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**The Riddle of Subjectivity:
The Humean Notion of the Self**

By

Siyaves Azeri

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fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of**

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To my parents, Nadir (Panjehbandpour) Azeri and Sharghieh (Doshvargoo) Azeri

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Abstract

The empiricist-naturalist approach to the self considers the mind's operations to be a function of its openness to the natural world via sense-impressions. Empiricist-naturalist philosophers, who are concerned with the self, more or less, followed the path of the Newtonian natural sciences. It is extremely difficult—as a matter of fact impossible—to locate the empiricist conceptualization of the self within the framework of a rationalist theory of subjectivity, which is based on the subject's undivided sovereignty over both itself and what is non-self.

Individualism presupposes the self-sufficiency of the individual subject and its complete self-sovereignty. In this respect, individualism turns to a form of substantialism that detaches the self from the external world. Husserl's egology, for instance, shows that substantialism is inherent even in a pure formalist approach to the question of the self. The efforts of later phenomenologists, such as Max Scheler and Edith Stein, are insufficient in providing a resolution to the question of the self, since these thinkers share and are committed to Husserl's individual-atomistic presuppositions. An empiricist theory of the self would totally be in contrast to such a conceptualization.

Hume distinguishes between the self with regard to thought and imagination and the self with regard to passions. This differentiation shows a tension between the substantialist conceptualization of the notion of the self and an empirical-social formulation of this notion. Hume's rejection of the idea of the self signifies the lack of a substantial self and the impossibility of providing any proof for the existence of such a substance.

Hume introduces the notion of the self as “a bundle of perceptions.” Yet, he is aware that such a formulation concedes the existence of an immanent tension—even a contradiction—within the self: to assume that the self is a perceptual entity is to propose that

it is *external* to itself. We face the problem of explaining how an objective and external entity like the self can acquire an intimate status when one considers one's own being. If we stick to an atomistic-individualistic account of subjectivity we cannot resolve this tension. The very notion of the individual, in such a case, appears as the substantial core upon which the notion of the self is to emerge. Individualism, thus, appears as a form of substantialism.

It is reference to the concept of "other," as a societal being, that provides us with the required data to form the idea of the self; such a notion of the self suggests a promising solution to this riddle. The existence of the self is "paradoxical" since such immanent being is rooted in elsewhere than in one's own interior. Psychological studies and philosophical investigations of Vygotsky and members of his school, such as Luria and Leont'ev, show that the existence of the self is paradoxical, merely in the sense that the self pre-requires the other. Such an approach to the riddle of subjectivity can be traced back to Hume's considerations of the notion of the self. Thus, the aforementioned apparently contradictory state of existence of the self would be explained away once we realize the potentials in Hume's interpretation of the problem of the self, which allows characterizing the self as a social being.

Introduction

The idea of self and the *specific* question “what am I?” and the nature of personal identity are relatively new notions and problems within the philosophical realm. It is true that philosophers, as early as Ancient times, have asked questions regarding the nature of the mind and the soul (e.g., Aristotle’s *De Anima*).¹ However, there has not been any systematic consideration of the question up until Modern Philosophy. To put it more accurately, in pre-Modern philosophy what is located at the center of philosophical interest is neither *personal* identity, nor the *concept* of the self, but rather the question regarding the nature of the soul. Mind is considered in its relation to the human body which is mostly taken to be completely material in contradistinction to the immaterial nature of the soul.

According to Aristotle’s presentation in his *De Anima*, Democritus identifies the soul and the mind while still differentiating these from the body. He then proceeds to identify the mind with the primary, indivisible principle of all entities, namely, the atom. Democritus considers the soul’s power of originating movement as the main proof of his

¹ In his *Ockham, Descartes, & Hume*, Julius R. Weinberg traces back the question of the self to 1) Avicenna, 2) Medieval Philosophy, 3) Aristotle (particularly *De Anima*), and 4) Plato (particularly *First Alcibiades*). Weinberg relates the question regarding the self to the question concerning self-knowledge, be it direct or indirect: “Thus, though the *First Alcibiades* seems to suggest the possibility of direct self-knowledge, the *Theaetetus* appears to be one of the first arguments to show that indirect inference to the existence of the soul from observed facts of cognition is correct route to take” (1977, 84). In his *The Riddle of the Self*, Feliks Mikhailov, from another perspective, traces the question about the self back to Aristotle and even to pre-Socratic philosophers. As does Aristotle, he puts the question about the self in the general framework of knowledge and truth. For instance, when he considers the Milesian School, he writes: “[T]he solution of the problem of the relationship between consciousness and being has always been concerned with both aspects of this relationship and the problem of being is at the same time the problem of consciousness.... [E]ven a purely ontological statement presupposes a certain appraisal of man's place in the world” (1976/1980, 23).

thesis. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, differentiates the soul and the mind and yet treats them as one and the same. Positing the mind as the principle of all existing things, he assigns the characteristics of knowing and originating movement to the mind. Aristotle then summarizes the ideas of his predecessors with regard to the nature of the soul by distinguishing between those who take the soul as the origin of motion and those who identify the soul with perception and knowledge (i.e., by “identify[ing] soul with the principle or the principles of Nature.”)

In his *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume deals with the question of selfhood as “so great a question” thereby emphasizing its importance in the section “On Personal Identity.” There he states: “We now proceed to explain the nature of *personal identity*, which has become so great a question in philosophy, especially in late years in *England*” (Hume 1967, 259).² A number of reasons can be enumerated to explain the emergence of the problem of personal identity at that time. The formation of a new type of society in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, the emergence of new social structures, the emergence of the idea of civil society and the valorization of the individual, the secularization of philosophy and the natural sciences might be considered among these many reasons. As important and as interesting as such questioning might be, the study of these phenomena would exceed the scope of the present work. Yet I would still like to emphasize the close connection between the rise of the ideals of humanism, namely 1) self-consciousness (or self-reflection), 2) self-determination (freedom), and 3) the modern notion of the self. Locke’s rejection of a substantial self, his differentiation between the person and the soul, even his suggestion that matter might be endowed with

² All references are to the *Treatise of Human Nature*, (ed. Selbey-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967).

the power to think, should be thought of as illustrating the rise of the idea of self-consciousness. Hume's account of morality is a moral theory without any reference to an immaterial, self-identical substance and can be considered an example of a secular, liberal approach to the question of the self. As Alain Renaut remarks in his *The Era of the Individual*: "Historically, these two dimensions have defined the classic idea of *subjectivity* as consisting in the capacity to be the conscious, responsible author of one's thoughts and acts: in short to be their foundation or sub-jectum" (1989/1997, xxvi).

A historical study of the concept of the subject in its modern sense shows that there is not simply one conceptualization of this notion. Subjectivity is a heterogeneous, multi-faceted concept. The Cartesian ego, the Leibnizian monad, the empirical self, the critical/transcendental subject, and the Hegelian absolute subject designate –although not necessarily in a hierarchical way—different conceptual stages of subjectivity. A consideration of the concept of the modern subject, which one-sidedly regards it as a finalized self that is not only transparent to itself but sovereign, master of both itself and nature is, at best, merely simplistic and reductionist. It is not surprising to see that such a reductionist approach rejects subjectivity in its entirety when facing the collapse of such a vulgar notion of subjectivity. As Renaut states: "The assault mounted against the idea of subject, at least since Nietzsche or Heidegger (and more recently by the French thinkers of the 1960's) was based on [these] unusually simplistic premises" (1989/1997, xxv). A study of how certain figures of modern philosophy consider the question of subjectivity (and/or selfhood) will serve to underline the differences that exist between various philosophical points of view when the question of subject is at stake. This will be the task of the present study.

The reductionist approach to the question of the subject as presented above is mainly put forward by Heidegger when he considers the Cartesian-Leibnizian self. Heidegger claims that modernity in a homogeneous way designates the “advent of subject,” which can be identified as the advent of humanism. According to Heidegger, the prototype of the modern subject is the Cartesian ego, which in turn finds its best expression in Leibniz’s monadological model. He states that the emergence of the Cartesian subject found its true impact only in Leibniz. According to this view, modernity finds its best expression in the idea of the advent of subjectivity and every moment of subjectivity can be reduced to a Leibnizian moment. Renault states:

Heidegger’s major thesis about the history of subjectivity consists in the decision to make this whole history (and, with it, the whole history of modernity) hinge on the *monadological cogito* as the twofold deepening of the Cartesian subject, both in the sense of the activist reinterpretation of the *cogitatio* and in that of the monadological (meaning anthropomorphic) reinterpretation of substance: Every *subjectum* is determined in its *esse* by *vis* (*perceptio-appetitus*). Every *substantia* is monad. (1989/1997, 7)

We face a number of serious questions if we accept such an account of the history of subjectivity (and history of modernity). One of the most important problems of such a reading is its disregard for completely different approaches to the question of selfhood. For instance, the empiricist conceptualization of the notion of the self, which appears within the context of a tendency toward naturalization of the concept of selfhood, cannot be located within the framework of Heidegger’s interpretation. The rationalist cogito (e.g., that of Descartes and of Leibniz), in contradistinction to the empirical self, is usually defined by the closure of the (so-called) mind upon itself. The rationalist view of the self shares the pre-seventeenth century belief which holds the soul to be an indivisible, immaterial substance that maintains the identity of the self and that will

survive after the body's death. On the contrary, the empiricist-naturalist approach to the question considers the mind's operation as a function of its openness to the natural world via sense-impressions. Empiricist-naturalist philosophers concerned with the problem of the self, more or less, followed the path of the natural sciences that had been introduced by the Newtonian naturalized understanding of the external world. Martin & Barresi state that "Newton had shown that there could be a natural philosophy of the external world. Progressive eighteenth century thinkers were intent on showing that there could be a natural philosophy of the internal world" (1999, 1 quoted in McIntyre 2003, 362-3). It is extremely difficult –as a matter of fact impossible—to locate the empiricist subject within the context of the rationalist theory of the self, which is based upon the affirmation of the subject's undivided sovereignty over both itself and what is non-self. The (rationalist or) Cartesian self might be conceptualized as detached from the external world, the senses and impressions. An empiricist theory of the subject, by definition, would be totally in contrast to such a conceptualization, because, as Hume points out "all our ... ideas," including that of the self, "in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (1967, 4). Thus we can assume that, even if the rationalist conceptualization of the subject has dominated the modern approach to the question –a thesis that I am extremely doubtful about—there exist nonetheless several *theories of subjectivity* that have their roots within various philosophies of the moderns.

Hume's approach to the problem of the self has a multisided nature: On the one hand he distinguishes between the self as related to thought and imagination and as it is related to passions, which can be read as a distinction between the substantialist

conceptualization of the notion of the self and an empirical-social formulation of the question. In reality, the fact that we do not own a self signifies the lack of a substantial self and the impossibility of providing any proof for the existence of such a substance.

It is the vague awareness of this problem that leads some philosophers to formulate transcendental models to explain the necessity and inevitability of such a paradoxical existence. Kant's notion of the transcendental self, for instance, is an attempt to explain the external source of the notion of the self. The transcendental self does not exist in one's being as the thinking self or the cogito in Descartes is supposed to. It is both inside and outside of one's being; it is inside but transcendently.

The apparent tension or contradiction in Hume's formulation can be considered the actualization of a tension between a transcendental-substantial formulation and the empirical conceptualization of the notion of the self. However, it is possible to overcome this tension on empirical grounds without reference to any substance, be it of an internal nature or of a transcendental character. The former approach can be labeled a form of theoreticism, the latter an effort toward a theoretical grasp of the question of the self.

Moreover, the lack of a substantial self leads us to search for other explanations regarding the emergence of the notion of the self. Hence Hume introduces the notion of the self as a bundle of perceptions. Yet he is aware that such a formulation designates the existence of an immanent tension—even a contradiction—within the self: perceptions, after all, are perceptions of external objects and subjects. To assume that the self is a perceptual entity is to propose that it has an external existence with regard to itself. In order to formulate the self as a derivative of perceptual processes, in other words, we face the difficulty of explaining how such an objectively external entity as the self can acquire

such an intimate status when a person comes to consider his being? And how can a perceptually produced self be sensed and felt with such intimacy that even Hume himself expresses it as being continuously and intimately present to the person? If we stick to an atomistic-individualistic account of subjectivity in particular and an individualistic account of existence in general, we cannot surmount the tension and contradiction that is supposedly inherent in such a formulation. However, the notion of other as another self provides one with the data that results in the formation of the idea of the self, which signifies a solution to this paradox.

The existence of the self is “paradoxical” since such immanent being is rooted other than in one’s own interior, and so not in one’s own spirit or mind. Such an apparently contradictory state of being of the self disappears once we come to realize the potential in the Humean formulation of the resolution of the question of the self that allows us to formulate the self as the other. There is a difference between theoreticism and the theoretical cognition of life. Theoreticism tries to present and constitute the whole existence of the being as a moment of the detached, indifferent system it has produced. It reduces being, the becoming of the once-occurring uniqueness to a moment of the architectonics of meaning. It tends to explain theory as a moment of another theoretical stance. By contrast, theoretical cognition of scientific thought presents a unique, distinctive world through the mediation of a morally responsive consciousness in an actual event or action. In this way, the once-occurring event is not something that is only thought but appears as something that really exists. It is accomplished through the acts of the “I” and the other, affirmed by the emotional-volitional act of the other and the “I.” Theoreticism amounts to negation of the existence of the “I” as a once-occurring being

that acts and performs deeds in the event. On the other hand, for scientific thinking, the whole theoretical thought appears as a moment of practical reason. This does not amount to any relativism: to emphasize the constructedness of the scientific world as a moment of a practical act of the subject is to confirm the historicity of the scientific world as a moment of the greater historicity of the event of being. To emphasize the fictitious status of the existence of the self is to grasp the being of the epistemological self as a moment in the existence of the self which is constructed socially and morally via passions and sentiments.

In the first chapter of the thesis I provide some historical background to the question of the self in modern philosophy. In this chapter, views of such major figures as Descartes and Locke as well as theories and criticism of less well-known figures such as Huet and Gassendi are discussed in the light of their own works and the studies of contemporary scholars.

It will be discussed that due to Descartes' substantialist and individualist point of view the Cartesian conceptualization of the self as a thinking thing results in relativization of the notion of the self. Moreover, Descartes' ambiguous position about thinking/thought, that is, his presentation of thinking as a state of being on the one hand, and as a property of the mind that resembles but which is not identical to the act of thinking on the other hand, turns his intended formulation of the self as a thinking agent to a non-thinking thing. The dualist Cartesian approach radically differentiates the intellectual element from volitional and affective-bodily aspects of the subject. In this way thinking is severed from the vividness of the life of the subject, from his intentions, interests, needs, motives, and inclinations. Thus thinking itself appears as that being that

thinks the thoughts. For Descartes, subjectivity of the human agent signifies a substratum that is identical to thought, where thought does not denote the outcome of an act of thinking but a state of being. Thus, the Cartesian ego is the representation of this state of being a substance.

Chapter one continues with an evaluation of Pierre Gassendi's conceptualization of subjectivity as tranquil self. It will be discussed that Gassendi shares the belief in immortality of the soul and substantiality of the self with Descartes. However, Gassendi rejects Descartes' reasoning regarding the self and the Cartesian identification of the self with the mind on logical grounds. Gassendi's rejection of Cartesianism is based on his rejection of rationalism in favor of empiricism. He tries to propose a theory of the self that reconciles Epicurean atomism with creationism and the belief in providence.

Although these two tendencies appear as incommensurable and contradictory, it will be discussed that Gassendi's belief in voluntarism serves as the basis for such a synthesis.

An Epicurean atomic model that leaves atoms the possibility to deviate from straight-line motion, in Gassendi's theory, serves as the proof of human's free will in a universe that contingently depends on God's absolute will. Man's ability to perform voluntary action is an instantiation of God's willful action. The only truly tranquil entity is God since he is the only self-identical being. Man's awareness of his own volition and his own freewill supplies him with the idea of continuity and stability since such consciousness tranquilizes the soul. It is only through tranquility, Gassendi claims, that the mind acquires the idea of self-identity against the ever-changing plurality of the appearances of the soul.

The last major figure that is evaluated in the first chapter is John Locke. It will be discussed that Locke's philosophy is an attempt to reject Aristotelianism. Moreover, siding with Newtonian naturalist view, he fights against neo-Platonic elaborations of Cartesians and rationalists and rejects the outlook that views knowledge as a harmony between human and divine ideas. Locke rejects the notion of innate ideas and introduces the mind as a blank sheet. He intends to show that there is no qualitative difference between the knowledge of external things and one's consciousness of one's own self. In line with the empiricist project, he tries to describe how unconscious encounters with environment amounts to the emergence of consciousness. For Locke the self is identical with consciousness and consciousness is accessible empirically, this is to say that it is acquired via self-reflection which is a form of experience. Locke differentiates the identity of inanimate objects from that of living things, of animals and of humans. As far as the identity of humans is concerned, identity of the self depends on the consciousness of the person. The person is identical to himself to the extent that he is aware of his own perception and thinking. The limit of consciousness, according to Locke, is set by the range of the person's memory. Although at times Locke uses consciousness and memory interchangeably, it is discussed that the former should not be identified with the latter. According to Locke consciousness is that element that accompanies all acts of thinking including acts of recollection. Such accompanying consciousness, it will be claimed, constitutes the form of the identity of the self whereas the memory-ideas may be considered the content of consciousness. Therefore, it is this formal constitutive element that provides the constancy of the idea of the self. If so, then it can be claimed that Locke's approach to the question of the self results in admitting the truth of what he

intends to reject; this is to say that Locke's methodology pushes him to adopt a Platonic-Aristotelian formal theory of identity in general and of personal identity in particular.

Although Hume's account of the idea of the self is the center of gravity of this project, this is not a historical study that is solely concerned with Hume's "bundle theory". It aims at resolving the riddle of subjectivity, which initially has been formulated by Hume, and later has become the center of attention of other major thinkers and commentators. It is not reasonable to assume that Hume has mysteriously stated this problem without suggesting a plausible answer or providing rudiments towards an adequate resolution of it. There are central aspects of Hume's philosophy that have been systematically ignored and have not been exploited towards resolving the riddle of the self. This negligence has resulted in two misinterpretations. The first reduces Hume's philosophy solely to the views expressed in Book I of the *Treatise*. This has resulted in the traditional stance which presents Hume as a solipsist philosopher. If this traditional interpretation holds, then Hume seems to fail to explain the passage from perceiving atomic sense-data (individual impressions) to conceiving objects. Since Hume openly rejects the idea that substance exists there is no justified explanation of how bundles of perceptions that consist of individual impressions are to be unified towards conceiving objects and ideas including the idea of the self.

This misinterpretation, in its turn, leads to the second. Various philosophers, who share the individual-subjectivist prejudices and mistakenly ascribe them to Hume, have suggested several models to resolve this difficulty. However, these models appear as some form of subjective substantialism and propose either formal-transcendental or egological-substantial theories of the self as the unifying principle of experience. I hope

to show that the individual-subjectivist attitude prevents these philosophers from satisfactorily resolving the riddle of subjectivity.

Addressing the social aspects of Hume's philosophy introduced in Book II and III of his *Treatise*, I shall try to show the fallacy of such an interpretation of his philosophy. I also hope to show that unless the solipsistic view is discarded a solution to the riddle of the self will not be attained. Man's social being and interactions supply him with the necessary apparatus to conceive objects, ideas and his self. If the social aspects of Hume's philosophy are properly addressed, then the affinity between the Humean position and contemporary societal approaches to the question of the self will become evident. Moreover, this new interpretation will place Hume within another historico-philosophical continuity that is radically different from the associationist position traditionally attributed to him.

The first section of the second chapter will discuss Kant's approach to the question of the self and to the notion of subjectivity in search for a plausible resolution of the riddle of subjectivity that is put forward by Hume. It will be discussed that there is a tension between two modes of Kant's concept of transcendental-critical subject. This tension results in a radical split between the transcendental and critical elements of the Kantian notion of the self. The former signifies an empty, purely formal structure of subjectivity, whereas the latter designates a notion of the self that is rooted in the idea of practical reason and which, apparently, offers an alternative theory to the monadic and Cartesian conceptualizations of the self. The transcendental subject emerges through the critique of absolute, pre-critical formulations of subjectivity. The "I" is the name of this transcendental, formal subject, which is the awareness of being a thinking entity. The pre-

critical standpoint introduces the “finitude” of the human subject as negativity, as a limitation that relativizes the subject. However, it will be discussed, as long as we stay in the realm of the “pure reason” Kant’s critically formulated transcendental subjectivity will boil down into the mere dissolution (radical deconstruction, and liquidation) of subjectivity.

The second section of the second chapter elaborates on Husserl’s phenomenological account of the self as it is presented in his *Cartesian Meditations*. Although Husserl introduces his inquiry as a non-Cartesian project at the outset, the quest for an absolute, universal, and transcendental ground for science appears to be Cartesian in essence. Husserl himself admits that the idea of philosophy as a universal and all-inclusive absolute science is rooted in Descartes’ view. Husserl also shares the belief in the existence of a solitary, individual subject with Descartes; the existence of the mind or the transcendental, pure ego cannot be doubted and is the basis for any attempt to posit philosophy as a certain, universal science. The “I,” in Husserl’s phenomenology, is the representation of the phenomenological, formal ego that actualizes the act of epoché and survives this act. It will be discussed that as far as the idea of the pure ego is concerned the phenomenological project is self-defeating. The notion of pure ego which survives the epoché and is deprived of all its empirical content has to be presupposed as having a purely formal, substantial existence. Husserl’s phenomenology does not arrive at the idea of such an essential pure ego but asserts it from the beginning. Therefore it presupposes the existence of that entity the existence of which is to be shown via the epoché. Phenomenology reconstructs the individual subjectivist approach to the question of the self by asserting a monadological self in the form of an originary temporal constitutive

subject. Such an assertion gives way to radical subjectivism and solipsism. The individual subjectivist approach of Husserl's phenomenology becomes clear when phenomenological treatment of other selves is evaluated. It will be shown that the phenomenologically posited other is nothing more than the objectified extension of my own Pure ego or the transcendental "I".

In the third chapter, notions of language, thought, and consciousness are discussed in the light of an influential school of psychological and cognitive sciences. Views of the Vygotsky School and major representatives of this trend are studied with the hope of clarifying some thoughts that are supposed to be found in Hume's discussion of the question of the self in potential form. The major task of this chapter will be showing the social genesis of consciousness and describing how through social interaction and with the use of which instruments humans transcend the boundaries of ordinary, concrete sensory experience in order to form the notion of the self. Language, it will be discussed, functions as the most important mediatory instrument through which such transcendence becomes possible. Moreover, it will be shown how the very immediate sensory experience, forms of abstraction, memory, volitional action, and the process of thinking are determined via language as the medium that makes the societal interaction and communicative action possible. In this way the traditional approach that looks for the origin of psychic and mental processes *in* the organism is criticized and it is shown how traditional philosophical and psychological-scientific approaches results in asserting consciousness as something external to psychological and mental processes. It further will be discussed that the common denominator of traditional theories of subjectivity is individualism. Furthermore, traditional philosophical and psychological schools suffer

from a dualism that radically differentiates the individual and the social as incommensurable poles. All higher cognitive activities, according to Vygotsky, are socio-historical in essence; they undergo change as socio-historical conditions develop. Consciousness is a product of these socio-historically conditioned and determined processes and therefore it is social in its essence.

In the second section of the third chapter, regarding the notions of empathy and sympathy, the views of two major representatives of phenomenological school, Edith Stein and Max Scheler, are considered from a sociological and genetic-historical point of view. A close study of Stein's *On the Problem of Empathy* reveals both Stein's Husserlian presuppositions such as the quest for solid and unshakeable grounds of the most universal form of science and Stein's own original approach to the question of the self and the origins of this idea as well as the question of other selves. Stein introduces empirical sensations as constituent elements of the transcendental "I". In this way Steins seeks to resolve the problem of relating the empirical self, that is, the content of the self, to the transcendental self, which may be formulated as pure phenomenological form of the self. However, such a formulation seems circular and self-contradictory. It is self-contradictory because it assumes an empirical content that survives the phenomenological epoché, which supposedly brackets all that is empirical, hence non-essential. It is circular, because to get rid of this contradiction it has to presuppose the phenomenological-empirical content of the phenomenological experience to explain the phenomenological experience itself. Stein tends to resolve the question of other minds by proposing the pure "I," in contrast to Husserl's original formulation, as both the subject and the object. Stein's individualist and substantialist point of view is most explicitly explained in her

distinguishing the genetic processes of the formation of empathetic feeling and being in the state of empathy and in her defining the “I” as having a soul in the body. Thus, it will be shown that Stein’s formulation falls short in explaining the formation of the idea of the self and in agreement with other individualist approaches results in assuming the existence of a pure “I” or the substantial subject as the ultimate ground of the idea of subjectivity.

Furthermore, the views of Max Scheler about the nature of sympathy, the self and the other, explained in his *The Nature of Sympathy*, is studied. Scheler proposes the problem of the existence of other minds as the basic problem of any inquiry about the epistemology of social sciences. However, Scheler attributes a form of primordality to the “I” that is, in his view, the source of formation of any apprehension of other. Scheler’s point of departure from which he criticizes empiricism and what he calls the prejudices of phenomenology is the assertion of primordality and priority of the existence of the “I” that turns *my* particular experience to the *general* experience of the general “I” and hence bestows meaning on experience. However, it will be discussed that Scheler’s approach amounts to nothing but a shift in the problem where the previously assumed particular and personal “I” is replaced with a previously asserted general “I”. Moreover, it will be shown that Scheler’s view shares all individual subjectivist and atomistic prejudices that radically differentiate the individual and the societal with other forms of subjectivism.

The last section of the third chapter elaborates on Hume’s account of sympathy. Hume does not differentiate one’s own self from other selves qualitatively. On the other hand, Hume does not reduce the existence of the other self to a mode or an extension of

the existence of the “I”. Man is the most social animal that produces the idea of his self through his passions and sentiments. The social being of man, through the principle of sympathy, guarantees the functioning of the passions that are caused and agitated by riches that are provided to him in society.

It is my hope that I will be able to show the similarities as well as differences between, on the one hand, the sociological and historico-genetic stand of the Vygotsky School and the phenomenological approach, and on the other hand, the similarities and differences between the approaches of the aforementioned trends and the Humean approach to the question of the self.

Hume apparently refuses the existence of the self in Book I of his *Treatise*. However, in Book II and Book III he reintroduces the idea of the self as an entity which humans are most intimately aware of. The self of Book I, according to Hume, is related to thought and imagination whereas the self in Book II and Book III is related passions. Hume’s conceptualization of self as a bundle of perceptions is based on his radical non-substantialist position. Most Hume scholars, however, try to overcome this riddle by eliminating either the notion of the self that is related to thought and imagination or the concept of the self that is related to passions. Some others, however, find Hume’s account of the self not only unsatisfactory but also inconsistent and contradictory in essence.

Hume’s non-substantialist position seems to result in a radical rejection of the idea of subjectivity. Yet, it should be pointed that Hume’s empirical project rejects the substantiality of the subject and not its agency. The more Hume criticizes the idea of the substantial self, the more he distances himself from the Cartesian jargon of subjectivity. Hume considers the subject, similar to the substance, a linguistic convention, which is

produced by association of ideas. The subject designates a class of simple or complex ideas; it signifies a fiction that denotes the *supposed* simplicity and identity of entities (Hume 1967, 219). The subject has no reality beyond this linguistic conventionality; otherwise, it is an “unintelligible chimera”. Therefore, a philosophical inquiry that attributes some form of existence to substances, or substantiality to subjects, and goes beyond this linguistic convention is an incomprehensible endeavor. As far as the substance of the self is concerned, Hume discards this question as “absolutely unintelligible” (1967, 250).

The self is not a simple idea and it is impossible, according to Hume, to conjoin it with a simple and indivisible substance. It seems that in order to avoid confusion, Hume abandons the jargon of subjectivity. The self is an ideological/mental entity, a conceptual construct, and therefore it is socially produced. The “I” signifies the concept of the self; i.e., it is the name of this complex idea and thus is identical to the self. It does not designate any essential idea, neither a substantial core, nor a transcendental form. Rather, it denotes this perceptually formed complex idea.

The first section of the fourth and final chapter discusses Penelhum’s approach to Humean riddle of the self as an exemplary method toward resolving the issue. Penelhum’s resolution consists in relating the notion of epistemological self (the self as it regards thought or imagination) to the Cartesian cogito and the passionate self to some instinctive perspective. It will be discussed that far from resolving the Humean riddle such an approach presents a dualist Hume whose approach is no more than a reformulation of the Cartesian cogito model. Penelhum’s interpretation of the riddle of subjectivity is rooted in his individual subjectivist position that supposes that mind can

exist and act outside the societal realm. Such an interpretation is obviously in contrast with Hume's non-substantialist project since it gives way to conceptualizing an individual self whose existence depends on some atomic-internal essence.

This chapter proposes a solution to the riddle of subjectivity that is put forward by Hume. In other words, I draw a line from the sociological and historico-genetic approach to the question of consciousness and language represented by one of the most prominent figures of the Bakhtin Circle, V. N. Vološinov, to Hume's own consideration of this question and recent analytical and historico-sociological discussions around the Humean riddle of the self. I try to show that Hume's theory of the self is a prototype of the genetic-historical model. Hume's attributing of fictitiousness to the idea of the self does not signify the unreality of the existence of the self but designates its non-substantial texture. The self is an ideological product, which means that it is of mental and not of physical material. The idea of the self belongs to the realm of signs which means that the self signifies something other than some mysterious essence of itself. Hence follows the obstinate relationship between language and the self. Since consciousness belongs to the ideological realm it also is a social reality. Hume's rejection of the idea of the substantial self in Book I, his reintroducing the self in Book II and Book III of the *Treatise* as a part of the moral and sentimental realm presents the necessary clue towards resolution of the riddle of subjectivity.

Chapter One: Concepts of Selfhood

Descartes' (Non)-Thinking Thing

According to Descartes, everybody is equally endowed with reason and good sense, which means that everybody has a mind. Mistaken beliefs and inferences are not due to lack of reason but are the result of false methods of reasoning. Hence from the very outset Descartes identifies the mind with reason. Truth comes from reason, and self-consciousness, totally independent from the world, is introduced as an essential moment of truth. Since everybody is equally endowed with reason we can infer that every human being has a mind, by definition. Moreover, what distinguishes humans from other beasts and animals is reason/mind. As Descartes says, reason “is the only thing that constitutes us men and distinguishes us from the brutes” (Descartes 1967, 82).³ Since rational capacity amounts to a qualitative difference between humans and animals, we can conclude that reason is not an accident of the human species but is its form or essence. Descartes states that “[o]ur nature is constituted by thought alone, which is thus known earlier and more certainly than any corporeal thing” (*Principia Philosophiae*, 66- 67).

The methodology of the *Discourse* not only arrives at some general philosophical and metaphysical conclusions, but it also indicates the emergence of the notion of the individual self. Why is it important for Descartes to show that, from beginning to end, he has tried to conduct his own reasoning correctly? Or why should his personal discourse (*fable*) be of any interest to anybody? The answer is that the personal methodology of Descartes, first of all, signifies the shared essence of humanity, namely reason, and,

³ References are to *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, (in two volumes, translated into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967).

secondly, the rise of a new era which requires a personal yet universal approach to knowledge. Descartes gives evidence of this new credo in the following passage:

Our century seems to me as flourishing, and as fertile in great minds, as any which had preceded. And this made me take the liberty *of judging all others by myself* and of coming to the conclusion that there was no learning in the world such as I was formerly led to believe it to be. (1967, 83-4)

The immediate certainty of the personal, individual self, results in another principle of Cartesian philosophy which follows the immediate certainty of thought. Descartes' conception of the indubitability of the "I" represents a shift to the field of subjectivity. Descartes expresses these particular points of view as individualities. Hegel, in the aforementioned work, formulates this Cartesian tendency as follows: "Thought is the entirely universal, but not merely because I can abstract, but because 'I' is thus simple, self-identical" (1995, 228).

The existence of the "I," the subject of knowledge, is the only certain part of our knowledge. According to Descartes, the ability to doubt everything indicates the unshakeable consequence that there exists a thinking agent, the "I," whose existence is beyond doubt. Several results might be enumerated as the outcome of such reasoning. First, the uncertain existence of all objects of knowledge (i.e., things other than the "I") in contrast to the unmistakable existence of the "I" (i.e., the subject of knowledge) refers to the complete separation of thought and the object of thought. It is through thinking that the "I" differentiates itself from the object and becomes aware of this differentiation. As Descartes states, every human being is the observer of all objects. Every human being is the owner of his or her mind; he has a mind that is a self. Secondly, the existence of the "I" cannot be related to any sensual or perceptual activity, but must be considered the capacity (or the power) to think, which in turn can be reduced to an introspective

questioning of one's own self. The "I" is the locus where Being is determined. The connection between the "I" and the Being constitutes Primary Matter. Thirdly, it follows from the above that thinking appears as the essential aspect of the existence of the "I," or, more precisely, thought is the sole essence of the "I." Fourthly, what guarantees the certainty of the existence of the "I" is the impossibility of doubting the substantiality of thought. For instance, in the case of sensory perception, misperceiving or making a mistake is always a possibility. Upon the basis of these results one can see that the subjective aspect becomes more permanent and even primary in the constitution of the world. Such primacy indicates the absolute independence of an individual self from other selves. The solitary existence of the "I" is the immediate consequence of such an absolute, subjective mode of being. The existence of the self depends on nothing but its own essence. Such a solitary existence also suggests the independence of the self from the body. After all, it is through the body and bodily abilities—in other words the body as machine—that we perceive and sense. The human body is merely a mechanical organization that is ruled by laws determining the relations and the movements of physical bodies. We are thus obliged to conceptualize body mechanically as a result of the conceptualization of the self as an essentially thinking thing.

The skeptic, Pierre-Daniel Huet raised serious criticisms of Cartesian philosophy and methodology in his *Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae*. According to Huet, the very formula, "I think, therefore I am," begs the question. What is the "I" if not something that exists? Descartes asks whether he exists and he assumes from the very outset that he does exist. I am thinking [ego cogito] means that I am (I exist) as a thing which thinks [ego sum cogitans]. I am (a thing that is thinking), therefore I am. It is obvious that the

Cartesian argument is circular and begs the question (1689/2003, 73). If one doubts that one exists, why should one not also doubt that one thinks? The basis of Descartes' argument about the certainty of the "I think" —where not only the existence of the "I" but the being of its activity (thinking) is presupposed—is that the "I" exists. Moreover, if everything is to be doubted why should the rules of logic be exempted from this process of doubting?

Huet argues that the proposition, "I am thinking," cannot be the first notion upon which a solid philosophy can be constructed. "I am thinking" is inferred from the universal proposition "Everything that thinks exists" which is a proposition Descartes claims to come by the natural light. I exist cannot be inferred from "I think, therefore I exist." Hence, "I am thinking" cannot be the first notion.⁴

Another criticism that is raised by Huet concerns Descartes' equivocal stand regarding the nature of thought. It is not clear if thought represents an activity of the mind or could be called a state of being. It seems that Descartes takes thought (thinking) to be an action. If this is the case, then the proposition "I think," will read "I think that I think," because, for a thought-action to happen, three things should exist: the active/affected mind, the thing affecting the mind (object of thought) and the affection/action itself. In the case of "I think," what can the object of the act of thinking be other than thought? Hence the proposition properly becomes "I think that I think" (1689/2003, 82-3).

However, such an expression is defective. In "I think that I think," the second "I think" is the object of the first whereas they both are supposed to be the actions of the same faculty

⁴ Note that the issue regarding the nature of the inference "I think, therefore I am" is still a topic of discussion within contemporary Cartesian scholarship. For instance, see Markie's point with regard to weak and strong intuitions, which is discussed below.

and/or same agent (1689/2003, 84). Descartes' unclarity in this area, Huet argues, forces us into a position where it is not possible to decide whether thought is an action or a state of being. If the first and the second 'thinking' are one and the same, then the Cartesian presupposition that one has immediate access to one's own self becomes dubious. The reason for this is that, in order to gain access to a former action, namely "I was thinking," the self has to go through a medium which is the present thinking. This results in the oddity that "I *am* thinking" and "I *was* thinking" are not the same action. Moreover, such a situation is contradictory to the Cartesian notion of the self that holds that one is supposed to have immediate, internal access to it. If the two are maintained as different actions, then the Cartesian supposition that the self is complete and self-sufficient collapses.

Huet also rejects Cartesian belief in the disembodied, immaterial mind from an Epicurean point of view. He reformulates Descartes' questions about the nature of thinking and of mind: "It is a man which thinks, and that man is an animated body, saying and making use of reason, and that wherever, and only wherever, there is a body of this sort, there is a man; so long as the body lives and moves so does the man" (1689/2003, 138). The contradiction in Descartes position, Huet continues, is based upon his dismissal of the body. Descartes provides the way to the certain knowledge of the mind by means of mind. He assumes that the mind is the proper instrument for knowing the truth. However, prior to this knowledge he should know the nature of the mind. Therefore Descartes' argument begs the question since, according to his line of argument, in order to know the nature of the mind, one should know the nature of the mind. Moreover, Descartes' certainty with regard to the mind's ability to know the truth

contradicts his position that doubts the certainty of all things. Therefore Descartes takes something as certain which, logically, he should have rejected as being uncertain.

Activity which, in the case of Descartes, is the act of thinking, will be at best an accident, an accessory, a reminder of the mind's existence.⁵ But, for an empiricist like Hume, there can be no concept of self prior to activity. Like any other notion, the concept of self should also be, logically speaking, derived from a particular mode of action, whereas the concept, factually speaking, should arise simultaneously with it. More precisely, the emergence of the self will follow the realization of a particular mode of action. Descartes simply attributes thinking to the mind without explaining either the nature of the mind or the nature of thinking. There is an element of circularity in such reasoning. On the one hand, the mind is defined in terms of a certain activity. On the other hand, the very same mind is used to explain what this "thinking" signifies, be it the activity of the mind as such or its state of existence or its mere state of being.

The importance of the Cartesian argument for the existence of the self is not simply a logical inference based upon the impossibility of the non-existence of a thinking thing. If such were the case, one could truly dismiss the originality of Descartes' position. The importance of his position is the fact that he has an answer to the question concerning the quality of the self: "*I am a thinking thing.*" The originality of Descartes does not lie in his *cogito ergo sum*, but in what the verb (action) *cogito* signifies: thinking. As Weinberg states: "The *cogito* is at once a reflexive discernment of thought by itself and an immediate reference of existence by way of the discernment of a

⁵ "[T]hinking as a means to acting is itself a species of action, purposive action. It is not like ideas just passing through the mind, as in the association of ideas. It is doing something purposive inside the head, usually as a means to doing something outside the head" (Armstrong 1999, 118).

necessary connection between this case of a thought and this case of existence”
(Weinberg 1977, 90).

The concept of the thinking thing emphasizes one’s qualitative difference from all other beings. The question then is not how my matter is related to my form, but how my qualitatively individual existence is related to the universal concept of mind as primary substance in the Cartesian sense. If thought is considered a universal, then one is forced back to the position that considers individuality an accident in relation to the universal essence, which is thought or mind. On the contrary, if we consider thinking a mode of activity, then we would be able to attribute thought –as the outcome of the process of thinking—to the individual person. On the other hand, if we consider the mind or thought a universal concept, our argument will be a circular one. We will be forced to admit the individuality of the individual not upon the basis of one’s position or qualitatively (and individually) different acts of thinking, but by simply claiming that one *is* an individual. Descartes states that: “Substances have several attributes without which they cannot be thought. Thus thought constitutes the absolute attribute of mind. Thought is the quality of mind” (*Principia Philosophiae*, quoted in Hegel 1995, 245). However, the mind is the “I,” the state of being which is deduced, either immediately or not, from thought. Hence, it is a contradiction to present the substratum of something as its attribute.⁶ The tension that arises in Descartes’ position is a result of his ambiguously taking thought to be, on the one hand, a mode of action and, on the other hand, a state of pure being. Descartes

⁶ Galen Strawson in his book *Mental Reality* explains this ambiguity as the logically necessary result of the Cartesian position that does not distinguish between thought as an attribute of the mind and thought as a substance. Descartes’ view on thought and its relation to the mind is a form of strict idealism (1994, 111).

cannot escape the classical matter-as-the-principle-of-individuation formulation while insisting on the existence of a universal mind.

Earlier it was mentioned that certainty is the central problem of Cartesian epistemology. Descartes' claim of certainty is based upon foundationalism. Foundationalism is the belief in self-evident, basic truths upon which other truths are erected. The foundational sources of certainty for Descartes are deduction and intuition. Markie defines deduction as "the inference of something as following necessarily from some other propositions which are known with certainty;" whereas intuition is "the faculty by which we gain the initial certainties that make deduction possible" (1992/1998, 53-4). Intuition does not involve any inferences. Descartes' response to the question 'what is the "I"?' is an intuitive one. In other words, the formulation "I think, therefore I am" is not an inference but a basic, primary intuition. However, it seems that Descartes himself admits that the cogito argument should be based upon the knowledge that "whatever thinks is a thinking thing, which is called 'I'" (Markie 1992/1998, 57-8). This is to say that, from the awareness of thinking, one cannot infer "I am thinking," but only that "thinking is taking place" (Huet 1689/2003, 90-1). We need a further inference, a syllogism, which shows that whatever is thinking is the "I." This tension is based upon Descartes' equivocal position with regard to the nature of thinking, that is, whether thought signifies a process of thinking or just an architectonic or a finalized structure which he calls the mind (Hegel 1995, 229). Rodis-Lewis refers to this tension as the "ambivalent Cartesian theory of the *idea*" (1990/1998, 203-4). Idea, on the one hand, refers to some mode of my thought, while, on the other hand, it points to some extra-

mental reality (i.e., an immaterial soul).⁷ Moreover, such tension results from the fact that Descartes is bound to language to an extent to which he is not aware. Descartes' use of language in the "I think, therefore I am" is therefore indispensable.⁸ As Lacan puts it, "the *cogito*, the 'I *think*,' cannot be detached from the fact that [Descartes] can formulate it only by *saying* it to us, implicitly – a fact that he forgets" (Lacan 1977, 36, quoted in Paliyenko 1999, 152).⁹

According to Descartes the "things we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true" (1967, 102). The question that immediately arises is: Do I clearly and distinctly perceive my own self? If the answer is affirmative, how do I perceive this self which is my very own? Descartes' response is based upon a sharp distinction between the senses and thought, which is the necessary consequence of the distinction he makes between mind and body. Basically we perceive bodies but not the mind. However, even in the case of the former, perception is not realized by the senses, but by intellect alone. Perception is not merely seeing or touching a thing, but is also understanding it. Hence, I cannot perceive anything more easily and more evidently than my own mind. To perceive is to possess the idea of what is perceived, and hence I possess the idea of my own self; I

⁷ Huet has already emphasized this ambivalence and the confusion in Descartes' use of the notion of idea (1689/2003, 124).

⁸ "We do not put what we think or mean into words; our meaning is only realised in the words. To think what one is going to say is to say it to oneself" (Cowley 1968, 155).

⁹ Huet's comment concerning the case has similar connotations with Lacan's criticism of the Cartesian position. Huet not only rejects the possibility of a non-linguistic, private thought or idea regarding the proposition 'I think, therefore I am,' but he states the formation of the ideas of thinking and existence as threshold phenomena. Since there cannot be a private language, there cannot be private reasoning, and hence no private thought or idea (1689/2003, 93).

possess it, I do not *imagine* it, *neither* do I perceive it through the senses; it is evident that I do understand my own self.

The Cartesian thinking thing is not a thing that thinks; the *Cogito* is silent (Cowley 1968, 154-5) and is a thing that possesses the idea of thinking, i.e., it is a mere thought that corresponds to the idea of a substance, namely the mind. Hence, the Cartesian self is not an agent of thought but only *exists* in a static or pure sense.

The Cartesian process of formation of (the notion of) the self turns then into the process of becoming conscious of its existence (its substance). It is thought that constitutes the entire essence of the soul. Thinking is an inborn permanent process which is infused with the body, that is, it starts even before one is born. The mind, as a thought that has never been thought, is no-body's thought, hence no-body's mind. The affirmation of the existence of mind in such a state of stillness excludes the possibility of the existence of other minds. Other humans, then, are mere material bodies. As Bordo and Moussa state: "In pronouncing the *cogito*, Descartes inscribes it within a 'system of deductions and protections,' where self identity cannot possibly exist, where identity always presupposes an Other (madness in this case)" (1999, 287). Matter serves as the ultimate other for the Cartesian mind, whereas God serves as the absolute Other who relativizes the existence of the "I" as well as the knowledge the "I" is supposed to possess. Thus, *cogito ergo sum* ends up being only the proof of the existence of the absolute Other, God, which is the identity of thinking and Being, and who, in turn, relativizes and dissolves the being of the subject.

Gassendi: The Tranquil Self

Gassendi is one of the major figures of seventeenth century philosophy and a prominent materialist who raises a comprehensive and highly original critique of Cartesian philosophy. The notion of representation is located at the center of his critique. Gassendi poses the following problem for Descartes. If the mind is representing an extended thing, the mind itself should be an extended entity. But Descartes claims that the mind is a purely incorporeal thing. Hence, the Cartesian mind is unable to represent matter's essential nature, extension. Gassendi tends to resolve this dilemma by asserting that the mind is not an "essentially unextended, unshaped, unlocated thing" (Lennon 1993, 108). Gassendi resolves the first horn of the dilemma by rejecting the resemblance model of idea and the thing represented, and instead suggests a causal model. There is a regular, (even if mechanically inexplicable) causal relationship between the ideas of the things in mind and the things represented. In order for any idea to rise up in the mind, it should be first printed in the mind as a representation of something that is presented to the external senses. Even the emergence of the idea of a triangle in the mind of a child follows the same rule (Gassendi 1972, 257-8).

Gassendi's first criticism against Cartesianism regarding the relationship between mind and body resembles Huet's Epicurean criticism. We cannot simply infer that the mind does the thinking by only stating that it is the mind that thinks. On the contrary, Descartes should demonstrate that the idea of the body's capability to think is contradictory. But he simply asserts that the body cannot think and claims it as proven. The Cartesian argument begs the question. The problem is how can the sensible image of (extended) body penetrate into the mind (the *subjectum*) which lacks extension? "An idea does not seem to be totally lacking in extension, but if it does not lack extension, how

would you be the subject in which it occurs if you were unextended? How will you adapt it to your nature?” (1972, 270) The question is related to the larger problem of the relation between mind and body. If the two are such distinct and separate substances, how do they interact? How can the mind move the body? (1972, 273)

Gassendi takes experience as the only source of knowledge. There cannot be any intuitions like those the Cartesians claim since there are no innate ideas. Some scholars see Gassendi as a closet materialist who used methods of dissimulation similar to those of Boyle and the Encyclopedists. According to Gassendi ideas exist in no other way than as operations of the understanding that abstracts them from individual things. Thus ideas are general notions based upon such abstractions and that is how they are applicable universally to individual things (Gassendi 1972, 206-7).

Gassendi insists on the existence of an immortal, incorporeal soul in order to justify and legitimize his appropriation of Epicurean atomism. However, there are elements in his consideration of the soul that reveals him to be a materialist.¹⁰ For him the soul is an accumulation of certain atoms and is not the form of the body, as in Aristotle. In this sense, Gassendi inherits Descartes’ substantialist approach to the self.

The state of tranquility is achievable only in an ideal sense and through the ultimate good. Unless tranquility is acquired, the soul or self will be in a state of constant change. Given this, the self lacks self-identity. It is only in the state of complete tranquility that the human subject acquires the awareness of being a self-same entity beyond the multitude of unique appearances. Images and ideas alone will not give us the knowledge of the essence of things. Gassendi believes in the existence of essences. In this

¹⁰ Bloch, for instance, considers Gassendi a materialist. Osler, too, admits the plausibility of this. For example, see Osler 1994, 60.

sense, he can be considered a substantialist. However, his empirical epistemology, ironically, pushes him towards rejecting, if not the existence, then the comprehensibility of substances. Therefore, though unintentionally, Gassendi anticipates the emergence of the Humean critique of the substantial self as well as the Humean notion of the self as an accumulation of distinct perceptions formed by habit.

Locke: The Form of the Self

Both in the metaphysical and epistemological spheres, Locke fought on two main fronts. On the one hand, he had to deal with the remnants of Scholastic Aristotelianism. On the other hand, along with Newton's *Principia*, he addressed the issues which later came to be known as the battle between rationalists and empiricists.

We are furnished with the ideas through experience and we form our knowledge via experience too. Experience is that upon which "all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself" (Locke 1975 104). There are two aspects of reality toward which experience is directed: the external sensible object, and the internal operations of the mind. For Locke, there is no qualitative difference between the knowledge of external things that is based upon ideas and the knowledge or the awareness of mind (the self) that is founded upon the operations of this mind. Yolton states: "The empiricist program has been designed to show that all conscious experiences 'come from' unconscious encounters with the environment, and that all intellectual contents (concepts, ideas) derive from some conscious experimental component" (1963/1968, 40).

Locke's claim is directly opposed to the Cartesian argument, which has it that the sensations that are caused by a piece of melting wax require interpretation by the intellect

via the innate, non-sensory idea of matter. Another important difference between Locke and Descartes is the conception of our awareness of the operations of our minds (i.e., self-reflection). For Locke, in contrast to Descartes, self-reflection is simply a part of experience.

External experience has a logical as well as a physical priority over self-reflection, or the mind's awareness of its own operations. Self-awareness follows from, and comes after, the impressions that are imposed upon the human mind by external entities. The concepts of the mind arising from self-reflection are not innate, but are the consequences of the ideas of the external things that are printed upon the mind starting from birth (Locke 1975, 106). Humans become aware of the outside world prior to becoming conscious of their inner impressions. They become aware of the external sensations prior to the operations of their minds which include contemplation. Self-awareness, therefore, requires that the mind be acquainted with the world of objects that are the exterior activity and the affections of the mind.¹¹

Locke is aware that the soul cannot think perpetually, just as it cannot perceive so. The relation between the soul and thinking and between the soul and perceiving is not similar to the relation between the body and extension, where extension is the essence of

¹¹ "The soul does not think before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on. The mind first and foremost is involved with situations caused by external objects. The mind employs itself in these operations which can be called perceptions, remembering, considering, reasoning, etc." (Locke 1975, 117). Also Armstrong states: "Perceiving is first-order representation, a representation of the world around us, our own body, and the relations in which our body stands to the world. It is, of course, a highly selective representation, and it can be erroneous. When we are *aware* of having perceptions we are having second-order awareness: Awareness of awareness, representations of representations. The second-order awareness is *also* selective, and there can be, for instance, perceptions that we are not aware of having (subliminal perceptions)" (1999, 119).

spatiality. Rather, it is like the relation between the body and motion. “The perception of the *Ideas* being to the soul, what motion is to the body, not its Essence, but one of its Operations” (Locke 1975, 107). The soul is not always active just as body is not always in a perpetual state of motion. To be a person is not to think but to be conscious of one’s thoughts and other operations of the mind.

The Lockean consideration of thinking suggests that the mind is not a ready-made substance that has certain properties and/or qualifications. Rather, it appears to be an entity that evolves towards understanding. It is by the permanent proximity of mind to ideas that the mind starts to distinguish the familiar from the non-familiar. Through continuous contact with ideas, a person forms the idea of objects and other people by receiving their impressions upon his mind. At the level of experiencing external objects and simple ideas then, the mind is passive. It cannot avoid the impressions that affect it just as a mirror cannot avoid reflecting the object opposing it (Locke 1975, 118).¹² It is through awareness of this external source of knowledge that humans form a second source, namely self-reflection as awareness of the operations of the mind. In this latter case, the mind is not only affected but is active.¹³

¹² According to Yolton and Pierce empiricism cannot be criticized for considering the mind as passive. To the contrary, it might be criticized for assuming it more active than what it possibly is (*Thinking and Experience*, p. 199, Yolton 1961/1968, 41).

¹³ “Locke has shown how all ideas arise *after* experience, that is after the organism has encountered the environment and been stimulated into neurophysiological and mental activity.” He never “claimed that ideas arise in the organism in the absence of mental operations, (although some ideas) require relatively few and simple mental operations” (Yolton 1961/1968, 48-9). However, Yolton’s consideration of the activity of mind is problematic and distorts Locke’s approach to the passivity and activity of the mind. Passivity of the mind, according to Locke, does not correspond to lack of neurophysiological activities, just as the mind’s activity does not simply mean the presence of such processes. The mind’s passivity, with regard to initial experiences that involve external objects, signifies lack of consciousness and not lack of mental activity.

Memory is of central importance to form knowledge. “Memory is the storehouse or our ideas” (Locke 1975, 150). Memory is the constant awareness of ideas by virtue of repeating and fixing them in the mind. Yet memories are in a constant process of dissolution and weakening, and unless the mind has ideas repeatedly impressed upon it, it will lose them (Locke 1975, 151). Since Locke ends up relating personal identity to consciousness and to memory, it is possible to say that, if our understanding is not repeatedly and constantly presented with the idea of self-identity, it would lose this idea.

To understand what personal identity consists in we must understand what the word ‘person’ designates. A person is a “thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places” (Locke 1975, 335). This he does only with consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking. We are our own selves through the awareness or consciousness of our acts of perception and sensation. The question here is not whether the self resides in the same or in different substances, because the core of personal identity is consciousness (Atherton 1983, 274). The limit of such an identity is as far as the memory of a person can reach back in time. As far as memory can reach to those thoughts and feelings of the past, so these same thoughts and feelings become part of personal identity; so it is in this way that the person as he was in the past is one with the person as he is in the present.

However, the following question may be raised: since no one ever has a complete memory of his past; how can one’s personal identity be complete. This question,

Yolton fails to distinguish between different senses in which Locke has used the word ‘idea.’ Locke’s notion of idea stands not only for sensory items but also for intellectual items such as thoughts or concepts. This is not an ambiguity; rather Locke “holds as a matter of theory that the mental items that come into mind, raw, in sense perception are – after a certain kind of processing—the very items that constitute the basic materials of thinking, believing, and the like” (Bennett 1994, 91).

however, tends to equate personal identity with some finalized and thus some substantial core, hence falls short of understanding the nature of personal identity. As was mentioned earlier, according to Locke, personal identity does not consist in any substance, be it matter or mind, but in consciousness (and memory) (Locke 1975, 336). Although Locke uses the terms 'memory' and 'consciousness' interchangeably, we should be aware that there is a difference between the two.¹⁴ It is not thinking which makes me the self that I am; thought is not the essence of self. It was mentioned earlier that, for Locke, thinking is an activity of the mind. Memory, too, is another form of the mind's activity; it is the recurrence of ideas without perception, since it is a mode of thinking. Consciousness, on the other hand, is that which accompanies thinking. It represents the state of awareness with regard to the operations of the mind.¹⁵ Locke states: "It being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive" (1975, 335). Hence, consciousness must accompany the act of remembering, too.¹⁶

¹⁴ Antony Flew suggests a similar point, yet he draws a different consequence from it; he maintains that "consciousness is not used by Locke clearly and constantly" (1951/1968, 159). On the contrary, he claims that mainly consciousness is equal to memory and remembrance. However, such a reading is reductionist and cannot give a full account of Locke's response to the question of personal identity. There are numerous instances where Locke uses the term 'consciousness' in a completely different sense than what the term 'memory' signifies. For instance, "[t]hinking consists in being conscious that one thinks" where "Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man's own Mind" (Locke 1975, 115).

¹⁵ "One is conscious of one's current self by being conscious of what is now thinking and doing. This does not in any way involve memory" (McCann 1999, 77).

¹⁶ McCann's formulation of Locke's theory of personal identity suggests a reading that runs parallel to mine. In the case of plants and animals the notion of life serves as the principle that organizes the parts as the causal basis of the living thing. In the case of personal identity, consciousness serves as such a principle: "Simply put, consciousness is the life of the persons. Less simply put, consciousness makes for personal identity in just the way life makes for animal or vegetable identity" (McCann 1999, 75-6).

Reducing consciousness to mere memory-ideas results in forcing Locke into a position he is critical of, namely, the identification of mind with its activity, be it thought or memory. The accompanying consciousness can be formulated as the general form of the mind's activities in contrast to the content of the mind's operations. In the case of memory, the memory-ideas form the content and the consciousness of the existence of such ideas; it is what makes possible the apprehension of such ideas as memory-ideas. "Consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes everyone to be, what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things" (Locke 1975, 335). Therefore, it is the constancy and identity of the form of memory, i.e., the continuity of consciousness, that provides the constancy of self-identity. Hence, the change in the content of memory cannot result in the disappearance of personal identity. That a "philosophizing" cat is a cat, be it an intelligent one, and not a person, is further evidence showing that Locke differentiates between the content and form of consciousness. The idea of man, to which the term 'man' is attributed, "is nothing else but an animal of such a certain *Form*" (Locke 1975, 333, italics added). Thus, Reid's criticism of Locke, which tries to show that the unavoidable fluctuation of memory would result in the dissolution of identity of the self, heads in the wrong direction, since it has not taken the difference between form and content of memory into account (Reid 1785/1975, 109-110). Personal identity can subsist in different substances as long as it carries the same consciousness. Butler's criticism against Locke, too, misses the point since he suggests substantial sameness as the principle that guarantees identity of the person. It is true that what the person remembers at one moment might be different from what that person will remember at another. However, what is constant and what keeps the

identity of a person continuous, is not *what* he remembers but the fact that he is *conscious* that *he* remembers. Each and every time a person recalls something the conscious “I,” the general name for the self,¹⁷ accompanies this activity of the mind.

Personal identity can subsist in different substances as long as it carries the same consciousness.¹⁸ The substance might change over time, yet the person would be the same person given the continuous consciousness of his own personality.

Loss of memory results in loss of identity; yet one should be aware that the absence of memory does not correspond to the absence of the content of memory-ideas. Memory is in fact subject to constant fluctuation. However, regardless of this, we still speak of the identity of a person as being continuous and constant. Rather, loss of memory indicates loss of consciousness. Locke’s example regarding juridical practices that may exempt the madman from being punished, and furthermore, the English expression, “one is not himself,” are in agreement with such a reading. Earlier in his *Essay* Locke speaks of the madman as being someone who makes incorrect inferences and incorrect propositions. He suggests that the madman maintains his identity although the content of his mind is confused whereas, with respect to the idiot, it is non-existent. What the English expression suggests is not a literal lack of memory but a lack of

¹⁷ Locke clearly states that “[p]erson is the name for the self” (1975, 346).

¹⁸ “The identity of substance is not required for identity in every case” (Noonan 1978, 345). Therefore, Butler’s criticism against Locke misses the point since he suggests substantial sameness as the principle that guarantees identity of the person and supposes that Locke’s account of personal identity works upon the same supposition. Butler infers that consciousness of being the same *person* is consciousness of being the same *substance*, or the same property of a substance, where, in the latter case, the constancy and sameness of the property is the sign of constancy and sameness of the substance. The substance of the self, for Butler, is something like the truth, pure and permanent, and perhaps it is the soul. For details, see Butler’s “Of Personal Identity” reprinted in *Personal Identity*, ed. John Perry, 99-105.

consciousness, or a lack of access to the content of the mind, which is a sign of a lack of communication between the content of the consciousness, that is, the memory-ideas, the acts and habits of the person, and the person himself. Whether consciousness is related to some immaterial substance or not, it determines personal identity. Hence, the diversity and identity of selves does not result from the diversity of substances, but it is determined only by identity of consciousness. Consequently, any substance that is united within the vital unity of our consciousness is a part of our selves. Upon the separation of man and his consciousness, that is to say, the moment that he is not communicating with his consciousness, the latter is no longer a part of the self. It follows that ‘person’ signifies the very conscious self that exists now. “Where-ever a man finds, what he calls *himself*, there I think another may say is the same *person*. It is a Forensic Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery” (Locke 1975, 346).

Locke’s formulation of experience is limited and restricted.¹⁹ He shares the opinion that perceiving is, in one way or another, having a duplicate image of something that enters into the mind. Locke states: “Our senses, conversant about particular sensible Objects, do *convey into the Mind*, several distinct *Perceptions* of things.... [T]hey from external objects convey to the mind what produces there those *perceptions*” (Locke 1975,

¹⁹ Yolton suggests that there is an “extended concept of experience” to be found in Locke, which covers both sensation and introspection. Apparently, if such an extended picture is accepted, then the claim that the Lockean notion of experience is limited does not hold. However, in the Lockean framework, most of the ideas that are formed out of experience in its extended sense should be traced back to encounters with the physical environment. As Yolton admits “consciousness for Locke arises out of unconscious encounters with the environment, *but not all mental contents are traceable to some experiential component*” (1961/1968, 50, italics added). It is in this sense that Locke’s notion of experience is limited and restricted, since it reduces experience to the organism’s encounter with the physical environment and leaves no room to include other intellectual activities such as thought experiments, reading fiction, etc.

105). Although the mind is active when forming complex ideas, yet, in the most general way and on a larger scale, it is passive. The mind simply obeys the orderliness and regulations that are dictated to it by rules of objectivity, as applicable to physical entities. Locke takes existence as individual – be it the object or the self—as granted. His method tends to show how substantiality results from subjective, individual perceptions of objects. Lockean experience does not apply concepts to or reflect them onto objectivity; on the contrary, concepts are simply to be derived from a multitude of singular experiences. For Locke, to know something by experience, ideally, means to know, to perceive, to conceive, or to get acquainted with every single instance of that thing. Locke does not regard the active, willful aspect of experience. He simply relies on the empirical.²⁰ The question is: how do we come to conceptualize individual, distinct experiences as being experience as such?

Although Locke distinguishes experience from abstraction, yet both rely on the senses, i.e., on the impressions that are imprinted on the mind from outside. Simple ideas come directly and immediately from sense-impressions; complex ones, on the other hand, come from the operations of the mind. Complex ideas express something in the thing that is experienced yet they cannot completely exhaust it. Locke proposes that we do not know the essence of things that is supposed to be reflected in simple ideas; what we do

²⁰ I am thankful to Pinar Sumer who brought this general shortcoming of the empiricist conception of experience –which is widely borne out by common sense too—to my attention. Cowley, similarly, speaks of this defective feature of empiricism: “Empiricists have discussed at length how sense-experience should be spoken of and described, and have distinguished the meanings of terms in which we do so, but remarkably few have discussed our sense-experience of language, and this is intimately connected with the fact that, from Hume to Ayer, the sense-experience they discuss is over-whelmingly visual.... Our sense-experience, on this view, does not include our hearing funny stories, threats, songs, voices like saws, loving murmurs, or witty remarks” (1968, 150).

know is the form of the things that are inferred from the nominal essence of things, which is mediated through complex ideas. Locke's major concern, as Hegel expresses it, is "to describe the *manner* in which thought accepts what is given to it" (1995, 310); he deals with the forms of attaining knowledge, i.e., his major concern is to attain the forms of things.

Locke's formalism resonates in his consideration of the notion of personal identity. What makes the identity is the form of the thing in question. What makes a bridge is the form of the bridge that perhaps may be named 'bridge-ness,' so is the case with the identity of plants and animals (as the organization of the parts towards nourishing and conserving the whole). The formation of an oak, from the time it is a seed to the point it becomes a tree, indicates that there exists a form of this particular oak tree regardless of its age, which is reflected in the perception of the organization of it.²¹ In the case of personal identity, the form is represented by consciousness that accompanies thought and other operations of the mind. Locke is successful in rejecting the existence of innate ideas; however, his own methodology pushes him toward adopting a Platonic-Aristotelian position with regard to the question of identity.²² In contrast to Kant who

²¹ "Although Locke's notions of substance and matter are so manifestly unaristotelian, something like Aristotle's *substantial form* holds a prominent place in his thought, at least with respect to living creatures" (Noonan 1978, 344). However, I believe that such forms are traceable back to material (non-living) structures, as is the case of a bridge whose parts are constantly replaced.

²² Antony Flew introduces a number of sources of Locke's mistake in formulating the question of personal identity. One source of his mistake is "the assumption that there is some real essence of personal identity, that it is possible to produce a definition and a definition furthermore which can guard us against every threat of future linguistic indecision" (1951/1968, 178). Earlier Flew suggests that the root of such a mistake is Locke's "Platonic-Cartesian conviction that people essentially are incorporeal spirits" and that Locke "takes for granted that people are souls; which, presumably, conceivably could thus transmigrate" (1951/1978, 169).

refers the existence of the forms, including the form of consciousness, to the transcendental self, Locke does not supply any explanation about the origin of these forms. It seems that, unless he admits their independent existence, this question must remain unanswered.

Chapter Two: Post-Humean Responses to the Riddle of Subjectivity

*Kant: The Transcendental Twist*²³

Kant considers subjectivity in a twofold manner. On the one hand, there is the empirical self, and on the other hand, there stands the transcendental subject as the principle of the unity of experience. Kant claims that there must be a transcendental ground of the empirical self.

A major problem with Kant's view is that he does not sufficiently support his claim about the existence of such a subject other than saying that the transcendental unity of apperception is a necessary condition of experience. Kant criticizes Hume for simply assuming that the experiences of an empirical subject are sufficient for it to form the idea of the self, and presuming that the idea of self is the inductive outcome of personal experiences. But this last criticism may be retorted on Kant himself.

The idea of a transcendental subject may be regarded as the liquidation of the idea of subjectivity. Kant's model may be intended as a theory of subjectivity which is impersonal and non-atomistic and excludes individualism. But, this model fails to constitute the factually existing person as subject.

Hume's attack on the idea of self as a substance is part of his refusal to countenance ideas of substance and essence. Contrary to Hume, Kant affirms the applicability of these categories within the bounds of the sensible world. Kant holds that, if we stick to the Humean position, there will be no way of demonstrating our knowledge of the sensible world. Kant likewise affirms the existence of a transcendental self that underlies the aforementioned bundle of perceptions. In other words, Kant maintains that

²³ A longer form of this section was presented in the *Kant Seminar: Critical Studies of Kant Philosophy*, which was organized by the *Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy* and was held December 18-20, 2004.

the Humean notion of the self is not realizable unless there already is a self which underlies this or that particular bundle.²⁴ The self-activity of such a subject combines the manifold of representations. It is clear even at this stage that Kant's reformulation of the question of subjectivity requires a dual existence of the self; i.e., two distinct subjects; the transcendental and the empirical. The perceptions of the latter are always changing. As Kant states: "there can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which *precedes* all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of object is *alone* possible" (Kant 1787/1929, A 107; emphasis added). According to Kant both Cartesianism and empiricism lack such a necessary distinction between these two modes of the existence of the self. Empiricism acknowledges only the empirical self and its self-activity. Cartesianism and rationalism hold to a confused definition of the transcendental self that reduces its existence to a substance, which, for Kant, must remain unknowable.

We should note that for Kant this unity of apperception is not simply another subject, it is the *consciousness* of being a subject: "Pure apperception or the original apperception is the self-consciousness which while producing the representation 'I think' cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation" (Kant 1787/1929, B 132f). One's representations stand united in the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Kant also characterizes the empirical self in terms of consciousness (Kant 1787/1929, B 133f). Self-awareness is present as a constitutive element of subjectivity whether in its transcendental or empirical mode. The distinction Kant has in mind is probably intended to be a solution to Hume's "bundle" problem. As Kant states: "the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and

²⁴ Penelhum refers to this problem as "MacNabb's Hexameter" (2000, 51).

without relation to the identity of the subject” (Kant 1787/1929, B 133). What seems to differentiate the transcendental subject and the empirical self is the analytical self-identity of the former in contradistinction to the diversity of the latter. The transcendental subject is not the consequence of having representations of the sensible world, nor the result of the “I think,” but the necessary condition of bringing these representations together: “That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with another, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another ... and am conscious of the synthesis of them” (Kant 1787/1929, B 133f).

This original unity of consciousness conjoins the representations and bestows identity upon the ever-in-flux bundle of perceptions. Quassim Cassam, inspired by Kant’s views, nevertheless tries to show that there are similarities between Kant’s and Hume’s accounts of the self. He regards Hume’s bundle theory as a form of reductionism, which involves impersonalization of subjectivity (1989, 72-4). But may not Kant’s transcendental self also be regarded as a form of reductionism? Cassam does not think so, because for Kant the unity of experience *requires* the transcendental unity of the subject, whereas empiricism assumes a conception of experience as experience of an objective spatial world, which Kant seeks to explain. As Cassam states:

Kant’s account of what unites diverse simultaneously or successively occurring experiences in a single consciousness incorporates two elements: firstly, the subject must be capable of ascribing these experiences to himself as *his* experiences; and secondly, the subject must be aware, or potentially aware, of the numerical identity of that to which the different experiences are ascribed. (1989, 77-8)

However, such a strategy only shifts the feeling of circularity. The existence of the transcendental, impersonal subject is simply presupposed. The possibility of ascription of different experiences to the same subject or the same “I” is supposed to be what unites

these different experiences as experiences that belong to one particular subject. Cassam acknowledges that Kant's account of subjectivity requires the existence of an "I" that can abstract from experiences as states of a subject and ascribe them to the "I think".

However, even in this formulation the existence of the abstracting, transcendental subject is presupposed. Cassam's Kantian argument can be restated in the following syllogistic form: if there is a unity of experience then there should be a subject that provides such a unity. There is unity of experience; therefore, there exists such a pre-experiential subject.

Cassam considers Hume's bundle theory, at least its revised form as presented by Derek Parfit, to be a form of reductionism. Reductionism sees a person as consisting in a body and a brain together with a series of deeds and mental states (Cassam 1989, 75-6). Such a reductionist account of subjectivity appears to be a form of error-theory that considers the subject to be essentially a grammatical or linguistic entity. Thus, the subject, in its non-linguistic sense, is a pseudo-entity. It may be thought that Hume's account is definitely an impersonal account of the subject. However, Hume never rejects the idea that people exist. What Hume rejects is a substantialist account of the self. For Hume the *substratum* that the idea of substance signifies is absolutely of no importance. So Hume's account may be labeled reductionist only if a person is supposed to signify a substantial entity. Hume's bundle theory is as much non-transcendental as it is impersonal. Cassam, however, tries to escape Hume's criticism of substantialism, and to *reintroduce* the idea of substance, but in the form of an impersonal, transcendental, subject. If such a replacement is accepted, then Kant's basic thesis that the transcendental subject provides the unity of experience is saved. Moreover, the idea of the self as an impersonal, experiential entity is restored as well.

Although Cassam is aware of the shortcomings of Kant's account of the self, and of Kant's ascription of the unity of the subject to some *internal* core that exists *within*,²⁵ he remains faithful to Kant's standpoint as the only plausible way of resolving the question concerning the nature of the self. Cassam's neglect of Hume's account of the self in Books II and III of the *Treatise* prevents him from viewing the process of unification of the self as subjectivization/internalization of the objective, societal elements.

Cassam's work is an attempt to provide a substantial account of the self which is not individual-subjectivist. However, the main point of the Humean theory of the self is not only criticism of the idea of a substantial subject in its individual-subjectivist form but is also criticism of the idea of substantial self in its entirety. That is why Hume's account of the self is not limited to what he explains in Book I of the *Treatise*. For Hume the social bases of the idea of the self provides the impersonal, yet non-transcendental, constitution of our idea of the self.

For Kant empirical knowledge is always an application of the categories to particular sensory manifolds. The necessity of the categories for knowledge then entails the existence of the transcendental subject. Following this line of thought into the realm of the subject itself, we encounter an intriguing, yet non-resolvable tension. As far as the existence of the subject refers to its schematic being, it is necessary. However, its empirical existence, as an object of experience, is only possible. Formally speaking, to

²⁵ "The question 'what explains the unity of consciousness?' is a question asked from the sideways perspective, and Kant's mistake is to assume that the answer must be faithful to the conception which, from within a mental life, underlies the capacity to conceptualize experiences as experiences of the objective" (Cassam 1989, 80). Concerning the criticism against Kant's transcendental account of subject Cassam also writes: "The objection is that the defense (of transcendental subjectivity) is committed to an unacceptable conceptual foundationalism in which the location of the subject is always taken for granted in determining the identity of objects of perception" (1989, 94).

the degree that my existence refers to the schema, the existence of the subject in general is necessary. On the other hand, my very empirical existence is only possible but not clearly and distinctly proven; it is not beyond doubt that I exist. *Cogito* for Kant can only be the proof of the existence of subject's schema and categories; in other words, it serves only as the proof of the existence of the form of the subject, i.e. the transcendental self. To be a subject, then, is directly related to the formation of judgments, since to judge something is to be aware of it, and awareness in turn requires the application of necessary categories (Carr 1999, 42, Schwyzer 1997, 351). However, if such be the case, we face circularity: to be a subject is to form judgments, and to form judgments is to connect representations through categories of the transcendental subject.

In addition to the points mentioned above, the idea of the subject of judgment, i.e., the idea that the subject makes synthetic judgments about the sensible world and posits itself as an object through the necessary schema and categories, raises the following questions: To whom do these categories and schema belong? From where does the supposed pre-propositional or pre-subjective "I" acquire these categories? Or is it at all the pre-subjective "I" that acquires them? In the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant answers this question as follows: "We can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them" (Kant 1787/1929, B xviii). And who does this 'we' refer to? In the section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* called "Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant relates the possibility of the formation of a priori knowledge to pure intuition and pure representation. Kant defines pure representation as something that has nothing in it that belongs to sensation, where sensation is defined as being the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation. The a priori ordering principle is found in mind

(Kant 1787/1929, B 34, A 20). Therefore, the ‘we’ refers to nothing other than the transcendental subject. So, is not this subject in one way or another pre-supposed from the outset?²⁶ It seems that we face a problem of circularity if we insist on staying within the conceptual framework of the metaphysics of the subject. As Cassirer remarks: “[c]onsciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found; but beyond this *logical* meaning of the ‘I’ we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this ‘I’” (1918/1981, 200). His gloss on Kant does not seem to possess the potential of resolving the tension between the empirical and transcendental selves.

The empirical self, as part of the sensible world, is subject to causal laws; it is not spontaneous, but is caused. The transcendental self, on the contrary, is active, spontaneous, and intentionally related to its objects. Therefore, we can only know the intuitively apprehended empirical self: “The intuition of the self represents the self with its natural properties, as a part of the world” (Carr 1999, 50) and not as the condition of the possibility of experience. Hence, the transcendental self is the self-in-itself. Kant does not formulate the case quite like that; but claims that the transcendental self is neither the self that appears to itself, nor the “I” in itself, but is only the self as a thought. As Kant

²⁶ Lacan differentiates “the ‘subject of the enunciation’ (the subject who utters a statement) and the ‘subject of the enunciated (statement)’ (the symbolic identity the subject assumes within and via his statement): Kant does not address the question of who is the ‘subject of the enunciation’ of the moral Law, the agent enunciating the unconditional ethical injunction-from within his horizon, this question itself is meaningless, since the moral Law is an impersonal command ‘coming from nowhere,’ i.e. it is ultimately self-positing, autonomously assumed by the subject himself)” (Žižek 1998, 17). However, it is clear that the subject of enunciation is the transcendental subject. The moral law does not come from nowhere but it comes from the transcendental subject. This will become clearer once the forms and intuitions are studied.

states: “Since I do not have another self intuition which gives the determining in me ... I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought... [B]ut it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an intelligence” (Kant 1787/1929, B 157). The transcendental self, therefore, is neither an element of the phenomenal world, nor part of the world of things in themselves.

For Kant the pure intuition of time is “the universal condition of the possibility of appearances” (Kant 1787/1929, B 46, A 31), and is not an object but “the mode of representation of myself as object” (Kant 1787/1929, B 54, A 37). So time is involved in differentiating the self from other selves. Only against such a plurality can the individual subjectivity of a particular self be acquired. The transcendental self can perhaps be understood as the consciousness that such a realization takes place within the universal form of time. My empirical self is the necessary condition that allows me to distinguish my unique self from the world of sensible objects. The empirical self is the objectivity of my self against which my transcendental self as the consciousness of such objectivity, as my objective being in time, can be proposed. The admission of the objectivity of my empirical self as the temporalized subject is the condition that gives way to the realization of the apperception of the “I think.” Time is the form within which the undetermined existence of my self is determined. As Deleuze observes:

[T]he ‘I think’ affects time, and only determines the existence of a ‘self’ that changes in time.... Time as the form of determinability therefore doesn’t depend upon the intensive movement of soul; on the contrary, the intensive production of a degree of consciousness at every moment depends on time. (1993/1997, 29)

Time is not a cosmological movement any more, but is the time of action. I act, I think, where thinking signifies an activity determined by time; therefore I am but in time. Time

as the form of the non-eternal results in the temporalization of the self, the awareness of time as the form of the self's finitude.

"Time is the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state" (Kant 1787/1929, B 49, A 33). Time is the interior affect of the self by itself. Space is the possibility of being affected by external objects; the possibility of being affected by other selves. Time is the interior form of finitude, whereas space is its exterior form. The interiority of time is not simply the interiority of time to the mind. It is the form that continuously splits the "I" and the self from within. The infinity of time, thus, points towards the unfinalizability of my doubling process. Time is the inner form through which the "I" becomes aware and admits the empirical existence of the self just as space is the external form of apperception of such empirical being.

The empirical subject or self, that bundle of perceptions as it may be called, is delimited by its own subjectivity in every empirical moment and by objects in space. Its finitude rests upon the fluctuating nature of its experiences. Otherness is not a limit but a horizon which no subject can escape. Moreover, such a horizontal finitude contains an aspect of intentionality: the self comports itself towards the other, since in the future it will be an-other. Such a subject is a threshold phenomenon; it exists at the conjuncture of past and future; it is the other itself. There is no absolute other to relativize its being.

Kantian transcendental subjectivity, although it contains an element of finitude and apprehends finitude through internal intuition, submits itself to an absolute limitation. The never-to-be-accomplished transcendental subject, in itself, represents an absolute, finalized limit. For Kant, the empirical aspect of the subject is what makes the realization of the subject impossible. The limit of the Kantian subject signifies a lack *of* the subject

and a lack *in* the subject. For the empiricist, on the other hand, it is this very lack that marks subjectivity. Empirically speaking, to be a subject is to be incomplete, i.e., to be other than itself. For the Kantian approach, on the other hand, to be a subject, is the apprehension of the impossibility of being a subject. The Kantian subject, with its dual mode of existence, does not emancipate the subject from the dissonant tension between the transcendental and empirical; it does not eliminate the tension between the “I” and the self, but rather brings about the paradoxical existence of the subject (Deleuze 1993/1997, 35). The sublime practical principle emancipates the transcendental subject from the empirical self at the point “where the law to which the willing subject submits himself negates and cancels the empirical existence of this subject himself; where life regarded as physical existence is sacrificed to the idea” (Cassirer 1918/1981, 255).

The Phenomenology of Transcendental Self

Transcendental phenomenology, according to Husserl, is a non-Cartesian methodology, which rejects almost all of Cartesian philosophy. Husserl identifies two significant levels in the Cartesian turn to the subject. First, anyone who wants to become a philosopher must, at least once in his life, withdraw into himself and attempt to overthrow all prejudice and rebuild all the sciences anew. “Philosophy –wisdom—is the philosopher’s quite personal affair”. The *Meditations* supplies us with the prototype of such a philosophical quest, and in it there is a regress towards “the ego as subject of his pure *cogitationes*.” The radical Husserlian turn to the subject signifies a fundamental belief in the solitary existence of the subject as the source of philosophical knowledge. Despite his disagreements with Descartes, Husserl shares the Cartesian belief in the solipsistic existence of the self whose existence cannot be doubted.

True science is not identical with objectively documented sciences. Every scientific claim has to be grounded, which is the repeatable act of bringing about its bases. “Grounding is an *agreement* of the judgment with the judged state of affairs.” A judgment is a meaning.²⁷ Hence the final goal of science, as a quest for grounded judgments, is a quest for meaning. The task of phenomenology is “to clarify the sense [*Sinn*] of this world, just that sense in which we all regard it as really existing and as really valid” (Husserl 1950: 5, 152-3, quoted in Follesdal 1998, 577). Merleau-Ponty characterizes this feature of the phenomenological method as a distinction between description and explanation: phenomenology neither explains nor analyzes but only describes. The external world has to be described, not constructed. Perception is not the same as the synthesizing of representations, neither is it an act *per se*. It is rather the *background* that makes any mental act possible. Similarly, the world is not the object from which I acquire the laws of its making; rather, it is the setting upon which my thoughts and perceptions are actualized. There is no exclusively inner man; the human is always *in* the world (1962, ix-xi).

The everyday world is not something that certainly exists as for Descartes, but is something that claims being. Other humans are for me, as all other living things, only the data of experience.²⁸ “Not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is”

²⁷ See (Cowley 1968, xii-xiii), (Follesdal 1998, 577), and (Follesdal 1968, 680).

²⁸ “The word ‘object’ must hence be taken in a very broad sense. It comprises not only physical things, but also, as we have seen, animals, and likewise persons, events, actions and processes, and sides, aspects and appearances of such entities” (Follesdal 1998, 578).

(Husserl 1967, 19). Moreover, transcendental phenomenology deprives us from positioning ourselves *within* the life-experience:

[T]he philosophically reflective Ego's abstention from position-takings, his depriving them of acceptance, does not signify their disappearance from his field of experience. The concrete subjective processes, let us repeat, are indeed the thing to which his attentive regard is directed: but the attentive Ego, qua philosophizing Ego, practices abstention with respect to what he intends. (1967, 19-20)

There follows the phenomenological epoché or parenthesizing of the objective world as “pure apprehension of myself as Ego”.²⁹ However, such a quest for a pure ego is self-defeating; and bracketing the world deprives our world-experience of its content and turns it into absolute form.³⁰ Yet the same question that was directed at Descartes by his critics can be directed at phenomenology, namely, why should the bracketing be stopped at the Ego? Why should not the Ego be subjected to epoché too? How do we come by the belief that we have extra-experiential access to the Ego?

By the *cogito*, Descartes indicates “the world as it is for me [and] absolutely nothing else but the world existing for and accepted by me.... By my living, by my experiencing, thinking, valuing, and acting I can enter no world other than the one that gets its sense ... from ... myself” (Husserl 1967, 21). By abstaining from stretching my consciousness beyond my life-world, and directing it purely towards my ego, I come into possession of myself as a pure Ego. But the question is: how can such an abstention be

²⁹ “We may also more radically leave the natural attitude altogether, put the objects we were concerned with in brackets and instead reflect on our own consciousness and its structure. This reflection Husserl calls ‘the transcendental reduction’ or ‘epoché’” (Follesdal 1998, 575).

³⁰ “Essence” is very similar to pure form. Essences (*Wesen*) “*are features that the object can share with other objects*, such as triangularity of a triangle or the greenness of a tree. For Husserl an object’s essence is therefore not something unique to that object” (Follesdal 1998, 578, italics added).

actualized unless the essence of an ego is asserted that can survive such a radical breaking off from experience?

Husserl addresses these difficulties by discussing the possibility of phenomenological reduction: can this reduction make possible apodictic evidence for transcendental subjectivity? He answers this question by claiming that only if the experience of the transcendental self *is* apodictic is this reduction possible. “That *ego sum* or *sum cogitas* must be pronounced apodictic, and that accordingly we get a first apodictically existing basis to stand on, was already seen by Descartes” (Husserl 1967, 22). The ego that survives the epoché is not a part of the world of phenomena, and its claim to existence does not signify its experiential being in the world. However, the fact that such an epoché is bound to the limits of linguistic expression negates the Husserlian-Cartesian transcendence. Husserl believes in the existence of a purely-internal experience of the psyche, of the “I,” which can be isolated from the “worldliness” of the empirical selves. Yet the purest access to such internality is still bound to linguistic expressions and the limits of language. In this sense, Husserl suffers from the same weakness that Descartes suffered from concerning language. Husserl, too, faces the impossibility of escaping the mediation of reason despite his claim about the originality and immediacy of one’s own self-experience. He admits this impossibility: “[T]hough I am continually given to myself *originaliter* and can explicate progressively what is included in my essence, this explication is *carried out largely in acts of consciousness that are not perceptions* of the own-essential moments it discovers” (1967, 102).

In response to this difficulty Merleau-Ponty claims that phenomenology is not an idealism and explains the phenomenological reduction not as a denial of the world and a

pulling back into the unity of the consciousness as the basis of the world, but rather as a stepping back and watching the forms of transcendence, thus bringing these forms into our notice. Since the subject is always in the world, there is no possibility of a fully achieved, finalized reduction. If we were pure consciousness, then no problem would be faced in the reduction; however, our being in the world amounts to an absence of thought that is able to embrace all thoughts. Reduction itself, since it is bound to man's being in the world, is subject to the temporal flux of the world. Therefore, according to Merleau-Ponty, phenomenological reduction is always at the stage of the *beginning* of the reduction (1962, xi-xiv).

The difference between transcendental phenomenology and empiricism lies in their different approaches to the question of world-experience. Empiricism considers data as belonging to the world that is supposed to exist “—that is to say, data taken as psychic components of man.”³¹ In the case of phenomenology, however, “the parallel data, with their like contents, are not taken in this manner, because the whole world, when one is in phenomenological attitude, is not accepted as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon” (Husserl 1967, 32). The reason for such a difference is that, for empiricism, there is no qualitative difference between the appearance and the essence. In other words, empiricism does not assume that such qualitatively different substances exist. By contrast, transcendental phenomenology, with regard to both subject and object, asserts two qualitatively different states of existence: appearance and essence, or, better,

³¹ While commenting on Hume, Husserl finds the central problem of Humean empiricism to be the status of a priori synthetic judgments, because these judgments refer to objects and not to our consciousnesses. Husserl says that Hume's philosophy has *already* realized the “Copernican Revolution” prior to Kant, since it implies that “the unity of experience is rooted in human thought” (Mall 1973, 22). See also (Davie 1977, 74).

phenomenon and essence. To a considerable extent, such a distinction resonates with Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena.

Husserl is critical of Hume's empiricist approach to the problem of cognition.³² He argues that Hume's project must end in solipsism and skepticism.³³ Yet he emphasizes the importance of Hume's theory of impressions and ideas in rejecting the dualism between subject and object (Murphy 1980, 2).³⁴ Husserl acknowledges that his phenomenology has its roots in Hume, and regards Hume's philosophy as the first such quest towards the formation of what he calls the pure science of egology.³⁵

³² Husserl argues that Hume fails to reject solipsism due to his sensualism; whereas Hume clearly states his belief in the existence of external world and other human selves. It is important to notice that later Husserl shifts from the traditional (Hamiltonian) reading of Hume, which was later adopted by Meinong, (Davie 1977, 73-5) to Hume's side. Husserl seems to be aware that Hume's approach to perception and formation of meaning supposes the active participation of the subject of knowledge, i.e., that it is human consciousness that structures the experience. However, Hume does not relate this active role to some essential (noematic) property or meaning object that resides *in* consciousness; rather, he extracts such active structural priority of consciousness directly from world experience.

³³ Against Husserl, Mall states the exact opposite, claiming that Hume's philosophy does not amount to skepticism. Rather, according to Mall, his impressionism "leads ultimately to a phenomenology of immanence" (1973, 28). George Davie argues that, towards the end of his career, Husserl approached the true Humean perspective that located "the roots of Europe scientific crisis ... in the reductive, atomizing procedures fatefully introduced by Descartes' arithmetization of geometry" (1977, 72).

³⁴ Cowley's account of Husserl's relation to Hume contrasts with Mall's. Cowley argues that Hume takes nature to be a fiction of the imagination. Objects in nature, as well as the self—which according to Cowley, in Humean philosophy, is not assimilable to human nature—are fictions (1968, 10).

³⁵ "Such a science has to deal with pure given in the field of consciousness; it is a *tabula rasa* psychology, deal only with what is immediately given to our consciousness" (Mall 1973, 25). Such a judgment may be considered valid only if we limit ourselves to the first book of the *Treatise*. However, the factuality of Humean philosophy, about which Husserl speaks too, makes the truth of such a proposition dubious. Husserl's interpretation of Hume formalizes Humean philosophy in a radical way and deprives it of all its content by excluding its empirical or sensual aspects.

In contrast to sensualist and transcendental idealist reductions, the phenomenological reduction is, according to Merleau-Ponty, “the determination to bring the world to light as it is before any falling back on ourselves has occurred, it is the ambition to make reflection emulate the unreflective life of consciousness. I am at and perceive the world” (1962, xvi). The fact that I am in the world designates the ability to distinguish between reality, imagination, and dream. Merleau-Ponty maintains that phenomenological reduction has as its objective delving into the possibility of the formation of such primordial knowledge of the being of the world. Phenomenology does not *assert* the world as thought but *assumes* it as lived world. The worldliness of the world consists in its being present to me as I live in it. Therefore phenomenology speaks about what appears as the form in which the facticity of the world is wrapped. It is what causes the world to become as it is, as is the case with the essence of the *cogito* (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xvi-xvii). However, such a re-conceptualization of essence shifts us to the problem of the relation between essence and the appearance. Essence loses the universal connotations traditionally ascribed to it; it is not the universal unitary and general concept or thought that stands behind all phenomena. Rather, it re-appears as the individual essence of every particular phenomenon. Thus we can conclude that the introduction of such an essence is either redundant, or is a pure formality.

To characterize Hume’s philosophy as a pure science of ego is both too strong and too broad a claim. Nonetheless, Husserl’s later philosophy has close links to Humean empiricism when it comes to the question of the existence of the external world. Husserl’s belief in the existence of objects is very similar to the Humean view of the

vulgar consciousness that takes the existence of the objective world for granted.³⁶

According to phenomenology the external world is the basis of our experiencing ourselves and others. It exists prior to theory and practice and implies a passive acceptance of its continuity. The world of the vulgar is pre-reflective and pre-philosophical.

An important property of the general thesis is the way it is presented as a “thesis,” a “doxa,” as a kind of non-contemplated, vulgar belief. There is no suggestion of a justification of such a belief. Although Husserl includes history and culture in its scope, he does not try to explain the historical genesis of such a widespread belief. As a non-contemplative supposition, the attitude of the general thesis should be transcended. Husserl calls this pre-reflective attitude “passive,” since he takes sensuousness as a mechanical-bodily process. He does not consider that this sensuous process itself, before and beyond the participation of an external reflexive faculty, requires the active-productive attitude of humans towards the world. The Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body is inherited and preserved in his phenomenology. Accordingly, the body as mere physical body (and not as concept), cannot think or sense; it is at best a mechanical transmitting medium that provides mind with raw data. It is the task of the mind—the transcendental ego—“to work out the ‘science of natural standpoint’” (Mall 1973, 30) and to surmount the pre-reflective, pre-philosophical attitude of natural human beings.

³⁶ “The ‘thesis of the world’ or natural attitude—in Hume’s terms, the natural belief in the independent existence of the world—is unthinking, unreasoned, and inseparable from our being embodied subjects in the world. It is not in any ordinary sense a belief. What we believe to be the case or not to be the case, what we believe to exist or not to exist, presupposes the world and our bodily being in it” (Cowley 1968, ix).

Husserl's egological approach requires the existence of an essential (substantial) – transcendental and pure—ego.³⁷

Hume's project, on the other hand, is to propose a plausible solution to the riddle of subjectivity in the face of the fact that the presumably self-identical self is subject to continual change. Hume attempts to establish a genetic science of the self, and emphasizes the pre-scientific and pre-logical basis of scientific and theoretical notions. Husserl criticizes Hume for presupposing the categories and concepts of the so-called faculty of reason, but Hume attacked abstract ideas and emphasized the priority of the social being when it comes to cognition; noting the importance of the socially conditioned life of the subject of knowledge, which goes together with his rejection of the idea of the substantial self.³⁸ Husserl admits that we cannot ascribe to Hume the idea that the external world (along with other people) does not exist. However, he thinks that Hume relegates all the intentional content of our life to fiction, so that, for Hume, the

³⁷ Such substantialism has its root in Husserl's identification of experiencing an object with experiencing its noema: "We should note that when we experience a person, we do not experience a physical object, a body, and then infer that a person is there. We experience a fully fledged person; we are encountering somebody who structures the world, experiences it from their own perspective. Our noema is a noema of a person; no inference is involved" (Follesdal 1998, 578). The question is where do we, as subjects, acquire these noema? Husserl reduces personhood (subjectivity) to having the noema of a person (noema of different objects in case of different entities). Such an explanation, however, is circular.

³⁸ Both Hume and Husserl, according to Murphy, assign "priority to the concrete, per-scientific 'world' *constituted subjectively* in the individual ego" (1980, 4). However, the supposition regarding the existence of a substantial, pre-cognitive ego is out of the question when it comes to Hume. Hume admits the existence of the self prior to science or logical laws; however, the supposition that he would agree with the idea of the existence of the self prior to acts of perception, which in turn lead to formation of laws and categories is highly dubious. Husserl, on the contrary, admits the existence of *a priori* laws of constitution which are rooted in *a priori* laws of temporality that govern so-called inner consciousness (Murphy 1980, 7).

external world is illusory. Husserl criticizes Humean empiricism as an anti-philosophy. However, Hume is critical of both the natural standpoint and philosophical reason.³⁹ Hume is critical of the naïve, passive acceptance of commonsense philosophy. Mall correctly sees that Hume's project, up to this point, runs parallel with Husserl's phenomenology; but suggests that Hume fails to develop a phenomenological standpoint (1973, 35).

Husserl emphasizes the active role of the subject in the process of the constitution of reality, but his standpoint is different from that of Hume since, for the latter, the active, constituting agent is clearly considered as the genetic product of such activity.⁴⁰ The notion of absolute subjectivity cannot be reconciled with Hume's radical anti-substantialist conception of the self. The question for Hume is how a relative (non-absolute) genetic self is able to form and own notions, concepts, and relations such as time and space. Certainly, Hume's non-substantialist position cannot assume a timeless consciousness. On the contrary, due to genetic characteristics of the Humean conceptualization of the self, consciousness can only be acquired within time. Thus, time, subjectively perceived, is awareness of the temporality of the act of perception. As the

³⁹ Mall, too, draws attention to the implausibility of such a statement. He writes "Hume does not relegate external world to fiction; he even does not doubt its existence" (1973, 25, n 21).

⁴⁰ "In the case of an immanently directed, or, more briefly expressed, of an *immanent perception, perception and perceived* essentially form an unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitation" (Husserl, quoted in Murphy 1980, 103). This explanation is related to the first meaning of the term 'flux,' where the latter designates a unifying frame for both the immanent –intended—object and consciousness. In its second sense, "flux designates the primal absolute flux of temporality itself; absolute, timeless consciousness or absolute subjectivity" (Murphy 1980, 104).

consciousness of the temporality of the act of perception, it is the awareness of the temporality of the perceiving self (as a bundle of perceptions).

Husserl also criticizes Hume for reducing phenomena to bundles of perceptions. But the bundle of ideas has no existence other than what is attributed to it by the perceiving agent. Hume never stops at the stage of calling the bundle of ideas *mere bundles*; he moves on to illustrate the mind's active capacity to form concepts. Hume clearly states that there exist "certain principles, which associate together the ideas of objects, and unite them in the imagination." Hume may be criticized from a phenomenological point of view for his blindness to the concept of intentionality. This line of criticism, however, rests upon a classical prejudice that positions Hume within the Lockean tradition, with the mind viewed as a purely passive *tabula rasa* that has no role in the formation of ideas. Textual evidence, however, shows that Hume emphasizes the role of imagination in the constitution of general ideas. And Hume's thesis that the self is a "fiction" that is *produced* by habit is yet another strong point that can be made against the aforementioned criticism.

For Husserl intentionality involves a *noema* which is the object of consciousness. As an object of consciousness, the *noema* is generalized meaning.⁴¹ According to this view, when an act or object is perceived, what is experienced is not the external object but the intended *noema*. It is through the mediation of the *noema* that consciousness relates to the object (Follesdal 1969, 682), and supplies the sameness of the object of perception. Each *noema* corresponds to one object only. This explanation of intentionality leaves the problem of mistaken perceptions unresolved. If what is

⁴¹ "The noema is nothing but a generalization of the notion of meaning" (Husserl, *Ideen*, 89, quoted in Follesdal 1969, 681).

experienced is not the sense-data that is somehow caused by external objects, but is the *noema* of the act of perception, then how can one ever be mistaken in any of one's perceptions? Even the formulation "to one and the same object there may correspond several different noematic Sinne,"⁴² only shifts the problem from the perception of externally caused sense-data to a phenomenologically conceived *noema*. Such a formulation does not explain how this correspondence is possible, and as a result it is too schematic and formalistic. For instance, in the case of perceiving the figure of a rabbit-duck, the noematic formulation is far from explaining why the person looking at it sees a rabbit at one time and a duck at another. This model only suffices to describe the successive events of perceiving a figure of a rabbit at one time and a duck at another. (Phenomenologically speaking, it is the experiencing the *noema* of a duck, at one time and of a rabbit at another.) Moreover, introducing this model does not really say anything more than that I had a perception of a rabbit at one time, and a perception of a duck, at another. Nonetheless, it adds another unresolved step to the problem of understanding the nature of perception, and makes it more complicated; but it contributes nothing to understanding the act of perception. Moreover, even such formal explication is far from exhausting this event. If the person looking at this drawing does not remember that he has had a different perception of the *same* drawing at an earlier time, one could accept the noematic explanation of this event. This is to say that, if "each act has one and only one *noema*," the person looking at the drawing should not be able to remember the *noema* of the rabbit while experiencing the *noema* of the duck. He should not be aware of relating another *noema* to the same object at an earlier instant; he should not become aware of the fact that there is an object beyond and beside his experience of the *noema* which

⁴² Follesdal 1969, 683.

supposedly corresponds to that object. Husserl (along with Follesdal) seems to be aware of this problem and tries to bypass it by saying that the *noemata* are abstract entities that can be perceived not through the senses, that is, in perspective, but only phenomenologically.⁴³ However, this explanation results in circularity and the argument begs the question. It assumes that the existence of *noemata* explains intentionality, while the phenomenological stance is supposed to explain the existence of *noemata*.⁴⁴

For Husserl the sphere of transcendental being is the sphere of monadological intersubjectivity.⁴⁵ But how can monads, which traditionally are defined as windowless entities, interact? How does this monadological point of view avoid solipsism and suggest intersubjective relations among individual monads? Husserl is aware of this problem. In paragraph 42 of the *Cartesian Meditations*, responds to it by evoking the notion of the other, and explains the confrontation with this other. I experience the other as something *in the world*, governed by physical, or, as Husserl designates them, organic principles, while on the other hand I experience them as *subjects for this world* (Husserl 1967, 91).

In order to attain the phenomenological attitude, or this unnatural stance, a phenomenological reduction towards pure transcendental consciousness must take place.

⁴³ “Noemata are known through a special reflection, the phenomenological reflection” (Follesdal 1969, 685).

⁴⁴ “The general theme of phenomenology, according to Husserl, is intentionality” (Follesdal 1969, 680). “The noema is an intentional entity, a generalization of the notion of meaning (sinn, Bedeutung)” (1969, 681).

⁴⁵ “I take their surrounding world and mine Objectively as one and the same world of which we are conscious, only in different ways [*Weise*]... For all that, we come to an understanding with our fellow human beings and together with them posit an Objective spatiotemporal reality” (1950: 3, 1, 60, quoted in Follesdal 1998, 582).

Through this reduction, we are supposed to reach a standpoint where all empirical objectivity, including the empirical other, is suspended (i.e., everything is bracketed). Only when the reduction is actualized, will we achieve a consciousness which is beyond doubt (Mall 1973, 33). But the problem is that the same object that performs the reduction is itself part of the natural world; it is *in* the world (Cowley, 1968, 4-6). Moreover, what enables us to achieve the reduction that is part of the world too. The question is: how radically different can such a reductively acquired pure intentional consciousness be? Besides, why should the process of bracketing come to a halt at the limit of the pure intentional subject? Furthermore, aren't all these concepts and conceptual frameworks loaded with axiological values that belong to the natural world? Unless the existence of the pure ego is presupposed, no reduction is possible. Yet, such a presupposition results in circularity; so the argument begs the question, since what requires explanation is the existence of the pure intentional ego.

Husserl distinguishes between the physical world and the world that exists in itself. Although the physical world is experienced by me and is conceived as my world-phenomenon, this experiencing does not imply what Husserl calls the private synthetic formulation of the world despite all the world-phenomena of subjects. I experience the other, phenomenologically speaking, through the "transcendental theory of experiencing someone else, a transcendental theory of the so-called empathy (Husserl 1967, 92). However, for Husserl, the range of such a theory of empathy is much wider and refers to a transcendental theory of objective world (Husserl 1967, 91). The "I" and the other are found contrasted within a natural attitude. However, since experienceable worldliness is experienced by every ego (namely by every subject), this worldliness is attached to every

subject. In other words, in the natural attitude, the opposing phenomena bear the stamp of being experienced by others. By contrast, the radical phenomenological reduction requires the construction of my ego with “an essential structure, which is part of all-embracing constitution, in which the transcendental ego, as constituting an objective world, lives his life” (Husserl 1967, 93). The other is a mirror image of my own self, yet is not an analogous image in the proper sense of the term. Even my own self is the mirror image of my Ego (i.e., my transcendental ego), which appears as alter-ego. Perhaps this is the point where my existence as alter-ego joins the existence of the other as the mirror image of the Ego. The question is: “*how* can my ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute ... precisely something other?” (Husserl 1967, 94) The attempt to answer this question will lead to a transcendental experiencing of the other via empathy.

Through the process of transcendental self-objectification, I experience my own being as the other of my transcendental ego. Similarly, I experience other subjects as objectified beings within the abstracted phenomenal world. By governing my own body, and experiencing my own being as the only fully governable entity, I reduce myself to my pure ownness. And by reducing other humans to my ownness, I come to experience their existences. “This peculiar abstractive sense-exclusion of what is alien leaves us a *kind of ‘world’* still, a Nature reduced to what is included in our ownness and, as having its place in physical Ego, with ‘body and soul’ and personal Ego- utterly *unique* members of this reduced ‘world’” (Husserl 1967, 48).

I am constituted as a subject in the world, as a human ego who is a member of the world together with the multitude of other objects out there. However, all of these objects are constituted psychically and intentionally by me and within me. All that is constituted

is an inseparable part of the ego's internal determinations. In this way, the internal world that the ego owns will be constituted through the mediation of the other, because the ego's own determinations appear as a part of the objective reduction (i.e., such reduction constitutes the ownness of the ego as a part of the world).⁴⁶ In this way, the ego will distinguish between his ownness as constituted within the world and the externality of the world that is psychically and intentionally constituted within him. With the influence of Hume's approach to the question of the self, Husserl comes to formulate the empirical ego as a case of transcendence and as a fluctuating entity. The pure ego constitutes itself as an identical, unifying center in which all conscious acts are rooted. Furthermore, it constitutes itself as a permanent self-identity, which he then calls a monad.

The question is: Do human actions belong to the realm of this constituted meaning or to the empirical realm? If meaning is not empirically produced, then it appears either as a transcendental given or as an innate idea. It is thus a pure form that does not have any content. If meaning belongs to the realm of experience, then the whole phenomenological reduction process is nullified. In such a case, the phenomenological conceptualization of meaning deprives meaning per se of any content, since such a phenomenologically conceptualized meaning does not have existence. On the other hand, the attribution of meaning to the self as the consequence/essence of phenomenological reduction indicates an inherently presupposed dichotomy of self (pure ego) and non-ego (object/nature) which, in the final analysis, is a mirror image of the Cartesian body-mind duality. In such a case, one may ask: how is such a radically differentiated reductive

⁴⁶ The question we face is where do we acquire the meaning? Is meaning constituted from within our selves? Is it constituted based upon an essence? Moreover, if phenomenologically to be is to be meaningful we cannot claim that Husserlian idealism does not deny the existence of objectivity regardless of any being.

meaning, that belongs to the realm of the transcendental self, applicable to the world of actual experience? Husserl's way of justifying the existence of a radically differentiated pure ego amounts to admitting the existence of different essences. As far as the relation among subjects is concerned, the radical differentiation of my ego from other egos appears as a form of radical atomism and solipsism. Hence, no interaction or intersubjective relation is possible among subjects unless the "I" reductively constitutes others in its ownness in contradistinction to the empirical existence of others.

Husserl bases his concept of the constitution of the life-world upon the notion of a disinterested subject. This is the isolation of the subject from whatever exists externally or objectively and signifies its residence in a pure, theoretical, contemplative position. Disinterestedness and pure contemplation are possible only if the subject is considered as essentially and radically different from the non-ego. Moreover, the historical and social dimensions of the life-world are elements of mere appearance. This is a formal history, i.e., it is the history of the successive appearance and disappearance of certain forms. Such a history is not social, but is relative, since for Husserl it manifests the essence of society as a community of transcendental egos. Therefore, when he speaks about the "hypothetical character of the universe of science as a superstructure built on the universe of our life" he implies such relativism. Science is the superstructure of the community of the transcendental egos that make up society. This scientific superstructure is the abstracted, ideal picture (representation) of the essence of the world. It is a function—an ideal duplicate—of the life-world. Therefore, the claims of science to universality are empty. Scientific nature is conceivable only by those egos that form the sub-structure (i.e., the life-world), which in turn gives way to this particular scientific outlook.

Therefore different cultures are, in a manner of speaking, incommensurable and so are the life-worlds. Husserl attributes an essential determinative power to the life-world, and to its historical and cultural manifestations. Why do transcendental egos produce/elucidate such a frame? Because such a context is the manifestation of their *essence*. We have no scientific, empirical, objective access to the essence, because, although it is present externally as historical and cultural superstructure, it belongs to the transcendental realm of the immanence that is supposed to be grasped only intentionally.⁴⁷

But Hume does not need to assume any other world than the one that is empirically perceived. As a philosopher of commonsense, his major task is to provide an explanation of what most people believe uncritically and non-contemplatively. A firm natural belief in the existence of the empirical world involves a rejection of the bogus idea of substance as substratum (whether of objects or of subjects). In the case of the self, he clearly proposes that it is a bundle of perceptions, a product of active processes of perception-apprehension-imagination. So no “reduction” is required to show the possibility of intersubjective relations among selves. Moreover, since Hume does not bracket the empirical, he can refer to systems of signs and to language as apparatuses that make a sympathetic notion of the self possible. Hume offers a genetic account of the self, without the bogus idea of substance as substratum, while Husserl assumes the existence of a self *beyond* the individual perceptions that, empirically speaking, are supposed to form a particular bundle of perceptions. The association of ideas serves merely as a tool to explain how these monadic perceptions are linked together to form a unity. But for

⁴⁷ (See Mall 973, 71).

Husserl, “[t]o appeal to the associative linkage of atomic perceptions presupposes an identical self or mind over and above the perceptions to observe and link them” (Murphy 1980, 11). However, this claim contradicts Hume’s claim that the mind is not a simple thing in time and space.⁴⁸ For Hume, on the other hand, there cannot be any mind other than the one that acts on objects and interacts with other selves. Hume clearly argues against such a god-like, transcendental position of the self. The self is formed in action and this existing bundle of perceptions subsequently refers to itself by using the word “I,” and such a referring can only happen in a social realm. The “I” is the signifier that the self assumes through perceiving the other and is the sign of the self conceptualizing itself as the other. As Hume states: “The *thought* alone finds personal identity, *when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind*, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other” (1967, 635). The important point is that the bundle of perceptions results in a fluctuating yet composed mind. Murphy’s claim that Hume’s approach results in a total rejection of the idea of personal identity, on account of its “paramount atomism,” could only hold if there were no indication of a socially constructed self in Hume’s theory. Murphy, like many others, ignores this aspect of Hume’s theory, and believes that Husserl judiciously corrects this aspect of empiricism by introducing the notion of the other as the constitutive element of the self. “The temporal unity of one is impossible without the other” (Murphy 1980, 117). However, the intersubjective formation of the Humean notion of the self rules out the aforementioned atomism.

⁴⁸ “By calling such an identity [personal identity] “fictitious” Hume, strictly speaking, is not denying the existence of an identical self, but merely its absolute invariability and simplicity” (Murphy 1980, 114).

Husserl's alternative to Humean "atomism" is a monadology of the self. Two aspects need to be considered in Husserl's criticism of Humean atomism. If Husserl's criticism of Hume's notion of the self is valid, then he is bound to suggest a model that excludes and transcends such atomism. But this is not possible unless the existence of the other, and the intersubjective existence of the self, are assumed. On the other hand, reference to intersubjective and interactive relations among subjects contrasts with monadological models. Therefore Husserl's assumption of the existence of the other as a guarantee of the temporal unity of the self seems to be incommensurable with asserting a pure, monadological self.

For Hume, however, the movement to form a self starts from the objective towards the subjective, from externality towards internality. When it comes to the question of the existence of the self, Hume assumes the existence of the other as the basis for the existence of one's own self. This is to say that, for him the self is formed out there; it is in-between, a threshold phenomenon. For Husserl, on the other hand, it is a step-by-step reduction from one's own transcendental selfhood to one's worldly ownness that eventually results in the formation of the other. The Humean self sympathizes with the other; the Husserlian self—the essentially transcendental, eventually reduced ego—empathetically identifies with the other.

With respect to the formation of our ideas of other selves, Husserl states:

I have become aware of myself as the transcendental ego, who constitutes in his constitutive life everything that is ever Objective for me—the ego of all constitutions, who exists in his actual and practical life-progress and Ego-habitualities and who constitutes in them not only everything Objective but also himself as identical ego. (1967, 99)

Husserl's construction of the other is nothing other than a self-dividing of the solitary self into the transcendental self and the self in the life-world. Empathy denies the plurality of existing subjects and objects independent of the subject of knowledge that is supposed to empathetically construct the image of the other out of its own image. Sympathy, on the contrary, requires admission of the fact that other subjects exist; the sympathizing self is not related to other selves ontologically but only epistemologically. The central question for the sympathizing self is not whether the other exists; rather it is how the "I" comes to know and conceptualize the other. In the final analysis, empathy is a form of reductionism, which reduces the existence of the other self to a function of the solitary existence of the "I". It is not clear how Husserlian phenomenology avoids solipsism.

The problem persists: the belief in an originary temporal constitutive subject—a monadological subject—definitely is radical subjectivism.⁴⁹ Moreover, it is radical solipsism. Hume's so-called atomistic model may be thought to lead to solipsism. However, this is not a necessary consequence of the Humean formulation. On the ontological level, Hume never denies the existence of the objective world, and *a fortiori* the existence of other subjects or selves. He sometimes calls himself a skeptic, but at various times he calls himself a philosopher of common sense. His view that objects are bundles of perceptions does not rule out the existence of objects; rather, it is a proposition about the nature of objects apart from their existential status. He does not reject the physical world but is critical of the stance that attributes Aristotelian essences and substances to it. Therefore his science of human nature cannot be considered an

⁴⁹ Murphy states that some of Husserl's later followers—for instance Merleau-Ponty—would abandon his so-called radical subjectivism (and his solipsism).

egological quest. On the contrary, from the very outset, the existence of other subjects is assumed.

The non-direct character of the ego clarifies Husserl's approach to the question of other selves. "Up to now we have characterized the fundamental concept of 'my own' only indirectly: as *non-alien* or *non-other* –a characterization that is based on, and thus presupposes, the concept of another ego" (Husserl 1967, 100-1). However, the non-egoness of the ego is a kind of otherness which is presupposed with reference to the transcendence of the self, the personal monadological self. The other, in its ownness, is my other self when compared to my self in its transcendental stratum. Husserl claims that the positive characteristic of the non-alien self, or the self that is construed positively, can be explained as follows:

[W]hatever the transcendental ego constitutes in that *first* stratum, whatever he constitutes as non-other, as his "peculiarly own" –that indeed belongs to him as *a component of his own concrete essence* (as we shall show); it is inseparable from his concrete being. Within and by means of this ownness the transcendental ego constitutes, however, the "Objective" world, as a universe of being that is other than himself—and constitutes, at the first level, the other in the mode: alter-ego. (1967, 100)

The monadological (solipsistic) existence of my self is prior to other selves and to the physical or natural other. This account of the positive aspects of the ego clearly reduces the world to the domain of one's monadological horizon; in other words, it reduces the world to the self's peculiar essentiality:

As soon as we exclude from consideration the intuitional effects produced by "empathy", by *our experience* of other, we have a Nature (including an animate organism) that is constituted, to be sure, as a unity of spatial objects "transcending" the stream of subjective processes, yet constituted as merely a multiplicity of objects –this experience being purely *my own* life. (Husserl 1967, 104, italics added)

This animate organism is no other than the transcendently existing self, one's own self which exists as a solitary, monadological entity.

The formulation of the question concerning the synthesis of the ego and the non-ego, the "I," and the other (as the "non-I") and its resolution illustrates Husserl's stance more clearly. The other, although intentionally-reduced, is a part of the non-ego or non-I. Empirically speaking, it is only a part of objectivity; it is external. However, this externality is part of my own reduction; it is synthesized in *my* own transcendence. This leads to the following consideration:

in the order pertaining to constitution of a world *alien to my ego* –a world "*external*" to my own concrete Ego (but not at all in the natural spatial sense)—that reduced world is the intrinsically first, the "*primordial*" transcendency (or "world"); and, regardless of its *ideality* as a synthetic unity belonging to an infinite system of my potentialities, it is *still a determining part of my own concrete being*, the being that belongs to me as a concrete ego. (1967, 106)

The existence of the other does not have the same status as mine. It is the "I" that impregnates the other with being. The other is not a subject *per se*, but a constituent element of the "[o]bjective nature," where I, together with other pure egos, form "*ultimately a community of monads*" (Husserl 1967, 107). The transcendental Ego is the harmonizing element that provides us with an explanation of the possibility of communal action among monadological egos. Husserl reinterprets the Leibnizian notion of pre-established harmony to explain the possibility of communal action and interaction of monads and to explain the possibility of the formation of a world as the horizon of the transcendental *we*, which is the immanent ideality that is formed within this community:

The objective world as an *idea* –the ideal correlate of an intersubjective (intersubjectively communalized) experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as constantly harmonious, whose component particular subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and harmonious constitutive systems. Consequently

the constitution of the world essentially involves a “harmony” of the monads.
(Husserl 1967, 107-8)

Such an interpretation, however, results in the contradictory idea that the transcendental ego exists prior to itself. In order to avoid an anomaly we are obliged to assume that the objective world of communal egos exists as ideality only; it acquires its existence ideally from a non-personal, non-reducible transcendency that, furthermore, acts as the harmonizing principle among empirical selves. If this be the case, the pre-established monadological harmony that Husserl has in view transforms into the self-harmonious, solipsistic existence of the non-participating, indifferent transcendental self.

Nonetheless, Husserl introduces the concept of “pairing” in an attempt to establish a more coherent approach to the question of communality and the existence of other selves. The ego and the alter-ego coexist in pairing. Pairing is a universal property of the transcendental sphere; it is, as Husserl calls it, a primordial form of passive synthesis which is conceived as association. The emergence of my phenomenal ego from the coexistence of the ego and alter-ego serves as a model in understanding the foundation of the other. However, this mode of reasoning is tautological. The question is: what individuates my own self so that I apprehend the alter-ego, that is, the other animate organism, not as a second organism of my own but as the other? The short answer is: “None of the *appropriated* sense specific to an animate organism can become actualized originally in my primordial sphere” (Husserl 1967, 113). This is to say that I apprehend the other as other because it is the other.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ In his criticism of Husserlian philosophy, Wilhelm Wundt describes the circularity and the tautological nature of phenomenology by saying that Husserl presented a series of negative definitions of concepts, that is to say, what a concept is not, and then finished with a mere tautology such as ‘love is love’. Max Scheler’s response to Wundt’s “misunderstanding” makes this tautological approach still more explicit. According to

In order to form a community of monadic egos, I should add to my experience of the other the body as a natural object of his experience. Husserl apparently resolves the issue by proposing a two-layered realm when it comes to perceiving/experiencing the intentional horizon the “I” subsists in. The first layer refers to the realm of mere objects where the “I” finds the other’s body. The second layer refers to the realm where the “I” confronts the other’s experience. The latter, however, is not other than the other’s experience as is perceived within the primordial environment of the “I.” In other words, it is the experience of the other animate body as the experience of the “I” as if it existed in the “there” mode. The other’s experience, therefore, is nothing but “my” experience. The gap is still unfilled. The reductively constituted “I” is hardly the other as another authentic consciousness; regardless of the intention of “I,” the other that has been constituted in this way will never acquire the status of the “I,” the status of another subject in the sense that I determine myself as an “I,” as a transcendental ego. Therefore there is *no* qualitative difference which distinguishes the other self from another inanimate object or from other creatures. The community that is thus formed will not be an interactively formed intersubjective community of egos but a world where the “I” serves as the center of a multitude of animate and inanimate objects, some of which the “I” apprehends as other egos.

Husserl attempts to surmount this difficulty with two arguments. First, we suppose a normality where the constitution of the common world of subjects is possible. Second, this normality is based upon pre-established harmony. However, this line of

Scheler, Wundt fails to recognize the phenomenological attitude of mind, “which must *bring* reader ... something to *intuit* which in essence may only be intuited.” The final tautology, discussed by Scheler, was tantamount to: “Now look, and then you will see it!” (See Lukacs 1980, 479).

reasoning begs the question since it presupposes the very communality –which might be called *harmonious* normality—instead of explaining its emergence. “The only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense and status of existent others, thus and so determined, consists in their being constituted *in me* as other” (Husserl 1967, 128).

The “I” is the “apprehended transcendental ego ... who first becomes aware of himself” and who experiences the other as his “Other”. The question, however, is how does this particular ego become aware of itself as itself? Reference to the realm of primordial existence or primordial being is Husserl’s possible response in order to resolve this question. I experience myself inwardly, internally whereas I experience the other externally. In other words, I experience the other by internalizing his externality or the externally given or externally formed experience of his existence. Consequently, I constitute the other in myself. However, it remains an enigma as to how I first come to experience my own self. Apparently, Husserl parenthesizes language and all acts that primordially designate the experiential and transcendental priority of the other. Yet, as is the case with Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum*, he is bound to language which is a realm in-between, a threshold phenomenon, and which defines (determines the limits and the finitude of) the horizon of my understanding of my own being.

Husserl’s notion of the other is nothing but an objectified extension of his own self:

[T]hat *everything I, qua transcendental ego, know as existing in consequence of myself, and explicate as constituted in myself, must belong to me as part of my own essence...* I must first explicate *my own as such, in order to understand that, within my own, what is not my own likewise receives existential sense* –and does so as something appresented analogically. (Husserl 1967, 149-50)

I, after parenthesizing all other humans, as well as myself, retain myself qua ego. We are back once again on Cartesian ground. However, we inevitably confront the question: why should we not bracket language and even the idea of philosophy as, to use Husserl's words, an all-embracing, original science of the ego?

Chapter Three: Language, Sympathy, and the Other

Language, thought, and consciousness

Human cognition is an active process. It consists not only in immediate sensory perception, but also in a process that recognizes things, and which transcends what is immediately available to the senses. Alexander Luria remarks: “The ability to transcend the bounds of immediate concrete experience is a fundamental feature of human consciousness” (1982, 19). Consciousness is peculiar to humans, and is formed through social interaction which involves the constitutive presence of language. As such, consciousness is a process that contains internal contradictions and oppositions that are involved in it. Leont’ev explains the relation between action and the formation of consciousness as follows: “Consciousness must be considered not as a field contemplated by the subject on which his images and conceptions are projected but as a specific internal movement generated by the movement of man’s activity” (1978, 7).

The tendency of all traditional psychological approaches is to look for the origin of psychic processes within the organism. In the traditional philosophical outlook, consciousness appears as something extraneous to psychological processes, which cannot be explained or known. Even in empiricist psychology, consciousness is mostly assumed to be a stage upon which mental appears, but often without any participation in the formation of mental processes (Leont’ev 1978, 14).

In empiricism, there is nothing in the mind that does not exist first in the senses. Although empiricism begins with sound premises, its methodology gives way to insurmountable difficulties. The approach of this school to cognitive processes and to the problem of consciousness is mechanistic and reductionist. Despite the correct assumption that nothing can happen outside experience, empiricists approach all categorical thinking

as reducible to sensory images and their associations. Thinking is no more than a mechanical relating of sensory data. They cannot explain the uniqueness of thinking, nor provide a satisfactory explanation for the distinct modes of animal and human being.

Individualism is the thread that binds different factions of psychology and philosophy together. But a reexamination of the principles of a science of human consciousness requires abandonment of subjectivist prejudices and a redefinition of the principles of mental activity as a product of social history.

Consciousness is a social product, which is produced in the process of work and is externalized as a construction. It is activity objectified. During this social process people formulate language, which functions as signifying the theoretical elements of objects. “Acquisition of language by individuals is acquisition of its signification in the form of perception” (Leont’ev 1978, 18). But language and consciousness are not identical. Language is *a form of existence of consciousness*. “Words, the language signs, are not simply replacements for things, they are conditional substitutes. Behind philological meanings is hidden social practice, activity transformed and crystallized in them” (Leont’ev 1978, 18).

We can distinguish two major psychological approaches to personality: One is based on *need* (behaviorism calls it reinforcement), and proposes that need determines the activity of a person. For this the study of consciousness is the study of these needs. The other seeks to understand how human activity develops, and results in the formation of new motives and needs, leading to a hierarchy of needs and changes in this hierarchy. A correct approach to consciousness must consider human behavior neither in isolation, (as, e.g., a phenomenology of mental acts), nor in mechanical relation to other “lower”

types of reflexes. A correct approach will see human consciousness within the complex of man's social and historical existence. Luria notes that "all fundamental human cognitive activities take shape in a matrix of social history and form the products of sociohistorical development" (1976, v).⁵¹ There are two important aspects that determine the uniqueness of human consciousness: one is the particular type of actions that are rooted in man's labor, and the other, which is equally rooted in labor, is language. Luria articulates the relation between work processes, language, and consciousness as follows:

Language, in the course of social history, became the decisive instrument which helped humans transcend the boundaries of sensory experience, to assign symbols, and to formulate certain generalizations or categories. Thus, *if humans had not possessed the capacity for labor and had not had language, they would not have developed abstract, "categorical" thinking*. That is why we should not seek the origins of abstract thinking and categorical behavior, which mark a sharp change from the sensory to the rational, within human consciousness or within the human brain. Rather, we should seek these origins in the social forms of human historical existence. (1982, 27, italics added)

Human existence is from the outset a social product and a socially conditioned entity.

Language is one of the most important social tools that provide us with instruments for thinking, perceiving, organizing, and analyzing.

Language, which mediates human perception, results in extremely complex operations: the analysis and synthesis of incoming information, the perceptual ordering of the world, and the encoding of impressions into systems. Thus words—the basic linguistic units—carry out not only meaning but also the fundamental units of consciousness reflecting the external world. (Luria 1976, 9)⁵²

⁵¹ See also Leont'ev (1978, 8).

⁵² Similarly, Vološinov expresses this organizing and determining function of language as follows: "[T]he location of the organizing and formative center is not within (i.e., not in the material of inner signs) but outside. It is not experience that organizes expression, but the other way around—*expression organizes experience*. Expression is what first gives experience its form and specificity of direction" (1973, 85).

The relation between thought and language has traditionally been viewed as unvaried, and can be classified in two major ways: a) that which considers the two as absolutely identical, and b) that which considers the two as completely distinct.⁵³ Both approaches, however, are far from a comprehensive understanding of the problem. If language and thought are taken as identical, then one cannot speak of any relationship between them. On the other hand, completely separating thought from language reduces the relation between them to an external, mechanical relation between two distinct processes.

A very important difference between intelligent apes and primitive men is the use of language, or a sign-system. The thinking of apes is entirely independent of speech, and this is an extremely important feature, since it designates distinct genetic roots of thought and language. Work is an essentially distinguishing element that divides humans and other primates. Vygotsky and Luria state that,

[A]lthough the ape manifests the ability to invent and use tools, which is the premise of all human cultural development, nonetheless actual work based on that ability has not yet been developed in apes even to the slightest extent. *The use of tools in the absence of work* both unites and divides the behavior of the ape and man.” (1992, 32)

The basic element of language is the word. Luria states that “[w]ords codify our experience” (1982, 31). The sympractical sense of the words designates their origin in the history of labor, this is to say that words can only have meaning and this meaning can only be understood in the process of related labor and only in that context (Luria 1982, 32). The sympractical nature of words in human language, on the other hand, signifies the

⁵³ “All the theories offered from antiquity to our time range between *identification*, or *fusion*, of thought and speech on the one hand, and their equally absolute, almost metaphysical *disjunction* and *segregation* on the other” (Vygotsky 1970, 2).

qualitative difference between human language and the quasi-languages. Due to this contextual-practical nature, a word can express a different number of situations.

According to Vygotsky, the unit of verbal thought is word-meaning. The word is the unit of thought because the powers of abstraction and generalization are the most important functions of thinking. Due to these same features a word also becomes an instrument of communication. Luria states that “[t]he word is the foundation of the system of codes which ensures the transition from the sensory to the rational word” (1982, 39). According to Vygotsky, “[t]he nature of meaning as such is not clear. Yet it is in word-meaning that thought and speech unite into verbal thought. In meaning, then, the answer to our questions about the relationship between thought and speech can be found” (1970, 5).

Both Gestalt and associative theory have been looking for the intrinsic nature of the word meaning in wrong directions.

A word does not refer to a single object but to a group or to a class of objects. Each word is therefore already a generalization. Generalization is a verbal act of thought and reflects reality in quite another way than sensation and perception reflect it. Such a qualitative difference is implied in the proposition that there is a dialectical leap not only between total absence of consciousness (in inanimate matter) and sensation but also between sensation and thought. (Vygotsky 1970, 5)⁵⁴

This qualitative difference between perception and thought signifies that, in the latter, reality is reflected in a generalized way. Generalization is also the essence of meaning. Hence meaning is an act of thought. At the same time, meaning is an inseparable part of the word and so also belongs to the realm of language. Meaning is categorical or conceptual; it also functions towards analysis of things (Luria 1982, 37).

⁵⁴ “The basic function of a word is its ‘referential’ function. According to Vygotsky, any word possesses an *object reference*. It can function as a substitute for an object. A word is always directed towards an object. It may designate an object, an act, a property, or a relationship” (Luria 1982, 34).

Man, thanks to words, has a double world. Words enable him to deal with things, which he does not perceive even indirectly. Words have a regulatory function too. Man not only regulates his perceptions but his memories with these images. He can control his actions via words. “Words give rise not only to a duplicate world, but also to a form of *voluntary action* which could not exist without language” (Luria 1982, 35). Language does not only serve to organize and analyze perception and memory. It provides humans with the ability to deal with objects that are absent. Language creates a duplicate world through words which maintain the system of meanings whether or not the person is directly experiencing the objects to which the word refers.

The primary function of language is communication. Understanding another person is impossible without the use of a mediating expression. Language, by its construction and function, is social. “Rational, intentional conveying of experience and thought to others requires a mediating system” (Vygotsky 1970, 6). Human speech is a prototype of such a system which has resulted from needs that have emerged within the work process. However, words as signs alone are not sufficient for communication. As Vygotsky states: “[R]eal communication requires meaning –i.e., generalization—as much as signs” (1970, 6). Words are the names of concepts. For every comprehensible and fully developed concept exists a word. Traditional approaches to the problem of thought and language, by separating consciousness from its different functions and parts, have driven the study of consciousness into a dead-end. As a consequence of this, it is the case that for traditional psychology, thoughts appear separated from one’s life, interests, needs, inclinations, and intentions. It seems then as if thoughts think themselves. Therefore one can trace no effect that thought has on life or vice-versa.

Earlier it was stated, that according to the genetic theory of language and thought, neither language nor thought nor consciousness are finalized, unalterable functions and entities. Two assumptions of an earlier psychology are that the relation between thought and speech is constant and unalterable, and that the meaning of the word does not undergo any change once the word emerges (Vygotsky 1970, 121-2). The changing character of language can be traced in the ontogenesis of the meaning of the word. “During ontogenesis there are important changes in the operations of referring to an object, coding these features, and placing the object into a system of categories” (Luria 1982, 43). The notion of the growth of word-meaning is related to consciousness. A word reflects the complex structure of objectivity; that is, the complex external structure of the world is reflected in word-meaning. Since changes in word-meaning determine the structure of consciousness (as consciousness that is essentially and constitutively associated with the structure of the word), a study of ontogenesis of the word is a study concerning the development of consciousness.

The main idea of the Vygotskite approach is that “the relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought.... Thought is not merely expressed in words: *it comes into existence through them*” (Vygotsky 1970, 125, italics added). The development of speech is from simpler units to whole, whereas the development of thought is in the opposite direction. Since it is related to meaning, it starts from a whole and moves towards differentiated units of meaning. Hence the development of these two aspects does not coincide. However, this does not mean that the two are independent of each other. Thought finds its *reality* and *form* in speech.

There is a difference between the meaning and the sense of a word. Meaning is what a word conveys in relation to the historically and socially formed linguistic structure; it is an objective reflection of a system of relations and associations. On the other hand, sense is the process of transformation of the meaning where this meaning is actualized by being selected subjectively and contextually from amongst a multitude of meanings (Luria 1982, 44-5). Understanding requires comprehension of both the meaning and sense of a word. Although the object-reference of a word might become stabilized at a certain stage of child development, nonetheless, its generalizing and analyzing function (that is, its meaning) undergoes change over a much longer period. One of Vygotsky's greatest discoveries is that the meaning of a word changes beyond its reference and that consciousness changes in association with such development. "As word meaning changes, psychological processes also change" (Luria 1982, 50).

Word meaning can be thought as closely related to the sense, i.e., what Luria calls meaning should be understood as "referential meaning" (no matter if the reference is an object, an affection or a "fixed" explained meaning in a dictionary). On the other hand, "sense" refers to the active, perpetually fluctuating contextual meaning of the word that is parallel to and reflects the perpetual changes of the consciousness. Along with the meaning of the word the consciousness changes too. Luria states

During the earliest stage of onto genesis, consciousness has an affective character. During the next stage, it begins to assume a concrete character. Words, through which the world is reflected, evoke a system of practically actuated connections. It is only at the final stage that consciousness acquires an abstract verbal-logical character, which differs from the earlier stages both in its meaning structure and in psychological processes, *although even at this stage the connections that characterize the previous stages are covertly preserved.* (1982, 53, italics added)

Meaning interprets the world in human consciousness. Language is the carrier of meaning but not its demiurge. There are socially developed forms of action behind meaning through which people perceive and change the world. Meaning has a dual life in that, on the one hand it is produced by society. It has its own history and development. It expresses the movement and various stages of human knowledge as well as the various ideological representations of society. In this sense, it is subordinate to socio-historical laws and to the internal logic of development. On the other hand, meaning operates human consciousness. It is only through this operation that meaning can exist. In this second life of meaning, that is, as consciousness, it is individualized and subjectivized. However, even at this stage, it carries historical and social determinations (Leont'ev 1978, 89).

Leont'ev, too, conceptualizes this second aspect of meaning as “personal sense”, which is the active realization and subjectivization of sociohistorically produced meaning. It should be emphasized that choosing sense, in contrast to meaning, is not passively selecting a readymade private meaning. To choose a sense is to decide between social positions in accordance with one's concrete social contacts and experiences. Leont'ev states: “If the individual in given life circumstances is forced to make a choice, then the choice is not between meanings but between colliding social positions that are expressed and recognized through these meanings” (1978, 94).

Following the same path, Vološinov elaborates on the difference between theme and meaning. According to Vološinov, theme or thematic unity is a unitary property of any utterance as a whole. Theme is irreproducible; it is individual, unique, and is the expression of concrete historical situations that condition utterance. Theme depends not

only on linguistic forms, but also on extra-linguistic situations and factors. “Only an utterance taken in its full, concrete scope as an historical phenomenon possesses a theme” (Vološinov 1973, 100). The repeatable, reproducible, and constant aspect of utterance is meaning. Theme is the upper limit of linguistic significance; it is only the theme that has a definite meaning. On the other hand, meaning is the lower limit of linguistic significance. Meaning is a potentiality that should be actualized in concreteness of theme. Unless actualized, meaning means nothing (Vološinov 1973, 101).

Genuine understanding is active. Only active understanding can grasp the *theme*; i.e., only active understanding is capable of producing sense as an actual, individuated meaning. The theme is a generative process, and only another generative process can conceive it. As Vološinov states, “any true understanding is dialogic in nature” (1973, 102). So, meaning is generated in dialogue; it is the material that is used in producing the sense or the theme of the word.

In many respects, Hume’s explanation of the process of individuation of the self reminds the process of production of sense and theme in contrast to meaning. Hume mentions the tension between reason and understanding on one side, and passions and actions on the other. In the section on virtue in Book III of the *Treatise*, for instance, he speaks of the influence of morals over actions and passions. Contrary to morals, reason has no such influence. Hume concludes that “the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason” (1967, 457). Morality is active, whereas reason is inactive. The inactivity of reason means that it does not exert any power upon passions and actions. All shapes and appearances of reason share this inactivity (1967, 457).

Hume compares vice and virtue to sound, color, heat and cold, pointing that these latter qualities do not reside in the object but belong to the human mind. Alike physical qualities that are not produced but only discovered by reason, moral qualities are not produced but are feelings that can only be distinguished. However, similar to the qualities attributed to objects, these feelings are sentiments that are felt by humans. Vice and virtue are objects of feeling and not objects of reason (Hume 1967, 469). This is another evidence for the priority of impressions of passions over impressions of sensation and reason. This priority, in turn, means that impressions of passion are actualization of impressions of sensation and reason. Unless actualized, impressions of sensation are mere abstractions that are deprived of any concrete content and meaning. This is another way to explain the tension between reason and passions, which according to Hume, is responsible for the diversification of a self with regard to others, and for the alterability of that self with regard to itself (Hume 1967, 438).

One strategy of analysis in traditional as well as contemporary psychology is the reduction of the subject's activity to stimuli-response. Leont'ev calls this a postulate of directness. Although motives, intentions, needs, and desires are admitted to be influential in this process, all these approaches assume that objective conditions of activity are opposed to motivation (Leont'ev 1978, 47). The only way to surmount the difficulties and shortcomings caused by the postulate of directness is to introduce the notion of action. It is important to realize that activity is not reducible to behavior or to neuro-physiological processes. Leont'ev states that "[a]ctivity appears as a process in which mutual transfers between the poles 'subject-object' are accomplished" (1978, 50).

Activity is a social phenomenon. Society should not be considered an opposition between mere external conditions and the individual. Society is not a simple substitute for external natural conditions. It is in society that man's activity is realized, and society itself is the product of such activity. At the same time, it reproduces the individual's activity which forms it. Activity is objective. "Objectivity of activity is responsible not only for the objective character of images but also for the objectivity of needs, emotions, and feelings" (Leont'ev 1978, 54). Activity indicates the peculiarity of human needs, namely, that they are produced and reproduced in society. Produced needs are reproduced as and in objects that are needed. Needs are objectivized and so is the activity towards production of such objectivized needs.

Vygotsky's views suggest two important aspects of a psychological consideration of behavior and activity. First, intellectual-mental psychological processes are preceded by practical activity. Vygotsky considers certain types of human activity which may be called "equipped activity". "Equipment mediates activity connecting man not only with the world of things but also with other people" (Leont'ev 1978, 59). In this way, human activity draws into itself the experience of the other's activities. At the same time, this feature designates the socio-historical dimensions and determinations of these activities. The highest psychological and mental processes can only be realized in social interaction. One might regard linguistic processes and thinking (both verbal and nonverbal) as a specific form of equipped human action. Departing from such a point of view, we arrive at a second feature, which is concerned with the question of consciousness.

"Consciousness is *co-knowing*, but only in the sense that individual consciousness may exist only in the presence of social consciousness and of language that is its real substrate

... Consciousness is originated by society; it is produced” (Leont’ev 1978, 60). The interiorization process then is not a mere mechanical process of transferring and transforming the external into internal; rather, it designates the very formation of such an internal plane, the consciousness of the human person.

Therefore, consciousness is not a postulate; it is not a necessary condition for a science of the psyche. Rather it is the problem and is the subject-matter that this science investigates. One is able to draw links between this active representation of, on the one hand, the psyche and consciousness and, on the other, the Humean position that rejects the idea of a substantial, self-evident notion of the self and, moreover, tends to provide a genetic model that studies the process of the formation of the idea of the self. The formation of the idea of self through other selves is not an imitative activity where one associates his own being with the conscious being of the other and internalizes his notion. Rather, it designates the genetic mode of formation of one’s idea of the self which one becomes aware of its internal, intimate existence. Hume’s thesis that prioritizes perceptual activity over the existence of the self can be regarded as akin to Vygotsky’s thesis that it is not meaning and consciousness that lie beneath life, but the very opposite, namely, that it is life which is the basis of consciousness and meaning.

The changing point of view that results in seeing the internal, mental-psychic movements in terms of objective activity changes the whole understanding about the subject-object dichotomy. The Cartesian-Lockean understanding separates the world into two spheres: subjective existence (that corresponds to the phenomenon of consciousness) and objective being (spatial extension). The new approach leads to another form of distinction. Leont’ev defines this distinction as follows: “on the one hand, objective

reality and its idealized, transformed forms, and on the other hand, activity of the subject, including both internal and external processes. This means splitting activity into two parts or sides as if they belonged to two completely different spheres is eliminated” (1978, 61). At the same time, the seemingly paradoxical form of the subject’s existence as consciousness of externally actualized activities is dispelled. Consciousness and selfhood are therefore necessarily external and objective and are mediated by objectivized action. Consciousness is socially, historically mediated action that is subjectivized. The psyche (consciousness) is the subjective image of objective reality.

It is important to notice that the subjectivity of the sensory reflection should not be understood in terms of subjectivism but as an indication of “subjectness.” This is to say that the formed (reflected) image belongs to the subject.⁵⁵ The point of departure for studying the subject is not the individual person in his subjectivist subjectivity but his condition as a social being. Hence, man’s experience, too, surpasses the individual’s personal being and includes those aspects that are not and cannot be experienced by him directly. As Leont’ev puts it: “The basis for cognitive processes is not the individual practice of the subject, but ‘the totality of human practice.’ For this reason not only thought but also man’s perception, to a very large degree, surpass in their riches the relative poverty of his personal experience” (1978, 39).

Objectification of activity does not mean objectification or expression of an internal image that belongs to consciousness. The product is not informed by the image but is objectified by the very activity, that is, it carries the content of the activity

⁵⁵ “*All perceptive activity finds the object there where it really is – in the external world, in objective space and time. It is this that constitutes that most important psychological feature of the subjective image that is called its objectivity or, much less fortuitously, its objectivization*” (Leont’ev 1978, 36).

objectively. There we acquire a circle of *subject* → *activity* → *object*, where the circle is broken and enriched by practical activity each time. Leont'ev states that "[t]he realized activity is richer and truer than the consciousness that precedes it" (1978, 78). If we limit ourselves to the postulate of directness, then we face the apparently irresolvable question: how does the internally formed subjective image appear outside our subjectivity? By contrast, the genetic-historical approach not only resolves this question based upon the notion of human activity but it also resolves the seemingly paradoxical issue of the formation of the notion of the self as something which is perceived internally and intimately that is, at the same time, based upon external, objectively comprehended and subjectively internalized perceptions derived from activity.

The basic material of consciousness is the sensory fabric: the images of perceived reality, memory-ideas, and imagination. "[O]wing especially to the sensory content of consciousness, the world appears to the subject as existing not in consciousness but outside his consciousness—as an objective 'field' and the object of his activity" (Leont'ev 1978, 81). The consciousness seen from either outside or from inside is not—and cannot be—for itself. Sensations, as descriptions of situations, happen on the periphery of my being, of my body, and since the sentient and the sensible are incomplete. Sensation is anonymous.

[A]ny sensation belongs to a certain *field*. To say that I have a visual field is to say that by reason of my position I have access to and an opinion upon a system of beings, visible beings, that these are at the disposal of my gaze in virtue of a kind of primordial contract and through a gift of nature, with no effort made on my part; from which it follows that vision is prepersonal. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 216)

Since the body is the subject of perception, the senses impose their distinct structure upon the sensible. However, this does not prevent them from collaborating and

forming a synthesis based on the unity of the senses. “Sensory experience is unstable, and alien to natural perception, which we achieve with our whole body all at once, and which opens a world of inter-acting senses” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 225). Experience of a separate sense is realizable only against the background of a unity of perception. Distinct sense is not of any assistance to comprehend consciousness. Sensible quality is only perceptible when such classification and narrowing of the sensory field is actualized. If the experience of perception as a whole, which Merleau-Ponty calls the gaze, is not scrutinized the sensible quality is not apprehended.

Feliks Mikhailov, in his *The Riddle of the Self*, addresses this question and relates the cooperation and mimicry among sense organs to the active nature of the process of human perception. For instance, he speaks of the groping movement of the eyes while seeing something, as if sight works as a tactile sense when, e.g., a doctor gropes for a certain tissue in a patient’s body. Merleau-Ponty, too, speaks of the “intentionality of body” in perception. Discussing the nature of perceiving a single image with the use of binocular sense organs, he maintains that the gaze that produces the unity is not the consequence of an intellectual activity or thought. Rather, it is the body that determines the correspondence between the sense organ and what is perceived (1962, 232-3). “Unity of senses... cannot be understood in terms of their subsumption under a primary consciousness, but of their never-ending integration into one knowing organism” (1962, 233). The same principle of unity is at work on the side of the object. An object is not a mere amalgamation of certain sensory and formal qualities; rather, the *form* of the object is the expression of a certain relationship to the *nature* of the object. Form is not a mere geometrical figure; it is an expression of an inner structure.

The thesis that perception is simple and immediate has been subjected to criticism. Perception is a complex and active process of assigning incoming data to familiar categories. It is intimately related to the abstracting and generalizing functions of language:

Sensory impressions serve only as a stimulus bringing into action our cognitive capabilities, and images of objects are engendered by internal mental operations – conscious or unconscious- that, *in other words, we would not perceive the object world if we did not think it*. But how could we think this world if it did not initially disclose itself to us specifically, in its objectivity, sensually perceived? (Leont'ev 1978, 84, italics added)

Studies made as early as the end of nineteenth century have indicated a close relationship between color perception and the categorization of color and color names. Studies initiated by Humboldt and continued by Sapir-Whorf maintain that “languages can distinguish among certain color differences and ignore others, something that inevitably leads to different groupings” (Luria 1976, 19-22). Perception –the direct, sensual reflect of human activity—is a form and a degree of cognition. Perception is a thought subordinated to a certain perceptual field (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 217). Human perception has acquired a high degree of perfection throughout man’s historical development. Perception requires sensory organs to be actualized. However, the existence of sensory organs is necessary but not sufficient. For the realization of perception, it is necessary that an active relationship between man and object be formed. At the same time, this process determines the degree of completeness of such a reflection. A satisfactory study of the process of perception not only involves scrutinizing the sensory organs and their work and the physical nature of the effects of the object upon them, but also “penetrat[ing] into the activity of the subject that mediates his ties with the objective world” (Leont'ev 1978, 20).

The radically fluctuating nature of perception is also observable ontogenetically in child-development. The child's perception is different from the adult's not only in its content (which is linguistically and conceptually limited) but also in its form.⁵⁶ The adult knows the world basically with his eyes; the child with his mouth. For the child's perception to become adult-like a long process of acquiring experience and skill is required. The child's vision has no perspective. He apprehends the same object at various distances as qualitatively different. Yet, we should not conclude that the child is less intelligent than the adult. He is intelligent but in a qualitatively different way (that is, in a more primitive way). The child's world of perception is unstable and alterable. It is only after the apprehension of "visual images" and their integration that the child develops a proper perception of the external world. Although now being able to perceive the world as an integrated whole, he still can confuse reality and fantasy.

There is a need for speech and thinking to develop, for the child's reality-based experience become strengthened and sufficiently autonomous... [A] great deal of cultural changes has to take place, in order for the child to move out of the phase of primitive perception, into the next phase, that of full-ledged forms of adaptation to the external world. (Vygotsky & Luria 1992, 93-95)

Sensory material and the word are the indispensable parts of the concept. "A concept is not isolated, ossified, changeless formation but an active part of the intellectual process, constantly engaged in serving communication, understanding and problem-solving" (Vygotsky 1970, 53). In early stages of ontogenesis, words are attributed to objects and object-groups due to mere external associations; they are bound to emotional

⁵⁶ The Vygotskite approach to perception and its relation to language and other cognitive abilities holds "language [as] the most decisive element in systematizing perception; insofar as words are themselves a product of sociohistorical development, they become tools for formulating abstractions and generalizations, and facilitate the transition from unmediated sensory reflection to mediated, rational thinking" (Luria 1976, 49-50).

“immediate” perceptual experiences. During the development of the child, on the contrary, words assume a codifying and abstracting-generalizing function that categorizes perceptual data due to development of meaning.

The existence of associations, however strong and numerous, is not sufficient to explain the formation of concepts (Vygotsky 1970, 54). There is a third element in the formation of concepts, a determining tendency which is set up by an image or a goal. It is only after comprehending that some problem cannot be solved except by the use of a concept that a concept is formed. However, a model that aims at explaining higher human activities and their organization only by way of their needs is incomplete. All higher human activities are performed through mediation, which in the case of psychic behavior, appears as sign or language.⁵⁷ The specific sign in concept-formation is the word that first emerges as the material and later as the symbol standing for the concept. Studies have shown that traditional psychological explanations of the formation of concepts that base concept-formation on logical association only are irrelevant to reality. [Concept formation] is guided by the use of words as means of actively centering attention, of abstracting certain traits, synthesizing them, and symbolizing them by sign (Vygotsky 1970, 80-1). Abstraction is not a device along other mental devices within the civilized psyche. It is more appropriate to say that abstraction is the necessary component; it is an indispensable tool of thinking.

⁵⁷ “Vygotsky interpreted differences in one’s reflections of reality as differences in the system of psychological elements that govern such reflections. In his view, language is the most decisive element in systematizing perception; insofar as words are themselves a product of sociohistorical development, they become tools for formulating abstractions and generalizations, and facilitate the transition from unmediated sensory reflection to mediated, rational thinking” (Luria 1976, 49-50).

The regulative function of language explains the nature and sources of acts of will. According to the Vygotskian view, the preliminary source of voluntary action is the linguistic commands of the mother. The mother's speech to the child organizes his physical acts and motor skills. Later, when the child enters the realm of language, he will replace his mother's linguistic presence with his own, and will organize his acts first, through overt speech and, later, through inner speech. At the beginning, the voluntary act belongs to two persons (mother and child) and later it becomes only the child's.

"Therefore, the source of the volitional act is the child's communication with the adult" (Luria 1982, 88-9). We can take the adult to be the other of the child and generalize communication into social interaction; hence, the formula can be restated as the source of volitional action is interaction with the other. A volitional act is a form of social behavior. "Along with the cognitive function of the word and its function as a means of communication, there is a directive function. The word not only reflects reality, it also regulates behavior" (Luria 1982, 90).

Further elaboration on the regulative functions of language provides us with a clearer understanding of processes of perception, imagination, volition, and thinking. Vygotsky states that "[i]nner speech is speech for oneself; external speech is for others" (1970, 131). External speech is materialization of thought. With internal speech the process is reversed: speech turns into inward thought. Hence we should conclude that the structures of the two are different. In contrast to Piaget who considers egocentric speech to be the reflection of the child's egocentric thought, and who claims that egocentric speech disappears as the child grows out of his autistic individuality and becomes socially mature, Vygotsky considers the pattern of development to originate in the

collectivity and evolves to individuality. “Speech for oneself originates through differentiation from speech for others. Since the main course of the child’s development is one of gradual individualization, this tendency is reflected in the function and structure of his speech” (Vygotsky 1970, 133).

The main distinguishing feature of inner speech is the peculiar nature of its syntax. When compared to external speech, inner speech appears to be disconnected and incomplete. Moreover, this incompleteness appears in the form of a predication process (i.e., inner speech tends to eliminate the subject and keep the predicate only). This is the basic syntactic form of inner speech. “Inner speech is speech almost without words. With syntax and sound reduced to a minimum, meaning is more than ever in the forefront. Inner speech works with semantics, not phonetics” (Vygotsky 1970, 145). Vygotsky enumerates three semantic peculiarities of inner speech: The first of these is the superiority of sense over meaning. Sense designates the totality of psychological states related to the word, its context. Meaning, on the other hand, is just one of these states albeit the most stable. It is like a cornerstone in the edifice of sense. “The enrichment of words by the sense they gain from the context is the fundamental law of the dynamics of word meanings” (1970, 146). The second semantic feature of inner speech is agglutination. Finally, the third semantic aspect is the “influx of sense” which designates the rather complex and complicated way the sense of different words influence each other. Borrowing a term from Gompertz, Vološinov, in his *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, defines this aspect of inner speech as the total impression of utterances. Accordingly, the whole of inner speech is not analyzable in terms of the grammatical aspects of ordinary, external speech. The total impressions that are the units of inner

speech join together according to the laws of evaluative or emotive correspondence and dialogical deployment. Although this inner speech follows the historically and socially conditioned and produced laws of dialogic speech, it appears nonetheless in abbreviated forms and indicates a more uniform (whole) structure (1973, 38).

The basic motive behind forming an utterance is the need to communicate. There are three basic types of motive: demand, contact, or concept. More complex forms of utterances are dialogic speech (one characteristic of which is that it is shared by two persons) and monologic speech (which is the realization of the interlocutor's own thought). Besides motive, there is an utterance plan that is required at a later stage for the constitution of speech. It is at this stage that the semantic schema of an utterance initially appears. Later, the constituted subjective senses are transformed into meanings that are comprehensible to others. Here we arrive at one of the central problems of psychology, namely, thought. The relation between speech and thought, as Vygotsky takes it up, is far more complex than it is traditionally assumed. Speech is not simply an embodiment of thought as, Cowley for one, tries to present it. "Thought is *completed* in speech" (Luria 1982, 150) but, prior to being uttered, it goes through many different formative stages. "Thought itself is formed with the help of the word or speech" (1982, 152). The word, as the material of thought, always belongs to the objective realm of the other. Even though it becomes one's own word as it is individuated via acquiring its sense, that is, through being conceived and uttered the realization of this individuation of the word as personal sense and as a concept is possible only after it is combined with the objective meaning of the word. This participation constitutes the objectivity of the word and of its meaning as the language of other. Regardless of the particular form of the utterance, that is,

regardless of monologic or dialogic form of the speech, the other is always present in one's speech and thought, i.e., in one's consciousness as a constitutive element.

The concept of artificial virtue, which holds for humans as members of society, has a central role in understanding Hume's account of language and its place in human life. Paul Árdal (1977) criticizes Hume's so-called official view to the effect that the meaning of words is a mental image. Árdal states: "If the meanings of words are such images their essentially private nature entails the impossibility of communication ... It is the claim, that ideas, conceived as images, are meanings, that I shall challenge" (1977, 52). A consideration of Hume's rudimentary account of language will show that the depiction of Humean philosophy as a kind of individualist atomism is not plausible.

Árdal claims that Flew's and Bennett's views on Hume's concept of language suggest that meanings are ideas.⁵⁸ While both commentators admit that there are points that are incommensurable with Hume's official view, Árdal, by contrast, criticizes such an approach to Hume, and proposes that the supposed inadequacies in Hume's philosophy that these commentators point out are not mere lapses, but are instead suggestive of a radical interpretation of the Humean view of language. In the chapter of the *Treatise*, 'Of Abstract Ideas,' Hume clearly rejects the view that meanings or words are private mental images (Árdal 1977, 53-4).

⁵⁸ Bennett (1971) writes: "Hume's view of meaning is essentially Locke's: to understand a word is to associate it with a kind of 'idea', and 'ideas' are quasi-sensory states." Like his predecessors Hume does not draw a clear line between thinking, imagining, meaning, and understanding. "In Hume, then, we again have the assimilation of the intellectual to the sensory" (1971, 222). Cowley (1968) similarly writes: "In the Humean doctrine, ideas—copies of impressions—are required to do service as concepts or meanings. But they cannot. Words are themselves impressions and ideas, occurring and becoming associated with other sorts of impressions and ideas. They refer, but they have no sense or meaning.... [I]n his work [w]ords, it would seem, are heard but not uttered" (1968, 154).

Although Hume might have not discussed the social context and significance of language here, the reason for this is not a Lockean identification of meanings and words with mental images and ideas. Rather, it is because he simply is not concerned with this issue at this stage. So here he does not speak about the forms of acquisition of language; but simply takes the existence of language for granted. Even though Hume openly says that ideas are images of impressions, and that there are ideas that are images of other ideas, we should note that the word “image,” as used by Hume, does not necessarily signify a pictorial entity. That ideas are images of impressions is more likely to mean that they are reflections of, and derived from, impressions. This is evident from passages about the relationship between complex ideas and impressions, as well as from the passage where Hume contrasts his views of ideas with the traditional philosophical view that considers ideas innate. Hume writes,

’[T]is remarkable, that the present question concerning the precedency of our impressions or ideas, is the same with what has been made so much noise in other terms, when it has been disputed whether there be any *innate ideas*, or whether all ideas be derived from sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which they are derived, and which they represent.” (1967, 7)

The expression “image,” as it is used here, designates priority of impressions over ideas.

Impressions and ideas, according to Hume, are also distinguished by their vivacity, so that the latter appear as reflections of the former. Although in the case of simple ideas almost all impressions and ideas resemble each other, it is not so in the case of complex impressions and ideas. Hume says that, most of the times when complex ideas are at stake, there are no particular impressions corresponding to such ideas (1967,

3). Moreover, there are not corresponding ideas for every complex impression that we may have. Hume's example of the city of Jerusalem with golden pavements and walls of rubies is worth noticing. As far as complex impressions and ideas are concerned, the active participation of mind in forming these impressions and ideas is admitted by Hume from the very outset.

For Hume the correspondence between simple impressions and ideas not only shows the dependence of the latter on the former but also the dependence of the former on the latter: "Such a constant conjunction [between impressions and ideas], can never arise from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions" (1967, 4-5). This adds to the evidence that for Hume perceiving is not a passive process where objects influence the mind, as is the case with Locke. Rather, the mind plays an almost equal role in perceiving the objects, by forming impressions and ideas as the object of perception. Furthermore, in the section "Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea" of *Treatise*, where Hume elaborates on understanding the idea of cause and effect, he openly mentions that it is not reason that discovers the relation of cause and effect between objects. Here Hume observes that although reason is aided by past experience and the continuous conjunction of objects, passing from one object to the belief about the existence of another is not determined by reason. Rather, different objects are united in the imagination so that causality "depends solely on the union of ideas" (Hume 1967, 92). This is to say that, it is the active participation of mind via imagination that gives rise to the idea of cause and effect. Hume maintains that causation is not a philosophical relation but a natural one (1967, 94); in other words, the idea of causation is rooted in human nature, which, according to Hume,

is social through and through. Similarly, in the section “Of the Causes of Belief” Hume makes the social basis of the formation of the idea of cause and effect even clearer, by claiming that belief adds a structural strength to, and enlivens, the ideas. Belief changes the form of conceiving of ideas; and it does so with the aid of custom or habit. As Hume remarks: “Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another (1967, 103). Yet, Hume admits the precedence of objects of perceptions over formation of ideas, since it is always the impressions that appear first and then ideas (Hume 1967, 5). Moreover, the impressions are the cause of the ideas but the ideas are not the cause of the impressions.

Speaking of general ideas and their relation to particular ones, Hume argues that “general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them” (1967, 17). This explanation can be considered a depiction of concept-making similar to that which Vygotsky speaks about in *Thought and Language*. According to this view, concepts are generalized ideas/thoughts that are applicable to different situations; they are not ready-made but are produced throughout childhood. Moreover, the Vygotskite approach rejects the identification of thought and language, although he admits the close and unbreakable link between the two. The unit of language is the word; the unit of thought, however, is the concept. Thought, according to Vygotsky, is internalized speech that works not with words but with concepts. The unit of linguistic thought is not the word but meaning. However, meaning not only belongs to the realm of thought but also to the realm of the word. A word without meaning is an empty

formal structure; it does not belong to the realm of utterance. Meaning is generalization; language is a means of communication. In order to communicate, we need meaning, i.e., we need generalization. Since every person's experience is in his own consciousness, it cannot be transferred to others. In order to transfer an experience to others, it should be placed within a determinate transferable category which is conventionally accepted by society. Consequently, as is the case with language, thought is not a private personal activity but is communal and social from the outset.

According to Árdal, Hume holds that

[T]alking or thinking, in such a way as to avoid nonsense, does not necessarily depend upon having non-verbal images ... One need not quasi-instantiate particulars in one's thinking, but in such cases there are at least, according to Hume, ideas or impressions of words. To be conscious is to have perceptions and these are either impressions or ideas." (1977, 58)

Language, for Hume, is rooted in convention. Árdal writes: "Language presupposes a shared world where people check their linguistic utterances by reference to public criteria" (1977, 64). Language is an apparatus of socialization and humanization. In the *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume introduces justice and language as rooted in human convention. By "convention" Hume does not mean promising; rather, he means "a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility" (1975, 306). Thus justice is supposed as a tool –a "whole plan or system" (1975, 306)—that functions for the utility of society. It is made by particular actions that belong to those who participate in the act. However, the larger structure should not be ignored; "every man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system" (1975, 306). This line of reasoning

can be used analogically with respect to language, since in the following passage Hume gives the example of system of exchange and speech and words and language as activities that are organized through human convention:

Thus, two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention for common interest, without any promise or contract: thus gold and silver are made the measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixed by human convention and agreement. (1975, 306)

Hume's linguistic model that is depicted here in its rudiments signifies a structure—a shared world—that is the historical consequence of particular linguistic acts performed by individual participants. This structure, is not only the genetic result of such actions, but also is the common ground upon which new linguistic acts can be performed and against which they can be verified. Moreover, the resulted structure is not a purely formal architectonic, but is an open-ended totality that continues to function with reference to public criteria and social utility.

In a letter to Joseph Spence (1754) Hume argues the case of forming the ideas that are not directly rooted in sensory impressions. Hume's position suggests a linguistic mediation that makes formation and association of ideas possible. Hume speaks of Mr. Blacklock, who is a blind poet (1754, 200). In answer to Hume's question whether he has an idea of light or colors, Blacklock says that in his reading of numerous books and poems, and in many conversations, he has encountered so often with terms expressing colors that he has formed some "false associations" of an intellectual kind. Hume, thus, makes a link between linguistic abilities, verbal thinking, and the formation of meaning and ideas: "I believe, in much of our thinking, there will be found some species of association. *It is certain we always think in some language*, viz. in that which is most familiar to us; and it is but too frequent to substitute words instead of ideas" (1754, 201).

This passage shows that thinking, for Hume, does not require having non-verbal images. Therefore, the limit of thinking is not set by the limits of imagination. Moreover, it indicates that Hume assumes a regulative function for language when it comes to thinking and the formation of ideas.

Such a model of language also explains the feeling of intimacy one has with regard to one's own self. In the abovementioned case, there are ideas and impressions *of* words. Words are uttered; they have an external existence with regard to the speaking agent. Yet, this externality is not only determined as a structural unity of a formal system, but also as the consequence of speech acts that belong to particular speaking agents. To be conscious is to perceive, and perceptions are either impressions or ideas. Thinking is a species of association of ideas and, as Hume openly states, it always happens within some language. To be conscious, then, involves being conscious of those linguistically formed impressions and ideas that appear both as internal –since they are performed—and as external, since they are uttered and also belong to a system of meaningful associations that transcends the individual speaking agent. Thus, the feeling of intimacy with regard to one's own self is the consequence of social activity and the internalization of action, which causes sentiments, and language is an important species of such acts.

An indirect way of considering Hume's rudimentary theory of language and showing the affinity it has with contemporary socio-linguistic approaches is through Hume's exploration of memory. Hume states: "The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position" (1967, 9). Apparently, Hume distances himself from a correspondence theory of memory, since the order he has in mind is identical with logical forms. Although memory-ideas, as mere reflections of

original impressions, might be misremembered, yet auxiliary tools, including the logical order, provide us with the ability to correct memory-ideas in comparison to impressions and to other ideas. Hume implicitly suggests a distinction between “natural” and “logical” memories, and attributes a particular importance to the latter in order to acquire a correct recollection of some impressions.

Hume’s consideration of the effect of habit and customs in acts of recollection is further evidence for interpreting his account of memory to be a higher mental function that is socially determined. In the section “Of the causes of belief” of the *Treatise*, Hume argues that when we make inferences about causes and effects, all past experience may influence our reasoning either directly or indirectly, i.e., whether we are aware of this influence or unaware of it. No matter if such inferences are direct or indirect, obvious or covert, they should all be considered habitual: “In all cases we transfer our experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either *expressly* or *tacitly*, either *directly* or *indirectly*” (1967, 105).

Hume also introduces the testimony of others that is mediated by assigning certain meanings to certain signs and letters and as the mediation which signifies certain actions, impressions and memory-ideas as a source of the formation of the idea of cause and effect: “’Tis obvious all this chain of argument or connexion of cause and effects, is at first founded on those characters or letters, which are seen or remember’d, and that without the authority either of memory or senses our whole reasoning would be chimerical and without foundation” (1967, 83).

When Hume speaks of memory and imagination he distinguishes the corresponding ideas due to their degree of liveliness. Memory-ideas, according to Hume,

when compared to ideas of imagination, are livelier and closer to the original ideas and/or impressions. However, this is not the only difference between these two sets of ideas. Memory-ideas and ideas of imagination also differ due to order and form. Memory-ideas are restrained by the order and form of the original ideas and impressions, whereas ideas of imagination are not. Thus Hume goes on to say that “[t]he chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position” (1967, 9); i.e., the basic function of memory is to preserve the structure of original ideas and/or impressions. Hume’s emphasis on the importance of the form of memory-ideas, in the light of contemporary psychological theories and approaches that differentiate eidetic and symbolic memories, can be interpreted as a reference to a sign-system, since order or structure is meaningful if it is applied to a set of signs that are related to each other according to particular rules of that specific sign-system. The so-called natural language is an instance of such an orderly sign-system. Although the analogy here is far from being exhaustive it serves to show the implausibility of the view that attributes to Hume identifying ideas with pictorial images. Moreover, it shows that relation between ideas resembles the relation between the elements of a sign-system that are connected in accordance with a particular structure.

In addition to this, Hume supposes a close relationship between the symbolic order of memory and imagination, and that of language. For instance, when he wants to explain the “principle of the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas” (1967, 10) the examples that he provides are realizable linguistically only. “Winged horses,” “fiery dragons” etc. that confound the nature are complex ideas that are related via linguistic apparatus. All these ideas, which are copied from original impressions, are

connected linguistically to form complex ideas. Thus, the potential language model that Hume has in mind is a sign-system that follows a symbolic order that resembles the symbolic order between ideas and impressions and makes the connecting of ideas possible. Furthermore, when Hume discusses the connection and association of ideas he mentions that such association follows a particular form that is “uniform with itself in all times and places” (1967, 10). The uniting bond among ideas, which may not be considered an inseparable and unalterable principle, is also responsible for great similarities between different languages (1967, 10).

Adam Smith’s essay, “Consideration the First Formation of Language,” is yet another source for what a developed Humean linguistic theory might have been had Hume himself developed his rudimentary account of language. Smith presents language as being dependent on social experience:

[W]hen the more enlarged experience of these savages had led them to observe, and their necessary occasions obliged them to make mention of other [objects], they would naturally bestow, upon each of these new objects, the same name by which they had been accustomed to express the similar object they were acquainted with. (1966, 507)

Smith correctly underlines the fact that the formation of words precedes the formation of concepts, and that the process of concept formation is closely linked to life experience: “The word *green* and *blue* would, in all probability, be sooner invented than the words *greenness* and *blueness*” (1966, 511).

Two points are worth noting at this stage: First, Smith links linguistic activity to general human activity. Furthermore, he emphasizes the peculiarity of linguistic activity as involving higher mental functions: abstraction and generalization. Moreover,

abstraction and generalization are required, since information about emotional/mental states of the individuals must be communicated between them.

As for the role of verbs in language, Smith defines language as the apparatus that functions to convey information about objective reality. He maintains that “we never speak, but in order to express our opinion that something either is, or is not” (1966, 524). Smith also attributes primacy to verbs. Verbs explain either an event or an act. The primacy of verbs can be interpreted as admitting the act as the primary source of language: “The first verbs, therefore, perhaps even the first words, made use of in the beginnings of language, would, in all probability, be such impersonal verbs” (1966, 525), that is, they would be socially and conventionally made words attached to, or mediating objective events and actions.

Smith is also aware of the relatively late emergence of such concepts as “ego” or “you” (the pronouns). He clearly states that the word “I” is a general word, yet a metaphysically complicated one:

[It] does not, like the word *man*, denote a particular class of objects, separated from all others by peculiar qualities of their own. It is far from being the name of a species, but, on the contrary, whenever it is made use of, it always denotes a precise individual, the particular person who then speaks. (1966, 528-9)

It is interesting to note that the idea of the “I” is explained as posterior to language. Language does not require “I” to be realized; rather, the “I” is conceived and understood, thus constituted, only at an advanced stage of linguistic development. Smith states, “this word [“I”], therefore, expressing so very abstract and metaphysical an idea, would not easily or readily occur to the first formers of language” (1966, 529).

Smith also explains the development of language, the grammar, conjugations, declensions and composition of linguistic elements in correspondence to the historical

development of humankind and the interaction not only within particular human communities, but also between different societies. Smith considers language an apparatus, among others, that fulfills the particular function of communicating information between members of human community. Language is a structured totality, which is developing continuously; it is an instrument that conveys information. As human develops it becomes less complex in principles but more complicated in its structure and composition.

Hume discusses that every idea is annexed to a word that in turn produces the idea upon utterance. Once the word is uttered it is impossible for mind to prevent the emergence of the idea that is annexed to that word. Moreover, the relation between the idea and the word is not one of remembering a past experience or a simple associating of a formal sign to former experiences but is one of signification that should be actualized by the active participation of the mind through imagination to produce the corresponding idea. Hume states:

Thus because such a particular idea is commonly annex'd to such a particular word, nothing is requir'd but the hearing of that word to produce the correspondent idea; and 'twill scarce to be possible for the mind, by its utmost efforts, to prevent that transition. In this case it is not absolutely necessary, that upon hearing such a particular sound, we shou'd reflect on any past experience, and consider what idea has been usually connected with the sound. The imagination of itself supplies the place of this reflection, and is so accusom'd to pass from the word to the idea, that it interposes not a moment's delay betwixt the hearing of the one, and the conception of the other. (1967, 93)

Hume enumerates three principles of the association of ideas: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Hume considers the quality of cause and effect as the strongest connection that is used by the imagination to associate ideas and objects (1967, 11). Moreover, Hume attributes a structural unity to the functioning of cause and effect. To explain the relation between distant and close causes and effects, for instance, he uses

the example of fourth-degree and first-degree cousins, siblings, parents and children. This analogy makes sense only if it is understood as an instance of the structural relationship between family members. Hume makes this structural unity clearer when he explains action and motion, not as a property of object per se, but as a particular structure within which objects are related. He states:

For as that action or motion is nothing but the object itself, consider'd in a certain light, and as the object continues the same in all its different situations, 'tis easy to imagine how such an influence of objects upon one another may connect them in the imagination. (1967, 12)

This structural unity and connection becomes much clearer with a further analogy that Hume makes between the association of ideas and the relation between men as members of society:

We may carry this farther, and remark, not only that two objects are connected by the relation of cause and effect, when the one produces a motion or any action in the other, but also when it has a power of producing it. And this we may observe to be the source of all relations of interest and duty, by which men influence each other in society, and are plac'd in the ties of government and subordination. (1967, 12)

In the section "Of Abstract Ideas" Hume discusses the nature of general and abstract ideas and concludes that the common view, which attributes a general form of existence to abstract ideas, is erroneous. According to Hume, abstract ideas, like any others, are particular and are finite in number. Thus the question arises, how such particular and finite ideas are general in their representations? According to Hume, custom is responsible for such a general functioning (1967, 24). Moreover, when discussing the difficulties of attributing a general form of existence to abstract ideas Hume emphasizes the symbolic/semiotic nature of such ideas. Considering the idea of the self as a non-substantial concept, or to be more precise as an abstract idea, we can thus

infer that the Humean notion of the self refers to some semiotic-ideological entity similar to the concept of consciousness that Vološinov speaks about. Hume, furthermore, underlines the societal aspect of such a semiotic nature when refers to the habitual constitution of such a symbolic order. Hume states,

[W]e have several instances of habits, which may be revived by one single word; as when a person, who has by rote any periods of a discourse, or any number of verses, will be put in remembrance of the whole, which he is at a loss to recollect, by the single word or expression, with which they begin. (1967, 23)

Keeping in mind that Hume asserts a close link between the progress of thought and language, and the fact that ideas, abstract or particular, are those elements that thought and imagination use to proceed, we can conclude that Hume's supposed system of language is a semiotic system that consists of signs that signify abstract and general ideas, which are formed in the realm of impressions of passion, that is, in the social sphere. Language not only serves for communicating ideas, but, due to its symbolic structure, it serves for the association of ideas and impressions. As far as the idea of the self is concerned, language assists the sympathetic communicating of ideas and impressions that are constituent elements of such an idea. As Hume goes on to say:

As the individuals are collected together, and plac'd under a general term with a view to resemblance, which they bear to each other, this relation must facilitate their entrance in the imagination, and make them be suggested more readily upon occasion. And indeed if we consider the common progress of the thought, either in reflexion or conversation, we shall find great reason to be satisfy'd in this particular. Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents them at the very instant, in which they become necessary or useful. (1967, 24)

Empathy, Sympathy, the Other, and the Thou

Although phenomenologists may have solved the problem of how a knowing subject is related to the object of knowledge, yet they face the same difficulty as Descartes when trying to explain how the transcendental “I” is related to the empirical “I”. Their problem is a variant of the question which Descartes himself confronted: how is extended substance related to non-extended substance?

Phenomena, or intentional objects, exist nowhere but in the subject’s consciousness. Yet we should note that the subject of intentionality is not the empirical self but is the one that is directed towards these phenomena. Husserl’s formulation of intentionality seems to suffer from circularity. Phenomenology knows no vivid relation between the concept (the essence) and the external significations and actualizations of the concept (e.g., words and images). The question is why should one require essences to explain the relation between a general term and its denotation?⁵⁹

According to MacIntyre one of the most important aspects of Hume’s philosophical outlook is his distinction between what is *presented* to sense-experience, and what is *projected* onto experience by the imagination (2006, 30). This projection includes objects, conceptions, and the idea of one’s own self. MacIntyre sees the Humean imagination as leading us to error. However, error is not the necessary outcome of the

⁵⁹ Hume already emphasizes this aspect of general meanings without the need for any such essence. Interpreting Hume’s view of subjectivity and of human nature Deleuze draws attention to this aspect of Hume’s philosophy. The significance of Hume’s philosophy is its emphasis not on sameness but on difference. Mind, in this view, at its original situation is a multiplicity of separable ideas. Possibility of thought, reason, and belief depends on the associative determination of the human nature. Association relates perceptions, where association is already given in perception. Association is an effect of the principle of human nature (Bell 2005, 99).

participation of imagination in experience. On the contrary, if we take Hume's own approach into consideration, if we notice that impressions are not only limited to those that arise from sensation but also include impressions of reflection (passions) then we can see that the imagination does not have to lead to error.

In the *Treatise* Hume claims that perception is "a mere passive admission of the impressions thro' the organs of sensation" (1967, 73). Yet this passivity should not be understood in the same way as Locke's notion of passivity. Perception, according to Hume, always has an intentional, directed element. Speaking about cause and effect he explains this active role of the human mind in perception: "We readily suppose an object may continue individually the same, tho' several times absent from and present to the senses; and ascribe to it an identity, notwithstanding the interruption of perception" (1967, 74). The supposition of a cause that "secretly" relates objects, for instance, is not drawn from reason or the senses but is the result of the intentional attitude produced by imagination. But this does not mean that imagination *fancies* such connections: "The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience, which informs us, that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoined with each other" (1967, 89-90). For Hume experience is not determined by reason or by sensation, although sensation supplies the data for experience. Experience determines the structure of both reason and sensation. Moreover, experience is also determined and structured by impressions of reflection or the passions. The relation between *imagining* necessary connections among phenomena, *believing* these connections, and the faculty of memory, is clear. In order for the imagination to suppose a connection between objects the mind must remember that these same objects, in former cases, have been conjoined in a similar

manner. Moreover, the mind has to possess vivid and forceful impressions about such past events so that such a supposition becomes plausible. Only after all these conditions are provided can the imagination unite different ideas.

Similarly, the fictitiousness of the idea of the self is not a belief in some non-existent entity, but is a belief which is produced within experience. So even before Kant, Hume was aware that the relation between the senses and the human mind is not based upon the passive determination of the latter by the former. For Hume there can be no notion of the self except in action. The relation between the self and perception is not the linear determination of the latter by the former. Nor is it the passive reception of data by the former. The self becomes the self as much as it perceives, and owns the conceptual framework that is required for perception. Such a framework, on the other hand, is only attainable through impressions of reflection.

Edith Stein includes sensations among the constituents of the transcendental “I.” Sensations in this way operate as a bridge between the transcendental “I” and the empirical “I.” The solution she puts forward seems dubious; sensations belong to the transcendental “I” because they cannot be bracketed. On the other hand, they always have a foothold in the realm of extended substance; they are always present somewhere in the body. In addition to this, sensations are always mine; they belong to the “I” (1964, xvi).

For Stein, a principal problem is “the question of empathy as the perceiving of foreign subjects and experience” (1964, 3). It is commonly assumed that foreign subjects and their experience are given to us. But this assumption needs to be scrutinized. Max Scheler follows a similar line of thought. In his *The Nature of Sympathy* he criticizes the British empiricists because they are not phenomenologists (1970, xlv-xlvii).

For Scheler, *the* fundamental question is that of the existence of other selves. Stein would agree. For her there is an “I” which indubitably exists. This “I” of experience “owns” the sensitive, living body. The subjectivity of my “I” is transcendental; it is prior to, and independent of my bodily presence in the world. It is this “I” that thinks, feels, and senses. But how is this “I” supposed to actualize all these actions if not through and *within* the body? Stein here appears to be a Cartesian dualist even to the extent of attributing a phenomenological intimacy to this mechanistic combination: “The living body of this *I* not only fits into my phenomenal world but is itself the center of orientation of such a phenomenal world. It faces this world and communicates with me” (1964, 6). Empathy is supposed to explain how we grasp the acts other subjects of experience.

An act of empathy is an awareness of the other’s state of mind (feelings, emotions, and perceptions). Stein distinguishes between the genetic process that leads to, on the one hand, the formation of feeling of empathy and, on the other, being in an empathic state. By analogy to the problem of disembodied mind, that is, the one pertaining to there having never been evidence of such a disembodied state, one can ask the question: is there any evidence of being in an empathic state without the genetic process of the formation of empathy? Moreover, due to the definition of empathy that was presented above, “awareness of the other’s state of mind” means the identification of foreign objects—including the other self—with one’s “I”. If such an explanation is accepted then one is lead to the point of rejecting any qualitative difference between knowing one’s own “I” and the other, since the two are in fact identical and the latter is

simply reduced to the former. Although the empathetic viewpoint is intended to explain the existence of other selves, it ends up being just another form of solipsism.

The experience of fellow-feeling and pity comes *after* an already apprehended existence of the other. Fellow-feeling, Scheler argues, is sharply different from the reproduction of one's experiences or feelings: "That we cannot be aware of an experience without being aware of a self is something which is directly based upon the intuitable intrinsic connection between individual and experience; there is no need of empathy on the part of the percipient" (Scheler 1970, 9-10). The slightest awareness of any animate body and/or organism requires a minimum of undifferentiated identification. "The simplest vicarious emotion, the most elementary fellow-feeling, and over and above these the capacity for understanding between minds, are built upon the basis of the primitive givenness of 'the other'" (Scheler 1970, 31).

According to Stein our knowledge of the feelings of others is similar to our knowledge of our own memories. She distinguishes two modes of knowledge: the immediate, which is of present impressions, and the mediated, which is of some past impressions that are not present at this particular moment. The former has a primordial character, whereas the latter does not. However such a view is far from convincing since it bases itself upon presuppositions that are not themselves justified: for instance, when, according to Stein, I feel my own joy, it seems that I am supposed to have some sort of preconceptual access to experiencing joy. However, one can argue that even the most "immediate" knowledge of some feeling or sensation is conceptually mediated. Even the most basic form of apprehension requires a conceptual framework that transcends the individual's being. Conceiving is realizable only against a background of other acts.

Therefore, *every* act is mediated. Her claim about the primordial status of the awareness of certain feelings is therefore based upon an unjustified distinction between one's inner and outer spheres. Such a view identifies one's subjectivity with that internality that becomes aware of itself reflexively. In such view one has direct access to thoughts and feelings of one's own self. Substantialism is the inevitable outcome of such a viewpoint. Hence Stein's thesis that one should understand oneself "as always necessarily a soul in a body."

For Stein, empathy is a primordial act in form, but a non-primordial one in content (Stein 1964, 10). Its form refers to its being present as an experience. In contrast to memory or fancy, the subject of which is the "I," that is, the past "I" which is fantasized as being identical to my present and primordial "I," the subject of an act of empathy is the other. The other is primordial in the present, in his "now" in a way which is entirely for him and not for me. Stein's formulation, however, is based on the traditional, individualist presupposition which claims that one's own self is prior to the being of the other. Moreover, the primordial, immediate "I" is not the empirically existing self but the transcendental "I," not the "I" in genesis but the "I" that is posited as omnipresent and immediately given to itself. As she remarks: "Empathy, which we examined and sought to describe, is the experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespective of the kind of experiencing subject or of the subject whose consciousness is experienced. We only discussed the pure I, the subject of experience, on the subject's as well as object's side" (Stein 1964, 11). Through empathy, then, we might be able to surpass the monadic character of the "I" and reach a higher subject, namely, the "we", where the "I," the "you," and the "he" are retained.

Scheler, too, attributes primordially to the “I” that functions as the source of apprehension of the experience of the other, which amounts to the formation of the idea of the thou. In contrast to empirical approaches he states the following:

An individual mind is never the mere ‘collection’ or ‘sum’ of its experiences; or a synthesis of such experiences whose subject is supposed to be a so-called ‘supra-individual’ conscious activity, a ‘consciousness in general’. On the contrary, an experience only becomes a concrete experience inasmuch as I thereby apprehend an individual self *in* it, or as it becomes a *symbol* to me for the presence of such an individual. Hence it is not just isolated experiences that I apprehend in another, but always the individual’s mental character as a *whole* in its total expression. (1970, 243-4)

Departing from this point, Scheler criticizes the “self-evident” suppositions of the phenomenological approach that one’s own self always is given to oneself primarily, and that one only encounters the other through his bodily features, and then empathetically ascribes to him the attributes of one’s own self. Scheler argues that *neither* of these two suppositions is self-evident. One cannot suppose that it is only one’s own experiences or thoughts that are immediately given. The fact of the matter is that we are aware of *many* cases where we are presented with thoughts and feelings that are not ours but belong to others. We have access to such feelings, Scheler argues, through sympathy. Hence, according to him, not these presuppositions, but the presence of a general self (an “I”) and a general other (thou) is the immediately given within experience. As he puts it: “[A]n immediate flow of experiences, *undifferentiated as between mine and thine*, which actually contains both our own and others’ experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another” (1970, 246). But unfortunately, Scheler’s own approach amounts only to a shift in the problem. The particular individual self, my particular “I,” in such a case happens to be an instantiation of a presupposed general “I” whose individuality and immediacy have already been asserted. This individual is of a totally

different and distinct essence than the social substance of the community. Scheler shares the same ground with the phenomenological approach that he is criticizing. The awareness of this self is *immediately* given in one way or another. In the case of phenomenology, it is the individual substratum that is presented in the personal existence of the “I” and is attributed empathetically to the other on account of his bodily appearance. For Scheler, this substratum is of a more general nature and is presented immediately between the “I” and the thou, but necessarily as an individual self; it is not immediately *my* self or *yours*. To whom it belongs is to be identified *later*. However, regardless of this problem of “ownership,” the individual self is an instantiation of this general essence.⁶⁰

Merleau-Ponty argues that besides natural surroundings, as humans, we are born into a world with cultural surroundings. The question is: how do we experience this world of ours? In the final analysis, we understand it through other people, as well as by analogy with our own behavior. “In the last resort the actions of others are, according to this theory, always understood through my own” (1962, 348). Therefore, “we,” or the “one,” as the generalized representation of man, is comprehended through the “I.” But the question is, as Scheler formulates it, “how can the word ‘I’ be put into the plural, how can a general idea of the ‘I’ be formed, how can I speak of an ‘I’ other than my own?” (1962, 348) Positing a general, pre-personal “I” as the condition of the realization of the subjectivity of myself as well as that of the other is but a reformulation of Kantian

⁶⁰ Scheler clearly explains the core of his approach to the problem of formation of the self as individuation of an immediately given general type—the essence of the community—in the following: “[A] *complete* understanding of the mental history of a people (or a religious community) can only be attained, in the last resort, by those who belong to the group in question and have been imbued with its tradition” (1970, 248, n).

transcendentalism. Even if the existence of such a pre-personal self is assumed it still remains a mystery how such transcendentalism is related to personal selves and is instantiated in the empirical “I.”

For Stein, The “selfness” of the “I” is given in contrast to the “otherness of the other”. The “I” is the “qualityless” subject of experience. At the same time, the “I” can be conceptualized as the unity of the stream of consciousness. What seems clear is that the qualityless unity of the “I” is immanently given; it is not formed or genetically produced but is transcendently given and only constituted phenomenologically. The “I” is presented by Stein as the form of the self, whereas the differentiation or the “individuality” of the self, which is basically defined in contradistinction to the other’s selfness, is presented as a variation based upon the experiential content of the experience of the “I.” Stein defines the individual “selfness” of the subject as a combination of selfness, which is identical to being an “I” in its most formal sense, and variation based upon experiential content that amounts to individuation. Her formulation is no more than, first of all, a variation of identification of the “I” or the “self” with the mind, and, secondly, a presentation of content as matter-as-the-principle-of-individuation. The material content does not constitute the selfness of the self since the latter has already been identified with being an “I” that is immanently given. Rather, it serves to individuate a particular empirical self. Hence there results the unity of selfness and experiential content as a psycho-physical unity (1964, 37).

Scheler argues that identification is a feeling that underlies the vicarious emotion. In other words, identification is prior to the vicarious emotion of fellow-feeling. He also maintains that, thanks to its primitiveness, identification takes place unconsciously and

involuntarily. As a fundamental principle, Scheler states that, “in the early stages we still find identification where later on we encounter various feelings” (1970, 97). The problem, however, is that studies concerning the ontogenesis and historical emergence of personal identity show that neither the child nor the “primitive” person (as representatives of the early stage that Scheler has in mind) refers to himself as self in the sense that a mature member of contemporary modern civilization does.⁶¹ In other words, a person becomes aware primarily of the other’s personality and identity and psychological features; later he forms such a picture of himself via mirroring the image of the other that he has produced in his mind. Although it is possible to interpret the sequence of the emergence of feelings of identification and vicariousness that Scheler discusses as consecutive stages of the appearance of consciousness towards others and reflexive consciousness, there is a problem with this analysis that Scheler presents these feelings as phenomena of different typical and essential stages that exist in the human soul and whose appearance does not undergo any alteration. Thus, for instance, he says that the feeling of identification “is confined to the sphere of vital consciousness” (1970, 97) which he had formerly presented as the mediatory psycho-physical space that is formed out of spirit and body.

Body, in Stein’s consideration of empathy, plays the role that the “heart” as the residence of divine emotions assumes in Scheler’s view of sympathy. Body is the localization of the consciousness of being an “I”. The body, according to Stein, is an object but different from all others. Other objects are always “there” whereas this peculiar object which is my body is always “here”. We cannot escape being embodied. Yet it is

⁶¹ Examples from these studies have been presented in Vygotsky (1970), Vygotsky & Luria (1992), and Luria (1982) and particularly in Luria (1976).

important to see that Stein distinguishes being a self from having a body. The basis of the phenomenological inquiry, she openly proposes, is pure consciousness. In other words, the selfness of the “I” is something that is not bound to the body. To be an “I” is not to be a body but is *to have* or *to be in* a body. Judging, willing, experiencing, etc belong to the realm of the pure “I,” which form the cogito, where the “I” turns toward an object. The body produces sensations which are always localized at some spatial distance from the “I” (1964, 39).

Stein identifies the body as something that surrounds what she calls the zero point of being an “I.” Whatever is an “I,” maintains Stein, is not distant from this zero point that the body determines, and whatever is at a distance from such a zero point is the non-I. The body is the localization of the self (the pure “I”) at the so-called zero-point. It follows that the selfness of the subject is something transcendentally and immanently given or asserted. This is so because for every object, even for a house, one can assume a “zero-point”. Thus, zero-point cannot be the property, which impregnates the “I” with subjectivity and demarcates it against the other. Hence the phenomenological inquiry tends only to provide a description of the essence of the self, which is the phenomenon of being a pure self.

Merleau-Ponty maintains a similar attitude. He considers the status of the “I” as a subject or an object an instance of a more general question about the relation between the in-itself and the for-itself. Traditionally speaking, the question concerning the existence of other people and other consciousnesses involves a paradox. If the other exists, then it is other than the “I;” it has to be “in-itself” meaning that it has to be an object. However, if it is supposed to exist as another “I,” then it has to exist “for itself”, which means it has

to be a subject. The paradox is that it cannot be both in-itself and for-itself simultaneously. Moreover, even if I assert that the other is a subject, a for-itself that constitutes the world, it is still the “I” that presents the other as a constituting agent of the world. Hence only the “I” is the constituting agent. It seems that solipsism is an inevitable consequence of this mode of thinking. Merleau-Ponty’s response is the following:

My body and the world are no longer objects co-oriented together by the kind of functional relationships that physics establishes. The system of experience in which they intercommunicate is not spread out before me and ranged over by a constituting consciousness. I have the world as an incomplete individual, through the agency of my body as the potentiality of this world, and I have the positing of objects through that of my body. (1962, 350)

In short, Merleau-Ponty tries to surmount the difficulty posed by individualism by reference to the materiality of the human body and then infer the existence of other conscious beings as consciousnesses residing and related to other bodies: “If my consciousness has a body, why should other bodies not ‘have’ consciousness?” But the same difficulty arises here: It would be the “I” that asserts the existence of consciousness in other bodies. Hence the same criticism raised earlier can be maintained. Mikhailov (1980), however, with reference to the concept of “life-activity,” suggests a possible solution. Accordingly, the plurality of consciousnesses is not a question of asserting or supposing a society as an amalgamation or a crowd. Social being is the consequence of man’s active, practical existence. Consciousness is not asserted but is the outcome of such active coexistence. Society and culture too have only meaning as the consequence of this practical process, of the life-activity of human beings.

Consequently the mind is certainly not what happens inside me and to me under the influence of external stimuli, but without them as such. Without them, that is, without correlation at every instant of my life-activity with the objectively

existing world, my “inner world” cannot exist. That which happens inside me but has no objective representation outside me is not the mind. It is physiology, biochemistry, anything you like, but not my inner mental world! My “mental world” is above all the world of culture in which I live and act; it is the real existence of nature assimilated by man, every detail of which signifies for me that which it objectively represents. In other words, my mental world is, in fact, the being, the existence of which I am aware. (Mikhailov 1980)

Merleau-Ponty, too, suggests a profound reconsideration of the notions of body and consciousness as a condition for the affirmation of the existence of the other. For him consciousness “has to be conceived, no longer as a constituting consciousness and, as it were, a pure being-for-itself, but as a perceptual consciousness, as the subject of a pattern of behavior, as being in the world or existence” (1962, 351). Yet his later explanation shows signs of the analogical mode of thinking. Since there is no notion of activity in his philosophical outlook, his tendency to resolve the question inevitably amounts to, on the one hand, thinking analogically and on the other, introducing subject-less behavior.

In order to think of him as a genuine *I*, I ought to think of myself as a mere object for him, which I am prevented from doing by the knowledge which I have of myself. But if another’s body is not an object for me, nor mine an object for him, if both are manifestations of behavior, the positing of the other does not reduce me to the status of an object in his field, nor does my perception of the other reduce him to the status of an object in mine. The other person is never quite a personal being, if I myself am totally one, and if I grasp myself as apodeictically self-evident. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 352)

My knowledge of myself is something I acquire as a consequence of the intimate relationship I have with myself. And the method through which I acquire the self-evidence of my existence as a consciousness (for myself) is a variation of introspection.

Empathy, in Stein’s view, simply appears as the re-presentation of the other’s sensation to myself as if these were presented to my own zero point of orientation.⁶² Two

⁶² “Empathy is that view which holds activity as an expression of a certain inner state and that the cognition of the object of such activity requires a co-experiencing of that inner state” (Bakhtin 1995, 61).

things are important to notice: the priority of one's own self, my pure "I" over the other; and the reductive approach towards the perceptual and conceptual apprehension of the world. The former results in circularity since the selfness and pure existence of the "I," the pure ego, is already asserted. The latter point reduces all human conceptualization of the external world (as well as the so-called internal existence of one's own self) to images or image-like representations. Hence the empathic relationship between people is strongly limited to the perceptual field. Thoughts or images are dealt with as abstracted forms that are nonetheless highly dependent on sense-data. Thus, Stein tells us that "a person without eyes fails to have the entire optical givenness of the world... the world is constituted for him only through the remaining senses, *and* in reality it may be impossible for me empathically to fulfill his world given in empty presentations" (1964, 58). With such an approach, the whole conceptual and linguistic communication between human subjects is parenthesized; no transmission of information, concepts, or signs is possible since subjectivity is reduced to the presence of the presupposed formal pure "I" within the subject's perceptual field. The foreign living body is the conveyor of fields of sensation and the center of orientation of the spatial world. Voluntary movement is another constituent of it. We empathize with spontaneous or voluntary movement in other subjects by ascribing liveliness to them.

According to MacIntyre, in order to have a coherent grasp of Stein's philosophical outlook it is important to understand her conception of community (2006, 109). Stein prefaces her account of community with an elaboration on individual psychology. She is concerned with external influences on what she calls the natural and social surrounding of the subject or the phenomenological "I". Comprehending the

human psyche is not possible unless such impacts are taken into consideration (MacIntyre 2006, 110). Yet, her formulation of the relationship between the individual and the communal and her approach to that particular external factor, namely the society, reveals the substantialist core of her theory. Firstly, at some phenomenological level there always exists an “I” which continues to be regardless of the so-called external factors. External factors “impinge upon” the “I”. These factors do not determine the existence of the “I”; moreover, they are not constituent elements of the being of the “I”.

Secondly, Stein’s conception of the communal is a reflection of the natural. It is not incidental that she enumerates the external factors as natural *and* social. In other words, social, in this view, is just another name for natural which implies the absolute separation between the individual “I” and the non-I. The contrast between the individual and the social is a mirror image of the contrast between the subjective and objective, that is, between the humane and natural. The subjective element, the human individual carries a soul whereas the natural is just a material background against and over which the individual subject acts. The natural is just a mere amalgamation of physical phenomena and entities. Similarly, the social is an amalgamation of individual subjects that cooperate due to a common goal, an axiological common ground or due to mutual benefit. Hence follows Stein’s reliance on Tonnies’ distinction between *Gessellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*. The former signifies individuals’ treatment of each other as objects, as means to particular ends; the latter signifies individuals treating one another as equal subjects (MacIntyre 2006, 118). In Stein’s view the characteristics that determine the individual in contrast to those that determine the communal or the social are unalterable and stable. Neither determines the other interactively; the social and the individual confront each

other only mechanically and externally. The differentiation that she makes between those relations that result in the formation of a community and those that do not shows this mechanistic approach explicitly.⁶³

In the final analysis, empathy functions as the source of constituting an image of one's self via the empathic perception/apprehension of the other. Through empathy the "I" is supposed to admit the centrality of the other's existence in the physical world. Stein compares empathic perception of our own self to inner perception of our selves. The retrospective inner perception is to perceive ourselves with reflexive sympathy, i.e., to see ourselves as the other sees us. Hence, by reference to the other's view of us we might come to the point of correcting the image that we have of our constitution as individuals. However, Stein emphasizes the primordially of one's own givenness to oneself via inner perception.

We not only learn to make us ourselves into objects, as earlier, but through empathy with "related natures," i.e., persons of our type, what is "sleeping" in us is developed. By empathy with differently composed personal structures we become clear on what we are not, what we are more or less than others. Thus, together with self knowledge, we also have an important aid to self evaluation. Since the experience of value is basic to our own value, at the same time as new values are acquired by empathy, our own unfamiliar values become visible. (Stein 1964, 105)

Scheler argues that it is only bodily sense or the organic perception of the other which can never be perceived in one's observations of the other's inner life. "The pain of

⁶³ MacIntyre, too, calls attention to a similar difficulty in Stein: "The intentionality of the mental acts and states of individuals can be directed towards common objects, objects of shared feelings, objects of common understanding, objects of shared values. So individuals may share grief or joy, may understand some task in which they are engaged with others by exchanging views of that task from different standpoints, may use a common idiom to describe and analyze what they are doing together, and may find it worthwhile for the same reason. But individuals can share in these ways without constituting a community" (2006, 118).

another person, or the sensory enjoyment of his food, is something I can never perceive directly... I cannot share it or reproduce it vicariously, as I can, for instance, the spiritual emotion of grief" (1970, 255). Scheler's thesis is in agreement with Vygotsky's. The latter proposes that perception (or more properly, *sensory* perception) is always personal. Hence, the claim that perception is personal can be used to adjust and thereby to improve the Humean thesis that a self is a bundle of perceptions. This is to say that, it is the awareness of this bodily perception that brings the reflexive awareness of individuation. Through sympathy and through the other, I acquire the general sense of being a self and through my sensory perceptions I acquire the reflexive awareness of the unity and uniqueness of my position that is determined and defined by my body. Hence I acquire the reflexive awareness of being a particular self, that is, the particular self that refers to itself and calls itself "I."

In a passage which is often cited as evidence of Hume's contradictory position concerning the idea of the self, Hume states that "ourselves is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality" (1967, 427). The intimacy of which Hume here speaks should not be understood as one's immediate access to one's own self. The aforementioned passage is a part of a section where Hume discusses distance in time and space. Hume compares these two ideas and infers that distance in time has a more diminishing effect on vivacity of ideas of objects—including that of the self—comparing to distance in space. Intimacy regarding the self is the expression of the existence of the self in a particular space, namely concrete bodily existence, and a particular succession of moments, namely imagination. Hume then states:

[T]he imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the

passions and senses, that however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present. (1967 427, 8)

One's access to the idea of the self, thus understood, is mediated and is external as is one's access to any object, since it is determined and delimited by the ideas of time and space. The idea of the self, too, is subject to the same logical rules that determine passing from one idea to another. Our concern about our self is the result of spatial contiguity that we have with our body, which is a point in the space since "[c]ontiguous objects must have an influence much superior to the distant and remote" (Hume 1967, 428). This spatial proximity to one's own self adds to one's idea of identity in time because, as mentioned above, distance in space is more influential in determining the vivacity of ideas of objects than distance in time.

The idea of space is the expression of the coexistence of certain parts in a certain order, whereas the idea of time consists in the succession of these parts so that not all of them are present to one's senses simultaneously. This incompleteness provokes the participation of imagination when the identity of objects in time is at stake. Yet, imagination's role in forming the idea of identity is not a fantastic one, but is the consequence of logical passing from a present idea to an idea in the future. So, the identity of the self in space and time is determined by the same rules that determine the relation between ideas and impressions in general, because "ourselves [are] existent in a point of time interpos'd betwixt the present instance and the future object" (Hume 1967, 431).

Hume's considering of the influence of imagination on passions provides further evidence regarding social determination of passions, impressions, and human subject. When it comes to deciding between different kinds of actions, humans do not make their

choices due to general, abstract maxims. Rather, they make decisions in accordance with forms of lives that they are engaged with. Hume states that “[a] pleasure, which is suitable to the way of life, in which we are engag’d, excites more our desires and appetites than another, which is foreign to it” (1967, 426). Appetites, desires, and intentions are not set once and for all in human nature. They change due to the life activity that humans are involved in. Even moral maxims are consequences of particular forms of human activity and are not inferred from general, transcendental rules. Yet, the individual agent is not a passive object that is mechanically determined. Imagination is an essential element in exciting certain moral behaviors and affections. Still, imagination’s activity is directly influenced by the presence of other humans. As Hume states:

We may of ourselves acknowledge, that such an object is valuable, and such another odious; but ’till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections... The bare opinion of another, especially when inforc’d with passion, will cause an idea of good or evil to have an influence upon us, which would otherwise have been entirely neglected. This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or communication; and sympathy, as I have already observ’d, is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination. (1967, 426-7)

The idea of the self is not based on an impression of sensation; rather it is based on an impression of reflection (passion). Notwithstanding the fact that all impressions are reducible into reflexive ones and therefore socially determined, the factuality of the self follows from sympathetically formed idea of the self (which is constituted in the image of social existence of other human beings).

Hume emphasizes the constitutive presence of others for the self when pride and humility is at stake. Hume writes that “even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and

riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (1967, 316).

According to Hume the phenomena of compassion and sympathizing with others is one of the most remarkable qualities of human beings. He is also aware of the ontogenetic nature of this feeling. Sympathy functions more easily in children “who implicitly embrace every opinion propos’d to them” than in adults, “who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions” (316). The uniformity that is observable among members of the same nations too is the product of sympathy and not of geographical or climatic factors and influences.

The ideas that are raised due to sympathy, and which are converted to impressions, gain such a degree of vivacity and force that they can replace the original passions themselves and produce affections equal to the original emotions. Thus, sympathy is “a lively idea converted into an impression” (1967, 386).

What factors are responsible for sympathy? Basically, similarity and uniformity of human nature is responsible. This similarity and uniformity is caused by the similarity in structure and composition of human nature. The more the object resembles us, the smoother becomes the transition from impression of an object to its idea. Family relations, acquaintance, education and customs, together with resemblance, contribute to conveying the sentiments of others into one’s own: “Custom and relation make us enter deeply into the sentiments of others; and whatever fortune we suppose to attend them, is render’d present to us by the imagination, and operates as if originally our own” (Hume 1967, 389).

Sympathy is a function the content of which is material, meaning that it is determined by the material conditions of life, namely human activity, arts, industry etc. For instance, in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume discusses the scope of certain rights and the idea of justice. When it comes to basic human characteristics, Hume attributes beneficence, humanity, friendship, gratitude, natural affection, and *public spirit* and tender sympathy to others to human nature (1975, 178). Similarly, in his first *Enquiry*, he defines human beings as “reasonable,” “sociable,” and “active” beings, who have to submit to business and occupation (1975, 8). Here Hume rejects the Hobbesian idea of a natural state of war of all against all (Hume 1975, 189, n. 1, 190); because, “Men are necessarily born in a family-society” (1975, 190). Hume raises a thought experiment. Suppose humans confront rational, but still weaker beings both in bodily and mental terms: dogs, for example. He concludes that the resulting intercourse between the two cannot be called society, which supposes a degree of equality. Rather, it would be a relation of absolute command and servitude (1975, 190). So it would be natural that these rational but lesser beings would be deprived of the right to property. The difference between human nature and that of this inferior animal species prevents the full functioning of sympathy, which “is plainly the situation of men with regard to animals” (1975, 190).

For Hume, when more advanced communities confront less improved ones, a similar “temptation” of considering them as lesser beings is at work, leading the former to consider themselves superior to the latter. He maintains that this is also the situation, in many nations, regarding the female sex and thus females are deprived—perhaps unjustly and in an unjustified way—from certain rights. Yet the similarity of their make as human

persons eventually gives way to the growth of the idea of justice, so as to embrace them too. This, however, happens only as the consequence of material production, art, industry and the intercourse between humans and human communities, which compose and determine sympathy:

[S]everal distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual connections. History, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue. (Hume 1975b, 192)

In his essay "Of National Characters" Hume sets out to explain the affinities among members of the same community. He rejects outright any role to air and climate, and emphasizes that human social activity is the only factor in determining national character. In animals the common characteristics may be attributed to biological and geographical dynamics. However, when humans are at stake, it is human activity and sympathy, political and social assemblage, and common language that is responsible for such sameness. It also makes the nature of sympathy as a function clearer.

The Human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to company and society is so strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other's sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or knot of companions. Where a number of men are united into one political body, the occasion of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, together with the same speech or language, they must require a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. (Hume 1985, 202-3)⁶⁴

⁶⁴ In a footnote to the same essay Hume also suggests the implausibility of attributing the difference between animals to climatic and geographical factors. Rather, such difference may be attributed to particular activities that human exercise on them: "This may beget a little suspicion, that even animals depend not on the climate; but on the different breeds,

Hume introduces the will as the internal impression of which the person is conscious (1967, 399). There are two important aspects of such a definition: first, the will is subject to the same general rules that govern the formation and apprehension of impressions, and thus, has its roots outside the mind of the perceiving agent. Second, reflexive consciousness of such an impression is the process of internalization of impressions that are caused by pain and pleasure as an effect of desire. Furthermore, the will, as a direct passion, is realizable only in the social realm. Thus, those impressions that produce the will are of a social nature. The will is intelligible only in relation with other human beings as elements of a social totality.

The active character of the will, which depends on its communality, and the social determination of human nature, which cannot be reduced to reason or intellect alone, resonates in Hume's consideration of formation of moral judgments in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Hume's theory of moral distinctions is that in examining any person we judge to be immoral, the understanding can detect no fact in which the vice consists. Rather, the vice is only identified when we view the scene as whole persons, rather than as disembodied dispassionate intellects. When we do so, we become aware of an impression of pain on seeing or contemplating such an action. This is the source of moral disapproval, which fully emerges with the correction of this initial affective response.

and on the skill and care in rearing them. The north of England abounds in the best horses of all kinds which are perhaps in the world. In the neighboring counties, north side of the tweed, no good horses of any kind are to be met with. Strabo rejects, in a great measure, the influence of climate upon men. All is custom and education, says he. It is not from nature, that the Athenians are learned, the Lacedemonians ignorant, and the Thebans too, who are still nearer neighbors to the former. Even the difference of animals, he adds, depends not on climate" (1985, 202, n. 4).

Although reason is necessary to form a judgment concerning matters that deal with justice, yet there must be a sentiment to attribute usefulness to some end in contrast to another. Reason, in principle, is indifferent towards ends, and it is only human sentiment that can provide us with the will to form a moral judgment and to act toward social utility. As Hume states, “Here therefore *reason* instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and *humanity* makes a distinction in favor of those which are useful and beneficial” (1975, 286).

Hume also emphasizes the social determination of judgments even at the level of the external world. There, too, he maintains that reason alone is not sufficient to overcome such an skepticism, and active participation of imagination, which in turn is socially conditioned, is required to resolves this issue. As he states:

I have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life. We save ourselves from this total skepticism only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views of things, and are not able to accompany them with so sensible an impression, as we do those, which are more easy and natural. (1967, 267-8)

It appears as if appealing either to reason or imagination forces us toward a dead-end, since the idea of appealing to the imagination is itself based on some preceding reasoning. On the other hand, if we reject imagination in favor of reason we completely subvert the human understanding. So it seems that we are left with no choice but between false reason and no reason at all (1967, 268). For Hume there is only one way out of this dilemma, and that is provided by nature: the social human nature that yields to the general thesis of the existence of the world and which passionately determines impressions. As Hume states:

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends ... Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasure of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy ... But does it follow, that I must strive the current of nature, which leads me to indolence and pleasure; that I must seclude myself, in some measure, from the commerce and society of men, which is so agreeable[?] ... No: If I must be a fool ... my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable. (1967, 269-70)

Hume presents the idea of freedom and necessity of human actions in an analogy with rules and determinations that govern the movements of material bodies. In order to explain the uniformity and cohesion of human action, Hume explicitly refers to civil society and the social nature of human existence. He states:

We must certainly allow, that the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explaining them: And for a like reason we must allow, that human society is founded on like principles; and our reason in the latter case, is better than even that in former; because we not only observe, that men *always* seek society, but can also explain the principles, on which this universal propensity is founded. (1967, 402)

Naturalism replaces nature with society, and attributes those properties to society that it normally ascribes to nature. In this sense, Hume is not a naturalistic philosopher. Although he attributes certain universal properties to humanity, he is aware that the rules that determine human society are not universal in a mechanical-naturalist sense. Hume may consider society a natural product, which is initiated by sexual appetite (1967, 486). However, he calls the idea of a “state of nature”, that would also give way to the actualization of this natural appetite, “a philosophical fiction” (1967, 493). He, thus,

concludes that it is the reflection on common interests that leads to the formation and perpetuation of society. Hume is aware that particular human activities differentiate humans in their manners, behaviors and, in a general sense, their perception and impressions. Thus he writes: “The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those of a man of quality: So are his sentiments, actions and manners” (1967, 402). It is the process of internalization of these external determinations that identify humans as members of society who belong to different ranks and classes. The universal aspect of the process of internalization of external determinations is the very process and mechanism of internalization. This process follows certain universal regulations and is applicable to all humans in a similar way. The only shortcoming that may be applicable to Hume’s analysis of this process is that the existing civil society and social order is the limit of the existence and persistence of man. This implication, according to Marx, is the shortcoming of all former materialism. Thus Hume states that “[m]en cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government” (1967, 402). Yet, the determining factor that guarantees the uniformity of human life is external to individual agent’s mind; this factor is the totality of human activity that is governed and regulated by the state:

Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suites, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an uniformity in human life. (Hume 1967, 402)

The way Hume relates ideas and impressions of an object to each other, the attribution of object-ness to impressions and subject-ness to ideas, and the fact that the stronger the latter become the more they resemble the former (i.e., a strong idea

resembles an original impression) shows that the Humean notion of the self is objectivized and is attainable to oneself externally only. Hume states: “Our affections depend more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions” (1967, 319). However, the operations of mind consist in ideas that are derived from impressions and are transformable into impressions. Sympathy is the enlivening of the ideas of others in such a way that they become impressions that make it possible to delve into others’ minds. Hume maintains that “the lively idea of any object always approaches its impressions” (1967, 319). Similarly, ideas of other selves turn into impressions of other selves through sympathy. Since “ourself independent of the perception of every other object is in reality nothing” (1967, 340) the idea of our own self, which depends on sentiments and passions, depends on the idea of other selves. This is to say that the principle of sympathy yields the idea of the self by providing one with the idea and the impression of sentiments and passions of others. Therefore, “we must turn our view to external objects; and ’tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us” (Hume 1967, 340-1).

Why do we care about judgments, love and hatred, praise and contempt of others? We feel pleasure when praised and pain when criticized. All sentiments and passions such as hatred, love, resentment, esteem, courage, mirth and melancholy are felt more strongly by communication rather than from within one’s own self. Through sympathy, the idea of other converts into an impression of our selves. This is to say that, through sympathy the idea of the other becomes a constitutive element of one’s own self. Thus follows the importance we attribute to the opinions of others about ourselves. The opinions of others are so important in forming the idea of one’s own self that they even

trigger imagination to fancy qualities attributed to one's own self, which in reality one does not own. Thus Hume states: "Plagiaries are delighted with praises, which they are conscious they do not deserve; but this is a kind of castle building where the imagination amuses itself with its own fictions, and strives to render them firm and stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others" (1967, 324).

Human beings become aware of one another's passions and sentiments by sympathy. We are social animals. Without others there could be no enjoyment. With the aid of imagination, we produce ideas resembling impressions of others' and partake in their pleasure and satisfaction. This is possible because our minds "are mirrors to one another" (1967, 365).

Empathy cannot give an account of the wholeness of the event. Bakhtin deals with this aspect in field of aesthetics; empathetic aesthetics makes it impossible to have an account of the whole of a work of art. Experiencing the whole is not a mere summation of individual empathetic experiences. Moreover, the whole is not a unitary *subiectum* but is a unitary whole as an event. This line of reasoning can be applied to the problem of empathy in general; the existence of the other cannot be reduced to my singular experience of the other's inner states. I cannot construct a whole out of such partiality and individuality. Moreover, my co-experiencing of the other's inner state is always an experiencing of the outer expressions of such a state. I cannot escape the mediation of expressive elements such as behavioral acts and language. The basic error of the empathetic view is to start from the analysis of elements and not from the whole.

In contrast to empathy, sympathy gives way to experiencing the life of the other not as one's own experience, that is, not from within the "I," but as the experience of the

other. As Bakhtin states, “a sympathetically co-experienced life is the life of another human being (his outer as well as his *inner* life) that is essentially experienced *from outside*” (1995, 82). What is of central importance in the process of sympathy or a sympathetic life is not that there is one more person just like myself, but that this other is a different person. Therefore sympathizing does not mean a merging of our lives which is impoverishing. Rather, it is an enrichening of our lives, because my experiencing his life and his experiencing mine results in a new form of experiencing, which is where the horizons of the uniquely occurring life of the “I” and that of the other meet. Sympathy adds a further dimension to life, not by merging the “I” and the other into one, but by constituting the outsideness of each with regard to the other.

Chapter Four: The Riddle of Subjectivity Resolved

The Humean Riddle Re-visited: Recent Discussions

Hume refers to the question of personal identity in several places in his *Treatise*. In Book I, Section VI, (“Of Personal Identity”), he distinguishes two aspects of the self: “[P]ersonal identity as it regards our thoughts or imagination.... and as it [personal identity] regards our passions or the concern we take about ourselves” (Hume 1967).

Many scholars have suggested that there is a tension, or even a confusion, between these two approaches. According to Penelhum, Hume’s account of personal identity is confusing because he “ascribes to the self (in Book I) a tendency to confuse invariance and succession in telling us how we come to generate the fiction of continuing identity; such a story seems to ascribe a continuing reality to the mind in the very process of showing how the belief in it can come to exist where there are only successive perceptions to constitute it” (Penelhum 1992/2000). There is a gap in Hume’s psychology, which is related to his account of personal identity with respect to thought and imagination as well as with respect to the passions. Some have tried to overcome this tension by completely separating these two accounts. Penelhum, however, proposes that such attempts are far from satisfactory: “Hume’s question in Book I is not a question about how it is that a mind he tacitly assumes to be more than this comes to think it *is* more than this, but a question about how the series that the mind actually is, comes to include within it from time to time perception *of* the series that represents it as having an identity that it (strictly) lacks”; Hume’s position in Book I then is one of giving an account of the formation of our belief in the existence of the self (Penelhum 2000, 89 f). However, in that case, Hume would be susceptible to accusations of inconsistency, since he explicitly states in Book II that the self is, “that succession of related ideas and

impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness” (Hume 1967, 277).

Penelhum tries to explain the differences and tensions between Book I, Book II, and Book III by connecting the first book to a Cartesian (“I think”) perspective and the last two to an “instinctive” perspective. However, this will not resolve what he claims to be an inconsistency. If these two aspects are so radically distinct then we might end up with a “dualist Hume,” for whom we have little or no textual evidence. Secondly, Hume deliberately distinguishes between the epistemological and passionate selves. What needs to be demonstrated, therefore, is how these two are related. Reference to instinct as the source of the passionate self is just a simple shift that is far from explaining the relation between the self of Book I and the self of Books II and III. Moreover, Penelhum merely adds to the problem which he identifies as a gap in Hume. His view that “[i]nstant supplies us with the beliefs we have in order to think and act as members of society,” implies that there is a possibility for the self or mind to think and act outside society. In this sense, Penelhum begs the question. In addition, when Hume discusses the epistemological self, he goes out of his way to show the logical absurdities of the Cartesian-substantialist position.

Hume is criticized by many scholars for accepting the existence of an idea of the self at the beginning of Book II, whereas earlier he denies having any such idea. Conceptualization of identity, despite the fact that people are constantly changing, seems almost contradictory. Penelhum presents a completely individualistic understanding of “feelings, thoughts, images and pains” when he says that “these can be talked about by others, they cannot be *seen* or *had* by them, even though our bodily movements are open

to public inspection” (Penelhum 2000, 24). Penelhum suggests that, traditionally, philosophers distinguish bodily activity and internal states as radically different entities. But he does not seem to appreciate the fact that there is a correlation, even a direct relation, between language as the bodily act open to “public inspection” and thought. He characterizes this philosophical trait as a tendency to dualism. The traditional view has posed the question of personal identity as the problem between the unity of a *mind* and all the changes a person undergoes during a lifetime. Therefore, the mainstream philosophical view is forced to ascribe to the mind an ongoing self-identity; this self-identity is conceptualized as mental and as a self. According to Penelhum, “This is of course ‘the self,’ which Hume begins by attacking” (2000, 24).

Penelhum summarizes Hume’s argument as follows: the reason for the emergence of confusing thoughts about personal identity is based upon confounding the idea of a thing which persists unchanged through time with the idea of a sequence of related objects. Hence, we are pushed to invent a substance or a self as the unifying element that subsists as the foundation of identity. It is in this sense that the identity we ascribe to things in general, and to persons in particular, is fictitious (Penelhum 2000, 25). What Hume means by saying that “persons are just a bundle of perceptions” is that “they are nothing but the series of *their own* sensations, feelings, dreams, images, and the rest” (Penelhum 2000, 27). Penelhum, then, suggests a shift in the question; it is not how we are justified in attributing identity to a person, but how we are justified in attributing identity to a mind (2000, 27).

According to Hume, our basic mistake is to confuse change with identity. Therefore, we face a psychological puzzle concerning what makes people commit such a

mistake. Philosophers have sensed this mistake, but their inability to give a full account of it as well as their immanent belief that there must be something that functions as the real, unchanging substratum, results in its continuation (Penelhum 2000, 28-9). Penelhum insists that, contrary to Hume's view, there is no contradiction in attributing sameness to a successive series. He gives the example of six notes and a musical sentence. Surely it would be absurd, he maintains, to say that there are not six notes but only one, whereas it is quite justified to say that there are six successive notes and one musical sentence. He claims that Hume ignores this fact (2000, 30-1). Another mistake he ascribes to Hume is that of thinking that whatever is to be predicated as the same should remain unchanged (Penelhum 2000, 31). This, in relation to the former point, is a confusion between numerical and specific identity.

Penelhum criticizes Hume for falling into a conceptual muddle when he uses the same word 'object' in expressions such as: "An *object* that remains invariable," and "Several *objects* existing in succession" (2000, 33). Instead he suggests that Hume should have used two different concepts in order to avoid the confusion arising from the use of the word 'object': an exemplary general use of an *x* and several *y*'s. However, what Hume tries to point out bears upon his statement that different perceptions signify different existences; and that, although we attribute sameness to such successions, we are nevertheless not aware of any perception of a connection between such distinct existences, namely, sameness or identity. Penelhum says that "Hume errs by supposing invariance as the standard of identity" (2000, 34). As a matter of fact, however, the heart of the Humean project is the rejection of such an idea. Hume tries to show how we attribute identity to things although, as a matter of fact, we only have distinct perceptions

of them. That is, Hume tries to show how distinct perceptions, which designate distinct existences, are supposed to give rise to or produce the idea of an identical object.

Penelhum's excessive reference to concept, and its applicability as the standard of identity that we attribute to objects, sounds like Locke's formalism and is an effort to find a one-to-one, simple corresponding something that gives way to the idea of identity, something that is foreign to Hume's project.

Penelhum claims that Hume's main concern, where the problem of personal identity is at stake, is what he puts forward in Book I (2000, 91). However, in that case, we are left with only negative conclusions and propositions, and the problem would remain unsolved. On the other hand, and as a consequence of this point of view, the problem of individuation and the problem of other selves remain unresolved in Hume. By contrast, in agreement with Capaldi, it can be claimed that Hume takes the existence of other selves as an explanatory ground, (that is, something that is self-evident) and not as something to be explained or proved. Hume explicitly proposes the self as the product of passions, particularly that of love and hatred, pride and humility. However, Penelhum insists that this is not precisely the case. He refers, for instance, to the statement that the self cannot be the cause, or be alone sufficient to excite the passions, and tries to justify this reading of Hume as having a dual idea of the self, namely one that is Cartesian, and one that is instinctive. "In order for pride to call up the self," says Penelhum, "the idea of the self should already be present in our repertoire of experiences. There is no way in which the mechanism of pride and humility could be the *origin* of our consciousness of the distinction between ourselves and others; for it requires us already to have that consciousness" (2000, 94).

However, even if Penelhum's claim is true, this does not result in a dual-natured self. We can think that the idea of the self is caused by the passions, within society, based upon a preconceptual self, which is constituted socially via linguistic and sympathetic abilities. According to Hume pride and humility are indirect passions and their object is one and the same: the self (1967, 277). Although pride and humility are possible only with accordance to the self, and despite the fact that the self is the object of these passions, it should be noticed that the self is not their cause. Pride and humility are passions that are placed between two ideas. The first idea, which is the productive principle, causes pride and humility. The second idea is the self, which is the object of these passions and is produced by these passions (Hume 1967, 278). Hume enumerates a number of qualities as the causes of the passion of pride and humility such as imagination, judgment, memory, etc, which are not confined to the mind, but also cover the body (1967, 279). What is worth noticing is the societal nature of all these qualities. All these qualities are realizable and meaningful against a background of others who share the same beliefs, customs and value-judgments. This is why Hume includes country, family, children, relations, and property among such qualities (1967, 279). These passions and the qualities that are related to them are not mere abstractions, but are related to us materially. For instance, speaking of beauty, Hume states: "Beauty, consider'd merely as such, unless placed upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion" (1967, 279). Thus, the distinction Penelhum is at pains to draw between the so-called Cartesian and so-called instinctive selves seems artificial and useless.

Penelhum refers to Capaldi's arguments about the process of the formation of the idea of the self in the *Treatise* and says that Hume does not answer Capaldi's question: How is the idea of the self acquired? According to Penelhum, Hume's inability to answer this question is based upon the fact that he does not offer an account of individuation. Whereas, in the passages he has quoted from Capaldi and Hume, and in a footnote by Penelhum himself, it is clearly indicated that, in Hume's view a plurality of selves has been presupposed from the outset (2000, 95). Penelhum even concedes that, from Hume's perspective, "the self (as it concerns the passions) is a social construction" (2000, 96).

Although in later articles Penelhum's approach to Hume's account of the self changes, the core of his criticism against Hume remains the same. According to Penelhum, Hume and his opponents share a common basis that accounts for their common mistake; that is they claim change and identity are mutually exclusive. Consequently, Hume's opponents are trying to overcome the difficulty by uncovering an unchanging, substantial core which is invariable through time. By contrast, Hume tries to show that there exists no such core, hence, no identity. As Penelhum states: "Both sides of the dispute, therefore, are attempting to explain away a paradox that does not exist" (2000, 43).

Penelhum claims that Hume inherits another Cartesian aspect. Hume rejects the doctrine of the unity of consciousness, or the idea that mental activities such as reasoning and thinking require a subject that holds the bundle of impressions and ideas together. Mental unity can be entirely accounted for in terms of association of impressions and ideas. However, Hume shares Descartes' view that "the mind has the ability to scrutinize

and chronicle the progress of its own perceptions” (Penelhum 2000, 103). The mind knows its own contents prior to that careful introspection that the science of human nature relies on. As Penelhum states: “Roughly, [Hume] holds, and must hold, that our conscious mental life must be known to us, but rejects the Cartesian claim that in knowing the contents of consciousness we are also aware of a self that owns them” (Penelhum 2000, 103). Hume insists that the thesis that there is an “I” that owns all its experiences is false. “[H]e thinks the ‘no-ownership’ thesis is demonstrable experimentally” (Penelhum 2000, 104). We can interpret this thesis as claiming that the content of mind is external, i.e., that the content of mind, which in turn is to form the mind’s totality, is not an inner or private phenomenon but an in-between one.

A more accurate account of the Humean theory of the self would be as follows: Hume rejects an idea of identity that is based upon a substantial core. Yet, in Books II and III of the *Treatise*, he explicitly proposes the existence of an idea of the self which is not necessarily unchanging. As a matter of fact, it is within the realm of the social and moral that we are in need of an unchanging identity to bestow responsibility upon us for certain acts and deeds, and Hume is perfectly aware of this. His reference to the alterability of the self in both space and time is strong evidence that he is working with the strange, paradoxical, and conflicting idea of a changing yet identical self. Hume dismisses the existence of a substantial self as the basis upon which the idea of an unchanging self is formed; however, he discovers and explains in a rudimentary way the idea of a socially constructed self. Besides, there is no textual evidence to show that the imagination’s participation in the formation of the idea of the self which is fictitious is a completely negative element that is involved in the process of the formation of the idea of

self. To read Hume's labeling of the idea of the self as fictitious in such a negative way is to attribute to his argument about the role of imagination an axiological negativity that he never intends. In addition to these points, Penelhum's reading of Hume's position is also strongly biased in that he takes Hume to be a dualist.

Despite efforts to reconcile the seemingly contradictory conceptions of the idea of the self in the *Treatise*, many scholars seem to dismiss the question, concentrating on personal identity either as it regards thought, or as it regards passions. Jamie Ferreira (1994) focuses on the latter and dismisses the question of the metaphysical self, touching on the question only briefly, when she tries to define the imagination's role with reference to sympathy. Similarly, Tony Pitson (1986) focuses upon Hume's view concerning other selves as alike the Cartesian question: "are the bodies that surround me mere bodies or do they have minds?" Pitson tries to relate the issue of other minds to the question of the content of perception in order to reconcile the two aspects of Hume's consideration of the self. Jane McIntyre (1989) tries to reconcile these two aspects by claiming that the principle of identity, which is discussed in Book I, does not exhaust the question of personal identity. Ainslie (1999), on the other hand, tries to overcome the tension by drawing a parallel between Hume's skeptical account of objectivity and his view on the formation of belief with regard to other selves. Robert Anderson (1966) relates the above-mentioned tension to two Humean principles or premises: 1) "[w]hatever is conceivable is possible" and 2) "[w]hatever is different is separable by thought or by imagination" (1966, 3). Conceivability requires clarity and distinctness, where this clarity and distinctness is supposed not to involve any contradiction. Since we have an idea of our self, we should assume that we have an impression of it, even if it be

perceived at a time that we are not aware of. The presence of an impression of the self signifies the existence of the self as a distinct entity. Yet another inference is possible: if we do not have an impression of the self, then the idea of our own self must be an illusion, a mere fiction because the lack of an impression of the self signifies its non-existence.

In Book I, Part IV, Section V of Hume's *Treatise* we are introduced to the idea that internal perceptions are not always simple but are often compounded and complex. We should not forget that, earlier, Hume relates self-identity to perceptions in general, i.e., the mind is supposed to be nothing but a bundle of perceptions. There is no essence to the mind. Hume states: "A man is a bundle or a collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement." However, he tells us in Section VI, that there is no impression from which the idea of the self is derived; hence there exists no idea such as the idea of the self. Our existence depends upon our perceptions without which we may be said not to exist (Hume 1967, 252).

Nicholas Capaldi (1985) has pointed out that for Hume the self should not be identified solely with the mind. According to Capaldi, the self is a compound made up of mind and body. What is a bundle of perceptions, therefore, refers only to the mind, not to the complete self (Capaldi 1975, 138, 1985, 271). Capaldi bases this interpretation upon a number of passages; however, his interpretation is not as plausible as he seems to think, for the following reasons. First, Hume uses the terms 'mind' and 'self' interchangeably in many places (for example, see Book I, Part IV, Section V and Section VI). Secondly, such a differentiation would not be of any use to support Capaldi's point about the

existence of the pre-cognitive self. Nor is it relevant to the question of the self as something which is not substantial.

It should be noticed that, for Hume, the perceiving self is not a passive construction of random perceptions and impressions. For Hume, the notion of action forms the ground of any explanation without itself being explained; it is presupposed. “There is, thus, in Hume’s theory a precognitive context of all analysis, and it lies in bodily action” (Capaldi 1985, 273). As early as Book I, Part VI, Hume introduces the faculties of love, hatred, and will. “But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time” (Hume 1967, 251-2). Elsewhere, in the *Appendix*, Hume states: “[T]he annihilation, which some people suppose to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other” (1967, 634-5). There is no real constancy and identity of the self; rather, there is an ability, a force, which must be involved, for the emergence of the idea of the self.⁶⁵ Imagination, by mistaking the resemblance between

⁶⁵ With respect to what I call the concept of active self and its formation Hume writes in the *Appendix*:

When I turn my reflexion on *myself*, I never can perceive this *self*, without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. ‘Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self. We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose it to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? Have you any notion of *self* or *substance*? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion. (1967, 634)

It is clear that Hume is criticizing the notion of substantial self or mind and relates the formation of the self to the active participation of senses and perceptions.

the successive perceptions for sameness, produces the idea of a substantial, identical self. Capaldi assumes that self is not a simple but a complex idea. As a complex idea, it does not need to have a direct analogue in experience where the self would be a reflecting impression of it. Moreover, it is, as Capaldi states, “formed through the creative activity of the mind’s association of ideas” (Capaldi 1985, 273).⁶⁶

Imagination is not alone in creating such an idea; it works together with sympathy:

But this is still more remarkable, when we add a sympathy of parts to their *common end*, and suppose that they bear to each other, the reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all their actions and operations. This is the case with all animals and vegetables; where not only several parts have a reference to some. general purpose, but also a mutual dependence on, and connexion with each other. The effect of so strong a relation is, that tho’ every one must allow, that in a very few years both vegetables and animals endure a *total* change, yet we still attribute identity to them, while their form, size, and substance are entirely altr’d. (Hume 1967, 257)

The same method, says Hume, should be followed to explain the nature of personal identity: “The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies” (1967, 259). The question, then, is whether the multitude of perceptions becomes in reality unified by the so-called identity of the mind, or these ideas are only associated by imagination to construct an identity. Hume goes on to state: “Identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when

⁶⁶ Capaldi expands his analysis by emphasizing the importance of the reference to action as an essential part for understanding the nature of the self: “What is more important is that action is a fundamental category in Hume’s analysis. Just as pure epistemology is incoherent and leads to scepticism when we try to understand ourselves as disembodied minds, so the concept of ourselves cannot be obtained in pure thought. It is the reference to action that underscores the importance of the body as part of the self” (Capaldi 1985, 273).

we reflect upon them” (1967, 260). This unity is based upon three principles: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. The most important ones are resemblance and causation. Unlike Locke who identifies personal identity with memory (consciousness), Hume assumes that memory discovers identity rather than producing it by looking back over our past impressions and ideas. However, Hume does not deny that we can credit memory with a more productive role where personal identity is concerned, since memory reproduces perceptions and thereby introduces the continuance and succession of perceptions (Hume 1967, 273). As he states: “Had we no memory, we never shou’d have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person” (1967, 261-2). The self is a projection too; it has an intentional aspect, since being related to the memory, it must be related to future memory as well.

When it comes to the self, and its relation to passions, the core idea that holds the Humean self together becomes even clearer. In Section II of Book II, for instance, Hume tells us that “[t]is evident, that pride and humility, tho’ directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness” (Hume 1967, 227). The relation between the self with regard to impressions (or, in other words, the epistemological or the metaphysical self), and the self with regard to passions, is obvious here. It is clear that Hume regards the two as closely linked. Passions are the basis of Hume’s moral theory as well as the basis of his concept of the self.

Later, Hume explains the relationship between the sympathetic and epistemological selves by emphasizing that the formation of impressions requires a particular point of view from a particular self:

Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are always consider'd with a view to ourselves; otherwise they wou'd never be able either to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them. When self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or for humility. But tho' that connected succession of perceptions, which we call *self*, be always the object of these two passions, 'tis impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them. (Hume 1967, 277-8)

The self, even when it is considered in relation to passions, must also be related to impressions and perceptions. The close relation of the self to impressions and perceptions is not an accident; rather, there is something identical between them. Similar to perceptions that change due to several factors, the nature of the self is changeable and inconstant. For Hume, every perception is a different existence, and he admits that there is no perception of a real connection between these different existences. The self cannot confine itself to one passion only. As Hume states, “[h]uman nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it” (1967, 283). There is something that organizes the sequence of perceptions without which one is nothing and relates it to the perceptions of external objects. There is a parallel between the external object and the internal self. As Baier states: “It is reasonable to expect that attention to external objects, to the heap of possessions of one possessor, will be needed before one can discern an enduring stable person in the continual revolutions of perceptions” (1979, 285). The apparent constancy of the internal or the mental, i.e., the constancy of the self, is based upon the apparent constancy of the external goods and the perceptions that one possesses of these external objects. We should note that other subjects too could be

considered sources of the idea of stability. External subjects bring together perception and sympathy as the necessary basis for an idea of the self.⁶⁷

In the *Appendix*, Hume expresses his inability to “explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness” (1967, 636). Since every perception is a distinct existence, and the mind cannot perceive any real connection between distinct existences, the task now is to explain the principle that holds these distinct perceptions together. It seems that Hume faces an impossible task when he is reevaluating the self with regard to thought (the “pure” epistemological self). But the plurality of perceptions of external objects should be able to serve as a source of formation of the idea of the self. Such a plurality, where human beings are concerned, turns into the plurality of other persons, which are considered as selves. The problem with regard to the epistemological self can only be resolved in the realm of the passionate self, where the existence of other selves is already presupposed.⁶⁸ This is why Hume never faces such a problem when he focuses upon the passionate, ethical, and social self. As Capaldi says, “Hume does not explain the social world but presupposes it” (Capaldi 1985, 281). The realm of passions is the realm of ethics, sympathy, and civil society where the existence of others is a prerequisite for the actualization of this very realm.

Another basic feature of the idea of the self is that it resembles itself. Even though it is in a state of perpetual flux, the idea of the self is associated with itself. This

⁶⁷ Capaldi introduces the precognitive self as the unifying element that keeps the fluctuating self together and refers to it as Hume’s great philosophical discovery. “The unity of consciousness as the preconceptual condition or content of conceptualization emerges as a fundamental discovery in Hume.” (1985, 278)

⁶⁸ “The whole discussion of personal identity is predicated on the assumption that the common sense view [regarding the existence of other selves] is basically correct, but still it has to be explained” (Capaldi 1975, 136).

resemblance is based upon certain properties of human nature. The first property is the association of ideas. Although it is impossible for the mind to fix upon the same idea for a long time, there still exist rules and regulations where the changeability of thoughts and ideas is concerned. Hume states: “The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produc’d by it. When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction” (1967, 283). The second property is the connection between the resembling impressions. “All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow” (Hume 1967, 283). The third property conceals the natural transition from one resembling idea or impression to another. Hume always assumes that, as human selves, we are able to properly apply and understand concepts of resemblance and contiguity.

The self is an impression of itself; otherwise the idea of the self could not be considered as present. Resemblance and contiguity are necessary conditions for the existence of the self, since, if something is not presented to our senses, it cannot exist. Something which is not presented to us “has no manner of influence on our vanity” (Hume 1967, 303). The formative impact of the relationship between sense perception and the perceived object is a reciprocal one; either requires the existence of the other: “Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and it is natural for us to consider with most attention such objects as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us” (Hume 1967, 340).

Conceiving the way in which the self is related to the effects of passions within time and space helps to give a more complete account of Hume's consideration of the self. His point of view on this matter can be summarized as follows. Basically, whatever is more distant in time or space has a lesser effect. Distance in time has a diminishing effect on the senses that is greater than distance in space. The existing situation of a person is based upon imagination. And with regard to time, distance from past experiences lessens the vivacity of the impressions more than distance from possible experiences in the future, since the past is unchangeable. These points are important since they introduce some basic elements of the Humean notion of the self. These are contiguity, the imaginative aspect of the self, and the intentional aspect. These basic elements emphasize the social aspect of the self when it is differentiated in time and in space.

Hume introduces the concept of the self as a bundle of perceptions which are always present to oneself. In this sense, the self is supposed to be only a fiction or, as Hume puts it, "a kind of castle building, where the imagination amuses itself with its own fictions" (1967, 324). The self as a fiction has its source in the memory of the idea of our own selves that might go under fictitious changes caused by the faculty of imagination. Capaldi states: "The mind consists of individual and separable perceptions, both ideas and impressions, the identity which is ascribed to it is fictitious; but fictitious in the innocuous sense in which we ascribe a continuous identity to a plant or to an animal or to a government" (Capaldi 1975, 139). However, the self is most intimately present to us: "the idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us" (1967, 354).⁶⁹ The question is

⁶⁹ "The discussion of the idea of the self presupposes the existence of the self" (Capaldi 1975, 139).

how to reconcile these two modes of the self and to show that they are neither in contradiction with, nor exclusive of, each other. The tension between the two modes of the self can be resolved only if we appeal to the notion of the other. The self is a habit which is perceived intimately; it is a self which is constructed sympathetically through the other. In a Humean framework, with regard to the self one cannot start from a metaphysical or epistemological self and proceed towards the moral and ethical self. On the contrary, the epistemological self is a moment of the sympathetic self.⁷⁰ The reconstruction of the Humean theory of the self requires a reversal in the movement of the *Treatise*, beginning from the self as a sympathetic construct, and moving towards the epistemological, perceiving self that is merely a bundle of perceptions. As Capaldi notes, Hume's criticism of the disembodied Cartesian self can be considered an affirmation of such a reversal: "Rather than denying an extra-conceptual self, Hume discovers it. What he denied was a simple, continuous, disembodied Cartesian self" (Capaldi 1985, 283).⁷¹

We form the idea of ourselves based on the idea of the other, through forming the impressions of another's self as an accumulation of the ideas and impressions of that self. As Hume states: "Every human creature resembles ourselves, and by that means has an advantage above any other object, in operating on imagination" (Hume 1967, 359).

⁷⁰ "A few commentators have seen the distinction [Hume makes between epistemological and passionate self] but failed to see the relation between the two. There is a direct relation, for as Hume says, 'our identity with regard to the passions serve to corroborate that with regard to the imagination' (T, 261)" (Capaldi 1975, 137).

⁷¹ Penelhum, in Chapter 4 of his book, claims that Hume criticizes the doctrine of mental substance as unintelligible and demonstrates the untenability of rationalist claims that matter cannot think or mind cannot produce physical effects. However, he continues the discussion to the point of rejecting any Humean philosophical theory of the self and claims that Hume has replaced it with a psychology of self. It seems that Penelhum identifies the self with the substantial disembodied self despite his intention to be critical of this conception.

Earlier we were introduced to the thesis that the formation of ideas requires proximity and contiguity together with resemblance. The only place where these conditions can be fulfilled is the realm of the other, since there can be no such thing as an impression of my own self, independent of others. In order to form an idea of myself, I need the other to reflect the impressions resembling myself that result in the idea of my own self and of the selfhood in general. As Hume puts it, “[i]n general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each others’ emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments, and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay by insensible degrees” (1967, 365). As was noted before, the object of the perception of the self can be another subject as well as one’s own self. One’s confrontation with one’s self happens through social mediation. One knows oneself through others.⁷² Sympathy, in this respect, is a lively idea that one has about the other’s self, which has been turned into an impression of the self (Hume 1967, 385-6).

The other, in a Lacanian sense, is the place where the chain of signifiers resides in order to make present to the subject the way it should appear to be. The other is the unconscious which, in its structure, resembles language. Language itself functions as the system of signifiers that, according to Lacan, “represents a subject for another signifier” (Lacan 1977, 207) where this second signifier, in turn, is a subject too. (It is *the other* subject.)⁷³

⁷² “I can come to know myself through others. This characteristic of self-awareness is exactly what Hume stresses in his discussion of the indirect passions of pride and humility which give rise to the idea of the self, and it is as well the foundation of Hume’s theory of sympathy and morality” (Capaldi 1985, 279).

⁷³ “What we find once again here is the constitution of the Other ... If he is apprehended at his birth in the field of the Other, the characteristic of the subject of the unconscious is

One can compare the principle of sympathy with the principle of comparison and see how important the notion of the other is for the self. As Baier writes: “Sympathy takes ‘a great deal of imagination’, to enable us to ‘enter deep’ into others’ sentiments, so deep that we become ‘sensible of all passions’ that we survey. More than mere beliefs about others’ passions are involved –we actually feel with others” (1991, 149). When the principle of comparison is at stake it, as Baier goes on to say, “excites ... something not as lively and ‘original’ in us as sympathy. What is more, ‘comparison’ is seen to presuppose our capacity for sympathy” (Baier 1991, 150). Sympathy is more basic and original; it does not have a negative analogue. This shows the constitutive importance of the other for the formation of the self. The “I” initially tends to sympathize with others rather than (mis)takes them as rivals. And any moral standpoint that deals with the subject, as far as Hume is concerned, requires the notion of the *other*. It should be kept in mind that Hume “takes physical proximity to another to be enough to guarantee sympathy” (Baier 1991, 150).

A particular self is different from all others due to the fact that, as a bundle of perceptions, it represents a unique series of perceptions. The question about the differentiation of the selves should not be addressed in a traditional way, i.e., the question cannot be answered based upon a substantialist or essentialist account. The whole critical standpoint of the Humean notion of the self is based on the rejection of any type of essentialist notion, be it Cartesian or Aristotelian.⁷⁴ Hume’s answer to this question will more or less resemble Locke’s consideration of the matter, where Locke addresses the question of the identity of *man*, whose identity consists in the preservation and

that of being, beneath the signifier that develops its networks, its chains and its history, at an indeterminate place” (Lacan 1977, 208).

⁷⁴ For a detailed discussion, see Capaldi 1975, chapter 7.

continuance of the same life (Locke 1975, 321-2). We usually do not start from a basic element or substance when addressing the problem of identity. That, at best, would be counted as a Cartesian attempt. The non-substantialist consideration of the self may be named formal-existential. What is meant by this is that the very existence of a particular thing (be it an object or a person) requires the appearance of that thing in a certain form, so that it can be differentiated from all other things. The uniqueness of the particular thing suffices to define the particularity of that thing from all others. As Capaldi puts it, “what Hume needs to be able to use in the accounts of the indirect passions and the mechanism of sympathy is primarily the idea of oneself as distinct from others. This means that Hume has to take for granted that there is some answer to the problem of individuation” (1985, 87). It clearly seems that Hume starts with other selves and that individuation happens only against such a background.

Once again, the use of some Lacanian concepts might help to clarify this point. While addressing the process of the formation of the subject, Lacan proposes two moments: the moment of the loss of meaning, which he calls alienation, and the moment of engendering of, or defending against, the other, which he calls separation. The subject is only actualized after the second moment, the one of separation. Separation is the moment when the initial *aphanisis* (i.e., the moment at which the subject and the other cannot be distinguished) has been overcome. “What the subject has to free himself of is the aphanisis effect of the binary signifier” (Lacan 1977, 219). Separation should be understood as defending oneself against the other; it is actualized as one forms an idea of a self which is distinct from the others. As Lacan states: “There is no subject without, somewhere, *aphanisis* of the subject, and it is in this alienation, in this fundamental

division, that the dialectics of the subject is established” (Lacan 1977, 221). The Lacanian dialectic of the self is not yet complete at this moment. The dialectic results in the formation of the subject where love (which has as its inverse the desire to be loved) is actualized as the moment of identification. At this moment of identification, which is equivalent to self-love, the separated subject is actualized as a subject. The love for the other, the sympathy towards him or her, guarantees the other’s selfhood as well as one’s own. One’s awareness of one’s self can only be realized against one’s awareness of the other’s existence as a self.

Hume divides impressions into two kinds: original and secondary. This corresponds to an earlier division of impressions into “impressions of sensation” and “impressions of reflexion”. The former arises directly from perception, whereas the latter proceeds from the former. All the impressions of the senses belong to the former; all passions and emotions belong to the latter form. Yet, in the final analysis, according to Hume, all impressions are impressions of passion, even those impressions that he calls impressions of sensation or direct impressions. This means that even the purest epistemological activities of the human mind and his perceptions are determined by the societal being of man. For instance, when it comes to the ideas of cause and effect that govern the uniformity of the movements of material bodies Hume rejects the view that the ideas of cause and effect are perceptible per se. To the contrary, he introduces experience as particular human experience, and as that factor that makes the understanding of the ideas of cause and effect possible:

’Tis only from experience and observation of [the] constant union [of different objects], that we are able to form this inference [that causality exists]; and even after all, the inference is nothing but the effects of custom on the imagination. We must not here be content with saying, that the idea of cause and effect arises from

objects constantly united; but must affirm, that 'tis the very same with the idea of these objects, and that the *necessary connexion* is not discover'd by a conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind. (1967, 405-6)

Hume maintains that human nature and abilities are insufficient by themselves, not only in the sense of physical survival but also in the sense of actualization of human skills and abilities. Without the constitutive and continual presence of others human nature would fail to provide the lively sensations and passions that agitate the spirit. Others communicate their actions and ideas to us and in this way these ideas participate in producing passions that belong to one's own. An idea of a passion is more agreeable than any other ideas "because such an idea becomes a kind of passion, and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, than any other image or conception" (Hume 1967, 353). Passions that are agitated by others, and actions that have become habitual due to continual acquaintance and repetition, strengthen the conception of any object (1967, 353). Hume further explains the active role of human societal interaction by reference to the role of education (1967, 353). This, on the one hand, shows how active the human mind is according to Hume, and, on the other hand, it shows the social aspect of Hume's conceptualization of the notion of the self, which is the object of passions.

The dialectic of the subject requires the other as the topology for the account of the formation of the subject. However, the other, prior to its linguistic structure, is an other. What should be emphasized about the otherness of the other is the priority of the other's existence as a material entity. The other is embodied and the acts of alienation and separation happen against the bodily presence of the other alongside the presence of the other. The body is the necessary *locus* for the realization of the self. As Baier puts it, "In Book Two [Hume] seems to realize that the best picture of the human soul is the human

body, so he can speak of ‘qualities of our mind and body, that is self’” (1991, 131). The notion of the body signifies the plural nature of the self. We cannot propose a satisfying answer to the question if we insist on basing our notion of personal identity entirely upon a solipsistic account.⁷⁵ This is to say that, insistence on a solipsistic-based notion of the self results in an irresolvable tension similar to what Anderson discusses.⁷⁶ The question is as follows: Is there a possibility of forming a notion of the self if I am to be *the only* existing entity? Unless one presupposes the existence of a substantial self here, one cannot claim that one has an impression, hence an idea of the self. It seems that, in this case, no one will be able to proceed from the bundle of perceptions towards the formation of the notion of the self. However, if a plurality of existing subjects is admitted, then the problem disappears. One can have an impression and idea of another self, even though this self is a bundle of perceptions. With the aid of the faculty of imagination then, the idea of the self is transformed into an idea of a self as a personal self. Thus the tension is diminished: The “I” is still a bundle of perceptions as well as a fiction, which is produced by imagination. Nonetheless, the impression and idea of the self are both real, and do not signify the self as a substratum. The fact that there are other selves, and that I become aware of them, supplies me with enough reason to believe that this specific self is

⁷⁵ There has always been an admitted relationship between empiricism and plurality/multiplicity. For instance, in *Reading Knowledge* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 102-103, Payne explains Deleuze’s empiricism as follows: “For Deleuze, to affirm multiplicity is to be an empiricist or a pluralist, one, first of all, who is convinced that the abstract does not itself explain anything but awaits itself to be explained and, secondly, one who is determined to find the creative circumstances that make possible the production of something new, rather than being determined to find what is eternal or universal.”

⁷⁶ See Anderson’s *Hume’s First Principles*, especially chapters 4 and 9.

different from the others.⁷⁷ Capaldi's notion of a pre-conceptual or pre-cognitive self is in accord with the above-mentioned. The pre-conceptual self refers to the material existence of the person prior to the emergence of any idea of the self, prior to the idea of the "I," where the "I" is "rooted in bodily activity" (Capaldi 1975, 279). As bodily existence this "I," in contradistinction to the idea of the self, finds itself within a plurality of other "I"s and therefore of other selves.⁷⁸

Resolving the Riddle of the Self

Hume's theory of the self can be considered as a prototype of a historical-genetic approach that defines the self as an ideological product which belongs to the same realm as scientific knowledge, literature, religion, arts etc. The non-substantiality of the Humean self designates not the unreality of its being but this distinguishing texture. As an ideological product, the self is not only a part of reality but also reflects and refracts the very same reality by assuming a unique position in it. In this sense, the existence of the self, like all other ideological products, assumes an active position regarding reality; it

⁷⁷ Pauline Chazan, in her book *The Moral Self* (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), after proposing that the Humean moral self is constituted socially through self-valuing, which is the self *qua* how other people see it relates this act of evaluation to the passion of pride. Therefore, pride turns to be the passion that relates us to the other: "As a moral being it is not enough to feel proud of one's own moral character and actions, the pride must be felt after having taken 'general views'" (p. 26), where the capacity to take such general views is related to sympathy. Clarifying the relation between pride and sympathy (the constituent presence of the other in formation of the self) she continues "for Hume pride and the idea of the self come into being simultaneously: both will be shown to be the joint effects of a certain train of perception" (p. 14). This point is in accord with what I stated about the plurality of the other and the self as the other. The Humean account of the problem of personal identity does not start from a solipsistic, metaphysical self that extends itself transcendently beyond itself; rather it will come into being as a plurality of selves, which are sympathetically interrelated.

⁷⁸ Baier also refers to the same issue in "Hume on Heaps and Bundles," when she speaks of the parallel between possessing material possessions and treating the internal, mental goods as "part of the Possessor" (1991, 286, 292).

functions as a means of production and hence it produces reality. By definition, the self has a meaning that signifies something other than itself with the use of signs. The system of signs the self uses as means of signifying the real is basically verbal and linguistic. In order to make this point clearer, and to draw the parallels between the Humean prototypical genetic approach and the genetic-historical theories that were referred to in previous chapter, it will be necessary to examine some of the presuppositions of such theories.

According to Vološinov, in his *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, a sign is different from a mere material thing in that the latter (e.g., an object) equals itself. However, as an object it can be combined with a sign, or can assume the function of a sign, or become a sign. However, a sign does not only persist in reality. Since it has meaning, it has value too; it can be right, wrong, true, false, fair, good, etc. Therefore everything ideological has semiotic value. As a phenomenon that belongs to the external world, the ideological sign, which reflects and refracts reality, has a certain type of embodiment. This embodiment may be sound, color, or the like. The sign and its effects occur in the external world (Vološinov 1973, 11).

Traditionally philosophy locates mental phenomena *in* consciousness, whereas they belong to the sign and realm of semiotics, and therefore are parts of the external world. Vološinov states that

[i]dealism and psychologism alike overlook the fact that understanding itself can come about only within some kind of semiotic material (e.g., inner speech), that sign bears upon sign, that *consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs*... Understanding is a response to a sign with signs. (1973, 11)

A sign is produced as the result of interaction between consciousnesses. Consciousness itself is filled with signs that are mental phenomena (ideological). Consciousness appears only when this filling of itself with semiotic content takes place, and therefore consciousness comes to be only within social interaction. By committing the same error of localizing mental phenomena in consciousness, and studying the latter in isolation from the real conditions of their being, both idealism and empirical psychologism reduce the study of ideology to the study of isolated consciousness and its laws. In this way, they treat consciousness either as transcendentalism or as an amalgamation of empirical data. In the former case, consciousness appears to be everything; in the latter, it amounts to nothing. For idealism, consciousness exists above and beyond existence and determines it in some mysterious way. For psychologism, it is but a conglomeration of psycho-physiological reactions that in some magical way result in a meaningful whole. The sign can only be produced in the social realm. In this sense it is not natural but social. The term 'social' has a specific meaning: it refers not only to a multitude of individual members making up a particular species called homo-sapiens. Society is a particular form of unity that organizes a plurality of human beings. As an ideological product, consciousness cannot be used as an explanation; it cannot be assumed to exist. Its existence has to be demonstrated and it should be explained by the use of its objective, social roots. As Vološinov puts it, "[t]he individual consciousness is a social-ideological fact" (1973, 12).⁷⁹ Therefore consciousness can only be defined sociologically.

⁷⁹ It should be noted that the term "ideological" in the sense that Vološinov uses it means "mental" or "mental phenomenon". It should not be confused with the present day use of the term that considers ideology as an expression of political bias. Yet, in contradistinction to "mental", which has pure subjectivist connotations "ideology" signifies objective phenomena; it emphasizes the objectivity of mental phenomena. Thus

A mental phenomenon acquires its reality from the objective reality of the social sign. Therefore, as an ideological product, the reality of consciousness, too, depends on the objective reality of the social realm. The ideological structure is not constructed by individual consciousness; on the contrary it is the individual consciousness that owes its existence to the being of the objective reality of the ideological superstructure. Thus we can interpret Hume's rejection of substantial being of the self as a vague awareness of the process of the formation and emergence of the idea of the self or the reflexive consciousness. Hume's treating of the idea of the self in Books II and III of the *Treatise* hints towards a possible solution of the question concerning the self as a social and objective but non-substantial phenomenon and leaves room for such an interpretation.

The existence of the sign depends on the fact of communication. Earlier, following Vygotsky, I defined the fundamental function of language as communication and as conveying information concerning the objective reality as the content of such an act of communication. The sign is materialization of communication. Language is the medium where this ideological aspect of the sign is actualized in its fullest sense. Vološinov defines the word as "the ideological phenomenon par excellence" (1973, 13). A word is a neutral sign. Neutrality of the word means that it does not have one particular and designated ideological/mental function and all ideological fields such as religion, art, science, philosophy etc can use it. Moreover, although the reality of the word as a sign is based upon the inter-individual realm, it is nonetheless produced by the individual. Therefore, as semiotic material, it has an important role in the depiction of the inner life of consciousness. Consciousness requires an objective and real medium for actualization

beside personal mental phenomena the areas that form the superstructure such as religion, art, sciences are considered ideology or ideological.

and the word provides consciousness with that reality. Therefore the problem of consciousness appears as the question concerning the inner word.

When setting up the psyche or human consciousness as an object and as a part of external reality, the question arises how to define the inner experience in external, objective terms. The basis of the answer to this question is that the reality of the psyche, the inner experience, is the reality of the sign. The psyche is not reducible to physiological and nervous processes. The subject, the consciousness or the psyche, resides in the borderline area that separates the organism from its surrounding world. This is the paradoxical mode of the existence of the self which is also designated by the Humean notion of the self. The paradox is that the internality of the self or consciousness is based upon external reality. To put it in another way, although there is no immanent substance of the self, and although the self is totally based on external reality and experience, there is nonetheless a sense of intimate access to the self. In fact, there is a self, even though not internally and intimately founded, that is internally and intimately accessible. Therefore the riddle of subjectivity that is put forward by Hume can be interpreted as a variation of this problem.

The organism and the outside world do not encounter physically but they encounter through the sign. Vološinov explains this encounter as follows: “Psychic experience is the semiotic expression of the contact between the organism and the outside environment. That is why *the inner psyche is not analyzable as a thing but can only be understood and interpreted as a sign*” (1973, 26). Experience is expressible only through the material mediation of the sign. And this is not the case for the other only, but for the one who undergoes the very experience. Experience exists only in the materiality of the

sign. Therefore the difference between inner experience and its outward expression is not a qualitative but a quantitative one. The ways of expression of an experience may change (e.g., from mimicry to verbal expression) but the qualitative fact of the dependency of the expressiveness of the experience remains the same. Everything that acquires semiotic experience can become the sign material of the psyche. Yet the most important of these materials is inner speech. Inner speech is not identical with thought. Moreover, consciousness is not reducible to speech –inner or outer. However, speech in general and inner speech in particular appears as the sign material of consciousness, of the self. In addition to this, the process of the acquisition of language and the formation of sign material coincides with the process of the formation of the notion of the self or the psyche. And language (speech) has a regulative and determining effect on the formation of the notions in general and the notion of the self in particular. Vološinov states that “[i]t is the word that constitutes the foundation, the skeleton of inner life. Were it to be deprived of word, the psyche would shrink to an extreme degree; deprived of all other expressive activities, it would die out altogether” (1973, 29).

In studying the psyche and the meaning implemented in the material of inner activity, we come to realize two planes of unity of the psyche: one is the unity that the particular psyche depicts as part of the objective, external ideological realm; the other is the unity that goes along with the determination of the psyche as a biological unity together with the totality of all historical and sociological factors. This second realm, in the final analysis, is a part and an element of the greater realm of ideology. Understanding the inner psyche means referring a particular sign to an interwoven totality of other signs, whereas, understanding the former sense of the psyche means referring it

to a system of ideology appropriate to it (Vološinov 1973, 34-5). The basic form of observing the psyche is inner experience or introspection. However, introspection happens through signs and an inner sign can also be outer sign. Introspection has to be expressed; it has to be brought up to the level of outer expression. Since introspection (self-observation) is a form of observation then it has to be understood; observation is not seen or felt; it is understood through signs. To understand means to illuminate a sign with the use of other signs (Vološinov 1973, 37).

According to Hume, sympathy is a feeling we have for those that are similar to us. Sympathy involves entering into the sentiments of others. Therefore we sympathize with those that resemble us most closely, both physically and intellectually. In this sense, sympathy presupposes the existence of the “I” and of others as embodied, intellectual beings that are capable of communicating and conveying their feelings and sentiments to each other and understanding the state of one another.

For Hume, sympathy means receiving the approbation of those with whom one sympathizes. David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart argue that Humean sympathy is similar to empathy. They base this on Hume’s claim that self-love is one of the sources of sympathy. However, empathetic feeling is only one of the moments of sympathy. Sympathy is not only rooted in the passions of pride and humility, but in the opinion of others. What is at stake is not only my own self as I perceive it internally but my name as perceived by others. Hume explicitly states that “[o]ur reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (1967, 316). Sympathy is not a one-way street that one goes

from one's self to the other. Through sympathy, the constitutive presence of the other's being as well as his opinions are internalized. Through sympathy the "I" acquires the sentiments of the other as moments of the constitution of itself.

The constitutive presence of others via sympathy is more clearly stated by Hume when he explains the intensity and strength of sympathetic sentiments as a function of familiarity that is acquired by habit. The other is not merely another object, but is another self that I resemble in my body, in my reason, manners, character, language etc. The other is the empirical and factual human being that I not only resemble but also understand and can sympathize with. The subjectivity of other subjects is necessary for my subjectivity. Hume states that "[t]he stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person" (1967, 318). He attributes a central role to the imagination in forming the idea of the self as the very personal and unique self. The idea of self, in this respect, is habitually acquired. The more I am exposed to others sympathetically and to their sentiments, the more likely will I be affected by their particular ideas and passions. Thus the more likely will I constitute an idea of my own self in the image of others. However, constituting the idea of the self is not the expression of a passive state of being affected by others. The central role of imagination in the formation of the idea of the self is an indication of the active participation of one's own person in this process of humanization. Moreover, familiarity and habit indicate that the other does not signify a conceptual abstraction but is an empirically existing human subject. Hence, the opinions and judgments of the other become important to me along with the degree of the importance that I ascribe to them.

Thus Hume writes that “[t]he judgment of a fool is the judgment of another person, as well as that of a wise man, and is only inferior in its influence on our own judgment” (1967, 321).

Susan James’ interpretation of the origin of the Humean notion of sympathy bases it on the experience of gravity, which in turn affects the imagination (2004, 115, 118). This way she suggests a naturalist formulation concerning the emergence of the moral and value judgments in Hume. However, such an approach ignores the aforementioned distinction that Hume makes between objects of one’s perception and other selves as one perceives them. As James herself notices earlier, “the admiration of other people reinforces our pride while their contempt undermines it, we cannot single-handedly sustain the feeling we have about our own condition and depend on the opinion of others to augment or diminish them” (2004, 114). It is obvious that Hume does not treat the force of gravity or any other natural phenomenon in this way. Moreover, when such values are attributed to natural and cultural objects, e.g., to mountains or building blocks, it happens only after such values have already emerged as the consequence of sympathetic interaction between human selves. Therefore, the affect of the experience of gravity on the imagination is not qualitatively different than the affect that is produced by the perception of a huge building; to the extent that their axiological effects are concerned, both influence the mind figuratively and metaphorically and both are byproducts of feelings of pride and shame that are societal constructions. James’ interpretation inevitably gives way to the emergence of a Cartesian Hume that is a dualist, and not only believes in the mechanical determination of the body, but also in natural-mechanical determination of the mind. It is true, as James herself notices, that

Hume intends to provide a scientific account of human nature (2004, 107). However, such a scientific account does not have to be of the mechanical-Cartesian character.

While she admits that Hume's stance escapes such an interpretation when she emphasizes the importance of the reflexive powers of the soul that Hume attaches to emotions (2004, 118), she nevertheless projects a Cartesian dualism of mind and body onto Hume, which forces her to attribute a notion of human nature to Hume which is conceptualized as a mechanical amalgamation of divergent and exclusive capacities and substances.

Hume's consideration of the idea of substance anticipates his rejection of the idea of personal identity as a substance. Hume asks whether the idea of substance is an idea of sensation or an idea of reflection. He reasons that if it is an idea of an impression, then it should be either a color, a taste, an odor, or a sound etc. However, it seems obvious that substance is neither of the aforementioned impressions. Thus he concludes that "the idea of substance must therefore be deriv'd from an impression of reflexion, if it really exist" (1967, 16). However, since impressions of reflection are resolvable to passions and emotions there can be no immediate and purely perceptual representation of any substance. Thus, Hume concludes, the idea of substance is nothing but a collection of particular qualities.

Two points are of great importance here. First, although the idea of substance does not correspond to an existing thing, it signifies something real as the representation of a collection of qualities. Second, Hume provides the basis for answering the question how atomic impressions or sensations are to be related: the association of impressions and ideas are possible only based on impressions of reflection. Impressions of sensation are only resolvable to atomic perceptions. The idea of a totality, such as an idea of a

particular object, that makes associating of particular sensations into an idea of that particular object possible, emerges only in the realm of impressions of reflection. It is in this sense that all impressions are reducible to impressions of reflection, if they are to correspond to any actual reality. Thus, Hume states, “The idea of substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection” (1967, 16).

Although Hume rejects the idea of the self as consisting of atomic impressions that present to the mind a substantial entity, he reintroduces the idea of the self in Book II of his *Treatise*. Hume rejects the idea of the self as an epistemological entity that is based on impressions of sensation. However, the self as a product of passions and sentiments and as a moral agent is affirmed. For Hume, the self is the product of passions of pride and humility, and the moral existence of the self is reinforced by sentiments through sympathy. Epistemologically speaking, Hume distinguishes between understanding, imagination, and the passions. However, these faculties are conjoined in the science of human nature which Hume constructs. In order to properly grasp the core of the Humean science of human nature in general and his consideration of the idea of self in particular, it is important to distinguish between different levels of abstraction where Hume addresses a particular issue.⁸⁰ For instance, the rejection of the idea of an

⁸⁰ Abraham Sesshu Roth (2000), for example, distinguishes between the identity of the self and the belief in the identity of the self as a reflection of differentiation between a metaphysical account of personal identity and a psychological account. Considering Pears’ approach to the Humean notion of personal identity as representative of a particular (and mostly dominant) way of dealing with the case, Roth writes: “Pears’ mistake results from an attempt to read Hume’s account as a straightforward metaphysical account of identity. But Hume’s concerns are primarily psychological” (Roth 2000, 95-6).

epistemologically constructed self is not in contrast with admitting the existence of the self as a product of the genetic processes that are rooted in the social and moral environment. What Hume rejects is the possibility of an associative construction of the idea of the self out of raw, distinct, atomic sense-data. There is no substantial and qualitative difference between perceptually acquired impressions that enable us to conclude that the idea of the self refers to such impressions. Therefore, the existence of the self must be rooted elsewhere. The empirical fact of Hume's own standpoint that criticizes the idea of a pure epistemological self signifies the existence of a totality, a wholeness, which in this particular case designates Hume's personal self. The existence of the idea of the self is already affirmed through the negation of the idea of the self via a particular self (in this particular case, via David Hume's self). The existence of an empirical (social and moral) interpretive self is a necessary condition if any meaningful criticism of the idea of the self is to be realized. It is in this sense that Amelie Rorty's characterization of Hume's philosophical project in the *Treatise* as a "British proto-version of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*" (1993, 169) makes a lot of sense.

The notions of the "epistemological" and the "passionate" self do not signify two distinct selves; rather, they signify different continuous stages of a single self. For instance, when deducing the idea of causality through making an analogy with will power and with reference to pure epistemological data that is based upon raw impressions of the individual person, Hume argues that our command over our mind has certain limits and one cannot claim total sovereignty over it. Moreover, it is not possible to precisely fix the boundaries of our authority—meaning the boundaries of our individual selves—unless we consult experience: "In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with

those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, more than the external objects have” (Hume 1967, 632-3).

Hume argues that there is no absurdity to reflect the principle of distinctness and separability of impressions onto the objects when the external objects are at stake. The philosophical idea that the impressions are separable and the vulgar formulation that the corresponding objects of impressions are distinct stand together without any contradiction (Hume 1967, 634). However, when the self is at stake one cannot proceed similarly with such simplicity. The reflexive perception of one’s own self consists of one or more perceptions and what is perceived reflexively is but perceptions. The self, or the idea of the self, which signifies the reflexive consciousness of those perceptions that form the self are composed of these perceptions:

We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose the mind to be reduced even below the life of an oyster. Suppose it to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive anything but merely that perception? Have you any notion of *self* or *substance*? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion. (Hume 1967, 634)

Hume is not a dualist in Cartesian sense of the term. In fact, he successfully resolves a number of oppositions between false binaries.⁸¹ The opposition between operations of reason and operations of the passions is one of these. As a matter of fact, in Hume’s system, these apparently opposing faculties turn into complementary abilities. For example, when it comes to proving the idea of the existence of external objects, reason alone cannot offer such a proof. Sentiments, as calm indirect passions, appear as cognitive complements of reason. Although the passions and reason are distinct, they are

⁸¹ For an explanation about some of these false binary oppositions see Rorty 1993, 171.

bound together at the psychological and cognitive level that designates the existence of the empirical self. There the passions and reason draw the limits of cognition.

Hume's non-Cartesian dualism, that mind and body are different and yet closely connected, also helps us to appreciate his rejection of the idea of a substantial self. The incorporeality that he attributes to mind does not denote the mind as a different substance but signifies the ideational texture of its composition. In the essay, "On the Immortality of the Soul," Hume argues that what is designated by the term "soul," that is consciousness and memory, definitely undergoes change. The mind, with the body, is generated, degenerated, corrupted, and eventually vanishes into nothingness (1985, 591-2).

In order to justify his argument Hume makes a number of assertions: First, substance, be it material or spiritual, is a composition of different qualities, i.e., it is a *name* that signifies a particular totality of a number of qualities. Hume accentuates this line of reasoning in the *Appendix* of the *Treatise* stating, "Philosophers begin to be reconciled to the principle, *that we have no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities*. This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, *that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions* (1967, 635). That is, the mind or soul just is a composition of ideational (or mental) properties. Moreover, this composite mind or soul is closely related to the individual body. Both are subject to change. By all the means of analogy, therefore, the soul is not immortal. It changes and vanishes just as the body dies, and as the person ceases to be.

This non-Cartesian duality of mind and body emphasizes the complex make of both the mind and the body. The immateriality of the soul follows from the impossibility

of reducing the mind or the consciousness to a *simple* substance. This form of immateriality can only be conceived in terms of action and activity. It is the social composition of the human species that determines the degree of development of consciousness.

Hume clarifies this point with reference to moral discussions. He states, “the whole scope and intention of man’s creation, so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to the present life” (1985, 593). Hume, then, relates the formation and determination of consciousness of a species to the forms of life and the kinds of activity that are peculiar to the members of that species. Thus, for instance (and regardless of its sexist connotations), he explains the difference between man and woman not as a substantial fact but as something actually and experientially determined: “On the theory of the soul’s mortality, the inferiority of women’s capacity is easily accounted for: Their domestic life requires no higher faculties either of mind or body” (1985, 593). He goes on to say that “The chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on the interest of human society” (1985, 595).

This non-Cartesian mind-body dualism, as we have stated, leads Hume to regard the soul as decomposing when the body dies:

Where any two objects are so closely connected, that all alterations, which we have ever seen in one, are attended with proportionable alterations in the other; we ought to conclude, by all rules of analogy, that, when there are still greater alterations produced in the former, and it is totally dissolved, there follows a greater dissolution of the latter. (1985, 596)

Though the body and mind are different, the two are closely and internally linked. Hume’s account of the mind is a response to both substantialist and physiological approaches. The soul cannot be reduced to the sum of physiological or mechanical bodily

movements. There is a correspondence between certain bodily states and consciousness. However, the two are not identical, since consciousness is not physical in its texture. This conclusion is also found in the *Appendix*:

The annihilation, which some people suppose to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with the self; since the one cannot survive the other. (1967, 634-5)

Human consciousness does not simply place upon lower bodily activities, as a structure is placed upon another. Rather, as the soul or human consciousness is formed ontogenetically, this particular unity emerges as human existence: “Everything is in common between soul and body. The organs of the one are all of them the organs of the other” (Hume 1985, 596). For human consciousness to emerge, bodily human existence is required. Yet, the latter alone cannot explain consciousness.

There is no substance to the mind; there is no substratum that holds the perceptions together. Rather, the mind is a system the content of which is determined by passionate activities. In the *Abstract* Hume states,

[T]he soul, as far as we can conceive it, is nothing but a system or train of different perceptions, those of heat and cold, love and anger, thoughts and sensations; all united together but without any perfect simplicity or identity. *Des Cartes* maintained that thought was the essence of the mind; not this thought or that thought, but thought in general. This seems to be absolutely unintelligible, since everything, that exists, is particular: And therefore it must be our several particular perceptions, that compose the mind. I say, *compose* the mind, not *belong* to it. The mind is not a substance, in which the perceptions inhere. That notion is as unintelligible as the *Cartesian*, that thought or perception in general is the essence of the mind. We have no idea of substance of any kind, since we have no idea but what is derived from some impression, and we have no impression of any substance either material or spiritual. (2000, 414)

Where morality is concerned, there is no opposition between inclination and reason in Hume since he does not absolutely separate the phenomenal and the noumenal

realms. As a matter of fact, there is no such distinction within the Humean framework. Christopher Arroyo tries to explain Kant's seemingly contradictory approach to phenomenal and noumenal virtues, that is, to virtues of passion and virtues of reason, by tracing the roots of such opposition back to Hume. He argues that, in Kant's philosophy, inclination and reason are not commensurate, and the only way to get rid of such tension is to posit a transcendentalism which is, at the same time, empirically individual. In this way Arroyo offers an account of what Hume's empirical approach resolves successfully and thereby provides a transcendental basis that makes the constitution of moral imperatives possible. Arroyo never explains why an empirical account of morality such as Hume's is not sufficient for the constitution of a system of morality. He simply states that Hume's (and to the extent that he is influenced by Hume's account, Kant's) habitual account of morality is mechanistic and results in an unthinking agent (Arroyo 2003, 80). Arroyo's critique of the Humean self, as well as his claim that an empirical moral system which is ethically genuine is impossible, is based on his interpretation of the empirical self's position with regard to passions and sentiments as an entity that only passively reflects the external impulses that are imposed on the self. At the same time, he attributes to Hume a position which cannot be derived from his philosophy, namely, that there is an insurmountable gap between the individual and the social, and that society is the linear addition of individual atomic selves. Therefore the social construction of moral regulations through sentiments and passions, which in turn regulates relations between individuals, does not serve, in Arroyo's view, as a sufficiently firm and solid basis for any universal ethics. On the other hand, since he is aware of the shortcomings and contradictions that are inherent in Kant's transcendental ethics, he attempts to

phenomenologize Kant and individualize the transcendental. In the case of noumenal virtues, Kant suggests, according to Arroyo, an account of morality that is atomistic; Kant demands that every single moral act should be actualized as if that the agent of that act had chosen to act out of a timeless disposition. In this way, every choice is to be viewed as an original exercise of freedom. Otherwise, acts are taken to be part of a causal chain that in fact belongs, as an explanation of moral behavior, to the experiential or phenomenal realm. However, if such a causal explanation is excluded—which it should be since it is a phenomenal explanation—we face an atomic model of moral agency according to which the subject is a “bundle of choices” (Arroyo 2003, 81). The problem is that Arroyo’s own phenomenological theory, one that tends to synthesize the empirical and transcendental via the individual transcendental ego, amounts to no more than a shift in the Kantian position. It is not clear at all why a transcendental element should be added to the empirical self in order to provide a solid ground for a system of morality.

Moreover, the individualization of the transcendental element via the transcendental ego does not provide an account of how such a transcendental element is to be related to the empirical, individual self. Dan Zahavi’s answer here, namely, that the transcendental self and the empirical self are not two different selves but are two different apprehensions of the same self is far from convincing (Zahavi 2003, 49). Who is the subject of the apprehension? Zahavi’s account is at best a circular one: the subject of transcendental apprehension is the transcendental subject that apprehends transcendently. The Transcendental subject is distinguished by transcendental apprehension and transcendental apprehension is distinguished by being the act of the transcendental self.

The general reason behind Hume's discussion against the claim that ground genuine love for the other upon self-love lies in his conceptualization of us as social beings. It is due to this sociality that Hume attributes general and particular benevolence to human kind. Hume states,

If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praise: if I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment: if I be not angry, the punishment of an adversary is totally indifferent to me. In all these cases there is a passion which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it our good or happiness; as there are other secondary passions which afterwards arise and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it is constituted such by our original affections. (1975, 301)

Reflexive impressions or passions that raise sentiments precede the formation of any judgment concerning oneself; they even precede the formation of the idea of the self. So, the line of reasoning that reduces the love for the other into a derivative of self-love proceeds on the wrong direction, since it is only through the reflexive impressions and passions that love is first exercised.

For Hume, sympathy, together with imagination, plays a central role in producing sentiments out of impressions that are provided by passions. Sentiments function as psychological and cognitive elements that enable us to acquire the psychological conditions of the other and to enter the horizon of his opinions and attitudes. Through sympathy, we acquire the position of the other and the information about his attitude. In this way we understand the other, his dispositions, and his behavior. In other words, sympathy intensifies the cognitive function of sentiments and, at the same time, supplies us with the possibility of considering the other's behavior and actions as signs of his attitudes and internal states. The ideas of impressions and the ideas of imagination are different due to their vivacity and orderliness. Imagination is able to enliven the ideas that belong to others in such a way that they become as lively and as orderly as the ideas that

are provided by impressions. In this way, imagination appears as complementing the function of sympathy with regard to the ideas of the passions and sentiments.

The passions are not mere reactions to external forces that act upon us. They are the primary source of action. The idea of the self, vis-à-vis the passions, is therefore real and expandable so that it determines the idea of the self with regard to thought and imagination. Passions are determined socially and their outcomes are social constructions. The idea of the self, in this sense, is socially (and passionately) constituted. Moreover, there is no opposition between the passions and reason; on the contrary, the two are complementary and reason is limited by the sentiments and therefore it is determined socially and in praxis. As Rorty puts it, “unless [reason] is supported by sentiment, habit and custom, [it] can only provide a criterion to determine the propriety of the intentions of the will: it is too general to command specific actions, indeed too general to provide specific intentions” (1993, 179). Passions and reason are not opposed; neither are they distinct (except *in abstracto*). Therefore the social being of the self is rational and reasonable too. Reason does not produce the idea of the self; the self is the product of the active participation of the passions. Reason discovers the idea of the self, as is with the case of reason discovering the relation between ideas (Hume 1967, 458-9). So it is in this way that the existence of the self with respect to thought and imagination is constituted. The existence of the epistemological self is not based upon the immediate, atomic impressions. The idea of the epistemological self is not rooted in the formality, vivacity, and immediacy of impressions but is an abstraction that is based on the idea of a passionately and socially constructed self that is continually enforced via sentiments and through sympathy.

Eugenio Lecaldano (2002) addresses the problem of the relation between the epistemological and passionate selves and admits that, in recent Humean scholarship, the interpretation that these two notions of the self are contradictory is no longer a tenable one (Lecaldano 2002, 175). Nevertheless, in agreement with Baier and Susan Purviance, he states that Hume abandons the notion of the self as a bundle of perceptions (Book I of the *Treatise*) and introduces a new notion of the self (Book II) (Lecaldano 2002, 176, 180). However, such a claim, instead of addressing the question that pertains to the relation between these two conceptualizations, aims at eliminating the question by giving up one of the notions.

Lecaldano agrees that, already in Book I, the Humean notion of the self as a bundle of perceptions indicates an element of awareness of the fact that perception is actually taking place. The fact of the matter is that the bundle-of-perception notion suggests in a negative way that the content of the perception is not some substantial entity but is mental or ideological. If the bundle model is taken not in relation to the passionate self and in connection with consciousness, then Hume's theory in Book I will be just a reformulation of the Cartesian "I think, therefore I am" so that it becomes "I perceive, therefore I am." This being the case, we are forced to draw the conclusion, together with Penelhum, that the bundle theory already presupposes the existence of a self that will function in Book II, as the object of the passions of pride and humility (Penelhum 2000). However, the self, in Book I, is the awareness of having perceptions; it is the reflexive consciousness that the "I" perceives. Furthermore, it is the awareness of the fact that the perceiving "I" is not a substance nor a substantial representation. Rather, it is the awareness that the idea of the self is based on acts of perception. Such awareness is not

innate, but is mediated by passions and sentiments; therefore it is societal. It is bound to the limits that are linguistic and therefore social. In Book I Hume writes:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat, or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perceptions. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. (Hume 1967, 252)

What is problematic in Lecaldano's account is his insistence on locating the consciousness, passions, and sentiments *in* the self. He tries to claim that reflexive awareness, sentiments, and passions are original and rooted in the individual self, and presents the feelings of pride or humiliation as something that is immediately presented to one's own self. To draw a parallel between this intimate and immediate self-understanding, on the one hand, and passions and sentiments, on the other, he compares pride and love. According to Lecaldano, one cannot love oneself but only be proud of oneself. He then concludes that Hume's distinction between love and pride requires a prior consciousness regarding the distinctness of one's own self and other selves (2002, 182-4). However, there is no explanation why such a consciousness and reflexive self-awareness amounts to presupposing that consciousness is rooted in the individual self. Lecaldano's conclusion is directly drawn from his abandonment of the notion of self as a bundle of perceptions. As he notes:

The fundamental error of the perspective of Book I lay in the effort to explain individual self-awareness as a process of representation of another object. This way of viewing the person is that of love –that is of a passion whose origin requires the perception of another self as real. In the case of pride, on the other

hand, the self appears as a real object without need to represent anything external. (Lecaldano 2002, 184)

Such a statement means that there is a central, hard core within oneself, a sort of pre-conceptual or pre-cognitive self that functions as a substratum of the self as an object of pride. In this way, we are left with no choice other than accepting Penelhum's aforementioned formulation, and ending up with a quasi-substantial notion of the self whose material is ontologically unknown and is to be formed by pride or humility. Moreover, such an approach assumes from the beginning precisely what is to be demonstrated, namely, the self as the bearer of passions and sentiments.

The connecting point between the self of Book I and the self of Books II and III is the paradoxical constitution of the self as an entity that is constituted externally but is accessible to the person intimately and internally. The negative position of Book I aims at rejecting the notion of the self as a substantial being prior to any action or activity. Meanwhile, this negative conclusion signifies a positive resolution of the matter that is put forward in Books II and III. The self, by its constitution, does not need an internally and inherently existing core or substratum; the self is rooted elsewhere, that is, in the external world. The externality in which the self is rooted is not the natural world presented to the senses that has to be considered epistemologically through atomic sense-data. The externality of the constitutive elements of the self signifies social surroundings. The idea of the self cannot be produced abstractly and through the association of ideas and with the aid of imagination in the absence of such an environment. Such an impossibility is not due to some shortcoming of the cognitive faculties of the agent of perception, but rather is due to a particular kind of sense-perception that is required for the constitution of the idea of the self. Such impressions cannot be achieved at the highly

abstract and formal level of epistemology as Hume presents it of in Book I of the *Treatise*. Unless both the difference and interconnection between these two realms is admitted and the social-moral constitution of the self is properly considered, the resolution of the Humean riddle seems impossible. Moreover, the orientation that tends to individualize the self as an atom or monad results in ascribing a dualism or a double existence to the Humean philosophy which Hume consciously and seriously tries to avoid. The supposed opposition between the epistemological and the passionate selves is in harmony with such dualist tendencies. The point of view which Lecaldano brings forward, while it pushes Hume towards an atomistic mental substantialism, cannot explain why Hume does not simply get rid of the passages in Book I of the *Treatise* if he thinks them wrong.

Donald Baxter (1998) holds a similar attitude regarding the Humean conceptualization of the self. He too identifies the idea of the self with the consciousness of having perceptions. Baxter rightly states that, for Hume, there is no perceiver distinct from the act and process of perception: "The core perceiver is just the ideas [the mind or the self] is having: there is nothing else to it" (1998, 212). However, his interpretation of Hume's account of the self is one-sided and reduces the idea of the self to the one that is presented in Book I only. Baxter's distinction between the consciousness of the self and the existence of the self is a reflection of the distinction he makes between what he calls the self and the idea of the self. Through such a distinction, Baxter aims to resolve the Humean riddle on an individualistic basis; so he necessarily excludes the passionate and sentimental self, since the latter requires the societal existence of the human person and

the existence of other selves as the source of consciousness and self-consciousness. He writes that

First [Hume] says that [the self and the idea of the self] are *not* alike: “we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense.” I take it that [Hume] means here that we have no idea of anything which is *in fact* a simple and individual self. [Hume] certainly thinks that in some sense we have a fictitious idea of the self as simple and individual, for explaining the genesis of that idea is a large part of *Treatise*. (1998, 208)

Ignoring the passionate self, however, Baxter simply avoids giving any explanation as to how this fictitious idea of the self is acquired. Moreover, distinguishing the self and the idea of the self without reference to the notion of the passionate (social and moral) self amounts to the assumption that there exists some idea of the self as a representation of some (non-substantial) individual core (no matter what it is in its essence) to which the quality of being a self is fictitiously attributed. Baxter’s point of view prods the Humean theory of the self towards individual subjectivism. In this way, Baxter arrives at an understanding which is in contrast with his other supposition, namely, that Hume’s theory of the self does not distinguish the process of becoming aware of the self from being a self. For individual subjectivism, the so-called idea of the self is taken to be the outward objectification of some inner existence. Individual subjectivism has two presuppositions: there is something inside and it is to be expressed for others or for oneself. As a theory of expression, it supposes the existence of an expressible that can somehow exist apart from expression. It supposes a duality concerning the existence of inner and outer elements and holds the existence of the former to be prior to that of the latter. Dismissal of the social dimension of the self—dismissal of Hume’s positive notion of the passionate self—prevents Baxter from conceiving the dialectical relation between the notion of fictitious

self with its social factuality and reality. Baxter's position prevents him from conceiving the self as the external and social objectification and embodiment of the idea of the self. Hence he concludes that Hume cannot escape a core model of the self by either considering the perceptions as inherent in something simple and individual or as a reflection of some real connection between perceptions. In both cases, according to Baxter, concluding that a unitary, core self exists is inevitable (1998, 214-5). This conclusion is necessary if Hume does not propose a second notion of the self, namely, the passionate self. Baxter's point of view presents an individual subjectivist Hume; this is the outcome of his own individual subjectivism. As Vološinov notes, individual subjectivism fails to see that "consciousness *is a fiction*."

It is an improper ideological construct created by way of abstraction from the concrete facts of social expression. But consciousness as organized, material expression (in the ideological material of word, a sign, drawings, colors, musical sound, etc.) –consciousness, so conceived, is an objective fact and a tremendous social force. (Vološinov 1973, 90)

A similar one-sided reading of Hume's philosophy comes from Fraser Cowley (1968), who considers Hume's account of personal identity and the nature of the mind in the context of Book I of the *Treatise* only, and by so doing easily reformulates Hume's empiricism as a distorted form of passive naturalism. According to Cowley, although Hume shares some Berkeleyan idealist suppositions, he is bound to the metaphysics of natural philosophy, especially to that of Newton (1968, 9). Cowley fails to see Hume's philosophy as an effort to explain the mechanisms and the process of formation of the beliefs in the existence of natural objects and in the idea of the self. Although the belief in the existence of the external world is *rationally* unjustifiable, it is still one of the major tasks of Hume's philosophy to explain the mechanisms that result in such belief. As

Norman Kemp Smith (1941) puts it, Hume tries to show that synthetic reason is based upon a generalized form of this belief (1941, 85).

According to Cowley, Hume doesn't regard the doctrine of impressions and ideas as a hypothesis; he thinks this doctrine is self-evident. But this doctrine always remains obscure and ambiguous; Hume never gives an explicit account of it (1968, 12). Hume considers both mental images and impressions (the latter being the origin of the former and so more vivid than them) as intra-mental entities. Cowley states:

For Hume, we believe we see things, bodies, material existents. But these are not what is given. We take our perceptions to be our only objects, 'and suppose, that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence' (*Treatise*, p. 206). The bodies and the impressions are the same: the bodies are simply what we believe the impressions to be, but there is nothing but the impressions. (1968, 13-14)

Cowley's inference, however, is not well-founded. It is clear, even from this quotation from the *Treatise*, that Hume does not identify impressions and objects in an ontological sense. We treat impressions *as if* they are bodies; this is what the term 'suppose' signifies. The active participation of the mind via imagination and belief is necessary to form an idea of the impressions and to go beyond mere perception and sensation. The active role that Hume attributes to the mind is a central aspect of it that distinguishes his theory from a passive Lockean empiricism. Hume is not concerned with the nature of these "as if" objects that are presented to the mind via sense organs; he does not make any ontological claims. Rather, he is concerned with how the mind relates these impressions to each other in a meaningful way.⁸² Hume states that "the difficulty is not concerning their nature [i.e., the nature of impressions], but concerning their relations and

⁸² In opposition to interpreting Hume as a subjective idealist who is in line with Berkeley "we must insist that Hume does not regard the principle of association as 'explaining' or 'generating' ideas or feelings, but only as stating certain of the conditions under which, as a matter of fact, we find them to occur" (Smith 1941, 86).

situations” (Hume 1967, 189). The problem Hume deals with is how to reconcile and to conjoin separate impressions (qualities or sensations) to form an idea of a compound body or object. The same perhaps can be thought of in the case of the self, where the self is supposed to be a bundle of perceptions. Hume’s proposition that the self is a bundle of perceptions is not a positive response to the question: what is the self? Rather, it is a negative answer that has been proposed in response to the notion of substantial self. The problem that Hume confronts is therefore how to distinguish this particular bundle from other bundles that are conjoined *as if* representing objects and not selves. Therefore Cowley’s claim, namely, that reflexive consciousness is asserted in a Cartesian manner by Hume (1968, 14), distorts the Humean conceptualization of consciousness as an active, sense-constituting entity. According to Cowley, most people take perceptions to be their only objects. Furthermore, he attributes the reversal of this view to Hume, namely, that objects are his perceptions (1968, 16). Paradoxically this reversal conflicts with Cowley’s proposal. As simple and unimportant as it may seem, this reversal determines the limits of our understanding and confrontation with the real. The common person approaches the real in a reductionist manner: identification of object and perception gives way to the idea that reality is whatever appears to the self. On the contrary, the Humean reversal emphasizes the limited and contextual scope of human experience and its intentional nature. In order for this to make sense, the subject is required to go beyond the perceived and imagine things that are not presented to ordinary perception. What follows is then the constitution of the belief in personal identity, causality etc.

Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas is based on the familiar distinction between the thing that really exists and the thing which is not present at the moment, or does not have any real existence but is imagined. However, Cowley argues that Hume never admits this fact and uses the ambiguous and complex language of vivacity and force (Cowley 1968, 19-20). Although Hume sometimes uses the terms 'impressions' and 'ideas' as if they stand for independently existing objects that act upon sense-organs, he distinguishes impressions as objects of immediate experience and as external bodies that are objects of belief (Smith 1941, 113). Moreover, in the *Essay*, when discussing the vivacity, force, and orderliness of memory-ideas in comparison to ideas of impressions and ideas of imagination, Hume introduces the notion of the testimony of others as a criterion to measure the facticity of memory claims. As well, he clearly mentions in the *Treatise* that he is a philosopher of common sense, that he never doubts the existence of the external world.⁸³ What distinguishes Hume's view from the common one is his search to explain the mechanism of sense perceptions and the constitution of beliefs and concepts. The fact that our senses are sometimes mistaken is one of the reasons that such a critical quest is necessary. The commonsense attitude never distinguishes perceptions from objects. Its standpoint is naïve realism that uses the two terms synonymously. However, it is this natural belief of commonsense that produces the awareness that a philosophical theory of perception is required (Smith 1941, 114-115).

⁸³ Kenneth Richman (1995) claims that the belief in the existence of external objects is consistent with Hume's empiricism. He further argues, however, that Hume's belief in external objects in general (and other minds in particular) is unjustified. But this interpretation is based on the individualistic and monadological assumption that radically differentiates ideas of impressions and ideas of passions and holds them as incommensurate. It ignores the latter to a great extent and puts an exaggerated emphasis on the former.

Unless such a critical stance is assumed, one cannot escape the common identification between the perceived and the idea of the perceived.

Hume tries to explain the mechanism that results in man's belief in the existence of self-identical entities while in reality no such identity is found; everything is in constant flux, even the self. The common man view about identification of perception and perceived, of idea and object falls short of explaining the emergence of such beliefs and notions. Therefore we cannot speak of the confusion between object of consciousness and consciousness of object in Hume's philosophy. Cowley's line of criticism seems to be based on the vulgar identification that in fact results in such confusion, namely, the identification of the idea of a thing with the thing itself. If such confusion were in fact the case, then Hume would not be able to criticize, e.g., the belief in the existence of a self-identical self. On the contrary, it is his awareness of such distinctions that enables him to recognize and question such suppositions. We always know things through mediation, that is, through the active participation of our senses. As is the case with identity, the very fact that we assume an identity in contrast to the data which indicates permanent change and flux is evidence for such a claim. Hume tries to explain that the mind naturally functions in a way that unites the contradictories, and he further tries to find out the causes that result in man's falling into these contradictions (Smith 1941, 117). If I do not assume a certain correlation between my perception and the perceived I am then claiming to have some sort of mysterious access to the thing-in-itself. This is to say that I am claiming that I know the object and the perception distinctly, which amounts to an infinite regress. In short, the whole Humean project is to explain the formation of the

belief in the identity of objects as well as the self in contrast to, and despite the fact that, sense-data continuously provide us with evidence which falsifies such beliefs.

Cowley's individualistic interpretation of Hume makes him ignore Hume's notion of impressions of passions and so to conclude that images or concepts for Hume are intra-mental objects. Moreover, due to this individualistic approach he claims that Hume takes the existence of the mind for granted. Ironically, Cowley draws the same conclusion as Hume's individualist proponent, Donald Baxter (1998), when he attributes to Hume a core substantialism of the self. Cowley states that

Hume, as I have said, takes the mind for granted, even when he is reducing personal identity to 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions.' The propensities, dispositions, activities and operations of the mind are repeatedly invoked. How these are to be reconciled with the quasi-mechanical principles of association, whereby Hume attempts to account for as much of experience as he possibly can, is nowhere explained. (1968, 28)

Cowley believes that Hume attributes passivity to the mind. However, he also mentions that there are points where Hume conceptualizes the mind as active. But Hume, he argues, "expounds no theory of the mind or consciousness, but only of the intra-mental objects and the objects of belief, the fictitious identities of the imagination" (1968, 28-9).

Hume clearly admits his belief and acceptance in the objective existence of the world. His main concern, as I have already mentioned, is to understand the mechanisms of ascribing identity to a permanently changing world of objects and events. How do we come up with consciousness of sameness and identity when in fact we are only aware and have only access to a bundle of perceptions that are discrete and distinct? In a similar way how do we come to assume the existence of a causal relationship among either simultaneous or successive events when in fact there is no impression that corresponds to such a relation? Here is the point where Hume introduces the active participation of

imagination and the role of habits and habitual beliefs. Contrary to Cowley's claim, such a modeling of the mind does not take the existence of the mind for granted.

Consciousness (that is, the mind if mind and consciousness are assumed to be identical) is nothing beyond and beside this active participation of the subject via imagination, habits, and beliefs. Moreover, such a conceptualization of the mind does not consider the mind as a passive, receptive faculty. The mind is a bundle of perceptions but perceptions are not a passive, non-participative reception of data. Perceptions require that there be an ascription of identity to what is perceived. The fact that we can have mistaken beliefs and notions points to the existence of the thesis of the world. On the other hand, it designates a distinction between what there is in the world and what we conceptualize about it.

According to Cowley, Hume's theory of impressions is circular: "the doctrine of impressions is the outcome of a study of the body, but the body is itself reducible to impressions. The 'we' to whom the impressions 'must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear,' is a disembodied consciousness; that is all 'we' can be if the body be reduced to 'our' perceptions" (Cowley 1968, 81). It is the disembodied mind, however, which Hume attempts to do away with in his celebrated account of personal identity. The mind or the self is composed of perceptions and "identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them" (Hume 1967, 260). Who is the "we" that reflects upon them and what is the imagination? Cowley claims that there is only one answer: "the disembodied consciousness" (Cowley 1968, 82). However, this is not the only plausible interpretation. We can argue that, in light of Books II and III of the

Treatise that are concerned with the moral and social being of man, the “we,” refers to the community of definitely embodied other selves that serve as constitutive elements in the formation of the notion of selfhood. Hume’s concern is not to prove the essential being of the so-called self, be it mental or material. He tries to explain the genesis of the notion of the self that in reality does not correspond to a physical object in the regular sense of the term –e.g. as is in the case of a table. His answer is to deny the substantial approaches to the self, which, claim that the notion of the self corresponds to an independent entity, namely the Self. That the mind is a bundle of perceptions is not a circular argument: The mind is a bundle of perceptions; it cannot be said that a mind exists where there is no perception and where there is no reflexive consciousness of such a bundle of perceptions. I perceive, and it is through the reflexive consciousness of the fact of my perceiving that I come to form a notion of myself as a self. If there is no perception, there can be no consciousness or reflexive consciousness. It is only after I acquire the reflexive consciousness of my act of perception that I become a self. That this self is embodied is obvious. However, to say that the self is embodied or that the self is the body does not resolve the issue. In the case of the self and the body being taken to be identical, the very criticism concerning the circularity of the idea of the self can be put forward since, in order for the self as body to exist, the body has to be presumed. Moreover, the question why is not every body a self?, is left unanswered. On the other hand, in order to escape such a question, the existence of the self as body is asserted from the beginning. The same can be proposed when the identity of the self and the body or the embodiment of the self is considered a situation of the self in the body. To go back to Hume: what his account of the self means is that we do not need to assume a notion of a

self prior to the act of perception. The self is the outcome of a genetic process of becoming a self which is realizable only through perception.

Abraham Roth (2000) proposes that a sound consideration of Hume's account of selfhood should distinguish between its metaphysical and psychological orientations and implications. He claims that the basis of the tension in Hume's account is the result of a psychologically oriented process that tries to explain, on the one hand, the plurality of self-identical objects based upon a series of sense-data, and, on the other, the idea of one's own self based upon the same series. Roth argues that, on a metaphysical and purely logical level, this might not cause a problem because we can group the same series in different ways. This resembles a situation where one is asked to group a number of people due to their sex, age, race, height, etc. On the purely logical level, membership in one of these groups does not contradict being a member of another. Roth's consideration of the case resembles Vygotsky's explanation of the concept-forming activity in children. However, Roth's account of the Humean notion of the self is misleading and insufficient on certain grounds. It is misleading because it has to assume that every perceiving agent possesses some core ideas. In the case of classifying people into, for example, male and female or child and adult, we already know what the terms 'male,' 'female,' 'child,' and 'adult' signify. In such a case, the agent is already able to apply concepts that have been acquired socially and ontogenetically. However, according to Roth's interpretation of Hume, there is no indication of an ontogenetic process of concept-acquisition. The concepts or at least some core concepts, mysteriously are present in the mind of the perceiving agent. This points to the insufficiency of Roth's account. Like most Humean scholars, his Hume is presented as an individual subjectivist. Therefore Roth does not

provide any explanation about the acquisition of concepts by the individual agent. One is left either assuming an individual and substantial core or presupposing the existence of a mysterious, necessary, and substantial connection between perceptions and impressions. This is also the case with Baxter's account as one finds it in his "Hume's Labyrinth" (1998, 205).

There is an important source of perplexity in Hume's account of the existence of objects and their relation to successive perceptions. As Fraser Cowley notes (1968, cf. 24), and as Hume himself clearly expresses, Hume uses the terms 'object' and 'impression' (or perception) interchangeably. Impressions or perceptions at times mean external objects and at other times representations of objects that one has in mind. The use of the term in these two senses does not cause any confusion. The confusion is the consequence of attributing the same sense of existence to both representations and objects; in other words, the source of confusion comes from assuming this double existence. The language of representation does not necessarily result in assuming double existence or in supposing the intra-mental existence of impressions. Hume is aware of this fact and he clearly explains it in the *Treaties*:

Philosophers may distinguish betwixt the objects and perceptions of the senses ... [T]his is a distinction, which is not comprehended by the generality of man kind, who as they perceive only one being, can never assent to the opinion of a double existence and representation. Those very sensations, which enter by the eye or ear are with them the true objects, nor can they readily conceive that this pen or paper, which is immediately perceiv'd, represents another, which is different from, but resembling it. In order, therefore, to accommodate myself to their notions, I shall at first suppose; that there is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently *object* or *perception*, according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose, understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat, a shoe, a stone, or any other impression, convey'd to him by his senses. I shall be sure to give warning, when I return to a more philosophical way of speaking and thinking. (1967, 202)

The representation of things may be said to be formed through the individual agent of perception. However, there is no indication that Hume assumes that these images reside *in* the individual consciousness. Hume's identification of object and perception should not be considered a variation of Berkeleyan idealism. Hume clearly explains that his assumption of a single existence means that, when one perceives something, one perceives it as something out there in space. Thus, for Hume, to perceive something means to conceive things in depth. Moreover, Hume's distinguishing between the epistemological self and the passionate self demonstrates Hume's awareness of the social determination and construction of meaningful ideas. The external perceptions can be concretized only in the realm of the passionate self where the existence of the other is the guarantee of the existence of the self. Hume's reference to the common man's view in contrast to the philosophical one is yet further evidence of his awareness of the necessity of such societal exteriority to comprehend and actualize perceptions. Therefore, contrary to Roth's view, one should conclude that social perception and apprehension of personal identity is the basis upon which the apprehension of the external objects and the attribution of identity to them become possible.

Gordon Park Stevenson (1998) claims that, according to Hume, the idea of personal identity arises from consciousness (1998, 95). This is a thesis to which Stevenson later refers to suggest both affinities and differences between Locke's and Hume's account of personal identity (1998, 113). Stevenson seems to identify the idea of personal identity with that of self-consciousness; however, he later makes it explicit that the idea of the self is rooted in self-consciousness as the reflexive consciousness of one about oneself. He therefore summarizes his thesis as follows: "consciousness is nothing

but a reflected thought of perception” and “personal identity arises from self-consciousness” which are formulas suggested by Hume in *Appendix*, 635. However, it is very dubious to ascribe these views to Hume himself, since he refers to “most philosophers” holding this view; though Hume presents a positive attitude toward these formulations.

Stevenson goes on formulating his thesis in contrast to the view that equates Humean self-consciousness with the awareness of the idea of the self. Rather, he says,

Humean self-consciousness should be identified with the *feeling of personal identity*, or more accurately, with the *phenomenological feelings of vivacity and facility (felt ease of transition) as they are associated intentionally with the constituent perceptions of successive bundles that characterize the Humean self or mind*. (1998, 96)

Stevenson defines consciousness as the awareness that accompanies the series of perceptions that appear in time. He puts his question about self-consciousness in terms of a question about those reflexive impressions or ideas that constitute consciousness (1998, 97).

Stevenson argues that vivacity is a reflexive impression (1998, 99-193). The important point is that in Humean terminology reflexivity is closely related to passions. In his *Treatise* Hume refers to this fact that impressions of reflection are closely linked to passions since they are related to those impressions such as pleasure and pain, thirst and hunger etc (1967, 7-8). Hume himself maintains that the study of sensation belongs to the realm of physiology, whereas impressions of reflection are to be studied within the realm of morals. Stevenson, however, phenomenologizing the Humean approach, abstractly cuts off the realm of passions from the realm of thought and imagination, thereby ascribing a rather individual, subjective, phenomenological quality to the latter. Thus, it

seems that Stevenson's claim that there are two sets of reflexive impressions that may be thought constituting consciousness is not genuine. He writes: "I think that the reflexive impressions of vivacity and facility are the most qualified ones for the job and not the 'passions, desires, and emotions'" (1998, 106). Whereas, according to the passage at the beginning of the *Treatise*, reflexive impressions in general (and vivacity, belief and facility in particular) belong to the realm of passions.

Stevenson's Humean self-consciousness has the functions of vivacity and facility in a way that seem irreconcilable with Hume's own account of these qualities. For instance Stevenson says that both these functions are central to self-consciousness, "for without vivacity there is no rock bottom awareness of things at all, and without facility there is no way for a mind to transcend the present moment of consciousness and hence to perceive a succession of perceptions as a succession, or in effect, as a connected self" (1998, 113). Hume, in the *Treatise* explains that belief (vivacity) super-adds nothing to ideas, but only changes our manner of conceiving them (1967, 101). Hume distinguishes between conceptualization of the existence of an object and believing in the existence of that object due to structural factors. What differentiates simple conception from belief is the form of the composition of the parts of the idea; it is due to the "manner, in which we conceive" the idea that belief is different than conceptualization (Hume 1967, 95). He states:

We may mingle, and unite, and separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in hundred different ways; but 'till there appears some principle, which fixes one of these different situations, we have in reality no opinion: And this principle, as it plainly makes no addition to our precedent ideas, can only change the *manner* of our conceiving them. (1967, 96)

Therefore, belief not only is explained in terms of vivacity, but also is explained in terms of form and orderliness of the ideas and impressions. In this respect, belief is akin to memory-ideas and to ideas of imagination, which are distinguished by their vivacity and force and their original order. Consequently, when we express belief in a particular idea we express that we conceive it in a particular order or form in contradistinction to other possible and plausible forms that such an idea may be conceived by others or by ourselves under different circumstances. When we believe in some idea we are persuaded of the truth of that idea, or to put it in another way, we are persuaded of the truth of the form of conception of that idea (Hume 1967, 97, n). Belief is not determined by reason; rather, it is determined by custom or principle of association. However, belief is no simple idea; “it is a particular manner of forming an idea” (Hume 1967, 97).

Introducing the active participation of imagination in connecting ideas, and the role of belief in conceiving ideas, means that Hume does not accept such a thing as pure and personal perception which is free of judgments and values but only as an abstraction. Experientially speaking, for Hume all concepts and ideas are of a reflexive nature, since all the impressions of the mind are different from each other only in their degrees of force and vivacity (Hume 1967, 96), and these latter elements, we showed, are intentional properties of the mind. In this respect, all ideas and impressions are subject to the effects of belief and value-judgments as these latter are defined in terms of vivacity and orderliness of the ideas and impressions. Otherwise, there would be no difference between the ideas that belong to two different persons when they are presented the same ideas in the same order. Although belief, as a value-judgment, does not add anything to

the original impression, it determines its creditability by imposing a particular structure upon the conception and apprehension of ideas. As Hume states:

If one person sits down to read a book as a romance, and another, as a true history, they plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order; nor does the incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense upon their author. His words produce the same ideas in both; tho' his testimony has not the same influence on them. The latter has a more lively conception of all incidents. (1967, 97-8)

Belief is founded on a present impression that will become a custom through repetition. Therefore, every belief is rooted in custom. This being the case, belief is described as a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, which proceeds from relation to a present impression (Hume 1967, 102-3). Belief, in this sense, is reflexive, since it is an enlivened and enforced idea, and ideas belong to the mind. The whole process of conceiving not only impressions but also notions and ideas is also of a reflexive character. Custom and habit operate upon imagination and other faculties whenever conception and apprehension takes place. Martin Bell (2005) states that, although seemingly Hume aims at founding all knowledge on experience, he is aware that experience, pure and by itself, is not sufficient to account for empirical beliefs. Experiential beliefs, beliefs about causation and necessary connections, belief in the existence of objective world etc. transcend the experientially given. Hume is aware that, for instance, the idea of necessary connection cannot be achieved by repetition of past impressions only; in this way no original idea ever is produced. The root of this synthetic contribution rests in habit and custom. Empirical beliefs start from experience, but they do not arise from there (2005, 97).

Therefore belief produces neither self-consciousness nor the idea of the self. However, belief might function toward distinguishing the idea of the self from other

ideas. The same can be said about memory which has close links to vivacity and facility. Stevenson, contrary to his claim that seems to distinguish between Lockean and Humean accounts of the self, introduces memory as not only discovering but also producing personal identity (1998, 118). However, memory, according to Hume's theory, does not function as an origin of the idea of personal identity.

According to Stevenson, without memory the reflexive consciousness of the self cannot go beyond the consciousness of the present moment. Therefore, he concludes, memory inheres in successive experience of reflexively feeling facility (1998, 119). In other words, it is memory that associates the successive ideas, whereas Hume, regardless of its veracity, explains the mechanism of association of ideas via resemblance, congruity, and proximity of ideas. Moreover, Stevenson's approach does not explain the formation of the momentary reflexive consciousness of the self. In addition to that, claiming that facility and vivacity are inherent in momentary self-consciousness does not explain how these discrete moments of reflexive consciousness form the succession that is to be considered self-consciousness. Hence, Stevenson himself calls such a construction an "illusory feeling". He states: "Given that identical self persisting through time is for Hume an illusion, it follows that the activity of self-consciousness must itself be illusory insofar as it feels as if it were constituted by a temporally non-discrete act of consciousness" (1998, 119).

Stevenson concludes that, as is the case with Hume's theory of personal identity, there are two conceptualizations of self-consciousness, namely, (1) self-consciousness with regard to thought and imagination, and (2) self-consciousness with regard to the passions. He relates the former to reason and the latter to body. This formulation,

however, is problematic on at least two footings. First, although Hume apparently mentions two approaches to the notion of the self it does not mean that he believes these two conceptions to be essentially distinct. This explains the efforts by many commentators to reconcile these two forms of conceptualization. Moreover, Hume's account of self as it regards thought or imagination, if taken at face value, as it is by Stevenson, dismisses the possibility of the existence of something such as the self. Secondly, Stevenson's account adds nothing to the resolution of the question of the self as considered by Hume. It only shifts the axis of the question from the notion of the self to some self-consciousness inheriting all the problems and tensions that are present due to Hume's dual approach to the question. Interpreting Hume's theory of the self as a theory that assumes distinct selves, one related to reason and the other related to body, on the other hand, unjustifiably attributes a dualist approach to Humean philosophy which has no affinity with the general body of his thought.

Let us now consider Deleuze's reading of Hume. What stands at the center of his attention is the Humean notion of relations. He considers relations of perceptions as the effect of principles of human nature. Relations are external to the terms of perception. That is, relations are not analytical but are a bringing together of terms (Bell 2005, 100). Therefore, relations are to be discovered by comparison. Since they are external they depend on the "manner" that perceptions are related together. It follows that "the place depends on a hundred different accidents, which cannot be foreseen by the mind" (Hume 1967, 69).

Deleuze rightly emphasizes that there are two kinds of principles: those that are related to association (reason), and those that are related to passions. We should note that

Hume does not repeat the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body. Rather, his main focus is on the principles of human nature. Therefore, understanding the Humean project we should be aware of the reciprocal and synthetic relation between association and passion: the former structures, whereas the latter directs and gives sense to, human nature, which Deleuze conceives as subjectivity. Human nature is not the result of rational reflection only; it is constituted in history and in action. Hence Hume's distinction between the self as it regards thought and imagination and the self as it regards passion (2005, 98). To acquire a proper understanding of Hume's theory of the self one should have this synthetic aspect of Hume's approach in mind; none of these two aspects should be dismissed in favor of the other. Otherwise, any account of Hume's theory of self and of subjectivity will be insufficient and reductionist. Ignoring this multiple constitution of Hume's idea of the self has led many commentators into a dead end.

Deleuze emphasizes that those ideas that arise from impressions of reflection are those that affect human nature and its principles, whereas impressions of sensation are effects of matter and association (Bell 2005, 102) Therefore it follows that the self is the object of passions, as it is of the concern we take in ourselves. Subjectivity is the way that atoms are related; the self is not an object of ideas, since ideas originate in perceptions that are distinct existences, whereas the self is a synthetic idea that is related to "manner of appearance" of ideas. Therefore the idea of self cannot be attained as it regards thought or imagination in its pure, epistemological sense. Mind, the self, is the product of the association and relation of distinct and different truths. It is, as Kemp Smith puts it, a reconciliation of contradictions.

Stefanie Rocknak (2001) states that Husserl focuses on two main problems in Hume's *Treatise*: Husserl thinks that Hume misinterprets the nature of generalities and that Hume's entire project is circular. Husserl refers to Hume's own writing that there are no general impressions or general ideas. Hume thinks that particular ideas represent general notions. Human mind annexes general notions to particular impressions. Hume believes that some element should be added to concrete images to create general meanings. In fact, this situation refers to what Deleuze identifies as the main distinguishing aspect of Humean empiricism: the so-called general meanings are constituted not due to relations that are included in terms of the to-be-related entities, but through their association with the use of relations external to these terms. The externality of relations with respect to terms of relation does not mean that they are absent; it means that they do not belong to realm of pure and absolute reason. They are transcendental without being a priori, since they originate in the realm of belief that is rooted in the impressions of reflection. The idea of the self is one such example; it is a mere fiction when considered from the point of view of thought and imagination, whereas it is factual with regard to passions.

The problem with Husserl's approach is that he ignores this aspect of empiricism and tries to introduce an internal element of general meaning that is rooted in reason and which exists in an essential and substantial manner. According to Husserl, says Rocknak

[intentionality is a] *manner* of consciousness, the *manner* of our intention, that makes the difference. A new type of reference makes its appearance, in which we neither mean intuitively apparent object as such, nor the object of verbal idea, nor that of our accompanying thing-idea, but the quality or form exemplified in the latter, which we understand in general fashion as a unity in the sense of a species. (*Logical Investigations*, 104)

Contrary to Husserl's claim, the element of vivacity (belief) in Humean philosophy is responsible for transcending the data of experience per se and determines the manner or the form of our confrontation with the experience. Husserl is correct that such an aspect is not to be found *in* ideas. However, this does not prevent Hume from giving a proper account of the mechanism of constitution of general meaning in harmony with the rest of his philosophy. The difference between Hume's and Husserl's approaches to this problem rests on their different attitude concerning the nature of the human mind and reason. Husserl, in this respect, is a Cartesian philosopher who looks for absolute foundations of all human knowledge which will be set once and for all. Hume, on the contrary, dismisses such a possibility and looks for ways both to remain in the realm of experience and to explain the extra-experiential elements and aspects of human knowledge *within* and *as* boundaries of experience. Therefore, Hume, from the outset, distinguishes between impressions of reflection and impressions of sensation. The latter represent the epistemological limits of experience, while impressions of reflection signify the extra-experiential, where experience is taken in the purely epistemological sense of the term. Impressions of reflection originate in the realm of passion and human action, and thus represent a transcendence that is based on human agency; it is a concrete empirical transcendence. Hume's reliance on experience in order to explain the experiential nature of knowledge as well as the empirical roots of this method can be interpreted as admitting the priority of concrete forms of human existence when it comes to epistemological and philosophical knowledge. What Husserl, and, following him, Rocknak present as a defect (2001, 31) is in fact the major characteristic of Hume's philosophy.

Husserl's search for an internal additive that actualizes the intentional meaning, and his search for an ultimate philosophical ground that stands as the basis for all knowledge, are due to his Cartesian, individual subjectivist stance. Thus, when he comes to interpret Hume's position that explains the impossibility of positing pure empirical-epistemological foundations for scientific inquiry, he looks for an intrinsic transcendental element within the subject. The subjectivity of the self, the consciousness, for Husserl, is asserted from the outset, whereas Hume tries to transcend the epistemological-empirical realm with reference to the realm of passions. In this way Hume does not presuppose, but arrives at the notion of the self, without having to rely on extra-empirical, extra-factual elements. Rocknak is right when she states that "Hume shows that we cannot account for psychology using an empirical method; namely we cannot study psychology by way of psychology" (2001, 33). Hume shows that we cannot account for consciousness by assuming consciousness. However, the way out of this apparent circle does not necessarily pass through assertion of a pure, egological self as the basis of such account. On the contrary, Hume refers us to the realm of the passions, to the plane of factually existing human beings where the principles of human nature are produced and are at work. Hume states: "Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life" (1967, 269).

If we rely solely upon the negative conclusions of Book I of the *Treatise* with regard to personal identity, we cannot propose any solution to the problem of it. As Baillie puts it, "Book I assumes an essentially non-social and individualistic starting point of earlier empiricists, whereby the solitary thinker struggles to establish a world on the basis of sensory input" (Baillie 2000, 37). Book I, in fact, fulfills a twofold task: on the

one hand, it criticizes the essentialist and rationalist accounts of personal identity by showing the impossibility of presupposing a substance, be it mind or matter. It also shows the shortcomings of the solipsistic empirical account. Defining the self as a bundle of perception does not satisfactorily answer the two questions “Who am I?” and “What does my personal identity consist of?”⁸⁴ This is the negative conclusion of Book I. On the other hand, Book I supplies us with the logical ground for our quest concerning the nature of personal identity. It is an undeniable fact that there exists something, be it a bundle of perceptions or a mere fiction resulting from the imagination, that is called the “I” or the self. The question then is not how it is different from other selves; rather the question is as to what the nature of this so-called self is, and how it is to be constructed? The first question, however, will be answered if the second is. What Hume does show in Book I is the impossibility of discovering a Cartesian ego by the use of reason. As Baillie states,

“[Hume] extends the conception of the perceiving subject to include the passions as well as the understanding.” [The key to the development of the self, Baillie goes on to say], lies in the passions. This socially constructed self, the object of reflexive concern, emerges alongside the capacity to feel the self-directed passions of pride and humility, which in turn require the capacity of love and hatred towards others. Social self is a hall of mirrors in which we symbiotically create ourselves and others through the endlessly reiterative reflection of each other’s gaze. (2000, 38-9)⁸⁵

The issue of the importance and priority of the other is to be addressed where Hume speaks of self-love as not being an appropriate form of love. One’s love always has

⁸⁴ Capaldi, in his article, rightly criticizes the cognitivist point of view and shows the essentialist-idealist conception of the self where the cognitivist view only refer to the negative notion of the self as a bundle of perceptions. The cognitivist point of view presupposes a cognitive activity of the self in its most sophisticated form right from the start. What can such a self be other than a ready-made, given substantial self?

⁸⁵ Baier, too, admits the social determination of the self in a Humean context: “Character traits and the structure of the heap of perception, the mentioned structure, is in turn, determined by the social structure” (1979, 292).

to be directed towards “some sensible being external to” oneself (Hume 1967, 329). In other words, oneself, if taken by itself, is not a truly sensible being but an abstraction only. This is in accord with Ferreira’s thesis that Hume “rejects ethical theories whose sympathetic activity does not transcend self-love” (1994, 40). Sympathy, in this sense, works as a mechanism that makes one receive the others’ sentiments and impressions as if they were one’s own. Sympathy results in admitting the existence of the other, as the true bearer of impressions and ideas, where one can form, through imagination, a sympathetic unity with the other as if the other’s impressions and ideas were one’s own. One forms a memory of the self sympathetically; one *remembers* sentiments and memories of others as if they were one’s own. In this sense, there is no epistemological self distinct from a socially constructed self. Hence, there is no movement from the former towards the latter; rather, as was mentioned earlier, the former should be understood as an abstract moment of the latter. That being the case, one can accept Taylor’s claim that differentiates the Cartesian disengaged self from the Humean self. The other, as the possibility of ethics, is always present in the self. Taylor’s claim that every philosophy of the subject should be dealing with ethics is verified, at least in Hume’s case (Taylor 1989). As the latter states, “[m]ind, by an *original* instinct tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil” (Hume 1967, 438) where the good might be interpreted as the other that is a constitutive element of another’s self and that requires another’s self as a constitutive element to form its own otherness sympathetically.

The ethical nature of Hume’s conception of the self as the other reveals itself when Hume refers to the nature of action. Baier claims that Hume supplies an account of the subject which emphasizes for human beings the priority of practical action. And

where practical action is concerned, there has to reside the other, both as the constituent element of selfhood, and as the object of one's action towards which one's intention is directed. The question of personal identity left unresolved in Book I of the *Treatise* is resolved in Books II and III. One's intimate awareness of one's own self is completed by the fact that oneself, "independent of the perception of every other object is in reality nothing" (Hume 1967, 340). Baier, in this respect, states:

I can still be seen as the bundle of my perceptions, but those of them that are impressions of reflection become very important members, both for displaying the causal influence of past members and the influence of anticipation of future members, and for displaying my dependence on my fellow persons for a steady idea of myself. (1991, 130)

Hume's rejection of imaginative self-love is based on a plural notion of otherness. The common mistake of most people is to consider the self and the other as simple binaries. In such a mistaken approach, either the "I" is reduced to the other, or the other is reduced to the "I". However, in such a case, we cannot escape the vicious circle of the absolute dissolution of the self or of the other empathetically. The other is always plural, both in the abstract sense and in the concrete living sense. One does not identify oneself with the other; rather he or she constructs oneself in resemblance to the other, one acts as if other's perceptions were one's own.

This is how one starts to form a notion of the self. There are always others external to oneself. They are external both as personalities and as bodies. As in the case of the perception of external objects, one first perceives the others' selves and their bodies (and one's own body among theirs). The notion of a plurality of selves results in the emergence of the relation of resemblance among selves. One is in contiguous relations with others. Hence, as in the case of perceiving the external object and forming

an idea about it, one perceives the other continuously; one is in touch with the other, so that one finds one's own selfhood on the basis of a resemblance to other's when one observes that oneself, too, owns a body resembling the other's, and one, likewise, possesses signs that the other has (i.e., language and other properties).

One can view the affinities this process has with the Lacanian conceptualization of mirror-stage. A mirroring process goes on between the infant in the early stages of her life in relation to her mother (who is the other). At this stage the particular contours of this relationship are decisive in the formation of the subject. The mirror-stage comes to an end with the very first words that the infant expresses, i.e., when she enters the realm of language. With the use of language, the aphanisis comes to an end and the dialectic of subject comes to the stage of separation.⁸⁶ One accumulates these perceptions until one forms the notion of one's own self, and such a transformation one realizes with the aid of imagination. One imagines oneself as the other. As Baier puts it,

The body provides a continuity lacking in the sleep-interrupted 'stream' of perceptions; the views of others are needed to complete one's own partial view of one's continuing body, and to supplement, correct and render 'firm and stable' one's less purely bodily self-conceptions.... One's own view of others and their identities imposes another constraint on one's own self-conception, if to avoid "absurdity" one must let one's conception of other persons have a 'line of communication' to one's self-conception. (1991, 143)

Thus, the meaning of the logical sequence and the real sequence of the *Treatise* that were mentioned earlier becomes clear. Logically, Hume starts with the epistemology

⁸⁶ For a very compact yet satisfying explanation of mirror-stage see Sullivan, Henry, W. *The Beatles with Lacan*, (New York, etc.: Peter Lang, 1995), "Glossary," pp. 175-186. Similarly, Lacan speaks of the importance of language in the process of the formation of the subject: "As soon as he wishes to speak, man is oriented in the fundamental topology of language, which is very different from the simplistic realism in which he who thinks that he is at ease in the domain of science all too often confess himself. The natural use of such expressions ... implies the enveloping topology in which the subject recognizes himself when he speaks spontaneously" (Lacan 1977, 244-5).

of human perception, and by this analysis of the passions, gets into the realm of ethics and civil society. However, one can claim that Hume begins with civil society, explains the dynamism of the possibility of the self *that is required as a subject if any act of perception is to be realized at all*. Norman Kemp Smith notes that, in contrast to Locke's approach, Hume tries to explain not only human understanding but also human nature in general and the mechanism of human understanding as a function of such nature. Hume treats a human not solely as a reasonable entity but as a passionate being; that is to say, humans are passionate in their actions and in their beliefs. Reason is only an instrument that enters into this picture of human nature later. Moreover, human passions are of a special kind: they are moral and aesthetic sentiments that involve approval and disapproval, judgments and values. Hence, Smith argues that the teachings of Book II of the *Treatise*, not only logically but also historically, are prior to the doctrines described in Book I. Therefore, a thorough understanding of Hume's philosophy is possible only if the affinities between Hume's epistemology and moral philosophy is regarded. This is to say that Humean epistemology is modeled upon his moral theory, particularly his doctrine of sympathy (Smith 1941, 150-162).

Acts of perception always happen as acts exercised by human beings who exist within a community. The priority of the other, on the other hand, explains the differences, which Hume discusses while considering the difference between degrees of the affectivity of time (past, present, and future) and space. Thus, as he notes, "we advance rather than retard our existence" (Hume 1967, 432). The self is a construction of our imagination based on the relations of proximity and resemblance; it is a project towards the future rather than simply a remembered past. Memory serves as a means to provide

the faculty of imagination with the causal relationships, which will result in the affirmation of personal identity (Baier 1991, 262).

How does one remember the other's experiences as if they were one's own? The answer lies in Hume's emphasis on signs, or the effects through such signs (Hume 1967, 151).⁸⁷ The "I" is the story—or the habit of remembering the story—that is being told to one continuously. The testimony of the other, which is a part of the story-telling, guarantees the order and vivacity of the sequences of one's experiences, which would result in the formation of a causal picture with regard to self-identity. The other's testimony is the background against which one testifies one's memory-ideas.

Hume's account of the self might be considered a narrative theory of the self, and apparently there is evidence that supports such an interpretation. However, Hume's account differs from narrative approaches in its emphasis on the societal dimension of the notion of the self. Daniel Dennett (1992), for instance, interprets Hume's theory of the self as a subjective-individualist narrative theory. To answer the question of the self, Dennett starts with an analogy between the notion of the self and the center of gravity of physical objects. A center of gravity is not an object, neither an atom nor a particle. It is only a spatio-temporal location and, according to Dennett, can be considered a good example of an *abstractum* (Dennett 1992, 103).

A center of gravity can be explained as a balance point where the overall effect of interacting forces, including the force of gravity, amounts to zero. Thus, the fictitiousness of the center of gravity does not have to be interpreted as its non-existence. Otherwise,

⁸⁷ Lacan writes, "The Other is the locus in which is situated the chain of the signifier that governs whatever may be made present of the subject—it is the field of that living thing in which the subject has to appear" (1977, 203).

one can argue against almost all physical concepts and definitions, including force, gravity, sub-atomic particles, etc. since these concepts are mostly only known through their effects and cannot be shown as punctual localizations. Thus, although it might be true that “[a]s an abstractum, [center of gravity] is not bound by all the constraints of physical travel” (Dennett 1992, 104) yet it should be kept in mind that it is subject to those rules that regulate the relation between interacting forces.

Although Dennett seems to be admitting the fictitiousness of the self—similar to the fictitiousness of the center of gravity—it is worth noting that he has a rigid, physical notion of the factual existence of things. One can claim that for Dennett—at least in the context of this particular essay—to exist is to be a physical object. Setting aside the debate about the nature of such objectivity, it would seem that for Dennett, if any entity fails in being a physical object in the narrow sense that he understands, then it is fictional, meaning that it is an abstract entity, which exists only in someone’s mind. He writes: “A center of gravity is *just* an abstractum. It’s just a fictional object” (1992, 104). The same is true in the case of the self: “[A self is] a theorist’s fiction” (1992, 105). However, in such a formulation the selfhood of one’s own “I” as the theorist is already presupposed. The circularity of such an approach to the notion of the self becomes obvious when Dennett writes that “each person has a *self* (in addition to a center of gravity). In fact we have to posit selves for *ourselves* as well” (Dennett 1992, 105). His version of a narrative theory of the self reflects this element of circularity: the narrative, fictitious self Dennett has in mind is constructed just as a literary character is created by an author. With reference to properties of fictional characters Dennett distinguishes the self from what he, following Reichenbach and others, calls “*illata*—inferred entities, such as atoms,

molecules and neutrinos” (Dennett 1992, 106). However, he does not give any explanation for his passage from the realm of mere literature —*Sherlock Holmes* and *Moby Dick*—to real life. He does not explain how one can attribute the properties of fictional (literary) characters to real human beings while, for instance, one should distinguish between fictional and inferred objects.

Dennett maintains that the self is just a story one utters to oneself. The self is nothing but a story one tells about one’s own life, which, thanks to the nature of narrativity, changes each time it is recited. He then asks why one should behave this way and appear an “autobiographical novelist” (Dennett 1992, 111)? His answer lays his physicalist version of subjective-individualism bare: It is due to the split in one’s brain or one’s self that such activity takes place. The narrative self, which is the only form of the self’s existence, is the consequence of the split of the self in two. This formulation, however, seems tautological. Dennett’s account of the linguistic sources of the self and consciousness also harmonizes with his subjective individualism. His explanation of the emergence of speech and inner speech is based on the traditional schema of subjectivist psychology: external speech-whispered speech-inner speech. Speaking of the route from external to inner speech Dennett writes:

All we have to suppose is that the route, the circuit that at first went via mouth and ear, got shorter. People ‘realized’ that the actual vocalization and audition was a rather insufficient part of the loop. Besides, if there were other people around who might overhear it, you might give away more information than you wanted. So what developed was a habit of subvocalization, and this in turn could be streamlined into conscious, verbal thought. (1992, 113)

Dennett’s model rejects the social constitution and determination of speech in particular and of sign systems in general. Why one starts to speak, he does not answer; rather, he implies that it is due to some internal, subjective nature of one’s being. The analogy that

he makes between the center of gravity and the self as an abstractum does not explain away the formation of the notion of individual self. It only claims the impossibility of bodily localization of the self. However, it affirms the existence of the self as a narration which is told by the narrated self, meaning that the fiction is already presupposed. Why should one speak? “[T]o make all of our material into a single good story. And that story is our autobiography” (Dennett 1992, 114). And what does this autobiography signify? One’s self that narrates to become a self.

Galen Strawson (2004), responding to Dennett, proposes a close reading of narrative theories and gives his own critique of narrativity. He begins by discussing two versions of the narrative approach to the self: (1) psychological Narrativity, and (2) ethical Narrativity. The former holds that, according to Strawson, the self *is* a form of narrative, whereas the latter claims that the self *should be* lived as a form of narrative. He calls the former the descriptive thesis, and the latter the normative thesis (2004, 429).

To explain his position Strawson makes a distinction between experiencing oneself as a human being in general and oneself as a self. This distinction, to some extent, brings the Lockean classification of the identity of person and man to mind. However, Strawson does not provide the reader with any explicit definition about these two types of self-experiencing. He holds a similar position when differentiating “narrative” type of people from what he calls “episodic” type of people. He simply states the existence of such forms of being. So Strawson’s source of knowledge about the existence of a class of non-narrative people stands upon the narrative account that these people provide (2004, 428-29). In time, however, he introduces his own immediate inner experience of himself as a non-narrative, episodic person, self, or human being as another unquestionable basis

for such a claim. He states: “One of the most important ways in which people tend to think of themselves (quite independently of religious belief) is as things whose persistence conditions are not obviously or automatically the same as the persistence conditions of a human being considered as a whole” (2004, 430). Yet it is interesting to note that the people whose names he lists as evidence of the truthfulness of his view about episodic being are champions of narration: “Plutarch, Proust, Parfit, and thousands of others” (2004, 430).

The fragmented self of Strawson, at least within the limits of his essay, is not conceivable except in a narrative form. Furthermore, his non-narrative, fragmented self is explained from an individual subjectivist point of view. That being the case, his conceptualization shares the same basis with the diachronic approach: the self is an entity which is internally and intrinsically accessible to oneself; one has immediate, preconceptual access to one’s own self. Strawson’s critique of the narrative, diachronic self is right to the extent that it is directed to presupposing a self that exists prior to narration, this to say that a self that tells its own story. Such a presupposition contradicts the very claim that a self is something that is constructed through narration. However, Strawson’s critique can also be directed to the concept of a fragmented self. In point of fact, a conceptualization of the self as a fragmented entity, as in Strawson’s essay, necessarily requires a notion of an existing core that functions as the principle of identity; this is to say that, such a concept of a preconceptual self is required to keep the episodes that are referred to as a self towards forming a notion of a person or a human in the sense that Strawson introduces at the beginning of his essay. His approach is destined to end up in either a form of Cartesian substantialism, where God is the guarantor of the identity of

the episodes of one's self, or in a form of Lockean formalism, where some (transcendental) form constructs the identity of the person by externally and mechanically combining these fragments.

If we consider Hume's theory of the self as a version of an episodic theory, and compare it to Strawson's account of a fragmented self the substantialist tendencies of the latter become clearer. Hume is critical of substantialism; therefore it seems at first inevitable that he should propose a narrative model in order to provide the self with an identity through time. Hume's claim that the self is fictitious can be read as a claim about the narrativity of the self; i.e., the self is a fable, a story that needs to be narrated in order to be realized. Yet the identification of the fictitiousness of the self with a narration is not logically necessary. Due to Hume's societal understanding of the self, the fictitiousness he ascribes to the self can be understood as indicating that the self consists of mental or ideological material. That being the case, Hume does not need to reduce the self into one single aspect of it, namely verbal behavior. A particular self is not made of the verbal account that oneself provides about oneself, but it is constructed out of the totality of acts that are performed by the self—including verbal acts—that are meaningful in the societal realm only. We are not only what we say—inwardly or outwardly—we consist of our actions and such activity should be realized against the background of others.

It is interesting to note that elsewhere Strawson (1989) introduces Hume's bundle theory as the only way to avoid getting involved with a fiction about the nature of the mind. Strawson claims that the only way not to suppose a fictitious being beyond what one perceives is to define the self as a bundle of perceptions. He calls this position "strict idealist" (1994, 111). He states: "Any (Basic Realist) theory that rejects a Strict Idealist

or bundle theory of mind, or a Strict Idealist theory of the nature of realist as a whole, must accept that some 'fiction' is actually true" (1989, 66). However, to adopt a Humean position one does not have to assume an idealist stance. As Strawson himself explains, (1989) Hume's position shows similarity to a regular realist stance; he believes in the existence of something beyond human perceptions as entities that regulate the relation between perceptions. As far as the notion of the self is concerned this regulating entity signifies the social being of man. If we continue to interpret Hume's position from an individual subjectivist point of view we cannot escape the tension and the contradiction between assuming Hume to be a strict idealist, on the one hand, or a realist, on the other. Strawson's individual subjectivist position forces him to attribute a type of transcendental essentialist tendency to Hume which openly contrasts with Hume's rejection of the idea of substance. Explaining this quasi-Kantian Hume, Strawson states: "I will accordingly talk without reservation of the 'intrinsic' or 'ultimate' nature of reality, or of 'reality as it is in itself'" (1989, 72). Such quasi-Kantianism, which assumes the existence of a distinct realm of thing-in-itself, is in no way reconcilable with Hume's position that rejects the idea of a substance that forms the substratum of the experience as a nonsubstantial phenomenon. As Strawson explains, "if we are going to talk of substance, as Hume pointed out, it seems that we have no good reason to reject the idea that experience itself can be a substance—a substance process somehow incorporating both experiences and a subject of experience" (1994, 111-112).

Strawson's account of the self as a fragmented entity leads to a subjectivist narrative model of the self due to its individualist, subjectivist, and substantialist presuppositions. In this sense his account is self-deficient. The question is: how can

spatio-temporal identity be attributed to a self that, due to its factitiousness, is fragmented? Strawson locates the source of the identity of the self *within* one's self. Therefore his account is a variation of substantialism based on a notion of pre-conceptual self. Moreover, such episodic substantiality necessarily requires narrativity, a position with which Strawson strongly disagrees. The narrative nature of Strawson's account is clearly expressed in this passage:

I need to say more about the episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively episodic, I'll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences 'from the inside', as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future. (2004, 433)

Strawson himself, formulates the problem of conceptualization of the self around the wrong axis. What differentiates various approaches to the concept of the self is not necessarily their attitude regarding narrativity. Substantialism, individualism, and subjectivism, are other determining factors that distinguish different accounts of the self. In addition to this, Strawson's account of narrativity is arbitrary and limited. In the most general sense of the word narrativity can be understood as an emphasis on the linguistic determination of the concept of the self. Narrativity of the self, in this sense, designates the linguistic boundaries of the concept of the self; it signifies the inevitability of linguistic mediation when it comes to conceptualizing the notion of the self. Taken in this sense, every account of the self, including that of Descartes', is narrative. However, Strawson seems to consider narrativity in a more technical, literary sense. Reference to narrative with or without form, narrativity versus factuality etc. in the passage quoted above are among the indications of such an approach. But, Strawson's own definition and

use of the term ‘narrativity’ cannot be considered sufficient evidence to claim that other narrative philosophers such as MacIntyre and Taylor use the term in exactly the same way. Nonetheless, Strawson’s account of narrativity presupposes too much on the side of these thinkers whom he is criticizing.

Any narrative, even that of the most radical solipsist about the notion of the self, designates the inevitability of the societal constitution of the self. Narrative is necessarily a linguistic phenomenon; language and verbal behavior are social through and through. Therefore narrativity of the self does not simply refer to story-telling but to other linguistic performances too. In other words, the self as narrative is not only a fable that one tells about oneself but is a synthesis of a multitude of stories told by others about oneself. Strawson, however, identifies narrativity with self-expression, leading him to interpret what Ricoeur and MacIntyre refer to as ‘good’ with identity of the self and with one’s own preconceptual self. Thus he writes:

MacIntyre’s claim [about narrativity of the self] seems at first non-psychological: a good life is one that has narrative unity. But a good life is one spent seeking the good life, and there is strong suggestion that seeking the good life requires taking up a Narrative perspective; in which case narrative unity requires Narrativity. (2004, 437)

Regardless of the position of philosophers such as Taylor, Ricoeur and MacIntyre who are criticized by Strawson, narrative identity does not have to be a search for identity for the sake of identity (this is to say that, it does not have to be a narrative unity based on narrativity). Narrative unity can also signify identity of one’s self through time in order to become a responsible agent with respect to other selves. Narrativity, thus understood, can be interpreted as becoming a responsible agent of the act.

Strawson views the self as an amalgamation of fragments that do not have any internal, synthetic unity with each other. His fragmented view of the self ignores the possibility of any relationship between one's different moments of being. In point of fact, it is this very synthetic relationship of these moments that forms the unity that is called the self. So, one's view of one's relation to one's past will not consist in considering the past as the past-as-such. On the contrary, claiming that there is no kind of relationship between the different moments of one's being results in narrativity and absolutizes the past as a form of the past-as-such. It turns the relationship between these different moments into an arbitrary conjoining of elements that can only be related mechanically. In such a case the self loses all its sense of factuality and turns into a mere fiction in the literary sense of the term. This is the inevitable consequence of the Strawsonian fragmented view of the self. Strawson himself unconsciously warns against the consequences of such a view when conceding that "the implication [of narrativity] is lain; the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the truth of your being" (2004, 447).

Narrativity does not have to exclude the determining function of the present with regard to the past. On the contrary, from a societal point of view narrativity necessitates affirmation of the determining influence of the present over the past. The past is always related to a present point of view, which is not neutral, and is charged with values. Moreover, narrativity of the self does not mean that the self is only what is remembered by one. Although such an interpretation can be considered a narrative account, narrativity cannot be reduced to one of its possible interpretations. Furthermore, what we remember about our selves is determined by the narrative about our selves. As a linguistic medium

narrative not only reflects the experiences that amount to the formation of the self, but also organizes and orders them, intensifies or weakens their effects, and is examined in comparison with the testimony of others. Strawson's equation of narration and memory, in the final analysis, is the expression of his individual subjectivist point of view.

Moreover, his theory pushes him to adopt either a substantialist or an idealist position that is expressed via the notion of preconceptual self or Shaftesbury's quasi-Cartesian soul (1979, 47).

In sum, there are two major problems with Strawson's reading. He rightly criticizes "narrative" approaches in that they trivialize narrativity itself. However, if taken within the limits of what he calls trivial narrativity, his own statement also turns into a narrative description. Perhaps, this is what forces him to take position against narrative accounts. This leads to the second problem. Strawson could criticize "narrativity" and emphasize the linguistic aspect of the self. He could formulate his critique of narrativity and the trivialization effect it has as an attempt to by-pass language and linguistic – therefore social—determinations of the self. Criticism of narrative accounts from this point of view requires introducing an "external" or societal factor into the self. For instance, this is where Hume's claim about the fictitiousness of the self is distinguished from post-modern notions of the self as a mere fable understood in the literary sense of the term. The problem is that Strawson's own formulation does not have any such social dimension as Hume's. Consequently, his notion of "episodic" or fragmented self turns into a mixture of Cartesian and empirical concepts of the self. In the final analysis, he is forced to introduce a notion of a preconceptual core (borrowed from literature of 17th and

18th century naturalism) which ironically looks very similar to Heidegger's and Manfred Frank's pre-cognitive self, which necessarily requires narrativity.

Occasionally one is pushed to survey one's past. How does one relate to this past of one's self-identity? The past, as well as the present and the future, is a combination of the other's and one's own perceptions, considerations, passions, and imaginings. One creates the habit of folding back on oneself through the perception of the other, as one creates the habit of perceiving the extension of one's own body. The other supplies the medium through which one is related to the past both causally and associatively. How does one's present self stand in relations of resemblance and causation to various past actions? The answer lies in the resemblance one forms as one witnesses the other in its continuum. The continuation of the self is but a reflection of the continuous presence of the other in time. One's feeling of shame, for instance, is one's own as far as it is related to a past transgression against the background of others. As McIntyre puts it, "the basic functioning of sympathy is interpersonal: it depends on contiguity, and *conversation* is one of the 'external signs' which initially conveys the idea of another's feeling" (1989, 555). In the future the "I" will be another "I." This is related to the sympathetic formation of the self. One not only includes the other's concerns into one's own conception of self as if they were one's own, but one does so when oneself is concerned. This is how one relates one's present self to one's future "I." One's own future is further in time; the concrete other, however, is closer to one both in time and space. Even though one's self is a projected self rather than a discovered one, it is nonetheless more greatly affected by the close proximity of the other in the present, than it is affected by one's own remote

future, which is projected as one's other, towards which one comports oneself (McIntyre 1989, 555-6).

Hume's argument in Section III of Book II of the *Treatise* is an evidence in favor of the interpretation that attributes priority to impressions of passion over impressions of sensation. In this section, Hume tries to show the fallacy of the philosophical and commonsense view that attributes superiority to reason over passions. Hume maintains that to show the falsehood of this view "I shall endeavour to prove *first*, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and *secondly*, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will" (1967, 413).

According to Hume, reason never causes or produces any actions but only directs the judgments concerning cause and effect. Moreover, the passions, especially those of pain and pleasure, attract us to or avert us from an object. Reason is nothing but the discovery of the relation between cause and effect. Unless objects affect us directly or indirectly through passions, we cannot expect to be affected by their connection. Thus we cannot expect reason to produce or prevent any action (Hume 1967, 414). Hume then concludes that "[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (1967, 415).

In Book II of the *Treatise*, Hume refers to the idea of the self as something that is intimately present to us. The point worth noticing is that Hume does not consider the idea of the self in isolation from other ideas. Moreover, as an idea *per se*, the idea of the self is another idea among a multitude of ideas. Thus, the idea of the self is interrelated to ideas of other objects and it bestows vivacity upon these other ideas (Hume 1967, 354).

Relation, acquaintance and resemblance are responsible when enlivening of ideas is at

stake. What differentiates the idea of the self from ideas of other objects is, thus, the social determination of the self. A perfect relation between two objects, according to Hume, is maintained only when conveying from an idea to an impression is accompanied by a mutual conveying of the idea of the other object to the impression of the former one (Hume 1967, 355). In the case of humans and the idea of the self, such reciprocal relation is possible only among humans, since men resemble each other to a great degree, more than any other object. “The double motion is a kind of a double tie, and binds the objects together in the closest and most intimate manner” (Hume 1967, 356).

Hume’s reference to the second marriage of a mother and a father, for instance, contributes to the interpretation that considers the Humean notion of the self a social construction. Hume is aware that our customs and value judgments, habits and web of beliefs determine the formation of the idea of our selves. This is to say that, relations of contiguity and resemblance are not mere epistemological categories; they are not formal principles. To the contrary, they are strongly influenced and determined by social factors. For instance, Hume argues that a mother’s second marriage weakens the relation between the mother and her child(ren) from the first marriage, whereas no such effect is detectable when a father’s second marriage is the case. This, according to Hume, is due to the social position of mother as a lesser figure and father as the head of family (1967, 356-7).

Although Hume’s attributing of certain social roles and positions to genders is ideological and thus incorrect, this should not prevent us from seeing the core of his reasoning concerning the formation of not only the idea of the self, but also determination of certain epistemological and scientific categories that humans use to define and explain natural and social phenomena.

In the section “of malice and envy” of the *Treatise*, Hume maintains that human impressions and ideas are not mere epistemological abstractions. He asks the question: how similar impressions and ideas can result into the rise of different judgments concerning the same object? (1967, 373) He is aware that the relation between impressions and objects of impressions, to put it more clearly, the relation between perceiver and the perceived, is not a simple mechanical reflection of object upon mind. He admits that the variation of judgment should in principle be caused by some variation in impressions, but the variation of impressions is caused by the variation in reflexive impressions that accompany every impression and idea. In other words, impressions of perception are subordinate to impressions of reflection, which adds to the point that impressions are socially determined. Hume states that “no object is presented to the senses, nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompany’d with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion’d to it” (1967, 373).

Hume’s evaluation of naturalness and originality of the causes of the passions of pride and humility is another evidence for the fact that these passions and their produced object are socially constituted. Although Hume considers the causes of passions of pride and humility “natural,” he does not ascribe originality to them, since they are “the effects of art, and arise partly from industry, partly from the caprice, and partly from the good fortune of men.” Hume continues:

’Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine, that each of these [causes] was foreseen and provided for by nature, and that every new production of art, which cause pride or humility; instead of adapting itself to the passion by partaking of some general quality, that naturally operates on the mind; is itself the object of an original principle, which till then lay conceal’d in the soul, and is only by accident at last brought to light.” (1967, 281)

The double relation of ideas and impressions also contributes to the strength of the societal constitution of the idea of the self. “That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion” (Hume 1967, 286). Thus, the idea of the self, which is attributed to the passion of pride by nature, is produced by this passion (1967, 287).

Hume introduces property as the relation, which produces most commonly the passion of pride (1967, 309). Whether property is a natural or an artificial virtue, it is a cause of the passion of pride that perfectly exhibits the double relation of ideas. “The mention of the property naturally carries our thought to the proprietor, and of the proprietor to the property” (1967, 310).

Hume’s evaluation of passions of pride and humility, together with passions of love and hatred, show that he does not differentiate the self and the other in a qualitative sense. One’s idea of one’s own self is caused by the same principles that cause the idea of other: Hume clearly enumerates and explains these external causes such as property, riches, etc. These causes bring about certain emotions that acquire different appearances due to their relation to different objects, namely the self and the other. Hume states that “[a]ll those objects, which cause love, when plac’d on another person, are the causes of pride, when transfer’d to ourselves” (1967, 391). The similarity that makes the relation between the self and the other, and thus sympathy possible is based on the sameness of the causes of these different objects of passions of love and hatred and pride and humility. Hence, “the passions of love and pride, and those of humility and hatred are

similar in their sensations, and that the two former are always agreeable, and the two latter painful” (Hume, 1967, 391).

The object of love and hatred is the other person. However, this other person is not the cause of the passions of love and hatred. The causes of these passions are almost identical with those of pride and humility. The object of love and hatred is the person of whose thoughts, feelings and actions we are not intimately conscious. Whereas, the object of pride and humility is that identical person of whose thoughts, actions, feelings, and sensations we are intimately conscious. Thus, what differentiates the self from the other is not a qualitative dissimilarity, since “every human creature resembles ourselves and by that means has an advantage over every other object in operating on the imagination” (Hume 1967, 359). Reflexivity of thoughts and actions is different from having immediate access to these qualities. In other words, such a differentiation between the objects of love and hatred, and pride and humility does not mean that the self is accessible without external mediations. To the contrary, intimate access to the self signifies the internalized mediated access to the object of reflexive passions of pride and humility, which in turn are caused by external, societal factors.

The concluding remarks of Book II, Part III, Section VIII of Hume’s *Treatise* not only show that all impressions are reducible to impressions of reflection, and that the passionate self is also the basis of the so-called epistemological self, but also provide a condensed explanation of the formation of the sympathetic self and its differentiation from itself and from others in time and in space. Hume clearly explains that both passions and reason are affections of the mind; the former is a violent passion and the latter a calm one. We had formerly said that passions yield the idea of the self, and, that the causes of

passions, being different from their object—that is the self—are variable. Hume maintains that notwithstanding the fact that the difference between calm and violent passions is a difference of degree rather than a difference of quality, these passions can change into one another. He states that “a calm passion may easily be chang’d into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and situation of the object, as by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination” (1967, 438). The tension between reason and passion, which is changing of one into another, explains the diversity of human selves as well as the diverse nature of one particular self. Humans are not only different from each other due to the relation between passions and reason, but are different from themselves in time. Hume states: “Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is call’d, diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from each other, but also from themselves in different times” (1967, 438).

Thus, the fictitiousness of the idea of the self with regard to thought and imagination, in contrast to the factuality of the idea of the self with regard to passions, is a reflection of the aforementioned tension between calm and violent passions that results into diversification of humans with regard to each other and themselves. Moreover, this tension and diversification represent the paradoxical being of the self as something that is subject to great and small revolutions but yet is supposed to have spatio-temporal identity. Unless objectivity of the self is admitted, the paradoxical existence of the self cannot be conceived and the tension between the epistemological and the passionate selves will not disappear. Since the self is external to itself, it is subject to the same logical rules that direct passing from one idea to another, regardless of how close or

distant in time and in space these ideas might be. It is through this passage that the identity of the self in space and time is attained. These diverse and numerous ideas that are caused by calm and violent passions can be related to each other as elements of an unfinalized whole to assume an identity which is called the self. Therefore, what guarantees the identity of the self and thus makes the idea of the self intelligible, is the paradoxical mode of the existence of the self as something which is objective and yet is apprehended as if intimately.

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