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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ  
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UNDERSTANDING TEXTUAL MEANING

Submitted to the School of Graduate  
Studies of the University of Ottawa  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts (Philosophy)

by

Li Si-Jin

July 1983

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface VI  
Introduction VIII

PART I: An Initial Consideration of the Question about  
the Nature of Textual Meaning 1

Section 1. The Necessity of the Question of Textual  
Meaning in a Reading Procedure 2

Section 2. Understanding the Focus of this Thesis:  
The Question--"What Is Textual Meaning?" 8

Section 3. The Definitions of Six Concepts Concerned  
with the Discussion of the Central Question 10

Section 4. The Consideration of the Interrelations  
of Author, Text, and Reader as the Basis  
for Discussing the Question of Textual  
Meaning 17

PART II: A Critique of Representative Theories of  
Textual Meaning 25

Section 5. Criticism of Anti-Intentionalism:  
Its Neglect of the Logical Connection  
between Textual Meaning and Author's  
Intention 27

Section 6. Criticism of Communicationalism:  
Indetermination of Textual Meaning with  
Respect to the Interpretation of a Text 35

Section 7. Criticism of Intentionalism: Conflicts  
between Textual Meaning and Author's  
Intention 44

Section 8. Criticism of Anti-Textual Individuationism:  
Neglect of the Reader's Role in Determining  
Textual Meaning 55

Conclusion 64

PART III: An Approach to Understanding Textual Meaning 67

Section 9: A Discussion of the Relations between  
Author and Text, Text and Reader 68

Section 10. The Involvement of Utterer's Idiolect  
Meaning with Linguistic Meaning of Text  
inside a Literary Work 75

Section 11: Possible Conflicts between Author's  
Intention and Linguistic Meaning of  
the Text 78

Section 12. Using a Reader's Socio-Cultural Code  
to Interpret the Text either as Linguistic  
Meaning of Context or as Author's  
Idiolect Meaning 86

Section 13. Text as the Criterion of Interpretation 92

Section 14. On the Question whether a Literary Work  
Has only One Correct Interpretation 102

Conclusion 111

Notes 116

A Selected Bibliography 124

## RESUME

The present dissertation attempts to present the problem of what textual meaning is.

At the base of the question are the interrelations among three factors: author, text, and reader. An author writes a text in which he intends his utterance to be understood by the reader. Yet, a text as an isolated entity may have its own meaning which is determined by the linguistic rules of the text and which may not be identical with what the author intends. In the communication between text and reader, the reader can only discover the meaning which is determined by the text itself or by the author's intention.

However, none of the four representative theories about textual meaning--anti-intentionalism, communicationism, intentionalism, and anti-textual individualism--focus on the interrelations among these three factors and correctly expound what textual meaning is.

Textual meaning is essentially determined by these three factors. Textual meaning should be understood according to the following formulation: For readers, the author intends his text to make those readers understand

his own intention. Since the text may involve the author's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of the context, the reader may interpret the text either as the author's idiolect meaning or as the linguistic meaning of the text by means of the reader's socio-cultural code.

**PREFACE**

This essay is intended to explore the problem of understanding what textual meaning is. As this topic is so broad, I focus on the following aspects: the representative theories of textual meaning such as Anti-intentionalism, Communicationalism, Intentionalism, and Anti-textual Individualism; understanding textual meaning according to the interrelations among author, text, and reader as well as the criterion of interpretation. Choosing not to discuss questions such as why it is so important to explore textual meaning, the relation between interpretation and criticism, etc., is not to say that those questions should be ignored. I avoid these questions in the present paper, in part, because I feel that they can be discussed separately in other essays.

I am sincerely grateful to my supervisor Professor Peter McCormick, who raised many valuable comments which substantially improved my studies. I would also like to express my appreciation to Professor David Carr, who first led me to study hermeneutics. Under his profitable advice, I made my first ventures into this area.

On the basis of the effort, I was led to the present topic. I would also like to thank Professor Vance Mendenhall, who carefully examined my thesis project and made useful criticisms and suggestions.

Ottawa, June 1983

S.J. Li



INTRODUCTION

What is textual meaning? This question is not merely the basic problem of literary theory but also the central question of hermeneutics. When we consider what a particular work means, there is no common perspective. Rather there are different, even disparate interpretations, which are all plausibly the real interpretation of textual meaning. This inevitably caused a chaos in literary criticism. Thus, it is of considerable importance to get a clear picture of what textual meaning is in order to solve problems in interpretation, criticism, etc. This essay attempts to consider the following question: how should the problem of what textual meaning <sup>is</sup> be understood? I try to focus on the concept of the meaning of a literary work.

My methodology is as follows: after having raised my central question, I look at the interrelations among author, text and reader in order to throw light on this question. After examining these interrelations in the framework of several representative theories about what textual meaning is, I conclude that none of them provides satisfactory answers to this question. Accordingly, I propose a reformation of, rather than a solution to the problem of what meaning should be.

There are three parts to my discussion.

In the first part, beside raising my question, I focus on the following six important concepts:

(1) Meaning. I consider both A Schaff's and H. Grice's concepts of meaning.

(2) Intention. I use Beardsley's notion that intention is what an author wanted to do before he began to make an artwork and while he was in the process of making the artwork. I further discuss the distinction between meaning and intention from Beardsley's standpoint on anti-intentionalism.

(3) Utterance, Utterance Meaning, and Utterer's Meaning. The discussion is based on Tolhurst's anti-textual individualism.

(4) Interpretation. I consider the relation between textual meaning and interpreter.

I mainly focus on the interrelations among author, text, and reader. For certain readers, an author writes a text in which he intends his utterance to be understood by the reader. Yet, a text as an isolated entity may have its own meaning which is determined by the linguistic rules of text and which may not be identical with what the author intended. In communication between text and reader, only the reader can discover the meaning which is determined by the text and not the author.

The second part attempts to criticize four representative theories about textual meaning. My analysis shows that all of them fail to expound convincingly enough what textual meaning is since none considers the question in terms of the interrelations among author, text, and reader.

(1) Anti-intentionalism holds that the author's intention is irrelevant to the textual meaning which is only determined by the linguistic rules of the text. Consequently anti-intentionalism denies that there must be a logical connection between textual meaning and the author's intention. However, in any given text, there may be two meanings, say M1 and M2. M1 can be called the linguistic meaning of the text and M2 can be called the author's intention. No matter what they are called, both M1 and M2 are necessarily relevant to the author's intention. M1 is written by the author to try to convey M2, even if M1 conflicts with M2.

(2) Communicationalism holds that textual meaning must go beyond the author's meaning because textual meaning is determined partly by the traditional situation of the reader. Textual meaning is always co-determined by the reader.

If we accept communicationalism, we must also accept that misunderstanding of a literary work never occurs. The reason communicationalism is in error is that it ignores the determinativeness of text itself and only stresses communication between text and reader.

In fact, even though the reader's traditional situation influences his understanding, his interpretation of a text is still in principle governed by the text itself.

(3) Intentionalism claims that textual meaning is what the author intended. The principle is that textual meaning is determined and unchangeable.

My argument is that in intentionalism, textual meaning is assumed to be identical with the author's intention. A text must observe linguistic rules such as syntax and semantics. But, the linguistic meaning of the text may conflict with the authorial intention. Therefore, the author's intention is relevant to textual meaning, but it may not be the same as the textual meaning. The reason intentionalism makes such an error is that it overlooks that the text itself must observe its linguistic rules and these rules are independent of the author's intention. On the other hand, intentionalists also ignore the reader's role in determining textual meaning. Since textual meaning may be both the author's intention and the linguistic meaning, it is up to the reader to choose a textual meaning depending on his socio-cultural code.

(4) Anti-textual individualism states that textual meaning is the utterance meaning which <sup>is</sup> relevant but not identical to what the author intended.

Since anti-textual individualism in fact mixes both intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, it will inevitably repeat the same mistakes that they made, which is, ignoring the reader's role in determining textual meaning. For anti-textual individualism the sole role a reader has is to understand utterance meaning as the author's intention. But this role is debatable. If we accept the anti-textual individualist view that utterance meaning may conflict with author's intention, we must recognize that, in the case where utterance meaning conflicts with the author's intention, the utterance meaning depends upon the reader's choice. The reader, in terms of his socio-cultural code, can interpret it possibly as an author's allusion, as a grammatical error, or as something totally different.

Consequently, the common mistake these theories make is that when they discuss what textual meaning is, none of them focus on the interrelations among author, text, and reader. Therefore, none of them can satisfyingly expound what textual meaning is.

The third and final part tries to show that textual meaning should be understood according to the following formulation: For readers, an author intends his text to make those readers understand the author's own intentions.

Since the text may involve the author's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of context, a reader may interpret the text either as the linguistic meaning of the text or as the author's idiolect meaning by means of reader's socio-cultural code.

On the basis of examining communicationalist views and intentionalist theories about the criterion of interpretation, I conclude that in the interpretation of a literary work, the criterion depends neither upon the author nor upon the reader but upon the text. The criterion of interpretation must be the text itself.

Furthermore, I show that a literary work may have a variety of incompatible interpretations which could be jointly seen as the textual meanings of the text.

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**PART I: AN INITIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION ABOUT  
THE NATURE OF TEXTUAL MEANING**

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Section I: The Necessity of the Question of Textual  
Meaning in a Reading Process

The procedure of reading is the process of interpreting a text or the process of understanding a text. In the reading procedure, many questions have arisen which attract critics to do study. Let us take an example. When we read August Strindberg's drama Miss Julie<sup>1</sup> we first of all know the story is about a young lady of noble birth. On a midsummer's night, she allows herself to be seduced by her servant; the next morning, out of repentance, she takes her own life.

What happens when critics read this tragedy? Some of them have raised the question: What is the theme of this play which really represents Strindberg's idea? Based on such a question, critics try to get the answer by means of biographical inquiry. Loney notes that the theme of Miss Julie is class struggle paralleled with a battle of the sexes based on Strindberg's own experiences.<sup>2</sup> M. Lamm says the same thing: He maintains that the lines in the play show that Strindberg based the contrast between the servant Jean and noble daughter Julie on the difference in social backgrounds between himself and his wife.<sup>3</sup> Other critics are interested in some other questions. G. Olién pays attention to the characters in the play. He says:

The dialogue is masterful and reveals the characters as if they were standing before us. There is Miss Julie, refined, extremely class conscious, but highly strung and uncontrolled because of her demanding but wholly suppressed affections and drives, the pitiful product of an undemocratic upbringing. There is Jean, polished in his own way, with the servants habitual deference but inwardly crude and ambitious, who has been raised with a proletarian view of love. Finally there is Kristin, solid, artless, soberly realistic, and endowed with a consciousness of her class that is at least as pronounced as that of her mistress.<sup>4</sup>

Some critics also discuss those characters with their own evaluations. M. Lamm has pointed out that Miss Julie is a "characterless character" and that Jean is a rich and vital character who was rendered with a superb sense of grotesque humor. However when we listen to his speeches we don't have the same feeling (as with Julie) of confronting a psychological problem. As for Kristin, he writes, she is nothing but a type who illustrates a whole side of the Swedish national character, in her sullenness, pitiless piety, churchness and innate respect for class distinctions as insuperable.<sup>5</sup>

Some critics are even interested in the problem of translation. A. Madsen mentions that like a cynical blast from a defiantly naturalistic trumpet, the very first line of the play is tossed off by Jean: "I kväll är fröken Julie galen igen; Komplett galen!" which is very imperfectly rendered by

the English translation "Tonight Miss Julie is crazy again, completely crazy". The meaning of the Swedish word galen in this context is that Julie is in heat, like an animal, although this specific meaning of galen does not become completely clear until later in the play, when the word is used again.<sup>6</sup>

Among those questions, is there one basic question which can be seen lead <sup>to</sup> other questions to be raised? I would say yes. There is one and it is what I intend to discuss in the present dissertation. The question is what the play Miss Julie means? This is a hermeneutic problem and it refers to interpretation. But it is undeniably a basic question in literary criticism.

For example, when we read the following paragraphs in the play Miss Julie:

MISS JULIE. Perhaps. But then so are you....Besides, everything is strange. Life, people, everything. It's all scum, drifting and drifting on the water until it sinks--sinks. There's a dream I have every now and then. It's coming back to me now. I'm sitting on top of a pillar that I've climbed up somehow and I don't know how to get back down. When I look down I get dizzy. I have to get down but I don't have the courage to jump. I can't hold on much longer and I want to fall; but I don't fall. I know I won't have any peace until I get down; no rest until I get down, down on the ground. And if I ever got down on the ground, I'd want to go farther down, right down into the

earth....Have you ever felt anything like that?

JEAN. Never! I used to dream that I'm lying under a tall tree in a dark woods. I want to get up, up to the very top, to look out over the bright landscape with the sun shining on it, to rob the bird's nest up there with the golden eggs in it. I climb and I climb, but the trunk is so thick, and so smooth, and it's such a long way to that first branch. But I know that if I could just reach that first branch, I'd go right to the top as if on a ladder. I've never reached it yet, but some day I will--even if only in my dream.?

What we must do first of all is to understand what these lines mean. Some people might do some biographical research into what Strindberg intended by writing this tragedy before they read it. On the basis of this research, they may understand these lines as expressing a class struggle between Julie and Jean and also that the struggle parallels with the war between the sexes. By contrast, those people who just read this play, rather than inquire Strindberg's biography, may understand it as nothing but Julie and Jean separately recounting their own dreams.

However, no matter how differences are drawn about what the text means they have to really know what it means before they begin to evaluate this text or discuss certain questions. Take, for example, the problems of translation. To say that <sup>to</sup> learn what a text means is the basic question in reading procedure is to say that only <sup>if</sup> we learn what a text means first can we follow to raise other questions. It is a very simple and clear consideration. For instance, if we do not know what Strindberg's play Miss Julie means, how can we draw such consideration of the character in the play like Miss Julie to be a "characterless character"? Why don't critics say that Hamlet is a "characterless character"? Apparently, the reason why the critic M. Lamm can judge that the character of Julie is a "characterless character" without simplification but also without losing a sense of its whole <sup>8</sup> is that Lamm at first understands that Strindberg wants this play to be an example of adaptation to social conditions of Darwin's doctrine concerning the survival of the fittest and the destruction of the weak in the struggle for existence. Based on this theme, Julie is described as an exceptional individual, an aristocrat with sensitive nerves and delicate feelings, who strays among lower-class people who don't understand her and who desecrate her ideals with their rough and dirty hands, gloat over her defeat and torture her to death. <sup>9</sup>

Now we understand that the question of what a text means is the necessary and basic question in the reading procedure. That is undeniable but we still confuse it with another question which is of course related to the question of what a text means. Let us think about this case for the same text, for example the play Miss Julie. Critics may hold several different explanations of what the text means. For instance, critics might have different interpretations for the paragraphs I quoted above. Some critics, by means of biographical inquiry, believe that the paragraphs demonstrate the basic differences in upbringing and social position. Other critics, on the basis of the linguistic contents of the text, understand the paragraphs as showing the love between Julie and Jean. Now we must raise the new question that if we say that to know what a text means is the necessary and basic question in the reading procedure, then we must also determine what the textual meaning really is. If we settle what textual meaning is, then there will be no difficulty to understand what the criterion of interpretation is.

Section 2: Understanding the Focus of this Thesis: The  
Question -- "What is Textual Meaning?"

The problem of how to interpret a literary text has occupied an important position in the literary theory. As P.D. Juhl points out, the interpretation of literary work is of considerable importance in the shaping of a cultural tradition. It seems desirable to have a general characterization of what is involved in interpreting a literary work, in order to state that a particular literary work means such and such.<sup>10</sup> In China, Liu Xie also claims although those works which were written in the past are old, there are always new understandings when we read them. But it does not mean that the predecessors who studied those works were much more advanced than the later generation who explored the meaning of these works.<sup>11</sup> Some literary works, like Shakespeare's Hamlet or Chinese novelist Cao Xue-Qin's Dream of the Red Chamber, hold many different interpretations of their meanings. The reason is of course very complex. I am interested in understanding what is the meaning of a literary work. Is it the author's intention? Is it the text itself? Or is it the reader's understanding? Obviously, only when we answer the question, i.e. what textual meaning is, can we then explore the problem of interpretation of a literary work. Thus, my purpose in the present essay is to attempt to throw light on how the problem of what is textual meaning should be understood.

I have to especially mention that what I do in this essay should be looked upon more as an attempt to provide a formulation as to what is textual meaning, rather than as an attempt to provide a definitive acceptable answer to the question.

Section 3: The Definitions of Six Concepts Concerned  
with the Discussion of the Central Question

Before I start to discuss my central question, I think I must define some relative concepts.

(I) Meaning. This is a central issue in semantics. In accordance with A. Schaff, who stands on the Marxist viewpoint, meaning is simply the vehicle by which an ordinary material object, a property of such an object, or an event becomes a sign.<sup>12</sup> He further maintains that by meaning we understand the processes which enable the sign to perform the function of an intermediary in the process of human communication, that is, in the process of conveying thoughts from one person to another. Therefore, meaning is an intricate system of interhuman relations whereby a material object becomes a sign.<sup>13</sup> Schaff professes meaning is a kind of sign but such a sign as a meaning of meaning in Schaff's view seems to be too abstract. So let us turn to see H.P. Grice's notion of meaning. Grice tries to clarify natural and non-natural meaning.<sup>14</sup> He therefore raises a formulation of meaning which is that A (human agent) means to do so-and-so by X.<sup>15</sup> Put in another way, A meant<sub>NN</sub> something by X. For Grice, meaning<sub>NN</sub> is someone's belief uttered by certain utterance X. Grice himself claims that we may say that "A meant<sub>NN</sub> something by X" is roughly equivalent to "A uttered X with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention."<sup>16</sup>

There are a number of theories to deal with the meaning of meaning. We can normally divide them into two kinds. One is called the designative theory where one explains a sign having meaning by pointing to what it designates. For example, in the sentence "Your pen is on the table", "your pen" designates a particular pen and "table" also designates another particular object. The other kind is called the expressive theory which concerns the meaning is whatever expresses person's thought and belief. But the expressive theory has a problem which, as Taylor points out, the expressive meaning cannot be fully separated from medium, because it is only manifest in it. The meaning of an expression cannot be explained by its being related to something else, but only by another expression<sup>17</sup>

The reason why I concur with Schaff and Grice's theory of meaning is that I believe that designative theory is more plausible than expressive theory and I think Schaff and Grice's theory can be included in the designative theory.

(2) Intention. The query is whether the explanation "A meant something by X" is equivalent to the explanation "A intended something by X"? Simply speaking, my question is whether meaning is the same as intention?

Schaff and Grice's theory clearly distinguishes meaning from intention. According to them, meaning is an element of the sign-situation or of the communication process.

In Schaff's meaning of meaning, meaning is understood as a system of interhuman relations, and undoubtedly, in the system of relations, intention is only one of them. Therefore since intentionality is one strand of a whole network of signifying relations, meaning cannot be identical with intentionality. Thus, an evident conclusion will be easily inferred: meaning is not identical with intention. In Grice's meaning of meaning, he claims that if a person A intends to get another person B to do something by giving B some information, it cannot be regarded as relevant to the meaning of A's utterance to describe what A intends B to do.<sup>18</sup> However, he proclaims that he does not hope to solve any philosophical puzzles about intention.

Even though Grice does not answer what intention is, his analysis of meaning of meaning may help us to think about it. According to his understanding, intention should be discernible in the situation in which it is invoked, and it should be less in need of philosophical clarification than the explicandum "meaning" itself, as well as it should be not dependent on meaning.

According to Roskill, it is hard to find out where the term "intention" came from because there is no real Latin equivalent to this term, which could be meant either as certain mental states, like voluntas, animus and consilium or as in the sense rendered by a conjunctive phrase indicative of aim or purpose.<sup>19</sup> During the Medieval Latin period, intentio carried the implication of application which was

used in the sense of the both of author and thing. Roskill points out that the use of "intention" in reference to a text dealing with an underlying scheme of thought or ideas to be unfolded in the sense of "the author means by this..." would seem especially relevant.<sup>20</sup> For Roskill, the notion of intention seems to be impossible to separate from the author's aim or thought.

When the term "intention" is used, it usually corresponds to what the author projected. For example, when a critic talks about a particular poem, he emphasizes the need to discuss what the poet intended, in order for the poem to be evaluated. Here, needless to say, intention is seen as the design in the poet's mind. In another saying, intention wants to "utter" the poet's thought. Intention has an obvious affinity for the author's attitude towards his work, the way he felt, and what made him write.<sup>21</sup> Obviously something which is expected to express is not always identical with something which has been expressed.

Now let us look at the distinction between meaning and intention. Beardsley claims the author's intention is a series of psychological states or events in his mind, that is, what the author wanted to do, how he imagined or projected the artwork before he began to make it and while he was in the process of making it.<sup>22</sup> Meaning, as Grice maintains, is something which the author uttered by means of certain utterance.

Put in another way, meaning is the verbal meaning or utterance meaning of the text. As Beardsley points out, what the poet meant is the same as what the poem means.<sup>23</sup>

Normally the verbal meaning of a literary work is understood as the author's meaning. Thus, the author's meaning should automatically be evidence of what the text means. Even though sometimes the author's report of what his work is intended to mean conflicts with the evidence of the text itself, we should acknowledge that the evidence of the text itself displayed must be what the author really meant, no matter what the author says later.

(3) Utterance, Utterance Meaning and Utterer's Meaning. What does "utterance" mean? Is it the same as the word sequence, or as context? Tolhurst distinguishes utterance from word sequence. He defines utterance as "a particular occasion of a string of words" and the term "word sequence" means the string of words used to make utterance.<sup>24</sup> However I doubt that this is clear enough. It is debatable whether an argument which I have arbitrarily chosen can be said to be utterance. For example, a letter to my parents can be seen as a written utterance, but why can't we admit that words on a paper by a child who has just begun to learn some words is also a written utterance? Obviously the reason is that the writing by the child is not logical and understandable writing. Therefore, utterance is something which must be logically understood, not just a particular occasion of a string of words. In this sense I admit that utterance is actually in context.

Now that utterance is context or part of a text, it is not hard to understand that utterance meaning must be textual meaning. Therefore, when I discuss the problem of textual meaning, I am in fact exploring what utterance meaning is. But whether utterance meaning is utterer's meaning? Let us see what utterer's meaning is. Grice has pointed out, utterer's meaning has the following locution: "U (utterer) meant that..."<sup>25</sup> According to him, the difference between utterance meaning and utterer's meaning is that in utterer's meaning, the meaning is specified without the use of quotation marks, whereas in utterance meaning, the meaning is specified with the aid of quotation marks, like this: 'X (utterance type) means "...."'. In Tolhurst's opinion utterance should be understood as "a particular occasion of string of words" and utterance meaning is identical with textual meaning. We can see that utterer's meaning is just whatever an utterer means by his use of linguistic token. Meiland sums up Tolhurst's view saying utterer's meaning is in fact identical with authorial intention because it is just what the author means to say.<sup>26</sup> According to Grice and Tolhurst's view, we can see that utterer's meaning should be understood as whatever an author intended to convey.

(4) Interpretation. The question of what textual meaning is can be translated to another question "Is the meaning of Hume's Treatise?" Of course M could hold a lot of explanations.

Obviously, the notion of textual meaning is closely related to the notion of interpretation. What is "interpretation"? Hirsch maintains that interpretation is an explanation of meaning.<sup>27</sup> But I think when we refer to interpretation, we cannot ignore that interpretation is given by an interpreter. Thus, when we discuss the interpretation of a text, we must be concerned with the situation of the interpreter. In this sense, I suppose interpretation involves a relationship between textual meaning and an interpreter's situation.

**Section 4: The Consideration of the Interrelations  
of Author, Text, and Reader as the Basis  
for Discussing the Question of Textual  
Meaning**

It does not look difficult to discover what textual meaning is. However if we really concern ourselves with this problem, we will encounter into a puzzle. The biggest puzzle is what kind of relation we should be concerned with when we think about textual meaning. Is the author's intention related to textual meaning? Is textual meaning merely determined by its own linguistic rules? Or is the reader's understanding the main factor in determining textual meaning? We can see that <sup>since</sup> critics and philosophers confuse the relation of textual meaning, we have many theories as to what is textual meaning.

What kind of relations should we consider here? When we focus on the problem of textual meaning, we will find that in the process of reading there are three basic factors which determine what textual meaning is. The three factors are: author, text, and reader. I think if we focus on the interrelations among author, text, and reader, only then can we really shed some light on what textual meaning should be.

What are the interrelations among author, text and reader? Basically they can be described as follows: For certain readers, the author wrote a text in which he intended his utterance to be understood by the readers. Yet, the text as an independent linguistic object, even though dependent on its author, may have its own meaning which is determined by the linguistic rules such as syntax and seman-

tics and therefore may conflict with what the author intended. The reader must somehow have contact with the text, and in terms of his own situation, can decide what is textual meaning.

Chinese critic Liu Xie points out the invention of literary work is caused by the author's emotion and then the work subsequently causes certain emotions in the reader when he reads the work. Here, Liu Xie refers to the general relations among author, text, and reader. According to him, an author writes a text only when he intends to write a text that utters his emotion and thoughts. The author also knows for whom his writing will be. For example, when Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, he intended to convey his intention to English-speaking rather than Chinese-speaking people. Similarly, when Chinese novelist Cao Xue-Qin wrote his Dream of the Red Chamber, he intended it to be understood by the Chinese. Simply, authors who write works always intend to let certain people understand what they write. In order for them to realize their aims, they should write their works for people who share the same cultural tradition and use the same language.

Now let us consider the relation between author and text. Liu Xie maintains that if a written text is incompatible to the author's will, how can we believe the text?<sup>28</sup> Some people wonder how can we know the author's intention if we read a literary work which was written a long time ago.

He argues that although we cannot go back to the time when the fiction was written, we may acknowledge the author's intention through reading the text. The text must be relevant to what the author intended to convey.

Juhl also shows that there is a logical connection between a text and the author's intention. By means of discussing allusion and irony, he argues that text certainly depends upon the author's intention. In the following example "I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each" (a sentence from Eliot's poem Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock) it is said to be an allusion to a line in a poem by Donne. But the question which Juhl provides us with is, namely, whether or not Eliot-Prufrock is alluding to certain lines makes sense only if Eliot could have alluded to them.<sup>29</sup> Clearly, Juhl's conclusion is that certain lines (1) in a literary work cannot be an allusion to certain lines (2) unless the author of lines (1) knows the latter.<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, Juhl discusses the following example:

(1) The cat is on the mat.

(2) The cat is very fat.

He thinks, if the two sentences were produced accidentally by a monkey who just randomly depresses keys on a typewriter, can we believe in the two sentences the cat in (1) is the same as the cat in (2)? He brings out the idea that we cannot take the various parts of a text (its lines, sentence, and so on) as forming a unit or as (here) belonging together, in the sense which our concept of a literary work requires, without assuming that the text represents a person's (intention) action.

To call something a poem or even a text is to say that the words, phrases, lines, or sentences of which it consists have not been arranged in this way by chance but have been produced by a person with certain kinds of intentions. In particular, the previous example shows that only if the text has been produced by a person with certain kinds of intentions can the facts in question make it more likely that the reference of "the cat" in (1) and (2) is the same--that is, only if those facts are evidence of what the author intended to express or convey. Thus to say "The reference of 'the cat' is (probably) the same in (1) and (2)" is to say "The author (probably) intended 'the cat' to refer to the same animal in (1) as in (2)". <sup>31</sup>

I agree that textual meaning must be relevant to what the author intended, and I am convinced that the text as an independent linguistic object could have meaning determined by the linguistic rules and may conflict with the author's intention.

Let us consider the following sentence in a Chinese poem: "The wood pestles were floating on blood when the vanguards transferred their allegiances." Now let us suppose the poet who intended to convey the idea that war is cruel, used the exaggerative way to utter such an idea. The real meaning the author intended to convey was not that the wood pestles were really floating on the blood.

But if we understand it only in terms of its linguistic meaning, the understanding that the wood pestles were really floating on the blood is also plausible, that is to say, it can be the true meaning of the sentence. The reason is that when we read a text, we can understand it just in terms of its linguistic meaning, which is determined by the linguistic rules such as syntax and semantics; they are fully independent of the author's intention. Thus, we will find that in the sentence there are two different meanings, one which is what the author actually intended, and another which is determined by the linguistic rules. These two meanings may conflict with each other.

As for the relation between text and reader, let us first look at Iser's view. A functional model of the text as a historical occurrence is concerned not with what a text may mean but rather with how a text affects a reader.<sup>32</sup> The important thing is that he provides the concepts of "foreground" and "background". He says:

Scheme could be regarded as a "primary code" of a text, which supplies the reader with instructions for creating a "secondary code", e.g. an "aesthetic code" in the sense of Roland Posner. The primary code serves as a model for cognitive enactment and hence as a precondition of many potential readings; it does not prescribe a fixed outlook. An individual reading enacts a "secondary code" guided by the socio-cultural code accepted by that particular reader.<sup>33</sup>

In the reading process there is no face to face situation. A text cannot adapt itself to each reader. It comes into contact with. Therefore, even in the process of reading, the reader's activity must be controlled by the text. The control cannot be as specific as in a face to face situation, as well, it cannot be as determinate as a social code which regulates social interaction. For Iser, the reading process is in fact a process of interaction between the explicit and the implicit, between revelation and concealment. What is concealed spurs the reader into action, but this action is also controlled by what is revealed; the explicit in its turn is transformed when the implicit has been brought to light.<sup>34</sup>

He maintains that the structured blank of the text stimulates the process of ideation to be performed by the reader on terms set by the text. That means the constitution of sense is not a one-side demand imposed by the text on the reader. The scheme, he writes, applying to textual states of affairs are only partial aspects of the total picture; they merely offer a reader viewpoint for creating a "horizon" of sense for the text. Sense is constituted within the reader's ideation, but it is not just the reader's fantasy. Sense is pre-structured via the text, but still needs to be created from the available aspects that cannot themselves already be what was intended by the text.<sup>35</sup>

Accordingly, the text as a primary code determines what the reader pays attention to. And then, in the reading process, the reader is also influenced by the secondary code which is guided by the socio-cultural code.

Among author, text, and reader, the text undoubtedly is the central concept. As long as we grasp the text itself, we will necessarily refer to both author and reader. And then by their interrelations, it will become clear what textual meaning should be.

For example, if we study the novelist Hugh MacLennan's life, probably it is profitable to write his biography but it is not very useful in order to know what his fiction Two Solitudes means. On the other hand, if we go to study those who read this novel, it will be a kind of research in psychology or sociology rather than knowing the textual meaning. Of course when we discuss what a literary work means, we must refer to the author and <sup>the</sup> reader. But such a consideration must be based on the text itself. For example, if we intend to know what Two Solitudes means, it will be useful to <sup>know</sup> the author's intention and <sup>the</sup> reader's interpretation of this fiction. But if we only do that, we will know nothing about the textual meaning. There is only one way we can know what the novel means, and that is to read it. In the novel, MacLennan says that "I should like to emphasize as emphatically as I can that this book is a story, and in no sense whatever documentary. All the characters are purely imaginary."<sup>36</sup> Does it mean <sup>that</sup> what MacLennan

wrote is false? If a person who intends to learn Canadian history by means which are different from reading a textbook should he give up on reading it? Obviously not. Why? After the person reads it, he will say that the novel is about "the lives of a few individuals working out the latest stage of their violent history".<sup>37</sup> Readers think it is true story about Canadian history because they interpret its meaning by means of the text itself rather than by what the author said. As Tolhurst says, no matter what an author may say about what he intended or even what he really intended, it cannot alter the meaning of what he has written. The work is a public object and the reader is as qualified to interpret it as is the author.<sup>38</sup> Thus, I think, text is the central factor which can link both author and reader.

PART II: A CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATIVE THEORIES OF  
TEXTUAL MEANING

In the following part, I would like to examine four representative theories--anti-intentionalism, communicationism, intentionalism and anti-textual individualism--in order to show that all of them fail to expound what textual meaning is since none of them considers the question in terms of the interrelations among author, text, and reader

Section 5: Criticism of Anti-Intentionalism: Its Neglect  
of the Logical Connection between Textual Meaning  
and Author's Intention

Anti-intentionalism can be summarized as follows: the author's intention is irrelevant to textual meaning, the latter being determined by the linguistic rules of the text. In other words, there is no logical connection between textual meaning and the author's intention; the textual meaning does not always appear to be what the author intended to produce, and similarly what the author intended is not necessarily what the text conveys. This theory is represented by M. C. Beardsley. His view has attracted considerable attention, and a large part of the professionally relevant literature since its appearance is explicitly concerned to defend or criticize its views.<sup>1</sup>

Beardsley maintains he only desires to argue that author's intention is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the textual meaning. His analysis is that intention is the design or plan in the author's mind. This plan has affinity with the author's attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write. Simply, intention is just a cause of the text. Beardsley further claims, to say something is a cause of something is incompatible with saying that something is a standard of something. To put another way, if one insists on the designing intellect as a cause of a poem, this is not to say that the design or intention is a standard by

which the critic can judge the worth of the poet's performance. In Beardsley's anti-intentionalism, a poem can exist only through its meaning--since its medium is words--yet, its meaning is, simply, in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring what part is intended or meant.

Beardsley thinks, when considering textual meaning, all we should do is to focus our attention on the text itself. If we want to find out what the author's intention is, we should inquire into his/her biographical background because intention as a cause of the text is different from the meaning of the text as a standard of judging the text. The text itself is the only evidence of what it means. Even though sometimes the author's report of what his work is intended to mean conflicts with the evidence of the text itself, we should acknowledge that the displayed evidence of the text itself must be what the author really meant, no matter what the author says later. Therefore, textual meaning is irrelevant to the author's intention and textual meaning may also conflict with what the author says what his intention is. According to anti-intentionalism, the irrelevance of the author's intention can be revealed in that we find textual meaning directly by reading or listening and that we discover the author's intention only by biographical inquiry: through letters, diaries, workbooks, or, if the author is alive, by asking him.

Beardsley further discusses what the distinction is

between internal and external evidence of textual meaning. The distinction, he explains, is that internal evidence is public and is discovered through the semantics and syntax of a text, through our habitual knowledge of the language, through grammars, dictionaries and all the literature which is the source of dictionaries, and, in general, through all that makes a language and culture. External evidence is private or idiosyncratic and is not a part of the work as a linguistic fact because it consists of revelation about the author's intention.<sup>2</sup>

Beardsley cites J. Donne's poem to expound upon his view. In Donne's poem, there is the following stanza:

Moving of the earth brings harmes and fears  
Men reckon what it did and meant,  
But trepidation of the spheares  
Though greater far, is innocent.<sup>3</sup>

Some critics say in this stanza that Donne expresses the feeling that he "exhorts his love to quietness and calm".<sup>4</sup> It means that Donne sees the moving of the earth as a celestial motion, which is, for him, a new astronomical principle, and by such a metaphor he intends to utter his certain willing of quietness. However, another says that "moving of the earth" means a fierce motion, for example, an earthquake, rather than the celestial motion. Which one is the plausible interpretation? People who hold the view that the meaning is celestial motion, assert that, in various works, Donne shows his familiarity with Kepler's De Stella Nova, with Galileo's Siderius Nuncius.

with William Gilbert's De Magnete, and with Clavius' commentary on the De Sphaera of Sacrobosco. That is to say, by such biographical inquiry, they affirm that the real meaning of "moving of the earth" is "celestial motion". People who hold the view that the meaning is "fierce motion" claim that when they read such a sentence they believe that it means that the fierce motion is like an earthquake. According to Beardsley, the only acceptable textual meaning must be that which we get by directly reading the text rather than by doing biographical inquiry. Therefore, we can say that the meaning of "moving of the earth" can plausibly be provided as a "fierce motion".

In short, Beardsley suggests that the text itself is the sole determinant of textual meaning and the authorial intention is not useful evidence for interpretation. As Tolhurst maintains, the anti-intentionalists' basic position is that a text is a piece of language in which meaning is determined by linguistic rules independently of what an author might have intended.<sup>5</sup>

Beardsley correctly shows how important the text itself is. According to him, an interpretation of a text must be based on the text itself rather than the biographical inquiry about the author's intention. For example, consider the following sentence:

"The wood pestles were floating on blood  
When the vanguards transferred their allegiances."

By directly reading it, it is not hard to understand that what it means is that in the cruel fight the soldiers' blood converged upon a river to float the wood pestles. But someone might argue that what the author really intended to convey was not that the dead soldiers' blood truly converged upon a river to float the wood pestles, but, rather, to allude to how cruel the war was. Nevertheless, according to Beardsley, whereas a poet's notes tend to seem to justify themselves as external indexes to the author's intention, they ought to be judged like any other parts of a composition i. e. the verbal arrangement special to a particular context, and, when so judged, their reality as parts of the poem, or their imaginative integration with the rest of the poem, may come into question.<sup>6</sup> There is another case where in the author often gives a report about what he really meant, which conflicts with the evidence of the text itself. In this instance, Beardsley claims that if a reader finds irony in a text, he should conclude that it is ironic, no matter what the author says.

We note that Beardsley rightly shows how important the text itself is in determining textual meaning. In the relation between author and text, even though the author writes the text, his intention is only one thing and the linguistic rules such as syntax and semantics are another thing, and are independent of the author's intention, though they are related to it. That means the author can use certain language to allude to or to imply something, but that the language the

author used may hold certain meanings which conflict with the author's intention.

Yet, even though Beardsley correctly explains the importance of the text itself in determining textual meaning, he meanwhile incorrectly denies the logical connection between the author's intention and the linguistic meaning of the text

Beardsley cites allusions in literature to show how the author's intention is irrelevant to textual meaning. The example he uses is Eliot's poem Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock. There is one sentence in the poem which is, "I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each", which, says Beardsley, bears a certain resemblance to a line in a song by J. Donne "Teach me to hear mermaids singing". So, Beardsley asks: Is Eliot's line an allusion to Donne's? According to his suggestion, the way of poetic analysis and exegesis is the true and objective way of interpretation, but the way of biographical inquiry is not acceptable. Therefore, whether or not Eliot's line is an allusion to Donne's should only depend on the sentence itself, namely, if we discover there is an allusion in the sentence, we can draw that it is allusive, no matter what Eliot himself says or what we find out by doing the biographical inquiry. Beardsley clearly indicates:

We shall not here weight the probabilities--whether Eliot would answer that he meant nothing at all, had nothing at all in mind--a sufficiently good answer to such a question--or in an unguarded moment might

furnish a clear and, within its limit, irrefutable answer. Our point is that such an answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem "Prufrock"; it would not be a critical inquiry. Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way. Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle.<sup>7</sup>

However, on the contrary, Juhl shows that the relevance of an author's intention to the textual meaning is obvious in the case of allusion. His discussion about how the author's intention is relevant to the textual meaning in allusion can be found in Part III where I will discuss the relation between author and text. I maintain that there must be a logical connection between the author's intention and textual meaning.

Let us consider an example to understand why the author's intention is relevant to textual meaning. In Sylvia Plath's poem The Arrival of the Bee Box, there is a stanza:

They might ignore me immediately

In my moon suit and funeral veil.

I am no source of honey

So why should they turn on me?

Tomorrow I will be sweet God, I will set them free.<sup>8</sup>

It might be said that the sentence "In my moon suit and funeral veil" is just an allusion which Plath uses it to refer to the beekeeper's suit and veil. This is one kind of interpretation about this sentence. But, according to Beardsley, this

sentence can also be interpreted so that the beekeeper really wears the moon suit and funeral veil which we understand by means of reading the sentence itself.

I will call the author's intention, which in this example is identical with the beekeeper's suit and veil, as  $M_1$ , and the linguistic meaning of the sentence, which is the beekeeper wearing the moon suit and funeral veil, as  $M_2$ . My claim is that it does not matter whether a reader accepts  $M_1$  or  $M_2$ , both  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  must be relevant to the author's intention. Of course, this is not to say that relevance is identical with determination; that is, the claim that the author's intention is relevant to the textual meaning is not to claim that the author's intention determines the textual meaning. Such relevance, I think, can be seen in the following way. Any text may hold that  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  is always given or written by an author who has the specific intention to write it, even though the author's specific intention may fail to be conveyed by  $M_2$ . Therefore, in this sense,  $M_2$  obviously is relevant to the author's intention but it may conflict with it.

Section 6: Criticism of Communicationalism: Indetermination  
of Textual Meaning with Respect to the Interpretation  
of a Text

Simply speaking, communicationalism claims that textual meaning must go beyond the author's meaning because textual meaning is determined in part by the tradition<sup>al</sup> situation of the reader.

Gadamer, whose theory is an instance of communicationalism, states that traditional 19th century hermeneutics is only concerned with the knowing relation to a text and such a relation is also thought to belong to the methodology. That is, in accordance with traditional hermeneutical theory, knowing is only conceived as a subjective process of man. On the contrary, Gadamer's hermeneutics focuses on the problem of the understanding relation to a text. Is there a radical difference between knowing and understanding? Gadamer thinks that there is. For example, the following question can be raised: Do you know the poem? "Knowing" the poem can be seen in the sense of being able to recite it; as Hoy says, the knowing relation suggests that two things are to be brought together, already specifying a distance and a distinctness between the text and the reader; the text is posited as an object existing at a distance from a subjective consciousness.<sup>9</sup> The question, though, Do you understand this poem? is not

tantamount to the first question and implies something more than knowing.

To know something is to be able to repeat it without comprehension. To understand something means, rather, to comprehend it and to be able to explain it. Therefore, in understanding something, interpretation is necessarily required. In other words, understanding includes interpretation. This is a principle in communicationalism. In it, the separation of understanding and interpretation is only an abstraction. Palmer points out, in Gadamer's communicationalism, understanding is not conceived as a subjective process of man over and against an object but the way of being of man himself.<sup>10</sup>

As we know, an interpretation of something is given by an interpreter to explain what the meaning of the thing is. In other words, if we consider an interpretation, we must also consider the interpreter's case. Gadamer holds the same idea. He suggests that an interpretation of a text should not be restricted to what the author intended because a text is not an expression of the subjectivity of the author; but rather it comes into a real existence only in a dialogue of the interpreter with the text.

According to Gadamer, Palmer maintains:

the experience of a work of art transcends every subjective horizon of interpretation, both that of the artist and that of the perceiver. For this reason, "the mens auctoris is not a possible measure

of the meaning of a work. Indeed, to speak about a work-in-itself, cut off from its ever renewed reality as it comes to stand in experience, is to take a very abstract view.<sup>11</sup> The decisive thing is neither the author's intention, nor the work as a thing in itself outside history, but the "what" that comes repeatedly to stand in historical encounters.<sup>12</sup>

In communicationalism, there is the key notion of "tradition", by which Gadamer draws his own perspective about what textual meaning is.

Like Heidegger, Gadamer maintains that we understand a given text not with an empty consciousness temporarily filled with the present situation, but rather, with an already established way of seeing and certain ideational "preconceptions".<sup>13</sup> He asserts that there is no pure understanding of historical text without reference to the present, and the present is in fact seen always through the way of seeing bequeathed from past. In terms of this principle, in the communication between a text and reader, meaning of a past text cannot be seen solely according to itself. Rather, it is seen in terms of the questions put to it from the present. That is, a literary work is not interpreted by the reader without preconceptions.

How do the readers get their preconceptions? Gadamer says they get them from the tradition in which the readers stand. What is "tradition"? When we normally use this term, we mean

a certain culture that we know and live in, or generally speaking, which determines the way of action and thinking of people who live in a certain society. A simple example is, as we know, that in Europe, people are accustomed to use a knife, fork and spoon when they have a meal. However, in China, people always use chopsticks. Why do they have such different customs? The answer simply is: they have different traditions.

Of course the notion of tradition is very widely accepted. Yet, for Gadamer, the notion of tradition is accepted only in the language. According to him, tradition is not simply an occurrence that one recognizes through experience and learns to control, but is rather language, which is to say it speaks from itself like "thou".<sup>14</sup> Tradition, far from being an object, is more like the other person in a dialogue. Gadamer's notion of tradition is that it is not the outcome of method or deliberate self-conscious design, as Ermarth points out, but is rather the outcome of language. We understand on the basis of pre-judgment, since prior to any comprehending there is a "pre-handing" which is not the work of subjective consciousness but rather of the tradition of language. We do not preside over or control tradition any more than we do language. According to Ermarth, it is in this sense that we belong to history. Gadamer also claims that, in truth, history does not belong to us, rather we belong to history.

In accordance with Gadamer, tradition is like the

relation between "thou and I" in a dialogue. Hoy reveals that understanding is always a form of dialogue: it is a language event in which communication takes place. Hermeneutical understanding is a language phenomenon in the further sense that the cultural tradition is itself present largely as "language" and often as written texts. To interpret these texts is to come into dialogue with them.<sup>15</sup> Obviously, in Gadamer's communicationalism, textual meaning is co-determined by the traditional situation of the reader and by the whole objective course of history rather than only by the author's intention. For communicationalism, the meaning of a text poses a question to him in his particular historical situation and he approaches the text with given expectations. This shows that Gadamer does not hesitate to state that the context of the interpretation of the immanent text is the interpreter's context.

Since Gadamer believes that textual meaning does not merely depend upon the author and his original public and it is always co-determined by the historical situation of the interpreter, he concludes that textual meaning surpasses its author not occasionally but always. Thus, understanding is in fact not a reproductive procedure, but rather a productive one.<sup>16</sup>

However, Palmer says:

Is what we work with in the process of reconstruction really what we label and search for as the

"meaning" of the work? Is understanding rightly determined when we strive to see in it a second creation exactly like that of the original--a re-creation? Obviously not, for the meaning of a work depends on what questions we are asking in the present. "Restoration," says Gadamer, "if made central in hermeneutics, is no less absurd than all effort to restore and revive life gone forever."<sup>17</sup> Integration, not restoration, is the true task of hermeneutics.<sup>18</sup>

What does "re-creation" mean? According to Gadamer, understanding is not a reproductive procedure but a productive one. The reason is that the tradition influences not only the author who wrote the text but also the reader who interprets the text. But, Gadamer thinks, such a process is not a re-creative process because the interpretation of the text is in fact not a restoration but rather an integration. This is what the notion of "re-creation" means. Integration implies that the textual meaning is not restricted to only the author's meaning but always goes beyond it, and integrates with what the interpreter understands in terms of his own historical situation.

Consequently, textual meaning is no longer seen to be determinate but rather indeterminate, because it is not determined by the author's meaning but, in a sense, by the widespread cultural tradition of the interpreter. Textual meaning is no longer limited to the author's meaning but becomes, in a sense, something integrated by the interpreter with the text. It of course goes beyond the author's meaning.

However, if we accept communicationism--which holds that textual meaning must go beyond the author's meaning and is co-determined by the traditional situation of the interpreter--then we will inevitably face the following problem: there is never any misunderstanding of a literary work. Juhl maintains that Gadamer is hard-pressed to make sense of the notion of misunderstanding. Even though Gadamer thinks a reader can misunderstand a text only in the sense in which his interpretation is inconsistent with his explanation of the relevant facts, such explanation is inadequate.

There are two reasons, Juhl suggests, for the reader misunderstanding a text. One is that it is possible that not everyone will understand perfectly what a text means; another is that even if a reader were not able to find an interpretation of the relevant fact under which his interpretation of the text would be highly likely, Gadamer could not say that to hold the interpretation would be to misunderstand the text, since another reader might find the required interpretation of the relevant facts.

Furthermore, Hirsch points out, since textual meaning is shared by both author and reader, and textual meaning must go beyond its author, textual meaning is a never-exhausted array of possible meaning lying in wait for a never-ending array of interpreters.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, a literary work in fact has never any determinate meaning. Accordingly, since textual meaning is not determined until a reader "interpret" it, there is no

interpretation at all. We know that an interpretation means an explanation of the meaning of a text. If we say such interpretation actually is integration rather than explanation, why do we still hold that the reader's integration of textual meaning is the explanation of textual meaning? Thus, we must say in communicationalism there is no interpretation of textual meaning, but only integration of textual meaning or a reader's own input of textual meaning.

The reason, I suppose, is that Gadamer incorrectly ignores the determination of the text itself and one-sidedly stresses the communication between text and reader. Truly, Gadamer suggests that the real meaning of a text as it addresses the interpreter does not just depend on the occasional factors which characterize the author and his original public. For it is also always co-determined by the historical situation of the interpreter and thus by the whole of the objective course of history.<sup>20</sup> Hoy also reveals that it would be a mistake to misconstrue Gadamer's point as implying that the interpreter merely reads his own meaning into the text or that he only understands the textual meaning for him and not in itself.<sup>21</sup> All of the evidence shows that what Gadamer emphasizes is the communication between text and reader. Yet it is not easy to find out that Gadamer affirms the determination of the text. In communicationalism, the text as an object of hermeneutics is only concerned to be that to which it is such an object. He indicates that the "meaning" of such a text is

not motivated by an occasion, but, on the contrary, claims to be understandable "anytime", that is, to be an answer always, and that means inevitably also to raise the question to which the text is an answer.<sup>22</sup> Also he claims that when we say that the work of art says something to us and that it thus belongs to the matrix of things we have to understand, our assertion is not a metaphor, but has a valid and demonstrable meaning.<sup>23</sup> It is quite clear for him that the important thing is to consider how the reader's asseertion can become a valid meaning in the communication between text and reader, rather than how the text determines the reader to interpret its meaning.

If the communication between text and reader is to be successful, clearly the reader's activity must be controlled in a certain way by the text. The control of text is not just to say something to the reader but to provide or guide the reader to understand its meaning just by means of the text itself. I would claim that even though the reader's traditional situation influences his understanding, his interpretation of textual meaning is still certainly governed by the text itself. Therefore, the reader's interpretation of the text does not necessarily surpass the meaning in the text, no matter how the reader's traditional situation influences his understanding.

Section 7: Criticism of Intentionalism: Conflicts between  
Textual meaning and Author's Intention

Intentionalism, which is opposed to anti-intentionalism, consists in saying that what a text says is that it has to represent someone's meaning--if not the author's, then the critic's. Its principle is that textual meaning is what the author intended.

Intentionalists such as Hirsch attack anti-intentionalism on the grounds that if a text means what it says, then it means nothing in particular. Its saying has no determinate existence but must be the saying of the author or a reader. The text does not exist even as a sequence of words until it is construed; until then, it is merely a sequence of signs.<sup>24</sup> According to anti-intentionalism, the author's intention is only a design or plan in his mind; that is to say, intention is only conceived as mental, and therefore private. Textual meaning can thus be discovered only by the syntax and semantics of the text and it is irrelevant to the author's intention. On the contrary, Hirsch maintains that textual meaning is not only relevant to the author's intention but more importantly is determined by the author's intention, because, he says, textual meaning must represent someone's meaning and it is impossible to say that a text means something which no one meant.

Naturally, the author's desire to communicate a particular meaning is not necessarily the same as his success in doing so. For example, a poet intends in a four-line poem to convey a sense of desolation, but what he manages to convey to some readers is a sense that the sea is wet, to others that twilight is approaching. Hirsch claims that even the poet's intention to convey desolation is not identical with his stylistic effectiveness in doing so, e.g. the only universally valid meaning of the poem is still the sense of desolation. The reason is that Hirsch believes that textual meaning is different from the significance of textual meaning.

Meaning, according to Hirsch, is that which is represented by a text and it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence. Meaning is what the signs represent, but the signs are identical with what the author intended to convey. Significance names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, or indeed anything imaginable. Simply speaking, significance is how a reader thinks about the meaning. Hirsch says that authors will obviously in the course of time tend to view their own works in different contexts. Clearly what changes for them is not the meaning of the work, but rather their relationship to that meaning. Significance always implies a relationship, and one constant, unchanging pole of that relationship is what the text means. Failure to consider this simple and essential distinction has been the source of enormous confusion in hermeneutic theory.<sup>25</sup>

In this sense, textual meaning as the verbal meaning of a text is always determinate and unchangeable. Readers may have different responses to a text because they may have different significances when they read the text. Hirsch points out that it is true that the significance of a text for one person is not altogether the same as for another, because the men themselves and therefore their personal relationships to a particular verbal meaning are different.<sup>26</sup> According to intentionalists, however, it does not matter that readers have different responses to the same text, their responses cannot alter the character of the verbal meaning at all.

Verbal meaning is whatever someone has willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs and which can be conveyed by means of those linguistic signs.<sup>27</sup> Evidently, this is to say, verbal meaning is something the author intended to convey. Since such verbal meaning, in Hirsch's intentionalism, must be determinate and reproducible, he suggests that if a meaning can change its identity and in fact does, then we have no norm for judging whether we are encountering the real meaning in a changed form or some spurious meaning that is pretending to be the one we seek.<sup>28</sup> Thus, Hirsch here raises a criterion for the interpretation of textual meaning which, for him, is only the meaning that is identical with the author's intention. Hirsch says that once it is admitted that a meaning can change its characteristics, then there is

no way of finding the true Cinderella among all the contenders. There is no dependable glass slipper we can use as a test, since the old slipper will no longer fit the new Cinderella.<sup>29</sup> Undoubtedly, for Hirsch, the "dependable glass slipper" must be the determinate verbal meaning of a text.

Furthermore, Hirsch suggests that any determinate verbal meaning requires a determining will, which he observes is the following principle: Meaning must represent someone's meaning-- if not the author's, then the critic's. Thus, he necessarily infers that verbal meaning as textual meaning is identical with the author's intention, not occasionally, but always.

Intention, we know, is what the author wanted to project before he began to create his artwork. Yet intention in Hirsch's intentionalism is seen as a linguistic term, rather than a psychological term, which means the verbal meaning is essentially shareable. Hirsch emphasizes that since verbal meaning is an intentional object and it is like any other meaning, we can infer that an unlimited number of different intentional acts can intend the same verbal meaning.<sup>30</sup> Notice that here Hirsch uses the term "intentional act", which is clearly defined as the author's act rather than <sup>the</sup> reader's. Thus, we can have no doubt that Hirsch's conclusion is that textual meaning must be the author's intention.

Accordingly, Hirsch criticizes the view that textual meaning may be independent of the author's intention and may be impersonal and autonomous. He claims that if we say text

means only what it says, then it means nothing in particular, because any word sequence can, under the conventions of language, legitimately represent more than one complex of meaning. For example, the sentence "I am going to town today", can be held in different senses by the simple device of placing a strong emphasis on any of the six different words. A word sequence, Hirsch supposes, means nothing in particular until someone either means something by it or understands something from it. Hirsch also says a text does not exist even as a sequence of words until it is construed. If we reject this view, then no interpretation can possibly correspond to the textual meaning, because we do not have the glass slipper to fit the true Cinderella, which means textual meaning will never be determinable.

Sometimes Hirsch also claims that textual meaning might present the critic's meaning and not necessarily the author's. He believes that if the best meaning of a text were not the author's, then it would have to be the critic's: at least, it must be someone's. In that case, the critic should be seen as the author of the best meaning of the text. In short, textual meaning must represent someone's intention, though it makes no difference whether it is the author's or the reader's.

Accordingly, Hirsch thinks the context itself cannot determine the textual meaning, because context itself is also determined, first by an author, then through construction by an interpreter. Hirsch knows that verbal meaning is not the same

as the "content" of which an author, quite often, is conscious. But, he thinks, it does not really contradict his principle where in textual meaning is what the author intended, because he admits, an author almost always means more than he is aware of meaning and he cannot explicitly pay attention to all the aspects of his meaning.

Clearly, Hirsch denies that the text itself has the possibility of holding its own meaning, which may conflict with what the author intended. But I doubt that this is right.

We know Hirsch's intentionalism<sup>in</sup>, which context cannot determine textual meaning<sup>is</sup> based on the idea that context itself is always determined by the author. But I argue that context may have its own meaning which is not determined by the author but rather is determined by the linguistic rules of context itself and which may also conflict with the author's intention. What I am discussing is not the notion of significance, by which Hirsch means the relation between a reader and the textual meaning. What I am talking about is that the verbal meaning itself may involve two meanings. One is what the author intended to convey and another is what the context itself holds in terms of its linguistic rules. For example, in the sentence "the wood pestles were floating on blood when the vanguards transferred their allegiances", we will say that what the author intended to convey might be that it was a cruel war in which a lot of soldiers died, but that he does not really mean that the soldiers' blood was like a river. Nevertheless, readers

who know English might understand that what the sentence really means is that the soldiers' blood converged to a river which floated a lot of the wood pestles. The reason for this kind of understanding is simply that the linguistic meaning is always independent of the author who uses them to convey his intention. Since this is so, we have to admit that a text may have two different meanings. One is determined by the author's intention and another is determined by the linguistic rules of the text itself, and even though both meanings have the same linguistic form, they may conflict with each other.

Obviously, I do not deny that any context must be provided by the author and the author believes he indeed conveys his intention by means of this context. What I am arguing is only that besides the fact that the linguistic rules are independent of the author's usage and have its own regulations, what the author wrote may be understood as something which is incompatible with the author's intention, but it is identical with the linguistic meaning of the context itself. On this basis, I conclude that even though textual meaning is relevant to the author's intention, it may not be identical with what the author intended to convey.

Another problem in intentionalism is the concern that the reader has little role to determine textual meaning. All he should do is read the text and find what the author intended to convey. Of course, this is provided for by intentionalist's principle, which holds that the author's intention is the sole

criterion of interpretation of textual meaning. Therefore, when Hirsch discusses textual meaning, except when he talks about the significance which is concerned with the relation between textual meaning and reader, he does not think it is important to consider whether the reader has certain roles in determining textual meaning.

Let us go back to this sentence:

The wood pestles were floating on blood


When the Vanguard's transferred their allegiances.

If we assume that the author's intention is that he just intended to convey how cruel the war was, rather really meaning that the dead soldiers' blood was like a river, then when we understand it as another meaning which is identical with its linguistic meaning, how do we know what the textual meaning is? Put another way, the verbal meaning of this sentence involves both implicit meaning and explicit meaning.<sup>31</sup> So-called implicit meaning is the meaning which is identical with what the author intended to convey. Explicit meaning is the meaning which is named as the linguistic meaning of the context. So, now, when we see a context holds both implicit and explicit meaning, what can we do? According to Hirsch, we just simply find out what it is that the author really means. But in many cases, in practice, it does not work out this way, and that is because it is plausible for readers to understand the textual meaning by means of the explicit meaning of the text, and also easily to do such. Therefore, to accept intentionalism

is not to solve the problem of what textual meaning is.

Probably someone will recommend that we turn to anti-intentionalism in which the anti-intentionalist prefers the explicit meaning as the textual meaning. But the problem is still there because anti-intentionalism fully denies that the author's intention is relevant to the textual meaning, namely, it denies that the implicit meaning is textual meaning. This is a misunderstanding. For example, in the sentence "the wood pestles were floating on blood when the vanguards transferred their allegiances", according to anti-intentionalists, only the meaning which is identical with the linguistic meaning of this sentence can be seen as the textual meaning, that is, the textual meaning is that the dead soldiers' blood really converged to a river which floated the wood pestles. Rather, the implicit meaning, i.e. the author's intention, which we probably find by the biographical inquiry, is, according to anti-intentionalists, not important and we should forget it. But the problem is that, if we do so, we will be asked if the meaning of the sentence is not related to the author's intention at all? If we answer that of course it is related to the author's intention--because the author believes that by means of this sentence he indeed conveys his intention--we must then admit that the meaning of the sentence truly also involves the implicit meaning.

Now that we have established that a text may involve both explicit meaning and implicit meaning, and that both



of them also may conflict with each other, we have only one recourse with which to get the determinate textual meaning, and that is to see how the reader decides what textual meaning is. Unfortunately, both Beardsley and Hirsch ignore it.

The role of the reader in determining textual meaning is evident in that, if a text always holds both implicit meaning and explicit meaning (whether they are identical or conflict), only the reader who interprets the text can decide whether textual meaning should be the implicit meaning or the explicit meaning. What I am saying is that the reader decides, rather than produces, what the textual meaning is. Quite a lot of critics misunderstand that the reader's role in determining textual meaning is to reconstrue the textual meaning. For example, Iser claims that the textual meaning must be constituted by readers in accord with their socio-cultural codes. For Iser, to constitute textual meaning is to produce textual meaning. In my opinion, when we read a text, we in fact do not produce any textual meaning, though in terms of our socio-cultural codes we may choose what the textual meaning is which we believe it should be. For example, we know that the sentence "the wood pestles were floating on blood when the vanguards transferred their allegiances" involves two incompatible meanings. One is what the author intended to convey and another is the linguistic meaning which the sentence holds. The textual meaning cannot be obviously determined until a reader reads it, when he, in

terms of his own socio-cultural code, decides either the implicit meaning is the textual meaning or the explicit meaning is the textual meaning.

Section 8: Criticism of Anti-Textual Individuationism:  
Neglect of the Reader's Role in Determining  
Textual Meaning

Now let us consider another version of the argument of what textual meaning is which is presented by W. Tolhurst. His theory can be called anti-textual individuationism, and it, generally speaking, holds that textual meaning is the "utterance meaning" which is relevant to what the author intended, but is not identical with the author's intention. He himself has pointed out, "I shall show that an author's intention, although relevant to a determination of textual meaning, does not constitute that meaning as a matter of necessity." 32

In Tolhurst's opinion, neither intentionalism nor anti-intentionalism correctly answer the question of what textual meaning is, although they oppose each other. Yet, it seems to Tolhurst that if we mix both intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, we will plausibly solve the problem.

As we have seen, anti-intentionalists take a text to be a sequence of words of which meaning is solely determined by the linguistic rules, and the authorial intention is not a legitimate source of evidence for interpretation. On the contrary, intentionalists suggest that a text is a particular use of word sequence wherein meaning is identical with the author's intention. But Tolhurst claims that these conceptions

of what a text is have not been effectively stated and supported by argument.<sup>33</sup>

Tolhurst refers to anti-intentionalism as "the theory of textual individuationism". It is, he believes, wrong to think, as anti-intentionalists do, that a text must be understood as a word sequence in which meaning and identity are solely a function of a set of linguistic rules. Rather, according to Tolhurst, a text must be viewed as an utterance or particular use of a word sequence in which meaning and identity are defined in part by the context in which it has been produced. He addresses the notion that textual meaning is properly a kind of utterance meaning and that utterance meaning is in part determined by the meaning of the word sequence uttered and in part by the context of discourse in which it is uttered, a context which may well include the author's intention.<sup>34</sup>

Before inquiring further into his view, let us first familiarize ourselves with some concepts he raises in his discussion. I would like to consider the following three concepts: "utterer's meaning", "utterance meaning" and "word sequence meaning". According to him, utterer's meaning is identical with authorial intention. Word sequence meaning is the meaning or meanings of the set of words taken by themselves apart from any actual use of those words. Utterance meaning is the meaning of the set of words as used by an author on a certain occasion. The relations among these

three concepts are described by Tolhurst as follows: an utterance is defined as a particular occasion of a string of words, and word sequence is used to refer to the strings of words used to make an utterance. Utterer's meaning is just whatever an utterer means by his use of a linguistic token. Because of these distinctions, Tolhurst says, we cannot interchange them with each other. The important thing is that Tolhurst discriminates between the meaning of "utterer's meaning" from the "utterance meaning". He denotes that it might be thought that "utterer's meaning" is the same as "utterance meaning", but the two must not be conflated.<sup>35</sup> Although people on the whole do manage to write and say what they intend to mean, the identity between what a person intends by his utterance and what that utterance means is not a necessary identity.

For instance, we often talk about two kinds of error in daily life that everyone commits, which are called a "slip of the tongue" and a "slip of the pen". Both errors occur in the case in which one wishes to say or write a certain thing but uses the wrong word. For example, when the American president Ronald Reagan had a state banquet to welcome the Honduran president, Mr. Reagan said to his guest that he welcomes the Guatemalan president to visit the United States. Mr. Reagan then realized his mistake and he explained that it was because next month he would be visiting Guatemala.

Another famous example given by Freud is the one at a festivity in honour of the marriage of a child of H. Helmholtz with a child of the well-known inventor and captain of

industry, W. Siemens, a physiologist, Dubois-Reymond was asked to speak. When he ended his speech with a toast, he said "Success to the new partnership, Siemens and Halske!" Actually, he wanted to say "Siemens and Helmholtz", but he slipped because he associated the former coupling with "Siemens and Halske", who were really well known.

According to the attention theory of error, one who makes a slip of the tongue or pen could be (1) tired or unwilling (2) excited; and (3) concentrating on something else. Although Freud believes that the reason for a slip of the tongue or a slip of the pen is that errors result from the mutual interference of two different intentions, of which one may be called the intention interfered with, and the other the interfering tendency,<sup>36</sup> we can still conclude that what the speaker said is not identical with what he intended to convey on the occasion.

Since there is such a phenomenon as a slip of the tongue, Tolhurst rightly discriminates utterer's meaning, which is identical with the author's intention, from utterance meaning, which is a string of words used by the utterer on a particular occasion, and in which the author's intention may not be identical with the set of words in the actual utterance, just like the slip of the tongue. Therefore, Tolhurst concludes that utterer's meaning is not always utterance meaning.

Tolhurst then turns to consider what textual meaning should be. Since he claims that utterance itself may mean

something which is different from utterer's meaning, he rejects the notion that utterer's meaning is identical with textual meaning. Yet Tolhurst especially points out that to deny that the utterer's meaning is textual meaning is not to say that utterer's meaning is irrelevant to a determination of textual meaning. It is just to say that it is not identical with textual meaning. In this sense, Tolhurst seems not to deny the value of intentionalism, and it is obvious that he disagrees with the anti-intentionalists' explanation of textual meaning, which maintains that textual meaning is irrelevant to the utterer's meaning.

For Tolhurst, utterance meaning is textual meaning and it must be relevant to utterer's meaning. Everybody can understand that, if we agree that an utterance is a set of words which is given by an author to convey certain things, the utterance meaning is necessarily relevant to its author. Therefore, Tolhurst says, there is little trouble in viewing a text as an utterance when the text is the direct production of a language user. He cites Schiffer's view to support his consideration. Schiffer indicates,

S meant that p by (or in) uttering x iff for some possible state of affairs E, which is sufficient for a certain audience A's recognizing from S's uttering x that S uttered x intending

- (1) to produce the activated belief that p
- (2) A's recognition of S's intention (I) to function as part of A's reason for acquiring the

activated belief that p  
 (3) to realize E,  
 S uttered x intending to realize E.<sup>37</sup>

Thus, says Tolhurst, understanding what a person means by an utterance is essentially a matter of correctly discerning what he intended by it. Therefore, we see that when Tolhurst discusses the problem of textual meaning, he always emphasizes that textual meaning is relevant to the author's intention, even though he admits that textual meaning is not identical with what the author intended.

But it is quite clear that Tolhurst thinks that intentionalism fails to explain why the author may fail to utter what he intended to convey. In this sense, he turns toward anti-intentionalism. Like Beardsley, Tolhurst also admits that a word sequence possesses certain properties, its meaning or meanings, which enable it to be used to perform certain tasks. Just as we can use a hammer to perform any one of a number of tasks, so too we may be able to use a given word sequence to make a number of different utterances.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, no matter what an author says about what he intended or even what he indeed intended, it is impossible to alter the meaning of what he has written. The example is that we sometimes fail to utter what we intend to convey, like a slip of the tongue or pen.

Let us sum up Tolhurst's anti-textual individualism. According to him, an author intends to convey a certain meaning

in his text, but he may fail to do so. Yet we must admit that even though the author fails to convey what he intends in the text, textual meaning is still relevant to the author's intention. Therefore, textual meaning is understood as something which is relevant to its author, but is not identical with its author. Now we can understand how Tolhurst's anti-textual individualism mixes intentionalism and anti-intentionalism.

However, the problem is that since Tolhurst in fact adopts both intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, it is inevitable that he makes the same mistake as intentionalism and anti-intentionalism do. That is, Tolhurst, like Hirsch and Beardsley, ignores the reader's role in determining textual meaning.

Perhaps someone could say that Tolhurst actually does not ignore the reader's importance in his theory. When Tolhurst discusses textual meaning, he also suggests that the reader has a role in justifying the utterance meaning as the hypothesis of utterer's meaning.<sup>39</sup> According to him, the relation between textual meaning and the reader can be described as how textual meaning should be understood by the reader. For him, the reader understands textual meaning always as the utterer's meaning. That is to say, when a reader reads a text, he just understands the utterance meaning as the utterer's meaning, no matter whether the utterance meaning in fact is incompatible with the utterer's meaning. Actually, the reader's role in determining textual meaning in Tolhurst's

anti-textual individualism is nothing.

If we accept Tolhurst's perspective, we will inevitably puzzle over the following question, which is, if anti-textual individualism is right, is utterance meaning determinable without the reader's determination? Consequently, we find, anti-textual individualism has no way to avoid the implication that, in his theory, utterance meaning is indeterminable. We know that Tolhurst admits that utterance meaning may conflict with what the author intended to convey and may also be identical with the utterer's meaning (of course, the author does not always fail to convey his intention by means of his utterance). Thus, when we read an utterance, we will probably find two cases in the same utterance. One can be seen to conflict with the author's intention, but, on the contrary, another can be seen to be the author's intention, like the allusion or irony. What I am trying to say is an utterance may involve two different meanings. If we ignore that the reader has a role in determining what the utterance meaning exactly is, utterance meaning is for ever indeterminable.

For example, Freud has spoken of an example in which a man managed, by asserting himself to be a bacteriologist, to obtain cultures of highly dangerous disease-germs from scientific institutions, and then used them for the purpose of doing away in this most modern fashion with people connected with him. The man once complained to the authorities of one

of those institutions about the ineffectiveness of the cultures sent him but committed a slip of the pen and, instead of the words "in my experiments on mice and guinea-pigs", the words "in my experiments on people" were plainly legible.<sup>40</sup>

Of course, the ordinary letter is different from a literary work, but no one can deny that their principle is the same. Therefore, in a literary work, the author can also make a mistake (if we can call it a mistake). Thus, when we read the utterance, we will be blank, because it could be (1) a slip of the pen, or (2) a true statement, or (3) an allusion, or irony, of the author. Thus, textual meaning only depends upon the reader who reads it making a possible choice. As we have mentioned before, the choice made is controlled by the reader's own socio-cultural code, in which someone probably thinks it is a slip of the pen, and others think it is just an allusion or even a true statement. In short, the reader's role in determining textual meaning cannot be ignored.

CONCLUSION:

Now let us briefly sum up these four representative theories I have chosen to explore. Anti-intentionalism pays more attention to the linguistic rules of the text. It thinks that textual meaning is only determined by the linguistic rule of the text which is irrelevant to the author's intention. But it incorrectly denies the importance of the author's intention in determining textual meaning.

Communicationalism claims that textual meaning is shared by the author and the reader. It notices the important role of the historical situation of the reader in determining textual meaning. But it ignores the fact that the text itself is also an important factor in determining textual meaning.

Intentionalism contends that textual meaning is determined by the author's intention. It emphasizes the relation of the author and the text, but it seems to ignore the importance of the text itself as well as the reader's role in determining textual meaning.

Anti-textual individualism holds that textual meaning is the utterance meaning and is relevant to the author's intention. It seems to overcome the difficulties of anti-intentionalism and intentionalism. However, it ignores the key role of the reader in determining textual meaning.

Through such discussion, it is not hard to find that the common mistake is that, in these four theories, no one

considers the problem of what is textual meaning fully in terms of the interrelations among author, text, and reader.

Anti-intentionalism persistently asserts that what a text means does not logically follow what the author intends to convey, and, conversely, what the author intends to mean does not necessarily follow what the text means. Accordingly, although it seems to consider the relation between author and text, its explanation is incorrect.

Communicationalism never systematically refers to the relations of the three factors when it discusses the problem of textual meaning. The only thing that attracts it is how the reader interprets the text. As D. Linge maintains, "Gadamer focuses his attention squarely on the subject matter of the text itself, that is, on what it says to successive generations of interpreters."<sup>41</sup>

Intentionalism mainly responds to anti-intentionalism. It focuses on the notion that textual meaning is necessarily what the author intends, rather than what is determined by the text itself. Meanwhile, the reader's role in determining textual meaning is nothing.

Anti-textual individualism seems to be interested in both anti-intentionalism and intentionalism. On the basis of mixing both theories, it purposes to establish a thesis which overcomes the difficulties those two have. But, it inevitably repeats the same mistake they made, which is to ignore the

reader's role in determining textual meaning.

Accordingly, I draw this conclusion: since none of them considers textual meaning in terms of the interrelations among author, text, and reader, none of them can satisfyingly expound what textual meaning is.

PART III: AN APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING TEXTUAL MEANING

Section 9: A Discussion of the Relations between Author  
and Text, Text and Reader

In the following chapter, I will attempt to provide a formulation which supercedes those four theories and concentrates on the interrelations among author, text, and reader.

I propose that the problem of textual meaning should be considered according to the following formulation:

For R (readers), U (utterer or author) intended C (context made by author) to make R understand I (U's intention). Since C involves both I (U's intention or U's idiolect meaning<sup>1</sup>) and L (linguistic meaning of context), R may interpret C either as L (the explicit meaning) or as I (the implicit meaning) by means of R's socio-cultural code.

Obviously, the focus is trying to answer what is textual meaning. One must first look at the text itself. When concentrating on the text, one must consider the basic relationship between author and text, and between text and reader.

Let us consider the relation between author and text. In my formulation, I admit that: For R, U intended C to make R understand I. I suppose, when an author writes, he uses certain reasoning, he has certain aims, and he has a certain audience in mind. Tolhurst mentioned that there is generally little trouble in identifying the group of people who are

the intended audience for any particular utterance; they are those with whom the utterer is trying to communicate, those whom he is addressing.<sup>2</sup> Almost every writer who writes a literary work wants the people to read it, and thus we say that an author is aware of whom he is writing for. For example, an author who writes his text in English of course intends to allow English-speaking people to read it. Although there are many translators who make it possible for literature to be read in different languages, one cannot deny that the author who writes a work does so for certain readers. Even though Tolstoy's War and Peace has been translated into many languages and has been widely read, one cannot say that when he wrote that text, he knew his writing would be read by Chinese or English people. We can assume it was written for his own people. We must admit then that his work is for Russians.

When an author writes his work, he not only is aware that what he writes is for those who have the same cultural background as he does, but also intends his text to communicate with those readers and to make them understand what he intended to convey. Grice claims that we can formulate the relation between text and reader as follows: For some audience A, U (utterer) intended his utterance of X to produce in A some effect (response) E, by means of A's recognition of that intention.<sup>3</sup> Briefly speaking, by certain intention, an

author writes a text for some people, and by such<sup>70</sup> text, the author intends these people whom he writes for to be able to understand his intention.

When I discuss text, it is with respect to context rather than the word sequence. Tolhurst distinguishes the context or utterance from the word sequence. According to him, utterance is a particular occasion of a string of words but word sequence is just the string of words used to make an utterance. Hirsch also maintains that we know the phrase means this rather than that only because of the context. By this we normally mean a very complex and undifferentiated set of relevant factors, beginning with the words that surround the crux and then expand to the entire physical, psychological, social, and historical milieu in which the utterance occurs.<sup>4</sup> Juhl points out that in order to understand an utterance of some sentence, it is not sufficient to know what the sentence means; it is necessary to know in what context the utterance occurred.<sup>5</sup> No doubt when we talk about a literary work, we imply it is a context or utterance rather than just a word sequence.

Context is of course offered by a certain author who employed words and sentences just as a speaker is doing when he makes an utterance. When the author was writing his fiction, he is of course not blind, oblivious about what he was doing. He must try to convey his intention by means of his writing. For instance, when Ernest Hemingway wrote his short story Now I Lay Me, he wished to convey very strong

emotions, and the emotion he wanted to utter was not that of happiness nor enjoyment. Hemingway through his writing tried to portray the suffering of a wounded soldier. The story is about a soldier, Nick Adams, who suffers as a result of his having been wounded on the Italian front. The story describes how Adams during an insomniac rumination tries different ways to stop himself from thinking about the horror which has shattered his nerves. A dialogue occurs between lieutenant Adams and John, a married man, who talk sympathetically about Adams's worries and sleeplessness. Hemingway tried to utter in this story that if a man comes so close to death as Adams did, love is not strong enough to win him back into life.<sup>6</sup> The reason why Hemingway intended to convey such emotion is Hemingway himself was wounded at Fossalta during the war and he also suffered from insomnia. Therefore, with Hemingway, Hovey writes, the wound seems to have become part of his personality as man and as artist. That is evidently because the emotional connections between his actual battle wound and his childhood fear of castration were more direct and stronger than in most men.<sup>7</sup> In other words, because Hemingway had had such an experience, he intended to let people understand.

Probably at this point the anti-intentionalist would say that we can directly know what Hemingway's Now I Lay Me says just by reading the text, rather than by doing a biographical inquiry. However, to know what a text means is irrelevant to know what the author intended, and it is not equivalent to

say that textual meaning is irrelevant to the author's intention. If we just read the text of Now I Lay Me without doing any biographical research about Hemingway's intention with respect to this fiction, and then read some biographies about Hemingway himself, we will see the identity of what the text means and what the author intended to convey. Therefore there is only one explanation that we should accept which is that textual meaning must be relevant to the author's intention. Juhl rightly draws the conclusion that there is logical connection between textual meaning and the author's intention.

Even so, we also know <sup>that</sup> what a text means may not be identical with what an author intended to convey. In this sense, I would like to say Tolhurst's anti-textual individualism plausibly can solve the relation between textual meaning and the author's intention.

When we say that textual meaning may not be identical with the author's intention, the examples we use are mostly a single incident. <sup>Therefore,</sup> people have conflicting <sup>may</sup> opinion on whether a literary work as a context or utterance is like a single sentence to be incompatible between the meaning and its author's intention.

I support this argument; because no matter whether it is a single sentence or a context, that linguistic meaning may conflict with the author's intention, remains constant.

Let us consider A. Strindberg's Miss Julie. Strindberg has expressed the intention of his play in the Preface. He writes:

"In the following drama I have not tried to do anything new--for that cannot be done--but I have tried to modernize the form in accordance with the demands which I thought the new men of a new time might be likely to make on this art. And with such a purpose in view, I have chosen, or surrendered myself to, a theme that might well be said to lie outside the partisan strife of the day: for the problem of social ascendancy or decline, of higher or lower, of better or worse, of men or women, is, has, been, and will be of lasting interest."<sup>8</sup>

By such intention, Strindberg portrayed Miss Julie who is intended to be a type character, as a representative of the upper class, and also of the "man-hating half-woman" group. Strindberg himself says:

"Miss Julie is a modern character, not because the man hating half-woman may not have existed in all ages, but because now, after her discovery, she has stepped to the front and begun to make a noise. The half-woman is a type coming more and more into prominence, selling herself nowadays for power, decorations, distinctions, diplomas, as formerly for money, and the type indicates degeneration."<sup>9</sup>

However, Carl E. W. L. Dahlström points out:

If Strindberg's drama follows the preface it will surely be difficult to determine motivation, for that will be complex rather than single and readily discernible. But a critic may also fall into the error

of taking too much stock in an author's preface.<sup>10</sup>

Dahlström then gives us a different interpretation of the character of Miss Julie. He writes:

Julie is after all Julie, a member of a particular sector of upper society and also a particular sector of the female sex. Even Julie's tragic experience is an individual case and not a typical situation, as the author himself suggests in the preface, for he selected the theme from real life.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, it is undeniable that Strindberg's own intention of Miss Julie is not only compatible but conflicts with Dahlström's interpretation of the context. Therefore, we can conclude that no matter whether readers get their interpretations, by doing certain biographical inquiry or by directly reading the context, the fact that in the context the author's intention may conflict with textual meaning cannot be ignored.

Section 10: The Involvement of Utterer's Idiolect Meaning  
with Linguistic Meaning of Text inside a  
Literary Work

Since text itself may be interpreted either in accord with its linguistic meaning or in terms of the author's intention, we now must turn to focus on the text itself to do further study. In anti-intentionalism, a text involves both internal and external evidence. Internal evidence is discovered through the semantics and syntax of the text and external evidence consists of relations about how or why the author wrote such a text. Beardsley thinks that internal evidence and external evidence are irrelevant to each other. We find internal evidence directly by reading the text and discover external evidence necessarily by doing some biographical inquiry. I think, even Beardsley incorrectly ignores the relevance between the author's intention and textual meaning, he acknowledges the importance of the incompatibility between the author's intention and textual meaning. I believe that the reason which causes such incompatibility is that a text involves not only the author's idiolect meaning but also the linguistic meaning of context.

Utterer's idiolect meaning is in fact identical with the author's intention, which is what the author really intended to convey to his readers. The author must use a certain vehicle to utter what he intended, otherwise no one can know what he

intended to say. For an author must certainly apply language to convey his intention. Since the linguistic meaning of a context is also determined by its own rules such as syntax and semantics although the context is certainly relevant to the author's intention, there is a possibility of the linguistic meaning conflicting with the author's intention.

In this sentence:

The wood pestles were floating on blood

When the vanguards transferred their allegiances.

the author's intention can be plausibly seen as meaning that the war was cruel. Nevertheless, by reading it, we also can say the real meaning of this sentence is that the dead soldiers' blood really converged to a river. In these two cases, we find if we prefer the first one, we must do some biographical inquiry to find the ground to support our consideration, because we cannot draw that conclusion directly from the sentence itself. Thus, I think, in this sense, the utterer's idiolect meaning is kind of private thing which we cannot directly find out from the text itself. Beardsley also admits that the author's intention is a private or idiosyncratic thing. However, for him, it is not a part of the work as a linguistic fact. Yet, the author's intention must be the part of the linguistic fact because only the author's intention can lead the author to create the linguistic fact.

Most authors believe their writings properly convey their intentions. But, the problem is since their intentions

are private or implicit, they have to be uttered through certain vehicles, the vehicles which themselves also hold certain meanings determined by their own rules may be understood to be something which conflicts with the author's intention. The linguistic meaning of a context is a kind of public thing which can be directly found by the reader who knows this language reads it. For example, everyone who knows English can understand the linguistic meaning of this sentence:

The wood pestles were floating on blood.

When the vanguards transferred their allegiances.

He even does not need do any biographical inquiry. Therefore, I call the linguistic meaning of a context is an explicit meaning. I shall call the utterer's idiolōct meaning an implicit meaning.

Section 11: Possible Conflicts between Author's Intention  
and Linguistic Meaning of the Text

At this time, I would like to point out that, in my view, the authorial intention as the implicit meaning and the linguistic meaning as the explicit meaning, such consideration is fully different from what Beardsley calls external evidence as private and internal evidence as public. The difference is that, according to Beardsley, the author's intention is irrelevant to the linguistic meaning at all. The author's idiolect meaning is concerned not to be a part of the work as linguistic fact.

But what I am dealing with here is that a text must be relevant to what the author intended. When an author writes his text, he is aware of that what he does can properly convey his idiolect meaning, namely, the author always believes his writing is the best expression of his private intention and he also believes that his writing is the only way of which he can let certain readers understand his intention. Meanwhile, as an author, he does not notice that his writing as a linguistic object may involve certain meaning which is determined by the rules of the language the author used and which may conflict with the author's intention. Of course a thing which a person does not recognize does not mean that the thing does not exist. Therefore, it is plausible to admit that while the text is relevant to the author's intention, it may hold a meaning which is incompatible to the author's

intention. Furthermore, when I say that the textual meaning may involve two different meanings, position is also based on the following consideration: since the author uses certain language to convey his intention, he never changes the meaning which the language itself holds but he can use the language to utter something else, i.e. his own idiolect meaning. Even in that case of which the author uses the language to convey his own idiolect meaning, the linguistic meaning of the language will keep its own identity.

Of course in many cases, the author's idiolect meaning is identical with the linguistic meaning of the context. The implicit meaning we find by the biographical inquiry concurs with the explicit meaning we find by reading the context. In this case, I admit that textual meaning is rightly equal to the author's intention.

But it is possible that the author's idiolect meaning conflicts with the linguistic meaning of the text. Normally, the case of such conflict can be found in the following types:

(1) Slip of the pen: Although it is quite occasional in the literary works, it is still possible and is the evidence to support our consideration, which is that the author fails to convey what he intended to utter. The example I use is Keat's sonnet On First Looking into Chapman's Homer, in which Keat writes:

Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold;  
Then felt I like some watcher of the skies

When a new planet swims into his ken;  
 Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes  
 He star'd at the Pacific--and all his men  
 Look'd at each other with a wild surmise--  
 Silent, upon a peak in Darien.

However the footnote in this text says, "That it was Balboa, not Cortez, who caught his first sight of the Pacific from the heights of Darien, in Panama, matters to history but not to poetry".<sup>12</sup> Truly, this sonnet is not a historical textbook which does not inquire everything must be in concordance with the historical fact. The interesting thing is that the meaning of this sonnet is provided not to be identical with the author's intention, although it does not matter to the poetry if Balboa was written as Cortez. Because what Keats intended to say was Balboa's case rather than Cortez's case. But, consequently, what the sonnet itself tells us is Cortez's case rather than Balboa's case.

(2) Violation of linguistic rules: Juhl denotes that many authors in fact write in a distinct idiolect, and this is certainly relevant to determining what their works mean. In many cases the authors do not observe the syntactic and semantic rules of the language when they write their works. It is however plausible to believe that these authors' violation of linguistic rules is certainly relevant to expressing what they intended to convey. Juhl regards the case in which a text violates the linguistic rules, we cannot construe the

context in terms of the standard linguistic rules since "many of them would make little sense and some none at all."<sup>13</sup> According to his suggestion, if we read some sentence in a text which does not make sense in terms of the syntactic and semantic rules of language, we should not simply dismiss them as nonsense, rather one should try to find an interpretation that does make sense. But the questions I have asked are (1) when we read some sentence in a literary work, especially poetic works which do not observe the syntax and semantics of the language, do we simply dismiss them as nonsense? and (2) how can we find interpretations that make those sentences which observe the linguistic rules sense if we have no ideas about the background of the context and the author? In order to answer these questions, let us see the following stanza from Christophor Middleton's Alba after Six Years:

Now when I wake  
                   through mist and petrol  
 birdsong cannonades  
                   blaze open-sighted  
 at a climbing sun.<sup>14</sup>

In this stanza, Middleton does not observe the standard linguistic rules, because it is incongruous to use a term like "petrol" in the sentence "now when I wake through mist and petrol" and the same applies to the verb "cannonade". Although the stanza seems to break the linguistic rules, we can never dismiss it simply as nonsense. We will understand the meaning

of the context in terms of the linguistic meaning if we do not know what Middleton's intention is. I believe that in the sentence "now when I wake through mist and petrol", petrol did mean gasoline, even though this makes us curious and does not seem to make sense. According to Juhl, since the sentence "now when I wake through mist and petrol" makes no sense in terms of semantics, we should try to find another interpretation that does make sense. But I am wondering what can be done for Middleton's sentence? If we do not have any idea what was Middleton's intention in using this term, what interpretation of this sentence (except that we believe the explanation of the term "petrol" is gasoline) can we offer? Therefore, if we read a sentence which does not observe the linguistic rules and we do not know anything about the background of the author's intention, we can only interpret in terms of the linguistic meaning of the sentence, no matter how <sup>strange</sup> the interpretation sounds.

Certainly Middleton intended to convey something when he used the term "petrol" in the sentence "now when I wake through mist and petrol". But since it is his own idiolect or implicit meaning, we cannot discover it until we do some biographical research.

(3) Exaggeration: In the literary works, authors tend to exaggerate to reinforce for artist effect. It is also a source that the explicit meaning conflicts with the implicit meaning. We know the following sentence:

The wood pestles were floating on blood

When the vanguards transferred their allegiances.

might be said to be an exaggerated sentence. The poet intended to let readers emphatically understand how cruel the war was, but his utterance is an exaggerated effect. Probably if we do some biographical inquiry we will find his implicit meaning. However, when we read this sentence, since the explicit meaning is so evident, it is plausible to understand this sentence just according to the linguistic meaning.

(4) Allusion and irony: These concepts are commonly used in the literary works. Juhl rightly shows that both allusion and irony depends on the author's intention, namely, whether a context or a sentence is alluding something only depends upon whether the author could have alluded to it. Even so, I think they are also evidence to support our consideration which the explicit meaning conflicts with the implicit meaning. For example, in Sylvia Plath's The Arrival of the Bee Box, she writes the sentence:

They might ignore me immediately

In my moon suit and funeral veil.

Which of course is an allusion by which Plath uses the "moon suit" and "funeral veil" to allude <sup>to</sup> the beekeeper's suit and veil. But for those who have no knowledge about how the beekeeper's suit and veil look but have seen that American Apollo astronauts landed on the moon, when they read this sentence, probably they will understand it in terms of its linguistic meaning. Therefore, allusion or irony may involve both the implicit meaning and the explicit meaning

and they may conflict with each other.

However, I am sure that readers can find which meaning is proper in a context or a sentence. But there are some pre-conditions. For example, if a reader knows a sentence as an allusion, i.e. the author's idiolect meaning, he must at least have certain knowledge which goes beyond the syntax and semantics. In Plath's poem's case, if a reader knows the sentence "in my moon suit and funeral veil" as an allusion, he must know what the beekeeper should wear and what the moon suit and funeral veil is for. Obviously, these knowledges go beyond his knowledge about the sentence's syntax and semantics.

Throughout the discussion of the four types of which the explicit meaning conflicts with the implicit meaning, we now believe that our consideration is plausible. The problem that inevitably rises is what is the true textual meaning if we consider that textual meaning involves two incompatible meanings? Should we say textual meaning is the author's idiolect meaning? Or should we say that textual meaning is the linguistic meaning of the context? If we agree in some case the implicit meaning is incompatible to the explicit meaning, it is impossible to say that in a same interpretation, we can say the textual meaning is both implicit meaning and explicit meaning because we cannot say that in the same time A is B and is not B. Therefore, this problem seems to be a puzzle. I think, if we just consider the relation between the text and its author, it is evident to be a puzzle. Yet, if we

put this problem within the context of the interrelations among author, text, and reader to consider, we will then find it is not a puzzle. So, I will discuss the relation between text and reader.

Section 12: Using a Reader's Socio-Cultural Code to  
Interpret the Text either as Linguistic  
Meaning of Context or as Author's Idiolect  
Meaning

As we know, an author writes a text which involves his idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of the context. When a reader reads a text, he might, in principle, find two incompatible meanings. As we mentioned before, it is impossible for the reader to give one interpretation of textual meaning in which he affirms that both the implicit and the explicit meaning are the textual meaning. He accepts only one interpretation if textual meaning holds two incompatible meanings. The reason why two readers can get two incompatible interpretations from the same text is that one who does some biographical inquiry finds out what the author intended to convey, and another who gives the interpretation only depends upon the linguistic meaning of the text. Yet, why and how do they have different ways to understand the same context? I presume that because they make their choice by means of their own socio-cultural codes.

I borrow the term "socio-cultural code" from W. Iser who, when discussing the relation between text and reader, mentions that context as a primary code supplies <sup>the</sup> reader with instructions for creating an aesthetic code (secondary code) which is guided by the socio-cultural code accepted by that parti-

cular reader. I think the real meaning of the term "socio-cultural code" Iser uses is essentially identical with the meaning of the term "tradition" Gadamer uses. Gadamer claims that tradition encompasses institutions and life-forms as well as texts. According to Gadamer,

Every time will have to understand a text handed down to it in its own way, for it is subject to the whole of the tradition in which it has a material interest and in which it seeks to understand itself. The real meaning of a text as it addresses the interpreter does not just depend on the occasional factors which characterize the author and his original public. For it is also always co-determined by the historical situation of the interpreter and thus by the whole of the objective course of history.<sup>15</sup>

By means of the socio-cultural code the reader stands, he may find either the author's idiolect meaning as textual meaning or the linguistic meaning as textual meaning. Chinese critic Liu Xie points out, those who are good at rhetoric can hide their intentions in the word sequence which makes a mediocre man puzzle and makes a man of insight comprehend.<sup>16</sup> He admits that people who have different levels of education may have different interpretations of a text.

I claim that a reader decides what the textual meaning is in terms of his socio-cultural code. Is that to say that the process of interpretation is, as Gadamer and Iser maintain,

a produced process? Do readers impose their own meaning into the textual meaning in the process of interpretation? I would say no. In Gadamer's opinion, we know, ~~since understanding is~~ a participation in the stream of tradition and in the moment which mixes past and present, interpretation of textual meaning must comprise not merely explaining what the text means in its own world but what it means in terms of our present moment. In Palmer's words, Gadamer addresses that the meaning of the work for us is a product of the integration of our own present horizon and that of the work.<sup>17</sup> For Gadamer, the meaning of the text is in one sense the meaning given by the interpreter, since the text poses a question to him in his particular historical situation and he approaches the text with given expectations.

Similarly, Iser also admits that readers can integrate the textual meaning in terms of their socio-cultural codes. According to him, text must be constituted by readers themselves during a dynamic process of creating both the text-sense and the large contextual background. Iser claims that

The schemas applying to textual states of affairs are only partial aspects of the total picture; they merely offer a reader viewpoint for creating a "horizon" of sense for the text. Sense is constituted within the reader's ideation, but it is not just the reader's fantasy. Sense is pre-structured via the text, but still needs to be created from the available aspects that cannot themselves

already be what was intended by the text.<sup>18</sup>

Like Gadamer, Iser insists that <sup>the</sup> reader reconstructs textual meaning. The reconstruction of reader to a text is said to be the interaction between the explicit and the implicit, between revelation and concealment. But the terms "explicit" and "implicit" Iser uses are different from what I think. For Iser, the explicit means the text itself, and the implicit implies the reader's own reconstruction of the text. He says, what is concealed spurs the reader into action, but this action is also controlled by what is revealed; the explicit in its turn is transformed when the implicit has been brought to light.<sup>19</sup> In short, whether Gadamer or Iser, they provide that in terms of reader's own situation, the reader imposes his meaning into text--which they call reconstruction of text.

I doubt that when a reader interprets the meaning of text, he will reconstruct the textual meaning. When we concern textual meaning, we should recognize that an utterer means his own idiolect meaning by means of a context on a particular occasion only if the utterer intends by means of the context to produce a certain complex effect upon a given reader. The certain effect is that the reader in terms of his own socio-cultural code can understand the author's idiolect meaning by means of the text. But we know, since the context may hold its own meaning which is determined by the linguistic rules and conflict with what the utterer intended to convey,

the meaning of the text thus should be either the author's idiolect meaning or the linguistic meaning of the context. Therefore, the task of reader's interpretation is to decide, not to reconstruct, what textual meaning should be. In terms of the different readers' socio-cultural codes, some readers may interpret the textual meaning as the author's idiolect meaning and others may construe it as the linguistic meaning of the context.

Perhaps people will say that if it is so, readers do not actually have any role in determining textual meaning. This is a misunderstanding. What I am trying to provide is that textual meaning is finally decided by <sup>the</sup> reader who accepts certain socio-cultural codes. We know that an author writes a text by which he intends certain readers to be able to understand his intention. But since the text as an independent linguistic object involves both the author's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of the context, textual meaning then becomes in this sense an indeterminate thing. If we now ignore the reader's role in determining textual meaning, textual meaning is always indeterminable. Therefore, only the reader can finally decide what textual meaning should be, that is, only <sup>the</sup> reader makes textual meaning determinable. I think, such determination is radically different from reconstruction. Determination only defines how reader chooses one possible meaning from two incompatible meanings held by a text.

the  
 Actually reader does not produce any new meaning into the text.  
 R. Crosman points out that in the view of which the text itself  
 means something, the reader "makes" meaning only in the sense  
 that he actualizes a potential meaning latent in the text.  
 The reader is necessary to the production of meaning but  
 he is constrained by the text, just as hot water is necessary  
 to the production of tea, but a mixture of tea leaves and  
 water will produce only tea, never coffee or chocolate milk.<sup>20</sup>

we ed  
 Above systematically discuss how the problem of what  
 textual meaning should be understood. Now let us briefly  
 sum up. According to my discussion, textual meaning is related  
 to three inseparable features--author, text, and reader.  
 Textual meaning is not determined by one of them but by all  
 of them and in their interrelations. Therefore, the problem  
 of what is textual meaning should be understood as the  
 following explanation: textual meaning is relevant to the  
 author's intention but is also determined by the linguistic  
 rules such syntax and semantics of context, and both the  
 author's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of text  
 may conflict with each other. Since the meaning of a text  
 involves two incompatible meanings, only the reader can finally  
 decide whether textual meaning is the author's idiolect meaning  
 or the linguistic meaning of the text. His decision is  
 influenced by his own socio-cultural code. Therefore, textual  
 meaning is essentially determined by author, text, and reader.  
 Textual meaning should be understood as a kind of link inter-  
 relation among these three factors. This is the conclusion I try  
 to provide in the present essay.

### Section 13: Text as the Criterion of Interpretation

Undoubtedly, the criterion of interpretation is based on what textual meaning is. According to communicationalism, the text is understood not because a relation between persons is involved, but because of the participation in the subject matter that text communicates. According to Palmer, this participation emphasizes the fact that one does not so much go out of his own world, as let the text address him in his present world. Such understanding, in communicationalism, is a participation in the stream of tradition in a moment which mixes past and present. On the basis of this understanding, interpretation of course involves continual mediation of past and present. Therefore, for literary interpretation in particular, Gadamer holds that the interpretation of the text cannot, in principle, be limited merely to what the author intended or how his own time understood him. The text is not an expression of the subjectivity of the author. On the contrary, the text only comes into real existence in a dialogue between the interpreter and the text, and the situation of the interpreter is an important condition of the understanding of the text.<sup>21</sup> So textual meaning is not only the internal feature of the text but also the interpreter's own understanding of both the subject matter and of his own interpretive input. This input, says Hoy, is constituted by various historical factors including the tradition in which the interpreter stands,

the historical accumulation of previous interpretations (conditioning, for example, what the interpreter thinks is new in his own reading), and the contemporary "state of the science" (the aim, method, themes, and so on, currently in use).<sup>22</sup> Even though Gadamer holds that interpretation must comprise not merely explaining what the text means in its own world but also what it means in terms of our present moment, Gadamer eventually considers that the criterion of interpretation must depend on the reader's own understanding of the text.

Hoy presents the criticism that some people misconstrue communicationalism as implying that the interpreter merely reads his own meaning into the text or that he only understands the textual meaning in himself rather than in itself. Of course, that is a misunderstanding of communicationalism. However, we cannot reject that Gadamer holds that the criterion of interpretation must be based on the reader's understanding of the text and such an understanding is not a reproductive procedure but rather always also a productive one in which textual meaning always surpasses its author.

If we accept communicationalism with regard to the criterion of interpretation, we will immediately face a serious problem which is in fact that there is no criterion of interpretation at all, because, as Hirsch points out, communicationalism actually denies that the text has any determinable meaning. That is to say, since the real textual

meaning is always co-determined by the historical situation of the interpreter and the perspective and idiom of the interpreter, textual meaning is of course always changable and indeterminable in terms of the reader's tradition.

Since the reader is partly the product of textual meaning and the criterion of interpretation is indeterminable, in this sense, I believe, there is no interpretation at all.

Hirsch realizes that the criterion of interpretation should not be based on the reader's understanding which would lead to the mistake Gadamer made. So, he offers the author's intention as such a criterion. We know, on Hirsch's account, a text has not only meaning but also significance. Meaning is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign. Hirsch names this the "verbal meaning" of the text. The construction of that meaning by the interpreter is called understanding, and the explanation of the understanding is interpretation. The act of judgment, construing a relation between the text and something else, can be explained as criticism. Hirsch points out that while the object of understanding and interpretation is "meaning", the object of judgment and criticism is "significance"; that is, the relation between the verbal meaning of the text and something else. Furthermore, although Hirsch clearly distinguishes interpretation from criticism, he still asserts that interpretation often shades off into evaluation, that is, judging the text in terms of external considerations. But, he also says that

while interpretations are almost always mixed with criticism, they nevertheless always refer to meaning as well, and if the meaning referred to is wrong, the interpretation is wrong too--no matter how valuable it may be in other respects.<sup>23</sup> Here he tells us what the criterion of interpretation is.

For Hirsch, the criterion of interpretation must be the author's intention, since Hirsch claims that the textual meaning is concordant with the author's willed meaning. Hirsch holds that verbal meaning is that which someone has willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs, and which can be conveyed by means of those linguistic signs. He repeatedly emphasizes that what a text means must represent someone's meaning. For example, in Plath's "The Arrival of the Bee Box", the words "in my moon suit and funeral veil" are used to mean the beekeeper's suit and veil by Plath. On the other hand, if we say that textual meaning is whatever someone has willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs, and which can be conveyed by means of those linguistic signs, we have to admit that in the line "in my moon suit and funeral veil" we can rightly understand it as the beekeeper really wearing the moon suit and funeral veil, because it is the right meaning conveyed by the particular linguistic signs.

However, some might say that I misunderstand what the line in the poem means because what Plath intended to convey

by such linguistic signs must be that the beekeeper wears his beekeeper's suit and veil, rather than the moon suit and funeral veil.

Thus, my interpretation is obviously disparate with others. Hirsch mentions that all interpretations are indeed different in some respect or other, but not all different interpretations are disparate or incompatible. For example, he indicates, two interpretations could be different in a vast number of ways--the subjects they treat, the vocabulary in which they are written, the purposes they are designed to serve--yet might nevertheless refer to an identical construction of meaning. On the other hand, two different interpretations might be highly similar in vocabulary and purpose but might nevertheless refer to two quite different constructions of meaning. Only the second kind of difference ought properly to be the issue, and in that case we should speak not of different but of disparate interpretations.<sup>24</sup>

According to Hirsch, the essential distinction between different interpretation and disparate interpretation depends upon the two functions of interpretation. One is that an interpretation merely "deepens" the interpreter's understanding, but another may genuinely "alter" his understanding. We know, as Hirsch insists, that the criterion of interpretation must be the author's intention. Therefore, to understand the textual meaning, according to Hirsch, is to know what the

author intended to convey. And when we interpret an author's intention, we are only able to "deepen" our interpretation, rather than to "alter" our understanding. Thus, as Hirsch mentions, once it is admitted that a meaning can change its characteristics, then there is no way of finding the true Cinderella among all the contenders. There is no dependable glass slipper we can use as a test, since the old slipper will no longer fit the new Cinderella.

Now here an apparent contradiction arises. I can believe that what the verbal meaning of the line "in my moon suit and funeral veil" is is what the particular linguistic signs used by Plath mean. Others can believe that what the verbal meaning of that sentence is is what Plath intended to convey by using such a word sequence. Both interpretations are the explanations of the reader's understanding of the same verbal meaning, and both can be said not to alter their own understanding of the verbal meaning. However, these two interpretations are disparate, or incompatible, not different.

The reason for the contradiction, I suppose, is that Hirsch merely recognizes that an author can use a particular sequence of linguistic signs to convey what he intended, but he ignores that the particular sequence of linguistic signs used by the author may hold its own meaning which may conflict with the author's willed meaning.

Accordingly, if we accept Hirsch's criterion of interpretation, we in fact admit an ambiguous criterion, because the

verbal meaning of the context may not be identical with the author's intention. Therefore, the author's intention should not be seen as the criterion of interpretation.

Given that neither the reader's understanding (Gadamer's communicationalism), nor the author's intention (Hirsch's intentionalism) can be the criterion of interpretation, is there a criterion which we can offer for interpretation? If there is one, what is it? I will say there must be a criterion of interpretation. When we read a literary work, it is obviously preposterous if we arbitrarily explain what it means. For example, if someone interprets Hamlet so as to make us believe that the text is a comedy or a lyric story, we will say that that person is crazy, since his interpretation does not completely observe the possible understanding of the textual meaning. I think, we must interpret the meaning of a text only in terms of the text itself. This is the sole criterion of interpretation.

Since I indicate that the criterion of interpretation depends only upon the text itself, and not the author, nor the reader, some will argue that my viewpoint is identical with what of Beardsley's. We know, according to Beardsley, what a text means is divided into internal evidence and external evidence. Internally, it is a question of linguistic rules concerning syntax and semantics; externally, however, it is a question of biographical inquiry. Beardsley's basic position is that a text is a piece of language whose meaning

is determined by linguistic rules independently of what an author might have intended. Since it is so, he concludes that textual meaning is irrelevant to what the author intended and the criterion of interpretation is merely the internal evidence of the text.

It is absolutely right to maintain the text as a central criterion of interpretation. The reason is not only evident from the foregoing examination of the defects of communicationism, but more importantly from the fact that the text is a central factor in the interrelations among author, text, and reader; it has the role to link these three inseparable factors. It is easy to understand that an author must utter his intention by means of a text, and that if a reader intended to know what the author's intention is, he must communicate with a text. In such a relation, the importance of the text as a central factor has been provided. Furthermore, since the text as a linguistic object is, in this sense, independent of both the author and reader (although its meaning is relevant to the author's intention, and its meaning must be received by readers), it may hold the meaning which conflicts with author's intention. This is to say that both the author's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of the text are involved in the text itself. On the view that both the author's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of the context are involved in the text, Olsen points out that the main piece of evidence for an author's intention to

allude is in the text itself. He says:

Daniel Haakonsen, in his book Henrik Ibsens "Peer Gynt", constructs an elaborate argument showing that the stranger in the fifth act of Peer Gynt is intended by Ibsen to represent Lord Byron. The argument relies heavily on evidence about Ibsen's knowledge of and attitude to Lord Byron, and it is successful in that it makes it seem likely that Ibsen intended the stranger to be identified as Lord Byron. Likely, that is, if one only considers evidence other than that provided by the work itself: having completed his argument, Haakonsen admits defeat. The suggestion that the stranger is Lord Byron still remains far-fetched and fanciful. And it remains so, not because of lack of what the anti-intentionalists dubbed "external evidence", but because the work does not provide sufficient indication that the character is to be identified as Lord Byron. No reasonably well-educated reader could recognize Lord Byron in the stranger, and a specialist critic like Haakonsen cannot find sufficient information in the text onto which he can hook his external evidence. Haakonsen suggests that Ibsen thought that the Byronic figure would establish itself as a legend in our cultural on a level with the Faustus figure and the Don Juan figure, and that if this had happened, the stranger would have been easily recognizable to any educated reader as a representative of true Byronism, as opposed to Peer's false Byronism. As it is, Ibsen's allusion fails and even Ibsen's intention to allude must be in doubt.<sup>25</sup>

In other words, a reader in terms of his certain socio-cultural code may interpret textual meaning either as implicit meaning or as explicit meaning. Therefore, I conclude that the criterion of interpretation should be the text itself.

Section 14: On the Question Whether a Literary Work Has  
only One Correct Interpretation

Given the preceding criterion of interpretation, the following question arises: does a literary work have one correct (possible) interpretation?

This question for Juhl seems not too hard to answer. In his book Interpretation, the third main point he draws is that a literary work has one and only one correct interpretation and such an interpretation governs critical practice. His claims are (1) that a literary work cannot have logically incompatible meanings, and (2) that there is reason to believe that it is in practice possible to determine the correct interpretation of a work.

First, Juhl presents the criterion of interpretation, that is, he believes that with respect to facts the text is more coherent on one interpretation than on another interpretation. And, furthermore, he argues that in fact an appeal to coherence in support of an interpretation of a literary work is an appeal to the author's intention. He cites a stanza by Wordsworth to support his view:

No motion has she now, no force;  
She neither hears nor sees;  
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,  
With rocks, and stones, and trees.

He assumes that we can call the interpretation according to

which the terms "rolled round" suggest slow and gentle motion  $I^1$ , and the interpretation according to which they connote violent motion  $I^2$ . Then he asks: what could it mean to say that on  $I^1$  the line is more coherent than  $I^2$ ? According to him, an interpretation is expected to provide an explanation of the feature of the text. The kind of explanation is one of referring to some purpose for which those features are an appropriate means. Therefore, in the interpretations of  $I^1$  and  $I^2$ , he indicates that only  $I^1$  explains the fact that the words "in earth's diurnal course" qualify "rolled round" by specifying a purpose for the qualifying phrase, namely, to suggest slow and gentle motion. Furthermore, Juhl points out,  $I^1$  cannot in principle account for the fact unless what is to be accounted for is the fact that the author used the phrase "in earth's diurnal course" to qualify "rolled round". Consequently, he says, the only kind of explanation which is both appropriate to the fact to be explained and which can and is expected to provide an interpretation is an explanation in terms of the author's purpose or intention. But an interpretation can provide such an explanation only if it is a statement about the author's intention.<sup>26</sup>

On the basis of this consideration, Juhl further concludes that a literary work has one and only one correct interpretation. He says that if the meaning of a work is logically tied to the author's intention, there is good reason to believe that any interpretation of a given text can in principle be

shown to be correct or incorrect. Juhl does not reject the fact that a literary work may have a variety of mutually incompatible meanings. He cites Wordsworth's poem "A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal". Some may say it conveys the lover's agonized shock at the death of the beloved; others suggest it is a pantheistic affirmation of the grander dead-Lucy who became part of the life of nature. It is a celebration of the grander dead-Lucy who has become involved in the sublime processes of nature and does not express grief or inconsolability.<sup>27</sup> But he claims that it is prima facie quite conceivable that of the incompatible interpretations provided for a work only one is correct. The reason, he maintains, is that it would be very peculiar to say of Wordsworth's poem that it expresses the lover's grief and inconsolability and that it does not express the lover's grief and inconsolability but rather pantheistic affirmation. There is no evidence that, in practice, critics would be prepared to allow that logically incompatible readings could be jointly true.<sup>28</sup> According to Juhl, the proposition: "a work means X and it does not mean X, but Y" is not plausible. Therefore, a literary work has only one correct interpretation which is compatible to the author's intention.

Further, he also tries to verify his consideration from the reader's side. Let us consider these lines of poetry:

The shooting of the hunters she heard,  
But to pity it moved her not.

Juhl believes that one can get at least three different meanings. They are: (1) she heard the hunters shooting but she had no pity for the victims; (2) she heard the hunters shooting at something and heard the hunters being shot at, but did not pity either; (3) she heard the hunters being shot but did not pity them. But, says Juhl, normally readers do choose only one of the possible readings of a given text. They do so at least occasionally even if they believe that on the basis of the textual evidence several interpretations are equally possible or plausible. Consequently, he sums up, it would appear to be intelligible to suppose that only one of the possible readings of a given text is correct.

Juhl attacks those views which hold that a literary work may have more than one justifiable interpretation. He asks if the fact that competent readers hold different interpretations of the same text shows that it has several equally "correct", plausible, or acceptable readings, then what is it that these readers are disagreeing about when each of them denies that the other's interpretation is acceptable?<sup>29</sup> Of course, he agrees that a literary work indeed has more than one possible readings, but, he adds, there is only one correct interpretation. I am suggesting, what he points out is that a theory of interpretation must account for the fact that we do draw a distinction between a possible and a correct interpretation, even if we do not agree in any given case with what the correct reading is.<sup>30</sup> Although a given text may

have several acceptable readings, readers in practice might generally impose one further restriction, or will discover the author's intention right away. Thus, a reading that is acceptable might be regarded as unacceptable by the readers who conform to the general practice, and only the reading which corresponds to the author's intention is regarded as the correct interpretation. Therefore, Juhl concludes that although a literary work usually has several possible or even plausible readings, there is strong evidence that it has one and only one correct interpretation.

Why do readers interpret a text in such various ways? According to Juhl, a literary work is interpreted in a variety of ways because literary interpretations satisfy in part two different demands. The first is that an interpretation should be logically tied to what we take to be the author's intention, and the second is that readers expect an interpretation to show us why the text is worth reading. In other words, we read literary works because they satisfy certain interests, needs and values. Because of such aesthetic or moral considerations, a text can be given several possible interpretations. However, for Juhl, it is obvious that those interpretations concerned with the readers' aesthetic consideration cannot be seen as the explanation of textual meaning. Only the interpretation which is compatible to the author's intention can be seen as the correct explanation of textual meaning. This is why Juhl insists that although a text has several possible

or even plausible interpretations, there is only one correct interpretation which is identical with the author's intention.

Is Juhl's view plausible? I do not think so. It is quite clear that Juhl's whole consideration stands on the central point that only the interpretation which is compatible to the author's intention is the correct interpretation since textual meaning is what the author intended to convey. In fact, Juhl's view is similar to Hirsch's view. Therefore, I think, the mistake in Hirsch's theory is also the mistake of Juhl's theory.

We have seen that the criterion of interpretation should not be understood as the author's intention since a text involves both the author's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of the text. Therefore, the criterion of interpretation should be understood only as the text itself.

If we accept that proposition, we can easily find the mistake of Juhl's view according to which a literary work has only one correct interpretation. Let us again consider the following lines of a poem by Plath:

They might ignore me immediately

In my moon suit and funeral veil.

According to Juhl, if we know that Plath used the terms "moon suit" and "funeral veil" just to mean the beekeeper's suit and veil, then we will explain their meaning as the beekeeper wears his suit and veil, and in practice, we will not at that

time accept another incompatible explanation, that is, the beekeeper really wears the moon suit and funeral veil. However, in my opinion, both incompatible interpretations are plausible and acceptable, because we can see the text itself as the criterion of interpretation. We know a text involves both implicit meaning and explicit meaning, for example, in the sentence "in my moon suit and funeral veil", the author's idiolect meaning can be explained to be the beekeeper's suit and veil rather than the moon suit and funeral veil. But the linguistic meaning of the sentence can also be plausibly construed as the beekeeper really wears the moon suit and the funeral veil. Since the criterion of interpretation is the text itself and the text also involves two incompatible meanings, readers of course can interpret the text in an incompatible way, namely, in practice readers would be allowed to give logically incompatible readings which can be jointly true. As Gadamer says, the work of art says something to the historian; it says something to each person as if it were said especially to him, as something present and contemporaneous. Thus our task is to understand the meaning of what it says and to make it clear to ourselves and to others.<sup>31</sup> Accordingly, it is plausible to admit that logically incompatible interpretations of a text are possible.

Certainly, those acceptable incompatible interpretations must be tied to the text itself, rather than the

person's free imagination. Juhl has pointed out the reason people interpret a text in a variety of ways is that those interpretations satisfy people's aesthetic or moral considerations (he calls it "demand"). He thinks, although these interpretations are possible, they cannot be seen as the explanation of textual meaning. For him only the interpretation which is identical with the author's intention can be the correct interpretation of textual meaning. Basically, I agree that if interpretations are truly made in terms of the readers' aesthetic or moral considerations, they are not the interpretations of textual meaning, but they are criticisms of textual meaning.<sup>32</sup> One problem that I have is whether interpretation is only made by the consideration, which is tied to the author's intention or by the consideration, which is related to aesthetic or moral concerns? If we say it is plausible that interpretation is made by the understanding which is tied to the author's intention, then we can say that the interpretation which is tied to aesthetic or moral considerations is beyond the interpretation of textual meaning. Therefore, I believe that Juhl's view, according to which the interpretation is only made by means of two demands, is untenable. I think, the reason why a text may have a variety of interpretation is that readers not only interpret the textual meaning in terms of the author's intention but also according to the text itself, which may hold the meaning

that conflicts with the author's intention. This view, I think, is coherent with the consideration that the criterion of interpretation is the text itself, and the text may involve both implicit meaning and explicit meaning which can conflict with each other. Therefore, on the basis of this consideration, I conclude that a text may have more than one justifiable interpretation.

### CONCLUSION

As stated in the introduction, this study tries to deal with the problem of what textual meaning should be. By means of examining four representative theories--anti-intentionalism, communicationism, intentionalism, and anti-textual individualism--I show that none of them focus attention on the interrelations among author, text, and reader which, I believe, are the basis of concern with regard to the question of what textual meaning is.

Based on these considerations, I then bring to light several commentaries concerning this question.

(1) The relation between author and text as well as between text and reader. An author not merely intends to write a work for a certain aim and for those readers who share the same cultural background, but intends his text to communicate with these readers and to make them understand what he intended to convey.

A text as a context or utterance rather than a word sequence must be offered by an author who employs words and sentences just as a speaker does when he makes an utterance. An author must also try to express his intention by means of his writing. Even though to know

what a text means is irrelevant to knowing what the author intended, it is not equivalent to the claim that textual meaning is irrelevant to the author's intention. In fact, there must be a logical connection between textual meaning and the author's intention.

(2) Textual meaning may conflict with the author's intention in that a context may involve the utterer's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of the context. The utterer's idiolect meaning is identical with the author's intention which is what the author really intended to convey to his readers. Undoubtedly, the author must use a certain vehicle in order to utter his intention. But since the linguistic meaning of a context is also determined by its own rules such as syntax and semantics (although the context is certainly relevant to the author's intention), there is still a possibility of a conflict between the linguistic meaning and the author's intention.

The utterer's idiolect meaning is his private or implicit entity which we hardly discover directly in the text and normally depends upon biographical inquiry in order to gain access to this. The linguistic meaning of a context is public or explicit entity which can be found out directly and easily by reading the text.

(3) A text must be relevant to what the author intended, but it is also true that the author's idiolect meaning may conflict with the linguistic meaning of the

text. Such a conflict can be divided into the following four types: (1) Slip of the pen, that is, the author in his writing fails to convey what he intended to express. (2) Violation of the linguistic rules, that is, literary works, especially poetry, frequently violate the syntactic and semantic rules of the language. (3) Exaggeration, that is, authors often use exaggeration way to reinforce artistic effectiveness and it is definitely a source of the conflict between explicit meaning and implicit meaning. (4) Allusion and irony, which show that linguistic meaning may conflict with what an author intended to mean by means of them.

(4) The relation between text and reader. I draw the conclusion that a reader may interpret the context either as the linguistic meaning of the context or as the author's idiolect meaning by means of the reader's socio-cultural code. That is to say, in conformity with the tradition of the reader's understanding, the reader can only choose to interpret the textual meaning either as explicit meaning or implicit meaning but not reconstruct the textual meaning, since the context itself may have held both linguistic meaning and author's intention.

Thus, our consideration may be summed up in the following formulation:

For R(reader), U(utterer or author) intended C (context made by utterer) to make R understand I(U's

intention). Since C involves both I(U's intention or U's idiolect meaning) and L(linguistic meaning of the context), R may interpret C either as L(the explicit meaning) or as I(the implicit meaning) by means of R's socio-cultural code.

Accordingly, textual meaning is essentially determined by author, text, and reader. Textual meaning should be understood in <sup>terms of</sup> interrelations among these three factors.

The criterion of interpretation is based on what textual meaning is. Both communicationalism and intentionalism incorrectly answer this question.

According to communicationalism, the criterion of interpretation must be based on the reader's understanding of the text and such understanding is not a reproductive procedure, but rather always is also a productive one in which textual meaning always surpasses its author. Consequently, in communicationalism, since textual meaning is always changable and indeterminable in terms of the reader's own understanding, there is no misunderstanding of textual meaning, even no interpretation at all.

According to intentionalism, the criterion of interpretation must be the author's intention, since intentionalism holds that textual meaning is identical with the author's willed meaning. But intentionalism ignores that the particular sequence of linguistic signs used by the author may hold its own meaning which may conflict with the author's willed meaning.

The criterion of interpretation only depends upon the text itself, because the text, as a central factor in the interrelations among author, text, and reader, has the role to link these three inseparable factors.

Furthermore, since the criterion of interpretation depends upon the text itself and since a text may involve both the author's idiolect meaning and the linguistic meaning of the context, readers in term of their socio-cultural code may interpret textual meaning either as the implicit meaning or as the explicit meaning, that is, readers would allow that logically incompatible readings are jointly true. Therefore, a text may have more than one justifiable interpretation.

NOTES

## PART I:

1. Readers can read this drama in the book: Tragedy: A Critical Anthology.
2. Ibid, p.361
3. O. Reinert, Strindberg, p.109
4. G. Olién, August Strindberg, p.46
5. O. Reinert, p.110
6. B. Madsen, Strindberg's Naturalistic Theatre, p.79
7. R. Corrigan, Tragedy: A Critical Anthology, pp.370-371
8. O. Reinert, p.110
9. Ibid, p.115
10. P.D. Juhl, Interpretation, p.3
11. Liu Xie, Wen Xin Diao Long, p.38
12. A. Schaff, Introduction to Semantics, p.215
13. Ibid, p.267
14. H. Grice, "Meaning", p.378
15. Ibid, p.385
16. Ibid, p.385
17. C. Taylor, "Theories of Meaning", p.285
18. Grice, "Meaning", p.386
19. M. Black, "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice's Views", p.272

20. M. Roskill, "On the 'Intention' and 'Meaning' of Work of Art", p.99
21. M. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", p.294
22. M. Beardsley, Aesthetics, p.17
23. Ibid, pp.24-25
24. W. Tolhurst, "On What A Text Is and How It Means", p.4
25. H. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", p.225
26. J. Meiland, "The Meaning of A Text", p.196
27. E. D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, p.129
28. Liu Xie, p.38
29. Juhl, p.59
30. Ibid, p.61
31. Ibid, pp.83-84
32. W. Iser, "Texts and Readers", p.327
33. Ibid, p.331
34. W. Iser, "Interaction between Text and Reader", p.111
35. Ibid, pp.111-112
36. H. MacLennan, Two Solitudes, Foreword
37. Ibid, Backcover
38. Tolhurst, "On What A Text Is and How It Means", pp.13-14

## PART II:

1. See J. Margolis, ed., Philosophy Looks at the Arts, p.290
2. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", p.299
3. A. J. Smith, ed., John Donne, p.84
4. C. Coffin, John Donne and the New Philosophy, p.98
5. Tolhurst, "On What A Text Is and How It Means", p.3
6. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", pp.303-304
7. Ibid, p.305
8. A. Alvarez, ed., The New Poetry, p.68
9. D. C. Hoy, The Critical Circle, p.46
10. R. Palmer, Hermeneutics, p.163
11. H. Gadamer, Truth and Method, XVII
12. Palmer, p.164
13. Ibid, p.176
14. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.340
15. Hoy, pp.63-64
16. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.280
17. Ibid, p.159
18. Palmer, p.186
19. Hirsch, p.249
20. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.280
21. Hoy, p.54
22. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p.90

23. Ibid, p.98
24. Hirsch, p.13
25. Ibid, p.8
26. Ibid, p.39
27. Ibid, p.31
28. Ibid, p.46
29. Ibid, p.46
30. Ibid, p.38
31. Concerning the meaning of explicit meaning, let us first examine what the term "explicit" means here. In MacMillan Contemporary Dictionary (W. D. Halsey, New York 1979), the word "explicit" is explained in such a way that "explicit suggests that nothing is left to inference that all pertinent details are clearly and unambiguously explained". According to my view, since the linguistic meaning of a context is determined by its own rules such as syntax and semantics, I use the term "explicit meaning" in the sense that the meaning of language as the vehicle of certain expression must be clear and unambiguous to those readers who know this language. When a reader reads a significant sentence, he should understand simply what this sentence means by reading it as long as he knows the language in which the sentence is written.

Concerning the meaning of implicit meaning, MacMillan Contemporary Dictionary designates the term "implicit" as

meaning "suggested or understood though not directly expressed". The meaning of the word "implicit" is exemplified in the following sentence: "conclusions that are implicit and must be drawn out by the reader". This too is what I mean when I use the term "implicit meaning". We know an author may utter his intention in a text by means of allusion or irony. Since the allusion used by the author may itself mean something else, which is determined by the syntax and the semantics of language, what the reader can easily understand is necessarily the explicit meaning. The way that a reader understands the author's allusions is definitely not by way of simple reading, but by way of an indirect inquiry. That is, through the biographical research, a reader can learn that the author intended to express something other than the literal meaning of the context which the reader can understand directly. So, in this sense, the author's own intention is implicit meaning, that is, that which hides behind the linguistic meaning of the context.

32. Tolhurst, "On What A Text Is and How It Means", p.3
33. Tolhurst, "On Textual Individuation", p.187
34. Tolhurst, "On What A Text Is and How It Means", p.4  
"On Textual Individuation", p.188
35. Tolhurst, "On What A Text Is and How It Means", p.4

36. S. Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, pp.4243
37. S. Schiffer, Meaning, pp.224-229
38. Tolhurst, "On What A Text Is and How It Means", p.11
39. Ibid, pp.11-13
40. Freud, p.50
41. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, XX

## PART III:

1. I borrow the term "idiolect meaning" from H. Grice.

Grice, in his essay "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", writes: "It will be convenient to recognize that what I shall call statements of timeless meaning (statements of the type 'X means "..."', in which the specification of meaning involves quotation-marks) may be subdivided into (i) statements of timeless 'idiolect-meaning', e.g. 'For U (in U's idiolect) X means "..."' and (ii) statements of timeless 'language meaning', e.g. 'In L (language) X means "..."' (in Foundations of Language, (4) 1968, p.226) Also Juhl points out: "our interpretation of a literary work frequently depends on our knowledge that the author associated certain beliefs, emotions, doctrines, and so forth with certain words. Many authors in fact write in a distinct idiolect, and this is certainly relevant to determining what their works mean." (Interpretation, p.108)

2. Tolhurst, "On What A Text Is and How It Means", p.12
3. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", p.230
4. Hirsch, p.86
5. Juhl, p.98
6. R. Hovey, "Hemingway's 'Now I Lay Me': A Psychological Interpretation", p.181
7. Ibid, p.197

8. A. Strindberg, Plays, p.97
9. Ibid, p.101
10. Carl E. W. L. Dahlström, Strindberg's Dramatic Expressionism, p.103
11. Ibid, p.104
12. The Norton Anthology of English Literature, pp.798-799
13. Juhl, p.108
14. See A. Alvarez, ed., The New Poetry, p.138
15. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.280
16. Liu Xie, p.242
17. Palmer, p.190
18. Iser, "Texts and Readers", p.336
19. Iser, "Interaction between Text and Reader", p.111
20. R. Crosman, "Do Readers Make Meaning?", pp.154-155
21. Hoy, p.52
22. Ibid, p.53
23. Hirsch, p.136
24. Ibid, p.129
25. S. Ulsen, "Text and Meaning", p.268
26. Juhl, p.88
27. Bateson, English Poetry, p.59
28. Juhl, p.201
29. Ibid, p.210
30. Ibid, p.213
31. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p.100
32. I do not discuss the distinction between interpretation and criticism in the present dissertation.

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