

Twitter Response to Vision 2030: A Case Study on Current Perceptions of Normative Disorder within Saudi Social Media

Saad Abdulrahman Alkarni

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Electronic Business Technology
Faculty of Engineering
University of Ottawa

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Abstract

There has been a mixed public response on social media toward Saudi Vision 2030, which could threaten public support of its implementation. This research investigated local tensions between social, religious, political, and economic values concerning the Saudi Vision 2030 plan, with a view to understand the opportunities and challenges of social and cultural change within an evolving Saudi society. In this study, Twitter activity is treated as a societal mirror that reflects some of the perceptions regarding the transformations taking place within Saudi society. Both a case study informed by tweets sampled from Saudi Arabia and Vision 2030 related documentation explored how the current public social media discourse reflects existing social, religious, and cultural tensions concerning the government-proposed Vision 2030. This study drew on theoretical framework informed by Durkheim's and Ibn Khaldun's theory of social change, Merton's strain theory, and Luhmann's Social System Theory, to explore social, political, economic, and religious tensions found within the interactions of Twitter users around projects and events implemented or inspired by Vision 2030. An application programming interface (API) was used to retrieve Twitter posts, while a thematic analysis was applied to published documents related to Vision 2030 to identify Saudi society's challenges to the implementation of the Vision. The study found that within Saudi society, Vision 2030 had an impact upon the normative disorder already taking place due to the rapid changes brought about by the Vision. Specifically, the study highlighted the link between ambiguous, clear, or absent norms, and a person's pre-existing background knowledge. Social and religious group norms were more ambiguous than clear, whereas economic group norms tended to be clearer. Finally, the study found that over time, through public debates, norms moved from an ambiguous and absent stage and became increasingly well-defined. The study showed that Saudi society, as a result of Vision 2030, is experiencing a normative disorder.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia; Saudi Society; Saudi Vision 2030; Anomie; Normative Disorder; Social Norms; Religion; Morality; Social Change; Communication; Culture; Media; Social Media; Twitter.

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Twitter Response to Vision 2030:

A Case Study of Normative Disorder in Saudi Society Social Media

1 Introduction

During the 19th and early 20th century, social change (as a phenomenon) was largely the product of gradual structural changes in Western societies (new technologies, changes in ways of living and working, and institutional arrangements that manifested in North America and Europe). In the late 20th century, however, globalization has played a decisive role in stimulating competition among nations for imposing political, social, and cultural hegemony. As a result, many social challenges have emerged, including multiple forms of social identity, one of which is the ability to interact in new ways within the expanding social reality of online and offline communications. Digital technology, in particular Information Communication Technology (ICT), is considered a powerful vehicle for carrying political, social, and cultural components that contribute to transferring the culture of the technology's producer to other societies with different values and social characteristics.

There is a consensus among theories of social change (e.g., Durkheim, 1982; Ibn Khaldun, 1958; Luhmann, 1993; Merton, 1938) that social change is a result of political, social, and cultural factors. Social change involves a change of certain values, rituals, and practices within societies, which in turn create environments for normative disorders. Durkheim (1893) referred to this phenomenon as *anomie* or *anomia*, which describes disorders and abnormalities in society, either for lack of common social norms, or ambiguity about those norms (Durkheim, 1982). Social change varies from one society to another based on the religious, cultural, economic, and political backgrounds of each

society (Durkheim, 1893; Merton, 1938). Rapid social change contributes to normative instability or disorganization and anomie becomes apparent and more pronounced. Saudi Arabian society constitutes a good example of a society undergoing a rapid social change because it is culturally, economically, and technically unique. Culturally, there are several reasons that make Saudi society unique among other countries; not only does it have a distinct culture that is versed in tradition, it is also governed by a political system that espouses a religious dogma and presents itself as a defender of this dogma. The tenets of this religious dogma are anchored in religiously held absolute narratives and religiously based laws. Despite these religiously anchored values and the fact that the government as a monarchical system shares the same tribal values and social norms with the society, the government is eager to adapt to modern and global values and lifestyles. In accordance with the most recent developments in Saudi society, a number of cultural, political and economic challenges have emerged. These challenges have been reflected in concepts and perceptions, such as modernity, Westernization and cultural colonization in societal dialogues within Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, this study identifies modernization as the acquisition of technology, institutional arrangements, educational systems and communication technologies of less developed countries. Westernization is defined as the acquisition of Western cultural technology and norms that are not necessarily associated with technology and lag far behind the cultural standards of Saudi Arabia. Cultural colonialism is defined here as the intrusion and inadvertent acceptance of foreign rules that conflict with local culture. However, norms tied to modern ways of living tend to change gradually with manageable conflict. The conflicting impact of new norms becomes pronounced when they clash with religiously based values. Certainly, values based on

religious dogma become more resistant to change than those based on secular political orders.

Economically, Saudi Arabia is considered the largest economy in the Middle East and produces approximately 25% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Arab world. The country is the largest exporter of oil worldwide, and has an overall industrial and production based economy (Al-Ariefy, 2011). It is also part of the G20, which is a significant station at the international level. Given its position in the global economic sphere, and given the decrease of the price of oil and new emerging sources of energy, Saudi Arabia finds itself in a position where it must diversify its economy in order to ease its dependence on oil export revenues (McDowall, 2016). A long-term plan which promotes this decrease of dependence on oil revenues must be put in place, and this is where Saudi Vision 2030 steps in. But there is a price to be paid, and not merely a financial one, for taking the country in this direction.

Technically, Saudi Arabia is one of the fastest growing countries in terms of use of social networking sites. Many Saudi people have expressed concern about new communication technologies and the threat they pose to the social order (Meijer, 2010), as people are able to tailor their online identities when interacting within the e-society (Webster, 2014). Given the skyrocketing numbers of Internet users in Saudi Arabia, ICTs have had an immense impact on the social, political, and economic spheres in the country. In January 2015, the total number of active Internet users was 18.3 million, representing 58% of a total population of 31.5 million (Kemp, 2015).

Informed by select theories of social and cultural change, this current research examines social media as a window through which to explore the normative disorder

emerging from the current economic, political, and social plan of Saudi Vision 2030, which constitutes a significant revolution in the condition of the country. This Vision adopts the ideal investment of the exceptional, strategic, and geographical position of Saudi Arabia. The main site used in this study is Twitter, of which a sample is monitored, in an effort to uncover evidence of normative disorder and its influence on public acceptance of the social, cultural, and economic consequences of Vision 2030 on Saudi society. In this study, Twitter activity is treated as a societal mirror that reflects some of the perceptions regarding the transformations taking place within Saudi society, as well as measuring the extent to which social norms can be identified as possessing clarity, ambiguity or absence.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The current study explores the response of the Saudi public to the government proposed “Saudi Vision 2030”—an ambitious development project. The responses are those revealed by means of Twitter users expressing attitudes and views regarding Vision 2030. They are assessed against the current social background that has been characterised by many social experts as manifesting a severe cleavage between the traditional norms and norms of modernity (Cloward & Ohlin, 1942; Durkheim, 1897; Sellin, 2003). Experts tend to attribute the severity of this cleavage to the rapid technological development and high use of communication technology carried within a society deeply versed in religious tradition, both institutionally and ideologically. The normative conflict and disorganization that is taking place and likely to increase, is seen from the theoretical perspective of Durkheim’s (1897) Anomie. In this study anomie is defined as a state of disorganization of norms that weakens their regulative and controlling functions. The

study also adopts Merton's (1968) three qualifications of normative disorganization: conflict of norms, ambiguity of norms, and the absence of norms. The assumption of the existence of anomie in Saudi society stems from two main sources:

1. Anomie generated by structural changes linked to the adaptation to new technologies and rapid urbanization. Such structural changes lead to severe cultural conflicts. For example, exposure to new norms introduced by electronic media tend to clash with many traditional Islamic norms, which in turn leads to an increase in anomie within Saudi society.
2. Anomie generated by strong rejection of unfamiliar norms and values, especially those linked to the west, which are dramatically different from those of Saudi religious institutions, tribal groups, and individuals who adhere to traditional religious dogma.

These two factors are instrumental in creating a conflict within Saudi society because traditional and modern groups use electronic media when promoting their values and religious views, while engaging in polemical critiques directed against modernists and liberals.

This conflict becomes even more exaggerated when played out on social media. This is especially true when one considers the religious doctrine of the Sunni religious majority, contrasted with the tribal cultural fabric, and how this demonstrates the dynamic nature of Saudi culture (Robertson et al., 2001). The influence of religious and cultural traditions persists in social and governmental activities in Saudi Arabia. However, despite this, the government strives to promote development and modernization while maintaining the standards of Islamic traditions. Thus, the Saudi government, as indicated in many of its

state publications, sees itself as both adhering to traditional values and embracing modernity (Farsy, 1990). These are the constraints within which the state is forced to operate and navigate, thus introducing anything into the society which would upset or interfere with that social order is bound to be met with opposition and criticism.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

With Saudi Vision 2030 as a case study, the purpose of this study is to assess the reaction of Saudis to the proposed Vision 2030. This assessment utilizes the Durkheim concept of anomie based on the theory of anomie. The three manifestations of anomie (clear, absent, and ambiguous) are assessed from the reactions to the project and as such describe the normative positions of the responses.

The first part of this study analyzes the text of Saudi Vision 2030, which was officially published by the government, and the published responses to the Vision, such as newspaper and magazine articles, reports, and social media. The second part is the analysis of Twitter responses based on the above described theory of anomie. The one-year time period under investigation includes the date of the official announcement of the Vision, from April 25, 2016 to April 25, 2017.

The Twitter responses do not provide any demographic information of respondents such as education, income, and group affiliation. Accordingly, the analysis is confined to the cognitive qualifications of norms (in terms of ambiguity, absence, belief position, and knowledge perspective) rather than their causal origins. This study hopes the analysis sheds some light on the types of normative commitments and particularly the expected normative polarization between traditional and liberalized groups with the latter typically found among the youth (65% are under 30 years of age).

By juxtaposing the results of the document analysis with the assessment of the responses of the Saudi public on Twitter, the study attempts to identify the manifestation of anomie in Saudi society and provide recommendations to pro-actively manage its outcomes.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

The following section highlights the major theories that have been selected as the framework of this study. These theorists provide a sound explanatory model when addressing the main concerns of this study. Durkheim's original concept of anomie, for example, highlighted the impact of modernization and the associated rapid changes. Merton expanded upon anomie by introducing standards of anomie, including ambiguous, absent, and clear. Ibn Khaldun discussed the role of religion in the creation of social cohesion, and the relationship between religion and society as encapsulated in the term "*asabiyyah*." Finally, Luhmann focused on the role of communication when rebuilding social norms and the meaning of societal values. These theorists provide important concepts when studying the impact of modernity on a society, as well as change in social norms. Selected theories are utilized after reviewing several competing theories related to social change and social media. These are: Durkheim's theory of social change, Ibn Khaldun's theory of social change, Merton's strain theory, and Luhmann's Social System Theory. According to Even & Schwarz (2003), when researchers analyze data from different theoretical perspectives, they are linking research questions with background theories. In addition, the unifying, integrating, competing, comparing, and networking between theories are a complementary approach which is useful when analyzing and understanding social phenomenon (Bikner-Ahsbabs & Prediger, 2006).

1.1.1 Durkheim's theory of social change (Anomie)

Durkheim's theory of social change focusses mainly on the unintentional dynamics that occur during a social change. Such changes are inter-connected and not particularly headed in one direction—specifically, they are not controlled by religion. His focus was the study of social phenomenon and not merely individual members of society. Durkheim believed that the developments and changes that accompanied the Industrial Revolution in Western society contributed to the absence of common social standards and social disorder. This leads to the breakdown of social bonds between the individual and the community at large. According to Durkheim, this Industrial Age disorder was the result of the transformation of traditional communities with shared standards and values, into communities with new imposed rules. This “anomie” introduces a number of challenges, including an inability to identify the meaning behind common social standards, weakened social bonds, and a diminished sense of solidarity among societal members. Durkheim (1951) believed that “society includes not only the range of individual emotions and activities, but also the power to control those emotions and activities” (p. 241). Despite the fact that Durkheim discussed anomie, he disregarded religion as a sacred divine revelation and considered it a mere human activity that can be applied to increasingly secularized societies (i.e. 19th-20th century France).

Durkheim's ideas continue to be relevant when studying rapid social change. Although he wrote about changes taking place within French society, his theories of the impact of social change can be applied to other contexts, including Saudi society. Saudi society, in general, believes that religion has a divine source. Hence, when studying Saudi

society, it is also important to include the theory of *asabiyyah* by Ibn Khaldun, which highlighted the characteristics of Arab and Muslim societies, including the role of religion.

1.1.2 Merton's strain theory

Merton's (1968) *strain theory*, which is an extension of Durkheim's theory of anomie, suggested that anomie can be seen as a forced adaptation exerted on individuals by the socio-economic order. He viewed anomie in a slightly different way from Durkheim. According to Merton, societies provide both culturally valued goals and culturally valued means. When there is a mismatch between these goals and means, anomie occurs. The *goals* are the achievements that a given society considers as a success based on the shared assumptions in that society, whereas the *means* are the ways to achieve these goals. The resulting anomie, as outlined in Merton's strain theory, leads people to pursue socially accepted goals using means that are not socially acceptable, i.e. criminal activities. Normlessness takes three patterns: absent, conflicting, and ambiguous norms. The previous three types of normative disorganization can be described as a description of an individual's position. For instance, the concept of clarity indicates that individuals may hold norms that legitimize and prohibit the same behavior. Furthermore, the ambiguity of norms implies that individuals may be unclear and uncertain regarding appropriate behaviour in certain situations. The absence of norms implies that individuals may have no position with respect to a certain social conduct or issue. In the context of Merton's discussion of the conflict of strain sources, he pointed out that religious value may conflict with social value, and this might strain the individual decision. He also claimed that tribal traditions lead to a development toward collective forms of *retreatism*, which involves a rejection of both the cultural goals and the means to obtain them. This in turn leads people

to seek an escape from both these goals and means, and marginality in society (Merton, 1968).

1.1.3 Ibn Khaldun's theory of social change (*asabiyyah*)

Ibn Khaldun was the first to use the term “tribalism” (Arabic: *عصبية asabiyyah*) in his book, *The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history* (1958). Tribalism, according to him, is a social system originally based on the biological bond between members of a particular community. Its function is to link individuals, groups, clans, and tribes in accordance with common cultural, social and behavioural values. Ibn Khaldun compared the biological relationships between tribal members with the ideological relationships between groups sharing intellectual and political views. He argued that tribalism (or social cohesion by extension) is an important factor in nation-building, but he went beyond that to say that religion and its spread among people can benefit from *asabiyyah* at all levels. That is, tribalism, ideology, and feelings of loyalty can help in the spread of a religion.

This theory is relevant to the current work as tribal and clan demographics in Saudi Arabia play a role in developing a culture of intolerance between said tribes, clans, and communities, because of differences in values. Saudi Arabian culture intersects with the culture of the Arab world, which Hofstede (1984) described as a high-context culture based on cooperation between its members. That description enhances cohesion among its members and makes social values an important and effective reference for activities and directions of the tribe and other social components in Saudi Arabia. In addition to *asabiyyah* at its tribal level, there are other types of *asabiyyah* such as those at the regional, racial, and ideological levels. All types contribute to shaping the cultural structure of the Saudi society.

1.1.4 Luhmann's Social System Theory

Looking at social change from a different but supplementary angle, Luhmann (1993) developed the Social System Theory (SST) which emphasizes the important role of communication in rebuilding societies and reproducing norms and standards. This theory asserts that society is a complex social system made up of interacting subsystems. The interactions among these various subsystems cause the overall social system to reproduce itself (*autopoiesis*) in its environment, by connecting these elements and by establishing selective relations through social interactions (Lee, 2009). One common underlying characteristic of the SST is that it uses the biological analogy of autopoiesis. This concept refers to systems that reproduce themselves from within themselves. This phenomenon is said to occur when the elements of a system interact, generate, and participate together to produce and re-produce themselves to recreate the system (Varela et. al, 1974). Luhmann (1993) stated:

Social systems use communications as their particular mode of autopoietic reproduction. Their elements are communications which are recursively produced and reproduced by a network of communications and which cannot exist outside of such a network. (p. 174).

When conceptualizing contemporary society from a macro-sociological perspective as a social system, observations and interactions of users are entangled within social media and information technology where technologically mediated communication is considered a core autopoietic process by which society produces and reproduces itself.

Luhmann believed that communication has three components, namely, information, utterance, and understanding. He stated that every communication

differentiates and synthesizes its own components (Luhmann, 1995). Communication can only be spoken of when all three of these elements interact simultaneously and dialectically (in a permanent loop). The selection of communication plays an important role when effectively conveying a message so that it is correctly understood. Luhmann (1995) noted that “Communication is the processing of selection” (p. 140). SST contributes to an understanding of the importance of the role of communication in rebuilding communities and reproducing standards of social norms, for example. With this in mind, the researcher refers to Twitter as a communication tool to investigate the normative disorder in Saudi Arabia during the first year of Vision 2030, with a view to understanding how people are changing their norms from one stage to another.

To summarize this section, Durkheim’s theory of social change addressed social phenomena as social facts, which can be studied scientifically, and envisions religion, in particular, as a social phenomenon which is created by members of a society rather than by divine revelation. Apart from his view of religion, Durkheim’s theory is an important framework theory for studying social structures and social changes in general, and anomie in particular. Ibn Khaldun’s *asabiyyah* theory also provides an important theoretical framework by highlighting the role of religion in Arab societies and giving special attention to some of the unique characteristics of Arab societies, which are still clearly present in Saudi Arabia. Merton’s (1968) strain theory is relevant to the current work as it highlights anomie (normlessness) and how it increases with rapid social change, and underscores the potential mismatch between the goals set by institutions and the means available to the society to achieve their cultural goals.

Finally, these theories as a group are important as they provide details about the different patterns of anomie, which is used as a scale in analyzing the data collected from Twitter microbloggers regarding Saudi Vision 2030. As Saudi society undergoes a transitional stage, both economically and socially, anomie is a possible outcome of these changes. These interactions regarding the role of religion within society and the change of social structures, as well as the adaptation to new sets of values, are central to this study. Since these debates take place via communication platforms, Luhmann's Social System Theory is also a core theory for this work as it reflects upon how changes occur in contemporary societies and upon the effect of communication on the religious, social, and cultural structures of Saudi society.

1.4 Research Questions

This study aims to investigate the extent to which Twitter posts reflect a state of anomie in the structure of Saudi society. The main question in this study is: *How do Twitter posts align with existing religious, social, political, and economic norms concerning the proposed Saudi Vision 2030?* This question is broken down into six sub-questions in relation to four main factors, namely, religious norms, social norms, political norms, and economic norms. These questions are as follows:

- I. How do published documentations discuss the Saudi Vision 2030 and what are the cultural opportunities and challenges identified that may face the implementation of the Vision? (Document Analysis)
- II. To what extent do Twitter posts reflect the existence, absence, and/or ambiguity in the use of **religious** norm-based utterances? (Sentiment Analysis)

- III. To what extent do Twitter posts reflect the existence, absence, and/or ambiguity in the use of **social** norm-based utterances? (Sentiment Analysis)
- IV. To what extent do Twitter posts reflect the existence, absence, and/or ambiguity in the use of **political** norm-based utterances? (Sentiment Analysis)
- V. To what extent do Twitter posts reflect the existence, absence, and/or ambiguity in the use of **economic** norm-based utterances? (Sentiment Analysis)
- VI. To what extent do the responses of Twitter microbloggers align with the opportunities and challenges predicted by the authors of the published documentations?

1.5 Delimitations

The current study is a case study that is delimited in terms of topic, resources, site, scope, and time constraints. With regard to the topic, it focuses on the recent public debate and social media response in Saudi Arabia concerning Saudi Vision 2030. This topic was chosen because it is a current social issue of high importance within Saudi society. As for the resources, the study is limited to two main resources: published documentations on the Vision and Twitter posts. Top trending hashtags related to the Vision's activities and events are chosen and public responses are analyzed and interpreted. Posts and blogs in other social media sites are not considered in this study. In terms of scope, the study focuses on social change and how it affects the religious, social, cultural, and political norms because these are the main elements of Saudi society which maintain its stability. Geographically,

Saudi Arabia is the targeted location of the study, regardless of whether microbloggers are Saudi or not. It is important to remember that not everyone who lives in Saudi Arabia is a citizen of the country, but they still are active on Twitter and express their views on a number of social and political issues. The collected data of this study comes from Twitter responses and published documentations of Vision 2030. Finally, in terms of time limit, the published documentations on the Vision and Twitter posts included are from April 25, 2016 (when the Saudi government announced the Vision) to April 25, 2017 (one year in total).

2 Review of Research

2.1 Religion, Morality, and Society

From antiquity to contemporary times, the relationship between religion, morality, and ethics has always been considered contentious. Green (2005) indicated that morality is used in social contexts to resolve conflicts, disputes, and problems between individuals and groups within a community. Furthermore, Turiel (1983) described morality as “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other” (p. 3). To give a precise definition to ethics, as with religion, is a complicated task—especially since *morals* and *ethics* can, at times, be used as distinct concepts, and at other times be considered synonyms, as Harakas (2002) revealed. Leslie (2000) mentioned that ethics, which originates from the Greek word *ethos*, is translated as *character*, and represents a map that shows an individual the right path in choosing between decisions, behaviours and life choices. In addition, ethics defines proper conduct of individuals according to their own traditions, customs, and beliefs.

Philosophers have always been interested in investigating the distinction between morality and ethics. Aristotle (384-322 BC), Plato's student, looked at ethics as a way to reach happiness, and considers it the compromise between desire and virtue. Ethics, however, should not be confused with morality: the former refers to the way in which an individual thinks and behaves, whereas the latter refers to the way in which society defines proper conduct according to their beliefs and customs (Markel, 2001). According to Green (2005), culture stands in the backdrop of these arguments, as well as debates between Western philosophers and theologians, concerning the relationship between religion and morality.

A more recent conversation is about the impact of scientific reasoning on issues of religion, morality, and ethics. Conflict arises when scientists talk about “scientific issues” regardless of the side effects upon society, whereas fundamentalists worry about the failure of Western morality (Noll, 2002). Evans and Evans (2008) described the conflict between religion and science as a conflict of interests which “avoid assuming that religion and science are struggling over truth, but [focus] on religion as an institution with multiple tasks and interests, struggling with other institutions” (p. 98-99). Religious opposition to science is then seen as part of a “social conflict between institutions struggling for power” (2008, p. 97-98). Conflict between scientific and religious world views continue to be influenced by relativism, skepticism, and nihilism among philosophers (Blackburn, 2001). Moreover, scientific activities influence religious studies. Thus, scholars such as Durkheim study religion by using scientific methods to describe social phenomena (Stark, 1996).

2.1.1 Religion and society

Sociology of religion is a branch of sociology that seeks to examine religious beliefs and practices from a social perspective. Many philosophers, both ancient and modern, have offered definitions of “religion” in line with both their cultural background as well as the historical period in which they lived. For example, one definition of religion is as follows: “Belief in and reverence for a supernatural power recognized as the creator and governor of the universe; a particular integrated system of this expression; the spiritual or emotional attitude of one who recognizes the existence of a superhuman power or powers” (Martin, 2015, p. 23). As this study later shows, religion is also a symbolic system that regulates society through devising rituals and practices of people in a general

framework. These practices are categorized as long-ranged and widely spread (Geertz, 1973). Pasquier (2007) described “true religion” as not just belief in a system of dogma, but also the act of properly carrying out one's duties, cultic practices, and obligations toward the gods” (p. 960). It is important to note that what is considered proper in carrying out duties and obligations may vary from one religion to another or even within the same religion.

In accordance with the above definitions, religion is not seen merely as rituals of worship, but also cultural aspects of people's lives which have an impact on their social and business behaviour (Samovar et al., 2013). From the foregoing, one can state that the relationship between religion and society is interactive and both are affected by a plethora of intellectual and social variables. As a result of this interaction, new perceptions have emerged regarding the ability of traditional religion to guide social behaviour, for good or evil (Eickelman, 2005). Based on the above definitions, this researcher examined that there is a strong relationship between religion and society in that one gives shape and substance to the other. For example, how one living in a particular social context may interpret or carry out the demands of one’s faith will in many cases depend on the social and political context in which they live.

2.1.2 Ibn Khaldun’s views

Ibn Khaldun (1958) stated that man by nature is a social creature; he needs others in order to live his daily life and practise his religion. Ibn Khaldun added that strength and stamina are the start of *asabiyyah*, and what brings about intimacy and close association among people is religion. In his view, the relationship between religion and society is interdependent in that each one will not exist without the other. This is the point at which

Ibn Khaldun's theory of clannish behaviour enters the picture since it is based on the notion of social solidarity. *asabiyyah* consists of connecting individuals and groups, clans and tribes within one framework, such as a state or nation, including common cultural, social and behavioural values, to build one society (Ahmed, 2002). Although religion is derived from an external divine source, it needs social solidarity (*asabiyyah*), which manifests the true meaning of religion. Religion and social solidarity, in his view, are complementary forces pushing society toward civility and urbanization (Ra'ees, 2004).

Ibn Khaldun believed that the role of society goes beyond integration, strength, and invulnerability. Religion doesn't arise other than with feelings of clan loyalty (Ibn Khaldun, 1958). Although religion has the power of righteousness and justice of the law, clannishness complements and reinforces this power and sense of justice (Stowasser, 1983). Ibn Khaldun stated that Arabs without religion are not able to create states. This directly reflects the impact of religion on Arab societies and the way Arabs carry out the orders of God and, at the same time, the way they derive their power and authority from religion. In an attempt to explain the Arab society's adherence to the teachings of the Prophet, Ibn Khaldun discussed the religious principles that limit envy, jealousy, and competition imposed by the tribe in the distribution of power among its members, with the result that these behaviours will disappear. To emphasize the importance of religion in guiding and building society, Ibn Khaldun saw religion as represented by the Prophet's behaviour, who is looked upon as a role model for the believers to follow. Ibn Khaldun believed that the behaviour of the Prophet has an essential cultural significance to the changing of the social patterns and imposing social and political principles underlying Muslim society (Mahdi, 2015).

2.1.3 Durkheim's views

Durkheim's analytical approach to sociological philosophies is concerned mainly with structures and functions of society as well as a perception of sociology that is more practical than common theoretical approaches of sociology of his day. Durkheim believed such historical approaches are limiting since they mean that social facts will only be studied philosophically and, consequently, will not yield a full understanding of society. Thus, Durkheim used the term "social fact" to study religion as a social phenomenon. In particular, religion, in his view, involves acting, thinking, and feeling.

[A] category of facts which present very special characteristics: they consist of manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by which they exercise control over him.

(Durkheim, 1982, p. 52)

Durkheim had two views about the role of religion in society: in the beginning of his career he thought that human societies could survive on a secular foundation without religion. But later he saw religion as an essential element of social life. Durkheim (1945) defined religion as follows:

A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden beliefs and practices which unite in one single society called a Church, all those who adhere to them

(p. 47)

In his perspective, there are three elements to any religion: sacred objects, beliefs and practices, and a moral community. The most important issue in Durkheim's theory of religion is the contrast between the sacred and profane, which is the central element in his

religious theory. In this regard, his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1995) was a serious attempt to explain the primary role of religion in society. Up to that point, religion had generally been considered as the dominant ideal that controlled society. In contrast, Durkheim's moral theory came from his vision of the concept of society as human activities. These activities do not necessarily come from religious concepts. Therefore, he looks to morality as a social fact, by which members of society create their moral principles. He also rejects theorists who believe that moral concepts construct ethical systems (Durkheim, 1961).

Durkheim's theory of social change focused mainly on the unintentional dynamics that occur during a social change. Such changes are inter-connected and not particularly headed in one direction—specifically, they are not controlled by religion. Durkheim stated in his book *The Division of Labor in Society* (1964) that dividing society creates new kinds of social solidarity, but that society can be divided into two parts. First is mechanical solidarity, which is compatible with the traditional social structure. Second is organic solidarity, which arises through the Industrial Revolution and rapid economic development that affects communities. In Durkheim's thinking, “mechanical” interactions are tied to the group solidarity that is typical of traditional societies, especially tribal links (e.g., links of common blood and family). In contrast, “organic solidarity” is a newer form resulting from the reorganization of societies due to the Industrial Revolution. In his book *Suicide* (1951), Durkheim shed light on some of the drawbacks of organic solidarity. For instance, he argued that organic solidarity is structured in a way that gives individuals the freedom to choose their own lifestyles. This freedom leads to what he called the disorder in social and moral standards. Mechanical solidarity, by contrast, overcomes this drawback because

individuals lack the freedom to choose their own lifestyle and thus adhere to the common social and moral standards of the society in which they live. According to his social theory, society and its components are in a continuous observation and categorization process by members of that society to achieve a full understanding of it. His ideas revolve around the perception of society as a mechanism that creates its different components and is more important and significant than the parts within this whole (Durkheim, 1982).

Religion is a common topic of investigation for both Durkheim and Ibn Khaldun. They both view religion as being very important to society and they both see it as essential for social solidarity. They believe that religion has a vital role in controlling societies and the people who inhabit them (Baali, 1988). For Ibn Khaldun, religion is holy and sacred, while Durkheim denies any sacred or holy aspects to religion. Durkheim viewed religion as a cultural phenomenon that can be tested and analyzed as any other social phenomenon. He also added that religion helps control societies' thoughts, ideas, and tendencies (Durkheim, 1984). This analysis gives religion a great role in societal solidarity both mechanically and organically. Despite the similarities of some of their thinking about religion, Durkheim and Ibn Khaldun viewed the source of religion differently. Durkheim considered it as a mere social activity created by members of a society to unify it through certain values, rituals, and practices. On the other hand, Ibn Khaldun viewed religion as holy and sacred, revealed by God through the *Qu'ran* and *Hadiths*¹ (Ibn Khaldun, 1386). He saw religion as possessing a divine external source, the sacredness of which makes it able to exercise a remarkable influence on Arabs despite their Bedouin environment where

¹ *Hadiths*: A collection of traditions containing sayings of the Prophet Muhammad that, with accounts of his daily practice.

tribal solidarity was paramount (Ibn Khaldun, 1958). One should keep in mind that Ibn Khaldun looked upon religion as a believer, whereas Durkheim looked upon religion as a non-believer. Despite their difference in approaching religion, both of their arguments have validity. Both of them accepted the role of religion, but where they differed is in the source of religion. Ibn Khaldun saw religion as having a divine source, whereas Durkheim saw religion as social activity without any divine source. In this case, looking at religion as a social institution makes it vulnerable to monetary standards like any other social activity. Perhaps it is between Ibn Khaldun and Durkheim that distinguishes the concept of the sacredness of religion from the prophets on the one hand and the non-sacredness of religion that is the product of individual practice and on the other. In this context, religion tends to imbue many tribal customs and traditions and replace them with new Islamic values. The normative teachings of Islam, via the Qur'an and prophetic Sunnah, act as a framework for religion. But how this framework translates from one society to the next varies greatly. This is evident by the fact that the interpretation and understanding of Islam varies among numerous Muslim countries because the religion is mediated through their respective cultures. This relationship between society and religion, as Ibn Khaldun stressed, highlights the remarkable influence religion possesses to guide Arab actions and gives an independent exercise of ethical boundaries and commonly shared behaviours.

2.1.4 Western perspective of society and morality

In the West, the 19th century saw materialism overcoming spiritual values, with emphasis on the individual over the group. Although the idea of maximizing individual self-interest may have contributed to economic growth and to the development of social skills, some believed this was not enough to produce sufficiently strong social and spiritual outcomes

(Sen, 1999). There was increased emphasis on scientific knowledge, as can be seen in the works of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Both William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952) developed the utilitarian doctrine into the so-called doctrine of pragmatism, which considers goodness to be the satisfaction of human demands and fulfillment of people's wishes. However, such beliefs led to a conflict between the needs of scientific research and values and community ethics. Consequently, there emerged a movement toward a strong return to religious fundamentalism in Western societies by those demanding the implementation of the literal understanding of religious texts (Eckersley, 2007). For example, even in a secular society such as the United States, there is a large Evangelical and Christian rights movement, numbering in the millions. These groups are much more conservative and literalist in their readings of the Bible and wish to shape society and embrace social policy based on these readings. In addition, the claims and findings made by scientists, in the minds of such people, have not properly addressed the existential questions of meaning and purpose and have instead left us without answers. Thus, the implications in this example make quite clear where two views and understandings of reality clash (Margaret & Taylor, 2005).

In this historical context, two scientists (Kant and Durkheim) excelled and studied social phenomena through the sociological approach, especially ethics and morality. During their times, religious values lost importance because they were viewing social phenomena purely as social activities, rather than something sacred with a divine source. They used scientific methods to assess the meaning and value of morality. Based on this trend, sociology, with its use of social scientific methods, became the standard for teaching

social phenomena and determining their foundations and humanitarian standards, which in turn became the norms of moral judgments (Gauthier, 1945).

Kant (1969) stressed that the moral obligation related to society's religious and legal sources was linked to the more advanced standing of the human soul. At this time, morality lost its religious value and began to face many challenges, such as the lack of common and consistent standards in society concerning what is right and wrong. The ability of morality to control human behaviour was subsequently reduced. In addition, there was a growing political and religious role for parents and the public in directing morality (Zaroug, 1999). Similarly, sociologists presented the concept of the separation between scientific facts and moral values where science dealt with scientific standards rather than values (Triqq, 1985).

Durkheim (1976) emphasized the role of religion in forming collective conscience, known as the moral conscience of the collective, which in his interpretation does not exclude religion from social life but sees its use as a tool of community moral cohesion. According to Durkheim, “[s]ociety is not only something attracting the sentiments and activities of individuals with unequal force but it is also a power controlling them” (Durkheim, 1951, p. 241). Merton (1968) confirmed that the social structures press heavily on community members to integrate within the community but these social structures do not completely determine the behaviour of the individual toward society—as studied in the Western realm.

2.1.5 Islamic perspective of society and morality

Since the Middle Ages, Muslim philosophers, including Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), al-Kindi (1399-1469) and al-Farabi (1468-

1543), have contributed to our understanding of human civilizations in several areas, especially within the field of ethics. The philosophy of Islamic ethics and its relationship to society are based on the principles of Islamic law, which derives its legislation from the Qur'an and Hadith (the authentic prophetic tradition). In this context, Al-Ghazali states in his book *Al Munkidh min al-Dalal (Deliverance from Error, 2000)* that morality is not an invention of the Greek philosophers but is a creation of the Abrahamic religions. In his book *Mizan al-'amal (The Balance of Action, 1964)*, Al-Ghazali defends ethics as a moderating force over people's power to think, their power of desire, and their power of anger. As he defined in *Ihya'ulum al-din (Revival of Religious Learnings, 1993)* the person who has a balanced ability to control these three urges can act ethically. If reason agrees with these acts, they are considered benign, but if the mind disagrees, these acts are ugly.

More recently, Darraz (1973) adds that the social consensus and collective choice of social rules was organized and interpreted from those texts and other sources in the Islamic moral system. The moral system in Islam is based on the idea of compulsion, leading society's members to assume moral responsibility toward individuals and society and also preventing social chaos (*fitnah*) and moral corruption (*fasad*). The principle of moral obligation places pressure on individuals to behave and act according to what is defined by the society. In his landmark work *Qur'an Constitution*, Darraz (1973) related Kant's theory of moral obligation to the Qur'an since the soul is born in the individual with an intrinsic and primordial understanding of what is good and evil (known as *fitrah* in Arabic). Kant also believed that the human soul had already received the sense of good and evil during its initial composition. According to Darraz (1973), this instinct is

considered a benchmark against which to measure human morality in terms of good and evil. He emphasized that due to this embedded sense there exists a basic common moral system in life, even if one does not have an explicit system of social rules.

In the Islamic moral system, there exists an individual responsibility toward the community that instructs the individual to execute the social duties outlined in the Qur'an and Hadith. This includes the organization of the relationships between individuals, families, and communities (Darraz, 1973). Here began the ideological conflicts between fundamentalists and modernists in the Islamic world regarding concepts of mortality and their place in Islam. These conflicts have contributed to the current interest of Muslim scholars who are presently studying the existence and applications of ethics in terms of philosophy. Perhaps the most prominent challenge facing the "relationship of morality to society" is the influence of Western culture on Islamic culture; from an Islamic perspective, not all of the cultural products of Western societies are necessarily in accordance with the existing value system.

Islam considers morality as a necessary human ingredient, especially as a feature that distinguishes humans from animals, who act upon raw instinct devoid of any moral code of conduct. Fakhri (1994) argued that the relationship between religion and morality had thus divided Islamic scholars into three categories of major theological ethics. He explained that the first group focused on a rational interpretation of ethics that began with the Mu'tazilites in the eighth and ninth centuries. Scholars who subscribe to this interpretation return more to the rules of logical proofs than to divine authority. Mu'tazilites, led by Wasil Ibn Ata (1301-1347), believed that the mind is the source of moral obligation and is used to distinguish between good and evil, a position based on

arguments related to their rejection of the interpretation of revelation and the determination of proper belief of scripture (Groff, 2007). Hourani (1962) stated that Mu'tazilites believed there was still a need for holy resources because of humanity's inability to independently detect what is right. Traditionalists oppose Mu'tazilites because they don't accept Mu'tazilites approaches toward ethics.

The second stream that Fakhri (1994) identified was semi-rational and voluntary, initiated by the Ash'arite theologians. Ash'arites believed that morality must be a process of revelation. The third group Fakhri pointed to is made up of anti-rationalist fundamentalists who were identified by Ibn Hazm (1064) in the 11th century, and Ibn Taymiyyah (1328) in the 14th century. This kind of thought denies the accuracy and validity of dialectics and theology since scripture is considered literally as the ultimate source of religious fact (Fakhri, p. 3-4).

Generally, Islam considers human ethics the necessary foundation for reaching ethical perfection and one of the crucial components of Islamic ethics. Muslim thinkers consider the human mind a tool to understand the principles of ethics. Hence, Hesamifar (2012) confirmed, "Islamic ethics must be preceded by human ethics" (p. 115). From an Islamic perspective, classical Muslim scholars give assurance that the three essential requirements for spiritual, intellectual, and moral behaviour and thought are faith (*Aqidah*), Islamic practice (*Shari'a*), and Islamic ethics (*Akhlaq*) (Mohammed, 2013). Islam considers ethics as the key factor in the development of a society which is based on a comprehensive understanding of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. This restores the moral development of human behaviour that fosters peace and prosperity (Isa Beekun, 1996).

The Qur'an guides Muslims to adopt moderation in all pursuits, as Allah says: *وَكَذَلِكَ جَعَلْنَاكُمْ أُمَّةً وَسَطًا* “And we have willed you to be a community of the middle path” (*Qur'an* 2, p.143).

2.2 Anomie

Anomie, which originated from the Greek language as “a-nomos,” meaning “without rules,” is a condition derived from a certain lifestyle which lacks a sense of belonging or group ruling. This definition is mostly seen in sociology relating to the works of Durkheim’s *Division of Labour in Society* (1964) and *Suicide* (1951). Durkheim’s goal was to provide the idea that sociology should study societies rather than study individuals on their own. Durkheim’s use of anomie in *Suicide* was especially important considering its contributions to the study and understanding of human nature. He used the term anomie to describe the lack of “regulations and consequent sufferings” that occurred due to “man’s activities” (Durkheim, 1951, p.258). Anomie is seen as a state of “declassification” or “loss” in which individuals undergo a transition from one social state to another (Durkheim, 1951). It can be described as a state of normlessness. This state will mostly occur after a sudden change in society, during which individuals struggle to adapt to or accept new rules, norms, and values (Stolley, 2005 & Kendall, 2006).

Durkheim concluded that due to the loss of social norms, it is only natural that social groups from industrial and commercial positions become victims of anomie (Durkheim, 1964). This description of anomie relates to dramatically altered economical states, which can affect individuals financially, leaving them in a lower or higher status than before. As a result, these social groups are observed to be at a greater risk of suicide, whereas lower class groups are less influenced by social anomie, as they live more modest lifestyles with fewer needs and expectations. When comparing social statuses, Durkheim

(1964) argued that the lack of solidarity is seen when “egoism weakens the emotional social attachments” to society (p. 172). This all potentially leads to “a loss of moral decision-making, a lack of collective consciousness, deterioration in social connections, and the decline in the level of solidarity at the macro-level of society” (Durkheim, 1951, p. 254). When individuals transition from a higher class to a lower class, they need to dramatically change their lifestyles, which means a restraint in needs and self-control. On the other hand, when individuals move from a lower class to a higher class, they encounter this adjustment in wealth, which widens their desires and expectations. This can be seen as a thirst for consumerism which cannot be satisfied (Ferrante, 2006, p.19).

Merton (1938), another prominent sociologist, proposed that anomie represents the discrepancy between culturally ingrained goals and the legitimate means for acquiring those goals. While most people endorse goals of success and consumption, not all are able to achieve them due to limitations of personal skill and opportunity. A strain develops as a result of this discrepancy which forces people into different adaptations with respect to goals and the means for their achievement: conventionalism, innovation, deviance, and retreatism. The latter two adaptations that are accentuated by the blockage of opportunity structures contribute to social instability. Cam and Irmak (2014) endorsed Merton’s position and argued that the unavailability of opportunities for employment or success among a large segment of the population promotes crime and anomie.

Durkheim’s view of anomie as normative disorganization was further simplified by Abdennur and Barhoum (2004). Norms are viewed as cognitive entities that can be qualified cognitively without reference to underlying forms of social and economic changes. Norms can be qualified in terms of cognitive characteristics such as clarity,

ambiguity, contradiction, consistency, and universality. Anomie can be assessed in terms of these norm characteristics. A measure of *Normative Disorganization Scale* was developed by these authors to measure anomie.

2.2.1 The influence of anomie

Durkheim believed that industrial developments and social changes that accompanied the Industrial Revolution in Western society have contributed to the absence and disorder of common social standards. According to Durkheim, this disorder is the result of the transformation of the traditional communities, which share the same standards and values through the ages, to new membership communities with new rules imposed by the social transformations that accompanied the Industrial Revolution communities. In addition, Durkheim (1897) mentioned that rapid change influences family, education, and polity. Levels of anomie can be expected or predicted from certain salient economic and cultural trends. Merton's theory, which is an adaptation of Durkheim's theory of anomie, suggests that crime does not stem from "pathological personalities" but from the "culture and structure of society" (Merton, 1968).

As indicated in the anomie literature (Durkheim, 1897; Sellin, 1938; Cloward & Ohlin, 1942; Merton, 1968), all rapid social change contributes to normative instability or disorganization. Some scholars emphasized that the association between socioeconomic and sociopolitical changes in different nations is linked to social stability. Anomie was also associated with increased rates of suicide, crime, and addiction. For instance, sudden economic changes can be reflected in major social adaptations such as criminal deviance and retreatism. First, the limits of legitimate means (due to increase in population, competition, and to personal and social limitations) are expected to increase the resort to

crime. According to Merton, American culture presents major achievements such as professional education, houses, cars, and many consumer items as universally accessible if people apply themselves (the American Dream). But the means for obtaining these goals are not accessible to all to the same degree. Hence, a strain exists between the desire to obtain culturally endorsed goals and legitimate means for obtaining them. This strain leads to five major adaptations 1) legitimate work, 2) innovation, 3) deviance, 4) ritualism, and 5) retreatism. Second, the retreatism option can be seen to be aggravated by the debilitating impact of an overall high anomie on mental health. Also, the overall anomie contains exposure to Western hedonistic norms. The use of alcohol, drugs, and sexual permissiveness can go beyond their recreational use and become focal pursuits or a way of life. Due to the influence of tribal traditions, one can expect a development toward collective forms of retreatism and marginality (Merton, 1968).

2.2.2 Critique of Durkheim's theory of anomie

While Durkheim's original theory of anomie is very useful for an analysis on social change in Saudi Arabia as a result of the introduction of new technologies and ideas, it is nevertheless limited because of its origin as a Eurocentric theory. In other words, Durkheim formulated his notion of anomie or normlessness based on 19th century liberal European capitalist society. This means that the processes of anomie are quite different in a non-European socio-cultural environment such as Saudi Arabia and other Arab and Muslim societies. The main critique of Durkheimian theory of anomie is that it is based on collective forms of normlessness or statelessness, while in other societies (e.g. Saudi Arabia) there might be more complex and interconnected forces that are causing statelessness on the individual and collective levels. For example, the rise of urban centres

and the related consumer lifestyle was felt more so on the individual level than the collective level in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, some individuals entered a state of normlessness as a result of the newly acquired hyper-consumerist culture while other segments of Saudi society did not feel its impact (e.g. rural areas, traditional families).

In fact, in Saudi Arabia the impact of normlessness was uneven in contrast to Durkheim's original formulation that normlessness would be collectively felt by the whole society. The extended family in Saudi Arabia showed that normlessness was unevenly distributed between generations and family members living within the same time and geographic area. Furthermore, if a young Bedouin male settled in the city and acquired new forms of solidarity, this did not necessarily mean his immediate family in the rural countryside were disconnected from him. Moreover, there is still no consensus among scholars on the definition or interpretation of Durkheim's theory of anomie. While Durkheim did not state that the only basis of solidarity in modern societies is a set of consensual moral norms, some definitions adopted anomie as a "common body of norms" which is the basis of solidarity (Willis, 2014). Thus, some view anomie as the absence or ambiguity of norms or "normlessness" such as Dohrenwend (1959), who described anomie as a state of "deregulation" (p. 472), and Wallwork (1972), who emphasized that anomie relates to the collapse of regulations in the industrial sector of society. Others discuss anomie as a lack of legitimacy given to societal regulations. Mawson (1970), for example, indicated that in a Durkheimian state of anomie "legal and moral rules have ceased to have sanctioning power" (p. 306), whereas LaCapra (1972) suggested that anomie is an absence of "consensually accepted limiting norms" (p. 159). In contrast, Nisbet (1970) defined anomie as "conflict of socially accepted norms in an individual" (p.55). These

definitions emphasized that “anomie is a complex societal condition involving a variety of factors” (Willis, 2014, p. 107). Willis (2007) believed “anomie is that societal condition in which members of a society pursue their own needs and desires without regard to their fellow members” (p. 110).

Therefore, the theory of anomie by Durkheim is open to re-interpretation and is not a monolithic theory that has remained the same since the 19th century. Some scholars have even cautioned the use of Durkheim’s theory of anomie, or its re-interpretation in different contexts such as in psychiatry. Some scholars, such as Chamlin and Cochran (2007), have argued that Durkheim’s theory of anomie is “...readily amenable to direct falsification” because it can be used to explain results that are not necessarily tied to a state of normlessness (p.41). Moreover, a large problem with Durkheim’s theory of anomie as found by Hilbert (1989) is that many functionalist scholars misuse it to formulate ideas about “the collective conscience” as norms, even though Durkheim does not argue that. Durkheim was not clear about the role of identity in the process of mechanical and organic solidarity. In addition, Durkheim’s theory of anomie has been criticized for not explaining events such as suicides and crime. Despite these criticisms, the theory is useful in interpreting the effects of cultural transformations in Saudi society, especially as it is living in a state of economic and social transformation under Vision 2030. Moreover, the use of modern means of communication, especially social media, has increased, similar to social transformations in Western society in the early 20th century.

2.2.3 Social norms and human behaviour

When theorizing about normative social behaviour, the relationship between norms and behaviours are closely linked. According to Perkins and Berkowitz (1986), the change

of normative beliefs will be reflected in people's behaviour. Additionally, Rimal and Real (2005) noted that social conditions influence the norms of social behaviour. There are different definitions of what constitutes “social norms” depending on the academic discipline one is working in. One way to define social norms is to state that norms are a regulation of behaviour. According to Parsons (1951), norms dictate and regulate the interaction of people in different social settings. He argued that the structural model of norms, which creates a system of values, contributes to restraining those behaviours which contradict this value system, with the ultimate goal of achieving a common interest of the group. From a Marxist perspective, social norms exist to maintain social order between different social classes (Parsons, 1951). According to Bicchieri and Mercier (2014), social norms are perceived in the social sciences as those social norms which restrain behaviour through matching attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours to group norms. Chung and Rimal (2016) pointed out that most definitions of social norms share a common ground, which is that individuals attain awareness about accepted and favored behaviours, which can be described as an awareness of social norms. They also pointed out that most disciplines have their own unique, and sometimes shared, defined norms. In testing how these social frames are created and the power of their persistence, Sherif (1937) highlights the power of groups in shaping the perceptions of individuals and how they present any information as being accurate and factual. He also argued that the group is a social reference for individuals to receive information regarding how to behave in ambiguous situations.

In all these definitions, the common thread is the regulation of behaviour through the shared agreement of members of society, as well as practicing control through social sanctions. In contrast, Jibbs (1965) presented several challenges when conceptualizing

social norms, which include the disagreement upon a definition of norms, distinguishing between different types of norms, and understanding the relationship between what to consider a norm, as well as the contributions of the norms. The following definitions of social norms clarify the social scholars' perspectives about the significant rules of norms on human behaviour. Merton (1963), for instance, looks to the social norms as a rule of human conducts:

A norm, then, is a rule or a standard that governs our conduct in the social situations in which we participate. It is a societal expectation. It is a standard to which we are expected to conform whether we actually do so or not. (p. 222)

In a different aspect, social norms usually have been created from cultural values of societies. Thus, members of societies are often consistent in a common cultural framework. For instance,

Religious norms are distinctive because of their reference to divine command, but otherwise they function as social, legal, or moral norms. A religious norm can be a social norm, held in place by empirical and normative expectations and informally enforced; or can be a legal norm, held in place by the formal enforcement of a religious or state authority; or can be a moral norm motivated by conscience.

(Mackie et al., 2015, p.35)

Leonard and Philip (1963) emphasized this meaning by saying that “[a]ll societies have rules or norms specifying appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. Norms are based on cultural values, which are justified by moral standards, reasoning, or aesthetic judgment” (p. 68). George (1961) argued that norms are created by members of society when he says, “[a] norm is a statement made by a number of members of a group, not necessarily by all

of them, that the members ought to behave in a certain way in certain circumstances” (p. 46). In the same direction, norms are used to uniform behaviour, to design “frame of references” and to express the existence of social obligations (Theodore, 1958, p. 226; Burke & Young, 2011).

As a quick reference, the pervious definitions of norms reflect the differences and agreements among scholars of sociology. One can note how the definitions of norms emphasize rules governing appropriate and inappropriate behaviour, and societal expectations placed on individuals with a view to achieving desired outcomes. These rules act as reference points which people can refer to before behaving, or even thinking, in a certain way. Implied in this definition of a social norm is the assumption of universality; that is, a norm should be followed by everybody even if the norm is imposed by a few. Thus, in Saudi society, norms based on religious dictum are perceived as universally applicable. Furthermore, the tribal tradition reinforces the universality of norms by imposing uniformity that is created from a small scale and mechanical solidarity within a tribe.

2.3 Culture and Communication

2.3.1 Elements and characteristics of culture and communications

Berger (2000) claimed there are close to 100 definitions of the term *culture* adopted by anthropologists. Smythe (1950) described culture as life, and considered arts, sciences, and technology as its major platforms, elaborating that culture is ever-present in its effects on our social relations and in our political-economic systems. Cultural theory has progressively become a theory of communication (Carey, 2009); however, recent research has revealed a lack of attention to the issue of the digitization of contemporary politics,

society, and culture, given that there is no direct model of digital culture. Gere (2009) stated that “[d]igitality can be thought of as a marker of culture because it encompasses both the artifacts and the systems of signification and communication that most clearly demarcate our contemporary way of life from others” (p. 12).

The increased usage of new media technologies contributes to the further reconfiguring of institutions and subjectivities (Hand, 2012). Consequently, many researchers have focused their studies on identity-construction (Mehdizadeh, 2010); there has been a particular focus on identity formation during childhood and adolescence (Buckingham, 2003), and the function of the media in shaping the lives of youth (Lenhart, Madden, & Hitlin, 2005). Virtual identity reveals that the Internet continues to play a central role in globalization and the development of hybrid identities (Ess, 2005). By creating online identities, users are able to simultaneously inhabit different social categories, including those of organizational membership, religious affiliation, gender, and age, while also upholding boundaries that are necessary for sustaining community and culture (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This can result in positive effects, such as the acceptance of cultural diversity that is geographically varied through cyberspace technologies (Strate & Jacobson, 2002). Luppicini (2013) outlined the results of “technoself” studies which show the transformation of human identity and values throughout their technological relationships.

2.3.2 Communication: forms, patterns, and contents

Park (1938) concluded that communication increases understanding between and among groups, thus fulfilling the social function of maintaining cultural solidarity among individuals and societies. The author stated communication helps to circulate diverse

cultural practices and influences, thus widening the cultural arena. Influential types of communication that have recently seen increased usage are “social media”, the term often used to refer to “new forms of media that involve interactive participation” (Harvey, 2014, p. 1158). Social media are widely available and enable many people to shape or transmit culture (Babe, 2000). Babe, who cited McLuhan, stated that the media shape both individuals and cultures by reshaping ideas and perceptions, accepting Innis’ main idea that “culture, society and civilization change in tandem with changes in the media of communication” (2000, p. 274). Innis argues that changes in communication technology have affected culture by altering the structure of interests, by changing the character of symbols, and by changing the nature of community (Carey, 2009).

At present, a large amount of community interaction and conversation takes place online, with sharing among members mediated through web-based communication tools (Murphy, Hill, & Dean, 2014). For instance, Robinson (2007) stated that in face-to-face social interaction, individuals engage with each other through sensory modalities. Yet, at present, most computer-mediated communication occurs through text-based exchanges, in which there are no physical interactional cues (Suler, 2004). In the absence of face-to-face communication during online social interactions, the digital expressions adopted by users become the sole way to present their identities (Robinson, 2007).

2.3.3 Arab patterns of communication

Arab culture has had a significant effect on interpersonal interaction and communication. For instance, a fundamental value throughout Arab culture is the respect of authority, especially authority of the chief of the tribe (Samovar & Porter, 2003). In the Arab culture, it is not customary to challenge tribe leaders or other power-holders, and is

instead expected that members will accept established ethical standards (Singhapakdi & Rawas, 1999). This pattern is demonstrated through communication in the Arab world by offering compliments and tending to courtesy, thus preserving these social relations. Ghanem (2011) insisted that maintaining harmony is crucial in the Arab world, labeling it a high-power distance culture. Moreover, Ghanem, Kalliny, and Elgoul (2012) explained the time orientation dimension as being related to whether cultures are primarily directed toward the past. This is because human relationships with time appeared to be a crucial factor to determining the communication style and culture (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). Thus, there is evidence of the relationship between societal communication style and the extent to which a society is individualistic or collective. Ghanem, Kalliny, and Elgoul (2012) measured this relationship by studying the use of the pronoun “I” or “we”, along with several other items including direct versus indirect communication, tone, and clarity of communication style. The data collected shows that out of 1,081 comments, 534 (49.4%) were rated as direct, 540 (50%) as indirect, and seven as neither. This result shows the common style of Arab people that determine the ways of communication. When using new technologies, Arab users must adapt their communication style in order to meet online norms of anonymity, including a lack of eye contact (Barak & Suler, 2008). Additionally, due to greater state control and the fear of persecution in the Arab world, social commentators and journalists choose to adopt a creative form of writing to avoid threats to their lives (Aman & Jayroe, 2013). Moreover, religious values are the most important influence in most decision-making (Ghanem, Kalliny, & Elgoul, 2012). Additionally, the culture of the Arab world as described by Hofstad (1984) is a highly contextual culture based on cooperation among its members. This description promotes cohesion among its

members and makes social values an important and effective reference to the activities and orientations of individuals in society.

Through social network penetration in the Arab world, there has been remarkable social change. As youth in the region gained access to the Internet, social media, wireless communication, and blogging tools, new forms of media interactions were born (Aman & Jayroe, 2013). As a result, communication has been relaxed across the boundaries of identity (Papacharissi, 2004). Hall (1990) stated that the Arab culture is a “high-context” culture, where most communication is in person (Thatcher, Foster, & Shu, 2006, p. 95). Further, in-person communication is viewed as more valuable than electronic messages, in contrast to communication patterns in the West (Yasin & Yavas, 2007). Kirchner (2001) highlighted how Westerners can interpret emotional displays of sincerity by Arab people as expressions of anger, noting the added differences in online communication. Arab people tend to be involved in more human technological relationships online (Luppicini, 2013). Further, Douglas and McGarty (2002) pointed out that members of high-context cultures possess the ability to rapidly build relationships with others because of the interdependence and cooperation of individuals in achieving their goals. As Arab culture is a highly contextual culture, social networks are an appropriate environment for Arab societies to increase interaction and cultural communication. This unlimited interaction through social media sites generally helps Arab citizens achieve their political and social goals, which are usually limited by the media of official government.

2.3.4 Technology and transformation of society

This section examines the rational link between technology and transformation of society. Technology is one part of culture identified by Lustig and Koester (2010) that

assists in generating cultural differences: a culture's history, ecology, technology, biology, institutional networks, and interpersonal communication patterns (P: 33). Moreover, technology not only has been integrated into daily life, but also, it has changed many things such as empowerment, decision making, and communication. Researchers emphasize that differences among cultures lead to different implementations of technology. For example, Hofstede (1984) confirms that technology, as part of a culture, cause differences in individual and organizational needs. Because of the influence of technological culture, the following principals work as a guide for exploring the level of influence in different cultures:

“1.The power distance dimension refers to the inequality of the distribution of power in a country. In organizations, the hierarchy reflects this distribution of power such as Centralized decision structures, authority and the use of formal rules.

2. Uncertainty avoidance “the degree to which members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity”. Adoption of a new technology involves risk and uncertainty.”

(Hofstede 1984-2001: 83).

The influence of culture comes from the availability of information through technology. This availability contributes to creating a new cultural conflict across different cultures, and especially conservative cultures. While technology itself, specifically as an instrument through which to disseminate ideas, may be considered neutral, the conflict that arises from such dissemination can ultimately reorient cultural values. Additionally, another side of the conflict is the compatibility between national and global culture. Globalization has allowed the rapid spread of technology across the world, and cultural conflict seems to be more intense when new technology interacts with conservative societies; when people in one

culture use technological tools which were designed according to the differing values of second, separate culture, said technology may actually threaten identity, privacy, and values of the first culture.

However, technological opportunities within public and private sectors is a very important factor for the socio-economic health of any country. Those technological opportunities will reflect on different aspects of communities such as Reliability of Data, and Attractive Multimedia. It is obvious that these may be “the areas, which do not directly contribute to the economic growth but indirectly these are the areas, which will help in eradicating poverty, creating and accessing economic opportunities and at the same time sustainability and adaptation, which is the key to success in the Knowledge Economy” (Hameed, 2007: 24). Furthermore, technology reconsiders teaching strategies, allowing teachers to move from ‘traditional’ educational practices to educational practices that focus on students as individuals with distinct abilities. These effects help speed up the societal shift towards modernization while offering appropriate alternatives to address cultural challenges in different societies. Overall, the impact of technology on culture, economy, and education was very clear noted in the research, especially around the performance advantages of information communication technology. Technology, especially as a component of globalization, allows for cultures to interact more closely and freely than ever before, and the inevitable result of such interaction and accompanying exchange of ideas is that participating cultures will be affected, and even transformed, by such exchanges.

2.3.5 Social media

Social media are important new tools of social interaction, leading to enormous change and upheaval throughout various societies worldwide. For instance, during the Arab Spring, governments found it difficult to control the quick and efficient spread of information amongst protestors (Aman & Jayroe, 2013). In order to restrict the flow of online information that the government deems sensitive, censorship is still widely practiced in the Arab world, through the monopolization of the electronic media (Eid, 2009).

As social media continue to give voice to marginalized peoples, the overlapping natures of subject formation and identity-construction become increasingly clear (Zemmels, 2012). Schwartz and Haleboua (2015) studied the connection between cultural and online social identities, concluding that social media are the foundation for the spatial self. In order to perform an identity, the online user must record and display experiences that are physical and geographical. The mass media have such a crucial role in the serious changes, ups and downs in the domain of intercultural relations (Basalamah, 2014). Through the documentation of personal mobility and location-based community participation, Arab social media users could understand and reinforce other online profiles, habits and actions (Frith, 2012). Additionally, young users without any recognized education can have easy access to important sources of new information (Gee, 2008). Social media have provided remarkable support to freedom of expression and human rights in the Arab world, changing the political, economic, and social landscape of the region in immense and important ways.

2.3.6 Why Twitter?

Twitter constitutes a valuable source of public communication. A large number of people all over the world use Twitter actively and the number is increasing dramatically. These Twitter users discuss a wide variety of topics including the subject of this research question. Previous research has shown that Twitter has become a medium for discussing politics, sociology, journalism, books, environmental issues, organizing collective actions, and showing support for, or critique of, an endless number of topics (Gainous & Wagner, 2014; Hargittai & Litt, 2012). Secondly, the data on Twitter is public and can be accessed easily by anyone at any time. The availability of Tweets gives researchers the ability to mine data and in turn understand and analyze human behaviour and actions. In addition to the fact that it is a phenomenon in itself, Twitter interaction can provide data on how people interact with one another and how they react to social phenomena (Freelon, 2014).

Thirdly, in reaction to any given topic or social phenomena, very large numbers of Tweets are posted. With this large number, one begins to see a wide range of opinion on any given topic. A high number of Tweets on a given topic indicates a higher degree of social engagement on that topic. Fourthly, as Twitter is largely uncensored and unfiltered, people are free to express their opinions, unlike traditional media where one can find much more censoring. In addition, Tweeter users will be able to express themselves more freely and independently. Thus, the researcher gets direct access to the person's opinion without it being filtered by an editor. Fifthly, with the help of data mining methods, it is quite easy to collect digital trace data with great rapidity (Howison et al., 2011). What would have taken months in the past, can now be done in a few minutes. Finally, although studies have shown skewing in the demographic and geographic make-up of Twitter users, the platform

remains a good source for studying public opinion or reaction regarding a variety of topics (Gainous & Wagner, 2014).

2.3.7 Microblogging

Twitter is a dynamic microblog platform with more than 500 million Tweets posted per day. Users usually share their information and their opinion about a variety of topics. Twitter is a kind of social communication technology which allows users to post short messages via Internet (microblogging). The short messages, called “Tweets,” now include 280 characters instead of the former 140 characters, which distinguishes Twitter from other online platforms. Microblogging does can not only include text but also videos, pictures, or emoji. Microblogging via Twitter is a part of social software tools that manage the “interactions and communication” among people through networks (Ebner & Lorenz, 2012). The amount of information that is publically available on Twitter can provide researchers with a valuable and reliable source of data to be used in large-scale analyses and studies. However, Twitter is loaded with an enormous amount of text, which makes it challenging for researchers to easily analyze data. This large amount of texts, while challenging to extract and analyze, is a great source for exploring the social, political, and religious viewpoints of users.

2.4 Saudi Society

2.4.1 Saudi cultural aspects

Saudi Arabia is characterized by its religious importance because it is home to some of Islam’s holiest sites. Also, Saudi Arabia contains a wealth of natural resources and enjoys relative political and social stability despite many regional conflicts. Factors that

have shaped Saudi Arabia's identity include the following: First, Islam plays a crucial role in Saudi culture as it clearly reflects Saudi values, customs, and social traditions (Al-Saggaf, 2004). For instance, Saudi society is separated by gender in public venues, schools, and governmental and private institutions, with some exceptions in hospitals and markets (Le Renard, 2008). Second, within Saudi Arabian society, despite multiple loyalties in accordance with tribal, family, and political strength, religion remains an essential component in all of these identities and affiliations. Thus, families and tribes play a vital role in its social and cultural composition (Nevo, 1998). Third, despite the nature of its culture and demographics, Saudi society boasts collective thinking on issues under discussion through the traditions, customs, and convergence of views (Al-Qahtani, Hubona, & Wang, 2007).

In spite of the common cultural traditions of the Arab world, Saudi Arabia stands out from others as being both a traditional and modern state (Gallarotti & Al-Filali, 2012). The religious doctrine of the Sunni religious majority, contrasted with the tribal cultural fabric, demonstrates the dynamic nature of Saudi culture (Robertson et al., 2001). That is why Saudi society is described as a conservative state despite its modernized infrastructure and quality of life, its development of state policies, and its thriving economy. Because the influence of religious and cultural traditions persists in social and governmental activities, the government strives to promote development and modernization while maintaining the standards of Islamic traditions. Consequently, from time to time, the government faces religious resistance regarding some progressive endeavours, as well as the introduction of technology to improve communication systems (Kostiner, 1993; Robertson et al., 2001). However, despite the government's struggle to reconcile social progress and religious

tradition, statistics confirm that Saudi society, which is traditionally conservative, adopts technology even more so than other modern societies. This adoption adds a new character to the Saudi culture.

Saudis live in different environments, from modern and sophisticated cities distributed along the eastern and western coastlines, to more rural areas including the desert, mountains, and a small number of agricultural villages. In spite of the Saudi people's different customs and traditions, they gather in big and small cities around the country but maintain multicultural and social loyalties to their demographic and geographic origins. This cultural diversity and the negotiations thereof give the state the responsibility of monitoring social behaviour in both security and political aspects (Lippman, 2012). This, in turn, provides the state with political and social influence.

2.4.2 The traditionally conservative Saudi culture and forces for change

The most distinguishing characteristic of Saudi Arabian society is its conservatism as compared to more liberal values in neighbouring Arab countries, an issue that has a huge impact on the perspective of foreigners (Nydell, 2006). Nydell concluded that this conservatism is a product of the religious-based nature of the Arab world. Saudi society is characterized by its conservative social nature. Social customs and traditions are considered to be rigid standards of conduct, against which individual identities and community commitments are upheld. The preservation of social norms and customs manifests itself in a broad social conservatism, observable through social habits such as family marriage, traditional fashion, and folk art. The commitment to traditional values within Saudi society is strongly defended, even in the face of factors that encourage development and modernization. This type of conservatism is reflected in religious and

legal practices, in which the conservative society is inherently resistant to modernity, being very slow to adapt to rapid cultural shifts. In general, Saudi people try to resist influences that may negatively affect their deeply held values (Ighbaria et al., 2001), in order to preserve their national culture (Collins, 1990). In response to increased calls for social and political reform, there has also been a surge in conservative and religious values. As these opposing sides fight for space and legitimacy, the government faces an internal battle between pushing for reform and liberalization, while also appeasing conservative extremists (Aman & Jayroe, 2013).

2.4.3 The religion-based nature of Saudi society

Saudi Arabia has adopted its religious vision from the Salafist tradition, which concords with the Prophet Muhammad's era. The main role of the religion, through the Qur'an and the Hadith, is organizing humanity's spiritual and physical needs, as an indicator of the organizational strategies of the economy within Muslim communities (Rice & Al-Mossawi, 2002). Consequently, Saudi Arabia can be described as a representative of religious fundamentalism because of the Saudi lifestyle and the implementation of religious law in economic, social, and political affairs (Hickson & Pugh, 1995).

In the same context, Saudi Arabia describes Wahhabism as the method of religiosity prevalent in worship and transactions. Wahhabism is derived from the name of the Muslim scholar Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792) from the Najd region of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism emphasizes "the unity of God (tawhid), not just in the sense of believing in one God but also that He alone should be the focus of worship and rituals and is totally unique in every way" (Wagemakers, 2012, p. 4). Wahhabism tries to emulate the first three

generations of Islam as a guide for Muslim's behaviours. Ibn Abdul Wahhab called upon Muslims in Saudi Arabia to return to the pure practices that first Muslim generations learned from the Prophet Muhammad. Wahhabis describe themselves as "Salafis," which means all religious practices are based upon companions of the Prophet Muhammad (Gause, 2014). Saudi scholars defined Wahhabism as a public system that controls social, political, and moral Islamic law. This definition illustrates the size of Wahhabism's authority within Saudi social and governmental system (Alsaif, 2013).

In spite of the fundamentalism evident in Saudi Arabia, where Islam is considered "as a comprehensive system of ultimate truth and unfailing principles" (Moaddil & Karabenick, 2008, p. 1685), there are many ideological conflicts in political, cultural, and social matters. These are evident in the public discourse, especially between fundamentalists and liberals. While fundamentalism believes that modernity supports the consumer ideology (which threatens the religious identity by inserting negative values into Saudi society), modernism believes that the Islamic political system accepts development and modernity. Some Islamic modernists confirm that the development of Muslim societies will lead to scientific advancements (Al-Shohaib et al., 2009; Zayani, 2012; Quamar, 2015). In contrast, some religious figures and politicians work together to resist modernization programs (Nevo, 1998; Al-Atawneh, 2009; Alsaif, 2013), but other times they support projects and development programs proposed by liberal parties (Kostiner, 1993; Niblock, 2008). One example of a contentious issue that describes the current relations among politicians, fundamentalists, and liberals is Internet usage.

In general, as globalization works through the Internet, it is possible to see the development of virtual identities. This is especially true for younger generations, who

spend more time online taking part in forums or writing blogs (Harden & Al Beaezy, 2013). Some commentators argue that the movement toward the modernization of Saudi Arabia could lead to a society in which economic, social, and cultural formations are autonomous from the religious monopoly over thought and knowledge (Murdock, 1993). While this process is occurring, many challenges have arisen related to the dualism of modernist and traditionalist thought in contemporary Saudi society (Nydell, 2006). In fact, while Saudi citizens ask (via social media) for social reform, they also realize that their opinions may have serious implications, such as arrest or deportation (Aman & Jayroe, 2013; House, 2013).

Overall, it is obvious from different aspects of these arguments that the civil society is experiencing some political change due to the power of new social media (Aman & Jayroe, 2013). Hence, the Saudi Arabian government faces the enormous challenge of balancing conservative and liberal demands. Additionally, the coalition of people demanding change continues to grow, and now the “virtual opposition is a diverse group, consisting of Shiites, women, liberals, and Salafis” (Almestad & Stenslie, 2014, p. 501). Despite the influence of the Wahhabi ideology on Saudi society, Almestad and Stenslie (2014) point to many factors that contribute to changing this society in the modern society. One of these factors, they say, is the influence of Western cultures on the Arabian Peninsula, which largely came about through its history of colonialism and trading with the West. The modernization of governmental institutions according to Western criteria, among other cultural products of the West, have been accepted or assimilated by Saudi Arabia and have certainly influenced the public perspective and standards (Bahgat, 1999; Dekmejian, 2003). Despite this, it is important to note that Islam, which is the national

religion of Saudi Arabia, does not always accept Western ideologies in entirety; in this way, various cultural products may be accepted without adopting all Western ideologies and their aspects. The cultural change that has occurred as a result of this influence has created conflict among different parties within Saudi society, such as between the liberals and traditionalists (Exline, 2002). Cultural openness and the acceptance of new technology has introduced conflict in the Muslim community in various aspects of life and remains a challenging phenomenon because of the strong influence of religious and family values (Al-Ariefy, 2011). In Saudi Arabia, for instance, due to the anonymous nature of online interaction, people may behave differently and with less inhibition than they would offline (Al-Saggaf, 2004).

2.4.4 Toward a more liberal and open Saudi society

To move toward the economic, social, and cultural modernization of Saudi Arabia would be to reach a society in which those formations are autonomous from the religious monopoly over thought and knowledge (Murdock, 1993). While this process is occurring, many challenges have arisen related to the dualism of modernist and traditionalist thought in modern society (Nydell, 2006), which impacts many sectors of the country. For instance, leaders in Saudi Arabia have consistently maintained the moral and spiritual standing of Saudis as Muslims (Al-Ariefy, 2011). On the contrary, the country's minister of information has announced his intentions for leading a new stage in Saudi Arabian culture that is based on "openness to others and freedom of opinion" (Zayani, 2012, p. 324). Zayani (2012) noted that Saudi Arabia's government has already issued new licenses for local private television and radio channels, thus shifting the limitations on freedom of the press and pushing the boundaries of social and cultural news coverage.

In the meantime, the Internet is an increasingly important platform in any societal discussion, which has led to complex ethical issues in many places (Ghannam, 2011). This platform gives Saudis a unique opportunity to challenge the restrictions of cultural and social norms. For instance, face-to-face contact between women and men who are not related is considered unacceptable according to some scholars' interpretation of Islamic and social norms. However, today many interactive actions are available via online communication (Al-Saggaf & Williamson, 2004). Some scholars have stated that these rules apply regardless of the medium of communication, noting that the virtual world does not exist outside of the physical world. Therefore, the challenge is how individuals can respect the same set of social norms for interpersonal interactions (Yee, 2007).

Without a doubt, Internet technology has created an evolutionary movement through the formation of a virtual society that transcends global borders (Igbaria et al., 2001). It has been difficult to enforce boundaries around the construction of identity within a sphere of competing ideologies. This conflict is opening possibilities for alternative identity markers to be reinvigorated and potentially siphoned through traditional identity markers, to be folded into the national narrative (Zayani, 2012). The liberal individualist camp sees the Internet as assisting the expression of individual interests and enhancing democracy (Eid, 2009). Yet, this individualism is not congruent with collectivist values of Saudi Arabia, which place the needs of the collective over the individual satisfaction (Castells, 2013). Individualism also ignores concerns that the use of electronic media may lead to the deterioration of Indigenous cultures (McLuhan, 1994).

To conclude, the Internet's dimensionality, continuity, curvature, and density limits make it a reconceived public sphere for social, political, economic, and cultural

interaction (Fernaback, 2002). Some claim that cyberspace offers freedom of movement that is not available offline. Whereas, others claim that virtual space, like physical space, is socially constructed and re-constructed (Jones, 1997).

2.5 Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

2.5.1 ICT in Saudi Arabia

Information and communication technology (ICT) has been a driving force of social transformation in many countries worldwide. Saudi Arabia has one of the highest rates of information technology use in the Arab world, with the number of Internet users rising from 200,000 to 2.5 million between 2000 and 2006 (Warf & Vincent, 2007). This marks an increase in use, representing 53% of 1.9 million. Saudi authorities have been encouraging this progress since 1999, with the aim of becoming one of the most technologically connected countries in the Middle East (Amos, 2011). Given the skyrocketing numbers of Internet users in Saudi Arabia, it is clear that ICT has had an immense impact on the social, political, and economic spheres in the country. In January of 2015, the total number of active Internet users was 18.3 million, representing 58% of a total population of 31.5 million—an increase of 28% since January 2014 (Kemp, 2015). This source states that the number of active social media users has now reached 9.2 million—a 21% increase from January 2014.

Statistics from Go-Gulf 2017 show that the usage of Internet in Saudi Arabia increased dramatically between 2015 and 2016 with a total of 20.29 million active Internet users; this makes up 63.7% of the population. While Facebook is the most used social media, ranking 7.96 million users, Twitter is still prominently ranked as the second most used social media site, making up 20% of Internet users. When compared to the rest of the

Middle East, Saudi Arabia ranks Twitter as being the most preferred social media tool at a usage of 12%. Lower ranked social media sites include LinkedIn and Pinterest with a usage of 10%. Go-Gulf 2017 also demonstrates that smartphones make the Internet accessible throughout the day for users, increasing usage dramatically. With smartphone users dominating the internet world, applications such as WhatsApp are being used by 22% of the population, which is even more than Facebook alone. Another mobile app, although ranking low, was Instagram with a usage of only 13%.

Brown (2012) concluded that Saudi youth have been able to access more information than their parents could have as youth. His research shows that, in 2007, 73% of home computers were owned by people between the ages of 15-25 years of age. Many adults are distressed by the consequences of ICT use for youth, especially as it relates to overall life-satisfaction (Sutanto et al., 2011). Saudi youth spend many hours online in a virtual environment where they may exude confidence, optimism, and a sense of control over their activities and lives (Brown, 2012). Sutanto et al. (2011) argued this can lead to unrealistic expectations for interpersonal relationships offline, leading some to question the impacts of having divergent virtual and real-world personalities. However, the massive development of ICT and the ensuing move toward an e-society has had the positive effect of making communication more concise, practical, and affordable, enabling more youth to discover new worlds (Loo, 2011; Pratt et al., 2007).

ICT use in Saudi Arabia has also fundamentally transformed the political arena, especially in its facilitation of women's political participation. Fung et al. (2013) stated that these new technologies allow for discussing citizen-initiated political challenges that

would have been unimaginable before their existence, including even the most taboo subjects, such as the driving restrictions faced by Saudi women.

2.5.2 Social networking sites

Social networking sites (SNSs) are web-based services that help people to build relationships, increase knowledge, and develop skills. They have a huge capacity to mobilize political and technological participation over the next 10 to 20 years (Ghannam, 2011). Saudi Arabia is one of the fastest growing countries in terms of use of social networking sites. Currently, Saudi Arabia is ranked 33rd worldwide for social media use. It boasts almost six million Facebook users, who make up 20.01% of the population (Socialbakers, 2013). There are 3 million active Twitter and YouTube users, with Twitter use increasing dramatically from 2011 to 2012 (Bennett, 2013). YouTube use increased by 109% during the same period, with more than 90 million videos being watched each day (Social Bakers, 2013). LinkedIn use has also reached a high point, with 840,000 active users (Almohsen, 2013).

In Saudi Arabia, some political issues can now be freely discussed online as they are in other Arab countries, and these conversations need no longer be contained within physical or national borders. Certainly, these conversations were taking place in intimate settings prior to the rise of SNS use, but they can now be echoed on a broader social scale. In many ways, SNSs act as mirrors to people's offline lives, given that "the world is composed of networks, not groups" (Wellman, 1988, p. 37). SNSs were primarily created to boost pre-existing relationships, and in many ways, online social connections also mirror offline ethnic-, religious- and/or nationality-based group affiliations (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). Based on these associations, some sites attract users that others do not, and vice

versa. This highlights a unique aspect of SNSs, in that they enable users to make their social networks highly visible. Depending on the specific site that one is using, connections are displayed and varyingly known as “friends,” “contacts,” or “fans” (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). While SNSs support communication and connection within pre-existing social networks, there is a greater focus on impression management than there is offline. Alternatively known as “egocentric networks,” they have noteworthy effects on the self-presentation of users, who significantly influence each other’s behaviour and opinions (Sledgianowski & Kulviwat, 2009). This behaviour usually includes the impact of the person’s targeted motivation (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973).

Thus, cultural and social norms are mediated through social networking, and new online social norms emerge. Harden and Al Beayeyz (2013) compared SNS use in Saudi Arabia to its use in the United States, examining the impacts that culturally-specific social norms have on social media activity. Cultural attitudes about SNS did not seem to play a role in either location in determining SNS use; rather, individual attitudes about perceived enjoyment available from social media presented a much stronger indicator. Perhaps surprisingly, this highlights the limited effect that traditional social norms have on general social media use in Saudi Arabia. However, this research also found that significant differences appeared between SNS use of the two cultures regarding self-presentation beliefs. When the results of this study were analyzed through cultural and gender differences, Saudi women’s self-presentation beliefs were found to be the most strongly influenced by their cultural values. This highlights the necessity of considering cultural values and beliefs when designing global information systems (Harden, 2013). In Saudi Arabia, Internet technology has had a massive influence in every aspect of people’s lives.

Clearly, though, long-held values also impact people's interactions with and through social media, leading to hybrid virtual cultures that reflex the transition from conservative to liberal society. Thus, it is necessary to illuminate their role in transforming various cultural fields and in ultimately being a prime factor in the modernization of Saudi society.

2.5.3 ICT and Saudi social challenges

Al-Areify (2011) said that cultural openness and acceptance of new technology has brought about conflict among the Muslim community in various aspects of life and remains a challenging task because of the strong influence of religious and family values. Due to the anonymous nature of online interaction, people may behave differently and with less inhibition than they would offline (Al-Saggaf, 2004). Many Saudi people have expressed concern about these new communication technologies and the threat they pose to the social order (Meijer, 2010), as people are able to tailor their online identities when interacting within the e-society (Webster, 2014). Through Internet technology, users can remain anonymous and can end an interaction through a simple click of the mouse (Khalema & Jones, 2002). In contrast, some people have gained increased visibility by communicating their identities on social media (e.g., Robinson, 2007; van Dijck, 2013), in which they have been able to create forums for action-oriented socio-cultural change (Fedorak, 2014). In both cases, it would seem, the political and social reality represents a threat and a challenge for Internet users.

As people spend more time socializing through the Internet (Zemmel, 2012), it is essential to draw boundaries that will sustain community and culture, and will resist the use of social media in the identity formation of children and adolescents (Buckingham, 2008). Moreover, it is important to consider how Saudi Arabia adopts Western

technologies without total acceptance of Western values and social practices (Nydell, 2006). It is also important to be aware that this may lead to the challenge of how to balance modern and long-held traditions among Saudi society. Added to these social and ethical issues are the complexities of political change, and these challenges within Saudi society will be presented and discussed in the next section.

2.5.4 ICT and Saudi political challenges

In Saudi Arabia, a monarchy with centralized power, there have been calls to reduce the control and censorship of cyberspace. This comes as conversations of complex social issues such as unemployment, poor education, and a lack of quality services have emerged through social networking sites (Gannam, 2011). Moreover, the new ICTs have an ability to lead to exchange and collaboration that contribute to political change (Fung et al., 2013). With the need for development, the government and the business community have felt an urgent need to adopt modern electronic, telecommunication and computer technologies while excluding some material (Al-Ariefy, 2011). However, Skoric and Park (2014) argue that political conflicts can lead to the emergence of stability and democracy (Skoric & Park, 2014). Increasingly, e-societies are formed on the basis of shared political beliefs.

There is a fear that this may lead to a revolutionary movement (Igbaria et al., 2001), as Saudis have used social media to express their opinions on political matters and to call for change and empowerment (e.g., Almestad & Stenslie, 2014; Hill, 2013; Wehrey, 2014). There has also been a call for Saudi Arabia's government to openly discuss the growth in Internet use among its citizens (Eid, 2009). Widespread censorship that has restricted the flow of information online and controlled what the media is able to say has

made the media ideologically dependent on the state's values (e.g., Gray, 2014; Teitelbaum, 2010; Zuchora-Walske, 2010).

Saudi Arabian government faces an enormous challenge to balance conservative and liberal demands. Additionally, the coalition of people demanding change continues to grow, and now “the virtual opposition is a diverse group, consisting of Shiites, women, liberals, and Salafis” (Almestad & Stenslie, p. 501). While Saudi citizens ask for political, economic, and social reform through social media, they are also realizing that their opinions may lead to serious problems, such as arrest or deportation (Aman & Jayroe, 2013). While social media have led to more conversation about religion, politics, and civil rights, some political systems use the mass media for propagandistic purposes or to create public support (Lerner, 1958; Fedorak, 2014). Himelboim et al. (2012) had found that political attitudes and interactions offline can successfully predict online political activities. Moreover, although some users are limited to activities of information search and consumption, many users are active in online political communication.

2.5.5 ICT and Saudi economic challenges

Given the need to diversify its economy and reduce dependency on oil production, the Saudi government has quickly realized the importance of the Internet in economic and business development (Samin, 2008). However, cultural and religious forces have stood in the way of this development through their opposition to free Internet use (Al-Ariefy, 2011). As Saudi Arabia is in the unique position of being an economic and religious powerhouse, a great deal of its international trade is bound with Islamic standards and codes of conduct (Chaudhry, 2014). In addition, studies by the Saudi Communication and Information Technology Commission (CITC) have shown that only a small percentage of

Saudi companies are involved in e-commerce, and few customers shop online because of a lack trust in ecommerce transactions (Alghamdi et al., 2012; Igarria et al., 2001). In order to address this issue, the Saudi Ministry of Commerce established a committee for e-commerce in 2001. This committee was tasked with the development of a general framework and future plans for improving the conditions needed to develop e-commerce, but unfortunately, it has not led to any significant changes (Saudi Ministry of Commerce, 2001).

Guillen and Suarez (2005) stated that governments have the ability to adopt telecommunication policies that will encourage-economic competition. They observed that such policies will improve infrastructure and provide support to businesses, with the potential to be engaged in global world trade and policy enactment (especially because Saudi Arabia is a G20 country). Ibrahim (2013) maintained that ICT is important to the development of the economy in Saudi Arabia, providing a fertile medium for economic growth and offering a new challenge for traditional trade.

2.6 Social Media Studies and Saudi Society

This chapter is allocated to provide a systematic literature review of the previous studies that have investigated the effect of social media on the Saudi society and how different parts of the social structures are reflected in the utterances by Saudi users of social media. It also reviews studies that have compared the Saudi culture to other cultures. While this chapter discusses a subset of these studies that are directly related to the current work, this review identifies other studies that were excluded from the discussion and the reasons they were excluded.

2.6.1 Prior research of Saudi society

To investigate the impact of social media on the Saudi society, this study followed the guidelines suggested by Creswell (2009) to conduct a literature review. A criterion that was used for the inclusion of studies for review was to include all peer-reviewed journal articles published between the years 1990 and 2017. Unpublished theses produced during the same period were also included. In order to collect these journal articles and theses, the libraries of the University of Ottawa and Carleton University, as well as online search engines (i.e., Saudi Digital Library, Google Scholar, and other online databases), were used to select relevant studies. Certain key words were chosen for searches in libraries and online databases. Out of these collected articles and theses, only studies that were directly linked to the present work were reviewed, whereas studies that were too general or too specific to particular topics rather than on the Saudi society as whole (such as the dominance of male in the Saudi society, women's rights, etc.) were omitted.

2.6.2 Previous studies of social media and Saudi society

There are many studies addressing the impact of social media on Saudi society. For example, social media studies have discussed Saudi society in relationship to other societies, the changes brought about in social and political norms as a result of social media, and have highlighted some of the conflicts within Saudi society. A variety of research methods have been utilized when carrying out these studies, such as case studies, content analysis, surveys/questionnaires, literature reviews, ethnographies, etc. There are, however, existing gaps in these studies. There has been an emphasis on the process of change but without an understanding regarding the real reason behind those changes. Without this understanding, these studies may lack the depth needed for one to fully

comprehend what is taking place. This study sought to close this gap by investigating the different types of normative adaptations to social change within Saudi society.

This study used Saudi Vision 2030 as a case study, as a means toward understanding how normative disorder can affect socio-economic change. This was carried out by looking at the response of Saudi Vision 2030 via Twitter feeds and how these responses reflect a growing anomie within Saudi society, which is a departure from an older state that has been viewed as a more cohesive and homogenous state, at least at the normative level. In addition, this research took into consideration the opinions of experts regarding the impact of Saudi Vision 2030 and how these opinions highlight serious battles taking place between traditional and modern norms within Saudi society. The following sections present the previous studies in three themes which are cultural comparison, change of social norms, and conflicts within Saudi culture.

2.6.2.1 Cultural comparison

The following studies present cultural comparisons between Saudi culture and other cultures. The self-perception of a Saudi is influenced by a comparison that occurs within the Saudi community as well as comparison with the world outside of Saudi society. Previous research on Saudi society show that cultural factors influence Saudis when they interact with other cultures such as British, Turkish, Australian, and American. Simmons and Simmons (1994) found that Islam is highly valued among Saudis, especially when they present their identity to others. Erturk (1991) studied the status of women in Saudi Arabia and Turkey as two Muslim societies which represent different models of national transformation. The study showed that the liberation of women in Muslim societies is not a religious problem, but mainly one of political consciousness and struggle. Alhazmi

(2010) discussed how gender segregation in Saudi Arabia may affect Saudi students' engagement within the Australian community and that the culture of gender segregation has affected the experience of these students, particularly in their ability to relate to their peers in a coeducational environment. Alqahtani (2011) found that there are definite needs that relate only to Saudi students studying in the UK, and that a number of these relate to cultural differences. Madini and Nooy (2013) studied participation in a public discussion forum of expatriate Saudi students in Australia. They found that the extent and type of self-revelation in online communication depends on the gender and culture of participants. A study of Hilal (2013), "From barriers to bridges: An investigation on Saudi student mobility (2006–2009)," emphasized that Saudi students tend to change their identifying patterns while studying in USA. Although the forums provide opportunities for extensive opposite-gender contact, participants do not benefit from these contacts.

Moreover, Saudis minimize direct communication with the opposite sex. Another example is Alhazmi and Nyland (2013), who mentioned that segregation in Saudi Arabia has shaped the lives of Saudi citizens. They indicated that Saudi students' cultural identity has a significant effect on the experience of being in a mixed-gender environment. Their findings also suggest a relationship between current experience and cultural identity. Al-Rawi (2014) examined popular online protests on Facebook that championed women's causes in the Arab world, especially women's equality with men, and freedom to express their views without the fear of being harmed. He noted that there are misunderstandings on all sides, with those who fight for women's freedom being misunderstood as promoters of immorality even among some Muslim women, while many activists, especially in the West, think that Islam alone is behind women's deteriorating condition and subjugation.

Aljasir (2015) investigated how Saudi university students used these opportunities (virtual communication) to discuss such issues. The results revealed that Saudi students used Facebook as a virtual world within which they engaged in several activities, including cross-cultural and cross-gender communications. They also used Facebook to defend their religious beliefs and advocate Islamic values. Hattingh, Machdel, and Hugo (2012) described how expatriates living in compounds in Saudi Arabia, which were designed as a zone for people with different conflicting beliefs to Saudis, make sense of their degree of isolation. The study indicated that the membership expatriates have with different communities is important as it provides them with a continued sense of belonging and support. It is further established that due to the unique environment expatriates are confronted with, virtual communities play a major role in the harmony of expatriates by addressing the main concerns the participants had, therefore reducing feelings of isolation.

2.6.2.2 Change of social norms

The change of social norms is mainly influenced by historical, cultural, and religious factors. For more clarification, religious men, social leaders, habits, and customs of Saudi society impact the process of the evolution of social norms. The following studies reflect how social media has both negative and positive effects in various aspects of Saudi social norms. On the positive side, social media allows people to communicate with others, express themselves, and decreases feelings of isolation. It helps Saudis to interact with other cultures by presenting Saudi customs, habits, and values. Social Media is not only a means of transferring information, but also instrumental in creating new versions of culture.

One of the positive effects is technological interaction which provides users with a unique opportunity to create a common culture. On the other hand, social media has negative effects on the person's academic performance, religious observance, and cultural manners (Al Lily, 2011). Moreover, social media reveals a significant effect of long-term orientation of cultural dimensions, especially social norms. For example, Elamin and Omair (2010) emphasized that the habits and customs of Saudis play a role in the interaction between men and women, such as preventing women from having jobs. Other studies indicated that affiliation by Saudi members consists of a religious, tribal, and political affinities. Yamani (2010) found youth were alternatively absorbed or marginalized into the system depending upon not only simple economic factors, but also tribal and sectarian affiliation which is downplayed or masked by the Saudi regime. The study emphasized that Saudis show more acceptance to other cultures in the virtual world than in real life. Bahkali (2013) and Ashaalan et al., (2013) in other studies indicated that culture and religion are considered unique factors that help Saudi women balance life and work. Chena and Chow (2015) studied the key values driving continued interaction on brand pages in social media: An examination across gender reveals that female customers are more motivated by social and emotional value factors in determining the level of their continued interaction. Bajnaid (2016) examined the impressions Saudi users intended to form when creating their profiles on matrimonial websites. The research shows the power of both social and religious norms in affecting these users' behaviours and decisions when using matrimonial websites. Samin (2012) in his study "Kafā'afil-Nasab in Saudi Arabia: Islamic Law, Tribal Custom, and Social Change" mentions that economic transformation and the weakening of tribal structures have caused the borders of tribal

endogamy to expand, producing a broad range of reactions whose implications are also explored. Alkahtani (2012) in his dissertation reported on a study about the effects of social media, such as social networks used by female university students in the context of a gender segregated system in Saudi Arabia. The results show that social media has a positive effect on collaboration of students as they can hold onto their culture and religious values without physically intermingling between the sexes. Madini (2012) investigated the traditions of online interaction of gender issues among Saudi students in Australia. He concluded that online communication provides participants with the opportunity to reflect on cultural traditions in a way that is not easily available in Saudi Arabia. Fandy (1999) mentioned that today's electronic media and satellite systems virtually end traditional barriers that once separated states and nations. Although the local population of Saudi Arabia can oppose the physical presence of foreign groups on Saudi soil, they cannot prevent the cyberspace presence of foreign, global ideas, and trends. Alsharkh (2012) studied the effect of the social media network on youth with their families and their traditions. The results show that Saudi youth improved their ability of self-decision making and more easily accept opposing opinions. In addition, women have gained knowledge of their rights and gained freedom of speech.

Finally, the findings led to a conclusion that there is potential social change in Saudi Arabian society, even though the family structure is not changing significantly. Al-Sharqi and Kutbi (2015) investigated how social media shape our perception of social and cultural aspects of society and our social behaviour, finding that students were more aware of the advantages of social media than its associated disadvantages. Mobaraki and Söderfeld (2007) studied gender inequity in Saudi Arabia and its role in public health in

the country, mentioning that local interpretations of Islamic laws and social norms have a negative effect on the health and well-being of women. Alsaggaf (2015) highlighted the use of Facebook by Saudi women, aiming to explore the formation of Saudi women's online identities and relationships on Facebook. Their identities were constructed, gendered, and tightly managed as they addressed multiple audiences. The findings suggested that Saudi women use Facebook for three main reasons. First, they use it to construct their identities with an increasing awareness of and control over their profiles, audience, and audience impressions. Second, they use it to share their political, religious, and social concerns, to establish moral positions within their activities, and to express feelings, especially negativity, towards offline events. Finally, the participants use Facebook to socialize, obtain benefits, and generate positive social outcomes. Al Lily (2011) examined how technology-facilitated communication has shaped the social-cultural pattern of Saudi female experience within academia. Al-Saggaf (2011) studied Saudi women on Facebook and found that they used Facebook to keep in touch with their friends, to express their feelings and to share their thoughts by updating their status, and to have fun taking online quizzes. Concerning the effects of Facebook use on their lives, some participants said Facebook made them more sociable and increased self-confidence.

2.6.2.3 Conflicts within Saudi culture

There is a continuous conflict in Saudi Arabia among the conservatives, liberals, religious groups, and governmental institutions. The conflict between these groups revolves around political, economic, and social change within Saudi society, especially changing social norms. For example, some groups within Saudi society support gender segregation and women driving in public places because they believe it is appropriate

within the religious and cultural norms. Other groups, on the other hand, believe this would be inconsistent with religious and cultural principles. Meijer (2010) investigated several issues which he considered to be worthy of attention in Saudi Arabia. First, it appears that the state itself is divided between reformists and conservatives, finding that the conflict between conservative and liberal citizens is continuing. He felt that conservative-minded people are in the majority and, as a result, it will be hard to influence them with liberal ideas. Teitelbaum (2013) examined Saudi Arabia's introduction of the internet, and the manner in which the Kingdom has sought to balance the communication, business, and economic advantages of the Information Revolution with the country's conservative form of Islam. The government wants to use the internet for modernization and business purposes, but at the same time prevent globalization from affecting the social norms of Saudi society.

Noman, Faris, and Kelly (2015) mapped and analyzed the structure and content of the Saudi Twitter world and identified the communities that mingle different political, religious, social, and cultural topics and viewpoints. They found that Twitter serves multiple groups in Saudi Arabia to express their opinions and to engage in conversations on political and social issues. Almahmoud, (2015) studied how Saudi Arabians intertextually framed the women2drive campaign in 2015, in which Twitter posts from the women2drive campaign were collected, based on factors such as the number of followers a person had, the number of mentions, and number of reTweets. The study discovered the means by which the two communities are defending their stand about the subject; men and people against the campaign saw this movement as a way to westernize women in Saudi and erode their cultural and religious identity. Women were using the tool of writing

Tweets in English as a way to involve the outside community in what they consider an international problem. Elmusa (1997) argued, in contrast with the prevalent view, that the massive import of modern technology has profoundly changed Saudi traditional culture. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is a culture that has at once accepted, resisted, and been overwhelmed by modern technology, but the struggle between modernity and tradition can be expected to proceed quickly and new patterns to evolve. Al-Kahtani, Jefferson and Jefferson (2006) investigated what females believed was the potential of the internet to change the way they are able to work and contribute to their society. The study revealed an interesting conflict of aspects influencing both attitudes and actual usage patterns. The main conclusion from this study is that there are huge differences in the opinions of Saudi society, as represented by the science, humanities, and religion faculty members, regarding the potential use of the Internet. The more conservative elements of Saudi society see more dangers and shortcomings in Internet access than benefits. The members who are focused on new knowledge, such as the science faculty, are less likely to see the internet as a danger and more likely to see it as a powerful tool for work enhancement. Bayly (2014) highlighted the widespread usage of Twitter in Saudi Arabia. He also linked the usage of Twitter with the current transformations among youth who have a desire to express their opinions on social, political, and religious issues. Many Saudis view Twitter as an online parliament that gives them the freedom to discuss their issues more than governmental institutions allow them to. In another study, Al-Jenaibi(2016) found that Twitter gives Saudis more freedom of expression to talk about any subject that might be considered taboo in an older and more traditional form of media.

Moreover, Saudis feel involved within the political decisions by supporting or opposing them. Alothman (2013) studied the conception of social media and the role these tools play in the social life and political environment in Saudi Arabia. This study found that Saudis use social media for political and social purposes. The advantage of social media tools, which cannot be controlled by the government, is that they provide a place where people can speak freely. Saudis are likely to use social media to improve the political environment and change the society positively. Samin (2008) mentioned that internet bulletin boards provide an important window into public discourse in relatively restrictive societies like Saudi Arabia. The study concluded that reconciling Saudi Arabian tribal identity with the Sunni Islamic identity of the state is, though laborious, an accomplishable task. Reconciling Shiite identity with the Saudi state, however, is considerably more difficult to imagine because most Saudis appear unwilling to contemplate such a possibility. Al Omoush, Ghaleb, and Alma'Aitah (2012) studied Facebook use in their paper "The impact of Arab cultural values on online social networking: The case of Facebook." The purpose of this research was to investigate the effect of cultural values on motivations and attitudes toward social networking sites in the Arab world, and the factors affecting the continuity of membership value. The results revealed a significant effect of members' motivations, attitudes, and usage on the continuity of Facebook membership value. The results also revealed a significant effect of masculinity and cultural dimensions on motivations of Facebook membership.

The studies discussed above show that social media have a great impact on Saudi society. In this work, social media has been chosen to be the source of information to measure social change in Saudi society. The current study examined the change in social norms in

Saudi society. Although Twitter is used to measure this, the role of Twitter in this study reflects the conceptual and normative implications of participants through Vision 2030, which aspires to bring about a unique social and economic transformation. The next chapter explains in detail the methods and procedures used to explore the status of anomie in Saudi society.

3 Methodology

3.1 Research Design

The mixed qualitative and quantitative research design utilized in this current work is a case study informed by content analysis of Twitter posts and published documentations about Saudi Vision 2030. Creswell (2009) defined a case study approach as a methodology that guides researchers to “[explore] in depth a program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals” (p. 13). Both sentiment analysis (for Twitter posts) and document analysis (for published documentations) have been utilized to explore the topic of interest. These two types of analyses are types of content analysis which read the features and characteristics of communicational materials (e.g., linguistic texts) and conduct systematic examination and interpretation of these materials to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings (Budd, Thorp, & Donohew, 1967; Berg & Latain, 2008). In this study, the researcher collected published documents from internal and external resources such as newspapers, articles, and reports related to Saudi Vision 2030 and explored the viewpoints of experts about Saudi Vision 2030 and the main opportunities and challenges raised by these experts (see Appendix F). Moreover, the researcher gathered and sorted Twitter posts by Saudi microbloggers on Saudi Vision 2030 and analyzed their responses using a systematic criterion (see Appendix G). The results of both analyses (document analysis and Twitter posts analysis) were examined to identify the status of anomie within Saudi society by measuring the amount of norm conflicts within the society.

3.2 Procedures

3.2.1 PART 1: Document analysis of Saudi Vision 2030

This section describes the procedures used in the document analysis of Saudi Vision 2030. Two types of documents are analyzed: the first type consists of the official document published by the government of Saudi Arabia, while the second consists of the published documentations that have responded to the Vision, including newspaper and magazine articles published by media outlets and economic and political institutions.

3.2.1.1 Discourse analysis

One of the most common methods in analyzing texts has been discourse analysis, which goes beyond the linguistic structures of texts to link them to other social and psychological factors. In other words, discourse analysis provides researchers with a general picture of the social and psychological status of the author of a given text. Interactional sociolinguistics theory is linked to the field of anthropology and contributes in the production, interpretation, and analysis of the discourse. Gumperz (1982) held the view that socio-cultural backgrounds play a significant role in understanding and interpretation of discourse. Moreover, discourse analysis links together texts and ideology (Fairclough, 2003). As the advances of technology have provided users with a variety of communication platforms, users utilized these platforms to communicate and to express their opinions about their topics of interest. One of these platforms that has been widely used is Twitter, an important platform of ‘networked sociality’ (Gillespie, 2010). Because of discourse analysis’ aim to interpret and determine the relationship between social and cultural interactions, this research analyzed Tweets to understand the reflection of social status in microbloggers’ Tweets. Microblogging via Twitter is a part of today’s social

software tools that manage the “interactions and communication” among people through networks (Ebner & Lorenz, 2012).

The amount of information that is publically available on Twitter can provide researchers with a valuable and reliable source of data to be used in large-scale analyses. However, Twitter is loaded with an enormous amount of text, which constitutes a challenge for researchers when it comes to analyzing the data. This large amount of text, although challenging and even overwhelming, is a great source for exploring the religious, social, political, and economic viewpoints of Twitter users. In this study, the text of Vision 2030 was examined to understand its overall content, and the researcher analyzed the challenges and opportunities associated with the Vision from religious, social, political, and economic perspectives. This method informed the researcher while analysing and classifying the Tweets. It further helped the researcher to gain a better understanding of opinions coming from experts, government, and the general public.

Leading experts in discourse analysis point to the importance of the following criteria (Antaki, Billig, Edwards, & Potter, 2004) for optimizing discourse analysis to achieve the purposes of the study and to conform to the hypotheses and questions of research:

1. Harmony and consistency of data extracted from texts.
2. The comprehensiveness of the analysis of the content of the texts, including those that appear to be abnormal.
3. Transparency and clarity in the statement of collection and analysis of texts.

4. The impartiality of the researcher in data analysis according to systematic methodology.
5. The clear link between theory and practice.

The following section provides a summary of Vision 2030 as one source of data that will help to analyze the content of the Vision.

3.2.1.2 Summary of Vision 2030

On April 25, 2016, Saudi Arabia announced, “Vision 2030” which constitutes a significant revolution in the politics of the country. This Vision adopts the ideal investment of the exceptional, strategic, and geographical position of Saudi Arabia (Vision, 2016), and has been promoted as the most comprehensive economic reform package in Saudi Arabia’s history. Vision 2030 is a neoliberal blueprint for privatizing entire sectors of the economy, raising non-oil revenues, cutting subsidies, courting investors at home and abroad, streamlining government services, and going public with the national oil company (Saudi Aramco), along with hundreds of other initiatives. The hugely ambitious plan is partly a response to low oil prices; there are economic, cultural, and political reasons that pushed Saudi Arabia to adopt this new shift of governmental performance, the most important of which is to reduce the country's reliance on revenues from oil exports and instead install a diversification of the country's economy. The other main reason is to break the cycle of government spending on public services and subsidies during boom times, while cutting back in times of budgetary constraints. In order to fund this ambitious initiative, the transfer of Aramco shares to Saudi's sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), will take place before going partially public.

Some of the Vision's more ambitious goals are to manufacture 50% of all military gear and hardware—including sophisticated aircraft—inside the Kingdom, whereas currently Saudi Arabia imports 98% of all its military needs. Vision 2030 mentions that the “government of Saudi Arabia plans to manufacture half of our military needs within the Kingdom to create more job opportunities for citizens and keep more resources in our country” (Vision 2030, 2016). In addition, some sectors of the economy will be privatized, including healthcare and air travel. Also, retailers, for the first time ever, will be permitted to be foreign-owned, which is hoped to be an incentive for more foreign investment in the country. There are also plans for the development of the tourism and leisure sectors with a view to increase more outside visitors.

3.2.1.3 Collection of published documentations on Vision 2030

The main document analyzed was the document published by the Saudi government that explained the Vision. In addition, published documentations (including journal articles, newspapers and magazines articles, and official websites of economic and political institutions), which were published between April 25, 2016 (the announcement of the Vision) to April 25, 2017, were also collected and analyzed. A total of 40 articles and reports have been collected (see Table 1).

Documents	Reports	Studies	Newspapers	Magazines	Websites	Excluded	Total
	6	2	27	1	1	3	40

Table 1 shows the sources of published documentations

3.2.1.4 Data analysis of Vision 2030

The current research is guided by the theory of anomie and an investigation of the changing social norms in Saudi Arabia. In order to carry out this project, data of published documentations have been collected, analyzed, categorized, and interpreted in accordance with the concept of anomie's theory. This study adopted the inductive approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to determine responses of some experts who describe and analyze Saudi Vision 2030. By analyzing the content of documents related to Vision 2030, the challenges and opportunities facing the Vision have been identified as the two main themes. After that, the researcher identified the similarities and differences between the documents (Bowen, 2008), to identify the common perceptions and factors as well as common challenges and opportunities that are expected with the implementation of Vision 2030. In the next step, the researcher classified challenges and opportunities into religious and social categories. However, during the analysis and classification of documents, the researcher reclassified the opportunities and challenges to include religious, social, political, and economic categorizations, because of the content of Vision's goals and the experts' responses, which were discovered during text analysis.

In analyzing the published documentations that have responded to the Vision, the researcher uses a checklist to help read all documents in a valid and reliable way. The checklist (see Appendix F) consists of three main parts. In the first part, details about the title, author, publisher, and date are filled in. The second part summarizes the opportunities and challenges discussed in the documents. Both opportunities and challenges are divided into religious, social, political, and economic categories, and statistics about the opportunities and challenges are identified. For each and every document, a checklist is

filled in. After all documents are read and checklists are filled, an overall summary of the number of opportunities and challenges was provided (see appendix F). In addition, the main opportunities and challenges discussed in these articles as a group are listed. Moreover, the official documents published by the government are summarized and the main plans and opportunities are identified. These lists placed the researcher on a stronger ground when analyzing and discussing the responses of Twitter microbloggers on the Vision. The researcher drew upon opinions and comments from public Twitter posts, expert opinion from academic and specialists, and previous studies regarding the impact of ICTs on Saudi society in accordance with the explanations required by the search results.

3.2.2 PART 2: Microblogging analysis of Twitter posts on Vision 2030

This section describes the procedures used in the analysis of Twitter posts on Saudi Vision 2030. This section presents the collection of data, data preprocessing, and data analysis of Twitter posts. However, Cislighi, Gillespie, and Mackie (2014) pointed toward the possibility of defining and changing general social norms through qualitative studies, further emphasizing that social norms can be identified through daily conversations as well as responding to open questions. The methodology of their study traced social terminology through human rights education sessions in West Africa highlighting the existence of common social rules through harmonic phrases in the participants' response. These studies open up wider horizons for those studying the Saudis' interactions on Vision 2030 via the Twitter platform.

3.2.2.1 *Sentiment analysis*

Sentiment analysis is used in this study as a means to analyze public opinion regarding Saudi Vision 2030. As the use of social media expands, it is being increasingly

used as a mechanism to organize and analyze news, online review sites, personal blogs, and other social media platforms. Such work can be done using a tool called sentiment analysis, which is an automated task of rapidly determining the sentiment of a large amount of text or speech from social media platforms (Pang et al., 2008). It is a tool utilized throughout a variety of professional research institutes to classify words, sentences, and expressions in order to discover and analyze society. In order to do so, it is best to use a semantic analysis approach in which the researcher can study different words and expressions, and how they can reflect societies' opinions and emotions.

Sentiment analysis has been used in a variety of research studies including online movie review analysis (Pang et al., 2008). This kind of tool has also been used for Twitter analysis in order to make classifications of Twitter context (Tartir & Abdul-Nabi, 2017), and other studies have shown how Twitter has been used as platform for political negotiation and opinion dispersal (Lai, 2010). The result of some studies showed that when using tools such as sentiment analysis and sentiment lexicons, election data polls could be simulated in order to predict future events (Conover et al, 2011). Another study examines re-Tweeting behaviour for political messages on Twitter by citizens in political elections of South Korea, comparing the types of re-Tweets and the sentiments captured with the results of public opinion about leading political figures (Lee et al., 2013). Specific studies have also been performed in Arabic social media, with such focuses as movie and product reviews, web forums, and the effect of preprocessing on sentiment analysis of Egyptian dialect Tweets (Abbasi et al., 2008; Abdul-Mageed et al., 2014; Shoukry & Rafea, 2012). In this study, sentiment analysis helped to extract and analyze the Tweets that have been posted in response to the proposed activities introduced by Saudi Vision 2030.

3.2.2.2 Measurements of social norms

Although it is difficult to measure social norms, especially with regard to personal standards, it is possible to study the attitudes and beliefs of individuals towards the intellectual references of behaviour in terms of actual and expected personal behaviour. The following are a few studies worth mentioning that attempted to measure social norms from economic, social, and health perspectives. For example, Burks and Krupka (2011) measured social norms by examining the relationship between the practices of financial advisors on the one hand and the top leaders of financial firms on the other. The study showed that measuring variance in expectations among single working groups was useful in determining social norms. Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) examined the relationship between personal beliefs and personal attitudes on the one hand and social norms on the other. The study collected social network data for reference group planning, measuring experimental expectations, standard expectations, personal attitudes, and behavioural outcomes. The results of the study showed a strong relationship between the attitude of behaviour and behaviour itself. In addition, Paluck and Shepherd (2012) conducted a field experiment to measure the relationship between social norms and bullying behaviour within the school social network, where experimental expectations, normative expectations, personal attitudes, and behavioural outcomes were measured. The results of the study confirmed that students' involvement in bullying behaviour is consistent with their belief that bullying is acceptable in their social environment, regardless of the attitude of social norms toward this behaviour. In another study, Mackie, Moneti, Denny, and Shakya (2012) analyzed the health and demographic data of UNICEF

and the discussions of those who collected this data to bring to light the existence of social criteria. They found that measuring attitudes is not necessarily reflecting the social norms.

3.2.2.3 Collection of Twitter Posts

To analyze the responses of Saudi society social media² to Vision 2030 via Twitter, data in this study has been collected from Twitter between April 25, 2016 when the Vision was launched, to April 25, 2017. To cover the different aspects of Vision 2030, the collection of data was divided into three four-month periods over the year following the publication of the Vision. “*Search API*” has been used to collect all the Tweets for a specific topic or trend of interest, filtered by topic, location, and language according to the following criteria:

1. Topic or trend using “#keyword:” For instance, using the search query #General authority for Vision 2030 retrieves all the Tweets about Saudi Vision 2030.
2. Languages: Arabic was the primary language used in the Tweets.
3. Location: “Saudi Arabia” (geo-location tags). Riyadh, Jeddah, and other cities were identified.
4. Time period: April 25, 2016 to April 25, 2017.
5. Real time Tweets or historical Tweets.
6. Personal Tweets: Tweets related to a specific person.

² The social feed manager program collected the Tweets of participants according to the sole criteria of where they are located within Saudi Arabia, regardless of any other consideration.

7. Public Tweets: random Tweets from different users.
8. Original Tweet: not a re-Tweet or a reply to mentions.
9. Length of Tweets: number of words in the Tweets.
10. Type of Twitter user: popular user or regular user.
11. Tweets with one or more hashtags.
12. Tweets without media (images and videos).
13. Subjective Tweets (with opinion).
14. Objective Tweets (with news, facts, and information).

Roughly 13,200 Tweets were collected in the first step of data collection.

3.2.2.4 Data preprocessing

After studying and analyzing the documents of expert responses and the official documents of Vision 2030 in the previous sections in accordance with religious, social, political, and economic challenges and opportunities, the researcher collected Tweets by Saudis that were related to Vision 2030 using to the following steps. The first step was to determine hashtags: The researcher conducted a comprehensive survey of all the hashtags that achieved the highest trend during the first year of Vision 2030. It was found that the following hashtags were the most prominent: #SaudiArabia2030Vision, #Saudi2030Vision, #EntertainmentAuthority, #OpeningOfMoviesInSaudiArabia, #NationalTransformationInitiatives.

The second step was to identify the most important issues discussed by microbloggers. The researcher has analyzed the equivalent of 10% of the Tweets that were

identified and linked to Vision 2030, both in public Tweets and the official Vision 2030 website. The purpose was to identify the important issues that had attracted the attention of the majority of Saudi microbloggers. When the hashtags were identified and linked to the results of the analysis of documents related to Vision 2030, the researcher then linked the results of the initial analysis to the research questions.

The third step was to classify the microbloggers' expressions:

- I. During the review of the Twitter content, the researcher classified, as a sample test, about 300 Tweets according to the expressions used (religious, social, and governmental).
- II. The classification of Tweets was notable for the political interest in narration due to the large number of expressions that were concerned with the political aspect of the Vision. The researcher re-categorized the phrases into "religious, social, political."
- III. Although Vision 2030 is primarily economic, the number of Tweets discussing the economic aspects of the Vision was very low in the pilot sample of 10%. The researcher then expanded the search space to include 20% of the total Tweets collected. Consequently, expressions of an economic and cognitive dimension then emerged, especially in the Tweets of the third period of the first year of the Vision.
- IV. After the initial classification of Tweets, in addition to the terms used, the researcher found a large number of Tweets not classified as religious, social, political, or economic expressions. The analysis of these terms showed that they had either a positive or negative attitude toward the Vision. However, they were general expressions that were not relevant to the general classifications, which were

defined in total by the published documents on the Vision, whether governmental, press, etc.

In the fourth step, due to the large number of these unclassified Tweets, the researcher added unclassified expressions as a new category, in addition to religious, social, political, and economic expressions. Fourth, the researcher classified the positions of microbloggers:

1. For the sixth time, the researcher re-read and categorized most of the Tweets in the experimental sample according to the position of either acceptance or rejection of the Vision.
2. It became clear to the researcher that some Tweets had a neutral view of the Vision, meaning they neither accepted or rejected it. Because the attitude of neutrality sometimes refers to an indication, the researcher categorized the positions of the Tweets as agree, disagree, or neutral.

The fifth step was to classify the normative standards of Tweets by adopting definitions derived from Merton's theory. In the sixth step, by reviewing the geographical locations of the profiles of the microbloggers, the researcher found that a large number of microbloggers did not specify their cities. The researcher classified the geographical location of the Tweets as coming from either Riyadh, Jeddah, or other cities, with most of the Tweets originating from Riyadh and Jeddah.

The seventh step, after an initial analysis of data, was to clean the data before the next step, which consisted of manually labeling the Tweets. The cleaning process included the following:

1. Removing links and URL's (websites, images, and videos) from the Tweets.
2. Removing duplication (to have unique Tweets in the dataset).
3. Removing user names, mentions, and reTweets (RT).
4. Removing non-related Tweets: those discussing other topics such as advertisements and marketing.
5. Check spelling: use dictionaries to convert wrongly segmented words or non-dictionary words into the correct words.

3.2.2.5 Data Analysis of Twitter posts

After extracting, collecting, and cleaning the Tweets, the next step was sorting collected Tweets into five categories: religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified expressions. This sorting process was conducted manually. The researcher classified the Tweets into religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified based on the dominant words and expressions on each Tweet. A sample of collected Tweets was also annotated manually by the researcher. Each Tweet has five labels, which are social norms, opinion types, standard types, geo-location tags, and periods of time.

1. Social norms concept: religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified
2. Opinion type: agree, disagree, or neutral
3. Standard type: absence, ambiguity, clear, or conflict of norms
4. Geo-location tag: Riyadh, Jeddah, and other cities
5. Period time: within the first year of the Vision 2030 announcement, with period one being the first four months; period two, the second four months; and period three, the last four months.

At the first stage, the expressions and utterances of the dictionary were coded as religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified. The researcher had individually examined all Tweets to determine frequently used words or expressions that related to the five categories mentioned above, i.e. religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified. The next step consisted of classifying all Tweets from all the categories about a given activity into three main groups, namely agreeing, disagreeing, and neutral Tweets. For instance, after collecting all the Tweets about opening cinema theaters in Saudi Arabia, the Tweets that encouraged this activity were classified under the agreeing group, while those that discouraged this activity were classified under the disagreeing group. After having all Tweets sorted and classified, the researcher manually went through the Tweets to double-check for any discrepancies. Up to this point, each Tweet had been identified as either agreeing or disagreeing, as well as whether it had religious, social, political, economic, or unclassified utterances.

The final step in classifying the data was manually classifying each Tweet within each category and group, based on the status of the clear, ambiguous, and absent norms. For instance, a Tweet that had been classified as religious and disagreed with opening a cinema in Saudi Arabia. The Tweet then has been critically analyzed by the researcher to determine the norm status according to Merton's standards. The Tweets were then classified on the basis of whether the standards or norms in the chosen Tweets were clear, ambiguous, or absent. Theoretically, according to Merton (1968), the following three types of normative disorganization can be seen as a result of social change and culture conflict:

- 1 ***Conflict of norms (clear)***: Individuals may hold norms that legitimize and prohibit the same behaviour or endorse two behaviours that are inherently contradictory.

- 2 *Ambiguity of norms*: Individuals may be unclear and uncertain regarding appropriate behaviour in certain situations. Multiple and incompatible norms pertaining to the same situation contribute to confusion.
- 3 *Absence of norms*: Individuals may have no position with respect to a certain social conduct or issue, or may be faced with the need to make choices without knowing the appropriate norms.

The accuracy of the classifying and coding was then verified by reviewing 150 random Tweets. The purpose of this reviewing was to ensure that the classification was consistent with the search questions. A number of Tweets that did not comply with the terms and classification mechanism were excluded.

3.3 Trustworthiness

It is important in research that researchers establish standards of trustworthiness. It should be kept in mind that the trustworthiness of qualitative research is often questioned by positivists due to the fact that their concepts of validity and reliability cannot be addressed in the same way as in quantitative research. However, to achieve accurate findings of the study, multiple procedures were used to investigate validity. This includes strategies of triangulation, identification of research biases, thick and rich description, and data mining checking (Creswell, 2009). In addressing this accuracy, this study refers to the work of Guba, who proposed four criteria when determining whether a study is trustworthy or not. Guba's four criteria include credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Guba, 1981).

Credibility is determined by the adoption of well-established social science research methods, with preferably more than one research method used, such as document analysis and discourse analysis. In addition, the researcher's qualifications, including familiarity with the society under investigation, and his examination of previous studies should also be taken into consideration when discussing the credibility of a study. Transferability involves demonstrating that the results of a study can be applied to a wider population. For example, the methods used in this study to explore Saudi responses to the Saudi Vision 2030 could be applied to any other social, cultural, or economic issue in the Saudi society. The study can also be replicated in other societies with similar social and cultural characteristics.

Dependability involves the design and implementation of the study as well as a description of what was planned and how the study was executed. For example, this study has compiled a lexicon of expressions or terms which are used on Twitter within the context of Saudi society. This lexicon was utilized as a reference point when analyzing Tweets. It also developed a lexicon for classifying Tweets into five categories, namely religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified (see Figure 1). This computerized classification and analysis was followed by a manual authentication and further classification of the data.

Confirmability involves questions of objectivity. A detailed description of the research methods adopted in the study helps determine to what extent one can accept its outcome. This study used a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods when collecting and analyzing data. Qualitative methods were mainly used to explore the status of anomie in Saudi society and analyze the social, religious, economic, political, and

unclassified expressions and how they reflect the absence, existence, or ambiguity of normative standards. Quantitative methods were used to quantify the percentages of each type of expression and determine whether or not they support Saudi Vision 2030. Using qualitative and quantitative approaches in tandem will lend strength to the findings of the study. In addition to the case study that analyzed the responses of Saudis to Saudi Vision 2030, the researcher conducted a systematic literature review to explore and analyze the previous literature on the relationship between social media and the social and cultural conflicts within Saudi society. In addition, this study conducted a document analysis that analyzed the published document of Vision 2030 and the reactions of politicians, economists, and journalists to this Vision. The literature review and document analysis were helpful when interpreting the results that were obtained from the case study. They also made the researcher more confident when analyzing and explaining the results as they linked the results to the previous studies and to the viewpoints of the experts.

Since qualitative research is prone to the involvement of researchers' personal views and biases (Locke, Spirduso, & Silverman, 2013), several procedures and tools were used to minimize the impact of the researcher on the level of trustworthiness of the results. In the Twitter posts analysis, the extraction of Tweets was computerized and the researcher's role was limited to classifying them into religious, social, economic, and political expressions, to identify whether they agree or disagree with the Vision, and to judge whether a microblogger's Tweet was based on clear standards or not. In the document analysis, a checklist is used to analyze the published documentations on the Vision. The fact that the researcher is aware of the Saudi society (as he is a member of that society) is considered as a strong point since he is aware of the historical, cultural, political,

and economic issues involved. However, this can also lead to certain biases as the researcher may not share similar social and cultural backgrounds with the Twitter microbloggers. Therefore, it was the researcher's intention to be fully neutral in collecting and analyzing the data and to separate his own opinions from the results obtained from this scientific research.

3.4 Ethical Consideration

One of the most common ethical concerns this study encountered is the concern of copyrights, in which Twitter posts are not protected by copyright law because it is impossible to assure the originality of the posts. Therefore, Twitter states in its terms of service that it denies the responsibility of any Tweets but assures its responsibility toward suspending reported users (Twitter, 2012). Thus, Twitter considers the copyright as being protected by privacy laws (Graham & Anderson, 2010). However, Twitter posts can be considered as public documents rather than human-related data (Wilkinson & Thelwall, 2011). In this study, Tweets are considered as public documents and was retrieved without notice or approval from users. However, the researcher made sure that names and personal data were not republished. When some Tweets were used as examples for certain aspects of the study, names and account information were replaced by codes.

When dealing with Twitter's terms of services, legal issues rose when a dataset was not properly identified using either a number, which was found in Twitter API, or specific keywords and times. As Twitter users may have some content rights, though the terms and services do allow their content to be shared to the public, this does not mean that Tweets may be used without notice, but the originality of the Tweets does give users some right to privacy. Likewise, the author of the current study did not test the originality of the Twitter

posts collected and will not be held responsible for any copyright violations by Twitter users whose Tweets were used in the study.

Issues this study faced during the Twitter data collection and analysis include ethical issues when retrieving user consent for usage of data, which was sometimes caused by the high volume of Tweets, and dealing with the sensitivity of the Tweet subject, which can cause quite a dilemma if not handled with proper research care (Beninger et al., 2014). It is also important to note that when collecting data on Twitter, certain countries may have laws and regulations which prohibit people to talk about any subject freely. Therefore, it is important to indicate that the limitations on the freedom of usage of social media in Saudi Arabia may result in Tweets that do not necessarily reflect a user's viewpoints and responses to Saudi Vision 2030.

Retrieving datasets varies from different usage of language, which can be problematic as it can have a negative impact on the accuracy of the analysis. When using a certain vocabulary that is used in a Tweet, it is important to use all keywords and hashtags in order to attain an unbiased sample. In this research, a lexicon of keywords was built to automatically classify the Tweets. There is also an exclusion criterion to exclude reTweets and unrelated Tweets or ads. The author's intervention was limited to describing the classified Tweets and deciding the presence, absence, or ambiguity of standards in these Tweets. As the extraction of data was automatic, the author's bias and selectivity in data collection was largely ruled out.

Another concern deals with the representation of the user behind the Tweets, as behind every Tweet there is not always an individual but also organisations, journalists, and unknown users who also speak their opinion on certain issues that may not be useful

to one's research. Online spammers use this to their advantage by creating accounts that are fictitious and garner substantial user attention. This affects data by providing false information as well as an inaccurate reflection of the popularity of the topic being discussed. While Twitter has created a verification sign that allows Twitter users to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate accounts, the feature applies only to people who are more likely to be impersonated (Twitter, 2012). In this case study, Tweets from individuals were used as long as they satisfied the criteria of inclusion discussed later in this study.

4 Results

This study aims to assess the current status of anomie in Saudi society. The study reviews the recently published literature regarding the impact of structural and informational developments on Saudi culture and society. The main part of this study analyzes 15% (1,919) of Twitter posts related to Saudi Vision 2030 (13,200), which were collected between April 25, 2016 (the date Vision 2030 was announced) and April 25, 2017. The Tweets were classified into five main groups: religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified. They were also classified based on whether they agree or

disagree with the proposed project. These responses were then evaluated on whether they show absence, clarity, or ambiguity of normative positions. The study also analyzed the official documents of the Vision and the published documentations that have responded to it. In addition, the study discussed the possible opportunities and challenges that may face the implementation of the Vision (37 preliminary documents).

The topic chosen for the case study, to evaluate the status of anomie in Saudi society, is part of a wide discussion among Saudi Twitter users. This is due to the fact that the Vision is an ambitious strategic plan (as described by the government) and that it has aspects that impact the lives of Saudis financially, culturally, and socially. Accordingly, the findings provided the following:

1. Indications as to the status of anomie in Saudi society since the Vision project tends to stir political and religious sentiments.
2. Indicators of the degree of public perception and acceptance of the project—information that is highly valuable to the Saudi government.
3. An assessment of the advantages of using the medium of Twitter in social research and the promotion of its use.

4.1 Official Document Analysis of Saudi Vision 2030

Two types of documents were analyzed. The first type consisted of the official document published by the government of Saudi Arabia; the second type of documentations include journal, newspaper, and magazine articles, as well as official websites of economic and political institutions that were published between April 25, 2016 (the announcement of the Vision) to April 25, 2017. A total of 37 articles and reports were collected:

Articles	Magazines/Newspaper	Reports	Websites	Total
1	31	4	1	37

Table 2 shows the resources of collected documents of experts

The official documents published by the government are summarized and the main plans and opportunities are identified. In analyzing the published documentations connected to the Vision, the researcher used a checklist to help read all documents in a valid and reliable way. The checklist (see Appendix F) consisted of three main parts. In the first part, details about the title, author, publisher, and date were filled in. The second part summarized the opportunities discussed in the document. The last part listed the challenges raised in the document. Both opportunities and challenges were classified into religious, social, economic, or political categories, including statistics about the opportunities and challenges. For each document, a checklist was filled in.

4.1.1 Synthesis of Vision 2030

The following section explores the goals of Saudi Vision 2030 by mentioning the most important targets. In order to achieve Vision 2030's objectives, the plan makes mention of the following themes:

4.1.1.1 A vibrant society

The first theme is "a vibrant society," which is seen as the real wealth of Saudi Arabia. The country's cultural heritage and its commitment to Islamic principles contributes to its growth and spurs further innovation. Saudi Vision 2030 (2016) mentioned that:

Members of this society live in accordance with the Islamic principle of moderation, are proud of their national identity and their ancient cultural

heritage, enjoy a good life in a beautiful environment, are protected by caring families and are supported by an empowering social and health care system

(p. 13).

This theme is important in order to achieve future targets of bringing about improvements in the social and health care systems. Vision 2030 concentrates on families and the encouragement of children's development when related to the foundations of moral beliefs, as well as cultural and social skills. Another goal of Vision 2030 is to concentrate on public attractions, such as allowing increased numbers of “Umrah³” visitors “by 2020, make it possible for over 15 million Muslims per year to perform Umrah and be completely satisfied with their pilgrimage experience” (Vision 2030, 2016). Moreover, the plan involves increasing the number of museums and showcasing the Islamic historical heritage of the country. Saudi Arabia holds some unique wonders, including a rich historical and cultural history which reveals details about ancient civilizations and global trade routes.

Vision 2030 also seeks to promote and fund an increase in cultural activities and entertainment. It is hoped that this change in social entertainment will be profitable for Saudi Arabia because it will promote jobs and activities, making life more enjoyable. This will include a drastic change in international involvement with Saudi Arabia, which will encourage the organization of cultural events, increasing the amount of entertainment projects and cultural venues. Another goal of Vision 2030 is the development of cities, including upgrading infrastructure and fostering the recreational needs of residents. In addition, environmental factors also play a big role in this Vision, including improving the

³ Umrah is an Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, which Muslims perform at any time of the year.

efficiency of waste management, encouraging recycling projects, and lowering the effect of greenhouse gases. There will also be an increase in efforts to rehabilitate and protect the country's beaches, islands, and natural reserves (Saudi Vision 2030, 2016).

All the above steps mentioned will, it is hoped, increase the variety of job opportunities for the residents of Saudi Arabia. A very important factor which is being popularized worldwide is the awareness of having a healthy lifestyle, and with this in mind, the Vision aims to increase and encourage sport facilities, health programs, and leisure interests that contribute to people's good health. These changes will lead to inspiring global and regional sport involvements, making Saudi Arabia more involved in global sports competitions.

4.1.1.2 A thriving economy

The second theme, which encourages a thriving economy, focuses on a strong educational system which provides Saudis the opportunity to enhance their skills to meet every changing need of the market. A thriving economy focuses on the skills and capacities of Saudi children to build their future by providing them with equal opportunities for success (Vision 2030, 2016). The strategies needed to complete these improvements in education include investing in the youth of Saudi Arabia by developing early childhood education; improving the national curriculum, including more technical programs for young students; and thoroughly training educational leaders. Vision 2030 also encourages diversity by providing equal opportunity for different ages and both sexes (Saudi Vision 2030, 2016). This goal will, no doubt, bring about significant changes within Saudi society.

Above all, the most important goal is economic growth from a diversified economy that is not dependent on any single resource, namely oil. From different perspective, this Vision aspires not only to create an economically changing world for Saudi Arabia, but also to connect the continents of Africa, Asia, and Europe. Because of the prime location of Saudi Arabia, it is hoped that such a connection will bring economic, political, and social benefits. Moreover, Vision 2030 emphasized that:

a thriving economy provides opportunities for all by building an education system aligned with market needs and creating economic opportunities for the entrepreneur, the small enterprise as well as the large corporation

(Saudi Vision 2030, 2016, p. 13).

The encouragement of small businesses and family productivity will take place by allowing easier access to funds and better business regulations. The goals include increasing investments with large international companies, being more involved in worldwide technologies, and creating more global investment opportunities via trading in the stock markets. There will also be more concentration on the manufacturing sector, technology, and mining opportunities in Saudi Arabia (Saudi Vision 2030, 2016).

Economically, it is agreed upon by most reviewers of Vision 2030 that if the plan is implemented as stated, it will reach a state of success that will profit Saudi Arabia and other investors around the world. The main feature of the plan focuses on the diversity of the economic resources and the exploration of new and modern opportunities. In the long term, Saudi Arabia will profit from these changes because it will have improved how the country is perceived globally, as well as making the country economically and culturally

stronger. Another important factor in the ambitious plan is the involvement of women in the economy and an enhancement of their rights to work and live among men in an equal society.

4.1.1.3 Improved government performance

Vision 2030's third theme aims at improving the government's performance by encouraging increased effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and achieving high-performance levels. Doing so would translate into a better environment for the country's citizens. As for the private and non-profit sectors, while their responsibilities and challenges would increase, they would be taken more seriously. The plan of Vision 2030 claimed that embracing transparency will be one of the many steps in accomplishing an effectively governed state, as well as adopting international standards of governance, which includes a zero-tolerance policy for any forms of corruption. This kind of support implies that even with a plan, publicity will increase interests internationally and increase the rate of success for Saudi Arabia. The Vision also emphasized the importance of improving government performance:

Our third theme is built on an effective, transparent, accountable, enabling and high-performing government. We will also prepare the right environment for our citizens, private sector and non-profit sector to take their responsibilities and take the initiative in facing challenges and seizing opportunities

(Saudi Vision 2030, 2016, p. 13).

All citizens of Saudi Arabia will be offered more efficient services provided by the government, as well as a better quality of life and access to increased opportunities. The importance of making Saudi Arabia a more accessible place for citizen includes embracing

the use of online services, such as online job searches, e-learning, banking, and health services, which all tie into an e-government. Saudi Arabia uses some transformative programs to achieve the goals of Vision 2030 such as the government restructuring, strategic directions, fiscal balance, regulation reviews, and performance measurement programs. One of the most transformative programs is the Saudi Aramco which is one of the future programs of Vision 2030. The purpose of this transformation is to transfer Aramco from “an oil producing company into a global industrial conglomerate” (Vision 2030, 2016, p. 7), as well as using funds from the sale of Aramco to support the goals of Vision 2030. Saudi Arabia is currently preparing such executive programs, which will contribute to achieving the goals of the Vision (Vision 2030, 2016), including programs for the public investment fund restructuring, human capital, national transformation, and strengthening public sector governance programs.

4.2 Responses of Experts on Vision 2030

The perspectives of economists, politicians, and journalists have played a significant role in designing the study, especially in the classification of religious, social, political, and economic categories. Experts’ perspectives have also contributed to a clearer understanding of Vision 2030 and have helped to analyze and interpret many of the Saudis’ comments about the Vision. The following section reviews the views of experts on the potential opportunities and challenges of Saudi Vision 2030.

4.2.1 Synthesis of Vision 2030’s opportunities

In the journalistic articles and other reports that were consulted for this study, the authors highlighted a number of social, political, and economic opportunities associated with Saudi Vision 2030, with no mention of any religious opportunities. As this study

shows in the discussion below, however, religion is a significant part of the discourse when investigating challenges arising from the Vision. As stated above, the authors of the articles and reports did not make mention of religious opportunities arising from the adoption of Saudi Vision 2030, even though the government has stated that Saudi society will be more open and allow for increased numbers of pilgrims to enter the Kingdom. The authors did, however, introduce several challenges, which are mentioned in the next section.

A total of 129 opportunities and challenges were collected:

Categories	Religious	Social	Political	Economic
Opportunities	None	4	16	27
Challenges	14	23	29	16

Table 3 shows the opportunities and challenges of Vision 2030 from experts' perspectives

Regarding the social opportunities from the Vision document, the authors made three main points. Firstly, there will be new forms of entertainment which did not exist within the society previously (Al Hammoud, 2016) and which are expected to introduce new social norms. Secondly, there will be an increase in the quality of social, cultural, and other services being offered, which will be instrumental in increasing the quality of life (Khadori, 2016). Thirdly, there will be an opportunity for Saudi society to move from a more traditional society to an increasingly modern one (Ignatius, 2016). However, the authors argued that Vision 2030 will transform Saudi society to a more liberal and open

society with fewer social constraints. Thus, it can be stated that the Vision is not merely an economic document, but also a blueprint for social change and transformation.

As for political opportunities, the Vision is positively looked upon because, for the first time, these modernization projects are being espoused by a leader who is both very senior in the royal family and very young. In addition, there is a newly ambitious repackaging of the diversification policies and privatization which will help achieve the objectives of the Vision, such as increased transparency and better governance. In addition, Saudi Arabia aims to take advantage of its geographical location by becoming a key hub connecting the three continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa (Al- Bawaba's editor, 2016; Khalizad, 2016; Kinninmont, 2016; Reed, 2016). Also, currently there are various interest groups within Saudi society, such as the merchant class and religious institutions, which place pressure on the government to adopt certain policies and exert a significant amount of political power in that way. With this new Vision, their power will be diminished, and the government will be able to move forward more freely (Nathan, 2017). Also, in the wake of Vision 2030, the government will have improved criteria for assessing government performance, the private sector will have greater control over government positions and policies, and economic plans will be developed to reduce dependence on oil revenues and decrease public spending (Al-Dakheel, 2016; Khalizad, 2016; Ross, 2016; The Economist, 2016). Currently, foreign workers do not have the opportunity to gain permanent status in Saudi Arabia, but with the introduction of Saudi Vision 2030, some will be granted permanent resident status or a green card (Tago, 2016). Privatization of the economy to create more employment opportunities and the increased participation of women in the workplace are also seen as opportunities arising out of the Vision (Reed, 2016). Finally, as

a result of the adoption of Vision 2030, the Saudi government hopes to play a more significant role in the Arab and Islamic worlds religious pilgrimage will increase, bringing more people into the Kingdom (Fattouh & Sen, 2016).

Regarding economic opportunities, which in some cases overlap with political ones, the articles and reports outline four major points. Firstly, as a result of the adoption of Saudi Vision 2030, there will be a decrease in the dependence on oil revenues which have for the past several decades propped up the Saudi economy (El-Arian, 2016; Khadori, 2016; Larson & Anne, 2016). Secondly, the economy will be more diversified into other areas of economic activity, thus reducing the Kingdom's economic vulnerability. All eggs, as it were, will not be placed in one basket. Thirdly, with the above two points kept in mind, there will be an increase in foreign investment as the economy modernizes. And finally, there will be an increase in the private sector share of economy, from 40% to 60% (Al-Dakheel, 2016; Black, 2016; Fattouh & Sen, 2016; Holodny, 2016; McDowall, 2016).

4.2.2 Synthesis of Vision 2030's challenges

The authors highlighted several political, social, economic, and religious challenges associated with Saudi Vision 2030. In fact, the challenges mentioned were twice as many as the opportunities. This could be due in part to journalists and think tanks being critical in their reporting, but it could also be due to the fact that there are many areas of concern associated with the Vision. With regard to religious challenges, some authors noted there will be resistance from the conservative religious establishment who will object to the many changes being introduced into Saudi society (Ross, 2016). There will be struggles between the voices of modernization and Islamism to accept the economic transformation which will unfold as Saudi Vision 2030 is implemented and ideological conflicts arise

(Henderson, 2016; Khalizad, 2016). For example, how does a conservative Muslim kingdom deal, from a religious vantage point, with the increase of women's participation in the workforce (Clinch & Gamble; Khalid, 2016)? In addition, fundamentalist religious discourse has traditionally been in charge of education within the Kingdom, but this will diminish somewhat when the Vision is implemented (van den Beukel, 2016). To what extent this religious power is prepared to diminish its control on Saudi social lifestyle is a central question (Feierstein, 2016).

With regard to social challenges related to Saudi Vision 2030, the most daunting challenge is the nature of Saudi society itself, which has been discussed in other parts of this study (Trad, 2016). As has been stated, most Saudis have depended on a strong central government when it comes to economic activity and guidance. In addition, Saudi is a more closed and conservative society with limited interactions between men and women and a strong emphasis on religious, family, and tribal values and alliances (Aldkhalil, 2016; Khashan, 2016; van den Beukel, 2016). Gender issues also remain a sensitive topic in Saudi society (Giorgio, Karasik, Miotto, & Wagner, 2016). Therefore, what impact will Vision 2030 have on all of this, and to what extent will these cultural characteristics be an impediment to the implementation of the Vision? As is generally known, people are resistant to change, especially if that change comes about rapidly. The challenge here is the progressive implementation of Vision 2030 in such a way so as to avoid social and economic conflicts (Abdul Hameed, 2016). As one article stated, Saudi Vision 2030 is a revolution, and as a result of it being so, it will have an influence on social, religious, and political stabilities in the country (Seznec, 2016). The authors of these articles and reports have, on many occasions discussed these issues because they are so central to the success

or failure of the Vision. For example, the challenge of matching local cultural content with global cultural content (Aldosari, 2016; Ignatius, 2016), or the challenge of accepting more women into the private sector (Clinch & Gamble, 2016; Feierstein, 2016; Ross, 2016). In addition, the nature of the social contract in the region will come under strain and will need to be reinvented (Kinninmont, 2016). There is also the social impact of opening up to more tourists and expatriates through a green card system to consider, as this would also be a significant change (Courtney, 2016). The impact of economic growth on the values of Saudi society were also discussed, in addition to how this economic growth will be instrumental in embracing a more moderate version of Islam. The hope is that this in turn will reduce administrative and financial corruption (Aldkhil, 2016), but it is unclear whether the economic shake-up will lead to the kind of social changes many believe are needed to truly modernize the country's economy and society. Permitting women to drive, for example, opening up the legal system, or ending the kind of human rights abuses that attract far more attention abroad than in the Kingdom itself, are all challenges that Saudi Arabia will encounter.

This study now turns to discuss the political challenges arising from the Vision and the proposed reforms. Perhaps one of the major challenges is that the Saudi government recognizes that relying on the hydrocarbon sector for stability and prosperity is not a sustainable strategy, given that the Kingdom's oil reserves will deplete in seven decades (Giorgio, Karasik, Miotto, & Wagner, 2016). Another major challenge is that policymakers have not adequately addressed the consequences of having an educational system that does not properly prepare people for this new economic and social model. Will people have the skills and training necessary to work in the private sector and compete with expatriates who

have already received the necessary training (Altijani, 2016; Courtney, 2016; Ouchtou, 2016; Holodny, 2016). Additionally, invigorated administrative and operational resources will be required at a time when Saudi Arabia is already exerting its role in the region, such as in Syria and Yemen, as well as experiencing a decrease in revenue from oil resources (Altijani, 2016; El-Erian, 2016). Will foreign investors be welcome, and will the workplace be capable of meeting the challenges of this new economic model (Larson & Pence, 2016)? Fattouh and Sen (2016) mention that the restructuring and reorganizing of the economy will bring about some benefits and generate efficiencies, but many uncertainties will remain and generate some risks.

The privatization of Aramco brings up a number of questions because of the company's powerful influence in the economic and political sectors of Saudi society (Khadori, 2016). The government will also face opposition from social conservatives as well as business people and the religious establishment, and their opposition to some proposed forms of entertainment. and so, there is therefore a risk of a contest for power and influence (Aljuasi, 2016; Ouchtou, 2016). In addition, some extremist groups will incite against the government by criticizing the new forms of entertainment (Aljuasi, 2016). In brief, there is a fear that the Vision is too ambitious and, although well intentioned, it is not certain it will bring about positive results from past experiences with similar plans (Field, 2017; Hafiz, 2016). At the same time, the government will face the challenge of creating a new social contract with the people in order to get them on board and embrace the Vision, which will take considerable time to implement (Khadori, 2016; The Economist, 2016). It is worth mentioning that there are a number of challenges that pose a threat to Saudi's instability. These threats include terrorist cells linked to al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic

State, missile attacks from Yemen, an exacerbating geopolitical rivalry with Iran, and internal sectarian tensions in the country's oil-rich Eastern Province (Giorgio, Karasik, Miotto, & Wagner, 2016).

This study now discusses some of the economic challenges as mentioned in the articles and reports. Perhaps one of the major challenges arising in the wake of Saudi Vision 2030 are the ensuing changes in the economic relations between citizen and state, which will inevitably alter the political relations. This will be especially true in the case of an increasingly well-educated and globally connected Saudi youth who will have economic expectations that will typically exceed their job prospects (Aldkhil, 2016; Kinninmont, 2016). In addition, increasing numbers of people will have to work in the private sector. Currently, only 10% of the Saudi workforce works in the private sector, but with Vision 2030 this number will significantly increase over time. The private sector currently highly depends on the government, but this dependence will decrease with the implementation of Saudi Vision 2030. In addition, some Saudis will be resistant to working in certain sectors of the private economy, due to social and cultural attitudes toward certain occupations, and many will not possess the necessary skills to meet the requirements of these new jobs (Reed, 2016; The Economist, 2016; van den Beukel, 2016). In the oil economy of Saudi society, people are dependent on the government for governance and economic opportunities, but the move to a more privatized economy will mean big changes for many people (Aldkhil, 2016; Aldosari, Cordesman, Nazer, Francois, Sez nec, & Feierstein, 2016). A move toward a more private economy exposes Saudi Arabia to some vulnerabilities due to the volatility of global markets and the prices of investment assets (Altijani, 2016). In addition, any further decline in oil prices will expose Saudi Arabia to further vulnerabilities

as these resources will be needed in the interim (Henderson, 2016). Nevertheless, economic necessity dictates that Saudi Arabia carry out these reforms despite the challenges (Black, 2016). The structural reforms outlined in Vision 2030 are essential, however, in order to shift the economy to a more sustainable path, even if only a small part of the Vision is implemented (Fattouh, 2016).

4.3 Twitter Posts of Saudi Vision 2030

The researcher collected 13,200 Tweets during the study data collection period. After applying the data selection criteria, the number was reduced to 1,919 Tweets which were analyzed by the researcher. Here, the perceptive variable had five categories consisting of religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified. The opinions variable was defined by three distinct levels: agreeing, disagreeing, and neutral. The normative standard variable has three categories: clear (individuals may hold norms that legitimize and prohibit the same behaviour or endorse two behaviours that are inherently contradictory), ambiguous (individuals may be unclear and uncertain regarding appropriate behaviour in certain situations, and multiple and incompatible norms pertaining to the same situation contribute to confusion), and absent (individuals may have no position with respect to a certain social conduct or issue; or may be faced with the need to make choices without knowing the appropriate norms). In addition, the time variable classified the different periods: Period 1 as the beginning, Period 2 as the middle, and Period 3 as the end of the first year of the announcement of Vision 2030. Moreover, the location variable has three levels: Riyadh, Jeddah, and unclassified (other cities). The following table shows the frequencies of perceptive, opinion, normative, time, and geographical variables.

Frequencies of Variables			
Perceptions	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Religious	362	18.9	18.9
Social	219	11.4	30.3
Political	702	36.6	66.9
Economic	226	11.8	78.6
Unclassified	410	21.4	100.0
Opinion			
Agreeing Tweets	1,010	52.6	52.6
Disagreeing Tweets	448	23.3	76.0
Neutral Tweets	461	24	100.0
Normative Standards			
Clear	900	46.9	46.9
Ambiguous	431	22.5	69.4
Absent	588	30.6	100.0
Time			
Period 1	873	45.5	45.5
Period 2	811	42.3	87.8
Period 3	235	12.2	100.0
Location			
Riyadh	673	35.1	35.1
Jeddah	280	14.6	49.7
Undefined	966	50.3	100.0

Table 4 shows frequencies of perceptive, opinion, normative, time, and geographical variables.

The variable of perceptions shows that more than one third of the Tweets were related to political expressions (37%), followed by unclassified expressions (24%), and

religious expressions (19%). Close to 12% of the participants used social and economic expressions when they were discussing Vision 2030 on Twitter. The variable of opinion shows that more than half (53%) of the Tweets Support Vision 2030, whereas only a quarter (23%) are against it and a quarter (24%) of the Tweets were found to be neutral. The variable of normative standards shows that almost half of the Tweets had clear normative standards compared to less than one third of the Tweets that lacked any clear normative standards. Around one fifth of the Tweets were found to have ambiguous normative standards. There were smaller numbers of Tweets (around 12%) at the end of the first year compared to the beginning (46%) or middle (42%) of the first year of the Vision 2030 plan. Over one third of the Tweets originated from the capital city Riyadh, while only 15% originated from second largest city, Jeddah, and undefined places (or other cities) consisted of half of the selected Tweets for this study.

4.3.1 Correlational analysis

The relationship between the time variable helped the researcher to understand and interpret the data provided as well as link them to the religious, social, political, and economic backgrounds of Saudi society. The unclassified Tweets did not indicate religious, social, political, or economic expressions. The following figure shows the correlations between the time and perception variables during periods of time as well as measuring the impact of each factor on the other. It also shows the significance of the relationship between variables.




Figure 1 presents the relationship between time and perceptive variable.

The above figure shows some interesting social dynamics over time. Research found that political expressions dominated the number of Tweets (40%) in the beginning of the first year of Vision 2030 and only 8% of the Tweets were related to religious expressions. More than one fourth (25%) of the Tweets were unclassified, being devoid of any perceptive expressions. As time progressed, smaller percentages of Tweets had unclassified expressions. In Period 2, there was a huge jump in the number of Tweets related to religious expressions (34%) and a decrease in political expressions from 40% to 31%, while economic expression slumped to 5% from 14%. By the end of 2016 (Period 3), religious expressions dropped back to 5.5% (lower than Period 1), political expressions jumped to 42% (higher than Period 1), and economic expressions became a key player (27%). Social expressions remained stable at around 10% over time.

Since all the key variables in this study were categorical rather than scale, the researcher conducted a chi-square test of independence to verify the association between

different variables. The following two equations were used to calculate the data in Table 5 below:

Null Hypothesis (H₀): Two categorical variables are independent

Alternative Hypothesis (H_a): Two categorical variables are not independent

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	300.581 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	300.178	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	38.773	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	1919		
Note: a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.82.			

Table 5 presents the significance of the relationship between time and perceptive variable.

The chi-square test suggests that time and perceptions were not independent, at 1% level of significance, implying that change in perceptions over time was not random.

4.3.2 The correlation between time and opinion

The following figure shows the correlations between the time and opinion (agree, disagree, neutral) variables during periods of time, as well as a measure of the change in participants’ positions during periods of time. This table includes the number of Tweets as well as the percentages regarding opinions. It also shows in the chi-square test the significance of the relationship between the time and opinion variables.




Figure 2 presents the relationship between time and opinion variables.

Looking at the opinions over time, two-thirds (67%) of the Tweets supported Vision 2030 in the beginning, which declined to 41% in Period 2 and 40% in Period 3. The proportion of disagreeing Tweets jumped from 7% to 39% between Period 1 and Period 2. However, the position of participants who disagreed with the Vision fell back to 29% by end of the first year of Vision 2030. Neutral Tweets in Period 1 were 26%, falling to almost 20% in Period 2 while increasing to 31% in Period 3. In total, 53% of the Tweets expressed agreement with the Vision, 23% disagreement, and 24% neutral.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	264.392 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	287.248	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	36.406	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	1919		

Note: a.0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 54.86

Table 6 presents the significance of the relationship between time and opinion variables.

The chi-square test suggests that time and opinions were not independent, at 1% level of significance, implying that change in opinions over time was not random.

4.3.3 The correlation between time and normative standards

The figure below shows the breakdown and percentages of the responses over three periods with regard to normative standards, which include clear, ambiguous, and absent. Tweets were selected during three time periods over the first year of the Vision.




Figure 3 presents the relationship between time and normative standard variables.

During Period 1, 49% of responses had clear norms. However, in Period 2 there was a sharp decrease to 44%. Interestingly, there was an increase of 52% in Period 3. What the data shows is that clear norms fluctuated over all three periods but tended towards an increase. With respect to ambiguous responses during Period 1, 16% of the responses were ambiguous but there was a tendency to fluctuate in Period 2 (increase of 29%) and Period 3 (decrease to 24%). Finally, the absent responses in Period 1 were 35% before a consistent decrease in Period 2 (28%) and Period 3 (25%). In total, 47% of the Tweets were clear, 23% were ambiguous, and 31% were absent norms.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	44.802 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	45.300	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.253	1	.071
N of Valid Cases	1919		
Note: a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 52.78.			

Table 7 presents the significance of the relationship between time and normative variables.

The chi-square test suggests that time and normative standards were not independent, at 1% level of significance, implying that change in normative standards over time was not independent of normative standards.

4.3.4 The correlation between location and perceptions

The figure below shows the breakdown and percentages of the participant responses based on three locations: Riyadh, Jeddah, and other cities. The table also shows the perceptions of the participants based on religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified variables.




Figure 4 presents the relationship between location and perceptive variables.

The correlation between the locations and perceptions was very clear. In terms of religious responses in Riyadh, the correlation was 8%, while it was 9% in Jeddah, and 29% in undefined cities in the country. For social responses, Riyadh had 11%, Jeddah had 8%, and 13% came from undefined cities. The political responses were 39% in Riyadh, 42% in Jeddah, and 34% in undefined cities. Interestingly, economic responses for Riyadh (16%) and Jeddah (15%) were very close, while in the undefined cities the response was 21%. Finally, the unclassified responses were 27% in Riyadh, 26% in Jeddah, and 16% undefined.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	173.291 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	181.749	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	126.377	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	1919		

Note: a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 31.95.

Table 8 presents the significance of the relationship between location and perceptive variable.

The chi-square test suggests that location and perceptions were not independent, at 1% level of significance, implying that variations in perceptions over locations were not random.

4.3.5 The correlation between location and opinion

The figure below shows the relations between locations (Riyadh, Jeddah, and undefined cities) and opinions (agreeing, disagreeing, and neutral).




Figure 5 presents the relationship between location and opinion variables.

Almost two-thirds of the Tweets emerging from Riyadh and Jeddah supported Vision 2030, compared to only 41% showing support from undefined cities. Less than 10% of the Tweets from Riyadh or Jeddah expressed disapproval of Vision 2030, while a substantial 37% of the Tweets from undefined locations disapproved. Whereas Riyadh and Jeddah were almost the same at 26% neutral, undefined locations were 22% neutral. In total, 53% of the Tweets express agreement with the Vision, 23% disagreement, and 24% neutral.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	212.621 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	224.768	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	20.828	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	1919		
Note: a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 65.37.			

Table 9 presents the significance of the relationship between geographical and opinion variables.

The chi-square test suggests that location and opinions were not independent, at 1% level of significance, implying that variations in opinions over locations were not random.

4.3.6 The correlation between location and normative standards

The following figure shows the breakdown and percentages of the participant normative standards and locations, such as Riyadh, Jeddah and other cities. The table also shows the normative standards of the participants based on clear, ambiguous, and absent norms.




Figure 6 presents the relationship between geographical and normative standard variables.

Almost half of the Tweets from Riyadh and Jeddah have a clear normative standard, compared to 45% of the Tweets from undefined locations. In other words, around 50% of the Tweets from Jeddah and Riyadh lack clear norms against 55% of the Tweets from undefined locations. For absent norms, Riyadh was at 32%, Jeddah at 38%, and undefined cities at 27%. The totals were found to be 47% clear, 23% ambiguous, and 31% absent.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	39.523 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	39.761	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.027	1	.870
N of Valid Cases	1919		
Note: a 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 62.89.			

Table 10 presents the significance of the relationship between geographical and normative variables.

The chi-square test suggests that location and normative standards were related (i.e., they are not independent), since the significance of the Pearson Chi-Square test is below the usual cut-off point of 0.05. Thus, there was not enough evidence to accept the Null Hypothesis; therefore, one must assume there was no independence. In other words, the relationship between normative standard and location is established.

4.3.7 The correlation between perceptions and normative standards

The figure below highlights the percentages of the participant responses based on perceptive levels and normative standards. The perceptive levels include religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified. The norms include clear, ambiguous, and absent.




Figure 7 presents the relationship between perceptions and normative standard variables.

Cross tabulation between perceptives and normative standards shows an interesting relation between different perceptions and normative standards. Only 39% of the Tweets that used religious expressions about Vision 2030 were found to have clear norms, compared to 44% of the Tweets using social expressions. On the other hand, only 57% of the Tweets using political expressions about Vision 2030 were found to have clear norms, compared to 72% of the Tweets using economic expressions. Only 25% of the Tweets with unclassified expressions were found to have clear norms. For ambiguous Tweets, 33% were religious, whereas 16% were unclassified, and 20% were social. Moreover, 25% were political, compared with 13% economic. For absent Tweets, 28% were religious while 56% were of the total number of unclassified participants. It was noted that the percentage of standard absenteeism decreased over time to become less in Period 3. This can be compared to the social and political Tweets which were 36% and 19% respectively, while

the economic Tweets were 15%. The total was 49% clear norms, 23% ambiguous, and 31% unclear.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	287.849 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	278.278	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	24.938	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	1,919		
Note: a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 49.19.			

Table 11 presents the significance of the relationship between perceptions and normative standard variables.

The chi-square test suggests that perceptive and normative standards were related (i.e., they were not independent), since the significance of the Pearson Chi-Square test is below the usual cut-off point of 0.05. Thus, there was not enough evidence to accept the Null Hypothesis; therefore, one can accept no independence.

4.3.8 The correlation between opinion and normative standards

The table figure shows the range of opinions regarding Vision 2030 including agreement, disagreement, and neutrality. It also shows the normative standards, including clear, ambiguous, and absent.




Figure 8 presents the relationship between opinion and normative standard variables.

For the Tweets that agreed with Vision 2030, 44% had clear norms, 22% had ambiguous norm, and 34% had absent norms. For those disagreeing with the Vision, 54% had clear norms, 20% ambiguous, and 26% absent. For Tweets holding a neutral opinion, 46% were clear, 26% were ambiguous, and 28% were absent. In total, 47% had clear norms, 23% were ambiguous, and 31% were absent.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.810 ^a	4	.001
Likelihood Ratio	17.675	4	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.013	1	.025
N of Valid Cases	1919		
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 100.62.			

Table 12 presents the significance of the relationship between opinion and normative standard variables.

The chi-square test suggests that opinions and normative standards were associated (i.e., they were not random), since the significance of the Pearson Chi-Square test is below the usual cut-off point of 0.05. There was not enough evidence to accept the null hypothesis; therefore, one can assume no independence. In other words, there was a relationship between opinions and normative standards.

4.3.9 The correlation between opinion and perceptions

The figure below shows the opinions and perceptive levels toward Vision 2030. Opinions range from agreement, disagreement, and neutral. Levels of perception were examined based on religious, social, political, economic, and unclassified variables.




Figure 9 presents the relationship between opinion and perceptive variables.

Figure 9 shows that over one third of the Tweets used political expressions to express their approval or disapproval for Vision 2030. Almost one-third of the Tweets that supported Vision 2030 used political expressions, compared to 12% that used economic expressions. Political and religious expressions dominated (40% and 30% respectively) the Tweets that disagreed with Vision 2030. Political expressions dominated (44%) the neutral Tweets.

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	103.057 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	102.766	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.684	1	.101
N of Valid Cases	1919		
Note: a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 51.13.			

Table 13 presents the significance of the relationship between opinion and perceptive variables.

The chi-square test suggests that opinions and perceptions were not independent (i.e., they were associated), since the significance of the Pearson Chi-Square test is below the usual cut-off point of 0.05. There was not enough evidence to accept the null hypothesis; therefore, one can assume association between opinions and perceptive levels.

4.4 T-Test

4.4.1 T-test for difference in proportion

This study created five dummy (binary) variables for five different levels of perceptive expressions to test whether there were significant differences in Tweets using different expressions over time. Use of the perceptive expressions over time was found to be statistically different between Periods 1 and 2. There was a large increase (26%) in the use of religious expressions in Period 2 compared to Period 1. Use of political, economic, or unclassified expressions declined around 10% between Period 1 and Period 2.

Null Hypothesis (H_0): Mean of perceptive levels are equal between Period 1 and Period 2

Alternative Hypothesis (H_a): Mean of perceptive levels are not equal between Period 1 and Period 2

4.4.2 T-test/Group statistics

Table 14 shows that perceptions were significantly different between Period 1 and Period 2 at 1% level of significance, except for social expressions which were significantly different only at 5%.

Perceptive Levels	Time	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Religious	Period1	873	.0836	.27698	.00937
	Period2	811	.3403	.47411	.01665
Social	Period1	873	.0997	.29971	.01014
	Period2	811	.1319	.33863	.01189
Political	Period1	873	.4021	.49060	.01660
	Period2	811	.3107	.46308	.01626
Economic	Period1	873	.1409	.34811	.01178
	Period2	811	.0481	.21409	.00752
Unclassified	Period1	873	.2738	.44615	.01510
	Period2	811	.1689	.37492	.01317

Table 14 presents the perceptive differences between period 1 & 2.

Furthermore, the following table compares the proportion of Tweets using religious, social, or political expressions between period 3 and period 1. No statistically significant difference was reported for these three categories. But there was a significant increase in

use of economic expressions (14% to 27%) and significant decrease in the use of unclassified expressions (27% vs 14%) between Period 1 and Period 3.

Perceptive Levels	TIME	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Religious	Period 1	873	.0836	.27698	.00937
	Period 3	235	.0553	.22909	.01494
Social	Period 1	873	.0997	.29971	.01014
	Period 3	235	.1064	.30899	.02016
Political	Period 1	873	.4021	.49060	.01660
	Period 3	235	.4213	.49482	.03228
Economic	Period 1	873	.1409	.34811	.01178
	Period 3	235	.2723	.44611	.02910
Unclassified	Period 1	873	.2738	.44615	.01510
	Period 3	235	.1447	.35253	.02300

Table 15 presents the perceptive differences between period 1 & 3.

4.4.2.1 Binary Logistic Regression

Since this research revealed a significant association between normative standards and perceptions along with locations and time, one can develop a logistic regression with binary normative standards as a dependent variable and others as independent variables, to quantify the theoretical relationship between norms and perceptive levels. Binary logistic regression can help predict the chances of having a clear norm compared to an unclear norm (ambiguous or absent) given a person’s perceptive level, location, and time period.

Model: Normative standards=f (perceptive levels, time, locations)

$$Norm_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Religion + \beta_2 Social + \beta_3 Political + \beta_4 Economic + \beta_5 Period 2 + \beta_6 Period 3 + \beta_7 Riyadh + \beta_8 Jeddah + u_i$$

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Step 1^a	Religious	.672	.164	16.882	1	.000	1.958
	Social	.865	.179	23.395	1	.000	2.375
	Political	1.389	.138	101.557	1	.000	4.010
	Economic	2.038	.190	115.569	1	.000	7.676
	Period 2	.165	.312	.279	1	.597	1.179
	Period 3	.014	.251	.003	1	.956	1.014
	Riyadh	.318	.298	1.139	1	.286	1.374
	Jeddah	.140	.307	.209	1	.648	1.151
	Constant	-1.316	.319	16.987	1	.000	.268

Table 16 shows the clarity of norms within perceptive expressions and shows the correlations among period times and locations.

Regression output in Table (18) shows that all the perspective variables were statistically significant, whereas time and location dummies were not. Regression results implied that persons using religious expressions in their Tweets related to Vision 2030 were two times more likely to have clear normative standards than persons using unclassified expressions. People using social expressions in their Tweets related to Vision 2030 were 2.37 times more likely to have clear normative standards than persons using unclassified expressions. On the other hand, Saudis using political expressions in their Tweets related to Vision 2030 were almost four times more likely to have clear normative standards than persons using unclassified expressions. People using economic expressions in their Tweets related to Vision 2030 are eight times more likely to have clear normative standards than Saudis using unclassified expressions.




Figure 10 shows the clarity of normative standards.

This means that the norms of unclassified Tweets were less clear than religious, social, political, and economic Tweets.

5 Discussion

5.1 Introduction

Some different cultures and religions regulate the relations among members of society, as well as other communities, through a set of selected values that govern and direct the behaviour of the individual and the community (Parsons, 1951). With the acknowledgment of the importance and the necessity of social values for the safety of communities, the degree of commitment to these values differs from one society to another, in accordance with the foundations formed and established by those social values on the one hand, and the commitment to the standards of those values on the other hand. The values derived from religion, such as gender relations and the earning of one's livelihood, have the mandatory and sanctity over all members of the organizations and societies. Those who believe in specific religion may derive some religious values as social norms which also become mandatory. (Darraz, 1973; Mackie et al., 2015).

Traditionally, in order to preserve the cultural component of each society, geographical borders were established and laws were enacted to protect societies from any variables and factors threatening the individual and society, both politically and culturally (Sackmann, 1997). For a time, this geographical protection strategy preserved the cultural and social identities and specificities of societies. However, a new development has rapidly changed many societies and their intellectual and cultural ideologies. This new development is the technical revolution represented in the new social media and its widespread access to each individual and organization, without any restriction or condition. This technology fosters the formation of new ideas and the adoption of new values in a

clear absence of local social norms adopted by the community to maintain social and cultural structure. In this context, the Saudi society is experiencing a state of transformation from traditional conservative values to a society which is governed by the values of modernization and globalization ideas that are promoted within Vision 2030. This rapid transformation threatens the cultural specificities of the Saudi society and its intellectual and religious references, which are governed by social customs and traditions on the one hand and Islamic fundamentalism on the other.

Under the rapid changes of the transformations in the economic, political, social, and religious aspects that accompanied Vision 2030, it is expected that a rapid change might impact the harmony of Saudi society social norms. However, this harmony today faces a great challenge, especially with regard to the current social norms, and the ability to harmonize and adapt to the social and economic reality promised by Vision 2030, in order to impact social and economic transformation. To recognize this change, its consequences, and its reflections on the society, the current research attempted to study the public response to this proposed economic and social transformations. This study was guided by a theoretical framework which highlights the theory of anomie--the notion that the absence or the ambiguity of common social norms in a society may lead to a disorder in the social norms, as well as a reduction of the interdependence between the members of society. This study was also guided by a theoretical framework that highlights the theory of anomalies-- the idea that the absence or ambiguity of common social norms in society may lead to the disruption of social norms as well as the reduction of social cohesion. In addition, the study relied on the theoretical framework inspired by social change theories of Durkheim, Merton, Ibn Khaldun, and Luhmann. These theories helped to understand

and explain social transformations in Saudi Arabia. For instance, Durkheim's theory has helped to understand and analyze the factors leading to anomie, which in his view are linked to rapid social transformations of the social and economic structure. Merton's theory also helped to understand and analyze the relationship between societal cultural objectives and institutional objectives on the one hand, and measuring the reaction to the contradiction between individual and cultural goals on the other. Given the nature of Saudi society and its participation in the characteristics of the Arab society, Ibn Khaldun's *asabiyyah* theory contributed to the understanding and interpretation of the cultural, social, political, and economic transformations in Saudi society associated with Vision 2030. The previous theories provided a distinct description of the factors and circumstances associated with anomie. However, they did not describe the interaction of the society and its transformations through communication. Since Twitter is one of the most modern means of communication, the main source of the present study is the need for a theory of delusions that is very urgent to understand and interpret the social and cultural transformations associated with Vision 2030. Luhmann's theory contributed to the comparison of the attitudes of the participants in the study during periods of data collection, as well as to follow the pattern of interaction and its reflection on social norms directly and indirectly. In conclusion it is important to clarify that The results of this study are limited to Saudi society and may not necessarily be generalized to other Arab countries. Tweets do not necessarily reflect the reality of any society as it cannot possibly capture the full range of public opinion. Public opinion is a complex combination of medium, message, and audience, thus it is difficult to take into account all of the factors which work towards shaping it. On the other hand, Twitter does not have a filter and anyone with Internet access

can control the content on their Twitter feed. The study examines the opinions only of those people who are active on Twitter and therefore the views of non-Twitter users are who may have different views are not captured in the study. The common lament of any researcher is the limitations of time and resources which makes it difficult to examine all of the factors involved, and this study is no exception. The following sections provide interpretations and possible analyzes of the study results.

5.2 The Relationship Between the Perceptions and Social Norms

Results of the Binary Logistic Regression test reflect that there is a clear connection between ambiguity, normative absence, and the absence of unclassified perceptive expressions. Through the study of the relationship between the social norms and perceptive levels, results confirmed that the religious and social expressions were twice as clear as the expressions that were not classified. Moreover, political expressions were four times clearer than the unclassified, while economic expressions were eight times clearer. In contrast, the proportion of ambiguity and normative absence in the unclassified category was the highest among all the categories, with a rate of 75%. The religious category followed with 61%, then social at 56%, political at 43%, and economic at 28%. These indicators confirm the strong relationship between the perceptive level of microbloggers and the degree of normative clarity.

5.2.1 The Normative standards of economic, religious, and unclassified expressions

The economic factor was one of the most important factors affecting the transformation of societies in the mid-nineteenth century, according to Durkheim and Merton. This impact is reflected on solidarity among members of society, especially social

norms. The results of the present study reflected a struggle over Vision 2030 between the views of politicians and economists on the one hand and religious and social conservatives on the other. Some participants believed that economic reform programs must be in line with the requirements of modernization such as cultural and social openness, while others believed the requirements of modernization and preservation of traditional values should be combined. This type of conflict reflects a range of challenges facing Saudi society politically, economically, and socially in the implementation of vision plans and programs. This challenge was evident in the standard ambiguity and absence of the study sample.

The relationship between the perceptive and normative level reflects the degree of normative clarity to the economic expressions category, compared to religious and unclassified expressions. While the clarity of norms within the religious category is 39% and 25% in the unclassified category, the clarity of economic expressions reached 72%. There are several reasons that might explain the clarity of economic expression. Firstly, the impact of the nature of the economic activity on those involved normally and digitally. Secondly, Vision 2030 is mainly considered an economic plan and hence dealing it by the experts reflect the perceptive and vocational dimension to the plan and its requirements. Thirdly, most of the microbloggers with economic backgrounds are from Riyadh and Jeddah, showing the impact of the perceptive environment on the participants. For example, one of the microbloggers said:

"الدولة سوف تتحول الى شركة مساهمة، المواطنون هم المساهمين واصحاب رأس المال، قراراتها تبنى ع معيار الربح والخسارة: فكرة جهنمية"

"The country will turn into a joint stock company, where citizens are shareholders and owners of capital, and its resolutions are adopted on the criterion of profit and loss: a hellish idea."

The terms used in the Tweet clearly reflect economic terms and have a norm explaining a conviction of the Vision: "قرارتها تبنى ع معيار الربح والخسارة" (*resolutions are adopted the criterion of profit and loss*).

Another Tweet reads:

"رؤية طموحة جدا بخصخصة النفط والاستثمار بالسياحة بشكل فعال وزيادة تملك السعوديين للاسكان. لا يتعمى عن ٢٠٣٠ الطموحه الا المتعمى"

"It is a very ambitious Vision through oil privatization, effective investment in tourism and increasing Saudis' housing ownership. No one is blind to the ambitious 2030 but the self-blinded."

This Tweet also has an economically perceptive dimension and a clarity in the criterion of the acceptance. On the other hand, this following Tweet is devoid of normality, as one microblogger said:

"الرؤية باختصار هي "تخصيص المملكة العربية السعودية"

"In brief the Vision is the "privatization of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."

Special reports related to Vision 2030 mentioned a group of the expected economic challenges. These challenges are represented in the transformation of the long relationship between the government and people, which has played an important role in the social stability during the past period. This relationship positioned citizens within a social contract based on the exchange of benefits with the government, which strengthens and weakens in accordance with the income of the government and oil prices (Aldkhal, 2016; Kinninmont, 2016). The second challenge is that the Saudi shift toward income sources other than oil exposes the economy to the market vagaries for those investments (Al Tijan, 2016). The third challenge is a cultural and social one, which opposes work in some professions that have been associated with low income or are deemed to be women's work

(Reed, 2016; The Economist, 2016; van den Beukel, 2016). Indeed, Elamin and Omair (2010) confirmed that customs and traditions play an important role in the interaction between men and women, especially in women's work. The fourth challenge is to match the local cultural content with the world cultural content (Aldosari, 2016; Ignatius, 2016). Despite these challenges, many studies have proved that Saudis accept social modernization for economic purposes (Teitelbaum, 2010), and analysis of Saudi Tweets interacting with Vision 2030 supports that Saudis accept modernization, especially in economic terms. One Tweet says:

"المزيد من تمكين المرأة هو أحد خياراتنا لتطوير المجتمع ونجاح رؤية_السعودية_2030"

"The empowerment of more women is one of our choices for the development of society and the success of the Saudi Vision 2030."

And another microblogger says:

"نجاح رؤية السعودية لا يكتمل الا بمشاركة وتمكين المرأة في المناصب العليا لدورها البارز في تربية وتنمية المجتمع"

"Saudi Arabia 2030's success will not be complete without women's participation and their empowerment in senior positions, where they have a prominent role in the education and development of the community."

However, perhaps the economy and its necessities to some microbloggers becomes more important than the community and its convictions. One microblogger says:

"رؤية_السعودية_2030 استثمارية 100% ولا يمكن تحقق بدون تحسين وضع المرأة. الاقتصاد هو صاحب الكلمة مش المجتمع"

"Saudi Arabia Vision 2030 is 100% investment-driven and it cannot be achieved without improving the status of women! The economy is the dominant, not the community!!"

The words "الاقتصاد صاحب الكلمة وليس المجتمع" (*the economy is dominant, not the community*) form a normative coup wherein the microblogger violates the Saudi intellectual and cultural structure, which stems from the principles of religion and the values of the society to control the Saudis' daily lives. On the other hand, others believe that empowering women socially and economically harms and damages the values of society. One of them Tweets:

"الذين يريدون حرية المرأة لا يريدون حريتها بل حرية الوصول اليها"

"Those who want freedom for women do not really want their freedom, they want free access to them."

Another microblogger believes that Vision 2030 threatens the community:

"من خلال الأحداث الحاصلة هاليومين بقولكم أن رؤيه 2030 راح نعيش بالخيمه ونرجع ترعى الغنم وندفن البنات وهم أحياء"

"According to the current events, I'm telling you that 2030 will make us live in tents, and return to herding sheeps and burying girls alive."

The participation of women in some activities of society has been the subject of considerable debate among Saudis for many years. This controversy continued in the Saudis' reactions to Vision 2030 programs, especially on the expected role of women in the transition plan. Moreover, the conflict of intellectual currents makes the participation of women in public activities an issue of social, political, and ideological conflict. This conflict is directly reflected in the values and norms of the genders' relationship in terms of acceptable and unacceptable forms of interaction in daily life.

Applied to some Tweets from the "unclassified perceptive" dimension, this conclusion is confirmed where one Tweets reads:

"المهم ارقدوا اللين 2030 ويحلها الله ???"

“Anyways, take it easy until 2030 comes and then it will be resolved by God???”

The Tweet does not reflect a clear perceptive dimension, and neither does it adopt a clear norm. Therefore, while the Tweet expresses the attitude of its owner toward the Vision, it is implicit and unclear. In the same context, another Tweets:

"رؤية السعودية 2030 التحول الوطني عمار يابلاذي، انت ما مثلك في هالدنيا بلد والله ما مثلك في هالدنيا بلد .""???"

“Saudi Arabia Vision 2030 for national transformation; hurray my country! You are a matchless country around the world, I swear you are a matchless country????”

Although the microblogger used "عمار يابلاذي" (*A cheer of excitement that shows his contentment and happiness with Vision 2030*) to show a positive attitude, this Tweet was devoid of a specific perceptive background or a normative acceptance of the Vision.

In contrast, the proportion of ambiguity and absence norms in the religious perceptive expressions were 61% compared to the standard of clarity. This reflects the problem of normative clarity with the religious category, in which clarity is assumed for several reasons: Firstly, most of the Saudi society has conservative and religious backgrounds. Secondly, the Saudis study a great deal of religious subjects in required school courses compared to other school subjects. Thirdly, jurisprudential interpretations of religious provisions are mostly consistent with each other, because of the unification of the religious referentiality. Returning to the Tweets of the religious category, the relationship between the ambiguity and normative absence in most of the sample Tweets is clear, especially for those who have religious expressions. For example, one Tweet reads:

"الفتاوى اللي سمعته من ال الشيخ والمطلق بخصوص السينما مضحكة والله، الغريب إن اللي يفتي ما عمره شاف سينما في حياته"

“Fatwas I heard from Al-Asheikh and Al-Mutlek related to cinema is funny I swear; the strange thing is that whoever gives a fatwa never ever went to the cinema in his life!”

This Tweet criticizes prohibiting cinemas and taunts that the mufti does not go to cinemas. On the other hand, it does not show any logical religious argument for the permissibility of cinemas from the microblogger’s point of view. Another microblogger says:

"انت مؤيد للسينما روح، موب مؤيد لها لا تروح، ولا تسوون دين من عندكم بأشياء مختلف بها وترا التحليل والتحرير حرام".

“If you are a supporter of cinema, go, and if you are not a supporter, do not go. Do not invent religious issues in debatable matters. You know, legislating legality or illegality without knowledge is illicit.”

This Tweet came devoid of argument or religious referentiality, which can be reliably read as being contrary to the fatwa prohibiting cinemas. But its argument was "ترا" "التحليل والتحرير حرام" (You know, permissibility and prohibition are prohibition), confirming the absence of normative and logical conclusion. The next Tweet, however, opposes the prevention of cinemas and uses religious expressions with a clear ambiguity to the rejection norm:

"الترفيه تتراجع عن السينما هههههههه تتراجع !! على اساس شعب الله المختار والشعب المحافظ، الدين عنده طافح حتى تعدى حدود السعودية نفاق وتناقض"

“The general entertainment authority retreats about Cinema ha-ha retreats!! As if we were the chosen people of God and conservative people to the point their religion has overflowed exceeding the limits of Saudi Arabia, hypocrisy and contradiction!”

This implies that ambiguity and the normative absence in the religious expressions are remarkable to some supporters and opponents of cinemas in Saudi Arabia.

Correspondingly, some Tweets reflected clarity in the religious norm based on religious philosophy, which reflects the Islamic identity of the society. For example:

"مرحبا بالسينما إذا كان ما تعرضه سيمثل ثقافتنا وهويتنا الإسلامية واعتزازنا بأنفسنا ويظهر كل جميل ويدعونا للخير"

"Welcome to cinemas if what they show will represent our Islamic culture, identity and our pride in ourselves as well as all beautiful things and inspire us for goodness."

It becomes clearer when there is a distinction between religious authority and the Islamic Sharia, such that they appear as if they were two contradictory methods:

"فرق شاسع بين السلطة الدينية وبين الشريعة الإسلامية. فالأولى وسيلة قمع باسم الدين والثانية هي أسلوب حياة راقٍ"

"There is a wide difference between the religious authority and the Islamic Sharia. The former is a means of oppression in the name of religion and the second is a refined style of life."

The normative turmoil can be interpreted for those who have religious backgrounds in view of the characteristics of religious knowledge and comprehensiveness of the speech on the one hand, and the way they receive it on the other. In addition, the sample of the present study does not necessarily represent the scholars' view on Islamic Sharia. as Additionally, the intellectual conflict between the different currents with some religious institutions, such as the Committee of the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), led to a kind of normative disorder. One microblogger says:

"لكي تنهض هيئة الترفيه، بواجباتها، علينا أولاً فك الاشتباك بين "الديني والديني": "أنتم أدرى بشؤون دنياكم"."

"For the Entertainment Authority to fulfil its duties, we must first remove the clash between what is religious and worldly": 'You know your worldly affairs best'."

Another microblogger confirms this conclusion when saying:

"لو نسمع كل الي تقوله المؤسسه الدينيه ' حياتنا بتكون بيض ! -نبي فله -نبي وناسه -نبي انفلات امنى -نبي بنات"

“If we listen to everything the religious institution says, ‘Our life would be eggs!’ We want entertainment, we want amusement, we want to be unrestricted, we want girlfriends.”

This Tweet agrees with Aldosari (2016) and Ignatius (2016) who mentioned that the attempt to relate the two contents will generate new social values and norms that are incompatible in one way or another with the prevailing values in the traditionally conservative Saudi society. This opinion is close to that of Luhmann’s theory, which states that society will be remade or rebuilt because of communication. The public debates surrounding Vision 2030 will lead the society to adopt new norms and values.

Another microblogger adds:

"التحول_الوطني ٢٠٣٠ انا من المستقبل ترا مافيه شى يحمس السعودية بتقعد زي ماهي والزحمة بعد والحريم ما بسوقون والليبرالية باقي يتضاربون مع الهيئة"

“National transformation 2030, I am from the future. You know, nothing exciting is happening. Saudi Arabia. It will be the same as it always is, with traffic jams, not women driving cars. The remaining is that liberals quarrel with the CPVPV!”

In spite of the manifestations of religious, social, and normative extremism present in the reality of daily life, a number of studies confirm that these stringent norms in the reality of Saudi society become more tolerant in virtual environments (Deaver, 2013; Bajnaid, 2016). The preceding analysis of Saudi microblogger responses reflected the normative disorder toward Vision 2030 programs, but at the same time it pointed to the challenges facing Saudis socially and religiously. A number of comments from experts referred to these challenges of the Vision in the press as well as in research institutions both locally and outside Saudi Arabia.

Perhaps the most important challenges identified by experts lie in the nature and specificity of the social norms of the Saudi community derived from religion, or the social

values and customs based on the tribe (Aldkhil, 2016; Khashan, 2016; van den Beukel, 2016). It is well known that religion clearly contributes in the formation of the Saudi society's identity in general, through considering religion as the source of the legislation that laws, regulations, and penalties are derived from. At the same time, religion is the cultural and ideological component that constitutes and regulates the individual's relationship with his Lord on the one hand, and the individual's relationship with his community on the other. Simmons and Simmons (1994) indicated that Saudis see Islam as the supreme value in their lives; in addition, when Saudis use social media, one of their purposes is defending their religious beliefs and values and showing pride in their religious and cultural identity (Ashaalan et al., 2013; Aljasir, 2015; Alsaggaf, 2015). It is clear from the previous discussion that the economic, political, and social transformations within the Vision 2030 programs constitute an important challenge represented in the clash between local cultural content and the content of world culture.

5.2.2 The Normative Standards of Religious and Social Expressions

The results reflect an approximation of the ambiguous and normative absence of religious and social dimensions. They explain the strong relationship between the customs, traditions, and social religions of Saudi society in terms of legislation and practice on the one hand, and a mixture of social and religious expressions in interaction with community issues on the other hand. This result is consistent with Durkheim's theory of social change, which focuses mainly on unintended dynamics that occur during social change. The overlap of religious and social expressions in the participants' comments increases the normative conflict because of the difficulty of separating them in real life as well. Previous Tweets have highlighted a serious consideration of participants' aspirations to separate

religious and social norms, in order to limit the impact of religion on modernization policies. These types of mixed expression are quite pervasive as described below. In the following Tweet, a microblogger conveys a view of one of the senior religious scholars in the Kingdom on opening cinemas, saying:

"قال المطلق مفتي المملكة: إن المجتمع السعودي لا يريد السينما أو الحفلات الغنائية"

"Al-Mutlek, the mufti of the Kingdom said: Saudi society does not want the cinema or concerts."

This is a notable returning of the religious fatwa to a social expression. As well, the interference in expressions and contents occurs in criticism cases between the religious and social norms:

"هيئة الترفيه مثل الولد الداج وابوه ملتزم. كل ما جا يبني يدشر علمو عليه ابوه وجلده الين ما يعظ الأرض."

"The general entertainment authority is like a devious boy whose father is conservative. Whenever the boy wants to enjoy himself, people inform his father and his father punishes him severely."

Since they affect each other, the concept and the reality of women's relationship with men is such that the religious interpretation and the social concept are mixed when determining a model of the relationship that is socially and religiously acceptable. For instance,

"أنا مع وجود السينما ولكن باحترام للعادات والتقاليد ومنع الاختلاط وكل ما يغضب الله"

"I am for opening them, but with respect to the customs, traditions, preventing gender mixing and all that displeases Allah."

In the previous Tweet there is a double face expression when the microblogger says "احترام العادات والتقاليد" (*respect for the customs and traditions*) and then says "ما يغضب الله" (*all that displeases Allah*). In addition, social expressions expressed a clear and critical

manifestations appear in the reality of daily life. But in return, as some studies confirmed, it seems to be more receptive and tolerant to other cultures in virtual reality (Yamani, 2010; Alkahtani, 2012). Not only that, but Al Lily (2011) confirmed that the technology used in academic environments in Saudi Arabia formed the pattern of the relationship between men and women differently from daily practice outside of academic institutions.

5.2.3 The Normative Standards of Political Expressions

While most of the expressions are political, the ratio of clarity of norm reached 57%. In contrast, the ratio of ambiguity and normative absence to the political expressions reached 43%. The following figure shows the normative standards of political expressions from different aspects. For example, the demands of political expellees, the positions of the microbloggers from Vision 2030, and the degree of clarity and ambiguity norms in political expressions.




Figure 11 presents the comparing the normative standards between political, economic, and unclassified expressions.

The results of the study indicate that the majority of the participants in the Vision are of political expressions. This reflects the Saudi society's concern for political affairs, in particular with regard to the reform program of Vision 2030. The Saudis have found their chance to express their cultural, political, and economic attitudes through social media. According to Winder (2014), they see Twitter as a parliament and express through it their political and social cases. Some studies suggest that the Saudis are using e-space, especially Twitter, to express their political and social views because of a lack of opportunities to practice political work in reality, as well as the absence of political parties (Alothman, 2013; Noman, Jenaibil, & Kelly, 2015). On the other hand, some experts confirm the political challenges that will face Vision 2030, which are represented, for example, in the government's ability to implement the Vision despite the financial difficulties, as well as the resistance of some social and economic forces to some of the Vision's programs that oppose their interests. Another challenge concerns the failure of some of the previous reform plans to achieve their developmental aims (Giorgio, Karasik, Miotto, & Wagner, 2016; Larson & Pence, 2016; Aljuasi, 2016; Ouchtou, 2016).

Despite the high rate of political participation in the Vision reviewing, the proportion of absence and normative ambiguity remains high (43%). It is possible to attribute the ambiguity and the normative absence in the political dimension to the nature of political work and the lack of Saudi experience in practicing political work. The following Tweet, for example, reflects a lack of political experience:

"إبارك لمقام سيدي خادم الحرمين الشريفين ولسمو ولي العهد ولسمو ولي ولي العهد موافقة مجلس الوزراء رؤية السعودية 2030"

“Congratulations to my lord the custodian of the two holy mosques [King of Saudi Arabia] to his highness the crown prince and to his highness the vice-crown prince on the approval of the Ministers council on Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.”

And another:

"لو يقسمون المملكة جزئيين واحد فيه سينما وواحد بدون هذا بيكون يوم هنا ويوم هنا"

“If the Kingdom is divided into two parts, one has cinemas and the other does not, I think some will spend a day here and the other there.”

In the same context, one of the microbloggers commented on one of the government’s official statements concerning a citizen's right to adequate housing:

"الرؤية ل2030 تقول نخطط لرفاهية المواطن وأنت تقول ليس من حقه السكن!! سوّد الله وجهك، وجعل فقرك بين عينيك"

“Vision 2030 is planning for citizen welfare and you say citizens do not have the right to adequate housing!! May Allah blacken your face and mark your poverty between your eyes.”

This is an offensive expression that pinpoints one’s annoyance and resentment of a claim or point of view with which one totally disagrees with and refuses. Despite the microblogger’s understanding of one of the Vision’s purposes, he simply prays against that government official in his comment. Another microblogger adds:

"تونا نقول يا هادي أشرقت رؤية السعودية 2030 ويطلع لك واحد يمثل الحكومة ويقول السكن ليس حق للمواطن
اجل رؤية السعودية 2030 من وحي الخيال"

“We have just said the Saudi Vision 2030 is bright and then a government official declares that housing is not a right for citizens. Then, Saudi Arabia 2030 is only a figment of the imagination!”

This Tweet criticizes the government's statements without a critical clear norm. On the other hand, some Tweets came with political backgrounds but bear a clear norm of acceptance or rejection; for example:

"الدولة التي لديها ثروة وليس لديها رؤية يصعب التنبؤ بمستقبلها اما الدولة التي لديها ثروة ولديها رؤية ستحقق نجاحات مذهلة"

"For the state that has wealth but does not have a Vision, it is difficult to predict its future, whereas the state that has wealth and a Vision will achieve stunning successes."

In addition, another microblogger says:

"السيولة الان شي ضروري الكل لازم يحتفظ فيها وبقتنص الفرص الوضع الجاي راح يختلف احنا مومنين ب رؤية 2030 لكن الاصلاح الداخلي لازم يسبق كل شي"

"Cash is highly important nowadays, so everybody should keep it and make use of the opportunities. The upcoming situation will be different. We believe in Vision 2030, but the internal reform must precede everything."

These Tweets clearly indicate the acceptance norm of the Vision being an opportunity to improve the economic situation, and achieving this opportunity is connected to the political reforms. This conclusion is linked with experts' acceptances, such as Kinninmont (2016), who mentioned that the changes in the economic relations between citizen and state will inevitably alter the political relations too, especially with an increasingly well-educated and globally connected youth population with economic expectations that typically exceed their job prospects.

5.3 The Perceptive Expressions and Normative Standards Over Time

The following figure discusses the correlations between perceptive levels and normative standards as well as the positions of participants on Vision 2030. Indeed, in the first period, political expressions were the most frequent among terms, reaching 40%, and were followed by unclassified expressions, reaching 27%, then economic, then social, while the proportion of religious expressions was only 8%. The amount of the political participations was interestingly high considering that the Vision was submitted by the

government as an economic plan. This reflects a degree of political awareness of the role of the Vision and its political implications. However, in the second stage, religious expressions jumped up to the first rank reaching 34%, followed by unclassified expressions at 17%, and economic expressions at only 5%. Referring to the events following the release of Vision 2030, in the second period it is clear that the entertainment activities were the most prominent subjects of the microbloggers' Tweets, especially the proposal of opening cinemas and holding some entertainment festivals. This rapid rise in the participants' responses with religious expressions indicates that religion in Saudi society plays an important role in accepting or rejecting the social and economic transformations associated with Vision 2030. In the third phase, political expressions returned to precedence with a rate of 42%, followed by 27% for economic expressions, with religious expressions retreating to the least participation at 6%, indicating that political expressions were dominant in both the first and third periods, which reflects the importance of the Vision on the political dimension. As well, the high proportion of economic expressions reflects a greater understanding of the economic dimension and its role in the Vision 2030. At the same time, the unclassified words gradually retreated over the three periods; this might be interpreted as the completion of the Vision's aspects and the formation of its components and programs for the participants during the first year of the Vision launch.




Figure 12 Statistical Variables during the Time Variable

In the second section, the results reflected the Saudis' acceptance of the Vision during the first period by 67%. This result can be explained by the ambitious goals and massive programs that accompanied the Vision; however, this acceptance fell sharply in the second and third period to nearly 40%. In contrast, the rate of rejection of the Vision in the second period increased to 39% from of only 7% in the first period. This can be explained by the impact of activities of the Vision programs on the views of the participants, especially those relating to the cultural aspect.

In the third section, the relationship between the clarity or ambiguity and absence of norms, and its relationship to the time factor during the three periods, reflected that the proportion of ambiguity and absence as a whole amounted to 55% in return for normative clarity. In the first and third period, there is also a great similarity between the proportion

of normative clarity on the one hand and ambiguity and normative absence on the other hand. However, in the second period, the proportion of ambiguity and absence increased to 57% and perhaps this is explained by the impact of entertainment events associated with the Vision and the extent of cultural conflict they reflect, in which religion plays a pivotal role. The proportion of the participants with religious expressions in the second period was the highest ratio (34%), and this is related to the results that confirm the clarity of the overall norms among religious expressions less so than with economic and political expressions. This view reinforces that disapproval of the Vision in the second period grew from 7% in the first period to 39% in the second period.

The results showed the relative gradient in the clarity of norms at the end of the first year of the Vision 2030 compared with the end of the same year. The ratio of normative absence in the first period reached 35%, then retreated to 28%, and finally settled to 25% at the end of the year. On the other hand, the proportion of the clarity of norms was at 49% in the first period, then dropped to 44%, and rebounded to reach the highest degree of normative clarity at 52%. As for the norm of ambiguity, its proportion was the least in the first period and then reached its highest degree at 29% in the second period before decreasing to 24% in the third period. This confirms once again the nature of the debate on general topics such as religious issues, which are characterized by comprehensiveness and complexity. Luhmann (1993) confirmed in his Social System Theory that one of the most important functions of communication is rebuilding communities, as well as the reproduction and development of norms. Through the Social System Theory, one can also explain a number of results related to changes that appeared on the expressions of the sample members.

5.4 The Perceptive Level and the Geographical Location

This section discusses the relationship between location and normative standard variables. The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the impact of geography on the normative standards of participants. The following graph shows that the ratio of political expressions was highest in Riyadh (39%) and Jeddah (42%) and lowest in undetermined regions (34%), while the religious expressions were lowest in Riyadh (8%) and Jeddah (9%) and highest in undetermined regions (29%). Economic expressions were higher in Riyadh (16%) and Jeddah (15%) compared to undetermined regions (8%). As for the norms and their relation to the geographical dimension, the proportion of normative clarity in Riyadh was the highest (50%), followed by Jeddah (47%) and undetermined cities (45%). As for the normative ambiguity, the undetermined cities were the highest (28%) followed by Riyadh (18%) and then Jeddah (15%). Jeddah was the highest in normative absence (38%), followed by Riyadh (32%), with the undetermined regions being the lowest (27%).




Figure 13 presents the relationship between location and normative standard variables.

Those results can be interpreted as follows: Through these indicators, it is clear that the predominance of religious expressions came from undetermined cities compared to Riyadh and Jeddah, while the predominance of economic expressions of participants came from Riyadh and Jeddah. This gives an indication of the impact of cultural, perceptive, and modern transformations for Riyadh and Jeddah societies compared to other regions, including, for example, the relationship between sexes and acceptance of life requirements (Al Torki, 1986; Al-Khateeb, 1989). Perhaps new social solidarity in Riyadh and Jeddah, which is referred to by Durkheim as Organic Solidarity, created perceptive concerns that trend to the modernization and contemporary concepts represented in economic and political affairs, while the perceptive and religious expression in other regions reflect a degree of conservation and traditionalism, according to Ibn Khaldun's theory of intolerance. With regard to the relationship between the normative standards and the microbloggers' locations, it is shown that the ambiguity and lack of norms in undetermined locations reached 55% compared to the standard of clarity, followed by Jeddah, where absence and ambiguity reached 53%, and then Riyadh with a rate of 50%. Although these are relatively minor differences in the percentages among geographic locations, they reflect a convergent intellectual pattern. This convergent model may occur because of the ideological backgrounds and the comparable methods used in the various educational institutions, which trend to oral lecturing and indoctrination, and do not rely on the skills of critical analysis. Moreover, the common strategy of learning usually employs the traditional teacher-centered approach in public schools (Grami, 2012). Results also indicate that the proportion of those who agree with the Vision in Riyadh and

Jeddah is about 65%, with the rate of disapproval in those cities being approximately 10%. As for the undetermined regions, the approval proportion is 41% and disapproval is 37%, showing that the disapproval proportion in the undetermined region is higher than in Riyadh and Jeddah.

5.5 The normative and Ideological Conflict and Normative Change

The results of the current study confirmed that there are intellectual and ideological conflicts on traditionalism and modernization within the components of the Saudi society, which will be discussed at the end of this section. From this conflict emerge two important players, which are "the conservatives" or clerics⁴ and "non-conservatives" (liberals; modernists; secularists; proponents of westernization). This ideological division is not confined to cultural forums and newspapers but has become a reality which the Saudi government deals with, and which affects some of its resolutions (Meijer, 2010; Al-Rawi, 2014). The new media has become a field of such conflicts as well (Noman, Jenaibil, & Kelly, 2015). In addition, there are assertions from a number of the experts that Vision 2030 (and the economic and social reform programs it contains) will stoke ideological and intellectual conflict between religious and intellectual currents on the identity of the community. They affirm that this conflict would have an impact on the prevailing social and religious norms (Ross, 2016; Henderson, 2016; Khalizad, 2016).

⁴ Matawaa' or Sunni; those who fulfill the prophet Mohammed on his Sunnah; Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV); revivalists; Muslim Brothers and Salafi; those who belong to an Islamic movement that takes the pious ancestors, the Salaf, as exemplary models.

On analyzing several Saudi Tweets about Vision 2030, the conflict concerning the Vision and its programs between the conservatives and non-conservatives is clearly shown. One Saudi microbloggers within the context of his description of the accompanying transformations proposed by Vision 2030 says:

"الليبرالية باقي ينضاربون مع الهيئة"

"Liberals are quarrelling with the committee of propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice authority, that is the remaining!"

Another says:

"جيل النكبة الصحوه هو اخر من يتحدثون عن الرؤية فقد وضعوا العصى في عجلة التنمية الشاملة"

"The catastrophe generation revival [sic] are the last who can talk about the Vision as they put a stick in the wheel of total development."

This reflects the intensity of the conflict between the trends and their effects that will reach the transformation Vision. One microblogger Tweets:

"هذه رؤية بغال الليبرالية والتغريبيين سينما وقيادة المرأة للسيارة"

"This is a Vision of the liberal mules and westernizers, which is about cinema and women driving cars."

This Tweet classified the whole Vision for liberal programs as totally rejected. Nevertheless, the important point in this Tweet is the rejection norm, which for the microblogger is "cinema and woman driving cars". The very vague criterion can be explained as follows: First, women driving is not one of the programs or objectives of the Vision; second, cinemas and women driving are disputable matters among religious scholars as far as whether they are legal or prohibited. In addition, one Tweet reads:

"لا يمكن ومستحيل تلتقي الهيئة ورؤية 2030 ابدا لا يمكن"

“It is impossible that the committee of propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice will ever agree with Vision 2030.”

The complete absence of the norm is clearly observed in this Tweet, since the microblogger did not mention the reasoning behind this judgment. In contrast, there is not much difference for those who are using secular speech to move away from religion. For example, one microblogger asserts:

"نهضة بلادنا تحتاج رجال سياسة تنتزع الواقع العلماني الخجول من "يد غلاة الدين" وتقذف به إلى عالم العلمانية الواضح".

“Our country’s renaissance needs policymakers who seize the shy secular reality from ‘the religion fanatics’ and throwing it into the clear realm of secular reality.”

And another asserts:

"حياتنا وكل شي فيها قائم ع فتوى في برنامج استفتاء جالسين يثبتون ان العلمانية هي الحل".

“Our life and everything in it is based on an opinion in a referendum program they are trying to prove that secularism is the solution.”

The criterion used in the two previous Tweets, "عالم العلمانية الواضح" (the clear secular world) and "العلمانية هي الحل" (secularism is the solution), is featured with an absolute and comprehensive formula and also contradicted with the announced cultural content of the state constitution, which is built upon religion. In contrast, another microblogger appeared to be more accordant with Vision 2030 if it bears transformation programs with an Islamic character:

"بنو ليبرال كانوا ينتظرون الغاء الهيئه وقيادة المرأه وفتح المراقص فاجأهم الامير بمتحف اسلامي ضخم"
“Liberal henchmen, who were waiting for the abolition of the CPVPV, women driving cars and opening discotheques, were shocked when the prince stunned them with a huge Islamic Museum.”

The words "متحف إسلامي ضخم" (a huge Islamic museum) are similar in terms of the absolute and comprehensive to the phrase "عالم العلمانية الواضح" (the secular world is clear). This came in accordance with the results of the statistical analysis for the microbloggers' views on the high proportion of ambiguity and normative absence within religious expressions, compared with economists, for example. In fact, participants' Tweets reflect a noticeable development in the criticism of religious institutions and reduction of their demonstration upon today's society. After conservatives' voices were found to be more prevalent than liberals,' according to Meijer (2010), it becomes clear from the previous Tweets that the role of the religious institution in directing the conduct of community became no longer as it was before. Nevertheless, the question remains, as posed by Feierstein (2016), to what extent can the religious institution control or demonstrate community options within Vision 2030?

Perhaps the new factor arising from Saudis' Tweets about Vision 2030 is the widening of the circle of actors and institutions that may hinder the Vision's aims, including the conservative, political, and economic groups. Aljuasi (2016) and Ouchtou (2016) indicated that conservative groups, religious scholars, businessmen, and politicians will lead an opposition against the proposed entertainment programs as these programs oppose the Saudi culture on the one hand, and harm their business interests on the other. One microbloggers says:

"رؤية_السعودية_2030 رؤية جباره لن يعارضها إلا ثلاثة فئات؟ 1-كارها لنا من تجار السياسية 2- فاسدون من تجار المال 3-متطرفون من تجار الدين"

"Saudi Arabia Vision 2030 is an overpowering Vision, no one would oppose it except for three groups: 1-Those who hate us among merchants of politics, 2-The corrupt of money traders, 3-The extremists of religion traders."

Another microblogger adds:

"رجال الاعمال واصحاب الثروات الطائله هم من سيقفون حجر عثره امام هذا التحول، اما الشعب فهو وقود التحول الفعلي"

"Businessmen and very wealthy people will stand as a stumbling block for this transformation while the people will be the actual fuel of this transition."

While another Tweets:

"رؤية ٢٠٣٠ ستنجح وتحقق كل أهدافها إذا كانت لا تفرق في محاسبتها بين كبير وصغير وتاجر وفقير ومواطن ووزير أو أمير"

"Vision will succeed and achieve all its aims if it does not differentiate between a VIP and a commoner person, a wealthy and a downtrodden, a citizen and a Minister or a Prince."

The previous Tweets make distinctions in the success criterion, the first and second Tweets return the potential of success to factors outside the government, while the third Tweet returns it to factors related to the government. However, it is vague in defining a mechanism for the Vision's success, as one Tweet said: "الشعب وقود التحول الفعلي" (the people are the effective fuel of transformation). On the other hand, the following Tweets reflect clarity in the success norm through the precise specification of what is believed to be the cause of success. One microblogger Tweets:

"وصفة لتفعيل الرؤية: شفافية جيل جديد من الوزراء التكنوقراط لا يمارسون التجارة مؤشرات اداء لمحاسبة الوزراء"

"A recipe to activate the Vision: transparency of a new generation of technocratic ministers who are not engaged in trade, performance indicators to question the ministers."

Another adds:

"الرؤية يجب أن يكون لها: 1- أهداف واضحة 2- مؤشرات أنية ومستقبلية لقياس تحقيقها إلى 2030 3- عزيمة وزراء ووكلاء تقنت الصخر 4-مراقبة مستديمة".

"The Vision must have: 1. Clear aims; 2. Immediate and future indicators to measure their achievement to 2030; 3. An overpowering determination of ministers and vice-ministers that disintegrate the rock; 4-Sustained control."

The previous Tweets reflect a significant shift (e.g. political, social, religious, and economic) in the Saudis' view toward Vision 2030, whether they are proponents or opponents. The participants' Tweets were also more accurate in diagnosing the success or failure factors. From another perspective, the interaction of Saudi microbloggers reflects a degree of public awareness of the importance and impact of Vision 2030, and this interaction also reflects a state of apparent conflict between the intellectual streams of Saudi society. It is important to note that the distribution of opponents and proponents of the Vision's programs among conservatives and liberals reflects the collective solidarity pervasive in the conflict. This solidarity is consistent with the concept of *asabiyyah* according to Ibn Khaldun.

5.6 Modernization and the Normative Development in Saudi Society

Some of the results of the current study confirmed some of the Saudis' fears, especially concerning their social and religious values and norms. The proposed and unprecedented programs in Vision 2030 highlighted a strong social and economic challenge facing the Saudi community. This challenge is represented in the transformation conflict from tradition to modernization. There is a consensus among the studies described below that Saudi society is undergoing significant social and normative changes. As discussed before, social change tends to impact the normative order of society. The study

focuses on the normative reactions regarding the project of Vision 2030 as a way to assess the status of anomie in general. Whatever the outcome of this conflict, it is likely to be reflected in the social norms that govern and regulate the relations between the components of the Saudi society in all cultural, social, economic, and political aspects.

Overall, the government of Saudi Arabia, according to Teitlbaum (2010), confirms its acceptance of the modernization for economic purposes but at the same time opposes the impact of globalization on social norms. Alsharkh's (2012) study also confirmed that there is receptiveness to modernization and development, on the condition that the social and cultural structure of Saudi society is preserved. On the other hand, according to the aims of Vision 2030, the social and economic transformations are intentional and closely linked; many journalists, analysts and research centers mentioned the simultaneous influence between the economic modernization and the social progressiveness in the Vision (e.g. Aldkhil, 2016; Kinninmont, 2016; Khadori, 2016; The Economist, 2016).

The Saudis demonstrate openness to other cultures, especially through the Internet (Elamin & Omair, 2010; Bajnaid, 2016; Alhazmi, 2010). However, several issues such as communication systems, relations between men and women, and the conflict between traditional and modern intellectual trends (e.g. Le Renard, 2014; House, 2013; Determann, 2014) are still strongly present in Saudi Tweets about Vision 2030. For instance, a defining feature of Saudi society is gender segregation, which occurs in public places such as charitable organizations, hospitals, schools, universities, restaurants, banks, theatres, public transportation, government offices, and other public spaces (Meijer, 2010). Elamin and Omair (2010) confirmed that customs and traditions play an important role in the formation of the relationship between the sexes, but may be designed to prevent women

from some kinds of work for the gender segregation. However, due to online communication via tools such as discussion forums and social media, males and females are able to interact, raising questions pertaining to acceptable conduct online. Madini and Nooy (2013), when studying the interaction of Saudi society with modern variables such as modern technology and social media communication, showed the impact of these changes on the norms of social relations between the sexes. For example, Saudis accept building friendship relations between the sexes online, while simultaneously rejecting it in the reality of their daily lives (Alkahtani, 2012). In spite of the stringent criteria for communication between the sexes, studies have confirmed that the relationship between men and women in the workplace and education has become less stringent (Hilal, 2013).

As a result of these social pressures, women's activity and interaction on social networking sites exceeded that of men's (Chena & Chow, 2015), and the new media has become a distinct window for women to be free of the social restrictions. In addition, the new media has become a space in which women can more actively construct their identities and increase their awareness of their roles in society (Alsaggaf, 2015; Al Lily, 2011). Additionally, some Saudis have turned to social media to voice their opinions on political issues (Almestad & Stenslie, 2014; Hill, 2013; Howard & Hussain, 2011; Matthiesen, 2012; Wehrey, 2014) and women's rights (O dine, 2013). It seems clear that the issue of gender segregation remains a strong challenge in the economic reform programs proposed in Vision 2030, as believed by some experts who discussed the Vision (Giorgio, Karasik, Miotto, & Wagner, 2016; Valencian & Gamble, 2016; Khalid, 2016). The previous studies and opinions confirm that while Saudis demonstrate high rates of

using modern communication means, many of the social and religious restrictions have moved from the realities of everyday life to the pages of the Internet.

Most studies, which examined the impact of social media on Saudis, confirmed an evolution in societal acceptance of modernization, particularly in social norms. The results of previous studies are in line with the views and attitudes of microbloggers for the adoption of new values that correspond to the goals of Vision 2030. This result is also in line with Luhmann's (1986) theory of the reconstruction and development of society through its interaction via communication. Some Tweets in this section provide an indication of changing social norms as a result of interactions with others via Twitter. For example, the percentage of ambiguous Tweets decreased over time, which indicates that people have a clearer understanding of the goals and objectives of Vision 2030. In addition, the percentage of Tweets agreeing with the vision were initially high but the level of disagreement increased over time as the programs became more specific, which is a result of interactions taking place via social media.

On reviewing a number of the sample Tweets about Vision 2030, the transformation of social norms seems to emerge through the interaction of Saudis on the subject of Vision 2030. One microbloggers says:

"السعودية بلد منغلق لا يسمح بالانفتاح السياحي وشعبها غير مؤهل فكريا وفطريا لخدمة مستثمرين أجنب".

"Saudi Arabia is a closed country which doesn't allow touristic openness and its people are intellectually and naturally unqualified to serve foreign investors."

Despite the clarity of the phrases that confirm the influence of local culture on the chances of modernization, the Tweet is devoid of the norm that can justify the microblogger's argument. On the other hand, another Tweets reads:

"ينبغي أن يواكب رؤية التحول ٢٠٣٠ رؤية تحول فكري أيضاً لتحرير المجتمع من العادات الاجتماعية السيئة التفاخر العنصرية الذكورية الاسراف الاتكالي".

"Intellectual transformation should accompany the transformation of Vision 2030 for the liberation of society from bad social habits like race boasting, masculinity, extravagance and dependency."

While Ibn Khaldun (1958) emphasized the role of the tribal authority over the values and criteria of its members, this Tweet provides clear evidence that tribal values were becoming less of an influence. It is understood from this Tweet that there is incompatibility among community members on their social norms. Some see social norms as sacred, perceiving them as religious and belonging to the tribe, and leading to economic and social gains (Yamani, 2010). Others seem to begrudge them and consider them to be the manifestations of civilization, as in the previous Tweet. The following Tweet also referred to the impact of the local culture with respect to gender segregation and blamed the society:

"لو كانت المشكلة في الاختلاط لتم حلها بالرجال والنساء لكن المشكلة هناك مجمع جهلة معطلة للحياة يقودون مجتمع".

"If the problem was in gender segregation, men and women would solve it, but the problem is that an ignorant and disabling group leads the society."

His saying "مجمع جهلة معطلة يقودون مجتمع" (*an ignorant and disabling group leads the society*) is considered a vague norm because of the commonness and the ambiguity of the phrase "disabling". Another Tweet says:

" يجب قفل جميع المحلات لحد الاختلاط ومنع الانحراف، كل واحد بعد الدوام على بيته، كل شئ تقدر تطلبه على الإنترنت".

"All shops should be closed off in order to limit gender segregation and prevent delinquency; everyone has to go home after work; everything can be reached through the internet."

In this Tweet, the microblogger used a rationale that seemed vague and incomprehensible. This is clear from its perspective adherence to the traditional criteria for gender segregation and its rejection of the activities of community modernization, which in the microblogger's opinion will lead to the mixing of the sexes. On the subject of opening cinemas, another person Tweets in favor of the idea as long as it respects customs, traditions, and religion:

" أنا مع وجودها لكن باحترام للعادات والتقاليد ومنع الاختلاط وكل ما يغضب الله"

"I am for opening them, but with respect to the customs, traditions, preventing gender mixing and all that displeases Allah."

It seems that the norm is clear: "باحترام العادات والتقاليد" (*With respect of the customs and traditions*). Another microblogger commented on the retreat of the general entertainment authority from opening cinemas, saying:

"وخير الخطاؤون التوابون نرجو ان تكون هذه الهيئة منضبطة بضوابط الشرع ولا تنتهج مصادمة المجتمع في ثوابته"

"The best sinners are those who are the most repentant i.e. those who repent whenever they sin; we hope that this [General Entertainment] Authority be disciplined by religious control and does not contend with society in its basic [norms]."

The two previous Tweets have combined the social and religious criterion in one position. This means that the challenges of change in society are difficult and complex since they have the same effect on the members of Saudi society. Reflecting on Ibn

Khaldun and Durkheim's theories is helpful here as these Tweets provide an example of how people view religion as both a divine source while also emphasizing its social nature. In the data of this study, it is difficult to distinguish between social and religious expression as they are closely linked in the mind's of the people. With the introduction of Vision 2030, there is the potential for more social conflict as a result of confusion in people's minds regarding the source of social norms. On the other hand, calls emerged demanding the new entertainment regardless of the prevailing values in the society. This sometimes happened through providing justifications, as one microblogger said:

"وجهة نظري؛ حدث العاقل بما يعقل دول العالم عربية وغربية فيها دور سينما وما حصل داك الفساد اللي بنسمع عنو"

"From my point of view, logically, both Arab and western countries of the world have cinemas and the corruption that we hear about does not happen."

Sometimes expression comes without normality as well, as one of the microbloggers Tweeted:

"قراي للمشهد كالاتي: اقلية تبي تفرض على اغلبية كيف يعيشون حياتهم"

"My interpretation of the scene is this: a minority wants to impose on the majority how they live their life."

This contradiction indicates that a category of the community has the desire to bring intellectual changes and modernization even if they oppose the norms of societal or religious values. This is reinforced when one said:

"اخيرا؛ ناس وصلت للقمر وناس بتموت واحنا نحلل السينما ولا نحرمها اللي فاسد مو محتاج السينما عشان يخرج الفساد الي فيه".

"Finally; some people travelled to the moon, and others are dying, and we are still analyzing whether the cinema is legal or illegal. Whoever is really corrupt does not need cinema to reveal his/her corruption."

These Tweets came in harmony with the result of the studies emphasizing the impact of social media on the relationship of Saudi society, especially young people, with their traditions and social habits, and the idea that some Saudis, especially young people, are more willing to adopt modernization programs (Alsharkh, 2012; Al-Sharqi & Kutbi, 2015). This previous Tweet, for example, agrees with Bajnaid's (2016) study which confirmed the impact of social and religious norms on the behaviour of the users of marriage sites in Saudi Arabia. The previous Tweet also acknowledges religious and social norms, which confirms the mixing of social and religious culture in the Saudi life (Bahkali, 2013). According to Hofstede (1984), who described Arab culture as a high-context culture based on cooperation between its members, the social values are an important and effective reference for activities and directions of the tribe and other social components in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Ibn Khaldun in his theory of *asabiyyah* said that there are several types of *asabiyyah* that go beyond the tribal level, such as those at the regional, racial, and ideological levels, all of which contribute to shaping the cultural structure of the Saudi society. Moreover, according to Luhmann (1986), the observations and interactions of community members are intertwined in the media. Consequently, new values and norms are produced for the community and then the reproduction of society itself.

Finally, Durkheim begins with an understanding of religion as a social phenomenon through his vision of the future of religion in modern societies. He believes that forms of religion and worship will disappear and religious feelings will remain strong at the individual level. In other words, religion's control of social behaviour will be reduced and replaced by the role of modern organizations and institutions that govern contemporary societies. Given the nature of the conflict between the currents of Saudi

society through the interaction of its members with Vision 2030, it is clear that the secular and liberal demands for the neutralization of the role of religion in modernization programs will have a role in reducing the role of religion within society. However, conservatives will continue to push the government to impose modern standards on reality using their understanding of the role of religion in shaping society with reference to Shari'a-based legislation and laws. The above shows the depth of the transformation at the level of social standards and their reflection on the intellectual and religious trends in Saudi society.

5.7 Overall

The results of the present study indicated that the acceptance rate of the Vision is higher than rejection or neutrality, with an average rate of 53%, rejection of 23%, and the rest neutral. It is clear, through the time factor, that the approval rate was high in the first period (67%). then it decreased to 40% by the end of the third period, while the disapproval of the vision was 7% in the first period, significantly increased the second period to 39%, then fell again to 29% in the third period. The neutral rate was between 20 and 30 percent during the three periods. These results reflect the interdependence of participants' attitudes towards vision. When the vision was announced, the reactions around them were very positive, but attitudes quickly turned to neutrality or rejection over time. This can be explained by the impact of very ambitious vision goals on Saudi society. On the other hand, this oscillation can be explained by acceptance and rejection of vision according to the degree of government in the presentation of vision programs. It is possible to say that the positions of the participants are related to the interests of the participants negatively or positively. The following sections illustrate the positions of participants in the political,

religious, and economic dimension. This provides a broader interpretation of these indicators.

However, the skepticism of Vision 2030 rose in the second period, six months after the announcement of the Vision. On returning to the reactions of the study sample, it was clear that those replies coincided with the declaration of the Vision's entertainment projects, which caused different reactions between supporters and opponents. These responses reflect the sensitivity of the change, especially if it is related to the religious and social aspect. Despite the increase in the number of opponents of the Vision in the second period to 39% up from only 7% in the first period, the proportion of the Vision supporters remained in the lead at a rate of 41%. This is also reflected in the views of the neutral, where the neutrality rate reached 20% and it is the minimum in the three stages, indicating a degree of clarity in the attitudes toward the Vision at the end of the first year.

Research data shows that the political perceptive level dominated opinions (approver, disapprover, and neutral), where approval in the political category was at 32%. Disapproval from the category of politicians was at 40%. As for the neutral, the political category reached 44%. Thus, this result reflects:

- 1 . That the largest number of participants was from the politician category and this contributed to their domination of the sample.
- 2 . That there was great interest in the political aspects of the Vision 2030 and that participants discussed it from all aspects.

3. The public's awareness of the requirements of the transformation plan and its direct relation with the political dimension.

In addition, the economists' approval stood at 12%, with disapproval at 9% and neutral at 15%. The result reflects the economic category's reservations about the Vision, and this can be ascribed to several reasons as follows:

1. The economists' realization of the nature of economic work in the Vision and the challenges it faces, which reflects the degree of normative clarity that economic category has.
2. The nature of the challenges relating to the ability of the private sector to achieve the required transformation, in terms of habilitation and training to its staff, and the challenge of building a business sector that relies only on Saudi labour (Aldkhil, 2016).
3. The strong correlation between the performance of the private sector and government spending that reduces the chances of the desired economic transition toward making the private sector a partner of the government.

Moreover, the results of the perceptive religious category came at rates of 17% approval of the Vision, 30% disapproval and 12% neutral. It is noted that a high rate of opponents of the Vision are those are of religious expressions, returning to the microblogger expressions and experts views:

1. Adopting the Vision for economic programs violates the vision of many conservatives, including entertainment programs and foreign investment.

2. The increase in the rejection of the Vision is related to the second period of microblogger data collection concurrent with the cinema opening proposal.
3. The rate of approval and neutrality is within its natural borders compared to the rest of the categories, representing the positive trend toward the Vision when it moves away from prejudice towards religious values and social traditions.

As for the category of unclassified expressions, the rate of disapproval was 27%, approval was 12%, and neutrality was 18%. On comparing the proportion of neutrality to approval, there is a clear retreat of the number of neutral expressions on the Vision, confirming that the positions of the unclassified perceptively head toward identifying their positions from a clear understanding of the Vision at the end of the year, compared to the beginning of the year. This confirms the previous conclusion about the relationship between the criteria and time, where results confirmed that with the duration of time norms become clearer.

For the relation between views (supporter, opponent, and neutral) and norms (clear, vague, and absent), results showed that opponents of Vision 2030 are clearer in norms at 54%, where approval was 44%, with normative clarity for neutral at 46%. This can be explained by Luhmann's (1993) Social System Theory, which considers communication a vital tool for interaction between the elements of society to achieve multiple benefits, including the rebuilding of social norms as well as the cloning of new social rules selectively and interactively between the elements of communication within the community. Therefore, there are shifts in the positions of the microbloggers' views within the terms of acceptance or rejection, while at the same time there are shifts of norms in

terms of their clarity or absence. The announced programs related directly to the Saudis' lives potentially affected these transformations. This could also be attributed to the weakness of the Vision media plan; followers of the Vision launch on April 25, 2016 note the great momentum of and the huge media attention to the Vision's activities, but this media momentum largely retreated later on.

The previous section analyzed the participants' attitudes and criteria they expressed during their interaction with Vision 2030. Whereas, this section analyzed the challenges and opportunities that the experts monitored toward the Vision 2030 reflected this variation among the microbloggers' views. For instance, the Vision, in accordance with its aim, achieves many of the Saudis' aspirations in the social and political aspects. Despite the existence of such excellent opportunities, the challenges, in accordance with the expert opinions, are strong and influential. For example, the conservatives' and religious institutions demonstrate resistance to some of the Vision's programs, especially those associated with the entertainment (Aljuasi, 2016). Some of the important challenges facing the government of Saudi Arabia are the extremist groups, which work to provoke the feelings of the people against the government because of the modernization projects accompanied by Vision 2030 (Aljuasi, 2016). On the other hand, participants' views reflect the danger of the Aramco privatization being a political and social contract between government and citizens. Khadori (2016) mentioned that the privatization of Aramco represents a strong challenge to the government in achieving its Vision because of the economic and political importance of the Saudi Aramco. Perhaps one of the reasons for the high anxiety and fear of the Vision's failure is the previous failure or stumbling of some of the precedent development plans of the state. This, in accordance with the experts'

views, is a serious challenge to the development as it is necessary to propagate a sense of optimism toward the new Vision programs despite the skepticism of citizens (Field, 2017; Mulberry, 2016). Through the previous opportunities and challenges, sample data research can be read according to approval or rejection of Vision 2030.

Finally, when contemporary society is conceived from a holistic social perspective as a social system, observations and interactions among users are interwoven in social media, and information technologies reproduce the concept of society. According to Luhmann (1993) when speech, information, and understanding simultaneously interact in a permanent loop, the development of concepts and changes in social norms is moving towards new patterns and concepts of social behaviour standards. In this case, political and economic factors cannot be excluded from rebuilding social norms. Thus, the current normative change of social values in Saudi Arabia seems more acute because of the relatively conservative nature of Saudi society on the one hand, and the government's tendency towards modernization on the other.

5.8 Significance of the Study

According to Creswell (2009), any scientific study is expected to add value to the scholarly research and improve practice and decision making. The current study addresses anomie in Saudi society, and analyzes the responses of Saudis to the recently published economic Vision of Saudi Arabia. This study is significant for the following reasons:

1. Although norms are prescriptions and directives for behavior, they can be qualified and examined independently of actual behavior. This study presented a model that permits a qualification of norms on structural and cognitive expressions. This

- model has helped in identifying the different types of normative adaptations to social change and in assessing their impacts on economic transformation in Saudi Arabia.
2. According to the theory of anomie, social norms can be predicted in advance and pro-actively managed. This research revealed a degree of normative change in Saudi norms and social perspectives.
 3. The conceptualization of the study may encourage political leaders to develop a normative synthesis between the values of tradition and modernization. A successful integration of the norms of modernity and tradition may lead to further development of pro-active policies that can decrease the levels of anomie and the contingency on amorphous social change to avoid the risks associated with the political, social and economic transformations. So, the current study encourages the Saudi government to establish a specialized center to study social changes and how they affect the values and standards that shape Saudi society. In view of the political and cultural reality of Saudi society, the supervision of the center should be linked to senior management in the government; this association will help to achieve the objectives of the center and facilitate its functions.
 4. This study was expected to indicate new forms of anomie which included the universally sought cultural and consumer goals. However, the data of this research did not examine Merton's assumption, as Merton's assumption would require more detailed information such as the status of economy, unemployment rate, and the rank of citizens' income, which were not available in data of the current study.

5.9 Conclusion

Despite the existence of previous studies on the modern transformations of Saudi society, and especially the impact of modern technology, this study is more specific in that it is a measurement of social change and an investigation of the impact of that change on the standards and values of Saudi society. In this study, Twitter activity is seen as a societal mirror that reflects some of the perceptions regarding the transformations taking place within Saudi society, as well as measuring the extent to which social norms can be identified as possessing clarity, ambiguity or absence. The study and its results are limited to a select sample of online Twitter comments. There are specific limitations to note pertaining to Twitter studies. Kelley and Cranshaw (2013) cite a number of limitations when conducting Twitter studies, including “a combination of data volume, user privacy expectations, and Twitter’s business interests.” They note that certain types of data “are not technically accessible through Twitter’s APIs, as well as some limitations on provided data.” (p. 2). The common lament of any researcher is the limitations of time and resources which makes it difficult to examine all the factors involved, and this study is no exception.

The study examined the impact of economic and social modernization programs on the values of society derived from religious or social constraints. Further, the study highlights the conflict between the currents of Saudi intellectual and economic society regarding prevailing social values and the values associated with modernization programs proposed by Vision 2030. Furthermore, the study also reflected some of the types of communication taking place among Saudis, such as the predominance of political and religious expressions in participants’ interactions. It is important to note the strong relationship between social norms in terms of clarity and absence on the one hand, and the

level of religious, social, political and economic knowledge contained in the participants' comments on the other. The current study confirmed a clear variation in the cognitive level in the sample of the study, especially in the category that is not categorized identically and in the category of religious expressions. This cognitive weakness represented a clear lack of argument and proof, whether mental or cognitive. In addition, many religious, social, and political expressions trend towards a comprehensive understanding when expressing attitudes towards the Vision and its associated programs.

The results emphasised that the majority of respondents believe that Vision 2030 will improve their economic and social lives. Moreover, they reflect that social norms in Saudi society are in a state of rapid change. According to the views of some participants, these changes are very complex, and they believe that the abandonment of prevailing values and their associated standards of religion will lead to a loss of Saudi society's conservative religious identity, and are thus concerned that society may become more liberal to the point of challenging or threatening their religious identity. One important outcome of this study has highlighted the importance of promoting coexistence between those who adopt acceptable societal norms from the broader community and those who reject them. In this new development of society, where there is a disturbance in what constitutes societal norms and standards, absence and ambiguity go beyond normative standards to standard inconsistencies. At the same time, contradiction can be considered as a new dimension in the forms of anomie. Overall, normative disorder threatens stability and social solidarity, which in turn may lead to a "loss of moral decision-making, lack of collective awareness, deterioration of social ties and low level of solidarity within the overall community" (Durkheim, 1951, p. 254).

One should also note that the political expressions of the participants reflected a special interest in Vision programs, although the programs of the Vision are devoted to economic and social aspects. This showed a state of political awareness among the participants about the requirements and objectives of modernization programs in Vision 2030. On the other hand, despite the normative degree of clarity among economic expressions, many expressed concern over the impact of the Vision on the economy of the Kingdom due to the proposed major changes in economic policies. It is certain that these transformations have a great influence on the composition of Saudi society in terms of its values and social norms.

The results of the current study lead to highlighting some of the political, social, religious and economic implications for Saudi Arabia. For example, the political challenge is the transformation of the economic system into further privatization. The reason for this implication is that the direct relationship between government and staff has dominated most jobs and has become a socio-economic contract binding both parties together for many years. Based on this visionary shift in Vision 2030, loyalty requirements between both parties, especially staff, will take on new forms. The social transformations expected to emerge in the future lie in structural changes to the social fabric. For example, the economic plan is moving towards the creation of new economic zones characterized by special systems that provide the rich with better economic and social opportunities. This, of course, will generate new models in social relations centered on forms of solidarity linked to the new reality economically and socially. In addition, the limitations of the relationship between men and women in new work environments may become more flexible. These social transformations are expected to be reflected in the traditional norms currently

prevailing in Saudi society. This reflection on standards may provide an opportunity to rebuild standards in the context of economic and social transformations. At the same time, it may lead to a new struggle between modernity and tradition. The most important question is how will the attitude toward religion change, when traditionally it has been associated with the daily activities of Saudis, and has always been a party to the conflict in many issues of Saudi society. To make matters more complicated, Saudi Arabia's religious influence on its geographical environment is clear and powerful, as it is the seat of the message of Islam and holds Muslim holy sites within its territory. These factors may make religious normative transformations more complex and ambiguous. In conclusion, managing these sharp shifts in Saudi society through the establishment of a specialized center may help mitigate conflicts and contradictions at the level of social norms.

Although the study highlighted some characteristics of Saudi society, it is not possible to generalize these findings to the whole of Saudi society. However, the results of current study confirmed the necessity of conducting further research, as the current study does not cover many of the social issues affected by the Vision 2030, such as the interactions between the sexes. Moreover, surveys, opinion polls and comparative studies between Saudi and Arab society, as well as other societies living in similar circumstances to Saudi Arabia, take time, effort and a commitment of resources. The study of the ongoing societal transformation of Saudi Arabia through other online applications, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat, etc., will reveal a wider range of responses regarding this transformation. Specialized studies can also be carried out on the changing social norms for specific knowledge groups, such as economic, religious, etc. Moreover, this current study examined changes in Saudi Arabia for the period covering the first year of

the Vision's launch; further studies could follow up on the results of the current study, which merely provided a foundation with which to begin a deeper investigation and provide greater insights into the impact of the changes to Saudi society in the years to come.

6 References

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7 Appendices

7.1 Appendix A: Summary of comparative studies of the Saudi culture and other cultures

	<u>Studies</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Methodology</u>	<u>Main Findings</u>
1.	Simmons & Simmons (1994)	Personal and Moral Adolescent Values in England and Saudi Arabia	Survey	Most marked was the prominence given to Islam by the Saudi Arabian adolescents and the high value placed on parents and friendship by the English young people.
2.	Erturk (1991)	The status of women in Saudi Arabia and Turkey as two Muslim societies	Interpretive Case Study	The study shows that the liberation of women in Muslim societies is not a religious problem, but mainly one of political consciousness and struggle.
3.	Alhazmi (2010)	Gender seclusion culture between Saudi Arabia and Australian societies	Experimental Study	The Saudi culture of ultimate gender seclusion has affected the experience of these students, particularly in their ability to relate to their peers in a coeducational environment.
4.	Alqahtani (2011)	The impacting of cultural differences on Saudi students in the UK	Questionnaire, Interview, and Observation	There are definite needs that relate only to Saudi students studying in the UK and a number of these relate to cultural differences.
5.	Madini and Nooy (2013)	Disclosure of gender identity in Internet forums among Saudis	Content Analysis	They found that the extent and type of self-revelation in online communication depends on the gender and culture of participants.
6.	Alhazmi and Nyland (2013)	From a gender-segregated society to studying in a mixed-gender environment	Interview	They indicated that Saudi students' cultural identity has a significant effect on the experience of being in a mixed-gender environment.
7.	Al-Rawi (2014)	Framing the online women's movements in the Arab world	Content Analysis	He found that many activists, especially in the West, think that Islam alone is behind women's deteriorating condition and subjugation.

8.	Aljasir (2015)	Facebook usage in Saudi Arabia	Questionnaire and Content Analysis	While Saudis engage in several activities, including cross-cultural and cross-gender communications, they use Facebook to defend their religious beliefs and advocate Islamic values.
9.	Hattingh, Machdel, and Hugo (2012)	The degree of isolation experienced in Saudi Arabia	Survey and Literature Review	The study indicated that virtual communities play a major role in the harmony of expatriates by addressing the main concerns the participants had and as a result reducing feelings of isolation.
10.	Hilal (2013)	From barriers to bridges: An investigation on Saudi student mobility (2006–2009)	Case Study	This article emphasized that demonstrating trends and policy changes and identifying patterns in student mobility in USA.
11.	Deaver (2013)	Concealment vs Display: The Modern Saudi Woman	Interpretive Case Study	From the Saudi point of view, segregation is necessary in the public domain whereas in the private domain display is appropriate.

7.2 Appendix B: Summary of studies on the change of norms in the Saudi society

#	Studies	Topics	Methodology	Main Findings
1.	Elamin and Omair (2010)	Male attitudes towards working females in Saudi Arabia	Questionnaire	Study emphasized that the habits and customs of Saudis play a role in the interaction between men and women, such as preventing women from having jobs.
2.	Yamani (2010)	Saudi youth: the illusion of transnational freedom	Interpretive Case Study	Study found that youth are alternatively absorbed into the system or marginalized depending upon not only simple economic factors, but also tribal and sectarian affiliation which is downplayed or masked by the Saudi regime. The study emphasised that Saudis show more acceptance to other cultures in the virtual world than in real life.
3.	Bahkali (2013)	Life balance for Saudi women workers	Interview	Study indicated that culture and religion are considered unique factors that help Saudi women balance between life and work.
4.	Chena and Chow (2015)	Values and social media	Content Analysis	Study mentioned that female customers are more motivated by social and emotional value factors in determining the level of their continued interaction.

5.	Bajnaid (2016)	The impressions of Saudi users on matrimonial websites	Content Analysis Questionnaire	The research showed the power of both social and religious norms in affecting these users' behaviours and decisions when using matrimonial websites.
6.	Alkahtani (2012)	The Impacts of Social Media and Electronic Mediating: Improving Educational Outcomes for Saudi Women within an Electronic Social Networking Environment	Interview	The results showed that social media has a positive effect on collaboration of students as they can hold onto their culture and religious values without physically intermingling between the sexes.
7.	Madini (2012)	Online interaction of gender issues among Saudi students	Ethnographic, Observation, and Discourse Analysis	The researcher concluded that online communication provides participants with the opportunity to reflect on cultural traditions in a way that is not easily available in Saudi where face to face communication between the sexes would not be permitted.
8.	Fandy (1999)	Saudi Opposition Between Globalization and Localization	Structuration Analysis	Although the local population of Saudi Arabia can oppose the physical presence of foreign groups on Saudi soil, they cannot prevent the cyberspace presence of foreign, global ideas and trends.
9.	Alsharkh (2012)	Social media and Saudi society	Survey	The findings led to a conclusion that there is potential social change in the Saudi Arabian society, even though the family structure is not changing significantly.
10.	Al-Sharqi and Kutbi (2015)	Social media impact on students' social behaviour	Survey	They found that students were more aware of the advantages of social media than its associated disadvantages.
11.	Mobaraki and Söderfeld (2010)	Gender inequity in Saudi Arabia	Literature review	They mentioned that local interpretations of Islamic laws and social norms have a negative effect on the health and well-being of women.
12.	Alsaggaf (2015)	The use of Facebook by Saudi women	Online and face to face Interviews	The findings suggested that Saudi women use Facebook to construct their identities, share their political, religious, and social concerns, and to socialize, obtain benefits, and generate positive social outcomes.
13.	Al Lily (2011)	Online and under veil	Literature Review	Study finds that technology-facilitated communication has shaped the social-cultural pattern of Saudi female experience within academia.

14.	Al-Saggaf (2011)	Saudi females on Facebook	Ethnographic Study Interview	Study mentioned that Saudi females used Facebook to keep in touch with their friends; to express their feelings, and to share their thoughts through updating their status.
15.	Ashaalan et al., (2013)	The emotional subculture among Saudi Female students	Questionnaire	Despite the high percentage of youth in Saudi society and increasing cultural openness in the last two decades, the cultural emphasis on parental control and the influence of conservative cultural and religious principles are the most effective.
16.	Samin (2012)	Kafā'afīl-Nasab in Saudi Arabia: Islamic Law, Tribal Custom, and Social Change	Interpretive Case Study	Economic transformation and the weakening of tribal structures have caused the borders of tribal endogamy to expand, producing a broad range of reactions whose implications are also explored.

7.3 Appendix C: Summary of studies on cultural conflicts within the Saudi society

	Studies	Topics	Methodology	Main Findings
1.	Meijer (2010)	Reform in Saudi Arabia: The gender segregation debate	Interpretive Case Study	Study found that the conflict between conservative and liberal citizens is continuing. At the same time, the conservative-minded people are in the majority and, as a result, it will be hard to influence them with liberal ideas.
2.	Teitelbaum (2010)	Dueling for Da'wa: State vs. Society on the Saudi Internet	Interpretive Case Study	The government wants to use the internet for modernization and business purposes but, at the same time, prevent globalization from affecting the social norms of Saudi society.
3.	Noman, Faris, and Kelly (2015)	Openness and Restraint: Structure, Discourse, and Contention in Saudi Twitter	Content Analysis Quantitative Metrics	They found that Twitter serves multiple groups in Saudi Arabia to express their opinions and to engage in conversations on political and social issues.
4.	Almahmoud, (2015)	Framing on Twitter among Saudis	Content Analysis	The study discovered the means by which the two communities are defending their stand about the subject; men and people against the campaign saw this movement as a way to westernize women in Saudi and erode their cultural and religious identity.

				Women were using the tool of writing Tweets in English in a way to involve the outside community to what they consider an international problem.
5.	Elmusa (1997)	Technology and Culture in Saudi Arabia	Interpretive Case Study	Saudi Arabia is a culture that has at once accepted, resisted, and been overwhelmed by modern technology, but the struggle between modernity and tradition can be expected to proceed quickly and new patterns to evolve.
6.	Al-Kahtani, Jefferson, and Jefferson (2006)	How Saudi female faculty perceive internet technology usage and potential	Interview	The main conclusion from this study was that there are huge differences in the opinions of Saudi society around the advantages and disadvantages of Internet.
7.	Winder (2014)	The Twitter Phenomenon in Saudi Society	Content Analysis	Linked the usage of Twitter with the current transformations among youth people who have a desire to express their opinions on social, political, and religious issues. Many Saudis view Twitter as an online parliament that gives them the freedom to discuss their issues more than governmental institutions allow them to.
8.	Al-Jenaibi1(2016)	The Twitter Revolution in the Gulf Countries	Content Analysis	Study found that Twitter gives Saudis more freedom of expression to talk about any subject that might be considered taboo in an older and more traditional form of media. Moreover, Saudis feel involved within the political decisions by supporting or opposing it.
9.	Alothman (2013)	Social Media for Social and Political Purposes	Survey	Study mentioned that the conception of social media and the role these tools play in the social life and political environment in Saudi Arabia. Saudis use social media to improve the political environment and change the society positively.
10.	Samin (2008)	Saudi Youth, Religious Minorities and Tribal Communities	Content Analysis	The study concluded that reconciling Saudi Arabian tribal identity with the Sunni Islamic identity of the state is, though laborious, an accomplishable task. Reconciling Shi'ite identity with the Saudi state, however, is considerably more difficult to imagine because most Saudis appear unwilling to contemplate such a possibility.
11.	Al Omoush, Ghaleb, and Alma'Aitah (2012)	Arab cultural values on online social networking	Online questionnaire	The results revealed a significant effect of masculinity and long-term orientation cultural dimensions on motivations of Facebook membership.

7.4 Appendix D: Summary of Studies on the Saudi society excluded from discussion and the reasons they were excluded

	Studies	Topics	Methodology	Findings	Why Excluded
1.	Alalhareth (2011)	Saudi Students in USA	Document Analysis Application design	There are several benefits from the suggested website because it will help the students to get accepted in the best universities around the United States of America.	This study has been excluded because it discusses the facilities that aid Saudi students to get into universities in the United States and not about the cultural aspect of Saudi students.
2.	Bukhari & Denman (2013)	Student Scholarships in Saudi Arabia: Implications and Opportunities for Overseas Engagement	Interpretive Case Study	Saudi students studying abroad are helping people in Western countries better understand Saudi customs and traditions, and to appreciate the generally warm and hospitable nature of Saudi students and their thirst for knowledge.	This study has been excluded because it reflects of how Saudi students communicate with the Western societies to better understand their costumes and traditions without changing the Saudi cultural norms.
3.	Algharabal (2010)	Two cultures, one room: Investigating language and gender in Kuwait	Participant-Observation Content Analysis	Many of the online norms of interaction that occur in chit-chat are still mostly absent in offline public settings.	This study has been excluded because although it represents the Gulf culture, it specifically investigates Kuwait’s status.
4.	Boado (2010)	A Religious, Cultural and Economic Overview of Arranged Marriages in India and Saudi Arabia	Structuration Analysis	The implementation and realization of fundamental human rights in India and Saudi Arabia are at a standstill due to social practices that are subconsciously engrained in the minds of men.	The study has been excluded because it is a comparative study about male dominance in India and Saudi Arabia.
5.	Kucinskias (2010)	Islam and Gender Egalitarianism in Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Youth Attitudes	Survey Interview	For young men in both contexts, belief and mosque attendance are negatively associated with gender equality. In contrast, for Egyptian young women self-identified piety positively affects gender equality, while for Saudi Arabian women, Islamic piety has no effect.	This study has been excluded because it discusses the equality of women’s rights in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

6.	Erkan and Evans (2015)	The influence of eWOM in social media on consumers' purchase intentions	Survey	The results confirm that quality, credibility, usefulness, and adoption of information, needs of information, and attitude towards information are the key factors of eWOM in social media that affect consumers' purchase intentions.	This study has been excluded because it measured the effect of feeling on purchase intentions that works in different societies.
7.	Mishra (2007)	Liberation vs. Purity: Representations of Saudi Women	Content Analysis	It compared the representations of Saudi women in The Washington Post with those of American women in the Arab News. While the Washington Post strongly portrayed Saudi women as maltreated victims in need of Western liberation, the Arab News represented the freedom enjoyed by American women as shallow.	This study has been excluded because it portrays the different point of views used by both American and Arab news in viewing the images of Saudi and American women through the newspapers. This study represents the differences between the social norms; however, each culture is different from the other.

7.5 Appendix E: Checklist for analyzing published documents

<p>1. Document title: Saudi Vision 2030: Opportunities and Challenges. Author: John Hopkins SAIS- Kenney Auditorium. Type: Institution report. publishing date: Tuesday, October 18, 2016. Publisher: Middle East Institute. International</p>			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
None		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The challenge is how to match the local cultural content with global cultural content. (Hala Aldosari). 2. Re-structural social contract and government do not continue to drive the economy. (Fahad Nazer) 3. Vision 2030 is revolutionary and will influence social, religious, and political stabilities. (Jean Seznec) 4. The social political fabric will be the big challenge in Vision 2030. In the other words, the challenge is how Saudis accept women in the public place or in the private sector. (Gerald Feierstein) 5. Religious power does not prepare to miss the control on social lifestyle. (Gerald Feierstein) 	<p>Social</p> <p>Social</p> <p>Religious/political</p> <p>Social/ political</p> <p>Religious</p>

Document 1 Saudi Vision 2030: Opportunities and Challenges.

2. Document title: Saudi Arabia Faces Its Future in Vision 2030 Reform Plan. Author: Jane Kinninmont			
Type: Newspaper article. publishing date: April 29, 2016. Publisher: Chatham House. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A newly ambitious repackaging of the diversification policies. 2. The main novelty lies in the fact that for the first time in Saudi Arabia they are being espoused by a leader who is both very senior in the royal family and very young. 	<p>Economic</p> <p>Political</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The changes in the economic relations between citizen and state will inevitably alter the political relations too, especially with an increasingly well-educated and globally connected youth population with economic expectations that typically exceed their job prospects. 2. The nature of the social contract in the Gulf will come under strain and will need to be reinvented. 	<p>Economic/</p> <p>Political</p> <p>Social</p>

Document 2 Saudi Arabia Faces Its Future in Vision 2030 Reform Plan.

3. Document title: Saudi Arabia needs realism –not a 2030 vision. Author: Jilles van den Beukel			
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: May 19, 2016. Publisher: Energypost.eu. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Over 10% of global oil production originates from Saudi Arabia and it possesses a much larger share of global oil reserves. 	<p>Economic</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Saudis are asked to comply to their family, tribe, and religion. 2. Private sector (with a workforce that is about 10% Saudi) offers much lower wages, has a better record regarding efficiency, but is very much reliant on government contracts. 3. A fundamentalist religious force has traditionally been in charge of education. 4. KSA has struggled in industry sectors because of working forces. 5. It is the lack of coherence and threatening which threatens the status quo. 	<p>Social</p> <p>Economic</p> <p>Religious</p> <p>Economic</p> <p>Political</p>

Document 3 Saudi Arabia needs realism –not a 2030 vision.

4. Document title: Saudi Arabia's plan to fix its oil 'addiction' doesn't go far enough. Author: Elena, Holodny Type: Institution report. Publishing date: April 25, 2016. Publisher: Business Insider. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges:	Types
1. Raising the private sector share in the economy to 60% from 40%.	Economic	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Saudis are facing political challenges as they try to push forward with reforms. 2. The policymakers failed to address some "crucial" long-term things, including the poor education system that doesn't provide young Saudis with the skills needed to work in the private sector. 	<p>Political</p> <p>Political</p>

Document 4 Saudi Arabia's plan to fix its oil 'addiction' doesn't go far enough.

5. Document title: Saudi Arabia's attempt to reduce reliance on oil has the world rapt. Author: Mohamed A. El-Erian Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: May 16, 2016. Publisher: The Guardian. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges:	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The plan seeks to enhance the generation of non-oil revenues, by raising fees and tariffs on public services, gradually expanding the tax base and raising more income from a growing number of visitors to the kingdom. 2. The plan seeks to diversify its national wealth and, in the process, increase current investment income. 	<p>Economic</p> <p>Economic</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic transitions are inherently tricky, especially one of this scale and scope. 2. Requiring invigorated administrative and operational resources, it comes at a time when the Kingdom is not only dealing with lower oil earnings and drawing down its large reserves, but also is increasingly asserting its regional role, including in Syria and Yemen. 	<p>Economic</p> <p>Political</p>

Document 5 Saudi Arabia's attempt to reduce reliance on oil has the world rapt.

6. Document title: Saudi Arabia unveils 15-year plan to transform its economy. Author: Matt Clinch and Hadley Gamble Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: April 25, 2016. Publisher: World Economy International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. The investment in infrastructure, culture, education, and military.	Economic	1. How the ultra-conservative Muslim Kingdom would increase women’s participation in the workforce.	Religious

Document 6 Saudi Arabia unveils 15-year plan to transform its economy.

1. Document title: Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030: Ambitions to Modernize and Diversify the Economy. Author: Alan Larson and Constance Anne. Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: June 06, 2016. Publisher: Global Policy Watch International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. The Vision focuses on channeling the Kingdom’s massive oil-related wealth to move the economy into new, high value-added activities. 2. Vision 2030 also contemplates boosting and facilitating the role of the private sector improving the business climate.	Economic Economic	1. Saudi opened markets, its institutions and workplace rendered nimble, inclusive and responsive, and foreign investors convinced they are welcome.	Political/Economic

Document 7 Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.

8. Document title: Saudi goes beyond oil. Author: Nigel Davis			
Type: Magazine article. Publishing date: May 2-8, 2016. Publisher: ICIS Chemical Business. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. The greater diversification in the economy, the development of new industries in the Kingdom and investment abroad.	Economic	None	
2. Vision 2030 will also make use of our global leadership and expertise in oil and petrochemicals to invest in the development of adjacent and supporting sectors.	Economic		

Document 8 Saudi goes beyond oil.

9. Document title: Saudi Vision 2030: A breakdown of the sweeping reforms. Author: Al- Bawaba’s editor			
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: April 26, 2016. Publisher: Al-Bawaba Business. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. Privatization: The thrust on Privatization will achieve multiple objectives of the Vision 2030 document (transparency and governance).	Political	None	
2. The Kingdom looks to leverage its geographical advantage, by developing itself as a key hub connecting the three continents of Asia, Europe and Africa.	Political		

Document 9 Saudi Vision 2030: A breakdown of the sweeping reforms.

10. Document title: The Potential of Saudi Economic Reforms. Author: Field, Nathan Type: Institution report. Publishing date: Jan 25, 2017. Publisher: The Washington Post. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges:	Types
1. Saudi Vision 2030 -a major decision – is made without the general buy-in of dozens of different interest groups, ranging from the religious establishment, but just as importantly the powerful merchant class.	Political	1. The challenge of Saudi’s economic reforms is over their ambition. Are they too ambitious? Will good intentions translate into positive results? 2. Saudi Arabia will have to face two key voices in protest to economic reforms: social conservatives and businessmen.	Political/Economic Political/ Social

Comments:

Much of the social conservatism is something only time can solve. There is every reason to believe that with each passing year, social norms will be modified to accommodate with the needs of ongoing reform and become more in line with those in other Muslim countries (Report’s Opinion).

Document 10 The Potential of Saudi Economic Reforms.

11. Document title: What will Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 mean for its citizens? Author: Freer, Courtney Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: May 03, 2016. Publisher: The conversation International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. The vision acknowledges the need to create jobs in new sectors, such as military manufacturing, industrial equipment, and information technology, in addition to staffing the oil and gas sector with locals.	Economic	1. To restructure the economy in a sustainable way, then, Saudi citizens will need to receive the type of education both relevant for the available private sector positions and of high enough quality for them to compete against the existing large number of expatriates currently employed in these specialized positions. 2. The social impact of opening up to tourists and more expatriates through a green card system would also, be significant. 3. Even if implemented seamlessly, the vision could provoke new economic and social issues inside the Kingdom.	Political Social Social/Economic

Comments:

While the plan reiterates the importance of maintaining Saudi culture and religion, including with the world’s largest Islamic Museum, it does ultimately hope to effect economic change, focusing the education system on “market needs” rather than on religion.

Document 11 What will Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 mean for its citizens?

12. Document title: Entertainment in Saudi Vision 2030. Author: Hamed, Alhumod			
Type: Newspaper article -Publishing: May 4,2016. Publisher: Al-qabas International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. He explores the New ways of entertainment which Saudi government will adopt. 2. He mentions the opportunities of investing in Aramco Company. 	Economic/Social	None	

Document 12 Entertainment in Saudi Vision 2030.

13. Document title: The religious stream pushes "Entertainment" into storm. Author: Khalid Aljuasi			
Type: Newspaper article - publishing date: January 16, 2017. Publisher: Today's Opinion. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges:	Types
None		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conflict between governance and religious streams because of opining of cinema. In seventieths, most of religious groups opposed governance. 	Religious

Document 13The religious stream pushes "Entertainment" into storm.

14. Document title: Saudi Vision 2030 An ambitious social and economic view. Author: Walid, Khadduri,			
Type: Newspaper article -Publishing date: May 1, 2016. Publisher: Al-Hayat International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Doubling the revenues of the Saudi economy and reducing the dependence on oil. 2. Creating a qualitative leap for Saudi society in cultural and social aspects and services. 	<p>Economic</p> <p>Social</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Privatization of Aramco creates numbers of questions because it has a high level in economic and political sectors. 	<p>Political & Economic</p>

Document 14 Saudi Vision 2030 An ambitious social and economic view.

15. Document title: Vision 2030 between political and economic. Author: Khalid, Al-Dakheel			
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: May 5, 2016. Publisher: Al-Hayat International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
None		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political and law challenges that will face Vision 2030 2. Economic, social, and cultural transformations upon Saudi society which grows up according to the characteristics of Oil age (people are depended on governance), to manage their lives. 3. Challenge of building a business sector that relies on Saudi labour. 	<p>Political</p> <p>Economic/Social</p> <p>Economic</p>

Document 15 Vision 2030 between political and economic.

16. Document title: McKinsey and sons of ruler.		Author: Trad Saeed Alamri	
Type: News Article- Publishing date: 1/25/2017.		Publisher: Gulf Centre for Development Policies International	
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
None		1. The characteristic of Saudi society and the diversity of its intellectual orientations pose a challenge to change	Social

Document 16 McKinsey and sons of ruler.

17. Document title: The Saudi vision 2030 between a supporter and a rejecter and a skeptic of solutions.		Author: Hafiz, Talaat	
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: May 5, 2016.		Publisher: Riyadh Newspaper Local	
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
None		1. Saudis who refuse Vision 2030 believe that inapplicable because their experience with previous plan changes.	Political

Document 17 The Saudi vision 2030 between a supporter and a rejecter and a skeptic of solutions.

18. Document title: Saudi Vision 2030 Reforms the economy or policy.		Author: Siham Ouchtou	
Type: Newspaper article Publishing date: 26-4-2016.		Publisher http://www.dw.com/ar/ International	
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. An ambitious plan could push Saudi Arabia out of its oil-based economic predicament.	Economic	2. The absence of a suitable ground for political and administrative reforms 3. The great overlap between the religious establishment and the ruling authority in the country.	Political Political/ Religious

Document 18 Saudi Vision 2030 Reforms the economy or policy.

19. Document title: Cinema step by step.		Author: Abdulrahman Al-Qahtani	
Type: Newspaper article Publishing date: Jan,23, 2017. Publisher: Sabq.org. Local			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
None		1. the existence of materials compatible with the values and the virtues of conservative Saudi society is the significant challenge of entertainment activities.	Religious

Document 19 Cinema step by step.

20. Document title: Saudi Vision: Challenges and Risks.		Author: Ibrahim, Altijani	
Type: Newspaper article Publishing date: Aug 19,2016.		Publisher: Asharq al-Awsat. International	
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. Diversity of production base	Economic	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complex regional conflicts (Yemen war) 2. Administrative and structural challenges facing private sector support. 3. The volatility of money markets in the prices of investment assets. 4. Administrative and financial corruption. 	<p>Political</p> <p>Political</p> <p>Economic</p> <p>Political</p>

Document 20 Saudi Vision: Challenges and Risks.

21. Document title: Vision 2030 is an ambitious socioeconomic outlook.		Author: Khadori, Walid	
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: May 1, 2016.		Publisher: Alhayat. -local	
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Created a social, cultural and qualitative shift in Saudi society towards contemporary societies. 2. Sustainable sources of alternative energy. 	<p>Social</p> <p>Economic</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Creating a contractual relationship between the government and the people to adopt and implement the vision. 	<p>Political</p>

Document 21 Vision 2030 is an ambitious socioeconomic outlook.

22. Document title: Saudi Vision 2030: Winners and Losers.		Author: Matthew M. Reed	
Type: Newspaper article		Publishing date: Aug 2 ,2016.	Publisher: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International
Opportunities	Types	Challenges:	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Address the problem of unemployment through activating the private sector. 2. Expansion of manufacturing base, especially arming. 3. Privatization of the service sector to improve employment. 4. Increase women's participation in work and production. 5. Governance of government performance and increased transparency. 	<p>Political</p> <p>Political</p> <p>Political</p> <p>Political</p> <p>Political</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reducing government subsidies alongside taxation and its impact on income levels of the middle and poor classes. 2. The challenges of transition to employment across the private sector and its impact on the lives of employees. 	<p>Political</p> <p>Economic</p>

Document 22 Saudi Vision 2030: Winners and Losers.

23. Document title: Opinion in Vision 2030.		Author: Al-Dakheel, Abdulaziz.	
Type: Article		Publishing date: May 17, 2016. Publisher: Gulf Center for Development Politicise. International	
Opportunities	Types	Challenges:	Types
1. The religious and geographic status of Saudi Arabia in the development of the economy.	Political/Economic	1. Privatization of 5% of ARAMCO. 2. Social and juridical constraints on women in employment and social activity. 3. The weakness of the educational system in the rehabilitation of young people as one of the main factors of unemployment. 4. The implications of economic growth on the values of Saudi society to lead to a moderate and moderate Islamic approach Vision ability to reduce administrative and financial corruption.	Political
2. Diversify sources of income for the Saudi economy and reduce reliance on oil.	Economic		Social/Religious
3. Governance of government performance and involvement of the private sector in building the economy.	Political		Religious/Social

Comments:

- ✓ The author calls for a distinction between state-owned Aramco and underground oil.
- ✓ The author connects population growth with economic and calls for birth control and polygamy.
- ✓ The author calls for the realization of political rights as well as economic growth.
- ✓ The writer calls for the adoption by the state of a religious reform program based on respect for man and the achievement of moderate

Document 23 Opinion in Vision 2030.

24. Document title: Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, one Year On.		Author: Simon Henderson	
Type: Institutional Report Publishing date: April 24, 2017. Publisher: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy _International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges:	Types
None		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional conflicts have a direct impact on the completion of Vision 2030. 2. The ideological challenge of change and the influence of religious people. 3. Continued decline in oil prices. 	Political Religious Economic

Comments:

Simon points out that the Washington Post conducted an opinion poll in Saudi Arabia about the participants' position between standing with the government or conservatives in reform processes? 85% of them said that in case of "necessity" they will support the government, which he says is a state of hesitation.

The author points out that evidence suggests that the vision is popular with young people eager for a more liberal society.

Document 24 Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, one Year On.

25. Document title: KSA’s green card plan for expats welcomed		Author: Abdul-Hanan, Tago.	
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: April 07, 2016. Publisher: Arab News. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Permanent residence or a green card will help the Kingdom’s economy and increase its revenues. 	Political	None	

Document 25 KSA’s green card plan for expats welcomed.

26. Document title: Saudi Vision 2030 is a milestone industrial stage. Author Mahboob, Abdulhafeez.			
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: May 7,2016.		Publisher: Aljazirah Local	
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Miscellaneous industrial development Supporting the participation of small and middle companies. Diversity of sources of income and attracting investments. 	<p>Economic</p> <p>Economic</p> <p>Economic</p>	None	

Document 26 Saudi Vision 2030 is a milestone industrial stage.

27. Document title: The vision of Saudi 2030 defines the features of the Saudi economic transition for the post-oil period			
Author: Abdul Hameed, Mohammad			
Type: Newspaper article Publishing date: May 1, 2016.		Publisher Forbes Middle East. International	
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
None		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> The challenge of progressive implementation of vision clauses to avoid social and economic conflicts 	Social

Document 27 The vision of Saudi 2030 defines the features of the Saudi economic transition for the post-oil period.

28. Document title: How does Saudi Arabia's 2030 Vision change from the Kingdom we have known? Author: BBC, Arabic			
Type: Article _ Publishing date: April 25, 2016. Publisher: BBC news International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges:	Types
None		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Change the management of government in the management of financial reserves 2. Opposing a segment of Saudi society to the change associated with the vision 	<p>Political</p> <p>Social</p>

Document 28 How does Saudi Arabia's 2030 Vision change from the Kingdom we have known?

29. Document title: Saudi Arabia’s Flawed “Vision 2030”-Analysis. Author: Hila Khashan			
Type: Institutional report. Publishing date: Dec 26, 2016. Publisher: Eurasia review (News and Analysis). International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
None		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic challenge which represents in the social and economic system that stands on tribal or family system. 2. Cultural challenge that do not support the objectives of Vision2030(Closed society-tribally structure-conservative values) 3. Religious Challenge which presents in Wahhabism that follows strict roles. 	<p>Political/Economic</p> <p>Social</p> <p>Religious</p>

Document 29 Saudi Arabia’s Flawed “Vision 2030”-Analysis.

30. Document title: ‘We Misled You’: How the Saudis Are Coming Clean on Funding Terrorism. Author: Zalmay Khalizad Type: Newspaper article - Publishing date: Sep 14, 2016. Publisher: Politico. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. On the economic front, the new leaders have developed plans for economic transformation and reduced dependence on oil. 2. Their Vision 2030 and National Transformation Program 2020 focus on shrinking the country's enormous bureaucracy, reducing and ultimately. 3. removing subsidies, expanding the private sector including attracting investment from 4. abroad by becoming more transparent and accountable and by removing red tape.	Political Economic Economic Political	1. The struggle between Modernization and Islamism to accept the economic transformation.	Religious

Document 30 'We Misled You': How the Saudis Are Coming Clean on Funding Terrorism.

31. Document title: A young prince is reimagining Saudi Arabia. Can he make his vision come true? Author: David Ignatius Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: April 20, 2017. Publisher: The Washington Post International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. The crucial requirement for reform is public willingness to change a traditional society.	Social	1. Accepting the cultural change which is linked with Vision 2030 plan.	Social

Document 31 A young prince is reimagining Saudi Arabia. Can he make his vision come true?

32. Document title: Building on sand; Saudi Arabia's reforms.		Author: The Economist	
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: Nov 05, 2016. Publisher: The Economist International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Aimed at weaning the kingdom off oil by curbing public spending. 2. Diversifying the economy and attracting foreign investment. 	<p>Political</p> <p>Economic</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stifling social restrictions, which advocate changes 2. A bigger problem is that the vision itself is fuzzy because of transformational procedures 3. Saudis lack the skills that employers want. Schools stuff young heads with religion, but neglect more practical subjects such as maths and science. 	<p>Social</p> <p>Political</p> <p>Social</p>

Document 32 Building on sand; Saudi Arabia's reforms.

33. Document title: Exclusive: Saudi reform plan approved by top economic council.		Author: Angus McDowall	
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: June 06, 2016. Publisher: Reuters. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Vison’s program, which is intended to restructure the kingdom's entire economy and make it less dependent on oil revenue. 2. transforming the government's Public Investment Fund into one of the world's biggest sovereign wealth funds. 	<p>Economic</p> <p>Economic/Political</p>	None	

Document 33 Exclusive: Saudi reform plan approved by top economic council.

34. Document title: In Saudi Arabia, a revolution disguised as reform				Author: Dennis Ross			
Type: Newspaper article. Publishing date: Sep 08, 2016. Publisher: The Washington Post. International.							
Opportunities		Types		Challenges		Types	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> The Saudis’ plans for transformation are ambitious, designed to diversify the economy, end overreliance on oil, keep capital in the country for domestic investment, and foster both transparency and accountability. “Transparency” and “accountability” are not terms one would have used in the past to describe Saudi Arabia. Building a public investment fund to exploit other minerals, promoting the Saudis’ petrochemical and alternative energy bases, and developing their domestic tourist industries and entertainment centers. 		<p>Political/Economic</p> <p>Economic</p>		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> While political change may not be in the offing, transformation is nonetheless taking place. The traditional culture that limits women too much. The workforce lacking key educational skills. The resistance from the conservative religious establishment. 		<p>Political</p> <p>Social</p> <p>Social</p> <p>Religious</p>	

Document 34 In Saudi Arabia, a revolution disguised as reform.

35. Document title: Japan's Important Role in Saudi's Vision 2030.				Author: Giorgio Cafiero, Theodore Karasik, Cinzia Miotto and Daniel Wagner			
Type: Institutional report. Publishing date: Nov 29, 2016. Publisher: Middle East Institute. International							
Opportunities		Types		Challenges		Types	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> There are growing challenges that post a threat to Saudi instability, including terrorist cells linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State, missile attacks from Yemen, an exacerbating geopolitical rivalry with Iran, and internal sectarian tensions in the country’s oil rich Eastern Province. 		<p>Political</p>		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Transforming Saudi society as essential to Vision 2030’s success, particularly with respect to gender issues. The Saudis recognize that relying on their hydrocarbon sector for stability and prosperity is not a sustainable strategy given that the kingdom’s reserves will deplete in seven decades, if production levels remain steady. 		<p>Social</p> <p>Economic</p> <p>/Political</p>	

Document 35 Japan's Important Role in Saudi's Vision 2030.

36. Document title: Saudi Arabia approves ambitious plan to move economy beyond oil. Author: Ian Black Type: newspaper article. Publishing date: April 25, 2016. Publisher: The Guardian. International			
Opportunities	Types	Challenges	Types
1. An ambitious strategy to restructure the kingdom’s oil-dependent economy, involving diversification, privatisation of massive state assets.	Economic	1. Economic necessity dictates that Saudi Arabia reforms now.” 2. It is unclear whether the economic shake-up will lead to the kind of social changes many believe are needed to truly modernise the country: allowing women to drive, for instance, opening the legal system, or ending the kind of human rights abuses that attract far more attention abroad than in the kingdom itself.	Economic Social/Religious

Document 36 Saudi Arabia approves ambitious plan to move economy beyond oil.

7.6 Appendix F: Raw Data Sample

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
1	السكن ليس حق للمواطن انا بعد الرؤية أصبحت متفائلة و نقول ان شاءالله يحلون مشكلة # الاسكان او تنزل أسعار الاراضي و الشقق	1	2	4	2	3
2	ابارك لمقام سيدي خادم الحرمين الشريفين و لسمو ولي العهد و لسمو ولي العهد موافقة مجلس الوزراء #رؤية_السعودية2030	1	2	3	1	3
3	جميل ان يكون لوطنك #رؤية_السعودية_2030 ولكن الاجمل ان تكون هذه الرؤية قابله للتطبيق ، قيادتنا الشابه بحاجة لوقوفنا معها لتحقيق الحلم	1	1	3	1	2
4	صباحكم رؤية ثاقبه لمستقبل مشرق بإذن الله لبلدنا و أمتنا ؟	1	1	5	1	3
5	ربي وفق بلادني ممثلة في ولاة امرها حفظهم الله لتحقيق #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	3	1	3
6	الرؤية السعودية 2030 عندما نستمع لأراء بعض المحللين الأقتصاديين و الأكاديميين والسياسيين من الخارج يعطى المرء تفاؤل بغد مشرق بإذن الله	1	1	5	3	1
7	فكر كيف تكون جزء فعال للوصول لهذه الرؤية و أجعل طموحك بقدر وطناك #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	3	3
8	الهيئة قلت لكم ولازلت أقول أبشروا بالخير سيكون هناك عمل مرتب و منظم يفرح به كل غير صادق في حبه لدينه ثم وطنه #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	3
9	مستثمرين أجانب: #السعودية بلد منغلق لا يسمح بالانفتاح السياحي وشعبها غير مؤهل فكريا وفطريا لخدمة #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	2	3	1
10	السكن ليس حق للمواطن فلنحدد: ١- حقوق: يحق لنا المطالبة بها ٢- واجبات: يجب أن نقوم # الرؤية_السعودية_٢٠٣٠##بها لتدعيم	1	2	3	3	2
11	رؤية الظلم ظلمات يوم القيامة ارحموا من في الارض يرحمكم من في السماء ليتنا نتدبر هذه العبارات في وقفة صادقة مع ضمائرنا	1	2	1	3	3

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
12	الدولة التي لديها ثروة وليس لديها رؤية يصعب التحكم بمستقبلها اما الدولة التي لديها ثروة ولديها رؤية ستحقق نجاحات مذهلة #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	3	3	1
13	الحمد لله هذه هي المقومات الأساسية التي بنيت عليها رؤية التحول الوطني، نسألك اللهم التوفيق والخامات سبل الرشاد.	1	2	1	1	3
14	لدينا اربع صناعات باستطاعتنا تحقيق الريادة بها ١/صناعة الثروات الطبيعية وتحويلها إلى منتجات نهائية كالبتروكيمياويات والثروة المعدنية #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	4	3	1
15	من خلال #رؤية_السعودية_2030 مع أمير الشباب محمد بن سلمان من أولى أهتماماته كل عاطل وعاطلة عن العمل أبشروا بالخير الفرج قريب بإذن الله	1	1	3	3	3
16	صباح جديد يبدأ بروية جديدة لمستقبل جديد 2030 بتكاتف الشباب السعودي الطموح مع رؤية الأمير الشاب الطموح	1	2	5	1	3
17	أبدعت اليوم أخوي في حديثك عن #الرؤية_السعودية_2030 كلامك وشركك جداً رائع ومن القلب والمعلومات ممتازة بارك الله فيك	1	2	2	1	2
18	رؤية_السعودية_2030 سبب تقدم الدول هو الشعب،، فعندما ينجح،، تنجح الدولة،، وعندما #يفشل،، تفشل الدولة،، اللهم احفظ وطننا وأمننا ومليكنا	1	2	5	3	3
19	تتجلى #رؤية_السعودية_2030 من خلال التي ستفتح ابوابها العام المقبل وستكون نقله هائله وعلامة تميز التعليم في المملكة	1	1	3	3	1
20	سؤال المتميز دائماً الزميل للأمير محمد بن سلمان : متى سنصنع الانسان قبل الاقتصاد في #رؤية_السعودية_2030؟	1	1	3	1	1
21	رؤية_السعودية_2030 المواطن لا يحتاج رؤيه،، المواطن يحتاج فقط : سكن،، وظيفه،، رخص #معيشه،، حياه كريمه. #بالله_صباحك_خير	1	1	3	3	1
22	لمحمدالربطيان ?? لا تتق أيها الأمير بمن يصفق للأعمال قبل إنجازها? رؤية_السعودية_2030 #	1	1	3	2	1
23	حتى لوحة رؤية ٢٠٣٠ اللي رازينها عند كل إشارة صارت صفراء فاقع لونها من الشمس والتصحّر.	1	1	3	3	1
24	لن أتحدث به إلا إذا في أمر مهم جداً لها إستراتيجي ونبض للحياة رؤية_السعودية_2030 #?حفاظاً على الملكية الفكرية قابلت سمو الأمير #محمد_بن_سلمان	1	2	5	3	2

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
25	د. بنتن: #رؤية_السعودية_2030 كشفت فلسفة اقتصادية رشيعة وفهماً عالياً لدعائم الاقتصاد الوطني.	1	1	5	3	3
26	رؤية_السعودية_2030 اهدافها تنمية اقتصادية(موارد لانفطية/مخصصة) تنمية اجتماعية # (وبشرية)(الاستثمار في الفرد) تنمية تنظيمية وإدارية(حوكمة	1	2	4	1	1
27	رؤية_المملكة و #عاصفة_الحزم اثبتنا بان هناك لحمة وطنية واهداف مشتركة بين القيادة # السعودية... والشعب	1	1	4	1	1
28	براق تباشرنا السعودي فكلمتين نرتقي بالعلم وعقول حكيمة والوعد قدام وفنون الحضاره لاح# ?يديهه رؤية اكبر من الكون ومداره	1	1	3	3	2
29	رؤية ملك .. لرفعة وطن و لرفاهية مواطن .. فلنكن عوناً لتحقيق ذلك ??	1	1	5	1	3
30	الرؤية ووضحت ننتظر الرسالة والقيم والاستراتيجيات اللتي ستوضع والإعلان عنها وتفعيل وضع الاعلام الصحيح وتدريبها للطلاب #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	3	1	3
31	المحاور الرئيسية للرؤية التي نستشرف آفاقها ونرسم ملامحها معاً اللهم اجعلها بركة وصلاً وريادة #رؤية_السعودية_2030 ?	1	1	3	3	1
32	الله يوفق الملك سلمان ويوفق المملكة العربية السعودية لما فيه خير لشعبها وشعوب العالم الاسلامي يارب #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	1	1	3
33	جعلها سبب بعد الله في نجاح الدولة وتطوره وتقدمه ومصالحه المواطن والشعب السعودي كامل ??❤️ #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	1	1	3
34	شخص رأى في المنام أنه يخبر الناس بأن الأمير #محمد_بن_سلمان يأمر بذبح مئات الآلاف من الأغنام .. #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	3
35	? على الجميع شد الهمة من اجل تحقيق الرؤية وفق الله ولي الامر رؤية_السعودية_2030#	1	2	5	3	3
36	هي الخارطة التي تقود الشعب والحكومة تنموياً واقتصادياً وصناعياً رؤية_السعودية_2030# وسياسياً واجتماعياً. فالكل معني بالمساهمة والدعم	1	1	5	1	1
37	وحدة حاطة في تويتر تقول:جديتي تقول عسى يوافقون لكم بالسواقة عييلنا راحو فالحوادث وانتن وش كثركن" #رؤية_السعودية_2030 الظاهر عندها رؤيا ???	1	1	3	1	1

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
38	الرؤية الجديدة وخططها لتخصيص الصحة، التعليم، المياه اتجاه أكثر للرأسمالية ونقصان في الاشتراكية مع عدم تغيير في نسبة الاقطاعيه	1	1	5	3	1
39	الخطة الاستراتيجية لـ (رؤية 2030) ؛ يجب ان لا تبقى حبيسة الأدرج ...! بل لتصل إلى كل من له بها علاقة (عمل) . بدون ذلك تفشل.	1	2	3	3	1
40	الرؤية ملائمة جداً، ولا نريد الإفراط في التشاؤم كما لا نريد الإفراط في التفاؤل. ومن غير الحكمة إصدار أحكام متسرعة.	1	2	3	1	2
41	وعيك هو سلاحك في ظل الرؤية الجديدة والشفافية ضد الفساد #مقاطعه_منتجات_العقاريين	1	1	5	3	3
42	رؤية_السعودية_2030 بقي مهاتير وأردوغان أكثر من عشرين سنة في الحكم لتحقيق خططهم # محمد بن سلمان طولة في طاعتك لتحقيق هذه الرؤية ، اللهم هب	1	2	3	1	1
43	سورة_هود# 41 { بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ مَجْرَاهَا وَمُرْسَاهَا ۚ إِنَّ رَبِّي لَغَفُورٌ رَّحِيمٌ .. } رؤية_السعودية_2030#	1	2	3	1	1
44	PDF رؤية_السعودية_2030 النص كامل لوثيقة رؤية المملكة كما أقرها مجلس الوزراء# فاستمتعوا بالأمل وانتم تقرأونها	1	1	5	1	3
45	اتضحتم الرؤية (2030) المواطن هو محور التنمية ! فهل هو مستعد للدخول في معترك التغيير؟؟	1	1	4	3	1
46	محد يعلم الغيب الا الله بس صل الله عليه وسلم #كم_بيصير_عمر_في_2030	1	1	1	3	2
47	كحيلان يستشرف المستقبل ويرسم ابعادا رؤية الوطن والمواطن ،،،	1	2	3	1	3
48	الرؤية السعودية مستقبل أمة كامل يارب وفقهم #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	1	1	3
49	الرؤية_السعودية_2030 التنوع في الدخل اهم نقطه ليصبح اقتصادنا مزدهر ??شخباركم بعد # التحول ???	1	1	4	3	2
50	أدام الله هذا البلد الطيب وجعله ذخرا للإسلام والمسلمين . #السلطي_#رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	1	1	3
51	من الخطأ استنفاد الموارد المتاحة ف توسيع نظم التعليم دون بذل جهود في الرؤية_2030# تحسين نوعية التعليم وتجويده..والبدء تحسين سياسة التعليم	1	1	4	2	1

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
52	رؤية عصرية متقدمة ؛ يقودها شاب يافع ؛ يتفقد نشاطا و اخلاصا ؛ لقد توقف الزمن وبدأت عقارب الساعة من جديد؛ انه انقاذ لتنمية مستدامة،	1	1	3	1	1
53	الكلام عن رؤية 2030 وصل. العبرة بالنتائج، الرؤية بحد ذاتها أفكار على ورق لكن العمل، لتنفيذها بجدية وحزم هو ما نريد سماعه.	1	2	3	3	1
54	رؤية_السعودية_2030 فعالة و مبدعه سنصل باذن الله و نحن #كلنا_السعودية بالهمه سنصل للقمه	1	2	5	1	3
55	رؤية السعودية 2030م. تتطلب توجيه وأرشاد المجتمع إعلامياً بشكل مستمر للعمل على تجهيز ذاته وتقبله للتحول.	1	1	3	3	1
56	كون ان السلطة القضائية هي التي تقوم السلطات ، وكي تتم الحوكمة بالشكل الذي يحقق تلك الرؤية إلى واقع #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	3	3	1
57	السعودية: حكم بالسجن على إصلاحي قبل يوم من إعلان "الرؤية"	1	1	3	3	3
58	ونحن على اعتاب تحقيق #رؤية_السعودية_2030 نتفاجأ بكائنات محنطة عشعشت تحت قبة #مجلس_الشورى منادين بأن #السكن_ليس_حق_للمواطن	1	1	3	2	2
59	ذا إيكونوميست: تحتاج #السعودية لتحقيق #رؤية_المملكة_2030 رمي نفسها على التجارة العالمية والإستثمارات والسياحة والقوانين والمزيد من الشفافية	1	1	3	3	1
60	ينبغي أن يواكب رؤية التحول ٢٠٣٠ رؤية تحول فكري أيضاً لتحرير المجتمع من العادات الاجتماعية السيئة التفاخر العنصرية الذكورية الاسراف التكاليف	1	1	2	1	1
61	العبرة في التطبيق، وليست في التنظير ... #رؤية_السعودية_2030 #نحن_نقدر	1	1	5	3	1
62	المهم ارقدوا اللين 2030 ويحلها الله ???	1	1	5	3	3
63	في #رؤية_السعودية_2030 للأمير محمد بن سلمان بناء للدولة على الطراز الحديث بمباركة خادم الحرمين الشريفين وولي عهده	1	1	3	2	3
64	الخاتمة: أن أهداف #رؤية_السعودية_2030 والمتعلقة بالعمل الخيري، لن يكتب لها النجاح إلا بوجود تشريعات مساعدة، وإعلام نشط، وانفتاح متبادل! #ق3	1	1	3	3	1
65	الأمير محمد بن سلمان فكر سليم ورؤية ناقبة ونظرة مستقبلية شفافة وتطلع شامل وخصخصة تطمئن الجميع على وضع مابعد النفط في المملكة العربية السعودية	1	2	3	1	1

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
66	يعرف ان الرؤية للمملكة تتصف ذوي الدخل المتوسط والمحدود ولا تنصفه لان هناك فرق طيب روح لصاحب الرؤية المواطن ماله دخل ? #السكن_ليس_حق_للمواطن	1	1	5	3	2
67	رؤية_السعودية_2030 رأى #محمد بن سلمان أن الانسان أئمن استثمار لذلك التركيز # والله مدري كيف يطور شعب ادمن الاجازات.. بالرؤية ع تطوير الانسان	1	1	3	1	2
68	بلادنا غنية بالموارد الطبيعية والطاقات البشرية الشباب التي سوف تسهم في #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	4	1	1
69	كلام يتلج الصدر بخصوص #رؤية_السعودية_2030 الله يوفقنا ويوفق البلد وينفع به الاسلام والمسلمين متقاتل كثير بهالرؤية بتغيير للافضل أن شاء الله	1	1	1	1	3
70	لأجل الوطن وأبنائه وأجياله القادمة حرصت القيادة على #رؤية_السعودية_2030.. شكراً للقيادة ولجهد #محمد بن سلمان	1	1	3	1	3
71	هديه نيوف الي محمد بن سلمان الولد لو اسأله وش هي الرؤية ما عرف يجاوب .. الشرهه # عالي مدبسه بالسالفه	1	2	5	3	3
72	في #رؤية_السعودية_2030 مع الأمير الشاب محمد بن سلمان الفرص ستكون لمن يعمل بجد ونشاط ولا مكان للمتكاسلين المتخاذلين.	1	1	3	1	2
73	رؤية_السعودية_2030 والله تستغرب من بعض المشاهير ما معه شاهدت ثانوي ويجي يقول # بعطيكم انتقاداتي وتعليقاتي والتعديلات الي اتمناها عن الرويه	1	1	5	3	2
74	السكن_ليس_حق_للمواطن قال #ولي ولي العهد أن مشكلة #الإسكان سئبتلع في ظل # #الرؤية_السعودية ?? الأخ العضو: كان نايم؟ #مقاطعه_منتجات_العقاريين	1	1	3	1	2
75	اللهم أنفع بهم البلاد لما تحب وترضى . وعلى خطى النجاح تسير دولتي بطموحات طويلة المدى ولجيل اجمل #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	5	1	3
76	بحجة سد الذرائع: سبقتنا كل دول الخليج بالرغم من الحجم الكبير للنتاج المحلي. #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	1	3	1
77	اللهم أعزهم بالإسلام وأعز الإسلام بهم اللهم انصرهم بنصرك ومكن لهم في ملكك وسخر لهم ملائكة السماء برحمتك وجنود الأرض بقدرتك #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	1	3	3
78	نحنُ الرياح ونحنُ البحر والسفن رؤية_السعودية_2030 تجري الرياح كما تجري سفينتنا# ?????	1	1	5	3	3

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
79	وزير راقى ودبلوماسي قدير وأكثر من ذلك بحكمة عالية لم ينجر للتطويل و كيل المديح للأمير وحصر الرؤية به.	1	1	3	3	2
80	رؤية_السعودية_2030 متفائل بإذن الله ..الله يوفق ولاية امرنا دائماً وابدأ#	1	1	5	1	3
81	ننتظر من كل منشأتنا الحكومية والشبه حكومية والقطاع الخاص ان نرى رؤيتهم التي تتناسب وتتوافق مع #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	3	1	2
82	رؤية_السعودية_2030 استثمارية ١٠٠٪ ولا يمكن تتحقق بدون # المجتمع_مع_قياده_المراه# !! الاقتصاد هو صاحب الكلمة مش المجتمع ! تحسين وضع المرأة	1	1	4	1	1
83	كنت في اجتماع فيه الكثير من الشفاهيه والعفويه مع سمو الامير محمد بن سلمان#رؤية_السعودية_2030 امزح امزح ماعزوموني??	1	1	5	3	3
84	اتمنى من قيادتنا الرشيداه بداية هذا المشروع بأعادة هيكلة كل وزارة رؤية_السعودية_2030# وتعيين وزراء شباب ذو كفاءه	1	1	3	1	1
85	القادة الناجحون يرون الفرص في كل مشكلة، وليس المشاكل في كل فرصة.عبارة اعجبنتي تنطبق على #رؤية_السعودية_2030صباحكم طموح وعمل وأمل	1	1	5	1	2
86	يعتقد البعض أن تُعد مائدة جاهزة على طابق من ذهب و الأمر عكس ذلك؛ بل هي دعوة للعمل الجاد، معاً تحت مظلة رؤية #التحول_الوطني	1	1	5	1	1
87	? رؤية_السعودية_2030 الرؤية تتم عن فكر اداري استراتيجي#	1	1	3	3	2
88	ينبغي أن يواكب رؤية التحول ٢٠٣٠ رؤية تحول فكري أيضاً لتحرير المجتمع من العادات الاجتماعية السيئة التقاخر العنصرية الذكورية الاسراف الانتكالية	1	1	2	1	1
89	كثرة الكاريكاتير ومقاطع الفيديو والمتمثله بالسخرية من رؤية المملكه عام 2030ماهي الا محاولة لثني عزيمة أبناء هذا الوطن عن إنجاح هذه الرؤية	1	1	5	1	2
90	المحاور الرئيسية للرؤية التي نستشرف آفاقها ونرسم ملامحها معاً اللهم اجعلها بركة وصلاً وريادة#رؤية_السعودية_2030?	1	1	5	1	3
91	العمل و المعرفة دليلنا الوحيد لطريق شاق في زمن لم يعد يقبل بأنصاف الحلول! فلنستعد بالله من فقر المقدره و عتمة العقل. #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	5	1	1
92	ضريبة القيمة المُضافة تدر مليارات لخزينة الدولة:رؤية_السعودية_2030 #	1	1	4	3	2

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
93	معكم بدأ بيد . بعد توفيق الله	1	1	5	1	3
94	رؤية السعودية 2030 وصفة لتفعيل الرؤية :/ شفافية . / جيل جديد من الوزراء التكنوقراط لا # . يمارسون التجارة./ مؤشرات اداء لمحاسبة الوزراء	1	1	3	1	1
95	الدولة سوف تتحول الى شركة مساهمة، المواطنون هم المساهمين واصحاب رأس المال،قرارتها تبنى ع معيار الربح والخسارة:فكرة جهنمية #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	4	3	1
96	ليست كل رؤية قابلة للتنفيذ إلا إذا كانت هناك إرادة صلبة وواعية للمعوقات التي ستواجهها في سبيل الوصول إلى أهدافها المرسومة.	1	1	3	3	1
97	الغاء رؤية السعودية 2030 والسبب ?? اشغلنا هو وعياله ??	1	1	3	2	3
98	. اللهم وفق قادتنا وسد خطاهم الرؤية السعودية ٢٠٣٠??#??	1	1	5	1	3
99	?? مواطنات ضد حق السكن للمواطن #??نطالب بحقوق المطلقات والارامل # انتم الحين اعرفو حقوقكم وبعدها فكرو في ٢٠٣٠ رؤية_السعودية_2030#	1	1	3	3	1
100	من أكبر عيوب #رؤية_المملكة_2030 هم أولئك المادحون المتغنون بكمالها . النقد والتقويم المستمر هو أساس النجاح لمثل هذه الرؤى العملاقة .	1	1	3	1	1
101	اخ مساعد يمزح لان دمه خفيف ولايحس بمعاناة الشعب بكفينارضنا ربي والدنا سلمان امن محمد بن نايف ورؤية محمد بن سلمان تكفيانا	1	1	5	1	3
102	رؤية_السعودية_2030اتمنى من قيادتنا الرشيدة بداية هذا المشروععبأعادة هيكلة كل وزارة # وتعيين وزراء شباب ذو كفاءته	1	1	3	1	1
103	إن لم تغربل الجامعات وارجاعها للمسار الصحيح بسرعة فسيصعب تحقيق #رؤية_المملكة_2030 المفترض ان تكون مفرخة الكوادر لا مقيرة!	1	1	3	1	1
104	ما ادري كيف نتطلع ل Vision 2030 وشعبنا فيه هذي العنصرية	1	2	2	1	2
105	يومٌ جديد مليء بالخير والبيشائر. اللهم احفظ هذا البلد وأهله ، ووفق قاداته وسددهم لكل خير. #رؤية_السعودية_2030??	1	1	5	1	3
106	الرياضة تحتاج غربة شاملة تفوقها العقول النيرة وهذا باذن الله سوف يتحقق في #رؤية_2030	1	1	5	1	2
107	يارب اجعلها رؤية خير وبركة يارب	1	2	5	1	3

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
108	متفائل جداً وتعتبر انطلاقة الخير على البلاد عامية. #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	3
109	? صباح _____ ?? التغييرات ?? التحولات ?? القفزات _____ صباح الوطن #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	5	1	3
110	رؤية السعودية 2030م. تتطلب توجيه وأرشاد المجتمع إعلامياً بشكل مستمر للعمل على تجهيز ذاته وتقبله للتحول.	1	1	3	1	1
111	وطني الحبيب على اعتاب حقبة جديدة من الإنطلاق نحوالعالم الأول برؤية طموحة تعمق الثوابت وتفعّل المواردوتوظف التاريخ والجغرافياشكرأحمدبن سلمان	1	2	3	1	1
112	ان #رؤية_السعودية_2030 توحى بمستقبل واعد وخاصة للمرأة مما يستوجب ازالة كافة العقبات عن طريقها واعطائها حقوقها لتساهم بفعالية في بناء الوطن .	1	1	3	1	1
113	توفير 10 مليارات دولار سنوياً. خفض تحويلات الأجانب إلى الخارج. ضخ استثمارات ورؤوس أموال. إلغاء نظام "الكفيل". #السعودية_رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	4	3	1
114	الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر درع الحماية من الفساد! .. وإصلاح الاقتصاد والتعليم والإعلام نماء وبناء وازدهار #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	1	3	1
115	رؤية 2030 تستند إلى خطة إستراتيجية (لا نعلم تفاصيلها وأولوياتها)؛ لكن العبرة تكمن في: جدية التنفيذ والمتابعة، ورصد وتحليل الدروس المستفادة.	1	2	5	1	1
116	الدولة التي لديها ثروة وليس لديها رؤية يصعب التنبؤ بمستقبلها اما الدولة التي لديها ثروة ولديها رؤية ستحقق نجاحات مذهلة #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	3	1	2
117	الشعب يريد_صالات_سينما فهي قادمة رغم أنوف من يرفضها في البداية ويزاحمنا عليها يوم #الافتتاح! هي جزء من الترفيه أحد مكونات#رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	2	1	3
118	بإذن الله وأسأل الله أن يحفظ . رؤية طموحة لمستقبل مشرق لوطننا#رؤية_السعودية_2030# لهذا الوطن أمنه وازدهاره تحت ظل قيادته الحكيمة	1	1	5	1	3
119	رؤية_السعودية_2030 لتحقيق الرؤية نحتاج الى العمل الدؤوب و التكاتف و التلاحم من جميع # فئات المجتمع من اجل الإنجاز و الوصول الى الهدف	1	2	5	1	1
120	كل قانون او نظام تطويري في البلاد جاء من الحكومة منذ تعليم البنات لليوم.ثم قبله الناس.#رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	3	1	2

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
121	رؤية السعودية 2030 رؤية واعدة لغدٍ مشرق رؤية صافعة لغربٍ أحمق	1	2	3	1	3
122	رؤية الحالية ان تزينون الشوارع وبيت للمواطنهاذي افضل رؤية انا اقولالي في علم الغيب يعلمبه للهكل وقت ورزقه معه #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	3	2	1
123	الرؤية وصراع التيارات ..! الله يستر ،، #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	1	3	3
124	في ما مضى كنا نبحث عن رؤية !! الان اصبح لدينا رؤية، من وجهة نظري ان وجود البوصلة اهم قرار ممكن نتخذه او اتخذناه #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	2
125	لجل تتحقق رؤية السعودية 2030 لازم يحاكم المسؤول عن #سقوط_مظله_علي_طالبات ويشهر به ..	1	1	3	1	1
126	القرين كارد كان كارثة على رؤية_السعودية_2030#الشعب_ضد_البطاقة_الخضراء # أصبحوا أقلية في وطنهم الإماراتيين	1	1	3	2	1
127	ويا وطن والله عظيم أطفال ورجال وحريم جمعهم الحب لثراك والدم والدين القويم #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	3
128	المملكة العربية السعودية حكومة وشعب لديها الامكانيات المادية والبشرية لتحقيق النجاح في هذه الرؤية بإذن الله	1	1	3	1	1
129	رؤية_السعودية_2030 رؤيه متميزة تعتمد على الموارد البشرية استثمار في نفسك وساهم في # تقييم بيركمان) ان عملت في ما تحب ، ستبدع (تحقيق الحلم	1	1	4	1	1
130	رؤية_المملكة_2030 واقع سيتحقق باذن الله في ظل قيادة حازمة ورجال مخلصين#	1	2	5	1	3
131	اقتراح #بيئي #سعودي استبدال رسوم # رؤية_السعودية_2030 #SaudiVision2030 الأراضي البيضاء بالتشجير ومسؤولية عنايتها #غابات_السعودية #مغردون	1	2	3	3	1
132	رؤية_السعودية_2030 تحتاج من مؤسسات الدولة أن تكون مؤسسات دولة لا مؤسسات # أشخاص وآراء شخصية	1	1	3	3	1
133	توفيق السيف: رؤية المملكة 2030 خطوة أولى كبيرة، نأمل أن تليها خطوات تعزز الأمل وتفتح أبواب المستقبل.	1	2	5	1	3
134	هذا بايدنا إذا أردنا أن نكون أفضل يجب أن رؤية_السعودية_2030 #SaudiVision2030 نعمل بشكل أفضل و بصدق	1	1	5	1	2

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
135	ولي ولي العهد ورؤية مستقبلية جريئة للمملكة والتحول من بلد ريعي إلى قوة اقتصادية مؤثرة في العالم وشركات للمال والأعمال والاستثمار.	1	1	4	1	3
136	عن خصخصة قطاع الصحة والتعليم في رؤيا 2030، هناك نماذج أمانا من دول مثل أمريكا وكندا وأوروبا، وأثبتت التجارب ان تكاليف الصحة الوطني على...	1	1	4	3	2
137	يجب علينا كسعوديين #المبادرة لانجاح #رؤية_السعودية_2030 خاصة التنفيذيين بالقطاعين (خاص وعم) النتائج على قدر الهمم ربي وفقنا لما فيه خير لنا	1	1	2	1	3
138	مستثمرين مجموعة_الذباب يجب الإصلاح ان لا يستنتي الإسراع #رؤية_السعودية_٢٠٣٠ # . في إعادة حقوق المستثمرين في حال وجود اي مشكلة	1	1	3	1	1
139	صباح الوطن المعطاء، صباح الرؤية الحاملة، كنت ومازلت أؤمن أن رؤيتنا ستتحقق بالاستثمار بالعقول، ملتزمون بجد لتحقيق #رؤية_السعودية_2030 ???	1	1	3	1	1
140	حسب روية 2030 رفع نسبة تملك المساكن من ٤٧٪ إلى ٥٢٪ هذا مؤشر ان العقار لن ينخفض	1	1	4	3	1
141	رؤية المملكة 2030 ماهي في حاجة هالشيبان اللي ماتخاف الله ، نبي شباب يابو سلمان تكفي	1	1	3	1	2
142	ياخي اصبر طيب خلنا نكشخ برؤيتنا شوي! #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	3
143	خلال الاجتماع بسموالأمير محمد بن سلمان رأيت الغيرة على الدينوالهمة العالية والفكر الراقى والحب الصادق للوطن والمواطن #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	3
144	لا للإحلال نعم للإعتدال رؤية_2030 لالتكفير نعم للتفكير #	1	2	1	1	1
145	من الواضح أن #رؤية_السعودية_2030 متجهة لتصحيح بعض الأخطاء الجوهرية لمشاريع تطوير عقاري استراتيجية لم تدار بعناية و لم تحقق أهدافها التنموية	1	1	4	1	2
146	الارتفاع الفاحش في أسعار العقار يمنع نمو القطاع الخاص ، أي أنه يُجسّد أحد معوقات التنافسية ، أحد معوقات الوصول الى #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	4	3	1
147	وطن له رؤية مستقبلية يزخر بكل ماهو منظم وفعال لآبناء البلاد وفق الله قدر بلادتي ٠٠ اشرفه امال جديدة في الخطة القادمة ٠٠	1	2	5	1	3
148	معا نحو مجتمع حيوي? رؤية2030 ,,	1	1	5	1	3

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
150	التيار الليبرالي الذي شارك بعض افراده في صياغة #رؤية_السعودية_2030 يعتبر ان التحول الفكري (التحرر من الدين) هي من اهم عوامل نجاح الرؤية !!!	1	1	1	3	2
151	اقتصاديا 4% بطاله تعتبر تشغيل كامل للطاقة البشرية، وضع هدف 7% بعد 15 سنة يدل على خلل في الرؤيا	1	1	4	2	1
152	تونا نقول ياهادي أشرفت #رؤية_السعودية_2030 ويطلع لك واحد يمثل الحكومة ويقول #السكن_ليس_حق_للمواطن_اجل_#رؤية_السعودية_2030 من وحي الخيال	1	1	3	3	3
153	صباح الوطن المعطاء، صباح الرؤية الحاملة، كنت ومازلت أؤمن أن رؤيتنا ستتحقق بالاستثمار بالعقول، ملتزمون بجد لتحقيق #رؤية_السعودية_2030 ???	1	1	3	1	1
154	نحو مُستقبلٍ تنتهي في "المملكة العربية #السعودية". مستعد أحلف أنها في 2030 ستكون من القصص. #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	3	3
155	القادة الناجحون يرون الفرص في كل مشكلة، وليس المشاكل في كل فرصة. عبارة اعجبتني تنطبق على #رؤية_السعودية_2030 صباحكم طموح وعمل وأمل	1	1	3	1	2
156	اقدر اهتمامك وحرصك وغيرتك في هذا الموضوع ..لكن قسم بالله ان اخر اهتمامهم المواطن واتضح ذلك في رؤية الفلس واجتماع اللي حصل لمغردون	1	1	3	2	3
157	رؤية_السعودية_2030لتحقيق الرؤية نحتاج الى العمل الدؤوب و التكاثف و التلاحم من جميع # فئات المجتمع من اجل الإنجاز و الوصول الى الهدف	1	2	5	1	1
158	ليبدأ التغيير من داخلنا بالطموح والتخطيط له فأنت لبنه في بناء الوطن بجد واجتهاد، والعمل #رؤية_السعودية_2030.	1	2	5	1	1
159	رؤية غير من رجل غير فالحمد لله . #رؤية_2030 #محمد_بن_سلمان .. #معدات_صناعية #مقاولات #ريوبي...	1	1	3	1	3
160	لكي يكتمل نجاحها باذن الله تحتاج مجلس شورى منتخب لو نصفه فقط #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	3	3	1
161	الرؤية تتطلب رسالة للوصول للأهداف #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	2
162	مع الادوات البشرية الحالية من مسئولين سيكون من الصعوبة تحقيق #الرؤية_السعودية_2030 ، التغيير سيكون كبيراً ووجوه جديدة غير مألوفه سنظهر ..	1	1	3	1	2

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
163	تمتد الرؤية ليصبح السودان جزء منها ليقدم الأرض البكر والنيل ويعود السودان سلة غذاء العالم بفضل #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	4	1	1
164	وأمن ولي العهد محمد بن نايف ونور طموح فكر ولي يكفينا الرؤية بفكر والدي سلمان الحزم# #	1	1	3	1	3
165	رؤية_السعودية_2030 سوف تشرق شمس بلادي الحبيبه من جديد وسوف ننافس الدول # ??المتقدمة في جميع المجالات.. يوماً و غداً مزهر لك بلدي	1	2	3	1	3
166	رؤية_السعودية_2030 ومن هذه الساعة كل شباب وشابات المملكة يعملون لهذه الرؤية وعلى # رأسهم أمير الشباب #محمد_بن_سلمان	1	1	2	1	3
167	ي ملكنا سلمنا وفر للمواطن??&??; Itالقنوع & ??; gt;سكن لو شقة🏠? أهم خطوة للتغيير # ✓✓✓الرؤية_السعودية	1	1	3	3	1
168	اولا نحتاج رؤية واضحة للمدى البعيد.. ومن بعدها سيصبح وضع الأهداف جدا بسيط. لكن للاسف البعض مايعرف ليش عايش أصلاً.	1	2	3	3	1
169	ياخي اصبر طيب خلنا نكشخ برويتنا شوي!#رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	3
170	اخيراً قلت في #تواصل إن #رؤية_السعودية_2030 فتحت صفحة جديدة للمنظمات الحكومية لتحسين صورتها الذهنية لدى المواطن وهي فرصة سانحة يجب استغلالها	1	1	3	1	2
171	الدولة ويهدر المال العام دون فائدة، وأرى أن الكفاءات هي الأحق بعضوية المجالس البلدية لتحقيق #رؤية_السعودية_2030 بشكل طموح وسريع	1	1	3	1	1
172	إن شاء الله برؤية المملكة أن تزيل كل شخص يظلم المواطن #مجلس_الشورى	1	1	3	1	1
173	حساد مين يا هيه .. نسبة الفقر عندنا أعلى منها في غزة حسب الإحصاء الرسمي وتقول حساد؟ #رؤية_السعودية_2030 #السكن_ليس_حق_للمواطن	1	1	3	2	3
174	من المؤسف والمخجل اننا نتطلع لرؤية المملكة 2030 وهالأشكال ماسكه مناصب في البلد #السكن_ليس_حق_للمواطن??	1	1	3	1	2
175	المجتمع غير جاهز، يحتاج الى جهود جبارة في نشر ثقافة موحدة ووعي تذيب التصنيف العرقي وغيره وتؤيد عادات النجاح والعمل والعدل.#رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	2	3	1

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
176	نهني الوطن بإطلاق #رؤية_السعودية_2030 وندعم وطننا وقيادتنا على هذه الرؤية الطموحة، حفظ الله ديننا وبلادنا والمسلمين.	1	2	3	1	3
177	صباح جميل ومختلف عندما تستيقظ وانت تعيش رؤية واضحة لوطنك #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	5	1	3
178	وهذا ماحدث فالوزراء والشورى والخبراء والمستشارين واعضاء المجالس واللجان الخ الذين درسوا وقرروا هذه الرؤية كلهم مواطنيين	1	1	3	1	3
179	شكرا أمير الشباب محمد بن سلمان عندما تكون #الرؤية_السعودية_2030 بتخطيط محمد بن # سلمان ثق بالله وبالنجاح الباهر الذي سوف يسطره التاريخ المشرف	1	1	3	1	3
180	الله يجعلها رؤية تحقق الكثير من الايجابيات للوطن وابناؤه --	1	2	5	1	3
181	? صباح _____ ?? التغييرات ?? التحولات ?? القفزات _____ صباح الوطن ? #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	2	5	1	3
182	يبدو ان رؤية السعودية لم تكتزث كثيراً للاسكان بقدر خلق فرص دخل متنوعه للدولة ، مستقبل مجهول	1	1	3	2	1
183	رؤية_المملكة سمو الامير محمد أخذ برأي ذوي الخبرة والاختصاص وتعتمد عدم الاستماع الى # من يسمون بالنخب والسبب ان هذه الفئة اضاعت بلدان باكملها	1	1	3	1	1
184	تنويع مكونات الاقتصاد تدل على رؤية عالية للمستقبل وان لا نكون رهينة لأسعار النفط في الأسواق العالمية.	1	1	4	1	1
185	معتقد المحافظة على الطبقة المتوسطة لأنها الطبقة التي تخدم الطبقتين الفقيرة والغنية ، هو منهج علمي #رؤية_السعودية_2030	1	1	4	1	1
186	رؤية 2030 الله يستر ??	2	2	5	3	3
187	هذا يعني اننا ننتظر آثارا قاسية جدا مباشرة وغير مباشرة ولذا انشئ #حساب_المواطن بسبب #رؤية_2030الله يستر الله يلطف...	2	1	4	2	1
188	اذا كانت #رؤية_2030 اساسها جلب الاموال الى خزانه الدوله فهل يوجد رؤية اخرى لاستثمار هذه الاموال !؟	2	1	4	3	2
189	اكبر علامة استفهام على #رؤية_2030 خلّوها من الاهداف الاستثمارية للاموال التي ستندفق الى الخزينه !.	2	1	4	2	1

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
190	وانا لازلت متفائل رغم الاعراض الجانبية الحادة للتحول والرؤية والشو الذي لامعنى له ، ورغم ان الجانب السياسي والحريات لازالت محلك سر	2	1	3	1	1
191	#سأحقق رؤية ٢٠٣٠ من خلال المساهمة في تنمية جيل اليوم التنمية المعاصرة والمستقبلية بإذن الله. #طفولة #STEM #STEM4ECE	2	1	5	1	1
192	العقار يترنح بين مؤيد بالنزول ومتشبت بالبقاء ونحن علي يقين بان التحول الوطني مقصد سنجد خيره في نهاية الطريق و بالرؤية مكسب للجميع	2	1	4	1	1
193	سين سؤال: أين ترى نفسك بعد ٥ سنوات بعد ١٠ بعد ٢٠ سنة؟ هذا معنى وأهمية أن تكون عندك رؤية شخصية الأهم هنا، أن تسعى لتحقيق...	2	2	5	3	3
194	كتب #غازي_القصيبي هي الأكثر مبيعاً في #كتاب_الرياض 2017 لأن أيقنت ان مجتمعنا جاهز ل #رؤية_2030	2	2	5	1	1
195	#تمكين_المرأة ورفع مشاركتها في سوق العمل إلى ٣٠٪ حسب يتعارض مع #شركة_تشرط_كشف_الوجه في #السعودية??	2	1	1	2	1
196	الهياط في احتظار ، #رؤية_2030 ستقتلع كل الممارسات السلبية .	2	1	2	1	1
197	رؤية ٢٠٣٠ للجانب لترفيه الاجنبي وطرد السعودي والسعودي بيكون حامى لهم عسكري يحرسهم وسكرتي يحرس مصالحهم طلعنا خدم #وزاره_التجاره_تخضع_للجانب	2	2	3	2	1
198	أنا أبغى أموت قبل 2030. ?	2	1	5	2	2
199	معالم رؤية 2030 بدأت توضح من الان ماشاءالله مطفين علينا الكهرب والصيف ماجاء !!!	2	1	5	2	1
200	ماضون نحو المستقبل بخطى ثابتة و بوجه وضاح و ثغر مبتسم. ورؤية 2030 نجحت مسبقا، وتفاعل الناس شاهدا على ذلك، أي نجا...	2	1	5	1	2
201	جودة التعليم ركيزة اقتصادنا المعرفي في ظل رؤية 2030	2	2	5	1	1
202	صدقتي، بس رؤية 2030 زادتنا فقر وحاجه تخيل حتى في المستشفيات تموت من المرض يعطوك ست حبات علاج والاجهزه خر...	2	1	4	2	1
203	خفوا الحماس شوي، مو اي شي ينحط عليه #رؤية2030 ??????????	2	1	5	2	2

#	Tweets	Periods	Location	Perceptions	Opinions	Normative Standards
217	الاختلاط موجود في الواقع، في الأسواق والمستشفيات #صوت_الجزيرة #الترفيه_تراجع_عن_السينما#تعلمت_من_السينما#الاختلاط	3	3	1	3	1
218	ما يعرض في صالات السينما يتم التحكم به #السعودية #صوت_الجزيرة #سعوديات #وسائل_الإعلام #الترفيه_تراجع_عن_السينما	3	3	3	1	1
219	قيادة_المرأة_للسيارة أكبر قضيتين يتم إشغال وإلهاء #الترفيه_تراجع_عن_السينما # !!#المجتمع_السعودي بهما عن القضايا الأساسية التي تهمة	3	3	3	3	1
220	السينما وقيادة المرأة السيارة #سعوديات #الترفيه_تراجع_عن_السينما #تعلمت_من_السينما #المرأة_قيادة_المرأة #الاختلاط	3	3	1	2	2

7.7 Appendix H: A complete version of the Saudi Vision 2030

Vision document can be retrieved from <http://Vision2030.gov.sa/en>.

7.8 Appendix K: A Sketched diagram explaining the data collection analysis.

