the movement towards industrial agriculture in the 1960s resulted in specialized division of labour in “upstream” (inputs) and “downstream” (processing and distribution) production removing farmer control over input production. They suggest that the emergence of these sectors created greater economic pressures in the forms of rents and input costs, resulting in a greater tendency towards use of wage labour among farmers.

The tendency towards consolidation in agrarian production resulted in the emergence in multinational food monopolies by the end of the 20th century. Friedmann and McMichael (1989) argue that theorization on the relations between agriculture and

industrial development have presumed a relationship fixed within national economies. Rather, they argue that these relations are far more dynamic and global, articulated along the lines of an international state-system, which they term a “global food regime”. They identify the tendency towards consolidation as arising directly from conflicts within agricultural production as they operate within a global food system. McMichael (2013), Akram-Lodhi (2015), Shiva (2016), and Fraser and Rimas (2010) situated the land grabbing more broadly within some of the internal material conflicts of the current corporate food regime. They see the phenomenon as an attempt by dominant actors within the food regime to resolve the apparent crisis of accumulation by appropriating more land and labour for its expansion. Hall (2015), Lawrence et al. (2015), and Hall et al. (2015) similarly argue that the direct appropriation of farmland, based on specific commercial imperatives, is not the only way land grabbing can be understood. There are other important processes to agricultural consolidation that contribute to farmland dispossession and consolidation that involve deeper systemic changes in the global political economy.

The literature on commercial agriculture highlights its tendency towards consolidation of ownership of agricultural production, resulting in a conflict between simple commodity producers and commercial producers. The conflict explains that simple commodity production came about due to free land grants to European settlers, which produced the conditions for the development of commercial farms. Many commercial farms were then able to consolidate farmland through their exercise of market power to outcompete simple commodity producers, pressuring small farms to sell them their farmland.

Land grabs based on financialization

The final two fields of scholarship on land grabbing covers processes of dispossession based on financial conflict. This conflict involves a contradiction between the deployment of the public wealth of governments and that of private wealth of financial companies. In this section I look at the literature on neoliberalism and financialization to understand how the struggle between the public and private interest in finance guides the distribution of farmland in French and British settler colonies. This conflict highlights the connections between a redirection of public investment towards private enterprise and the rise of financial investment companies as a dominant force in the distribution of farmland.

Neoliberal reforms and the deregulation land ownership laws

This subsection will look specifically at the literature on the role of the Canadian state in the promotion and restriction of farmland investment and accumulation. Much of the global literature on land grabbing emphasizes the importance of the state in enabling and restricting land investments and accumulation (Li, 2015; 2014; Clapp and Martin, 2015; Bjørkhaug et al., 2018; Harvey, 2005; Arrighi, 1994). The topic on neoliberalism has become central to critical perspectives on the role of the Canadian state in the distribution of resources. Harvey describes the concept as follows:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that

proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. (Harvey, 2005, 2)

Inconsistent reforms of actually existing neoliberalism

Contemporary Marxist political economists have demonstrated how neoliberalism exhibits contradictory characteristics as it manifests at different levels of governance. That is, neoliberalism is rarely applied in any universalized model but rather manifests in ways that are specific to previous political economic systems, path-dependent institutional configurations, scales, and geographies (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). The complementary relationship between neoliberal deregulation and re-regulation has been described by Brenner & Theodore (2002) as having a tendency towards variegation and hybridization between neoliberalism and the welfare state. The variegated characteristic of neoliberal politics challenges the popular notion that it is simply a roll-back of state institutions. As noted by Castree (2010), governing regimes often find themselves embroiled in persistent sets of tensions inherent to the delivery of neoliberal reforms. Such tensions can be identified through several kinds of reforms. The first set of tensions and reforms are privatization, marketization, deregulation, market-friendly re-regulation. The second is the establishment of market proxies within the state, devolution of social services to the voluntary sector. The third is the enforcement of individual self-sufficiency and self-regulation throughout civil society.

Variation therefore takes place where one reform produce a barrier to private wealth accumulation or a politically threatening social crisis, which then requires the incorporation of policy solutions uncharacteristic to neoliberal ideology. Brenner and Theodore (2002) have termed “Actually Existing Neoliberalism”, which explains how neoliberal regimes tend to meander into the realm of neo-Keynesian and neo-corporatist state interventions or other alternatives to meet its ideologized objectives.

Neoliberal farmland use and ownership reforms

There is a wealth of literature on global (Edelman et al., 2017; Anseeuw and Taylor, 2014; McMichael, 2014; Hall, 2013; Margulis and Porter, 2013; Margulis et al., 2013; Sasken, 2013; Wolford et al., 2013; Fairhead et al., 2012) and United States governance over farmland ownership (Fairbairn, 2020; Gunnoe, 2014). Neoliberal reform within the Canadian state unfolded unevenly at different scales corresponding to its federalist framework, divided into national, provincial, municipal, and Indian Act institutions. The governance of farmland use and ownership has been delegated through the Constitution of Canada to the provinces. The Senate of Canada (Heminthavong and Lavoie, 2014), the National Farmers Union (Holtslander, 2015), and Cullingworth (1984) have conducted studies comparing farmland investments between provinces, all identifying that financial farmland grabbing is taking place albeit entirely in accordance with provincial and national laws. Holtslander (2015) quantified the magnitude of the phenomenon across so-called Canada, but concludes that much information about financial land ownership remains hidden as proprietary information. There has been some study on the distribution of farmland on federally-owned

properties (Edwards, 2016; Warner, 1981), and the globalization of Canadian agriculture (Skogstad, 2008; Hall, 2003; Skogstad and Cooper, 1990).

Province-level studies of land grabbing have focused on neoliberal reforms to farmland governance. Sommerville (2018), Magnan (2017; 2015), Desmarais et al. (2016; 2015), and Sommerville and Magnan (2015) investigate the extent to which land grabbing has taken place in Saskatchewan in relation to the relaxing of farmland protection laws in 2002 that were originally implemented in 1970s. Desmarais et al. (2015) did this by combining government data on land title, interviews with local farmers, and GIS software in order to determine changes in land ownership patterns among the top four largest landowners in each Regional Municipality (RM). Somerville (2018), Magnan (2017; 2015), Desmarais et al. (2016), and Sommerville and Magnan (2015) explore how farmland ownership in Saskatchewan has changed since 2003, and what impact regulatory regimes have on this process in comparing two governing paradigms: social and economic farmland investment. Gheller (2018) and L'Italien (2012) have looked into financial land grabbing in Quebec. L'Italien identified provincial restrictions on out-of-province farmland ownership, which had limited success in preventing the practice. Gheller (2018), however, argues that political conversations in Quebec around the topic of "land grabbing" fail to address First Nations land rights and the underlying problems resulting from corporate farming. Scholarship in Ontario has primarily focused on farmland conservation, and has tended to look at the history of farmland policy and conservation outcomes protecting farmland in the Greater Toronto Area (Troughton 2007; Wilton 2007; Caldwell and Hilts 2005).

On a municipal level, Albo and Fanelli (2019) describe neoliberal urbanism as a

process by which local city governments internalize changes in the state's policy regime and in turn reorganize and produce space for expanded wealth accumulation. Spatial production of neoliberal spaces entail considerations of regional competitiveness for investment. In Canada, this process is situated within an historical context of de-industrialization, financialization, and the dismantling of the post-war welfare state. Ella Haley (2013) has written about practices of elite capture over public land use decisions by Walton International in her local community of Brantford. Smythe (2015), similarly, explores a particular case study of farmland investment that has taken place in Edmonton, Alberta by the property development corporation Walton International. This study demonstrates how investment companies exert political pressure on municipal governments to produce a favourable regulatory environment to increase the long-term value of their investments. Akram-Lodhi (2012) however, alludes to a contradiction within the literature regarding these accounts of land grabbing. He notes that scholarship on the expropriation of farmland for urban development in India and China has not been defined as "land grabbing" because it does not result in agricultural use of the land. This disagreement in the land grab literature on urbanization as a kind of land grabbing copells greater nuance and attention to the processes differentiating actors engaged in real estate development to discern what specific actions genuinely qualify as a land grab.

This section has briefly covered scholarship in Turtle Island that has looked at how and to which extent neoliberal reforms over governance of farmland distribution have enabled financial land grabbing. It identified that the financial land grabbing has occurred where land use and farmland protection laws have been relaxed based on

neoliberal imperatives to allow market forces to regulate land ownership. These reforms increasingly empower real estate markets to direct the distribution of farmland, as private actors seek to realize the most valuable use for the land to increase their profits.

Land grabs based on financial conflict

This subsection details the recent rise of financial investment companies as influential farmland owners in French and British settler colonies on Turtle Island. The scholarship on the subject of financialization reveals how neoliberal financial reforms enriched and empowered economic elites to shape the distribution of productive capital—such as farmland—throughout global markets. This subsection focuses on how the finance sector is transforming farmland from a productive asset into a new class of financial security. Financial securities are investment products that are used to store and grow saved wealth. The power of financial capital has geographic impacts that transcend the boundaries of the modern state, resulting in imperialist and colonial appropriation of territory.

Scholarly debates surrounding the topic of financialization

Harvey (2010) and Arrighi (1994) initially mention financialization in the context of global economic transformation. Arrighi (1994) attributes his use of the term financialization to Kevin Phillips, who is a former Republican Party strategist and political commentator who was concerned with the United States economy's focus from industrial production to financial services, resembling the declining phases of the Spanish, Dutch, and British

Empires. Margulis et al. (2013) and Harvey (2010) argue that the financialization is indicative of the world economy reaching a stage of “late capitalism”, with the process starting in the 1970s and eventually becoming involved in farmland investment in 2008. Epstein (2005) offers the following definition: “financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”.

French et al. (2011) describe how the concept was developed out of three schools of thought: regulation theory, critical social accountability advocacy, socio-cultural scholarship on the influence of finance on everyday life, and more recently, scholarship over the social construction of space. However, there has been a great deal of debate about the usefulness and applicability of the term. Christophers (2015a) calls for greater definitional clarity and empirical grounding to the concept of financialization for it to hold greater analytical value. He also suggests that the broadness of the concept of financialization has had the effect of “black boxing” finance (Christophers 2015b). Ouma (2020; 2016) takes issue with the attribution of financialization as a socio-political force to be analyzed. However, Mader et al. (2020) and Bjørkhaug et al. (2018) argue that the definition of financialization is necessarily and most effectively broad so that it can fit into a plurality of social and historical contexts.


The literature on the financialization of farmland ownership that has developed over the past two decades has provided rich debate and research. It details the conflict between public and private interest regulation taking place in the advancement of neoliberal reforms over the regulation of finance and land ownership and the rise of financial investment companies as a dominant force driving changes in farmland

distribution. However, the majority of scholarship argues for more empirical research on the phenomenon, to establish conceptual limits to the concept (Mader et al. 2020; Ouma 2020; 2016), understand complexity of contexts in which it takes place (Mader et al., 2020; Lapavistas, 2011), identify actors involved (Visser, 2015), document practices and causal linkages with outcomes (Mader et al., 2020; Krippner, 2005), understand the role and agency of farmers (Ouma, 2020; 2016), and better understand how it can be effectively regulated (Visser, 2015). In this thesis I contribute to this body of knowledge by examining how patterns of land distribution change in relation to a sudden rush in farmland investment in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017.

Towards a theory of land grabs within settler-colonialism

In this chapter I have looked at five fields of scholarship to better understand why the recent wave of financial land grabs in Turtle Island is taking place. I was able to identify three types of conflicts that take place through land grabs: colonial, commercial, and financial. I was also able to identify structural connections and continuities between these three kinds of conflict over land in Turtle Island. The dominance of settler colonialism gives rise to that of the simple commodity producer, which gives rise to the commercial farm and agri-food monopoly, which finally gives rise to a regime of agri-finance. This is illustrated in Figure 2 below and will be further demonstrated in Chapter 2. The practices used by the colonial governments to displace Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities and establish a settler colony determines the conditions under which commercial farmers can displace simple commodity farmers to achieve their economic

imperatives. Those strategies then determine how and if financial actors can displace public institutions to become involved in the region as a land-accumulating operation.



*Figure 2 — Political-economic conflicts driving land grabs in the Kitchi Sipi Valley
(Diagram made by Christopher Bisson)*

The amount of scholarship dedicated to the topic of farmland distribution in Turtle Island is still small but growing. It has so far had limited engagement with indigenist and decolonial scholarship about the systems of land relations specific to First Nations communities in relevant areas of studies. Gheller (2018), Kepkiewicz and Dale (2018), Rotz (2017), Geisler (2014), and Akram-Lodhi (2012) cover settler-colonialism as the original moment of land grabbing in so-called Canada. In this thesis I similarly weave Anishinaabe scholarship on land relations into the theoretical model developed in the conceptual framework chapter to better explain how the project of settler-colonialism

shapes contemporary conflicts over land distribution; an important consideration for a study of land distribution in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, which remains predominantly stolen Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land.

Topics of original accumulation and the development of the colonial and post-colonial governments have both featured prominently in scholarship on farmland distribution in poor countries in the “global south” and recent scholarship on settler colonialism in Turtle Island. However, scholarship on farmland distribution within the French and British settler colonies on Turtle Island has tended to take the foundations of the settler colonial system of private property as a given. This presents the opportunity to elaborate more on the importance of settler colonial institutions and the project of accumulating and retaining land as a component that determines decisions over land distribution. The three dimensions of political-ecological conflict driving land grabs identified in this chapter appear to connect in ways that have theoretical implications for the scholarly study of the phenomenon. The next chapter presents these implications and discusses how they can be modeled into the core theoretical framework of this thesis: the long grab.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework - The long grab

In this Chapter, I draw on insights from scholarly debates over original accumulation and settler colonialism in French and British settler colonies on Turtle Island to develop a theoretical framework that I call the “long grab”. I argue that this framework can serve as a nuanced variation on the accumulation by dispossession explanation for contemporary land grabs. Scholarship on contemporary land grabs have taken on accumulation by dispossession as a leading theoretical explanation for the phenomena. According to Harvey (2003), land grabs are a way that economic elites, facing a crisis of overaccumulation, deploy the powers of the state to dispossess populations of common resources to secure continuous growth in profits. The financialization of farmland ownership therefore occurs as a way of deploying pent-up wealth among equity funds and wealthy individuals looking for new financial securities that can yield reliable profit growth (Fairbairn, 2020; McMichael, 2014; Gunnoe, 2014). This scholarship on land grabbing, however, has yet to contend with the rich debates within historical materialist and Indigenist/decolonial scholarship that have surrounded Harvey’s theoretical concept and articulate what exactly it means for financial investors to accumulate private farmland properties—land that has already been grabbed by colonizing empires.

Here, I present the debates surrounding the accumulation by dispossession theory and build on the work of Indigenist and decolonial scholars who are interested in using recent discussion around original accumulation and settler colonialism to better explain the role of settler colonial states in creating the conditions for capitalist accumulation, particularly of private property. This provides the theoretical basis for the

long grab theory I present. The theory situates recent financial land grabs in the Kitchi Sipi Valley within a broader historical project of producing both colonial private property relations and capitalist relations of production to advance the interests of settler-capitalist elites who exercise hegemonic control over land distribution in so-called Canada. I draw on the works of Marxist and Indigenist/decolonial scholars to develop the theory, which I use in the rest of the thesis to explain the way farmland was distributed in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017. I specifically detail and synthesize three theoretical concepts relating to land distribution: (1) original accumulation, (2) settler colonialism as a structure and continuous process, and (3) the spatial production of settler-capitalist private property relations. These three theoretical concepts connect in ways that demonstrate how private property relations within a settler colonial context are shaped by a series of sometimes contradicting and sometimes reinforcing social conflicts. Fundamentally, I explain that the political-economic imperatives of the pre-capitalist settler state to secure and maintain a settlement through extensive free land grants created conditions that held back the capitalist imperative to produce conditions of market dependency among farmers, which enables financial land grabbing in certain locations. I argue that contemporary patterns of farmland distribution can therefore be explained by analyzing how these different dimensions of settler-colonial land conflict interact, which helps me address the question of why farmland investment companies were buying large sections of farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017, and why they select some regions and properties over others.

The theoretical framework that I develop in this chapter is used to explain the

recent land grab moment in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley within a longer and constantly-transforming process of optimizing the capacity of elite land owners to extract value from the ownership of land. The long grab theory is a novel contribution that identifies colonial land grabs and settler-colonial land reform as prerequisites for the development of capitalism in so-called Canada. It also stresses the importance of past decisions over land distribution in shaping present conflicts over farmland ownership.

Original accumulation and accumulation by dispossession

Original accumulation—also termed “previous accumulation” or “primitive accumulation”—indicates an historical moment when capitalist⁹ private property relations are imposed through the direct force of the state. The term was initially used by Karl Marx (1867) to critique what classical political economists presented as the origins of capitalist property from within a pre-capitalist society. Adam Smith (1776, 167) explained that the origins of the privately accumulated property, used to establish a system of capitalism, came from differences in productivity among workers in a pre-capitalist “original state of things”. Essentially he argued that the process where land was accumulated to establish a system of capitalism was no different than modern processes of capital accumulation. Marx (1867, p. 875) countered this presupposition by laying out how the creation of private property relations in fact involves a great deal of expropriation by the state and suggested that Smith’s idea of “previous accumulation” is “nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of

⁹Capitalism, in this thesis, refers to both the local relations of production and global processes of expanding capitalist access to resources, labour, and markets. These two scales are interconnected geographically through various “circuits of capital accumulation” as detailed in David Havey’s (1982) *Limits to Capital*.

production.” Marx’s primitive accumulation therefore describes the English state taking land away from peasants and giving it to gentry lords as a necessary precondition for the development of capitalist social relations. Critically, he argues that this is a process that is distinct from capitalist monopolization, which involves larger companies expanding their operations by out-competing and buying-out small ones.

Original accumulation as an explanation for English enclosure

Marx’s critical insights on the importance of land dispossession as a necessary condition for capitalist development have informed the later work of other historical materialists, like Kautsky (1899), Luxemburg (1913), Lenin (1933), Polanyi (1957), Thompson (1963), Brenner (1982; 1976), and Wood (2002). They have detailed the process of “enclosure” of the peasant commons in England, Scotland, and Ireland as a significant reform that transformed relations of agricultural production in ways that allowed for the development of capitalism in England. However, these scholars emphasize the uniqueness of the English, Scottish, and Irish experience of land enclosure, which limits the application of this theoretical framework to places outside of the region, like the Kitchi Sibi Valley.

Accumulation by dispossession

Variations on the term primitive accumulation that are more universally applicable have been recently developed. Harvey (2003, pp. 31-2) uses the term “accumulation by dispossession” to specify how a combination of neoliberal globalization and military

imperialism between the 1960s and 2000s served to create new opportunities for private companies to make profits in the face of a persistent crisis of overaccumulation by opening access to new commodities and markets, appropriating new assets through financial debt-enforcement, privatizing public assets and services, and marketizing new aspects of life that were previously accessed as a commons. Harvey draws on Arrighi's (1994) and Hardt and Negri's (2000) description of global capitalist expansion and describes how distinct state and capital "logics of power" operate together to impose a new order of capitalist imperialism around the world. The phenomena can therefore be thought of as the deployment of state power to accumulate territory as a way to secure the ability of capitalists to accumulate capital.

Theoretical applicability of accumulation by dispossession

Scholars of historical materialism in general and the contemporary land grab phenomenon in particular have debated whether the terms primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession provide an accurate description of the contemporary dispossession of Indigenous and peasant communities in economically-poor countries (Hall, 2015; Ince, 2014; Adnan, 2013; Akram-Lodhi, 2012). These critiques point out the theory's lack of attention to relations of production, conflation with capitalist accumulation, and an overgeneralization of local experiences.

Inadequate focus on relations of production and reproduction

Wood (2006) argues that Harvey's interpretation of original accumulation presumes that

Marx agreed with Adam Smith that accumulation of surplus capital was sufficient in and of itself to establish a system of capitalism. She asserts that Marx was explicit that primitive accumulation involves a process of producing worker dependence on markets to make a living. This reminds us that original accumulation is not based on the accumulation of capital *per se*, but in the imposition of capitalist relations of production on workers through dispossession. Castree (2006), to this effect, notes that Harvey's separation of territorial and capitalist logics of power in the concept of accumulation by dispossession is not made with a sufficiently-developed theory of state or imperialism to be effective.

Conflation with ongoing processes of capitalist accumulation

Brenner (2006), Sutcliffe (2006), Fine (2006), and Adnan (2013) take issue with the way Harvey's accumulation by dispossession problematically conflates and exaggerates instances of original accumulation with characteristics that normally describe capitalist accumulation, weakening its analytical usefulness. Brenner (2006) and Fine (2006) assert that Harvey's characterization of distinct state and capital logics of power operating within accumulation by dispossession does not capture familiar processes that involve dispossession without the deployment of state power to advance capitalist accumulation. Adnan (2013) argues that dispossession does not have to involve direct state violence to expropriate land from an unwilling peasantry, but can include market-based maneuvers like forced commoditization of production through the enforcement of debt contracts and the collection of property taxes. Callinicos and Ashman (2006) suggest that explicit acts of dispossession through policies of enclosure imposed by the

state are fundamentally different from dispossession that occurs through capitalist accumulation. They argue that moments of privatization, which Harvey claims are examples of accumulation by dispossession, are in fact moments of either “commodification” or “recommodification”.

Adnan (2013) specifies that instances of original accumulation ought to be carefully defined as phenomena that are distinct from capitalist accumulation. He elaborates that it must involve the creation of new assets and commodities for market and contribute to an expansion of capitalist production. This means that historical instances of land grabbing that precede the formation of a capitalist mode of production do not qualify as original accumulation or accumulation by dispossession. Akram-Lodhi (2012, 126) stresses that the expansion in farmland holdings of large-scale domestic farms through the acquisition of smaller ones constitutes a “routine and predictable” process of agrarian change—what Karl Kautsky (1899) termed “the agrarian question”—within capitalist agriculture as firms face the imperative to expand production to capture economies of scale to remain profitable.

Overgeneralization of local experiences of dispossession

Fine (2006) takes issue with the idea that dialectics and periods of dominance can take place between the universal imperatives of the territorial logics of power and the historically-specific imperatives of capitalist logics of power. He suggests, alternatively, that the role and logic of financial actors—along with supportive cooperation of the neoliberal state—within global capitalism is the genuinely novel development that merits theoretical focus, which I advance in my theory of the long grab.

Hall (2015) and Ince (2014) specifically warns that hasty comparisons to the emergence of English agrarian capitalism poses a colonial danger of imposing the example of a specific European case of dispossession on the rest of the world. Hall (2015, p. 81) helpfully suggests that,

... drawing on Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation may make us assume that people being dispossessed today live under the same conditions as did the medieval English peasantry. The danger is a somewhat ironic one. One of the great strengths of the primitive accumulation framework is its analysis of the centuries-long process by which capitalism has become truly global, but the framework can simultaneously encourage us to ignore the effects of that history of capitalist expansion on the places where land grabs are now taking place.

Pre-capitalist development and subsequent moments of dispossession

Adnan (2013), Akram-Lodhi (2012), and Brenner (2006) have suggested looking at specific historical processes of capitalist expansion—specifically the pre-capitalist conditions of capitalist development—to better understand the specific ways that the state and capital interact around contemporary moments of land dispossession. I interpret this suggestion to imply looking at development of private property relations in a similar fashion to Friedmann and McMichael's (1989) focus on the history of long term transformations in global relations of food production. I therefore reconsider Harvey's theory of accumulation by dispossession to identify an appropriate theoretical framework for this study by looking at the connections between the development of private property relations and the unfolding of the agrarian question under the specific

conditions produced by a pre-capitalist mode of production in the so-called Upper Canadian settler colony. I do this by taking a long-historical approach to critical political economy that looks at the origins and evolution of actors and institutions governing the distribution of private property in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. This kind of analysis requires a conceptual framework that can explain how different historical processes and events are connected, arranged, and rearranged to advance and defend dominant political-economic interests of economic elites. It also requires specific consideration of the settler-colonial context of the Kitchi Sipi Valley, which produces unique sets of political-ecological conditions for the production, distribution, and redistribution of private property in the area.

Expanding original accumulation to include colonial dispossession

Indigenist and decolonial scholars have debated the applicability of using the terms primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession to describe instances of colonial dispossession (Englert, 2020; Coulthard and Simpson, 2016; Pflug-Back & Kesīqnaeh, 2016; Coulthard, 2014; Wolfe, 2006). Some have used the latter term to describe instances of contemporary land grabs in Turtle Island based on resource extraction. Pflug-Back & Kesīqnaeh (2016) explicitly use the latter term to describe the present colonial-capitalist structure of extractive industries in so-called Canada as a kind of accumulation by dispossession. They identify the Canadian settler state—fixated on goals of “job creation”—as an important partner for extraction corporations in securing access to natural resources in First Nations-controlled areas. Others, however, have asserted alternative ways of explaining settler colonial development. Wolfe (2006)

describes British settler colonialism in Turtle Island and Australia as a long-historical and ongoing process. Coulthard (2014) expands the concept of original accumulation to include processes of Indigenous genocide rather than proletarianization. These two interventions highlight the need to attend to the intersections of colonial and capitalist processes of dispossession to explain capitalist development in a settler colony.

Settler colonialism as structure and process

Wolfe (2006; 1998) presents a framework for understanding settler colonialism that echoes Harvey's depiction of accumulation by dispossession. Namely, he identifies the importance of the settler state to constantly reproduce conditions for capitalist accumulation. He argues that settler colonial regimes are engaged in a constant struggle to keep the land colonized, facilitating further capitalist accumulation. This leads him to refer to settler colonialism as a long-historical process following the dynamics of global capitalism rather than representing it as a single moment. Englert (2020), however, expresses concern with Wolfe's over-generalization of settler colonialism by focusing on cases in Turtle Island and Australia. He argues that this focus problematically represents all settler colonialism as singularly focused on the removal of Indigenous peoples. The central point, however, remains valid when considering the maneuvers of the Canadian state as detailed in Pflug-Back & Kesīqnaeh (2016). Settler colonization is not a single moment after which colonialism is over. It is an ongoing process that requires attention to local context to accurately describe.

Pre-capitalist imperatives for colonization

Coulthard and Simpson (2016) argue that Marx's critique of original accumulation reflects a "normative developmentalism" that generalizes the way capitalism develops and expands around the world. Coulthard (2014) asserts that it would be incorrect to presume that capitalism developed in Turtle Island by the expropriation of surplus First Nations labour through enclosure. The original impetus of colonization in Turtle Island was not for the creation of a regime to extract surplus value from First Nations as proletarian laborers for the realization of private profit. It was driven by the need to acquire land for the pre-capitalist extraction of resources to be worked through a capitalist mode of production in the colonial metropole. This required the removal of First Nations from the land and the dismantling of their systems of social organization. He therefore suggests that theories of "original accumulation"¹⁰ could be better articulated by approaching the phenomenon as a process of creating colonial relations of conquest and assimilation as opposed to purely capitalist processes of enclosure and proletarianization.

This insight shifts the focus of accumulation by dispossession in settler colonies away from the expansion of purely capitalist social relations based on the subjugation of labour, towards the project of acquiring and securing the land base through colonial means necessary for the expansion of capitalist social relations in the settler colony. Critically, this places the process of acquiring land for a settler colony before—and continuously alongside—the practice of producing capitalist social relations of

¹⁰ Coulthard (2014) emphasizes the use of "original accumulation" instead of 'primitive accumulation' to make the case that the process of incorporating non-capitalist societies and spaces into an expanded capitalist mode of production is not confined to any historic period, but rather it takes place continuously as colonialism throughout the history of capitalist expansion.

production and accumulation. Englert (2020, p. 1648) expands on this by arguing for analysis of the specific processes of “settler accumulation” and settler relationships with Indigenous communities, which establishes particular conditions for settler class struggle over conquered lands and resources.

These reflections on original accumulation and accumulation by dispossession highlight the need to identify specific historical dilemmas faced by colonial powers in acquiring and securing the land base for a later process of capitalist development. One essentially needs to consider the historical conditions and strategies of pre-capitalist colonial expansion by European empires before being able to theorize the expansion of capitalist social relations in the settler colony.

The spatial production of settler private property relations

I use private property as the analytical focus of this thesis to connect historical processes of settler colonialism and agrarian change. I do this by looking at one theoretical concept underpinning David Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession: the production of space. Harvey (2003) has drawn on the works of the Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1974) to explain how specific modes of production produce their own spaces. In this section I examine Lefebvre’s concept of spatial production to help develop a theoretical framework surrounding the historical production of private property in a settler colonial context.

Modes of production and the production of space

Lefebvre explains that different modes of production direct labour towards the physical production of new landscapes out of old ones. Such labour, importantly, is directed in ways that are meant to be self-reinforcing of the regime's power, producing and continuously reproducing spaces that serve its interest (Lefebvre, 1974). In other words, dominant classes direct the activity of subordinates to produce space that best serves its interests. Lefebvre describes how space is produced to serve the dominant class and then produces a consciousness of space whose purpose is the reproduction of the mode of production. This results in a continuously reinforcing cycle between consciousness, social activity, and the physical environment that reproduces the power of the dominant group.

Abstraction of space to assert dominant class power

Lefebvre (1974) suggests that the abstract space of a mode of production abstracts space in a similar way to the abstraction of labour described by Marx. Abstraction of space relies on the continuous interaction between three different ways of engaging with space. *Espace perçu* (perceived space) is the everyday space, the social world lived by individuals. It is also the space they navigate, which is shaped by their practices, experiences and movements. *Espace conçu* (abstract space) refers to the ways "experts" plan, representing and organizing the rural or urban space with which individuals interact. It involves spatial codes and discourses that come from abstract and scientific ways of understanding the world (ex. cadastral grids, regional plans, etc.), which usually excludes the knowledge and expertise of everyday people and

communities who are the ones using, feeling, and shaping the space. *Espace vécu* (social space) is the conflicting and reinforcing set of social relations in space that emerges from the interplay between perceived and abstract space: here/there, inside/outside, access/restriction, concentration/dispersal.

Pre-capitalist modes of production in so-called Upper Canada imposed the imperatives of a pre-capitalist and neo-feudal society, which comprised the need to secure colonial territory for imperial resource extraction and to reinforce arbitrary status and privilege of colonial elites over settler peasants. The abstract space conceived of by pre-capitalist elites therefore asserted a consciousness of colonial space as a means of accessing resources for export and paying for services to the empire and securing a political order structured along relations of patronage. Capitalism compels workers—through our reliance on markets—to produce space in ways that help advance profitable production. Capitalist and political elites collaborate in a constant process of reducing the labour time needed to bring together labour, inputs, and productive capital to produce increasing amounts of surplus value for capitalists to appropriate in the form of profits. Marx (1939, p. 539) refers to this process in the *Grundrisse* as a reduction “to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another”, a formulation later simplified by Harvey (1990) as the “annihilation of space by time”. This imperative leads governments and capitalists to use spatial codes to plan optimal systems of transportation to and from places where production and consumption occur. The implementation of both pre-capitalist and capitalist abstract spaces, however, are often fraught with challenges that arise from the social and environmental conditions it seeks to re-order into profitable spaces.

Ecological and social struggle over the production of space

Settler-capitalist accumulation of private property is both enabled and regulated through spatial codes such as cadastral maps that order a matrix of public and private property rights; zoning bylaws that mediate conflicting forms of profitable land use; and land inventory surveys that compare the relative soil fertility of different sections of land. These spatial codes direct who is permitted to access and manipulate certain parcels of land in ways that reinforce profitable production. Such abstract spatial codes, however, need to be physically produced through labour into a new material form. This results in conflict with challenging biophysical conditions and resistance from groups of workers and people inhabiting the space. These conflicts require elites to make compromises, or to direct labour, resources, innovations, or the use of violence towards the realization of their spatial codes. This makes the development of space historically dynamic in its form and character (Lefebvre, 1974).

Private property and the conflation of abstract and real space

Once an elite group manages to assert dominance over space, the validity of its abstract space begins to acquire a perceived material realness by some groups of dominated peoples. As spatial patterns of behaviour and routines of everyday life are replicated and normalized, an ideological conflation between the conceptual and the lived space becomes blended, confused, and even fetishized (Lefebvre, 1991).

Settler colonial private property is a good example of the conflation between

abstract and real space. Blomley (2004) argues that private property pre-exists capitalism as a feudal institution, and functions as an exertion of private rights through granted state powers rather than as a power wielded autonomously by the gentry. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 427-9) suggest that “private property presupposes State public property”. Private property relations transform consciousness of space itself, giving rise to the conventional way of thinking among settler landowners that owning private property rights is the same thing as owning the land itself. At this stage, elites do not need to directly manage social relations in space as subordinates begin self-regulating their everyday actions to reflect the imperatives of the imposed abstract sense of space. Colonial governments, essentially, do not need to defend their claims to a territory as long as subordinate settlers remain convinced that their ownership of land is an inalienable private right that is independent from any history of colonial violence or contemporary government relations to First Nations.

Lefebvre’s concept of spatial production and its application to the concept of private property in the Canadian settler colony improves our understanding of the critical connections between historical processes of settler colonialism and the agrarian question. The specific ways that the Canadian settler colony established a system of private property relations out of stolen land demonstrates how regimes are in a constant process of simultaneously re-perceiving and re-conceiving the land into new formations to maneuver around crises and to advance their goals.

The long grab and the production of settler-capitalist space

I have covered, in this chapter, two streams of theoretical scholarship—Marxist and

decolonial—that explain various instances of land grabbing which took place in the Kitchi Sipi Valley since colonization. I then drew upon Henri Lefebvre’s concept of spatial production to bridge these two explanations through the focus on the production of private property on stolen land. I argue that examining specifically how private property was produced in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley can serve as an analytical tool to explain how land is distributed today. This theoretical framework—spanning and connecting colonial and capitalist processes of accumulation—is what I call a “long grab”. In other words, I suggest that we need to look at and consider the historical series of land grabs in this region as a single project participating in the formation of a settler society in which colonial elites endeavour to optimize the extraction of wealth from the land. I suggest that the ways in which pre-capitalist colonial powers used violence and deceit to extract land from Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities, breaking it up, fighting over it, and distributing it among different groups of migrant settlers, produced specific geographic patterns of farmland distribution prior to the establishment of liberal private property markets and the rise of corporate agribusiness. These patterns of distribution then conditioned the local experience of global processes of agrarian change. These long historical processes and conflicts over private properties eventually established the conditions experienced by contemporary farmland investors. This kind of historical materialist analysis can therefore contribute to explaining why the financial land grab phenomenon took place in certain locations in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017.

The spatial production of settler-capitalist private property relations in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley has therefore taken a winding path through three

different modes of production that were dominant at different points in the settler colonial history of the Kitchi Sipi Valley: feudal, pre-capitalist, and capitalist. Conquering land, extracting fur and timber, and producing farmland property have all shaped the natural and built environment in ways that either advanced (ex. logging roads, tillable soil, etc.) or hindered (ex. deforestation, erosion, etc.) the regime’s ability to accomplish its goals.

Settler farmers—as a result of extensive land grants throughout the 1800s—received control over sections of land which increased their standard of living and social power, but they received it unevenly and with specific conditions that reinforce the colonial state and capital’s power (i.e., loyalty and military service to a colonial oligarchy, lease or mortgage payments, etc.). They also, however, often fought back and gained power over the land to advance their own interests. Moments of land conflicts in the Kitchi Sipi Valley took place in three arcs where one set of interests dominated land distribution. The displacement of one set of colonial elites—defending a mode of production that serves their interests—by another set of elites then begins a new process of “land reform” to achieve the new elite’s goals. The term land reform describes a process where a new group takes control and the way land is shared or distributed changes. It is often accompanied with a label that describes its ideological purpose (Bernstein, 2010).

Table 2 - Settler Colonial Modes of Production in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, 1500 to 2017			
Mode of Production	Dominant Interest	Actors Involved	Land Conflicts
Feudal	French Merchant Aristocrats	Commodities: Fur and timber Owner: Aristocrats Labour: First Nations and peasant labourers Market: Mercantile Distributors: Merchants	1. First Nations Government vs Imperial Merchant Charters 2. English vs French empires

Pre-Capitalist	British Gentry Aristocrats	Commodities: Grain and timber Owner: Gentry Labour: Migrant workers Market: Mercantile Distributors: Merchants	1. First Nations government vs. Imperial Proclamation 2. Gentry vs. bourgeois 3. Farmers vs. squatters
Capitalist	Canadian Agribusiness and Finance	Commodities: Grain, beef, and dairy Owner: Private Labour: Settler workers Market: International financial and commodity markets Distributors: Public institutions and private distributors	1. First Nations government vs. settler government 2. Public vs. private 3. Banks vs. farmers 3. Agribusiness vs. farmers 4. Farmers vs. land workers

A new set of colonial elites tend to come from subordinate settler groups who own land (i.e. military aristocracy, industrial capitalists, etc.). New elites then incorporate aspects of the old mode of production into the land reforms that establish a new mode of production. This produces a continuity of different historical processes across different modes of production, such as the development of a settler colony on colonized lands or the separation of workers from the ownership of the land and tools that they own. This thesis refers to these long-historical processes as “the long grab”, a process of continuous colonial land reform that takes place across multiple modes of production. The specific long grab examined in this thesis describes the development of a “settler-capitalist” mode of production. This mode of production seeks to accomplish two goals: (1) suppressing First Nations society to allow for the development of a settler colony, and (2) establishing a fully capitalist system of private property and labour relations to maximize the extraction of surplus value, which other Marxist literature has referred to as “primitive” or “original accumulation”.

The long grab framework situates contemporary instances of financial land grabbing within broader historical processes of colonizing land and transforming it into properties that optimize the economic value that can be extracted for profit. It also helps to identify particular conflicts in the production of farmland properties in the Kitchi Sipi

Valley that result in specific challenges faced by colonial elites in implementing a system of colonial capitalism, which helps to explain why farmland investors select certain regions and properties to acquire over others. The following chapter details the cartographic and historical materialist methodologies used to conduct this kind of analysis.

Chapter 3: Methodology - Mapping farmland distribution

In this chapter I reiterate this thesis's research questions and draw on the literature review detailed in Chapter 1 theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 to present the research hypothesis. I then describe the methodological approaches that I use to answer the research questions and test the dissertation hypothesis. The long grab theory would suggest that the land investment phenomena is the result of an historical process of continuously transforming social relations surrounding private property rights driven and directed by conflicts that exist within settler-capitalism. The question that this dissertation seeks to answer is therefore: is the financial land grab phenomenon in Kitchi Sipi Valley, between 2000 and 2017, indicative of a process of land reform corresponding to the emergence of a new dominant group of economic actors and material interests guiding farmland distribution? If this is true, then one would observe a transition of a majority farmland ownership from farmers and farming corporations towards a different group that are not direct agricultural producers. In other words, this thesis tests to see if non-farmer corporations are becoming the dominant interest represented in how farmland is distributed in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

I use three different research methods to test this hypothesis. First, I employ critical cartographic methods to survey, categorize, and analyze quantitative changes in the proportion of farmland owned by investment corporations in the survey area between 2000 and 2017. Second, I use historical materialist analysis of secondary historical sources to identify moments of crisis, reform, and transformation in the way land is distributed in the study area since early colonization in the 1500s. Finally, I conduct a case study analysis of two investment corporations to identify particular

motivations they have to purchase farmland in the area, and what drives them to or prevents them from purchasing more. Together, these three methodologies answer the question about whether financial investment companies have become a dominant force in the distribution of farmland in the study area, and what specific historical conditions have enabled or prevented this. The results of this analysis allows me to evaluate the validity of the research hypothesis, suggesting that long-historical challenges of settler colonialism shape whether an area is vulnerable or resistant to the phenomenon of financial land grabbing.

Research questions and hypothesis

The scholarly literature suggests that financial investment firms could be emerging as the dominant interest surrounding a new set of economic elites, therefore this study specifically focuses on rates of land accumulation among investment firms. If investment companies have accumulated a significant amount of farmland in a survey of private property ownership then it seems reasonable to conclude that farmland investment companies are succeeding in consolidating farmland. A significant amount of farmland, in this case, would be proportions of investor farmland ownership similar to those found in Desmarais et al. (2015). If private farms or farming corporations retain the majority of farmland ownership in the survey area, then it is reasonable to suggest that farmland investment firms are not successfully consolidating farmland and a different explanation is needed to explain levels of farmland consolidation.

Two indicators were used to measure the proportion of farmland that is owned by financial investors. The first indicator is the concentration of land ownership among the

four largest farmland owners (CLO4), which combines the acres of land owned by the top four farmland owners for a given year (Desmarais et al., 2015). An increase in the CLO4 value suggests that consolidation in farmland ownership is taking place around the largest land owners. A decrease in the CLO4 value suggests that dispersal in farmland ownership is occurring. The second indicator is the proportion of sampled farmland that is owned by different ownership categories that I have established in this study (i.e. private farms, farm corporations, financial investment firms, etc.). The categories of farmland ownership that own the highest proportion of the sampled properties could indicate that they exercise some degree of control over land distribution. Categories with the lowest proportion of the sampled properties could indicate that the actors involved are unable or unwilling to exercise control over how land is distributed.

1. How much farmland have investment companies acquired in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017?
2. What are the historical factors that enable or prevent the financial land grabbing phenomenon?
3. How can the current moment of financial grabbing be understood in a broader objective of land justice, access, and security under settler-capitalism?

	Increasing CLO4: consolidation	Decreasing CLO4: dispersal
High proportion of new category	<u>Land Reform</u>: New group of elites are consolidating farmland [hypothesis]	<u>Land Diffusion</u> : New group of elites are fragmenting
Low proportion of new category	<u>Land Entrenchment</u> : Old group of elites are consolidating	<u>Land Dispersal</u> : Old group of elites are fragmenting

Table 3 - Land distribution scenarios for land-owning elites

Table 3 describes the four potential ideal-type outcomes to this study. The first outcome involves an increase in the CLO4 and an increase in the proportion of a new category of land owner such as “farmland investment company”. This combination would suggest that consolidation of farmland around a new, dominant category of land owner is taking place and those actors are emerging as a dominant land owner. I refer to this combination as “land reform”. The second outcome is if the CLO4 increases but the new, dominant category of land owner remains low. This combination suggests that the old set of actors are consolidating their holdings to secure their power over the distribution of land. I refer to this combination as “land entrenchment”. The third outcome involves a combination of decreasing CLO4 and a high proportion of farmland owners among the new category. This suggests that land is gradually diffused to a new category or categories of land owners but the new set of actors have not consolidated their holdings. I refer to this combination as “land diffusion”. The fourth outcome involves a combination of decreasing CLO4 and a low proportion of the category of farmland owners. This suggests that no new, dominant category of farmland owner is

emerging and land is being redistributed through the old set of actors. This could be indicative of a new, dominant category of landowners either reorganizing their distribution of land or that they are losing their hegemonic power without being replaced by a new, dominant group of landowners. This thesis refers to this combination as “land dispersal”, as control over the distribution of land is generally more dispersed.

I have hypothesized that the recent land grab in the study area most likely resembles a process of land reform surrounding financial investment companies and driven by a broader process of financialization in agricultural production based on the findings of the land grab scholarship in so-called Canada (Gheller, 2018; Sommerville, 2018; Rotz et al., 2017; Le Billon and Sommerville, 2017; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Holtslander, 2015; Magnan, 2015; Martin, 2015). Financialization, in this respect, is defined as cases where an investment firm has purchased farmland in the study area. It is therefore valid if the farmland ownership survey results in an increase in both CLO4 and the proportion of farmland owned by farmland investment companies.

Critical cartography and farmland distribution mapping

The first method that I use in this study is a critical approach to cartography to measure the distribution of farmland ownership in the study area. Cartography can be described most simply as, “art, science and technology of map-making” (Kent and Vujakovic 2017). However, this simple action has historically been driven in pursuit of territorial control. The European use of cartography was originally based on determining the geographic extent of “civilization”, instrumental to the expansion and governance of the Greek and Roman empires (Edney 2017, p. 68). Cartography has more recently been

used in the Americas as a tool of colonization. Cartography was used by European Empires as a tool for navigation and exploration, especially by colonial empires seeking wealth and resources to exploit (Radcliffe, 2017; Driver, 1991). Cartography was then used to divide portions of land to suit the needs of an expanding settler colony. The surveying and cadastral separation of landscapes into freehold properties was essential to the displacement of First Nations peoples and successful settlement of European pioneers (Gehl, 2017; Lawrence, 2012; Kelly et al., 2010). Recent cartographic innovations, like remote sensing technology and geographic information systems (GIS), have made it easier and less-resource intensive to develop a detailed understanding of today's physical and human geography. These technologies were developed within geography departments where quantitative geography was the leading paradigm. GIS was initially met with criticism by social scientists for its positivist and reductive nature (Fisher and Unwin, 2005). After all, the advent of geomatics has been led by an interest to further exploit territories of their resources, whether they are mineral deposits, land claim agreements, or commercially exploitable spatial information. However, a more nuanced criticism emerged making a distinction between GISystems and GIScience.

Maps are representations of spatial complexity (Edney, 2017). Cartographers make choices over what to include or exclude in their selective depiction of an infinitely complex landscape. They have a specific point they are trying to make and to communicate to the reader (Griffiths and Baker, 2019). If a credible cartographer is commissioned to make maps for the purposes of powerful actors and institutions, then their maps possess a degree of power and authority (Braun, 2002). Conflicts over real property (land, buildings, mineral rights, etc.) boundaries are mediated through official

maps and surveys (Blomley, 2004). This is, following Henri Lefebvre (1992) thinking, what produces the “conceptual space”. The creation and use of maps are therefore essential to exercise power over territory, hegemonically or counter-hegemonically.

Maps inevitably leave things out to be effective at communicating an insight. However, choices can be made for the purposes of justice regarding what to include in a map and how such things are to be mapped (Blomley, 2004; Braun, 2002). This research is being done partially because of the lack of cartographic information about land distribution in Ontario. The Government of Ontario chooses to map many agricultural themes such as soil quality, crops production, available heat units, etc. In doing so, these maps mostly serve agribusiness interests, since they can be used to facilitate industrial-scale productivity, infrastructure to access global markets, and the reinvestment of capital to maximize productivity.

My cartographic survey was conducted through a spatial analysis of farmland ownership using the geographic information software (GIS) ArcMap. I conducted this analysis to identify how many investment firms are buying farmland. It must be noted, however, that this narrow definition of financialization was chosen because the data used in this study was only able to disclose the identities of property owners, and not the specific investment practices used. It is therefore likely that the extent of financialization, in its broadest sense, is not fully captured in the research findings.

The study sourced the most recent mapping files (SHPs) from 2016 detailing the geographic features of properties for three municipalities in the three eastern most municipalities of Ontario: Ottawa; Prescott and Russell; and Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry. I explain in Chapter 1 that these municipalities were selected as the study

area because they contain the largest sections of farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. These files contained hundreds of thousands of properties, including properties in urban areas with no agriculture taking place.¹¹ The study consulted the most recent Official Plans for the three municipalities to identify what properties permit agriculture, defined as “Normal Farm Practices” by Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. Properties that were covered by less than 50% of a zoning category permitting conventional agriculture were removed from the sample. There was also a great deal of rural properties that were small lots containing only a building for housing or commercial purposes. Properties zoned for conventional agriculture, but under 10 hectares were therefore also removed from the sample. These parameters produced a sample size of 13,232 properties between the three municipalities.

Land ownership information in Ontario is managed by a third-party, private corporation called Teranet. I was able to obtain 16 months of access to Teranet’s online property search tool called Geowarehouse for the purposes of public interest research. Through this search tool I could input the Property Identification Number (PIN) or address provided in the SHPs files to receive a report of all land transfers for the property dating back in most cases to the 1980s. From the property reports I was able to extract information about the current property owner, other property owners between 2000 and 2017. This information was then added to a series of new fields that I added to the SHP files using ArcCatalogue. I was therefore able to produce for all sampled properties a value or name for each year between 2000 and 2017 for: title holder name

¹¹ As of 2017, the City of Ottawa passed a motion permitting “urban agriculture” on properties of virtually all zoning classification, which mostly includes community gardens and backyard vegetable production. Properties that permitted urban agriculture, but no other forms of agriculture were excluded from this sample of properties used in this study.

and sales price.

I gave each sampled property an ownership-type classification by year as I entered the data extracted from Geowarehouse. I categorized each property by year based on the name of the owners given in each report. In the majority of the cases, properties were owned by private individuals or a group of private individuals, which were given a category of “private ownership.” In many cases, properties were indicated to be owned by an incorporated entity. I ran the names of these incorporated entities through basic online search tools to infer their specific purpose of owning the property. Some properties were registered under the title of an anonymous numbered corporation (ex. 123456 Ontario Inc.). I was able to learn about the identity and purpose of some anonymous numbered corporations, in which case they were categorized based on their true purpose; however, the majority were not reasonably searchable therefore a category of anonymous ownership was given to these properties. Further research is needed to identify the identities of these corporations (see Conclusion chapter).

The categories of ownership used in this study are as follows, from most common to the to least common in the study area:

1. Individual, Partnership or Group of Private Owner(s)
2. Farming Corporations
3. Anonymous Numbered Corporations
4. Property Development and Resource Extraction Corporations
5. Waste Management Corporations
6. Financial/Investment/Holding/Escrow Corporations

7. Other Corporations
8. Local Government
9. Provincial Government
10. Federal Government
11. Conservation Trust
12. Post-Secondary Institutions
13. Faith-Based Organizations
14. Not-for-Profit Organizations

The area of land owned by corporations included all forms of incorporated business structures: farming corporations, anonymous numbered corporations, property development and resource extraction corporations, waste management corporations, financial and holding corporations, and “other corporations.” This aggregate measure of corporations provides a theoretical upper-limit to the extent of rent-seeking and speculative farmland ownership by corporations. The precise quantification of rent-seeking and speculative ownership practice is not feasible due to the proprietary nature of farmland investment and the large amount of farmland owned by anonymous numbered corporations. Therefore, the overall proportion of corporate ownership indicates the upper limit to what is possible for farmland ownership for rent-seeking and speculative profits. There were cases of individuals owning a significant amount of farmland properties. However, these individuals were all affiliated in some capacity with corporations investing in farmland, therefore these individuals’ land holdings were included with the corporations in which they are affiliated.

The final quantitative component of this study involved determining who were the largest landowners in the region in 2017 to identify potential key actors in farmland investment in Kitchi Sipi Valley. This was done by aggregating the farmland holdings of entities or individuals owning more than one farmland property in an excel spreadsheet. Landowner titles for all three municipalities were placed in one column followed by their corresponding land area value in another column. The landowner title column was then sorted alphabetically to cluster land holdings by name. The multiple holdings of entities or individuals were then counted, and their areas aggregated. Individuals or entities with land holdings greater than 100 hectares were then ranked producing lists of approximately 1,000 landowners per municipality. The top ten landowners across all three municipalities confirmed to be engaged in rent-seeking or speculative activity were then identified for further analysis later in this thesis.

The level of significance in financialization taking place in the study area is ultimately determined by comparing the findings to those published in Desmarais et al. (2015). CLO4 rates comparable to that study are considered high given that the authors attribute its magnitude to an instance of financial land grabbing. Farmland ownership categories, however, have no other cases for comparison to determine its relative significance. Financial land ownership is therefore considered high if these companies become the largest landowners by proportion of the study area. Financial land grabbing is therefore determined in this study as significant in the study area and time period if CLO4 matches the findings of Desmarais et al. (2015) and if financial firms are becoming the largest class of land owner.

Historical materialist research

The second method I use in this study is historical materialist analysis of secondary historical sources. This research adopts Harvey's (1996) particular interpretation of historical materialism analysis as a methodological framework for the collection and analysis of secondary historical sources. He suggests that history is driven by an unfolding of conflicts between different social classes attempting to secure their material interests. Moments of crisis reveal the inner social and ecological conflicts that are created by political-economic formations like private property relations. Instances of land grabbing are therefore ideal subjects of study to understand key political-economic actors, institutions, and processes that determine how farmland is distributed.

Desmarais et al (2015) and Sommerville and Magnan (2015) have identified a series of political-economic factors that have resulted in farmland land grabbing in so-called Saskatchewan. Their analysis identified historical moments of policy reform that altered how farmland is distributed. They demonstrated that there was a distinct correlation between land ownership reforms in Saskatchewan in 2007 and a rush of farmland investment by Canadian financial entities. Gheller (2018) and L'Italien (2012) illustrated how existing land ownership regulations in Quebec limited the capacity of a foreign-owned financial company interested in large scale land acquisition. There is therefore reason to suggest that governments in Canada possess the ability to mitigate or facilitate the forces of global financial capital from engaging in land grabbing.

I conducted a similar analysis as a member of Sustain Ontario's Farming and Farmland Network, which looked at how to protect farmland in Ontario from

development and degradation. This thesis builds on the insights from this work as part of the research network. Sustain Ontario's Farming and Farmland Network specifically wanted to know what policy tools exist in so-called Ontario for farmland preservation, in order to guide their advocacy work. This earlier project was conducted through a research assistant contract funded through a project called Community First: Impacts of Community Engagement (CFICE) led by Dr. Peter Andrée (Political Science, Carleton University). The report that resulted from this policy analysis and mapping component was drafted as a discussion paper for the Farming and Farmland Working Group's farmland protection session of Sustain Ontario's Bring Food Home Conference at the University of Ottawa in November of 2017.

The specific process of policy mapping entailed an extensive literature review on land use and ownership in so-called Ontario. The literature review used a snowball sampling of key policies, laws, and themes that emerged from the literature. Initial searches involved the use of Google Scholar to identify literature on "farmland in Ontario", which produced a list of various policies (municipal bylaws, conservation strategies, etc.) and laws (Planning Act, Provincial Policy Statement, etc.) that govern farmland use and ownership in Ontario. The literature from the second list of search terms were then scanned for any potential omission in laws or policies. I then conducted a focused literature review on each policy and law to identify the history of their formation, use, and potential contradiction with other laws or policies.

The Farming and Farmland Network report on farmland conservation that I prepared identified a series of key actors, policies, and institutions that are involved in regulating farmland use in so-called Ontario, with attention towards conservation. I used

the findings of this report as a starting point for the historical materialist analysis in this thesis. I went deeper into the historical development of the policies and institutions identified in the report to find moments of change surrounding the regulation of private property in so-called Ontario. I was able to discern critical moments of conflict over private property distribution throughout the history that resulted in significant policy changes, detailed in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

Case study research

The third method that I use in this study is case study research. The academic literature on land grabbing worldwide shows us that the moments of rupture created by the conflicts of the global land rush tend to take place at the local level and are characterized by context-specific idiosyncrasies. Most scholars use comparative and case study approaches to understand the phenomenon of land grabbing. This approach has successfully demonstrated the uniqueness to the unfolding of land conflicts on the local level. Various works of global scholarship on land grabbing have also emerged, but they largely come out of this collectivity of local case studies. This research contributes to this process by offering more empirical evidence to the global study of land grabbing. Case studies in this research are used to test the financialization hypothesis operating through much of the global land grabbing literature.

Case selection

Case study research makes insights about a social phenomenon through focused

investigation of cases (Gerring, 2017; Gillham, 2000). Gerring (2017, 27) defines a case as, “a spatially and temporally delimited phenomenon of theoretical significance”.

Gillham (2000, 1) defines a case as a, “unit of human activity embedded in the real world ... that can only be understood in context”. In this research, the broader phenomenon under study is the practice of farmland acquisitions as a form of financial investment. The cases selected to study this phenomenon are drawn from Kitchi Sipi Valley because members of this farming community told me that they think there are land ownership disputes resulting from the practice of land grabbing in the area.

The literature on land grabbing in Canada has suggested that farmland investment cases have resulted in disputes between investment companies, real estate agents, development corporations, custom farm businesses, farmers, local government, and a local rural community (Smythe, 2015; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015). The instigating actor in these cases is the investment company that seeks to acquire land in a pre-existing rural community. This research therefore defines its cases as encompassing a specific investment company’s purchase of farmland that serves as catalyst for social change in a local community.

The empirical data that was collected for the cartographic component of this study highlighted two companies as significant actors among farmland investors in Kitchi Sipi Valley from 2000 to 2017: Walton International and Bonfield Financial. Each case study provides an historical account of the formation and evolution of each company.

Elite Interviews

I conducted a small set of semi-structured interviews with elites to learn more about operations of the two land investment companies under study. This qualitative research was approved by the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Office and conducted in accordance with their protocols for research with human subjects (see Appendix A). Elites – experts who hold specific technical or proprietary knowledge – were identified through a mapping of regulations, institutions, organizations, and actors involved in the practice of farmland investment in Kitchi Sipi Valley. These elites were contacted by various means in accordance with the communications protocol of call scripts and letters of introduction. I planned to conduct at least three interviews for each case study—six in total, which would include one interview with company representatives and two with farmers in the area where land investments took place. I prepared a digital poster that I circulated through targeted emails and untargeted social media posts (i.e. local farmer facebook groups) to recruit potential interviewees. None of the investment companies responded to my requests for an interview. A representative of Bonnefield Financial, however, reached out to me later to request an interview after seeing the social media poster that I circulated.

Ten farmers responded to my request for an interview, but only three interviews returned information that was useful for this research. My initial call for interviewees resulted in little interest. I assumed that the low result was either because little investment was taking place or because farmers did not want to share what they knew out of fear for social or professional repercussions. This led me to create an anonymous, online form that farmers could fill-out without disclosing their identity. Only

two respondents indicated knowledge of farmland investment activity through the anonymous form, but they were located outside of the study area. Six of the farmers who responded to the request for interviews were white men over the age of 50, two were white men under the age of 50, one farmer was a white woman over the age of 50, and two farmers were white women under the age of 50. Four of these farmers, however, were located outside of the study area. Two of them were located in so-called southwestern Ontario. One farmer was located in the study area and had information about the operations of an investment company, but did not want to be interviewed on the subject. All farmers who I interviewed agreed to have their real name disclosed in this study. One farmer, Denis St. Pierre, was located in the study area and is involved in farmland investment as a private investor. He had direct knowledge of the farmland investment industry that he was able to share with me. Three interested farmers that were located in the study area who were willing to be interviewed had no knowledge of farmland specific purchases by investment companies. I was able to identify one farmer, Tom Black, who was located directly in the area where Walton International was buying farmland through contacts working for Just Food. He and his spouse were able to share a great deal of information about their experience of the company bought from friends and acquaintances. I was also able to interview Ella Haley, who is a farmer and scholar located in Brantford where Walton International has bought a great deal of farmland. This interview did not reveal much specific information about Walton's operations in the study area. It did, however, provide information that was valuable to understand the operations of the company more broadly. I use the interviews of three out of ten farmers who expressed interest in participating in the study.

The low number of respondents was an unanticipated result in itself. Farmers, in my experience, are willing to speak at length about their livelihoods and local history. The lack of response on this specific subject suggests that it is not something that farmers want to talk about. Interviewees, Ella Haley (2019) and Tom Black (2019) both suggested that farmers might be too busy to respond or they might not want to talk about the subject because of potential legal, professional, or social reasons associated with selling land to an investment company. The impact of farmland investment on social relations among farmers was beyond the scope of this research but it would be useful to investigate this topic, with an adequate methodology considering the sensitive nature of the subject.

Chapter 4: Empirical findings on farmland ownership

The research study area in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley experienced a rush of farmland purchases by various kinds of corporations between 2000 and 2017. The region's land rush, however, resulted in a much smaller rate of consolidation when compared to other areas of so-called Canada. Land investment was also primarily done by large-scale, family-owned farm corporations, though a small number of farmland investment companies were able to make modest gains in their land holdings in the region relative to other regions of the country. These findings complicate the long grab hypothesis presented earlier and contradict the popular financialization hypothesis in the study of land grabbing in so-called Canada. I inferred—based on the existing scholarship on land grabbing in Turtle Island—that investment companies would be the ones accumulating the most farmland out of a need to fix a problem of overaccumulation in financial wealth, therefore becoming the new, dominant actor in control of farmland distribution. Farm corporations, however, ultimately proved to be the dominant actor controlling farmland distribution in the region, expanding their farmland holdings to increase commodity production to meet economies of scale and remain competitive in global and domestic commodity markets. This finding suggests that the continuity of historical processes of agrarian change remained the dominant factor determining farmland distribution, rather than direct processes of financialization in farmland ownership. These findings require a reassessment and reinterpretation of the long grab explanation, detailed in Part II of this thesis.

Farmland consolidation

I conducted an analysis of the concentration of land ownership for the four largest farmland owners (CLO4), similar to Desmarais et al.'s (2015) findings on farmland distribution in so-called Saskatchewan. My findings, however, demonstrate that much less farmland consolidation is happening in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley (see Table 4).

Table 4: Average CLO4 in Saskatchewan and Southeastern Kitchi Sipi Valley

Location	1994	2000	2014	2017	Increase
Saskatchewan Avg. CLO4*	8.6%	-	21.0%	-	+12.4%
E. Ontario Avg. CLO4	-	4.3%	-	6.4%	+ 2.1%

* Average CLO4 results for select rural municipalities in Saskatchewan are based on those presented in Desmarais et al. (2015)

My results found that the CLO4 for the area of study increased by 2.1 percentage points (from 4.3% of total farmland in 2000 to 6.4% in 2017), resulting in an addition of 9,228.2 acres (37.34 km²) to the holdings of the top four farmland owners (see Chart 5). The total area of the farmland acquired by the top four investors amounts to about half the size of Cornwall, Ontario (61.56 km²). This indicates that the study area did indeed experience farmland consolidation between 2000 and 2017 (see Table 5).

Table 5 - CLO4 area, proportion, and companies operating in Ottawa, PR, and SDG between 2000 and 2017

Year	Total CLO4 Acres	CLO4 %	#1 Farmland Owner	#2 Farmland Owner	#3 Farmland Owner	#4 Farmland Owner
2000	7,450.9	4.3%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	CORNWALL GRAVEL COMPANY	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	SCHOUTEN CORNER VIEW FARMS
2001	7,759.8	4.3%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	CORNWALL GRAVEL COMPANY	SCHOUTEN CORNER VIEW FARMS	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC
2002	7,858.5	4.2%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	CORNWALL GRAVEL COMPANY	SONIBRAND FARM INC	SCHOUTEN CORNER VIEW FARMS
2003	8,667.4	4.6%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	RIVERSIDE SOUTH DEVCORP	CORNWALL GRAVEL COMPANY	SCHOUTEN CORNER VIEW FARMS
2004	9,613.9	5.0%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	RIVERSIDE SOUTH DEV CORP	CORNWALL GRAVEL COMPANY	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC
2005	9,613.9	4.9%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	RIVERSIDE SOUTH DEV CORP	CORNWALL GRAVEL COMPANY	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC
2006	10,231.5	5.0%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	RIVERSIDE SOUTH DEV CORP	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	CORNWALL GRAVEL COMPANY
2007	11,033.5	5.1%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	RIVERSIDE SOUTH DEV CORP	WAHLER FARMS INC.
2008	12,330.9	5.6%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	WALTON INTERNATIONAL GROUP	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	WAHLER FARMS INC.
2009	12,693.6	5.7%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	WALTON INTERNATIONAL GROUP	WAHLER FARMS INC.
2010	13,543.1	6.0%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	WALTON INTERNATIONAL GROUP	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	WAHLER FARMS INC.
2011	13,720.1	5.9%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	WALTON INTERNATIONAL GROUP	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	WAHLER FARMS INC.
2012	13,978.7	5.9%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	WALTON INTERNATIONAL GROUP	WAHLER FARMS INC.
2013	14,565.8	6.0%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	LEDUC, ALAIN; LEDUC, SUSAN	WALTON INTERNATIONAL GROUP
2014	14,971.4	6.0%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	LEDUC, ALAIN; LEDUC, SUSAN	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	WALTON INTERNATIONAL GROUP
2015	15,322.8	6.1%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	LEDUC, ALAIN; LEDUC, SUSAN	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	WALTON INTERNATIONAL GROUP
2016	15,948.1	6.3%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	LEDUC, ALAIN; LEDUC, SUSAN	SCHOUTEN CORNER VIEW FARMS	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC
2017	16,679.1	6.4%	BRETZLER FARMS LTD	LEDUC, ALAIN; LEDUC, SUSAN	SCHOUTEN CORNER VIEW FARMS	CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC
Change	+9,228.2	+ 2.1%				

Findings based on a survey of 9,858 farmland properties covering as sample 9,228.2 acres located in the municipalities of Ottawa, Prescott-Russell, and Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry

Farmland ownership categories

I conducted an analysis of the different farmland ownership categories represented in the study area between 2000 and 2017. The farmland ownership category indicator is a novel political-ecological indicator developed in this thesis, which is explained in greater detail in Chapter 3. My analysis found that corporate farmland ownership in Kitchi Sipi Valley farmland increased by 46.1% between 2000 and 2017, while the amount of farmland owned by sole proprietors or partnerships declined by 10%. The total number of farmland owners represented in the sample decreased by 2.4% between 2000 and 2017, with most of the decline experienced after 2009 (see Table 6). These findings suggest that farmland investors were not a significant factor in the growth of corporate land holdings that have increased in Kitchi Sipi Valley. Large-scale, family-owned farm

corporations were, by far, the category of corporations that increased their holdings the most. Farmland investors mostly operated in the peri-urban fringe of Ottawa, while corporate farms accumulated the most land in more rural areas of the study area. This finding demonstrates a process of corporatization of farmland ownership without explicit financialization.




Figure 3 —Acres of Farmland Owned by Investment Companies, 2000 to 2017

Farm corporations had the largest increase in land holdings, growing at a rate of 46.1% (+43,962.89 acres). This was followed by anonymous numbered corporations, which increased its holdings by 22,401.46 acres, growing at a rate of 109.9%. Following behind these categories are other corporations, which increased their holdings by 1,194.4, expanding by 10.8%. Further below these categories are financial investment firms (see Figure 3), which increased by a total of 922.7 acres and expanded by 11.1%.

The lowest category of corporation for growth was development and extraction corporations, which increased its holdings by 413.3 acres, expanding 1.4% (see Table 6).

Table 6 - Farmland Owned by Different Ownership Categories in Ottawa, PR, and SDG														
Sample Size: n=9,585 properties covering 1,006,643.18 acres														
	Private Owners		All Corp's		Investment Firms		Agricultural Corp's		Dev. Corp's		Numbered Corp's		Other Corp's	
Change: Prop % Acres														
	-10.0%	-74,026.76	+42.1%	+68,894.78	+11.1%	+922.70	+46.1%	+43,962.89	+1.4%	+413.32	+109.9%	+22,401.46	+10.8%	+1,194.41
2000	739,280.98	73.4%	163,789.15	16.3%	8,280.46	0.8%	95,265.91	9.5%	28,758.47	2.9%	20,390.45	2.0%	11,093.86	1.1%
2001	738,336.85	73.3%	164,723.21	16.4%	8,280.46	0.8%	95,349.72	9.5%	29,093.47	2.9%	20,476.06	2.0%	11,523.50	1.1%
2002	736,080.13	73.1%	167,110.57	16.6%	7,925.57	0.8%	97,456.80	9.7%	29,283.99	2.9%	20,901.15	2.1%	11,543.06	1.1%
2003	734,712.58	73.0%	168,422.58	16.7%	7,952.22	0.8%	98,524.22	9.8%	29,335.28	2.9%	20,968.76	2.1%	11,642.10	1.2%
2004	732,062.35	72.7%	170,980.03	17.0%	7,896.03	0.8%	98,895.32	9.8%	29,828.72	3.0%	22,577.54	2.2%	11,782.42	1.2%
2005	730,046.26	72.5%	173,417.25	17.2%	7,982.55	0.8%	99,717.06	9.9%	30,169.48	3.0%	23,706.16	2.4%	11,842.00	1.2%
2006	727,007.67	72.2%	176,301.90	17.5%	7,987.49	0.8%	100,799.96	10.0%	30,834.84	3.1%	24,905.68	2.5%	11,773.92	1.2%
2007	722,349.70	71.7%	180,813.09	18.0%	9,552.24	0.9%	102,602.29	10.2%	31,196.11	3.1%	25,776.39	2.6%	11,686.07	1.2%
2008	719,533.22	71.4%	183,629.57	18.2%	10,093.89	1.0%	104,878.82	10.4%	30,588.49	3.0%	26,589.42	2.6%	11,478.96	1.1%
2009	716,819.21	71.2%	184,607.45	18.3%	10,200.20	1.0%	106,260.98	10.5%	27,676.86	2.7%	28,702.94	2.8%	11,766.47	1.2%
2010	711,268.85	70.6%	189,911.47	18.9%	9,579.70	1.0%	111,013.69	11.0%	27,558.11	2.7%	29,912.18	3.0%	11,847.79	1.2%
2011	706,616.00	70.1%	194,184.09	19.3%	9,579.70	1.0%	113,737.09	11.3%	27,727.35	2.8%	31,234.90	3.1%	11,905.04	1.2%
2012	702,080.31	69.7%	198,514.61	19.7%	8,787.96	0.9%	116,364.01	11.5%	28,079.30	2.8%	33,364.84	3.3%	11,918.51	1.2%
2013	695,124.57	69.0%	205,636.48	20.4%	8,854.84	0.9%	120,016.40	11.9%	27,969.21	2.8%	37,430.90	3.7%	11,365.13	1.1%
2014	688,078.60	68.3%	212,731.02	21.1%	9,296.67	0.9%	124,786.95	12.4%	27,798.59	2.8%	38,683.89	3.8%	12,164.92	1.2%
2015	682,796.62	67.8%	218,140.73	21.6%	9,318.49	0.9%	128,517.99	12.8%	28,006.36	2.8%	40,092.12	4.0%	12,205.78	1.2%
2016	675,326.76	67.0%	224,578.72	22.3%	9,288.64	0.9%	133,443.01	13.2%	28,251.78	2.8%	41,522.78	4.1%	12,072.51	1.2%
2017	665,254.22	66.0%	232,683.93	23.1%	9,203.16	0.9%	139,228.80	13.8%	29,171.79	2.9%	42,791.91	4.2%	12,288.27	1.2%

The total number of farmland owners within the sample (n = 9,585 properties) of property reports collected from Ottawa, Prescott-Russell, and Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry declined between 2000 and 2017 by 2.38% (see see Figure 4). The decline was greatest within the City of Ottawa (n = 3,885 properties) with a rate of 4.36%. It was less severe in the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry (n = 3,743 properties) with a decline of 1.83%. The rate of decline was lowest in the United Counties of Prescott-Russell (n = 2,230 properties) with a rate of 0.98%.




Figure 4 — Number of Farmland Property Owners, 2000 to 2017 (Statistics Canada 2022a)

Figure 20 reveals a decline in the total number of farmland property owners. This decline in the number of owners, however, was relatively stable between 2000 and 2009 (+0.15%), which is then followed by a steady decrease between 2009 and 2017 (-2.83%). The property data illustrates a clear transition in farmland ownership away from sole proprietor and partnership categories, towards varieties of privately incorporated categories of ownership. Acres of farmland in the property sample owned by sole proprietors and partnerships declined by 10% (a reduction of 74,026.76 acres) at the same time as corporate-owned farmland increased by 42.1% (an increase of 68,894.79 acres).

Table 7 - Farmland distribution scenarios: results and identified scenario

	Increasing CLO4 [+ 2.1%]	Decreasing CLO4
High proportion of new category	<u>Land Reform</u> : New group of elites are consolidating	<u>Land Diffusion</u> : New group of elites are fragmenting
Low proportion of new category [+11.1%]	<u>Land Entrenchment</u>: Old group of elites are consolidating	<u>Land Dispersal</u> : Old group of elites are fragmenting

The combination of the study's CLO4 and ownership category findings indicates the farmland distribution scenario that took place during the study area and period. The Kitchi Sipi Valley experienced a period of land entrenchment around corporate farms between 2000 and 2017 (see Table 7). This means that the existing elites—commercial farmers—whose interests dominate farmland distribution have increased their farmland holdings by absorbing medium and large-scale farms as they exit production. Simple

commodity producing farms—selling commodities independently to the market—are losing farmland to large-scale commercial farms that are integrated into the global corporate food regime.

Major farmland investors and investment locations

The findings from the CLO4 and farmland ownership categories allowed me to identify my case studies, that is, the two farmland investment companies most involved in the accumulation of farmland in the study area between 2000 and 2017. The majority of actors involved were large-scale agricultural operations (Bretzler Farms, Charlottengro Farms, the Leduc Family, Wahler Farms, Sonibrand Farm, and Schouten Cornerview Farm) though farmland investment and development corporations were also included (Cornwall Gravel Company, Riverside Development Corporation, and Walton International).




Figure 5 — Actors included among the four largest farmland owners, from 2000 to 2017
(Map made by Christopher Bisson)

There was also no clear geographic focus of farmland consolidation among the top four farmland owners (see Figure 5). Geographic patterns became more evident when looking at a larger list of the top farmland owners. 31 of the top farmland owners were operations related to agriculture, while 8 were related to real estate and infrastructure development, and one was related to waste management. Operations related to agriculture were dispersed throughout the study area (see Figure 6).




Figure 6 - Largest Agriculture-Focused Farmland Owners from 2000 to 2017 (Map made by Christopher Bisson)

Investment and development-related operations tended to be located, predictably, in the peri-urban area surrounding Ottawa and Cornwall (see Figure 7).




Figure 7 — Largest Development-Focused Farmland Owners, 2000 to 2017 (Map made by Christopher Bisson)

Two companies were selected for case study research based on these findings. The first case study is based on the farmland acquisitions of Walton International, which has placed among the top four largest farmland owners in the study area. It is also a development-oriented farmland investment company located within the peri-urban area

just beyond the Ottawa greenbelt. The second case study is based on the farmland acquisitions of Bonnefield Financial. It is an agriculture-oriented farmland investment company located in rural portions of Prescott-Russell and Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry. These contrasting examples of farmland investment companies are investigated in depth in Chapter 8.

In this chapter I presented farmland ownership data that demonstrate a clear change in land distribution patterns between 2000 and 2017 that resemble a process that I call farmland entrenchment surrounding a set of large-scale corporate farms. The following chapters in Part Two provide an historical materialist explanation for the entrenchment of farmland around large-scale corporate farms in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

Chapter 5: Farmland Investment Company Case Studies

This chapter presents the findings of the case study analysis I conducted on two farmland investment companies that purchased farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017. These cases help to better understand what specific motivations and constraints informed their farmland investment choices in the region, and what impact these kinds of investment practices have on farmers in general, and farmers' access to farmland in particular. The two companies are two distinct types of farmland investors. Walton International is one of the largest landowners in the southeastern Kitchi Sipi Valley focused on urban development and reputed to have a particularly aggressive farmland acquisition practice. Bonnefield is a relatively smaller farmland investor that is focused on the value of farmland for agricultural production. I discuss the conditions and motivations for founding these companies and purchasing farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

Walton International - Development-Oriented Farmland Investment

Walton International was a Calgary-based real estate investment group that engages in land banking practices oriented towards urban development. Today it is now known as Walton Global. They describe their business model as “land banking” of “pre-development land”, which means acquiring and holding on to private farmland properties on the edge of a expanding major city and making it available for development companies to buy for development at a significantly higher price (Walton

Global, 2023; Sasso, 2019; Smythe, 2015, 53; Holtlander, 2015; Reevely, 2013; Gowan, 2008; Ng, 2007). Walton International has become a dominant owner of farmland in the southwest of Ottawa, just beyond the city's urban boundary. They were able to amass a substantial amount of pre-development land making them one of the largest landowners in Kitchi Sipi Valley. However, Walton has not been successful in profiting from the sale of pre-development land for development due to an oil price crisis in Alberta and new provincial and city regulations restricting development in agricultural resource areas. The company's land investment is reminiscent of the unsuccessful land speculation practices that took place in Nepean two centuries prior, suggesting that attempts to profit from the development of peri-urban land has long been a folly money-making fixation of Canada's affluent settlers enriched from the sudden windfalls gained from colonial and neo-colonial frontier expansion.

Company origins in the 1970s Alberta oil boom

Its origins are based in the urban development rush that accompanied the post-war oil boom in Alberta. Patrick and Maureen Doherty were first generation and migrant Irish Catholics, respectively, who began a real estate business in 1972 in Calgary, Alberta called Doherty Brother Realty (Calgary Sun, 2022; Walton Global, 2019; Smythe, 2015; Holtlander, 2015). They rebranded as Quance Enterprises in 1979 and their son, William "Bill" Doherty became involved in the operations of the company as the Canadian economy depressed commercial and residential real estate sales in Alberta (Walton Global, 2023). Quance Enterprises reacted to the downturn by acquiring other

real estate companies in Alberta and diversifying operations into global real estate investment. The company rebranded as Walton International and expanded operations during the downturn, taking on staff displaced from Alberta's oil and gas sector (Walton Global, 2023). They developed a model of land investment that involved (Walton Global, 2023; Fayed, 2022; Haley, 2013):

1. Purchasing farmland at agricultural prices at the edge of a city, sourcing investment (i.e. "syndication") in the form of "limited partnership" (LPs) ;
2. Petitioning municipalities to rezone the land;
3. Selling (i.e. exiting) the properties as "pre-development land" to construction companies at residential or commercial property values.

Process of assetizing farmland

Walton uses a "limited partnership" (LP) ownership arrangement for the land they bank.

This means that the company sells time-bound shares to investment partners and enters into joint-ownership arrangement over the land when they purchase a share, which is why the names of specific investors names sometimes appear in the title records of the properties (Holtslander, 2015; Reevely, 2013; Business Wire, 2009).

Shares owned through the LP arrangement mature at a specified date and are then sold to a developer with the returns given to the investment partners (Holtslander, 2015). To render the pre-development land into an investment security Walton "syndicates" the properties, making investors co-owners of the property rights albeit with the recognition that Walton exercises those rights on behalf of the investors. Syndication is a relatively

rare and supposedly stable and lower-risk approach to land investment that entails first buying the land with the company's own wealth, then taking on LP owner-investors to recoup the purchase costs and capitalize other purchases (Sasso, 2019; Haley, 2013; Reevely, 2013; Ng, 2007). The company takes on the investment risks related to the ownership of the property (i.e. taxation, changes in real estate market conditions, and regulatory changes) and charges management fees to investment partners, but the investors retain up to 90% interest in the land and the final returns from its eventual sale of the land at the correct moment in its "value cycle" (Walton Global, 2023; Holtslander 2015; Ng, 2007). Not all financial analysts agree though that it is a lower risk and some financial advisors advise against purchasing such securities (Sasso, 2019; Reevely, 2013).

The novelty and relatively high risk of LP pre-development land securities brings it under the "exempt securities" category under Ontario's securities regulations (Holtslander, 2015). Securities regulations protect investment partners from the risk of the investment failing and absolves them of responsibility for management decisions that compromise the success of the investment (Holtslander, 2015; Reevely, 2013). However, they also stipulate that investors have to meet a series of provincial regulatory criteria to be eligible to invest and shares must be valued at a minimum of \$150,000 (Holtslander 2015). Walton is authorized by Ontario securities regulations to sell LP pre-development land securities as an "Exempt Market Dealer" (EMD). This means they are not subject to provincial restrictions on selling such securities to investors. However, they can only sell to "accredited investors", who have more than \$1 million in

investments or \$5 million in overall assets (Sasso, 2019; Holtslander, 2015; Walton International, 2016; Reevely, 2013; Gowan, 2008).

Prospectuses are pitched by sales consultants to investors through marketing seminars in luxurious hotels where attendees could win expensive vacation packages (Sasso, 2019; Hallam, 2006). Walton's investment prospectuses have solicited investment by promoting the political and economic stability, strong growth trajectory, and the relatively easy process of property development in Canada and the United States (Smythe, 2015). They also promote their connections to local third-party real estate consultants and housing development companies, who help Walton identify specific areas that are suitable for urban development (Walton Global, 2023; Reevely 2013). They assure investor confidence by demonstrating how they monitor urban regulatory, population, employment, environmental, infrastructure, and housing demand trends throughout Canada and the U.S., with a focus on new industrial and commercial establishment and expansion (Walton Global, 2023; Smythe, 2015). They also, initially, provided investors the option to choose specific residential or commercial property properties or zones to take on as a security, allowing them to take on the level or risk they desire (Walton Global, 2023; Ng, 2007). Walton, to encourage investment, encourages investors to take out mortgages to purchase investment units (Hallam, 2006). For investors in the United States, they take advantage of a nation-wide program available through the State of Delaware called the Delaware Statutory Trust (DST), which allows undivided fractional ownership of investment properties (Walton Global, 2023). They also participate in the U.S. Employment-based Immigrant Investor Visa

Program (EB-5), which allows land investors the ability to obtain a U.S. green card if they invest in a Walton-brokered security (Walton Global, 2023).

Walton International manages the partnership-owned pre-development lands for a set amount of time and sells it to a development company (Reevely, 2013). They will often offer “vendor financing” arrangements with property development companies, where they lend money to developers for them to purchase it (Walton Global, 2020). A Walton-owned subsidiary land management company charges a semi-annual interest premium to developers for the effort of assembling, managing, and making the land ready for development (Walton Global, 2023; Reevely 2013). Property management fees are charged to investors for the entire time that Walton manages it, whether or not the property is eventually sold (Reevely, 2013). Walton also takes a sales commission of up to 13.25% when they “exit” the properties (Sasso, 2019; Walton International, 2016; Reevely, 2013).

Farmland investments

Walton first operated their model of LP pre-development land banking at a time when developers would predominantly acquire land themselves for development (Walton Global, 2023). However, in 1986 they bought a 14 acre property on the north edge of Calgary and syndicated it as Panorama Estates (Walton Global, 2023; Fayed, 2022). Strong economic growth in Japan, South Korea, and China during the early 2000s led the region’s growing class of wealthy investors to seek out new securities to place their wealth, and farmland on Turtle Island became seen as a reliable investment that can provide a relatively good return on investment (Hallam, 2006). William Doherty sourced

investment for the property by opening a subsidiary real estate investment company in Hong Kong in 1992 (Walton Global, 2023; Fayed, 2022). They succeeded in selling the property in 1998, which returned “strong returns” of 12% for investors (Hallam, 2006), 80% of whom were based in Hong Kong (Walton Global, 2023; Fayed, 2022; Bryant, 2001). William Doherty then established subsidiaries in Singapore and Malaysia in 1996 (Smythe, 2015; Fayed, 2022; Holtslander, 2015; Bryant, 2001), Hamburg, Germany in 2005 (Walton Global, 2023; Fayed, 2022; Smythe, 2015, 53; Holtslander, 2015; Business Wire, 2009; Gowan, 2008), and Shanghai, Guangzhou, Taipei, Kuala Lumpur, and Dubai by 2023. Walton has sold farmland securities through these offices to 92,000 different investors in 71 different countries by 2019 (Walton Global, 2023; Sasso, 2019).

Walton raised enough investment to continue the success of the Panorama Estates exit by expanding their land holdings around Calgary and Edmonton, seeking out the largest parcels of farmland available to maximize returns (Walton Global, 2019; Bryant, 2001). High oil prices between 2003 and 2007 triggered a rush of investment and migration to Alberta. Walton’s Acquisition Team therefore acquired large amounts of farmland with the intention of dominating the development path for specific areas by becoming majority landowners (Smythe, 2015; Haley, 2013; Ng, 2007). Walton was able to “deploy” \$100 million worth of Alberta farmland for investors by 2005 (Fayed, 2022; Hallam, 2006), and they set a goal of reaching \$1 billion in revenues by 2008 (Ng, 2007).

Walton continued growing its operations, establishing Interborder Holdings Ltd. to expand operations in the U.S. (Sasso, 2019). They also expanded into southern and

Kitchi Sipi Valley in 2005 (McLean, 2018; Holtslander, 2015; Brownlee, 2013; Ng, 2007). Developers and land investors began buying up farmland in the Brant, Simcoe, Niagara, and Wellington areas after the Ontario government established the Golden Horseshoe Greenbelt in 2005 to push development further out from the Greater Toronto Area (Smythe, 2015; Haley, 2013). Walton identified the Golden Horseshoe area as an opportunity for land banking projects. However, several acquisitions triggered fierce opposition from local communities in ways that they had not experienced in Alberta. They also operated briefly in New Brunswick, selling \$2 million in securities to 53 residents. However, the New Brunswick Securities Commission conducted an investigation into their investment practice and found that Walton's sales agent was soliciting securities investments to non-accredited investors. Walton had to give the money back and pay \$18,000 in penalties. The salesperson was fired from Walton and banned from selling securities in New Brunswick (Gowan, 2008).

In Ontario, Walton first acquired farmland properties in Tutela Heights, Brant County in 2006 for \$2.2 million. However, some of the land fell within the new Greenbelt (Two Row Times, 2017; Haley, 2013). The land also fell within the Haldimand Tract, which remained subject to title dispute between the Government of Canada and the Kanien'kehá:ka of Grand River. Furthermore, it contained a burial site and the potential site of the historical central Longhouse of the Tutelos. Members of the Mohawks of Grand River blockaded the site until Walton was granted an injunction. An agreement was also reached with Six Nations Elected Council over compensation for the development of the site, though the community remains divided over the development

(Windle, 2016; Gamble, 2012). Walton managed to acquire 6% of the total farmland in Brant County, which drew resistance from the local farming community opposing the development of farmland and Walton's aggressive land acquisition practices (Haley, 2013). However, Walton had representatives that lived in the area. They became close to the city council and active in the drafting of official plans. Representatives became in charge of the home builders association and chair of the Chamber of Commerce (Haley, 2019). Ella Haley, a local farmer and sociology professor, explained how real estate agents representing Walton would tell interested farmers that they would only purchase their farmland if they can also get the land of an adjacent farmer, creating tension within the community between those who want to sell and those who want to preserve the farmland (Haley, 2019). Walton, despite resistance, managed to secure its interests by capturing local government and dividing the local community to continue its land banking operation in Brant County.

Shortly after acquiring land in Brant County, Walton began purchasing farmland in the southwest of Ottawa, starting a new cycle in the area's land grabbing history. The area was historically a site of significant amounts of land speculation by absentee military landowners that took place in the early 1800s. It became settled in the mid-1800s by a wave of Scotch-Irish Protestants and Irish Catholics migrants to Kitchi Sipi Valley who settled on 100 acre farmsteads along concession lines earlier cut by military surveyors (Black and Black, 2019; Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). Nepean soon grew into one of the most significant agricultural areas in Kitchi Sipi Valley. The area was farmed by farming families, mostly raising beef. Farmland therefore became highly

fragmented after multiple generations of family farms, over almost two hundred years, portioned out family holdings for their children's inheritance. Generations later, trade liberalization in the 1990s and the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in 2003, cut off Canadian exports, collapsing Kitchi Sipi Valley's beef industry. Nepean was especially hit hard by the BSE crisis due to the high concentration of beef farmers in the area. Local beef farmers, at the worst of the crisis, could only receive 22 cents for a 1,400 lb cow, minus the \$22 trucking fee. They were able to receive some relief from the Provincial Government through AgriCorp. However, AgriCorp soon asked the farmers to make repayments on some of the funds they received (Black and Black, 2019). Walton therefore began purchasing farmland in southwestern Ottawa in 2006 to get in on the Kanata housing boom (Business Wire, 2009), at a time when farms in the area were going through an existential crisis.

Walton International established a land development plan for 2,900 acres of farmland throughout the southern Kanata and Stittsville areas (Reevelly, 2013; Hill, 2010; Business Wire, 2009). They divided the proposed development into three different master plans for investors to choose from: Southwest Ottawa 1 (777 acres), Southwest Ottawa 2 (1,356 acres), and the Ottawa Gateway Employment Zone (1,040 acres) (Walton Global, 2023). Walton's properties are owned under a mixture of different title names. There are five different corporations owned by Walton International in Ottawa (see Figure 25). Walton also purchased land using five different anonymous corporations for one year, which were then transferred to an extensive list of hundreds of names under a list of thousands of names, listed at random dates within the same

year. This finding is consistent with Haley’s (2013) investigation of properties owned by Walton International in Brant County. Each transaction cost for the lists of LP investors were listed in denominations of \$5,000, suggesting that share prices were in denomination of \$5,000 (Haley, 2013).



Figure 8 - Walton International holdings in the southwest of Ottawa (Map made by Christopher Bisson)

Walton anticipated that investor partners would sit on the pre-development land for two to four years after syndication before exiting (Hill, 2010). A realtor representing Walton began going around the Fallowfield and Eagleson road area in 2007 to acquire

the land, making substantial offers to farmers (Hill, 2010; Shufelt, 2008). Tom and Marlene Black, local farmers, said that they were approached three times for an offer of \$14,000 per acre totaling \$4 million for the entire farm. Tom Black said that, despite pressure from other farmers to sell, he was not interested because of the land's importance to him as a place where his family farmed for generations. He disclosed that Walton's entry into the community as a land banker changed the tone of community relations and resulted in devastating family conflicts similar to those experienced in Brant County (Black and Black, 2019).

Farmers who sold their land to Walton continued farming the land under a five year lease-back contract. The contracts required farmers to pay the property taxes on the land and specified that they could only grow cash crops. Walton, in both Brant County and Ottawa, also tore down surplus houses and allowed farm properties to degrade, reducing the agricultural value of the land (Black and Black, 2019; Haley, 2019). Walton managed to accumulate 295 acres of the 2,900 acre plan by 2009 for \$26.4 million. This was purchased using the \$35.8 million raised from investment partners (Reevely, 2013). Walton estimated that their Ottawa land holdings had a potential value of \$45 million if they could get it re-zoned for development. Their holdings in Ottawa fell far short of its acquisition plan but still managed to become the largest landowner in the Kanata and Stittsville area (Walton Global, 2018; McLean, 2018; Reevely, 2013; Hill, 2010). Walton managed to successfully syndicate their Ottawa properties and combined it with their properties around a new Honda factory in Alliston, Simcoe County. The syndication took place in March 2009 for \$9.1 million with

a group of 352 European investors partnered with Walton under the name Walton Europe Landentwicklung Ottawa 3 GmbH & Co. (KG) (Hill, 2010; Business Wire, 2009). However, Walton's farmland purchases in Ottawa stopped in 2009 so they could focus on reorganizing their operations for the changing economic climate (Black and Black, 2019).

The Great Recession between 2008 and 2011 initially depressed investment in Walton securities, which pressured the company and the entire development industry to adapt to new market conditions (Walton Global, 2023; Haley, 2019). The Great Recession was ultimately beneficial for Walton International (Smythe, 2015). The Subprime Mortgage Crisis resulted in an oversupply of pre-development land in the U.S. Walton decided to pursue this opportunity and shift its investment capital away from Canadian projects and focus on buying up land around U.S. cities. Investors also became wary of companies in the development sector that held too many non-revenue producing assets, which pressured developers to hold a smaller inventory of pre-development lands. They therefore moved towards what became known as a "land-light" development strategy. This meant that development companies began acquiring "just-in-time" land inventory right before developing (Walton Global, 2023). Walton was therefore also able to take advantage of the new strategy with investors shifting their wealth from real estate development towards land banking companies (Bryant, 2001). They managed to syndicate \$2.1 billion in farmland properties with 57,300 different clients by 2009 in Alberta, Ontario, Texas, and Georgia (Business Wire, 2009). Their holdings increased rapidly to a value of \$2.5 billion by 2010, allowing the company to

grow to 580 employees (Hill, 2010).

Government and public relations

Local governments have different regulations around land banking and the conversion of farmland for development. Walton therefore operated in provinces that are most permissive of these practices, like Alberta and Ontario (Holtslander, 2015 Smythe, 2015). Both provinces, however, have land use planning policies and Ontario has several outstanding First Nations land disputes that result in a certain amount of uncertainty regarding the realization of Walton's land investments (Walton International, 2018). Walton navigates this dilemma by amassing a large enough land base to dominate an area's economic development pathway to the extent that they can influence the outcome of land claim struggles, municipal annexations, urban boundary changes, and zoning adjustments (Smythe, 2015; Holtslander, 2015; Haley, 2013).

Walton is also known to lobby municipal and provincial politicians and donate to their election campaigns (Smythe, 2015; Haley, 2013). They attempt to establish social license in the face of community resistance by making generous donations to local community initiatives and promoting the company's so-called "environmental, social and governance" (ESG) program, which supposedly ensures that their investment practices benefits the local community (Walton Global, 2023; Haley, 2019; Haley, 2013). Under their ESG program they fund several summer camp operations and financed the construction of a women's shelter in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and schools in Tanzania, Vietnam, Mexico, China (Walton Global, 2023). They have also donated funds directly

to municipalities and school boards in the U.S., to charities that works on improving newborn health and stopping domestic violence, child abuse, and childhood cancer, several sports organizations, and a children's arts program in Calgary and Hong Kong (Walton Global, 2023). They have hosted welcome events for new residential subdivisions they helped develop (Walton Global, 2023). They have twice donated to a community group organizing to host a Hockey Night in Canada event in Brantford, Ontario, where they are attempting to develop a subdivision (Walton Global, 2023). The Government of Canada has significantly bolstered their reputation when they awarded Maureen Doherty the Order of Canada for her work funding youth summer camps in Alberta (Governor General of Canada, 2009).

Walton's Ottawa LP pre-development land securities were approaching maturity in 2013, which meant that they had to get the land rezoned for development. However, the city's new official plan created an urban boundary that restricted development further into the agricultural resource area southwest of Ottawa. Walton now had to convince the City of Ottawa to remove the farmland from the agricultural resource area to extend the urban boundary and rezone the land (Reevely, 2013). Walton began to increase the pressure they put on the city to amend the urban plan (Reevely, 2013; Shufelt, 2008). They attempted to garner social license with the public for their proposed development by making donations of \$20,000 to the Youville Centre to build a new library through United Way Ottawa and \$20,000 to Main Street Community Services (Walton Global, 2023). They also sponsored a fundraiser event for the Ottawa Boys and Girls Club in partnership with players from the Ottawa Senators hockey club (Phillips,

2011).

The City of Ottawa conducted a review of the Official Plan in 2014 and decided not to move the urban boundary to include the Walton Properties (Walton International 2016, November 28). This was because the city's review found that Ottawa had more than enough pre-development land within the urban boundary to accommodate housing demand until 2031 (Reevely, 2013). Walton International responded to the City of Ottawa's decision by filing an appeal to the OMB (Walton International, 2016; Holtslander, 2015). The OMB heard the appeal and requested that Ottawa review its pre-development land requirements with a planning horizon of 2036 and to conduct a Land Evaluation and Area Review (LEAR) and an Employment Lands Study to identify what lands were prime agricultural lands or lands suitable for development. However, these revisions and studies all showed that Ottawa still had a surplus of pre-development land to accommodate future housing needs. Walton rejected these findings and has requested that Ottawa conduct another land study with updated evaluation of soil quality (Walton International, 2016). This is likely because of the company's tendency to allow farmland to degrade in quality so that it is no longer suitable for agriculture. Both Ella Haley (2019; 2013) and Tom Black (2019) explained that they observed how farm infrastructure would fall into disrepair and how neglect of farm ditches could result in field flooding, which creates an "agrislum" with lower agricultural class designations.

Bankruptcy and corporate restructuring

Walton International, prior to Ottawa's decision on the urban boundary, began to feel the impact of the global oil price slump that began in 2014, which would prove to be a bigger challenge for the company than the Great Recession. Failed land investments restricted anticipated investment returns and low oil prices depressed revenues of Alberta-based oil operations led to a wave of layoffs and business closures. Demand for housing in Walton's most reliable land banking area crashed, which resulted in \$67.3 million in losses between 2014 and 2017, ultimately leading to the company going bankrupt (Two Row Times, 2017; CBC News, 2017). Walton went into bankruptcy protection on April 27, 2017 under the Alberta Court Queen's Bench, which appointed Ernst and Young (EY) to oversee the company's debt restructuring (Ernst and Young, 2022). Walton also had several of its Asian investment offices raided on allegations of fraudulent trading practices (Two Row Times, 2017). The company reduced its staff from 469 to 96 employees and several investment properties in Alberta were sold to settle the company's outstanding liabilities (Sasso, 2019; Walton Global, 2018; McLean, 2018; CBC News, 2017). The remainder of Walton's 22,533 acres of pre-development land, valued at \$600 million, was combined into one entity named Roll-Up Corporation (RUC). 27,000 Investment partner shares for 133 different land projects across Turtle Island (North America) were transferred to a general share in RUC (Haley, 2019; Sasso, 2019; Walton Global, 2018; McLean, 2018; CBC News, 2017). Investors lost an average of 43% of their equity invested in Walton securities due to the transfer, with some investors losing as much as 87% (Sasso, 2019).

Local community impact

Walton continues to own the same farmland properties in southwest Ottawa under the company's new name Walton Global. The company continues to promote the site as an area for urban expansion, which remains outside of the Ottawa urban boundary (Walton Global, 2023). Farmers continue to struggle to affordably farm since Walton's activity has inflated land prices, driving up property taxes and making it unaffordable to purchase more land to expand production to reach economies of scale. High land prices also make it impossible for retiring farmers to sell their land to new farmers interested in entering production, meaning that the land is likely to face development in the future (Smythe, 2015; Holtslander, 2015, 7; Haley, 2013; Shufelt, 2008). Walton's activity has also degraded the agricultural quality of one of Kitchi Sipi Valley's largest and best quality tracts of farmland at a time when food bank usage was increasing in the City of Ottawa (Black and Black, 2019; Shufelt, 2008). Similar to land speculation practices that took place in Nepean two hundred years ago, Walton's investments came about due to a sudden influx of wealth resulting from an expansion of Canada's neocolonial resource extraction frontier. Furthermore, the investment fervor that took place in the 1800s had a similar effect of arresting the area's agricultural development and degrading the health of the land. It is yet to be seen whether Walton's investment will prove successful, but it seems likely that the company has produced market conditions in southwest Ottawa that have appreciated land values beyond what farmers can afford.

Bonnefield Financial - Agriculture-Oriented Farmland Investment

Bonnefield was established to serve the function of connecting the bloated equity of the finance sector with the unmanageable debt levels in the agrifood sector by unfixing farmland as an illiquid asset. The “capital reallocation model”, also known as the sale-leaseback practice, readjusts the social structure of farming where financial institutions become a lord over the land and farmers effectively become tenants. Agricultural development in Ontario reached an advanced level of capitalization by the early 2000s, at the same time as global commodities market volatility made cash cropping a personally hazardous pursuit for family farms. This combination made it a burden for farmers to pay-off the agricultural machinery and vast holdings of fixed private property they acquired through debt with low margins gained by selling to highly volatile global commodity markets. Simultaneously, the financial crisis produced systemic instability and wealth overaccumulation that became a barrier to increased returns on investment in the financial sector. Bonnefield International was created to bridge these imperatives by producing farmland securities for public and private equity firms to purchase.

Company origins in the 1990s Ottawa tech boom

The founders of Bonnefield Financial understood the financial dilemma that medium-sized farms in Canada were facing and decided to put its real estate investment experience to work offering an alternative to debt financing to help expand agricultural operations (Sali, 2019; Waldie and Leeder, 2010). Two of the founders, Steve and Jan

Kaminski were successful commercial real estate developers and property managers who catered to Kanata's booming tech sector in the 1990s and early 2000s. Their company, Colonnade Investment, was initially capitalized from the wealth accumulated by their father Jan Kaminski Sr. who owned plumbing and mechanical-contracting operations in Ottawa. Colonnade therefore had the adequate resources and capacity assembled by the time the tech boom started. They were able to become one of a few companies capable of serving the needs of Kanata's tech sector. They secured large, multi-million dollar contracts, development building and managing facilities for new tech startups flush with investment capital from venture capitalists and government contracts (Bagnall, 1995).

The Kaminski brothers purchased a Kitchi Sipi Valley sod farm called Manderley Sod. They applied their commercial real estate investment experience to the business and concluded that the company could be more efficient if a different company owned the farmland and leased it out to them (Sali, 2019). They followed the prevailing commercial thinking where real estate investment trusts (REITs) act as property managers for other companies so they can have flexibility and are competitive to rapidly adjust operations and locations amid volatile market dynamics. Lease-back operations were already established in other countries (Sali, 2019; Pitts, 2011). However, nobody was offering that kind of service for farmland at the time in Ontario. They hired local Wally Johnston, an Ottawa-based cow/calf farmer and real estate agent to bring in an agricultural perspective to the project (Bonfield Financial, 2023; Johnston and Farrer, 2019). They began conducting focus group research in 2008 with institutional investors

and farmers to see if a farmland purchase lease-back operation would be viable (Sali, 2019; Johnston and Farrer, 2019). One problem that the Kaminski's learned was that farmers were facing challenges from the precarious nature of farmer-to-farmer land leasing. They claim that farmers say that farmer-to-farmer land lease agreements lacked security for the grower since they were informally arranged (Sali, 2019; Johnston and Farrer, 2019). However, it remains unclear why this could not be remedied simply by providing greater access to and the promotion of formal lease contracts for farmer-to-farmer contracts. As real estate investors, however, they understood that there was a time when mortgages were relatively rare for the purchase of a home today. They figure the same could be true for farms in the future (Johnston and Farrer, 2019).

Process of assetizing farmland

The Great Recession in 2008 and low interest rates, however, led many investors to seek reliable securities that could guarantee a return to place their wealth amid market turmoil; a "flight to safety" phenomenon. Institutional financial managers and high net-worth individuals therefore became interested in de-risking their investment portfolios and smoothing out cash flows, leading sovereign wealth funds like the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board to seek out farmland securities (Sali, 2019; Johnston and Farrer, 2019). This meant that the Kaminski brothers began pursuing this farmland investment just as investor interest was growing for farmland securities.

The Kaminski brothers met with Tom Eisenhauer, a Nova Scotia-born financial manager who also made a fortune from the Kanata tech boom after selling his tech-

sector private equity firm Latitude Partners. Eisenhower was similarly interested in farmland investment after coming to the same conclusion about farmland ownership as the Kaminski brothers from time spent in rural Brantford, Ontario (Bonfield Financial, 2023; Johnston and Farrer, 2019; Willis, 2016; Pitts, 2011). They established Bonfield Financial together in 2009 (Holtslander, 2015). The core component to Bonfield's viability as a farmland investment company is the anticipation of farmland values to increase steadily over time following increases in the value of agricultural production (St. Pierre, 2019; Magnan, 2015). Bonfield therefore consults with the FCC and private financial advisors to identify farmers that are looking for investment capital to grow into large-scale commercial operators, which will bring land values in line with other, similar properties (Pitts, 2011).

Bonfield uses Geographic Information System (GIS) technology to combine farmland property maps with soil quality, production data, yield data, and weather maps. These factors are combined into an index value that they are able to compare against the value of specific farmland properties, which they call a "price-earnings ratio". Bonfield focuses their investments in areas that have a low price-earning ratio. In other words, they invest in properties that are undervalued relative to the agricultural revenues the land can produce (Johnston and Farrer, 2019; Pitts, 2011). Their price-earning ratio metric differentiates between farmland's "market value" and its "economic value". Land that is already highly valuable relative to agricultural earnings (i.e. high market value) cannot yield much of an increase in its agricultural value (i.e. increase its economic value). This means that they will not invest in areas where land values

appreciate due to demand for development, which precludes farmland in urban expansion corridors (Johnston and Farrer, 2019).

Bonnefield then acquires land through “sale-leaseback” agreements, which they sometimes refer to as a “reallocation of capital” (Johnston and Farrer, 2019). This entails buying some portion of farmland from farmers and leasing it back to them in ten-year renewable agreements (Fairbairn, 2020, 78; Desmarais, 2017, 161; Willis, 2016; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Magnan, 2015; Fairbairn, 2014). Any future capital improvements to the property, like tile drainage, irrigation pivots, or grain bins, are negotiated in the lease agreement along with accompanying rental fee adjustments. These assets are then purchased using the company’s own capital and becomes the property of Bonnefield. Wally Johnston (2019) emphasized that they mostly work with farmers that approached them, and he elaborated that sometimes banks and creditors will refer clients to them that are facing challenges paying off debt. Bonnefield is particular about what kind of farmers they work with and operate with a concern for confidentiality. They prioritize investing in farmers that are interested in commercial growth and operating in-line with the value-maximization paradigm of dominant actors within the Canadian agri-food value chain (Rotz et al., 2019, 156; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015). Reliance on the value of the farmland to maintain value as a financial security requires the company to maintain or take on tenants that will maintain it in good working order for agriculture. This is the labour of physically reproducing the value of the land. Bonnefield therefore requires tenant farmers to abide by the Bonnefield Standards of Care, which was created by Wally Johnston after consulting numerous

farming best practices guides (Johnston and Farrar, 2019).

Bonnefield, to ensure that the standards are kept, conducts yearly farm visits. The standards include elements like good agronomic practices, good crop rotation, responsible pesticide use, and good record keeping. Bonnefield offers farmers training resources to farmers so they can adhere to these production practices (Sali, 2019). Their standards are included in the lease contract, so if the farmer does not abide by them Bonnefield says that they “work with the farmer” to bring them into compliance. However, they did say that persistent non-compliance could serve as grounds to end a lease agreement (Johnston and Farrer, 2019; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015).

Bonnefield, as the farmland owner, then holds onto it indefinitely as the value of the farmland theoretically increases. The farmland investor literature has emphasized the value of farmland securities in places like Canada and Australia as safe political climates with little risk of having land publicly expropriated (Ladurantaye, 2009). Bonnefield claims that their analysis shows that the agricultural value of farmland in Canada has increased at a consistent yearly rate of around 7.1% from 1950 to 2010, leading some to suggest that it is a “recession-proof” investment (Johnston and Farrer, 2019; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Koven, 2012; Ladurantaye, 2009).

Bonnefield, similar to Walton International, is a farmland investor that structures its operations through LPs. They raise funds from accredited investors at a \$150,000 minimum and deploy the equity periodically into a series of LP funds (Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Magnan, 2015). They only source funding from investors that are Canadian citizens so that they can operate within the regulatory requirements of most

Canadian provinces (Johnston and Farrer, 2019; Ladurantaye, 2009). Most of their investment comes from Canadian pension funds and they operate several partnership funds that specifically deploy their investments (Sali, 2019; Johnston and Farrer, 2019). Their properties are always registered under a Bonnefield title along with the specific fund associated with the property (Johnston and Farrer, 2019).

Farmland investments

Bonnefield began raising funds in 2010 to create their first farmland partnership fund, named Bonnefield LP I. They made their first farmland five acquisitions amounting to 6,500 acres in Norfolk County, Ontario, Melford, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba (Johnston and Farrer, 2019; Waldie, 2010; Waldie and Leeder, 2010). The investment community, however, was slow to show interest in their proposed farmland investment security. They purchased 15,000 acres of farmland in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario. They slowly reached their fundraising farmland acquisition goals of \$22.9 million for the purchase of 15,000 acres in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario by 2011, so they were able to officially “close” (i.e. begin operating) Bonnefield LP I (Willis, 2016; Holtslander, 2015; Annable, 2013; Koven, 2012). The fund produced 13% return per year for partner investors, supported by increasing global commodity prices (Sali, 2019; Willis, 2016).

The company’s initial success led them to form three other LPs. Bonnefield started assembling land and fundraising for Bonnefield LP II in 2012 as enthusiasm among institutional investors was picking up (Holtslander, 2015, 12; Mittelstaedt, 2011).

They were able to raise \$22.5 million and acquired 31,000 acres for the fund (Willis, 2016). A quarter of the investors for LP II came from the investors of LP I (Bonniefield, 2013). Bonniefield, with the assistance of Colonnade Investments, also attempted to source investment capital for the new LP through the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). They applied to the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to introduce a farmland exchange-traded fund (ETF) through initial public offering (IPO) raising \$100 million (Fairbairn, 2014; Koven, 2012).

One of the land purchases for Bonniefield LP II was for 6,500 acres of farmland in Melancthon Township, Ontario for \$60 million. In 2013 from a Boston-based hedge fund Baupost Group who was attempting to develop a limestone quarry on a tract of Class 1 farmland. This plan led to strong public resistance and two years of legal challenges, which made the project unfeasible. Bonniefield offered to buy-out their farmland holdings and keep the land in agricultural production. They were given 60 days to pay for the land but only had \$5 million available to invest. This led Bonniefield to create a third LP to raise the funds to buy the tract (Johnston and Farrer, 2019; Willis, 2016; Holtslander, 2015; Greenwood, 2013). LP II closed in 2013 with 10,600 acres in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario (Sali, 2019; Holtslander, 2015). This fund produced 11% returns for investor partners (Sali, 2019; Willis, 2016).

Bonniefield's LP III was started in 2013 to capitalize the land purchases of LP II, which started with a goal of raising \$200 million in investment (Bonniefield, 2014). This LP involved Bonniefield's first farmland purchases in Kitchi Sipi Valley (see Figure 28). Six separate properties, amounting to 651.2 acres, were bought from the same family in

Hawkesbury in 2014 under the name BONNEFIELD GP III INC., which were then rolled into BONNEFIELD FARMLAND ONTARIO III INC in 2015. Another 195.6 acre portion of land near Alexandria, North Glengarry in 2016 was bought under the same name. LP III closed in 2014 over their fundraising target at \$261 million (Willis, 2016; Holtlander 2015; Bonnefield, 2014). Bonnefield purchased a total of 21,600 acres of farmland from 53 farmers throughout Canada for LP III, which closed in 2014 (Sommerville and Magnan, 2015).




Figure 9 - Bonnefield Financial's holdings in eastern Ontario (Map made by Christopher Bisson)

Bonnefield LP IV started around 2015 with a goal of \$300 million (Kiernan, 2017; Willis, 2016). However, they closed the fund in 2016 after raising \$60 million in investments (Bonnefield, 2016; Willis, 2016). LP IV's first closing included 515.9 acres of farmland 12,400 that was also bought in 2016 from the Alfred Agricultural Campus of Guelph University of Alfred in North Plantagenet under the name BONNEFIELD FARMLAND ONTARIO IV INC. Another 180.8 acres was bought from the college in 2017. They opened the fund again after raising an additional \$70 million, doubling the size of the fund to \$130 million. LP IV closed for a second time in 2017 (Kiernan, 2017). It closed a third time in 2018 after raising an additional \$80 million, bringing the fund to \$211 million (Bonnefield, 2018). The number of acres owned by LP IV can be extrapolated from other public statements to be around 12,400 acres. However, the specific amount of land owned by the fund has not been publicly disclosed. Bonnefield also rolled LP I and LP II into one fund called Bonnefield Canadian Farmland Evergreen LP containing 46,000 acres, which closed in 2017 (Bonnefield, 2017).

Bonnefield, by 2017, owned a total 80,000 acres in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and BC. The land was tended by 70 tenant farms (Global AgInvesting, 2017; Willis, 2016) They deployed a \$400 million in farmland securities by 2017, primarily contributed by various Canadian pension funds (Global AgInvesting, 2017; Willis, 2016) In Kitchi Sipi Valley, they accumulated 1,543.5 acres of farmland between 2014 and 2017, primarily in the Plantagenet, Hawkesbury, and North Glengarry areas. Kitchi Sipi Valley therefore constitutes a very small 1.9% proportion of the company's total land holdings, which is primarily located in the prairie provinces due

to the large size of farmland properties available there. Wally Anderson was asked what Bonnefield's interest is in owning farmland in Kitchi Sipi Valley, and he responded: "Eastern Ontario hasn't really been for us and I'm just not sure why" (Johnston and Farrer, 2019).

Government and public relations

There has been public resistance to their farmland investment practices that has challenged the important reputation they have cultivated as a Canadian-owned company supposedly helping farmers be successful. Some farmers, particularly in the prairie provinces, have argued that the investment practices and kind of farming that Bonnefield promotes contributes to: farmland value inflation, crowding out of new farmers, rural depopulation, and a restructuring of agricultural production that removes the economic independence of farmers (St. Pierre, 2019; Gehl, 2013; Waldie and Leeder, 2010). Bonnefield says they recognize the critique they have received that they are driving up land prices by their investments. But they say that they are buying land for less than other companies. However, they maintain that land prices need to reflect market conditions. So, despite the desire to avoid farmland price inflation, they are still bound to the requirement to set their prices according to the cost of inputs, commodities, and local real estate values. Bonnefield works to maintain social license for their operations by attracting little attention and through initiatives like their Good Neighbor Program, which involves giving donations to community projects directly connected to the tenant farmers they work with. However, Bonnefield stresses that they

go about community donations in a decidedly quiet way to avoid negative public attention (Johnston and Farrer, 2019).

Ontario stands out to the company as a model jurisdiction for farmland investment. Wally Johnston stated, “I think of Ontario, probably, as having the least regulatory controls of any province in the Country.” Ontario, compared to other provinces, allows virtually any individual or organization from anywhere in the world to purchase farmland. This allows companies like Bonnefield to amass larger pools of investment capital and arrange it in models that specifically suit investment funds (Johnston and Farrer, 2019). The province also has land use and tax laws that benefit farmland investors. The ability of investment firms to take advantage of agricultural zoning, greenbelt conservation areas, and farmland tax classifications protects the land from development pressure and allows them to avoid paying the full amount of property taxes on their land holdings as long as it continues to be farmed (Johnston and Farrer, 2019; St. Pierre, 2019). Ontario also has flexible farmland protection regulations, which allows farmland values to rise steadily over time in a way that remains linked to the economic value of industrial agricultural production (St. Pierre, 2019; Skerritt, 2015).

Competition with large-scale corporate farms

Bonnefield Financial was unable to find a significant number of suitable farmland properties in the Kitchi Sipi Valley to invest in because large-scale corporate farms were already absorbing financially–precarious farms in the area at the time. Farmland ownership debt and inheritance has caused a number of challenges for farming

operations. Family farms, in particular, encountered high debt levels as a result of acquiring enough land to meet economies of scale for cash crop production beginning in the late-1970s (see Chapter 6). Farm succession and inheritance also became more challenging. Family-owned farming operations with extensive land holdings and multiple sibling branches faced conflicts surrounding farm ownership when family members sought to exit production and redeem the cash value of their farmland inheritance. Farmers also faced succession challenges in terms of finding family members or new farmers to buy their land holdings to pay for retirement (St. Pierre, 2019). These challenges are the result of two waves of agricultural migration in the 1960s and 1970s that assisted existing farmers sell their land to secure their retirement. The first, was a post-war rush of migration from the Netherlands. Several of these Dutch migrants held an aggressively commercial attitude towards farming, resulting in some of them accumulating large farmland holdings that are now owned through a series of family farm corporations (Black and Black, 2019; St. Pierre, 2019; Ganzevoort, 1983).

The region also experienced another wave of agricultural migration in the 1970s from Switzerland who came to Canada due to high farmland prices resulting in an inability to procure land for their children. Several of these Swiss immigrant farmers also held aggressive commercial attitudes resulting in the accumulation of large land holdings. Both waves of migrants came to Canada with very little wealth who worked as farm labourers. Some managed to save enough money to buy their own land, while others entered into informal financing agreements with exiting farmers (St. Pierre, 2019; Schiller, 2001; Schelbert, 2005). This is why the region has seen the emergence of

various large-scale, mixed agribusiness operations with large farmland holdings, like the Schouten and Bretzler families.

Large-scale corporate farms, however, do not have the need for nor the capital available to purchase the farmland of every retiring or exiting farmer in the region. Many farms started the 2000s with high levels of debt and no means of exiting agricultural production. The smallest farms, selling produce through locally-oriented markets and taking on off-farm income, were able to maintain their operation at their own personal expense through off-farm work. Farms with dairy, egg, broiler hen, and turkey production quota enjoyed relatively consistent prices, which made debt-financed expansion possible (see Table 8). However, the volatility of global commodities markets made it nearly impossible for cash croppers to confidently service additional debt. These farmers did, however, possess farmland properties that appreciated in market value over the course of the 1990s due to the increased value of capital-intensive cash crop production. Medium-scale farms dependent on selling into commodity value chains experienced a price-cost squeeze that pressured them to either exit production or take on additional debt to expand into a large-scale, diversified agribusiness corporation, with at least 1,500 acres in farmland (Johnston and Farrer, 2019; St. Pierre, 2019; Waldie and Leeder, 2010)

Table 8 - Farmland holdings and production of the five largest farm corporations				
Farm Corporation	Farmland 2000	Farmland 2017	Rate of Increase	Production/Operations
BRETZLER FARMS LTD	2,819.39 ac	5,419.91 ac	+ 92.2%	Diary, grains, and biogas energy
Schouten Family - Various Corporations	1,250.60 ac	3,658.94 ac	+ 192.5%	Dairy and grains
CHARLOTTENGRO FARMS INC	1,495.26 ac	3,621.34 ac	+ 142.2%	Cattle and grains

WAHLER FARMS INC.	0.0 ac	2,897.83 ac	-	Grains and grain handling
SONIBRAND FARM INC	0.0 ac	1,754.58 ac	-	Dairy, grain, top soil, custom work, grain handling

Considering the recent agrifood and urban development history of Kitchi Sipi Valley, it seems that there are numerous factors that act against the region, despite the fact that Ontario remains the most permissive jurisdiction for farmland investment. First, the urban development pressure from the City of Ottawa has inflated the market value of farmland for a substantial portion of the area's best tracts of farmland, especially in Kanata, Nepean, Osgoode, Gloucester, Orleans, and Cumberland. This kind of farmland cannot return the steady land value growth that Bonnefield prefers-explain further why. Second, Kitchi Sipi Valley is much more fragmented in terms of tracts of prime farmland, consisting of a large tract along the Magtogoek River, a smaller tract south of Ottawa, and small pockets in Prescott-Russell. This means that there is less prime farmland to own in the area. Third, supply managed production is popular in Kitchi Sipi Valley, which has resulted in a relative level of price stability limiting the debt challenges faced by farmers. Those who faced the greatest economic hardship from commodity price instability in Kitchi Sipi Valley were beef farmers located primarily in Nepean and Renfrew and cash croppers located in Prescott-Russell. They have largely been absorbed by large-scale corporate farms. These families remain the largest private landowners in the region and consolidated, by far, most of the farmland between 2000 and 2017. These factors combined limited the number of farms that were in the precise condition to be both eligible for investment and seeking a non-debt source of capital for commercial expansion. Bonnefield emerged from Kitchi Sipi Valley in 2009

but was actually very limited in its investment in the region. That said, they were able to become 32nd largest private land-owners in the area, owning 1,543.5 acres, which is the size of a significantly-sized commercial farm in Kitchi Sipi Valley

In this chapter I detailed the findings of the case study research I conducted on two major farmland investment companies that purchased farmland in the survey sample area during the study period. These two companies were researched to get a better understanding of what motivated or prevented farmland purchases in the region. I presented the findings of the farmland ownership survey I conducted for this study in Chapter 4. They suggest that farmland investment company purchases were relatively little during the global land rush of the late-2000s. I presented the historical conditions that supported and limited the interest and ability of farmland investment companies to accumulate farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley in chapter 5, 6, and 7. I suggested that farmland investment companies were either uninterested or unable to purchase farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley because the region's farms were already highly capitalized, the land was highly fragmented, and commercial farms that would be vulnerable to financial land grabs were already grabbed by large-scale corporate farms. These findings and analysis, however, did not indicate what impact farmland consolidation and financialization is having on farmland access for farmers.

In this chapter the two case studies showed very different motivations and outcomes from farmland investments in the study area. Walton International, the development-focused investment company, was motivated by the high potential for property value appreciation for farmland at the edge of Ottawa's urban boundary that

could be converted to pre-development land. Its investment success has been jeopardized by the City of Ottawa's decisions to maintain the urban boundary. It has had a strong negative impact on farmer farmland access in southwest Ottawa because of the farmland property value inflation that their buying practices produced. Bonnefield Financial, the agriculture-focused investment company, was motivated by finding farmland properties with the greatest potential for increasing the land's agricultural value. Its investment interest in the study area was limited by the already high agricultural value of the farmland and the value inflation caused by urban expansion. The farmland they purchase is bought at market value for agricultural use. Their impact on land values are therefore unlikely to have any additional effect on land values beyond reinforcing the impact of global commodity prices on local farmland values.

Part II

The long grab in the Kitchi Sipi Valley

In the remainder of this thesis I explain the historical development of the corporate entrenchment of farmland ownership in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley that took place between 2000 and 2017, primarily in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The entrenchment of farmland ownership in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley around large-scale corporate farms—which possibly the reduced the rate of farmland investment in the are —is the result of three interconnected historical processes of dispossession that were involved in the reorganization of farmland distribution in the region at the time (see Figure 8).




Figure 10 — Political-economic dimensions of the long grab in the Kitchi Sipi Valley (Based on analysis Christopher Bisson in Chapters 5, 6, and 7).

The first process involves the colonization of Anishinaabe lands and continuous reproduction of settler colonial authority. The second process involves the consolidation of farmland owned by smaller farms around a handful of large-scale corporate farms. The third process involves the accumulation of farm enterprises by financial corporations to market as a new kind of investment security through the deployment of the wealth of global investors. I argue, over the course of the next three chapters, that different political-economic imperatives have clashed over colonial land distribution decisions in ways that determined what is possible for farmland investors in the region today. Chapter 5 covers the conflict between Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities and various colonial governments, illustrating the history of land conflict involved in the colonial land grab. Chapter 6 details how the land taken from the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg was partitioned and granted out to some settlers, and how that land

served as the basis for simple commodity relations of agricultural production that developed overtime into a system dominated by agribusiness monopolies. This illustrates the land conflict between small farms and large agribusiness corporations involved in the agrarian land grab. Chapter 7 explains how the firms managing the wealth accumulated from the profits of corporate monopolies are deployed in ways that use debt to take farmland ownership away from farm businesses, large and small. Chapter 8 focuses on two farmland investment companies to better understand why the financial land grab was so limited in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

Chapter 6: Colonial dimensions of the long grab

The first land grab operating in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley is the ongoing colonial land grab. The French, British, and Canadian settler colonial governments obtained their sovereignty over the Kitchi Sipi Valley—the underpinning Crown title that serves as the legal validity of private property rights—through different moments. Each moment, however, was fraught by diplomatic deceit, military defeat, and genocide, which has produced the legal-political conditions for the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg litigate and protest for the restoration of their land rights. Colonial land grab of the Kitchi Sipi Valley was conducted in such a way that it eventually compromised the legal validity of the Crown title underpinning private properties of the area. In this chapter I explain the key moments involved in the colonial land grab of the Kitchi Sipi Valley to highlight the problematics of Canadian sovereignty that may one day undermine the validity of private property in some parts of the area.

The first moment of the colonial land grab was the clerical license given by the Pope to European Monarchs to claim the lands of non-Christians. This started in 1430 when the Pope issued a series of Bulls sanctioning Spain to claim most of the Western Hemisphere as their colony. The second moment was when the French Empire manipulated diplomatic and military relations with Algonquin-Anishinaabeg to terminate their control over trade access through the Kitchi Sipi River. The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg of the Kitchi Sipi Valley first encountered French explorers in 1603 and extended offers of friendship and trade. French explorers accepted this kindness and

offered to form a military alliance, which brought the Kitchi Sipi Valley into inter-imperial warfare, and it ended with the British conquering both French settlers and Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities. The third moment was the British conquest of the Kitchi Sipi Valley and the misrecognition of the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg's original title to the land. The British Empire defined the land rights of the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which recognized their original title to the Kitchi Sipi. The colonial government, however, claimed to have extinguished the original title of the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land through the Crawford Purchases negotiated with a leader of the Michi Sagig Nishnaabeg in 1783. They granted out private land charters and permitted settlers to squat in the Kitchi Sipi Valley despite Algonquin-Anishinaabeg letters of complaint demanding the British to honour the promises made in the Royal Proclamation (Coburn and Moore, 2021; Gehl, 2014).

The fourth moment of the colonial land grab was the attempted genocide of the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg people. Treaty misrecognition was combined with genocidal policies of the newly-formed Dominion of Canada meant to remove Algonquin-Anishinaabeg people from the Kitchi Sipi Valley to make way for timber extraction and settlement expansion. Private lots owned by Algonquin-Anishinaabeg people were confiscated through laws that enabled municipalities to seize the land to recover unpaid property taxes in the early 1800s. Children were taken from their parents and placed in Residential Schools and women who married outside of the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg community were stripped of their Indian Act rights (Gehl, 2014). The fifth moment in the colonial land grab was the resurgence of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg power to land rights

through modern treaty negotiation and organized political action. Several families were able to accumulate enough land around Golden Lake in 1864 to convince the Government of Canada to recognize their community as the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation and establish the Pikwakanagan Indian Reserve (Golden Lake 39). This recognition gave the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation the legal power to seek justice for treaty misrecognition. Supreme Court of Canada rulings over First Nations land disputes around so-called Canada established the precedent for the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation to submit a land claim over the southern portion of the south of the Kitchi Sipi Valley (Coburn and Moore, 2021). The following sections describe the proceedings of these five moments in the colonial land grab and identify outstanding political tensions that contribute to conflicts over land distribution in the south of the Kitchi Sipi Valley today.

Contested concepts of authority and territorial sovereignty

Algonquin-Anishinaabeg people have occupied the Kitchi Sipi Valley for time beyond memory. Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities lived throughout the watershed governed by sophisticated systems of stories, ceremonies, and processes of consensus-based decision making. These practices have made it possible for Algonquin-Anishinaabeg society to inhabit the watershed for thousands of years, which the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled constitutes a “moral right of occupancy” (Coburn and Moore, 2021, p. 6). Algonquin-Anishinaabeg traders encountered the

French Empire for the first time in 1603, extending to them invitations for friendship and trade (Jenkins 1996). The French Empire responded, however, with declarations that the inhabitants of the land were new subjects of the King in Paris, an introduction that indicates a far different way of relating to each other in space. This section covers the specific practices of governance, land use, and international relations of the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg people that resulted in their ability to occupy the region for so long and assert territorial control over the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg's power to block French access to the watershed in the 1630s meant that the French Empire had to negotiate alliances and treaties with the nation to secure access to Wendat territory to the northwest. This historical demonstration of original title to the watershed, which was recognized by the British through the Royal Proclamation of 1763—and never extinguished through any treaty, surrender, or purchase—serves as the basis for the Algonquins of Ontario land claim that continues to be negotiated today.

Algonquin-Anishinaabeg laws governing land relations

Anishinaabe laws of land relations are traditionally practiced autonomously by different communities up and down the Kitchi Sipi Valley based on the harvesting and hunting activities of each season. This produces a kind of space that is organized through a horizontal process of deliberation and informed by stories and ceremonies that instruct how to maintain *mino-pimatiziwin* (a life through good relations) (Gehl, 2017, p. 47). The goal of good kinship relations—between a network of human and non-human persons—

is based on a core understanding that the land is the product of the relationships of co-creation between diverse living beings. Knowledge of how to achieve *mino-pimatiziwin* is therefore inherent within the land and its occupants, which can be accessed through sacred stories, critical self-reflection, and by actively being in relation to the broader watershed community (Gehl 2017; LaDuke 1999; Simpson 2011).

Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land use practices

Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) patterns of traditional habitation shift on a yearly-basis, oscillating seasonally up and down the Kitchi Sipi Valley, organized around the harvesting practices of seasonally-available food sources. This tradition of seasonal habitation existed prior to European contact, and continues in limited-yet-resurgent capacities to this day despite the disruption and disordering of colonial violence and occupation. In the winter, Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) communities organized into groups of families inhabiting sites at the height of land in the Kitchi Sipi (Ottawa River) watershed for hunting and trapping. Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) communities also organize in the spring at the confluence of these headwaters to harvest geese and pimisi (eels) (Coburn and Moore, 2022; Gehl, 2017).

In the summer, Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) society gathered at major points in the watershed, like Akikodjiwan (Chaudière Falls), to engage in trade and hold celebrations, religious and civil ceremonies, and national political deliberation (Coburn and Moore, 2022; Gehl, 2017). Wild rice cultivation along the watershed's system of

lakes and wetlands was also practiced among the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin), Nipissing Nishnaabeg (Nipissing) and the Michi Saagiig Anishinaabe (Mississauga) alike (Gehl, 2017; Simpson, 2011). These kinds of land-based livelihoods resulted in the sustained Algonquin-Anishinaabeg occupation of the Kitchi Sipi Valley for thousands of years (Coburn and Moore, 2022).

Algonquin-Anishinaabeg treaty relations

The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg managed an array of treaty relations and military alliances with other First Nations nations in the region and throughout Turtle Island (see Figure 2). Anishinaabe international relations involve the establishment and maintenance of treaties (Simpson, 2017). Pre-contact relations between First Nations were mediated through negotiated treaties, enshrined through the creation of wampum belts, and reaffirmed regularly through visits and ceremonies. First Nations treaties traditionally address conditions of cohabitation, passage, trade, and mutual aid (Starblanket, 2019). The Kitchesipirini (those who inhabited so-called L'Isle-aux-Allumettes), for example, held a territorial control over access to the Kitchi Sipi River under the leadership of Tessouat in the 1640s and 1650s. They demanded a reciprocation of gifts from fur traders who traveled through the territory they occupied (Dickason & McNab, 2009). The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg first encountered the French Empire when a trading party led by Tessouat met Samuel de Champlain in 1603 at present-day Tadoussac. They approached the French Empire with the same expectation of treaty relations that they were used to negotiating with other First Nations. The French Empire and Algonquin-

Anishinaabeg worked out a trade agreement for beaver pelts where the Kitchesipirini retained control of access over the Kitchi Sipi River and restricted French passage, which lasted until the Peace of Montreal in 1701 (Gehl, 2017; Jenkins 1996).




Figure 11 — First Nations Travel Routes in Northeastern Turtle Island, 1600 CE (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on maps in Native Land 2022; Royal Canadian Geographical Society 2018; Harris and Matthews 1987)

Physical conflict between First Nations traditionally took the form of skirmishes and raids, with successful war parties taking hostages and prisoners out of retaliation or to replace community roles lost through prior conflict. Conflicts over the political control

of territory did not take place to the same extent or in the same manner as was dominant in Europe at the time, since the idea of absolute political sovereignty over territory is not characteristic of the traditional First Nations systems of international relations (Starblanket, 2019). These international relation practices were the expectations and norms of diplomacy that the French Empire encountered when they first arrived in the region. It compelled the French, Dutch, and British to make alliances and treaties with First Nations as a way to gain access to lucrative fur resources to sell back in Europe.

European Doctrine of Discovery

Algonquin-Anishinaabeg international relations over land access experienced radical change when they began trade relations with French colonists. French trade interests in the region were very different from the terms that were typically negotiated for access to hunting grounds. The French Empire came to the region with the impression that they possessed territorial sovereignty to the region based on charters granted by the King of France. This section details the way European empires established the legal authority to claim the lands of non-Christian peoples through the Doctrine of Discovery. The authority of European monarchs was based on the divine right¹², which was maintained through recognition by the Pope. This gave the Pope the authority to compel monarchs

¹²The custom of the “divine right of kings” for European monarchs in the middle ages traces its lineage to the Papal endorsement of the rule of Charlemagne over the Carolingian Empire. This custom ultimately traces its origin to the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity, and the doctrine passed down by St. Peter that all Christians must recognize the divine power of the Roman Emperor granted by God (Bothwell, 2006; Burgess, 1992).

to rule their Kingdoms in ways that reflected the priorities of the Vatican. The Pope issued a series of Papal Bulls in the 1430s (*Regimini gregis*, *Creator omnium*, and *Sicut dudum*) intended to resolve political-economic conflicts that were emerging between rival kingdoms vying for access to new resources and trade routes. These decrees became known as the Doctrine of Discovery, which served as the basis for European empires to claim lands as their own despite the fact that nations were already occupied and claimed political authority over them (Burgess, 1992). It amounted to a global-scale land grant from the Pope, initially to the Spanish and Portuguese, and later the French, Dutch, English, and Swedish empires.

These rulings came about as a result of the religious fervor of the time stemming from the Reconquista of the Iberian peninsula from Muslim Granada, widespread antisemitism throughout Europe, and fears over the expansion of the Ottoman Empire (Bothwell, 2006). However, through continued conflict over territorial expansion, this evolved into the Bulls of Donation (*Inter caetera*, *Eximiae devotionis*, and *Dudum siquidem*), which granted permission to the Castilian and Portuguese crowns to claim lands that were not already claimed by a Christian monarchy. Portugal and Spain then negotiated the Treaty of Alcáçovas in 1479 and the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, which ratified the same conditions (Gottschalk, 1927).

France had not previously demonstrated interest in overseas exploration and trade other than small-scale and informal fishing ventures off the Grand Banks, mostly because they were still recovering from the economic and political fallout of the Hundred Years War with England between 1337 and 1453. The French Monarchy was not a

subject of the papal decrees or the Spanish-Portuguese treaties that ratified them. This led France to challenge the authority of the Pope to grant monopolies over exploration, trade, and colonialism. In 1533, the Pope agreed with the French King that the papal decrees only applied to already “discovered” lands, and that any new “discoveries” could be claimed by other Christian kingdoms (Eccles, 1998). The advent and reform of these papal decrees ultimately established the internal political legitimacy for monarchs to claim land that was considered *terra nullis* (empty land) in what would come to be known as the “Doctrine of Discovery” (Wolfe, 2006).

The Doctrine of Discovery immediately produced a conflict over sovereignty to the lands that France and England recently learned about. Both countries were now convinced that they had the indisputable authority from the Pope to claim land as long as the people living there were not Christian. The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg, on the other hand, saw their autonomous right to the territory as unassailable given that they had successfully thrived in the area for millenia (Coburn and Moore, 2021; Gehl, 2014). This contradiction of recognized authority went misunderstood by European empires when they met a diversity of First Nations eager to enter into friendships and trade relations on the basis of international relations on Turtle Island. European colonizers ultimately used these friendships to advance their project of establishing permanent trade settlement through chartered merchant corporations to facilitate the extraction of beaver pelts produced and transported through First Nations labour (Weaver, 2003; Eccles, 1998). The French, Dutch, and English empires, however, quickly moved beyond peaceful coexistence among First Nations and began to grow trade settlements into

early settler colonies.

Imperial alliances and treaty misrecognition

French and English colonies were both managed by chartered merchant companies. The difference, however, between the objectives, structures, and relationships of these companies ultimately determined the extent and shape of early settlement growth. The French Empire structured their merchant colonies through a seigneurial (manorial) system of land tenure and restricted migrants to Catholic settlers, which restricted migration and investment. The English, on the other hand, organized their merchant colonies around *fee simple* private property relations that was popular amongst the English nobility at the time. They also permitted the migration of a greater diversity of migrants. These two factors resulted in English settlement growth on the Atlantic coast of Turtle Island to rapidly outpace French settlements. The uneven magnitudes of early colonial settlements on Turtle Island led to France becoming overextended relative to its territorial claims, which gave England a strategic upper-hand over control of the continent, despite France's superior defensive position (Weaver, 2003; Eccles, 1998). I argue therefore that the differences in the kinds of colonial charters issued by the French and English empires had an impact on the strategic position of one empire over the other as they competed for control over Turtle Island.

Colonial merchant charter grants

In the early colonial period, British and French empires wanted to protect potential colonial sources of trade and credit from inter-imperial interference so trade was organized into a mercantilist system (Arrighi 1994). Mercantilism was therefore a way of organizing trade and finance as a state-controlled and semi-feudal compact of aristocratic and merchant investors (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Eccles, 1998; Arrighi, 1994). It was an internalization of “capitalist techniques of power” that established a triangular Atlantic trade network, where slaves would be captured from Africa, and brought to North America to produce or extract raw materials, which would then be brought to England for the production of manufactured goods destined for European and colonial markets (Bernstein 2010; Arrighi, 1994, p. 144).

Mercantile trade expansion and colonialism operated through a handful of multinational joint stock ventures. Such ventures as the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, Hudson Bay Company, or the British and Dutch east India companies, were granted trade monopolies and state powers through charters to secure their commercial operations abroad, such as the deployment of military forces, engagement in diplomacy, and the civil administration of settlements—including raising taxes (Bernstein, 2010; Weaver, 2003). Joint-stock companies therefore operated as both a government and a commercial operation. Their operations not only served to increase trade supplies and revenues, but they were also responsible to establish and govern new settlements (Arrighi, 1994).




Figure 12 - European merchant charters in Turtle Island, from 1538 to 1670
 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on Harris, 2008; Weaver, 2003; Dean, 1998; Eccles, 1998; Winearls, 1991; Sakolski, 1932)

French explorers claimed much of northeastern Turtle Island (North America) for the French King in 1534, bringing it into the realm (i.e. radical title) of Francis I (see Figure 10). The King then granted them a charter to all of Turtle Island between 40 and 46 degrees latitude. This gave them a trade monopoly over the territory and the power to grant seigniorial tenure over lands to vassals. Viceroy, Cardinal Richelieu brought 100 investors together in Paris in 1627 to form the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France to manage the trade and seigniorial administration of the colony, until it was transferred in 1645 to a company controlled by local nobles in New France. The failure of both of these companies to successfully develop a self-sustaining colony led Louis XIV to

declare New France a province of France in 1663, making the colony administered directly from Paris until the fall of New France in 1763 (Eccles, 1998).

French colonial stagnation under the seigneurial land system

The structures of early colonial settlements themselves within French colonies on Turtle Island were based on feudal class relations stratified hierarchically. Power originated from the Pope's recognition of the crown's supreme title over the realm and cascading downwards towards various types of nobles, then eventually down to free peasants, settler labourers, indentured servants, serfs, and slaves. The feudal system of western Europe originated in France during the Carolingian Empire in the 800s and in England after the Norman Conquest in 1066. Both the Carolingian and Norman kingdoms claimed land through the principle of *nulle terre sans seigneur* (no land without a lord), that all land within the realm belongs absolutely to the crown (allodial/radical title), over which various land rights (estates in land embodied as a manor or seigneurie) can be granted (feoffed) to tenants (lords of seigneurs) with the condition of fealty and political, economic, and military service. Lords were then permitted to subinfeud (grant to subordinate tenants) portions of their manors or seigneuries for fealty and service (Bothwell, 2006; Burgess, 1992).




Figure 13 – Social structure of land ownership in New France, 1534 to 1763 (Diagram created by Christopher Bisson based on Eccles 1998)

Land distribution in the colony of New France was a simplified version of the seigneurial land system back in France. Land was organized along the feudal class lines of the clergy, nobility, and *roturiers* working on fixed-term contracts. Upon termination of their labour contracts, *roturiers* workers were permitted to remain in the colony as habitants if they were able to clear 1.36 hectares (four *arpents*) of land for a land grant of 10 hectares. Habitants did not pay the high taxes on land that peasants faced back in France, but they were still expected to pay seigneurial dues and parish

tithes. The vast amounts of land that France conquered was made available for habitant labourers within the settlement area. This prevented social differentiation between land-owning and waged farm labour, which limited surplus wealth accumulation by lords and free peasants. Alienation of seigneuries or lots was forbidden, which prevented wealth accumulation through land speculation. These strict limits on wealth accumulation in New France contributed to a shortage in investment capital and placed a damper on settlement development and population growth. Moreover, the statutory exclusion of French protestants from operating in New France further reduced the availability of investment capital and labour power for the colony's development (Eccles, 1998).

English colonial expansion under the liberal land system

English settlements along the Atlantic coast of Turtle Island were experiencing substantial settler population growth, which included a large influx of African slaves. Similar to French colonies, English proprietary charters were governed by a viceroial governor. However, English colonial settlements were organized in fundamentally different ways. Colonized land initially became divided and governed in the fashion of gentry reformers back in England. By 1620, English puritan settlers rushed to New England escaping religious persecution (Weaver, 2003; Eccles, 1998, 19). The Puritan worldview of New England settlers produced a colony that was ordered around a hybrid between feudal fealty to the British monarchy, reformist fundamentalism, and liberal ideas of democratic self-government. This model for settlement was detailed in the Mayflower Compact of 1620, which formed a joint stock company called the Council for

New England. In this model, the company territory was divided into colonial settlements and governed by a colonial council. Settlements were divided through communal agreements around a town centre, granting land in fee simple to British settlers at sizes that encouraged agrarian self-sufficiency and the organization of a trained civil militia (Weaver, 2003). The rights obtained by settlers in English colonies permitted free landowners to accumulate wealth—though very slowly at first, as colonized land was still plentiful—in quantities that could be reinvested in farm expansion, hiring of farm labour, and the purchase of land for speculative profits. The availability of local investment capital, influx of English settlers, and the ready supply of slave labour resulted in rapid colonial expansion, relative to colonial development in New France (Weaver, 2003). This pushed English settlement further up and down the Atlantic coast and inland, frequently coming further into conflict with New France and other newly encountered First Nations (Weaver 2003; Eccles 1998). This placed New France at a military and economic disadvantage despite its favorable defensive location. This contributed to the eventual conquest of New France by the British Empire during the Thirty Years War (Eccles, 1998).


Imperial competition over access to fur-trapping grounds led the English, Dutch, and French empires to make treaties and alliances with the First Nations they encountered. These agreements established the common principles underpinning formal international relations between First Nations and settler governments, shaping the conditions of treaty relations today. Conflicts over access to areas of fur production led the French and English to make military and trade alliances with the many First

Nations, escalating the intensity of war between rival groups of nations, like the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, Wabanaki Confederacy, and the Seven Nations of Canada. These conflicts established political bonds between different First Nations and the French and British empires. These bonds were codified through formal treaties and alliances, which included promises of territorial recognition made to the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Weaver, 2003; Borrows, 1997).

The Beaver Wars (1603-1701)

The first major political conflict over territorial control of the Kitchi Sipi Valley took place over the course of the Beaver Wars, from 1609 to 1701. This series of colonial conflicts began when the French Empire allied with various Anishinaabe nations and the Wendat (Huron) in 1603 against the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy who then formed an alliance with the Dutch through the Two Row Wampum in 1613. These alliances were formed for both protection from raids and to secure access to trapping grounds and trade routes. They also intensified conflicts between the Haudenosaunee and surrounding nations as they became implicated in competition for trapping and trading territories (see Figure 12). The intensity of conflict especially escalated when the Dutch began trading guns to the Kanien'kehá'ka at a time when the French were withholding them from their allies, which resulted in the disordering and expulsion of many First Nations from southwestern Ontario in the 1640s. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy initially gained a dominant military position in the conflict until the Dutch surrendered their colony to the English in 1664 cutting off Haudenosaunee supplies of arms and

munitions, as well as access to European markets for fur (DeVries, 2011; Bonaparte, 2006; Bothwell, 2006; Barr, 2006; Borrows, 1997).



Northeastern Extent of English and French Settlement and Trade, 1670 to 1760

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| ■ British Settlement | ■ Thirteen Colonies | ▨ Wabanaki Confederacy | --- English Trade Routes |
| ● French Settlement | ■ New France | ▨ Haudenosaunee Confederacy | — French Trade Routes |
| ◆ Haudenosaunee/Wendat/Petun/Neutral | ▨ Jesuit Missions | ▨ Three Fires Confederacy | |
| ▲ Anishinaabe/Néhinaw/Innu/Abenaki | | | |

Figure 14 - English and French Settlement and Trade, 1670 to 1760 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on NativeLands.ca, 2022; Harris, 2008)

English settlements began expanding into the former New Netherlands colony and an alliance was developed between the English and Haudenosaunee against France. At the same time, New France became administered directly from Paris in 1663, and received increased military support and arms to distribute to First Nations

allies. This allowed the French Empire to successfully invade and conquer Kanien'kehá,ka territory in so-called New York, as well as expand into Ohio and Illinois extending the French fur trade network further into the continent. Knowing that they were still outnumbered, in 1687 French soldiers captured around 200 Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) *hoyenah* (chiefs), warriors, and civilians as hostages through dishonest diplomacy, sending 36 of the strongest among them to work as rowing slaves on Royal galleys back in France (Eccles, 1998). This, understandably, resulted in aggressive retaliatory raids on Fort Niagara, Lachine and up the Kitchi Sipi Valley, pushing Algonquin-Anishinaabeg families into hiding, or exile further up the watershed or into French-controlled areas along the Magtogoek River (Gehl, 2014; Jenkins, 1996).

The Haudenosaunee nations were confronted by rapid population growth in New England, which threatened their territorial sovereignty. These factors brought the long-standing conflict between the French Empire and Haudenosaunee to an end with the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701. Haudenosaunee raids on French settlements stopped, as well as hostilities against the French and English empires. French trade was extended into Haudenosaunee territory, and several First Nations were permitted to return to the Great Lakes area. However, the French Empire agreed to end their alliance with the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin), which unleashed Haudenosaunee raids on the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg once again, this time opening the Kitchi Sipi River to secure French passage to Wendake (Lake Huron) (Gehl, 2014). The Odawa-Anishinaabe (Ottawa) expanded their trade from the Great Lakes into Kitchi Sipi Valley, filling a power vacuum that was created through the disordering and

displacement of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Gordon, 2015; Eccles, 1998; Jenkins, 1996).

The Seven Years War (1756–1763) and the fall of New France

The Beaver Wars were ultimately a series of conflicts that destabilized the order of the First Nations communities in the regions surrounding New France, New Netherlands, and New England. The series of conflicts began with France gaining the upper hand over British colonies at the end of the Beaver Wars, but ultimately losing control over northeastern Turtle Island at the end of the Seven Years War, which began in 1756 and concluded with the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Great Britain gained control over New France, but Canadian habitants were permitted to stay in the colony and retain their Roman Catholic faith and seignorial land regime. Colonial powers fighting over parts of Turtle Island could not have defended their claims without the military support of First Nations allies. This compelled the British Empire to formalize post-conquest relations through the recognition of First Nations original title to the land and restricting settlement on lands where the original title has not been extinguished. The British Crown, through the Royal Proclamation of 1763, specifically recognized the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg as the original title holders to the Kitchi Sipi Valley (Coburn and Moore, 2021). This fact serves as the foundational legal basis for the Algonquins of Ontario claim that they are the original title holders, in their land claims case with the Government of Canada. But more immediately, it indicates that the original title of the farmland analyzed in this thesis remains unextinguished, meaning that it still belongs to the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg by the very laws made by the British Crown in the Royal Proclamation of

1763.

The Royal Proclamation and the Crawford Purchases

The Royal Proclamation detailed the process requiring colonial administration to first alienate lands from First Nations communities before engaging in settlement expansion. It also recognized First Nations title and a sovereignty of lands that were not yet alienated, which could not be relinquished except through a treaty with the British Crown (Clarke 2001). The Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Sir William Johnson met with the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) near Montreal to explain the terms of the proclamation and to document the extent of the land they inhabited. The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg explained that they inhabit both sides of the Kitchi Sipi (Ottawa River) from Long Sault to Lake Nippissing, which was officially recognized by the Crown as sovereign Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land (Coburn and Moore, 2022; Jenkins, 1996).

This moment involved a transition that is described by Coulthard (2014) and Wolfe (1996) where the colonial gentry's value of First Nation labour to defend the settler colony sunk below the value they then associated with the land for resource extraction performed through cheap imported labour. The colonial administration of Canada, under racist prejudices of First Nations inferiority, began to presume that the so-called Province of Quebec was under absolute British dominance, rather than the treaty environment that it actually was—and still is. That dominance therefore became enforced through the justification of constitutional “rule of law”, which only recognized parliamentary sovereignty and common law conventions of private property law with

little regard to treaties made with local First Nations (DeVries 2011, 36).

General Amherst—then Governor General of British North America—erroneously presumed that the territories they occupied in the western parts of the so-called Province of Quebec were conquered and now subject to the authority of the British Crown. Amherst refused to recognize local political structures and protocols and permitted settlement to expand into areas inhabited by First Nations. This provoked conflict among the different occupied First Nations, escalating into so-called Pontiac's War, which saw a resistance from Anishinaabe (Omàmiwininiwag, Michi Sagig, Nippissing, Ojibwe, Odawa, and Potawatami), Haudenosaunee (Iroquois), Wendat (Huron), Myaamiaki (Miami), Kikapú (Kickapoo), Mascoutin, Lënapeyok (Delaware), Shaawanwaki (Shawnee), and Illiniwek (Illinois) communities, who joined forces around the leadership of Odawa-Anishinaabe chief Pontiac in an attempt to expel the British from the occupied area. Pontiac's resistance force was able to defeat and occupy four British forts until a vigilante gang of British settlers started murdering First Nations civilians and a British militia was dispatched to suppress the rebellion (White 2011; Dixon 2005).

Haudenosaunee communities that were allies with the British during the Seven Years War, led by Thayendanegea (Joseph Brant), lost the majority of their traditional homeland with the British surrender to the United States and were understandably angry about it. The Governor of Quebec, Sir Frederick Haldimand was therefore initially reluctant to settle the Loyalists in the west of the province for fear of provoking further conflict with First Nations. Despite this, he offered Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) allies a

grant of land along the Bay of Quinte in 1784, which was predominantly settled by Kanien'kehá:ka (Mohawk). Thayendanegea then requested a two-million acre tract along the Grand River as well, which Governor Haldimand reluctantly accepted with the hope that it would secure the remainder of Upper Canada for Loyalist settlement. Overall, about 2,000 Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) refugees of the Revolutionary War were relocated to so-called Upper Canada (Craig, 1963).

Much of today's Kitchi Sipi Valley was erroneously claimed by the British Crown through the Crawford purchase of 1783. Captain William Radford Crawford was ordered by Governor Haldimand to secure a purchase of land for the British Crown from the Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg (Mississauga) for the region to settle Loyalist veterans. Governor General Frederick Haldimand—contradicting the Royal Proclamation's recognition of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg sovereignty in Kitchi Sipi Valley—assumed that the entire valley belonged to the Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg (Mississauga). Crawford negotiated a legally invalid land purchase with Chief Menas of the Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg near Kingston in 1783 for access to the territory spanning seventy-two kilometers, from east of Mallorytown to the Bay of Quinte, at a depth of one day's travel¹³ in exchange for trade goods (Gehl, 2014; Jenkins, 1996). This was significantly less land than the Crown planned to settle. However, Crawford told Sir John Johnson in a written report that the First Nations original title was extinguished for all of the land

¹³ Most of Kitchi Sipi Valley technically fits within the theoretical limit to how far one can walk in a day, which is 120 kilometers assuming a perfectly clear and level path, no obstructions, carrying nothing, and an average human walking speed of 5 kilometers per hour (based on "Naismith's Rule"). However, northward inland travel from the Magtogoek River at the time would have been significantly slower given the difficult wetlands, hills, lakes, and forest terrain of the area. This makes it very unlikely that the terms of the Crawford Purchase includes any significant amount of land in Kitchi Sipi Valley beyond the shoreline.

between the Magtogoek (St. Lawrence) River and Kitchi Sipi River. The colonial administration accepted this report as proof of title extinguishment and proceeded to settle Loyalist migrants in the area, regardless of the misinterpreted terms of the treaty (Jenkins, 1996). This would prove to be a common practice for the British in the settlements throughout so-called Canada (Pasternak et al., 2021, 9; DeVries, 2011; Simpson, 2011). Ultimately, the British claimed 50 million acres of Crown property in western Quebec/Upper Canada between 1783 and 1850 through treaties, purchases, and cessations (Weaver 2003).

Persistent misrecognition of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land title

Once the land was considered to be ceded through a treaty, cessation, or purchase, it was considered legitimate private property of the British Crown—i.e. Crown Lands. These tracts were then organized into three different categories: crown reserves, clergy reserves, and “Indian” reserves. Crown lands were meant to be first surveyed as townships and then distributed through private land grants. Clergy reserves were granted to the Anglican Church to be rented out to tenants for income, and so-called “Indian” reserves were granted as treaties, cessations, and purchase agreements concessions (Clarke 2001). The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg were not initially granted any “Indian Reserve” land on the south side of the Kitchi Sipi River because it was falsely presumed that their original title had been extinguished.

The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) petitioned the Crown continuously between 1828 and 1863 to enforce treaty promises made by the British Crown in the

Royal Proclamation for protection from the entry of squatters on their territory, as they starved and fled encroachment. Every petition was received by the Governor General, but they were all ignored and never sent to Britain. Meanwhile, timber companies in Kitchi Sipi Valley were being granted enormous land grants pushing Algonquin-Anishinaabeg families further north and west (Coburn and Moore, 2021; Gehl 2017; Gehl, 2014; DeVries, 2011; Jenkins 1996).

The Canadian Government then issued sixty-four mineral licenses to prospectors in 1845 in the northwest of the Kitchi Sipi Valley, before any treaty agreements were made for access to the land. This angered the Ojibwe-Anishinabek who inhabited the area and prompted them to seize some of the mining sites to defend their territorial sovereignty. These land defenders were then arrested and brought to Toronto for trial. The Ojibwe-Anishinabek leadership demanded treaty discussions to negotiate the terms of settler access to their land to prevent further escalation of conflict. The Robinson Huron Treaty of 1850 (Crown Treaty Number 61) was signed in Sault Ste Marie as an agreement between the Ojibwe-Anishinabek living north of Lake Huron and the British Crown, represented by Upper Canadian fur merchant, land speculator, and Family Compact politician William Benjamin Robinson. Robinson offered both one-time and yearly payments in cash, guaranteed Ojibwe-Anishinabek hunting, trapping, and fishing rights, and granted tracts of 10,240 acres (41.5 km²) to each band that signed the treaty. He threatened bands who did not sign, arguing that they would not be protected from encroachment from settlement and mining development (Hele, 2020). The Government of Upper Canada appeared uninterested in fair relations with the First

Nations it occupied. The Robinson-Huron Treaty, however, demonstrates an unevenness in treatment between nations. The treaty, exploitative as it was, afforded the Ojibwe-Anishinabek people far more by recognizing and affirming their land rights. The Algonquin-Anishinaabeg, on the other hand, faced increasing waves of settlers and timber extraction encroaching on the land, despite the fact that the British had recognized their land in the Royal Proclamation, and several governors general ignored petitions to honour those terms.

The initial recognition of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg original title in 1783 followed by misrecognition of the treaties by colonial administrators of Upper Canada was essential for generation of land and resource wealth for the development of Upper Canadian settler society. It enriched settlers at the cost of positioning First Nations under colonial control and dependency vis-à-vis the Crown (Pasternak et al. 2021). Misrecognition of Algonquin-Anishinaabeg title to the Kitchi Sipi Valley was also by their own laws completely illegal and ironically an utter betrayal to uphold both constitutional rule of law; a massive failure of governance—and the moral legitimacy to the land—that persists to this day under the Canadian Government (Coburn and Moore, 2021; Pasternak et al., 2021; Gehl, 2017; DeVries, 2011).

Settler domination and attempted genocide

Treaty misrecognition and uncontrolled settlement expansion cheated the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg of their land, but it could not remove the fact of their continued existence. The continuation of grounded livelihoods, political and legal resistance, and direct action

against colonial encroachment has been a powerful demonstration of Anishinaabe power to access and defend land (Simpson, 2017; Coulthard, 2014). The Canadian settler state, to be able to maintain its legitimacy as a liberal democracy, required legal and moral consistency among the settler public. Wolfe (1998) argues that the Canadian settler state sought to produce a discourse of “dominion without conquest” to consolidate its territorial sovereignty. This imperative—coupled with Canada’s commercial appetite for more resources—led the Government of Canada and various Christian organizations to attempt genocide against Indigenous peoples across the north of Turtle Island through the Indian Act of 1876 (Coburn and Moore, 2021; Pasternak et al., 2021; Manuel and Derrickson, 2021; King et al., 2019; Starblanket, 2019; Hill, 2017; Simpson, 2017; Coulthard, 2014; Simpson, 2014; Gehl, 2014; Daschuk, 2013; Wolfe, 2006).

Territorial expansion of the Canadian settler state

The project of westward expansion effectively transformed the Canadian state into a more efficient and brutal colonizing power, which would worsen the lives of the already-occupied Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities in Kitchi Sipi Valley (Gehl, 2017). The Dominion of Canada consolidated an existing series of policies governing First Nations relations and included new provisions into a single Indian Act in 1876. The Act established a corresponding department of Indian Affairs. This was done both to hasten and systematize the process of removing First Nations from their homes to make way for new settlements, and to control their lives as wards of the Canadian state (see

Figure 13). The imperative of the government to dictate the lives of First Nations was initiated either to assimilate them into settler society or to exterminate them entirely, thus nullifying treaty promises to various nations and removing conditions for settler expansion into First Nations land (Daschuk, 2013; Manuel and Derrickson 2015; Chamberlain 1997).




Figure 15 — Southern Algonquin-Anishinaabeg Land Dispossession, 1790 to 1890 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on NativeLands.ca, 2022; Dean, 1998; Winearls, 1991; Harris and Matthews, 1987)

The Indian Act instituted the creation of “Indian Reserves”, which are typically tracts of land on the periphery of settlement that served little economic value to the settler colonial population at the time they were established (Monture-Angus, 1995). Many reservations were established as a condition of treaties that were understood by the Crown to secure the surrender of land title to Canada (Pasternak et al., 2021). For the southern and western sides of Kitchi Sipi Valley this was not the case. Lands granted through the Public Lands Act of 1853 and the colonization roads that supported the development of these lands were granted for free to settlers, without the land ever having been ceded or surrendered by the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin). Furthermore, the Ontario Government instituted the Agricultural Loans Act of 1860 and a policy of taxing wild lands in 1890. These laws require the payment of taxes to a municipal township board (which emerged from the district land boards discussed in the last section). If taxes were not paid, then the land would be appropriated by the council and sold off at their discretion. Many Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) people either didn't know about the tax requirement or could not pay it, therefore they were forced out of their homes by settler authorities who were effectively squatting on their land (Gehl 2017).

First Nations resurgence and treaty renewal

Most Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) lived north of the Kitchi Sipi River by 1850, though in 1864 several families living south of it secured 1,561 acres of privately-granted land on Golden Lake. Many Algonquin-Anishinaabeg living south of the Kitchi

Sipi (Ottawa River) were then relocated to the Golden Lake reserve where settlers cleared land around them (Jenkins 1996). Payments that were promised by the Crown as a condition in the treaties were held in trust controlled by the colonial government. Many of the non-monetary promises in the treaties were ignored, misinterpreted, or denied, which placed First Nations in a relation of dependence on Indian Affairs to supply the basic necessities of life (Pasternak et al., 2021; Daschuk, 2013; Gehl, 2017).

In 1884, the Indian Advancement Act ended recognition of the traditional leadership of First Nations, requiring instead the formation of Indian Affairs-controlled band councils that were only allowed to meet with Indian Affairs agents and superintendents. Band councils were also not allowed to raise money, organize with other band councils, or make legal claims against the government (DeVries, 2011). A Supreme Court of Canada ruling in 1997 on the *Delgamuukw v British Columbia* case recognized pre-colonial First Nation land title, building on the partial recognition of their original title with the 1973 *Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia* decision. This ruling affirmed that the Government of Canada was compelled to consider First Nations land claims on the basis of historical occupation. It also affirmed that areas in Canada that were settled without any treaty—such as the lower half of Kitchi Sipi Valley—were officially recognized as the unceded and unsurrendered land of the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Coburn and Moore, 2021; Manuel & Derrickson, 2021).

This conflict in Canadian territorial sovereignty over the lower Kitchi Sipi Valley persists to this day, ultimately problematizing the Crown's radical title to the land supposedly underpinning all property in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The Algonquins of Ontario

continue to negotiate a land claim with the Government of Canada and the Province of Ontario. The terms included in early agreements of the negotiations suggest that only a handful of private properties will be included in the land claim (Algonquins of Ontario, 2013). There is, however, disagreement within the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg community about the proposed treaty. It therefore remains uncertain what the future holds regarding the Crown's radical title underpinning private properties in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

Chapter 7: Commercial dimension of the long grab

The second land grab operating in the Kitchi Sipi Valley is the commercial land grab.

The granting and settlement of stolen Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land and its development into a system of farmland properties has unfolded around four critical moments in the advancement of capitalist power over the production and distribution of extractive and agricultural commodities. Each moment marks changes in private property relations that have both reinforced and undermined the power of colonial elites to advance their political interests and increase their wealth by consolidating land. These political and economic changes are responsible for the specific policies and market conditions that govern the distribution of agricultural properties and farmland property. Once granted land was cleared by settler homesteaders and timber companies, the historical trajectory of farmland distribution over the course of the corporate land grab follows the path of agrarian change typical to populations of land-owning farmers, as theorized by Kautsky (1899). Essentially, competition between wealthier farms and poorer farms produce unequal market conditions that allows larger, more commercially-oriented producers, to out-compete and absorb the farmland of smaller, more subsistence-oriented farms. This dynamic of economic consolidation has developed towards a network of corporations described by Friedmann and McMichael (1989) as the “corporate food regime”.

In this chapter, I describe the four moments around which the corporate land grab developed. The first moment involves the settlement of Loyalists in so-called

Upper Canada, which involved a hasty process of surveying, rampant land speculation, and uneven infrastructure development, which resulted in uneven and irregular regional development. The second moment involves the granting of timber extraction lands to a handful of timber barons, who rapidly expanded logging operating up the Kitchi Sipi Valley, clearing the land for agrarian settlement. The third moment involves the institutionalization of private property rights through the establishment of municipal governments, planning authorities, agricultural protection programs, and conservation laws. The fourth moment involves the corporatization of agricultural production and the effects of farmland consolidation that it produced. The following section describes these key historical moments and their impacts on the distribution of farmland properties in the southwest of the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

Loyalist land grants and the Family Compact

The British Empire gained control over the Kitchi Sipi Valley in 1763 but they were drained of their wealth due to a cascading series of wars against other European empires. Settlers who were loyal to the Crown during the American Revolution in 1783 also lost their land holdings in New York and New England. The British Empire therefore had few options in terms of ways to compensate their military beyond the granting of newly conquered lands as private property in the so-called Province of Quebec (Weaver, 2003). They granted land extensively in ways that reflected the neo-feudal social structure idealized by colonial elites, organized as a strict political hierarchy governed under the authority of a landed gentry and the colonial office in London. The

magnitude of land grants made under such a political structure produced an internal political-economic conflict over the distribution of private property. Gentry elites commanded networks of patronage and colluded in the form of a so-called Family Compact to maintain their authority over the settler colony. Land grants also enriched an enormous population of European settlers with private property rights, which empowered them to assume political positions and launch their own commercial enterprises extracting resources and producing agricultural commodities (Clarke, 2001). The colonial government was so overextended bringing an enormous new territory under its dominance that it had little capacity to survey, demarcate, and settle the southwest of the Kitchi Sipi Valley in a coherent manner (Gordon, 2015). It also led settlers to engage in land speculation throughout the settler colony resulting in uneven development between large areas of potential farmland owned by absentee landowners and overpopulation along the Magtogoek (St. Lawrence) River (Gordon, 2015; Weaver, 2003; Jenkins, 1996). These outcomes resulted in an irregular and fragmented property grid in the southwest of the Kitchi Sipi Valley, which has to this day made it technically challenging and expensive to assemble large-scale holdings of farmland properties into a financial security.

Post-conquest economic crisis and political revolution

The financial pressure of the past series of wars created the imperative for colonial expansion in both the United States and the British Empire. The Seven Years War and the suppression of Pontiac's Rebellion drained the British Crown of funds to pay

soldiers for their service. In lieu of payment, soldiers were paid in land grants. However, much of the granted land was in the Mississippi, Ohio, Genesee river valleys, which remained inhabited by various First Nations. Some soldiers were already wealthy gentry landowners, such as Sir William Johnson and George Washington. Many of these wealthy colonial landowners combined their wealth and holdings to establish a series of land companies selling land to settlers on the western frontier of the Thirteen Colonies. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 rendered the landed wealth of these companies illegal. Many of the leaders of the American Revolution, therefore, had an interest in political revolution as a way to protect their landed wealth. The Revolutionary War placed even greater financial strain on the British Empire, prompting them to also pay for military services through the granting of land (Weaver, 2003; Clarke, 2001; Sakolski, 1932).

Over four generations after the founding of the Jamestown Settlement in Virginia, plantation owners in Virginia managed to accumulate large land holdings and wealth from slave production of cotton and tobacco. Struggling to find profitable investments in the colonies, a company of plantation owners—including George Washington—was formed to acquire land to sell for settlement expansion in the Ohio Valley (Ferling, 2002, 41). They established the Mississippi Land Company in 1763, began survey lots in the area, and requested an enormous grant along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers from the British Crown (Sakolski, 1932). At the same time, Pontiac's Rebellion—along with the Cherokee Rebellion of 1761—pressured the British to once again recognize the Covenant Chain alliance through the Fort Niagara Treaty, which would reinstate limits to settlement expansion. The British Crown simultaneously instituted limits to settlement

expansion through the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Proclamation was made as a temporary halt to the growing settlement expansion of the Thirteen Colonies. However, despite the prohibition of expansion into the Ohio Valley, the British Empire was both unable to enforce the containment of settlement expansion and ultimately interested in the benefits of the wealth and resources it yielded (Weaver, 2003; Sakolski, 1932).

Another private purchase, called the Piankeshaw Deed was negotiated by the Illinois-Wabash in 1775 for a large section of present-day Illinois. This scheme involved the American land speculator Robert Randall who was cited for contempt for attempting to bribe about 30 to 40 federal legislatures to recognize the claim (Clarke, 2001). This scandal led Randall to leave the United States for Upper Canada where he would later become an influential land speculator in the Kitchi Sipi Valley (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996; Clarke, 2001). These private purchases were all declared illegal by the Crown under the terms of the Treaty of Fort Niagara and the Royal Proclamation. However, the land company had already sunk investment into acquiring and preparing the land for settlement and stood to lose a great deal of potential wealth from the re-sale of divided lots. Washington and Henry were among the class of plantation gentry “patriots”—enriched through slave-produced commodities and land ownership—expressing outrage at British imperial policies that compromised colonial wealth accumulation, specifically the 1765 Stamp Act, the 1774 Quebec Act, and the 1774 Boston Port Act. The loss of wealth resulting from the Crown’s invalidation of these private land purchases, was part of what provoked these gentry patriots to wage the American Revolutionary War in 1775, and ultimately proclaim political independence from the British Empire as the


United States of America in 1776 (Weaver, 2003).

Post-revolution British North America and the United States faced two interconnected and worsening economic challenges. The Revolutionary War further depleted the wealth of Great Britain and the United States to the point of near-insolvency, making it impossible to pay the accumulated war debts owed to creditors, producers, and soldiers (Sokolski, 1932). The American Revolution also pushed out those loyal to the British Crown, supporters of Toryist ideology, and the unfree people of whom they claimed possession. This included British loyalists, First Nations, and French Canadian military allies, hired Hessian mercenaries, and African slaves. The mass-expulsion of Loyalists left the British Empire desperate for a strategic location to put them and some means to pay for military service during the Revolutionary War. These material pressures combined with the ideological reaction of Loyalist elites to American republicanism to attempt the foundation of a neo-feudal agrarian aristocracy in what would be called “Upper Canada” (Clarke, 2001; Mancke, 1999).

Neo-feudalism and the British colonial gentry

The colonial elites of British North America wanted to establish an aristocratic order in Upper Canada through the granting of western Crown lands for free—fearing revolutionary opposition to taxation—in exchange for service and loyalty to the British Crown. Land was granted through conventions of patronage common to the rural aristocracy in the UK dating back to the Norman Conquest, meaning that settlers were granted land with the expectation of political loyalty and military service (Weaver, 2003;

Clarke, 2001). This led the colonial administration to hastily direct settlement in the late 1770s and the 1780s to strategic sites along the Magtogoek River, like Cornwall, Prescott, and Brockville, in case of any future conflict with the United States (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). Colonial elites believed that settlement was meant to reflect British feudal relations (see Figure 14), defined through the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which would establish a stable social order that would be appealing for those seeking security under the benevolent rule of an avowedly Tory aristocracy (Clarke, 2001; Craig 1963).



*Figure 16 — Social structure of land ownership in Upper Canada, 1763 to 1863
(Created by Christopher Bisson based on Clarke 2001, Gordon 2015, Gehl 2014, and
Jenkins 1994)*

Toryist ideology saw the monarch-aristocracy class alliance as a natural order bestowed by a supreme designer (i.e. God) by virtue of the Absolute Monarch ruling through a divine mandate. This reified the gentry-led, neo-feudal system of Upper Canada as operating as a fact of nature, rather than a historically-produced social order (Weaver, 2003; Clarke, 2001). Strachan and the class of Anglican clergy that were responsible for reproducing this ideological superstructure of the colony were not understood as moral philosophers as we do today. They were understood as natural scientists operating with a concept that nature was a machine designed by God to be stewarded by “man”. The American Revolution that the Tories were fleeing was understood as a traumatic conflict to the balance of nature—the “natural aristocracy”—gifted to them by God that brought peace to society (Clarke, 2001).

An important component to the creation of an agrarian aristocracy, however, was the legitimacy of title underpinning a secure order of private property rights. As Weaver (2003) suggests, private property rights in British settler colonies were based on the intentions of an orderly process of legally alienating the land from colonized people and dispensing it out as private lots to settlers. Therefore, amid the rush of Loyalist settlers, General Thomas Gage nullified French grants in so-called western Quebec (i.e. Upper Canada) and reiterated the terms of the Royal Proclamation in 1778 (Clarke, 2001). The

neo-feudal order envisioned by the colonial elites of Upper Canada produced an imperative to distribute land adhering to strict customs particular to the British aristocracy, which was undermined by the fact there was no Indigenous peasantry—like in Ireland or Scotland—to enclose under a landed nobility. Feudal relations of patronage had to be developed through the importation of displaced peasants and then obtaining their sworn loyalty in exchange for private property.

Networks of patronage among colonial elites were consolidated around what would be derisively called the “Chateau Clique” in Lower Canada and the “Family Compact” in Upper Canada (Kellogg, 2015, 15; Clarke, 2001, 46). The combined consolidation of land and power was justified by compact members, such as the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada John Graves Simcoe, as a way to “foster attachment to government” among elites and administer the colony in a more politically stable manner than in the United States (Clarke, 2001).

Property ownership, however, also afforded the growing number of landed settlers with independence and status that they could not obtain back in England, Scotland, Ireland, or the United States (Clarke, 2001). The idea that settlers could own private property without the obligation to provide surplus production or rental payments to a lord was a novel political reality that distinguished English settler life from that of Great Britain and France (De Tocqueville, 1835). The rights obtained by settlers in British colonies permitted free landowners to accumulate wealth—very slowly at first, as colonized land was still plentiful—in quantities that could be reinvested in farm expansion, purchasing of slaves, and hiring of farm labor. Importantly, the availability of

locally-accumulated wealth available for investment eventually resulted in rapid colonial expansion (Weaver, 2003; Eccles, 1998). Land ownership also granted settlers the ability to participate in the affairs of local government, creating a new class of land-owning settler farmers that could be called upon for military service. The British Empire, however, had to create the supply of new private properties quickly out of newly-conquered land to pay soldiers for their military service during the Revolutionary War.

The settlements of so-called New England and New York by chartered land companies in Turtle Island (North America) followed a process of establishing private property rights by utilizing several legal steps for the production of a stable regime of private property. First, merchant companies would be issued a charter from the British Crown to a newly claimed territory, granting them “preemption rights” to acquire land or a monopoly to trade in the area. Second, the company would find a way to extinguish the property rights of First Nations through conquest, treaty, or purchase. Finally, the companies would resell large tracts to gentry land companies or parcel the land out themselves to sell to settlers. They also developed any necessary infrastructure agreed to in the purchase of land patents by settlers. The model of settlement that was implemented in New England, New Jersey, and southeastern New York was divided into colonial settlements and governed by a colonial council. This meant that land-owning settler farmers were not only able to accumulate wealth, but also to assert their interests politically to continue accumulating wealth (Weaver 2003; Sokolski, 1932).

So-called Upper Canada created their private property primarily through decrees and contracts. This initially placed the burden of settlement on the colonial

administration and military elites, which resulted in a lack of government capacity to effectively survey land, issue properties, and plan new communities. The responsibility to deliver an orderly and timely settlement of European migrants was funneled through colonial officers in Quebec City, which meant that communication was slow and resources for settlement were very limited. This resulted in significant complications, delays, and mistakes in the planning and development of the first settlements in so-called Upper Canada.

Settler land grants

Rantlet (2014) estimates that 20,000 Loyalists left the United States for Quebec (which included Upper Canada at the time) following the Revolutionary War, with approximately 30,000 following over the course of the next decade. Migrants from mid-Atlantic States and New England re-settled in southwestern Ontario and Kitchi Sipi Valley, fleeing violent confiscation of property by American patriots and hearing promises from the British Crown for free land, compensation for property losses, and—selectively, emancipation from enslavement. Sir John Johnson was tasked in 1784 with matching Loyalists fleeing the United States to settlements through the allocation of free grants. Among the twenty thousand Loyalists who fled to the Province of Quebec, fourteen thousand began moving out of camps around Montreal through the “Great Migration” to settle in what would soon become Upper Canada (Craig, 1963).

Land was granted in sizes corresponding to one’s social position in the settler colonial hierarchy, with the expectation that those with larger holdings would hold greater power in colonial society (Gordon, 2015; Clarke, 2001). Grants ranged from 500

acres for warrant officers to 1,000 acres for field officers, and between 300 and 500 acres for Anglican clergy (Craig, 1963). Most white settlers received tools and provisions to assist with settlement until 1786 (Craig, 1963). The colonial government also promised township surveys and to construct civic and legal infrastructure, such as roads, courts, and post offices (Clarke, 2001). However, such services and infrastructure were slow to develop precisely because the land was granted out for free, which limited the tax base for government services (Gordon, 2015, 40).

Military personnel were granted land in clusters by regiment, ethnicity, and religion (see Figure 15). Scottish Catholics were settled in clusters next to Scottish Presbyterians (eastern portions of Lunenburg District, known today as Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry), who were then placed next to clusters of English Anglicans, German Calvinists, and German Lutherans (Mackleburg District, known today as Leeds and Grenville, and Lennox and Addington) (Craig, 1963). Several hundred free African-Americans escaped from the United States and migrated north with the Loyalists (Oyeniran, 2021). African-Americans, escaping slavery, fled to so-called Upper Canada where they were sometimes sold or extradited back to slave-holders in the United States, until possibly as late as 1834 (Cooper, 2007; Bode, 1993). Black settlers were predominantly settled on small marginal plots of land along the Magtogoek (St. Lawrence) River, the Bay of Quinte, the Niagara Peninsula, and the Detroit River. The Crown, however, did not grant black settlers titles to the land and were slow to survey the sites (Oyeniran, 2021).




Figure 17 - Early Loyalist settlement in the Province of Quebec, 1790 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on NativeLands.ca 2022; Dean 1998; Winearls 1991; Harris and Matthews 1987)

The practical challenges of settling large numbers of migrants on Crown reserve lands all at once in a region with minimal supporting infrastructure resulted in inconsistent and rushed development. Loyalist settlements, for instance, lacked administrative capacity to grant and survey land to incoming migrants and were located far away from the Surveyor General's Office in Quebec City (Clarke, 2001; Craig, 1963).

This was addressed by appointing aristocratic military retirees with little experience surveying land to draft and stake-out new townships, resulting in overlapping and incongruous township layouts in Kitchi Sipi Valley (Gordon, 2015; Clarke, 2001; Jenkins, 1996). For instance, Nepean township was surveyed by veteran officer of a Hessian mercenary unit, John Stegmann. Stegmann's lack of experience as a surveyor produced many property boundary mistakes and mismatched road layouts in both Nepean and Gloucester townships that shape the cadastral layout of Kitchi Sipi Valley today (Gordon, 2015).

The earliest British settlement in Upper Canada was facilitated through the "Leader and Associate" application process, where wealthy settlers or high-ranking officers would apply for a grant of land on behalf of a group of settlers. The entire Magtogoek valley was surveyed by 1789. The Surveyor General's Office hoped in vain to have Kitchi Sipi Valley fully surveyed before any further settlement (Gordon, 2015; Parham, 2004). The Surveyor General in Quebec City drafted a series of potential township settlements in 1790 laid out on a non-variant grid system, with townships arranged every fifteen kilometers along the Magtogoek and Kitchi Sipi rivers and named after prominent dukes in Great Britain (ex. Gloucester, Cumberland, and Hawkesbury) (Gordon, 2015; Weaver, 2003). The first settlement, Cornwall, was surveyed and populated with 516 settlers in 1784. Before the survey was completed, military officers would make an application to the colonial office of Quebec for grants to settle personnel of their regiments in one of the townships. For instance, George Hamilton first attempted to settle a party of 143 veterans in 1792. The 200 acre township lots in

Nepean were “minted” through the very first survey conducted by Stegmann by 1794 (see Figure 16). However, the settlers rejected the grant, disliking the dense forest and wetlands of the area and its isolation due to the lack of access roads to the settlement (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996).




Figure 18 - Eastern Upper Canada settlement expansion, 1810 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on NativeLands.ca, 2022; Dean, 1998; Winearls, 1991; Harris and Matthews, 1987)

Many of the Loyalist veterans were older and unaccustomed to agrarian or

forestry labour. Therefore they could not undertake the immense amount of labour required to settle in the area (Craig, 1963). They chose instead to settle along the Magtogoek River, concentrating development to the fully-surveyed and planned riverside settlements like Brockville, Johnstown, Cornwall, and Kingston, resulting in uneven development that would stunt growth of the Upper Canada settlement over the next century (Gordon 2015; Jenkins 1996). The colonial administration also granted free land to two regiments that fought in the War of 1812 to concentrate the settlement of soldiers around the Rideau Canal in several settlements, which was appealing to the veterans given the poor economic conditions back in the UK at the time (Gordon, 2015). The largest of these settlements became Richmond and Perth (Gordon, 2015; Campey, 2005). However, many did not like the marshy land and sold it off to poorer settlers, like the Irish and French-Canadian migrants that came to build the canal (Gordon, 2015; Weaver, 2003).

Loyalist settlers also began making demands for property ownership reforms, since they disliked the French legal system that was preserved in the colony through the Quebec Act. Governor Carleton was, at first, too preoccupied with a famine that struck early Loyalist settlements on the Magtogoek River, which was caused by the rush of migrants and the region's agricultural under-development (Parham, 2004; Craig, 1963). He was also hesitant to make any reforms for fear of instigating French Canadian rebellion in the eastern portions of the Province of Quebec. However, the preservation of the Catholic Church's authority over French Canadians and a good period of agrarian production experienced in eastern Quebec dampened civil outrage over British

occupation until the 1800s (Russell, 2012). Between 1783 and 1788, all land was granted by the British Crown in manorial title in accordance with the seignorial property laws of Quebec as recognized in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. This type of grant required yearly “quit-rent” fees to the Crown. This practice was especially disliked by those fleeing the United States, given that property taxation was a major social irritant that caused the American Revolution. Manorial title was also poorly suited for the buying and selling of private properties because of its restrictions on the alienation of granted properties (Clarke, 2001).

Governor Carleton, in 1786, was ordered by the Crown to revise the Quebec Act, prompting the drafting of the Constitution Act, which was passed in 1791. The Act divided the settler colony of Quebec into “Upper” and “Lower Canada” so that British settlers in western settlements could institute a system of Common Law, and enjoy the privileges of “fee simple tenure” in private property. These reforms established the beginnings of a liberal market for real estate, and courts to arbitrate property disputes, which immediately boosted property values, paying-off immensely for those who were already granted land (Russell, 2012; Clarke, 2001; Craig, 1963). These conditions resulted in rampant land speculation among the Loyalist settlers.

Land speculation and squatter settlement

Land speculation has been practiced in Turtle Island since the arrival of English settlers in so-called New England. It involves someone deliberately acquiring land to re-sell it at a profit. It has taken place in settlements where liberal property rights allow settlers to

privately alienate and accumulate land. The American Revolution itself triggered a wave of speculative investment in western New York, Ohio, and the Mississippi Valley (Arrighi, 1994; Weaver, 2004; Sakolski, 1932). For the most enterprising settlers, there were few options available at the time for profitable investment, resulting in a problem of settler overaccumulation. Wealthy settlers therefore sought to reproduce their capacity to accumulate wealth through colonial expansion. This meant securing land grants, attempting to purchase it from First Nations, and selling it off to new settlers. However, this rush of land speculation to fix the colonial problem of overaccumulation collided with the values of the aristocratic elites overseeing colonial affairs within the British Empire. The “quiet enjoyment of land” was regarded as a central component in the virtuous life of the nobility, which conflicted politically with the intensifying practice of improving land for profit. A major conflict emerged between the rigidity of British colonial land policy prohibiting private land purchase, the practical difficulty of enforcing it, and the economic conditions that encouraged it. A prohibition on private land purchases came without the creation of institutions to coherently register and survey private property claims, and resolve disputes between claimants and First Nations. Private land contracts in the expanding colony were therefore legally precarious, riddled with fraudulent activity, and beset by risks of competing claims and dismissal of property claims by colonial administrators (Weaver, 2003; Clarke, 2001). Gentry land speculators would often invoke principles of classical liberalism to advocate for secure private property rights for settlers and to justify the “natural right” of First Nations to sell their land (Weaver 2003, 55-6).

Upper Canada settlers proved equally motivated to profit from land speculation. Their initial unwillingness to clear land and establish homesteads led many to accumulate large tracts of land with the intention of holding it in anticipation of higher land values once the momentum of settlement picked up speed. Most of Nepean Township had become owned by absentee landlords without any land registry to indicate who owned what properties (see Figure 17) (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). Some 62 per cent of land in Upper Canada (8 million acres) was owned by land speculators by 1825 (Clarke, 2001; Widdis, 1979). There were also some families that famously made fortunes from the accumulation and selling of land along the Magtogoek River, such as the Frasers and Cryslers (Gordon, 2015). This was ironic, since the Crown's reason to grant land instead of sell it was to prevent the kind of land speculation that was happening in the United States (Widdis, 1979). Some new land owners even discouraged settlement so that they could purchase even more land at a depressed rate before the prospective settlement rush (Russell, 2012; Clarke, 2001). Not only did this speculative behaviour stunt settlement, it also offended the aristocratic sensibilities of colonial elites who frowned at the practice because of their high-Tory values but also because of the political difficulties they observed taking place in the westward expansion of the United States (Gordon 2015).




Figure 20 — Eastern Upper Canada settlement expansion, 1830 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on NativeLands.ca, 2022; Dean, 1998; Winearls, 1991; Harris and Matthews, 1987)

Colonial officers also took part in land speculation. Surveyors were paid in land grants, which they would survey themselves, incentivizing unscrupulous surveying practices. They could use their position to secure significant landed wealth through a “double-dipping” practice, where they would accumulate land grants for both surveying townships for the Crown, and scouting-out the highest quality land for private speculators (Weaver, 2003, p. 233). Indeed, many surveyors that laid out townships in Kitchi Sipi Valley were openly engaged in land speculation (Weaver 2003).

Land speculation even frustrated the development of the colonies defensive infrastructure. The conclusion of imperial conflicts in 1815 allowed the British to focus on reinforcing its defensive infrastructure. Both Britain and the United States feared invasion from one another following the War of 1812. The British saw that the United States were rapidly developing roads and canals to the Great Lakes and anticipated that, despite the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 blocking warships from the Great Lakes, the Magtogoek River could still be attacked to cut off supply lines into Upper Canada in any future war (Gordon, 2015). This prompted the development of the Rideau Canal to divert supply routes away from the Magtogoek River (Gordon, 2015; Clarke, 2001).

The government of Upper Canada faced a lack of investment capital available to develop the canal, so they under-valued the estimate for the construction of the canal and managed to convince military authorities to fund much of its construction (Gordon 2015). The British military sent 162 engineers and miners in 1819 to survey and plan its construction (Gordon, 2015, 25; Jenkins, 1996). They hired Colonel John By in 1826 to lead the construction. The most contentious task of this project was the canal's route, which was based on the already-granted properties that they had to buy back, which piqued the interest of land owners in Bytown (Gordon, 2015).

The potential for land speculation in so-called Upper Canada led notorious slave-owning land speculators John Askin, William Robertson, and Robert Randal to move their operations to Upper Canada. They relocated there to escape the controversy of the scandal that resulted after they attempted to bribe members of Congress to recognize their Miami Land Company claim to two-hundred million acres of land in

Michigan for their Illinois-Wabash Company, which they falsely said had already acquired from the First Nations communities of the area through marriage and purchase (Clarke, 2001; Jenkins, 1996). Enterprising land owners, such as Robert Randal, Livius Sherwood, Louis Besserer, Captain John LeBreton, Nicholas Sparks, Bradish Billings, and Abram Dow offered land for the canal hoping that it would increase the value of their holdings (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). However, for subsequent purchases, disputes over land prices influenced the Crown's preference for the canal's location (Gordon, 2015).

One influential land speculator that shaped the settlement and developmental trajectory for Nepean Township was Captain John LeBreton. Robert Randal received credit from Loyalist businessman and future Family Compact member Thomas Clark to pursue several unsuccessful industrial development opportunities in Niagara (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). He sought to escape the new debt he had accumulated in Niagara by relocating to Montreal in 1798 to seek credit to purchase land for industrial development along the Magtogoek River in Cornwall and Masena in 1803. He was successful in establishing a ferry crossing, tannery, and potash factory. He used these profits to secure a lease for 950 acres of land adjacent to Akikodjiwan (Chaudière Falls) in 1800, which was identified to contain iron ore deposits (Gordon, 2015). He partially received amnesty for his debt in Niagara, and built an iron foundry in Bytown in hopes of paying off the remainder (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). By 1807 he owned 3,400 acres of industrial real estate throughout Upper Canada (Jenkins, 1996). However, he also held a large amount of debt among creditors, which he was unwilling to pay off by

selling his land holdings. This resulted in a seven year sentence in debtor's prison for Randall from 1809 to 1815 (Gordon, 2015, 28; Jenkins, 1996). He was released after being ordered in arbitration to relinquish his Niagara properties to Clark, and lived in relative poverty for the rest of his life (Jenkins, 1996).

The 1825 Sales Act prescribed how credit could be used for the purchase of land in Upper Canada, requiring no deposit but establishing a protocol for the liquidation of bad debts. Many credit-backed land purchases in Upper Canada defaulted, which were then put up for auction starting at a much lower "upset price" (Clarke, 2001). Captain John LeBreton bought Randall's 9,000 acre property on Akikodjiwan at a sheriff's auction in Brockville. His intention was to parcel it off to sell as town lots to establish the settlement that he named "Britannia". LeBreton saw an opportunity to profit off of the Rideau Canal project and offered to sell half of the tract to Governor General Lord Dalhousie at significant mark-up. This offended Lord Dalhousie immensely, which led him to unsuccessfully challenge the legality of LeBreton's title to the land. The Governor was offended at the idea of a lower-born businessman trying to profit from a land deal with the Crown. The military had also depleted its defense budget by upgrading fortifications in Kingston and could not afford such high land prices (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). The best course of the canal identified by military engineers would have it pass through lands through LeBreton's tract, extending from just below Akikodjiwan to present-day Dow's Lake. However, the neo-aristocratic colonial administration refused to reward attempts by a lower-born soldier to profit from a sale of land to high-born nobility, and decided instead to develop the canal along the much more difficult and

costly course that it currently takes. This decision resulted in cost overruns for the military and dampened LeBreton's ambition to develop a wealthy settlement at what would become known as the LeBreton Flats (Gordon, 2015). LeBreton sold off all of his land as private lots in a lottery in 1843 (Jenkins, 1996).

Before 1825 the acreage of granted land in Upper Canada was based on social status, and patent deeds were issued conditionally upon survey and administration fees to the Crown. Grantees—who were primarily made up of United Empire Loyalists—would then receive economic and political benefits for their loyalty, like tax exemptions, government appointments, and favourable access to resources and capital. After 1825, land was sold by the Crown based on the market value for the land. However, grants were still issued for free to reward service to the Empire, such as those with government positions or military service. Edward Gibbon Wakefield specifically established a plan of unequal fees and taxes to exclude those with limited wealth from land ownership in South Australia and Upper Canada. The Wakefield Scheme he drafted detailed how unequal access to land would concentrate a class of poorer migrants into urban centres to supply labour for industrial development (Weaver, 2003; Clarke, 2001). Based on the recommendations of Justice Beverly Robinson, the British government implemented a sales policy somewhat resembling the Wakefield Scheme in response to the need to reduce the costs of colonial government and for the government of Upper Canada to become less dependent on the Empire for revenues. However, the most immediate impact of this policy was to enrich local colonial administrators who accumulated personal fortunes from the sale of Crown lands through companies like the Canada

Company, the Clergy Reserve Company, and the British American Land Company (Clarke, 2001).

Colonel By planned a settlement called Upper Town for government and wealthy settlers near the military buildings overlooking the river (Gordon, 2015). He also established Lowertown, which rapidly developed into cramped, swampy, diseased, and poorly laid-out settlement of cheap wooden shacks that were rented out to Irish Catholics from Cork and French Canadian who became canal and timber workers (Gordon, 2015). As the canal expanded inland, meager construction camps of burrows and sod huts were developed along the way. Canal, dam, and lock construction through inland swamps was grueling work and workers were vulnerable to accidental explosions, rock falls, malnourishment, and infectious disease. Many ventured out from the camps to squat in the bush or work as labourers on farms close by (Gordon, 2015; Bleasdale, 1981). The 1837 Land Act allowed the governor-in-council to sell these Crown lands off as private lots to squatters and leases until this right was removed in 1841 (Clarke, 2001).

The magnitude of land that was granted to Loyalists for their military service and property ownership reforms that followed created the conditions for rampant land speculation. The large waves of European migrants settling in so-called Upper Canada ensured land speculators profited from their investments. At the same time, the British Empire eventually instituted a price for land grants, which was used to exclude poor European migrants from property ownership so that they would be dependent on wage labour to make a living. This, however, created the conditions for wide-spread informal

settlement camps and settlers squatting beyond the settlement frontier. Land speculation and squatting has been responsible for the underdevelopment of areas like Nepean, which sat idle as areas along the Magtogoek River remained overcrowded. It also diverted the path of the Rideau Canal to a location that was more difficult and took longer to develop at a time when investment capital was lacking in the colony. This has determined the pathway of the Kitchi Sipi Valley in ways that still impact land use today.

Land companies and the Family Compact

The Crown's growing demand for land accelerated with the pledge to compensate military veterans and civilian victims from the War of 1812 with land grants (Weaver 2003, 219-20). This coincided with the recent increase in wealth among gentry land owners, which could be invested in larger speculative ventures. By far the largest and most successful land company in Canada was the Canada Company. The Crown stopped providing the colonial government with funding to run the settler colony in 1817. They wanted them to start developing a relatively-autonomous system of capitalism within the settlements to generate revenues to operate the Crown institutions. This led colonial administrators to consider selling-off Crown and clergy reserve lands. The clergy reserves were established with the intention of granting land to the Anglican Church to rent out to settlers generating a steady source of revenues for the clergy. However, renting land was not popular among settlers and unenforceable by the Crown, which resulted in lower revenues than expected. In fact, many who rented clergy

reserve land simply extracted the timber and abandoned it (Clarke 2001).

The colonial government therefore decided to institute a policy to sell-off clergy reserve lands through a private land company. Gentry investors—led by Scottish novelist John Galt—established the Canada Company in 1824 offering to purchase all of the lands from the Crown to sell off as free hold lots to settlers, while retaining the mineral rights for the company (see Figure 18) (Weaver, 2003; Clarke, 2001). Galt toured land company holdings in the United States and decided to emulate the “hot house” model used by the Pulteney Associates and Holland Land Company, which involved the company privately developing roads and other settlement infrastructures. The Crown agreed to sell the land to the Canada Company through a charter similar to the ones used for settlement companies in New South Wales (Karr 1966).




Figure 21 — Land companies in northeastern Turtle Island, 1775-1867 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on NativeLands.ca, 2022; Gordon, 2015; Weaver, 2003; Sakolski, 1932)

The colonial administration was keen about this initiative, wanting to increase the speed of settlement in Upper Canada. They prepared a survey to determine the extent and quality of land involved (Karr, 1966). However, by 1826, the Crown's higher-than-anticipated valuation of the clergy reserve led Bishop John Strachan to reassert Anglican Church ownership of land through the 1827 Clergy Reserve Act, which they gradually sold-off between 1829 and 1853. By 1854, the Canadian legislature passed the Clergy Reserve Secularization Act, recognizing lease and squatter properties as

free hold property. The Crown compensated the Canada Corporation for renegeing on the promise by selling them 1.1 million acres for \$693,000 (42 pence per acre) of what would become known as “the Huron Tract” (Gordon, 2015; Clarke, 2001). The land’s Ojibwe-Anishinabek (Ojibwe) title was considered by the Crown to be extinguished in 1827 through the Huron Tract Purchase (Huron Tract, No. 29) and was then sold by the Canada Company at a three-hundred percent markup from 1827 to 1953 (Weaver 2003; Clarke 2001). The wealth accumulated by the Canada Company both empowered the formation of a neo-aristocratic oligarchy which controlled virtually all aspects of Upper Canadian society that became known as the Family Compact. It also capitalized the financial sector that would provide credit for industrial development in Upper Canada.

Loyalist land grants—issued in payment for military service for a series of wars—resulted in a sudden rush of land speculation. The practice offended the sensibilities of the colonial gentry and frustrated attempts to settle the area and develop defensive infrastructure. It also enriched and empowered a large population of settlers who would become a political force that would eventually overturn the neo-feudal order of the Family Compact and institute a government focused on the protection of private property.

Timber barons and extractive land grants

A shortage of land began in New England and the mid-Atlantic states following the Revolutionary War. The initial lack of profitable investments and caps on interest rates

for loans meant that the wealthy had to look outside the settler colony to find opportunities to place their investments (Gordon, 2015; Weaver, 2003). Many wealthy individuals from the United States and United Kingdom saw an investment opportunity in extracting timber and selling it to the imperial market. The timber industry established many of the original European settlements, cleared vast expanses of forest for farmland, and contributed to develop the transportation infrastructure along the Kitchi Sipi River.

The early timber boom

The first timber baron in the Kitchi Sipi Valley was the middle-class Massachusetts land owner and retired U.S. soldier Philemon Wright. Wright was unable to find land to expand his agricultural operations in New England and was also trying to escape from outstanding taxes and loans (Elliot, 2000). He visited Lower Canada in 1796 and 1797, where he was looking for land to establish an agrarian community for friends and family. He selected the site of present-day Hull, Quebec as the site for his settlement because of the relative availability of good quality soil and the region's capacity for the production of agricultural potash (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996).

Wright petitioned for his grant through the leader and association process (explained on page 173), but he personally retained the entire township of granted land by either getting his investment partners to sign it over or by stealing the deed papers from his family. His party of five families, twenty-eight workers, and a herd of cattle set out to found the new settlement in the early spring of 1800. They struggled to travel to

the mouth of the Tenàgàtino (Gatineau) River, only making it with the assistance of a passing Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) family (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). They had the Crown survey the site, and then designed the settlement based on the typical form of a New England village (Gordon, 2015). The party initially cleared land to produce hemp to fund the settlement's development (Jenkins, 1996). They also constructed a water-powered gristmill and sawmill but ran out of money for agricultural expansion in 1806. Wright then decided to concentrate on timber production to pay-off an outstanding \$200,000 in debt from creditors in Montreal, which he first struggled to sell in Lower Canada (Jenkins, 1996). However, the next year Napoleon began to blockade British ships out of Baltic ports exporting timber. This increased the demand for timber from British colonies to maintain the imperial naval fleet, making it possible for Wright to profitably produce timber for export. British timber merchants in Lower Canada convinced London to implement import tariffs on timber exported from outside the British Empire (Gordon, 2015). This produced a sudden price spike for British North American timber to six times that for Baltic timber. These new tariffs resulted in a short rush of investment capital for the development and expansion of timber mills in Kitchi Sipi Valley, creating a massive windfall of profit for Wright and his settlement (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). In 1805, British North America exported one-hundred thousand tons of wood, and by 1819 total exports reached three-hundred and fifty thousand tons (Jenkins, 1996). Wright also represented Ottawa County in the Legislature, essentially ruling over Wright's Town as a "benevolent autocrat" and capturing the will of Parliament for the interests of lumber barons (Elliot, 2000).

The early Ottawa timber boom (1807 to 1815) attracted new competition from several aspiring robber barons¹⁴ who migrated from the oversaturated land market in New England and depressed plantation economy in Ireland, like David Pattee, Thomas Mears, George and William Hamilton, and Charles Adamson Low. They were all granted charters to extract timber in the area and leveraged their commercial success to secure power and influence within the colonial government. At the same time as imperial markets for timber were booming, landless French Canadians were leaving Lower Canada and settling up the Kitchi Sipi Valley because of a lack of available farmland. There was also a rush of Irish and Gaelic Scottish refugees who arrived in Canada escaping starvation and forceful land clearances. Upper Canada's population doubled between 1830 and 1833 as a result of this new rush of migrants (Russell, 2012).

Timber expansion up the Kitchi Sipi Valley

Agrarian production in Lower Canada was based more on a model of peasant self-sufficiency, which maintained greater food security. However, inheritance laws produced conditions of overpopulation that were exacerbated by shortages in land availability that arose in the early 1800s as settlement expansion came up against the marginal lands of the Outaouais, Laurentians, Lac St-Jean, and the Eastern Townships (Russell, 2012). Many French Canadian peasants began looking for industrial work in

¹⁴The term "robber baron" is a critical way to identify a kind of industrial capitalist who commands a great deal of power over local politics through resource monopolies, patronage to political elites, and appointment to official roles within the settler-colonial administration.

New England, New York, and Upper Canada to secure an alternative way to make a living, and Wright was also happy to rent homes to concentrate and profit from a growing source of industrial labour (Gordon, 2015; Russell, 2012). Coulthard (2014), Wolfe (2006), and Pendland (1959) describe the necessity of the establishment of a reserve of cheap and mobile labour to sustain colonial industrial production. The coincidence of early United States investment, land shortages in Lower Canada, and the rush of Irish refugees combined to produce an early, if short-lived, economic boom in Kitchi Sipi Valley, driven by industrial timber production. Industrial employment in Wright's Town and Bytown rose from 747 workers in 1851 to 2,744 in 1871 (Gordon, 2015).

Timber barons accumulated only a small portion of the resulting wealth, despite the rush of investment and labour dedicated to industrializing timber extraction. British merchants, such as the Gilmour Family, in Scotland retained the lion's share of revenues from timber exports. Timber prices were also volatile because of the war, and a mill fire in 1808 forced Philemon Wright to re-invest his savings to construct a new one (Gordon, 2015). The end of the War of 1812 and the re-opening of Baltic timber ports in 1815, depressed imperial demand for timber, which deflated local wheat and land prices, shrinking the fortunes of Upper Canadian landowners like Wright (Gordon, 2015; Russell, 2012; Clarke and Buffone, 1996). Wright also owned all of the auxiliary businesses in Wright's Town and used his political influence to ban competing companies from establishing operations in Wright's Town. These factors restricted the investment capital from the industrial development of Hull and brought Wright close to

bankruptcy (Gordon, 2015; Elliot, 2000). However, Wright's operations were kept afloat in 1819 by the emerging market in Europe for potash and bleach (Jenkins, 1996).

Merchant investors in the Upper Canada timber industry became suddenly endowed in the 1820s with wealth resulting from a period of increased wheat yields in Upper Canada, which was boosted by favourable imperial grain prices established through the Corn Law of 1815 (Russell, 2012; Clarke and Buffone, 1996; Jenkins, 1996; McCalla, 1993).

Timber barons and the development of the Rideau Canal

In the 1820s, the imperial demand for timber recovered and remained supported by a combination of: peace-time industrial expansion in the UK, a rush of immigration from overpopulation in England and the colonization of Scotland and Ireland, the post-war reconstruction effort along the St Lawrence, and construction of various canals, dams, railways, and fortifications around Upper and Lower Canada, including the Rideau Canal (Pasternak et al., 2021; Gordon, 2015). In this period a series of new settlements were founded, requiring even more timber, throughout eastern Upper Canada composed of land grants made to veterans of the War of 1812, most in townships throughout the Pasāpikahigani (Rideau) Valley (Campey, 2005). This all pushed settlement further inland into unceded and unsurrendered Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin) land and devastated the ecosystems that sustain their livelihoods (Pasternak et al., 2021, 29; Gehl, 2014).

This period of economic expansion was sustained through territorial expansion

pushed by land theft, forest depletion, and settlement expansion to Kitchi Sipi Valley started slowly in the 1820s and reached a fever pitch by the 1850s. It extended extractive operations inland beyond the Kitchi Sipi and Magtogoek rivers, with roadways and agricultural development following closely behind it. Square grid township plans were made and surveyed for the towns of Perth in 1815, Richmond in 1818, and Lanark in 1820. Settlers bound for Perth cut a road north from Brockville, and settlers for Richmond created a road west from the Kitchi Sipi River. By the 1820s, absentee landlords came to own most of Nepean Township through this ad hoc process of settlement and there was no land registry to see who owned what land along the Pasāpikahigani and Jock rivers (Gordon, 2015).

Despite the economic boom in Upper Canada at the time, the economic instability of imperial timber markets made it challenging for Wright to expand his territory of timber extraction, even though there were no permits or fees required to exploit new areas (Gordon, 2015). As forest stands close to Wright's Town were depleted from clear-cut harvesting, repeating the sudden economic collapse for the region experienced with the depletion of the region's beaver population. The most easily-accessible timber was up the Pasāpikahigani (Rideau) River and into more Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities by 1816, clearing land for the soon-to-be settled Richmond township and prompting a new round of petitions to the Indian Affairs office (Jenkins, 1996). Competition from operations like the Hamiltons' was also starting to challenge Wrights control of the region's timber industry. His son Ruggles Wright built a timber slide to divert timber away from, often-destructive, Akikodjiwan (Chaudière Falls).

Immediately after its completion, the colonial administration built a timber slide on the south side in-part to prevent Wright from controlling the supply of timber beyond the falls (Gordon, 2015). New timber barons and independent loggers alike now rushed to the south side of the Kitchi Sipi River to extract timber (Gordon, 2015).

Philemon Wright died in 1839 and the consequences of him stealing the land deeds of his family members was in-fighting among Wright's descendents over ownership. In-fighting and fragmentation divided the family's holdings, resulting in shortage of financial capital available for reinvestment in the development of Hull's industrial infrastructure (Elliot, 2000). The diversion of investment to new timber operations in Bytown and the exhaustion of local forests peaked Wright's timber operation in 1863 and created conditions of under-investment in what would become the working class community of Hull (Gordon, 2015).

The canal was completed in 1832 costing the British £800,000. However, the Military Ordnance Commission gave the canal property to the government of Upper Canada when it proved to be unprofitable to maintain. The contracting companies that were hired to construct the canal re-invested the profits in the development of property in the now-burgeoning Bytown settlement. For instance, Thomas McKay, a stonemason from Scotland, was hired as a contractor to develop some of the masonry for the Rideau Canal. He invested the wealth gained from this enterprise in the construction of a sawn-lumber factory in what would become New Edinburgh 1829 (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). He saw the need to establish a railway from Bytown to Prescott to expand the rate of lumber shipments to the United States. He convinced the town council to loan

him \$200,000 and invested his personal wealth to construct the railway. However, poor planning, undercapitalization, and nepotistic management made the railway unsuccessful and it went bankrupt in 1863. The failure of this project resulted in a credit shortage in Kitchi Sipi Valley that would restrict industrial development for the next few decades (Gordon, 2015). McKay then went on to represent the District of Colchester in 1874 and 1878. James MacLaren bought the company from McKay in 1868 and used the wealth he accumulated from it to help capitalize the new Bank of Ottawa in 1874, the Hull Iron Company in 1880, and the North Pacific Lumber Company of British Columbia in 1898 (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996).

Electrification and inland timber expansion

The economic fervour that started slowly in the 1820s from the lumber boom, wheat boom, and contracts for the construction of the Rideau Canal concentrated a great deal of industrial capitalists looking to enter timber extraction and profit from the establishment of auxiliary industries. Some of these operations were short lived but impactful, like that of William Stewart of Scotland who got in during the recovery in timber prices but was unable to expand to a size that could withstand market volatility in a minor imperial timber glut of the 1840s. He exited timber production in the 1840s to concentrate on speculating land in Sandy Hill and using that wealth to help capitalize the Bank of British North American. He used this power and wealth to get elected to represent Bytown and then Russell in 1843 in the Upper Canadian legislature. Operations like those of John Eagan from Ireland, Daniel McLauchlin of Scotland,

James Skead from England, and William Goodhue Perley from New Hampshire established mills further up-river in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, predominantly in Aylmer, Westboro, and Arnprior (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1994). These operations expanded the range of extraction deep into still unceded and unsurrendered Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land.

The expansion then led them to invest in developing new roads, railways, and steamship companies to reduce the costs of transporting timber to their mills. By clearing these areas of trees and extending transportation infrastructure further into Kitchi Sipi Valley, they effectively opened areas along the Bonnechere, Mississippi, Madawaska, Quyon, and Petawawa Rivers for agricultural settlement. These profitable operations enabled John Egan, Daniel McLachlin, and William Goodhue Perley to acquire elected positions in the Upper and Lower Canadian legislatures (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996).

British timber demand began to decline by the 1850s, which coincided with the Canadian–American Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 opening the timber industry in Kitchi Sipi Valley to U.S. markets (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). The Mayor of Bytown, Richard W. Scott, fixed an auction of leases for industrial lots along Akikodjiwan (Chaudière Falls) to several American industrialists looking for sources of lumber to produce sawn timber for United States markets (Gehl, 2017; Gordon, 2015). An initial wave of American industrial investment included the Harris and Bronson Company, and John Rochester. Henry Franklin Bronson and John J. Harris started a sawn lumber operation in New York, which ran until 1889. They collaborated with Mayor Scott to

secure a lease for Victoria Island in 1852, where they built a sawn timber mill to ship to the United States. Bronson's son Erskine Henry Bronson assumed control of the company in 1889 after serving on the Ottawa City Council from 1872 to 1877. He diversified the company's operations into hydroelectricity production just as the lumber industry of Bytown started to decline in the early 1900s. John Rochester established a brewery, tannery, and two sawmills on the LeBreton Flats. The profits accumulated from these operations capitalized the creation of the Ottawa Agricultural Insurance Company and the Metropolitan Trust and Loan Company. Rochester also became the Mayor of Ottawa from 1870 to 1871, and the Member of Parliament for Carleton District in the House of Commons from 1872 to 1882. Following this wave of industrial development, a second one followed with the establishment of the E.B. Eddy Company and the operations of John Rudolphus Booth. Ezra Butler Eddy of Vermont, started a company in New York taking waste wood from lumber milling and manufacturing matches. He moved his match company to Hull in 1854 forming the E.B Eddy Company but shifted into timber extraction in 1858 (Gordon 2015; Jenkins, 1996).

Decline of the timber industry

John Rudolphus Booth, who was second-generation Irish from western Upper Canada, helped construct sawmills in Sherbrooke and Hull. He was hired by Andrew Leamy to manage his sawmill in Hull, and rented it out to produce wood shingles for roofing until the mill burned down. In 1858 he managed to secure a much-coveted contract to supply

timber for the Parliament construction project after offering the cheapest bid by hiring unemployed Irish workers in Montreal. He bought John Egan's logging rights in the upper portions of Kitchi Sipi Valley and expanded logging as far north as Lake Nippissing, consolidating almost four and a half million acres of woodlands at the peak of operations. He established a rail line in 1881 from Lake Nippissing to Mattawa to transport timber overland to float them downriver to Ottawa. The success of his operations made him the largest exporter of lumber in Turtle Island and among the wealthiest people in Upper Canada at the time. However, the wave of timberyard fires also compromised Booth's lumber production in 1893, 1900, and 1903. This forced him to shift production to hydro power and pulp and paper in 1905. However, Booth's operations were not flexible enough to adapt and they were all gradually acquired by George Weston, Ltd. in 1946. The era of Ottawa timber barons came to an end by the mid-1990s. The wealth accumulated by the families who owned these timber companies capitalized Ottawa's early banks and embedded industrial capitalist interests within the Canadian settler state (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1994).

The Ottawa Timber Boom was the result of wealthy settlers in the U.S. and U.K looking for profitable new timber extraction opportunities. The British Empire assisted the boom through the generous grants of unceded land far up the Kichi Sipi Valley. Extraction companies cleared the forests of the areas and developed the infrastructure necessary for settlement expansion. Their profits helped capitalize Canada's early financial sector and the interests of the timber barons became embedded in the Canadian settler state as they used their wealth and influence to gain elected positions

in various parliaments.

Liberal reforms and land use planning

The empowerment of Upper Canadian settlers through generous land grants, the establishment of an influential class of timber barons, and the frustrations of a strict and ineffective neo-feudal government resulted in a political imperative among reformers, farmers, and workers to institute a government based on the will of local parliament, focused on the protection of private property, and oriented towards improving civil infrastructure and land use planning. This led Upper Canada reformers to first mount a doomed rebellion in 1838 and then negotiate the formation of a dominion federal government and local municipal governments (Kellogg, 2015; Bothwell, 2006; Clarke, 2001; Bleasdale, 1981).

Legacy institutions, such as land boards, were transformed into transportation infrastructure planning agencies. The Province of Ontario and its municipalities also established formal land use planning protocols. These public institutions became an authority in themselves directing the distribution of land, especially with the formation of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). The OMB became vested with quasi-judicial powers to overturn local planning decisions. It was swiftly captured by the interests of real estate, agribusiness, and infrastructure developers. Such institutions—despite their additional responsibilities for nation-building, and social and environmental protections—became political tools used by wealthy landowners to assert their private property rights and commercial interests over the distribution of land (Chipman, 2002). This kind

of political power was responsible for the levels of post-war urban sprawl but it also proved to limit development on prime farmland. The Federal Government, at the same time, experienced pressure from farmers during wartime and economic downturns to protect commodity prices. This resulted in a series of market protections such as supply management and Farm Credit Canada, which stabilized market and reliable access to credit leading simple commodity producers to reinvest profits into expanded production (Hall, 2003; Knuttila, 2003).

The transformation of the settler colonial government into a self-governing dominion in 1867 resulted in the formation of public institutions oriented towards the protection of private property rights and advancing the interests of wealthy landowners. It also, however, established some limits to their ability to advance capitalist accumulation, allowing simple commodity producing farmers to compete with large-scale commercial farms.

Confederation and municipal government

The tension between the political-economic imperatives of the colonial gentry and reformers resulted in the series of internal political conflicts that escalated into the Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837, the Durham Report of 1839, and eventually the confederation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867. The new Dominion—organized primarily around the protection of parliamentary supremacy, market liberalism, and property rights—established the institutions and policies necessary for a system of commercial agriculture to thrive.

The ability of wealthy private citizens to own commanding amounts of land and investment capital under the neo-feudal colonial order was reinforced by their ability to obtain positions in local parliament (Whitaker, 1977). To become a member of the Family Compact, for instance, a white anglo-protestant man could use their veteran land grant or merchant wealth to acquire a large enough land holding and exercise the necessary influence to gain an appointment on a local District Land Board (Clarke, 1975). Land board membership or work as a land surveyor then allowed the land owner to decide who can settle in the district and influence or marry their way to judicial and administrative appointments (Clarke, 2001). Greatest political influence in the colony came through proximity to the executive council of the colony, which permitted greater accumulation of land. Prominent landowners outside of the favour of the Compact were able to become elected to the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada and the United Province of Canada. However, the council only needed to answer to the lower house if it benefited their power or to avoid settler rebellion (Clarke, 2001).

Political reformers of the time—predominantly settlers and land speculators from New England and New York and their descendants—took offense to the elite privileges accumulated and concentrated between free land grantors and grantees (Clarke, 2001). An ascendant class of wealthy merchants and non-aristocratic land speculators began to contest the power of the Family Compact in the colonies as well as the aristocracy back in London (Knuttila, 2003; Clarke, 2001; Arrighi, 1994). Reformers promoted anti-imperial sentiments on the frontier articulated primarily around the possessive individualism of private property rights resembling a combination of Leveller, Chartist,

and Owenite positions (Weaver 2003). However, the reform movement in Upper Canada was also fraught with internal political conflict. On the one hand, those who demanded reforms to protect private property found themselves with a lack of secure land title, investment capital, or adequate local infrastructure. This often resulted in failed settlements and the loss of their land at sheriff auctions (Clarke and Buffone 1996). On the other hand, wealthy reformist speculators objecting to the arbitrary power of the Family Compact sought wealth through the purchasing of land at sheriff sales for speculation. Recalling the cases of Robert Randal, gentry land owners would purchase the holdings of bankrupt land owners for upset prices at auctions setup to liquidate unpaid property taxes (Gordon, 2015; Clarke 2001; Jenkins, 1996).

The Upper Canadian reform movement leadership arose from a combination of British social reform thinkers who wanted to improve working and farming conditions, as well as wealthy British and American merchants and land speculators who were reaching limits to their wealth accumulation because they operated outside of the patronage system surrounding the Family Compact. This included Robert Randal, who was elected to the House of Assembly with assistance of his reformist political allies, William Lyon Mackenzie and Robert Baldwin (Jenkins, 1996). Reformers spoke out against the conflict between different groups of settlers over land rights. They argued that the growing social conflicts were the result of unequal access to land, government positions, and social privileges, which was impeding development and depressing the social betterment of the settler colony (Clarke, 2001). For instance, many of the working class residents of Bytown dwelled in rented shacks in Lowertown. At the time, one could

only vote for district representatives to the House of Assembly if they owned land. This meant that Tory conservatives held a virtually uncontested control over political representation for the region in government, despite their small population relative to the French Canadian and Irish Catholic workers in Kitchi Sipi Valley (Gordon, 2015). Reformers prescribed the use of the colony's wealth and resources be used for the development of the province, through the guidance of "responsible government" (i.e. when the executive governs with accountability to all sections of the legislature, notably the House of Assembly) and the creation of local government in the form of town councils (Clarke and Buffone, 1996).

The reform movement grew large enough in popularity among the voting population that their leadership gained a majority in the Assembly. However, the legislative council blocked many of the reforms they would ratify. The Executive Council rejected proposals for democratic reforms in 1837, which led the reformists to start advocating for political independence, organizing for rebellion, and coordinating with the Patriote movement in Lower Canada. The rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada led the Crown to investigate its causes and make recommendations for reforms to prevent further uprisings. The findings of this investigation were published as *The Report on the Affairs of British North America* (The Durham Report) in 1839. It detailed many of the grievances of the reform movement about the clientelist political economy of Upper Canada and recommended the institution of a responsible government. A decade after the Upper Canada Rebellion, the Assembly of Canada legislated the Rebellion Losses Bill of 1849 (Gordon, 2015; Bothwell, 2006). This law granted amnesty to the rebels,

which angered Toryists, triggering further riots throughout the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The seat of the Province of Canada's capital was also rotated between 1841 to 1858 between Kingston, Montreal, and Toronto, which resulted in volatile urban land values that frustrated and bankrupted land speculators who were hoping to develop housing for government officials and staff. Ottawa was selected in 1858 by Queen Victoria as the permanent location for the capital of the United Provinces of Upper Canada, despite the Legislature rejecting the choice. Ottawa was selected due to its relatively equal distance between Montreal, Toronto, and Kingston. This ushered a wave of migration, infrastructure subsidies, and property development necessary to accommodate the growing public sector for the colonial government, numbering 300 to 400 public servants by 1865 (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996).

Popular demand also grew for the formation of local governments to replace the mandates of the colonial office, military ordinance committees, and private land developers, to manage the affairs and infrastructure of the region's emerging cities. The City of Kingston was established 1846 and the City of Ottawa, with a population of 10,000, was established through the Municipal Corporations Act in 1855 (Gordon, 2015). The Upper Canada Legislature ordered local governments to recognize the property rights of squatter settlers, and accommodate their properties through surveys and land value assessments. Usury laws from 1811 obliging fees and dues to gentry land owners and speculators were also narrowly overturned in the Legislature in 1852 (Weaver, 2003). The outcomes desired by the Wakefield Scheme (explained on page 183) were coming to fruition and a market economy driven by the capital of domestic

financial institutions, and the labour of land-owning farmers, and a settled community of wage labourers was emerging (Clarke, 2001; Pentland, 1959). By the 1850s, the government reforms that were legislated in the United Provinces of Canada effectively ending the rule of the Family Compact, replacing it with what would become a self-governing dominion and a capitalist market economy (Weaver, 2003). The political reforms of the 1840s and 1850s marked the triumph of the private landowner and timber barons over the gentry oligarchy of the Family Compact (Gordon, 2015; Clarke, 2001).




Figure 19 — Eastern Upper Canada Settlement Expansion, 1850 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on NativeLands.ca, 2022; Dean, 1998; Winearls, 1991; Harris and Matthews, 1987)

The political class of the United Province of Canada relished in the wealth that

the new market economy produced but also struggled to figure out how to address the growing problem of overcrowding (see Figure 19), collapsing land prices, and declining land availability (Russell, 2012). They sought to profitably reinvest domestic surplus wealth into the expansion of the settler colony westward. However, they lacked the mandate to acquire new lands to settle, prompting the desire among reformers and Tories alike for greater political autonomy from Westminster (Kellogg, 2015; Knuttila, 2003). This project was assisted by a growing nationalist sentiment among the freeholding settlers that cultivated the demand among the voting population of the colonies for partial political independence from the UK, and the exercise of power of the voting public as citizens rather than subjects (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Hobsbawm, 1996; Arrighi, 1994; Polanyi, 1944). Politicians from the United Provinces of Canada, to this end, met with those of the Maritime Union in 1864 to discuss the possibility of combining governments to form a dominion government (Gordon, 2015). They succeeded in 1867 to convince Westminster to pass the Constitution Act bringing into existence the Dominion of Canada.

Mainly, the federal structure of the Canadian Government produced political conflict between Atlantic, Quebecois, and Ontarian interests that manifested in a form of brokerage partisan politics. The divisions between reformist liberals and conservative liberals in Canada differed significantly from the class-based Labour-Conservative conflict in Great Britain. Toryist farmer-settlers in Ontario allied their class interests predominantly with the gentry-led liberal conservatives, while Catholic peasant-settlers saw their class interests represented by the bourgeois-led reformist liberals (Kellogg,

2015). The brokerage politics of the Canadian Parliament therefore did not go through the same post-imperial partisan conflict over land reform that defined political dynamics in Mexico, Central America, and South America at the time. Instead, political dynamics centred around particular ethno-regional interests that differed between sections of Canada's economic elites, with labour reforms and First Nations land rights almost entirely absent from political debate (Jensen and Brodie, 1998).

Land use planning and boards of appeal

The economic reforms that established liberalized private property rights and land markets in Ontario's also came with new institutions established to temper the monopolistic powers of colonial elites and foster municipal governance that are responsive to various local interests. The establishment of these institutions came out of the slow insistence of reformers. Governance over the affairs of local issues, however, began early in the history of Upper Canada Districts. By the early-1800s, the population of Upper Canada was too large to be governed by district magistrates, and the requirement for decisions to be made by district magistrates and the lack of personnel to fill these roles resulted in significant delays and chaos in addressing district issues. The shortage of magistrates was exacerbated by the tendency to restrict those with reformist persuasions from such posts. Settlers were therefore unable to fulfill oath requirements and magistrates could not make labour orders to construct roads, and rulings on property dispute settlements could not be litigated. The quality of roads declined as settlement expanded and the lack of secure private property rights

challenged the capacity of profits to be made in agricultural production. The prevalence of absentee landowners (explained on page 193) also placed the burden of taxation entirely on those who actually resided within the districts and led to reliance of tolls to finance roads construction (Altchison, 1949).

Institutional reforms were also made during this time to make private property rights legally secure. A land registry was established in 1787 to help resolve title disputes and size limits for free land grants to Loyalist soldiers were increased (Widdis, 1979; Craig, 1963). Land boards were created and operated between 1788 and 1794 to govern over the dispensation of land for four districts, which would be further expanded and divided in 1799. The role of the land boards was to consider petitions for land under 200 acres on behalf of the Land Committee of the Executive Council of British North America (Clarke 2001; Jenkins, 1996).

A land board would first approve a petition for a land grant in their region. The Executive Council of the colony would then make an order-in-council to issue a “fiat” in exchange for a fee. Applicants would then have to take the fiat to the Surveyor General’s office who would then give them a “certificate of location” and property description for another fee. The Surveyor General’s office—once the fee was paid—would issue a patent deed for a land grant. This acted as the registered legal instrument guaranteeing that the British Crown recognized the grantee’s private property rights over the granted land (Clarke, 2001).

Upper Canada went bankrupt in 1837. This led the colonial executive to devolve local infrastructure costs to the districts. This was accompanied with the empowerment

of local governments to levy property taxes with the drafting of the Act of Union in 1839. Upper Canadian settlers, however, were strongly against property taxation. There was also an influential class of absentee landowners that did not want local councils to have the power to tax their land holdings. Provisions for local district councils to raise taxes were therefore removed from the initial Union Bill in 1839. Reformers pushed back and managed to add provisions in the final Act of Union in 1841 that allows for civil society organizations to raise small levies on property through the passage of bylaws. The collection of funds was managed centrally by the United Canadian Government, and township councils still required approval by the Board of Works to develop any new infrastructure (Altchison, 1949).

The reform movement in Parliament pushed for the creation of municipal governments under the leadership of Robert Baldwin. They legislated the District Councils Act of 1841, which took authority governing districts and townships away from appointed magistrates and delegated powers to draft bylaws and raise taxes to a newly-formed series of municipal corporations composed of elected township councilors and operating through provincial charters. The problems of political patronage, however, persisted through the continuation of appointed wardens, treasurers, and clerks (White, 2019; Altchison, 1949). Conservative control of Parliament in the second session of the Canadian Parliament delayed further reforms until the end of the decade. Baldwin regained control in Parliament in 1848 and legislated the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849—often referred to as the Baldwin Act. This Act standardized municipal powers and removed caps on the rate of taxation they could levy on their inhabitants, which was

eventually re-introduced in 1866 albeit at a much higher level than before 1849 (Altchison, 1949).

The consolidated decision-making powers over land distribution in the Dominion around federal and provincial parliaments, shifted the focus of provincial and local government to regional development rather than settlement expansion. The first move made to consolidate and modernize regional development in eastern Canada was the establishment of the federal Board of Railway Commissioners in 1904 to coordinate the development of interprovincial and international rail networks. The Government of Ontario established the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board in 1906 to coordinate rail and utility development in a consistent manner between municipalities, as well as to oversee and discipline the financial management of municipal government (Chipman, 2002). Reformers—many of whom owned or ran businesses that depended on reliably-available wage labourers—were also becoming concerned by 1912 with the lack of housing in Canada, which led to the development of a movement focused on institutionalizing town planning to proactively curb the ad hoc development of unsafe and poorly-serviced dwellings (Hodge, 1985; Van Nus, 1976).

Municipal councils, who had the capacity to organize housing and planning reform, began to emerge along with the political reforms of Confederation in 1867. The Ottawa City Council, for instance, was formed in 1888 (Gordon, 2015). Town and city councils were delegated specific powers to establish general subdivision plans through the Ontario City and Suburbs Plans Act in 1912. These powers were broadened in 1917 through the Planning and Development Act Ontario, to include the planning of parks,

monuments, and major arterial roadways. By 1921, municipalities could make general subdivision plans beyond the existing urban area and establish U.S.-style zoning bylaws (as opposed to British-style development controls), and articulate transportation corridors and utilities to supply newly developed private properties (Chipman, 2002; Hodge, 1985). Ottawa City Council developed its own set of zoning bylaws in 1926, which provoked backlash at city council from the Ottawa Property Holders Association and the Ottawa Real Estate Board (Gordon, 2015). Reformers and government officials, therefore, preferred that planning and housing issues be addressed by arms-length commissions of technical experts rather than committees connected to municipal government to avoid inevitable challenges from private property owners (Hodge, 1985).

Town planning and housing programs were first initiated through an alliance of government officials and business interests, seen as a necessity to develop manufacturing capacity and to house a growing civil service supporting Canadian participation in World War I, between 1914 and 1918 (Delaney, 1991; Hodge, 1985). To this end, the Government of Canada coordinated the Federal-Provincial Housing Scheme, mandated through the War Measures Act, between 1918 to 1923, and the Province of Ontario contributed to it through the legislation of the Ontario Housing Act of 1919. These programs established the “Better Housing Scheme” accompanied by \$25 million in federal loans available for municipalities throughout Canada. The Federal and provincial governments assigned a public role for the development of the models and standards for increased housing development and neighborhood planning. They also took on the task of securing low-interest loans for individuals to construct their own

private dwellings. However, they stopped short of doing the physical task of construction, instead preferring a process where development companies constructed privately-owned residential properties (Delaney, 1991).

The Town Planning Institute of Canada was established in 1915 and received a federal charter in 1915 to govern a professional body of planners (Van Nus, 1976). This program established a model of urban expansion that involved the construction of planned neighborhood subdivisions supported by adequate transportation and sanitation infrastructure, with uniform land use and density, with sections of housing to match different social classes (Sendbuehler & Gilliland, 1998). Plans were developed by the Ottawa Town Planning Commission in 1926 for suburban developments that would house the growing population of the Ottawa-Hull area (Gordon, 2015; Van Nus, 1976). The City of Ottawa, under the delegated leadership of the new Ottawa Housing Commission also became involved through the development of the Lindenlea suburb development pilot, just to the east of the New Edinburgh neighborhood (Delaney, 1991). These early initiatives to institute modern planning and development practices effectively placed the business of urban expansion and development in the hands of technocratic planners and private developers, with little accountability to bodies of civic deliberation represented by municipal councils.

Professionalized practices of town planning and real estate development quickly became the norm in the most populated municipalities in Ontario. However, the geographic and social diversity of towns and cities risked the establishment of inconsistencies between municipal plans, which planners and developers worried would

hamper coherent regional development. The Province of Ontario's Executive Council and Bureau of Municipal Affairs decided to absorb the Office of the Provincial Municipal Auditor and Ontario Railway and Municipal Board in 1932, forming the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). The OMB was directed by a commission of expert accountants, engineers, planners, administrators, civic reformers, and politicians that were all appointed for life by the provincial government (Chipman 2002). It was delegated a mandate to review and appeal municipal decisions over most provincial-regulated utilities and railways, town plans, and budgets to ensure that they were operating in the "public interest" (i.e. protecting private property rights from external nuisances) and consistent with provincial laws. It functioned until 2018 as a quasi-judicial administrative body that could conduct hearings, make rulings over property disputes and adjustments to zoning bylaws, develop administrative policies, and overturn municipal legislation (White, 2017; Chipman, 2002).

The OMB has generally been criticized as an institution that was captured by the real estate industry to overturn democratically-established council resolutions in favour of advancing development projects. However, despite this general tendency it did often rule in favour of municipal council decisions where it aligned with the interest of protecting private property owners from nuisances from development (Chipman, 2002). Effectively, the reforms instituting civic democracy over land distribution and land use advanced by the reform movement in Ontario after Confederation became confined and captured between 1849 and 1932 by those same reformers as they pursued rational planning and housing improvement in alliance with private developers and expert

technocrats.

Public housing, mortgage policies, and urban sprawl

The rapid expansion of the federal public service during the first and second world war and the economic recession of the 1930s resulted in a housing shortage in Ottawa, which pressured the federal government to establish public policy to encourage housing development, which eventually created the conditions for post-war urban sprawl and real estate speculation. The Dominion Housing Act was legislated by the Conservative Federal Government of R.B. Bennett in 1935 out of pressure to act on the growing houseless population during the Great Depression, but was constrained by the lack of federal powers necessary to intervene in housing development and distribution. It committed to studying the cause of the housing crisis and allocated \$10 million to compliment private mortgage loans to individuals to purchase or build a home. This initial policy response to the homelessness crisis of the 1930s was insufficient to prevent the Canadian housing market from collapsing due to a lack of participation of private financial companies who found the program too expensive and risky to participate in (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996; Delaney, 1991; Hulchanski, 1986).

The depression decreased household incomes, which reduced effective demand for housing. This simultaneously collapsed house prices, contracted municipal property tax revenues, and shrunk the supply of capital available for affordable mortgages, which produced a paradoxical combination of low occupancy rates for existing housing and high levels of homelessness and co-housing (Gordon, 2015; Hulchanski, 1986). The

depression also resulted in a large number of tax defaults among property owners. Rural townships like Nepean became endowed with large numbers of vacant lots, which they sold off at a significant discount (Gordon, 2015). This produced the conditions for real estate speculators to consolidate land holdings for future subdivision development.

The Economic Council of Canada concluded its study on the crisis and they recommended the formation of a corporation that would convene the Federal Government, mortgage lending industry, and the housing development industry to coordinate the provision of mortgage loans to middle class workers to purchase existing housing or construct their own homes in new subdivisions on Crown lands the edge of cities like Ottawa (Gordon, 2015; Hulchanski, 1986). This Council specifically avoided policy options oriented towards increasing the supply of public housing through direct investment, preferring instead to establish institutional support to protect private mortgage lenders from the risk of lending to households during an economic downturn. It also focused on supporting housing development for the purpose of providing employment, rather than directly for the provision of housing. These measures were instituted through the Home Improvement Plan in 1936, the Home Improvement Loans Guarantee Act in 1937, National Housing Acts in 1938 and 1944, and the Central Mortgage Bank Act of 1939, and the Veterans' Land Act in 1942 (Hulchanski, 1986; Oberlander and Fallick. 1992). These laws resulted in the creation of the Central Mortgage Bank (1939) which provided \$200 million in mortgages raised through government bonds to private mortgage lenders (Cullingworth, 1984; Hulchanski, 1986).

The Wartime Housing Limited was established in 1941 through the War

Measures Act as a crown corporation with the mandate to construct and manage temporary working class rental housing. These measures managed to proliferate mortgage debt among middle class workers and farmers. It also increased employment in the construction sector. However, they did not remedy the general inability and the lack of confidence of low and middle income workers and farmers to reliably pay off their mortgage debt. Wartime Housing Limited began to sell its rental units in 1943. Government-backed mortgage lending was also repealed with the start of World War Two in 1945 (Oberlander and Fallick, 1992; Hulchanski, 1986).

World War Two increased demand in the UK for manufactured goods and food from Canada, which increased employment and re-established public confidence—especially among the large reserve of discharged war veterans that were gradually entering the workforce—to borrow money to purchase or construct homes. The post-war fervor from the influx of veterans and war brides produced immense pressure for urban expansion through subdivision development in peri-urban areas. The haste of this expansion became chaotic and congested hampering development and producing challenges to the orderly development of transportation infrastructure and utilities. The Federal Government responded to this chaos with the establishment of the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) in 1945, which was run by David Mansur of Sun Life and responsible to Reconstruction and Supply Minister C.D. Howe. It was empowered to manage the National Housing Act and stabilize housing, construction, and mortgage lending markets. The corporation absorbed the rental units of Wartime Housing Limited and Housing Enterprises of Canada Limited, purchased tracts of land

for the development of factories in places like Kingston, and increased the number of mortgages in Canada by 362% from 1946 to 1950, which further accelerated the rate of urban expansion through suburban development, peaking with the construction of 13,531 houses throughout Canada in the period of 1947 to 1949 (Oberlander and Fallick, 1992; Cullingworth, 1984).

Significant tracts of land in the suburban belts around Canadian cities were now portioned into mortgaged properties and developed into clustered “satellite communities”, remitting regular payments towards private insurance and mortgage companies through the mediation of the CMHC with collaboration from local governments (Gordon, 2015). Mortgage debt was prolific, but it was now serviceable by middle class workers enjoying increased pay due to the combination of high demand on labour to power the economic reconstruction, and the success of unions to secure high wages and benefits for workers. This resulted in rampant urban sprawl in the post-war period on prime farmland in Ottawa’s west-end.

The provincial governments of John Robarts and Bill Davis implemented publicly-funded social welfare programs and founded programs for the development of public housing. The Federal Government of Pierre Trudeau amended the federal National Housing Act in 1974 supporting the development of non-profit housing corporations and housing cooperatives. These programs made housing more affordable and raised the income of lower-income workers making many more people able to purchase suburban housing (White, 2017; Banting and Myles, 2013; Cullingworth, 1984). Home ownership at the time served as a pathway for many low and middle-income earners to increase

their wealth. Home purchases were exempt from federal tax policies in the 1970s on capital gains, and real estate was among the few investments appreciated in value at a greater rate than the rising interest rates of the time (Cullingworth, 1984). This endowed middle-income homeowners with savings that could then be invested in further real estate speculation, investing in the emerging Ottawa tech sector, or placing their savings in the rapidly expanding commercial banking sector. Eventually, these homeowners accumulated so much wealth in savings that they had to find a profitable way to invest their equity. They largely invested their savings in private equity funds, which would become important to the capitalization of farmland investment companies in the early 2000s and 2010s (Harvey, 2010).

The Government of Ontario implemented the Planning Act in 1946, which allowed municipalities to establish local and regional planning boards, and legislate binding official plans with provincial mediation. The need for comprehensive regional planning in the post-war period, however, was unavoidable as the infrastructure and utilities necessary to support the pace of suburbanization required a coordinated effort. The City of Ottawa and the townships of Vanier, Rockliffe, Nepean, Gloucester, and March agreed in 1969 to establish the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC), containing numerous overlapping jurisdictions and granting Ottawa the controlling vote over regional decisions (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). However, the number of rural and suburban councilors represented in the RMOC quickly outweighed the disproportionate powers retained by Ottawa, which established the dominance of suburban interests in the municipality by the late 1970s. The dominant interest of the

RMOC therefore became the development of low-density housing subdivisions and industrial and commercial parks. This resulted in the conversion of many rural communities in the Ottawa area into bedroom communities housing commuters working in Ottawa (Gordon, 2015). The planning institutions created to oversee the orderly expansion of urban development were quickly captured by developers. The profitable development of suburban subdivisions, however, would only take off through the reliable availability of mortgage credit for middle-income urban dwellers in the postwar period.

Regional planning and conservation policies

The industrial development of timber barons throughout the 1800s produced a tangled and irrational network of rail lines that made moving around the Ottawa-area a slow and frustrating process. Federal Prime Ministers and Governor Generals also expressed a desire to beautify Ottawa as a way to impress diplomatic missions to so-called Canada and to advance the project of settler nation-building. These imperatives led the Dominion of Canada to establish federal land use planning and management institutions, which eventually coalesced into the National Capital Commission.

Municipalities in so-called Ontario also saw that urban expansion was costing more in the development of infrastructure and utilities than it could take in in tax and development fee revenues. This led municipalities to establish zoning bylaws to limit development. The Province of Ontario, in the postwar period, began to take on the responsibility of standardizing planning practices, monitoring and regulating

environmental externalities that resulted from industrial, residential, and agricultural development. These institutions functioned as a public check on the negative effects of the rapid pace of capitalist development that occurred throughout the 1900s.

Institutional capture of legacy institutions like the OMB, however, rendered many of these public regulatory powers ineffective to contain sprawl and environmental destruction (Gordon, 2015). The political conflict between these institutions have come to determine the urban form of the City of Ottawa and has shaped the developmental characteristics of the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

The most significant attempt by the Government of Canada to enact a regime of conservation in the Kitchi Sipi Valley came under the leadership of Prime Minister Mackenzie King following World War I. He initially hired Jacques Gréber in 1936 to develop a national capital plan for Ottawa, but plans were put on hold during World War Two as Gréber was a pro-Vichy regime planner who was called to develop urban renewal plans for the City of Marseille. Gréber came to Ottawa after the war to develop plans for the national capital region. He developed a regional plan that organized much of the southeastern Kitchi Sipi Valley into a network of decentralized federal office campuses and small suburbs surrounded by a green belt of farmland and natural areas (Gordon 2015; Jenkins, 1996). The City of Ottawa supported this plan and attempted to annex neighboring townships in 1949 to implement the suburban development plan (Gordon, 2015).

The most important component of the Gréber Plan was the establishment of a “greenbelt” ring around Ottawa that would contain urban development and conserve the

farmland and forests that gave the city a verdant aesthetic desired among proponents of Ebenezer Howard's Garden City style of landscape planning. However, the plan faced opposition from town councils over options to increase federal power over land use and development. Prime Minister Diefenbaker therefore passed the National Capital Act in 1958, transforming the FDC into the National Capital Commission (NCC) and granting it more resources and powers to assert regional land use plans. In contrast, the City of Ottawa was forced to cut back on operations in 1957 after incurring a \$1,000,000 deficit. This made the NCC the only authority in the region able to implement land use plans until 1969 (Gordon, 2015).

Townships surrounding Ottawa agreed to allow the NCC to convert railway routes into regional highways and parkways to service new suburban developments, which was developed through a combination of provincial and federal funding. The NCC also convinced Ottawa and the surrounding townships to implement zoning bylaws by 1962. However, early property surveys in the 1800s were done so poorly and the area was so under-developed due to early speculative ownership. This meant that arterial roadways followed irregular pathways, frustrating developers who had to plan suboptimally laid out subdivisions that required greater time and expense to construct. This led to haphazard subdivision planning and development in Nepean. Rural townships in Kitchi Sipi Valley, therefore, developed at a slower and less systematic pace than the expanding City of Ottawa (Gorden, 2015).

The NCC began purchasing land from private owners in the 1960s that would make up the greenbelt surrounding Ottawa. Real estate developers caught wind of the

NCC's greenbelt plans which triggered a rush to purchase as much land as possible with the hopes of either developing valuable properties within the greenbelt or to get as much value as possible by selling it to the federal government. Most of these investments, however, failed. Those who did succeed in profiting off of the establishment of the Ottawa Greenbelt were Costain Limited, Aubrey Moodie, the Greenburg family (Minto Development), and developers William Teron and Robert Campeau. These land speculators accumulated the land necessary to develop subdivisions in Kanata, Bells Corners, and Blackburn Hamlet. The Kanata subdivision was especially successful due to the Federal Government development of Atomic Energy Canada Limited and Communication Research Centre, which attracted several private research labs: Bell North Research, Microsystems International, Mitel, and Digital Equipment Canada (Gordon, 2015).

Private landowners in the proposed greenbelt area were compelled, through new expropriation policies, to sell undeveloped land to the NCC at agricultural property values. The land holdings of the Bronson Company were donated to the NCC in the 1960s, conceding the last remaining timber baron tract in Ottawa. However, once the land was bought by the NCC, farmers were permitted to lease-back the land to continue farming. Farmers also had first right of refusal to purchase the land if the NCC ever decided that it was surplus to their need. The farming communities of these townships were divided over this policy. Many welcomed measures to preserve farmland from development. However, there were also many—like Harold Munro of Gloucester—who were angry that they lost ownership over the lands that were originally granted to their

family by the Crown. The move also prevented farmers from selling their land to eager developers looking to buy land at residential prices for the development of new housing subdivisions. Ultimately, the NCC spent a total of \$244,000,000 between 1947 and 1970 to acquire the land that now makes up the Ottawa Greenbelt (Gordon, 2015).

The Ottawa Greenbelt was established just as the housing boom was augmented by federal and provincial government programs. This boom increased the urban footprint of Kitchi Sipi Valley at a rate that went well-beyond what was anticipated in the Gréber Plan. Ottawa's population doubled from 125,000 in 1915 to 250,000 in 1946. This led Gréber's team to estimate that growth would continue along this trajectory reaching 500,000 by 1976. However, Ottawa-Hull grew well past this prediction, reaching 516,985 by 1971 and just under one-million by 1991. Development initially expanded inside the greenbelt in the subdivisions of Vanier, Rockcliffe, Nepean, Gloucester, and Altavista, but it also began "leapfrogging" the greenbelt and clustering in Kanata, March, Barrhaven, Stittsville, and Orleans. To accommodate this growth, the NCC developed a regional growth plan in 1974, which suggested the creation of growth corridors establishing and connecting more satellite towns. The rate of development was greatest in the west of Ottawa around the townships of Kanata and Nepean, where the growing wave of public and private investment in high-tech research and innovation took place: Alcatel Canada, BreconRidge Manufacturing, Corel, Entrust Inc., General Dynamics, Honeywell Video Systems, KeySpire Inc., JDS Uniphase, Nortel Networks, and Mitel Networks (Gordon, 2015).

At the provincial-level, the Planning Act was legislated in 1946 allowing individual

municipalities (i.e. lower-tier) and regional groups of municipalities (i.e. upper-tier) to establish binding municipal zoning bylaws and official plans. The province also amended the Act in 1952 to allow municipal committees to decide on adjustments and variances to the zoning bylaw schemes contained in provincially-approved official plans (Gordon, 2015; Chipman, 2002). Ottawa and the Federal Government collaborated to overcome the resistance of townships to regional land use planning through the formation of the Ottawa Area Planning Board. However, the townships of Gloucester and Nepean blocked the plans by appealing to the OMB's approval for the regional development plans. The conflict was mediated by the OMB with Ottawa agreeing to annex and develop portions of Nepean with existing urban development (Gordon, 2015).

Planning laws and policies in Ontario and environmental laws in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, despite many conflicts with treaty obligations, began to include specific provisions protecting ecologically-sensitive areas as reserves of natural resources. There are examples of early settler-colonial initiatives to protect forests and wetlands areas from development and extraction. The Mowat government legislated the creation of Algonquin Park in 1893, which reserved 1.8 million acres of forest as an outdoor recreation area for settlers (Pludwinski and Grimwood, 2021). Several other national and provincial parks were slowly established throughout Ontario until a significant wave of new parks began in the 1960s, including the formation of the Ottawa Greenbelt by the NCC. Canada West had already established a Drainage Act in 1859 to prevent flooding, and Ontario enacted the 1946 Conservation Authorities Act

empowering the formation of Conservation Authorities to monitor and manage natural resources and wetlands, and prevent erosion and drought. Amendments were made to this act in 1960 and 1968 limiting where waste or fill dumping can take place and prohibiting waterway diversions. A series of rural planning and development guidelines also protected natural areas, like the 1966 Urban Development in Rural Areas guidance document requiring adequate infrastructure and services for development expansion, and the 1977 Rural Estate Guidelines requiring municipalities to limit settlement sprawl into rural areas. It was then updated with the 1992 Growth and Settlement Policy Guidelines. Ontario also empowered municipalities to collect development fees to fund infrastructure and service expansion through the 1989 Development Charges Act (Chipman, 2002).

The Planning Act, to rectify problems of poor planning, was reformed in 1983 allowing the province to grant municipalities relatively-autonomous planning authority to draft and implement official plans, subject to OMB appeals. A balance between provincial/regional and local interests was ultimately brokered through the 1994 version of the Planning Act, which granted municipalities the authority to implement binding official plans subject to a series of “provincial policy statements” (PPSs). These policies required municipalities to prevent development on floodplains and wetlands, and sites set aside for future aggregate quarries. It also required municipalities to zone enough land for the municipality’s housing needs and to keep housing prices relatively affordable (Chipman, 2002).

These requirements were combined in 1995 into the Comprehensive Set of

Policy Statements (CSPS), which included new requirements protecting ecologically-sensitive areas (Chipman 2002). The 1990 Ontario Conservation of Land Act and 1990 Ontario Heritage Act allowed property owners to place an easement on a property to protect a natural area or enter into a conservation covenant with a conservation land trust, such as the Rideau Waterway Land Trust, and the Mississippi Madawaska Land Trust. Conservation land trusts in Ontario cover an estimated 60,540 acres (Proctor et al., 2022; Logan & Wekerle, 2008). However, the Planning Act and PPSs, despite its forward-thinking ecological and agricultural considerations, failed to include provisions recognizing First Nations treaty rights, which placed municipal planning powers at odds with federal treaty obligations.

The governments of Canada and Ontario enacted a series of environmental legislation in the 1970s. The 1971 Ontario Environmental Protection Act, 1975 Canadian Environmental Contaminants Act, and the 1988 Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) imposed broad responsibilities for development and resource extraction companies to limit environmental harm, which has been amended on several occasions to add new classes of pollutants. The 1976 Ontario Environmental Assessment Act required impact assessment studies to be conducted for public developments and any development requiring a federal or provincial permit or license. The 1990 Ontario Water Resources Act prohibited the dumping of pollutants and sewage into bodies of water and ground aquifers. Ontario enacted the 1993 Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights following prominent Canadian participation in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED - Rio Earth

Summit). The Bill of Rights detailed procedures for public participation in the assessment and approval of developments and established a commissioner to report on the file to the Ontario legislature. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established a designation of wetlands that are of international importance under the 1971 Ramsar Convention. The Mer Bleue wetland, located in the eastern span of the Ottawa Greenbelt, was given a Ramsar designation in 1995 (Dickenson and Harrison, 1995). Civil society groups in Ontario attempted to have a number of similar site-specific conservation policies introduced for ecologically-sensitive areas like the Oak Ridges Moraine and the Niagara Escarpment. However, these proposals were vigorously opposed by the real estate development industry through OMB challenges, which delayed implementation of the conservation measures until 2005 when the McGuinty Government included these regions into the Ontario (Golden Horseshoe) Greenbelt surrounding the Greater Toronto Area (Caldwell and Hilts, 2005).

Specific farmland preservation policies were first implemented in Ontario in the 1960s. Urban expansion was the primary driver of farmland loss as suburban subdivisions expanded onto areas of prime farmland. Individual farm properties were also being sporadically divided into smaller parcels to remove unused housing to sell or gift to family members as farmers either retired or consolidated their holdings. The proliferation of large-scale livestock operations in the 1960s led to the establishment of policies to mediate conflicts between residential and agricultural land uses. The Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food (OMAF) drafted the 1970 Suggested Code of Practice and the 1976 Agricultural Code of Practices that established a Minimum-Distance of

Separation (MDS) formula that was to be used by municipalities to determine how far apart farms had to be from residential properties to prevent land use conflicts, primarily concerning the smell of livestock waste (Dickenson et al., 2010; Chipman, 2002).

The Federal Government endeavored to study the availability of farmland with the intention of determining what areas were of greatest importance for agricultural production. This led the federal Department of Forestry and Rural Development to begin conducting Canada Land Inventory surveys in 1963. This classification rendered areas like the Niagara Peninsula and Holland March to be of greatest importance, and most of Kitchi Sipi Valley to be considered of minimal importance, most suitable for the production of dairy products and feed grains for livestock (Wilton, 2005). Some provinces used the Canada Land Inventory survey to plan and implement direct measures to protect farmland. The Davis Government, however, opted to not legislate any farmland conservation but decided instead to enact Food Land Guideline documents in 1976 and 1978. These documents provided suggestions for farmland conservation measures that municipalities ought to include in their official plans (Wilton, 2007; Chipman, 2002).

Land severances—also known as consents—were specifically targeted to prevent residential encroachment into agricultural areas. Severances involve the removal of a portion of private property for the creation of another. They have been regulated indirectly through the Food Lands Guidance, which has been used by municipalities to establish conditions for severance approvals detailed in municipal official plans. Rural severances typically remove a surplus dwelling from a property,

which results in shrinking and fragmentation of agricultural properties and increase in the number of rural residential properties (Joseph and Smit, 1985). The Food Land Guidelines were replaced by the first Provincial Policy Statement in 1996, which combined a number of different planning policies enacted by the Government of Ontario (Chipman, 2002). The McGuinty Government legislated Ontario's, combined various ecological and farmland conservation policies for specific areas around the Greater Golden Horseshoe area through the 2005 Greenbelt Act. However, it excludes Kitchi Sipi Valley and is persistently threatened by applications to exempt properties for the development of aggregate quarries, highways, and airports (Holtslander, 2015).

So-called Ontario—despite some attempts at regulating land use and development—remains one of the most liberal land markets in so-called Canada. Real estate developers have therefore become a powerful political force in the province capable of overturning popular municipal zoning decisions resulting in urban sprawl into prime agricultural areas.

Agrarian change and the capitalist accumulation of farmland

The establishment of a liberal order of private property rights and land markets, clearing of vast expanses of forest, and institutionalization of land use planning set the stage for competition among commercial farmers and simple commodity producing farmers to produce agricultural commodities for domestic and export markets. Commercial farms dominated the Upper Canadian export grain market, which allowed them to expand production through the acquisition of new land and investment in mechanized

production. Farmers up the Kitchi Sipi River, however, were isolated from the imperial grain market meaning that farms tended to be smaller because they were not able to accumulate less wealth from the 1800s wheat boom than other parts of so-called Upper Canada (Russell, 2012). Settlement overpopulation and growing demands for more farmland for farmers, to accumulate and pass on as inheritance to their children, led the Dominion of Canada to carry out another wave of land granting in so-called western Canada. This eased pressure on land competition, which allowed commercial farms to continue increasing their land holdings.

Capitalist accumulation in farming was arrested somewhat in the post-war period as Canada made permanent the war-time guaranteed loan programs, crop insurance, competitions laws, and public marketing boards that stabilized Canadian agricultural production in times of crisis. These public interventions increase the capacity of smaller, simple commodity producing farms to compete with the largest commercial farms. Neoliberal deregulation and marketization, however, unleashed the economic power of agribusiness corporations to capture the market and regulatory institutions, which accelerated the rate of capitalist accumulation in Canadian agriculture. This has resulted in a dramatic decline in the number of farms and increase in the average size of farms in Canada. Agrarian social differentiation, where large farms out-compete and absorb small farms, has allowed the kind of capitalist accumulation that resulted in the agrifood monopolies that exist today. This produced the commercial land grab phenomenon, which accounts for the accumulation of farmland around large-scale corporate farms in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, as identified in Chapter 4.

Settler simple commodity production

The primary production unit of agrarian society in Upper Canada, starting in the late 1700s, was the simple commodity producing family farm, which practiced different mixtures of subsistence and market production. The political-economic conditions of settlement in Upper Canada produced a hybrid class of family farms, which Marx (1867;1990, 934-5) identified as “simple commodity producers”. For Marx, private family farms are not their own social class distinct from labour, but a group of relatively-autonomous producers who sell directly to the market, outside of capitalist class relations. Bernstein (2010) explains that these farmers are essentially a group of peasants who produce to maximize their consumption, operating under the pre-capitalist logic of C-M-C’ (i.e. maximize commodity production to receive the most money possible to be able to purchase the most goods). They tend to exploit their own labour—rather than reducing wages and input costs like a capitalist—when their rate of profit declines as they compete in commodity markets (Bernstein, 2010).

Friedmann (1978) further elaborates that they operate under this logic as workers who own their means of production. Despite this relative autonomy from capitalist class relations, their reliance on markets to obtain goods, services, and income means that production is still valued as labour-time relative to the price of a commodity at the market. This fixes in convention a gendered division of labour, where men are primarily responsible for commodity production and exchange, while women and children dedicate their labour to subsistence production and the reproduction of the household

(Rotz, 2017; Russell, 2012; Friedmann, 1978). It also intertwined contradictory discourses of agrarian populist moral ideals of autonomy and just reciprocity, European-Christian social mores, and the white supremacist ideology of dominion without conquest (Rotz, 2017; Fullenwieder, 2018; Wolfe, 2006). Farming, as it has conventionally been done by settlers in Kitchi Sipi Valley, exists as an historical condition that results from the sudden introduction of large quantities of landed wealth into a global food regime of production and accumulation (Freidmann and McMichael, 1989). Wakefield—in his recommendations to the Colonial Office the state of the Upper Canadian economy—identified a “tendency of dispersal” where capitalist social relations were hindered by the escape of potential workers into relatively-autonomous land owners. He suggested instituting land prices and taxes to limit the access of poor settlers to land ownership, and retain a population of market-dependent workers necessary for industrial-capitalist development (Clarke, 2011; Weaver, 2003; Arrighi, 1994; Johnson, 1981).

Many family farms in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, on owned, leased, or squatted lands, supplemented their incomes with wage labour. The mix of subsistence, market, and wage labour production often depended on the environmental conditions, commodity prices, availability of roads and markets, as well as the kind of wage labour available (Russell, 2012; Friedmann, 1978, 2005; Kautsky 1899). Timber extraction was a common employment of landed settler men throughout Kitchi Sipi Valley, which could be combined with agrarian production to support a household. The capacity and success of family farms to support a household and accumulate wealth differed greatly

(Russell, 2012).

A gendered division of labour existed within the family farm as well. Men were initially the only ones who could purchase or be granted land¹⁵. They were also the only household members who could sell their labour for a wage. This relegated women and children to the task of subsistence production and unpaid social reproduction labour. The development of the settler colony in Upper Canada therefore relied heavily on the unpaid work of women and extracted surplus value from wage labourers. Yet, it was mostly owner-operator men, working to produce commodities for export, who managed to accumulate enough wealth to elevate their social position through commercial agriculture (Rotz, 2017; Russell, 2012; Weaver, 2003; Friedmann, 1978).

Settler farmers in the Kitchi Sipi Valley possessed different amounts of land and capital, ranging from nobles with inherited wealth to refugee peasants squatting on Crown Lands. Farms of all sizes sold wheat to the export markets with differing capacities, creating divisions between some producers who possessed larger amounts of land than they could work, and others who were unable to afford the costs of clearing land and purchasing essential farm implements. Poorer farmers therefore had to seek wage employment in timber extraction, rent land from other land owners, or work for richer farmers to provide a living for themselves and obtain more land to bequeath to their children (Clarke, 2011; Weaver, 2003).

Simple commodity-producing farms were ultimately in competition with commercial farms and each other. Competition for grain increased as the settlement

¹⁵This does not mean that women never owned land. For instance, dower laws enabled a woman to own the land of their deceased husband, father, grandfather, etc (Weaver, 2003).

population grew and imperial grain markets expanded during the early 1800s. Farmers therefore had to either rely more on subsistence production, wage income, or increase production to maintain the same quality of life. Farms with accumulated wealth were more able to reinvest their wealth in land purchases, mechanization, and hired labour. These disparities in capacity to expand production resulted in a differentiation within agricultural production between small-holder farms operating to maximize their standard of living through cooperative marketing and those transitioning to fully commercial production (Russell, 2012; Bernstein, 2010; Friedman, 1978).

Agricultural settlements and squats along the Kitchi Sipi River and its tributaries were relatively independent from the dynamics of the growing export wheat market, which established a certain degree of resilience to the imperial grain price volatility that occurred from the 1830s to the 1860s. This volatility was the result of good wheat harvests in England and the transition of the British Imperial economy from protectionist policies towards an internally free market system, which initially flooded imperial grain markets with wheat from other colonies. The policies that created the wheat boom worsened the economic conditions in Ireland that produced a series of devastating famines, which led to a rush of migrants to Upper Canada, putting even greater pressure on westward settlement expansion (Hobsbawm, 2010). Western portions of Kitchi Sipi Valley, with poorer soil conditions, were therefore significant sites of settlement among poorer Irish migrants (Russell, 2012).

This market volatility hampered the development of townships reliant on commercial wheat production such as those along the Magtogoek River. This produced

less pressure, relative to southwestern Upper Canadian townships, for settlers to push deeper into Algonquin-Anishinaabeg (Algonquin)-occupied lands and accumulate larger holdings to capture economies of scale and achieve commercial resilience. Markets in Kitchi Sipi Valley largely supplied food and forest products for the labour population of Wright's Town and Bytown, which linked capitalist accumulation among farms of the area more to dynamics of imperial timber prices rather than wheat prices. Though the two overlapped where demand for potash among southwestern Ontario wheat farmers during wheat high price periods would boost the revenues of timber operations during downturns in imperial timber demand (Russell, 2012). Isolation from imperial wheat markets and dependence on the dynamics of the timber market meant that farms on the Kitchi Sipi River tended to be smaller in size and more oriented towards simple commodity production.

Commercialization and industrialization of agriculture

Some settlers—like higher-ranking Loyalist officers—were granted large tracts of land for free and enjoyed favourable access to the market. This immediately resulted in the establishment of a class of commercial farmers producing wheat for imperial markets with prices secured through tariff protections. Some of these commercial farms were large enough to take-on cheap labour from the growing and mostly landless Irish and French Canadian communities. Farms that specialized in wheat production tended to be the largest ones. They had enough space to diversify their production, which enabled

them to market other commodities like dairy and beef when imperial prices declined (Russell, 2012).

Townships that were settled in Upper Canada first—mostly along the Magtogoek River—tended to specialize most in wheat production and contributed most to wheat exports. The small proportion of specialized commercial farms that produced wheat and livestock surpluses for export tended to be the largest ones located in older settlements, which benefited most from the period's policy of trade liberalization. Wheat production went through a series of booms and busts, which produced conditions for larger commercial farms to outcompete and absorb smaller ones. However, in-land portions of Kitchi Sipi Valley, such as Renfrew and Lanark, never reached the same high rates of wheat production as southwestern Upper Canada due to poorer climate and soil conditions. Commercial farms in the Kitchi Sipi Valley therefore also remained underdeveloped relative to townships on the St Lawrence (Russell, 2012).

Favourable export prices for wheat and timber collapsed in the 1860s as production in Great Britain, Turtle Island (North America), and Australia increased to match imperial demand. Average wheat yields in Canada West peaked in the 1860s, triggering a transition away from export wheat production towards oats, barley, and livestock. However, the wheat export boom period allowed merchants and commercial farmers to accumulate and re-invest surplus wealth in transportation infrastructure and agricultural modernization. The savings of commercial farmers capitalized the formation of smaller regional banks that would invest in factories oriented to produce farm machinery, reducing the colony's dependence on imported agricultural equipment and

retaining greater amounts of these profits in Upper Canada (Russell, 2012).

The second agricultural boom began in the 1860s shortly after the imperial wheat boom, when declining British demand for Canadian wheat was replaced by growing domestic demand for wheat, blockades on Russian wheat due to the Crimean Wars, and new grain and dairy markets in the U.S. The UK entered into the Canadian–American Reciprocity Treaty with the United States between 1854 and 1866 at the behest of merchants in Montreal who were angry about the repeal of the Corn Laws (Russell, 2012). This opened merchants to markets in the United States, which was experiencing poor harvests in the 1850s and a civil war in the 1860s (McCallum, 1980). However, the treaty ended in 1866 due to a rise in popularity for United States protectionism. High wheat prices the emerging imperial free market allowed commercial farmers and merchants in Upper Canada to accumulate enough capital to invest in agricultural modernization and expansion, as well as supplying the region’s growing market for financial credit (Russell, 2012; McCalla, 1993; Freidmann and McMichael, 1989; McCallum, 1980).

During this boom Turtle Island (North America) and Australia increased production enough to account for half of the world’s total wheat production (Hobsbawm, 1975). The second agricultural boom ended in the 1870s as global wheat production caught up with demand. This factor combined with the demographic crisis in so-called Upper Canada and a credit crisis in the UK due to land speculation in Australia and New Zealand, which caused a depression in so-called Ontario and the British Empire between 1873 and 1896 (Arrighi, 1994). The conditions that led to the Long Depression

in the British Empire between 1870 and 1914 and the decline in the peak of the British Empire in 1890 (Gordon, 2015; Hobsbawm, 1987), also consolidated power over global commodities markets into a hegemonic structure around competing European trade monopolies (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989).

Trade protectionism resumed between the United States and Canada in 1866, just as the global economic depression began. However, the short-lived reciprocity treaty, and accompanying economic boom, allowed farmers to import new machinery from New York that made it possible to develop extensive wheat, beef, and dairy production. Commercial farmers in Kitchi Sipi Valley began to specialize in dairy for butter and cheese production, which enabled expansion and consolidation of farmland in places like Lanark County (see Figure 20), and industrial development in towns along rail lines such as Perth and Carleton Place to supply growing international cheese markets in Great Britain (Russell, 2012; Menzies, 1994). Dairy production allowed agricultural settlement to expand into the wetlands of Prescott County, which dramatically increased revenues for a new wave of migrants from Quebec to the region (Russell, 2012). However, the rise of industrial dairy production came at the expense of the dominance of men over what used to be a woman-dominated source of revenues (Russell, 2012).




Figure 22 — Eastern Ontario Settlement Expansion, 1870 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on NativeLands.ca, 2022; Dean, 1998; Winearls, 1991; Harris and Matthews, 1987)

Trade protectionism in Canada and economic depression in the UK also encouraged investment from British banks into industrial expansion throughout commonwealth colonies, renewing the political-economic power of financial institutions of London over development in Ontario (Arrighi, 1994). Protectionism and depression also limited investment opportunities for Canadian merchants and industrialists, which the Government of Canada used to encourage timber barons like William Goodhue Perley and John Rudolphus Booth to focus investment into the construction of inter-provincial rail infrastructure from the Maritimes towards the newly conquered Province of Manitoba (Jenkins, 1996). Investors from Canada and Great Britain benefited from

the profitable gains to be made in expanding the agricultural frontier westward through the development of broad-scale wheat production made possible through agricultural mechanization and the advent of new rail and steamship networks (Russell, 2012).

The wave of domestic and British investment in the 1870s also coincided with the advent of the so-called second industrial revolution, which introduced steel, agrochemicals, electricity, and gasoline into agricultural production, along with the rise of modern agribusiness around the grain-livestock complex in the mid-western United States (Bernstein, 2010). This shifted commercial farming towards the adoption of scientific paradigms to agricultural production relying on extensive monocultures of single commodity or forage crops produced using imported soil amendments and gas-powered machinery (Clapp, 2015a; Friedmann, 2011; Fraser and Rimas, 2010; Hobsbawm, 2010; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). This made it possible for farmers to work more land, increasing the demand for farmland and pushing settlement further into forested and wetland parts of the Kitchi Sipi Valley (see Figure 21).




Figure 23 — Eastern Ontario settlement expansion, 1890 (Map made by Christopher Bisson based on Gordon, 2015; NativeLands.ca, 2022; Dean, 1998; Winearls, 1991; Harris and Matthews, 1987)

The availability of machinery, relatively cheap credit, and stable commodity prices enabled larger yields on increasing acreage. It also contributed to the specialization of production of a small number of crops, with an increasing proportion of production oriented towards livestock and dairy production (Clapp, 2015a; Weis, 2010). Farms that were able to invest in expanded production increased the value of their land holdings, which increased land prices making it further difficult for smaller farmers to compete (Fairbairn, 2020; Mitchell, 1975). Agriculture production in so-called Upper

Canada therefore developed along a differentiation between commercial producers maximizing production for imperial markets and smaller direct producers balancing subsistence and local market production. Differentiation between commercial and direct producers progressed and the consolidation of farmland ownership around large commercial farms.

Land shortages and territorial expansion

The specific pathway of intergenerational wealth accumulation within the family farm unit reflects British cultural norms around inheritance. Namely, wealth that was gathered in the family belonged to the father who would then bequeath it to one of his sons to distribute among a group of sons and possibly daughters. The size of early settler land grants included acreage that would be subdivided to bequeath to the owner's children and grandchildren, which became the expectation of subsequent generations. Settler families most often had more than one child, which required them to continually seek out more land each generation to bequeath to future generations (Russell, 2012). These land inheritance practices grew the demand for land to such an extent that required constant settlement expansion to keep up.

The availability of suitable land in Upper Canada for settlement began to decline in the 1850s, which produced a demographic crisis of land shortages by the 1870s. Population growth and demand for land among farmers boomed in the 1850s due to the combined forces of export wheat prices and the growth in the industrial labour population, increasing the westward, inland pressure for settlement expansion. New

settlements and squatting communities followed logging roads and the Rideau Canal (Gordon, 2015; Jenkins, 1996). This expansion was enabled by the collapse in Upper Canada land prices in the 1850s and the clear-cutting by the lumber industry, reaching further inland with the exhaustion of forests (Russell, 2012). The Crown further facilitated expansion by developing colonization roads into the difficult terrain and preparing surveys to accommodate new migrants east into the wetlands of so-called Prescott and Russell, and north and west of the Pasāpikahigani (Rideau), Missississippi, Bonnechere, and Madawaska rivers. However, the rapid rate of deforestation hampered settlement somewhat due to its devastating ecological consequences. The most dramatic of this devastation is evident with the extinction of the region's passenger pigeons and the creation of the Bourget Desert between Rockland and Casselman. The deforestation of areas with sandy and karst soil formations established a series of barrens resembling a desert, which was restored through reforestation efforts in the 1920s (Jenkins, 1996). The overpopulation crisis resulted in waves of outmigration and smaller family sizes and delayed marriage, which contracted the natural rate of settler population expansion along with settlement productivity and gross revenues from exports (Russell, 2012)

The desire for Confederation in 1867 was influenced, in part, by the desire to gain the powers to acquire greater territory to address the demographic pressures for settlement expansion, and the necessary infrastructure to support this. Expansion was initially focused towards northern Ontario through the Free Grant and Homestead Act of 1868. The Canadian Shield environment of northern Ontario was hardly amenable for

agricultural production. However, Canadian politicians were enthusiastic about the progress of agricultural innovation and simply assumed that the region's marginal capacity for agriculture would be addressed through advances in mechanization, plant breeding, and agrochemical soil amendments. This act granted between 100 and 200 acres of land in Renfrew, Muskoka, and Parry Sound to European settlers for free, deliberately excluding First Nations peoples. The grants required settlers to clear 15 acres within five years and construct a homestead. The land in these regions, however, proved to be inappropriate for extensive agricultural production despite the adoption of new technologies, and many of these settlers took on work in the lumber industry instead, which hampered development and did little to alleviate population pressures in Ontario (Gehl, 2017; Russell, 2012).

The Dominion of Canada acquired Rupert's Land in 1870 to relocate significant numbers of farmers from Ontario (Gehl, 2017; Russell, 2012; Knuttila, 2003; Hobsbawm, 2010). This was done to avoid out-migration to the United States or provoke political rebellion. They also legislated the Dominion Lands and Homestead Act in 1872, which expanded the territorial claims of the Dominion of Canada far to the west, into the Prairies where extensive grain production was possible with agricultural mechanization. This was accompanied by the National Policy of 1876, which placed protective tariffs on manufactured goods produced in Canada and coordinated significant public and private investment into the development of a rail network to transport grain back east for domestic consumption and export to international markets (Desmarais et al., 2016; Magnan, 2016; Knuttila, 2003). This triggered an exodus of

settlers from Ontario seeking access to viable farmland alleviating the population pressure on the province's land base, which was becoming depleted from overproduction. It also further enriched Canadian rail development companies, banks, and private investors—some of whom were problematically among the politicians who legislated the westward expansion and tendered contracts for rail development (Pasternak et al., 2021; Desmarais et al., 2016; Russell, 2012). The overpopulation crisis in Ontario extended settlement into marginal areas for agriculture and depleted the soil in areas of prime farmland. These factors contributed to the underdevelopment of farms in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

Public market protections for farmers

Many commercial farms used the wealth they accumulated from the wheat booms of the 1800s and reinvested it into dairy production. The cost of dairy production equipment required farmers to specialize and orient production for export markets to capture economies of scale. This made them less resilient to market shocks, meaning that farms could suddenly go bankrupt if dairy prices suddenly dropped. International dairy markets proved to be far more unpredictable than local markets, which made increased production a very risky endeavour for farms (Muirhead, 2014; Laidlaw, 2003; Giangrande, 1985; Scullion, 2006).

The Government of Canada, prior to the wartime period, engaged in some temporary measures to stabilize agricultural commodity prices coordinating with farmer-controlled wheat pools in western Canada (Magnan, 2016). The great depression and

wartime period reconfigured the international political economic order, and placed significant strain on the global food supply. A reliable supply of agricultural commodities was critical for the success of Allied Powers in Europe, particularly in defense of Great Britain from the threat of German invasion. This prompted the Government of Canada to reinstate and expand the institutions of both the National Policy and the marketing boards of World War I (Magnan, 2016; Knuttila, 2003). The negative impacts of war and market globalization on the rural Canadian society is evident in the number of farms that closed. The farm population in 1939 composed 32% of the population, which fell to 12% by 1961 (Scullion, 2006).

The trend of declining rural population coupled with the growing social reform paradigm circulating through policy networks emerging from the interwar period in Canada (Knuttila, 2003), pressured the Federal Government to consider intervening in certain agricultural sectors, like dairy production (Scullion, 2006; Skogstad, 1993). The Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations was formed in 1937 to investigate the errors in Canada's management of the depression. The Commission's Rowell/Sirois Report recommended that the Government of Canada redistribute federal tax revenues to the provinces through transfer payments. This federal equalization scheme was meant to develop an equality of public services in all provinces, including a greater role for public institutions in the management of the economy, just in time for Canada to enter another world war in 1939 (Knuttila, 2003). The post-depression enthusiasm for Keynesian public intervention in the Canadian economy emerged just as the world was again brought to war in 1939 (Owram, 1986).

The new managerial approach of the Government of Canada resulted in the creation of the Canadian Dairy Commission in 1966 (Scullion, 2006). The formal supply management quota system was introduced by 1974, which proved to be effective in stabilizing prices (Muirhead, 2014). However, the Federal Government would often bow to the pressures of market interest by decreasing the number of quotas issued, which would then be resisted by mass-farmer protest. These institutions were captured by private commercial interests through vertical integration with processing and retail corporations (Friedmann, 2011). Furthermore, supply management became organized around the distribution of production quotas, which would be assigned to a farm property. Quota could also be bought and sold through auctions. As dairy farms expanded so too did their need for production quotas, which placed an upward pressure on the price of quota at auction. The price of quotas and dairy operations grew together, larger and larger, and the corresponding price of dairy farm property appreciated as well. Supply management is an institution that functions as collective bargaining for farmers. It stopped the precipitous decline of smaller-scale dairy farms, but it also had the inadvertent effect of appreciating land values of many farms in Kitchi Sipi Valley, making it prohibitively expensive for new farmers to acquire dairy farmer properties or to purchase dairy quota. Nonetheless, it stabilized prices enough to avoid medium-sized farms from going bankrupt and losing their land (Larue et al., 2007).

Agribusiness in the Kitchi Sipi Valley

The development of commercial agriculture in Upper Canada throughout the 1800s

created a new market for agricultural inputs and machinery. The handful of companies in the area that produced the agricultural machinery eventually grew and consolidated to become large, multinational agribusiness corporations.

Agricultural machinery and agrochemical corporations expanded with increasing commodity production, with the most competitive corporations acquiring smaller ones concentrating ownership around a smaller number of vertically-integrated corporations primarily based in the United States (Bernstein, 2010; Arrighi, 1994). These corporations established regional production chains by the 1960s, which combined the “upstream” production of inputs and machinery with the “downstream” purchasing and distribution of commodities. Agribusiness consolidation of upstream and downstream operations developed farms, allowing corporations to accumulate wealth from both ends of the production chain. This consolidation allowed agribusiness corporations to establish monopoly control over Canadian input markets and the distribution of certain commodities by the 1970s (Bernstein, 2010; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). Neoliberal reforms since the 1980s have created market-oriented regulations and privatized public institutions removed the protections preventing the consolidation of agribusiness monopolies (covered at greater length in Chapter 7), which have come to be organized into the corporate food regime of today (ETC, 2015).

The price-cost squeeze and capitalist accumulation

Farms in the Kitchi Sipi Valley faced challenging economic conditions produced through a combination of agri-input and commodity trading monopolization, free market

globalization, and higher reliance on debt to capitalize expanded production. This combination squeezed the profits of farmers as purchased inputs, land, and machinery increased in price, while commodity prices steadily decreased, punctuated by moments of crisis-driven price volatility. Smaller farms selling into commodity markets, with more debt and less savings, were most at risk of bankruptcy due to sudden economic shocks. These conditions accelerated capitalist accumulation within agricultural production, where large farms absorbed smaller ones. This period of rural decline coincides with the advent of neoliberal reforms in Canada that began in the late 1970s.

A sudden interest rate hike in the early 1980s coincided with a time when farms in Canada and the U.S. were highly indebted and dependent upon purchased inputs and hired labour. This brought the farm debt loads beyond what many farms could afford. Canadian farms in the 1970s were already taking on an average of \$3.40 in debt for every dollar they earned in net income. This ratio increased from an average of \$7.42 in the 1980s and \$23.25 in the 1990s (Qualman, 2011). Monetary reforms in Canada and the U.S. also depressed export growth, commodity prices, and land values (Fairbairn, 2020). Family farms historically found resilience to sudden reductions in farm receipts by subsidizing production through the exploitation of their own labour (Bernstein, 2010). However, the cost-price squeeze amid growing agricultural specialization resulted in a wave of farm bankruptcies in the 1980s. The unserviceable debt load faced by many farms in Canada and the United States placed incredible economic pressure of farmers to exit farming, and caused significant mental health problems resulting in a growing wave of farmer suicides (Fairbairn, 2020).

Bankrupt farms were forced to sell their land to settle outstanding debts and liabilities, which were primarily sold to larger farms or real estate development corporations in the area at discounted prices to convert farmland to liquidity as fast as possible. The cost-price squeeze throughout the so-called United States and Canada accelerated the process of agricultural consolidation and farmland conversion to residential development in the last quarter of the 1900s by pressuring large farms to continuously expand at the same time as exiting small-farms provided a steady supply of cheap land and equipment (Fairbairn, 2020; Holtslander, 2015; Desmarais, 2013; Wiebe and Wipf, 2011; Qualman, 2011; Lohano and King, 2009; Mitchell, 1975).

The process of farm expansion, consolidation, and rationalization began to accelerate in the 1980s, which had the immediate impact of decreasing the income of farmers rendering them vulnerable to market and environmental crisis (Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Lohano and King, 2009). The provinces addressed the farm income crisis through a diversity of means. Quebec, Saskatchewan, and PEI imposed capital controls on out-of-province purchases of farmland, to prevent foreign farmland ownership and to stabilize prices. Ontario went in the opposite direction by refusing to regulate farmland consolidation, engaging in a “brutal sorting of winners and losers” among farmers (Sassen 2016, 90 in Rotz et al. 2017, 160).

Not all small farms exited production, but they became increasingly treated as peripheral to the mainstream agri-food value chain, resulting in “farm scale polarization” (Rotz et al, 2017; Akram-Lodhi, 2007). The average Canadian farm size increased from 500 acres in 1930, to 598 acres in 1991, and 788 acres in 2011 (Rotz, 2017; Smythe,

2015).

Farmers saw little improvement from increased investment, despite advice from public and private advisors to “modernize”, use innovative new machinery and inputs, and take on more debt to finance expansion to reach economies of scale. The price-cost squeeze phenomenon is visible in Table 8. The table shows average net cash incomes in so-called Ontario falling because the average operating expenses increased greatly as average cash receipts fell. It seems understandable, therefore, that the number of farms in so-called Ontario has dropped significantly since the late 1990s. Statistics Canada agricultural census data indicates that farms between 70 and 400 acres dropped, while the number of farms 400 acres remained relatively stable between 1996 and 2021 (see Figure 22).




Figure 24 — Farms in so-called Ontario by Acreage Categories, 1996 to 2021 (Statistics Canada 2022a)

Farm debt accumulation and consolidation persisted at a stable rate among larger, profit-maximizing operations, until the beginning of the Great Recession in 2007. Average net cash incomes reported by Statistics Canada appears at first glance to increase between 1996 and 2006, but this does not capture the precipitous decline in the number of farms across the country. If the balance between total cash receipts and operating expenses is averaged across the number of farms that reported to the Agricultural Census in 1996, then what we observe is a general stagnation in net cash income (see Table 8).

Table 9 - Net cash income among farms in so-called Ontario from 2001 to 2016

	2001	2006	2011	2016	Percent Change
Number of Farms Reporting [1]	59,728	57,211	51,950	49,600	-17.0%
Average Fuel Expenses [2]	\$6,989.50	\$10,188.07	\$11,010.21	\$12,195.73	74.5%
Average Fertilizer Expenses [2]	\$6,089.24	\$7,391.62	\$11,602.30	\$22,010.59	261.5%
Average Pesticide Expenses [2]	\$4,306.30	\$4,946.97	\$5,853.22	\$6,618.98	53.7%
Average Feed Expenses [2]	\$17,159.08	\$20,455.68	\$25,599.74	\$38,996.62	127.3%
Average Contract Labour Expenses [2]	\$6,052.05	\$8,944.36	\$10,384.32	\$17,528.03	189.6%
Average Hired Labour Expenses [2]	\$14,573.19	\$19,544.80	\$24,442.97	\$27,649.16	89.7%
Average Rental and Interest Expenses [2]	\$10,596.19	\$12,835.67	\$15,579.29	\$23,671.78	123.4%
Average Total Farm Operating Expenses [1]	\$131,081.68	\$154,583.60	\$191,836.49	\$257,861.65	96.7%
Farm Operating Expenses Averaged to 2001 Sample [1]	\$131,081.68	\$148,069.29	\$166,854.83	\$214,136.38	63.4%
Average Farm Cash Receipts [1]	\$111,932.98	\$119,705.76	\$133,496.54	\$143,781.81	28.5%
Farm Cash Receipts Averaged to 2001 Sample [1]	\$111,932.98	\$114,661.23	\$116,112.12	\$119,400.92	6.7%
Average Net Cash Income [1]	\$18,934.40	\$19,865.45	\$20,874.74	\$22,810.12	20.5%
1 - StatsCan 2022a - Table 32-10-0164-01					
2 - StatsCan 2022b - Table 32-10-0164-01 and Table 32-10-0136-01					

Many small and medium-size farms in competition with rapidly expanding corporate farms either could not acquire or service the credit necessary to invest in expansion. Farmers who took on debt to expand production often could not compete, meaning that they could either sell their land or face bankruptcy. An increase in farmland consolidation among large-scale farming operations is evident in Kitchi Sipi Valley. The number of farmland property owners in Ottawa, P.R., and S.D.G. remained stable at a rate of 0.15% from 2000 to 2009. However, from 2009 to 2017, the number of farmland property owners fell by 2.83% (see Chart 3 above). So-called Ontario, province-wide, experienced a 28.39% decline in the number of farms from 2000 to 2017. The relatively modest rate of decline in Kitchi Sipi Valley makes sense considering the importance of supply managed commodities that are produced in the area relative to the rest of the province (MacDonald et al., 2017).



Figure 25 - Major commodity prices in so-called Ontario, 2000 to 2017 (Statistics

The farms that grew largest in Kitchi Sipi Valley produced commodities that fluctuated the most between 2000 and 2017: soybeans and corn. All of the top-ten largest farms in the study area produce cereals, predominantly corn and soy for livestock feed. Six of these farms had additional dairy, beef, or hog operations. Half of them (5) operated an agribusiness enterprise like grain handling, livestock breeding, transportation, tile drainage, customs spraying, or retailing crop inputs. Kitchi Sipi Valley's largest agricultural corporations were able to diversify their operations to either distribute their risk of production across various commodities, or become integrated in the backward and forward linkages within the agrifood value chain.

The average farm size in southwestern Kitchi Sipi Valley grew at a rate of 6.5% from 2001 to 2011, which was slightly lower than for all of Ontario at a rate of 7.6%. However, Kitchi Sipi Valley had an average farm size of 264.4 acres in 2001 and 287.8 acres in 2011, which was larger than average farm sizes for all of Ontario, having 227.3 acres in 2001 and 244.6 acres in 2011 (City of Ottawa, 2016). These figures suggest that Kitchi Sipi Valley farms during this period were larger on average and increasing in size at a slower rate. Farms in so-called Ontario that owned between 70 and 400 acres decreased in number the most, whereas the number of farms below 70 acres or above 400 acres remained relatively stable in number (see Figure 22). These factors combined suggest that farmland consolidation in Kitchi Sipi Valley occurred less than elsewhere in so-called Ontario between 2001 to 2011. This is likely because of the

significance of supply managed commodity production in the region and the fact that the region was already significantly consolidated to begin with. Similar to Karl Kautsky's (1899) description of agrarian differentiation, the relative stability of farm numbers below 70 and above 400 acres suggests that social differentiation within agricultural production is deepening between locally-distributed, small-holder farms and large-scale, global value-chain integrated farms operating as a junior partner to multinational agribusiness conglomerates.

In this chapter I have detailed key historical moments that contributed to the commercial land grab which took place in periodic waves throughout the settler history of the Kitchi Sipi Valley through a process of settler-capitalist accumulation. The stolen Algonquin-Anishinaabeg land that was granted out to private settlers and timber barons, coupled with the neo-feudal order of Upper Canadian society, resulted in haphazard attempts at settlement in the Kitchi Sipi Valley that has produced a fragmented and inconsistent cadastral landscape. Many settlers engaged in land speculation, which made large sections of prime farmland idle for decades as farmers over-cultivated fields along the banks of the St. Lawrence River. Timber barons cleared the land and brought-in migrant workers who developed informal settlements on land owned by absentee landowners. They also developed a complex array of suboptimally-designed road and rail infrastructure that drew development away from ideal locations for settlement.

The Dominion of Canada attempted to rectify these planning and settlement mistakes through newly-formed planning and land management agencies that sought to transform the region into their vision of a national capital. Provincial and municipal

planning institutions attempted to rationalize infrastructure and land use. However, this pitted rural townships in the Kitchi Sipi Valley against the City of Ottawa, which hampered the orderly development of social services and public utilities throughout the region. Public programs encouraging suburban development led to urban sprawl into these rural townships, which diminished the farmland base of the region. As the City of Ottawa expanded settler farmers went through boom and bust cycles coupled primarily associated with the success of the timber industry. The largest commercial farmers in the region were able to use the profits from these commodity booms to invest in equipment necessary for export-oriented dairy production, which made many of the region's farmers vulnerable to global price shocks. This led the Government of Canada to establish supply management institutions that could provide them with economic stability. This stability allowed commercial farms in the Kitchi Sipi Valley to grow and consolidate into the handful of large-scale corporate farms that have accumulated the largest farmland holdings in the region.

Chapter 8: Financial dimensions of the long grab

The growth and consolidation of corporations in so-called Canada during the 1980s and 1990s put vast amounts of accumulated wealth into financial investment companies. Investment companies, flush with financial capital, used their wealth to further consolidate power over entire value-chain sectors and captured regulatory institutions to bring about policy reforms that were more permissive to financial accumulation. Neoliberal policy reforms re-oriented the Canadian state towards the private accumulation of wealth to encourage economic growth and create more jobs. Food production also consolidated into an agri-food value chain network of multinational corporations, domestic farmers, and regulatory institutions. The growth of financial services offered investors opportunities to bet on agricultural commodities, which eventually led to companies specializing in farmland investment. These developments took place just as the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 in the United States triggered a worldwide global financial crisis. The crisis produced an imperative among investment companies to hedge the risk of the portfolios they managed by purchasing securities based on real assets like real estate.

Farmland investment companies started accumulating farmland in so-called Canada just before the global financial crisis. They were initially capitalized by multinational investors but the financial crisis directed public equity funds like the Canadian Pension Plan to include farmland securities in their portfolios. Farmland investors have shown limited interest in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The region experienced a

small wave of farmland investments prior to and just following the Global Financial Crisis. The investment wave correlates with a dramatic rise in farmland property values, but it remains unclear if investment is causing it.

Neoliberal reform and regulatory capture

The late post-war period—in addition to increased farm debt-load—saw the rise of the U.S.-led wave of global political-economic reforms that would place private corporations, markets, and individualism at the centre of economic development policy (Harvey, 2005). Such neoliberal reforms in Canada involved trade liberalization, fiscal austerity, amalgamation, deregulation of competition laws, market-friendly re-regulation of finance, and regulatory capture. These reforms resulted in the formation of the agri-food global value chain, which has combined agribusiness, producer-interest groups, agri-finance, and public-sector stakeholders to dominate agriculture production and rural life in so-called Canada.

Farmer access to credit prior to neoliberal reforms in the 1970s

The Great Depression prompted discussion among imperial governments to establish ways to monitor and regulate international finance to prevent future depressions. In Canada, the depression bankrupted provinces and municipalities who attempted to provide public assistance without adequate powers to raise revenues by selling bonds or through taxation (Gordon, 2015). Many farms faced bankruptcy due to the lack of public subsidies or private credit to cover the losses of commodity price collapse.

Private lenders saw family farms as too small and risky of an investment, especially during a global economic downturn. The Government of Canada did not want to directly subsidize farm producers, so they instead opted to cover the credit and insurance gap by enlarging the existing Canadian Farm Loan Board through legislation of the the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act in 1934 to issue small loans to farms at lower interest rates as a lender of last resort. This also served to protect the private credit market from the systemic risk of mass-foreclosure on family farms, which could result in a credit crisis (Martin and Clapp, 2015). The Farm Credit Act established Farm Credit Canada (FCC) as a federal crown corporation that would lend-out a total capital reserve of \$8 million at a fixed statutory interest rate of 5%. The mandate of the FCC was gradually expanded through successive amendments in 1965 and 1968 to increase the diversity of financial services to cover a more diverse base of agricultural activities and even offer credit for off-farm business activities following the market rates for private credit. This expansion led the FCC to become a self-financing crown corporation that was no longer reliant on federal subsidies to operate (Hall, 2003; Cullingworth, 1984).

Post-war agricultural commodity boom

Global commodity prices experienced a boom in 1974, corresponding to land value inflation, and low interest rates initially made the farm debt load relatively manageable (Fairbairn, 2020; Magnan and Sulner, 2017; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Hall, 2003). This period of economic growth increased the rate of agricultural inputs and

capital purchases, which accumulated increased amounts of wealth among a growing and consolidating class of agribusiness corporations. The consolidation of agricultural input markets and vertical integration of the production chain around a shrinking number of corporations distorted prices upward due to price-setting powers that result from monopolistic market share (Knuttila, 2003).

Commercial banks began lending more to farmers in the 1970s, encouraging them to increase their profitability by taking out mortgages and loans to finance land and machinery purchases to boost production amid rapid trade expansion. Farm debt loads, therefore, increased and became a more wide-spread phenomenon (Fairbairn, 2020; Magnan and Sulner, 2017; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Qualman 2011; Hall 2003). Many farms also entered into futures contracts with vertically integrated value-chain corporations who exercised monopsony powers to determine production practices and assert both input and commodity prices on small farms. Farmer investment in specialized machinery and equipment further locked farms into specialized production that required the continuous, yearly purchases of crop inputs. It also reduced the diversity of farm production, which afforded a certain degree of resilience to shocks in global commodity prices. This led large-scale farms, with the exemption of supply managed sectors, to become dependent on public assistance programs and crop insurance to survive extreme weather or supply chain crises (McMichael, 2013; Fraser and Rimas 2010).

The Washington Consensus

The ascendance of U.S. capitalist hegemony in the 1990s over much of the world created the conditions for the emergence of a new global food regime, organized around the developmental economic interventions of the United States extending industrialized food production and agricultural products into emerging markets (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). This hegemony came about due to the fall of the Soviet Union and the influence of global financial institutions. The United States used its financial power to orient these institutions towards imposing the Washington Consensus of market-based reforms on countries seeking credit and financial assistance (Harvey, 2005). Canada, a major trade partner with the U.S., was especially influenced to adopt free market trade and investment policies, which would transform farming and land ownership in Canada.

The Washington Consensus was formed in response to the strong economic growth from U.S. investment in western Europe and east Asia meant that the U.S. was having trouble keeping pace with global economic expansion. To maintain the same kind of economic growth the U.S. had to either devalue the U.S. dollar to reduce their deficit and maintain exports, or impose protectionist policies that would prevent a reduction in its purchasing power and gold exports. Currency devaluation would hurt emerging economies and trade partners reliant on the U.S. to maintain a stable global currency for economic growth. Protectionism meant worsening the problem of overproduction, where U.S. corporations required access to more international markets to advance their growth (Brenner, 2003; Gowa, 1984).

President Nixon opted to support U.S. export growth by limiting the convertibility of gold for the U.S. dollar and reducing its value in 1971. The adjustments of the “Nixon Shock” lowered the value of the U.S. dollar, but came at the expense of growth and stability for emerging and re-emerging trade partners (Harvey, 2003; Gowa, 1984). The standard of living enjoyed by the U.S. became reliant on high commodity prices, especially for steel (Fairbairn, 2014; Bernstein, 2010; Harvey, 2005). Oil producing countries attempted to resist U.S. hegemony to direct investment and commodity prices worldwide. They imposed political-economic pressure on the U.S. in 1973 through an oil embargo, which suddenly spiked U.S. oil prices. Corporations in the U.S. and Canada panicked in response to this by laying off workers and increasing prices for their goods and services, causing the phenomenon of “stagflation” where unemployment and inflation increased at the same time (Bernstein, 2010; Harvey, 2005; Brenner, 2003; Gowa, 1984).

Neoliberal globalization

Right wing economists attributed the early 1970s moment of inflation to imbalances in the supply of money and market expectations of future inflation, and the stagflation phenomenon in particular to restrictions in the supply of labour, credit, and raw materials that resulted from organized labour power, financial regulations, and high oil prices. The ideological components of this reaction grew into a political movement that left-wing critics would identify as “neoliberalism” (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004; Brenner et al., 2010; Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Conceptually, neoliberals rejected the

political-economic paradigm of Keynesian international development programs like the Marshall Plan, which had come to somewhat weaken United States economic hegemony through the rise of political-economic competition in Japan and Europe (Knuttila, 2003). They ultimately sought reforms that involved monetary policies aimed at reducing the supply of money in circulation and a roll-back and reorientation of market regulations to bolster the power of business owners to increase supply of labour, credit, and raw materials to boost economic growth. These reforms were promoted through a narrative of “liberating” the skills and wealth of individuals and free enterprise from suppression from a supposedly overbearing and arbitrary state bureaucracy (Castree, 2010; Harvey, 2005). The failure of the Bretton Woods system and corporate capture of global financial institutions also led the IMF and World Bank to reorient their lending and development practices towards programs of monetary reform, export-focused development, trade liberalization, and government austerity (Harvey 2005; Arrighi, 1994).

The United States was enthusiastic to cooperate with the demands of financial capital in the 1980s. They reduced capital gains taxes, repealed antitrust policies, and eased aspects of the Glass-Steagall legislations, allowing commercial banks to engage in a greater number of riskier financial services like commodities speculation (Fairbairn, 2020; Arrighi, 1994). The U.S. Federal Reserve in 1979 triggered a wave of economic crises when the U.S. Federal Reserve Secretary Paul Volcker implemented what would become known as the “Volcker Shock” to limit the rate of price inflation in the U.S. economy. He increased the federal reserve rate (i.e. the interest rate for loans to private

banks) from an average of 11% in 1979 to around 20% in 1981 (Gunnøe, 2014). This move triggered an immediate economic recession by increasing the cost of borrowing money to finance economic expansion and increasing the interest payments of existing debt, which increased unemployment, reducing consumer spending and ultimately reversing inflation by impoverishing workers and farmers (Harvey, 2005).

The Government of Canada followed the United States by shifting from fiscal to monetary policy as the main mechanism to regulate economic growth. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney adopted neoliberal monetary policies in response to the stagflation crisis, increasing the Canadian interest rate from 4-5% in the 1960s to 9% by 1990 and back down to 4-6% throughout the rest of the 1990s. The interest rates charged by the Bank of Canada have since followed the dynamics of the U.S. Federal Reserve, while floating the exchange rate to manage U.S. demand on Canadian capital and exports against the advice of the IMF. Canada's real interest rate went from 4-5% in 1960 to 6% in 1980 and peaking in 1990 at 9% resulting in similar hardship for farmers and workers holding more debt and seeing less work or market opportunities (Whiteside, 2009). Neoliberal reforms of the 1980s enabled corporations to consolidate and centralize power in the United States, Japan, and Europe to such an extent that it became harder to find ways to further increase "shareholder value". Corporations in Canada became so bloated with financial capital and in need of tangible assets as securities that they leveraged their growing political-economic power to press for regulatory reforms under the premise of unleashing investment into new industries and markets (Fairbairn, 2014; Burch and Lawrence, 2013; Gunnøe, 2014).

Trade liberalization and supply management

Trade liberalization was a key area of neoliberal reform necessary to increase access to cheap international labour and resource extraction in countries without the labour and environmental regulations in rich countries. It was also necessary to increase access to markets to sell manufactured goods and investment capital. The Bretton Woods institutions and GATT of the 1940s had already facilitated the integration of global trade and enshrine private property rights in international law, which enabled the formation of a global food regime based on the “dumping” of agricultural surpluses from rich countries towards poor ones (Martin and Clapp, 2015; Margulis and Porter, 2013; Assies, 2009; Harvey, 2003; Arrighi, 1994). Canadian agricultural commodities, pulp and paper, and hydroelectricity exports significantly expanded under this regime along with Canadian financial investments abroad from the 1940s to the 1970s (Clapp, 2015a; Knuttila, 2003). However, international development augmented the productive capacity of emerging and re-emerging markets, establishing greater global market competition for export goods and investment capital by the 1970s, resulting in an economic crisis due to falling export growth (Knuttila, 2003). These global trade conditions resulted in a series of devastating oversupply crises in dairy markets that led farmers to successfully press the Government of Canada to establish systems of supply management (Martin and Clapp, 2015; Giangrande, 1985). However, these conditions also led rich countries and global trade institutions in the 1980s to demand new bilateral trade agreements and reforms to global trade agreements to facilitate greater liberalization to enable continued

trade expansion.

The Government of Canada struck the Macdonald Commission to conduct hearings and study the prospects of trade liberalization as a remedy to the economic recession that depressed the Canadian economy in the early 1980s. It released a report in 1985 that recommended greater economic integration with the United States through trade liberalization to enable greater economic development for Canadian industries. The Mulroney Government also insisted on a policy of agricultural expansion despite persistent market oversupply problems. These recommendations were opposed by unions, farmer groups, the federal liberal opposition, and the Peterson Liberal government in Ontario (Muirhead, 2014; Albo & Jensen, 1997). Despite this opposition, the Mulroney Government signed the Canada-USA Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) with the United States in 1988, which negotiated trade barrier concessions on agricultural products but kept import tariffs in place for supply managed commodities (Larue et al., 2007). A new round of multilateral trade negotiations began in 1986, called the Uruguay Round, to revitalize the GATT. This was aimed at establishing a new multilateral trade framework that could restore the economic stability of the Bretton Woods system. The purpose of the Uruguay Round was to get treaty partners to agree to reduce agricultural subsidies and trade barriers for agricultural commodities, and to establish agreements for the free flow of investment capital and access to global providers of financial services (Martin and Clapp, 2015; Fraser and Rimas, 2010). It created a framework in international law, called the Foreign Investment Protection Agreements, which defined private property in land as a commercial asset available for

international investment and compelled participating countries to protect foreign access to buy and sell land. This established private property as a legally-protected investment security that could be bought and sold internationally just like any other asset or commodity, undermining the ability of national and subnational governments to impose capital controls or prohibitions of foreign land ownership (Le Billon and Sommerville, 2017; Cotula, 2013).

The Uruguay Round transitioned the GATT into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and established a tribunal that would rule on trade disputes. The binding commitments accepted among 123 partners empowered the WTO's to enforce open trade relations, the free circulation of investment capital, and the international enforcement of property rights (Fraser and Rimas, 2010; Le Billon and Sommerville, 219). However, these principles were unevenly adopted among partners where many countries proved either unwilling or unable to ratify neoliberal trade reforms due to political and social movement resistance against the removal of agricultural subsidies and import tariffs. By the mid-1990s, the necessary international legal framework was in place to globalize land ownership, which could be used as a financial security as a component of new investment products that would be established through the deregulation of commercial banking in the United States and Canada that was taking place at the same time. But the realization of international land investment still required domestic ratification. The Mulroney and Chretien governments negotiated and ratified the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) replacing CUSFTA in 1994 at the same time as the WTO was officially established with the Marrakesh

Agreement (Wiebe & Wipf, 2011).

Trade liberalization was becoming political consensus in Canada by the early 1990s through structural adjustment policies that were imposed on debtor countries, and as neoliberal leaders gained power over advanced capitalist governments (Fraser and Rimas, 2010). Free market-oriented politicians had been in power in the Government of Canada since 1984 and Government of Ontario since 1985, and they have tended to comply with demands for free trade and investment policies except for supply managed agricultural commodities. However, trade partners challenged Canada through WTO mediation over continued use of agricultural price controls and import barriers through the supply management of dairy production, which pressured Canada to cut farm subsidies by 30%, end supply managed dairy exports, and create a tariff-exempt quota system for foreign access to Canadian dairy markets (Muirhead, 2014; Nogueira et al., 2012; Scullion, 2006). These reforms were accepted by a WTO tribunal in 1996 as consistent with Canada's treaty obligations (Muirhead, 2014; Larue et al., 2007).

Commodities that maintained supply management marketing systems (i.e. dairy, eggs, broiler hens, and turkeys) were relatively sheltered by existing institutional protections from the pressures to transform into an export-driven commodity value-chain and consolidate around dominant corporations leading their sector. However, this protection received significant challenges over the past two decades. In 1999 a trade dispute panel of the WTO ruled that milk boards are essentially government agencies because of their operation as crown corporations, and therefore constituted government

interference in global competition (Muirhead, 2014; Scullion, 2006). This ruling was made despite the 1996 GATT panel ruling that the over-quota tariff practice was consistent with Canada's obligations under the agreement (Muirhead, 2014; Larue et al., 2007). This time, the WTO ruled that the continuation of a public marketing board would result in a \$70 million for Canada. However, the Dairy Farmers of Ontario (DFO) proposed a scheme where global importers would submit contracts to the marketing board, which would then invite individual farmers to bid for them independently. This compromise maintained the original dairy export practices with a slight administrative adjustment handling dairy exports. The WTO withdrew its ruling against supply management two years later claiming that the U.S. and New Zealand failed to make a case why it violated trade rules. Both countries persisted in appealing the ruling, and at the end of 2002 the WTO finally ruled that Canada would have to cut its milk export program (Muirhead, 2014). Dairy farmers, despite losing receipts from international markets, were allowed to continue marketing through the supply management system.

Agricultural export growth expanded rapidly in 2000, particularly for Western Canada. The low value to the Canadian dollar in 2000 and growing middle class markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC countries) meant that demand was increasing globally for Canadian agricultural exports. This was despite a series of crises that depressed global export demand, such as the dot-com bubble, the terrorist attacks in the United States, depressed value of the American Dollar, growing energy prices, discovery of BSE in Canadian cattle, and the SARS epidemic of 2002 depressed global demand for Canadian goods and services (Carmichael, 2002). Export growth quickly

increased the value of the Canadian Dollar, which increased prices abroad. Energy prices also increased due to supply chain disruptions from Hurricane Katrina. This reduced demand and profits, particularly in Ontario-based manufacturing sectors. The Bank of Canada therefore reduced interest rates in 2004 in hopes of priming economic growth in Ontario. However, only the energy and real estate sectors maintained their growth (Goff, 2002; Quinn, 2004). These events transitioned the Canadian economy from dependence on manufacturing and technology to energy exports and the financial services industry to drive economic growth, which meant that the Canadian dollar and interest rates followed global dynamics of energy and financial markets (Oschinski, 2017). Selling agricultural commodities on the global market therefore became very unpredictable for farmers in Canada.

Continuous expansion of Canadian agricultural commodity exports required the opening of new markets in other countries. Global market expansion slowed in the early 2000s as political disagreements between trade partners at WTO negotiations grew over state involvement in agrifood markets. The Doha Development Round began in 2001 to establish international trade conventions on a variety of different matters. However, tensions emerged between partners desiring open access to foreign agri-food markets and those insisting on maintaining public subsidies and marketing boards. Canada's position on trade relations was mixed on the subject. They insisted on open grain and oilseed import regulations but defended their right to operate several supply management systems. Negotiations stalled throughout the 2000s and 2010s before effectively ending in 2018. Canada therefore shifted its focus in the late 2000s towards

expanding market access through bilateral and regional trade agreements, like the Canada-Europe Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Muirhead, 2014). The failure of economic multilateralism in the 2000s and 2010s dampened export growth since international trade relations remained uneven and incoherent relative to the open trade environment that agribusiness had come to rely on as part of their business strategies.

Canadian farmers were, therefore, not able to benefit from growing Chinese markets. China entered the WTO in 2001, which meant that Canada could rely on common trade policies and a mutually-recognized disputes resolution process. However, China continued to assert their national interests over open exchange in trade relations with Canada. Political instability in the Middle East, Nigeria, and North Korea, also produced an oil price shock that benefited energy companies in western Canada. The impact of these factors pushed the Canadian dollar to parity with the U.S. dollar and created a global food crisis in poor countries, which further stifled growth among exporters. The subprime mortgage crisis also hit the U.S. markets in late 2008, which triggered a series of financial crises around the world since global financial markets had investments in the wave of defaulting U.S. housing and mortgage companies. Global demand for agricultural commodities plummeted in 2009 as the U.S. and E.U. entered a period of economic recession (Clapp, 2019; Martin and Clapp, 2015).

Slow recovery in the U.S. economy, conservative monetary policy in China, European economic recession, and high dollar value decreases global commodity and energy demand. The Canadian domestic economy soon began growing again.

However, this was supported by public stimulus, consumer debt, and a recovering housing market, but exports growth remained low. Droughts in Canada, Australia, and Russia further depressed the agri-food sector, despite growth in commodity prices. In 2011, the growth of meat-eating middle class markets in BRICS countries as well as the Arab Spring and the Libyan war increased energy and commodity prices back to 2008 levels. This resulted in a sudden but short increase in economic growth. The decade of commodity price volatility prompted large-scale farmers and commodity traders to change their marketing practices. Farmers, processors, and distributors were advised to take on “food hedging” practices, which entailed greater use of futures contracts on their own production as well as the purchase of derivatives on other commodities. Farmers could theoretically use the financial gains from one commodity sector to buffer global price shocks in the agricultural commodities (Pett, 2011; Lamphier, 2011; Lam, 2011; Shufelt, 2010).

Export demand in the U.S. and E.U. and global energy prices began to recover and stabilize by 2013, which improved the market prospects somewhat for farmers in Canada. Western Canada was growing at a rapid pace due to high oil prices, while most of eastern Canada struggled to access global export markets. The Bank of Canada decided to rely on the decreasing value of the Canadian dollar value, coupled with increasing U.S. export growth, to promote growth while preventing inflation, rather than through adjustments of interest rates. The Government of Canada focused on promoting trade diversification through free trade agreements with E.U. and Pacific countries to promote export growth for eastern Canada to keep pace with western

growth. However, the oil boom proved to be short-lived as expansion of unconventional oil extraction created a problem of oversupply in global energy markets, which made western Canada especially vulnerable given the high energy prices needed to afford tar sands oil production. This was counteracted by OPEC countries in 2016 who agreed to cut oil production to stabilize prices, which managed to keep agricultural commodity prices relatively stable for the next few years (Isfeld, 2016; Shmuel, 2015; Isfeld, 2014; Isfeld, 2013). Canadian farmers began in 2000 with a stable currency and optimism about market expansion. However, Canadian agricultural exports ultimately struggled due to a series of structural political-economic reforms and crises that took place between 2000 to 2016.

Fiscal austerity, privatization, and deregulation

The Government of Canada and the provinces attempted to decrease public spending and tax rates in the 1980s out of the desire to simultaneously reduce sovereign debt and free up private wealth for investment. The Mulroney Government's reduction in public spending was paired with a series of tax reduction and shifting measures. Federal corporate income taxes were dropped from 36% to 28%, and the income tax base was expanded to lower-earning citizens and businesses. Tax exemptions were replaced with tax credits and capital cost and dividend allowances were reduced. The 13.5% Manufacturers Sales Tax on industrial production was shifted onto consumers through the implementation of a 9% Goods and Services Tax, which was later reduced to 7% and eventually integrated in some provinces in 1996 into the Harmonized Sales

Tax. These tax reforms ultimately resulted in a reorientation of federal revenues from corporate profits towards individual incomes and purchases, which widened economic inequality and reduced the redistributive capacity of the Federal Government (Gunnoe, 2014; Banting & Myles, 2013). The Chretien and Martin governments that followed focused their efforts on trade liberalization and monetary policies to augment export growth, which they hoped would increase tax revenues enough to balance the federal budget. These trends of fiscal austerity on the federal level continued past the neoliberal reforms of the Chretien and Martin Liberals, which increased in severity with the Harper Government in 2006 (Whiteside, 2009).

Public spending on agriculture programming was slashed, reducing subsidies to commodity transportation and price stabilization programs (Martin and Clapp, 2015; Sommerville and Magnan, 2015; Knuttila, 2003). Canada's public plant breeding program was scaled-down and integrated into public-private partnerships (P3) arrangements with agribusiness (Whiteside, 2009). Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) plant breeders began conducting only the early stages in crop improvement and variety registration, with agribusiness purchasing licenses on AAFC to finish and market them to farmers. This created an incentive to prioritize crop varieties that were best suited for agro-chemical-based production, limiting or delaying the dissemination of more cost-effective and ecologically-appropriate varieties like hairy canola or midge-tolerant wheat (Giacomoni, 2019; Prudham, 2007).

Government support for farmers also went through a period of transformation in the 2000s. The Government of Canada and the provinces and territories agreed in 2000

to the creation of a new Agricultural Policy Framework whose funding would be split 60:40 between the federal and provincial governments. However, the framework was compelled to conform to the permitted practices detailed in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The framework therefore made adjustments to laws governing advance payments, income stabilization, crop insurance, and disaster funds to focus on farm income stabilization through means-tested compensation for revenue losses rather than guaranteeing specific commodity prices (Rotz et al., 2019; Hedley, 2007).

One of the legislative changes addressed Canada competition laws as a barrier to growth. The Competition Act was amended in 2002 to allow private parties to bring cases before the Competition Tribunal for review. It also changed the criteria for how anti-competitive behaviour is determined. The Tribunal shifted its focus from considering criminal monopoly practices to an assessment of “the Abuse of Dominant Position” (i.e. if a company with dominant market share is effectively controlling a product or geographic market). This amendment was made to bring Canadian competition laws in alignment with multilateral agreements and the regulations of major trading partners, particularly the U.S. The Competition Act was further amended in 2010, with very little public consultation, to implement several recommendations made in a report of the “blue ribbon” Competition Policy Review Panel. The Amendment weakened the criteria for “adverse impact on competition” and removed previously prohibited practices, like price discrimination, price maintenance, and predatory pricing. It also followed U.S. laws by establishing market share tests to determine if collusion cases would be treated as civil or criminal law. Changes to Canadian competition laws in the early 2000s ultimately

proved ineffective at curbing monopolization and promoting competition (Day et al., 2009; Duhamel, 2003). In fact, multinational corporate consolidation in the agri-food value chain increased significantly over the past two decades. Concentration among the top four seed companies doubled, from 32.5% in 2000 to 65% in 2013. The top four global farm machinery companies also doubled their market share from 32.8% in 2000 to 64.9% in 2013 (Fuglie et al., 2011; ETC, 2015).

Federal fiscal austerity pressured provinces to also impose neoliberal reforms. The Rae Government began in 1990 with high deficits and slowing economic growth due in significant part to the monetary and trade liberalization policies of the Mulroney Government, which hurt the Canadian manufacturing sector. They first implemented rent increase restrictions, increased social assistance and housing allowances, and even promoted limited reforms aimed at First Nations self-government. However, the devolution of social services from the Federal Government and finance sector threats to downgrade Ontario's credit rating undermined the Rae Government's capacity to finance greater deficit spending. The Harris Government that followed in 1995 imposed an even stricter program of fiscal austerity that they called the "Common Sense Revolution". The Harris Government implemented an aggressive program of fiscal austerity and tax reduction. They reduced social assistance, slashed public sector employment and wages, privatized highways, cut spending for urban infrastructure development, devolved social programs to municipalities, and amalgamated local governments (Oschinski, 2017; Gordon, 2015).

In the mid-1990s the Harris Government made changes to the Planning Act and

structure of municipal governments in Ontario, in the interest of offloading the expenses of planning, social services, and public infrastructure onto municipal governments. This effectively established a pathway for developers to circumvent the decision-making of municipal councils, planning departments, and adjustment committees. The Harris Government amended the Planning Act in 1996, adding “Section 40” which made guarantees to developers to have their applications seen by municipalities within 90 days. If an application was not seen by the municipality within 90 days—down from 180 days—then developers would be allowed to bring it before the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) for consideration, who was notorious for siding predominantly with developer private property rights over municipal concerns for the public interest (Pagliaro, 2017; Kaplinsky, 2006; Reevely, 2002; Wellar, 2000; Toronto Star, 2000; David, 2000).

Ontario had 812 municipalities in 1996, which was reduced to 447 by 2002. However, despite reducing the number of elected officials by 23%, the amalgamation increased municipal employment by 39% by 2011. The Regional Municipality of Ottawa—Carleton (RMOC) was established in 1969 as a regional municipality composed of Ottawa, Cumberland, Gloucester, Goulbourn, Kanata, Nepean, Osgoode, Rideau, Rockcliffe Park, Vanier, and West Carleton. The 1999 City of Ottawa Act consolidated the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC) municipalities and the Township of Cumberland into the City of Ottawa (Gordon, 2015).

The amalgamation centralized municipal services and land use planning, which has created political-economic tensions in city government between rural, suburban, and urban interests (Gordon, 2015). The reforms that enacted amalgamation

additionally made municipalities able to access municipal bond markets for credit and shouldered them with the responsibility of funding public transportation, housing, and many social services (Gordon, 2015). The Harris Government then initiated a process of amalgamation in the late-1990s that resulted in the dissolution of independent “lower-tier” counties, which was replaced by a series of new larger “upper-tier” municipalities and city governments. The decentralized Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC) was shaped into the much more centralized City of Ottawa. Numerous committees of adjustment and planning departments, responsible for deciding on the approval of development applications and rezoning requests, were consolidated and streamlined around the new city and upper tier municipal governments without allocating more funding or staff. This increased the number of cases seen by the committees, extending the amount of time it took to consider applications (Pagliaro, 2017; Gladstone, 2001).

Municipal reforms were also accompanied by reforms to the province’s laws governing the recognition of private property rights. Ontario merged private properties recognized under the Land Registration Act into the Land Titles Act, and started digitizing property records. It also established a public-private partnership with a corporation called Teranet in 1999 delegating the management of land title records to the corporation. The majority of private property titles in Ontario were digitized by 2010, at which point the province sold its stake in the partnership (Wood, 2014). Second, property values prior to 2000 of all properties in Ontario were assessed directly by municipalities for property tax purposes, which resulted in uneven and inconsistent

values. In 2000, legislation was passed mandating the newly-created Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) to conduct property valuation for the entire province. The maxim that informed the property valuation became the land's "highest and best" use. This means that land became valued according to the permitted land use that has the highest market value. The Act also allows the Ministry to establish regulations that determine the classification of different properties, including what criteria determines the classification of farm properties. In 2000, the Assessment Act was amended through the Continued Protection for Property Taxpayers Act to reserve the assessment of property values for farm properties solely to components that are used in agricultural production the Assessment Act and an amendment to the Municipal Tax Assistance Act in 2006 allowed municipalities to decide if certain farms properties over five acres can be exempt from taxation, and to allow for property value increases to be phased in over a period of three years. Furthermore, amendments—reminiscent of the spirit of the original Baldwin Act of 1849—granted local governments the power to establish their own corporations, impose new taxes, control over the provincial housing development fund, and privatized programs and operations without provincial approval (Kaplinsky, 2006; Brennan, 2001; St. Pierre, 2001; Hall, 2001; Shannon, 2001). Effectively, the municipal and property reforms of the late 1990s and early-2000s increased the powers and autonomy reserved for municipal governments to fund and determine their own operations.

Corporate capture of land use regulatory institutions

Government austerity also resulted in even greater deference towards the real estate industry to assert its private interests over housing develop as if it were the public interest. The Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA), the Ontario Municipal Board, the development industry, and local, provincial, and federal governments, and government collaboration made real estate broker interests a dominant force in the governance of property markets (Roseman, 2006; Schiller, 2001). Municipalities and local civil society groups also began to rely more on the collection of “Section 37” community benefit charges, development fees, tax-free stock option donations, and increasing the property tax base to finance their operations (Pagliaro, 2015; Roseman, 2006). The provincial politicians made patronage appointments to the OMB for their colleagues (Benzie, 2003) and rotating professional networks between municipal planning departments, board membership, and development corporations resulted in a tight epistemic network between the real estate value chain and regulatory institutions (Gray, 2001). Municipal and provincial politicians also accepted political donations from the owners of real estate development corporations, and vehemently defended their interests in city council in return (Reevelly, 2017).

This permitted accelerated growth and consolidation for large real estate developers such as Campeau Corporation, Minto Corporation, Cadillac-Fairview, Costain Limited, and the Calgary-based Walton International (Holtslander, 2015; Smythe, 2015; Cullingworth, 1984). This wealth and capacity was quickly extended into political influence as development fees became important revenues for municipal

governments, and campaign donations became important for councilors looking to win municipal and provincial elections. Planning and development professionals also moved between employment with development corporations, municipal planning departments, regional planning authorities, and the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). This produced an epistemic network of officials and professionals that would make the corporate interests of private developers hegemonic within Ontario's institutions regulating land use planning resulting in the phenomenon of "regulatory capture" decreasing the effectiveness of regulatory institutions as regulated parties exert political-economic influence over them (Maclean, 2016; Carpenter and Moss, 2014; Kruger, 1974).

The OMB tended to side with the demands of real estate developers—especially as the province asserted policies to increase the housing supply—but subdivision plans were often overturned in cases where they would cause nuisance to private property owners. This indicates the emergence of an inherent tension to suburban development where the interests of real estate developers would contradict and undermine those of the private property owners dwelling in the suburban subdivisions (Chipman, 2002). Residential subdivision proposals in the peri-urban community of Manotick in 2009 proved how weak provincial land use laws and regulations were to prevent urban sprawl into farmland properties.

Minto Communities, an Ottawa-based development corporation, purchased a large area of farmland for the construction of 1,400 housing units. Ottawa rejected the proposal citing the lack of infrastructure available to service the new neighborhood. Minto brought the case before the OMB to argue that the City of Ottawa was

overstepping its authority to impose urban boundary restrictions that could limit the city's housing supply (Rupert, 2009; Jaimet, 2009). The OMB ruled that the city's rejection of the development was not reasonable and overturned their decision. The City of Ottawa responded by appealing a Divisional Court appeal to overturn the OMB decision. However, the court ruled that the meaning of "having regard to" was too weak to compel the OMB to head the decision of Ottawa City Council or any provincial policy statement (Rummery, 2009). Large-scale developers were therefore able to have developments approved by bringing cases before the OMB, which were indeed required to consider provincial policy statements or watershed conservation authority objections in their rulings (Adami, 2013; Dare, 2009; Courtney, 2009).

This enabled new forms of land speculation based on real estate development. For instance, the Firestone family made a substantial profit by purchasing cheap farmland in Kanata, lobbying to have it rezoned for commercial development, marketing the location as a new centerpiece of suburban activity, and then selling it in 1990 to investors looking to construct a large entertainment venue and establish a professional hockey team to play in the NHL for Ottawa (Gordon, 2015).

Commodities speculation and market instability

The liberalization of commodity markets and integration of producers, distributors, processors, retailers, financiers and regulators over the management of the Canadian food system has oriented agriculture towards the objective of value creation. Forwards

contracts and the expansion and consolidation of commodity distribution corporations have locked commercial farms into producing for global exports (Knuttila, 2003). The coordination of commercial and financial actors within the agrifood sector has also resulted in corporate capture over regulatory institutions and directed them towards protecting profit growth. This means that the food production chain has become focused on benefiting the interests of financial investment companies.

Commodity trade liberalization and the global food regime

The liberalization of agricultural commodities markets during the neoliberal period led to common usage of futures contracts between farmers and commodity distributors. These contracts secured farmer participation in global commodity markets. They would serve as the mechanism of consolidating and globalizing commodities trading. Commodity traders operating through the Chicago Board of Trade since the mid-1800s began the practice of entering into contracts with farmers that stipulated how much of an agricultural commodity a farmer would deliver at the end of a season for a guaranteed price, called “futures contracts” and variations on this called “forwards” and “options” contracts. Futures, forward, and options contracts could then be bought or sold by different financial companies based on investor predictions on what commodities will perform well in different regions, effectively betting on the success of the growing season. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission in 1974 loosened the rules over position limits and the requirement to trade through approved exchanges, which meant that farmers in Canada could get better prices at U.S. exchanges when prices

were high for commodities that were not regulated by Supply Management or the Canada Wheat Board (Fairbairn, 2020; Martin and Clapp, 2015b; Clapp, 2015a; Clapp, 2014). This put pressure on Canada to deregulate commodity trading to achieve higher trade revenues.

Commodities that were not regulated and locations that did not regulate commodity prices—most importantly in the United States—saw the emergence of multinational commodity trading corporations: ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis-Drefus, which have all acquired smaller private trading firms to become the dominant actors in global commodity trading today (Clapp, 2015b). Corporations also emerged and consolidated around the production of agricultural inputs and machinery, which remained a largely unregulated market in Canada. Innovations in inputs and mechanization have long been a reliable avenue for profitable investment in agricultural production. The deregulation of commodity futures, forwards, and options trading in the U.S. and the re-orientation of trade policy towards free market production in Canada combined to accelerated the rate of corporate consolidation in Canadian agriculture, which drew the interest of global financial capital who could find high rates of return on investments in upgrading the entire agricultural “value chain” towards capital-intensive expansion (McMichael, 2013; Harvey, 2005). The deregulation of price supports on agricultural commodities in the United States further enabled the practice of commodity speculation, especially in wheat, corn, and sugar. Large-scale grain traders like Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus were able to increase their profits by offering financial derivatives to investors on the movement of commodities (Fairbairn,

2020).

Agri-finance and commodity index funds

Banks and financial investment firms also increased the practice of investing in and offering credit for the trading of futures, forwards, and options contracts. They created new financial products that bundled a variety of different futures derivatives in agricultural, mineral, and fossil fuel commodities of different risk profiles into portfolios called “Commodity Index Funds” (CIFs). CIFs allowed investors to enjoy the financial benefits of investing in commodities without having to actually purchase, store, and distribute them (Clapp, 2015a; Holtslander, 2015). CIFs are “over-the-counter” (OTC) investments, meaning that they can be bought and sold directly between financial investment companies rather than through centralized and monitored stock exchanges (Clapp, 2014). The unregulated practice of commodity trading practice was encouraged by organizations like the World Bank, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), as a way to promote investment in agriculture worldwide even though speculative investment practices had high transaction costs and produced price volatility making it virtually impossible for smaller-scale farms to participate independently in global markets. This has led to a global increase in and dependency on commodity trading for the distribution of agricultural commodities, resulting in an overall increase in the price of food worldwide and corresponding interest in farmland investments (Fairbairn, 2020; Clapp and Isakson, 2018; Martin and Clapp, 2015; Clapp, 2015a; Clapp, 2014; McMichael, 2012).

Global commodity market instability

Farmers in the Kitchi Sipi Valley who sold commodities to export markets became more integrated into global value chains. Canadian farmers, as a result, experienced a great deal of unpredictability due to commodity price volatility resulting from trade liberalization of the 2000s and 2010s, which transformed commodity marketing practices. The outgoing Clinton government, in 2000, removed regulatory restrictions on over-the-counter derivatives trading for US commodity futures trading. Contracts between farmers and distributors over a season's anticipated crop could now be bundled together with a vast array of different kinds of securities and traded by investment funds outside of regulated asset exchanges (Clapp, 2019; Martin, 2015; Clapp, 2014; McMichael, 2013; Burch and Lawrence, 2013). Canadian regulations quickly changed to be coherent to the deregulated commodities markets in the U.S. and E.U (Martin and Clapp, 2015).

The Canadian economy, overall, was transitioning from one that is driven by manufacturing in Ontario towards energy production in Alberta (Oschinski, 2017). Global political-economic changes that took place over this period happened in three phases in terms of how it impacted agricultural commodities markets. The first phase was a period from 2000 to 2008 that was marked by high volatility in global commodity prices for Canadian exporters due to the crisis caused by the deregulation of U.S. commodity trading and Canada's uneven development into a predominantly energy-exporting economy. The second phase was a period of volatility in global commodity

prices due to the global financial crisis and uneven economic recovery among different export markets from 2008 to 2013. The third phase was a period of slow commodity export growth and price volatility for farmers in Canada due to geopolitical instability in energy production. Farmers and commodity traders in Canada, over the course of these three phases, were pressured by the political-economic crisis to increase trade revenues and integrate commodity speculation practices into farming operations. This had the effect of increasing the financialization of actors within Canadian agri-food value chains at the level of marketing and exports and increasing the control of dominant agri-food corporations over the operations and regulations of Canada's agri-food industry.

Agrifood value-chains and regulatory capture

Throughout Canada, multinational agri-food corporations reached historically unprecedented scales of production and distribution by 2000. Distribution companies like Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland Company, Nestle, and Pepsi and agri-input companies like Bayer, Dupont, and Monsanto had already attained enough market share collectively to protect them from price competition (ETC Group, 2015).

Value chains and regulatory modernization

Continued growth in agricultural production required a new strategy that involved the organization of networks among industry-wide production chain "stakeholders" in conjunction with regulators to collaborate to promote private investment and product

development to achieve growth targets for the entire sector. Federal and provincial governments convened round tables and working groups of handpicked industry experts to consult on how to “modernize” existing regulations to encourage investment.

The practice of organizing industries and regulators together for industry-wide advancement was an idea that had become prominent in government in the 1990s. The concept of an industry “value chain” came about in business strategy discussions in the 1980s with a focus on creating networks of economic relations between “business units” to coordinate operations to maximize sector-wide profits (Porter, 1985). Scholarship on the regulation of value chains has come to prescribe the participation of public and civil society “stakeholders” into the operation of value chains to assist in the private delivery of “corporate social responsibility” at the same time as maintaining global economic competitiveness (Mayer and Phillips, 2017). Rapid technological advancements are seen as an important component to value-chain advancement, which results in lobbyist pressures on regulators to create a “competitive regulatory environment” to attract private investment. International conventions around food and hunger helped construct a discourse surrounding the necessity to defer regulations to corporate actors and fast-track regulatory approvals for new biotechnology and agrochemicals under the aegis of a renewed neo-malthusian “feed the world” discourse that misconstrued factors of global food insecurity to emphasize technical and private investment problem, rather than one caused by the inequalities of profit-driven distribution (Rissing, 2021; Peng, 2018; Chopra, 2015). Regulation over agricultural and food production therefore increasingly focused on negotiating rather than enforcing compliance, and regulatory

roles are delegated through “alternative service delivery” arrangements with private value chain actors (Karlsen, 2018; Ponte & Sturgeon, 2014; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005).

Monopolization and regulatory capture

Canadian governments and industry collaborated through the formation of new value chain networks to develop strategies that enshrined “value creation” among agribusiness stakeholders as the public interests. This kind of value chain capture of regulatory institutions altered public policy to allow corporations to continue consolidating market share and subordinate upstream producers as junior partners and middle managers in the value chain. Agribusiness effectively managed to monopolize farmer access to inputs and use futures contracts, technology use agreements, and farm credit to absorb farmers into larger stakeholders along the value chain (Bernstein, 2010). The integration of financial investment companies in agriculture that developed since the 1980s has allowed investment companies to begin buying farmland as an investment security. New farmland investment securities for global investors to add to their investment portfolios as a hedge on the risk of other securities.

Financialization and the global land rush

A series of political-economic crises beginning in the mid-2000s disrupted the orderly development of free market trade and finance around the world. The 2007 global food crisis, the 2007 global energy price crisis, the 2008 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, and

the E.U. sovereign debt crisis all combined to cause a global economic recession that persisted until 2009. Financial investors responded to this crisis by seeking more secure investments to offset the risk of riskier ones, resulting in a global land rush. They specifically targeted agricultural commodities and various kinds of real estate (Fairbairn, 2020; Clapp, 2019; Harvey, 2010). Specialized investment firms began purchasing and securitizing farmland as a financial asset for a growing number of public and private equity funds with vast amounts of wealth to deploy. Farmland investment companies of different sorts have had some success with farmland assetization in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The results of the farmland ownership survey that I conducted, however, suggest that they did not accumulate very much farmland in the study area.

Early farmland investment

Before the global land rush began in 2007 farmland ownership by financial investors was rare. Banks in so-called Canada have given loans to farms since the early 1800s, which helped elevate merchant creditors as accepted members of the neo-aristocratic Family Compact that ruled over Upper Canada. Farm mortgages offered by insurance companies were a common option for farmers who sought to access credit to purchase a farm property up until the 1930s when the Great Depression drove down land prices dampening the desire of creditors to invest in farm properties (Fairbairn, 2020; Ouma, 2016; Weaver, 2003; Clarke, 2001; Green, 1933). The Government of Canada began facilitating guaranteed loans to farmers through Farm Credit Canada (FCC) in the 1930s, which disciplined the power of private banks and insurance companies to

influence farmland ownership and production choices. (Martin and Clapp, 2015). There was periodic short-term interest among speculative investors during the post-war period in the U.S. to profit on farmland price volatility during periods of supply chain and credit shocks (Fairbairn, 2014). During the 1970s tax-exempt real-estate investment trusts (REITs) and Timberland Investment Management Organization (TIMOs) emerged in the United States due to the repeal of antitrust policies between the 1960s and 1980s to fill the rapidly expanding niche for property and resource investments and asset management (Fairbairn, 2014).

A niche sector of investment managers in the 1980s became increasingly involved in the management of foreclosed farm properties on behalf of insurance companies. They started promoting farmland and timberland assets to private and institutional investors (Fairbairn, 2020). In Britain lenders invested in farmland to lease-out to tenant farmers to establish a regular revenue stream of rental fees, and investors and owner-operator farmers alike became increasingly interested in profiting off of the sale of farmland after its appreciation in value (Fairbairn, 2014). Farmland investment ultimately emerged in both the financial sector as an extension of property market boom, and out of the agribusiness sector as part of the commodity market boom and increased rent-seeking behaviour (Fairbairn, 2014). Large-scale, highly-capitalized farming corporations in Canada in the 1990s also became interested in the ownership of farmland to rent-out to other farmers (Desmarais et al., 2015). Both finance sector and agribusiness investment activities converged resulting in the financialization of farmland in the United States, Canada, and Britain beginning after the neoliberal reforms of the

1970s (Fairbairn, 2014; Krippner, 2005).

The specific practices of farmland investment began in the 1980s and 1990s and were established to manage the farm-debt and housing crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s. The farm-debt and housing crisis of the time prompted the U.S. government and the financial sector to expand the range of affordable mortgage options available for home and farmland ownership (Harvey, 2010; Harvey, 2005). The drive to profit from lending subprime mortgages grew throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s creating the economic conditions for a speculative bubble that would face a sudden price correction in 2007, which reverberated throughout financial markets around the world.

Global economic crisis and the land rush

The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 is what triggered the start of specialized farmland investment companies in so-called Canada focused on purchasing farms to market as a novel financial security (Desmarais et al., 2015). The causes and components of the Global Financial Crisis are ultimately what guided the emergence of farmland investment and shaped its practices. Corporate consolidation rich countries in the early 2000s produced the conditions in Canada for agricultural consolidation to take place as well. First, the Dot Com Bubble collapse resulted in the sale of JDS in 1999 and the bankruptcy of Nortel in 2001 resulted in a wave of layoffs that slowed economic growth in Kitchi Sipi Valley, especially in the west end of Ottawa (Gordon, 20150). Second, the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre caused a minor recession in the U.S., followed by the geopolitical re-orientation of U.S. foreign policy and fiscal spending

directed at waging the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq. These factors combined to produce a brief economic recession in the U.S. and Canada, as well as a sudden spike in deficit spending (Harvey, 2005). This resulted in a corresponding reduction in the value of the Canadian dollar, a reduction in the U.S. federal reserve rate, and a spike in global commodity prices, especially for oil and gas (Oschinski, 2017). This caused a surge in agricultural profits among large-scale export producers, which made agricultural commodities and farmland appealing to investors in a way not seen since before the financial crisis of the late 1970s.

The U.S. Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) increasingly offered mortgages to low and middle-income workers at interest rates below their calculated risk premium by combining them with government bonds and lower risk securities as part of a broader investment package to defray the risk of the subprime mortgages. The deregulation of commercial banking in the U.S. allowed mortgage lenders to sell packages of securities with different risk profiles to other companies, who could then use these derivatives to make complex financial maneuvers to increase investment profits. Competition amongst investors led to the innovation of new and unregulated investment practices like credit-default-swaps (CDSs) where low-risk commercial banks and mutual funds could guarantee and re-insure the high-risk securities that were traded among hedge funds and more aggressive private equity firms. This introduced unnoticed levels of “systemic risk” throughout the banking sector. A wave of subprime mortgage defaults in 2006 drew attention to the imminent risk of such investments leading investors who either

sold-off or bet against vehicles containing subprime mortgages, which burst the subprime mortgage bubble by 2007. By this time, large banks like Lehman Brothers, AIG, and the Bank of America began to collapse and it was too late to insulate the commercial banking sector from the crisis (Harvey 2010).

The 2008 Wall Street Crash that resulted from the subprime mortgage crisis rapidly spread around the world producing what became known as the Global Financial Crisis between 2008 and 2015, involving a cascading failure of private and public institutions around the world that had money in what they thought were highly-rated investment vehicles (Margulis and Porter, 2013). Canada experienced the Great Recession relatively later and to a lesser degree than the United States and Europe. Economists in Canada have attributed this resilience to qualities of the Canadian banking sector, which is composed of a small number of heavily capitalized banks that are able to absorb financial losses without becoming insolvent. The Canadian economy, however, did experience economic contraction by the end of 2008 due to reduced export demand due to the U.S. economic downturn and increased value of the Canadian Dollar. Economic growth in Canada—in GDP terms—remained low until the end of 2009, and slowly recovered until another minor recession hit in 2015. The profits of Canadian industry shrank during the recession as a result of downturn in exports. This led to factory closures, commercial bankruptcies, industry consolidation, and increased unemployment, which further contracted economic growth and concentrated the benefits of economic recovery among wealthy companies and individuals (Oschinski, 2017).

The 2008 Global Financial Crisis took place at the same time as a global food crisis. The 2008 financial crisis had many similarities to the 1970s economic crisis, but it followed global financial conflicts of wealth overaccumulation that are characteristic of late capitalism (Visser, 2015; Margulis et al., 2013; McMichael, 2013). The economic crisis from financial deregulations and financialization of agricultural production, coupled with the biofuel boom, and oil price shocks disrupted the availability and pricing of financial capital for farming and commodities trading (McMichael, 2013). It prompted governments like China, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates to acquire farmland in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America to secure their domestic food supply, with assistance of local governments seeking scarce foreign investment (Zoomers et al., 2017; Li, 2014; Margulis et al., 2013; De Schutter, 2011). It also triggered investors to seek lower risk “real assets” rather than fiat ones like currency (Sommerville, 2018; Cotula, 2012; Bernstein, 2010).

Financial interest also grew in commodities as the direction of agricultural production and commodity prices continued to rally upward, despite overproduction, around the wave of investor enthusiasm. Investment firms created Commodity Index Funds (CIFs) to allow investment clients to customize their exposure to growing commodity prices (Clapp, 2019; Clapp and Isaakson, 2018). Commodity speculator activity in the markets led farmers towards overproduction and spiked prices as they hoarded commodities derivatives to sell when they estimated global prices to be at their highest (Clapp, 2014). This resulted in a rapid increase in global maize and soy prices by 125% and 107% respectively, between 2006 and 2008 (Le Billon and Sommerville,

2017; Clapp, 2014; Bernstein, 2010). However, the commodity investment rush subsided in 2008 following a sudden collapse in commodity prices in 2008, which would rise and fall again between 2012 and 2017 (Le Billon and Sommerville, 2017; Clapp, 2014). Investors therefore began purchasing farmland in 2006, which included influential financial actors like George Soros encouraging the practice as a hedge against systemic risk and inflation (Fairbairn, 2020; Fairbairn, 2014; Gunnoe, 2014; Sassen, 2013). They invested an estimated ten to twenty-five billion dollars of their wealth in 2010 into agricultural real estate worldwide (Clapp, 2019; Clapp and Isakson, 2018; Lawrence et al., 2015; Ghosh et al., 2012).

Financialization and farmland assetization

Financial investors, during the Great Recession, became specifically interested in purchasing land in areas where values were rising. Investors could purchase under-capitalized farm properties and add equipment and reorient production in a way that maximized its profitability, thus increasing the value of the land. Investors, once the land appreciated in value, could then either sell-it off at a profit or hold it as a rent-yielding asset to offset risk in a broader investment portfolio (Fairbairn, 2020; Magnan and Sunley, 2017; Holtslander, 2015; Visser, 2015; Gunnoe, 2014; Bernstein, 2010). This was pitched to farmers as an opportunity to alleviate the financial burden of farmland ownership, which could allow them to direct their remaining capital towards covering the inputs necessary for commodity production (Fairbairn, 2020). Financial investors could then fix their wealth in expanding, consolidating, and upgrading properties to maximize

commodity yields, resulting in a “production-feedback-improvement cycle” that would re-orient the production practices of tenant farmers towards higher-volume, export-oriented production (Visser, 2015; McMichael, 2013; Petzelka et al., 2013).

There are diverse models for farmland investment that are organized around the specific financial goals of investors and the local context of farmland acquisition and ownership. Ashwood et al. (2022) identified seven kinds of corporations organized around different ways of organizing liability that were operating in two counties in Illinois as FIMOs. These include Limited Liability Companies (LLCs), Limited Partnerships (LPs), Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs), Limited Liability Limited Partnerships (LLLPs), Family Limited Partnership (FLPs), S-Corporation (less than 100 shareholders), and C-Corporation (operated by a board of directors). Some of these companies operate as independent or subsidiary farmland management companies. Private equity firms that explicitly engage in land jobbing (i.e. upgrading farmland properties for resale) tend to be incorporated as limited partnerships operating over a fixed period of time (Fairbairn, 2014). Private equity firms that operate own-lease-out schemes are often organized into farmland Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) (Fairbairn, 2020). There are also Farmland/Agricultural Investment Firms (FAIFs) that engage in owner-operator schemes where the farmland is owned by an agricultural corporation—often a single family or religious community—that engage in both farmland investment and agricultural production (Fairbairn, 2020; Magnan, 2015; Burch and Lawrence, 2013). Most farmland management companies, however, tend to operate an “own-lease out” operation, where they own the land and rent it out to farmers or

agricultural corporations (Magnan and Sulner, 2017; Magnan, 2015). The largest farmland investment companies operating in the Kitchi Sipi Valley all bundled their farmland securities as LPs, managed through a parent company that employs an own-lease out model.

Ashwood et al. (2022) also identified four different investment models among farmland investment companies. Personal self-finance and corporate self-finance both involve individuals sourcing investment capital from their own equity or lines of credit. The Internal Market Creditor model involves a parent investment company who supplies investment to a series of subsidiary farmland management companies. Finally, the External and Internal Market Creditor model involves a web of farmland owning subsidiaries, parent investment companies, grandparent companies, and external capital models all circulating investment capital between one another. External capital, in such networks, are often sourced through a publicly-listed company selling shares on a registered exchange (Burch and Lawrence, 2013). Fairbairn (2020; 2014) has also identified companies that operate their own crowd-sourced investment platforms. Farmland investment companies operating in the Kitchi Sipi Valley use a combination of personal and corporate self-financing to organize the distribution of wealth to purchase farmland.

The financialization of agricultural production and commodities trading has complicated the distinction between speculative or rent-seeking investment and productive investments in farmland. Farmland asset management firms grew and evolved into Farmland Investment Management Organizations (FIMOs) to provide

customized investment portfolios composed of different types and locations of farmland with different risk profiles. FIMOs make it possible for institutional investors, hedge funds, and private equity firms to include farmland as a financial asset to include in broader investment portfolios with minimal transaction costs and without the need to tangibly own and manage farmland (Fairbairn, 2020). The farmland investment companies operating in the Kitchi Sipi Valley offer these kinds of customization tools for investors to use.

Investment companies have engaged in public relations to counter international criticism and the perception of farmland investments as “land grabs” (Clapp, 2014). Farmland investors have even been shielded from public criticism somewhat through the call from G8 in 2009 for the WTO, World Bank, and IMF to establish a voluntary ethical investment framework to garner social license for the practice (Kish and Fairbairn, 2018; Margulis and Porter, 2013; Margulis et al., 2013). This resulted in the establishment of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 2011, the UN Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in 2012, the FAO’s Committee on World Food Security Principles for Responsible Investments in Agriculture and Food Systems in 2014 (Le Billon and Sommerville, 2017; Margulis et al., 2013). These global documents describe somewhat better practices for investment companies to follow. However, these minor improvements remain unenforceable in Canada and therefore rely entirely on the voluntary participation of investment firms.

Large-scale, public and private equity and insurance funds became increasingly

interested in farmland. They saw the time frame, risk level, and return on investment as ideal to store and build wealth to pay out future retirement policies (Martin, 2015; Fairbairn, 2014; Gunnoe, 2014; Cotula, 2012). Institutions considering farmland as a long-term form of security compare its potential rate of return against a standard mutual fund over the same period of time, which is ultimately dependent on interest rates (Lohano and King, 2009). The deregulation of public pension funds since Canada's period of neoliberal reforms began in the 1980s has brought unprecedented amounts of investment wealth to farmland investment companies to deploy. Institutional pension funds encouraged investment managers to pursue new and riskier ways to invest the retirement savings of middle class workers. They began the practice of indexing funds to make certain portfolios cheaper to manage, and diversifying pension and mutual fund portfolios away from low-risk government and corporate bonds, towards higher risk stocks and commercial real estate (Clapp, 2019; Gunnoe, 2014). The public Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) and Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) were reformed in the 1990s so that the Government of Canada would not have to subsidize the increasing cost of retirement payments relative to declining worker contributions. Both public funds could now engage in a broader range of investments to ensure that the retirement fund kept pace with payments. Prime Minister Martin established the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board in 1997 to actively manage the fund and diversify its investments globally (Clapp, 2019). Bonnefield Financial—one of the case studies presented in Chapter 8—has handled farmland investments of the Canadian Pension Plans in several of the limited partnership funds.

Provincial and federal government—in coordination with international institutions governing property rights and trade—also assumed the role of enforcing private property rights, providing property market assurances, market regions as destination of foreign investment, offering secured loans for agricultural development, and the deregulation of finance laws to allow investment capital to access farmland as a security (Giacomini, 2019; Bjørkhaug et al., 2018; Martin and Clapp, 2015; Li, 2015; Holtslander, 2015; Demarais et al., 2015; Qualman, 2011). For instance, reforms made to the FCC in the 1990s allowed the crown corporation to lend to investment companies through programs like the Advanced Payment Program (Holtslander, 2015). The Government of Canada also does not have any laws or regulations related to speculative or rentier farmland ownership. Quebec has laws controlling the amount of farmland foreign individuals and corporations are allowed to purchase (Gheller, 2018, 624; L'Italien, 2012). Ontario has no such capital controls on farmland purchases. However, such foreign capital control laws are easily circumvented by establishing a corporation that is registered in Canada or entering into a partnership or joint venture with a Canadian individual or company, even though that means the company will need to pay corporate income and capital gains taxes on their investments. The Canada Investment Act, however, does oblige the Government of Canada to review foreign purchases that are larger than \$CA5 million for companies from non-WTO countries and \$CA 354 million for companies from WTO countries (Magnan, 2015)

The low Canadian interest rates of the 2000s and 2010s gave farmland securities the edge over mutual funds, which were not returning as much of a long-term profit as

farmland at a similarly low level of risk. Investment and equity funds are also able to acquire and bundle different kinds of farmland in different regions to create diverse and sophisticated new investment vehicles to allow investors to select specific investments and risk profiles (Visser, 2015; White et al., 2012; Lohano and King, 2009). Equity funds, overall, increased the value of their farmland holdings from an estimated six billion U.S. dollars worth in 2002 to an estimated three-hundred and twenty billion U.S. dollars by 2012 (Clapp, 2015a). Farmland investment abated somewhat in 2014 as global commodity prices dropped (Fairbairn, 2020). Despite the passing of the investment rush from 2006 to 2014, equity and investment funds continue to acquire land as a speculative asset and financial security.

Farmland investment in the Kitchi Sipi Valley

The financial farmland grab that took place in so-called Canada in late-2000s took place in different regions at uneven magnitudes. Desmarais et al. (2015) have documented how the farmland of certain rural municipalities in Saskatchewan have become dominated by investment companies. Gheller (2018) has documented how investment companies have not had much success acquiring farmland in Quebec. Farmland investment has been even less significant in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The findings of the farmland ownership survey and historical materialist analysis of farmland distribution in the region suggests that farmland investment firms are likely discouraged from acquiring farmland in the region due to challenges dispossessing land from farmers producing non-supply-managed commodities and commodifying it into a profitable investment due

to the urban development pressures.

The amount of farmland owned by explicit farmland investment companies has increased. The data presented in Chapter 4 indicates that the farmland in the study owned by financial investors increased from 8,280.46 acres in 2000 to a high of 10,200.20 acres in 2009 (+1,919.74 acres), then down to 9,203.16 acres in 2017 (-997.04 acres). This amounts to relatively little compared to the vast holding of farmland investment companies in the Prairie Provinces. Large-scale corporate farms are otherwise the largest and most numerous actors who have consolidated vast acreages of farmland, totalling 139,228.80 acres by 2017 (+43,962.09 acres from 2000). Many of these agricultural corporations could also be engaged in farmland investment practices even though the majority of their revenues are derived from agricultural production. I was not able to determine in this study if any of the large-scale corporate farms are engaged in land investment.




Figure 26 — Average Value of an Acre of Farmland in Eastern Ontario, 2000 to 2017
(FCC, 2022)

I did not look explicitly at the impacts of farmland investments on the property values of farms in the study area. Farm Credit Canada’s (2022) reports on average farmland values, however, does suggest that values have increased significantly following the investment rush hit the Kitchi Sipi Valley (see Figure 24). This correlation, however, does not tell us what causal relationship there is between investor farmland purchases and increasing farmland property values. I focus, in the next Chapter, on the two largest farmland investment companies operating in the study area to try and answer this question and to determine why farmland investment has been relatively limited in the region.

Conclusion

I have argued in this thesis that the recent dominance of large-scale corporate farms over farmland ownership in the southeast of the Kitchi Sipi Valley limited the amount of farmland purchased by financial investors between 2000 and 2017. I demonstrated that farmland consolidation in the study area was relatively small (6.4% by 2017) when compared to average levels of farmland consolidation (21.0% by 2014) in rural municipalities in Saskatchewan (Desmarais et al., 2015). Large-scale corporate farms, unlike in Saskatchewan, were mostly responsible for farmland consolidation, accumulating 13.8% of the study area by 2017. Farmland investment firms, on the other hand, only managed to accumulate 0.9% in this same area. I also demonstrated, through an extensive historical materialist analysis of farmland property ownership in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, that the dominance of corporate farms in the region is the product of various historical struggles over original title, land use planning, agricultural policy, and urban development.

Large-scale corporate farms were able to thrive and expand their landholdings throughout the post-war period by absorbing smaller farms as they went out of business, which has limited the farmland properties available for investors. My findings are different from those of other land grab scholarship in so-called Canada. They contradict the financialization hypothesis problematizing the presumption that financial actors are primary actors engaged in contemporary land grabbing in so-called Canada. Furthermore, the long grab theoretical framework that I have proposed did explain why this is the case, and it offers a more nuanced approach to the accumulation by

dispossession and financialization theoretical frameworks that have informed a great deal of land grab research.

My findings and analysis, however, are not a reason to celebrate the resilience of corporate farms, even though they have limited the incursion of farmland investors into the region as landowners. Large corporate farms, with incentives from the federal government, have indeed made it very challenging for new farmers to access farmland. Such farms have become highly capitalized due to stable commodity prices afforded to them through supply management. This has allowed them to amass large holdings from bankrupt farms that produced commodities like grains, pork, and beef. The long grab in the Kitchi Sipi Valley, in other words, is a story of capitalist accumulation around corporate oligopolies. The results of this long grab—in addition to ongoing treaty misrecognition for Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities—is that entry into agricultural production has become virtually impossible.

I explained in the introduction that what brought me to this research was my personal search for secure access to farmland to operate a small market garden. This research and my personal experience to find farmland exposed me to the many challenges facing new farmers looking to enter agricultural production. I attended several workshops on accessing farm startup loans and land matching events that sought to connect exiting small-holder farms with new farmers seeking land. I paid close attention to farm property listings on real estate websites and local farmer Facebook groups. The prices that exiting farmers were asking for reflected the 2022 FCC report that valued the region's farmland at just under \$10,000 per acre. The advice that I and

many other 'hopeful farmers' received was to take on even more debt to develop a much larger commercial farm than we could manage. New farmers today simply cannot afford the price of buying land. Reliance on debt to finance farmland purchases places new farmers under an unbearable amount of financial risk. This pressures us to enter into lease agreements with farmland owners or to seek farmland outside the region. Leasing farmland poses practical challenges around housing and land improvements that can make starting a farm business unfeasible. This leaves new farmers with little other options but to leave the region.

In my case, I eventually found one acre of land that I could reasonably afford that I am converting into a market garden. But I had to sell my home in Ottawa, pay for it through a new mortgage, and move to Mi'kma'ki (Nova Scotia) to find it. Many of my fellow new farmers from the south of the Kitchi Sipi Valley have also left the region, mostly moving north of the Kitchi Sipi River. This level of farmland inaccessibility is something that should concern people in the region given the aging farmer population that will soon be looking to retire, and the negative impacts that a shrinking farmer population will have on local food security in the coming decades. This is why I suggest in this conclusion that public policy and farmer-led alternatives to private farmland ownership is needed to secure the viability of new farms.

The body of research

Chapter 1 The scholarly literature surrounding land grabbing in British settler colonies, primarily on Turtle Island was analyzed by looking at five interdisciplinary subject areas.

I identified three dimensions to the long grab in the Kitchi Sipi Valley: colonial, commercial, and financial. I argue that a theoretical framework that connects these three conflicts helps explain specific patterns of financial farmland grabbing, rather than looking at recent processes of financialization alone.

Chapter 2 developed the long grab theory, which explains the structural relationships between colonial, commercial, and financial dimensions of land dispossession in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. I detailed debates on three theoretical concepts that have been used to explain land grabs in other literature: original accumulation, settler colonialism, and the social production of space. I pieced together interpretations of these three theoretical concepts to develop my theoretical framework of the long grab. I contribute this framework as an alternative to the accumulation by dispossession explanation advanced by Harvey (2003), which is often used in land grab scholarship.

Chapter 3 drew on my long grab theoretical framework to establish the research question and hypothesis of this dissertation. I indicated that I would seek to answer: (1) how much farmland investors have accumulated, (2) what the historical factors are that led to the land grab phenomenon, and (3) how the phenomenon can be interpreted from a land justice perspective. I was able to infer—based on the long grab theoretical framework—that the financial land grab phenomenon was likely resulting in a significant amount of farmland being accumulated by investors, that this was taking place because financial capital is becoming a dominant force over agricultural production (similar to the findings of Desmarais et al. 2015). I also explained how I combined methods of critical cartography, historical materialism, and case study analysis to enrich the analysis and

answer the research questions. In this chapter I contributed a new farmland ownership category indicator that can be used to specify the characteristics of land grab moments.

Chapter 4 presented the results of my farmland ownership survey. It demonstrated that farmland consolidation did in fact take place, but it was far less than the findings in Desmarais et al. (2015). It also showed that farmland investment companies did not become a dominant new farmland ownership category. Rather, large-scale farmland corporations became the largest category of landowner. The two indicators together led me to conclude that farmland in the study area went through a process of corporate entrenchment, where farmland was consolidated around the already dominant group of landowners: large-scale corporate farms.

Chapter 5 detailed the origins of how the French and British empires first used friendships and alliances with the Algonquin-Anishinaabeg to take control over the area as an important trade route for the fur trade. It explains how the military and economic power wielded by Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities secured early recognition among the French and British empires, which has produced the basis for contemporary decolonial conflict that has come to undermine Canada's radical title over land in the Kitchi Sipi Valley.

Chapter 6 explained how the haste of Loyalist exile from the United States and the neo-feudal order of the Upper Canadian political-economy resulted in uneven and inconsistent settlement and development of the Kitchi Sipi Valley. This has had an impact on the contemporary problem of farmland fragmentation into small parcels, which has made it more difficult to assemble and consolidate farmland holdings as an

investment security. Social tensions over farmland distribution at this time also drove political rebellion, which resulted in the formation of the Dominion of Canada. The dominion institutionalized commercial farmer interests of private property rights and free markets. It also, however, limited the profit-maximization imperatives of commercial farms by instituting public price controls over certain commodities. This tempered the tendencies of capitalist accumulation within settler colonial agriculture until neoliberal reforms began in the 1980s. Large-scale corporate farms were then able to accumulate the farmland holdings of smaller commercial farms who produced non-supply-managed commodities over the course of the 2000s and 2010s.

Chapter 7 detailed how farmland investment companies came to own land in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. It explained how the Canadian settler-state transitioned towards neoliberal policy approaches to agriculture and land use management over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. This allowed agribusiness corporations, financial companies, and the Canadian governments to collaborate through a new agrifood value chain framework. The incorporation of financial companies into the management of food production resulted in the financialization of agriculture, which has included factors like commodity trading and farmland ownership. The chapter argued that farmland investment was less present in the Kitchi Sipi Valley than in Saskatchewan because of the power and wealth of large-scale corporate farms.

Chapter 8 looked at two case studies of major farmland investment companies operating in the study area: Walton International and Bonnefield Financial. Walton International was initially formed to deploy wealth gained from developing properties in

response to Alberta's resource extraction boom in the 1970s. It gradually took on international investors and expanded development-focused farmland purchases across so-called Canada. The company was only able to accumulate a portion of its planned farmland acquisition and it was unable to convince the City of Ottawa to expand the urban boundary to include the farmland that it owns in areas zoned for residential and commercial development. It also managed to make farmland in southwestern Ottawa unaffordable to farmers due to its farmland acquisition practices. Bonnefield Financial was created out of the wealth accumulated through the Ottawa tech boom of the 1990s and early-2000s. The company, however, has had very limited interest in farmland investments in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. This is because urban development pressure and high levels of farm capitalization has appreciated prices of many properties past the agricultural value of the land, making it a bad investment for financial companies. Bonnefield Financial's impact on farmland accessibility has therefore been indirect, participating in the broader appreciation of farmland values through capital investments and the adoption of contemporary agricultural technologies and practices.

Contributions and limitations

This thesis has presented research findings and analysis that offer a better understanding of how and why patterns of farmland distribution changed in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017. It makes three key contributions to the study of the land grab phenomenon in so-called Canada. The first contribution is the theoretical

framework presented between chapters 1 and 2, which synthesized the theoretical debates over land conflict within the fields of agrarian change and settler colonialism in the French and British settler colonies of Turtle Island. The relationship between settlers and First Nations in so-called Canada has been discussed in the settler literature on land grabs. My consideration for the impact of settler colonialism on contemporary financial land grabs has not previously been done. In this thesis, I present a systematic synthesis and integration of the two theoretical frameworks through the long grab model (Chapter 2).

The second contribution is the replication and variation on the critical cartographic method used in Desmarais et al. (2015) to measure financial farmland grabbing in Saskatchewan between 1994 and 2014. My use of the method was combined with the farmland ownership category that I developed for this study. The combination of these two indicators allowed me to identify a more precise way to describe changes in patterns of farmland ownership. The third contribution is the empirical findings that were produced through the farmland ownership survey, historical materialist analysis, and case study research that I conducted. These findings add more data and analysis to the body of scholarship on land grabbing, agrarian change, and settler colonialism in so-called Canada. This kind of research is important to assist communities struggling to defend the land from dispossession.

The findings and analysis provided in this thesis have some critical limitations. First, my engagement with Algonquin-Anishinaabeg scholarship was done independently through existing scholarship without any formal teaching relations. My

relationship to the community has been limited to a small number of pow wows, demonstrations, and anti-mining and development occupations. I have not been able to develop the kind of lasting and significant relationship to any Algonquin-Anishinaabeg communities that could give me the capacity to interact and exchange with them on my research topic, even less the authority to make claims about their lifeways, oral history, or worldview. My representation of these fundamental elements of their everyday life reflect my learning as a settler and I hope it will encourage settler readers to deepen their own knowledge on the subject, by consulting Algonquin-Anishinaabeg knowledge keepers for an authoritative perspective on the subject.

The second limitation is regarding the generalizability of the long grab theoretical framework. This model was developed as a tool to explain certain aspects of the contemporary farmland grab phenomenon in so-called Canada. It was appropriate to explain the findings of farmland ownership patterns. It might not be an appropriate model for analysing the role of unpaid domestic work or migrant farm workers in the production and reproduction of farmland properties, or its conversion into financial securities. Indicators like the consolidation and ownership categories could be used in the wrong context to present land consolidation of all kinds as inherently negative and dispersal as good. I must stress that it is necessary to use this kind of model as a research tool by adapting it to be appropriate to the local context.

The third limitation is regarding the interpretation of my survey findings. I was not able to include farmland properties under the size of 100 ha because of the prohibitively large quantity of small lots in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. The survey results do not reflect

smaller farmland properties that may have been accumulated by investors. The high number of “family farms” represented in my findings also indicated high levels of private and corporate-owned farms as a positive result because farmland remains owned by farmers. It is important to recall that the term farmer and category of farmer as a farmland owner encompass a broad range of scales and relationships to production. The study was also unable to confirm the identities of the individuals or companies that own farmland under an anonymous numbered corporation. The farmland ownership indicators presented in this study are my best approximation for general trends in farmland ownership in the study area between 2000 and 2017.

These research findings lead me to conclude that it is important for future research on farmland grabbing in so-called Canada to consider other kinds of farm land-owning elites. There are other actors besides financial investors that can be engaged in land grabbing. Furthermore there are other political-economic processes—such as basic capitalist accumulation—that are also responsible for the contemporary farmland grab phenomenon.

Factors limiting farmland investment in the study area

My research findings and analysis led me to identify three key factors that explain the relatively limited activity of farmland investment companies in the Kitchi Sipi Valley between 2000 and 2017: monopolization of farmland around corporate farms, regulations surrounding urban expansion, and the negative impacts of urbanization on agriculturally-oriented farmland investment. These three factors demonstrate that the

recent land grab moment in the Kitchi Sipi Valley is a phenomenon that was driven by systemic processes of capitalist accumulation that are inherent to commercial agriculture and urban expansion.

The monopolization of farmland ownership by corporate farms

My findings suggest that financial investment companies were not a significant factor in the trend of farmland consolidation when compared to a similar study in Saskatchewan. Attempts at farmland investment, in fact, have been rather unsuccessful in the area for reasons that echo Fairbairn (2021) and Visser's (2016) discussions of the struggle of investment companies to make farmland into an adequately liquid and fungible commodity for investment.

The study found that farmland consolidation was mostly focused around a handful of large-scale farm corporations. Most of these corporations were established by a number of aggressively expansionist commercial dairy farmers who arrived in the Kitchi Sipi Valley from the Netherlands and Switzerland in the 1970s. They settled in the area because they were unable to expand their landholdings back in Europe. They have been gradually accumulating large farmland holdings, producing and handling a variety of commodities through different subsidiary branches. Corporate farms, unlike many farmland investment companies, engage in the production of supply-managed commodities like dairy, eggs, broiler hens, and turkeys. These commodities afforded price stability at a time when non-supply-managed commodities faced high levels of instability, which allowed large farms opportunities to acquire farms facing bankruptcy.

These corporate farms have a family ownership structure, with different family members either owning corporate shares or different branches of the company. This means that their farmland acquisition practices reflect the commercial imperatives and challenges of expanding the production of a commercial farm rather than that of owning farmland as an investment security.

Land-use regulation and development-focused farmland investment

Walton International's plans to profit from farmland investments in the southwest of Ottawa have been thwarted by the city's decision to institute a boundary limiting urban expansion. This demonstrates how planning tools like official plans and zoning bylaws can effectively regulate the practice of development-oriented farmland investment.

These companies, however, expect to hold the land for extended periods of time and gradually influence municipalities to rezone the area to allow for development.

Furthermore, my research, along with Smythe (2015) and Haley (2013), have indicated that institutions governing land use tend to be vulnerable to regulatory capture by land investors and developers. Neoliberal reforms in so-called Ontario in the 1990s imposed fiscal austerity on municipalities making them more reliant on development companies to fund social programs and less able to regulate them due to weak provincial farmland protection policies. This has resulted in sporadic instances of urban expansion into rural areas like Nepean and Cumberland since the 1990s.

Recent decisions to institute an agricultural resource zone in the official plans and to institute a Land Evaluation and Area Report (LEAR) to identify important areas of

farmland have tightened restrictions on urban expansion somewhat. Ottawa's so-called "urban boundary" has been the subject of great debate during the development of the most recent official plan in 2021, which ultimately extended the urban boundary to include extensive amounts of farmland for development. This extension excluded Walton International's holdings specifically because of the high agricultural value of the land they own. These policy tools have effectively limited the ability of companies like Walton International to profit. Other development companies, however, have managed to negotiate concessions from the city through their influence on city council. Walton International is ultimately able to allow the farmland to degrade to a level that decreases its agricultural value, eventually giving them a case to have it included within the urban boundary for development.

Urban expansion and agriculture-oriented farmland investment

The study also demonstrated that urban expansion increases farmland prices to a degree that prevents agriculture-oriented farmland investors like Bonnefield Financial from grabbing large tracts of farmland. Agriculture-focused investors purchase farmland to appreciate its productive values. They purchase farmland at a low market value and finance capital improvements to appreciate its productive value. Such companies then hold on the land indefinitely as a financial security for public and private equity funds. This slow but steady rate of growth offers the ideal level of risk for the investment needs of equity funds. Urban sprawl that appreciates the value of the farmland beyond its productive value. This makes the land less appealing for companies like Bonnefield

Financial to invest in as a financial security. Agriculture-oriented farmland investment has therefore been absent closer to the City of Ottawa because of the upward pressure that urban expansion puts on farmland values.

Policy and community recommendations

The findings and analysis presented in this thesis highlight factors that limited financial land grabs. This highlights several lessons about settler-capitalist land distribution that can inform policy reforms and farmers' movement strategy.

The limits to existing land use and ownership policies

The overall lesson that my research presents is that the land grab phenomenon is the result of inherent structural conflicts within commercial agriculture and urban development. Federal, provincial, and municipal responses to the problem of farmland investment have been through a combination of capital controls and land use regulations. For the most part, though, they have been ineffective.

Domestic farmland ownership laws

Capital controls involve regulating how much land can be bought by someone or a company that is based outside the province. This was implemented to differing extents

in Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Prince Edward Island (Holtlander 2015). This approach, however, has done little to prevent local farmland investment companies from grabbing land. Both case studies presented in Chapter 8 are companies that are registered in Canada, and Bonnefield Financial is permanently based in the Province of Ontario. Walton International also demonstrates that domestically-owned companies can source equity to invest from outside of Canada and own farmland as a locally-registered company. Over the course of conducting this study I was asked on many occasions to comment on the possibility of supposed Chinese investors buying farmland. I found no evidence of any foreign-owned investment companies buying farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. All farmland investment companies identified in the study were registered as businesses through the governments of Ontario, Alberta, Quebec, and Canada. Gheller (2018) has further demonstrated that financial land grabs are happening despite the Province of Quebec's capital controls over foreign farmland ownership.

Farmland use planning and regulations

Land use regulations are the other way provinces have conserved farmland from development. This involves the use of provincial laws and policies to establish zoning and infrastructure requirements that municipal governments must include in their zoning bylaws and official plans. This kind of regulation is evidently effective to prevent land grabs like the one done by Walton International in the southwest of Ottawa. The implementation of urban boundaries and protected agricultural land use zones,

however, do little to prevent the kind of financial land grab conducted by agriculturally-oriented farmland investors. There is nothing effectively stopping such companies from accumulating farmland in the peri-urban agricultural resource zone surrounding the urban area of the City of Ottawa.

The land use regulations approach also relies on the discretion of municipal planning departments and the Ontario Municipal Board, which are vulnerable to elite capture by land investors and developers (Smythe, 2015; Haley, 2013). Public accountability for the application of land use regulations has been lacking in the way Ontario presently regulates land use. Land ownership information, for instance, is managed by a private company that charges a fee to public users to access property reports, which are presented in a format that makes it very challenging and time-consuming to analyze. This effectively renders sufficient amounts of land ownership information inaccessible to the public to understand how the land is distributed.

Policy alternatives and community action

A combination of regulatory reforms, systemic political-economic changes, and farmer-led alternatives to private property ownership are therefore needed to effectively prevent future land grabs in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. This involves: greater transparency and analysis over land ownership, regulatory reform addressing corporate monopolies and collusion, the reform and expansion of public commodity price controls, and decolonial ways for farmers to access farmland that do not involve tenancy or farmland ownership.

Public access to and analysis of land ownership information

Property ownership information in so-called Ontario has been maintained by predecessors to the Land Registry Office since the founding of so-called Upper Canada. For most of Ontario's history one accesses land ownership information at the local registry office free of charge. The Harris Government privatized this service in the late 1990s, which resulted in the government's partnership with Teranet, a private land use data management company. The company operates an online portal called GeoWarehouse. This portal is primarily accessed by real estate agents through yearly subscriptions to assist clients in fulfilling the legal requirements involved in buying and selling of real estate. I had to pass through a long series of conversations with civil servants, lawyers and sign legal agreements to make the case that I was conducting public interest research. This is not a reasonable process for members of the public to have to go through to access land ownership information.

The challenges of conducting public interest research on farmland ownership highlights the important need for the Government of Ontario to reform policies and renegotiate private contracts with alternative service providers to improve and facilitate public access to private property ownership information. The information on its own, however, is not sufficient to keep the public informed about the state of farmland ownership in so-called Ontario. Public involvement in the governance of land ownership needs timely analysis from non-commercial sources. The Province of Ontario therefore ought to publish reports on the state of farmland ownership, similar to how Farm Credit Canada publishes annual reports detailing changes in farmland property values.

Agri-food monopolies and reforms to Canadian competition laws

The agri-food value chain in so-called Canada has come to be controlled by a handful of multinational food and agri-input corporations (ETC, 2015; Clapp, 2018). The large-scale corporate farms that have become the largest farmland owners in the Kitchi Sipi Valley produce commodities for these corporations. Agri-food monopolies have thrived and captured power over regulatory agencies in instances mentioned earlier in this thesis. This has been enabled by so-called Canada's relatively weak competition laws that were made even weaker under the Harper Government. The current laws make it hard for the Federal Government to prove that a company is abusing its "dominant position" in the market to negatively impact competition.

Prior iterations of Canada's competition laws placed firm limits to the proportion of the market that a private company can control. Reversal of Canada's competition laws to a regulatory framework based on hard market-share caps could give the government the justification and power to break up agri-food monopolies. This could theoretically have the effect of lowering the cost of agricultural inputs and machinery and curb the speculative activity taking place over the trading of agricultural commodities. Farms that are more financially stable are less likely to exit production due to financial hardship and have their farmland absorbed by a larger farm or investment company.

Limiting market conditions that promote farmland investment

Land grabs can potentially be regulated by targeting the specific market conditions that make farmland in the Kitchi Sipi Valley appealing to investors. The targets that are appropriate to do this, however, depend on the kind of investment companies operating in the area. Development-focused farmland investment, as alluded to above, is easily prevented through firm, long-term commitments to the location of a city's urban boundary. Making periodic adjustments based on industry-produced indicators like housing land supply gives land investors the sense that city officials can be persuaded by investors to include their properties within the urban boundary permitting real estate development. Policy that commits municipalities to firm urban boundaries for indefinitely long periods of time takes away the sense among investors that they can just wait-out these bylaws and cash in on their investment when the urban boundary is eventually moved.

Regulating the market conditions that make agricultural-focused farmland investment appealing is more difficult. They are specifically interested in farmland properties that are undervalued, which can be improved through capital investments and changes to production practices. There are many regulatory components governing these practices. The first major potential reform involves access to credit for investors to purchase land and make capital improvements. Notably, Farm Credit Canada has made loans to investor owner-leaseback operations throughout so-called Canada (Holtlander, 2015). The mandate of Farm Credit Canada could be reformed to prohibit loans granted to source or improve farmlands owned by investment companies. Another

potential reform could involve public initiatives to stabilize farmer incomes through debt forgiveness and a general or agriculture-focused basic income program for small-holder farms, which could protect them from facing economic hardships. Farms that are financially-secure and able to save wealth to make capital improvements to the land are of little value for agricultural-oriented farmland investment companies.

Another policy reform that could be made to limit the potential for farmland investment is the establishment of a coordinated agricultural succession and retirement program, which farmers could access when they exit production. Farmers remain reliant on the value of their farmland to cover the costs of retirement. Most farmers in so-called Canada also lack a succession plan for who will take on farmland ownership when they retire. A program that provides farmers with a livable pension for a good retirement would decrease the pressure to sell farmland to developers and investors to exit production. Such a program could also be responsible for connecting and facilitating farm transfers from exiting farmers to new farmers, removing the need for financial intermediaries who hold an economic imperative to appreciate farmland values.

The final policy reform that targets the market conditions for farmland investment is a reform to and extension of supply management into other commodities. Farms that produce grain, beef, and hogs for unregulated markets are most vulnerable to bankruptcy and liquidations by larger farms and farmland investors. Supply management, however, has also established a quota auction market, which has seen an inflation in value to the point of excluding new farmers entering production. Land grabs could therefore be controlled through a combination of reforms to the allocation of

production quota within supply management and an extension of such price control programs to other agricultural commodities.

Towards reconciliation through the self-governing commons

The final recommendation of this thesis gets to the very heart of the problem of farmland grabbing, the institution of private property ownership itself. I have made the case in this thesis that private property in the Kitchi Sipi Valley is fraught by the fact that the government has never extinguished Algonquin-Anishinaabeg original title to the land. I have also demonstrated that direct farmer-ownership, while preferable to feudal or capitalist relations of production, does have a tendency towards processes of capitalist accumulation that results in the formation of large-scale corporate farmland owners. The problems of individual private property ownership are especially evident when one considers the growing gap between what new farmers can afford to pay and the price that exiting farmers must sell to receive a livable retirement.

The coincidence of these three facts suggests that governments, in coordination with First Nations and farmers, could establish a just and secure access to land by taking it out of private property markets or finding alternatives to private ownership. Alternatives exist around the world about farmer and government-led programs, cooperatives, land trusts, and institutions that govern land as a commons (Ostrom, 1990). It is important, from a land justice perspective, that control over farmland as a self-governing commons must involve the establishment of good relations between farmers and First Nations, centring Algonquin-Anishinaabeg leadership to ensure that it

produces justice and reparations for centuries of colonial harm. Such farmland commons would then need recognition and support from all levels of government as an alternative form of land tenure to be effective controls against future attempts at land grabbing.

Future research and community action

My research and analysis has presented a case where the financialization and accumulation by dispossession hypothesis were helpful but not sufficient to explain the land grab phenomenon in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. More research is ultimately needed. Here, I specify what areas of research that are needed to advance the study of land grabs in other settler colonies and inform action to prevent them and organize for land justice. Collectively, this study concludes that research on farmland grabbing needs to consider a broader array of political-economic actors and processes that contribute to the farmland grab phenomena in so-called Canada. Farmland grabbing can be driven by processes of capitalist accumulation among large-scale family farm corporations and conglomerates, which limits the desire of financial investors to purchase farmland in the area. Future research ought to consider that land grabbing is not a pathology within an agri-food value chain that can be regulated to some acceptable rate, but something unjust and destructive that is inherent to the growth and development of a settler-capitalist society.

The long grab in other settler colonies

I explained that the recent farmland grab in the region was the result of a long process of capitalist accumulation within agriculture and urban development. This was because of historical challenges settling and developing the region, which has resulted in farmland accumulation among large-scale commercial farms today. This is just one location where a long grab has been described, but there are many other locations, such as Mi'kma'ki, that have similar settlement histories. The long grab framework of analysis seems useful for understanding land ownership in areas of significant agricultural production, like the so-called Annapolis and St. John river valleys. The framework is equally applicable to parts of Scotland and Ireland that experienced settler colonialism early in the period of English imperial expansion. Research on long-term historical changes in farmland ownership in these regions would therefore be needed to further test the long grab theory.

Improvements in farmland mapping

The critical cartographic methodology I used in my research to measure changes in patterns of farmland ownership in the Kitchi Sipi Valley is applicable to any location where property ownership information is available. There are, of course, ways that the indicators I used could be improved. Faster and more systematic ways of gathering and mapping farmland ownership through the application of data processing programs would allow researchers to analyse much larger study areas. Greater attention to the identification of the owners of numbered corporations and understanding potential farmland investment practices of corporate farms would provide a more accurate

measure of land grabs. Collection and analysis of specific farmland property values could allow for analysis on the statistical relationship between farmland investment practices and property value inflation. These are all topics for future research that would contribute to the study of agrarian change, settler colonialism, and historical materialism.

First Nations-centred practices of farmland commoning

Action to advance land justice merits prioritization as consolidation within the agri-food value chain jeopardizes public control over our food system. Farming, as a way of life, is under threat and rural communities are experiencing decline. Attention towards alternatives and organized farmer action is therefore imperative to inform communities and potentially stop such long grabs.

I started this research in September of 2015 as I was wrapping-up another growing season producing vegetables on rented land. I shared that land with a dozen of other so-called “startup farmers” most of whom were also looking for more secure access to farmland. My plan was to use off-farm employment to save money and eventually have enough to afford the down-payment on a small farmland property somewhere in the Kitchi Sipi Valley. This research has clearly demonstrated that such a plan is no longer a viable way to gain secure access to farmland for most new farmers. As I kept searching for affordable farmland my data kept showing how large-scale corporate farms and investment companies were buying-up the best properties in the region, because they were the only ones who could afford it. This realization is

especially dire considering that few among the aging farmer population have a plan for who will take ownership of their farm when they need to retire. Immediate community or public action is therefore needed to redistribute land in a just way.

Now that I have relocated to Mi'kma'ki, I have found myself in the company of other "come from aways" who have tried in vain to access farmland in B.C., Alberta, and Ontario. We have shared our struggles with each other over access to land and have started strategizing about how to establish a land commons in our area, to accommodate other farmers. The growing number of land trusts and co-ops around the world has given us so many ideas about how to organize a land commons. Yet, little analysis has been done on how to scale-up the establishment of self-governing commons in so-called Canada to meet the growing needs of retiring and new farmers in ways that creates good treaty relations with First Nations. Research is urgently needed on how to do this in a good way, because there is very little time left before a large proportion of the farmers' population faces retirement. If that farmland is not being passed on to First Nations or other farmers, then it will be sold to corporate farms and investment companies. This is an opportunity for the Canadian and Ontario governments to demonstrate that reconciliation is the objective and must be built on concrete actions, including giving back land and governance power to First Nations. Moreover, as settlers, farmers must build direct relationships with First Nations leaders in order to find alternatives that respect the grounded normativity of First Nations lifeways. As the farmland becomes owned by a shrinking number of corporate owners, farmers will increasingly need to pay leases, take on higher amounts of debt, or become

employees of agri-food corporations. It is therefore not sufficient to understand the land grab phenomenon in so-called Canada, as I have contributed to in this thesis. Future research must be directed towards building relationships with First Nations, and together find ways to end the grab by removing a significant amount of farmland from property markets entirely and redistributing it in a just and sustainable way.

References

Interviews

Black, Tom and Marlene Black. (2019, December 6). Personal communication [Personal Interview].

Haley, Ella. (2019, January 29). Personal communication [Personal interview].

Johnston, Wally and Roy Farrer. (2019, March 6). Personal communication [Personal Interview].

St. Pierre, Denis. (2019, January 17). Personal communication [Personal interview].

Secondary Sources

Adami, H. (2013, Sep 12). Property lost its village status; owner's dreams are now in tatters. *The Ottawa Citizen*.

Adnan, S. (2013). Land Grabs and Primitive Accumulation in Deltaic Bangladesh: Interactions between Neoliberal Globalization, State Interventions, Power Relations and Peasant Resistance. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 40 (1): 87–128. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.753058>.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. (2015). LGAR - Land grabs, the agrarian question and the corporate food regime. *Canadian Food Studies*, 2(2), 233–241.
<https://doi.org/10.15353/cfs-rcea.v2i2.94>

- . (2012). Contextualising land grabbing: contemporary land deals, the global subsistence crisis and the world food system. *Revue Canadienne d'études Du Développement*, 33(2), 119–142. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2012.690726>
- Albo, G. & Carlo F. (2019). Fiscal Distress and the Local State: Neoliberal Urbanism in Canada. In Olena Lyubchenko, Carlo Fanelli, Leah F. Vosko, and Mark P. Thomas's *Change and continuity: Canadian Political Economy in the New Millenium*, 265-96.
- Algonquins of Ontario. (2013). Overview of Treaty Negotiations. Retrieved from: <https://www.tanakiwin.com/our-treaty-negotiations/overview-of-treaty-negotiations>
- Alchison, J. H. (1949). The Municipal Corporations Act Of 1849. *The Canadian Historical Review*, 30(2), 107–122. <https://doi.org/10.3138/CHR-030-02-01>
- Annable, K. (2013, Jul 02). Investors sowing seeds in Prairie soil; Funds lease the land back to farmers. *Calgary Herald*.
- Anseeuw, W. & Mike T. (2014). Factors shaping the global land rush. In Alexander Reid Ross's *Grabbing back: Essays against the global land grab*, 45-60.
- Armstrong, F. (2000, May 03). Tories balance the books. *Kingston Whig - Standard*.
- Arrighi, G. (1994). *The long twentieth century : money, power, and the origins of our times*. London: Verso.
- Ashwood, L., Canfield, J., Fairbairn, M., & De Master, K. (2022). *What owns the land:*

- the corporate organization of farmland investment. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 49(2), 233–262. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2020.1786813>
- Bagnall, J. (1995, Sep 16). Colonnade: High-tech's developer of choice; A family outfit stresses speed and open books. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Bannai, E. B. & Commanda, W. (2013). Teaching of the Seven Prophets: The Seven Fires. In *Justice As Healing: Indigenous Ways*.
- Baptist, E. E. (2016). *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism*. New York: Basic Books.
- Barr, D. P. (2006). *Unconquered: The Iroquois League at War in Colonial America*. Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Benzie, R. (2003, Apr 09). MPP who gave up seat for Eves gets plum patronage posting: [Final Edition]. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Bernstein, H. (2010). Class dynamics of agrarian change. *Fernwood*.
- Bjørkhaug, H., Magnan A., & Lawrence G. (2018). Introduction: The financialization of agri-food. In Hilde Bjørkhaug, André Magnan, and Geoffrey Lawrence's (eds.) *The financialization of Agri-Food Systems*. London: Routledge, 1-20.
- Bleasdale, R. (1981). Class Conflict on the Canals of Upper Canada in the 1840s. *Labour* 7, 9-39.
- Blomley, N. (2004). *Unsettling the City : Urban Land and the Politics of Property*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499801>.
- Bode, P. (1993). Simcoe and the slaves. (Lieutenant Governor John Graves

- Simcoe's support of law intended to free slaves). *The Beaver*, 73(3), 17–19.
- Bonaparte, D. (2006). *Creation & confederation : the living history of the Iroquois*. The Wampum Chronicles.
- Bonnefield Finance. (2013, Feb 05). Bonnefield Financial closes second investment partnership. *Global News Wire*. Retrieved from <https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2013/02/05/1346831/0/en/Bonnefield-Financial-Closes-Second-Investment-Partnership.html>
- . (2014, Jan 29). Bonnefield Canadian Farmland LP III closes, oversubscribed at \$261 Million. Retrieved from <https://bonnefield.com/news/bonnefield-canadian-farmland-lp-iii-closes-oversubscribed-at-261-million/>
- . (2016, Jul 30). Bonnefield announces initial closing of Bonnefield Canadian Farmland LP IV. Retrieved from <https://bonnefield.com/news/bonnefield-announces-initial-closing-of-bonnefield-canadian-farmland-lp-iv/>
- . (2017a, Mar 13). Bonnefield announces creation and first closing of Bonnefield Canadian Farmland Evergreen LP. *Global News Wire*. Retrieved from <https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2017/03/13/944571/0/en/Bonnefield-Announces-Creation-and-First-Closing-of-Bonnefield-Canadian-Farmland-Evergreen-LP.html>
- . (2018, Aug 22). Bonnefield announces the third close of Bonnefield Canadian Farmland LP IV. *Global News Wire*. Retrieved from <https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news->

release/2018/08/22/1555245/0/en/Bonnefield-Announces-the-Third-Close-of-Bonnefield-Canadian-Farmland-LP-IV.html

—. (2023). About Us. Retrieved from <https://bonnefield.com/about-us/our-team/>

Bookchin, M. (1986). *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*, Second Edition. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Borrows, J. (1997). "Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government." *Aboriginal Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays of Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference*, edited by Michael Asch. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 155- 172.

Bothwell, R. (2006). *The penguin history of Canada*. Penguin Canada.

Braudel, F. (1979; 1983). *Civilization and capitalism, 15th - 18th Century: The wheels of commerce (Volume 2)*. London: William Collins Sons & Co.

Braun, B. (2002). *The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture, and Power on Canada's West Coast*. Minneapolis, MN ; University of Minnesota Press.

Brennan, R. (2001, May 08). Aid for rental housing urged ; report calls for consideration of tax incentives: [ontario edition]. *Toronto Star*

Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. (2002). Cities and the Geographies of Actually Existing Neoliberalism. *Antipode*, 34(3), 349–379. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8330.00246>

Brenner, R. (1976). Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe. *Past and Present* 70, pp. 30-75.

—. (1982). The agrarian roots of European capitalism. *Symposium: Agrarian*

- class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe. *Past and Present* 97, 16-113.
- . (2003). *The boom and the bubble : the US in the world economy*. Verso.
- . (2005). *The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn*
- . (2006). What Is, and What Is Not, Imperialism? *Historical Materialism* 14 (4), 79-105).
- Brodie, J. (1989). The political economy of regionalism. In Wallace Clement and Glen Williams's *The New Canadian political economy*, 138-59.
- Brownlee, M. (2013). "Walton Preparing Development Plans for Massive Land Holdings in Southwest Ottawa." *Ottawa Business Journal*. March 22, 2013. <http://www.obj.ca/Real-Estate/2013-03-22/article-3205454/Walton-preparing-development-plans-for-massive-land-holdings-in-southwest-Ottawa/1>.
- Bryant, A. (2001, Dec 21). Psst! There's this hot city in Alberta: Walton International introduces Hong Kong to Edmonton real estate Series: The Hong Kong Connection. *Edmonton Journal*.
- Burch, D. & Lawrence, G. (2013). Financialization in agri-food supply chains: private equity and the transformation of the retail sector. *Agriculture and Human Values* 30, 247-258.
- Burgess, G. (1992). The divine right of kings reconsidered. *The English Historical Review* 107(425), 837–861.
- Business Wire. (2009, Sep 21). Walton Completes Land Syndication for Walton Europe

Ottawa 3.

Caldwell, W., & Hilts, S. (2005). Farmland preservation: innovative approaches in Ontario. *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, 60(3), 66–.

Calgary Sun. (2022, July 5). Obituary: Doherty, Patrick Joseph July 16, 1937 - June 30, 2022. Retrieved from <https://calgarysun.remembering.ca/obituary/patrick-doherty-1085602192>

Canadian Press. (2016, Mar 03). Chiefs say proposed Algonquin land claim deal illegal, fraudulent. Retrieved from: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/algonquin-land-deal-illegal-1.3475359>

Campey, L. H. (2005). *The Scottish pioneers of Upper Canada, 1784–1855: Glengarry and beyond*. Dundurn Press Ltd.

Carmichael, K. (2002, Mar 28). Canadian firms double foreign investments: Latest data conflict with view low dollar spurs economic takeover: [final edition]. *The Ottawa Citizen*

Carpenter, D. & Moss, D. (2014). *Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Castree, N. (2010). Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What “Neoliberalism” is, and What Difference Nature Makes to it. *Geography Compass*, 4(12), 1725–1733. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2010.00405.x>
—. (2006). David Harvey’s Symptomatic Silence. *Historical Materialism* 14(4), pp. 35–57.

CBC News. (2017, May 1). Alberta property developer Walton International Group

- granted bankruptcy protection. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/calgary-walton-international-group-property-developer-creditor-protection-1.4094583>.
- Chayanov, A. (1927; 1991) *The theory of peasant co-operatives*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Chipman, J. G. (2002). *A law unto itself how the Ontario Municipal Board has developed and applied land use planning policy*. University of Toronto Press.
- Chopra, T. (2015). GRAB - Persistent narratives, persistent failures: Why GM crops do not—and will not—“feed the world.” *Canadian Food Studies / La Revue canadienne des études sur l'alimentation*, 2(2), 209–216.
<https://doi.org/10.15353/cfs-rcea.v2i2.123>
- Christophers, B. (2015a). The limit to financialization. *Dialogues in Human Geography* 5(2), 183-200.
- . (2015b). From financialization to finance: For ‘de-financialization’. *Dialogues in Human Geography* 5(2), 229-232.
- . (2016). For real: land as capital and commodity. *Transaction of the Institute of British Geographers* 41(2), 134-48.
- City of Ottawa. (2016). *Land evaluation and area report (LEAR)*. Planning, Infrastructure, and Economic Development.
- Clapp, J. (2014). “Financialization, Distance and Global Food Politics.” *Journal of Peasant Studies* 41 (5): 797–814.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.875536>.
- . (2015a). Distant agricultural landscapes. *Sustainability Science* 10(2), 305-

16.

—. (2015b). ABCD and beyond: From grain merchants to agricultural value chain managers. *Canadian Food Studies* 2(2), 126-135.

—. (2019). The rise of financial investment and common ownership in global agrifood firms. *Review of International Political Economy* 26(4), 604-629.

Clapp, J. & Isakson, S. R. (2018). Risky returns: The implications of financialization in the food system. *Development and change* 49(2), 437-60.

Clarke, J. (1975). "The Role of Political Position and Family and Economic Linkage in Land Speculation in the Western District of Upper Canada, 1788–1815." *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien* 19 (1): 18–34.

—. (2001). *Land, power, and economics on the frontier of Upper Canada*. Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Clarke, J. & Wood, J. D. (2002). "Land Power and Economics on the Frontier of Upper Canada." *Ontario History* 94 (1): 107–8.

Clarke, J., & Buffone, J. (1996). "Manifestations of Imperial Policy: The New South Wales System and Land Prices in Upper Canada in 1825." *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien* 40 (2): 121–36.

Coburn, V. & Moore, M. (2021). Occupancy, land rights and the Algonquin Anishinaabeg. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1-18.

Cooper, A. (2007). *Acts of Resistance: Black Men and Women Engage Slavery in Upper Canada, 1793-1803*. *Ontario History*, 99(1), 5–17.

<https://doi.org/10.7202/1065793ar>

- Coulthard, G. (2014). *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Coulthard, G., & Simpson, L. B. (2016). Grounded Normativity / Place-Based Solidarity. *American Quarterly*, 68(2), 249–255. <https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2016.0038>
- Cotula, L. (2012). “The International Political Economy of the Global Land Rush: A Critical Appraisal of Trends, Scale, Geography and Drivers.” *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3–4): 649–80.
- Courtney, K. E. (2009). Sustainable Urban Transportation And Ontario's New Planning Regime: The Provincial Policy Statement, 2005 and the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe. *Journal of Environmental Law and Practice*, 19(2), 71-104.
- Craig, G. (1963). *Upper Canada: The Formative Years 1784–1841*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. pp. 30–31.
- Creighton, D. & Moore, C. (1937; 2002). *The Empire of the St. Lawrence: A Study in Commerce and Politics*. University of Toronto Press.
<https://doi.org/10.3138/j.ctt1287sz2>
- Cullingworth, J. B. (1984). “Land Policy Issues in Canada.” *Land Use Policy* 1 (4): 343–56.
- Daniel, P. (2013). *Dispossession: Discrimination against African-American farmers in the age of civil rights*. The University of North Carolina Press.
- Dare, P. (2009, May 13). Councillors line up against sprawl; Hundreds at rally urge city to stop suburban expansion. *The Ottawa Citizen*.

- Darroch, G. & Soltow, L. (1995). "Property & Inequality in Victorian Ontario: Structural Patterns & Cultural Communities in the 1871 Census // Review." *Ontario History* 87 (1): 87–89.
- Daschuk, J. (2013; 2019). *Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Indigenous Life*. Regina: University of Regina Press.
- Day, S., Girard, A., Snider, L., & Watters, J. (2009). Rightsizing Regulation: The Competition Act, 1975–2005. *Canadian Journal of Law and Society*, 24(1), 47–67. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0829320100009765>
- Dean, W. G. (1998). *Concise historical atlas of Canada*. University of Toronto Press.
- Delaney, J. (1991). The Garden Suburb of Lindenlea, Ottawa: A Model Project for the First Federal Housing Policy, 1918–24. *Urban History Review*, 19(3), 151–165. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1017590ar>
- Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1987; 2011). *A thousand plateaus: CCapitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press.
- Desmarais, A. A., Qualman, D., Magnan, A. & Wiebe, N. (2015). "Land Grabbing and Land Concentration: Mapping Changing Patterns of Farmland Ownership in Three Rural Municipalities in Saskatchewan, Canada." *Canadian Food Studies / La Revue Canadienne Des Études Sur l'alimentation* 2 (1): 16. <https://doi.org/10.15353/cfs-rcea.v2i1.52>.
- . (2016). "Investor Ownership or Social Investment? Changing Farmland Ownership in Saskatchewan, Canada." *Agriculture and Human Values*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-016-9704-5>.

- DeVries, L. (2011). *Conflict in Caledonia: Aboriginal Land Rights and the Rule of Law*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Dickenson, V. & Harrison, J. (1995). Magnificent Mer Bleue Bog gains global significance. *Ottawa Citizen*, November 25, 1995: I4.
- Dixon, D. (2005). *Never come to peace again : Pontiac's uprising and the fate of the British empire in North America*. University of Oklahoma Press.
- Driver, F. (1991). "Henry Morton Stanley and His Critics: Geography, Exploration and Empire." *Past & Present* 133 (1): 134–66. <https://doi.org/10.1093/past/133.1.134>.
- Duhamel, M. (2003). On the Social Welfare Objectives of Canada's Antitrust Statute. *Canadian Public Policy*, 29(3), 301–318. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3552288>
- Eccles, W. J. (1998). *The French in North America 1500-1783*. Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside.
- Edelman, M. (2013). Messy hectares: questions about the epistemology of land grabbing data. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 40(3), 485-501.
- Edelman, M. Hall R., Borrás S. M., Scoones I., White, B. & Wolford, W. (2017). *Global Land Grabbing and Political Reactions "from Below."* Routledge.
- Edney, M. H. (2017). "Map History: Discourse and Process." In *Critical Cartography*, edited by Alexander J. Kent and Peter Vujakovic, 67–79. Routledge.
- Edwards, B. (2016). "Breaking New Ground: Montreal–Mirabel International Airport, Mass Aeromobility, and Megaproject Development in 1960s and 1970s Canada." *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études Canadiennes* 50 (1): 5–35.

- Ekers, M. (2019). Financiers in the Forests on Vancouver Island: On Fixes and Colonial Enclosures. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 19(2): 270-294.
- Elliot, B. (2000). Philemon Wright (1760-1839). In *Up the Gatineau!* vol. 26.
<http://outaouais.quebecheritageweb.com/article/philemon-wright-1760-1839>
- Englert, S. (2020). Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession. *Antipode* 52(6), 1647-1666.
- Epstein, G. A. (2005). Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy. In *Gerald A Epstein's Financialization and the world economy*. UK: Edward Elgar Pub.
- Ernst and Young. (2022, May 31). Walton development and Management GP LTD. 2021 Annual Report. Retrieved from:
<https://documentcentre.ey.com/api/Document/download?docId=35649&language=EN>
- Errington, J. (2012). *The lion, the eagle, and Upper Canada a developing colonial ideology* (2nd ed.). McGill-Queen's University Press.
- ETC Group. (2015). *Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play*. Retrieved from https://www.etcgroup.org/files/files/etc_breakbad_23dec15.pdf
- Fairbairn, M. (2014). 'Like gold with yield': evolving intersections between farmland and finance. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 41(5), 777-795.
- . (2020). *Fields of Golds: Financing the Global Land Rush*. New York: Cornell University Press.

- Fairhead, J. Leach, M., & Scoones, I. (2012). Green Grabbing: A New Appropriation of Nature? *Journal of Peasant Studies*.
- Fayed, A. (2022). Walton Global: A history and review. Retrieved from <https://adamfayed.com/walton-global-a-history-and-review/>
- Ferguson, R. (2000, Jan 27). BCE spins off Nortel stake ; Sets Canadian corporate record with \$5.4 billion net earnings: [1 Edition]. *Toronto Star*.
- Farm Credit Canada. (2022). FCC Farmland Values Report. <https://www.fcc-fac.ca/en/knowledge/economics/farmland-values-report.html>
- Ferling, J. E. (2002). *Setting the world ablaze : Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and the American Revolution*. Oxford University Press.
- Fisher, P. & Unwin, D. J. (2005). "Re-Presenting Geographical Information Systems." In *Re-Presenting GIS*, edited by Peter F. Fisher and D. Unwin, 1–13. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- Fine, B. (2006). Debating the 'New' Imperialism. *Historical Materialism* 14(4), pp. 133–156).
- Foster, R.F. (1988). *Modern Ireland: 1600-1972*. New York: Penguin Publishers.
- Fraser, E. D. G., & Rimas, A. (2010). *Empires of food : feast, famine, and the rise and fall of civilizations* (1st Free Press hardcover ed.). Free Press.
- French, S., Leyshon, A., & Wainwright, T. (2011). Financializing space, spacing financialization. *Progress in Human Geography* 35(6)
- Friedmann, H. (1978). "Simple Commodity Production and Wage Labour in the American Plains." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 6 (1): 71–100.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066157808438066>.

—. (1986). Patriarchy and property: a reply to Goodman and Redclift. *Sociologia Ruralis* 26(2), 186-193.

—. (2015). Governing land and landscapes: Political ecology of enclosures and commons. *Canadian Food Studies* 2(2), pp. 23-31.

—. (2016). Commentary: Food regime analysis and agrarian questions: widening the conversation. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 43(3), 671-692.

Friedmann, H. & McMichael, P. (1989). Agriculture and the state system; The rise and decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present. *Sociologia Ruralis*, 29(2), 93–117. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.1989.tb00360.x>

Fuglie, K. O., Heisey, P. W., King, J. L., Pray, C. E., Day-Rubenstein, K.

Schimmelpfennig, D., Wang, S. L., & Karmarkar-Deshmukh, R. (2011). Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and Biofuel Industries Worldwide. ERR-130. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Econ. Res. Serv.

Fullenwider, L. (2018). Settler biopower: accumulation and dispossession in Canada's Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement. *Settler Colonial Studies*, 8(4), 422-41.

Galbraith, J. S. (1951). "Land Policies of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1870–1913." *Canadian Historical Review* 32 (1): 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.3138/CHR-032-01-01>.

Gamble, S. (2012, Dec 04). Six Nations to work with Walton on housing project.

- Brantford Expositor. Retrieved from
<https://www.brantfordexpositor.ca/2012/12/04/six-nations-to-work-with-walton-on-housing-project>
- Ganzevoort, H. (1983). Dutch immigration to North America. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario.
- Gehl, L. (2014) *The Truth the Wampum Tells*. BC: AbeBooks.
- . (2017). *Claiming Anishinaabe*. Regina: University of Regina Press.
<https://uofrpress.ca/Books/C/Claiming-Anishinaabe>.
- Gehl, M. (2013, Feb 21). Investment rules threaten viability of young farmers. *Star Phoenix*.
- Geisler, C. (2014). "Disowned by the Ownership Society: How Native Americans Lost Their Land." *Rural Sociology* 79 (1): 56–78.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ruso.12028>.
- Gerring, J. (2017). *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Second edition. *Strategies for Social Inquiry*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Gheller, F. (2018). "Governing Large-Scale Farmland Acquisitions in Québec: The Conventional Family Farm Model Questioned." *Agriculture and Human Values*, March, 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-018-9855-7>.
- Giangrande, C. (1985). "Wine and Milk." In *Down to Earth: The Crisis in Canadian Farming*, 44–61. Toronto; Buffalo: House of Anansi Press.
- Gillham, B. (2000). *Case Study Research Methods*. Real World Research. London ;

Continuum.

Gladstone, D. (2001, Jul 05). City moving too quickly to alter committees of adjustment.

The Ottawa Citizen.

Global AgInvesting. (2017, March 14). Bonnefield launches new open-ended farmland fund; announces first close. Retrieved from

<https://www.globalaginvesting.com/bonnefield-launches-new-open-ended-farmland-fund-announces-first-close/>

Goff, K. (2002, May 08). Get ready for a 70-cent dollar: Analyst: Canadian exporters should be prepared to raise prices, open new markets: [final edition]. The Ottawa Citizen.

Goodleaf, D. K. (1995). Entering the war zone : a Mohawk perspective on resisting invasions. Theytus Books Ltd.

Google Maps. (n.d.). Satellite view of eastern Ontario and western Quebec. Retrieved October, 2023

Gordon, D. (2015). Town and Crown: An Illustrated History of Canada's Capital. Ottawa: Invermire.

Gottschalk, P. (1927). Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas.

Governor General of Canada. (2009). Mrs. Maureen Doherty: Member of the Order of Canada. Retrieved from <https://www.gg.ca/en/honours/recipients/146-9157>

Government of Ontario. (2013). The Algonquin land claim.

Gowa, J. (1984). State Power, State Policy: Explaining the Decision to Close the Gold

- Window. *Politics & Society*, 13(1), 91–117.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/003232928401300104>
- Gowan, D. (2008, Aug 30). Commission bans salesman from trading securities; Capital markets Employee applied exemptions without checking qualifications. *Telegraph-Journal*.
- GRAIN. (2008). Seized: The 2008 landgrab for food and financial security. Retrieved from:<https://grain.org/en/article/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-financial-security>
- Graeber, D. (2011). *Debt: The first 5,000 years*. New York: Melville House Publishing.
- Gray, K. (2001, Nov 20). Ex-planner now at work for developer: Project involving superstore creates furore in east end. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Green, R. M. (1933). Farm Mortgage Delinquencies and Foreclosures. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 15(1), 14–26. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1231339>
- Greenwood, J. (2013, Jul 18). Quarry dies, farm fund rises; Potato fields purchased for 'more than \$50M'. *National Post*.
- Griffiths, M. & Baker, K. (2019). “Decolonising the Spaces of Geographical Knowledge Production: The RGS-IBG at Kensington Gore.” *Area* 0 (0).
<https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12586>.
- Gunnoe, A. (2014). “The Political Economy of Institutional Landownership: Neorentier Society and the Financialization of Land: The Political Economy of Institutional Landownership.” *Rural Sociology* 79 (4): 478–504.

- Haley, E. (2013, March 6). The plunder of Brant County's foodland. *Alternatives Journal*. Retrieved from: <https://www.alternativesjournal.ca/politics-policies/web-exclusive-the-plunder-of-brant-countys-foodland/>
- Hall, A. (2003). Canadian agricultural policy: Liberal, global, and sustainable. In Jane Adams's *Fighting for the farm: Rural America transformed*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 209-28.
- Hall, D. S. R. (2001, Aug 21). Municipalities get more clout; Province to give up some authority in revamped Municipal Act. *The Windsor Star*.
- Hall, D. (2013). *Land*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
- . (2015). Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession and the global land grab. In Marc Edelman, Carlos Oya, and Saturnino M Borrás Jr.'s *Global land grabs*, 66-88.
- Hall, R.J. (2015). Divide and Conquer: Privatizing Indigenous Land Ownership As Capital Accumulation. *Studies in Political Economy* 96 (1): 23–46.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19187033.2015.11674936>.
- Hall, R., Edelman, M., Borrás, S. M., Scoones, I., White, B., & Wolford, W. (2015). "Resistance, Acquiescence or Incorporation? An Introduction to Land Grabbing and Political Reactions 'from Below.'" *Journal of Peasant Studies* 42 (3–4): 467–88.
- Hallam, A. (2006, Feb). Home on the bubble. *MoneySense*, 8, 10.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000). *Empire*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Harris, R. (2004). *Creeping conformity how Canada became suburban, 1900-1960*. University of Toronto Press.
- Harris, C. (2008). *The reluctant land society, space, and environment in Canada before Confederation*. UBC Press.
- Harris, C. & Matthews, G. J. (1987). *Historical atlas of Canada*. University of Toronto Press.
- Harvey, D. (1982). *The Limits to Capital*. London: Verso Press.
- .(1990). *The condition of postmodernity: An enquiry into the origins of Cultural Change*. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
- . (1996). *Justice, nature, and the geography of difference*. Blackwell.
- . (2003). *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . (2005) *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . (2010). *The enigma of capital: And the crises of capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hedley, D. D. (2007). "The Road to Whole Farm Programming in Canada". In Knutson, R. D., Knutson, S. D., Ernstes, D. P., Armbruster, W. J., & Ernstes, D. P. *David P's Perspectives on 21st century agriculture : a tribute to Walter J. Armbruster (1st ed.)*. Farm Foundation.
- Hele, K. (2020). *Robinson Treaties of 1850*. In *The Canadian Encyclopedia*. Retrieved from <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/robinson-treaties-of-1850>
- Heminthavong, K. & Lavoie, A. (2014). *Background paper: Farmland*

- grabbing in Canada. Library of Parliament: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Publication No. 2014-101-E.
- Hill, B. (2010, Feb 02). Calgary developer sets sights on west-side properties; Bets on growth for Ottawa region. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Hill, S. M. (2017). *The clay we are made of: Haudenosaunee land tenure on the Grand River*. Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press.
- Hobbes, T. (1651; 2002). *Leviathan or the matter, forme, & power of a common-wealth ecclesiastical and civil*. The Project Gutenberg eBook.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1962; 1996). *The age of revolution: 1789-1848*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Hodge, G. (1985). The Roots of Canadian Planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 51(1), 8–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01944368508976796>
- Holt-Giménez, E. (2017). Agrarian Questions and the Struggle for Land Justice in the United States. In Justine M. Williams and Eric Holt-Giménez's (eds.) *Land Justice: Re-imagining Land, Food, and the Commons*. Food First.
- Holtslander, C. (2015). Losing our grip, 2015 update: How corporate farmland buy-up, rising farm debt, and agribusiness financing of inputs threaten family farms. National Farmers Union Report.
- Horn-Miller, K. (2013). "What does Indigenous Participatory Democracy Look Like? Kahnawà:ke's Decision Making Process." *Review of Constitutional Studies* 18(1), 111- 132.
- Hulchanski, J. D. (1986). *The 1935 Dominion Housing Act: Setting the Stage for a*

- Permanent Federal Presence in Canada's Housing Sector. *Urban History Review*, 15(1), 19–39. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1018891ar>
- Ince, O. U. (2014). "Primitive Accumulation, New Enclosures, and Global Land Grabs: A Theoretical Intervention: Primitive Accumulation." *Rural Sociology* 79 (1): 104–31.
- Isakson, R. S. (2014). Food and finance: the financial transformation of agro-food supply chains. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 41, 749-775.
- . (2015). Derivatives for development? Small-farmer vulnerability and the financialization of climate risk management. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 15(4), 569–580.
- Isfeld, G. (2013, Dec 05). BoC 'stealth' campaign singses dollar; Central bank, reluctant to lower interest rates, hopes weaker loonie will spur Canadian economy. *The Ottawa Citizen*
- . (2014, Sep 05). Exports to EU rise despite concerns. *The Ottawa Citizen*
- . (2016, Nov 03). Tide turning to global exports as demand spreads, EDC says. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Jaimet, K. (2009, Oct 09). Municipalities' power at stake in OMB case; Judges set to review Manotick decision under provisions of Planning Act. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Jenkins, P. (1996). *An Acre of Time*. Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter and Ross.
- Jensen, J. & Brodie, J. (1988). *Crisis, Challenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, ch 1.
- Johnson, L. A. (1981). Independent commodity production. *Studies in Political*

Economy 6(1), 93-112.

Joseph, A. E., & Smit, B. (1985). Rural residential development and municipal service provision: a Canadian case study. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 1(4), 321–337.

[https://doi.org/10.1016/0743-0167\(85\)90045-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/0743-0167(85)90045-2)

Kaag, M., & Zoomers, A. (2014). *The Global Land Grab: Beyond the Hype*.

Zed Books Ltd.

Karlsen, A. (2018). Framing industrialization of the offshore wind value chain – A discourse approach to an event. *Geoforum*, 88, 148–156.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.11.018>

Karr, C.G. (1966). *The Foundations of the Canada Land Company, 1823-1843*. Thesis --University of Western Ontario, 1966.

Kautsky, K. (1899;1988). *The agrarian question: In two volumes*. London: Zwan Publications.

Kellogg, P. (2015). *Escape from the staple trap: Canadian political economy after left nationalism*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Kelly, J. H., Herlihy, P. H., Viera, A. R., Hilburn, A. M., Smith, D. A., & Cendejas, G. A. H.

(2010). Indigenous Territoriality at the End of the Social Property Era in Mexico. *Journal of Latin American Geography*, 9(3), 161–181.

<https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2010.0026>

Kent, A. J., & Vujakovic, P. (2017). "Introduction." In *Critical Cartography*, edited by Alexander J. Kent and Peter Vujakovic. Routledge.

- Kepkiewicz, L., & Dale, B. (2019). Keeping “our” land: property, agriculture and tensions between Indigenous and settler visions of food sovereignty in Canada. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 46(5), 983–1002.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1439929>
- Kiernan, L. (2017). Bonnefield Canadian Farmland LP IV holds second close – Nearly doubles in size. *Global AgInvesting*. Retrieved from <https://www.globalaginvesting.com/bonnefield-canadian-farmland-lp-iv-holds-second-close-nearly-doubles-size/>
- King, H., Pasternak, S., & Yesno, R. (2019). A Yellowhead Institute Red Paper. Yellowhead Institute.
- Kish, Z. & Fairbairn, M. (2017). Investing for profit, investing for impact: Moral performances in agricultural investment projects. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 50(3), 569–588.
- Koleszar-Green, R. (2019). What is a Guest? What is a Settler? *Cultural and Pedagogical Inquiry*, 10(2), 166–177.
- Koven, P. (2012, Jan 20). ETF may stand for exchange-traded farmland. *National Post*
- Krippner, G. R. (2005). The financialization of the American economy. *Socio-Economic Review* 3(2), 173–208.
- Kropotkin, P. (1912; 1993). *Fields, factories and workshops*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Knuttila, M. K. (2003). “From the National Policy to Continentalism and Globalization: The Shifting Context of Canadian Agricultural Policy. In Jane Adams’ *Fighting for*

- the Farm: Rural America Transformed.
- Kugelman, M. & Levenstein, S. L. (2012). *The Global Farms Race: Land Grabs, Agricultural Investment, and the Scramble for Food Security*. Island Press.
- L'Italien, F. (2012). "L'accapement Des Terres et Les Dispositifs d'intervention Sur Le Foncier Agricole: Les Enjeux Pour l'agriculture Québécoise." Institut de recherche en économie contemporaine.
- LaDuke, W. (1999). *All our relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life*.
- Ladurantaye, S. (2009, August 26). Hungry investors eye agriculture again. *Globe and Mail Online*.
- Laidlaw, S. (2003). "A Cold Glass of Milk." In *Secret Ingredients: The Brave New World of Industrial Farming*, 169–190. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Lam, E. (2011, Jan 21). Weather beaten; agriculture industry fighting to recover from disasters. *The Ottawa Citizen*
- Lamphier, G. (2011, Jul 01). We're still waiting for real recovery; Economy not out of purgatory just yet. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Lapavistas, C. (2011). Theorizing financialization. *Work, Employment and Society* 25(4), 611-26.
- Lappé, F. M. (1985). *The Family Farm: Caught in the Contradiction of American Values. Agriculture and Human Values*.
- Larue, B., Gervais, J. P., & Pouliot, S. (2007). "Should Tariff-Rate Quotas Mimic Quotas?: Implications for Trade Liberalization under a Supply Management

- Policy.” *The North American Journal of Economics and Finance* 18 (3): 247–261.
doi:10.1016/j.najef.2007.07.002.
- Lawrence, G., Sippel, S. R., & Burch, D. (2015). “The Financialisation of Food and Farming.” In Guy M. Robinson and Doris A. Carson’s *Handbook on the Globalisation of Agriculture*.
- Le Billon, P. & Sommerville, M. (2017). “Landing Capital and Assembling ‘Investable Land’ in the Extractive and Agricultural Sectors.” *Geoforum* 82 (June): 212–24.
- Lefebvre, H. (1974; 1991). *The production of space*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Lenin, V. (1933; 1937). *Imperialism: The highest stage of capitalism: A popular outline*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Leroux, D. (2019). *Distorted Descent: White Claims to Indigenous Identity*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.
- Li, T. M. (2014). What is land? Assembling a resource for global investment. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 39(4), 589-602.
- . (2015). Transnational farmland investment: A risky business. *Journal of agrarian change* 15(4), 560-8.
- Lock, J. (1690; 1963). *Two treatises of government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Logan, S. & Wekerle, G. R. (2008). Neoliberalizing environmental governance? Land trusts, private conservation and nature on the Oak Ridges Moraine. *Geoforum*, 39(6), 2097–2108. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2008.08.009>
- Luxemburg, R. (1913). *The Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to an Economic*

- Explanation of Imperialism. London: Routledge.
- Maclean, J. (2016). "Striking at the Root Problem of Canadian Environmental Law: Identifying and Escaping Regulatory Capture." *Journal of Environmental Law and Practice* 29.
- Macpherson, C. B. (1962; 1979). *The political theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mader, P., Mertens, D., & Van der Zwan, N. (2020). Financialization: An introduction. In Philip Mader, Daniel Mertens, Natascha van der Zwan's (eds.) *The Routledge International Handbook of Financialization*, 1-16.
- Magnan, A. (2015). "The Financialization of Agri-Food in Canada and Australia: Corporate Farmland and Farm Ownership in the Grains and Oilseed Sector." *Journal of Rural Studies* 41 (October): 1–12.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2015.06.007>.
- . (2016). *When Wheat Was King: The Rise and Fall of the Canada-UK Grain Trade*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- . (2017). Farmland investment and financialization in Saskatchewan, 2003-2014: An empirical analysis of farmland transactions. *Journal of Rural Studies* 49, 92-103.
- Malthus, T. (1798; 2009). *An essay on the principle of population*. Project Gutenberg Ebook.
- Mancke, E. (1999). Early Modern Imperial Governance and the Origins of Canadian Political Culture. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 31(1), pp. 3-

20.s.

- Manuel, A. & Derrickson, R. M. (2021). *Unsettling Canada : a national wake-up call* (Second edition.). *Between the Lines*.
- Margulis, M. E. & Porter, T. (2013). Governing the Global Land Grab: Multipolarity, Ideas, and Complexity in Transnational Governance. *Globalizations* 10(1).
- Margulis, M. E., McKeon, N., & Borras, S. M. (2013). "Land Grabbing and Global Governance: Critical Perspectives." *Globalizations* 10 (1): 1–23.
- Martin, S. J. & Clapp, J. (2015). Finance for agriculture or agriculture for finance. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 15, 549-559.
- Martin, S. J. (2015). "The State of Time in This Financial Moment: Financialization in the Food System—Synthesis Paper." *Canadian Food Studies / La Revue canadienne des études sur l'alimentation* 2 (2): 287–93.
<https://doi.org/10.15353/cfs-rcea.v2i2.93>.
- Marx, K. (1867; 1990). *Capital* Volume I. Penguin Classics.
— (1939; 1993;). *Grundrisse*. Penguin Classics.
- Massey, D. (1980). The Pattern of Landownership and Its Implications for Policy. *Built Environment* 6, 263–71.
- Mayer, F. W. & Phillips, N. (2017). Outsourcing governance: states and the politics of a "global value chain world." *New Political Economy*, 22(2), 134–152.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2016.1273341>
- McCalla, D. (2015). *Consumers in the bush: Shopping in rural Upper Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Quebec University Press.

- McCallum, J. (1980). *Unequal beginnings: Agriculture and economic development in Quebec and Ontario*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- McCarthy, J. & Prudham, S. (2004). Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism. *Geoforum*, 35(3), 275–283. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2003.07.003>
- McGregor, D. (2008). “Anishinaabe-Kwe, Traditional Knowledge, and Water Protection.” *Canadian Woman Studies* 26, 3-4: 26-30.
- . (2013). Indigenous women, water justice and Zaagidowin (love). *Canadian Woman Studies*, 30(2-3), 71+.
- McLean, S. (2018, Aug 9). Proposals are being sought for the sale of, or investment in, industrial lands in Edmonton and pre-development lands in Ottawa held by affiliates of Walton International Group Inc. Retrieved from <https://renx.ca/ey-monitoring-waltons-ottawa-edmonton-lands>
- McMichael, P. (2013). Value-chain agriculture and debt relations: Contradictory outcomes. *Third World Quarterly* 34(4), 671-90.
- . (2014). Land grabbing as security mercantilism in international relations. In Matias E. Margulis, Nora McKeon, and Saturnino M. Borrás Jr.’s *Land grabbing and global governance*, 25-64.
- Menzies, H. (1994). *By the labour of their hands : the story of Ontario cheddar cheese*. Quarry Press.
- . (2014). *Reclaiming the commons for the common good*. British Columbia: New Society Press.
- Mitchell, D. (1975). *The politics of food*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company.

- Mittelstaedt, M. (2011, May 13). A case for plowing funds into agribusiness. *The Globe and Mail*.
- Mohammed, A. (2000, Jul 22). Boom expands urban limits: Region proposes rezoning farmland near Corel Centre for business park. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Monture-Angus, P. (1995). *Thunder in my Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks*. Fernwood Publishing, Halifax.
- Muirhead, B. (2014). "Crying over Spilt Milk: The History of Dairy Supply Management and Its Role in Recent Trade Negotiations." Centre for International Governance Innovation, Cigi Papers Series, , April.
<https://www.cigionline.org/publications/crying-over-spilt-milk-history-dairy-supply-management-and-its-role-recent-trade>.
- Native Land. (2022). Omàmiwininiwag (Algonquin). Native-Lands.ca
- Naylor, R.T. (1975; 2006). *The history of Canadian business 1867-1914*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Ng, L. (2007, Feb 1). Land banking. *Malaysian Business*.
- Noël, A. (2014). "Studying Your Own Country: Social Scientific Knowledge for Our Times and Places: Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, St Catharines, May 28, 2014." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 47 (4): 647–66. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423914001085>.
- Nogueira, L., Barichello, R. R., Baylis, K., & Chouinard, H. H. (2012). "Policy Risk in the Canadian Dairy Industry." *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy* 34 (1): 147–166.

- Nyéléni Movement. (2007). Declaration of Nyéléni. Retrieved from:
<https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf>
- Oberlander, P. H. & Fallick, A. L. (1992). House a Nation: The Evolution of Canadian Housing Policy. University of British Columbia, Centre for Human Settlements.
- Oschinski, M. (2017). The political economy of Ontario. In Cheryl N. Collier and Jonathan Malloy's *The Politics of Ontario*. University of Toronto Press, pp. 20-37.
- Ostrom, E. (1990; 2008). *Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ouma, S. (2016). "From Financialization to Operations of Capital: Historicizing and Disentangling the Finance–Farmland-Nexus." *Geoforum* 72 (June): 82–93.
- . (2020). *Farming as financial asset: Global finance and the making of institutional landscapes*. UK: Agenda Publishing.
- Owram, D. (1986). *The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900-1945*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Oyeniran, C. (2021). Black Loyalists in British North America. In *The Canadian Encyclopedia*. Retrieved from
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/black-loyalists-in-british-north-america>
- Pagliari, J. (2015, Jan 16). Tory wants 'good hard look' at developer funds: Mayor's call for transparency on community projects cash draws support from industry. *Toronto Star*

- . (2017, Feb 18). What is the Ontario Municipal Board? Toronto Star
- Parham, C. P. (2004). From great wilderness to Seaway towns : a comparative history of Cornwall, Ontario and Massena, New York, 1784-2001. State University of New York Press.
- Pasternak, S., Metallic, N., Numata, Y., Sekhara, A., Galley, J., & Wong, S. (2021). Cash Back: A Yellowhead Institute Red Paper. Yellowhead Institute.
- Penniman, L. (2018). Farming while black: Soul Fire Farm's practical guide to liberation on the land. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing.
- Pentland, H.C. (1959). The development of a capitalist labour market in Canada. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25(4), 450-61.
- Pett, D. (2011, Oct 14). Looking for stability; Volatile commodity prices spark more food hedging. The Ottawa Citizen.
- Pflug-Back, K. R. & Kesīqnaeh, E. (2016). Accumulation by Dispossession. Briarpatch Magazine.
- Phillips, A. & Sharman, J. C. (2020). Outsourcing Empire : How Company-States Made the Modern World (1st. ed.). Princeton University Press.
- Phillips, C. (2011, May 30). Fighting for the boys and girls of Ottawa. The Ottawa Citizen
- Pitts, G. (2011, Apr 18). Back to the (farm) land. The Globe and Mail.
- Pludwinski, B. J. & Grimwood, B. S. R. (2021). (Re)producing wilderness tourism discourses in Algonquin Provincial Park. Tourist Studies, 21(3), 424–443.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1468797621989207>

- Polanyi, K. (1957; 1944). *The Great Transformation: The political and economic origins of our time*. Boston: Beacon.
- Ponte, S. & Sturgeon, T. (2014). Explaining governance in global value chains: A modular theory-building effort, *Review of International Political Economy*, 21:1, 195-223, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2013.809596
- Ponte, S. & Gibbon, P. (2005). Quality standards, conventions and the governance of global value chains, *Economy and Society*, 34:1, 1-31, DOI: 10.1080/0308514042000329315
- Porter, K. (2021). Algonquins of Ontario not the biggest landowner at Tewin. CBC News <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/tewin-land-ownership-taggart-algonquins-of-ontario-1.6207407>
- Porter, M. E. (1985). *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance*. New York.: Simon and Schuster.
- Proctor, C. A., Schuster, R., Buxton, R. T., & Bennett, J. R. (2022). Prioritization of public and private land to protect species at risk habitat. *Conservation Science and Practice*, 4(9). <https://doi.org/10.1111/csp2.12771>
- Proudhon, P.-J. (1840; 2013). *What is property? An inquiry into the principle of right and government*. Project Gutenberg EBook.
- Prudham, S. (2007). "The Fictions of Autonomous Invention: Accumulation by Dispossession, Commodification and Life Patents in Canada." *Antipode* 39(3), pp. 406-429

- Qualman, D. (2011). Advancing agriculture by destroying farms? The state of agriculture in Canada. In Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurélie Desmarais, and Nettie Wiebe's Food sovereignty in Canada: Creating just and sustainable food systems. Halifax: Fernwood.
- . (2019). Civilization critical: Energy, food, nature, and the future. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
- Quinn, G. (2004, Jan 23). Exporters want stronger action to cool dollar: Currency's big jump hurts competitiveness: [final edition]. The Ottawa Citizen.
- Radcliffe, S. A. (2017). "Decolonising Geographical Knowledges." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 42 (3): 329–33.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12195>.
- Raster, A. & Hill, Gish, Christina . (2017). The dispute over wild rice: an investigation of treaty agreements and Ojibwe food sovereignty. Agriculture and Human Values.
- Reevely, D. (2002, May 10). Planning act hobbles cities, planner says: Officials need more time to review development: [Final Edition]. The Ottawa Citizen
- . (2013, Mar 25). Walton, investors banking on growth; City planners will ask councillors to freeze the southwest Ottawa boundary, but that isn't what everyone wants to hear, writes David Reevely. The Ottawa Citizen.
- Ricardo, D. (1817; 2010). On the principles of political economy and taxation. The Project Gutenberg EBook.
- Rissing, A. L. (2021). "We feed the world": the political ecology of the Corn Belt's driving

- narrative. *Journal of Political Ecology*, 28(1). <https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.2959>
- Roseman, E. (2006, May 03). Shares given to charity suddenly cost less. *Toronto Star*.
- Rotz, S. (2017). "They Took Our Beads, It Was a Fair Trade, Get over It': Settler Colonial Logics, Racial Hierarchies and Material Dominance in Canadian Agriculture." *Geoforum* 82: 158–69.
- Rotz, S., Fraser, E. D.G., & Martin, R. C. (2017). Situating tenure, capital and finance in farmland relations: implications for stewardship and agroecological health in Ontario, Canada. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 46(1), 142-64.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1755; 1964). *The first and second discourses*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Royal Canadian Geographical Society. (2018). *Canadian Geographic Indigenous Peoples Atlas of Canada*. Ottawa: The Royal Canadian Geographical Society.
- Rummery, D. (2009, Apr 14). Manotick ruling shows OMB must go. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Rüeck, D. (2014). "Commons, Enclosure, and Resistance in Kahnawá:ke Mohawk Territory, 1850-1900." *Canadian Historical Review* 95(3), pp. 352-81.
- Rupert, J. (2009, Jul 09). Manotick expansion fight going to court; Suit could settle how much power OMB has over city councils. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Russell, P. A. (2012). *How agriculture made Canada: Farming in the Nineteenth Century*.
- Sakolski, M. (1932; 2011). *The Great American Land Bubble: The Amazing Story of Land-Grabbing, Speculations, and Booms from Colonial Days to the Present*

- Time. Connecticut: Martino Fine Books.
- Sali, D. (2019). Ottawa-based farm investment fund leader in its field. *Ottawa Business Journal*, 22(7), 22–. Retrieved from <https://obj.ca/ottawa-based-farm-investment-fund-is-a-leader-in-its-field/>
- Sassen, S. (2013). "Land Grabs Today: Feeding the Disassembling of National Territory." *Globalizations* 10 (1): 25–46.
- Sasso, M. (2019, June 13). Investors Pumped Billions Into Suburbs That Never Got Built. Bloomberg: National Real Estate Investor.
- Sawyer, D. (2015). Massey-Ferguson Limited. In *The Canadian Encyclopedia*. Retrieved from <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/massey-ferguson-limited>
- Schelbert, L. (2005). "Swiss Diaspora". In Ember, M., Ember, C. R., & Skoggard, I.'s *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World*. Springer US.
- Schiller, B. (2001, Jan 23). Land deal? I'm not involved, harris says ; premier insists friendship with developer played no part in approving project. *Toronto Star*.
- Scoones, I., Hall, R., Borras, S. M., White, B., & Wolford, W. (2013). "The Politics of Evidence: Methodologies for Understanding the Global Land Rush." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 40 (3): 469–83.
- Scott, J. C. (1990).(1998; 2020). *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Scullion, E. (2006). *The Canadian Dairy Commission: A 40-Year Retrospective*.

Canadian Dairy Commission.

Sendbuehler, M., & Gilliland, J. (1998). The Ontario Housing Act, 1919, and a New Suburban Ideal. *Urban History Review*, 26(2), 42–55.

<https://doi.org/10.7202/1016658ar>

Shannon, K. (2001, Aug 20). Province expected to unveil new Municipal Act. *The Ottawa Citizen*.

Shiva, V. (2016). *Who really feeds the world? : the failures of agribusiness and the promise of agroecology*. North Atlantic Books.

Shmuel, J. (2015, Jan 23). Bank rate cut may spur faster growth; Weakening dollar likely to offset borrowing costs for consumers. *The Ottawa Citizen*.

Shufelt, T. (2008, Jul 02). Growing dilemma. *The Ottawa Citizen*

—. (2010, Nov 26). Exports face headwinds; Canadian M & E sector projected to post 5% decline. *The Ottawa Citizen*

Simpson, A. (2014). *Mohawk Interruptus : political life across the borders of settler states*. Durham ; London.

Simpson, L. B. (2011). *Dancing On Our Turtle's Back: Stories of Nishnaabeg Re-Creation, Resurgence, and a New Emergence*.

—. (2017). *As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom Through Radical Resistance*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

—. (2021). *A Short History of the Blockade: Giant Beavers, Diplomacy & Regeneration in Nishnaabewin*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.

Skerritt, J. (2015, May 08). New Rules Cool Farmland Price; Saskatchewan mulls limits

on investors amid worries young people can't afford to start farms. Calgary Herald.

- Skogstad, G. (1993). "Policy under Siege: Supply Management in Agricultural Marketing." *Canadian Public Administration* 36 (1): 1–23. doi:10.1111/j.1754-7121.1993.tb02163.x.
- . (2008). *Internationalization and Canadian agriculture: Policy and governing paradigms*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Skogstad, G. & Cooper, A. F. (1990). *Agricultural trade: Domestic pressures and international tensions*. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.
- Smith, A. (1776; 1978). *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*. London: Penguin Books.
- Smith, A. A. (2019). Toward a critique of political economy of "sociolegality" in settler capitalist Canada. In Olena Lyubchenko, Carlo Fanelli, Leah F. Vosko, and Mark P. Thomas's *Change and continuity: Canadian Political Economy in the New Millenium*, 167-84.
- Smythe, E. A. (2015). "Local Food, Farmland, and Urban Development: A Case of Land Grabbing North American Style." *Canadian Food Studies* 2 (1): 48. <https://doi.org/10.15353/cfs-rcea.v2i1.29>.
- Sommerville, M. (2018). "Naturalising Finance, Financialising Natives: Indigeneity, Race, and 'Responsible' Agricultural Investment in Canada." *Antipode* 0 (0). Accessed January 2, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12395>.
- Sommerville, M. & Magnan, A. (2015). "'Pinstripes on the Prairies': Examining the

Financialization of Farming Systems in the Canadian Prairie Provinces.” *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 42 (1): 119–44.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.990894>.

St. Pierre, D. (2001, Nov 17). Councillor knocks province over proposed changes to Ontario's municipal act. *Sudbury Star*.

Starblanket, G. (2019). *The Numbered Treaties and the Politics of Incoherency*.

Canadian Journal of Political Science 52 (3), pp. 443 - 459.

Statistics Canada. (2023a). New housing price index, monthly. Table: 18-10-0205-01.

<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1810020501>

—. (2023bb). Farm product prices, crops and livestock. Table: 32-10-0077-01.

<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3210007701>

—. (2022a). Farms classified by total farm area, Census of Agriculture historical data. Table: 32-10-0156-01.

<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3210015601>

—. (2022b). Characteristics of farm operators, Census of Agriculture historical data. Table: 32-10-0230-01 <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3210023001>

Stevenson, G. (1977). *Federalism and the political economy of the Canadian state*.

In Leo Panitch's *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power*.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 71-100).

Sunseri, L. (2010). *Being again of one mind: Oneida women and the struggle for decolonization*.

- Sutcliffe, B. (2006). Imperialism Old and New: A Comment on David Harvey's *The New Imperialism* and Ellen Meiksins Wood's *Empire of Capital*. *Historical Materialism* 14(4), 59–78.
- Thompson, E.P. (1963). *The making of the English working class*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Toronto Star. (2000, Jun 26). Editorial: Hiding behind the OMB.
- Troughton, M. (2007). Canadian farmland – a fluctuating commodity. In W. Caldwell, S. Hilts, B Wilton (eds.) *Farmland preservation: Land for future generations*. Guelph: Farmland Preservation Research Project Centre for Land and Water Stewardship, pp. 33-54.
- Two Row Times. (2017, October 4). Walton International Group granted bankruptcy protection. Retrieved from <https://tworowtimes.com/news/regional/walton-international-group-granted-bankruptcy-protection/>
- Van Nus, W. (1976). Sources for the History of Urban Planning in Canada, 1890-1939. *Urban History Review*, 5(1-76), 6–9. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1019545ar>
- Visser, O. (2015). Finance and the global land rush: Understanding the growing role of investment funds in land deals and large-scale farming. *Canadian Food Studies* 2(2), 278-86.
- . (2016). "Running out of Farmland? Investment Discourses, Unstable Land Values and the Sluggishness of Asset Making." *Agriculture and Human Values*, February, 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-015-9679-7>.
- Von Thünen, J. H. (1826; 1966). *Von Thünen's Isolated State: An English edition of Der*

- Isolierte Staat. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Waldie, P. (2010). Boardroom farmers: Some of the world's biggest agricultural investors.
- Waldie, P. & Leeder, J. (2010). Do corporate buyouts signal the end of the family farm?
- Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S. R., & Kinzig, A. (2004). Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social–ecological systems. *Ecology and Society* 9(2): 5. <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/>
- Wallerstein, I. (1974; 2011). *The modern world system I: Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. California: University of California Press.
- Walton Global. (2023). Website. <https://walton.com/>
- . (2019, October 31). Walton International Group: Continuing a track record of success. Retrieved from <https://walton.com/walton-international-group-continuing-a-track-record-of-success/>
- . (2019, September 11). Purchase sale agreement executed with Toronto-based homebuilder on 2,000 acre land assembly in Simcoe County, Ontario. <https://walton.com/purchase-sale-agreement-executed-with-toronto-based-homebuilder-on-2000-acre-land-assembly-in-simcoe-county-ontario/>
- . (2020, Feb 21). Walton Group returns CAD 2 Million to Golden Greater Horseshoe Phase 2 investors. <https://walton.com/walton-group-returns-cad-2-million-to-golden-greater-horseshoe-phase-2-investors/>.
- . (2018, August 10). EY monitoring Walton's Ottawa and Edmonton lands.

- <https://walton.com/ey-monitoring-waltons-ottawa-and-edmonton-lands/>
- Walton International. (2016, November 28). Walton Ontario Land L.P. 1 reports Q3 fiscal results. <https://walton.com/walton-ontario-land-l-p-1-reports-2016-q3-fiscal-results/>
- Warner, S. L. (1981). *Balanced Information: The Pickering Airport Experiment*. The Review of Economics and Statistics.
- Weaver, J. C. (2003). *The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Weis, T. (2007). *The Global Food Economy: The Battle for the Future of Farming*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- . (2013). *The Ecological Hoofprint: The Global Burden of Industrial Livestock*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- . (2017) A Political Ecology Approach to Industrial Food Production. In Koc, M., J. Sumner, and T. Winson's (eds.) *Critical Perspectives in Food Studies*, 2e. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 118-34.
- Wellar, B. (2000, Jun 07). A map for ottawa's future?: We spent \$400,000 on outdated ideas. *The Ottawa Citizen*.
- Whitaker, R. (1977). Images of the state in Canada. In Leo Panitch's *The Canadian State: Political economy and political power*, 28-68.
- White, B., Borrás S. M., Hall, R., Scoones, I., and Wolford, W. (2012). "The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals." *The Journal of*

- Peasant Studies 39 (3–4): 619–47.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.691879>.
- White, G. (2019). *The Government and Politics of Ontario* (G. White, Ed.; 5th ed.). University of Toronto Press,. <https://doi.org/10.3138/978144267019>
- White, R. (2011). *The middle ground : Indians, empires, and republics in the Great Lakes region, 1650-1815* (20th anniversary ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Widdis, R. W. (1979). "Motivation and Scale: A Method of Identifying Land Speculators in Upper Canada." *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien* 23 (4): 337–51. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0064.1979.tb00669.x>.
- Wiebe, N. & Wipf, K. (2011). "Nurturing food sovereignty in Canada". In Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurélie Desmarais, and Nettie Wiebe's (eds.) *Food sovereignty in Canada: Creating just and sustainable food systems*. Halifax: Fernwood, pp. 1-19.
- Williams, D. (2018). *Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg: This is Our Territory*. ARP Books.
- Willis, A. (2016, Jul 29). Investing in farmland - and reaping double-digit returns. Retrieved July 18, 2023, from *The Globe and Mail*.
- Wilton, B. (2007). Farmland preservation perspectives. In W. Caldwell, S. Hilts, B Wilton (eds.) *Farmland preservation: Land for future generations*. Guelph: Farmland Preservation Research Project Centre for Land and Water Stewardship, pp. 13-32.
- Winder, G. M. (2002). *Following America into the second industrial revolution: new rules of competition and Ontario's farm machinery industry, 1850-1930*. The Canadian

- Geographer, 46(4), 292–309. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0064.2002.tb00752.x>
- Windle, J. (2016, March 2). Location of Tutelo longhouse and burial ground no mystery. Two Row Times. Retrieved from <https://tworowtimes.com/news/location-of-tutelo-longhouse-and-burial-ground-no-mystery/>
- Winearls, J. (1991). Mapping Upper Canada, 1780-1867 : an annotated bibliography of manuscript and printed maps. University of Toronto Press. <https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442677012>
- Wolfe, P. (1998). Settler colonialism: The politics and poetics of an ethnographic event. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- . (2006). Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. *Journal of Genocide Research* 8(4), 387-409.
- Wolford, W., Borrás, S. M., Hall, R., Scoones, I., & White, B. (2013). “Governing Global Land Deals: The Role of the State in the Rush for Land: Governing Global Land Deals.” *Development and Change* 44 (2): 189–210.
- Wood, E. M. (1991). *The pristine culture of capitalism: A historical essay on old regimes and modern states*. London: Verso Books.
- . (2002). *The origin of capitalism: A longer view*. London: Verso.
- . (2006). *Logics of Power: A Conversation with David Harvey*. *Historical Materialism* 14(4), pp. 9–34.
- Wood, J. (2014). Understanding Electronic Registration: Rights of Way and Property Rights Generally. *Carswell's Real Property Reports* 38 R.P.R. (5th) 4

Zoomers, A., Van Noorloos, F., Otsuki, K., Steel, G., & Van Westen, G. (2017). The rush for land in an urbanizing world: From land grabbing toward developing safe, resilient, and sustainable cities and landscapes. *World Development* 92, 242-252.

Appendix A: Ethics Approval Notice

File Number: 09-17-15

Date (mm/dd/yyyy): 04/04/2018



Université d'Ottawa
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche

University of Ottawa
Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

Ethics Approval Notice

Social Sciences and Humanities REB

Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)

<u>First Name</u>	<u>Last Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>	<u>Role</u>
Marie-Josée	Massicotte	Social Sciences / Political Science	Supervisor
Christopher	Bisson	Social Sciences / Political Science	Student Researcher

File Number: 09-17-15

Type of Project: PhD Thesis

Title: Land Grabbing in Eastern Ontario

Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy)	Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy)	Approval Type
04/04/2018	04/03/2019	Approval

Special Conditions / Comments:

N/A

1

550, rue Cumberland, pièce 154
Ottawa (Ontario) K1N 6N5 Canada
(613) 562-5387 • Téléc./Fax (613) 562-5338
www.recherche.uottawa.ca/deontologie/ www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/