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**BIPOLARITY'S BREAKDOWN AND
THE COLLAPSE OF WORLD ORDER**

**BY
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School of Graduate Studies and Research
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FOREWORD

This thesis began as an attempt to understand why the war in Bosnia was allowed to unfold in the fashion it did. Why in spite of the widespread reports of genocide and ethnic cleansing (carried out in this bloody war) did we in the West stand by and do nothing? My initial questions with respect to this revolved around whether or not we had forgotten the lessons learned from the Second World War or had we - Western society - simply become void of all sense of morality? Did we not care about what was going on in Bosnia because of the apparent lack of an immediate impact this would have on our lives?

While not denying the validity of the last two points (as will be shown later in this thesis) the answers to my initial questions would prove to be much more complex and evolve the scope of this project tremendously. Guided by the principles developed by Kenneth Waltz in his book Theory of International Politics an attempt at answering these questions is provided. This thesis is an effort to illustrate that it is not merely coincidence that the war in Bosnia unfolded on the heels of the unraveling of the Soviet Empire. Rather, by using the war in Bosnia as a case in point, this thesis is an attempt to illustrate that events such as the conflict in Bosnia are consequences of the breakdown of the bipolar confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.. Furthermore, it is also an attempt to point out that events such as Bosnia can be expected more frequently unless the leadership (in the international system) the bipolar structure demanded is restored.

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INTRODUCTION

When one thinks back to the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the popular Western images which come to mind are of nuclear warheads and their destructive capabilities. The period between 1945 and 1988 was like no other before it, at least in terms of the apprehension felt in the world, as dramatic advancements in armaments technology in the two superpowers gained the potential to determine the ultimate fate of mankind. What is also significant about this period, however, is a feature that often goes unmentioned; this apprehension held had a positive spinoff in that it forced the two superpowers - the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. - to work relentlessly to preserve their preeminent status. In order to avoid the images of domination and destruction resulting from a nuclear fallout, the geopolitical concerns of the two would come to encompass not only all of Europe, but the entire planet.¹ Neither would allow any event to escalate if such an event had the potential to affect their fate, at least not without their direct (and controlling) implication.

At the same time, the fears of both superpowers were echoed by their allies and thus demanded adherence to the security concerns of the respective superpowers. Individual state geopolitical concerns were suppressed creating a pseudo rivalry of blocs pitting the East under Soviet control versus the West under U.S. leadership.² As a result of this fact the nature of global decision making for the two superpowers in their

¹ Although Europe was the primary focus of the two's concerns because of its political and historic significance, gains by either one in any other geographic area grew to become viewed as extremely important as well. With the advances made in transportation and communications the world has rapidly become a much smaller place.

² This is not to say that there was complete uniformity within the blocs for the entire period, it is necessary to note here that there was in fact a major break in the link uniting the Western allies during the Cold War period. During the 1960's, France under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle chose to forego the

competition with one another was eased tremendously. What this confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. actually helped to create was a de facto international pecking order (outside of the Third World). A pecking order where each state within each bloc knew its proper position - which was that of a secondary power - within the order as well as the impact of its actions upon the order. Thus individual state decisions by these secondary powers which might imperil the stability of the international system were avoided. Due to the lasting images of the destruction endured in World War II and the realization that another major war would be that much more horrific, no longer were the aligned states willing to risk allowing a dangerous situation to escalate. Individual state concerns were sacrificed for the sake of unity and the good of the system. Hence, despite the label of the era - The Cold War - and all the risks at stake, stability and direction were actually the order of the day for much of the period.³ The Cold War with all its damaging possibilities demanded, and achieved, the leadership and unity necessary for stability in the European theatre.

With the decline and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, such is no longer the case. As illustrated by the conflicts in Bosnia and the former Soviet Republics, stability and direction in Europe are no longer the norm. Situations such as that experienced in Bosnia whose containment was once deemed vital to the stability of the international system as a whole (by the superpowers) have been allowed to escalate out of control.

While Russia is no longer capable of controlling such conflicts as Bosnia due to its dire political and economic situation, the U.S. apparently no longer desires to. Rather (as

protection provided by the American security umbrella and stand alone. However, this unitary, neutralist stance would not survive past de Gaulle's tenure.

will be seen in our second and third chapters), the U.S. appears more content, in this post-Cold War era, to focus upon its domestic situation and on certain issues/events that might imperil that domestic situation.⁴ As a result, without anyone capable or willing to provide the necessary leadership and direction to the international system, leadership provided during the Cold War by the two confrontational superpowers, instability and uncertainty have overcome the international system and Europe in particular.

These observations discussed above have motivated this research, focussed upon the following principal questions : why is it that rather than leading to increased peace, the collapse of the Cold War confrontation - antedated by the collapse of the Soviet Union - has led to a period of declining stability and increased conflict in the international system? How is it that with the collapse of the U.S.S.R. there has been a breakdown of order in the international system?

In order to begin to respond to these questions, certain theoretical foundations must be laid. First of all, it is necessary to develop a sound theoretical understanding of the Cold War period so as to better comprehend how a relatively high level of stability and order was maintained. From this background, we will thus be able to see better how, with the end of the Cold War, this stability and order is now absent. We will also be better able to decipher what type of situation to expect in the absence of the Cold War.

³ Aside from a few brief flare-ups such as the 'Bay of Pigs' scare in 1963 and the war in the Middle East in 1973, the direct threat of nuclear war was for the most part held in check during the Cold War era.

⁴ Some of the domestic issues/events triggering this inward focus are the growing emphasis upon the widening disparity in social standing among American citizens, the rapidly rising violent crime rate, and regional instability and its potential impact upon the fabric of the American population. All the while, the European community has been unable to transcend its differences and thus deal with such situations as Bosnia.

In assessing the pertinence of our choice of theoretical understanding of the Cold War, it is first necessary to point out that there have been several key theoretical analyses that have been applied to this time. Prominent among them are the ideas of Hans Morgenthau and Immanuel Wallerstein, two authors whose theories have been applied to try and understand the world system. Morgenthau, who is widely recognized as the father of the realist school of thought in International Politics wrote that post-World War II international relations was a security competition shaped by bipolarity and nuclear weapons, both of which were double-edged swords.⁵ Bipolarity was 'a mechanism that contains in itself the potentialities for unheard of good as well as unprecedented evil. It made the hostile opposition of two gigantic blocs possible' at the same time as holding out the possibility of stabilizing the confrontation through an 'equilibrium of power maintained by moderate competition'.⁶ The nuclear arms race rendered international politics to a 'primitive spectacle of two giants eyeing each other with watchful suspicion. Human survival depended on mutual restraint'.⁷ To Morgenthau the nuclear confrontation was not a feature of the international system's structure (bipolarity) but of the skill and commitment of its leaders.

Immanuel Wallerstein and the world systems approach provide us with a differing conception of the Cold War. Here system hierarchy, not anarchy, was assumed, and attention was directed towards the political economy of production and economic growth. The Cold War, according to this logic, could be seen as a battle between a hegemonic country - the United States - and one challenging the essential logic of accumulation and

⁵ Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace 4th ed. New York : Knopf, 1966. p.47.

⁶ Ibid. p.47.

production practiced by the hegemon - the Soviet Union.⁸ Wallerstein would cite the end of the Cold War as evidence of continuity rather than a change in the international system. The hegemony of the dominant mode of production was reaffirmed, and the challenge led by the U.S.S.R. was persuaded to accept assimilation, a fact to which they has been resigning themselves for quite some time.⁹

However, in spite of the obvious merits of both of these understandings of the Cold War, for the purposes of this thesis the theoretical understanding chosen to provide an explanation of the Cold War and the order and stability achieved throughout that period - and the subsequent breakdown of this order - is Kenneth Waltz's theory of bipolarity as developed primarily in his book Theory of International Politics.¹⁰ Waltz's theory of bipolarity which involves the preeminence of two states in direct confrontation with one another on a global scale, is testimonial to the necessity of leadership in the international sphere. It provides an analysis of how the concerns of the two poles in a bipolar structure force both of them to work for the stability of the system in order to ensure their own dominant position (and survival for that matter) in the international order. As well as this, it also illustrates how in the event of the breakdown of the bipolar structure, the international leadership this structure demanded can no longer be expected to be achieved as easily, thus placing the order and stability of the international system in severe jeopardy.

⁷ Ibid. p.49.

⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein The Capitalist World Economy Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1979. ch.1.

⁹ Ibid. ch.1.

¹⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics Reading Massachusetts : Addison-Wesley, 1979.

As to why Kenneth Waltz and his theory of bipolarity has been chosen to explain the stability of the Cold War structure of the international system and the subsequent instability that has arisen as a result of the collapse of the Cold War confrontation, the reasons are several. First of all, as will be developed in chapter one, Waltz's theory of bipolarity provides us with a clear account of the nature of the bipolar structure that patterned the development of the international system, clearly illustrating how order and stability were achieved. Secondly (again as will be developed in chapter one), and most importantly, the reason for which Kenneth Waltz and his theory of bipolarity has been chosen is that Waltz's theory provides us with sound responses to the principal concerns of this thesis, which are, once again; why is it that rather than leading to increased peace and stability the collapse of the Cold War confrontation - antedated by the collapse of the Soviet Union - has led to a period of declining stability and increased conflict in the international system; and, how is it that with the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been a breakdown of order in the international system?

The central argument of this thesis is that the breakdown of the Cold War bipolar structure has led to a series of disturbing consequences for the international system. They are : an increase in the level of uncertainty of states as to the implications of their actions and those of others, a reluctance on the part of the great powers to manage global crises, and finally, an increase in the diversity of interests among states. As a result we will demonstrate that the combination of these factors has led to a decline in effective international action, an increase in global instability, and, consequently, the breakdown of

world order.¹¹ This hypothesis will be substantiated through an analysis of the above listed factors in relation to the events surrounding the conflict in Bosnia. As well as this, this hypothesis will also be substantiated through an analysis of several occurrences in the international system that have coincided with bipolarity's collapse - namely, the proliferation of conflict (particularly in Europe), calls for the dissolution of such regional organizations as the U.N. and NATO, and the rise of regionalism.

The chapter breakdown of the thesis is as follows : chapter one will present an analysis of Kenneth Waltz's theory of bipolarity, and its consequences for our understanding of the post-bipolar structure. It will examine Waltz's interpretation of what the collapse of bipolarity entails for the international system. This chapter will focus on the Cold War era with some attention devoted to the post-1991 period. Chapter two will involve an assessment of the three features that Waltz sees as resulting from the collapse of bipolarity : an increase in the level of uncertainty of states as to the implications of their actions and those of others, a reluctance on the part of the global powers to manage global crises, and an increase in the diversity of interests among states. This assessment will be conducted using the events surrounding the crisis in Bosnia. This second chapter will focus on the period beginning with the outbreak of the conflict in Bosnia in 1991 until mid-1995.¹² Chapter three will involve an assessment of the implications of the rise of the

¹¹ Effective international action here means foresight and leadership on the part of a particular state or group of states (be it a formal organization, alliance or not) necessary to stem the tide of conflict or economic disruption within a state that is incapable of doing so on its own.

¹² The reason for which mid 1995 has been selected as the break point for the thesis is that the majority of the research was conducted in the 1995/96 time frame. However, in spite of the fact that there has been a significant amount of movement in Bosnia in the form of resolutions and intervention since mid 1995, this does not negate the fact that the crisis was allowed to happen. Nor does it negate the fact that this crisis was badly managed by the international community from the beginning. Hence, the time frame fits directly with the main contention of the thesis which is that the bipolar structure of the international

three features detailed in chapter two on the international system. More specifically it will assess how bipolarity's collapse has led to the proliferation of conflict (particularly in Europe), to increased calls for the dissolution of such organizations as the U.N. and NATO, and to the rise of regionalism. This chapter will focus upon the period beginning after the end of the Cold War.

In terms of methodology, this thesis will be developing a case study of the Bosnian crisis so as to evaluate the relevance of Waltz's theory of bipolarity. This case study will allow us to assess several important developments that have coincided with bipolarity's breakdown, and their consequences for the international system.

system forced the two superpowers to manage the international system (in a proper fashion) , and since its breakdown, as clearly illustrated in the Bosnian case, this is no longer happening.

Chapter One

AN ANALYSIS OF KENNETH WALTZ'S THEORY OF BIPOLARITY

The study of international politics from the end of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was dominated by superpower conflict. The Cold War was a global conflict pitting the United States and the Soviet Union against one another. Each sought to establish and maintain its authority in its respective sphere of influence, all the while pushing military research to the limits of technology to promote its preeminence.

Perhaps unsurprisingly given its impact on the structure of global politics, many theorists have sought to explain the Cold War. One of the more predominant theories that has been proposed is that of bipolarity. As stated in our introduction, bipolarity is a term that has several different meanings in the study of international politics. For the purposes of this thesis, however, we will concentrate on one of the most established and influential understandings of bipolarity, that developed by Kenneth Waltz in his seminal work Theory of International Politics.¹ As Robert Keohane states in his article "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", the significance of Waltz's theory of bipolarity lies in the fact that it is an original "attempt to systematize political realism into a vigorous, deductive systemic theory of international politics".² The end of the Cold War provides a unique opportunity to re-examine Waltz's important work on bipolarity.

Waltz's understanding of bipolarity is centered on the preeminence of two specific units in the international system - two states - in direct confrontation with one another. It

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979. While Theory of International Politics will be the main source of reference for this chapter, it is necessary to point out that some of Waltz's earlier and later works will also be cited, since these works provide some important background as well as follow up material to Waltz's main tenets.

sees bipolarity as providing stability to the international system for it more clearly defines (as opposed to other structures such as the multipolar one) the rules of the game; rules which are in turn determined for the most part by the relationship between the two dominant states within the bipolar structure.³

In this chapter we will present the underpinnings of Waltz's theory of bipolarity. This will be done through an evaluation of the key concepts and tenets of the theory, and supplemented by a review of the various reactions to Waltz's work by other theorists. This review will assist in the deepening of our understanding of bipolarity. Following this, an effort will be made to detail Waltz's predictions for the future of the international order in the event of the collapse of the bipolar structure. This will be done for a couple of reasons; first, in order to illustrate (according to Waltz) the stability and desirability of the bipolar structure as opposed to any other structure of the international system, and second, in order to apply Waltz's theory to the Bosnian case in our Second Chapter.

System and Structure

In attempting to understand Kenneth Waltz's theory of bipolarity, it is essential that we clarify two key concepts integral to bipolarity's development : the concepts of system and structure. In assessing these two concepts, it is important to realize that they are invariably interconnected. According to Waltz :

² Robert O. Keohane "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics" in Robert O. Keohane ed. Neorealism and its Critics New York, New York : Columbia University Press, 1986.

³ According to Waltz, the interactions (or lack thereof) between the two superpowers produced a bipolar structure which in turn conditioned the patterns of behaviour of all states within the international system.

"A system is composed of a structure and interacting units. The structure is the systemwide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole... Since structure is an abstraction, it cannot be defined by enumerating material characteristics of the system. It must instead be defined by the arrangement of the system's parts and the principles of that arrangement".⁴

Here the nature of the international system is to be determined by its structure, which in turn determined by the ordering of the states/units within the system.⁵ Waltz believes that systems theories reveal how different units behave similarly, and, regardless of their variations, produce results that conform to expectations.⁶

Structure according to Waltz is to be understood in terms of the arrangement of the system's parts and the principles of that arrangement.⁷ This concept is grounded in the belief that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting produce different outcomes.⁸ The structure of the international system, Waltz argues, will produce a similar pattern of behaviour so long as that particular structure endures. The structure's continuation depends upon the continuation of a consistent distribution of capabilities across the system's units.⁹ That is to say that once the distribution of capabilities of the system's 'key' units - its most powerful states - is altered, then the structure of the international system is inevitably affected. By capabilities, what is meant is the attributes that distinguish states from one another in terms of state power. These capabilities are, according to Waltz, as follows : size of population and territory, resource

⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics op cit. p.79

⁵ States and units are to be understood as synonymous

⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics op cit. p.80

⁷ Ibid. p.80

⁸ Ibid. p.81

⁹ Ibid. p.87

endowments, economic capability, military strength, and political stability.¹⁰ As long as the system's most powerful units maintain a steady equilibrium in relation to the above listed capabilities or factors, a particular international structure can be expected to endure. However, once one of the key units experiences a significant alteration in the level of its capabilities - be it a growth or a decline - then the structure of the international system will necessarily be altered as a consequence.

It is also necessary to point out that, according to Waltz, despite the fact that capabilities are attributes of specific units, the distribution of capabilities is a systemwide concept.¹¹ That is to say, the capabilities of states are measured in relation to other states in the system and not in and of themselves. Thus, the concept of structure is to be determined by the measuring of states - according to their capabilities - in relation to one another.¹² Waltz's study abstracts from all other qualities except a state's capabilities, thus, for example, whether a state is democratic or communist has no bearing on the structure of the international system.

Based on the fact that assessing a state's position within the international order is determined by measuring state capabilities in relation to other states, what emerges is a sort of positional picture : "a general description of the ordered arrangement of a society written in terms of the placement of the units rather than their quality".¹³ Hence, what results is states that, while maintaining their autonomy, form a particular relational order in the international system. Within this order certain patterns of behaviour emerge that are

¹⁰ Ibid. p.131

¹¹ Ibid. p.99

¹² Ibid. p.98

¹³ Ibid. p.99

the result of the structural constraints of the system.¹⁴ These constraints are limits on the abilities of states to perform certain acts due to their differing capabilities. For example, a state of limited military means is unlikely to adopt an aggressive military stance that might antagonize a more powerful military state for it knows full well the potential consequences. Hence, while states may be similar in terms of the tasks they face and the aspirations they hold, their abilities will differ according to their capabilities, and thus their positioning within the international order will differ.

From this understanding of the concepts of system and structure, it is quite clear that the structure of the period from the end of World War II to 1989 can be classified as bipolar due to the fact that the capabilities of two units within the system - the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. - were far greater than those of any other. In assessing the capabilities of states in the international system throughout this era, two particular states stood out above all others, underscoring their preeminent position within the international order and the structure's bipolar nature.

Bipolarity...Active, Interested, Clear

According to Kenneth Waltz the bipolar structure is the preferred type of international system structure since it best leads to international peace and stability. Here peace is to be understood as the absence of great power war. An international system is stable so long as :

It remains anarchic and no consequential variation takes place in the number of principal parties that constitute the system.

¹⁴ Ibid. p.100

Consequential variations in number are changes of number that lead to different expectations about the effect of structure on units.¹⁵

Waltz posits that as the number of key parties/states in the international system changes, so too will the structure change thus affecting the behaviour of states and the very nature of the international system. He also argues that the Cold War era provided us with an unparalleled period of stability in international politics, the direct result of the system's structure and its superpower face-off.

From this we need to ask a simple question : how did the bipolar structure, as Waltz sees it, contribute to the continuing peace and stability of the international system throughout the Cold War? To this question, Waltz provides us with several responses. First of all Waltz tells us that because each superpower is the other's 'obsessing danger', there is the perceived necessity to manage global affairs. By this he means that throughout the superpower conflict there were no 'peripheries' on the international scene.¹⁶ By the lack of peripheries what is meant is that there were no areas of marginal importance to either superpower because of the risks at stake. With threat of domination by the opposing superpower or the risk of nuclear war if peripheral situations were allowed to escalate to an uncontrollable point and involve the two superpowers, any event in the world that involved the fortunes of either automatically attracted the attention of the other.¹⁷ Equally, as the intensity of the competition increased - as it inevitably did with the advances made in the fields of nuclear and conventional weaponry - the range of factors involved in the competition increased. Among such factors was the reluctance by the U.S. to accept small

¹⁵ Ibid. p.162

¹⁶ Obsessing danger is the phrase used here by Waltz to depict the manner in which the two superpowers viewed one another. Peripheries is the term used to describe areas of marginal importance within global politics.

territorial losses in Korea, the Formosa Strait and Indo-China, as well as the hailing by Richard Nixon of the U.S. Supreme Court's desegregation decision as a great Cold War victory. With the fear being in the U.S. that the Soviet Union was expanding both territorially - by gaining more and more countries under its influence - and economically at a pace that far exceeded the American rate, the worry became that the U.S. would lose the Cold War without a shot being fired. This fear was due to their territorial encirclement, isolation, and eventual economic collapse (the same fear applied in the Soviet Union). Thus, it is clear that any event to do with either country came to be interpreted in terms of its Cold War implications. Very few issues in the national or international realm were thought of as irrelevant.¹⁸

In addition to the managerial efforts resulting from the fact that each superpower was the other's 'obsessing danger', Waltz argues that the smaller the number of great powers, the more likely they are to act for the sake of the entire system. That is to say, the wider the range of capabilities between the few most powerful states and the many others, the more likely the former are to participate in the management of, or interfere in the dealings of, lesser states :

The likelihood that great powers will try to manage the system is greatest when their number reduces to two. With many great powers the concerns of some are regional not global. With only two their worries about each other cause their concerns to encompass the globe.¹⁹

¹⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz "The Stability of the Bipolar World" *Daedalus* vol.93 no.3 Summer 1964. p.882.

¹⁸ The domestic concerns of the Soviet Union were of concern to the U.S. and vice versa. While the role of domestic politics in the lesser states is of little importance to Waltz's theory of bipolarity, the situation in both of the two superpowers was extremely important due to the profound impact changes in either one could have on the structure of the international system.

¹⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz *Theory of International Politics* op cit. p.198.

Waltz argues that that the chances of the great powers working for the sake of the system are greatest when their numbers are limited to two and the structure of the international system is bipolar. The reason for this, Waltz posits, is that the Cold War produced a constant sense of pressure and the recurrent possibility of crisis confronting both superpowers. Thus caution, moderation, and the management of crises came to be of undeniable importance if the preeminent status of the two superpowers was to be protected and international stability maintained.²⁰

Secondly, for Waltz, the bipolar structure contributes to the peace and stability of the international system given that the constant attention paid by each superpower leads to a situation where the two key units eventually become accustomed to each other. Through their constant opposition, the two superpowers learn how to interpret the adversary's moves and subsequently how to deal with them, thus limiting uncertainty in the international system.²¹ This growing experience with one another as well as a similarity in aspirations adds a sense of familiarity to the relations between the two thus contributing to the stability of the system. As the process of understanding the behaviour of the adversary is facilitated, the rules of the game, according to Waltz, become more clearly delineated, uncertainty lessens, and calculations become more precise. Hence, the clarity of the bipolar structure allows the two superpowers to act with greater certainty for the sake of the system, as well as for mutual benefit. By being able to reasonably predict the outcome of their actions, superpowers within the bipolar structure are able to act definitively to preserve the stability of the system and their preeminent position within that system. Moreover, due to the preeminence of the two superpowers, the input of a third party/state

²⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz "The Stability of a Bipolar World" op cit. p.884.

does little or nothing to alter the scale of most situations, and the resulting pressure to moderate behaviour is heavy :

The onus of singular responsibility coupled with the devastating effects of modern weaponry forces the two superpowers that rule the game to moderate their own behaviour as well as that of their allies. The great threat involved calms their impulses.²²

Thirdly, according to Waltz, the level of peace and stability was enhanced throughout the bipolar era given that challenges to the authority of the two superpowers were limited. As a result of the superpowers' preponderant power and the risk of nuclear war throughout the bipolar confrontation, all states knew their proper position within the international order. Waltz argues that as the number of voices grows in the international system, the rate of complications accelerates as a result of the difficulty all parties have in coping with the interests and uncertain behaviour of others.²³ Thus, as the diversity of interests grows with each additional player, so too does the difficulty of achieving stability and order due to the large number of competing interests.

For Waltz, the combination of the three factors discussed above results in "a remarkable ability to comprehend and absorb within the bipolar balance the revolutionary political, military and economic changes that occurred in the international system".²⁴ As the Soviet Union moved forward and was checked, as empires dissolved and numerous states appeared in the world, and as revolutions in military technology occurred roughly

²¹ Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics op cit. p.173.

²² Ibid. p.174.

²³ Ibid. p.193-195.

²⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz "The Stability of a Bipolar World" op cit. p.886.

once every five years and at an accelerating pace, all were accommodated without much effect on the bipolar balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.²⁵

According to Waltz, the Cold War bipolar era provided us with a remarkably stable set of relations among the two great powers. The bipolar distribution of power and the rough military parity between the two states led to a well defined division of responsibility and clarity of relations, as well as to the maintenance of a relatively stable international system. A quick look at J.D. Singer's 'Correlates of War' study, for example, tells us that the same cannot be said about the period from the birth of the European nation-states leading to the outbreak of WW II.²⁶

Criticisms and Responses

Critics of Waltz's theory of bipolarity (who are in no short supply) point to several deficiencies in his model of the bipolar structure. Chief among them are doubts about the stability that Waltz attributes to the bipolar structure. As Richard Rosecrance points out, since the competition between the two poles is both intensive and extensive, every step one takes will be regarded by the other as an act of strategic significance.²⁷ Thus, even domestic measures which have no direct external implications will be viewed in terms of the bipolar competition. This will in turn lead heightened hostility between the two poles

²⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics op cit. p. 173.

²⁶ J.D. Singer R.J. Leng " Militarized Interstate Crises : The BCOW Typology and its Applications" International Studies Quarterly, vol.32 no.2 June 1988.

²⁷ R.N. Rosecrance "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future" Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.10 no.3 September 1966. p.315. By the intensive and extensive nature of the competition between the two superpowers, we mean here that both sought to outdo one another on a domestic as well as an international level. Both sought to win the battle by attaining economic superiority as well as greater international influence and adherence to. i.e. A larger amount of states under its sphere of influence.

and in turn, to greater instability : "The antagonism generated on one side by the action of the other will be reciprocated, and the tempo of discord will increase. Since the competition is akin to that of a zero-sum game, this is quite a natural outcome".²⁸ Any steps forward in the position of one (be they territorial or technological) will inevitably take place at the expense of the other, thus most minimal ameliorations in the position of one will move the other to new exertions. Hence, the fears become that, at some point in this downward spiral, one of the two poles will think not of the risks of striking an opponent, but rather of the risks to be faced if one decides not to strike. This leads to increased insecurity and fear, and quite possibly, preventative war, which will in turn be seen as preferable to war at the opponent's initiative.²⁹

Equally, as Stephen Van Evera points out, a militaristic stance is a much greater danger within a bipolar structure than it is within a multipolar one.³⁰ Under conditions of bipolarity, as the rival militaries of the two poles continue their weapons buildup, these militaries may take on somewhat of a mythical status in relation to one another. This rivalry, critics point out, often drives the bipolar powers to flaunt their position, thus raising the risk of crisis due to increased posturing.³¹

In addition to this, as Rosecrance again points out, the prescriptive 'peace by crisis' so closely associated with the bipolar structure is a 'dubious palliative' for this can be equated to saying that the world's most peaceful place is on the brink of war.³² Now while

²⁸ Ibid. p.315.

²⁹ Ibid. p.316.

³⁰ Stephen Van Evera "Primed for Peace : Europe After the Cold War" in Sean M. Lynn-Jones ed. The Cold War and After : Prospects for Peace Cambridge, Massachusetts :The MIT Press, 1991. p.223.

³¹ By flaunt, we mean here that states can be seen as attempting to reveal the scope of their military strength; in essence an arrogant gesture inviting reaction from an opponent seeking to prove that they will not be intimidated, which in turn threatens to escalate an already dangerous situation.

³² R.N. Rosecrance "Bipolarity, Multipolarity..." op cit. p.316.

passivity may be present in the sense that states work harder to avoid war when confronted with it as a direct prospect, if the will to avoid war is greater, the proximity of war is also greater.³³ This is a feature which critics believe limits bipolarity's claim to heightened stability.

As well as providing their critiques of Waltz's bipolar structure, critics such as Van Evera cite the positive aspects of multipolarity. Here, they note that in a multipolar world, the coalition politics that result often produce coalitions that overpower aggressors by a much greater margin than is possible under bipolarity.³⁴ Since balancing behaviour is the prevalent tendency of states (according to realists), the push to form large defensive coalitions is decisive. Furthermore, they also point to the fact that a successful defense is more likely under conditions of multipolarity and therefore the penalty for aggression is higher : "The aggressor will also be smashed - a penalty that is unlikely under bipolarity. Hence aggressors are better deterred, and all states are more secure."³⁵ To substantiate this belief many point to the recent example of the Gulf War coalition that formed in opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Here a large multinational coalition led by the U.S. was formed to thwart the aggressive Iraqi tactics. This coalition proved to be overwhelmingly powerful and succeeded in thrashing any and all Iraqi advances.

It is held by the proponents of multipolarity that as long as states are capable of moving laterally from one coalition to another, their self-interest will favour the development of evenly matched coalitions. Thus, substantial arms increases by one party,

³³ Ibid. p.316.

³⁴ Stephen Van Evera "Primed for Peace..." op cit. p.222.

³⁵ Ibid. p.222.

which in a bipolar world might trigger a dangerous arms buildup, might, in a multipolar world, call for nothing more than a quick alteration of alliances.

Complimenting this view of the merit of the multipolar structure is the perspective provided by Karl Deutsch and David Singer. According to them the needs and resources of states differ. This is positive in the sense that the more independent states there are, the larger the number and range of tradeoffs available to states :

As possible tradeoffs increase, the greater the possibility for compensatory and stabilizing interactions to occur. That is, in a system characterized by conflict-generating scarcities, each and every increase in opportunities for cooperation will diminish the tendency to pursue a conflict up to and over the threshold of war."³⁶

As well, as the number of independent actors increases in a multipolar system, the proportion of attention that any particular state is able to devote to another will inevitably diminish.³⁷ Assuming that some minimum amount of attention is required for an escalating conflict, multipolarity enhances stability :

If some minimum percentage of a nation's external attention is required for that nation to engage in behaviour toward armed conflict, and the increase in independent actors diminishes the share that any nation can allocate to any other single actor, such an increase is likely to have a stabilizing effect upon the system."³⁸

According to Deutsch and Singer, there is more flexibility within a multipolar structure as a result of the increased number of options available to states.³⁹ As a result, the greater the number of great powers there are in a system, the more stable and less warlike it will be.

³⁶ Karl W. Deutsch David J. Singer "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability" World Politics vol.16 no.3 April 1964. p.395-96.

³⁷ Ibid. p.396.

³⁸ Ibid. p.400.

In responding to these criticisms of his theory of bipolarity, Waltz, as cited in Richard Rosecrance's article "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future", observes the following. While he concedes the fact that in a bipolar world, an alteration in the capabilities of either of the two superpowers is of importance to the entire system, Waltz points out that changes are quite simple to predict.⁴⁰ Conversely, in a multipolar world, although a single adjustment in military prowess or alliance combination may not be significant to the system as a whole, its consequences are far more difficult to foresee. Waltz points out that in a multipolar world there lies the potential for an astronomic number of alliance combinations, and the military dispositions may take on a number of forms. The difficulty of policy making is thus increased immensely as the lines of force and allegiance are no longer clearly drawn, a factor which in turn limits the stability of the system. In a multipolar world, without the clear alliance patterns and established understanding among allies as well as rivals that bipolarity provided, the results of one's actions become that much more difficult to predict.⁴¹ Hence, Waltz argues that war may in fact occur not through a failure of will but through a failure of understanding due to the system's lack of clarity.⁴²

In addition, Waltz, as cited in Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder's article "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks : Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", states that in a multipolar system, contrary to what its proponents believe : "In the face of a rising threat, balancing alignments fail to form in a timely fashion because some states try to free-ride on

³⁹ Ibid. p.394.

⁴⁰ R.N. Rosecrance "Bipolarity, Multipolarity..." op cit. p.320.

⁴¹ Ibid. p.320

⁴² Ibid. p.320

other states' balancing efforts."⁴³ Waltz notes that within a multipolar structure characterized by increasingly selfish concerns, states may often adopt free rider tactics.

Rather than engage in balancing alignments, many states in a multipolar world will simply hang back and wait for others to act so as to avoid bearing the costs of action. By choosing inaction, they may perhaps enhance their relative position vis a vis those states choosing action by avoiding the damaging effects (financial or physical) which may be incurred when a state acts for the sake of others as well as the system.⁴⁴ Such behaviour, according to Waltz, does not bode well for the stability of the system in the sense that not only will it create resentment on the part of those states consistently working for the sake of the system - those pursuing such stabilizing actions as peacekeeping - but it will also encourage other states to adopt a 'free-riding' strategy, this at the expense of the system.⁴⁵

Finally, Waltz also believes that a multipolar world will likely increase the number of international conflicts, rather than lower it as his critics have suggested. In a bipolar system there can be but one major antagonism, conversely, multipolarity may have countless frictions.⁴⁶ While it is true that the attention of states will be dispersed throughout the system, so it is true that the variety of national interests expressed will multiply. Thus, since in a multipolar order a large number of states will be relevant actors in the system 'a bewildering range of interests must ensue'.⁴⁷ The greater diversity of demands that will inevitably ensue due to the diverse natures of states in the international system, the more difficult it will be to accommodate these demands. As a result,

⁴³ Thomas J. Christensen Jack Snyder "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks : Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity" International Organization vol.44 no.2 Spring 1990. p.141.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p.141.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p.141.

⁴⁶ R.N. Rosecrance "Bipolarity, Multipolarity..." op cit. p.318.

'multipolarity by increasing diversity, must also increase conflicts of interest'.⁴⁸ As more and more states bring their ideas to the table as to how to deal with certain situations, the more difficult it will become to reach a consensus, a factor which Waltz argues will inevitably increase tension and hostility.

Bipolarity's Breakdown

Given this understanding of bipolarity, the question now becomes, how would Waltz interpret the events that have unfolded over the past six or seven years? More specifically, how are we to understand the instability that has followed the collapse of the Soviet Union?

In responding to these questions, it is necessary to reiterate that, according to Waltz, structural change begins with a system's units.⁴⁹ Thus, the decline in capabilities of the Soviet Union - one of the system's two key units - has led to the breakdown of the bipolar structure that had existed for fifty years. The breakdown of this structure, as will be shown in the following chapters, has contributed to the confusion and lack of direction now permeating throughout the international system. The prevailing patterns of behaviour among states once dictated by this structure no longer hold. States are now left struggling with how to deal with the emerging order/disorder and what their place within that order/disorder will be.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p.319.

⁴⁸ Ibid p.319.

⁴⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz "The Emerging Structure of International Politics" International Security vol.18 Fall 1993. p.49.

To begin with, Waltz believes that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the bipolar structure is forcing states to either learn new roles or relearn old ones. This scenario holds out negative implications for several reasons. First among these is the fact that the breakdown of bipolarity is contributing to increased difficulty in interpreting the moves of others - a fact which leads to heightened uncertainty and to the potential for increased miscalculations. This in turn raises the level of insecurity of Western states, and paralyzes effective action, a fact which will be clearly illustrated in our second chapter case study involving the situation in Bosnia. As Waltz states : "New roles are hard to learn and actors may trip when playing on unfamiliar sets".⁵⁰

Second, the decline of the Soviet Union in the East has inevitably triggered the decline of U.S. influence in the West. With the absence of an all-encompassing threat posed by the Soviet Union, no longer do the Western allies seem willing to subordinate their own security interests in order to ensure their continued protection under the U.S. security umbrella. Furthermore, no longer does the U.S. seem as willing to provide this service. As a result, effective international action by the West is now that much more difficult to achieve. As the allies have begun to place their interests above those of the 'greater common good', the high level of consensus so often achieved throughout the Cold War has diminished.⁵¹ As the number of significant actors in the international system has increased, so too has the range of interests and ideas on how to deal with particular

⁵⁰ Ibid. p.72.

⁵¹ The 'greater common good' here was the security provided to the allies during the Cold War by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and the subsequent stability that resulted. Throughout this period the allies sacrificed their independent interests to some degree in return for the security provided to them by the U.S. As a result a unified Western stance was the norm, and not the exception. Now that such a structure is no more, Waltz questions the will of the U.S. to continue providing such leadership, as well as the desire on the part of many of the allies, whose strength has grown vis a vis the U.S. over the past number of years, to continue to sacrifice their individual interests.

situations as each actor has brought its agenda to the table. This diversity has in turn limited effective international action because it limits the possibility of consensus. As a result of this increased inability to achieve a consensus, the international community's ability to move forward and act effectively has been stalled. Once again, this fact will be clearly illustrated in our second chapter which deals with the Bosnian quagmire.

Equally, the U.S. willingness to provide the costly role of international leadership has declined. Under the Cold War bipolar structure, as a result of the means at its disposal and the nature of the bipolar conflict, it was in the direct interests of the U.S. and its allies to maintain the provision of U.S. leadership in the international system. With the demise of this conflict and its unifying feature for the West - as will be shown in the second chapter - there is a reluctance to continue this international managerial role. Many Americans and their allies are challenging the prospect of continued U.S. leadership and placing their own interests above those of the whole.⁵² For Waltz, this challenge limits the potential for positive international action since the U.S. is the sole remaining power capable of affecting the direction and outcome of particular situations in the international system.

As will be shown in the third chapter, instead of leading to peace, Waltz sees the breakdown of the Cold War bipolar structure antedated by the collapse of the Soviet Union as leading to a natural intensification of conflict and division. With centuries old national and ethnic conflicts now freed from the tight grip of Soviet rule, stability in Europe - the breeding ground of some of the most destructive episodes in the history of

⁵² What is meant here is that states are now choosing relative gains as opposed to absolute ones. By placing individual interests above all else, I argue, following Waltz, that states are acting with a shortsightedness that threatens the international system as a whole.

mankind - is more tenuous.⁵³ In addition, Waltz sees the breakdown of the U.S.S.R. and the subsequent collapse of bipolarity as triggering the rise of regional organizations and limiting the future of several international organizations. Waltz questions how a particular organization or alliance (such as NATO) can continue to function when the threat it was created to deal with is no more. As well, Waltz asks how a particular organization based on consensus and unity will be able to act effectively with the absence of the unifying feature that has helped override the differences between states.

Conclusion

According to Kenneth Waltz, there exists a sense of order and direction under bipolarity that cannot be found under other, multipolar structures. The bipolar structure led to the creation of a set of clearly established rules in the international system, thus limiting uncertainty. It forced the superpowers to manage, and it limited diversity and dissension as a result of the two superpowers preponderance of power and the existing nuclear threat. These three factors are identified by Waltz as favoring positive, effective international action and thus, international stability. Bipolarity, Waltz argues, demands the international leadership of its two most powerful states, as well as - to a large degree - the acquiescence of lesser states. These factors bode well for international stability in the sense that there exists a degree of uniformity to the international system. In the chapters to follow an attempt will be made to substantiate these points by illustrating the effects of the

⁵³ Kenneth N. Waltz "The Emerging Structure of International Politics" ... op cit. p.78.

collapse of the bipolar order in relation to Bosnia, as well as the implications for the international system of bipolarity's collapse.

Chapter Two

BOSNIA : A CASE STUDY ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE COLLAPSE OF BIPOLARITY

In our first chapter we reviewed Kenneth Waltz's theory of bipolarity. From this review, we identified a number of consequences of a collapse in the bipolar structure : an increase in the level of uncertainty confronted by states; a reluctance to manage global affairs on the part of the great powers; and an increase in the diversity of interests accompanying an increase in prominent actors. These consequences, according to Waltz, would have the ultimate effect of paralyzing effective international action, leading to increased instability in the international system.

In this second chapter, an attempt will be made to illustrate Waltz's predictions on the collapse of the bipolar structure. These predictions fall into three general categories. To begin, we want to show that the absence of global order in the post Cold War world can be attributed to bipolarity's collapse, and this by focussing on the situation that has unfolded in Bosnia over the past number of years. As a result of the collapse of the Cold War bipolar structure, the increased uncertainty among the great powers limited their efforts to deal with the situation in Bosnia, allowing it to escalate out of control. Secondly, it will be argued that the collapse of the immediate nuclear threat formerly represented by the Soviet Union triggered a reluctance to manage the situation in Bosnia on the part of the great powers - and particularly the United States - due to the perceived absence of a direct threat to their interests in this conflict. Finally, it will also be argued that the emerging diversity of interests accompanying bipolarity's collapse and the absence of an immediate security threat to Western Europe has led to a desire on the part of the Western

allies to no longer subordinate their interests to those of the United States (or anyone else). Consequently, a log jam on how to deal with the situation in Bosnia arose as each state implicated in the peace process brought their own agenda to the table. These three factors, highlighted by Waltz's analysis, limited effective international action and contributed to the prolonging of suffering in Bosnia.

Prior to proceeding to the analysis, one must ask : why the choice of Bosnia to illustrate Waltz's theoretical conclusions? The answer is clear : throughout the Cold War, despite the fact that each superpower was the other's 'obsessing danger' (thus leaving no peripheries in the international system), the true focus of each's concentration in the bipolar confrontation was Europe. The bipolar structure provided for a relatively stable, peaceful situation in Europe. Realizing the huge stakes at risk the two superpowers worked diligently to avoid such situations as that experienced in Bosnia. Bosnia has been selected as the case for this thesis precisely due to the fact that in being allowed to escalate, it epitomizes everything that the Cold War bipolar order worked against - the destruction of peace and stability, primarily in Europe.

A Chronology of the Bosnian Conflict

Before we can begin any analysis of the three key features that Waltz sees as resulting from the collapse of the bipolar structure in relation to Bosnia, it is necessary to first develop a preliminary understanding of the events that have unfolded in Bosnia. Thus the following section highlighting some of the key events in Bosnia has been included. While this section does not profess to fully include or explain all the events in the history

of the conflict, it does provide a base from which one can reasonably proceed to the following sections of this chapter.

First of all, it is essential to state that the brutal conflict that has been experienced in Bosnia is the result of a complex interaction of historical, religious and political factors. As well as this, it is also the result of the absence of effective political institutions in newly created states.¹

The historical nature of the tragedy dates back centuries, at least to the crossing of the Dardanelles by the Ottoman Turks and their settlement in Europe.² At this time the Turks created the millet system of government for the Balkan region. This system divided the populations into semi-autonomous religious groups. Muslim and non-Muslim alike were free to organize and develop institutions under the leadership of their religious organizations. As a result, religion became a central element in the national identity of the people living in the Balkans, distinguishing them from one another.³

In the nineteenth century the principle of nationality was introduced into this mix of interdependent ethnic groups. Not surprisingly the application of this principle produced conflicts between disputatious Balkan nationalisms that became part of the fuse to the powder keg of World War I.⁴ In the twentieth century all the Balkan states endured some form of autocratic or military rule. This includes Yugoslavia, whose various ethnic

¹ Michael Moodie "The Balkan Tragedy" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and social Science no. 541. September, 1995. p.101.

² Ibid. p.102.

³ Ibid. p.102.

⁴ Ibid. p.102

elements were held together largely by the force of the personality of war hero, resistance leader, and communist Josep Briz Tito.⁵

Questions about the future of a post-Tito Yugoslavia began to circulate even prior to his death in 1980. During the 1970's a federal system of government had evolved that divided the country into a number of republics and provinces based largely on ethnic and historical patterns.⁶ Given the diverse ethnic identity, however, there was little correspondence between republic and provincial boundaries, on the one hand, and patterns of ethnic settlement on the other.⁷

In the late 1980's and early 1990's with the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia lost any semblance of cohesiveness and direction. The absence of democratic institutions ruled out any possibility that extensive political activity could be channeled into a civic nationalism to fill the political and ideological void. Coupled with this was the fact that the country had endured a severe economic crisis since the early 1980's and furthermore, was now subject to the painful measures associated with shifting to a market economy. As a result there was a general air of discontent enveloping the country - particularly so within the Serbian population - discontent which fueled a desire for strong leadership.⁸

Akin to this Serbia malaise was an ambitious politician in Belgrade who learnt and understood the tactics of communist power politics as he worked his way up through the party ranks; his name was Slobodan Milosevic.⁹ Milosevic recognized the sense of

⁵ Ibid. p.103.

⁶ Ibid. p.103.

⁷ Ibid. p.103.

⁸ Noel Malcolm Bosnia : A Short History New York : New York University Press, 1994. p.212-213.

⁹ Ibid. p.213.

vulnerability of the Serbian population and sought to instill the belief that ethnic nationalism and pride was the proper channel through which to safeguard economic and physical security.

In line with such thinking were certain results that would add fuel to the conflicting interests in Yugoslavia and worsen the situation dramatically. The first of these was the resurfacing of the anti-Croatian rhetoric surrounding the Second World War which had long been suppressed. This rhetoric was not only accepted by the Milosevic regime but incited by it.¹⁰ The second was a resolution passed in the Serbian Assembly in March of 1989 which abolished the political autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, rendering them subject to the direct control of the Serb capital of Belgrade.¹¹

Realizing the offensive nature of Milosevic's tactics, and his desire for control of Serb populations in the other republics, the Republics of Slovenia and particularly Croatia, with its Serb minority, began to press for independence. On the 19th of May 1991 a referendum on full independence was held in Croatia - 92% voted in favour. On the 25th of June 1991 both Croatia and Slovenia declared independence, on the following day a column of Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) tanks was sent to both Republics in an effort to quell the revolutionary forces - the conflict had begun.¹²

On the 15th of October 1991, the Republican Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a resolution declaring the Republic a sovereign and independent state.¹³ This act would come to signal the advent of conflict in Bosnia for the Bosnian Serbs were bitterly

¹⁰ Ibid. p.214.

¹¹ Ibid. p.212.

¹² Ibid. p.225.

¹³ Susan Woodward Balkan Tragedy : Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1995. p.181.

opposed to such a resolution and clung to the hope of maintaining Bosnia in a rump Yugoslavia. Rather than accept the Belgrade initiative to form a new federation of nations and republics choosing to remain within Yugoslavia, the Bosnian mistrust of Milosevic and the Serb agenda led them to opt for secession. On the 17th of October 1991, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina created a new coat of arms and a flag, and on the 29th of October it informed the federal Parliament that it was now a sovereign state.¹⁴

In April of 1992, after Bosnia had been recognized by both the E.C. and the U.S., the Bosnian Serb threat was upheld triggering the outbreak of a full-scale civil war. True to their words the Serbs began to establish their independence with devastating military force. They were well prepared for the conflict since Belgrade had been flooding the Bosnian Serbs with weapons since early 1991.¹⁵

It is essential to point out that the war in Bosnia was executed with alarming ferocity, involving the systematic bombardment of civilian targets, including the Serbian sieges of Goradze and Sarajevo in 1993, the blockade of humanitarian relief efforts, and communal killing.¹⁶ A particularly disgusting practice that was adopted was ethnic cleansing, or the forcible expulsion of people of the wrong ethnic background from a given area through violence and terror including murder, rape, arson, robbery, and beatings.¹⁷ The purpose was to create such a sentiment of terror in the targeted population that they would want to leave and never return. While all sides are said to have pursued such a practice, it is held that the Bosnian Serbs have done so much more often.

¹⁴ Ibid. p.181.

¹⁵ Michael Moodie "The Balkan Tragedy"... op cit. p.107.

¹⁶ Ibid. p.107.

¹⁷ Ibid. p.108.

On the ground, the Bosnian conflict was accompanied by constant cajolery and deception. On the heels of the breakdown of an early cease-fire - cease-fire breakdowns were a recurrent pattern - in April of 1993 the United Nations Security Council declared the Muslim held town of Srebrenica a safe area to be especially protected by U.N. peacekeeping forces. A month later Sarajevo, Zepa, Tuzla, and Bihac were given similar status.¹⁸ However, the Serbs continued to pound these Muslim held areas. For example in June of 1993, Serb shelling of Sarajevo killed 11 people at a football match, an act which prompted the Security Council to authorize U.N. forces to use force to protect safe areas and humanitarian convoys.¹⁹ As well, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) now agreed to enforce the U.N. imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia, which now consisted of only Serbia and Montenegro. Two months later NATO agreed to guidelines to enforce the safe areas following Serb attacks against Goradze, Sarajevo and other sites.²⁰ Yet little was actually done by the interventionary forces for quite some time and the conflict proceeded virtually uninhibited.

On the 9th of February 1994, in response to a Serb mortar attack in a Sarajevo market that killed 65 people and injured more than 200, NATO issued an ultimatum promising airstrikes against the Serb positions unless they agreed to a cease-fire, the creation of a demilitarized zone of 20km around the Bosnian capital and the placement of their heavy weapons under U.N. control. Although the Serbs acquiesced to these demands and an uneasy calm settled over Sarajevo, the situation through the rest of the country

¹⁸ Ibid. p.108.

¹⁹ Ibid. p.108.

²⁰ Ibid. p.108.

remained unsettled. In fact, by the middle of 1994, Serbs controlled almost 70% of Bosnian territory.²¹

On the diplomatic front the Bosnian conflict lay witness to frustration after frustration. In early 1993 Cyrus Vance, the U.N. special representative (later replaced by Norway's Thorvald Stoltenberg) and Lord Owen, representing the E.C., offered a plan for the cantonization of Bosnia in attempt to institutionalize and defuse ethnic diversity.²² Although it ultimately received the support of the U.N. and the West, the plan was severely criticized as "a piece of labored artificiality, a constant imposed from the outside" with its maps serving "primarily as blueprints for further aggression by those who would want to create their own mini-state on the ground".²³ Although the leaders of all three Bosnian parties signed the Vance-Owen plan's principles, the Bosnian Muslims refused to sign the cease-fire accompanying them and both the Serbs and the Muslims rejected the specific map boundaries. In March 1993, Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed the Vance-Owen plan based on a revised map, but the Serbs refused. The Bosnian Serbs then overwhelmingly rejected the Vance-Owen plan in a referendum in May because it did not give them sufficient control over all the territories they had won on the battlefield.²⁴

In lieu of the failed Vance-Owen plan, Croatia and Serbia proposed in June of 1993 that Bosnia be divided into three ethnic states. This prompted Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic to walk out of peace talks in Geneva. The Bosnian president later came

²¹ Warren Zimmerman Origins of a Catastrophe New York : Random House, 1996. p.227.

²² Michael Moodie "The Balkan Tragedy"... op cit. p.109.

²³ Ibid. p.109.

²⁴ Ibid. p.109.

to accept the concept of dividing the country into three separate republics but the year was marked by the inability of the sides to agree on a map designating those areas.²⁵

Relative calm prevailed for several months in 1994 during which diplomatic efforts to resolve the problems were stepped up. Under increased international pressure from the United States and others, Croatian and Bosnian Muslims agreed to a federation between their respective territories in early 1994. In the summer of 1994, the Contact Group (outside powers including Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States seeking a diplomatic solution) proposed a peace plan that would give 51% of Bosnian territory to the Croatian/Muslim federation and 49% to the Bosnian Serbs, a move that would force the Serbs to relinquish 20% of the territory over which they had assumed control.²⁶

Although Serbia's President Milosevic supported the plan so as to assist in the lifting of the international embargo against his country, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic rejected the proposal. The Bosnian Muslims accepted the plan, acknowledging however, that they did so because they saw no risk that the Bosnian Serbs would ever agree to its implementation.

Late 1994 was witness to the rise of certain developments that would once again heighten the level of conflict in Bosnia. One such development was the fact that the Bosnian Serbs were joined at this time by Croatian Serbs who had proclaimed an independent republic in Krajina, a region just across the Bosnian border. As well as this, it was also at this time that Karadzic indicated that his political goals had changed and that

²⁵ Ibid. p. 109.

²⁶ Warren Zimmerman Origins of a Catastrophe op cit. p.231.

he no longer sought a Bosnian Serb entity, but an independent state recognized by the U.N.²⁷

In light of such revelations, the Serbs stepped up the intensity of their military operations in Bosnia, particularly in the area of Bihac.²⁸ Throughout this, U.N. peacekeeping forces and NATO looked on helplessly. Despite NATO's tough talk, the Serbs continued to pound the safe areas. In addition to this, in an act humiliating to the U.N., the Bosnian Serbs took U.N. peacekeepers hostage, using them as human shields to insure against the threat of NATO airstrikes.²⁹

As a result of such degrading acts by the Serbs and the continual shelling of civilian areas by Serb forces, NATO's hand was finally forced and on the 25th of May, 1995, airstrikes against various Serb artillery positions were introduced.³⁰ In September of 1995, as a result of yet another massacre in Sarajevo (on the 28th of August a mortar hit a Sarajevo market killing 38 people), NATO airstrikes were stepped up dramatically in order to force the Serb withdrawal of all heavy armaments from within the 20km exclusionary zone around the city of Sarajevo.³¹

As a result of Serb compliance with these ordinances, the diplomatic efforts led by U.S. Ambassador Richard Holdbrooke and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were stepped up tremendously. These efforts culminated in the first true prospect for real peace in Bosnia and the rest of the former-Yugoslavia in five years on the 11th of November,

²⁷ Michael Moodie "The Balkan Tragedy" ... op cit. p.110.

²⁸ Ibid. p.110.

²⁹ Ibid. p.110.

³⁰ Warren Zimmerman The Origins of a Catastrophe op cit. p.232.

³¹ Ibid. p.232.

1995.³² On this date in Dayton, Ohio, after several days of negotiations, the leaders of all the warring factions finally agreed to peace.

The terms of the peace agreement were to preserve Bosnia as a single state within its present borders and with international recognition. The state will be made up of two parts, the Bosnian-Croat Federation with 51% of the territory, and the Bosnian Serb Republic with 49% of the territory. The capital city of Sarajevo will remain united.³³

In order to assist in the proper functioning of this agreement it was agreed that an international force (IFOR) under NATO's auspices and the U.S.'s direction be provided. This force would consist of some 60,000 troops, 40,000 of whom would be coming from some 25 other nations (led by Britain and France) and 20,000 of whom would be provided by the United States.³⁴

Uncertainty of Implications

With this discussion of the events in Bosnia as context, we can now turn to an evaluation of Waltz's claims. The first issue to be discussed that has limited effective international action (and thus contributed to the rise in international disorder) is the rise in the level of Western states' uncertainty over the implications of their actions as a result of the breakdown of the bipolar structure. Today's world order is unlike the previous Waltzian bipolar order where there was an established pattern of behavior among states allowing them to reasonably predict the outcome of their actions. The uncertainty

³² William J. Clinton Public Papers Of The President Of The United States November, 21 1995. p.571.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

manifested in the Bosnian case is due to the fact that the problems posed by and the risks involved with state actions are now extremely unclear. The confusion and uncertainty that have coincided with bipolarity's breakdown, as we have seen, paralyzed any attempts to intervene in the situation for much of the early going (1991-1994). As articulated by Carroll J. Doherty, who covers Defense and Foreign Policy issues in the U.S. Congress for Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report : "Lawmakers lacking a foreign policy compass for the post Cold War era, appeared to go off in every direction. Old alliances had disappeared with the Soviet threat, and the new array of opinion defied easy categorization".³⁵ As a result of the absence of order no longer did state policymakers appear confident in predicting the fate of their actions as they tread upon this new, unfamiliar ground. Without a firm grasp of what the consequences of their actions might be, Western statesmen and political thinkers left Bosnia to burn as they debated differing scenarios of the effects of intervention rather than acting decisively. While the world stood by and watched in horror, the fate of those caught in the crossfire appeared to be of secondary importance.

As a result of the structural transformations being experienced due to bipolarity's collapse, uncertainty was tremendously heightened during this period. Worsening the situation were certain initial attempts to deal with the Bosnian case which many feel may have in fact contributed to its violent outburst. In June of 1991, the then U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker stated that the United States preferred a unified Yugoslavia. While this statement was apparently made so as to avoid a violent secessionist eruption and promote peaceful dialogue, it came to be interpreted by the Serb forces in Belgrade as

³⁵ Carroll J. Doherty "Voices for Restraint Grow Louder Amid Calls for Military Action" Congressional

tacit approval to crush regional secession.³⁶ This heralded the beginnings of Yugoslavia's violent civil conflict pitting the Serb led Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the secessionist Croatian forces against one another. Later that year, yet another effort by the international community to stem the conflict would (many believe) further fuel its fire. Under strong German pressure the E.C. (and later the U.S.) formerly recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia so as to grant them international legitimacy in hopes of allaying Serb advances.³⁷ However, this move would prove to backfire disastrously and come to affect the fate of the Bosnian Muslim population more than anyone else. Faced with the prospect of either being swallowed up by the Serb dominated remains of Yugoslavia or independence, the Bosnian government chose the latter. In doing so (as noted earlier) they triggered the beginnings of a full scale Bosnian civil war, in which the Bosnian Muslims would endure tremendous suffering.³⁸

As the level of uncertainty rose as to whether these initial 'preventative' actions by the international community had in fact contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Bosnia, Western policymakers became even more wary of any new action to deal with this new 'unknown'. Rather than intervene in this period where the outcome of their actions could not be reasonably predicted, uncertainty limited the actions of the Western states.

The next forum to which we now turn in order to illustrate the uncertainty held by the Western states (and primarily the U.S.) over the implications of their actions is the U.S. Congress. What is significant about the debate in Congress is that it is reflective of

Quarterly Weekly Report vol.51 no.18 May 1, 1993. p.1093.

³⁶ Stephen Stedman "Alchemy for a New World Order" Foreign Affairs vol.74 no.3 May/June 1995. p.16-17.

³⁷ Ibid. p.17.

³⁸ Michael Moodie "The Balkan Tragedy"... op cit. p.107.

the domestic concerns of the sole remaining superpower in this new era free of bipolar confrontation. What is also significant is that it reflects the fact that if the sole remaining superpower - the only state capable of influencing the direction of the international order, Waltz tells us - allows its uncertainty to limit its international role, then this does not bode well for the stability of the international system. As the former U.S. National Security Advisor (in the Bush Administration) Brent Scowcroft states :

We are the only nation in the world capable of setting an independent foreign policy, all other nations set their foreign policy according to ours. As a result, if we waver on this issue confusion and disorder are inevitable.³⁹

What was at the heart of the debate in Congress was the uncertainty over involvement and the consequences it might bring. More specifically, what would intervention mean for the future stability of the international system and for the states involved, and what would non-intervention mean? As we shall see, no clear answers could be agreed upon for there was no clear way of predicting the fate of one's actions. The only constant this debate revealed was that the absence of established rules and parameters of action that coincided with bipolarity's collapse was allowing for the escalation of extreme brutality in Bosnia.

Echoing the sentiments of Michael Lind, the executive editor of the National Interest (an extremely conservative American periodical), many of the proponents of non-intervention into the Bosnian fiasco in Congress sought to downplay the scope of the conflict and its potential impact on the international order. In so doing, they noted that there was little danger, as many interventionists had alluded, that the Balkan violence

³⁹ Words spoken by former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft on the 21st of November, 1995 while a guest on the Charlie Rose Show on PBS.

would draw traditional European great powers - Germany, Russia, and Turkey - into the conflict.⁴⁰ Here they pointed out that rather than spreading and escalating, the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia would inspire common sense and peacefulness in other conflict areas of East-Central Europe.⁴¹

As Senators John W. Warner (R.-Va.) and Lee Hamilton (D.-Ind.) noted, the belief of the non-interventionists was that the more disastrous outcome could only be expected if the West, led by the U.S., were to adopt a strategy of large scale intervention. Their reasonings for this were several. First they asked whether or not the U.S. and its allies were ready to declare war in a hostile area of the world about which they understood little? Were the U.S. and their allies prepared to sacrifice the lives of their servicemen, for that is what any large scale intervention would inevitably entail?⁴² Furthermore, were these Western states prepared to deal with the domestic unrest any such actions would provoke? As Henry J. Hyde, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated : "People are now trying to figure out whether this is Germany 1942 or Vietnam 1975".⁴³

Bolstering the uncertainty over the prospects of heightened Western intervention were the reports of American military planners who insisted upon the difficulty of any attempt to thwart the Serbs short of all out war.⁴⁴ With more and more briefings revealing how ideal the Bosnian landscape was for guerilla fighting, and how the Serbs had such a storied tradition of guerilla fighting dating back to WW II, fuel was added to the fears that

⁴⁰ Michael Lind "To Die in Sarajevo" Policy Review vol.62 Fall 1992. p.38.

⁴¹ Ibid. p.38.

⁴² Carroll J. Doherty "Voices for Restraint..." op cit. p.1093.

⁴³ Ibid. p.1095.

⁴⁴ David Rieff "Bosnia's Fall Our Failure" Harper's vol.290 no.1737 Feb.1995. p.15.

already existed and 'loaded a deck that was already stacked against helping Bosnia'.⁴⁵ The questions of those such as House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) were repeated in the House of Representatives over and over again. Were the allies willing to embroil themselves in a guerilla war with a well-seasoned adversary? Did the U.S. want another Vietnam and its devastating results in such a highly unstable period of international politics?⁴⁶

Perhaps the greatest fear of the non-interventionists stemming from the collapse of the bipolar order (a concern not given a lot of public attention on the American front but which was highly played out on the European front) was the potential effect of large scale intervention on Western-Soviet relations. Here many prominent Europeans such as Jaques Delors, the former President of the E.U., and Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, questioned whether the Western powers would be charting a more dangerous path by escalating the level of Western intervention in the conflict given the potential problems this might provoke in Russia.⁴⁷ Citing the fact that Moscow, largely due to economic and political uncertainty, was caught in a rising tide of nationalism both difficult and dangerous to ignore, they questioned the logic of the American desire to end the Bosnian arms embargo and introduce NATO military intervention through airstrikes. Reinforcing this apprehension were warnings coming out of Moscow such as those by Sergei Shakrai, the

⁴⁵ Ibid. p.15.

⁴⁶ Carroll J. Doherty "Congress Reaches No Consensus Takes No Action" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report Aug. 7, 1993. p.2172. Invoking the image of Vietnam in his opposition to U.S. intervention into Bosnia, Newt Gingrich alluded to the fact that, against the will of the American people, diplomats were again leading Americans down the path to war just as they had in Vietnam.

⁴⁷ Olivia Ward "Moscow Crisis Looms Over Bosnia Attack" The Toronto Star Feb.8, 1994. p.B15. Fear of antagonizing the Russians has been evident in the discourse of much of Europe's elite concerning Bosnia. In fact, Jaques Delors has consistently warned against the dangers of erecting new frontiers around Russia which could lead to frustration and aggression. At the same time Britain has allied itself with Russia in opposition to U.S. pressure to heighten intervention.

nationalities minister and former Yeltsin top troubleshooter who predicted that escalating the conflict could lead to world war. This statement, made in a parliamentary meeting, came shortly after Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev accused ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky of trying to provoke a global conflict by pressing Russia into a pro-Serbian position.⁴⁸ While Russian officials sought to downplay Zhirinovsky's rabble rousing, they also warned against any heightened military action against Serbia, a warning to the West that Russia could not afford to upset its delicate balance of political forces, and one that non-interventionists took very seriously.⁴⁹

On the opposite side of the spectrum in the U.S. Congress, the proponents of intervention, such as former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Ka.) and Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) were uncertain as to whether ignoring the situation in Bosnia would risk upsetting the continental balance in Europe, thus throwing the entire realm of international security into jeopardy.⁵⁰ Here they questioned whether the vital interests of all the major powers would be at stake if this situation were allowed to continue unabated. As the revelations of extreme atrocities and human rights abuses went on without being checked, would the U.S. effectively be providing the green light for the spread of this conflict and the proliferation of such events elsewhere, events that would inevitably escalate the level and scope of conflict.⁵¹ As reflected in Senator Lugar's comments, the interventionists

⁴⁸ Ibid. p.B15.

⁴⁹ Ibid. p.B15.

⁵⁰ Carroll J. Doherty "Voices for Restraint..." op cit. p.1095.

⁵¹ Hearing Before the Sub-Committee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 103rd Congress Feb.18, 1993. Address by David Gompert.

argued that : "Without stopping the music at this point, the United States and its allies are fated, in my judgement, to face difficulties that are very severe down the trail".⁵²

In addition, as articulated by David Gompert, the former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Defense, the proponents of intervention noted that continuing instability, conflict and aggression in the Balkans could threaten to abort democracy in at least a half dozen former communist states, a factor which holds profound implications for Western strategic interests.⁵³ Gompert argued that if no action were to be taken then the West could be left with only a small handful of successful democracies in a part of the world that just a few years ago appeared to hold out the hope to be uniformly democratic :

... this conflict is already putting enormous pressure and I think if it continues and spreads it will put unbearable pressure on fragile democracies throughout a large part of Eastern Europe, which I think affect important American interests.⁵⁴

Uncertainty over how to act in the Bosnian situation stemmed from the absence of rules in the international order resulting from the collapse of the Cold War bipolar structure. Without being able to reasonably predict the outcome of their actions, the individual uncertainties of the nations capable of influencing the situation - particularly the United States - overrode their humanitarian concerns and the Bosnian situation was allowed to fester out of control. Thus it becomes clear that the underlying feature of the debate over intervention is uncertainty; uncertainty over how intervention or non-intervention would come to affect the parties involved in the debate - the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Russia... This is illustrative of what Waltz speaks of when he states that in a bipolar world the concerns of the two poles are global, whereas in a multipolar world

⁵² Carroll J. Doherty "Voices for Restraint..." op cit. p.1095.

⁵³ Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs... op cit. p.80.

the concerns of the many become regional. Thus the question being asked in the uncertainty over intervention was 'how would intervention or non-intervention come to affect our fate (each particular state) and, what would it mean for us?' Although the question is no different from the one that was posed throughout the Cold War, the answer certainly is, resulting in the heightened uncertainty and the limited action in the Bosnian situation.

Reluctance to Manage

The second key element in our hypothesis concerning the lack of effective international action in the Bosnian conflict was the reluctance to manage the situation on the part of the great powers of today. As stated in our introduction and again in chapter one, throughout the Cold War the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sought to outdo one another in every corner of the globe. As will be shown in the reluctance to deal with the Bosnian situation, such is no longer the case. As a result, we are forced to ask why is this so, what is at the root of this reluctance to manage the Bosnian situation on the part of the great powers - and the U.S. in particular? The answer to this question, as will be illustrated in the following section, is that as a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure, there has been a refocusing of American attention away from such global responsibilities. No longer does the U.S. feel compelled to manage such situations as Bosnia, for no longer does it feel its direct interests to be at stake.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p.80

At the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict the prevailing attitude within the U.S. was that this problem should be looked upon as 'Europe's baby'.⁵⁵ Observers - including then President George Bush - noted that throughout the Cold War it had been America's responsibility to shoulder the burden of European security, and that now, in the dawn of this new era, it was time for the European states to begin to undertake the costs and risks of their own security. As pointed out by Douglas Seay, the Deputy Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies at the Heritage Foundation (a prominent very conservative thinktank in the U.S.) :

The U.S. role in Yugoslavia must be to encourage, insist upon, even force Europeans to undertake intervention themselves and reserve for America a supporting role. Only by doing so can the U.S. prepare to protect its long term interests during the era now unfolding.⁵⁶

With the demise of the Cold War's bipolar structure and the immediate threat that had patterned America's existence for close to fifty years - forcing it to adopt an activist global stance in order to ensure its own protection - some of the more conservative segments of American society were beginning to make it clear that they were no longer interested in playing a global role and intervening in conflicts that they believed to have little impact upon American interests. Bosnia was an early example of this.

The point was further substantiated within the U.S. in late 1992 with the failed reelection bid of George Bush.⁵⁷ Bush, who in 1991 had reached a point of unprecedented popularity, could not, despite all his foreign policy accomplishments and international

⁵⁵ Douglas Seay "To Die in Sarajevo" op cit. p.39.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p.39-40.

⁵⁷ Daniel Deudney John G. Ikenberry "After the Long War" Foreign Policy no.94 Spring 1994. p.22.

stature, prevent his fall from electoral grace in this new era freed from the bipolar nuclear standoff as a result of his Cold War warrior image.⁵⁸

With the collapse of the Cold War bipolar structure, the resulting absence of an immediate threat led to a refocusing of American attention away from foreign policy. It is this refocusing which contributed to George Bush's downfall, and it is this refocusing which has led to a heightened reluctance to manage global affairs and, subsequently, left Bosnia out in the cold for so long. Front and center within this refocusing is the realization that the U.S. faces a major crisis in health care, has a worsening social crisis in which over 30 million people live below the poverty line, and in which large segments of its society continue to be deprived of adequate opportunities for economic advancement.⁵⁹ Within the context of structural transformations resulting from the collapse of the bipolar structure and the subsequent absence of an immediate security threat to America's interests, questions about the U.S. economy and the extent to which it could reduce its budget deficit and reestablish its competitiveness came to override any concerns about a civil war that 'had been going on for generations in some far off land'.⁶⁰

The reemergence of an 'America first' strand of elite and popular thinking appeared based largely on the proposition that there is a domestic imperative which can no longer be ignored and which does not allow for any significant attention to be devoted to what might be going on in Bosnia. This 'America first' position, rather than being understood as part and parcel of the decline of American hegemony can be more fruitfully seen as a result of the structural transformations associated with the collapse of the bipolar order.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p.22.

⁵⁹ Phil Williams Paul Hammond Michael Brenner "Atlantis Lost - Paradise Regained - The U.S. and Western Europe After the Cold War" International Affairs vol.69 no.1 January 1993. p.9.

The reluctance to manage the Bosnian situation cannot be interpreted as resulting solely from the economic woes of the United States, which Paul Kennedy and Robert Keohane argue have come in part from excessive military spending.⁶¹ The hesitation to intervene must not be regarded as a sign of fear of imperial overstretch and thus symbolic of the decline of American power, but rather, the reluctance to manage must be understood as stemming from the perceived limited impact upon American interests that Bosnia holds as a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure and the immediate threat that the Soviet Union represented within that structure. Thus, when former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe points out that 'The U.S. keeps looking overseas when our biggest threat is at home', it needs to be noted that such is the direct result of the void created by the decline of the bipolar structure.⁶² Ross Perot's almost exclusive focus on domestic issues in the 1992 U.S. Presidential election campaign or Pat Buchanan's plan to build a 'Fortress America' articulated in the 1996 Republican Presidential nomination campaign are not demonstrative of declining U.S. hegemony - it is still by far the most powerful country in the world. Rather, they are extreme manifestations of the refocusing of American attention as a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure, and symbolic of the 'selfishness' that has accompanied this collapse and prompted a reluctance to manage such situations as Bosnia.⁶³

⁶⁰ Ibid. p.9.

⁶¹ Paul Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 New York : Random House, 1987. Robert Keohane After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1984.

⁶² Williams, Phil et al. "Atlantis Lost..." op cit. p.9. Here Admiral Crowe argues that the U.S. cannot be activist in international affairs without an improved fiscal base, while still others go even further and see the domestic problems as ample reason for renegeing on international activism altogether.

⁶³ Ibid. p.10. In the 1992 presidential election, Ross Perot ran the most successful third party campaign in U.S. history focussing on the need to deal with America's domestic economic problems. In that same year Pat Buchanan unveiled his 'America First' platform in seeking the Republican presidential nomination.

While declinists would like to have us believe that the U.S. reluctance to deal with the Bosnian situation is testimonial to the validity of their beliefs, such is not the case. They (Kennedy particularly) have been espousing these views since the late 1960's and yet there was still a very active American foreign policy up until the end of the Cold War - Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada... What separates the current period is not a vindication of the declinists' arguments, but rather of Waltz's structural explanation. With the decline of the immediate threat facing the U.S. - the U.S.S.R. - and the subsequent collapse of the bipolar structure, no longer does the U.S. feel it necessary to manage such situations as Bosnia. No longer does the U.S. feel its immediate interests to be threatened by such 'incidents'. The reluctance to deal with the Bosnian situation is not symbolic of U.S. decline or some new neo-isolationism, but rather is symbolic of the limited potential impact Bosnia is perceived to hold in some U.S. circles.

Coincident with this heightened concern for the domestic situation within the U.S. has been the rise of yet another feature associated with the bipolar structure's collapse : the splintering of national cohesiveness. This splintering has hindered the great powers' desire to manage the situation in Bosnia. Throughout the Cold War, the 'semi-permanent mobilization against communism strengthened the national identity of Americans as well as the unity of the Atlantic Alliance'.⁶⁴ The existence of this total adversary represented by the Soviet Union greatly enhanced the ability of Western leaders to mobilize support for

While receiving minimal support in 92, Buchanan returned under the same platform in the 1996 Republican race and managed to splinter the GOP with his radical views, and as his victory in the New Hampshire primary illustrated, heightened his popularity. These two factors are demonstrative of a strand of American popular opinion which could no longer be ignored.

⁶⁴ Daniel Deudney John G. Ikenberry "After the Long War" op cit. p.27.

national goals, thus overriding any ethnic or sectional differences that may have existed.⁶⁵ However, such is no longer the case for as the external threat has collapsed and led to the realization of growing economic hardship, national cohesiveness has declined and growing ethnic and sectional differences have come to the fore. In France this splintering of national cohesiveness can be seen with the rise in popularity of the Front National led by Jean-Marie LePen, a party whose main platform is 'La France au Francais' and one who publicly advocates the extradition of all people of non-French or non-European descent from France.⁶⁶ This can also be seen in a French government whose Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, publicly declares that 'France no longer wants to be a country of immigration' and one who gives credence to the link between France's economic crisis and its immigrant population 'There is a tension relating to foreigners which is linked to the economic crisis and some people blame them for the threats to their jobs'.⁶⁷

This tension can also be seen in a recently reunified Germany where, in the wake of growing racially motivated attacks, several surveys have revealed alarming results. One poll conducted in 1992 showed that 35% of the respondents in the West and 38% in the East perceived the presence of foreigners in Germany as unacceptable.⁶⁸ With the immediate security threat facing the West no longer in existence as a result of the decline and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the unity that the bipolar structure demanded was replaced by a reorienting of priorities highlighting economic difficulties. These difficulties in turn led to the search for reasons or excuses for the apparent economic

⁶⁵ Ibid. p.27.

⁶⁶ Donna Mayer "Le Phenomene LePen" *Histoire* no.162 Jan.1993. p.114.

⁶⁷ "Pasqua Plays Race Card" *New Statesman and Society* vol.6 June 18, 1993. p.10.

⁶⁸ Elliot Neaman & Flajo Funke "Germany : The Nationalist Backlash" *Dissent* vol.40 Winter 1993. p.11-12.

downspin, resulting in the rise of a prejudicial bias towards outsiders (the immigrant population) as well as outside ventures - of which Bosnia was viewed as one. Hence, in line with a focus on and concern for domestic issues that the collapse of Kenneth Waltz's bipolar structure has led to, the Western nations steered clear of an interventionary mission that risked splintering their internal cohesiveness even more.

Yet another feature in the reluctance to manage the situation and intervene in an effective fashion in Bosnia on the part of the great powers needs to be raised :

Dying for world order when there is no concrete threat to one's own nation is a hard argument to make. For understandable reasons are leaders are not making it.⁶⁹

Despite the fact that Western nations have professional armies made up of volunteers, the death of a few soldiers lead to cries for withdrawal from whatever type of engagement they may be involved in (the scope of these cries have become amplified tremendously in this new era free of the superpower confrontation). We see concrete evidence of this in the Somalia debacle involving U.S. troops,⁷⁰ as well as in April of 1993 when two French soldiers killed in Sarajevo on the eve of a French presidential election almost led to the total withdrawal of 4,350 peacekeeping troops from Bosnia. Hence, when one asks why there has been a reluctance to manage the situation in Bosnia on the part of the great powers, it is necessary to note that as a consequence of the collapse of bipolarity, the unraveling of the situation in Bosnia was perceived to imply no direct threat to the U.S. or

⁶⁹ Arthur Schlesinger "Back to the Womb? Isolationsim's Renewed Threat" Foreign Affairs vol.74 no.4 July/Aug. 1995. p.7-8.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p.8. A national uproar was created within the United States when 18 U.S. servicemen died while serving in the U.N. interventionary force in Somalia. Some of the dead servicemen's bodies were in turn flaunted in fron of international television crews as they were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by angry Somali mobs. This event horrified and enraged much of the American public who perceived the troops to be involved in the U.N. expeditionary force against the will of the American population.

its Western allies. Thus, in light of the potential human costs and the political fallout such costs entail no European government was any more willing than the U.S. to risk its soldiers in combat.⁷¹

The reluctance to properly manage the situation in Bosnia has been a direct result of the collapse of the bipolar structure and the refocusing of attention away from the international system to the self/state. As a result of the absence of an immediate threat facing the U.S. and its allies, Bosnia was seen to have little impact upon these states and was thus marginalized. As stated earlier, to attribute such reluctance to the declining ability of the U.S. (or the rest of the Western states) is to ignore the fact that it is still by far the most powerful state ever known. Bosnia can be seen as the direct result of the structural transformation away from the bipolar structure to an emerging multipolar one, where the refocusing towards the self/state has led the United States (and others) to refrain from directly dealing with what it perceived to be a conflict of less relevance than its domestic situation for much of the conflict's duration.

Diversity of Interests

What the situation in Bosnia also served to illustrate is the fact that effective international action cannot be expected unless the interests and values of states can be clearly agreed upon. This commonality of interests and values has become increasingly difficult to achieve as a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure. The overarching threat represented by the Soviet Union helped to transcend the differences between the

⁷¹ Edward N. Luftwak "Where are the Great Powers" Foreign Affairs vol.73 no.4 July/Aug. 1994. p.24.

Western powers and unify them to some extent under American leadership. In this section it will be demonstrated that with the rise in the diversity of interests accompanying the increase in key states no longer willing to subordinate their own particular foreign policy interests to those of the United States, effective action by the international community with respect to Bosnia was extremely difficult to achieve. It will be argued that the increase in these different voices has led to a growth in competing interests and had thus limited concrete efforts to stem the bloodshed in Bosnia, much as Waltz had predicted would happen with the collapse of the bipolar structure.

The 'Europeanists'⁷² saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to springboard themselves onto the international scene, and initially the situation in Bosnia (and all of the ex-Yugoslavia) was viewed as providing just such a test. The results have not, however, been as projected. Instead of illustrating cohesiveness, the events surrounding Bosnia have shown the EC (later EU) to be lacking the unity and will to act as a 'custodian of continental security'. As suggested by Michael Brenner, Professor of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh :

Yugoslavia has sapped the EC's confidence and undermined its credibility... Certainly Western Europe no longer looks the sturdy partner ready to shoulder the principal responsibility for superintending the continent's post Cold War order.⁷³

⁷² The Europeanists are those policy makers in Europe - among them diplomats and statesmen - who believe in the possibilities of European unity and, therefore, in promoting its deepening. Prominent among them are the former President of the E.U. Jaques Delors, the current President Jaques Santar, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the late French President Francois Mitterrand, current Vice-President of the E.U. Sir Leon Brittan and Martin Bangemann, the E.U.'s Commissioner for Industrial Affairs.

⁷³ Michael Brenner "E.C. : Confidence Lost" Foreign Policy no.91 Summer 1993. p.24.

Without an overarching Soviet threat against which to unite, the differences between the European players on how to deal with the Bosnian crisis came to the fore and became that much more difficult to override.

These competing values and interests can be easily illustrated when one looks at the major European players. For example, despite all its criticisms of Serbian crimes, France proved unwilling in the early part of the war to intervene against its traditional ally. On the other hand, Germany consistently sought to talk its allies out of imposing sanctions against Croatia, to which it has historical ties, despite their advances against the Bosnian Muslim population. Equally, Germany favored standing up to the Serbs throughout the conflict and stated so publicly. This fact enraged many other European leaders who realized that they would bear the brunt of such an action given the German constitutional restraints that inhibit it from engaging in any military ventures. All the while, Britain continued to rule out any intervention as long as the events unfolding in the Balkan peninsula did not affect the balance of power on the continent.⁷⁴

The competing values and interests that have accompanied the collapse of the bipolar order, as detailed by Kenneth Waltz, were further underscored when the U.S. Administration (under strong Congressional pressure) finally decided to enter the Bosnian fray on a much more substantial basis. In an effort to curb the territorial drive of the Serbs, in May of 1994 then U.S. Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher detailed a plan indicating that the U.S. favored a two pronged strategy of arming Muslim-led Bosnian government forces and threatening NATO airstrikes.⁷⁵ Speaking on the first of these two

⁷⁴ "Western Europe's Dreams Turning to Nightmares" The New York Times Aug.1 1993. p.16.

⁷⁵ Carroll J. Doherty "Military Action Loses Favor Moral Claims Lose Voice" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report vol.51 May 22, 1993. p.16.

issues, President Clinton articulated his belief that the imposition of the arms embargo by the U.N. : "before this country was created and recognized, had the unintended consequence of giving the Serbs an insurmountable military advantage which they have pressed with ruthless efficiency".⁷⁶ Former Senator Bob Dole further developed these arguments in visits to London and Paris in late November and early December 1994, where he directly called for more forceful NATO airstrikes against the Serb positions in the Bosnian War and for the arms embargo against the Bosnian government to be lifted immediately.⁷⁷

The French and British were bitterly opposed to such a strategy for several reasons. The first of these was the concern for the immediate security of their troops on the ground. France had approximately 4,700 and Britain more than 3,500 troops in Bosnia. The possibility that the combined impact of ending the embargo and NATO airstrikes might incur the vengeance of the Serb army and widen the violence to include the direct targeting of an ill-equipped staff of Blue Helmets compelled them to speak vociferously against such an option.⁷⁸ Equally for these states, incorporating a strategy such as the one the Americans were advocating implied abandoning the pretense of neutrality in the conflict, therefore dooming it to a lengthy continuation. The French stand as Foreign Minister Herve Charette put it in July of 1995 was this :

I firmly believe that if you want a peaceful solution, you have to avoid taking sides either way. On the ground the parties are not

⁷⁶ William J. Clinton Public Papers of the President of the United States May 7, 1993. p.593.

⁷⁷ Facts on File 1994. p.910. Senator Bob Dole created an uproar upon his visits to London and Paris by meeting with former British P.M. Margaret Thatcher prior to meeting with then P.M. John Major, and then directly calling for more forceful NATO airstrikes against Serb targets as well as the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government,

⁷⁸ "The Arms Embargo Dilemma : Questions and Answers" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report vol.53 no.27 July 8, 1995. P.2008.

entirely equal. Admittedly, you have aggressors on one side and victims on the other, but if you want to reach a negotiated outcome you have to be willing to enter into discussions with everybody. This is why we strongly oppose the idea brought upon again by the American Congress about lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia.⁷⁹

By escalating the scope and intensity of the battle, which they felt ending the arms embargo and initiating airstrikes would inevitably do, Charette and several of his European counterparts believed that we would only be prolonging the devastation and thus limiting any possibility of a negotiated settlement, for no longer would the Serbs view the West as credible mediators.

In this new post-bipolar era, dissension was becoming the norm as opposed to the exception⁸⁰ as traditional allies voiced their differences on how to deal with the Bosnia. These differences risked destabilizing even further not only the Bosnian situation, but the very nature of the relationship between these allies. Some of the more militant European voices (particularly within the French government, and numbering Alain Juppe and the late Francois Mitterand among them) questioned why the European allies should follow an American leadership that is 'unsure of what it wants to do about Bosnia other than lead'.⁸¹ They noted that the White House's stand seemed flawed and that its ability to argue for any of its own policies was doomed from the outset as a result of its refusal to provide any ground troops to participate in the U.N. peace plan.⁸² While acknowledging the fact that

⁷⁹ Statement by Herve Charette, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, July 8, 1995. (Excerpt issued by the Embassy of France in Ottawa, Canada).

⁸⁰ Reg Whitaker "What Is the Cold War About and Why Is It Still With Us?" Studies in Political Economy no.19 Spring, 1986. p.15. In this article Whitaker writes that based on the 'never again' premise in reaction to the destruction endured during WW II, the Western allies reacted with a series of agreements (which included the Truman doctrine, NATO, SEATO...) which precluded public disagreement with one another and limited their level of dissension throughout the Cold War.

⁸¹ Interview with Mr. Alain Juppe, French P.M. broadcast on France 2, Paris, July 19, 1995. (Excerpt issued by the Embassy of France in Ottawa, Canada).

⁸² "Stop the Genocide in Bosnia" Dissent v.40 Summer, 1993. p.284.

airstrikes might be useful in certain circumstances, Charette pointed out that the suggestion was easy for the Americans to make since they did not have troops on the ground and thus faced limited risk. He further went on to point out that American troops must be part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) if peace on the ground (i.e. the protection of refugees, Sarajevo etc.) was to have a chance.⁸³

Such proclamations were met with severe criticism within the U.S. on several fronts. In the Senate, Senator Joseph R. Biden could be heard directing the following shots towards Britain and France : "After they hold our coats in Kuwait and Somalia, they are asking us to put a few thousand troops on the ground in order to have the right to speak".⁸⁴ He further went on to charge that : "What you encountered was a discouraging mosaic of indifference, timidity, self-delusion and hypocrisy... European policy is based on cultural and religious indifference, if not bigotry, and this would be an entirely different situation if the Muslims were doing what the Serbs had done".⁸⁵

With the ensuing volleys back and forth across the Atlantic, the actual situation in Bosnia was quickly becoming shrouded behind a veil of criticism on how to deal with the matter, criticism which threatened to create the greatest post-war rift between America, Britain and France since the crisis surrounding the Suez in 1956 :

⁸³ Statement by Mr. Herve Charette, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, Aug.2, 1995. Charette makes the point that peace on the ground will not be possible until the Americans commit ground troops for several reasons. First of all, in a land battle in order to properly intervene it is necessary that a large scale land interventionary force be provided. Second of all, and foremost, he notes that there is no way that the allies would adopt a more aggressive interventionary role, which would increase the level of risk subjected to them, until the Americans commit themselves to the same level of risk. Thus if the airstrikes or any other threats to the aggressive tactics of any of the warring parties were to be adopted, the Americans must first commit the ground forces. In stating this Charette was undeniably conceding that more aggressive interventionary policies were necessary in order for peace to have a chance.

⁸⁴ Carroll J. Doherty "Clinton Backs Off Policy : Lawmakers Assail Allies" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report vol.51 May 15, 1993. p.1244.

⁸⁵ Ibid. p.1244.

Now this bloody conflict is lapping around the very edifice on which democratic values and Western ideals have been based for more than fifty years, the transatlantic alliance.⁸⁶

However, the distinguishing feature of this rift was that there was no longer the presence of an all-encompassing threat to serve as a unifying feature among the allies.⁸⁷ As each of the Western states brought its own ideas on how to solve the Bosnian conflict to the table, Bosnia became a highly contentious issue. As a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure and the diversity of interests that had emerged, the growing divisions among the great powers was limiting effective international action. With the will to subordinate one's own particular interests for the sake of the international system dissipating, the continuing stability of the international system, much as Waltz had predicted it would be, was thrown into serious doubt.

Throughout the Cold War bipolar era, the immediate threat to the West represented by the Soviet Union united the allies under the American security umbrella, and thus American direction. As has been seen in the Bosnian case, this unified stand no longer characterizes the West. As a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure, no longer is there a perceived need on the part of the allies to subordinate their own particular interests to those of the United States. As such there has been a rise in the diversity of interests as to how to deal with situations like Bosnia, preventing agreement among the

⁸⁶ "U.S. Fears Suez Like Rift With the Allies" The Times May 12, 1993. p. 1.

⁸⁷ "A Whiff of Suez" The Times May 12, 1993. p.16. The Suez crisis of 1956 represented a brief but major schism in the allies' relationship in the bipolar era. At the heart of the matter was American opposition to the British and French interventionary tactics in the Suez Canal which they had adopted without consulting or informing the Americans. However, what separates the Suez conflict from today's situation is that there still was an all-encompassing threat present to aid in overcoming the differences between the allies.

Western allies, limiting effective international action, and thus threatening the stability of the international system.⁸⁸

Conclusion

When one seeks to truly understand why it is that so little has been done for so long surrounding the Bosnian crisis, Kenneth Waltz's theoretical understanding of bipolarity seems to provide us with very sound reasoning. With the breakdown of bipolarity resulting from the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system has been submersed into a state of flux lacking any form of clarity or direction. Of key significance in this breakdown are the three factors limiting effective international action which we have elaborated upon in this chapter. The first is found in uncertainty over the implications of state action which has arisen as a result of the absence of order or rules for state behaviour in the post-bipolar era. The second is the reluctance to manage the global system by the great powers as a result of the absence of an immediate threat to security. The third is the increased diversity of interests that has accompanied the rise in relevant actors, equally a result of the lack of an immediate, all-powerful threat, that has led to increased disagreement and limited cooperation among states - many of which are 'allies'.

With the collapse of the international system's bipolar structure, no longer does an established pattern of behaviour among states exist as it once did throughout the Cold

⁸⁸ With the collapse of the bipolar structure and the Soviet Union, it will be much more difficult to overcome the differences between the allies and maintain the level of unity that has existed for close to fifty years. No longer is there a great threat around which to rally unified support.

War. Thus when one poses a question such as what would intervention into Bosnia entail - for the intervening state(s) and the international system - no one appeared capable of providing a concrete response. As a result the level of insecurity associated with such ventures has risen dramatically, thus limiting effective international action. Unsure of what effect their actions might have, most states stuck to the sidelines for much of the Bosnian conflict.

By failing to manage the situation in Bosnia, the great powers risked profoundly negative implications (according to Waltz), risks that would not have been encountered under the bipolar structure. With the collapse of the bipolar structure and the global confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., no longer is the security threat to the West perceived to be as great as it once was. Thus, there was a reluctance to manage the situation in Bosnia (and a greater concern for domestic and, as will be seen in our third chapter, regional issues) due to the limited impact Bosnia was perceived to have on Western (U.S.) interests. However, by failing to deal with such situations in this new era, Waltz believes that we are only setting a precedent that allows for their proliferation (as will be seen in our third chapter) and which could eventually lead to dramatic upheaval. This shortsightedness that has accompanied the lack of an immediate threat to one's own security with the collapse of the Soviet Union is not only selfish, but dangerous. The bipolar structure demanded that states sacrifice their immediate short term interests for the greater, longer term good of the international system. By refusing (initially) to deal directly with such situations as Bosnia, we are setting a perilous precedent for the future of international peace and stability.

As a result of the increased focus upon individual states rather than the international system that has accompanied the collapse of the Cold War bipolar structure, the accuracy of Waltz's prediction that the bipolar structure holds out a much greater promise for peace and stability in the international system seems corroborated. As uncertainty, the reluctance to manage, and the diversity of interests has grown, the ability to act upon and stabilize a situation such as Bosnia has been made that much more difficult. As each great power has brought its own particular interests to the table, not only have they threatened the continuing relevance of such staple organizations as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (as will be seen in our third chapter), but they have also limited truly effective international action. In doing so, as seen in the Bosnian case, they have prolonged the suffering.

Chapter Three

THE POST-BIPOLAR ORDER AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

As seen in our previous chapter, one of the most prominent features that appears to have accompanied the collapse of the bipolar structure is the heightened emphasis placed upon the individual state by the Western allies - and particularly by the United States. Those uncertain of the implications of their actions in lieu of the collapse of bipolarity are not worried about the potential results their actions might have upon others so much as they are worried about how they may affect themselves. Those reluctant to manage global affairs in this new era absent of an immediate threat are so because of the burden - both financial and physical - such management places upon them. As well, the rising diversity of interests is a reflection of each Western state's growing concern with its own particular interests as opposed to the interests of the system, now that there is no longer the overarching threat to unify them.

In this final chapter we will seek to assess some of the implications for the international system of the three features listed above, features Waltz sees as directly associated with bipolarity's collapse. Here we will detail three consequences of the post-bipolar era's heightened concern for the individual state, and how it is that the features associated with bipolarity's breakdown triggered these consequences.

The first of the consequences to be dealt with is the rise in the incidence of conflict that has coincided with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar structure, encompassing within it a resurgence of ethnic and national hatreds not seen since the Second World War. Here it will be argued that as a result of the collapse of the bipolar confrontation, ethnic and nationalist impulses once held in check by the two superpowers -

such as those highlighted in the Bosnian fiasco - have been allowed to escalate out of control, resulting in armed conflict. This escalation can be attributed to the rising uncertainty in the international system limiting state actions, and the reluctance to manage global situations due to a lack of perceived threat that has coincided with bipolarity's collapse.

The second issue to be dealt with are the calls for the dissolution of such organizations as the U.N. and NATO that have accompanied the end of the Cold War. Again, here it will be argued that as a result of the growth in prominent voices and the subsequent diversity of interests that have accompanied the collapse of the bipolar structure, effective action has been limited. Consequently, organizations such as the U.N. and NATO have been made to appear the scapegoat for the inability to reach a consensus and act decisively on such issues as Bosnia.

The third and final issue to be dealt with is the rise in regionalism that has followed bipolarity's collapse and the subsequent return to prominence of such regional organizations as the OAS, as well as invigorated efforts to deal with such regional issues as drugs and immigration. Here, it will be asserted that with the collapse of the bipolar structure and the resulting absence of an immediate threat facing the U.S., there has been a refocusing of American attention toward American problems and a consequent reluctance to manage global situations (such as Bosnia). Thus, as a result of the immediate domestic impact such regional issues as drugs and immigration can have upon the individual state, regionalism has enjoyed a renewed emphasis.

The Proliferation of Conflict

The first issue to be dealt with that has accompanied the collapse of the Cold War bipolar structure is the proliferation of conflict, and more specifically conflict on the European continent. This is very significant in the sense that, as argued in the first chapter, the stability of Europe was of ultimate significance during the Cold War period. Since the decline of the Soviet Union and the bipolar confrontation, growing uncertainty in the international system has triggered a reluctance to manage global situations on the part of the great powers. An immediate consequence of this is that ethnic and national cleavages previously held in check by the bipolar confrontation - such as the one in Bosnia - have been allowed to escalate out of control on the European continent.

All of this is rather ironic when one considers the euphoria that surrounded the radical transformations in global politics of the late 1980's, and the strong beliefs that global peace had finally been attained.¹ Given the crumbling of the nuclear standoff that had occupied global attention for decades, anyone arguing that military issues would not become less salient in the new era was immediately cast as a pessimistic cynic. The end of the Cold War was to herald a new era of growth in international trade and prosperity.

What many failed to realize is that the Cold War bipolar structure - as detailed by Kenneth Waltz - provided the 'stark simplicity of confrontation between the two superpowers and their alliances'.² During the Cold War the principal lines of force in Europe could be extended with remarkable clarity and those lines changed slowly if at all;

¹ Paul D. Wolfowitz "Clinton's First Year" Foreign Affairs vol.73 no.1 Jan/Feb 1994. p.32.

² Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics Reading Massachusetts : Addison-Wesley, 1979. p.170.

'today was much like yesterday; and in the main, next year was much like this year'.³

Throughout the Cold War stability and direction were the order of the day, and each state knew its proper position within that order.⁴ Thus national conflicts such as the one in Bosnia were held in check for the greater good of maintaining the stability and direction of the system.

With the dissolution of the lines of force that accompanied the bipolar structure's collapse, uncertainty, and subsequently, instability have overcome the international system. The recent proliferation of conflicts in places such as the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Republics (as well as Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda) have underscored this fact.⁵ The revolutions of 1989 have not only toppled communism, they have also unleashed a panorama of unexpected events that have undone the peace orders of Yalta and Versailles.⁶ "The seemingly daily occurrence of unexpected developments and the many uncertainties that prevail in every region of the world, have become so pervasive as to cast doubt on the viability of long established ways in which international affairs have been conducted and global security maintained".⁷ In today's order, anomalous events seem to have replaced the recurrent pattern as the predominant theme of world politics.

Of fundamental significance to this occurrence is that rather than bringing about the "end of history" as Francis Fukuyama predicted, the termination of the East-West

³ Ibid. p.171.

⁴ As detailed in chapter one, state capabilities in the bipolar order were measured in relation to those of other states. Thus, a lesser state's freedoms were constrained by its inferior capabilities. To adopt a particular course of action which deviated from one's position in the order was to risk grave consequences, thus very few ever did so.

⁵ Dusko Doder "Yugoslavia : Old War New Hatreds" Foreign Policy no.91 Summer 1993. p.2.

⁶ Ibid. p.3.

⁷ James Rosenau "Security In a Turbulent World Order" Current History vol.94 no.592 May 1995. p.193.

confrontation has allowed for the brutal expression of historical grievances.⁸ Enveloped within these grievances is the return of ethnic, communal, and nationalist conflicts :

...since the end of the Cold War, conflicts between communal groups and states have been recognized as the major challenges to domestic and international security in most parts of the world. Minority peoples are now the principal victims of gross human rights violations.⁹

In 1993 more than 25 million refugees were fleeing from communal conflicts. Communal conflicts now threaten the stability of most of the Republics of the former Soviet Union, have devastated East-Central Africa as well as, of course, Bosnia and much of the rest of the former Yugoslavia.¹⁰

Throughout the Cold War the hypernationalism we see exploding today was held in check by the post-war occupation forces - the U.S. and the U.S.S.R..¹¹ Nationalism's contradictory and potentially catastrophic consequences which manifested themselves in the 1930's were suppressed by the Cold War bipolar order and the nuclear revolution that accompanied that order.

According to Kenneth Waltz, both superpowers realized that each of them would only lose heavily in war with one another, hence as a result of their privileged position in the system each sought to render such conflicts as the Bosnian one inconsequential in order to avoid their escalation and possible spread :

The objective of both states was to perpetuate an international stalemate as a minimum basis for the security of each of them - and

⁸ Thomas G. Weiss "The U.N. at Fifty : Recent Lessons" Current History vol.94 no.592 May 1995. p.223.

⁹ Ted Robert Gurr "Communal Conflict and Global Security" Current History vol.94 no.592 May 1995. p.212.

¹⁰ Ibid. p.212.

¹¹ Yale Ferguson "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics Great and Small" Mershon International Studies Review vol.38 no.2 Oct.1994. p.241. The term occupation forces applies to the dominant power(s) in the respective spheres of influence that emerged following the Second World War - the East and the West.

as a result of the stake that both had in the maintenance of the system this meant doing so even if the two big states do all the work while the small ones have all the fun.¹²

As a result of the fact that the world was able to destroy itself, the bipolar powers sought to bring the competitive instincts of nations under control.¹³ Thus both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. took the fate of many others to be of their immediate concern throughout the Cold War. In return for these global managing activities, they acquired a degree of control, thus gaining the ability to influence political and military strategies that others followed, maintaining stability.¹⁴ In this emerging multipolar era characterized by heightened uncertainty over state actions and an increased diversity on the part of states, no longer do the most powerful states appear willing to take the fate of others to be of their immediate concern. Thus, in the absence of the stabilizing and regulating influence from above that the bipolar structure provided, the resurgence of ethnic and national impulses accompanying communism's collapse has been allowed to explode throughout Eastern Europe virtually uninhibited.

According to Waltz, under the bipolar structure, leading states played leading roles because they had incentives to act in the interest of general peace and the wider security of nations. This was so despite the fact that they would be assuming the brunt of the burden in terms of cost - both physical and financial.¹⁵ Both superpowers justified these costly policy stances to their domestic population in several ways, but in keeping with the focus of this thesis two specific U.S. justifications appear most relevant. First of all, U.S. officials could point to the Russian or communist threat so as to mobilize public support.

¹² Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics op cit. p.185.

¹³ Ibid. p.188-189.

¹⁴ Ibid. p.207.

Since the Soviet Union was the U.S.' 'obsessing danger', the domino theory could be used as the traditional rationale for peripheral military actions.¹⁶ Second, they could base their policy decisions on the need to act for the 'good of other people' or 'for the sake of the system'. A vivid illustration of both of these justifications is provided in the rhetoric surrounding the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. As claimed by the Reagan administration at the time, America's overseas economic interests were severely threatened by the growing rebellion and subversion in the Third World - most of which they attributed to Soviet and Cuban adventurism.¹⁷ Thus as the then Secretary of State Casper Weinberger stated : "We now must be prepared to halt and seek to reverse the geographic expansion of Soviet control and presence, particularly when it threatens a vital interest or further erodes the geo-strategic position of the U.S."¹⁸ This reference to geo-strategic position reflected the belief that the Soviets, realizing America's dependence on raw materials, sought to gain control of the Caribbean and Central American sea lanes so as to cripple the U.S. economy. As a result of this perception, it was felt to be necessary that the U.S. stem the tide of change before such an incident could occur. In order to do so, they needed to demonstrate a huge showing of force so as to intimidate all others entertaining any illusions of action that might be destructive to U.S. interests. As well as this justification is the fact that - as Reagan so often suggested - American troops were invited into Grenada by the Grenadian leader Sir Paul Scoon to restore order to his country.¹⁹ Hence, the Americans were simply complying with a request for a favour by a

¹⁵ Ibid. p.208.

¹⁶ Ibid. p.199.

¹⁷ Michael Klare "The Reagan Doctrine" New Statesman & Society vol.106 Nov.4, 1983. p.9.

¹⁸ Ibid. p.10.

¹⁹ Fred Halliday "Controlling the Caribbean" New Statesman & Society vol.106 Nov.4, 1983. p.8.

friend in need. As the 'Grenadian experience' illustrates, within the context of the Cold War American actions and interventions could be upheld as necessary for the preservation of the American way of life, at the same time as being for the 'good of other people'.

However, such is no longer the case as detailed in the 'Reluctance to Manage' section of chapter two. With the collapse of the Soviet threat and the bipolar structure, the U.S. has lost its main justification for an activist global policy stance. Acting for the 'good of other people' is no longer a reasonable excuse for foreign policy, for they must now act for the 'good of their own'! Hence, in this post-bipolar era, as is clearly evidenced in the initial reluctance to deal with the Bosnian situation, no longer are the interventionary or preventative capabilities Waltz speaks of readily available in the U.S. (not to mention the U.S.S.R.).²⁰ Thus we have the proliferation of a spate of conflicts that have been held in check for an extended period of time, conflicts which appear to be the inevitable result of the transformation of the international structure. "How deluded we were!...we did not understand that the relative quietude of age-old ethnic strife in Europe reflected not so much the triumph of states as the dampening effect of the post WW II bipolar experiences."²¹ Yugoslavia's implosion clearly highlights this trend. National hatreds that have long been suppressed by a global confrontation that directly impinged upon the lives of everyone have now come to the fore, and the wars that have ensued can be seen as an immediate consequence of bipolarity's collapse and the lack of will to manage for the sake of the system.

²⁰ As detailed in the 'Reluctance to Manage' section of chapter two, the collapse of the Soviet threat and the perception of a declining social and economic situation within the U.S., has meant that the U.S. is no longer as able as it once was to intervene in areas around the globe. U.S. policymakers must now take into account the public reaction to such costly ventures, and how these might affect their political futures.

²¹ Yale Ferguson "Ethnicity, Nationalism..." op cit. p.241.

Calls For The Dissolution Of...

A second feature that has coincided with the collapse of the bipolar structure, as it has been understood through the writings of Kenneth Waltz, are the calls that have come for the dissolution of institutions whose goals required collective efforts. Foremost among those institutions targeted are the United Nations and NATO. As the range and diversity of interests has expanded with the growth in prominent voices in the international system, agreement among the great powers, as highlighted in the Bosnian situation, has become that much more difficult to achieve. Consequently organizations such as the U.N. and NATO have been made to appear the scapegoat in this new era characterized by the diverse individual concerns of the great powers. In the following section we will illustrate how, as a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure, the growing diversity of interests among states limited the abilities of the U.N. and NATO to deal with the situation in Bosnia and has subsequently led to the calls for their dissolution.

NATO was a construction of the Cold War. With its end many observers expected that this would signal the end of NATO. After all, the alliance's primary purpose had been to address the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Western Europe. With that threat's evaporation many of its current members questioned the continuing relevance of the organization.²² In Europe there has been a growth in the desire to remove the perceived dominating U.S. military presence that NATO provided and replace it with an all-

²² It must be noted that while some of NATO's current members questioned the continuing relevance of the organization, many of the former communist states of East and Central Europe have been trying to gain membership in the organization.

European security order such as the Western European Union.²³ Within the U.S. Congress, questions about NATO's future confronted the issue of burden sharing. As a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure U.S. critics now argued the dominant U.S. share of NATO defense spending to be a 'relic of an earlier era'.²⁴ With the refocusing of attention towards the domestic situation, Democrats Patricia Schroeder (Col.); Byron L. Dorgan (N.D.); and Charles E. Shumer (N.Y.); noted that times had changed. No longer should it be the U.S.'s responsibility to shoulder a huge share of the European security burden : "We are not dealing with bomb devastated Germany... we are dealing with economies that are strong, that are competing and that no longer need this American subsidy."²⁵ Furthermore, as noted by John S. Duffield, an Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville :

Much of I.R. theory teaches that states form military alliances in response to common external threats. Conversely alliances should disintegrate when the threats that occasioned their formation disappear. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that alliance membership usually entails some costs in terms of reduced autonomy and the risk of entrapment in another ally's conflicts. In the absence of a common external threat, moreover, concerns about the distribution of benefits of cooperation will increase, making it more difficult.²⁶

Faced with the realization that it was no longer as relevant as it once was, NATO sought to reassert itself in light of the changing security environment and adopted a 'New Strategic Concept'. Encompassed within this 'New Strategic Concept' as articulated at the

²³ "NATO IS Obsolete" New Statesman & Society vol.7 no.284 Jan.7, 1993. p.5.

²⁴ Pat Towell "Debating How To Share The Burden" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report vol.49 no.21 May 25, 1991. p.1385.

²⁵ Ibid. p.1385.

²⁶ John S. Duffield "NATO's Functions After the Cold War" Political Science Quarterly vol.109 Winter 1994/95. p.764.

Rome NATO Summit in November of 1991 was a much greater emphasis on the importance of conflict management and conflict prevention :

Our aim is to maintain a smaller but capable collective military organization in order to serve NATO's political objectives. This structure will provide sufficient military forces to protect the peace, to manage crisis and to provide for defense. Our military forces will be capable of several missions, including defense and support for crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and, as before, the defense of the Alliance territory.²⁷

This translation of principles entailed the belief that, by orienting its defense projects away from 'forward defense' and toward a modification of 'flexible response', NATO would be better able, through such measures as peacekeeping and crisis management, to defuse crises that might - and likely would - develop at an earlier stage.²⁸ This new orientation was seen as contributing to the security and stability of the European continent in light of the changing security environment.²⁹

Despite these efforts at redefinition, little if any success has accompanied NATO's transformation. While some have argued that Bosnia simply caught NATO off guard, such cannot be seen as a viable excuse in light of the 'New Strategic Concept' - for Bosnia

²⁷ "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" NATO Review vol.39 no.6 December 1991. p.26. While many questioned the continuing existence of NATO, its proponents sought to reassert the organization based on its historical level of success. Realizing that the organization played a great role in maintaining peace and stability throughout a turbulent period in European history, they (NATO's proponents) insisted upon its continuing relevance - albeit in a reformed fashion - in light of the unstable period ahead. Thus you have such revisions as the 'New Strategic Concept'.

²⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Facts and Figures Brussels, NATO Information Services, 1971. p.92. The concept of 'flexible response' implies the following : NATO should be better able to deter, and (if deterrence fails) to counter, military aggression of any kind; and that this can be secured only through a wide range of forces equipped with a well-balanced mixture of conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear weapons. This balance of forces, while retaining the principle of 'forward defense', should permit a flexible range of responses combining two main capabilities : meeting any aggression at a level judged to be appropriate to defend the attack, and 'escalating' the level under full control, if defense at the first level is not effective. 'Forward defense' implies that any aggression must be resisted as far to the East as possible, in order to ensure the defense of all member countries.

would seem to have been precisely the type of scenario envisaged.³⁰ The main focus of the 'New Strategic Concept' was, as stated, a modification of the principles of flexible response which would allow for NATO to deal with such conflicts as Bosnia effectively. The objective of such intervention is simple : to prevent a conflict's escalation and potential spillover into neighbouring countries, a feature that could risk embroiling NATO member countries directly in such conflicts. Rather than dealing effectively with this situation (for much of the conflict) under the guise of this new orientation, when it finally entered the Bosnian fray NATO was paralyzed by disagreement. (For much of the early part of the conflict NATO was left on the backburner as a result of the desire by the Americans and the Europeans to let the Europeans solve this European problem). As a result of the growth in prominent Western (largely European) voices who no longer wished to subordinate their interests to those of the United States, NATO was confined to the sidelines for much of the conflict. Thus, many were led to ask 'if NATO cannot deal with problems like Bosnia then what good is it and the transformations it has made?'.³¹

The United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, faced a different set of initial reactions as a result of the collapse of the Cold War, yet they have since come to be similar to those confronting NATO. The beginning of the post-Cold War era appeared to herald enhanced prospects for conflict management and intervention. Freed from the specter of the U.S.-Soviet stalemate in the Security Council for the first time, the level of

²⁹ In addition to this, the 'New Strategic Concept' emphasized the need to strengthen relations with the East Europeans, to adopt a more global outlook in security matters, and to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.

³⁰ Jonathan Clarke "Replacing NATO" *Foreign Policy* no.93 Winter 1993/94. p.30.

³¹ *Ibid.* p.30

enthusiasm and fervor surrounding the organization was unparalleled since its inception.³² Bolstering this fact was the stunning level of success it enjoyed in the first post Cold War military venture, the U.S.-led Persian Gulf War coalition opposing Iraq.³³ However, such sentiments were to be shortlived. Following the fanfare of the Gulf War success was to come a sobering series of public U.N. shortcomings in places such as Somalia, Rwanda, Croatia and Bosnia.³⁴

As these more intractable conflicts advanced, scathing criticism of the U.N. from both within and without began to grow, leading to questions about its continuing viability. Dick Thornburgh, the U.N.'s former Under-Secretary for Administration and Management, testified before a U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on March 5, 1993 that the U.N. is plagued by inefficiency, faulty lines of communication, and has virtually no means at all to deal with internal fraud.³⁵

In the U.S. Congress, politicians lashed out publicly at U.N. peacekeeping operations, arguing that key member-states are being asked to pay too much for programs that are ill-advised and poorly managed. As Rep. Jim Ross Lightfoot (R.-Iowa) put it : "It is not our role to put our young men and women in harm's way to satisfy a very corrupt group that is full of cronyism".³⁶ In fact, the common sentiment in many circles became that U.N. mediation in such matters as Bosnia may in fact extend or aggravate many of the disputes :

³² Thomas G. Weiss "The U.N. at Fifty..." op cit. p.223.

³³ Ibid. p.223.

³⁴ Ibid. p.223.

³⁵ Carroll J. Doherty "Thornburgh's U.N. Critique" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report vol.51 no.10 March 6, 1993. p.528.

³⁶ Holly Idelson "Crime and Peace" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report vol.51 suppl to no.49 Dec. 11, 1993. p.35

As currently constituted the U.N. has great difficulty performing many basic functions required of an effective mediator. It does not serve well as an authoritarian channel of communication. It has little real political leverage. Its promises lack threat and credibility. And it is incapable of pursuing coherent, flexible and dynamic negotiations guided by an effective strategy.³⁷

Rather than becoming the mantlepiece of the 'New World Order' as George Bush had proclaimed it to be, the U.N., and particularly the Security Council, much like NATO, had become mired in disagreement that threatened its very existence.

While the Security Council's member-states debated the U.N.'s role in such conflicts as Bosnia, Congress questioned the continuing U.S. commitment to the U.N. In a letter to Senator Pete V. Domenici, the Chairman of the Budget Committee, Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.) stated that U.S. participation in U.N. programs should be terminated. Such a statement more or less implied a call for an end to the U.N. given that the U.S. is its major shareholder.³⁸

In order to detail the shortcomings of both the U.N. and NATO leading to the calls for their dissolution, the following points are of notable significance. In August of 1993, NATO had committed itself to bomb Serb forces if they continued to strangle and shell Sarajevo and block relief convoys elsewhere. Yet on one day in the first week of January 1994, 1,353 shells fell on Sarajevo and relief convoys continued to be blocked on a regular basis, with airstrikes nowhere to be seen.³⁹ As for the U.N., the pattern that appeared to be emerging was 'agreement in principle and paralysis in action'.⁴⁰ Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. had become a font for resolutions authorizing international action, yet

³⁷ Saadia Touval "Why the U.N. Fails" Foreign Affairs vol.73 no.5 Sept./Oct. 1994. p.45.

³⁸ Barbara Crosette "U.N. Finds Skepticism Is Eroding the Hope that Is its Foundation" The New York Times June 25, 1995. p.A1.

³⁹ "Crisis of Credibility" The New York Times Jan.7, 1994. p.A31.

in Bosnia little was being done. As former Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali arrived in Sarajevo to angry cries of 'what is the U.N. doing for us', U.N. peacekeepers were being held as human shields against airstrikes. The \$1.6 billion a year peacekeeping costs in Bosnia and Croatia appeared to be yielding very limited returns, with ground forces restricted to the role of peacekeepers in a land where there was no peace to keep.⁴¹ These factors all forced an extended period of deep introspection on the part of the countries supplying the peacekeepers as to whether to maintain their commitment : "As the U.N. could not keep the city (Sarajevo) open for food and could not defend its credibility or stop itself from being manipulated by the enemies in the war..." many wondered aloud about its continuing relevance in a new world of little clarity or direction.⁴²

From these points it is clear that both these organizations have been experiencing considerable difficulties. When one reflects a little more deeply, however, several key issues become clear. The Bosnian crisis clearly reveals that no organization of sovereign states can function any more effectively than the consensus among its member states permits. If neither the U.S. nor its allies know what values or interests they are willing to defend, no bureaucratic arrangement will produce concerted action.⁴³

One cannot forget the fact that organizations such as NATO and the U.N. are 'mere instruments of nation-states', and that their successes or failures depend directly upon the degree to which sovereign nation-states - and more specifically the most

⁴⁰ Michael Mandelbaum "The Reluctance to Intervene" Foreign Policy vol.95 Summer 1994. p.17.

⁴¹ "Geneva Negotiations Press on in Hopes of Peace on Paper" The Times Jan.2, 1993. p.11.

⁴² Roger Cohen "U.N. Looking More Inept in Peace Efforts" The Globe and Mail May 10, 1995. p.10.

⁴³ Stanley Sloan "U.S. Perspectives on NATO's Future" International Affairs vol.71 no.2 April 1995. p.229.

powerful ones - believe that international cooperation is beneficial to their own national interests.⁴⁴ Both the U.N. and NATO cannot be more successful than international politics and powerful international players allow. They can never be independent political forces on the world scene; at best they will be accurate reflections of the competing interests of sovereign nations : "Only governments as shareholders and boardmembers of the U.N. and its agencies, have the power to undertake the task of renewing the framework of international cooperation to shape a new world order".⁴⁵ To cast the blame for the current problems being experienced in places such as Bosnia upon these organizations is to disregard the reality of our current order, a reality characterized by diversity and disagreement among the great powers.

As the great powers have become more and more reluctant to expend blood, treasure and prestige, to resolve the ever growing list of disputes that have accompanied the collapse of the Cold War bipolar structure organizations such as the U.N. and NATO have seen their workload soar and, at the same time, their success rate stymied.⁴⁶ Former Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant has offered an explanation for this disappointing occurrence :

Great problems usually come to the U.N. because governments have been unable to think of anything else to do about it. The U.N. is a last ditch, last resort affair, and it is not surprising that the organization should often be blamed for failing to solve problems.⁴⁷

The current difficulties being experienced by both the U.N. and NATO can be directly attributed to the collapse of the bipolar structure. In addition to the fact that the

⁴⁴ Kim Holmes "New World Disorder : A Critique of the U.N." Journal of International Affairs vol.346 Winter 1993. p.340.

⁴⁵ Ingvar Carlsson "The U.N. at Fifty : A Time to Reform" Foreign Policy vol. 100 Fall 1995. p.4.

⁴⁶ Saadia Touval "Why the U.N. Fails" op cit. p.47.

principal reason for NATO's creation is no more are several other important developments that have resulted since the end of the Cold War. As has been detailed in chapter two, the ensuing growth in prevalent voices has made agreement that much more difficult, a fact which has subsequently sapped the abilities of both these organizations. Furthermore, this has made bargaining amongst the great powers over the division of responsibilities that much more difficult. This point is clearly illustrated in chapter two in the debate over the military strategy to be adopted in Bosnia and the issue of ground troops. As Waltz states in Theory of International Politics : "The principal pains of a great power, if they are not self-inflicted, arise from the effects of policies pursued by other great powers, whether or not the effects are intended."⁴⁸ This point has become blatantly obvious for both NATO and the U.N. in the emerging multipolar era as these organizations dominated by great powers have been unable to transcend the differences within to deal effectively with cases such as Bosnia. With the overwhelming threat that once unified the West no longer in existence, concern for the individual state has come to override the greater concern for the system. NATO and the U.N.'s future is now in a difficult state, not to mention the rest of the conflicts unfolding.

The Rise of Security Regionalism

The initial reluctance to manage the situation in Bosnia and the subsequent refocusing towards domestic issues in the U.S. that has coincided with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar structure, highlights the third and final issue to be

⁴⁷ Ibid. p.45.

discussed in assessing the implications for the global order of bipolarity's collapse : the rise of regionalism. Within the past few years old regional organizations have been revived, new arrangements formed, and the call for strengthened regional arrangements have been central to many of the debates about the nature of the post-Cold War international order.⁴⁹ Among those organizations that have reemerged in the political field are the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and more importantly for the purposes of this section, the Organization of American States.⁵⁰

The return to prominence of such organizations can be attributed to several factors, the foremost of which is the regionalization of international security triggered by the dramatic upheaval in the international political system. With the collapse of the Cold War bipolar structure and the immediate threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet Union represented within that structure, there has been a redefinition of security concerns away from the international system towards the state. As a result of the U.S. reluctance to manage global affairs, domestic and subsequently regional issues have become more telling. With the rising concerns for relative as opposed to absolute gains (state gains as opposed to systemic gains) that have accompanied the collapse of the bipolar order, regional organizations have seen their stock rise, this so as to share in the costs of promoting the interests of particular states.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics op cit. p.187.

⁴⁹ Andrew Hurrell "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics" Review of International Studies vol.21 no.4 Oct. 1995. p.331.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p.331.

⁵¹ By stoking up such regional organizations as the OAS and the principles its Charter espouses, the U.S. hopes to force all the OAS members to conform to its democratic principles. Put more simply, the U.S. can wage war on its domestic problems - which as noted have come to include the regional issues of drugs and illegal immigration - under the principles of the Charter of the OAS. The objective is to force the other member-states to comply with U.S. interests, as well as spreading the financial burden of these interests. For example the OAS member-states can help in the battle to stabilize democratic regimes

A prime example of this is to be found in the increasing salience of the OAS in light of the changing policy stances within the U.S. While it is the world's only remaining superpower, the U.S. has to a large degree in the late 1980's and 1990's turned its focus inward in an attempt to shore up its economic situation. In doing so, the U.S. government has come to believe that the root of many of America's current problems are regional in nature. As a result, we have seen the rising significance of the OAS as a forum to help America do battle with such problems, and ease the burden of that battle.

One such regional problem that appears to be having a devastating domestic impact is drugs :

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have led to a fundamental reevaluation of U.S. security interests. In Latin America the perceived security threat of the 1990's is not a revolutionary government or an insurgency with alleged Soviet ties but a substance : illegal drugs.⁵²

The spread of crack-cocaine and the dramatic escalation of drug related violence that has ravaged American cities and splintered the fabric of American society led former President George Bush to declare 'war' on drugs.⁵³ By the end of the 1980's, with the Cold War just barely ended, more Americans identified drugs as the number one threat to the country than any other problem.⁵⁴ As such, in early September of 1989 George Bush devoted his first nationally televised address to the drug problem, and in doing so outlined a national drug control strategy that called for an 'assault on every front'.⁵⁵ Of particular significance to this 'assault' were enhanced efforts to curb the cocaine supply at the source

throughout the Americas so that the U.S. does not have to assume as much of a financial burden in its battle against illegal immigration.

⁵² Peter Andreas "Dead End Drug Wars" *Foreign Policy* no.85 Winter 1991/92. p.106.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p.106.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p.106.

of production. Henceforth, the Andean cocaine producing countries of Bolivia, Columbia and Peru became a 'first front' in the drug war abroad. Under the \$2.2 billion five year Andean Initiative, drug related military aid to the region leaped from approximately \$5 million in 1988 to more than \$140 million in 1990.⁵⁶

Yet another regional concern that has emerged in the U.S. is illegal immigration. As is evidenced by the amount of attention now paid to the situation in the U.S., the Americans have placed a heavy emphasis upon this problem and have sought to deal with it through the OAS by promoting effective democracies throughout Central and Latin America.⁵⁷ As was illustrated in Haiti, Raoul Cedras - the Haitian military dictator - was deemed no longer acceptable to the U.S. During the Cold War, he would likely have been embraced as precisely the type of dominant leader required to suppress international communism and cooperate with the U.S. (a sensible, no-nonsense fellow with friends in the U.S. military) while in 1991 he could no longer be tolerated as a result of the undemocratic nature in which he came to power.⁵⁸ The U.S. refused to recognize his government and immediately announced a commitment to return Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Within the U.S. it was felt that if a 7,000 man army could thwart the collective will of a nation, not to mention the principles of a Charter uniting 34 countries, then a dangerous precedent would be set in the region.⁵⁹ In particular, it was feared that such an action might encourage restive or reactionary elements in larger military establishments

⁵⁵ Ibid. p.106.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p.106.

⁵⁷ William Odom "How to Create a True World Order" *Orbis* vol.39 no.2 Spring 1995. p.169.

⁵⁸ Gaddis Smith "Haiti : From Intervention to Intervasion" *Current History* vol.94 no.589 February 1995. p.57. Raoul Cedras assumed power after the Haitian elections through military force (a coup d'etat), ignoring the results of the democratic elections which clearly signalled Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the new leader.

⁵⁹ Pamela Constable "Dateline Haiti : Caribbean Stalemate" *Foreign Policy* no.89 Winter 1992/93. p.176.

throughout the Americas. For the U.S., this was an undesirable scenario. As the post-coup surge of Haitian 'boat people' picked up in appallingly unseaworthy boats in the Straits of Florida demonstrated, a desperate and oppressed populace so close to American shores always presents the U.S. with the specter of a mass infusion of refugees.⁶⁰ In light of the increased focus upon the domestic economic situation, this prospect was becoming ever-more unpopular by the day within the U.S. body politic.

In his speech justifying the need for the invasion of Haiti, President Clinton argued:

Now the U.S. must protect our interests to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders, and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere, and to uphold the commitments others make to us.⁶¹

While not denying Clinton's emphasis on human rights, for many the most relevant aspects of this justification was the focus on the securing of U.S. borders from illegal immigration flows and the emphasis placed on democracy throughout the Americas so as to do this.⁶² (It was felt that by establishing stable democracies guaranteeing the rights of the individual throughout the Americas, the citizens of these countries would be less inclined to flee the United States.) Within the U.S., it is clear that there was great concern over the prospect of a mass infusion of refugees. Thus, the foreign policy discourse emerging to justify the intervention constructed the Haitians as a threat to the U.S. population in terms of race (blacks of African descent), public health (carriers of HIV and AIDS), economic health

⁶⁰ Ibid. p.185.

⁶¹ Cynthia Weber "Dissimulating Intervention : A Reading of the U.S. Led Intervention Into Haiti" *Alternatives* vol.20 no.3 July/Sept. 1995. p.265.

⁶² Ibid. p.272.

(illegal competitors for U.S. jobs), and morality (spreading of unpopular religious views such as voodoo).⁶³

When one realizes the renewed and invigorated emphasis placed upon such regional concerns as drugs and illegal immigration occurring at the same time as a growing reluctance to deal with such issues as the proliferation of conflict in different areas of the planet (i.e. Bosnia), what becomes quite evident is the growing concern for the state as opposed to the system. According to Kenneth Waltz, as a result of the great stakes at risk, the bipolar structure forced the two superpowers to work for the sake of the system and not just for themselves to ensure stability. With the collapse of the bipolar structure, and the apparent shift towards a multipolar one, regional concerns have received a greater level of attention. This is not to say that drugs and illegal immigration are not legitimate concerns that present very real problems to the U.S. (as well as others). What is telling and warranting of significant concern, however, is that drugs and illegal immigration can be seen as the redefinition of American security interests.

Regionalism is prominent in this redefinition as a result of the perils that certain regional issues hold for the state. Illegal drugs and illegal immigration are seen as threatening the fabric of American society and thus justify significant attention. The OAS is the forum through which some of the burden of these problems will be eased. As a result of the limited initial impact a situation such as the one in Bosnia might have on the U.S., no longer is the U.S. as willing to act to deal with such a situation. The justification becomes that 'we cannot afford to deal with such far-off issues, we have our own problems'. According to Kenneth Waltz, such a scenario does not bode well for global

⁶³ Ibid. p.272.

stability, especially when one considers the fact that many regions of the world no longer appear capable of stabilizing themselves - this in large part due to their history of exploitation and manipulation at the hands of others in the games they played.

Conclusion

Two key points Kenneth Waltz makes in Theory of International Politics are quite evident in this chapter. First, great powers are most likely to act for the sake of the system when their numbers are reduced to two.⁶⁴ Second, in a multipolar world the concerns of many become regional as opposed to global.⁶⁵

Why is it that these points are so relevant is clear when they are further explained to us. As understood through Waltz, in a bipolar world concerns are reflective of the system - this is not to say that the two poles are not acting out of self-interest, but as a result of their preeminent position. Their self-interest comes to incorporate the entire system. In a multipolar world, concerns reflect the state, leading to a focus on domestic and, to an extent, regional issues.

When one wonders why there has been a proliferation of armed conflict since the end of the Cold War, why so little has been done about it, why institutions that are supposed to be able to deal with such situations are not, and why those capable of dealing with this conflict are not doing so, the answer becomes quite clear. As a result of the collapse of the bipolar structure, the ensuing focus has been on the state as opposed to the

⁶⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics op cit. p.205.

⁶⁵ Ibid. p.205.

system - the unit as opposed to the structure. This has allowed for the explosion of impulses that the bipolar structure would have prevented.

When one looks at the situation in East-Central Europe, is it truly conceivable to believe that centuries of ethnic hatreds such as those being exhibited in the former-Yugoslavia could have suddenly disappeared with the advent of the Cold War? What kept these hatreds and ensuing conflict under wrap was a bipolar order that did not allow for such outbursts. These sentiments were suppressed for the purposes of the greater goal : global stability.

This point leads to a further question : was global stability something achieved on its own? Again the answer is no. Global stability was brought about by the bipolar powers acting for the sake of the entire system, a fact that the bipolar structure and competition predicated. With so much at stake each worked diligently to regulate their own sphere of influence so as to avoid the system's violent eruption, thus maintaining order and stability. This feature of the system in turn prompted others to mute their own individual concerns and also to contribute to the maintenance of that order.

Such is no longer the case. As the great powers have grown reluctant to manage global trouble spots and have allowed their differences to transcend the capabilities of various organizations designed to bring them together, global instability - as we have seen in Bosnia - is inevitable

CONCLUSION

The liberalization of the Communist Empire in Central and Eastern Europe and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union has been accompanied by general disorder and confusion in the international system. Nowhere is this more evident than in the former Yugoslavia where the bloodshed triggered by ethnic furies was allowed to rage out of control for close to five years. As this thesis has attempted to illustrate, much of this mayhem can be attributed to the collapse of the bipolar structure of the international system as it has come to be understood through the writings of Kenneth Waltz.

In order to reiterate Waltz's main premise, it is necessary to point out that he felt that the bipolar structure of the international system lends the greatest opportunity for stability in the international system. As revealed in our first chapter, Waltz argues that the bipolar structure provides a level of order and direction to the international system that cannot be found under other - multipolar - structures. His reasons are several : first, Waltz states that the bipolar structure led to the creation of a set of clearly established rules in the international system, thus limiting uncertainty and enhancing stability. Furthermore, as a result of the constant attention paid by the two superpowers to one another, they become quite familiar with one another's actions, thus limiting the threat of potential miscalculations. Second, as a result of the stakes at risk in the bipolar competition, the two superpowers are forced to manage the international system. In order to ensure their own survival, each superpower's individual concern had to come to incorporate the entire system. Third, according to Waltz, the bipolar structure limited the level of diversity and dissension in the international system as a result of the two superpowers preponderance of power. Waltz felt that these three factors favoured effective international action, and thus,

international stability. By forcing the two poles to manage the international system, as well as forcing the lesser states to suppress many of their individual concerns, the bipolar structure of the international system bode well for its continuing peace and stability (especially in Europe).

Waltz believed that the breakdown of the bipolar world would most likely lead to a multipolar world, and thus could quite possibly return us to the type of world known prior to 1945 - one of great turbulence. The basis behind such a prediction - as revealed in our first chapter - is as follows : With the collapse of the bipolar structure one could expect a rise in the uncertainty held by states over the implications of their actions, a reluctance to manage global trouble spots on the part of the great powers, and an increase in the diversity of interests held by states. All of these factors, Waltz argues, would serve to limit effective international action, and thus international stability.

In our second chapter, this prognostication was put to the test in reference to the crisis unfolding in Bosnia. The results yielded were striking and indicative of the merit of Waltz's theory. To begin with it is clear that with the collapse of the international system's bipolar structure an established pattern of behaviour no longer exists. What intervention into Bosnia would thereby entail for intervening states is unknown - no one can reasonably predict the consequences of intervention. The insecurity associated with such a venture has therefore risen dramatically, limiting any effective action by the great powers for much of the conflict, and prolonging the suffering of the warring populations. Second, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, no longer is the security threat to the West - and the U.S. in particular - as imminent as it once was. In consequence, there is a rise in the reluctance to manage such situations as Bosnia on the part of the great powers (and once

again, by the U.S. in particular) as a result of the limited impact such situations are seen to have for 'their' interests. With the Soviet threat no longer, there has been a renewed focus upon domestic issues in the U.S. (as well as the other great powers), and subsequently effective action in cases such as Bosnia has been limited. Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet threat, no longer do states feel the necessity of subordinating their own security interests to those of the United States. As seen in the Bosnian case, each state implicated in the process has brought its own ideas to the table on how to deal with the Bosnian quagmire. As such, dissension has been heightened and consequently, there has been limited effective action and prolonged suffering in Bosnia.

In our third chapter, the implications of bipolarity's collapse for the international system were discussed. In this chapter it was noted that as a result of the features associated with bipolarity's collapse - as revealed in the Bosnian case - three particular consequences could be discerned. The first of these stemmed from Waltz's argument that by failing to properly manage such global trouble spots as Bosnia, we risked their proliferation. In the 'Proliferation of Conflict' section of chapter three this view was elaborated. Ethnic furies unleashed in East-Central Europe - previously held in check by the repressive state powers of these governments - risked disastrous consequences. Second, as revealed in the 'Calls for Dissolution' section, due to the rising diversity of interests that has coincided with the U.S.S.R.'s collapse, disagreement among the great powers over how to proceed in situations such as Bosnia has paralyzed the ability of organizations like the U.N. and NATO. The inability of these organizations to move forward in such situations has led to calls for their dissolution. The growing sentiment in certain circles (the U.S. Congress in particular) can be summarized simply : if these

organizations cannot aid the stabilizing of such situations as Bosnia, then what's the point of their continuation, especially in light of the hefty costs of membership. The third consequence discussed in this chapter flows directly from an increased concern for the individual state. As a result of the focus on domestic issues, leading to a reluctance to manage such situations as Bosnia, regionalism has enjoyed a renewed emphasis - particularly in the U.S. Due to the potential impact certain regional issues - such as drugs and illegal immigration - may have on the U.S., these issues have received immediate attention. On the other hand, as a result of the limited impact a situation such as the one in Bosnia is now seen as having upon 'American' interests, there has been a reluctance to properly manage it.

These three consequences clearly reveal an increased focus upon the state as opposed to the system in this emerging multipolar era. Such a scenario, Waltz predicted, did not bode well for the continuing stability of the international system - and Europe in particular. Bosnia (as well as other trouble spots such as the ones in many of the former Soviet Republics) is clearly indicative of the validity of this belief.

The question therefore becomes : are we, in writing this thesis, longing for a return to a confrontationist past in order to justify foreign endeavors more easily and thus aid in stabilizing the international system? Do we wish for the creation of a new enemy in order to force the continued projection of American power (and a united Western front) and thus help in our quest to avoid the unraveling of such impediments to peace as Bosnia? The answer to these questions cannot be other than a resounding no. Rather, the goal of this thesis has been to illustrate the stability of the bipolar structure - as opposed to any

other multipolar structure - that Waltz speaks of, and to illustrate the order and direction that this structure provided to the international system.

While stressing the virtues of the bipolar structure, what Kenneth Waltz is really doing is stressing the virtues of leadership in the international political system. The bipolar structure demanded the leadership and direction necessary for stability in the international system. While a return to a bipolar, confrontationist past is not desired, the return of international leadership in order to stabilize the system and prevent further Bosnias from unfolding and possibly spilling over is. For just as any corporation cannot survive without leadership, nor can the international system.

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





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