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Interrogating the “Selective Gaze” of Canadian CCTV Operators: Perspectives from Behind the  
Camera’s Lens

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**Interrogating the ‘Selective Gaze’ of Canadian CCTV Operators:  
Perspectives From Behind the Camera’s Lens**

**Patrick M. Derby**

Thesis submitted to the  
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the MA degree in Criminology

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Faculty of Social Sciences  
University of Ottawa

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## ABSTRACT

A new field of research commonly referred to as 'surveillance studies' has emerged over the past decade. Despite work being done in this area long before September 11, 2001, the acts of terrorism which occurred on that day, and the subsequent response by several states have spawned an explosion of interest in this area. This study looks beyond post-9/11 surveillance practices and technological obsessions, delving into the 'black box' to explore how CCTV surveillance is conducted within the institutions of everyday life. Drawing on ten interviews and covering eight sites that employ CCTV surveillance this research explores how camera operators organize and perceive their work. Of specific interest is developing an understanding of how CCTV operators determine whom and/or what requires their attention.

The researcher interrogates the 'selective gaze' of CCTV operators to reveal that their gaze is frequently directed by information they receive from other sources. This study also corroborates Norris and Armstrong's (1999) suggestion that an individual operator's own values and beliefs play an important factor with regard to their selectivity. In addition to exploring the gaze of CCTV operators as it relates to suspicion, this work also provides an understanding of how surveillance information flows within and through the surveillance sites.

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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BEYOND TECHNOLOGY, 9/11 AND THE 'NEW NORMAL'

Since the morning of September 11, 2001 when two passenger planes flew into the 'twin towers' of the World Trade Centre and, more recently, the London bombings, governments across the globe have mobilized in an attempt to improve the security of their nations. Mobilization has occurred at all levels, from calls for increased vigilance among citizens, to the responsabilization of the transportation industry, to the improvements in intelligence gathering and information sharing at the national and international levels. The increased security measures adopted in response to the so-called terrorist threat at airports, borders, and ports of entry (to name only a few locations) rely predominantly on improving surveillance capabilities, and widening and strengthening the surveillance nets that currently exist (Lyon, 2003). The following selection of headlines which appeared in Canadian newsprint media illustrates the apparent obsession with increasing surveillance capabilities:

- *Ottawa demands greater wiretap access<sup>1</sup>;*
- *Immigration to test biometrics<sup>2</sup>; and*
- *Threat to New York: Subway security beefed up after mayor issues warning<sup>3</sup>.*

In addition to the headlines above, which portray a desire to improve surveillance technologies and expand its capabilities, it appears that challenges to surveillance are also more visible. Albeit its resistance to surveillance remains limited, the following headlines illustrate some of its regulative, educative, and mobilizing forms respectively (Lyon, 2001).

- *Biometric standard sought<sup>4</sup>;*

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<sup>1</sup> Campbell, Clark. "Ottawa demands greater wiretap access". *Globe and Mail*. 2005.10.11, p. A1.

<sup>2</sup> McClintock, Maria. "Immigrations to test biometrics: inkless fingerprint part of federal pilot project" *The Ottawa Sun*. 2005.10.02, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> McCarthy, Shawn. "Threat to New York: Subway security beefed up after mayor issues warning" *Globe and Mail*. 2005.10.07, p.A1.

<sup>4</sup> Free Press News Service, "Biometric Standard Sought" *The London Free Press*. 2005.10.07, p.A8.

- *Privacy has suffered since 9/11, report says*<sup>5</sup>; and
- *National Muslim group considers legal action against proposed no-fly list*<sup>6</sup>.

Although surveillance practices have certainly intensified since the events of 9/11, they are nothing new to democratic societies. While the events of 9/11, and the subsequent war response, have brought issues of national security, surveillance, privacy and other legal rights to the surface of the collective consciousness, surveillance technologies such as biometrics, closed-circuit television, and information databases have existed and been in use long before the dust settled at the site where the 'twin towers' once stood. Societies have long relied on surveillance capacities for such things as policing, taxation, and ensuring the rights of citizenship.

Much of the recent focus on, and the challenges to, surveillance have been cemented in the post 9/11 context. While such a focus is important, it may also be problematic as it may serve to narrow the scope of the surveillance debate, diverting attention away from the surveillance that occurs in other areas of everyday life. For example, by focusing on the surveillance and profiling of Arab men in airports, we may overlook the social injustices that may be perpetrated upon other individuals and/or groups that are under surveillance in varying contexts. On another note, once the terror threat ceases to be a primary concern for the state, the surveillance infrastructure which has been strengthened in this post 9/11 context will not be rolled back; rather, it will likely be directed toward the everyday activities of citizens (see also Haggerty and Gazso, 2005).

It is to avoid a narrowly focused post-9/11 discussion of surveillance that I have decided to conduct my research on surveillance that occurs in public and semi-public environments that are not primarily concerned with the threat of terrorism. I emphasize my careful selection of the words 'not primarily', as I am not sure to what extent the discourses on

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<sup>5</sup> Den Tandt, Michael, "Privacy has suffered since 9/11, report says". *Globe and Mail*. 2005.01.07, p.A6.

<sup>6</sup> Canadian Press Newswire, "National Muslim group considers legal action against proposed no-fly list". *Canadian Press Newswire* 2005.10.05.

'national security' or the 'risk of terrorism' have infiltrated what I believe to be the institutions of everyday life. For example, to what degree have shopping mall administrators come to perceive their establishment as a potential target for terrorism and have taken steps to address this concern? While I am certain the answer to this would depend on the profile of the particular shopping centre and its symbolic meaning, I am confident that targeting the 'the flawed consumer' remains a priority over the search for 'potential terrorists', at least for the majority of shopping centre security teams.

It is also noteworthy that a significant amount of surveillance discourse and/or theorizing concerns itself with the technological. This emphasis on the 'high technology' component of surveillance does much to reinforce a perception of technological determinism, which may have significant implications for mobilizing resistance to inappropriate surveillance practices. From the choice to utilize surveillance technologies to supervise and control individuals and/or groups, to determining which technologies are most appropriate and how they will be adapted within a particular social environment, to how surveillance impacts upon the life chances of those targeted, it is important to be mindful of the fact that surveillance is inherently a social phenomenon. Watching and being watched are social experiences which involve human processes. It is far too easy to lose sight of the *human* component of surveillance when discussing the latest surveillance technologies. In order to avoid a discussion of contemporary surveillance that is technologically determined, I have chosen to focus my examination on the human side of surveillance by focusing on the cognitive processes individuals utilize when doing surveillance work mediated by closed-circuit television cameras.

Anyone wishing to pursue surveillance studies, especially those studying visual surveillance through closed-circuit television, cannot avoid a discussion of Michel Foucault's (1977) concept of panopticism. I will not provide a description of the concept here as it will be explicated in chapter two, but it is worth noting that the extent to which closed-circuit television surveillance in public and semi-public spaces mirrors panoptic principles has been reconsidered by surveillance theorists (Haggerty, 2006; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; Lyon,

1994; 2001; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 1998; 2002). It has been accepted that the totalizing vision fundamental to the functioning of the panoptic prison cannot be reproduced in the streets or other locations within the public domain through the introduction of video surveillance. Simply stated, the mobility, anonymity, and vast number of the surveillance subjects in public and semi-public spaces pose challenges for the automatic functioning of the panoptic power. The surveillance of public and semi-public spaces invites attention to questions that are not posed within the setting of the Panopticon, specifically, how selectivity operates in practice (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). The questions of whom and what are watched, and what warrants intervention have largely been ignored, particularly in the Canadian context.

In this thesis I will use semi-structured interviews to engage surveillance workers in a discussion about how they organize their work, in an attempt to examine whether visual surveillance is targeted at specific categories of people based on profiling; individual behaviour; information received about an individual or a combination thereof. In order to fully understand the reasons for targeting, one must also explore whether suspicion is constructed by individual operatives, the institutions in which they work, or a combination of both, and how those suspicions become constructed (informed) and perpetuated.

Before providing an outline and discussion of how this thesis is organized it is imperative to define some of the key concepts which are used throughout this work. While a number of concepts will be defined as they are presented, I would like to orient the reader to the concepts of surveillance, closed-circuit television (CCTV), and public/semi-public space.

#### **THE MUDDIED CONCEPT OF SURVEILLANCE**

David Lyon (2001) states that surveillance is always tied to projects of care and control. He also argues that there is a surveillance continuum, stating that surveillance may be practiced as hard, centralized, and panoptic control or soft, dispersed persuasion and influence (Lyon, 2003). Certainly everyone has had experience with one form of surveillance or another, and our understandings of surveillance depend largely on such experience.

One might imagine that operationalizing the term surveillance for a Masters Thesis would be a relatively painless process - they would be mistaken. Defining surveillance is muddied by its various forms, recent technological advancements, and its object of focus (to name only a few challenges). Surveillance defined in its broadest terms means simply 'to watch over' (Lyon, 2003), and the Oxford dictionary (1996) defines surveillance as the "close observation, especially of a suspected person". Allow me now to describe the deficiencies of such a conceptualization of surveillance. Once this is complete, I will frame a working definition for the purpose of this thesis.

*To watch over* connotes a 'top-down' approach to surveillance with all its implications of power. That is, the surveyor is in a position of power over the surveyed. The surveillance of citizens by nation states, whether through the police agencies or the taxation department are examples of 'top-down' forms of surveillance. Certainly a popular image which may resonate in our cultural imagination is that of George Orwell's fictionalized account of Big Brother. The influence that Orwell's dystopian novel *Nineteen-Eighty-Four* has had on how we think of surveillance should not be underestimated as evidenced by the fact that several Orwellian terms, such as 'Big Brother', 'telescreen', and 'thought police', have entered our vernacular (Tyner, 2004). Some surveillance scholars have suggested that to use Orwell's novel as a metaphor for the surveillance in contemporary society would only serve to exaggerate the centrality of surveillance and the degree of power exerted by the State in obtaining information about the everyday life of its citizens<sup>7</sup>. Certainly, to conceptualize surveillance simply as a top-down State function would not do justice to the complexities inherent in the 'surveillance society'.

In challenging the Oxford definition of surveillance, Gary Marx argues that to limit surveillance to 'close *observation*' does not adequately capture contemporary surveillance

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<sup>7</sup> Some surveillance theorists, who believed that the public had an exaggerated perception regarding the centralization of surveillance data, have conceded that since 9/11 the State has demonstrated the power that it may exert over other institutions in order to obtain and centralize information (for more see Lyon, 2003).

practices, as “much of surveillance involves superficial scans looking for patterns of interest to be pursued later in greater detail” (Marx, 2002: 11). Also the use of the word ‘observation’ may restrict our understanding of surveillance to its visual forms, downplaying the role of new technologies in modern surveillance practices. The abstract surveillance of textual forms of information made possible through the modern database is certainly different than directly observing human behaviour (Marx, 2002).

By emphasizing ‘*a suspected person*’ as the target of surveillance, the Oxford dictionary does not appear to appreciate the extensiveness of modern day surveillance. As surveillance practices become increasingly automated by the modern computer all aspects of the everyday life, including the most mundane, are passively collected and stored. Further, targeted surveillance may be applied categorically against certain types of people, or in relation to a specific context (i.e. a specific place and/or time) and not solely applied to those whose identity is known beforehand as is suggested by the dictionary definition (Marx, 2002).

Finally, the above definition implies a rupture between persons carrying out the surveillance and their object (Marx, 2002). However, the importance of self-monitoring has increasingly emerged as an important theme in contemporary surveillance studies (Lyon, 1994; Marx, 2002; Vaz and Bruno, 2003). Self-surveillance is usually understood as the attention one pays to their own behaviour when facing the actual or potential observation by others whose opinions one deems as relevant (Vaz & Bruno, 2003).

A new definition which more accurately describes contemporary forms of surveillance practices and offers a framework for understanding how surveillance is to be conceptualized for the remainder of this work. Contemporary surveillance should be understood as the garnering and processing of personal data and/or supervising the activities of individuals, populations, or contexts, whether the forms of surveillance are readily identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing, managing, or controlling the attitudes, behaviours, and even life chances of those individuals and/or populations (Lyon 1992; 2001).

While the majority of contemporary surveillance makes use of technical means, at least to some degree, to extract or create personal data (Marx, 1988; 2002), these technologies are bound with networks that include human actors, social organizations and structures (Lyon, 2001). Surveillance should not be conceptualized as an inherently anti-social practice tied to the coercive powers of the State; it is also tied to socially productive aspects of societal life such as health care and other forms of social benefit (i.e. welfare benefits) (ibid.). Further, surveillance has increasingly been dispersed into more and more areas of social life as several agencies and institutions, in their own private interest, have established surveillance practices (ibid.). While this increasing range of agencies involved in surveillance includes the State, it also goes beyond the state and is increasingly based on capitalist ideals rather than repressive state ideals (Shearing and Stenning, 1992).

Drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson (2000) argue that we are witnessing the convergence of what were once discrete surveillance systems, which is challenging the hierarchical understanding of surveillance as proposed by the 'Panopticon' and 'Big Brother' metaphors. Because of such merging, Haggerty and Ericson suggest that we must move beyond the traditional top-down metaphors, which have only served to stagnate surveillance theorizing, and conceptualize an emerging *surveillant assemblage* (ibid.). A consequence of the assemblage is that surveillance hierarchies are leveled rhizomatically exposing more of the populace to routine forms of surveillance (ibid.). The assemblage works by abstracting bodies from their territorialized setting and turning them into information flows, which may then circulate through various realms of society (nationally and/or internationally). These divisible information flows are "then reassembled into distinct 'data doubles' which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention" (ibid: 606). This process is facilitated through the technology of the database.

#### **THE VARIETIES AND FORM OF CCTV**

While, as discussed above, the surveillance apparatus takes on many forms in contemporary society, for the purpose of this thesis my empirical research will be limited to visual

surveillance conducted by human agents, as mediated through the use of *closed-circuit television cameras* (CCTV). While CCTV schemes may vary significantly between surveillance sites, it is important to provide a general definition of this technology. While the term CCTV has commonly come to be used to describe any form of video surveillance (Goold, 2004), used properly CCTV refers to those “electronic monitoring systems which make use of video cameras connected by means of a ‘closed’ (or non broadcast) circuit, to capture, collect, record, and/or relay visual information about the event-status of a given space over time” (Deisman, 2003: 7).

Discussions of CCTV, like other forms of surveillance, are often characterized by a focus on their technological capabilities, with both proponents and adversaries often overstating its capabilities (Goold, 2004), albeit for very different reasons. CCTV schemes may be extremely sophisticated and include such features as night vision, computer-assisted operations (i.e. facial recognition), and motion detection. The cameras may also be able to ‘pan’, ‘tilt’, and ‘zoom’, allowing persons of interest to be followed as they move through surveillance spaces. Systems may also be fitted with audio equipment allowing the surveyed population not only to be seen, but also be heard by, as well as hear, the camera operator who may provide explicit instructions to specific users of the space in question.

While CCTV schemes may be fitted with the militarized technologies described above, such sophistication is rare. The majority of existing systems used in public spaces are nowhere near achieving such a level of sophistication (Goold, 2004). The majority of cameras used in today’s schemes are connected to a non-broadcast circuit allowing the images captured by a camera to be sent, through fiber-optic (or other) wiring or microwave signal, to a central control room equipped with a central monitoring screen (or a bank of screens) and some form of recording device. The majority of schemes allow for, to various degrees, the simultaneous monitoring and recording of images; this may include ‘real-time’ or ‘time-lapse’ recording (some systems allow for a switching between these two modes). Increasingly common are cameras that may be manipulated via remote control, allowing the

camera direction to be changed, as well as a particular image to be zoomed-in upon. Given the varieties of technology which may be mobilized for use with CCTV systems, it may not be surprising that the human aspect of CCTV surveillance can easily become obscured, even overlooked in discussions regarding the capabilities and effectiveness of this form of surveillance.

One camera in a CCTV scheme, if recording constantly over a twenty-four hours period, will produce 1,440 minutes of surveillance footage, and may capture thousands of passers-by in its gaze (Goold, 2004). Of course, this is not to say that everything is captured by the camera's gaze as it may be turned off, directed elsewhere, or simply not monitored at a given moment in time – each of these decisions are made by human operators responsible for overseeing the system. In short, CCTV must be thought of as an 'assemblage' that aligns cameras, computers, people, organizations, and telecommunications in order to survey public and semi-public spaces (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000).

#### **WATCHING OVER PUBLIC AND SEMI-PUBLIC PLACES / SPACES**

Throughout my thesis I will be using the terms 'place' and 'space' interchangeably. Despite my acknowledgement that these two terms may be ascribed significantly different meaning, I use them interchangeably for the purpose of clarity. Various forms of surveillance, including CCTV, penetrate all categories of space, whether they are private, public, and quazi or semi-public.

For the purposes of this work, I am not interested in the use of CCTV to monitor exclusively private space, but rather I am interested in the surveillance of places that may be categorized as public and/or semi-public. The concept of 'public' place should be understood as space that is freely accessible (Koskela, 2003), or "those sites ... that our society understands as open to all" (Brooks Gardener, 1995: 3). 'Semi-public' places may be understood as "mostly accessible space which may be privately owned and can be closed at some time of the day" (Koskela, 2003: 294).

In her article, entitled '*Cam Era*' – *the contemporary urban Panopticon*, Hille Koskela (2003) provides a useful grid to categorize public and semi-public spaces which are often exposed to visual surveillance. Public spaces penetrated by CCTV may include such places as the high street, town/city squares, market places, or various other pedestrian areas (ibid). CCTV schemes may also be located in semi-public spaces such as, but not limited to: shopping centres, department stores, transportation vehicles and/or terminals, banks, hospitals, museums, schools, and nightclubs (ibid).

#### **LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE: CHAPTER BREAKDOWN**

In the following chapter I use the current surveillance literature to set up the theoretical framework for the remainder of my analysis. Drawing on the sociology of risk and governmentality studies, I situate surveillance and specifically CCTV, within neoliberal forms of governance at the macro level. Understanding CCTV as risk management tool, I theoretically explore how risk management rationalities penetrate and impact on how CCTV operators sort the populations that they monitor. Given that few empirical studies have been conducted on CCTV, and specifically the 'selective gaze' of CCTV operators, my empirical findings will serve to test this theoretical framework.

Chapter three serves as my methodology chapter. While it includes those components that one would typically expect to find in such a chapter, I also use this chapter to reflect on my research journey as graduate student. I also utilize this space to discuss the challenges one faces when undertaking empirical surveillance research that is critically grounded.

Chapter four is intended to push the reader beyond a simple technological understanding of CCTV, through the introduction of the research participants and their perceptions on various issues. While this chapter can be read on its own to understand how the CCTV operators interviewed, view, think of, and understand several issues that emerge in CCTV surveillance, I believe it is more fruitful to read this chapter as one that provides a context to assist in understanding the selective gaze of CCTV operators, which is explored in the fifth chapter.

As stated above the fifth chapter explores the factors that influence the gaze of the CCTV operators. Beginning with an exploration of the how the configuration of the cameras in a space impact the gaze, as well as issues such as the demands on the camera operator's time, the automation of the gaze, and the exclusionary gaze. The latter part of the chapter explores the influences on the CCTV operator's decisions vis-à-vis whom and what to watch, with a particular emphasis on what they deem suspicious.

The final chapter serves to wrap-up the discussion of how selectivity occurs in practice, based on my empirical findings. I conclude the thesis by exploring the possible future direction(s) of surveillance studies in general, and specifically the potential direction of my own research in this area.

## CHAPTER TWO:

### THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: CCTV, SOCIAL SORTING AND THE 'NEW PENOLOGY'

The literature base on the topic of surveillance has exploded in recent years. In addition, the study of surveillance is transdisciplinary and much of it theoretical, touching upon the realms of sociology, criminology, urban studies, and governance studies, to name only a few. In light of this fact, I have organized this chapter with two aims: to provide the reader with a review of the literature, and to present it in such a way as to make clear the theoretical framework and key concepts I engage with to make sense of CCTV surveillance in public and semi-public spaces.

#### SURVEILLANCE STUDIES AND THE PANOPTIC OPPRESSION

Influenced by Cesare Beccaria, in 1787, utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham corresponded by letter from Russia to a friend in England, outlining his proposal for a simple design in prison architecture which he called the *Panopticon*. The word 'Panopticon' derives from the Greek words *pan*, meaning 'all', and *opticon*, referring to the visual; in short, meaning 'all-seeing' (Lyon, 1991; Mathieson, 1997). Control and discipline of individuals, Bentham believed, would be best achieved if they were under constant watch. Short of being able to achieve this level of supervision, the next best option would be to give the appearance of constant supervision (Bentham, 1995).

It is with the two-pronged objective of maximizing both the 'visibility' of the prisoner, and the 'unverifiability' of being watched, that Bentham designed his prison blueprints. In his second letter to England, Bentham describes the Panopticon as a circular structure, with the prisoners' cells occupying its circumference, and the inspector's lodge positioned at its centre (Bentham, 1995). Through the particular use of construction materials, lighting, and windows, the prisoners' every action would be visible from the watchtower, while a system of carefully positioned blinds would preclude the prisoners from observing the inspector. A system of tubes would be used as means of communication from the central tower to the

individual cells, thus not allowing the prisoners to be conscious of the fact that the attention of their governor was elsewhere.

In his fifth and sixth letters, Bentham also outlined the essential characteristics of the Panopticon, along with some of its advantages. The most important point according to Bentham, was that the individuals under inspection must constantly feel as though they are under inspection, or, at the very least, made to feel as though they stand a great chance of being scrutinized by the inspector at any specific moment (Bentham, 1995). Bentham also stressed that the potential subjects of inspection should actually be subjected to the inspectors gaze for the greatest proportion of time possible, allowing for individualized intervention when transgressions are witnessed. It is only through actual inspection that the most minute of transgressions can be intervened upon, giving the subject an intense feeling of subjugation, and making one's consciousness of constant inspection stronger (ibid.).

For Bentham, the central inspection lodge needed to be meticulously designed, not only to maintain the unverifiability of the inspector's gaze, but also to ensure the inspector's vigilance. Through designing the lodge for constant occupation, the inspector may be secluded from any other object and/or distraction. In search of a source of entertainment, the inspector will naturally turn his/her gaze toward the subjects, serving the functions of both alleviating the inspector of the boredom of seclusion, and ensuring the constant observation of those under inspection.

Sparing no effort to sell the advantages of his prison design, Bentham insisted that the apparent omnipresence of the inspector combined with the facility of his/her real presence would create an environment where fewer guards would be required to supervise more prisoners. Bentham, however, did not stop at the supervision of the prisoners; he also presented the Panopticon as a tool capable of ensuring that subordinate prison guards and/or inspectors are subjected to the same conditions of unverifiable visibility in relation to their supervisors. By the same process, the entire prison is exposed for periodic institutional inspections by the superintendent, or various other officials, as well as a curious public.

Indeed, Bentham did not limit his panoptic ambitions to the building of prisons. As is suggested in the preface of his *Panopticon Writings*, he had broader applications in mind for his imagined apparatus stating that this “simple idea in Architecture” could reform morals, preserve health, invigorate industry, and assist with instruction (Bentham, 1995: 32).

Although Bentham’s prison model was never actually built, its full significance was pointed out in the 1970s, by French philosopher Michel Foucault. In his book entitled *Discipline and Punish* (1977), Foucault situates the “Panopticon” historically at the turning point between the ‘old regime’, characterized by torture and harsh punishment, and ‘modernity’, characterized by attempts to alter behaviour through calculated human intervention (Lyon, 1991). More than simply discussing the particularities of Bentham’s architectural project, Foucault purported that Bentham achieved his dream of breaking the Panopticon free from its institutional constraints, and transforming it into a “network of mechanisms that would be everywhere and always alert, running through society without interruption in time and space” (1977: 209).

For Foucault, the genius of the Panopticon lay not in its physical architecture, but in its abstraction as a technology of power. The Panopticon:

must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men. No doubt Bentham presents it as a particular institution, closed in upon itself ... But the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction ... it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use (Foucault, 1977: 205).

Many surveillance scholars have utilized Foucault and his popularized notion of *panopticism*, that is, the seeping of the panoptic from its institutional settings into non-institutional spaces (McCahill, 2002), as an explanatory model for the ‘new surveillance’. This is especially true of CCTV which utilizes, like the Panopticon, visual surveillance and centralized monitoring. Fyfe and Bannister (1996) have suggested that the panoptic

mechanism of power has infiltrated public urban space with the introduction of CCTV; that the electronic gaze of the video-camera provokes a state of conscious and permanent visibility resulting in an automatic functioning of disciplinary power. Others, however, are more cautious in applying the panoptic metaphor to CCTV, stating that some institutional settings are more conducive to the panoptic principles than others (McCahill, 2002), or that the totalizing vision of panoptic prison, with all its implications for power, cannot be simply reproduced in the public domain through the introduction of video cameras (Norris and Armstrong, 1999).

Norris and Armstrong (1999) argue that the panoptic prison relies on its strict enclosure to immobilize and subject a known, and already classified, inmate to its disciplinary gaze. This enclosure also facilitates immediate intervention as it is required. This is contrasted with the anonymity and relative mobility of those individuals subjected to visual surveillance in public and semi-public spaces. Those 'doing surveillance' in the public sphere are confronted with a challenge not posed by the Panopticon, specifically, how to determine, among a fluid crowd, who warrants further scrutiny in the absence of individualized knowledge regarding deviant classifications.

In their participant observation research, Norris and Armstrong (1999) seek to answer the question of how selectivity operates in practice, given the impossibility for CCTV operators to monitor everyone at every moment. While the panoptic metaphor divides surveillance into two stories, the story of the watcher and that of the watched (Simon, 2005), it provides very little by way of an account of the role or importance the watcher plays (Haggerty, 2006); it also offers little toward an understanding of the subjectivities inherent in the surveillance of public space. It is with the story of the watcher that I am concerned, and it is with this story of the watcher that I break beyond the insulated walls of the Panopticon and head out on a quest for further theoretical understanding in a world filled with risk.

## RISK AND SOCIETY

The notion of *risk* can be loosely interpreted. For this reason it may be fruitful to begin this discussion by way of definition. Simply, 'risk' may be defined as the probability or possibility of consequence. While this consequence may be positive (building wealth by playing the stock exchange) or negative (becoming indebted through gambling), the term has become synonymous with negative or undesirable outcomes (Lupton, 1999). It is with this negative side of 'risk' that I am concerned, and it is within its negative connotation that 'risk' must be understood for the purposes of my thesis.

While the terms risk and danger are often used interchangeably and may be closely connected, they are distinguishable. As Garland (2003) explains, 'risks' are merely estimates regarding the likely impact of dangers. While danger and hazard are *material things* that have the potential to cause harm to someone or something regardless of whether knowledge about them exists, risk is not. That is, risk cannot exist outside of our knowledge of danger or hazard (Garland, 2003) as it is merely the calculating concept that modulates the relationship between our fear of danger or hazard and the actual harm they cause (Hacking, 2003). By way of illustration, the risk that people and objects may be struck by lightning does not exist without the potential of lightning striking the earth. Allow me to elaborate. As an avid golfer, my knowledge of weather patterns allows me to rest assured that there is no danger of being struck-down by lightning when the sky is clear blue, therefore, I do not experience any risk. However, as storm clouds begin to roll in I may not be so complacent, suddenly my knowledge of a potential hazard (a lightning storm) invokes a sense of risk.

To take the discussion of risk further, risk can only exist where there is uncertainty in knowledge as risk claims are merely informed estimates or probabilistic predictions of a future event (Garland, 2003). To continue with my golfing example, if it were a certainty that everyone who remained on the course to golf in the rain would be struck by lightning should they swing a golf club, there would be no risk of lightning hitting me; a lightning strike would be inevitable, and I would be foolish to continue golfing.

Risk is not a new phenomenon. Certainly human beings have always had to cope with uncertainty about what the future held, and have engaged in activities that would allow them to know and, hopefully, control future outcomes (Garland, 2003). In the past, societies were much more vulnerable to the hazards imposed by nature (Lupton, 1999), such as harsh weather which may lead to illness or drought. Nature was largely viewed to be out of the realm of control for human beings, thus societies engaged in very superstitious ways to control the future, “giving rise to auguries, omens, prophecies, and propitiating sacrifices” (Garland, 2003: 71). As societies and their knowledge of nature evolved, more rational means were attempted to make the future more predictable. For example, seasonal patterns were observed and mapped allowing societies to more efficiently harvest crops and prepare in advance for extreme weather conditions.

By the nineteenth century the concept of risk was no longer solely used in relation to nature or the supernatural, it was extended to acknowledge that unanticipated outcomes may also be the consequence of human action and interaction, and as such the responsibility of humans to control, alter, and/or avoid (Giddens, 1991; Lupton, 1999). Consequently, it is also at this time that advancements in predictability emerge thanks in great part to the development of mathematical and statistical techniques. Garland (2003) argues that it is not attempts at gaining mastery over risk that distinguishes modern society from its forerunners, but rather it is modern society’s widespread adoption of rational techniques and technologies to achieve such ends that serves as distinctive.

In his book *Risk Society*, published in English in 1992, Ulrich Beck argues that while risk is not new to human societies, a consequence of scientific and industrial development has been the rise of risks and hazards, the likes of which have never before been seen. Beck argues that risk, in its various forms, has become more globalized, less identifiable, and more serious in its effects (Lupton, 1999). Simultaneously, modern society has become increasingly aware and reflexive of the risk it creates and obsessed with attempts at managing it. It is stated that in the risk society we become active in the present in an attempt to “prevent, alleviate or take precaution against the problems and crises of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow”

(Beck, 1992b: 34). Modern society has seen both the development of an ever expanding apparatus of research and knowledge surrounding the idea of risk and the proliferation of risk *analysis, assessment, communication* and *management* practices across various segments of society (Garland, 2003; Lupton, 1999).

While Beck takes a realist approach to risk, a weak social constructionist argument also underlies both his work and the work of his interlocutor, Anthony Giddens (Lupton, 1999). Certainly Beck discusses both the social and cultural process which serves to mediate understanding and perceptions of risk, acknowledging that the existence and urgency of risk may vary with the fluctuation of societal values and interests (Beck, 1992a; 1992b; Lupton, 1999). Garland (2003) argues that risk – from deciding which risks to focus on to deciding how to best manage them – is a thoroughly social, cultural, and psychological phenomenon.

There is a difference between ‘real risk’ and the public’s perception of it (Beck, 1992a; 1992b; Lupton, 1999). That is, certain risks may be hyped or downplayed by authorized definers leading to disjuncture between the real and the perceived. The fact that risks may be socially constructed makes them no less real in our experience of them, however, it does mean that they can be magnified and dramatized in the public imagination (Garland, 2003), with a real impact on social life.

With a plethora of risk from which to choose – from the global risks associated with pollution to the local risks such as vehicle accidents or risks yet to enter public consciousness - it may be argued that governments have emphasized relatively few. Each individual and certainly every society has what Ian Hacking terms a *risk portfolio*, which he defines as “that set of hopes but especially fears that moves you, concerns you, that you feel strongly about” (2003: 33). Hacking (2003) also differentiated between risks from the border (risks to groups from the outside world) and risks from the centre (risk to groups from inside). While such things as nuclear war and cancer may appear high on the list of risk from the border, Hacking argues that of the fears that move the centre, fear of crime looms largest (ibid.).

While sociological analyses of all risks that move a society are important, as a criminologist it is on the crime and deviance risk portfolio that I wish to expand.

#### THINKING AND POLICING CRIME IN TERMS OF RISK

Several academics have commented on the prominent shift in the politics of criminal justice practices and the discipline of criminology during the last half of the twentieth-century and debates about the nature of this shift have emerged among critical scholars (see Feeley and Simon, 1992, 1994, Garland, 1996, 1997, 2001; O'Malley, 1992, 1996, 2001; O'Malley and Palmer, 1996; Rose, 1996; Simon, 2001; Sullivan and Stenson, 2001). At the level of the meta-narrative it has been suggested that we have experienced a shift from the politics of the Keynesian-welfare state of the post-war era toward neo-liberalism. It is important to note that these modes of governance are ideal types and that despite the shift toward neo-liberalism some aspects of welfarism have been maintained (Beckett and Western, 2001).

Nikolas Rose (1996: 329) argues that under the welfare-state model of immediate post-war societies *the social* became “a kind of ‘a priori’ of political thought”. The optimistic assumptions underlying this model of governance were that the goods of life were plentiful and the state's role was to ensure that they were distributed in a just and equitable manner (Stenson, 2001). As such, the state absorbed a variety of risks (economic and criminal, to name a few) in the name of society by establishing a socially responsible mode of governance (i.e. techniques such as social security and social reintegration).

In terms of mainstream criminology, given the hegemony of social rationalities in government during the era of welfarism, it may not be surprising that the discipline witnessed a quantitative increase and an expanding influence of *social criminologies* (i.e. anomie theory, social pathology, and the social interactionist perspective) (O'Malley, 1996). With regard to criminal justice practices, there was a belief that professionals armed with social science could rehabilitate and reintegrate those engaged in deviant and/or criminal lifestyles or who were afflicted with personal and/or social pathologies (Stenson, 2001).

Over the last thirty years the traditional welfare (or social) model of governance has bent under both a fiscal crisis and a crisis of legitimacy (Reichman, 1986). Jock Young (1999) argues that the meta-narrative of progress through social planning commonly associated with the modern welfare state became tarnished with the rapid rise of crime rates despite corresponding increases in affluence. This crisis in criminological aetiology was compounded by the fact that the rise in crime rates paralleled unprecedented growth of population under some form of penal supervision (Christie, 2000; Young, 1999).

In addition to the above described penological crisis there has also been a shift in the governing of economies and a corresponding shift in culture. In the emerging globalized economy many industrial corporations took advantage of flexible economic relationships and the competitive labour wages found in developing countries (Rose, 1996). Cities that were once industrial were now left to morph into *world cities* competing to attract global corporations, conferences, sporting events and tourism. Like these cities, individuals were also left to fend for themselves. In short, Rose (ibid.) argues that the government of the social gave way to the governance of particular zones with an emphasis on individuals becoming active agents in their own economic governance, what he terms 'the death of the social'.

Scholars have argued that the economic precariousness found in neo-liberal societies has been reified and inequality and poverty have become accepted as given features of modern life (Stenson, 2001). In this context the economic and the social are perceived to be antagonistic and "economic government is to be de-socialized in the name of maximizing the entrepreneurial comportment of the individual" (Rose, 1996: 340). The social services once provided by the welfare state are replaced by individual prudence and responsibility (O'Malley, 1996, 2001). With such pressures many places, such as the workplace and the urban centre, to name a few, cease to be spaces for social interaction, rather they become spaces for competition and self-promotion.

While the more individualized life of modernity may lead to more flexible and open life-courses it is also fraught with ontological insecurity (Young, 1999) as the institutions which have traditionally structured society and assisted in the formation of personal identity have experienced a decline in influence (Lupton, 1999). Despite being placed under individual control, life-course in an individualized society remains uncertain resulting in greater conflict between individuals (ibid.) and providing a source of criminal and other risks (Stenson, 2001).

Under neoliberalism, lives have become increasingly defined on market terms which mean a willingness to define in risk terms. Thus, it should not be surprising that there has been a shift away from social criminologies, toward a redefining of criminal justice in terms of risk (Sullivan, 2001). Crime becomes perceived as an inevitable aspect of social life, to be moderated by managerial practices that are no longer assumed solely by the state. The central state has been down-sized under neoliberalism and top-down forms of control have, to some degree, been supplanted by more indirect forms of networked social control. The state delegates risk management responsibilities to individuals, families or other voluntary collectivities such as community (O'Malley, 1996) while private institutions provide services such as insurance, to citizens who are increasingly treated as responsabilized consumers of commodified risk reduction techniques (Sullivan, 2001).

In the modern risk society, it is no longer sufficient to apprehend, reform and release the criminalized other, nor is the strict policing of crime enough, the goal is to predict and prevent future criminal behaviour and limit the damages associated with crime. The conduct of those affiliated with mainstream societal values is governed, at least in part, through the selective amplification of passion, anxieties and identities; they are subjected to processes of functional integration such as life long learning, continual retraining, constant job readiness, and ceaseless consumption (Deleuze, 1995). These processes, however, have also been "accompanied by the intensification of direct, disciplinary, often coercive and carceral, political interventions in relation to particular zones and persons" (Rose, 1996: 344-345). In *Visions of Social Control*, Stanley Cohen describes this mutation:

The real master shift about to take place is toward the control of whole groups, populations and environments – not community control, but the control of communities. In this movement technology and resources, particularly at the hard end, are to be directed to surveillance, prevention and control, not ‘tracking’ the adjudicated offender, but preventative surveillance (through closed-circuit television, for example) of people and spaces (1985: 127).

The rising rates of crime discussed previously (p.20) were accompanied by the realization that traditional reactive policing activities have accomplished very little by way of crime reduction (Clarke and Hough, 1984; Kelling, 1983). Police have done much to reorganize in light of the shift described above by Cohen (see also Bennett, 1994). Policing has become increasingly viewed as only one aspect of the law enforcement, crime prevention and harm reduction regime. Several scholars have commented on the governance capabilities afforded to the insurance industry (see Litton, 1982; O’Malley, 1991), and the private security industry (Stenning and Shearing, 1980). In order to obtain insurance, individuals and organizations may be required to conform to techniques of risk reduction as prescribed by the insurance companies. For individuals this may mean ensuring that the doors and windows to their homes are locked or fire alarms are installed, while organizations, such as retail stores, may be required to invest in loss prevention devices prior to insurance being provided.

The majority of the information provided to individuals or other institutions regarding the risk of crime and its management is provided by the police as they reorganize to define most everyday activities in terms of risk and serve as knowledge brokers (Ericson, 1994). In *Policing the Risk Society* (1997), Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty argue that much of police work is oriented toward producing and disseminating knowledge of crime and criminality for interested institutions. They further state that the police and the criminal justices system in general turn suspects into objects of knowledge for the purpose of managing crime risk and that this knowledge of risk is more important than moral culpability and punishment. Some of the principal enablers of this knowledge production

and dissemination are the elaborate surveillance and information technologies and infrastructure available in modern society.

#### **SURVEILLANCE, CCTV AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CRIME RISK**

Industrialization and the rise of the city significantly altered the dynamics of social living, facilitating the growth of individualism and privacy. As discussed briefly above, individualization relates to the weakening influence of traditional structuring institutions resulting in more fluid identities, and life-courses that are more flexible, but it is also fraught with anxiety and contributes to social isolation (Lupton, 1999; McCahill, 2002).

Moreover, in modern times, transportation has become more accessible than ever and we have witnessed the rapid expansion and popularity of communication and information technologies, resulting in unprecedented individual mobility. With the expansion of such technologies co-presence is no longer required to engage with urban social life. Shopping and banking can now conveniently be done online from the comfort of home, while professional and personal relationships (local and global) may be mediated through the internet without any actual (physical) meeting. David Lyon (2001) refers to this declining requirement for co-presence in our day-to-day interactions as the *disappearance of bodies*.

Much of contemporary urban living in western societies has been characterized by an exceptional amount of privacy, leading some to suggest that we have become a *world* or *society of strangers* (Lofland, 1973). Someone is a stranger when they have no reputation (Nock, 1993), thus the thesis of the 'stranger society' simply means that most of our interactions in everyday life occur with strangers who cannot vouch for our reputation based on first-hand personal knowledge. The reputations and motives of unknown others become a source of uncertainty and insecurity. Fear and insecurity may be paralyzing (socially and economically), therefore they must be guarded against through the rational calculus of risk and its management.

The desire to minimize various threats and dangers and to anticipate likely outcomes lends to the production and communication of knowledge on risk, which is facilitated through surveillance. Organizations of all varieties increasingly use surveillance data to keep electronic tabs on their clients, to make visible and coordinate the activities of their disappearing bodies (Lyon, 2001), and to distinguish the trustworthy from those who are not. When viewed in these terms everyone becomes a legitimate target for surveillance, everyone is assumed to be a risk until their profile demonstrates otherwise (Norris and Armstrong, 1999).

In such a context the onus is on individuals to establish their trustworthiness or reputation through *credentials* and/or *ordeals* (Nock, 1993). Credentials refer to acquiring such things as certifications, qualifications and licenses, while ordeals refer to submitting to such things as drug testing, polygraphs, and/or multiple other forms of surveillance, including visual surveillance. It is important to be mindful that these forms of establishing trust are not mutually exclusive; credentials may be linked to databases which mediate ordeals. For example, when stopped by a police officer one must provide a driver's license to establish one's qualification to be driving a motor vehicle; however, once one's driver's license is run through the police databank one's reputation will be based on the resulting list of infractions (driving or otherwise). Norris and Armstrong (1999) contend that those who fail to conform to these requirements are deemed to be a risk. This can be exemplified by such clichés as “one has nothing to fear unless they have something to hide”, or that “bad credit is better than no credit”.

Much of the above discussion on the use of surveillance has focused on its soft and seductive side (the enabling face of surveillance). As previously discussed, surveillance may also be experienced in a more coercive and carceral way by particular persons and/or populations, or in particular locations. In order to examine the constraining face of surveillance, we will now turn to a discussion of crime and social control.

As indicated above, criminal justice has undergone transformation in the last half of the twentieth-century. The shift from what Feeley and Simon (1992; 1994) term an *old* to a *new* penology has meant a shift from individualized blame, diagnosis and rehabilitative treatment toward actuarial justice and control, based on assessments of risk. The discourse on social control is no longer concerned with changing the offender (thoughts, intentions, and motives). Rather, it is concerned with reducing opportunity, situational prevention, and risk management (Cohen, 1985). It is within this new proactive form of crime control that closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance was singled out by the Audit Commission, an independent UK organization responsible for ensuring the public money is spent effectively, as having a major role to play in crime prevention (Norris and Armstrong, 1999).

Crime prevention rationalities have increasingly dismissed dispositional theories of crime in favour of a rational choice perspective with opportunity viewed as a 'root cause' in need of addressing (Felson and Clarke, 1998). The rational choice perspective informed preventive initiatives such as situational crime prevention which have as a focus the criminal event rather than the motives of the offender. Situational crime prevention makes attempts at reducing the physical opportunities for offending through such tactics as target hardening, as well as increasing the chance of being caught by improving lighting and increasing the number of guardians. It is with this aspect of increasing the chances of being caught that the use of CCTV surveillance cameras coincides, making transgressions more observable.

Proponents of surveillance cameras believe that most rationally thinking individuals entering an area that has CCTV will modify their actions to comply with socially accepted behavioural norms as it is difficult for them ascertain whether or not they are being observed (Smith, 2004). Similar to Bentham's panoptic prison, this unverifiability will result in self-surveillance and the self-governing of one's behaviour (Koskela, 2003; Vaz and Bruno, 2003). Should the individual fail to self-govern in the presence of surveillance cameras there is still a chance that the transgression will have been observed and responded to appropriately by the camera operator. The use of CCTV fits neatly with neoliberal forms of governance for it demands that individuals and institutions be responsible for social control. The individual

must self-monitor and the institutions of every day life must intervene when individual self-governance fails. Encouraging the extensive use of CCTV networks allows for state-governance at a distance while leaving the centralized state machine more powerful than before, with an extended capacity for action and influence.

Most criminological research on CCTV has been administrative in nature, assessing the government and police claims that cameras are highly effective (Ditton and Short, 1998; Skinns, 1998; Tilley, 1997; 1998). While an examination of these evaluation studies will not be provided here, it should be noted that CCTV effect on crime is inconsistent at best. Despite the disparity between evaluations on the effectiveness of CCTV, no academic research seems to support the police's general assertion that CCTV installations usually bring about a seventy percent reduction in crime, with little or no displacement effects (Smith, 2004). Can the effect of CCTV be measured by rates of crime in the monitored area? Cannot both increases and decreases in the crime rate demonstrate the effectiveness of CCTV depending on whether one wishes to define success as 'catching criminals' or 'preventing crime'?

Administrative criminology appears preoccupied with the effect of CCTV as technology, tending to ignore that surveillance technology is utilized and shaped by existing social relations and cultural practices (Lyon, 2001; McCahill, 2002). Criminologists will never understand the true impact of CCTV without exploring the politics of surveillance and visibility. Criminology must attempt to understand how surveillance operates at specific sites – looking into the black box – as well as explore its consequences for individual subjects and its social impact. Such an approach includes exploring issues of power and resistance within particular surveillance sites.

#### SUSPICION, CCTV AND THE 'SELECTIVE GAZE'

*Suspicion* may be defined as a cautious distrust. It may be *general* and based on actuarial categories, or *specific* and based on individualized interest. Clive Norris (2003) states that suspicion should be understood as a process which begins to take shape at a distance, but can

only become substantiated through face-to-face interaction. As will be discussed below this has an implication for CCTV surveillance.

Over three decades ago, in an essay first published in 1972, Harvey Sacks (1978: 190) argued that police officers “were the occupational specialists in inferring the probability of criminality from the appearance people present in public places”. Sacks was interested in researching what police officers use to guide their observations, and maximize their likelihood of choosing those with actual criminal intent. Using ethnomethodological analysis, Sacks discovered that police officers employed a number of working rules to assist in guiding their gaze. Sack’s list of working rules was taken up and modified slightly by Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong (1999) in their empirical research on CCTV operators in the UK<sup>8</sup>.

In their research, Dixon et al (1989) and Dunham et al (2005) discuss how police suspicion is constructed and how it plays out in police interactions with citizens. Dixon et al (1989) acknowledge that stereotypes of potential and actual criminals play a factor in the construction of police suspicion. However, they also indicate that as police officers gain experience and knowledge of their patrol environments they begin to establish expectations of “normal appearances” – a *normative ecology* (Sacks, 1978). Individuals who are identified as being ‘out of place’ in a particular space or at a particular time attract suspicion. In their study on the formulation of police suspicion, Dunham et al (2005) also indicate that three quarters of police officers surveyed use some form of working rules to help them identify suspicious persons. However, this study identifies “behaviour” as the primary factor in the formulation of suspicion.

While little empirical research has been conducted on CCTV operators and how they construct suspicion, one must be mindful of differences between direct surveillance, and surveillance mediated through CCTV. First, it must be noted that a police officer’s gaze can only attend one location at any given time, while the CCTV operator may be responsible for

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<sup>8</sup> The list appears at p.30 in relation to the work of Norris and Armstrong (1999).

monitoring various locations simultaneously. Second, when a police officer approaches what appears at first glance, to be a suspicious situation, they may rely on all of their senses to interpret a situation and re-evaluate their initial assumptions. On the other hand, those monitoring surveillance cameras are often deprived of other sensory input, particularly sound, which is essential to providing context to visual images (Norris, 2003).

CCTV surveillance, despite its mediation through visual technology, relies on the cognitive processes of its human operator. On its own CCTV technology can only relay, and perhaps store, surveillance footage. It is also important to understand how this technology is used by its human operator, what information CCTV is used to collect, and finally how the collected information is used in the future (McCahill, 1998; 2002). The degree to which the majority of CCTV schemes in public or semi-public spaces can achieve the individualizing aims associated with panopticism is questionable. Members of the public tend to be unknown to the operator, and, if so desired, they are likely able to evade the gaze of the camera by shifting the time and space of their activities (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). It is for this reason that the Panopticon, with its totalizing vision cannot - at least now - be easily reproduced in public or semi-public space with the introduction of surveillance cameras.

This inability to know in advance which individual members of the public are criminal or deviant means that CCTV operators are faced with a mass of undifferentiated visual images “with the potential for the whole population being the object of suspicion” (Norris and Armstrong 1999; 94). Given the above described limitations of CCTV, and the potential for an overload of visual stimuli, there is an occupational necessity that CCTV operators develop a set of working rules and procedures which seek to maximize their chances of selecting those most likely to be involved in criminal or deviant behaviour (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). The discretion that CCTV operators have in choosing who and/or what they focus their attention on is referred to as the *selective gaze*, but the ‘selective gaze’ also implies much more.

The concept of the 'selective gaze' can be used to describe the selectivity involved at various levels of abstraction. There is much variation in how surveillance may be used across locations and over time. The particular risk that a culture or society chooses to engage, their *risk portfolio* (Hacking, 2001), plays an important factor in guiding the surveillance gaze. In the case of western neoliberal cities, the risk and fear of *street* crime has served to direct the surveillance agenda toward the goal of reclaiming the streets in the urban core for the purposes of urban living, tourism, consumerism, and global investment (Coleman, 2004a; 2004b; Coleman and Sim, 1998; 2000). As local authorities, local business or other institutions, and public as well as private security become *responsibilized* to create defensible spaces in the city, they become authorized definers of security, risk and order, and by extension definers of the role for and uses of CCTV in the city and/or their specific institutions (Coleman and Sim, 1998). Kevin Walby (2005a) suggests that the 'selective gaze' of the CCTV operator is normalized along institutional lines. This perspective is in line with Shearing and Stenning's (1985) instrumentalist view on the uses for surveillance and discipline, which implies the existence of a variety of social orders - or accepted behavioural norms - and reflects the fact that different communities and/or institutions have different objectives for surveillance.

Clive Norris and his collaborators Gary Armstrong (Norris and Armstrong, 1999) and Michael McCahill (Norris and McCahill, 2006) do not agree that CCTV operator selectivity is based on institutionalized discourses of risk as is suggested by Walby (2005a). Norris and Armstrong argue that "it is ... left to the operators to come up with their own *modus operandi*, ... that who was watched, and for what duration was influenced by the idiosyncracies of individual operators" (1999: 102). Norris and McCahill argue that "operators do not see 'risk' ... they see 'scotes' and 'scallies' and people who are 'out of place' and 'out of time' (2006: 114).

Following Harvey Sacks (1978), Norris and Armstrong (1999: 119-48) indicate that CCTV operators abide by seven working rules to assist in them in determining whom, or what activities warrant scrutiny:

1. *Certain behaviours warrant surveillance because they are themselves criminal or disorderly.* There is also a range of other actions (while not criminal) that operators treat as indicative of potential or recently occurring criminality;
2. *Use already existing understandings of who is most likely to commit crime or be troublesome;*
3. *Certain people are worthy of surveillance because they are known by operators to have engaged in criminal or troublesome behaviours in the past;*
4. *Must learn to treat locales as territories of normal appearances and against this background variation can be noticed.* This involves using both temporal and spatial variations of activity within a locale to judge what is both out of place and out of time;
5. *Normal ecology of an area is also "normative ecology".* People who do not belong are treated as "other" and subjected to treatment as such;
6. *Just as operators treat territories as a set of normal appearances, others are expected to also treat them as such.* Thus if a person appears lost, disoriented, or in any other way at unease with a locale this will indicate suspiciousness; and
7. *Learn to see those who treat the presence of the cameras as other than normal as other than normal themselves*

#### **SOCIAL SORTING: DISCRIMINATION BY ANOTHER NAME**

As previously discussed, situational crime prevention is part of a larger shift toward addressing criminal situations rather than changing the individual offender. In essence, with situational crime prevention approaches the focus is on immediacy, the here and now in criminal circumstances. So the rationale goes, an individual may be deterred from criminal transgression if there is no opportune target or if there is likelihood that their transgressions will be observed. By way of example, an individual is likely to be deterred from speeding on a road with speed bumps, or, a car thief is less likely to steal a vehicle that is parked in an area that is well lit.

But a focus on the here and now is no longer sufficient. In a time where speed has become increasingly important, preventing crime in real time is no longer enough, the trend is toward pre-emption (Lyon, 2001). The goal is to simulate and anticipate likely behaviours,

to manage potential risks. It is no longer enough to know what one is saying or doing now, but to anticipate what they will say and/or do next (ibid.).

Oscar Gandy (1993) coined the term 'panoptic sort' to expand on how the classification powers of the Panopticon, as discussed by Foucault, have spilled into the realms of market research. Gandy argued that information regarding the everyday life of individuals and groups is collected, processed, shared and used to coordinate and control their access to the goods and services that define life in the modern capitalist economy. David Lyon (2001; 2003) uses the term 'social sorting' to describe how information collected through various forms of surveillance is used to organize the social and manage persons, both collectively and individually.

Lyon (2003) indicates that the aim of everyday surveillance is to allow for differentiation. The need for modern institutions to classify the population based on varying criteria, the differentiation between those qualified and those not, those eligible for inclusion and those to be excluded, is facilitated by the process of social sorting (ibid.). Much of this discriminatory sorting occurs invisibly in the virtual world of digital information and databases, where disembodied data-doubles increasingly take on a life of their own in the ebb and flow of the virtual world, and increasingly affect how individual lives are experienced by impacting on life chances.

Most of us, especially white middle class men, are blind to the social sorting process because it has had very little negative impact on our lives. I will use an example from the seductive side of consumer and/or marketing surveillance technologies to illustrate how we are all sorted into categories vis-à-vis recommendation services online. I frequently shop for books online at Chapters-Indigo. It was when I added Paul Virilio's book the *Information Bomb* to my online shopping cart that I realized that Chapters was recommending other book purchases based on my previous choice. I was informed that others who have purchased Virilio's book also purchased a number of books in the Harry Potter series. The assumption in the coding of the website and the assumption behind other forms of social ordering is that

'birds of a feather flock together'; because of the shopping patterns of others who purchased Virilio's book, I too must be interested in purchasing the latest book in the Harry Potter series.

Unfortunately not all social sorting is so free from negative consequence, especially when social sorting is used as a means of simulating, anticipating, and controlling crime and/or other forms of undesired behaviour. The risk of crime is predicted through the use of quantified and analyzed information about crime and deviance. This statistical data is then used to construct categories of risk, into which the population is sorted. This actuarial response to the risk of crime tries to work out in advance who will likely commit crime, where, and if necessary deploy police or other criminal justice powers appropriately (Lyon, 2001).

Actuarial practices such as preventive detention, mass surveillance, and geographical and offender profiling are increasingly being used in the new penological context (Feeley and Simon 1992; 1994; Garland; 2001). Preventive detention is used as means of incapacitating those deemed to pose a significant and otherwise unmanageable risk to society. Geographical profiling identifies geographical patterns of crimes with a view to pre-empting crime by pin-pointing where the offender will strike next (Lyon, 2003). This may result from the need to track a serial criminal or identify a particular location as a crime 'hotspot' (Bennet, 1994).

Classification and categorization is made easy with computer power, vastly improving the sifting and sorting process. But it must be also understood that the computer does not itself determine how people are classified. How the computer classifies and categorizes information about persons is manipulated by those who input the programming codes. Individual and/or cultural "values, opinions, and rhetoric are frozen into codes" (Bowker and Star, 1999: 135 quoted in Lyon, 2003: 23) and into the bureaucratic form (whether a paper or online form), much the same way they are crystallized into legislation.

While complex information structures and computers allow for the analysis of varied and complex data, the result of the computerized calculus is often an oversimplified aggregate, frequently in the form of a probability calculation or a risk category, used to justify suspicion against and/or the exclusion of those designated 'risky'. As an individual you no longer need to have done something to warrant additional attention or scrutiny, you simply come under what Gary T. Marx (1988) terms 'categorical suspicion', by virtue of possessing certain characteristics. Categorical suspicion based on physical characteristics is particularly relied upon where the surveillance technologies that are utilized are not yet used in conjunction with searchable databases and there is lack of personal knowledge about the population under surveillance. A case in point is surveillance through CCTV (Lyon, 2003; Norris, 2003; Norris and Armstrong, 1999).

In the first ever empirical study of CCTV surveillance, Norris and Armstrong (1999) engaged in participant observation research inside surveillance control rooms at three different public street sites in the United Kingdom. After 592 hours of monitoring whom the CCTV operators scrutinized for more detailed surveillance, Norris and Armstrong concluded that more than one-third of all targeted surveillance was the result of categorical suspicion, which they defined as "suspicion based merely on personal characteristics such as dress, race, membership of subculture group" (ibid.: 112). Groups more than individuals, and young men (in their teens and twenties), particularly if they were Black, were more likely to illicit the camera operator's attention (ibid.). Their study also revealed that one's manner of dress appears to have little implication for surveillance on public streets. Norris and Armstrong further suggest that while women were not often targeted for surveillance, if they were it was most likely for voyeuristic reasons rather than protectional ones. A more recent study conducted on a college campus examines which categories of suspicion are used to guide the operator's 'selective gaze' in an area where young males make up the majority. In such a context it appears that items of fashionable (subcultural) clothing become associated with crime and deviance, and are used to justify more detailed visual surveillance. In his study of surveillance in British shopping malls Michael McCahill (2002) points out that those who disrupt the commercial image of the shopping centre, the 'flawed consumer' (i.e. lower

class youth and suspected or known drug dealers) were not only more likely to be targeted for surveillance, but also more likely to be excluded from the environment.

It may be argued that since categories of risk are statistically determined, those individuals designated risky and targeted for more thorough visual surveillance merely reflect that distribution of criminality in society; however, the statistics are also based on pre-given assumptions regarding the distribution of criminality (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). Lyon points out that “[c]amera systems tend to inflate stereotypes and operators often follow suspects even where the grounds of suspicion are merely hairstyle, skin colour, clothing or age” (2001: 63). While some proponents have argued that CCTV operators must abide by strict codes of conduct, such as only targeting individuals who arouse suspicion, Norris (2003) suggests that most codes of conduct do not indicate which situations and/or individuals should arouse suspicion, and states further that this is also the most neglected part of training.

Allow me to move, for a moment, to a discussion of *new generation CCTV*. New generation systems are characterized by digital technology. The digitization of video technology permitted the incorporation of visual images and information databases, resulting in capabilities such as facial recognition. This integration of technologies is said to strengthen the panoptic gaze of video surveillance by ameliorating the limitation of spatial distancing and enhance prediction through simulation (Norris, 2003). While it is suggested that the new digital and facial recognition technologies will eliminate discretion and therefore reduce discrimination, the entry of information into databases remains subject to human discretion which tend to prioritize some types of crimes and criminals, while overlooking others (ibid.) While facial recognition software has and will continue to prove useful in some instances, its widespread use will likely limit surveillance to those already policed (McCahill, 1998) by public police and/or private security agents.

The problem appears to be that CCTV is used as both a tool to manage risk and a tool to acquire information about risk, serving only to reinforce classificatory and stereotypical

thought. Categories of suspicion are used to guide the surveillant gaze, perhaps often only adding validity to the biases already inherent in risk classifications. As Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argue, these categories of suspicion cannot be viewed as impartial because they are produced by risk institutions that already put different value on young and old, rich and poor, black and white, men and women. The result is criminological knowledge based on essentialism and 'othering'; a discriminatory knowledge which makes a mockery of justice in general and social justice in particular.

#### **WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?**

I have situated surveillance in general and CCTV specifically within the debate of postmodern penalty, emphasising that surveillance of all forms has emerged as a means of managing various and diverse risks. The literature suggests that CCTV fits neatly with neoliberalism and its managerial style for governing the city. The literature also suggests that at a micro-level CCTV operators do not require individualized knowledge about potential offenders, but rather aggregated knowledge that will allow them to sort the 'risky' or 'suspect' from the trustworthy, which may be categorized into crude characteristics such as gender, age, and race.

As I have indicated at the opening of this chapter, much of the literature on surveillance is theoretical in nature. Norris and McCahill argue that such theorizing is often "conducted at a very high level of abstraction ... [and] can often 'mistake rhetoric for reality' and fail to consider the aims, activities and values of penal actors themselves" (2006: 98). It is with this in mind that I pursue the 'messy actualities' (O'Malley et al., 1997) of how selectivity occurs in practice.

**CHAPTER THREE:****THE RESEARCH JOURNEY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF DOING SURVEILLANCE RESEARCH**

In the spirit of reflexivity, a previously prepared and admittedly very mundane outline of my research methodology has been abandoned. Instead I have written one that shares the experience and the challenges of doing graduate research in general, and graduate research on surveillance more specifically. This chapter outlines my research journey. The expedition includes a discussion of the initial formulation and subsequent re-formulations of a 'doable' problematic; methodological choices, reconsiderations, and compromises; recruitment and ethics challenges, as well as the paradox of being a surveillance researcher.

**FINDING YOUR PASSION: THE RIGHT QUESTION WILL DRIVE YOU**

Armed with a general area of research interest, a prospective thesis supervisor and ambition for two, I set out into the academic world of graduate studies. This was a foreign world, one not embarked upon by anyone in my immediate circle of peers. Several aspects of my life - employment, academics, peer group, and parenthood - were worlds apart; they were disjointed and irreconcilable, resulting in feelings of isolation which I have never before experienced.

Early in this journey my thesis supervisor advised me to find a research question that impassioned me, for when push comes to shove it is that passion that will carry you through. While this is sound advice, identifying such a question is not an instantaneous occurrence. Getting to the right question can take considerable time, and paradoxically an inspirational research question only invites further contemplation and tinkering - sometimes even complete overhaul. Despite significant life circumstances which saw me take a short leave from my academic studies, it was in part the desire to explore a question that I was passionate about which would provide the driving force necessary to complete my degree. This section reflexively explores how I came to develop a question that inspired me.

Beginning with a general interest in the area of surveillance and social control, it did not take long to realize that little to no empirical research has been conducted on surveillance in the Canadian context. I initially proposed an exploration of the current state of CCTV surveillance in Canada, intending to explore whether Canada was following the expansionary trends found in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). If it was determined that Canada was not, how has Canada resisted this movement toward the mass surveillance of public space? I quickly realized the full breadth of this research endeavour and that this question would not sustain my interest. Without intending to devalue the need for mapping out the rise and extensiveness of CCTV surveillance in Canada, this research object simply was not inspirational. Unable to adequately respond to the self-posed question *so what*, this question was quickly abandoned and a new one pursued.

Thinking of surveillance as a social justice issue, and dissatisfied with the bulk of responses to surveillance - often under the rubric of privacy (Lyon, 2001) - I began exploring forms of resistance to closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance. It was quickly realized that much of the work in relation to surveillance was theoretically oriented, and much of the empirical research regarding CCTV was oriented around evaluations. With the exception of a few studies (McCahill, 2002; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Smith, 2004), there is a notable blind spot in the surveillance literature specifically with regard to empirical research on the processes of doing surveillance work, especially within the Canadian context. In short, faced with a choice of whether to study acts of resistance undertaken by those watched or explore the act of watching, I chose the latter.

Quickly moving beyond an interest in whom or what is targeted by surveillance workers, what most fascinated me was exploring the *how* questions: 1) How does selectivity operate in practice; 2) How do CCTV operators make sense of what they are watching on the screens?; 3) How do CCTV operators determine whom or what requires more detailed scrutiny?; and 4) How are these decisions influenced?

In their groundbreaking study, Norris and Armstrong (1999) suggest that when selecting who should be targeted for surveillance, operators begin with taken for granted assumptions about the distribution of criminality among the population. They do not, however, address how these assumptions are informed and perpetuated. This is the question I wish to explore in my research with the hope of contributing to the debate on whether the social construction of suspicion, which guides the 'selective gaze' of the camera operator, is created by the individual operator's idiosyncrasies, determined by the institutional context in which they work, or influenced by a combination of both.

### **The Importance of What We Care About: Reflecting Upon Research Questions**

If, as alluded to in chapter two, the risk that a particular society concerns itself with reveals more about the nature of that society than it does about the nature of the identified risk (Garland, 2003), then so too must a research question posed by a social scientist reveal more about him/her than the phenomenon that the question seeks to explore. It is with the hope of assisting students who follow in their quest of finding an inspirational research object that I write this section.

In undergraduate methodology classes students are taught the importance of researcher objectivity in the sciences - social or natural - as though such a thing were possible. The first research question which I formulated regarding whether CCTV in Canada is following the expansionary path of the UK and US, is an example of an illusory attempt at posing a research question and conducting research that is uncontaminated by my personal or political sympathies (Becker, 1967)<sup>10</sup>. It is no wonder that such a question was unsustainable, as it did not allow me to articulate my position within the surveillance debate.

The question, to borrow from Howard Becker (1967), is whose side am I on? As a self-proclaimed critical criminologist, the answer to this question is both obvious and complex.

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<sup>10</sup> This is not to imply that my initial research question was value free, but rather that it did serve (however slightly) to constrain my personal position.

As social researchers we are also citizens and cannot separate ourselves from the forms of social control dispersed throughout society. I cannot lay honest claim that this research object emerges from the complaints of individuals who have felt unjustly targeted by CCTV operators, as, if these voices exist, they have been all but silent. The suppression of widespread resistance to CCTV may be partially explained by the fact that camera operators work within a 'black box', where their actions and/or decisions about who requires monitoring and where to deploy resources are invisible to the surveillant subject(s). Instead, it is the front-line security guards or police officers deployed in relation to CCTV who are charged with allegations of discrimination or misconduct, while the actions of the operators behind the screens – and by extension the very presence of surveillance mediating technologies - continue without widespread challenge.

My position is informed by the research of other critical social scientists - whose works scarcely enter mainstream discourse - and as a subordinate myself in the day-to-day politics of surveillance and visibility. In part my passion is fuelled by the ambivalence that most citizens – including academics - demonstrate with regard to what occurs behind the surveillance cameras that mediate their being watched. If, as suggested, knowledge *is* power, it is time we start working toward levelling the playing field. It is time we generate knowledge(s) that encourage and facilitate debate and dissent rather than control.

My identification as a subordinate in my relationship with CCTV surveillance should not be mistaken as a bias against those who operate surveillance cameras. To be sure, while the question of how selectivity operates in practice is grounded in a concern for citizens subordinate to the CCTV operators, the answer to this question is explored through the experiences and voices of the operators themselves. It is hoped that by employing methodological tools which allow one's analysis to be grounded in voices of the surveillance worker, that analysis may be insulated from a one-sided bias (Becker, 1967).

### **WHO SAYS THERE'S A RIGHT WAY: METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES**

In order for a researcher to contribute to the knowledge(s) of a particular topic, they must first be able to organize and understand their data; this is achieved by choosing, from among the many options, an appropriate research design and method (Bryman, 2004). As noted previously, the majority of surveillance literature to date is theoretical or administrative in nature. Very little has been written regarding the (in)appropriate methodological approaches for studying surveillance, and what has been written typically concerns such things as appropriate evaluation methods (Tilley, 1997; 1998). When considering the empirical research conducted on camera operators, relatively few methodological tools have been utilized, suggesting that it is open season for methodological experimentation within the realm of surveillance studies - that is if you can negotiate access to surveillance sites and its workers.

#### **Choosing a Research Strategy: The Quantitative and Qualitative Divide**

The first choice a researcher makes regarding their research design is whether to employ exclusively quantitative or qualitative research methods, or to employ a combination thereof. The limited volume of empirical research conducted on CCTV operators have employed either strictly qualitative (Smith, 2004; Walby, 2005a, 2005b) or both qualitative and quantitative methods (Goold, 2004; McCahill, 2002; Norris and Armstrong 1999).

Being careful not to dismiss the use-value of quantitative analysis, especially when used in conjunction with qualitative research methods, a quantitative approach, with its preoccupations with measurement and causal explanation offers very little for exploring or describing a social actor's interpretation of the social world of which they form a part (Bryman, 2004). As such, qualitative methods will best allow me to explore how CCTV operator decision making is influenced, as it allows for an understanding of how the participant interprets his/her social world (ibid.). In short, qualitative research will allow for a more humanistic appreciation of surveillance work (Lofland, 1971: 5)

### **Design and Method: Concepts Not To Confuse, More Choices To Be Made**

With a few decisions already taken, it was time to choose a research design and method. While many may view these to mean the same thing, it should be made clear that they are not. To be certain, they are related as a chosen research design will have an impact on what methods can and cannot be used. While a research design “provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data” (Bryman, 2004: 27) a research method “is simply a technique for collecting data” (ibid.). Choosing an appropriate research design is presented as relatively straight forward and appears relatively painless in most methodology textbooks; however, one must be willing to compromise and revise their preferred approach.

Early on I decided to focus on one specific surveillance site, in other words deciding on a *case study* research design. The intention was to study, in great detail, how CCTV surveillance was organized within a downtown shopping centre in Canada. It was determined that combining a number of methodological tools, available within a case study design would allow for the best possible picture of how surveillance practices operate. I had intended to engage in one hundred and fifty (150) hours of participant observation in the CCTV control room of this particular shopping centre. In addition to observing the camera operators in their work environment the intention was to conduct semi-structured interviews with the camera operators and other security guards, as well as analyse any policy or training documents made available to me.

Aware that simple participant observation had already been used in the UK to study CCTV operators (McCahill, 2002; Norris and Armstrong, 1999), I had little concern with repeating this methodological approach in the Canadian context. This feeling changed when, after starting this research project, two new empirical studies of CCTV operators were published (Smith, 2004; and Walby, 2005a). In 2005, Kevin Walby published two articles (2005a; 2005b) suggesting that an institutional ethnographic approach would serve as useful methodological tool for studying CCTV surveillance. What problematized the situation further was that Walby, a PhD candidate at Carleton University, was writing about CCTV

surveillance in Canada. This was my first experience revising a methodological approach that I was personally satisfied with and thought was set in stone.

I immediately began searching for a new methodological approach to experiment with in order to study camera operators. Looking for a way to one-up what little had already been done, and Walby in particular, I stumbled across a methodological approach that was imported to study decision making by police (Dunham et al, 2005). Dunham et al (2005) utilized the qualitative methodology of *verbal protocol analysis* in an attempt to examine the formulation of police suspicion and examine the cognitive processes used by police prior to making the decision to stop a citizen. Verbal protocol analysis “involves making a detailed record of the [participant’s] verbal report while they are engaged in carrying out a task (...)” (McGuinness and Ross, 2003). The participant may provide their verbal report concurrently or retrospectively (ibid; also see Ericsson and Simon, 1984). I quickly modified my research methodology to include protocol analysis in lieu of simple participant observation, seeing how this method may provide new insights into how CCTV operators decide whom and/or what to target.

After approximately one month of unreturned phone calls and emails, and fruitless visits to the administrative office at the downtown shopping centre, I was finally able to secure a meeting with the Security Manager through an acquaintance who works on the shopping centre’s security team. With a newly fleshed out methodological framework I confidently attended a meeting with the manager prepared to negotiate but found myself immediately stonewalled when advised that I would not under any circumstances be granted access to the CCTV control room. Further, the Security Manager indicated that that if I was to be granted access to the security staff, they would be advised not to discuss institutional policy with me. The Security Supervisor, who was also in attendance at this meeting, stated that there is a lot of outside interest in the operations of the security staff at this particular shopping centre and that they make efforts to keep their “secrets” to themselves. After advising the supervisor and manager of the ethical process at the university and its corresponding requirements for protecting anonymity and confidentiality, I was advised to return to them

once the Research Ethics Board had approved the research. The Security Manager also insisted that he would first have to screen all interview questions prior to granting access to his security staff.

It became evident after this first meeting that gaining access to a CCTV control room would be far more difficult than initially anticipated, making a case study research design implausible until I had developed a rapport and built trust with surveillance workers and their employing institutions. It is with the intention of using my Master level research as such an opportunity that I decided to switch from a case study to a *comparative* research design (Bryman, 2004). It was thought that conducting simple qualitative interviews with CCTV operators would allow me to avoid negotiations for the formal access required to conduct a more intensive case study. It would also allow for comparisons of surveillance practices across different institutions rather than having a singular site to focus upon, and may serve to alleviate the concerns of participant's that the practices of their particular site would be revealed. This was also viewed as an opportunity to network beyond one particular site for the purposes of future research in this area.

In the end a comparative research design was selected and the semi-structured interview was the method of choice. For the most part I was not able to obtain the training packages or copies of institutional policies, thus I decided to forego their use in the analysis, instead relying on CCTV operator perceptions regarding what the policies or training entailed - if they existed - and to what degree they influenced what the operators perceived as suspicious or as requiring more detailed surveillance. I chose a semi-structured interview approach because it would allow flexibility for the research participants to speak freely about their work and its influences, while at the same time providing me with a guide, and each interview with enough structure to make useful comparisons between the interviewees. Semi-structure interviews also allow for probing and requests for clarification. After several versions, and with the help of my research supervisor, a question guide was drafted, submitted to and approved by the University of Ottawa's Ethics Review Board. However, minor adjustments were made subsequent to my first interview incorporating the

participant's suggestion that questions be added and other influences on the CCTV operator's gaze be explored. Despite being given the opportunity, none of the other research participants recommended any changes or additions to interview questions. A copy of the final interview schedule can be found at *Appendix A*.

#### NAVIGATING THE ETHICS LABYRINTH

The *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans*, established in 1998 mandates that all research involving human subjects be approved by a REB prior to data collection. As such, every Canadian university has established REBs within their institutions, which serve to evaluate whether the researcher has successfully balanced the potential harms and benefits of the proposed research. Where it is deemed that the risk of harm outweighs the benefit of the research, and where it is deemed by the REB that the researcher cannot sufficiently mitigate these potential harms, the researcher may be asked to make changes to their project, or in extreme cases the researcher may find their research project declined by the board. In short, REBs have become a significant institution in the governance of academic scholarship and the creation of knowledge. Surprisingly, relatively little has been written about the implications that university REBs have for university scholarship in Canada, especially for the social sciences. To my knowledge, the implications of the REB on graduate level social science research – especially at the Master level - have largely been ignored. Inspired and informed largely by Kevin Haggerty's (2004) article *Ethics Creep: Governing Social Science Research in the Name of Ethics*, this section examines my experience with the REB. It also explores the potential consequences that the ethics process may have on Master level scholarship. Despite my passion, this section should not read as the rant of a frustrated student, but as the expression of concern by an apprentice who ponders the possibilities of critical scholarship in criminology.

#### Process and Timeframes

The first step in the ethics approval process is to submit a *Research Ethics Board Project Submission Form (Appendix B)*, along with various other supporting documents. The submission form itself is composed of six main sections. These sections include: a general

information section; a section outlining the summary of the research protocol; a section indicating the risks and benefits of the proposed research; sections in which the researcher outlines how they will obtain informed consent and ensure confidentiality and anonymity; and finally, the signature section which by signing binds the researcher to the protocol outlined on the submission form. In addition to this form the researcher is required to submit: a recruitment text (*Appendix C*); a consent form on faculty letterhead, in both official languages (*Appendix D*); a research proposal, not exceeding five pages; a copy of the interview guide; and, a letter from either the student researcher's thesis committee, or research supervisor indicating that they approve of the student proposed research protocol. Should any of the fields in the project submission form or any of the supporting document be omitted the REB will not review the application.

Putting together such a package requires significant planning, a concrete research proposal, and an understanding of the methodology that the student researcher will be using for their data collection. While how long it may take for a student to reach this point may vary depending on the structure of their graduate program, Master students in the criminology program at the University of Ottawa spend the first two sessions of a two year program fulfilling course requirements and completing their research proposal. Thus, the majority of students who require ethics approval for their research may not be in a position to prepare their ethics application until the summer of their first year.

With no REB sitting in the month of July, my goal was to meet the deadline for the August 2006 REB. Submitting my application for a minimal risk review, the evaluation time for my submission was to be three to four weeks according to the *Summary of Procedures for REB Review*, found online at the University of Ottawa website. However, initial feedback was not received from the REB until September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2006. It was not until September 22<sup>nd</sup> – almost a full eight weeks later – that the ethics submission was approved and I received the ethics certificate (*Appendix E*). Notwithstanding the fact that the REB had no ethics concerns and required very little clarification regarding the content of this submission, it

took almost double the normal length of time to obtain approval from the REB over the summer months.

While delays are to be expected from any bureaucracy, it does pose challenges for students who have a relatively short deadline to complete their research, as is the case for Master students. Further, it should be noted that because the REB governs the entire research process, including the recruiting process, students – if actually abiding by the ethics requirements – should not even begin recruiting participants until such time as they received ethics approval. What this means in many cases is that the student's project comes to a halt, at least in terms of their data collection and analysis. While such delays may annoy faculty and PhD student researchers, they pose much more of a challenge for Master student researchers who have only budgeted for two years of tuition payments, or those who have received only two years of internal or external funding to complete their degree.

Certainly, the knowledge that this process is lengthy has turned some Masters students off of using human research subjects from the very beginning. Others many have initially decided to employ human subjects in their research but have backed out upon finally facing the ethics labyrinth. Furthermore, under the corporate management structures of contemporary universities, faculty are encouraged to have their student complete their thesis in as short a period as possible, making way for new 'consumers'. As a result, research supervisors may increasingly discourage their student from conducting research that requires ethics approval because it simply takes too long. As a result of the above, relatively few decide to take the risk and see it through. Those who do, however, pay the cost in terms of time, energy, and consequently, additional tuition fees.

### **The Risk and Reduction of Harm**

Thanks in part to the warnings of a student colleague, very few modification were required to my ethics application prior to obtaining approval. I was advised by my colleague to include all harms imaginable that may potentially come to the research participants, no

matter how implausible it may be, otherwise my application would be returned to me with direction to do so.

Recall that my research protocol was modified after failing to negotiate access to a site for the purposes of conducting a case study. Understanding that most organizations do not want their surveillance practices discussed with strangers, my intention was to approach CCTV operators, attempting to bypass management where at all possible. As such, quite an extensive warning was included in the consent form regarding the potential harms that may come to the participant should their employer or colleague learn that they had spoken to a researcher. The following is an excerpt from the 'risk' section of my participant consent form:

I also understand that should I share information which violates my terms of employment, and this is revealed to my employer, I may suffer administrative and/or disciplinary consequences. In an extreme case this may include dismissal from my employment ... I have received assurance from the researcher that every effort will be made to minimize these risks by ensuring my **anonymity** and that the information I share remains **confidential**. I have been advised that, if requested, I will be provided a copy of the interview transcript to review. I have also been assured that I may retract my entire interview or any statements made by contacting the researcher prior to publication.

Despite assurances to the research participants to protect their anonymity and confidentiality, as well as the implausibility that any of the CCTV operators would be dismissed, it was determined that further *precautions* must be taken (Haggerty, 2004: 202-03; see also Haggerty, 2003). As such, the REB requested that I "ensure that it is not necessary to obtain the employer's approval before *recruiting* and interviewing employees of private companies". This stipulation made the recruitment process much more challenging as it required negotiation with institutional gatekeepers. While for the most part, I believe I abided by this demand making the recruitment process lengthier and more challenging than it needed to be, it imposed an artificial ethical boundary or line which was difficult to walk at times. For example, James, who I know through a social network, had agreed to participate in the research prior to the project receiving ethics approval, and while my

interview with him was not scheduled until after I received ethics certification, we did not discuss whether his management was aware that he and Xavier were participating. However, during our interview their manager arrived to replace James and he himself provided information to me, which was not used as had not signed the consent form. Further, Richard, a manager for a department store security team, was recruited for this study. While Richard decided to participate and provided another participant, another department store security manager who expressed an interest in participating was advised by upper management not to partake in an interview. This leads me to believe that Richard should have also first sought permission from Regional level management prior to his participation.

### **Obtaining Informed Consent**

While most researchers would agree that informed consent must be obtained from the research participant and that they be fully informed of what participation would entail, the degree to which someone should be informed of the research objective is perhaps slightly more controversial. While I did not in an outright manner deceive my research participants, the requirement imposed by the REB, that I obtain approval of companies prior to interviewing their employees meant that I would have to make great efforts to sell, and obtain buy-in for my research topic – this is especially true given the research has a critical edge. As such, the purpose of the research, as written on the consent form was constructed in such a way as not to reveal its critical focus. If this is to be considered deceptive, then I find solace in the fact that it is no different than what my participants do on a daily basis by covering-up the direction of their surveillance camera lens through the use of a tinted globe.

The role of the researcher during the data collection phase is to extract as much information as possible for later analysis, whether it is in the form of obtaining documentary sources or obtaining information from human participants. As such, the research must establish trust with the participants and offer an environment where the interviewee feels secure enough to share information in as open a manner as possible. Notwithstanding attempts to approach every interview with an open mind, every researcher has a position – in this case a critical

one – on the problematic being researched. One can only imagine how the interviews would have went if at the beginning of each I had indicated that I had social justice concerns about surveillance and thus was critical of institutional surveillance practices. Surely, the participants would have been more guarded than any researcher would have liked. Instead, I provided a cordial environment respectful of the interviewees and their positions. Sociologist Richard Leo became the target of allegations that his study of interrogation tactics used by police was not ethical because he “adopted a more professional and conservative persona than he did in his daily life ... [This] included dressing formally and cutting his hair” (Haggerty, 2004: 406; see also Allen, 1997). Measured against such an absolutist ethical standard, it may also be suggested that this researcher engaged in unethical research as I sometimes laughed at participant jokes or stories which I otherwise believed were not appropriate.

### **Protecting Anonymity**

Some have suggested that the requirement for social scientists to protect the anonymity may serve to weaken the potential political impact of social science research (Haggerty, 2004). While this may be true in some cases, the anonymity requirements may be waived if the participants provide consent to use their real names, and/or the researcher provides appropriate justification as to why such protection is not necessary. If the default position of the REB is that the anonymity of participant be protected, it is ironic that the REB would require me to first obtain approval from the companies to interview their employees, consequently violating this ethical obligation.

Undoubtedly, there have been research studies conducted in the name of science - both social and natural - that have crossed over acceptable ethical boundaries, such as Stanley Milgram’s (1974) obedience and Philip Zimbardo’s (1973) prison experiments, or to use a more extreme case the experimentations undertaken by the Nazi regime in Jewish concentrations camps (Allen, 1997; Haggerty, 2004). While most of us may agree that studies such as these should not be condoned within our institutions of higher learning,

“[w]e have reached the point where breaking many of the rules imposed by REBs would not in fact result in unethical conduct” (Haggerty, 2004: 410).

By way of concluding this section, it is clear that the REB has become a powerful force in the governance of academic research, making it more difficult and/or impractical to produce certain forms of knowledge. Specifically at risk are “non traditional, qualitative, and critical social scientific research knowledge” (Haggerty, 2004: 393). Certainly, several of the classics that we take for granted would not be possible under the current regime. Imagine sociology without Erving Goffman’s work on the asylum or Howard Becker’s works on musicians, medical students, or college students (Becker, 2004). It has become much easier to do research which does not include human subjects, such as archival and other documentary sources, stifling the initiative of some graduate students (Haggerty, 2004: 397).

#### **RECRUITMENT AND SAMPLING**

Prior to commencing the recruitment process a list was comprised of the various sites which may employ CCTV surveillance systems. This list was shared with the REB at their request, but it would also serve as a guide while canvassing sites for research participants. A number of different recruitment methods were employed throughout the process, and in some cases relied on snowball sampling in order to recruit participants. For example, when James was recruited to participate in the study he indicated that he knew other CCTV operators who may also be interested in participating. James was then provided with a copy of the recruitment text to share with potential participants. It was through James that the participation of Xavier and Barry was secured.

Most of the other interviews scheduled required much more active work on the part of the researcher. Spending parts of some days, armed with copies of the recruitment text and question guide I canvassed shopping mall and department stores security staff. It proved quite difficult to get hold of CCTV operators, who often work in a room removed from the public areas under surveillance. Often customer service agents would contact a security agent who would not speak without the approval of the manager, whose telephone number

or email address would be provided as they never appeared to be on site. It became quite evident early on in the recruitment process in-person canvassing would not be an effective use of time, nor would it yield great success. However, Richard was recruited in this manner, and he was able to put the researcher into contact with his friend and colleague Michael.

For the remaining interviews, various institutions were contacted by telephone or through email, and in some instances both. In the majority of these cases I was directed to a manager to sell the research project. Recruitment through such means makes the process easier and paradoxically more difficult at the same time. Certainly, it reduces the amount of time spent canvassing potential research sites, as several shopping malls or college/university campus' in the city or surrounding area could be contacted in an hour's time, while it would have taken days or even weeks to cover the same sites in person. However, given the impersonal nature of telephone, and especially email communication gatekeepers are certainly freer to immediately state that they were not interested, where they may have taken the time to hear out the project if I had canvassed in person.

It is remarkably difficult to speak to CCTV operators without first going through institutional gatekeepers, whether in person or by email and telephone. While one is more likely to get in touch with the CCTV operator directly if contact is made by telephone, in almost all cases the CCTV operator indicated that I would need to speak to their manager. In one case in particular, the CCTV operator expressed interest in participating, but indicated that the approval of his supervisor needed to be sought. After speaking to the director of security by the telephone, he requested a copy of the recruitment text and question guide by email for his review. Shortly thereafter he indicated through return email that he was "advised [by his dispatchers] that they [did] not wish to participate" in the research project. Ironically, in another situation, an interview date with Ian was established through contact with his security manager; however, Ian was never advised that he was going to be interviewed.

Overall the recruitment process was complicated and lengthy. This was compounded by the fact that this process could not be undertaken prior to receiving ethics approval. The requirement that I go through an institutional gatekeeper added an additional layer of bureaucracy to navigate. Whether it entailed going through security management, site management, regional management, or the media relations division, this process was lengthy and ongoing, and as such, the recruitment phase overlapped with that of data collection. In some cases, frustrated by the many bureaucratic obstacles confronted, attempts to access CCTV operators at particular research sites were abandoned. Certainly, a few additional interviews may have served to make the analysis herein more robust; however, it would have come at the expense of further delaying not only the analysis, but ultimately the completion of my thesis as well.

In the end, the goal of recruiting ten research participants who work or have worked in the area of CCTV surveillance was achieved. Also successful were the attempts at accessing surveillance workers across various institutional settings; a diversity not seen in any other single study of CCTV. The following table (*Table 1*) demonstrates the diversity between the institutional settings, the technologies employed, and the demographic of the CCTV operators in this study. It should be immediately apparent that no women CCTV operators were interviewed in the course of this research. It should be noted that this omission was not intentional on the part of the researcher and that while this may be purely coincidental given the recruitment and sampling techniques employed, it may also speak to the masculine culture of security work and CCTV work specifically. This is not to suggest that women do not operate CCTV, but rather that their numbers are sparse in comparison to male operators.

Table One – Snapshot of Research Sites and Participant Demographics

Name of Participant	Demographic of Participant	Institutional Setting	Technology Employed
Paul	White Male 50s	Campus	- 700-800 still and rotational cameras - Digital video recording
Andre	White Male 30s	Casino	- 590-600 still and rotational cameras - Digital video recording
Richard	White Male 20s	Downtown Department Store	- 70-80 still and rotational cameras - Digital video recording
Michael	White Male 20s	Downtown Department Store	- 70-80 still and rotational cameras - Digital video recording
Shawn	Black Male 40s	Downtown Department Store	- 40-50 still and rotational cameras - Video cassette recording
James	White Male 20s	Downtown Shopping Mall	- 15-20 still cameras - Video cassette recording
Xavier	Black Male 20s	Downtown Shopping Mall	- 15-20 still cameras - Video cassette recording
Ian	White Male 50s	Suburban Shopping Mall	- 40-50 still and rotational cameras - Digital video recording
Barry	White Male 20s	Museum	- 30-40 still and rotational cameras - Digital video recording
Frank	White Male 50s	Open-Street	- 5 rotational cameras - Digital video recording - Video cassette recording

#### DATA COLLECTION, MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

Surely it is at this stage of the research process that the researcher begins to learn more about the subject or topic under examination. With each interview further understanding was gained about the 'selective gaze' of CCTV operators; however, the researcher's learning extends beyond the substantive issue being studied. To be sure, as a rookie researcher I learned as much - if not more - about how to conduct interviews, and about my strengths/weaknesses and abilities/disabilities as a researcher. This section not only outlines the manner in which the data was collected and managed, in it I also reflect on what this process has taught me about myself as a researcher.

#### The Interview Process

The interviews for this study were conducted between November 1, 2006 and January 08, 2007. The length of the interviews ranged between approximately one hour and twenty minutes (1hr 20mins) to approximately three hours and fifteen minutes (3hrs 15mins), with

the mean length being approximately two hours and fifteen minutes (2hrs 15mins). Interviews were scheduled at the convenience of the participants and were undertaken at a location of their choosing. This decision was made in an attempt to minimize the inconvenience to the participants and allow them to choose a location in which they would feel comfortable being interviewed. As such, the interviews were conducted at a variety of times and in a variety of locations, each of which posed their own unique challenges for conducting interviews.

Two of the interviews were conducted in the basement of a restaurant, two interviews were conducted at coffee shops, while the remaining five were conducted at the surveillance site, either in the surveillance control room or a more secluded and quiet area. While the interviews undertaken on site in a more secluded and quiet space provided the best environment for recording interviews, the atmosphere during these interviews was cold and the interview felt much more contrived than interviews which occurred in the other environments. While those undertaken in the context of a restaurant or coffee shop felt less unnatural, these environments often had much more background noise making the transcription of interviews more of a challenge. Perhaps most natural - but also most challenging - were the interviews conducted within the surveillance control rooms while the CCTV were working. While it was apparent that CCTV operators interviewed in this setting were most comfortable as it allowed them to demonstrate while speaking, there were always a significant number of distractions and interruptions making the interviewing process more challenging.

While being in the CCTV control room also allowed for the researcher to monitor the operators at work, these interviews also posed challenges for audio recording as the interviewees would move around the surveillance control room completely disregarding the fact that the discussion was being recorded. Furthermore, telephones and alarms needing answering and colleagues and clients requiring service often broke the flow of the interview, making it difficult - sometime impossible - to pick up where we left off. Such interruptions also posed ethical concerns as I was uncertain whether to pause or keep the

recordings going. Ultimately, in the majority of cases the recording were kept going, however, the statements made by others in the office were not transcribed nor used for analysis.

Perhaps the most challenging interview undertaken was the one conducted with James and Xavier simultaneously. The research protocol for this study allowed for group interviews or for a third-party to be present. The purpose for doing so was three-fold. First, it would provide an option for companies or CCTV operators who would only participate if a supervisor could be present. Second, participants may feel more comfortable participating in an interview and sharing information about their work if doing so with colleagues in a group setting. Finally, it would allow for more participants to be interviewed in one sitting, potentially reducing the time required for data collection and transcription. Thankfully only one interview was conducted in this manner. My interview with James and Xavier posed many different challenges in that it was conducted on site, and because for large portions of time the participants were conversing amongst themselves. While this method undoubtedly produced a vast amount of information for analysis, I did not feel in control of this interview, and as such it went well over the expected timeframe resulting in the need to rush the final questions.

### **Transcription and Data Storage**

At the beginning of each interview all participants were asked to read and sign the *Consent Form for Research Participants*, in the official language of their choosing. In the majority of cases the researcher also went through each section of the consent form with the participants. In one case the participant began reading the text but quickly disregarding the remainder and simply signed the consent form. Efforts were then made to highlight the key points on the consent form, such as the assurance of participant anonymity through the use of a pseudonym and the researcher's commitment not to identify by name, the institution for which the participant works. The original signed consent forms were subsequently provided to researcher's supervisor for storage as directed by the Research Ethics Board.

All interviews were recorded using a Panasonic digital voice recorder and uploaded to the researcher's desktop computer using the sound file management software *Voice Studio 2.0*. Using this same software each interview audio file was converted into a WAVE file so that they would be compatible with more mainstream media players such as Windows Media Player. Each interview was then transcribed into text for the purpose of analysis. The audio interviews and their corresponding transcripts were saved under a password protected folder on the researcher's desktop computer and a USB key which was carried on the researcher's person. A copy of these files was also saved onto a DVD-ROM which was provided to the researcher's supervisor for accountability and/or verification purposes.

Transcribing each interview on my own proved to be quite a lengthy and challenging process. Each transcript was completed in three phases. During the first phase each interview was roughly transcribed converting the brunt of the audio interview into text. Any gaps remaining after the first phase were filled in during the second, while the third phase comprised of a thorough review of the transcript to ensure that it was an accurate reflection of the audio interview. At each phase attempts were made to be as accurate as possible, thus pausing and going back was repeated as necessary. Where it was not possible to make out what was stated in the audio after several attempts during the first phase, the section was left blank and attempts were made again in the second and third phases as needed. If after the third phase I was still not able to make sense of what was stated by the interviewee, the word *inaudible* was inserted in parenthesis to indicate such. While this appears infrequently, as discussed in the section above some of the interviews were more problematic in this regard than others.

The transcribing process began immediately after the first interview was conducted and continued simultaneous to recruiting and conducting subsequent interviews, and it continued of some time after all of the interviews were completed. It did not take much transcribing before I began to transpose words and sometimes invent words entirely. While fortunately these errors were caught in the second and third phases of transcribing, parallels were quickly made between the transcription process and the process of monitoring CCTV

cameras for extended periods with its sensory overload and distractions. To be sure, what I was experiencing while transcribing was similar to some of the challenges described in the CCTV literature and which were reiterated by the research participants.

### **Data Management and Analysis**

Without a doubt qualitative interviews generate copious amounts of rich data for analysis. The ten interviews undertaken for this project produced approximately 350-400 pages of transcripts and notes. The analysis began immediately after the first interview was completed by comparing what the participant had said against concepts which emerged from the surveillance literature. The interview question guide was modified slightly following the first interview to include areas of inquiry which I had not initially thought of. This analysis continued during the transcription of the first interview and while awaiting the appointment for the second interview. With each new interview undertaken and transcribed I began making comparisons and connections between interviews and across themes. In hindsight, realizing the significance of early thought processes, more detailed notes should have been made earlier on in the process.

Despite having developed a fairly structured interview question guide for the purposes of later comparing the data from each interview, it became quite evident that data could not be so easily contained. For example, while the question guide was organized to address each of the potential influences on CCTV operator decision making separately there were elements which fit in more than one category. While it may have been naïve to think that the richness of data could be contained in such neat canisters without spilling over the edges, this initial organization did serve as a benefit for managing the data.

Each interview was listened to and each transcript was read several times throughout this process. In order to assist in *managing* the data each transcript was read and colour coded into broad themes corresponding the broader questions in the interview guide. For example, question 1b explores the additional work requirements of CCTV operators. Each interview transcript was read and every indication of additional job requirements was colour-coded in

yellow. Once the entire transcript was completed, all portions colour-coded yellow were cut and pasted from the transcript into another document which allowed for comparisons across interviews (*Appendix F*). This document identified the main theme and provided space for sub-themes to be included upon initial analytic coding. Such a document was prepared for each overarching theme.

Although colour-coding was used to help organize the data into more manageable bites, once the interviews were organized into the table pictured above the slate was wiped clean and the coding for analysis purposes began. The coding was conducted in two phases. The first phase consisted of an initial coding which was very detailed, attempting to generate imaginative ideas (Charmaz, 2004). The second phase of coding emphasized an exploration of the most common and revealing themes, dividing and combining some of the codes in order to create new or improve old ones (*ibid.*).

Conscience efforts were made not to fragment the data in the process of cutting and pasting from one document to another during the analysis phase. Where the context was considered relevant to any particular statement, the entire paragraph or section of the interview was cut and pasted to the new so not to lose perspective. Further, understanding that any one data item can and should be coded in more than one way, this was done where required (Bryman, 2004). Finally, the coding for chapter four and five of this thesis were undertaken separately and with some temporal distancing, allowing the researcher to maintain a degree of mental rigorousness.

#### **RESEARCH AS SURVEILLANCE: THE PARADOX OF CRITICAL SURVEILLANCE RESEARCH**

To review, it was stated in the opening chapter that surveillance should be understood as the garnering and processing of personal data and/or supervising the activities of individuals, populations, or contexts for the purposes of influencing, managing, or controlling the attitudes, behaviours, and even life chances of those whose information has been collected (Lyon 1992; 2001). Given this definition of surveillance, are researchers not themselves then surveillance agents? Is the role of critical criminological scholars not to try to influence the

attitudes and even the behaviours and life chances of those individuals, groups or institutions we research, especially those attitudes, behaviours and life circumstances we perceive as socially unjust? Nils Christie (2004: 107) pointedly states that as researchers “we are in great danger of becoming the willing executors ... if we keep quiet”. I must acknowledge feeling a sense of achievement when research participants indicated that they had never previously reflected on their on-camera surveillance decisions and thus were unsure whether they employed discriminatory practices.

If we accept the idea of researcher as surveillance agent, does critical surveillance studies cease to make sense, or are critical forms of academic surveillance more acceptable because they challenge stereotypes, and taken for granted assumptions about marginalized groups, or because they turn the gaze back upon those who normally wield the power of the surveillance assemblage? This question is not easily answered as regardless of the intentions one has in carrying out their research, they may find themselves implicated in existing surveillance networks. Kemple and Huey (2005) describe how one researcher found herself accused by a ‘skid row’ inhabitant of being a surveillance agent despite the researcher’s explanation that she was studying how the police treat the dispossessed on ‘skid row’.

While social researchers may be perceived as surveillance agents by research subjects, state institutions may also attempt to pull them into this role. Criminological practitioners are bound by their discipline’s initial and long standing promises of “controlling crime or otherwise being *relevant* to the state and governance” (Hogeveen, 2006: 2), and universities are “under extraordinarily strong pressure to prove that they are useful and deserve their money” (Christie, 2004: 118). Certainly even those engaged in critical social research may find state agencies attempting to implicate them in surveillance networks. For example, a former graduate student at Simon Fraser University attended the euthanasia of a person with AIDS as part of his research. The student was later subpoenaed and asked to reveal the names of his research participants. Upon refusing, the student was threatened with a contempt of court charge (Palys and Lowman, 2000).

Moreover, critical surveillance scholars may also find their ideas and critiques about surveillance technologies and/or practices co-opted by surveillance networks and the institutions which form them. Critiques of the technological capabilities merely send researchers and developers back to the drawing board, resulting in the rapid advancement of surveillance technologies, while critiques of surveillance practices and the identification of gaps in institutional surveillance flows may only result in the tightening up of these practices making them more efficient and/or pervasive (Ball and Haggerty, 2005).

Surveillance scholars are just beginning to explore these issues (Ball and Haggerty, 2005). The Surveillance Project out of Queen's University will be hosting a week long summer seminar in 2007 which will reflect upon some of the challenges and paradoxes of doing surveillance research. In a spirit of reflexivity this chapter explored the research journey I undertook, outlining the methodological protocol used for this study, as well as some of the challenges faced while conducting empirical surveillance research on CCTV operators. It is hoped that this chapter could be of assistance to new graduate students by providing practical information about the research process at the Master level. It is also hoped that this chapter inspires questions about the governance of social research – particularly critical social research – and encourages a more reflexive approach to how we do our business, as ironic as this may be coming from one critical of surveillance.

**CHAPTER FOUR:**  
**WHO'S WATCHING YOU? INTRODUCING THE WATCHERS AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS**

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the ten research participants and provide context for the following chapters by exploring how those interviewed think of CCTV surveillance work. The first part of this chapter provides basic demographic information on each of the research participants, as well as an indication of where they work, and their educational and professional backgrounds. I then move on to explore the additional responsibilities that monitoring CCTV entails and provide an understanding of what the CCTV operators identify as being important in their line of work. The second part of this chapter explores the general perceptions shared by the research participants in relation to such issues as: institutional risks; surveillance post-9/11; prejudice, bias and stereotyping; being watched themselves; and, the effectiveness of CCTV.

**INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS**

**Richard:** Richard is a White male in his 20's. He is currently employed as a part-time Security Manager in a downtown department store, which operates approximately 70-80 surveillance cameras. At the time of our interview Richard was in his final semester of university completing a double degree in Criminology and Psychology. Richard explained that prior to obtaining a job at the department store he had brief experiences working in a provincial jail, as well as the mental-health ward of a hospital. Prior to attaining the position of Security Manager at his current store location, Richard worked at two other locations, within the same city, for this particular department store chain. Richard indicated that he has been working as the Security Manager for almost two years. During our interview, Richard presented as open; he was critical of how surveillance is practiced in his department store.

**Michael:** Michael is a White male in his 20's. Michael currently works part-time as a Resource Protection Investigator at a downtown department store. Michael explains that even prior to his friend Richard (also a participant in this study) informing him of a job

opening with the department store, it was a line of work that he has had an interest in. Michael indicated that he recently completed an undergraduate honours degree in Political Science, and that he served a short time with a Military Intelligence Unit in the Canadian Forces Reserves. Michael has been working in the department store under the management of Richard (among others) for approximately two years. During our interview, Michael presented as reticent, and routinely emphasized that he conducts his work in a politically correct manner.

**Shawn:** Shawn is a Black male in his 40's. Shawn formerly worked as a full-time Security Investigator in a downtown department store; one that competed with that of Richard and Michael. Shawn indicated that while the department store for which he worked has recently upgraded their surveillance camera system, the store employed approximately 50-60 cameras during the time that he worked there. Shawn completed high school and played one year of football at university, but did not complete his first year of studies. After his studies, Shawn joined the Canadian Forces Reserves as an Artilleryman, at the same time applying for a position as a security officer at this particular department store. Shawn remained at the department store for approximately sixteen years before making a career change. Currently Shawn works with a municipal police service as a peace officer, where he has been for approximately five and a half years. He has maintained ties with his former colleagues at the department store and continues to be a serving member of the Canadian Forces Reserves. During our interview Shawn presented as confident, often emphasizing that there is no room for racial prejudice when conducting surveillance in a retail setting.

**James:** James is a White male in his 20's. James is currently contracted through a private security company to work as a part-time Building Control Centre Operator within a building complex. The building complex, located in a downtown core, is currently owned by the federal government and houses two large federal government departments, as well as a small shopping mall. Of the surveillance systems at all the sites, this one was the least technologically sophisticated and is monitored using 18 fixed surveillance cameras. In addition to working part-time in the building control centre, James is currently enrolled in

university graduate studies in the field of Criminology. James indicated that perhaps he got involved with security work because he was looking for employment that was related to his area of undergraduate studies. James stated that he applied for a spot as a security guard because he was attracted to the authority that he thought he would obtain. He looked forward to the excitement that he thought doing patrol work would provide. Hired during the summer to replace other security guards taking summer vacation, James began patrolling the mall at this site. When another employee was fired, James filled a vacancy in the building control centre. Despite stints in other positions, James has remained at this site for approximately four and a half years, often requiring that he change private security companies as the contract for the building control centre has been held by several private security companies during his tenure at the site. Currently James works only on weekends, alternating weekly between the day and night shifts. During our interview James presented as relaxed and forthcoming.

**Xavier:** Xavier is a Black Haitian-Canadian male in 20's. At the time of our interview Xavier was working full-time as a Building Control Centre Operator in the same location as James. Xavier got involved in security work while still in high school, when he applied to a private security company in order to "make money". Xavier began by working shifts at various short-term sites until there was an opening for a mall security guard at the location where he was employed when the interview was undertaken. After working as a security guard in the mall portion of the complex for approximately one year, Xavier was asked to work in the building control centre. After working the weekend nightshift in the building control centre for a short time he accepted an offer to work full-time during weeknights. Xavier explains that working the nightshift was convenient for him as it allowed him to attend college during the day and obtain a diploma in Computer Sciences from the local community college. Like James, Xavier has also had to change the private security company he is employed with in order to remain at this particular site for approximately five and a half years. Subsequent to our interview I crossed paths with Xavier who informed me that he was no longer employed at this building complex. During our interview Xavier presented as

confident and expressed significant concern with global events presented by the popular media.

**Barry:** Barry is a White male in his 20's. Barry is currently contracted through a private security company to work full-time as Control Room Operator in a city museum. The museum is visually monitored using 32 surveillance cameras. Barry indicated that he was introduced to security work through a friend of the family who had extensive experience in the security field. The family friend provided Barry with an opportunity to work as a security guard part-time during the summer months for the festival season. Looking to work on a full-time basis, Barry applied to a private security company where he was quickly hired and posted at a hospital to carry out access control and patient watches. When the private security company Barry was working for lost the contract for the hospital, he asked to be posted at a government building complex where he began to work with CCTV (at the same site as James and Xavier). After working at the government complex for two and a half years, Barry switched private security companies and work sites, finding himself at the museum, where he has been for only a couple of months. Barry indicated that he graduated with honours from a two-year Police Foundations college program but is still undecided as to whether his long-term ambition is to become a police officer. He stated that he is applying for a position as a transit law enforcement officer and that he was hoping to be offered a position in short time. During our interview Barry presented as confident and talkative. He was critical of the abilities of CCTV surveillance technology, and expressed a high degree of criticism toward the media for what he indicated is a bias against the police.

**Ian:** Ian is a White male in his 50's. Ian is currently a Senior Officer at a large suburban shopping mall, which is monitored using 42 surveillance cameras. After long service as a patrol officer with the shopping mall, Ian explained that because of a bad back he was posted to the security communications centre, when it was established approximately five or six years prior. Originally, Ian worked at the shopping mall as a heating and cooling engineer; however, a poor relationship with a new engineering supervisor brought Ian to look elsewhere for employment. Ian explained that he had a solid relationship with the previous

security supervisor, thus he made the decision to transfer to the security team. Ian stated that while he does have some formal education from a business college, he was self-educated as a stationary engineer and had no previous training in the realm of security. He has been a security officer with the shopping mall for approximately twenty years, and currently works at the communications desk in the morning and early afternoon. During our interview Ian presented as confident, yet humble and cooperative.

**Paul:** Paul is a White Franco-Canadian male in his 50's. Paul is currently a Dispatcher for the protection service division of a Canadian university. In addition to his responsibilities as a dispatcher, Paul monitors the campus' 700-800 video surveillance cameras, 18 of which monitor the exterior campus grounds. Paul explained that previous to becoming a Communications Centre Dispatcher three years ago, he served twenty-seven years as one of the campus' protection patrol officers. Prior to gaining employment at the university, Paul worked under contract with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and as a Communications Officer with a municipal police force. Paul has also completed various post-secondary courses related to his profession. In addition to obtaining a college diploma in the area of Law and Security, he has continued his post-secondary education through various correspondence programs, including a Certified Protection Officer program which he completed in 1996. During our interview Paul presented as confident and verbose. He stated that he always tries to show people that Hollywood's portrayal of television watching security guards is incongruent with reality.

**Andre:** Andre is a White Franco-Canadian male in late 30's. Andre is currently a Surveillance Supervisor for a government run Canadian casino. Andre indicated that he is largely responsible for providing training to the casinos surveillance technicians, who monitor the sites 590-600 surveillance cameras. In 1994, Andre completed his undergraduate degree in the field of Criminology. The following year, while working in the area of corrections, and prior to the casinos opening, he applied and was hired onto the casino's surveillance team. Andre indicated that he recently completed a Master in Business Administration, which he undertook part-time while working full-time at the casino. After

working at the casino for eleven years, Andre indicated that he recently accepted a buy-out package and that he would be leaving the casino within a few weeks of our interview. With nothing lined up, and unsure of which direction his career would take, Andre simply stated that it was time for a change, and that he looked forward to some time-off. During our interview Andre presented as humble and cooperative.

**Frank:** Frank is a White male in his 50's. Frank is currently a Constable working in the Call Management Section of a central municipal police station, which is responsible for monitoring 5 open-street surveillance cameras in the city's downtown core. Frank indicated that he has been posted to the Call Management Section for about 3-4 years. He further explained that police officers injured while on duty, and who can no longer work on patrol, are posted to this section, which was established as a cost-saving measure to free up patrol resources for more urgent calls for service. When the city council approved the city's open-street CCTV initiative, which was lobbied for by the local business association, the police administration decided to attach the monitoring duties to the call management section. Frank explained that while there is currently no one specifically assigned to monitor the city's CCTV initiative, he often volunteers to monitor the cameras. Frank indicated that policing is the only job he knows as he has been serving with the municipal police service for thirty-four years, beginning immediately after completing community college. During our interview Frank presented as calm, confident, and genuinely happy to be asked to participate in the research study.

#### **JOB REQUIREMENTS AND WHAT'S IMPORTANT**

Through the course of my research I have come to realize that much of the CCTV literature leaves the impression that watching the cameras is, if not the sole responsibility, then at least, the priority of those who monitor surveillance cameras. While my research participants are responsible for monitoring and/or supervising the operation of CCTV surveillance cameras, they are also responsible for much more. The range of duties assigned to camera operators may vary from site to site, from those in a casino who are primarily

responsible for camera monitoring, to those at an open-street surveillance site whose monitoring responsibilities have been added to their duties as an afterthought.

While I will continue to use the term ‘CCTV operators’ for the ease of describing my research participants, I will outline the other responsibilities that they undertake. I will not present these additional job requirements by site, but rather as a summation of the typical situation – as a sort of ideal type. That said, this should not be read as an exhaustive list of CCTV operator duties. It should rather be used as an indication of those which are substantial, as measured by the fact that the participant’s felt they were important enough to speak to.

### Monitoring Actors and Interactions in Social Spaces

[M]y primary duties [were] to surveill the staff and also [the] customers that come in the store. So my job is to stay inside the office and I see exactly what keys he’s punching in the cash. And also I will monitor the sales, and also monitor customers.

(Shawn, Downtown Department Store)

While there may be distinctions between the activities undertaken in a department store versus those undertaken on a university campus, they are social spaces which comprise a multitude of interactions, whether economic, social, political, or a combination. Notwithstanding the fact that the settings I researched may be categorized and divided as public or semi-public, they are first and foremost social spaces, and must be conceptualized as such. CCTV operators utilize video technology to monitor the actors and interactions within these social spaces.

While everyone in a social space may be conceptualized as an actor, in order to understand the social dynamics of semi-public spaces we must further divide actors into those who are *users* and *providers*. By users I am referring to the patrons in all their manifestations; be they shoppers in a department store, or students on campus. I use the term *providers* to denote those employed within the space, whether they are security agents, cashiers, or any other form of employee.

CCTV operators may single out users or providers for monitoring, especially users who appear out of place, such as the ‘crack heads’ in a shopping mall and those suspected of shoplifting in a department store, or cheating in a casino. CCTV operators scrutinize groups of users, such as a group of youth walking along a downtown city sidewalk, or a group engaged in politicised forms of activity, whether it is friendly association on a campus or demonstrations on the grounds of City Hall. The operator’s gaze may also be turned onto the providers in order to address issues such as internal theft and policy violations, or sometimes just for fun. The CCTV cameras may be used to locate colleagues on the ground in a shopping mall, to monitor custodial staff suspiciously returning to their vehicle in middle of their shift, or to ensure that casino dealers complete a hand sweep after coming into contact with casino chips, and prior to touching their person.

CCTV operators may also monitor various social and/or economic transactions/ interactions between users and providers. Interventions between security staff and patrons are often recorded in order to pre-empt possible allegation of unprofessional or abusive conduct on the part of security personnel. Also, point-of-sale dealings may be monitored to ensure the integrity of economic transactions. Such is the case where the amounts bet and the amounts paid are monitored at the Blackjack, or other casino gaming tables. Below, Shawn describes one of the many transactional concerns for those who monitor CCTV in a department store.

Staff are allowed to get a discount, but they cannot use their discount for anyone else ... Sometimes you’ll see staff try to have their friend come in and give them a ‘sweetheart deal’, we call it, okay. And basically ... their friend will come with ten different items and the staff will ring in one or two items, and put the rest in a bag ... [S]o that friend will sometimes pay for [the] two items, but at discount, and also get the extra items placed in the bag. There’s a lot of different ways [that] staff and customers steal from the store, so we have to monitor everything like that.

(Shawn, Downtown Department Store)

Thus far I have outlined the research participants’ task as CCTV operators; however, as discussed above, often this duty is merely the tip of the iceberg when it comes to detailing all

of the CCTV operator's responsibilities. I will now examine some of these other responsibilities.

### **Investigations, Interventions, and Other Duties**

There was significant variation across sites regarding responsibilities related to investigations. While the majority of CCTV operators were not responsible for investigations, those who worked in department stores were more likely to indicate that their tasks included conducting and/or assisting in investigations and/or audits. These tasks include such things as auditing credit card payment reports in order to keep an eye out for fraud, or setting up covert surveillance operations of staff in order to look into suspicions of employee theft. Richard indicated that while he enjoys catching shoplifters, he prefers investigating cases of credit card and internal fraud.

You know what I enjoy the most about it, it's the investigations ... It's more work than [when] someone picks something up and walks out of the store. I think that's fun and its thrilling ... But, doing the paperwork aspect and trying to follow somebody who's sneaky and trying to cover their tracks, I find that the most exciting part of the job. It has nothing to do with CCTV. It has nothing to do with regular theft or shoplifting because you're going to get either credit card fraud, or you're going to get internal fraud, or you're going to get somebody who's doing something that they're not supposed to be doing ... [Y]ou go through and you try to weed it out.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Shawn's recollection of an investigation which he assisted in demonstrates that CCTV operators working for large-chain department stores may also be tasked to conduct investigations against staff at other store locations.

I remember we shut a store down ... It was a warehouse and they were stealing ... and the staff was doing a lot of stuff ... [B]asically we set up for a week, and within a week - the following week - we got everyone. So, that was good, you know. We set up like the internal investigation, we set up everything. [The internal investigator] used to have one of us go in, set-up all the cameras [and] help him out ... so we always learn[ed] from it.

(Shawn, Downtown Department Store)

The remaining CCTV operators did not indicate that they were responsible for conducting investigations; however, the participants from the casino and the university campus,

indicated that the organization for which they work did have internal investigators who they may collaborate with in relation to particular cases. The large suburban shopping mall, along with both sites monitored by contracted security companies (i.e. the downtown shopping centre and the museum) do not appear to have any internal investigative capabilities, turning to the police to conduct investigations as required. Finally, the open-street surveillance scheme is run and monitored by city police. Where further investigation is required at the open-street site it is undertaken by the investigations branch of the police service and not the CCTV operator.

All participants indicated that ideally they would continue to monitor the surveillance cameras while communicating with colleagues on the ground who would approach or confront the object of surveillance where intervention was deemed to be necessary. However, the ideal is often not the practice. The CCTV operators' responsibilities for intervention also vary from site to site in ways similar to their investigative requirements. The CCTV operators from the campus, both shopping malls and department stores, indicated that they had the ability to contact colleagues on the ground directly, in order to mobilize immediate intervention, while the CCTV operators for the casino, museum and the open-street stated that they were first required to contact a third-party, who would then make a decision regarding the need for intervention. Barry explained that if, in the museum, "somebody commits a crime [he] report[s] it to [the] protection officer, which is the client, and then they make the final decision on call[ing] the police".

Frank shared his concerns relating to the process currently in place to govern the open-street surveillance initiative that he monitors.

I will call the Communications Section and I will tell them that [a crime] is happening ... But, I'm not talking to the dispatcher ... I'm talking to a call taker who has to type everything up, and then forward that information to the dispatcher who's doing other things at the time. So, it's quite slow ... I'm witnessing a crime in progress, or just after, and I would love to be able to say we need units to respond here and direct them. But the way our system is set up, it's not done that way. There's no override for me to do that.

(Frank, Open-Street Surveillance Initiative)

The division of labour within the department store security teams appeared much more fluid than that described at many of the other sites. It was explained that every member of the department store security team rotates between walking the floor and monitoring the CCTV cameras. Depending on the number security staff on shift and how busy the security team may be, CCTV operators may also be required to leave the surveillance control room in order to make arrests or engage in other forms of intervention. Below, Richard describes some of the challenges of working alone in a department store setting.

[Y]ou can say you're a hundred percent but there's always that chance, especially if you're working alone. It's hard to be on cameras, be right beside them, and check an area that they've just been in, you know. What if they exit? ... .

**In that situation you're expected to do all. You're watching the cameras, you're getting down there ... .**

Yeah ... .

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Every CCTV operator indicated that they were also responsible for completing written reports. While the type, format and comprehensiveness of reporting will undoubtedly vary across surveillance sites most were responsible for keeping a running log of what happens during the day, such as alarms and observations that appear 'out of the ordinary', as well as more detailed occurrence reports. These occurrence reports are most often completed where crimes are witnessed by the CCTV operator and/or arrests are made. The division of labour will also dictate who is responsible for writing a report. For example, if an individual was asked to intervene based on something that the CCTV operator witnessed, the intervening individual would be tasked with completing the general occurrence report, while the CCTV operator would be required to complete a report regarding what they witnessed through the camera.

While report writing is prevalent at most of the sites researched, the reports are often not a result of CCTV observations. When discussing the issue of report writing with Frank he indicated that writing reports was all that he did; however, when asked whether the high

number of reports was a result of the CCTV scheme, he indicated that very little report writing was related to the open-street surveillance cameras because they “don’t identify that much crime”.

The coordinating role that most CCTV operators play will help in understanding the large volume of report writing they are responsible for.

If something happens, [and] nobody know[s] what’s going on, they gonna call us. That’s the first thing they gonna do. [If w]e have alarms they gonna call us, someone fell on the floor and ... we need [an] ambulance - they need help, they gonna call us ... Anywhere in the building, anything happens we’ll be [the] first ones to call ... .

(Xavier, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

Xavier’s statement above, in which he describes the central role that he feels the CCTV operators play at his site, was corroborated by several of the other research participants. It was apparent early during the interviews that where institutional information flows were smooth, the CCTV operators were often situated as the hub. Even at sites where the information flows were staccato there was an expectation that the CCTV operators were in the loop. Working out of building control centres or communications centres the CCTV operators were often responsible for such things as: monitoring and responding to the fire control panels and intrusion alarms; responding to both emergency and non-emergency telephone calls; coordinating security personnel and other emergency first-responders, key and access control for maintenance staff and/or other contractors, as well as lost and found for both items and persons. Finally, at all but two sites (the open-street scheme and casino) the CCTV operators were also responsible for retrieving, and in some cases reviewing, past surveillance footage.

In addition to the duties identified above, some of the CCTV operators indicated that they also undertook special projects, such as reviewing and/or writing institutional policies, reports on lessons learnt and best practices, as well as various statistical reports. Paul indicated that at the university campus he has “a lot of projects [and administrative duties] to

do”, from compiling “stats [on] the panic alarms [to] stats [on] the emergency [telephone] lines”.

In sum, it is clear that to use the simplified title ‘CCTV operator’ to describe the research participants may be misleading and that their actual job titles are likely more reflective of their duties; however, referring them as CCTV operators makes it much easier to organize the text.

### **CCTV Operator as Protector**

While there are certainly differences in job requirements across surveillance sites, there is common ground as well. For example, there is variation in the requirements for intervention between those who work in-house security at a department store and those who work as contracted security at a museum; however, all are responsible for writing reports, at least to some degree. In almost all cases questions regarding what the participants perceived as the most important aspect of their work led to a discussion about safety and protection. It became quite evident that the CCTV operators I interviewed saw their role as that of protector. Of course what was described as requiring protection varied slightly by site, however, they can be broadly themed as the protection of property, of persons, and of the organization.

Most of the CCTV operators interviewed had a clearly delineated area of responsibility, usually within and just outside the institutional boundaries, and as such they were mandated with ensuring the safety and protection of the property and the persons within that institutional setting. In relation to the protection of property, CCTV operators are responsible for the premise itself, which includes the building and its grounds, and they may monitor for such things as break-ins, floods, and fires. James described a situation where he identified a fire in the loading dock of the small downtown shopping mall via the CCTV cameras. He indicated that he “actually caught a fire before the alarm went off ... because there [are] no smoke detectors [or] sprinklers in the loading dock”.

In most cases the CCTV operators are also responsible for protecting the objects or products found within the surveillance site. While in the setting of a department store surveillance staff are concerned with protecting the loss of merchandise from internal or external forms of theft, protecting artefacts from being damaged by visitors or protecting a client's winnings are some of the concerns that were identified at the museum and the casino respectively. Certainly, CCTV operators within a mall setting assist in the loss prevention initiatives of their tenant retail stores, and open-street surveillance schemes may work with other downtown businesses to protect them from merchandise loss. As Shawn, from a downtown department store, indicated "[Y]ou recover your merchandise 'cause you're there to protect the property of that store, and now your job is done 'cause you recovered the property". Barry pointed out that in the context of the museum the protection of property may also extend to classified documentation, intellectual property and/or other types of information.

The CCTV operators also indicated that they were responsible for the protection of persons, which includes both users and providers. While the protection of the user's property has already been touched upon above in the example of the casino, CCTV operators are also responsible for the physical safety of users while they are within the social space. This may be achieved through: intervening in fights that break out between users in a shopping mall, or on a public street; providing protection for VIP visitors to a campus; or coordinating the arrival of emergency medical technicians for injured or ill patrons.

Continuing on this theme, some CCTV operators indicated that they must also protect the privacy and confidentiality rights of the users within these social settings. This is achieved by ensuring that the windows of residences are blacked out from the view of camera operators of open-street surveillance sites, and that CCTV operators are not using the surveillance cameras to zoom-in on campus dorm rooms or department store fitting rooms. Richard explained that care is taken to protect the confidentiality of individuals caught shoplifting, especially if the violator is a young offender. When trying to coordinate a site visit to the department store at which Richard works, I was advised that it could not be

during business hours as that would breach the confidentiality rights of anyone arrested during my visit.

[I]f we're approaching a youth, we're going to do as much as we can to protect their rights and ours ... A lot of the times people don't see what we do as necessary if its ... a fourteen year old kid, but at the same time we still have to protect our assets and their rights.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

CCTV operators are also responsible for protecting the providers within the surveillance site. Operators described situations where they intervened in disputes between an employee and a spouse who comes to the site, or where they responded to the security needs of professors on campus. Several of the CCTV operators also indicated that they are responsible for providing protection to their security colleagues, whether through using the camera as a form of visual back-up for fellow police officers or campus protections officers, or monitoring an arrest by shopping mall or casino security staff in order to protect colleagues from false allegations.

When [security] ... interven[es] with a customer, automatically they will call us. It's just to prevent that someone will say 'Ah, he push me when he talk to me'. So, just in case of stuff, we always ... zoom on the intervention - they will always call us before.

(Andre, Casino)

CCTV operators may also feel the need to self-protect, or, 'cover their ass' as James and Xavier described it.

**James:** Whenever I write a report ... the foremost thought in my head - my intention - is to *cover my ass* as hard as possible.

**Xavier:** *Yeah, that's one other thing.*

**James:** So, I will put *everything* that I possibly can ... even if it's completely useless.

**Xavier:** *Yeah, because in a way we're responsible for anything that happens. If you could explain what you're told to do, you're covered. You do your best to make everything better, I guess ... If anything happens we need someone to blame because ...*

**James:** And that's where the 'cover your ass' comes in.

(James and Xavier, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

Finally, CCTV operators also described a responsibility for protecting the organization that they represent. While the argument could be made that preventing the loss of merchandise and destruction of property also serves to protect the organization, what is referred to here is quite different. By protection of the organization, I am referring to the protection of its reputation and protecting it from liability.

It became apparent that not all sites were equally concerned with their public reputation as a safe environment. However, the two sites that discussed the issue of public fear had an interesting commonality. The open-street surveillance scheme researched was established in conjunction with the local downtown business association in an attempt to revitalize the city's downtown core. The camera scheme was erected in an attempt to reduce fear of crime in the city centre in order to bring people back to the core and attract new business to the city itself. Shopping centres too must do what they can to maintain a client base in order to keep their tenants from relocating. As Ian described, the shopping centre for which he works wishes to maintain its reputation as family friendly.

My boss wants this to remain a family mall, where you are not fearful to bring your wife, your children down to this mall and spend some time ... [H]e wants to keep this very family oriented, so that people aren't afraid to bring their family.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

While protecting the organization from liability includes as a component the protection of the user, it can also be taken further. For example, as discussed previously most CCTV operators will coordinate with maintenance and/or custodial staff to ensure that things such as spilled beverages or broken glass are cleaned up as quickly as possible. However, a few of the CCTV operators also indicated that they will record slip and fall victims in anticipation of possible civil suits.

If there's anything we want to see immediately, like the guys are dealing with an issue upstairs - say a slip and fall. We have to investigate those, and I'll keep the camera on

the injured person until they leave. If they're walking quite normally then we reserve that video because some people will sue the mall.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Centre)

### CCTV OPERATOR PERCEPTIONS

This portion of the chapter explores the research participants' perceptions on a number of themes that arose in the course of the interviews. The issues discussed here are not an exhaustive list of all the perceptions shared by the CCTV operators; however, they will provide an overall understanding of how the participants think about and understand their work.

#### On Institutional Risks

When asked to describe the top three crime or security risks for the institution in which they worked, most participants required clarification about what the question meant, supporting Norris and McCahill's (2006) suggestion that CCTV operators are blind to postmodern conceptualizations of 'risk', at least at the level of discourse. However, once clarification was provided participants prioritized the following concerns, which I have grouped into three broad risk categories. They are the risk of theft, the risk to personal safety, and many of the operators identified the 'flawed consumer' as risky.

Almost every CCTV operator identified theft as something that required their attention. For our purposes I have included such behaviours as shoplifting, stealing, credit card fraud, price switching, violating discount policy, skimming, and cheating under the umbrella term *theft*, as thievery implies dishonestly obtaining another's property or product with the intention of depriving its owner of it permanently. While some participants, such as those who work at shopping malls simply identified dealing with theft as a priority, CCTV operators at department stores were more likely to break down the theft category and prioritize these sub-divisions, as the follow statement from Michael demonstrates.

There's the obvious ... shop theft, that's pretty big. Although, it's not necessarily just external shop theft, it's internal – employees - as well. I don't know if you want to class those two differently, but we do. Third, I would say probably fraudulent transactions,

things like that. Like, maybe not necessarily fraud per se but people doing things like using other people's credit cards - stuff like that. Trying to get better deals on things on certain days, you know ... [That's] pretty much the top three.

(Michael, Downtown Department Store)

CCTV operators also prioritized personal safety. While they were concerned with the personal safety of the users of the site, in most cases the participant's felt that their personal safety and the safety of their security colleagues were at risk. Some participants described inadequacies in the security procedures at their site which may place them at additional risk. While James and Xavier indicated that they had no means of identifying individuals who gain access to their site or the public parking garage below the small downtown shopping mall, Andre indicated that the casino he works at has no metal detectors at its entrance and that the security agents have no weapons to secure the site from armed robberies. Prevalent among participants was the perception of risk when confronting users, be they shoplifters or loitering youth. The following statement from Shawn summarizes the concerns expressed, and indicates that in some cases security personnel will not risk their personal safety to confront suspects, if they do not have the staff to back them up.

It's dangerous to have sometimes only two or three security officers working when you have sometimes ten guys walk in and you have to go out there and stop these guys ... Sometimes you're outnumbered ... Sometimes security officers see the crime committed but they can't do anything about it because they don't have enough staff on backup.

(Shawn, Downtown Department Store)

While almost all of the CCTV operators interviewed insisted that bias had no place in their work, there undoubtedly were some social groups that were deemed to be a risk or potential risk to particular institutional settings, and as such were deserving of more attention from the CCTV operators and/or other security personnel. For purposes of consistency with previous literature, I will refer to these groups as *flawed consumers*, a term coined by Zygmunt Bauman (1997) and used again by other surveillance scholars (McCahill, 1998; 2002). Here, I am conceptualizing the 'flawed consumer' to incorporate those who disrupt the normative images of the 'ideal user' across differing social settings.

Richard, from a downtown department store, and Ian, from the large suburban shopping mall, respectively described 'shitheads' or 'crackheads' as those who look "stoned, high, cracked out", or "look a little haggard, like life hasn't been as easy on them as most". The CCTV operators perceived this group as a double threat in the sense that they believed these individuals were there to support their drug habit by engaging in drug deals in or around the premise, or engaging in theft to finance their addiction. Richard also described this group as a safety risk to security personnel and to others.

Nine out of ten of them have needles or weapons. It's a stereotype but they're easily identifiable based on their behaviours ... Case in point, recently we had an individual in the store who was doing drugs in the store; visibly seen with needles and pipes, lighting stuff in the store. That is a number one priority, because we know that they're carrying. We know chances are they're diseased. In this location nine out of ten people have the ABCs, all Heps and Aids.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Those who are visibly intoxicated are also targeted by CCTV operators and security staff because their unpredictable behaviour poses a risk to the other users of the space, as well as a liability for the organization because of their impaired coordination and balance.

[Y]ou can usually tell when somebody's drunk as opposed to maybe having a beer or two - you can tell if somebody's intoxicated. You'll automatically watch them because it's not necessarily a theft issue ... [I]t could even be a health and safety issue. If they happen to come into the store and hurt themselves, first of all it's good to see because you gotta go help them, I mean you gotta give him first aid, and second of all I mean that's ... a pretty big liability.

(Michael, Downtown Department Store)

Loitering youth, suspected or known members of gangs, and the homeless also form part of the 'flawed consumer' group. The presence of youth gangs is perceived to present safety risks for users and providers in most of the social settings researched, especially consumer sites such as department stores and shopping malls. More important than the 'real' risk that youth and/or youth gangs present, is the perception that this group instills a climate of fear within the social space. CCTV operators indicated that they work hard to reduce levels of fear. In general, loitering youth are monitored and excluded as much as possible from the

retail settings researched because of the belief, as Ian suggested, that “idle hands get in trouble”. In the context of the museum, children are monitored to ensure that they do not damage artefacts, however, they are typically treated with velvet gloves as opposed to an iron fist. Finally, while most subjects appeared to take a more liberal stance when it came to the homeless, this group was monitored by CCTV operators for any indication of inappropriate behaviour. In most cases where the homeless individual does nothing to warrant intervention, CCTV operators indicated that they would leave them be, unless they received complaints from other providers and/or users.

### **On 9/11 and the Terrorist Threat**

I previously indicated my intention to examine surveillance in settings that are not primarily concerned with the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>. While the majority of subjects studied did not address the issue of terrorism, three did. The first to express the influences of 9/11 was Xavier who worked at the government complex and the small downtown shopping mall. I must acknowledge that while I was not too surprised that this came up in the context of this particular site, I was surprised that the issue of terrorism was raised again by CCTV operators at the large suburban shopping mall and the university campus. What did surprise me by my conversation with Xavier and his co-worker James, was the disparity between the perceptions each presented on the topic of terrorism in a post-9/11 world. Given that the topic was discussed at three of the eight sites studied, and by four of the ten participants, the issue cannot be side-stepped. As such, I will explore for a moment the impact that 9/11 has had at these sites, as well as its impact on the perceptions of the CCTV operators who work within them.

First, with regard to the securing of the researched sites, it is difficult to determine whether security has increased across the board following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks. While James and Xavier both agree that the number of security guards within the government complex has increased for the purposes of access control to the government towers following the attacks, the mall complex itself has not increased its security. James indicated that despite the current mentality of government “to be paranoid” about terrorism and hints that

these particular government departments may be targeted, relatively little has been done to secure such basic things as the underground parking garage. Across all of the other sites that I researched, it appeared that their CCTV systems were either recently upgraded, in the process of being upgraded, or upgrading was in the plans for the near future, but in no situation was I given the impression that the surveillance systems were expanded or improved as a direct result of 9/11. In fact, several CCTV operators indicated that the sites have reduced the number of security staff over the years. Paul indicated that the ratio of protection officers to students on campus has been reduced, while the number of surveillance cameras has increased in recent years. Andre also pointed out that the recent CCTV system upgrades at the casino have led to the surveillance staff fearing job losses.

The September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks and those which followed have had an impact on the perceptions of some of the CCTV operators interviewed. Some of the participants expressed real concern that their sites could potentially be a target for terrorism, and specifically indicated that the terrorist threat is a Muslim threat. The following excerpt from my interview with Ian expresses well the sentiment found at the three sites where the CCTV operators interviewed spoke of their concerns regarding terrorism.

[S]ince 9/11 you become more aware of Middle Eastern people; tend to watch them a little, pay closer attention to them because you never know when something's going to happen here.

**Is that a fear? That something like that could happen at a mall - in this mall?**

Oh sure, this is one of the busiest malls in [the city]. There's more traffic through here than the rest of the malls. I have people that I've met [who work retail] and they went off to work at other malls and they come back here and say this one's by far busier. It's got public transport attached to it.

**So it's made you more cautious, especially since 9/11?**

Yeah.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

While James and Xavier both agreed that they have become more vigilant with regard to terrorism, they debated amongst themselves from where the risk comes.

*Xavier: [W]e know that terrorism is not a particular group of people, you know. It could be - I don't know, man - [it's] mostly based on Muslims ...*

**James:** You're entering tricky ground there, but that's okay, it's your hole. It's not all religion related, look at the guy in Oklahoma. He's ...

*Xavier: No, that's a different story ...*

**James:** That's terrorism ...

*Xavier: No, it is, but, it's not based on what is really going on right now. That's me; this is what's going on right now ...*

**James:** You're talking about it as if there was a big clash between western and eastern cultures.

*Xavier: Whatever, that's me. I'm talking about most of the terrorism people that explode themselves or put bombs in places, they're mostly Muslim people. This is what I've seen.*

(James and Xavier, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

### On Prejudice, Bias and Stereotyping

It is clear from the excerpts above that Muslims have been stereotyped, at some of the sites and by some CCTV operators, following the destruction of the World Trade Centre towers. But what about the roles that prejudice, bias and stereotyping play more generally? Of course you cannot ask outright whether individuals employ bias, prejudice or stereotypes without confronting a wall of political correctness. I was, however, able to glean some information from the participants on this topic which proved fruitful. The majority of CCTV operators acknowledged that stereotyping occurs; however, while some openly admitted its use value, others were not as forthcoming, and still others out-and-out denied the employment of stereotypes, not only by themselves but also by the entire company.

Michael described remaining indiscriminate as one of the challenges of doing surveillance work, while others suggested that stereotyping has a use value. James indicated that if one

did not employ stereotypes then everyone would be a suspect and they would be “looking at everybody”, alluding to the fact that this would be an inefficient way of monitoring video cameras. Several of the participants acknowledged that CCTV operators need to rid themselves of any prejudice before beginning CCTV work, or when beginning to work at a new location. Andre stated that the first thing taught to new CCTV operators is “not to have stereotypes”, while Michael suggested that when he first began working security in the department store he thought he would be able to tell who was going to steal, but insists that since beginning in this line of work he has learned that “it’s not like that”.

Richard seems to echo the need for CCTV operators to rid themselves of preconceived notion of who is likely to commit crime or be trouble, especially when beginning or changing sites; however, he does acknowledge that he has his own biases that guide who and what he is going to watch, insisting that they will vary from site to site, depending on the demographic of the users. Richard also explained that biases and stereotypes are formed and reinforced by the fact that those who are watched end up stealing.

[T]hat person stole so I am going to watch the next person that is similar to that person. Oh, that person stole so I am going to keep watching someone who has those similar [characteristics] ... It’s absolutely reinforcing, that’s why typically we watch quote unquote ‘shitheads’ and that’s why we have the ‘shithead scale’ - because they keep stealing. They may be the nicest people in the world, it’s nothing personal.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Other CCTV operators insisted that they did not discriminate while carrying out their surveillance activities. Frank indicated that he is an anti-discrimination activist and that he has been involved in the movement for several years. Shawn goes even further to state that the department store company would never “pinpoint one group of people and [say] they’re gonna steal”, and that if the supervisor ever caught security personnel conducting their work in such a way they would “be fired”.

### On Being Watched Themselves

Shawn's statement above opens up a discussion which has not been addressed in the CCTV literature thus far; a discussion regarding the perceptions of CCTV operators on having their work monitored. As discussed in the second chapter, several theorists now question whether the automatic functioning of power associated with the Panopticon metaphor is possible outside of the prison setting. It must be kept in mind that the automatic functioning of power described by Jeremy Bentham did not end with the subjugation of the inmate. Under the panoptic architecture subordinate prison guards were subjected to the same conditions of unverifiable visibility as the inmates, only in relation to their supervisor or the head inspector (Bentham, 1995). Interestingly, Shawn was not the only CCTV operator to suggest that his actions were potentially monitored by his supervisors. As such, it is worth exploring the degree to which current CCTV technology allows for the surveillance of the CCTV operator's actions on and off of the cameras, as well as their perceptions on being watched themselves.

Current electronic and digital technologies, such as those employed by CCTV, make it not only much easier to monitor the activities of the general population, but also the activities of surveillance workers, both on and off of the cameras. In addition to regular in-person site visits to ensure that the security officers are not sleeping on the job, technology such as *registered wands* can also be used to monitor security staff. Some of the CCTV operators indicated that their duties may include routine patrols of the building which requires that they carry an electronic wand that registers its interactions with other electronic devices strategically placed throughout the premise. The electronic information recorded to the wand can then be downloaded to a computer and reviewed by the supervisor to ensure that the security officers are conducting their patrol rounds appropriately.

While the example above describes how the off-camera actions of CCTV operators can be monitored, I will now speak to how remote and digital technologies permit supervisors to potentially scrutinize what the CCTV operator chooses to watch in real-time and/or after the fact. First, on account of such things as fibre-optics and remote technologies not only can

CCTV operators monitor what is going on from the CCTV control station, but supervisors or other individuals that form the surveillant assemblage may also monitor what the CCTV operator is viewing live. In some cases the CCTV operator's supervisor and even the managers from the head office, hundreds of kilometres away, can remotely take control of the camera away from the CCTV operator on site.

Further, thanks to the digital technologies recently introduced at a number of the locations researched, the mass storage of CCTV footage is now possible and it is easier than ever to retrieve and review. Several of the sites indicated that the footage captured by each camera is recorded and stored for an amount of time which varies by setting. Simply, what this means is that the watching habits of the CCTV operators are now recorded and stored for potential viewing by the operator's supervisor(s). Richard, the security supervisor for a downtown department store, indicated that his staff is aware that they should not "zoom in on something stupid because there's no point ... They tape it [the CCTV footage] for a month and if [they] do it I'm going to know".

Richard's claim that he will find out is unlikely given that the particular CCTV system he is responsible for consists of 60-70 cameras each of which is constantly recording. Surely, it would be impossible for Richard to review the footage retroactively to monitor the surfing behaviours of the camera operators he supervises. Nor can one supervisor, as Andre, from the casino, explained, "catch every little thing". However, the watching habits of the CCTV operators may not only be observed by security and/or surveillance supervisors, as several of the participants indicated that others may come to the security office and catch them misusing the camera technology, be they managers from head office, colleagues from other departments, or members of the public. In other cases still, it may be a fellow CCTV operator who addresses the behaviour informally.

Regardless of whether every instance of camera misuse is identified, what is important is whether the CCTV operators believe their actions to be monitored and whether this belief serves to restrain inappropriate use of the CCTV system. While the majority of CCTV

operators did believe that their on-camera actions were potentially scrutinized, their responses were mixed when discussing whether this belief was enough to keep them from using the cameras in ways deemed inappropriate. Despite acknowledging a fear that his actions would be caught Ian indicated that he still occasionally zooms in on ‘bucksome looking women’. Shawn, however, insisted that the cameras are used only for business purposes, suggesting that if one wished to watch attractive women, they “can get on the floor and watch that kind of stuff”.

For one operator the knowledge that his on on-camera watching behaviour was potentially scrutinized was not only enough to dissuade him from inappropriately using the cameras, but his fear of having what he is watching misinterpreted has served to constrain who he is willing to watch for legitimate purposes.

I think that females could be suspects the same as men ... [However], I’m not comfortable in that environment because I’m being monitored. Someone else may have a different idea of why I’m looking at one individual and may not understand the fact that that person’s a criminal, or whatever. I think it somewhat limits what I do look at because of the fear that it might be misunderstood by someone else who’s not there.

(Frank, Open-Street Surveillance Initiative)

It appears that, similar to the surveillance of citizens in public and semi-public spaces, CCTV operator knowledge that their actions may be monitored has not resulted in the automatic functioning of power. The degree to which CCTV operators govern what and whom they monitor based on the knowledge that they themselves are potentially being watched may vary by individual operator.

### **On CCTV Effectiveness**

I also questioned the research participants about how they understood or measured the effectiveness of CCTV technology. To my knowledge no other study has discussed perceptions of CCTV effectiveness with the individuals who operate them. While the following is not an exhaustive list of the ways CCTV operators indicated that they measure the success and failure of the CCTV system, it does address those which most commonly

emerged. I will now discuss their views of CCTV's deterrence and observation capabilities, as well as its ability to reduce the fear of crime.

The majority of operators did not perceive CCTV to have much of a deterrent effect. On the one hand, while the more optimistic of CCTV operators believed that CCTV cameras did have a deterrent effect, or at least did deter individuals from committing acts of deviance when the cameras are noticed, they also acknowledged that most citizens do not see the cameras and/or the signs warning them that surveillance cameras are in use. On the other hand, the most pessimistic of camera operators questioned whether criminals cared that they were potentially being monitored; stating that while people know that the cameras are there, "people still do what people want to do". The majority, however, believed that the cameras potentially deter those who are 'first-timers' or amateurs, while doing very little to discourage the habitual or professional criminal or cheats. I acknowledge that in order to determine whether CCTV does have a deterrent effect, one must speak to those who use the social space. Certainly, a research study of offenders caught by CCTV in the commission of their crimes indicated that they did not perceive CCTV to be a threat to them (for more, see Gill and Loveday, 2001).

In addition to the CCTV operator perspective discussed above, some went so far as to suggest that they did not believe that CCTV was intended to deter criminal or deviant behaviour. They supported their position by indicating that in environments such as department stores signs are rarely erected to warn that CCTV is in use, and that the surveillance cameras have been reduced in size, making them less conspicuous. This leads into examining another purpose of CCTV – that of simply improving observation. It is in the domain of improving observation and the management of resources that operators applaud the effectiveness of CCTV. Almost all CCTV operators appeared to agree that CCTV allows them to see and monitor things that they simply would not be able to see on the ground. Not only does CCTV provide the camera operator with a better vantage point and a panoramic view of the space under surveillance, it also allows for tight zooms in order to see what one could not see

at the ground level. The following statement by Shawn sums up well the overall sentiment by most CCTV operators interviewed.

Well I think it's very effective because you and I couldn't get close enough to see a lot of stuff compared to the camera ... I think the camera helps us to get closer than ever. Especially if its in a dome, they don't know where the camera ... [is] pointing, so it could be right on top of them ... pointing directly over their hand, seeing what their hand is doing. Where's their hand going? You can see. If you're standing behind them ... [y]ou see their hand go in their pockets, but you don't know exactly what they're doing with their hand, right. [CCTV] is part of the tools that security use to get a lot of people because they can say for a fact that that individual did ... pick it [an item] up with his left hand, look at it and with his right hand place [it] in his pocket and exit the store. They can tell you exactly what happened.

(Shawn, Downtown Department Store)

CCTV operators explained that even if you are not certain of what you saw in real-time, CCTV allows you to go back and monitor the incident again, just to be sure. The participants also suggested that recorded CCTV footage could be submitted to the courts in corroboration, or in lieu, of eye-witness testimony. However, some participants did raise concerns regarding the use of CCTV footage in lieu of eye-witness testimony, especially in terms of the interpretation of CCTV footage. Barry suggested that at the right camera angle even the most benign behaviour on the ground may be misinterpreted by the camera operator as malignant.

A few of the participants also discussed the ability of CCTV to impact perceptions regarding the prevalence of crime, as well as reduce the levels of fear among users and providers within social spaces. As indicated previously in this chapter, while not all sites expressed the reduction of fear as an objective for their CCTV systems it appears that the cameras have had this effect at some of the locations, at least from the perception of the CCTV operators. Frank pointed out that while the open-street surveillance scheme may not be deemed to be an effective tool if measuring its success against the impact it has had on the cities crime rates or the number of arrests made with the help of the CCTV cameras, it may be considered successful in the sense that there is a perception among citizens that the cameras are effective, thus fear has been reduced, especially among those who live and own

businesses in the city's downtown core. At the casino, patrons are asked to complete a customer satisfaction survey which, according to Andre, reveals that the surveillance cameras provide the clients with a sense of security.

Some of those who applauded CCTV also provided a critique of the technology stating that while the technology is great when it is working, there are often equipment break-downs and system crashes that interfere with its effectiveness. Some also suggested that different equipment used at particular sites may serve to constrain the surveillant gaze. Whether it is because the viewing monitors are too small to make out details or the surveillance cameras cannot be rotated, what the human operator can do is limited by the technologies capabilities.

You could do a better job than a patrol officer at viewing stuff, but your boundaries are set on those cameras. [L]et's say you have a camera, you can't rotate it but yet there's something that's happening behind the camera. You can't see it because you can't rotate [the camera]. Your boundaries are set on that camera.

(Barry, Museum)

The reverse, however, is also true in the sense that the technology may be underused by the CCTV operators because they simply do not know how to use it to its full capacity. Examples of this could be found at the small downtown shopping mall, where in the opinions of James and Xavier the cameras were not efficiently placed to monitor those coming and going from the loading dock and the parking garage, or at the open-street site where bureaucratic lines of communication hinder a prompt response to crime in progress. Interestingly, the recommendations made by those operators who critiqued the CCTV systems focused on improving or upgrading the technology used at their specific sites.

The interplay between the social and the technological is evident. From its invention to serve a specific social purpose, to its implementation at a specific site, and finally, to the manner in which it is used by those who employ it, CCTV technology, like all other forms of technology, are social constructions. This is a perspective that appears lost in administrative evaluations of CCTV effectiveness, and also one that appears lost on the majority of CCTV

operators that I have interviewed. However, it is one that must be borne in mind in order to understand how surveillance work is done, and how the 'selective gaze' of CCTV operators is guided.

In this chapter I have introduced the research participants and I have presented their perceptions on various topics. By first exploring the additional job requirements undertaken by CCTV operators, as well as how they think about and understand their institutional roles and various other issues in CCTV work, I can now more comfortably move forward in my analysis. In the following chapter I will be exploring the 'selective gaze' of CCTV operators across these various social settings, especially in terms of what they perceive to be suspicious. I will also be exploring the various influences on the operators' gaze, which includes, but is not limited to, such things as training, institutional policies, and the media.

**CHAPTER FIVE:****HOW DO THEY DECIDE? INTERROGATING THE 'SELECTIVE GAZE' AND ITS INFLUENCES**

As discussed in chapter two, the 'selective gaze' refers to the discretion that those responsible for surveillance have in determining what and/or who requires monitoring. Recall that the concept of the 'selective gaze' can be applied at different levels of abstraction, from determining which areas of a city require open-street surveillance camera systems, to determining how many cameras will be installed and in which configuration, to the operator's determination of which individuals and/or situations to monitor. While the focus of this thesis is the latter, whom and what CCTV operators watch is impacted by the 'selective gaze' at the more macro-levels. As such, where possible these different levels of abstraction will form part of this discussion.

Certainly CCTV operators, like the rest of us have agency, and are able to make their own choices about where or whom to watch. However, these choices are governed by a number of factors, whether individual, social, cultural, or institutional. When individuals wake up each morning and make the choice of what to wear for the day, this choice is often limited to what wardrobe is immediately available in their closets. Further, the clothing immediately available in their closet is influenced by social and cultural factors such as what is currently fashionable, or what one's peers are wearing. What one chooses to wear may also be influenced by policies established by the institutions with which they will be interacting. For example, one may be required by the policies of their employer or school to wear a uniform, or more broadly to dress professionally. The choices made by those who operate CCTV are also governed by similar influences. This chapter explores in detail the multi-faceted concept of the 'selective gaze' through the perspective of the CCTV operators.

**YOU CANNOT SEE WITHOUT EYES: SELECTING AMONG AVAILABLE OPTIONS**

While there appears to be little difference between what attracts the gaze of CCTV operators and what attracts the attention of those police and security officers on the ground, it is clear that CCTV technology potentially provides the CCTV operator with a much greater field of

view. While those on the ground are limited to monitoring what is in their immediate vicinity, those who monitor CCTV cameras are afforded what Paul refers to as a 'helicopter' view. CCTV technology may allow a single individual to monitor a much larger area than those on the ground; however, the CCTV operator's gaze is significantly dependant on the technology employed and how it is configured. Without surveillance cameras to capture images, wiring or remote technologies to transfer those images, and monitors on the other end which enable the operator to view them, CCTV operators would merely be staring at the walls of an otherwise empty room. With each camera installed more area is opened up for the CCTV operator to survey, thus more selectivity must be employed in determining which area(s) to monitor and which object(s) within that specific area(s) require scrutiny.

While the number of open-street CCTV schemes in Canada is not as pervasive as in the UK and the US, Canadians routinely come under the gaze of the surveillance cameras employed by those institutions they interact with on a daily basis, whether it is while shopping, taking public transit or attending work or school. The number of institutions which rely on CCTV technology as a form of security and the number of cameras installed within those institutions is increasing rapidly, making more public and semi-public space potentially open to the gaze of camera operators. As indicated in the previous chapter every site in this study had, was, or was planning to expand and/or improve their CCTV systems. While some interviewees insisted that every inch of their institution was covered by the camera's gaze, others admitted to having at least minimal blind spots. James and Xavier describe a significant one in their CCTV system.

*Xavier: If anything happened in the food court and the entrance we can see a little bit of what's going on there. But [o]n that side there's nothing [no video cameras].*

**James:** I don't know if we should say this on tape, but pretty much if you go to the garage door and you say "Commissionaire", you'll get in. And you [can] take the freight elevator in the loading dock to C3, and you'll end up behind C2. And then from there you just stick to this side and you pretty much go unnoticed.

(James and Xavier, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

The response to blind spots such as the one described above appears to be the addition of more functional cameras. Even at sites where there are a sufficient number of cameras installed to potentially monitor every square inch of the environment, blind spots may still exist and there may be circumstances which preclude the observation of some areas. For instance, each model of security surveillance camera commercially available has its own technical shortcomings, objects may obstruct a view which the cameras would otherwise be capable of monitoring, and equipment may also malfunction.

Contemporary CCTV cameras typically come in two types. Still or fixed cameras typically offer a wide-angle view of a particular area, however, these cameras are immobile thus the operator cannot control in which direction they are aimed. Barry explained that something could be happening behind the camera but because the operator cannot rotate it to check, they will never know. Alternatively, pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras are also available, which can be remotely controlled by the operator. These cameras can be zoomed-out completely to provide a wide angle view of the scene or zoomed-in tight to scrutinize objects more closely. A network of PTZ cameras can be used to deliberately follow individuals throughout a social setting. However, when a PTZ camera is zoomed-in to get a high-resolution view of one particular object, something may be taking place just outside the field of view and the camera will be unable to register it. Further, because PTZ cameras can be rotated, they may be inadvertently left aimed in the wrong place, capturing fruitless video images. Sometimes this may go unrealized for extended periods of time.

A research team at York University recently developed the prototype for a new type of surveillance camera comprised of two separate camera units mounted one on top of the other. The bottom camera is fixed and capable of providing a low-resolution wide-angle view of the entire scene, while the top camera is mounted on a motorized pan-tilt base and offers a narrow lens which will allow for a portion of the wider scene to be selected and viewed at high-resolution<sup>11</sup>. While York University Professor James Elder and his research

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<sup>11</sup> The full article available at Yfile. Yfile is York University's weekly student newsletter. This article if available online at: <http://www.yorku.ca/yfile/2007/04-April/04-23/eldercam-042307.htm>. Last verified on 2007-03-25.

team's innovative attempt at combining these two images into one surveillance camera is more sophisticated, several of the sites examined in this research already utilize a combination of both fixed and PTZ cameras in the surveillance of their environments. At the casino, CCTV operators utilized both fixed and PTZ cameras together to monitor table games, allowing them to zoom-in and focus on a specific object without losing a wider view of the surrounding area.

When we watch, we always use two monitors. So let's say I'm watching a Roulette table, we'll use the fix[ed camera] which [is] very wide. We [will] see all [of] the tables with all [of the] players and we use another one [camera] which we will zoom for the gaming, for all the manipulation with the hands and everything. So we always work with two monitors, one with [a] wide angle of everything and then when you watch Roulette or Blackjack you will use the other one to zoom on what the dealer will do, what the players will do, what are the bets, what are the payments for the winning bets. Even if we watch ... a cashier we have all the wide-angle of ... his work place and then the zoom with the other one.

(Andre, Casino)

While often times much thought and experimentation goes into how CCTV systems are configured, there are sometimes situations where institutional administrators place objects in the environment in such a way that they obstruct a security camera's full range of view. For example, at the large suburban shopping mall a CCTV camera used to monitor a busy corridor was obstructed by directive signage erected to assist in shopper orientation. In other environments cameras were obstructed by decorative foliage or the construction of new buildings.

As is the case with most electronic equipment CCTV technologies are at risk of frequent malfunctioning, especially given that some of the cameras and/or wiring are exposed to inclement weather. The majority of sites indicated that the reliability of the multiple electronic components required for the successful operation of a CCTV left something to be desired. Whether it is a malfunctioning surveillance camera, a server crash, or problems with recording devices, each pose a challenge for the gaze of the CCTV operator. At the university one of the cameras used to monitor the activities of students on one of the main

grounds of the campus was not functioning. The malfunctioning of this one camera resulted in a 4-5 acre blind spot for campus security.

Unfortunately, I have one [camera] that's down right now in front of [the administrative building]. It's a new camera so it's expected [that for] two weeks ... we'll have problems with it ... [I]t's [also] being installed prior to the winter, which is the worse time to do it ... [W]hen it's operational I will see the entire lawn of the [administrative building].

(Paul, University Campus)

As those who utilize the cameras on regular basis, CCTV operators are likely the ones with the expertise as to which cameras are fruitful and which are not, which malfunctioning cameras need to be replaced immediately and which are not as urgent. This being said, there was significant variation in the influence the interviewees had in relation to decisions rendered about the CCTV systems they operated. Whether it is the headquarters of a department store chain, the client who employs contracted private security agents, the government department in charge of casinos, or the city counsel who oversees a police run open-street surveillance systems, administrative decisions are often made and resources often controlled at levels beyond the operator, and in most cases even the site supervisor.

With regard to the configuration of the system Michael indicated that as a loss prevention officer in a department store he does have some input into where merchandise should be displayed in order to prevent loss, while as a security supervisor of the same department store Richard is responsible for determining where new CCTV cameras should be installed. Barry frankly stated that as a contracted security officer his personal opinion about the configuration of the CCTV system doesn't matter, rather it is dependent on what the client wants, and more importantly, how much money the client is willing to invest in their security system. James, another contracted security guard indicated that when he came in for his shift on the weekend of our interview he realized that one of the television monitors, used to monitor the buildings freight elevator, had been removed. He had not been informed previously that they would no longer be responsible for monitoring that particular camera.

In relation to the maintenance of the system, it appears that in the majority of cases the CCTV operators and/or supervisors merely place requests to have the equipment repaired, while the decision is taken at a higher level. Richard explained that head office of his department store chain reviews and evaluates such requests on the basis of need, taking into consideration the amount of loss suffered at a particular site and the number of apprehensions made.

I don't know quite where they get their numbers but the higher caseload stores will tend to get [a] higher budget for staff and for their CCTV system. Our wait time [for equipment and repairs] as compared to other stores in the same city is not even half. We just put in a request to get a bunch of things replaced ... from head office. It took a week and we got all our stuff. Another store has waited three months to get half the stuff we got. But we have four times the caseload and four times the incidents ... so quote unquote we need the stuff more than they do, because we use it more.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

While the majority of sites appeared to rely on the technical assistance of outside companies to repair and/or replace even minor equipment malfunctions, Xavier described a more hands-on approach to deal with his camera feed cutting out, indicating that "you just have to go in the back and shake the wires and they [the cameras] work". Even when all cameras are fully functional and configured in such a way to allow the operator potentially to view every inch of their environment, their gaze can only be focused upon a limited number of monitors at any given time.

Each new camera that is brought online in a CCTV network demands greater selectivity from the CCTV operator, ultimately resulting in a greater proportion of cameras not being monitored at any given time. There is a plethora of ways CCTV control rooms may be organized to display the CCTV footage. While I will not spend more time discussing the ways in which control rooms may be configured, it should be kept in mind that each manner requires that operators develop a way of coping with the demand of supervising numerous cameras. It is impossible for any CCTV operator to actively monitor all the camera for which they are responsible at any given time, thus the majority of CCTV schemes are recorded allowing those responsible for monitoring to go back and re-examine

what they previously monitored, or review the footage captured by a camera they were not watching. Of course the ability of CCTV operator to peer into the past is dependant on the often taken for granted recording capabilities of their CCTV system.

The manner in which CCTV footage is recorded has recently evolved from the use of cassettes and video cassette recording (VCR) to digital video recording (DVR). While the majority of sites researched for this study appeared to have switched to DVR technology, some sites were using a combination of the two. Only the small downtown shopping mall was still utilizing solely VCR technology. The participants revealed some of the challenges posed by each of these technologies. VCR technology requires a system of recording, switching and storing cumbersome video cassettes. James and Xavier explained that at their site the same tapes had been recorded over once a week for approximately seven (7) years before it was realized that the system had malfunctioned. After purchasing a new VCR and new video cassettes the system was in operation for only a few months before it too malfunctioned. The site has been without any means of recording CCTV footage for a significant amount of time.

Barry expressed concerns with recording CCTV using VCR technology, specifically the gaps which occur during the switching of video cassettes or the reviewing of CCTV footage. When cassettes are switched approximately 3-4 minutes are lost as the process requires the rewinding and removal of the current cassette and the insertion of the new one. Further, the time spent reviewing past footage from a cassette for a particular camera meant that the real-time images were not being recorded. Barry praises DVR technology because it omits the need to switch tapes. As well, because DVR technology stores the CCTV images on a hard drive, past footage can be retrieved and reviewed without interrupting any real-time recordings.

While DVR technology has significantly increased the storage capacity of CCTV systems, there appeared to be very little consistency between sites regarding how long CCTV footage was maintained. While some sites indicated that footage was maintained for only seventy-

two (72) hours, others suggested that their hard-drive could store footage for six (6) years. The majority of systems automatically purged themselves of stored footage, meaning that the footage could be lost unless the operator or a technician saved an incident of interest to a hard-copy DVD. Michael also suggested that DVR technology, similar to any other computer server, is prone to malfunction, sometimes resulting in the loss of information. The loss of CCTV footage or the inability to record it in the first place may prove embarrassing to system operators, as is suggested by James' story of a theft that occurred at a restaurant inside the complex he monitors.

Apparently some guy came in through the mall [and] he went into the back entrance [of the restaurant]. He somehow got into their [the staff] locker room which is probably in the back ... and he took all of their winter boots and winter jackets. And this is like in the dead of winter. And he [a restaurant employee] came to me and he was like "Yeah, we just had this theft ... do you think we could review your tape and see if we can see anything?" And ... I wasn't embarrassed, but I told him "Sorry, they're not recorded" [Laugh]. So, basically he just looked at me like ... 'What's the point?'

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

#### FINDING THE TIME TO WATCH

While the section above examines how the area that CCTV operators are able to survey depends on the number and configuration of the surveillance cameras utilized, this section explores the proportion of time that the operators spend monitoring their cameras in real-time. It became evident early during the interviews that the amount of time that operators spend monitoring their institutional environment live is impeded upon by the long list of additional occupational requirements, as well as their hours of work, as not every site is monitored by CCTV operators outside of the normal hours of operation.

The additional job requirements of CCTV operators will not be detailed here as they were discussed in the previous chapter. What will be explored here is the proportion of time that CCTV operators spend engaged in these other activities versus monitoring their surveillance cameras. No one would be astounded to learn that CCTV operators do not constantly monitor the cameras throughout their shift; however, they may be surprised to learn how little time is actually spent undertaking this activity. While how much time is spent

monitoring the CCTV system varied among sites and interviewees, the bulk of interviewees indicated that they spend the minority of their time watching the cameras. While some interviewees spoke in general terms, either stating that they do not pay as much attention to the cameras as they used to or stressing that they don't only monitor the cameras, others provided a more specific indication of how little time they spend on the CCTV system. Barry explained that approximately two hours of an eight hour shift is focused on monitoring the surveillance cameras, while Frank insisted that during the rare shift he spends solely at the surveillance monitoring station, at best, one or two of twelve hours are spent actively monitoring the cameras. The remainder of the time is used to complete reports.

The casino and the department stores appeared to make the greatest effort to ensure that their cameras are monitored on a regular basis. The four or five operators working per shift at the casino allowed for much more continuity than was found at the majority of sites. Michael explained that at least 50 percent of a loss prevention officer's work shift consists of monitoring surveillance cameras, insisting that between the two officers working during any given shift the cameras at his department store are almost always monitored. This may, however, over estimate the continuity of the surveillance at his site, as his supervisor, Richard, acknowledged that the department store cameras are not always monitored during the hours of operation. Richard indicated that sometimes there are more pressing matters such as an investigation, "which takes precedent over anything that is happening in the store".

Five of the sites studied had CCTV operators working twenty-four hours of every day, while the remaining three did not. The casino, campus, museum, and both shopping malls comprise the former group, while both of the department stores and the open-street surveillance system form the latter. Of those operators employed during silent hours, Paul suggested that at the campus operator workload is significantly lessened during the night shift providing the operator more time to actively monitor the university grounds using the cameras. However, James and Xavier insisted that working the night shift provides the

optimum environment to complete homework rather than watch surveillance cameras. Those sites which did not employ CCTV operators during silent hours or were not concerned with the continuity of watching cameras in real-time must once again rely on the recording capabilities of their surveillance systems.

Thus far this analysis has focused upon the technological and temporal constraints on the CCTV operator's real-time gaze, pointing to the need for the recording of CCTV footage. While the remainder of this chapter will primarily focus on those factors which influence the selectivity employed during active real-time surveillance, reference will be made to stored CCTV footage, thus one should not lose sight of this critical component of contemporary CCTV systems.

#### **MINIMIZING OPERATOR SELECTIVITY? VARIATIONS OF THE AUTOMATED GAZE**

New generation CCTV has become the preferred term to describe the digitization of CCTV technology. The shift from analogue toward the digitization of CCTV technology is said to bring with it the ability to automate the 'selective gaze' through the use of algorithms. However, as Graham and Wood (2003: 231) explain, the digitization of CCTV surveillance does not necessarily imply that it is algorithmic.

Algorithmic surveillance refers to surveillance systems using software to extend raw data ... Many of the latest surveillance technologies have embedded digital and algorithmic features. A city centre CCTV system providing images that are watched and analysed by human operators may be digitally recorded and stored, but is not algorithmic. If the system includes software that compares the faces of the people observed with those in a database of suspects, it becomes algorithmic.

Algorithmic surveillance minimizes human operator discretion through the use of such things as facial and movement recognition software. CCTV combined with facial recognition software is designed to compare the faces of individuals in the social setting monitored with those of known individuals whose photograph and personal information is stored in a database (Graham and Wood, 2003; Norris, 2003). CCTV cameras may also incorporate gait recognition software which functions similar to facial recognition with the

exception that it maps and compares the unique manner in which people walk (Graham and Wood, 2003). Finally, CCTV may be combined with software which maps movement in a social setting by monitoring the pixels in the digital images collected by the camera. The software recognizes when a blob of pixels remain constant across a sample frames and alerts the CCTV operator to an object that, or a person who, is not moving. While this software was designed for the purpose of crowd flow management, it received acclaim for its potential for reducing suicides on subway platforms, as those who choose this form of suicide typically do not jump in front of the first train but rather tend to let a few trains pass before taking their fateful leap (Norris, 2003).

While the number of sites globally – especially in the UK - utilizing algorithmic CCTV may be increasing, its use is still not prevalent. The majority of sites researched for this study employed digital technology; however, none used algorithmic surveillance. This is not to mean that the gaze of the participants was not automated to some degree, or that their gaze was not guided by automated alarms. While there was variation across sites, most interviewees provided examples of an automated gaze. Certainly, the automation was nowhere near as sophisticated as the gaze automated using algorithms.

Most CCTV operators can modify how the images from the cameras are displayed to them in the control room. At rudimentary level, they have the option of having their monitors constantly display images from a single camera at a time. Using a controller they may select which area they wish to monitor, from any of the cameras they have at their disposal. At most sites they may also configure things so that the images from multiple cameras may be displayed on a single monitor. Obviously, the more the operator divides their screen to project the images from more cameras the smaller the images will be, resulting in the loss of detail. Finally, rather than choosing which areas to monitor, operators may configure the system so that the images from each camera are automatically displayed in a looped sequence, the image from each camera displaying itself for a few seconds before switching to the next. The sequence mode can also be used together with monitors that display a single camera image. Ian explained that he always keeps one of his monitors on the

sequence mode. If anything catches his eyes, he will then select the camera on a second monitor to take a closer look. Such a practice allows for operators to keep a pulse on the rest of the environment, even while focusing on one specific area. Further, at the open-street initiative, when the cameras were not being monitored by an operator they were placed in an automatic mode in which each camera would randomly pan, tilt, and zoom itself, freezing occasionally. Frank suggested that when operated in this mode, every inch of the area under surveillance in the open-street is recorded over the course of a minute.

In addition to CCTV, each site employed a variety of alarms, such as fire and intrusion alarms. Intrusion alarms certainly provide CCTV operators with a guide for their gaze; however, there is slight variation in how they do so. At minimum most organizations have alarms on main entrances and/or emergency exits. Likewise, most also have CCTV cameras in these locations. As such, when an alarm is triggered, the CCTV operator is notified by means of the alarm control panel and may then select a camera closest to the alarm point in an attempt to search for suspicious persons or activity. Of course this is only possible if there are cameras installed that can view the area in question.

We could tell [that an alarm has been tripped] on our control panel and then we have to zoom the camera into the area - if we're able to. It doesn't necessarily mean the camera covers the area [and] that is the problem. I find that causes us a problem because we should be able to see what's going on.

(Barry, Museum)

At other sites the CCTV cameras were linked to the intrusion and/or emergency exit alarms so that when an alarm was triggered CCTV images from the door were automatically projected on the main monitor in the control room. This automated system is limited by the how the cameras are configured and whether the images are recorded. At the small downtown shopping mall, James and Xavier explained that because the cameras are situated only inside the building, if someone were to leave via the emergency exit the cameras would only catch a glimpse of a closing door. Further, because this particular site currently had no recording capabilities, the CCTV operators could not even retroactively identify who left via the emergency exit. While this technological ability is far from new, few sites

appear to be currently employing it. Barry indicated that he had suggested to his employer that the museum could benefit from such a capability, while Ian stated that they are currently working on implementing this technology.

The university campus was the only site to employ emergency stations. These emergency stations are strategically placed throughout the campus grounds and within campus buildings. When an individual utilizes the emergency station an alert is received in the university's communication centre and the individual is placed in audio communication with campus security. In most cases the security surveillance cameras are automatically engaged and the images from the emergency station are displayed on the main monitor in the campus communications centre. While most of the cameras directed at the emergency stations inside the campus buildings are fixed, the rotating cameras utilized to monitor the exterior grounds of the campus will automatically swivel and fix themselves to monitor the emergency station which was triggered. Also, at least one of the campus merchants has been provided with a panic button, which when engaged attracts the attention of a PTZ camera installed nearby, as well as the CCTV operator. A few of the sites also indicated that the cameras in their elevators were linked to the emergency button, allowing them to monitor the occupants in an emergency situation.

CCTV cameras may also be used in conjunction with motion detectors in order to guide the gaze of the operator. When a motion sensor is triggered the operator will be notified and they may then monitor the area. Further, in an attempt to conserve storage space, surveillance cameras may also be connected to motion detectors. Where such technology is employed the default setting for the cameras is off. When someone comes into the vicinity of the camera they will trigger a motion sensor which will turn the camera on and begin recording. While this may not impact the real-time gaze of the CCTV operator, it will reduce the amount of footage to review retroactively, should the need arise. As previously discussed, digitally recorded footage is also automatically purged or overridden after a specified period of time, limiting how far in the past the operators gaze may extend.

### Protecting Privacy through Automation

The rise of CCTV brings with it ethical concerns, especially in relation to a person's right for a reasonable expectation of privacy. The privacy debates surrounding the use of CCTV in public and semi-public environments will not be outlined here. What is important to note, however, is that the drafting and/or modification of legislation and/or other forms of regulation for the protection of privacy typically follow, and rarely if ever lead, advances in surveillance or surveillance friendly technologies.

While regulatory restraints are beginning to emerge in the UK, here in Canada there appears to be little to regulate the gaze of camera operators, except, as Paul indicated, a reliance on "everyone's inner professionalism"; however, what is deemed acceptable appeared to vary by site. For example, one site did not grant me access to their CCTV control rooms citing confidentiality concerns for those being monitored by the camera operators, while the majority did not share this concern and welcomed my visit. Only the casino indicated that they required the police to have a warrant prior to releasing any information, the rest appeared eager to assist the police. Further, while some sites such as the university campus made attempts to strategically install cameras in so that they precluded a view of dorm room windows, this was not always feasible. In such cases the operator's individual ethics were relied upon to prevent needless intrusion of privacy.

One of the sites which formed part of this study automated the protection of privacy. The police run 'open-street initiative' integrated a software program with their CCTV cameras which allows them to block the operator from gazing into the windows of any residential unit in the camera's field of view. Frank provided the following explanation of the system.

I don't know if you saw ... the black boxes on some of the camera views. Well, those are deliberately blocked out because people may be living in those units. [Its set up] not to allow the police to be intrusive into someone's living room or bedroom. I believe when the views were being established ... someone manually blocked those things out with the software.

(Frank, Open-Street Initiative)


### SITUATING GAZE OF HUMAN OPERATORS

Advocates of CCTV insist that its use to enhance the formal surveillance capabilities of guardians, consequently furnishes a deterrent threat to potential offenders, and fits nicely under the situational crime prevention (SCP) umbrella (see Clarke, 1995; Felson and Clarke, 1998). Such logic makes a number of assumptions about the manner in which CCTV is utilized. It takes for granted the ability of surveillance cameras to generate an automatic functioning of power, *à la* Bentham. Where such power fails, the SCP approach assumes the omnipresent gaze of the CCTV operator will catch and intervene as necessary. Absent from this discourse is any discussion of the relationship between the operator's gaze and the employment of intervention. Monitoring CCTV cameras is fruitless without the ability to intervene when crime is identified. A key ingredient in Jeremy Bentham's recipe for the automatic functioning of power was the ability to intervene when transgressions are recognized by the watcher, and evidence of the criminal event in the form of CCTV footage serves no purpose if the offender is never arrested and/or brought to court.

While the gaze can be placed on a continuum from proactive to reactive, it must be noted that these are not mutually exclusive and, certainly, operators may alternate between each style of monitoring. A proactive gaze is illustrated by the operator who manipulates the cameras in search of situations and/or individuals which arouse their suspicion. A reactive gaze is one which is mobilized after being advised of a suspicious person or situation. Somewhere along this continuum are those operators who tend to be much more passive in their monitoring. This can be illustrated by those who scan wide-angle views of the area under surveillance or those who complete other duties while monitoring the cameras using their peripheral vision.

Whether an intervention is preventive or responsive depends on when it occurs in relation to the criminal or otherwise undesired event. If intervention occurs prior, then it is to be deemed preventive. If it is employed subsequent to the event, then it is responsive. The following figure (Figure Two) illustrates the possible relationships between the gaze and intervention.

Figure One – The Interactions between Gaze and Intervention



A *proactive-preventative* approach occurs where the camera operator actively monitors an area looking for clues of suspicious activity or identities. Once the operator identifies something suspicious he will request intervention in an attempt to pre-empt a criminal event. Operators may also look for nuisance behaviours such as loitering and request intervention in the hopes of forestalling a more serious occurrence. By way of example, the large suburban shopping mall had a zero-tolerance policy for youth gangs and/or loitering youth. In this environment the CCTV operator proactively looks for loitering youth and pays particular attention to their clothing, looking for any indication that they are wearing gang colours and/or other gang paraphernalia. Ian explained that if left idle youths and gangs can get into trouble within the shopping mall. As such, a precautionary approach is taken to nip the issue in the bud. Ian indicated that he will try to anticipate where something is likely to happen – typically the food court - and actively monitor that area. When he suspects a group of youth to be loitering, intervention is immediately requested. The youth are then provided with a copy of the mall rules which indicate that loitering is prohibited and they are provided an opportunity to use the mall for its stated purpose. If they do not conform they will receive a short-term verbal barring.

Similar to the case above, with the *proactive-responsive* approach, the camera operator actively monitors an area for clues of suspicious activity or identities. The operator may even go so far as to mobilize another individual or team for the purposes of intervention. However, intervention will not take place until the criminal event has occurred. In order to apprehend an individual for shop theft, department store security staff must first fulfill a number of requirements. As Richard explained a security officer must see the offender select the item(s), conceal the item(s), as well as maintain continuity in the monitoring of the individual until they depart from the store. Only after satisfying these criteria shall they make an arrest. Such requirements demand that the CCTV operator actively monitor individuals in anticipation that they will commit theft, however, wait until they commit the criminal act before they can intervene.

A *reactive-responsive* approach occurs when the camera operator is warned of suspicious activities or identities via an electronic alarm or a third-party. After being advised, the operator turns their attention toward the suspicious individual or activity, however, intervention will not occur until such time as the operator witnesses a criminal event. In some cases, this may be satisfied by retroactively reviewing CCTV footage to explore whether a criminal act has occurred. Andre indicated that with just five camera operators and over sixty gaming tables and hundreds of slot machines to monitor, the surveillance team rely on directive information coming from the gaming tables through the card dealers and/or pit bosses. Andre estimates that nine of ten times the surveillance camera operators are advised of suspicious activities by the dealers at the table. Once directed, camera operators will scrutinize the playing behaviour of the suspicious individual. They may also go back to review previous footage from the table. Should subsequent real-time monitoring or the retroactive review of camera footage reveal that the suspicious player is cheating, the surveillance team will notify an investigator who will examine the footage prior to making a decision regarding intervention.

A *reactive-preventive* approach, like the reactive-responsive approach, entails the CCTV operator being warned of suspicious activities or identities via an electronic alarm or a

third-party. Once the operator is directed to a suspicious person or activity they will request intervention to pre-empt a criminal event. Such a preventative approach may require addressing minor annoyances. An example of this approach can be found in the context of the university campus. When one of the university campus' emergency stations is activated the operator's attention is averted from whatever they were previously doing and directed toward the suspicious situation at hand. The operator may then immediately mobilize other security personnel in order to prevent a criminal event from occurring, such as an assault.


### THE 'EXCLUSIONARY GAZE'

Another form of situational crime prevention is through controlling access to a particular environment (Clarke, 1995; von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000). With the exception of the open-street surveillance site and the casino, individuals may be excluded from all the sites which participated in this research as they are deemed to be private property - despite their public functions. As James explains the authority to enforce exclusions from semi-public – but legally constituted as private – spaces derives from provincial trespass statutes.

If you're going to make a citizens arrest, you're going to make it for that [trespassing]. [Under] the Trespass to Property Act ... all I do is I just ask them to leave once or twice, and if they do, great. If they don't, well, then you can charge them with trespassing. I mean, it's under the *Trespass [to Property Act]* ... but you ... put them under a citizens arrest for refusing to leave when asked to do so ... and that's enough to have them charged with trespassing. And right there you put them under citizen's arrest, call the cops, and they deal with it.

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

Andrew von Hirsch and Clifford Shearing (2000) suggest that exclusions of individuals from semi-public spaces may be based on their risk profile, the commission of minor acts of nuisance, or previous criminal offences. While interviewees corroborated each of these tactics to varying degrees, the participant from the casino indicated that individuals with gambling problems may request that their exclusion from the casino be enforced under the casino's self-exclusion program. I will now take a moment addressing each of these exclusion types.

Figure Two – Excerpts from the Province of Ontario's *Trespass to Property Act*

Profile-based exclusions are based on the assumption that those who possess certain characteristics are more likely than those who do not to engage in criminal activity. While some of the operators in this study acknowledged that particular profiles attracted their attention more than others, this did not appear sufficient to bar entry into a space. Rather,

in most cases, profiles were considered together with the person's or group's conduct. As von Hirsch and Shearing suggest:

[P]ersons considered bad risks are kept away by prohibiting conduct that is deemed to typify them. For example, groups of male teenagers, or persons dressed in a certain manner, are kept out of shopping malls because their presence is thought to bode risks or potential disruption or theft (2000: 89).

The conduct required to warrant exclusion varies. In some cases simply wearing the wrong type of clothing may result to in one's exclusion. Casinos may require that patrons wear a collar shirt and pants, while shopping malls may prohibit the wearing of what they deem sub-cultural clothing or gang paraphernalia, such as bandanas or hoods. Congregating in large groups and, if noticed by mall security staff, actions such as passing gang signs will also suffice to have one excluded. While the conduct outlined above is relatively innocuous, as will be discussed next, one may also exclude based on conduct which is deemed a nuisance or based on a criminal offence.

Exclusion grounded in the commission of minor nuisance acts is typically a short-term solution in which the individual will be given a *verbal barring* from the space. A verbal barring is typically for a 24 hour period or slightly longer, and its intended purpose is to reduce the number of panhandlers and other forms of solicitation, such as individuals who place literature on vehicles in the institutional parking lots. Verbal barring may also be used to remove the homeless and/or other loiterers in an attempt to restore the aesthetics of the space. It is hoped that by taking this *broken windows* approach administrators will be able to reduce fear, and retain and/or "attract more respectable paying customers" (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000: 86). Ian described the primary objective of his supervisor as that of ensuring the mall he monitors "remain[s] a family mall, where you are not fearful to bring your wife [and] your children down and spend some time".

Typically those engaged in the kinds of conduct described in the two previous paragraphs will be provided an opportunity to cease and desist. Should the individual(s) conform to the

organizational rules and/or appropriate conduct requirements, they will be allowed to remain. If they fail to do so, they will be asked to leave the premise. Should they refuse to leave they may be arrested for trespassing.

When we're dealing with a group of youths ... we'll pick out the one person that we feel is the leader in the group and we'll give that person a [rule] card and explain to them why we approached [them]. Most times kids are pretty adapting but we do have the odd one that is the exception. In a case like that, if it gets out of hand that person is trespassed from our property. And if you trespass the leader, the rest of them follow.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

The most common reason for long-term exclusion, commonly referred to as a *trespass*, is previous criminal activity. Shawn's suggestion that banning an individual prevents recidivism is in line with the 'exclusion as situational crime prevention' approach. However, exclusion is not an inevitable sanction imposed to address criminal behaviour. For example, Richard indicated that at his department store young offenders are treated differently than adult offenders. Rather than being issued a trespass notice, Richard suggested that youths may be advised not to return to the store unless they are in the presence of their parents. His colleague added that simply because an individual commits theft does not mean that they will be barred from the department store.

Some people that get caught [shoplifting] do learn their lesson and don't do it again, you know what I mean. It's not fair to say that everybody that has done something like that at one point is gonna do it again. But, it does, for at least for the first little, which gives you a reason to watch them, because ... well why not? I mean, you know.

**So if somebody does it they're not necessarily going to get banned right away?**

No, not necessarily.

(Michael, Downtown Department Store)

To be sure, "[s]ince so many people, especially young persons, have at one or another time been found to have committed petty thefts or lesser acts of disruption, a very substantial class could be denied the freedom to utilize public spaces" (von Hirsch and Shearing, 2000: 91). Such a response may also have significant economic impacts for a consumer society. However, Richard indicated that his organization will only trespass a person if they

absolutely do not want them back in the store. In many situations if a person is issued a trespass notice it is life-long, as short-term bans become too difficult to manage. Furthermore, a ban initiated at one store results in a ban across the entire chain of stores country-wide with the exception of stores in the province of Quebec, as Quebec does not have a trespass statute.

The casino offers services to its patrons with gambling problems. Persons who self-disclose or those that the casino administrators suspect have a gambling problem will meet with an intervener to discuss the concern and a referral for professional assistance will be made as needed and if consented to. In addition to such referrals, individuals may register in the self-exclusion program which is offered by the casino. The self-exclusion program is voluntary and non-revocable once the patron has specified a period of exclusion – typically ranging from six (6) months to five (5) years – and completes the necessary paperwork. As Andre indicated “[i]f he [the patron] signs for five years, [it’s for] five years, that’s it! If they call and they say ‘I was drunk’, no way!”

Notwithstanding the type of exclusion or the reason for it, organizations must have a mechanism for enforcing them. Most CCTV operators indicated that they managed information on excluded individuals in various ways, and while such information may be initiated at the operator’s site, they may also receive information from other company locations or external partners. Once an excluded individual is spotted in the social space they may simply be turned away and/or escorted off the premise, or, depending on the circumstances, they may be immediately arrested and turned over to the police. While operators do learn to recognize habitual violators, Ian indicated that it is difficult to recall everyone who is barred. Further, Richard offered mixed reviews regarding trespass notifications from other sites, stating that on some occasions these notifications work and on others they do not.

### **EXPLORING INFLUENCES ON THE 'SELECTIVE GAZE'**

This portion of the chapter examines the various potential influences on the 'selective gaze' of CCTV operators, with a particular emphasis on how these factors impact on what the operators deem suspicious. The following factors will be studied: institutional policy; training; reports, statistics and other actuarial tools; peers; external entities; media; personal experience; characteristics; and, mood, boredom and play.

#### **Institutional Guidelines, Policies and Rules**

At a broad level, the gaze of CCTV operators is guided by criminal legislation and/or other statutes as they serve to prescribe normative behaviours against which violations stand out. There is no doubt that those who monitor CCTV may be on the lookout for criminal or other violations, such as acts of theft, assault, and trespassing. Given this, no more time will be spent examining the influence of such legislation. What will be examined rather is whether the institutions have developed policies and other forms of guidelines which govern CCTV and the work of operators.

All participants indicated that the sites for which they work have policies which govern the entire security department. Whether they are referred to as policies, post orders, or procedures, at a minimum they guide what is expected of security officers. In some instances the policies may be detailed, such as those which direct the security staff of what to do in the case of a bomb threat or what must be included in an incident report. In other cases the policies may be very vague as was illustrated by James and Xavier's statements that the most common phrase to emerge in their post-orders is to "use common sense". The participants who worked in a department store setting indicated that the most significant policy governing their work is that which states that they may not intervene and/or detain a person for shoplifting unless they are certain that the individual took, and is still in possession of, merchandise.

Basically, the guideline is if you didn't see it, it didn't happen. If you think that somebody steals something, that's not good enough you have to actually see it happen in order to make the arrest. So the guideline is if you didn't see it don't arrest it; don't even

approach that individual and say 'did you?' or 'I suspect you did something wrong', because that's not legal. So you can't approach somebody and it [policy] will stipulate, and very strongly, that you do not detain somebody unless they do something wrong.

(Shawn, Downtown Department Store)

While clearly such policies may also impact those who operate CCTV cameras, fewer participants acknowledged the existence of policies which deal specifically with CCTV. The two sites which appeared to be most regulated by policy documents were the casino and the open-street initiative. It is not surprising that the use of CCTV was more regulated at these two sites because first, the casino was a government run organization, and second, the open-street system must operate within the professional guidelines developed by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.

Most interviewees indicated that their sites did not have policies governing the recording, storage, and management information collected from video surveillance, and few could say with certitude how long that their sites kept the footage. While the deletion of footage has become automated with the emergence of digital technology which, by design, overrides previous with more current footage or purges itself of data after a specified period, hard-copies may still be made and stored as needed. The following statement by Richard illustrates the inconsistency in the storage of data, even at different locations across the same department store chain.

Well it depends on the system; I'm talking an average over the systems I've experienced. [Footage is kept for] between a month, two months. It can be up to four months, it can be as low as two weeks. It depends on the store.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Policy developed by the police service responsible for the open-street surveillance initiative outlined in detail how the information collected through the video cameras is to be managed, detailing such things as how long the footage is maintained (72 hours), who is responsible for monitoring the cameras, issues related to the freedom of information, and who has access to the footage and under what circumstances. However, as Frank stated

succinctly “it governs what each section is responsible for in case something happens, but it doesn’t govern what you’re watching”.

Only the casino had a policy which made attempts at governing the gaze of the surveillance camera operators. The government run casino had policy which stipulated the type(s) and number of cameras required at different gaming tables, as well as how much lighting was required at each table to improve surveillance abilities. Policy also stipulated the priorities for the surveillance department (i.e. focus on the integrity of financial transactions rather than the safety of patrons), and detailed the amount of time the department must spend monitoring each area of the casino.

We know from the policies [that] we should spend sixty percent of our time watching the table games, thirty percent watch[ing] all the money transactions, and ten percent will be [used] to help the security agents. So, we do have guidelines from [headquarters].

(Andre, Casino)

Although it is extremely rare that institutional surveillance or security divisions are as strictly governed through policy as they were at the casino, even there such policy did not dictate to CCTV operators what or whom to deem suspicious. However, institutional rules, such as those at the outlined below (*Figure 3*) may, similar to legislation and statutes, serve to prescribe normative behaviours against which violations stand out as suspicious, attracting the gaze of camera operators.

Figure Three – Vetted Mall Rule Card (Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

CENTRE - MALL RULES	
To ensure a safe and pleasant environment,	Centre management asks that you comply with the rules of conduct listed below. Violation of the mall rules would result in the issuance of a Notice Prohibiting Entry to the mall property. Any questions should be directed to the Security Supervisor at ( )
The following activities are prohibited on	Centre property:
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Smoking in the mall common areas and rear corridors.</li> <li>2. Loitering (which includes sitting in the food court and/or mall seating areas) for long periods of time without any intent of purchasing food or merchandise.</li> <li>3. Any behaviour which may interfere with the enjoyment of the facilities to other patrons and tenants, (i.e. running, horseplay, fighting, using profanities, skateboarding, roller blading, bicycling, etc.).</li> <li>4. Obstructing or interfering with the free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic or with patrons' view of doorways, windows, and/or other merchant or mall displays.</li> <li>5. Distribution of flyers or other literature, or solicitation of products or services without written permission of mall management.</li> <li>6. Congregating in large groups so as to interfere with mall traffic.</li> <li>7. Wearing of gang paraphernalia or disguises (i.e. bandanas, hoods, ski masks, etc.) in the mall.</li> <li>8. Using mall property such as tables, chairs, trash containers, etc. for use other than intended for.</li> <li>9. Playing of radios or other audio devices without prior authorization from mall management.</li> <li>10. Taking of photographs or videotaping without permission from management.</li> <li>11. Being in restricted areas of the mall (i.e. back corridors, designated parking stalls, barricaded areas after mall hours, etc.) without prior permission from mall management.</li> <li>12. Any infraction of Ministry of Health and Occupational Health and Safety Acts or regulations, including no smoking in the building, no pets (excluding special aid pets) in the mall common areas. Also shirts and shoes must be worn in the mall at all times. Customer cooperation is required in safely using mall equipment.</li> <li>13. Parking in areas that are controlled by barricades or ropes / as well as fire routes and handicap spots could result in the vehicle being towed or ticketed.</li> <li>14. Any behaviour deemed to be inappropriate by management.</li> </ol>	

### Operator Training

Notwithstanding differences in quality and comprehensiveness, each participant indicated that their employer provided some degree of training relating to their duties as security officers. On the one hand, general training typically includes any or all of the following: basic criminal law and trespass law powers of arrest, report writing, workplace hazardous materials information system (WHMIS), and CPR. On the other hand, site specific training may be required as the technology and electronic systems employed, as well as how they are configured varies by site. In addition to in-house training, several interviewees suggested that their schooling - whether college, university, or professional courses - has also been of benefit to them in their current position. Other than Frank - a police constable himself - only one other CCTV operator stated that they received training from local police service representative.

Of foremost importance for security personnel is an understanding of where they derive their authority to make arrests and/or exclude individuals from the spaces for which they

are responsible. As such, most of the operators indicated that they were provided training on the basics of law and its applicability to their work. While some undertook training in criminal and/or other law through their post-secondary education, most were provided information packages or brief lessons by their employer, which included relevant laws and policies. Similarly, while the majority of operators received training from employers regarding what information to include in general occurrence reports, those who were enrolled in, or had completed, university insisted that the writing demands of their schooling improved their written communications on the job.

You have to be able to communicate, and I think ... my university training [has] made me a better writer. I do get comments from people that ... my reports are some of the only ones the can be understood sometimes. I guess another thing, like I was saying ... about the tricks behind the *Trespass to Property Act* ... those are all tricks that we talked about in my courses. I did take a course on private policing.

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

As previously indicated, the gaze of the CCTV operator is limited to where observation is mediated by video surveillance technology. Where a camera does not exist, the operator cannot see. Likewise, where the operator does not know a camera exists, it is not used, thus creating a blind spot. Also, should an operator not know how to manipulate the cameras or utilize other technologies associated with the system, the CCTV network will not be used to its full capacity, limiting the surveillance workers' gaze.

While some of the participants suggested that learning the camera system and learning to orient themselves using the cameras posed a significant challenge for them, others appeared more comfortable. In almost all cases, participants indicated that they received, at a minimum, technical training on the how to utilize the CCTV cameras, such as switching from camera to camera, or controlling the camera via a joystick, or by other means. Orientation training was also a common feature in the training regime at most sites, whether it was a general orientation to the site and/or more specifically learning the orientation of the cameras. In some cases general orientation of the site could be bypassed as the operators had already been employed at the site. For example, in the cases of James

and Xavier both had previously worked as floor security guards in, and were familiar with the layout of the small downtown shopping mall prior to being employed as CCTV operators in the building control centre. As such, all they had to learn was where the cameras were situated and how to use them. Others were provided more comprehensive orientation training.

I was sent out with a piece of paper, a rough blueprint of the store and [they] said 'okay, go map where the cameras are, just write it on there'. You start to learn fairly quick where you are if you can orient where you are in the store as to which camera you're looking at. So that was a big ... training tool for myself. As for actually working with the CCTV system, another pretty good training aid is ... following one of your guys around. Say 'I'm gonna go take a walkin in the store, follow me', and see if you can do it, kind of thing. So its things like that, it helps you pick up where things are. Even if you don't know exactly where one camera is, you know at least what you're looking at, so then you can kind of gauge where you are. Those are the two biggest training aids for me.

(Michael, Downtown Department Store)

As Michael indicated in the passage above, once an operator is familiar with where each camera is situated, with practice they begin to learn how to smoothly manipulate the cameras using the joystick, and as necessary transfer from one camera to another, in order to maintain continuity in the monitoring of persons through the social setting. Paul indicated that once an operator is habituated to using the camera system, they are able to gradually incorporate new additions with relative ease. Further, as operators become more familiar with the field of view that each camera can achieve they will be able to cheat and manipulate camera to get a better view or even open-up blind spots, as the following examples from Paul and Frank illustrate.

Well, we can cheat a bit sometimes. What I mean by cheat is that I can go take a camera inside of a building and if I'm lucky enough and the window is open, I can zoom outside the exterior of this building. That's why they like me here, because I know my cameras. 'Hey Paul, I'm in front of [address], no problem Charlie-six [camera six] is there'.

(Paul, University Campus)

There's nothing that I haven't looked at, like an alley or a crevasse. One of the cameras can see a building, but can't see the other part of the building. [However], there's a building across the street that's all mirrored, so I now look at the mirror and I could see

behind where I couldn't see with the normal camera. So, now I'm using mirrors or reflection. It's just part of the innovation.

(Frank, Open-Street Initiative)

When asked whether their training addressed concerns about when it is appropriate or inappropriate to select persons in the social setting for more detailed scrutiny, every participant indicated that it had not. Quick to follow in most cases was the common response that everyone is capable of cheating, or engaging in criminal activity like shop theft, and as such it could never be deemed inappropriate to watch someone. In response to this question, Richard, a security supervisor at a downtown department store, insisted that there was not training regarding this issue, adding that "if anyone is asked that question the answer will always be everybody steals. But in practice, like I say, people will have their picks".

Without training on what may be considered inappropriate surveillant targeting, operators are free to select what they perceive to be 'suspicious'. However, how does one learn what is suspicious? Is there training provided to them that teaches what to look out for? The response to this question was mixed, with James, Xavier, and Frank suggesting that there is no training provided on what is to be deemed suspicious. James insisted that the only guidance that is provided in this regard is the very vague statement to look for "anything out of the ordinary". Frank indicated that it would be insulting for police officers to be re-trained on what to look out for in the context of monitoring the open-street surveillance cameras. When asked if this was a component of basic police training, he stated that it was not, but rather that police officers are taught to be observant.

The remaining participants did indicate that there was some degree of training about what one should consider suspicious, but insisted that for the most part the training did not focus on crude categorical suspicion based on sex, age, race, or appearance – more commonly referred to as profiling. Rather, they suggested that focal point was behavioural suspicion and suspicious situations. The contrast between suspicious identities and behaviours will be explored further on in this chapter. In the meantime, where such training is provided it is

commonly done so through the use of training videos, prior CCTV footage, or job shadowing. Participants indicated that training videos typically include common behavioural cues that a person may give off prior to engaging in criminal activity, such as surveying their surroundings. Showing CCTV footage is a much quicker way to disseminate information about latest trends or new and innovative way of committing a particular crime or cheat. Shadowing a more experience employee is also a common training method described by the CCTV operators in this study. This training method entails a veteran employee mentoring and directing the newcomer's attention to behaviours and activities that the veteran deems suspicious.

Of all the sites researched for this study the casino appeared to have the most extensive training regime, with it taking more than a year before an operator was qualified to monitor all of the casino's games. For the first month of training a new camera operator will be partnered with an experienced surveillance worker. The coach will show the new employee how the camera system and its peripheral technologies function. Following one month of training the new operator will spend the next year of their career monitoring only the slots area of the casino. Following this first year the operator will be evaluated to determine whether they are able to work the casino's gaming tables. If so, the operator will receive three to four weeks of training for the tables. This training includes how the games are played, the duties of the dealer, as well as how to spot cheaters. Once this training is complete, the operator is evaluated on their aptitude on the cameras and their ability to detect cheats. Only after this will the operator be able monitor both the slots and the gaming tables

In speaking with the participants it became clear that they were, to some degree, influenced by the training they received about what to deem suspicious. Most suggested that their training has become integrated with their experience, sometimes reinforcing the basic characteristics of suspiciousness which they have learned through their training, and other times being incongruent. While Richard suggested that these basic characteristics are reinforced, he also stated that doing the job is never like it says it will be in the training

manuals and that “you never really know until you do it”. Shawn indicated that when his mentorship ended and he was on his own he figured out for himself and watched for cues he deemed suspicious. Eventually, interviewees suggested, identifying suspiciousness becomes instinctual; a gut feeling which comes to supersede all else.

### **Occurrence Reports, Statistics, Surveys and Other Actuarial Tools**

Given the demands on security employees to write occurrence reports, one may assume that these documents may serve to assist, or otherwise influence, the subsequent gaze of CCTV operators. At a broad level, such reports may be used to justify the installation of new cameras, as well as inform their placement. However, the influence of such tools on the individual gaze of CCTV operators is much more precarious.

The university campus security division employs a criminologist who is responsible for analysing reports, surveys and statistics. In addition to analysing such things as occurrence reports and alarm statistics, the university regularly surveys students and faculty about their perceptions of security on campus. Such surveys may be used to identify areas on campus where persons feel particularly vulnerable. Paul indicated that such surveys have a tremendous impact on where subsequent cameras are going to be installed.

Whether it is through general occurrence reports addressing individual incidents or statistical reports generated monthly dealing with the amount of merchandise lost – referred to as *shrink* - in the different departments of a retail store, there is an expectation that CCTV operators remain informed. Where reports identify a department with a high shrink, loss prevention resources will be directed to that department in an attempt to explain and subsequently reduce it. Not every CCTV operator has access to statistical reports of this sort. In the majority of cases the operator is simply expected to remain informed of the individual incidents which have occurred.

I constantly keep in touch with all the reports that we've had. Do I remember them all?  
No. Eventually you get to know 'well okay, we've had something here, we've had something there, so let's keep these cameras focused here'. We got a break and enter in

cars, it's natural we're gonna keep that one [camera] there [to] survey those cars in the parking lot.

(Paul, University Campus)

In the examples illustrated above the camera operators gaze becomes focused on a particular area, or 'hot spot'. Suspicion becomes *locational* in that anyone who enters the retail store department with a high shrink or who walks through the campus parking lot are initially viewed with suspicion.

In the same way that problem departments or areas may be identified through reports, so to may problem and excluded individuals. To assist in the management of excluded individuals each site typically maintains photographs of these persons. Whether they are available for review on a computer or in a photo album, security staff are responsible for ensuring that they regularly update themselves and/or refresh their memory with regard to those who have been excluded from the social setting.

I look through there every day I come in to see if there's something new, and go back and look at old pictures that we have. We have records that are on the computer back to the year 2000, so I could go back and reminisce.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

Occurrence reports may also be accompanied by surveillance footage illustrating new behaviours and/or activities that the CCTV operator should deem suspicious and be on the lookout for, as discussed in the above section on operator training. What reports do not appear to encourage is categorical suspicion, based on race and gender as these categories are not included in occurrence reports. Thus, occurrence reports cannot be coded, sorted and aggregated to categorize suspicious identities based on gender, race and appearance. When asked whether his institution kept track and analysed demographic data from occurrence reports, Michael responded the following:

It's pretty hard to do that because we don't necessarily have a lot of the demographic information. There is a demographic between young offenders and non young offenders and that one is documented. But aside from that there's really no [way] to verify a lot of the information anyways, so it would be hard to get anything concrete.

(Michael, Downtown Department Store)

Simply because reports were not used to collect and sort demographic data into categories of suspicion does not mean that categorical suspicion does not exist. To be sure one of the downtown department stores had what Richard and Michael referred to as the 'shithead scale'. According to Richard the scale lists a number of characteristics that typify persons which members of the security team would categorize as 'shitheads'. Having certain characteristics would increase one's rating on this scale. As Richard indicated if an individual is "wearing chequered clothing or camouflage that will bump him up to another level". While Richard appeared at ease speaking of the scale, and at one point offered to have his colleague Michael provide me with a copy of the scale during our interview, Michael did not appear comfortable discussing the scale, and he did not bring the scale to the interview. And as indicated previously, Richard would later rescind his offer of providing me a copy of the scale. The following is an excerpt from my discussion with Michael, illustrating his unease with discussing the topic.

Well first of all ... like ... it's by no means an official scale - by no means! It was pretty much developed as a joke. Well I shouldn't say *pretty much*, it *was* developed as a complete joke but ...

**So it started out as a joke?**

Oh, it's still a joke. Regarding the scale ... like ... How do I put this? There's no ... The characteristics are on there and it's funny because it's more or less ... How do I put this ... The reason, I guess, it is a joke is because you would know looking at that scale how far wrong it is. Like, you'd be looking at it and go 'oh yeah right' that may be what people think but ... 'cause it is ... If you do look at what it says on that scale. I can't remember it off by heart or I would tell you. If you look at what it says on that scale that is pretty much the epitome of what somebody that just starts doing the job would probably think. They'd be like 'yeah that makes sense, yeah'. In actuality it's the exact ... not opposite but really holds no weight. So I mean ... but ... yeah ... no ... .

(Michael, Downtown Department Store)

To be sure, it is difficult to gauge whether this tool actually informs categorical suspicion. If not, questions emerge about Michael's apparent unease discussing the scale. Further, whether the scale is meant merely to be humorous or, as Richard suggests, "to keep morale

up”, it undoubtedly serves to reinforce stereotypes about social categories, and it certainly speaks to the institutional culture within this particular department store security team.

#### **Information From and Experience of Occupational Peers**

The reference here is to occupational peers. While CCTV operator attitudes and perceptions may also be influenced by other peer groups, such as members of their family or friends, these groups will not be referred to unless they also fit into the occupational peer group, which in several cases it appears they do. For example, occupational peers may refer to other CCTV operator at the participant’s site, other members of the security team, or family and friends who also work in the security field.

Like several other areas of employment, obtaining a position as a security guard and/or CCTV operator is made easier if you know someone already in the field. Most of the operators indicated that they knew someone who was able to assist them in obtaining a position. In some cases, individuals may have transferred to the security or surveillance departments from other areas of the organization after having established relationships with members of the security team. While I will not suggest that qualified persons would be precluded simply because they do not ‘know someone’, Richard provides the following insight.

If you bring somebody new to the team it usually takes them awhile to be accepted. And because of it, I hate to say it but a lot of the time new hires are friends of people who are there. It’s like a police culture, and within different stores in the same city you’ll even find the separation there. I have good connections with all three stores because I worked closely with all of them, so I’ve gotten to know all of them, but the people who haven’t had that experience to get to know the other people will say ‘ah, they suck’ or something, you know. There will be that old insider/outsider perspective.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Certainly, while some may have initially obtained a job with a company as a result of peer influence, once hired they may be posted or request a transfer to a site where they do not have pre-established relationships.

Well, at my new site it's more of a professional way of looking at things. There's no real relaxation, whereas at my old site ... I had friends. We chat all the time; we go out for beers and stuff like that. But it was more of a relaxed environment. I could say [that] I can't relate to the people at work, I just go in there. I used to love going to work. I used to stay there right after my shift, talk it up with friends and stuff like that before I left to go home. Now it's like 'okay, I'm here at work – business'. My relief comes in, I go home. I don't stay because that's the environment, there's no room of making friends.

(Barry, Museum)

The younger the staff at a site, the more likely they were to indicate that they would get together after or outside of work to socialize. These social networks may also include other security personnel from other locations. Such environments allowed the group to discuss events which occurred at their respective locations and identify trends and possibly the same suspects. While 'shop talk' did occur at such get-togethers, Michael insisted that their conversations were not limited to this. Given that such an extensive social network of peers only existed at one of the participating sites, it is difficult to gauge what influence such informal information sharing will have on what is subsequently watched. Michael suggested that the experiences of others, shared through such stories reinforce suspicion of everyone.

If you hear enough of them [stories from peers] ... there's no trend to them. Yeah there'll be a good story about something happening here and then you'll hear another one a couple of days later and it'll be totally different. It'll be the exact opposite of what the first one was about. If anything is just reinforces the fact that you really should be watching pretty much everybody you can. That's pretty much what it boils down to.

(Michael, Downtown Department Store)

Despite Michael's insistence, information from peers does serve to guide the gaze of CCTV operators and vice versa. As was suggested by a number of participants, security work relies on communication. To assist communication, the majority of sites have implemented briefing sessions at each shift change. While who is responsible for conducting the briefings and how much time is set aside for them varies by site, those coming on shift are typically informed of the day's goings on. Only the open-street surveillance site did not appear to have regular briefing sessions because the monitoring of the cameras was not continuous.

Where verbal briefings do occur, the information shared may include, but is not limited to: events which occurred during the previous shift; known events which will be occurring in the upcoming shift; information about lost and found items; information about excluded persons or known offenders who were seen in the store that day (or recently); information about suspicious activities or individuals, with or without a physical description; information on individuals who may have escaped apprehension; and, information about 'hot spots'. During these briefings, staff may be shown CCTV footage of an incident or individual. In addition to sharing this information through shift briefs the incident may also appear in reports, logbooks, and/or be shared through email. Also, where photos of suspects or excluded individuals are available, they are placed in either a log (paper or electronic), or fixed to a notice board in front of the surveillance monitors.

Several of the participants indicated that such information will serve to influence their gaze while on shift. For example, Richard indicated that if one gets information that a known offender was seen in the department store "you're going to look in the last place you know he stole something". When descriptors are provided the operator will focus their gaze on the identified physical characteristics, dividing the social space along the lines of race, sex and age. Searching for the closest match to the description first involves placing an entire segment of the setting's population under categorical suspicion.

While the above types of information are kept in the back of the CCTV operators mind as they go about their surveillance duties, at other times information from peers may play a more immediate influence on what the operators monitor. For example, in the same way that CCTV operators contact those on the ground for the purpose of intervention, those on the ground may contact the CCTV operator and direct their attention to suspicious individuals or activity. As Andre indicated, approximately nine of ten surveillance targets at the casino are the result of informational suspicion, which is initiated by the casino's dealers. All but one participant indicated that information from their colleagues about an incident or suspicious individual/activity will immediately provide focus to their gaze. Once again at

the open-street initiative Frank indicated that there is no direct line of communication between him and his police colleagues on the street.

Knowing the location and activities of their peers is also important to CCTV operators for several reasons, and this knowledge – even the lack of it – may serve to guide the gaze of the camera operator. Knowing that their colleagues are in the food court, or on the far south-end of campus, camera operators indicated that they turn their gaze to areas that the ground security team are not currently able to cover. This practice allows for surveillance resources to be spread out and cover more of the site. At the university campus, Paul indicated that if his fellow protection officers “are stuck on the south end of campus with an individual, [he]’ll have a camera trained on them, and ... other cameras watching the other side of the campus”.

The above statement from Paul also points to another way that the operator’s gaze is guided by their peers, as the notion of protection was raised in a number of interviews. While surveillance is portrayed to the public as tool that is able to protect populations vulnerable to victimization, such a protectional gaze is rarely employed. Where it is, the operator’s gaze is usually directed at protecting their peers rather than the vulnerable, be it physical protection or the protection of reputations, as the following passages illustrate.

Mike, who was watching us with the camera, called me. I hadn’t even started my shift yet, and he called me on the radio he’s like ‘Let’s go up there, Eddie’s in trouble’.

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

If we’re dealing with an arrest, I’ll follow my guys from the point of the arrest down to the back hallway, where we bring them [the accused] downstairs, so there are no issues with the person saying that he was abused or whatever, we can show that he was being dealt with in a very professional manner

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

Of course not all information provided by one’s peers arouses the suspicion of CCTV operators. Richard suggested there is a differentiation to be made between information that is useful for your own purposes and that which is not. For example, information shared by

peers that an individual is a known shoplifter or that that they are known to be violent will be influential, while information from a peer that they simply do not like one of the patrons will not be. In the following passage James demonstrates that the experience of his peers with a particular individual does not hold much weight in whom he considers to be problematic.

Like ... that crazy bad lady that comes in, you know. Every time I see her, I just think 'Okay, there's the bag lady'. Eddie ... like ... if he spots her, or Mike if he spots her, it's like right away, they call the cops. I've seen Mike call the cops on a bag lady. Like, I'm sure they had their own little scuffle in the past, but I have no problem with her.

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

In some situations peer influence may serve to keep an operator's gaze in check through intervention, especially where it is believed that they have transgressed professional and/or ethical boundaries. As Andre suggested a lot of times "their partner ... will say 'hey, don't do that please'".

### **Organizational Administrators, External Entities and Citizen Vigilance**

In the same way that a camera operator's gaze is influenced by information or requests from their peers, so too may their gaze be influenced by information and requests deriving from organizational administrators, external agencies, and vigilant citizens. Once information is received it is disseminated in the same fashion as discussed in the previous section (i.e. briefings, email, and the posting of pictures). In some cases it may even be disseminated further to other locations.

#### ***Organizational Administrators***

In some cases information may be shared across the various sites of one particular company. For instance, the security director in one area store may contact other stores in the city, providing information about a recent occurrence. Where relevant this information may also be disseminated to stores in different cities across the country through company administrators at the headquarters level. Computer power and email have enabled and improved the instant flow of data, whether they are simple reports or whether they include

photos and CCTV footage. At some of the sites researched a security administrator sat on local and/or national Boards of Associations, where organizational concerns are discussed. Shawn suggested that at the local level teams of security personnel and managers from the downtown core will get together monthly to discuss amongst themselves and with the police the goings on in the downtown core in relation to crime and its prevention. Casinos also have a national association of security directors, where national information about specific cheats and/or cheating trends are discussed.

When something happens ... we will send them a copy of what happened just to show to their [operators], 'look they tried something here'. Or if they succeeded, 'this is how it happened'. So we share all the infos with the ... other casinos in [the province], and sometimes with casinos in Canada, because there's an an association of the security directors. So when something happens in a casino in Canada ... we will receive all the pictures and maybe the tapes of how it happened.

(Andre, Casino)

While some of the sites researched such as the casino and department stores had a decentralized organizational structure and clear hierarchy, others were much more autonomous. Those who worked for a private contracted security companies (James, Xavier and Barry) indicated that they are removed from their parent company, receiving very little, if any, information from their headquarters. Rather, information about incidents, tenants, and things to look out for comes to them from site administrators. Paul indicated that the campus administrators will inform the security division when a prominent individual will be on campus. This information is then disseminated to the entire security team. Additional security guards, as well as the CCTV operator's gaze will be mobilized, and focused upon the VIP and the immediate area they are in.

### ***External Entities***

Participants also indicated that they worked with a number of external entities, such as local retailers, other security personnel, government departments, and most commonly the police. This section explores the sharing of information between the CCTV operator and these groups.

With respect to sharing information with local retailers, those camera operators who are responsible for monitoring in a shopping mall environment appear to have the most interaction with this group. Responsible for meeting the needs of the other retail tenants in the shopping mall, the mall security team is the first point of contact in the event of an incident. The CCTV operators will typically be informed and provided with a description of suspicious individuals. As Ian suggested, once provided with a description he will utilize his camera to locate the person, and then will inform his ground security team who will also begin surveillance of the individual as they enter other retail stores. If ground security is not immediately available the CCTV operator may contact the merchant and advise the employees to monitor the individual.

We had one guy a couple of weeks back, he went to six different stores and the first two stores called immediately saying 'we think he's taken something out but we're not sure'. Immediately we located this guy, we followed him around the mall, and then when he starts going into other stores I'm on the phone, 'listen, keep an eye on this guy he's possibly shoplifted at two other stores'. And eventually we caught him meeting another two individuals outside in a car, called the police ... and they actually arrested him in the car with a quantity of stolen property.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

At the small downtown shopping mall, James and Xavier indicated that the homeless are typically monitored upon arrival because the retail tenants will undoubtedly complain about their presence. In addition to the information sharing between the mall tenants and the mall security department, the security departments across malls may share information about suspects, including a photograph, a description of their activities, and if possible a list of their preferred stores to target. Such information sharing allows security personnel at other malls to keep an eye out for suspects or particular activities.

Participants from the department store settings suggested that they do not share much information with neighbouring stores as they do not tend to attract the same clientele; however, where needed, information may be shared with competing department stores. For example, if an individual is suspected of taking merchandise from one department store but the CCTV operator could not be 100 percent certain that a theft occurred, the person of

interest may be followed through the mall by department store security. If the individual should enter a competing department store, the two security teams will communicate and subsequently work together. Despite being advised from upper management not to share information with security personnel from the competing department store, all three participants from two competing department store settings insisted that they will share information with the competitor if it means getting their merchandise back.

We get pictures on occasion, FYIs [for your information reports], from rivalling department stores. We're told from upper management not to communicate with these people, if they want to steal from them, go ahead. We don't give them pictures, but at the same time we're both trying to catch the same people. We will work together to get people caught and get our stuff back.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Basically, our store will call over [to the other department store] and inform them as to our location and [that] we're entering the store at the first level or third level, wherever and give them a description of the individual that we're following. And then their cameraman will also pick that up right away and then somebody from the floor will come down, meet us and start tailing them also. They will take over the investigation part right there, because we're no longer in our store so we pass that over to them but we will just tag along because we think that they have something and we want it back.

(Shawn, Downtown Department Store)

Not every site received information from local merchants, or, as is the case with the open-street surveillance initiative, there simply was no direct communication between the surveillance camera operator and the downtown merchants. Further, while for some sites information from local merchants is disseminated through their security department, sites may also network with the security division from other agencies such as the transit authority or other private contracted security companies.

Two of the sites in this research indicated that the bus transit authority was a significant partner in their surveillant assemblage. Ian indicated that because the shopping mall he monitors serves as one of the city's central hubs for the bus service and there are a significant number of commuters which frequent the mall, the two security divisions work very closely together. The transport authority may request the assistance of mall security to

track individuals, or as Ian explained he may be warned by transit security of a possible fight between individuals and/or groups of bus riders. Frank also suggested that there is two-way cooperation between the campus and bus transit security divisions. The campus security division can have all buses in the area suspended and/or re-routed in the event of an emergency, while the transit security division is advised to contact the campus security division if something occurs at the campus bus station as the campus security team has cameras that can be immediately directed to that area. Paul indicated that he keeps one of his surveillance cameras trained on the entrance to the campus grounds from the bus station and will contact the transit authority should something arise.

While thus far a smooth relationship between the research sites and other security divisions have been portrayed, participants from one of the research sites indicated that their relationship with personnel from other security companies was not positive. At the small downtown shopping mall James and Xavier described the site as having multi-layers of security personnel. As indicated previously the small shopping mall area of the complex is situated between two government towers. As such access to the government buildings is controlled by the Commissionaires, a private security company typically responsible for the security of government buildings in Canada. Another security company is responsible for monitoring the floor of the shopping mall, while James and Xavier, who work for yet another security company, monitor the complex's security cameras. While one could not be blamed for assuming that this complex is highly secure, in truth there appears to be a muddled sense of responsibility. This may have influence on the surveillant gaze, as James and Xavier do not monitor the cameras for the shopping mall area as regularly as they used to because they are no longer certain that it is one of their responsibilities.

[Y]ou'd like to think there's good collaboration between each security but usually we're just throwing the ball back and forth, 'This is your problem'. 'No, this is your problem'. Sometimes tenants come to us with problems about [one of the other security companies], and we have to tell them 'Sorry, this is not really our problem, you're gonna have to go call this person'.

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

A number of participants stated that they may also work in collaboration with government agencies, both local and federal. All of the interviewees stated that they worked in collaboration with the police, while one participant suggested that his site provides information to the courts, and yet another indicated that his site was working to assist Citizenship and Immigration Canada by collecting information and CCTV footage for a deportation case. The majority of participants appeared satisfied with – even proud of – their cooperation with ‘big brother’.

Ian indicated that some time back the police and agents from the federal immigration department arrived at the large suburban shopping mall to monitor a person of interest. The mall security department was then asked by immigration officials to monitor and report the activities of this individual any time he is in the shopping mall. Ian further explained that the suspect was previously arrested for gang involvement and must now abide by a number of conditions. Because the immigration department is looking to build a deportation case against this individual mall security has been asked to advise government officials any time the individual is in the mall, or any time he utilizes his cellular telephone. The CCTV operator indicated that all members of the security team have been advised to let the camera operator know if this individual is spotted, and any CCTV footage that is collected is immediately provided to the immigration officials so that they may use it in their case against this person.

While all participants indicated that they most commonly worked with the police, there was variation in the relationship each site had with police agencies. Obviously, police attended each site when called by the participants to deal with situations and/or specific individuals. It appeared that the two sites employing contractual security guards did not go beyond such a relationship. James and Xavier insisted that they had no partnership with the local police, stating that “the only interaction [they] have with them [the police] is when [they] call them for their help”. While Barry insisted that the police relationship with security staff is unidirectional, with security staff providing information and material

to the police, the evidence suggests otherwise – or perhaps such a relationship is only characteristic where the security guards are contracted from a private security firm.

Several of the other participants indicated that they are provided information from various police departments, from the local police to the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which may then serve to guide what and whom they monitor. Police may provide CCTV operators with information of interest about individuals that security personnel may already be familiar with. The following passage from Richard illustrates this type of information sharing.

We had one instance where we ended up getting a couple of guys that had warrants [out] for them, and they ... went to jail for a little while and they got out. The officer who responded to us came in on his time off and said 'you should know that these guys are back, they're armed, they just did some pretty hard stuff up the road, so be careful'. So that might be some of the information that is shared.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Police may inform the sites of current criminal trends in the area that they may wish to keep an eye out for. For example, Shawn and Michael both indicated that they have received information from the RCMP about counterfeit monies and/or credit cards being circulated in the area. Where such crimes are identified by the CCTV operator, the footage will be turned over to the police for investigative purposes.

While the information sharing between police and the site discussed above relate to activities of interest to security staff at the researched site, police may also request information from the CCTV operators to serve their own purposes. CCTV operators may also be provided with pictures or descriptions of wanted individuals and be requested to inform the police should they see the person of interest.

[T]hey'll call us and they'll give us a description. They know we have cameras, they'll ask us to check around. So, officers will check outside ... and I'll check with my cameras. It's happened in the past that we saw suspects that they were looking for with our cameras, and officers were sent to stop the person. The police were then called.

(Paul, University Campus)

Ian indicated that police may be searching for better pictures of suspects, or may request a copy of past footage for investigative purposes. Ian explained that recently the police requested footage from the mall's surveillance cameras for a murder investigation that police had been working on. The police had received information that the murder victim may have been shopping at the mall prior to his murder and were requesting the CCTV footage.

The police have come down here to look at our video regarding the murder last fall. The guy that just got out of jail and was murdered within hours of leaving jail, he was here at the mall. So we had video of him in the mall and we had an idea where he went. The police had told us that he had been in here to buy a pair of shoes. We figured that he'd go to one of two stores ... and we focused our search on those areas and the entrances that he may have come in. We actually had video of him with possibly the people that were involved in the murder. So the police took that. They often ask us to review the video and see if we can find individuals.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

Several of the participants indicated that the police are aware that they may have cameras that overlook public streets and request that they do so. Be it a request to retroactively review footage from the public streets or that the cameras be turned to the street in anticipation of an incident, the gaze of institutional surveillance cameras may spill onto the public streets. According to Paul the RCMP requested that some of the campus' surveillance cameras be used to monitor a large anti-Bush / anti-war demonstration which began on the public streets in front of city hall. Paul indicated that the campus security gladly obliged as this is what they call 'interdepartmental assistance'.

In some cases the police do not request footage, instead they may simply arrive at the site and begin monitoring a suspect in real-time. Ian shared an incident from 2005 where police detectives monitored an individual using the mall's surveillance cameras. While the police did not divulge to Ian who the individual was at the time, he later pieced it together when Christopher John Clarkson, a.k.a Stephen Willis Duffy was arrested and the story was covered by the media as Clarkson was a member of the Stopwatch Gang.

I'll give you another example, police didn't divulge why they were after the individual but I found out a day or two later. We had a couple of detectives come in here and they were following a bank robber that was in the watch clock gang there, whatever it is. Anyway, he was in here getting a haircut, we found him on video and they watched him - what he was doing in here, watched him leave, saw the vehicle he was in, then they followed him off to wherever he was and the next day they actually arrested him.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

In some instances the police assisting gaze is self-initiated as Shawn indicated that occasionally he would walk around the exterior of his department store with a handheld camera, recording incidents of drug ingestion and/or dealing. The recording is then provided to police for their action. Police also appeared to be involved in the training of the staff at the large suburban shopping mall. Security staff was provided training by police on a range of things, from the application of laws to guidance in the recognition of gangs. Ian, of the suburban shopping mall, also indicated that he attended a seminar on gangs which was facilitated by a member of the Los Angeles Police Department. Given the above information, Barry's suggestion that police do not turn to security guards for assistance certainly cannot be generalized across all surveillance sites as in some cases police appear to rely on the security guards as much as the reverse is also true. Further, the opportunity to assist the police was given pride of place by the majority of participants with only Andre from the government run casino indicating that police required a warrant in order to obtain information and/or surveillance camera footage from his site.

### *Citizen Vigilance*

The final group that may provide information to guide the 'selective gaze' of CCTV operators are vigilant citizens. Information provided from citizens may range from information about suspicious packages, suspicious individuals, lost persons/items, or about their general sense of fear and insecurity in a particular area. How serious this information from citizens or patrons is taken appears to vary by site. While some of the sites indicated that they investigate all concerns coming from this group, the following excerpts from the interview with James and Xavier suggests otherwise for other sites - at least at the small downtown mall.

That was pretty funny, man. Somebody came up to me - just like a customer - she came up to me and she said 'Yeah, there's this suspicious package'. There was this little box. I mean, there was no name, no number, no nothing; just no information. So yeah, it is suspicious, so I tell Jake - he was one of our guards - to check it out for himself, because I'll take his word over her's any day. So ... he went there, grabbed the box [laughing] and just like chucked in the trash compactor. 'That's the end of it'. I was like 'Good God!' This is all [at the time that] the stupid paranoia was going on about that suspicious package [that] they blew up and it turned out to be some dude's school bag that he forgot under a bench.

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

**James :** Like the woman that came up to me ... [and] wanted us to send somebody to check because she could hear voices in the elevator. What do you do with that, you know ?. You could send somebody just to ease their mind.

*Xavier :* Well, ... if that was me, I would ask them which elevator ... because sometimes it's the speakers they usually play ... in the mall.

**James :** Maybe it was real. I just assumed that she was crazy.

(James and Xavier, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

Paul shared an example of a woman professor on campus who contacted him to express her fear and sense of insecurity in one particular area of the campus which did not have any cameras or emergency stations. After listening to her concerns Paul asked the professor to email her request to his supervisor. Paul indicated that "she expressed her fear in the letter and ... pushed a good cause for a future camera to go [be installed] in that area". While most sites indicated that citizens and/or patrons are able express their concerns directly to the security division of each institution, which will then serve to guide the gaze of the operators or influence the expansion of the camera network, once again the open-street surveillance initiative did not have any interaction with members of the public.

## Media

In his critique of Michel Foucault's panoptic metaphor for contemporary social control, Thomas Mathiesen suggests that while we certainly live in a society where the few watch the many (panoptical), there has been an acceleration of surveillance technologies where the many watch and contemplate the few (synoptical) – predominantly through the mass

media, and increasingly the world wide web (Mathiesen, 1997). As Mathiesen points out, panoptic and synoptic forms of social control are not mutually exclusive. They “have developed in intimate interaction, even fusion, with each other” (Mathiesen, 1997: 223), and theorizing them should be done with this in mind (Lyon, 2006).

Theorizing of the synoptic appears to be merely a repackaging and reframing of the old debate on media’s influence on the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the audience, perhaps best highlighted by the debate on whether media violence begets ‘real’ violence and discussions on moral panics, only this time with the objective of examining the spectacles influence on social control (Doyle, 2003; Lyon, 2006). The underlying assumption of those who theorize the spectacle as a form of social control is that the mass media has mass influence. While the debate surrounding the mass media’s ability to influence the attitudes of its audience is likely long from over, we must be careful to avoid overdeterministic interpretations of the media’s effects. While Aeron Davis (2003: 669) suggests that media effects research supports only a “minimal effects model”, Aaron Doyle (2006: 877) argues, more pointedly, that it is far too facile to assume the “effects as flowing unidirectionally from media producers to media texts, and audiences”.

Working from this position Doyle (2006: 871-2) has offered a number of cautions that media researchers must heed. First, efforts must be made to avoid utilizing a passive audience model and the ‘the fallacy of internalism’, which is the tendency to make assumptions about the production and reception of texts based on a reading the text themselves. Second, avoid conceptualizing media organizations, production and audiences as homogeneous and avoid assumption that media has a unitary effect, acknowledging that mass media audiences may be a fragmented one.

Doyle suggests that one way to avoid these errors is to explore the impact that representations in the mass media have in particular political and institutional contexts (Doyle, 2006: 874; see also Doyle, 2003). However, analysing the mass media’s impact on these contexts does not respond to the question about its influence on the lives of

individuals. In order to gain this perspective, Doyle suggests that ethnographic research on the audiences of crime stories will provide a more nuanced understanding of the influence that mass mediated messages have on the public (Doyle, 2006: 876).

Keeping the above in mind, this section explores the influence that media have on CCTV operators, specifically its influence on their worldview, their work, and whom or what they deem suspicious. It is clear that the surveillance work conducted by each of the participants is panoptic in nature, and as members of the viewer society, they may also engage in synoptic forms of surveillance through the mass media. This section seeks to explore the relationship between them.

For the most part, the research participants had diverse interests in media and media programming. The only common thread that strung the majority of the group together was that they were an avid news audience, with only one participant suggesting that he did not pay attention to the news on a regular basis. Few of the participants indicated that they watched fictional programming, and where they did they watched either fictional crime/criminal justice or science fiction shows. Some indicated that they enjoyed reading books, others listening to music or talk radio, others yet enjoyed watching sports and playing video games.

Despite a common interest in news, their preferred news mediums and sources varied, with several indicating that they go to multiple sources for their news. Some preferred international news, others local. The majority turned to Canadian sources, however some preferred sources such as CNN or the BBC. Most read newspapers; however, there was a division between those who read dailies and those who read tabloids, while some read both. Thus far Doyle's cautions bode well, as even this small group may be considered a fairly fragmented audience of mass media.

Further, six of the participants presented critiques of the media, particularly the news media that they consume. Richard, James and Xavier discussed their concerns that fictional

accounts of criminal justice portrays a skewed account of crime fighting where the police always come out on top, or where police procedures such as arrests, the reading of rights, and obtaining of confessions are incongruent with reality. Shawn criticized the sensationalistic manner that American news sources represented crime and justice and insisted that Canadian and British news sources do not engage in such activity, but rather “tell it like it is”. Others indicated that particular sources have their own priorities and/or agendas, or that the angle that particular news stories take are determined by the opinions, values and beliefs of the author and/or the editors, or are determined by from whom the journalist obtained their information. Barry insisted that the media tends to ‘twist’ information and that it is biased against the police. He illustrated his concern using an example of an alleged police brutality incident that was caught by the surveillance cameras at a doughnut and coffee shop. A copy of the surveillance footage was obtained by the media and they aired it, while the story also appeared in print media. While the story was told under some variation of the headline *Police Beating Caught on Tape*, Barry suggested that some of the media’s facts and interpretations of the footage were “totally dead wrong”. While Barry suggested that the media tends to represent crime stories so that they side with citizens rather than police, Frank insists that the media are given all of their information about crime from the police. He also indicated that the police do not give the media a full account of the information they have.

It appears that those who provided a critique of the media representations of crime, base their critique in information and/or knowledge that they are able to obtain through other sources and/or their own experience. Certainly Richard and James’ university education in criminology provided them with a critical understanding of crime and the media. Others, such as Frank and Barry, have access to alternative information through their work and/or social networks. Once again Doyle’s advice against using a passive audience model holds true.

Notwithstanding their critiques, several of the participants indicated that the mass media has had an influence on them and their work. With regard to how the media has influenced

their world view, most of the participants stated that the media has made them more aware of things that occur within their city and globally. Richard suggested that the news media allows him to understand the ripple effects of specific events. Participants indicated that it opens your eyes to places and events that you may not have access to, whether through watching documentaries on exotic locations, countries and/or other cultures, understanding conflict overseas, or understanding local crime problems.

[The] media shows a different side of the world. How can I say this? We're clouded by some stuff whereas the media can get [access to] certain stuff. Like a big bust of marijuana, [that is] something I would never see, but it's there and the media is showing that. [A] stabbing on the bus, wow, I've never seen that, but it's there - I read it. It's normal stuff that's happening to the world that you normally don't see and you're shown because it's happened. Like somebody getting shot in [this city], somebody gets gunned down, holy molly, since when do we have horrible gun control. We're getting worse than the States, you know. So it's showing us a different side of the world, its showing us a complete - not horrible side but something that we wouldn't normally see.

(Barry, Museum)

Despite his critique that the police do not provide the media with complete information about a particular criminal case, and his knowledge that media stories are missing part of the picture, Frank indicated that even as a police officer most of his information about crime in his city is gleaned from the media.

The irony of it all, yes. [Its] always been sort of a joke, that many of us get our information from the newspaper, as opposed to within our own group where we work. But, I think that information is a lot more guarded now than it used to be. In fact I know that that is the case. I think that information that is given is spread on a 'need to know' basis, to patrol because they're working the street. But, I often get a lot of my information from the newspaper.

(Frank, Open-Street Initiative)

Some participants suggested that the media did have an influence on how they do their work, and the experiences they have at work sometime influence how they interpret media stories on crime. Aside from being critical when the media get the facts wrong, a number of participants also suggested that their experience at work helps put a human face on crime stories and helps them wrap their mind around how particular crimes are possible. Most

participants also indicated that crime stories in the media do, in some instances influence how they engage in their work. The majority indicated that particular crimes stories may mobilize their entire organization and/or themselves personally to be more vigilant and cautious at work, as well as in their personal lives. As Paul indicated, if “a bombing happens somewhere, and [he] knows [they] have special interest groups on campus that study in [a] particular building, [he’ll] keep a watch on that side of the campus for the day”. Others further indicated that they may look out for people that they may have seen on crime stoppers, or be particularly on the lookout for those matching the description of suspects that were provided via media sources.

In part due to media-amplification of official discourses and definitions, the ‘Middle-Eastern’ looking man and the ‘black trench coat’ have come to be symbols of fear in Western – or at least North American – culture. They have respectively come to symbolize international and domestic terror. The research participants certainly did not appear immune to these cultural fears, as a number of them indicated that these two symbols arouse their suspicions and guide their gaze.

[P]articularly since 9/11, you become more aware of middle-eastern people, tend to watch them a little. You pay closer attention to them because you never know when something’s going to happen here.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

Well, if I see a guy with a big coat and ... wearing black stuff and [he looks] all messed up ... in my head man. I don’t want to be too close to him, [because] he’s probably got something hiding there. But, you never know, he could open that coat and then [take] out an Uzi and then start shooting people. This thing happened not long ago in Montreal, in that college.

(Xavier, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

### **Personal Experience**

All participants emphasized personal experience as the most significant influence on their gaze. Some suggested that while training and statutes may be important, they are quickly absorbed mixed in with one’s personal life experience and/or experience at other sites. Certainly some sites are looking for transferable skills from a new hire’s previous work

experience. Previous work experience as a security officer, or even in different capacities within that particular social setting are considered an asset, as they suggest that one is trained in the art of observation, or one is familiar with the goings on in the setting. Both of which are deemed a solid base on which to build.

Experienced security guards may be required to adapt their skills to a new social environment with a different demographic. As Richard indicated, every time he transferred to another department store within the same city he would have to adapt to the demographic variations. Barry, who recently transferred from the small downtown shopping mall to the museum echoed Richard stating that while he has “a basic idea of what to look for because [he has] previous experience, what may look abnormal [in the previous environment(s)] may be reasonable for the museum”.

On the other hand, those who transfer to surveillance work from other areas of the social environment already have a feel for the normal appearance of the environment but may require training in various other aspects of surveillance and/or security work. Notwithstanding where the surveillance worker comes from, it is important that the CCTV operators develop an understanding of the normal appearance and/or behaviours for that social setting. It is against these normal appearances that difference stands out and is perceived as suspicious.

You get to watch the same thing over and over and over, and that's how you can tell that there's something suspicious. Because you keep on seeing the same thing over and over and over again until something weird that you've never seen before happens, and that's how it makes it easy to detect something. It's a repetitive thing, [monitoring] the camera.

(Barry, Museum)

Whether it is an object that is out of place, the way a gambler holds their cards, or the way individuals shop, the research participants suggested that there are norms and that deviation from them are scrutinized.

The average shopper is not going to be aware of anybody else around them. You can typically stand there, fart beside them and they'll wonder who did it because they don't know you're there. Someone who's up to something is gonna be ... aware of who is or isn't [around them], and you'll notice those people.

(Richard, Downtown Department Store)

Some participants also indicated that through experience they begin to get a feel of the patterns which emerge in the social setting. For instance, Ian suggested that the large suburban shopping mall which he monitors has particular areas that are busier at certain times of the day than at others, and different social groups enter the space at different times, and tend to congregate in particular areas. Others suggested that they develop an understanding of the normal pace and flow of people in the social space. Operators suggested that through experience they also develop an understanding of who belongs and who is out of place; who is generally good and who needs to be monitored; who is there to shop and who is not. Certainly, operators develop personalized knowledge of particular individuals who regularly enter the site. Several of the operators echoed Michael's statement that sometimes a person walks in and they immediately think "oh, here we go!"

*Xavier: I think that some things come up with time, when you work in the mall. Some people we will recognize because they've done things before in here and they always come back. When you see them we're like 'Oh, okay'. Some of them we even have names for them; not nicknames, we know who they are, you know.*

**James:** Like 'Shin Kicker'.

*Xavier: Yeah, and then as soon as we see them, or someone sees them in the camera he says 'Oh, I just seen that person coming in'. We already know who it is, so we're gonna follow him and tell him 'Hey, you know what? You're not allowed to come in here, you have to leave'.*

**James:** Have you ever seen shin kicker? That guy is nuts. He would just run up to you, kick you ... hard right in the shin and ... run away. That was his fun.

(James and Xavier, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

It was difficult for participants to express how they came to understand who is likely to commit crime or be troublesome for the environment they monitor. Most often they simply stated that their response is simply instinctual, or that they have developed a sixth sense for identifying suspiciousness. Like all social beings, surveillance camera operators

develop a sense of the *normative ecology* (Norris and Armstrong, 1999) for the social space they watch. Doing so allows them to recognize regulars to the site from outsiders, but as Ian indicated it also allows them to anticipate trouble areas and where and when they will have to deal with situations. Of course human operators and the technology are not infallible, nor can they be omnipresent and omnipotent. What makes humans different from many other animal species is our ability to adapt to past experiences.

In most cases the experiential adaptation employed by CCTV operators is unbalanced, resulting in an expanding pool of suspicious individuals and/or activities. Past or recent events, that were not identified or prevented, are considered to be mistakes and are taken as lessons learnt. These lessons indicate to the camera operators where their attention should be directed in the future, as the following example from Ian illustrates.

If a car pulls up here [zooms camera at back of the mall toward an outdoor ATM machine.] and the engine is left on, and there's an individual sitting inside, I'm gonna zoom in and get the plate number. Because we've had robberies historically at the jewellery store just inside the doors there. And particularly [depending on the] time of night, if they're getting ready to close; that's when they got hit both times - at close.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

I suggest that the experiential adaptation employed is unbalanced, with the pool of what is deemed suspicious appearing to increase at a rapid pace. Persons, groups, and/or activities deemed suspicious by the CCTV operator appear to have a difficult time shaking that label. The following discussion of the little influence false positive suspicions have on the gaze of CCTV operators illustrates this point.

The topic of false positives appeared to be a sensitive one for some of the research participants, specifically those working in the department store environments. For the purposes of this research false positive suspicion must be conceptualized as the targeting of someone, deemed by the operator to be suspicious, for more scrutiny which results in the revelation of no criminal or otherwise undesired activity. False arrests may be considered within the concept of false positive suspicion; however, it is not a necessary element. While

making a false arrest was considered highly undesirable among most operators, they had little concern with monitoring individuals for extended periods of time despite the person of interest's failure to engage in inappropriate activity, insisting that it resulted in no harm or consequence.

Shawn stated that one must always follow their 'gut instinct', suggesting that when he is uncertain whether someone has committed an offence he will not intervene for fear of arresting falsely; however, he will mark their face and monitor them on any subsequent visit. The common sentiment among operators was that simply because the person of interest did not do anything on this visit, does not mean that they didn't intend to, or that they will not on the next visit. As such, the operators perceive that it is better to be safe than sorry. The following statement from Barry about an error he made in trusting a suspected person would imply that 'trusting your gut' could itself be a form of experiential adaptation.

Well, it's happened before, and I've regretted it. I've actually went up and talked to a person and ... [they said] 'no, no, I'm okay. I'm going to pay for it'. Turns out ... they stolen it, so my suspicion was right to begin with. It's a learning experience; you learn for the next time.

(Barry, Museum)

While some may argue that experiential adaptation makes for efficient policing and/or security work, it also poses a challenge for remaining unbiased and encourages the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes. Richard suggested that every operator employs their own bias and stereotypes and acknowledged that he has developed the stereotype that obvious immigrant families – obvious because of their skin colour and manner of dress - tend to engage in price switching. While Richard indicates that he could support this using the number of cases his store has, he is not blind to the fact that if he were looking to other groups he may find them engaged in the same sort of activity.

### Identifying Characteristics Which Arouse Suspicion

Participants were asked to share which characteristics would immediately arouse their suspicion. They were also asked to identify characteristics which arouse a sense of trust. These questions were tough to respond to because most of the participants had not previously given their own 'selective gaze' much thought. The following characteristics emerged from this discussion.

With regard to individual characteristics that arouse suspicion, one's personal appearance emerged most commonly, specifically one's manner of dressing and/or their grooming habits. Certainly, those who wear sub-cultural (i.e. gangster or hip hop) clothing, including hooded sweatshirts and black trench coats are likely to attract the attention of most the participants, especially if they happen to be young. Those who appear 'nervous', 'sketchy', 'intoxicated', 'homeless', or otherwise 'haggard' are also likely to top the watch list of most CCTV operators. While most participants provided the politically correct response that they do not, or that it is inappropriate to, target particular races or ethnicities, others suggested that doing so is sometimes unavoidable, or at a minimum very difficult.

When asked to describe the characteristics of a situation that would arouse their suspicion the typical response was anything that breaks the flow of the environment, or anything that stands out. When pushed further to explain, a number of examples were provided which I have grouped under the following themes: breaking the flow; looking out of place/time; suspicious behaviours; suspicious interactions; and suspect tools/accessories/technology.

As indicated in the section above, every social space has its own ebb and flow which the camera operator comes to learn and associate as normal. Anything that breaks that flow is typically regarded as suspicious. In every environment the act of running appears to arouse suspicion in the camera operator, at least until they can make a quick assessment as to why the individual is running. Activities such as biking, rollerblading, or skateboarding indoors will also attract the attention of the operator. On the other end of the spectrum, operators also indicated their suspicion is aroused where one is immobile for an extended period of

time. Frank suggested when he notices someone stationary at a street corner he questions whether they are engaging in drug dealing activities. Stationary objects such as a lone backpack or a car idling by an entrance are also viewed with suspicion. Finally, a number of operators stated that the formation of crowds indicates to them that a situation requires their attention.

Participants explained that individuals who look out of place and/or time are also regarded as suspicious. Persons who appear to be walking around aimlessly or uncertain of their surrounding will attract the gaze of camera operators. Richard explained that a male patron alone in the lingerie section of the department store will stand out because he is not the typical demographic of shopper you would find there. Further, in most environments anyone out late at night or in the early hours of the morning is watched with suspicion. While persons who have been excluded from a space may attempt to go unnoticed by covering hiding their face from the camera, as Andre explained, hiding one's face arouses his suspicion that the person is not supposed to be in the casino.

In some cases the person of interest may simply be engaging in behaviours that are not appropriate or accepted in the social setting. For example, if a card dealer is seen playing with casino chips, or if a panhandler is seen approaching other patrons they will be viewed with suspicion for theft or solicitation respectively. Operators also appear to be attuned to observing nervous and/or 'scoping' behaviours. Whether it was the subjects pacing or their eyes darting back and forth, most research participants suggested that such nervous behaviours were a dead give away that the person would attempt something, or was at a minimum considering it. Also, those who appear to be looking around (or 'scoping out') the area for the location of clerks, security guards, even the location of the security cameras will arouse the suspicion of most camera operators who participated in this research. While such behaviours assist the CCTV operator to identify amateur criminals, professional do not tend to behave in such ways.

A person's interaction with others in the environment may also arouse suspicion in the camera operator. First, groups tend to be viewed more suspiciously than individuals. This is especially true where a people arrive at the space together but split up. Richard explained that when people split up in his department store, regardless of their age, "one tends to select [merchandise] and the other will pick it up". Second, individuals who appear to go out of their way to avoid interactions with others are viewed with suspicion in most settings. For example, someone who appears to be retreated in a corner of a department store and refuses assistance from the clerk. However, Shawn also suggested that people who are highly sociable are also viewed with the suspicion of being a decoy, or otherwise attempting to distract the clerk from their criminal activity. For example, it was suggested that an individual who engages a cashier in conversation may be attempting to take the cashier's attention away from the signature on the credit card they are using to pay. Finally, a couple of operators indicated that animated interactions between individuals within the space may arouse suspicion that an argument is occurring and that a physical confrontation will ensue.

Several of the participants indicated that individuals involved in criminal activity will typically have tools and/or items to assist them. Depending on the environment, seemingly innocuous items such as suitcases, backpacks, large and/or empty bags, shopping carts begin to be viewed with suspicion by CCTV operators when identified. A number of participants indicated that technological gadgets are increasingly being viewed with suspicion. Taking pictures in a number of sites such as shopping malls, department stores, or casinos, is not permitted and the flash of a camera will attract the attention of the camera operator. Andre explained that the casino takes strict precautions against cheating using high tech gadgets, because, while it has not yet happened at his site, individuals in Las Vegas have been known to use miniature video cameras, laptops, and hand-held computing devices to cheat. Interestingly, the cellular telephone, now in common use globally, was viewed with great suspicion by some of the participants. Andre indicated that patrons are prohibited from using cell phones around that gaming tables, while Richard explained that cell phones are

now commonly used by thieves to communicate with each other by voice or via text messaging.

Frank indicated that he has not yet come to consider cell phones a normal feature of the social environment. Given his experience as a police officer and the fact that a number of cellular phones on the market flip open and are silver in colour, Frank explained that he immediately perceives the extraction and opening of a cell phone as a suspicious and threatening action that will encourage him to watch. Upon reflection he suggested that perhaps one day he will come to view this behaviour as normal and it will not longer catch his attention.

[A] challenge is the popularity of cell phones now. They represent a problem in the sense that the worse case scenario for someone who's monitoring cameras, I think, is that someone is injured by someone carrying a weapon, or an act of violence. So, if you're observing people taking things out of their pockets, the cell phone ... looks very similar to revolver, I think. Especially when it's at night time, it's pretty hard to detect what that is. I always have to identify whether that really is a cell phone, before I jump the gun and report it as a revolver. It's probably going to lose its distinction as threatening, as a possible weapon, because it's most likely a cell phone. In fact that may have already happened where reaching into your pocket and grabbing something quickly is not a threatening gesture.

(Frank, Open-Street Initiative)

The majority of participants initially stated that everyone is suspicious, and that nobody could be trusted. The prominence of such statements themselves provides commentary on the current state of western society and culture, characterized by ubiquitous distrust and a suspicion of the 'other'; however, participants were probed for additional information. While most participants certainly do not approach their work with the belief that the masses are trustworthy, a few did acknowledge that some subcategories of people are viewed with more trust. Attractive, well-groomed, well-dressed individuals who appear approachable and friendly are least likely to attract the gaze of CCTV operators – at least for reasons of suspicion (voyeurism will be discussed in the subsequent section). Some participants insisted and/or kidded that only individuals in police or security uniforms instil

an immediate sense of trust. Additionally, regular patrons may also develop a positive reputation for themselves and be viewed with a sense of cautious trust.

By no means are individual and situational characteristics that arouse suspicion and/or trust exclusive categories. In a significant number of situations they are considered together. As Frank's statement indicates both individual and situational characteristics are sometime evaluated together, and in some cases one may cancel out the other.

There [are] quite a few Asians now in the centre core. Now they tend, to my perception, travel in groups as friends. Other groups don't travel in this kind of a pack or herd, or whatever. So, that's not unusual for me, I wouldn't necessarily pay much attention, if I could identify those people as being Asian because that might be part of their culture to travel with many friends as opposed to ... other ethnic groups.

(Frank, Open-Street Initiative)

### **Mood, Fatigue, Boredom and Play**

While the factors discussed above serve to guide the camera operator's gaze toward particular individuals, groups, or events, there are also factors which may have a negative impact on the gaze, the operator's mood being one example. Some of the operators suggested that when they are having a bad day or are bored and/or tired their camera monitoring suffers. On the extreme end, it was not unimaginable that the operators working the night shift at the small downtown shopping mall would fall asleep while working alone at night, while most of the operators simply suggested that in such situations they will take a less proactive approach or simply can no longer make sense of the images they are seeing due to a lack of concentration. Frank stated that sometimes "you're looking at the camera and you've missed an offence because it's just not relating anymore because you're too tired". In such cases operators may take a breath of fresh air, or engage in other activities such as reviewing previous CCTV footage or walking the floor.

While a minority of operators interviewed insisted that there was no time to get bored while at work, others acknowledged being bored often and others suggested that they go to great lengths to ensure the boredom does not set in. In several cases the CCTV operators

indicated that the cameras may be utilized to alleviate their boredom. Ian suggested that when he feels he and/or his security team is getting lackadaisical he will challenge himself to find individuals who look suspicious. For others the cameras provide an outlet to the monotony of the other aspects of their job. James indicated that the CCTV cameras provided him a lens to the outside world when he is feeling boxed in. He stated further that “if they weren’t there [he’d] probably be really bored”.

While cameras may be used to alleviate operator boredom in ways that are deemed productive, they may also be used to do so in a more playful manner. A few of the participants cast off the idea that the cameras could be used in a playful manner, however, the majority acknowledged that the cameras have been used by themselves and/or peers in such a way. James suggested that 80 percent of his time on the cameras is spent playing. At the department store where Richard and Michael work, the cameras are sometimes used to spot celebrity look-alikes, who would then have their pictures printed out and posted. Richard indicated that they recently found Saddam Hussein and Lionel Ritchie look-alikes.

Cameras may also be used to monitor and ridicule friends and/or other employees. While both Richard and Michael indicated that the cameras could be used to catch other employees in a ridiculous pose, James indicated that he would derive entertainment from watching the security guards working the in the freight elevator at his site.

The cameras in the elevators ... they’re still working, it’s just that we don’t get to see them [anymore]. I remember having a lot of fun with those cameras [in the freight elevators] ... because they have guards in there ... that just sit in the elevator for eight hours. Its fun, you see them ... slowly go insane. They start pacing back and forth, you know. At first they’re ... standing up and pushing the buttons, and then they start reading the newspaper. I caught one guy one time, he was singing and dancing. I put the speaker on and was listening to him sing and dance. Ah, it’s funny. Yeah, that does suck that we don’t have that feed anymore.

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

Six of the interviewees suggested that they may watch television while on shift. While James and Xavier indicated that one of their peers brought a television to work so that they

could watch the World Cup of Soccer, Michael suggested that there may also be certain surveillance cameras in the electronic department of his store to mediate the watching of television. Further – and in true Canadian fashion - participants from two other sites revealed that it may not be uncommon to find CCTV cameras focused on a television set for a few moments; especially when there is a hockey game playing. While zooming in onto a television in the front window of the Sony Store, Ian stated:

[S]ometimes you can kind of ... close-in on the store and you can watch a bit of TV if the TV's at the right angle, that's some stuff that happens. If the hockey game is on and ... everything's relatively quiet you can zoom in there for a couple of minutes and see what's going on.

(Ian, Large Suburban Shopping Mall)

While some of the participant did not feel comfortable with referring to some of their on-camera actions as play, preferring to suggest that it was merely personally practical use of the cameras. One operator suggested that he is able to monitor the arrival of pizza when the security team places an order, while another operator indicated that he is able to monitor the arrival of his bus at the end of his shift, ensuring that he does not miss it while also allowing him to remain inside and warm as long as possible. Notwithstanding whether they refer to the above described use of the CCTV equipment as play or practical use, a number of rationalizations have been made for using the camera in such a way. Michael insisted that it was impossible to misuse the camera system given that there are no guidelines for the appropriate use of the cameras. He further suggested that even when the cameras may be used this manner the operator still remains concentrated on what's going on. Frank would add that it is through such playing that operators learn the capabilities of the cameras.

Less easily justifiable are sexually voyeuristic on-camera activities. Despite the indication that such on-camera behaviour is not to be tolerated several of the operators acknowledged that it happens occasionally or that they know it to have happened. Shawn suggested that it was inappropriate to ogle women through the camera, however acceptable while working on the floor of the department store. The following passage from James regarding a former

mall security guard illustrates that voyeuristic surveillance mediated through CCTV cannot simply be understood as an innocuous virtual act, as one can easily cross over from watching-at-a-distance to watching in the flesh.

He was a patrol officer, but he would sit here sometimes for the ... whole shift. He would just sit in here and ... I swear every time a hot chick walked by the camera, he'd get up and go 'oh, oh, oh, oh, oh', grab his keys and radio and he would just run after her. I shit you not, he would do that. But that's Jake, the only thing he had on his mind was ... sex, soccer and football.

(James, Small Downtown Shopping Mall)

In this chapter I have explored the concept of the 'selective gaze' from various angles. First, I examined the operator's gaze as it relates with the technological capabilities of the CCTV system in use and the operator's ability to use that system, as well as the structuring of the operator's workload. Next, the relationship between the gaze and the mobilization of intervention was discussed, with specific attention paid to the 'exclusionary gaze'. Finally, the factors which guide the gaze of surveillance camera operators were explored, with a particular emphasis on whom and/or what the operators treat as suspicious.

**CHAPTER SIX:****BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER: CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND FUTURE RESEARCH**

Some – I dare not say all – of us have become more aware of the various forms of surveillance in our society; CCTV being just one of many. In Canada, the rise of open-street video surveillance schemes has not occurred at as rampant a pace as it has in the UK or US. The comparatively few open-street CCTV schemes in Canada may provide a false sense of comfort to many. While as citizens of Canada we may not currently be monitored by over four million open-street surveillance cameras as are our UK counterparts, the number of open-street cameras is increasing. Even in the absence of extravagant public video surveillance systems, our lives are played out in front of video surveillance cameras as we engage with the institutions of everyday life. Although surveillance cameras are a general tool used by a myriad of institutions to secure a premise, prevent the loss of merchandise, or protect patrons, these institutions often have cameras which may be turned toward and used to monitor public spaces.

Regardless of whether one is comfortable with, or resistant to, the rise of CCTV in urban areas, most speak as though the cameras are a single-layered entity (Haggerty and Ericson, 2006). They speak as though the cameras themselves have the power to prevent crime, protect the public, or violate privacy rights. In essence the CCTV schemes have been ‘black boxed’ and little is known about what occurs inside these ‘black boxes’. Without getting into the ‘black boxes’, discourses on the effectiveness of CCTV, or those discourses which try to mobilize resistance to their implementation are incomplete. For example, several attempts have been made in the past to mobilize resistance to CCTV on the grounds of individual rights to privacy; however, peering into the ‘black box’ has exposed issues of social sorting and function creep, revealing the limitations of resistance solely under the privacy rubric.

In this study I delve into the ‘black box’ of CCTV using semi-structured interviews to engage Canadian video surveillance workers in discussions about how they do their work. What has emerged is a study of how surveillance camera operators from across various institutions

perceive and organize their work, with a particular emphasis on how these workers come to develop an understanding of whom and/or what to deem suspicious and worthy of more detailed scrutiny. In short, this work interrogates the 'selective gaze' of Canadian CCTV operators.

This thesis highlights the techno-social aspects of CCTV networks. While efforts are underway to automate the surveillant gaze, most camera schemes still require human operators to work the cameras and to select what requires monitoring. In order for a CCTV scheme to be effective both the technology and its human operators depend on one another. CCTV operators require functioning and properly configured equipment in order to effectively survey the social spaces that they are responsible for monitoring, while the technology is most effective when its operators are skilled users. It is likely impossible to find surveillance sites where the technology and the human operators function together infallibly.

With regard to the 'selective gaze' of the CCTV operators, information they receive from other sources about suspicious individuals and/or situations plays a significant part in determining whom and/or what they monitor. In the absence of such information, operators rely on their experience in making such determinations. Here I use the term *experience* broadly to include their experiences prior to becoming a camera operator, their experience on the job, as well as their experience of the world as mediated via the mass-media or interactions with peers. While each institution employing CCTV may be expected to have different priorities, even individual participants from the same site (i.e. Richard and Michael from the same department store, as well as James and Xavier from the small shopping mall) prioritized different institutional risks. Further, this research reveals that training, as well as institutional policies and guidelines play little, if any, role in guiding the operator's gaze. This confirms Norris and Armstrong's (1999) suggestion that an operator's individual idiosyncrasies play an important factor with regard to their selectivity.

When CCTV operators enter a control room for the first time, they do so with pre-established social values and beliefs. These values and beliefs play a significant role in what and/or whom they believe to be suspicious and in creating and reproducing their patterns/style of surveillance. Of course one's values and beliefs also evolve in the course of doing surveillance work and through socialization with their peers. Through experience and socialization CCTV operators develop their own understanding of who belongs and who does not belong, as well as what are normal appearances and/or behaviours for the social space they are monitoring.

There is no doubt that CCTV schemes operate as an assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000), comprised of the video cameras, other ancillary equipment and software, human operators, as well as a plethora of external stakeholders. However, after exploring how surveillance information and/or images flow through and across surveillance sites, I suggest that the most appropriate metaphor to describe CCTV practices in Canada is that of a *web*; what Michael McCahill (2001) refers to as the 'surveillance web'. The web metaphor allows us to move beyond conceptualizing surveillance in terms of the top-down unidirectional power characterized by the Panopticon, while infusing the hierarchical relationships which appear to be absent from Haggerty and Ericson's image of surveillance as a *rhizome*. While the web metaphor can illustrate hierarchical, as well as lateral relationships of power in the surveillance assemblage, the strands of a web may also fuse together like the various factors which influence the surveillance workers 'selective gaze', making it difficult, even impossible, to distinguish and/or separate them. Also, it certainly appears that when an individual and/or social group are deemed to be suspect they are cast into a web of suspicion and have a difficult time freeing themselves from its grasp.

#### A MOMENT OF FURTHER DISCUSSION

While a number of themes which emerged in the course of this thesis may be worthy of further contemplation and/or discussion, there are two which I would specifically like to take a moment to discuss. In their book *The Maximum Surveillance Society* (1999), Norris and Armstrong take aim at those who argue that the surveillant targeting of the young,

Black, and working class is merely reflective of those officially recorded as deviant, indicating that such an argument leads to circular reasoning as “the production of the official statistics is also based on pre-given assumptions as to the distribution of criminality” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999: 119). While most of the camera operators interviewed for this study did not appear to have access to aggregated statistical reports per se, they tend to target individuals and/or social groups who look similar to those that they previously caught stealing and/or engaging in other deviant acts. What results is a circular reasoning similar to that describe above.

The first point which I would like to discuss relates to flawed reasoning addressed above in that most of the research participants asserted that ‘everyone steals’ or ‘everyone cheats’. While on their face such statements may convey that the operators interviewed for this study check their assumptions, biases, and prejudices at the control room door, they may also simply be a means of presenting oneself in a politically correct manner. More importantly, however, such statements may also be used by camera operators to justify their selective targeting of particular types of individuals and/or groups. Richard, from the downtown department store, indicated that while the official answer to the question of selectivity “will always be [that] everybody steals”, in practice every operator has their own picks, which are “reinforced by the fact that those who are watched do end up stealing”.

As the following statement by Michael suggests, when ‘everybody steals’ it becomes difficult to imply that an operator is using an inappropriate tactic and/or style when targeting individuals for surveillance.

I mean, it would be pretty hard to misuse CCTV because, like I said, there are no guidelines as to who to watch or what to watch, really. So I mean it’s pretty hard to misuse. I mean, they’re only cameras so what can you really do with them.

(Michael, Downtown Department Store)

Michael’s statement brings us to the second item which I would like to discuss. The above narrative illustrates the general lack of reflexivity on the part of the surveillance camera

operators interviewed for this research. Often, when asked to discuss the characteristics of an individual and/or situation which arouse their suspicion, the interviewees indicated that they had never given the topic much thought. Rather, they described their suspicion as 'instinctual' and/or as a 'sixth sense'. While my initial thought was that the participants were attempting to avoid conceding that they engaged in profiling type behaviours, their struggle with reflexivity quickly became apparent. In addition to their difficulties with enumerating the characteristics which aroused their suspicion, the majority of operators often did not and/or could not perceive the potential social impacts that their selectivity may have on the subjects of their gaze. It appeared as though in the minds of several operators the cameras which mediated their discriminatory gaze also insulated the subject from the social consequences of such discrimination.

In sum, this discussion is not intended to suggest that statistics should not be used to guide the gaze of surveillance workers, nor that the logic that 'everyone steals' is inherently negative. Certainly, statistics may be heuristic and everyone should have an equal chance of being selected for more detailed surveillance. However, camera operators must be made aware of the potential negative consequences of such rationalizations. In short, training should be provided to CCTV operators about the social implications that their work has on the surveillance subjects, rather than solely the technical and skills training they currently receive.

#### **FUTURE PATHS FOR RESEARCH**

If, as stated in the methodology chapter of this work (chapter three), my project is to generate knowledge(s) which encourage and facilitate resistance to the so-called 'surveillance society', then this work does so by exploring and presenting the 'selective gaze', an aspect of video surveillance which is typically hidden from public view. It is hoped that such an inquiry sparks more critical questions about how surveillance occurs in practice and encourages other researchers to seek answers to those questions. Certainly, as similar empirical work emerges there will be an opportunity for making international comparisons with respect to CCTV practices.

In relation to 'doing surveillance work', one area which has emerged from this study that requires further research and theorizing is the role that emotions play in surveillance work. In the film *The Lives of Others*, set in Berlin, Gerd Wiesler, a Stasi Captain, is asked to bug the home of a playwright who is believed to be politically active. Listening in on his target, Wiesler becomes emotionally involved in the lives of the playwright and his actress girlfriend. Moving from the 'reel' to the real-life, an Ontario police officer described how his heart raced and his feelings of nausea when while monitoring internet chat rooms for potential child sex offenders a person of interest directed him to a real-time feed of a child sex abuse act in progress<sup>12</sup>. There is a need to explore how surveillance workers are affected when they witness such acts, or where other heinous acts are played out in front of the cameras?

While this thesis explored the politics of surveillance by studying specific surveillance sites, research must also be conducted on how subjects experience surveillance - the politics of visibility. Is there a clear line between the watcher and the watched? Do we not all watch the lives of others while being ourselves watched by others? I intentionally ended chapter five with a discussion of voyeurism, as some have suggested that we become of society of 'voyeurs' and/or 'scopophiles' (Calvert, 2000; Lyon, 2006), and that in our desire to watch others we become complacent and complicit in our own surveillance (Andrejevic, 2005). Such a focus also opens up avenues for exploring the 'politics of resistance'.

#### A FINAL POINT OF REFLECTION

Throughout the research process my engagement with the material took on a life of its own, and what emerged was a story that needed to be told, and perceptions that needed to be portrayed. Film makers often indicate that the most difficult time in the film making process is when they enter the editing room, and decisions need to be made about what makes the

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<sup>12</sup> Harris, Dan. "Cop witnesses online child molestation, catches alleged pedophile: Toronto detective describes difficult moment with child in distress". *ABC News Online*, <http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=2625095>. Last verified on 2007-06-20.

cut and what is left on the cutting room floor. With approximately four hundred pages of transcribed interview text, I found myself in a similar position; I needed to decide which narrative accounts would and would not make the final version of this text. If this were a DVD it would certainly feature a series of 'deleted narratives', unfortunately this was not possible.

I trust that what has resulted from these last three years in the masters program is a research study that is critical in its content, yet honest to its participants. I hope that it is presented in a way that is informative, while at the same time written in a style that is accessible and entertaining. Most importantly, however, I expect it to raise more questions than answers so that other avenues for enquiry may be opened up.

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**APPENDIX A:**  
**INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE**

***Interview Question Guide***

**General Information**

1. Can you tell me how you came to be involved in surveillance/security work?
  - a. What is your current position title?
  - b. Can you explain the *official* requirements / duties of your current position?
2. Can you describe what you believe to be the most significant aspect(s) of your job?
3. Can you describe what you believe to be the three most significant security risks that need to be guarded against for the environment in which you work?
4. Can you describe the capabilities of the surveillance system which you operate?

**Challenges**

5. Can you describe the challenges associated with monitoring a CCTV system?

**Working Rules**

6. Can you describe any working rules you use to assist you in making sense of the visual images you are watching on the screens?
  - a. Can you describe the working rules you use to assist you to differentiate between what requires your attention and what can be ignored?
7. Previous research conducted in the area of surveillance has suggested that surveillance workers use an understanding about who is likely to commit crime or be troublesome to help direct their attentions. Can you comment on the validity of this research finding?
  - a. Can you tell me how you came to develop your understanding about who is likely to commit crime or be troublesome?

**Influence of Training**

8. Can you describe the training you received to prepare you for your current position?
  - a. Can you explain the extent to which this training actually plays a role regarding whom or what scenarios you perceive as suspicious?

**Influence of Policies and Guidelines**

9. Does the institution for which you work have established policies and/or guidelines related to the work you do?
  - a. Can you list and provide a brief description of the policies and/or guidelines that govern the work you do?
  - b. Can you explain the extent to which these policies and/or guidelines actually play a role regarding whom or what scenarios you perceive as suspicious?

**Influence of Other Organizations**

10. Can you tell me what other organizations you frequently work with or share information with, in managing the security/crime risks to your institution?
  - a. Can you expand on this collaboration?
  - b. Can you tell me about the type of information about security/crime that is shared between police and your institution?
  - c. Can you explain how this information is used by your institution?
  - d. Can you explain the extent to which this information plays a role regarding whom or what scenarios you perceive as suspicious?

**Influence of Media**

11. Can you describe your media consumption habits?
  - a. How has the media influenced how you view the world?
  - b. How has the media influenced how you view your work?
  - c. How has your work influenced the manner in which you view the media?
  - d. Can you explain the extent to which the media plays a role regarding whom or what scenarios you perceive as suspicious?

**Influence of Peers**

12. Can you describe the working relationship you have with your peers?
  - a. Can you explain the type of information concerning security/crime risks that is shared among peers?
  - b. Can you explain the extent to which the experiences of others actually play a role regarding whom or what scenarios you perceive as suspicious?

**Influence of Personal Experience on the Job**

13. Can you explain when the surveillance of an individual would require actual intervention and the process that this entails?
14. Have you ever had an experience where you requested intervention based on suspicion that turned out to be false?
  - a. Can you describe what happens in such a situation?
15. How willing are you to risk false positive interventions in order to prevent crime/disorder?
16. Can you explain the extent to which your experience on the job plays a role regarding whom or what scenarios you perceive as suspicious

**Suspicious Characteristics**

17. Can you describe the characteristics of a situation that would arouse your suspicion?
18. Can you describe the characteristics of an individual that would arouse your suspicion?

**Boredom and Play**

19. Can you tell me about boredom and the monitoring of surveillance camera?
  - a. Can you provide an example of how cameras can be used to alleviate boredom?
  - b. Can you provide an example of how cameras can be used out of a sense of play rather than strictly for work purposes?

**Perceptions of Effectiveness, Success and Failure**

20. How effective do you feel video surveillance is at preventing / managing the security risks which you have previously identified?
  - a. On what terms do you as an operator measure the success or failures of the system?
  - b. On what terms do you measure the success or failures of your own actions/choices?

## Appendix B

### Research Ethics Board Project Submission Form

#### Research Ethics Board Project Submission Form

This form must be used by all University of Ottawa researchers submitting to the Research Ethics Board (REB) for ethical review of their projects involving participation of human beings, excluding those from the Faculty of Medicine who must submit to the Ottawa Hospital Research Ethics Board. Such research includes, without limitation, projects involving questionnaires, individual interviews, focus groups, testing of equipment, physical endurance tests, etc. For research based on secondary use of data or for courses requiring independent data collection by students (course outlines), please use one of the other forms available on the Ethics Web site at:

[http://web9.uottawa.ca/services/rgessrd/ethics/application\\_dwn.asp](http://web9.uottawa.ca/services/rgessrd/ethics/application_dwn.asp)

Please answer all the questions. The REB will not review incomplete applications. For your information, "N/A" and "SEE ANNEX" (without any explanation) are not considered acceptable answers. The original of the submission form should be written on one side of the page only.

#### SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION

Title of the Research Project:

Doing Surveillance Work

#### 1. Principal Investigator (or Supervisor)

**Note:** If this is a 4<sup>th</sup> year, Master's or Doctorate project, indicate your supervisor's name and coordinates here:

Name: Robert Gaucher, PhD	
Department: Criminology	Faculty: Social Sciences
Address: 25 University, Thompson Building, Room 135, Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5	
Phone Number: 613-562-5800 Ext. 1796	Fax Number: 613- 562-5304
E-Mail: <a href="mailto:rgaucher@uottawa.ca">rgaucher@uottawa.ca</a>	

Title:  Professor  Doctor  Miss  Ms.  Mrs.  Mr.  
 Other: \_\_\_\_\_

Preferred language of correspondence:  French  English

#### Documentation Requirements and Checklist

Proposals will be considered for review by the ethics office only when all relevant documents are included. Please check all applicable documents on the checklist below and provide them in the following order.

Full REB Review	Minimal Risk / Expedited Review	Documentation required:
13 copies	4 copies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Research Ethics Board Project Submission Form ( <b>mandatory</b> )
13 copies	4 copies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Recruitment text to participants, parents, community representative ( <b>mandatory</b> )
13 copies	4 copies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Consent form or information letter on <u>Faculty letterhead</u> ( <b>mandatory</b> )

13 copies	4 copies	<input type="checkbox"/>	Assent form for children (if applicable)
13 copies	4 copies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Research proposal ( <b>mandatory</b> )
13 copies	4 copies	<input type="checkbox"/>	Written permission from participating institution (if applicable)
13 copies	4 copies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Interview guide, questionnaire, or other instrument (if applicable)
13 copies	4 copies	<input type="checkbox"/>	Debriefing form (if applicable)
13 copies	4 copies	<input type="checkbox"/>	Thesis committee's approval (if applicable)
13 copies	4 copies	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (specify)

If you cannot provide all relevant documents at the time of submission, please explain:

--

**Note:** In the event that you have requested Minimal Risk or Expedited Review (see question 5 of the present form) and it is subsequently determined that full REB review of your proposal is needed, you will be required to provide 9 additional copies of the submission form, and (as applicable) recruitment texts, consent and assent forms, and information letters.

**2. Co-investigator (or Student investigator /4<sup>th</sup> year, Master's and Doctoral levels):**

**Note:** Please provide a permanent postal and email address for future correspondence.

<b>Name: Patrick M. Derby</b>	
<b>Department: Criminology</b>	<b>Faculty: Graduate and Post Doctoral Studies</b>
<b>Address: 1-356 Olmstead St. Ottawa, ON. K1L 7K6</b>	
<b>Phone Number: 613-298-4093</b>	<b>Fax Number: 613-947-0601</b>
<b>E-Mail: pderb073@uottawa.ca</b>	

**Title:**  Professor  Doctor  Miss  Ms.  Mrs.  Mr.  
 Other: \_\_\_\_\_

**Note:** Additional space for co-investigators and students is provided at the end of this form.

**3. Funding information:**

Did you ask for funding?  Yes  No  
If yes, name of funding agency:  
U of O RE # or Cost Centre or Funding Agency Reference #:  
Status of funding:  Received  Pending  
Expected date of completion of the project: 30 April, 2007

**4. Type of Research:**

Professor's research  4th year project  
 Doctorate thesis  Other (Specify)  
 Master's thesis

--

**Note:** Students conducting research for their **Master's or Ph.D. thesis** should append their **thesis committee's approval**. The REB will not evaluate thesis-related proposals before the thesis committee has evaluated the project.

**5. Do you wish to have your project considered for:**

Expedited Review  Minimal Risk Review  Full REB review

If you wish to have your project considered for expedited or minimal risk review, please complete the appropriate section below entitled *Eligibility for Minimal Risk or Expedited Review*. **The remaining sections of this submission form must also be completed.**

## SECTION B: SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH PROTOCOL

6. Submit also (separately) the research proposal, which should not exceed five pages (excluding references).

**a) Rationale:** Briefly describe the purpose, hypothesis(es) and objectives of the proposed project (**not exceeding 150 words**).

This is an exploratory study, the purpose of which is to shed light on the cognitive processes that human surveillance workers utilize in selecting whom and what to target for visual surveillance. The objective of this research is to advance understanding regarding the complexities entailed in determining whom and what situations require surveillance. This study will also allow the researcher to complete the requirements of his Masters degree.

**b) Methodology:** Briefly describe chronologically all procedures in which the research participants will be involved in (e.g. paper and pencil tasks, interviews, surveys, questionnaires, physical endurance tests, etc). **Note:** Please append a copy of all questionnaires, interview guides or other test instruments.

**The research participants will be involved in one (or more) semi-structured interview session(s). If follow up is required, only those who have consented to a follow up session will be contacted. The attached interview guide provides the basic structure to the interview session, however, this structure is subject to minor changes depending on how each interview evolves.**

**c) Participants:** Describe the number of participants being recruited and their characteristics (**age group, gender, affiliation etc.**). Also, if the research involves only women or men, or only Francophones or Anglophones, or any other particular group while excluding another, indicate why such exclusion is appropriate for the study.

**It is my intention to recruit approximately ten (10) research participants. Participants will not be excluded based on any of the prohibited grounds for discrimination found in the Canadian Human Rights Act. Due to the researcher's own language limitations, research participants must be conversant with the English language. Given the subject of the research being conducted participants must also work with, or in conjunction with, video surveillance cameras.**

**d)** If the research involves only one particular group while excluding another, for example only women or men or only Francophones or Anglophones, indicate why such exclusion is appropriate for the study.

**Limiting the research participants to those conversant with the English language is due solely to the researcher's own language limitations and should not impact the research outcomes. Francophones who feel comfortable participating in an English language interview will not be excluded from the research.**

7. Recruitment:

**a) List all locations where participants will be recruited.**

**Research participants will be recruited from public or semi-public environments which utilize video camera surveillance technologies. This list includes, but is not limited to, shopping malls, department stores, hospitals, government office buildings, and public streets. For example, participants will be recruited from the following locations: Rideau Centre, St.Laurent Shopping Centre, Place d'Orleans, Bayshore Shopping Centre, The Bay, Sears, Zellers, the Byward Market, Ottawa Court House, The Ottawa Hospital (all campuses), University of Ottawa, Carleton University, The Midway: Family Fun Centre, and Club 426.**

**b) When, how, and by whom will participants be recruited? Note:** Please append a copy of any poster(s), advertisement(s), telephone scripts or letter(s) of information to be used for recruitment.

**The recruiting process will begin immediately upon ethics approval. Initial recruiting will be conducted by the researcher who will approach potential participants with a verbal presentation. The recruitment presentation may be conducted in person or via telephone. Potential participants who have expressed interest in participation will be contacted further to confirm their participation and schedule an interview date. Participants will be asked refer other potential participants, hopefully producing a snowball effect.**

**Where research participants identify another potential participant a copy of the recruitment text will be provided. The recruitment text can then be shared with any potential participants. The researcher's contact information will be available on the recruitment text to facilitate contact by parties interested in participating.**

**c) Are there any supervisory relationships between the researchers and the participants (e.g. professor-student; manager-employee).**

Yes  No

If yes, please describe:

---

**d) Will you be asking participating organizations to provide names of potential participants?**

Yes  No

If yes, how will the participants' permission be obtained to provide their names to the researcher?

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**e) Are participants recruited in an organization or in other premises where permission is required to access the potential participants or premises?**

Yes  No

If yes, how will you obtain permission to access the premises? **Note:** Please append written permission by participating organization(s).

**I will ensure that it is not necessary to obtain the employer's approval before recruiting and interviewing employees of private companies. Should it be determined that employer's approval is required, it will be sought prior to recruitment. All corresponding**

**documentation (i.e. letters indicating approval) will be forwarded to the REB prior to the interview being conducted.**

**f) Will minors (0-17 years old) be asked to participate in the research?**

Yes  No

If yes, please specify the age group(s):

Consent from the parent or guardian is normally required if the child is less than eighteen years of age. This consent form must be submitted. If you are seeking an exception to this requirement, please explain:

In addition to parental/guardian consent, the child must also confirm his or her agreement to participate. This is normally done in writing with an assent form, drafted in age-appropriate language and must be submitted in addition to the parental/guardian consent form. If a child's unwritten concurrence is to be sought, researchers must nevertheless obtain and document the child's unwritten assent. If applicable, please explain below why *unwritten* assent of the child is necessary and the measures to be taken to obtain and document such unwritten assent.

**8. Selection of participants:**

**a) Are inclusion or exclusion criteria, in addition to those identified in question 6d, necessary for the research methodology?**

Yes  No inclusion or exclusion criteria are necessary. All those who wish to participate will be included in this research project.

If yes, explain how the screening of potential participants will be carried out and how the excluded candidates will be notified. **Note:** Please append a copy of any selection test or questionnaire, if applicable.

**b) Is there a risk of negative reaction on the part of excluded candidates, or any other inconveniences for the excluded candidates?**

Yes  No

If yes, describe the nature of such risks or inconveniences, and the measures taken to minimize or mitigate these risks or inconveniences. **Note:** Please append any script or material used, if applicable.

**9. Participation:**

**a) What will participants be asked to do and where will the research take place? If you are interviewing participants, please indicate where the interviews will take place.**

The research participants will be asked to participate in a semi-structured interview session. The interviews will take place in an environment of the participants choosing. (i.e. their place of employment, coffee shop, etc.) It is hoped that allowing the interviewee to determine the location of the interview will make them more comfortable with the interview process.

b) How often will they be asked to participate (i.e. how many sessions)?

Each participant will be asked to participate in one (1) interview session. Should a follow-up session be required, only those participants who have consented in advance (see attached consent form) to a follow-up session will be contacted.

c) How long will each session (including interviews and questionnaires) take?

I anticipate that each session will take approximately one hour thirty minutes (1 hr. 30 mins.).

d) Will participants be compensated?

Yes  No

If yes, please provide details.

e) If participants choose to withdraw, how will you deal with compensation?

f) Will scientific instruments involving direct or indirect physical contact (e.g. electrodes, sensory devices, remote sensory devices, etc.) be used?

Yes  No

If yes, provide a description of the apparatus, its function and how it will be used. **Note:** Please also submit any questionnaire or other material distributed or administered to the participants.

## SECTION C: RISKS AND BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH

### 10. Risks and Benefits:

#### a) Proportionality of harms and benefits:

Your research project may cause negative reactions or inconveniences to the research participants. Each person reacts differently to experiences. It is important to foresee possible negative reactions or inconveniences to prevent any practical problems when obtaining free and informed consent.

Indicate if the participants might experience any of the following potential risks:

Physical (e.g. muscle pain, tiredness, weakness, nausea, etc.)

Yes  No

Psychological or emotional (e.g. self-image issue, loss of confidence, anxiety or stress, regret for disclosing personal information, boredom,

disruption of family routines, etc.)

**Note:** Depending on the level of risk, the REB may ask that a list of resources be submitted to the participant in the consent form so he/she knows where to go for help.

Yes  No

Legal or social repercussions for participating or not participating in the study (e.g. possibility of marginalization, risk of being judged by peers or employer, risk of being sued, etc.)

Yes  No

Economic or other type of inconveniences (e.g. expenses incurred for participation, long travel to research site, time consumed, etc.)

Yes  No

Are any possible risks to participants greater than those the participants might encounter in their everyday life?

Yes  No

b) **Please describe any other risks you can foresee but which are not mentioned above:**

c) **If you answered yes to any of the above, please explain the risk(s).**

- 1) It is possible that the research participant may experience psychological or emotional stress disclosing information that he/she may later wish they had not disclosed.
- 2) It is possible that the research participant may experience social repercussions from their peers and/or employer should it be revealed that they participated in an external research project. This may include pressure from peers to divulge what was disclosed during the interview. Should the participant disclose information in violation of any terms of employment, and this is revealed to the employer, the participant may experience administrative and/or disciplinary consequences. In extreme cases this may include dismissal.
- 3) Any type of research imposes inconvenience on the research participants in terms of time consumed. As indicated above, it is anticipated that each interview to be conducted will consume approximately 1 hr. 30 mins. of the participant's time.

d) **Indicate the measures taken to minimize or mitigate such risk(s).**

- 1) In order to minimize the psychological and/or emotional stress associated with disclosing personal information, the participant's will be informed that they may contact the researcher to retract any statement that they made during the interview. This option will be available to the participants up to the point of publication.
- 2) In order the minimize the potential for social repercussions from peers and employers anonymity and confidentiality will be ensured. Should the research participant request to be interviewed in the presence of another individual, they will be asked to sign a waiver indicating this desire (see consent form). Every effort will be made from the researcher's perspective to ensure confidentiality in an effort to minimize the potential for social harm.
- 3) In order to minimize the amount of time consumed during the interview process, an interview guide has been prepared in advance. The interview guide will allow for flexibility in an attempt to limit the requirements for follow-up contacts with the research participants. While the researcher is intent on keeping the consumption of the participants time to an absolute minimum, follow-ups may be required. Follow-ups with consenting research participants will only be conducted if the missing information is deemed crucial to the research outcomes.

- e) Describe the potential benefits of the study (e.g. to the participants, society, science, etc.), and how these benefits outweigh the risks.

Through interviewing surveillance workers in an attempt to comprehend how they organize and understand their work, researchers can move toward a more complex understanding of how and why certain individuals are targeted for video surveillance. This study would contribute to the debate of whether suspicion is predominantly constructed by individual operative themselves, or more influenced by the institutional context the operator finds him or herself located within. This work would also begin to flesh out an understanding of how information concerning categories of suspicion flow through institutions and impact the politics of surveillance and visibility. This is especially relevant in contemporary society, which is increasingly characterized as a 'surveillance society'.

## SECTION D: THE INFORMED CONSENT PROCESS

### 11. Free and Informed Consent:

- a) Describe the process that you will use to obtain free and informed consent of the research participants or of authorized representatives of participants who are not legally competent to give consent or who are mentally incompetent, including a description of who will be obtaining consent and a script of what they will say. **Note:** The Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS) states that many individuals who are not legally competent are still able to express their wishes in a meaningful way. These individuals must still be given an opportunity to express their wish to participate or not (they have the final right), either verbally or non-verbally or via an assent form, as the case may be. See question 7f for more information on the assent form.

Each of the research participants will be provided with a consent form. This form will provide a brief description of the research project and will include information regarding the rights of the research participant (i.e. the right not to respond to questions they do not feel comfortable answering, the right to withdrawn from the research at any point without consequence, etc.). The researcher is intent on ensuring that research participants are fully informed prior to providing consent for participation (see consent form).

- b) Is the researcher or the person recruiting and conducting the consent process in a position of authority or trust towards potential participants?

Yes  No

If yes, please explain what measures will be taken to minimize the possibility of coercion.

- c) If dealing with specific cultural, social, or ethnic groups, please describe the measures you have taken to adapt the research protocol and consent process to the divergent values, traditions, privacy issues, and modes of communication of the target group. In cases where there will be verbal consent rather than written, explain why this is so, and describe the alternative means that will be used to document consent.

This research does not deal with a specific culture, social, or ethnic group which would require modification to the traditional research consent protocol.

- d) Describe how the participants will be informed of their right to withdraw from the project.

This information will be clearly outlined in the consent form provided to each of the research participants.

**e) Indicate if information and consent documents, questionnaires, interview guides etc. will be translated for participants who may be more comfortable understanding one of Canada's official languages (or other language, if applicable). Note:** Generally, Canada-wide studies must be presented in both official languages. If your study is not a Canada-wide study and is being conducted in one official language only, then one of your inclusion criteria should be that the participant must be proficient in the language in which your study is being conducted. Please also submit translated versions of your documents where applicable.

The researcher has determined that the consent form will be translated to ensure that the participants are informed of their rights in both official languages.

**f) If you do not plan to translate your documents, explain the reasons why not.**

**The researcher does not intend on translating the interview guide as the interviews will be conducted in English given the researcher's language limitations.**

## SECTION E: ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY

### 12. Anonymity:

**a) Will anonymity of research participants be ensured during the conduct of the research and in publications?**

Yes  No

If yes, how will anonymity of research participants be ensured during the conduct of the research and in publications?

**Unless otherwise requested by the research participant's anonymity will be ensured during the research process by ensuring that identifying information does not appear on any of the research documentation. In instances where research participants request to be interviewed in the presence of an other individual, they will be asked to indicate this request on the consent form. The researcher will, however, ensure that the participants anonymity will be maintained in relation to the remainder of the research process.**

**Research participants will not be personally identified in any publications. The names of research participants will be altered by using pseudonyms. Further the institutions in which the individuals work will only be identified in general terms (i.e. Shopping Mall, Hospital, etc.)**

**b) Will public disclosure of the research results be limited to pooled data only?**

Yes  No

If no, how will the anonymity of participants be protected?

**c) If participants are interviewed, state whether the interviewees will be quoted, and if so, how the anonymity of participants will be ensured.**

Interviewees will not be quoted.

Interviewees will be quoted but all personally identifying information will be removed or altered **and** contents of quote will not be revelatory of individual identities.

If other measures are used (e.g. use of pseudonym or number), please provide details:

**Interviews may be quoted if they illuminate the broader themes. Pseudonyms will be used to identify individual interviewees and their work environments, if revealed, will only be referred in general terms so not to reveal the identity of the insitution (i.e. Shopping Mall, Public Street, etc.)**

**d) Will you quote from written comments?**

Yes  No

If yes, explain how anonymity will be ensured.

**e) If you are quoting interviewees, will they be given the opportunity to review their transcripts?**

Yes  No

If yes, clearly explain the procedure.

**Participants will be advised that, if requested, a copy of their interview transcript will be shared with them for review. This will included in the consent form under the section regarding risks.**

**f) If anonymity is not to be guaranteed, explain why. Note:** This fact must be mentioned on the consent form or information sheet given to the participant.

**While the research will ensure the anonymity of the research participants, some participants may feel more comfortable being interviewed in the company of a third party. Further, perhaps some participants may desire to be interviewed with a colleague.**

**Methodology texts have suggested that when interviewing individuals of certain occupations (policing, security, military, etc.) discussions are more fruitful when interviews are conducted with two or three members of that occupation. Often this dynamic results in a more open conversation. I do not want to preclude this option from my research.**

**If this situation does arise, they will be asked to indicate this desire (see consent form). While in such cases anonymity cannot be maintained during the interview process, the researcher will ensure that the anonymity is ensured in any resulting publications.**

### 13. Confidentiality of data

**a) Who will conduct the data collection?**

**The data collection will be conducted by the researcher (Patrick M. Derby).**

b) By what means will data be collected (e.g. tape-recorded interview, paper questionnaire, etc)?

The data will be collected through the use of digitally recorded interviews. Researcher's notes my also be taken during the interview.

c) Who will have access to collected data (principal investigator, co-investigator, graduate student, etc.)? **Note:** All the people who have access to the data must sign the present submission form, with the exception of research assistants.

The researcher (Patrick M. Derby) and his supervisor (Dr. Robert Gaucher) will have access to the collected data.

d) Describe the procedures to be used to ensure confidentiality of data both during the conduct of the research and in the release of its findings.

The names of research participants will only appear on the signed consent forms. Each interview will be assigned a numerical code, and individual identifiers will not be used in the interview process. Each numerically coded interview will then be randomly assigned a pseudonym ensuring that even the researcher is no longer certain of the participants actual identity.

e) Explain where each item (i.e. written records, electronic data, audio/video tapes, transcripts, questionnaires, etc.) will be stored. **Note:** Generally, data must be kept in the principal investigator's/supervisor's office.

Consent forms, once completed, will be maintained in the supervisor's (Dr. Robert Gaucher's) office. The remaining data (i.e. digitally recorded interviews, typed transcripts, and interview notes) will be stored on the researcher's (Patrick M. Derby) desktop computer, to allow for the completion of the project. This electronic data will be saved under password protection. Only the researcher and his supervisor will have access to the password. Once the digitally recorded interviews are uploaded to the the researcher's desktop computer, the files will be deleted from the researcher digital recorder. An electronic copy of all data collected will be provided to the researcher's supervisor on a password protected CD-Rom for accountability purposes.

f) For how long will data be conserved (indicate maximum period of conservation)? **Note:** Most publishers request that data be conserved for a period of 5 to 10 years after time of publication, but this can vary according to the guidelines specified in your field of study. Health Canada requires that all clinical trial data be kept by the Principal Investigator for a period 25 years as outlined in Health Canada's Food and Drug Regulations, Division 5 – Drugs for Clinical Trials involving Human Subjects, Section C.05.012.

Upon completion of the research project, the electronic data will be written to a password-protected CD-Rom and deleted from the researcher's computer. The CD-Rom and the consent forms will then be secured together in the researcher's locked filing cabinet for a maximum of five (5) years (i.e. until 01 May, 2012).

g) What will be done with the data, mentioned in item e) above, at the end of storage? Provide detail of their final disposal (e.g. shredding, deletion etc.).

Consent forms will be shredded at the end of storage. All other information stored on the password protected CD-Rom (digitally recorded interviews, transcripts, and interview notes) will be destroyed with the CD-Rom when the researcher determines to cease storage of the items.

**h) Are there any plans for secondary use of data?** As stated in the TCPS “secondary use of research data” is understood to be “the use in **research of data contained in records collected for a purpose other than the research itself.**” **Note:** Projects making use of secondary data must also be submitted for REB approval using the form available at:

[http://web9.uottawa.ca/services/rgessrd/ethics/application\\_dwn.asp](http://web9.uottawa.ca/services/rgessrd/ethics/application_dwn.asp)

Yes  No

If yes, provide details.

--

**i) Are there any plans for dissemination of the research results to participants? If so, how?**

<p><b>No, there are no plans for disseminating the research result to the participants. Upon completion the of the researcher's thesis and any subsequent publications, the material will be available to the public.</b></p>
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#### **SECTION F: SIGNATURES**

*The University of Ottawa and its investigators and students whose research projects involve the participation of human beings as research subjects must comply with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS), the University of Ottawa's guidelines, and other relevant guidelines and legislation. This is both a collective and an individual responsibility.*

**Signature of Principal Investigator/Supervisor and Co-investigators / students attesting that:**

- a) **the Principal Investigator/Supervisor and all Co-investigators/students:**
  - i) **have reviewed the protocol contents;**
  - ii) **agree with the protocol as submitted;**
  - iii) **will adhere to the research protocol and documentation (including the consent form, etc.) as approved by the REB;**
  - iv) **agree to comply with requests made by the ethics office during the life of this research;**
- b) **the information contained in this form is complete and accurate;**
- c) **the conduct of the proposed research will not commence until ethical certification has been granted;**
- d) **the Principal Investigator/ Supervisor will notify the REB in a timely manner of any changes in the project and of any adverse events/experiences encountered by participants;**
- e) **the investigators understand and agree that they are responsible for the ethical conduct of this research project, including that of research assistants, students and any other persons under their supervision.**

Signature of the Principal Investigator (or Supervisor):	Original signed by Robert Gaucher	Date:
--	--------------------------------------	-------

Signature of the Co-investigator (or Student):	Original signed by Patrick Derby	Date:
--	-------------------------------------	-------

**Print and mail (in sufficient copies) with additional material to:**

Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research  
Research Grants and Ethics Services  
University of Ottawa  
Tabaret Hall (159)  
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5  
(613) 562-5841  
[ethics@uOttawa.ca](mailto:ethics@uOttawa.ca)

**Sheet for extra names of co-investigators and students**

**Co-investigators and students (4<sup>th</sup> year, Master's and Doctoral levels):**

**Note:** Part-time professors and students should give a permanent postal address and email address for future correspondence.

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Department/School:</b>	<b>Signature:</b>
<b>Address:</b>	<b>Faculty:</b>	
	<b>E-mail:</b>	
	<b>Phone:</b>	
	<b>Fax:</b>	
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Department/School:</b>	<b>Signature:</b>
<b>Address:</b>	<b>Faculty:</b>	
	<b>E-mail:</b>	
	<b>Phone:</b>	
	<b>Fax:</b>	
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Department/School:</b>	<b>Signature:</b>
<b>Address:</b>	<b>Faculty:</b>	
	<b>E-mail:</b>	
	<b>Phone:</b>	
	<b>Fax:</b>	
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Department/School:</b>	<b>Signature:</b>
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	<b>E-mail:</b>	
	<b>Phone:</b>	
	<b>Fax:</b>	
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Department/School:</b>	<b>Signature:</b>
<b>Address:</b>	<b>Faculty:</b>	
	<b>E-mail:</b>	
	<b>Phone:</b>	
	<b>Fax:</b>	
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Department/School:</b>	<b>Signature:</b>
<b>Address:</b>	<b>Faculty:</b>	
	<b>E-mail:</b>	
	<b>Phone:</b>	
	<b>Fax:</b>	
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Department/School:</b>	<b>Signature:</b>
<b>Address:</b>	<b>Faculty:</b>	
	<b>E-mail:</b>	
	<b>Phone:</b>	
	<b>Fax:</b>	
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Department/School:</b>	<b>Signature:</b>
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	<b>Fax:</b>	
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	<b>Fax:</b>	

<b>Address:</b>	<b>Faculty:</b>	
	<b>E-mail:</b>	
	<b>Phone:</b>	
	<b>Fax:</b>	

### Eligibility for Minimal Risk or Expedited Review

Your project may qualify for Minimal Risk Review or for Expedited Review.

Further information is provided at

[http://web9.uottawa.ca/services/rgessrd/ethics/minimal\\_risk.asp](http://web9.uottawa.ca/services/rgessrd/ethics/minimal_risk.asp)

Investigators are strongly encouraged to contact the Protocol Officer for assistance and guidance in this determination prior to submitting their project for review.

To assist us in the determination of whether or not your project is eligible for Minimal Risk Review, please check the applicable boxes where indicated below.

Research Methodology	Participants
<input type="checkbox"/> Questionnaires	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fully competent adults
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Interviews	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No involvement of vulnerable populations
<input type="checkbox"/> Software evaluation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No involvement of aboriginal or vulnerable ethnic communities
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (please state):	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No captive populations
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No possibility of coercion
Health and Safety of Participants	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No sensitive questions likely to evoke painful memories	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No likelihood of inducing embarrassment, fear, stress or anxiety in participants	

(Please return to question 5).

To assist us in the determination of whether or not your project is eligible for Expedited Review, please check the applicable boxes where indicated below.

Project has been reviewed and approved by a TCPS-compliant Research Ethics Board at a Canadian university or hospital, including University of Ottawa affiliated hospitals.

If yes, please **complete this form** and provide complete copies of the documentation submitted to, and approved by, the other organization and the REB approval certificate. The REB will not review incomplete applications.

Minor revision or substantive replication of a project previously approved by the REB of the University of Ottawa.

If yes, please provide the following information:

- i) Title of previously approved project:
- ii) Ethics file number:
- iii) Please explain how the project for which REB approval is now being sought differs from the previously approved project (append additional page if required):

Involves secondary use of research data that cannot be linked to individuals (as stated in the TCPS “secondary use of research data” is understood to be “the use in research of data contained in records collected for a purpose other than the research itself”). Please use separate form available at:

[http://web9.uottawa.ca/services/rgessrd/ethics/application\\_dwn.asp](http://web9.uottawa.ca/services/rgessrd/ethics/application_dwn.asp)

**Appendix C:**  
**Recruitment Text**

**Recruitment Text**

Hi, my name is Patrick Derby. I am a Masters student at the University of Ottawa, currently completing the thesis component of my degree which requires that I conduct original research. My current research interest is in the area of CCTV surveillance. Specifically, the research I am conducting for my thesis relates to the human process of doing CCTV surveillance. The purpose of my research is to move away from a purely technical understanding of CCTV surveillance and shed light on the mental processes that human surveillance workers utilize to make sense of, and organize their work and work environment. The aim of my research is to advance an understanding of the complexities entailed in determining whom and what situations require surveillance. In order to complete my data collection, I require volunteer research participants.

**Who Can Participate:** This study requires research participants who work, or have worked, as CCTV operators, in public or semi-public environments. This includes, but is not limited to the following environments: shopping malls, hospitals, public streets, campuses, public transportation stations, and bars/night clubs.

**Participation:** Volunteers will be asked to participate in one (1) semi-structured interview sessions to last approximately one hour thirty minutes (1hr. 30mins.), with the option of volunteering for follow-up sessions, should the need arise.

**Anonymity/Confidentiality:** The researcher guarantees all research participants that they will remain anonymous and that the views and/or opinions they share will be kept in confidence. The identities of the participants will not be revealed in any of the resulting publications. The researcher also guarantees that the work locations of the participants will not be identified.

**When/Where:** In an attempt to minimize any inconvenience on the research participants, times and locations of the interview sessions will be negotiated with participants on an individual basis.

**Contact:** If you are interesting in participating in this research project, please contact Patrick Derby by telephone at (613) 298-4093 or by email at [pderb073@uottawa.ca](mailto:pderb073@uottawa.ca).

APPENDIX D:  
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS



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Université d'Ottawa  
 Faculté des sciences sociales  
 Criminologie

University of Ottawa  
 Faculty of Social Sciences  
 Criminology

CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

TITLE OF THE STUDY: Doing Surveillance Work

**Researcher:**

Patrick M. Derby, MA Candidate  
 Department of Criminology  
 Faculty of Social Sciences  
 University of Ottawa  
 Telephone: 613-298-4093  
 Email: pderb073@uottawa.ca

**Supervisor:**

Robert Gaucher, PhD  
 Department of Criminology  
 Faculty of Social Sciences  
 University of Ottawa  
 Telephone: 613-562-5800 Ext. 1796  
 Email: rgaucher@uottawa.ca

**INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE:** I am invited to participate in the abovementioned research study conducted by Patrick M. Derby and Robert Gaucher, PhD.

**PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:** The purpose of the study is to shed light on the cognitive processes that human surveillance workers utilize in selecting whom or what to target for surveillance. The aim of the research is to advance an understanding of the complexities entailed in determining whom and what situations require surveillance. This study will also allow the researcher to complete the requirements of his Masters Degree in the discipline of Criminology.

**PARTICIPATION:** My participation will consist essentially of one (1) interview session to last approximately one hour thirty minutes (1hr 30mins). I also understand that, if consented to below, I may be requested to participate in a follow-up interview. During this interview session I am to respond to the researcher's questions to the best of my ability in an honest manner.

**RISKS:** My participation in this study will entail that I volunteer information about my work and this may cause me to feel vulnerable and exposed to criticism from peers and/or my employer. I may experience pressure from my peers to divulge information that was shared during the interview. There is also the possibility that I may experience psychological and/or emotional stress after disclosing information I wish I had not. I also understand that should I share information which violates my terms of employment, and this is revealed to my employer, I may suffer administrative and/or disciplinary consequences. In an extreme case this may include dismissal from my employment. I may also feel inconvenienced by the length of the interview process. I have received assurance from the researcher that every effort will be made to minimize these risks by ensuring my anonymity and that the information I share remains confidential. I have been advised that, if requested, I will be provided a copy of the interview transcript to review. I have also been assured that I may retract my entire interview or any statements made by contacting the researcher prior to publication. The researcher has also assured me that the demands on my time will, to the greatest extent possible, be limited to the requirements described above. I have also been assured that I will only be contacted for follow-up if I provide my consent to the researcher, and it is deemed essential to the research project.

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 📠 613 562-5304  
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 Ottawa ON K1N 6N5 Canada  
 www.uOttawa.ca

**BENEFITS:** My participation in this study will contribute to advancing knowledge in the area of surveillance. Specifically, my participation will contribute to understanding surveillance as a complex human process and move beyond the pure technological focus found in much of the current information on surveillance.

**CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY:** I have received assurance from the researcher that the information I will share will remain strictly confidential. I understand that the contents will be used only for academic purposes, such as the researcher's thesis and any spin-off academic publications, and that my confidentiality will be protected through the assignment of numeric codes for any research documentation as a substitute for the use of names. Anonymity will be protected by ensuring that my identity is in no way revealed to the public. I understand that I will be randomly assigned a pseudonym to be used in any publications resulting from this research. I also understand that the organization for which I work will only be identified in a general manner (i.e. a hospital)

**CONSERVATION OF DATA:** The data collected, such as digital recordings of the interviews, transcripts, and researcher's notes will be kept secure. Digital recordings of the interviews will be immediately uploaded to the researcher's computer and deleted from the recorder. The electronic files (digital interview recordings, transcripts, notes, etc.) will be secured on the researcher's computer using a password protect feature. Upon completion of the researcher's publications, all electronic files will be written to a password protected CD-ROM and maintained for a maximum of five (5) years. Once the data is written to a CD-ROM it will be deleted from the researcher's computer. Only the researcher and his supervisor, as named above will have access to this material. Any hard-copies of the above identified materials will be destroyed upon completion of the research. Until such time they will be maintained in a secure filing cabinet in the researcher's home. A copy of all data collected will also be secured in the office of the researcher's supervisor, named above.

**VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION:** I am under no obligation to participate and if I choose to participate, I can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If I choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal may still be used in accordance with the above stated purpose, unless otherwise specified or in the case of a complete retraction of the interview. I may also retract my interview or any statement I made during the interview by contacting the researcher and/his supervisor. This option remains available to me until the research has been published.

**ACCEPTANCE:** I, \_\_\_\_\_, agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Patrick M. Derby of the Department of Criminology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, whose research is under the supervision of Robert Gaucher, PhD.

I consent / do not consent (circle one) to being contacted should the researcher be required to follow-up for the purposes of clarification or additional information.

If you have consented to being contacted for follow-up purposes, please provide a contact telephone number: \_\_\_\_\_

I, \_\_\_\_\_, request to be interviewed in the presence of a third-party. I understand that as a result of this request the researcher cannot ensure my anonymity during the interview. I have, however, received assurance from the researcher that my anonymity will be maintained throughout the remainder of the research process.

If I have any questions about the study, I may contact the researcher or his supervisor.

If I have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, I may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 159, (613) 562-5841 or ethics@uottawa.ca.

There are two copies of the consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

Participant's signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Researcher's signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Witness signature *(needed in the case where a participant is illiterate, blind, etc.):*

\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Person responsible for the Participant *(i.e. parent, guardian, substitute decision-maker):*

\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT:**

I, \_\_\_\_\_, understand that any information shared and/or statements made during this interview must be kept confidential. I will not discuss the content of the interview with anyone who was not present during the interview session.

Third-party signature *(needed in the case where a third-party is present)*

\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_



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Faculté des sciences sociales  
Criminologie

University of Ottawa  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Criminology

## FORMULAIRE DE CONSENTEMENT À LA RECHERCHE

TITRE DU PROJET: Doing Surveillance Work

**Chercheur:**

Patrick M. Derby, candidat à la Maîtrise  
Département de Criminologie  
Faculté des Sciences Sociales  
Université d'Ottawa  
Par téléphone: (613) 298-4093  
Par courriel: pderb073@uottawa.ca

**Superviseur:**

Robert Gaucher, PhD  
Département de Criminologie  
Faculté des Sciences Sociales  
Université d'Ottawa  
Par téléphone: (613) 562-5800 Ext. 1796  
Par courriel: rgaucher@uottawa.ca

**INVITATION À PARTICIPER:** Je suis invité(e) à participer à la recherche nommée ci-haut, qui est menée par Patrick M. Derby et Robert Gaucher, PhD.

**BUT DE L'ÉTUDE :** Le but de l'étude est d'examiner les processus cognitifs utilisés par les contrôleurs de surveillance dans leur cible de personnes ou d'attributs à surveiller. L'objectif de la recherche est de comprendre les processus complexes qui déterminent ce qui mérite l'attention des contrôleurs de surveillance et ce qui les amène à faire de la surveillance active. Cette recherche permettra aussi au chercheur de compléter les exigences de son programme et d'obtenir son diplôme de Maîtrise dans le domaine de la criminologie.

**PARTICIPATION :** Ma participation consistera essentiellement d'une (1) session d'entrevue d'une durée approximative d'une heure trente minutes (1hr 30min.). Je comprends qu'il est possible, si je consent à la présente, que l'on me demande de participer à une deuxième entrevue dans le but d'assurer un suivi. Lors des entrevues, je devrai répondre, selon mes capacités, aux questions du chercheur et ce, de façon honnête.

**RISQUES OCCASIONNÉS:** Je comprends que ma participation à cette recherche implique que je devrai discuter d'informations relatives à mon travail et que cela peut m'amener à me sentir vulnérable aux critiques de mes collègues et/ou de mon employeur. Il se peut que mes collègues de travail exercent de la pression pour que je leur divulgue les informations dont j'ai partagé lors de l'entrevue. Il est aussi possible, suite à l'entrevue, que je me sente psychologiquement et/ou émotionnellement en détresse suite au dévoilement d'informations que j'aurais souhaité ne pas divulguer. Si je divulgue des informations violant mon contrat d'emploi et que mon employeur en est mis au courant, j'entrevois la possibilité de subir des conséquences administratives et/ou disciplinaires, voire même un congédiement. Ce disant, j'ai la garantie du chercheur que tous ses efforts seront déployés dans le but de minimiser ces risques. Entre autres, le chercheur assurera que les informations dont je lui ferai part resteront anonymes et confidentielles. On m'a avisé que, si j'en fais la requête, on me fournira une copie du compte-rendu de l'entrevue. Aussi, on m'a rassuré que je peux, en tout temps, retirer mes commentaires, voire même l'entrevue entière, en contactant le chercheur avant publication de cette recherche. De plus, le chercheur me certifie qu'il minimisera le plus possible la durée de temps qui me sera imposée par la recherche. On entrera en contact avec moi à nouveau, suite à l'entrevue initiale, que si j'en donne la permission au chercheur et qu'une deuxième entrevue se voit absolument essentielle à la recherche.

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📠 613 562-5304

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Ottawa ON K1N 6N5 Canada  
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**BIENFAITS :** Ma participation à cette recherche aura pour effet de contribuer à l'avancement de la connaissance et de la problématique de la surveillance. Plus spécifiquement, ma participation résultera en une connaissance plus approfondie de la surveillance en tant que processus humain complexe et permettra d'avancer des conclusions qui iront au-delà des recherches centrées sur la technologie, que nous retrouvons en abondance.

**CONFIDENTIALITÉ ET ANONYMAT :** J'ai l'assurance du chercheur que l'information que je partagerai avec lui restera strictement confidentielle. Je m'attends à ce que le contenu ne soit utilisé que pour des raisons académiques, telles que le projet de thèse du chercheur et les publications qui pourront en découler. Si les informations que je divulgue se donnent à être publiées, je comprends qu'on m'attribuera un pseudonyme au hasard pour y référer. Je comprends aussi que l'organisation pour laquelle je travaille sera identifiée de façon générale (par exemple, « un magasin »). L'anonymat sera conservé de façon à ce que mon identité ne soit pas révélée au public.

**CONSERVATION DES DONNÉES :** Les données recueillies, tels les enregistrements numériques des entrevues, comptes-rendus des entrevues et notes du chercheur seront gardés de façon sécuritaire. Les enregistrements numériques des entrevues seront téléchargés à l'ordinateur du chercheur et effacés de l'enregistreuse immédiatement par la suite. Une protection par mot de passe sera utilisée pour sécuriser tous les fichiers électroniques (enregistrements numériques, comptes-rendus des entrevues et notes du chercheur) du chercheur. Une fois la recherche (et articles qui en découleront) publiée, tous les fichiers électroniques seront copiés sur un CD-ROM qui sera aussi protégé par mot de passe. Ce CD-ROM sera gardé pendant une période de cinq (5) ans. L'information que ce dernier contiendra sera effacé de l'ordinateur du chercheur immédiatement suite au transfert sur CD-ROM. Seuls le chercheur et son superviseur auront accès à ces informations. Toute copie des informations mentionnées ci-haut sera détruite une fois la recherche terminée. Avant leur dite-destruction, les informations seront gardées dans une filière sécurisée à clé au domicile du chercheur. Une copie des données sera aussi sauvegardée dans le bureau du superviseur du chercheur, mentionné plus haut.

**PARTICIPATION VOLONTAIRE :** Ma participation à la recherche est volontaire et je suis libre de m'en retirer en tout temps, et/ou de refuser de répondre à certaines questions, sans subir de conséquence négative. Si je choisis de me retirer de l'étude, les données recueillies jusqu'à ce moment pourront encore être utilisées selon le but de l'étude, à moins d'indication contraire ou de rétraction totale de l'entrevue.

**ACCEPTATION :** Je, \_\_\_\_\_, accepte de participer à cette recherche menée par Patrick M. Derby du Département de Criminologie (Faculté des Sciences Sociales) de l'Université d'Ottawa et guidée par le superviseur de ce dernier, Robert Gaucher, PhD.

Je consent / Je ne consent pas (encerclez) à être contacté(e) si le chercheur a besoin de plus d'information en guise de clarification ou de renseignement.

Si vous avez consenti à être contacté(e) de façon à assurer un suivi, veuillez indiquer un numéro de téléphone où vous pourrez être contacté(e) : \_\_\_\_\_

Je, \_\_\_\_\_, demande à ce qu'un tiers soit présent durant l'entrevue. Je comprends qu'à la lumière de cette demande, le chercheur ne pourra m'assurer l'anonymat durant l'entrevue. Par contre, le chercheur m'a assuré que l'anonymat sera maintenu en tout temps suite à l'entrevue. Pour tout renseignement additionnel concernant cette étude, je peux communiquer avec le chercheur ou son superviseur.

Pour tout renseignement sur les aspects éthiques de cette recherche, je peux m'adresser au Responsable de l'éthique sur la recherche de l'Université d'Ottawa au Pavillon Tabaret, 550 rue Cumberland, pièce 159, (613) 562-5841 ou [ethics@uottawa.ca](mailto:ethics@uottawa.ca).

Il y a deux copies du formulaire de consentement, dont une copie que je peux garder.

Signature du participant : \_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_

Signature du chercheur : \_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_

Témoin (*nécessaire dans le cas où le participant serait illettré, aveugle, etc.*):

\_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_

Personne responsable pour le participant (*exemple : parent ou tuteur*):

\_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_

**ACCORD DE CONFIDENTIALITÉ :**

Je, \_\_\_\_\_, comprend que tout commentaire ou information partagés doivent être gardés confidentiels. Je m'abstiendrai de discuter du contenu de l'entrevue avec toute personne n'étant pas présente au moment de l'entrevue.

Signature d'un tiers (*dans le cas où un tiers est présent*):

\_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX E:**  
**INTERVIEW COMPARISON TEMPLATE**

**Main Theme:**

**Sub Theme(s):**

<b>Participants</b>	
Richard	
Michael	
Shawn	
James & Xavier	
Barry	
Ian	
Paul	
Andre	
Frank	