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CORSAIRS OF SANTO DOMINGO: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDY, 1718-1779

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Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Ottawa, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Department of History.

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ABSTRACT

The topic of this thesis is the corsairs of Santo Domingo and their role on the island between 1718 and 1779. Far from constituting a series of minor, isolated incidents, it is claimed that Dominican corsairs were well-organized, profit-making entrepreneurs whose ventures made a perceptible impact on the island's economy during the time period mentioned. It is suggested that privateering was a convenient and even vital alternative to the failing mercantilistic policy of the Spanish crown which theoretically stopped contraband but which in reality provided the island with needed goods.

The thesis first examines the colonial situation of the time, one in which Spain had a rigid but untenable policy whereby she prohibited inter-colonial or foreign trade in the Indies. At the same time the crown expected the colonies to rely on imports sent directly from the Peninsula on annual crown fleets. Santo Domingo in particular suffered from the inadequacies of colonial policy and by the beginning of the eighteenth century, she was in particularly difficult circumstances. The island had no lure of raw materials, gold or silver and its dwindling population relied on agricultural subsistence for its livelihood. It is from these circumstances that the need for and rise of corsair activities emerged.

The official perspective regarding privateers is seen as fluctuating throughout the time period according to Spanish conditions of war or peace. It is demonstrated that the

legislation which provided for and guided the licensing of corsairs changed in accordance with the political situation. Invariably, privateers were encouraged in periods of war whereas in peaceful times their activities were more often than not a source of embarrassment to the crown. Hence, official policy controlled them more strictly at those times.

The significance of the corsairs is indicated by an in-depth study of these men, their expeditions, and the nature and value of their prizes. A further description of three individual privateers adds substance to the claim that these men were successful entrepreneurs who brought considerable benefits to the island while at the same time compensating themselves with substantial rewards.

The corsairs are viewed as contributing to the resurgence of Santo Domingo not only by providing goods which were either unobtainable or extremely expensive but also by developing one of the few activities which was viable to the island in the eighteenth century. Privateering represented an economic niche which included the outfitting and equipping of expeditions and the subsequent marketing of the cargoes. They thus provided revenue for the island and employment for its residents. Finally, corsair involvement in legitimate ventures of mercantile transport is illustrated which indicates that their activities extended into other spheres of the island's economic life.

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Methodological Note

This thesis is largely based on primary sources found in the Archives of the Indies (Seville, Spain), although secondary works were also consulted. Useful information was drawn from all documentary series which refer to the island of Santo Domingo. As regards Chapter Two, particular use was made of those containing crown legislation and directives. The core of the thesis, however, consists of statistical information extracted from the court records concerning vessels declared to be valid prizes.

The Spanish crown required meticulous accounts of all important legal proceedings in her overseas colonies. Accordingly, these records are unusually complete and trustworthy, but they report only a part of the activities of Dominican corsairs. Captures rejected by the courts and the abuses committed by privateers on the high seas are not represented.

The data culled from the court proceedings consists of information on 159 captures made between 1720 and 1774, which were subsequently declared de buena presa (valid prize) by the tribunals. Each of those 159 is termed (in this thesis) an "incident". This material is presented in Appendices I and II.

Appendix I is a compilation of quantifiable information. It contains data which by its nature and completeness could be counted and presented in statistical form. Tables I to VIII,

Chapter Three were each drawn individually from the information in Appendix I, and constitute the base for that chapter.

The information in Appendix II complements that presented in Appendix I. It was not, however, used in the construction of the tables because the data was not sufficiently complete to present as a set of statistics. Nonetheless historians interested in particular incidents of privateering may find the Appendix useful.

Appendix III consists of three separate lists of the names of individuals involved in Dominican privateering activities from 1720 to 1764. These names were taken from the third column in Appendix I and placed in Appendix III under the separate headings of Armador, Captain and Unspecified. They appear in alphabetical order with the number of corsair incidents in which each man was involved. The appendix excludes the privateering expeditions of Lorenzo Daniel in 1774 for which there is information in Appendices I and II. The excluded expeditions are so late in the period studied and of such magnitude, that leaving them out seemed the wisest choice.

Finally, Appendix IV contains information on provisions for outfitting corsair expeditions from 1740 to 1753. Like Table IX in Chapter Five, it was compiled separately from the above three appendices. No tables were drawn from it, although reference to the material is made in Chapter Three.

Introduction

This thesis focuses on the corsairs of Santo Domingo in the eighteenth century. It covers the years from 1718 when the spanish monarchy instituted privateers as a reaction to growing foreign commercial presence in the Indies through to 1779, by which time, Bourbon economic reforms and changing crown legislation no longer actively encouraged privateering. Chapter One examines the historiographical literature for the beginning of this time period in Spanish America and then discusses the conditions which led to the rise of privateering on the island. The following two chapters, firstly examine how crown policy controlled the corsairs and secondly, look at the procedures for privateering expeditions and prize distribution. Chapter Four includes biographical sketches of three Dominican corsairs, men who were representative on privateering activities during particular periods of the eighteenth century. In the final chapter, there is a discussion of the corsairs' socio-economic impact on Santo Domingo. Indeed, whereas at the beginning of the century, the island was poor and sparsely populated, by 1750, its economic situation had improved substantially. Evidence suggests that the privateers, with the sales of the cargo from their prizes and their independent business ventures, contributed significantly to the island's recovery.

Two conclusions may be drawn from the present research. First, far from being a small group of unemployed adventurers, the Dominican corsairs were highly organized and successful entrepreneurs. Their activities fed upon the island's limited economic opportunities but also represented a solution to the problem of obtaining basic provisions which the Peninsula could not supply. As such, the privateers are one example among many of eighteenth-century colonials developing alternatives to failed crown policies.

Secondly, it is suggested that the crown's encouragement of the corsairs was not merely an aggressive response to the introduction of European contraband to her colonies. Rather, it was a means of taking advantage of foreign ships who provided supplies for the Indies while at the same time, punishing those nations who threatened Spanish commercial interests. Consequently, it is postulated that it was not the crown's intention to eradicate contraband trade altogether and that in fact, the corsairs were the tool by which the crown effectively managed to keep her colonies supplied.

Chapter 1: Spain and the Caribbean

Spain was in an economically and politically unenviable position at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The country suffered from severe unemployment, yet many of her estates were untilled and there was little industry. Almost her entire budget was devoted to wartime expenses and consequently, the crown was in severe debt. With problems such as these, the Spanish monarchy was unable to focus on its overseas colonies except as suppliers of silver, which helped to finance its wars.[1]

It might be reasonable to assume that the advent of the new Bourbon dynasty would provide an opportunity to rectify this situation. In fact, it may well have in Spain itself as institutional and intellectual innovations built upon natural growth dating from the late seventeenth century. In the colonies, however, matters were more ambiguous. Indeed the Spanish crown was so concerned with re-establishing a significant presence on the Italian peninsula, that until the end of the War of Austrian Succession in 1748, it continually sacrificed colonial interests to European advantage.

This did not mean that the crown was without a colonial policy or that the Indies were moribund. Rather, it took advantage of a ready accommodation to the status quo and surrendered the main responsibility for the defence of the Indies into the hands of the colonial population itself. Understandably, Spanish Americans showed a lively interest in assuming that responsibility.

One of the more interesting and little known colonial

reactions during the eighteenth century was active privateering among the Spanish West Indian population which the crown, in fact, encouraged. The anti-Spanish exploits of men such as Drake, Morgan and the filibusters are well-known. During most of the eighteenth century, however, Spanish corsairs were the scourge of the Antilles, with Dutch, English, French and Danish vessels as their prizes.

Santo Domingo (the corsairs of which are the subject of this thesis) was one of the most active privateering bases. Although other Caribbean ports, such as Havana, may well have been more important, the case of Santo Domingo is particularly interesting because of its relative importance to the colony. Indeed, although Santo Domingo had been the centre of Spanish American colonization in the sixteenth century, the island was a peripheral zone by the early eighteenth. For this reason then, such an inherently marginal activity as privateering could play a disproportionate role in the economy.

Why did the Spanish crown encourage privateering? In times of war, this behaviour is perfectly comprehensible since all Western nations did the same. During peace time, the matter is more problematical as corsairs could provoke violent international reactions. Ostensibly, privateering was a means of discouraging contraband, which was unacceptable to Spain on mercantilistic principles. Indeed, the crown's legislation described the corsairs as its guardacostas, the vessels charged with suppressing illicit trading in the Indies, and in times of

peace, this task was the only legal line for privateering activities.

It is important, however, to understand that this was only a pretext. As will be shown, mercantilism did not in fact prevail in Spain's relationship with its colonies. The guardacostas were meant to punish those foreign powers who conspired to deprive Spain of her profits from colonialism and to help those islands which were left uncared for by the inefficient Spanish system of trade. They could not, however, truly repress contraband.

The Failure of Mercantilism

That the tenets of mercantilism did not, in fact, describe the relationship between Spain and the Indies may seem surprising. The elaborate and highly restrictive system of trade started under the Catholic Kings and perfected by Philip II certainly lends itself to a mercantilistic interpretation. Whatever the reality might have been in its initial conception, however, the situation in the colonies had slowly been changing from the third decade of the sixteenth century. With that change, Spanish America's role as supplier of silver to Spain also altered.

Several historians have characterized the situation in the Indies during the seventeenth century as one of crisis and depression. Woodrow Borah's thesis concentrates on the dwindling native population. Over the course of the sixteenth century

the number of Indians declined to the extent that commercial agriculture in New Spain was severely affected and there was not enough available labour for the silver mines. Thus, Borah evolved a model of growing depression which he and his colleagues used to describe New Spain's seventeenth century experience.[2] This model was subsequently generalised, and extended to the entire empire by other historians.

For his part, Earl J. Hamilton studied the volume of imports of precious metals to Spain during the seventeenth century. He discovered that by the third decade, the amount of silver from America was steadily decreasing. Hamilton concluded that the colonies were in a crisis situation as they were no longer sending the same annual volume of silver as they had done in preceding decades.[3]

Finally, Pierre and Huguette Chaunu in their multi-volume work on trans-atlantic trade between Seville and the colonies discovered that overseas commerce was seriously affected during the seventeenth century. Their research concentrated on the number of ships sailing back and forth from the colonies and concluded that the fall off in numbers as of 1620 was due to a lack of economic growth in Spanish America.[4]

More recently however, scholars have realized that some areas of the Indies, far from being in a depressed situation, were in fact, gradually becoming economically self-sufficient. Peter Bakewell provides one example of this in his study of

the seventeenth century mining community in Zacatecas (Mexico).. He agrees that there was a decline in silver production at the beginning of the century but this was due to factors unrelated to colonial socio-economic conditions. Nonetheless, by the end of the century the Zacatecas mines were once more prospering and there was an increase in commercial activity, population and in the extension of the city of Zacatecas itself.[5]

The specific example of Zacatecas can be related to a new model of the Indies' economic experience during the course of the seventeenth century. This stemmed from a growing rejection of the traditional system of colonial control and expressed itself in a gradual development of economic independence from the peninsula.[6] The point is elegantly made by John Lynch who depicts the situation in Spanish America at this time as one of economic growth and social change. He strongly rejects Borah's depression theory and although he recognises from Hamilton's research that there was a decline in silver exports to Spain, he does not accept his conclusions.

Lynch states that the decrease in silver exports was in fact due to a re-direction of the metals. Instead of sending silver back to Spain, the Indies were retaining it for their own administrative, defensive and economic purposes. With this in mind it follows that peninsular consumer goods were no longer in such demand and there was a corresponding decline in trans-atlantic trade. Furthermore, Lynch points out that the colonies were developing ties with each other at this time and

there was trading outside of the crown's fleet system. In other words, there was a shifting balance of power from the traditional one-to-one in which the colonies needed Spain less and less. [7]

This balance of power which Spain had attempted to hold in place for the preceding two centuries was based, in theory, on strict mercantilism. The crown stimulated the extraction of precious metals from the colonies but forbade their export to any other nation. Furthermore, she prohibited inter-colonial trade and the development of industry. The Indies were expected to rely completely on the annual fleets from Spain for their manufactured needs. The Indies trade then, was designed to provide precious metals for the crown in exchange for luxury goods. For the system to work effectively, it was necessary for Spain to have a developed industry to supply her overseas possessions. At the beginning of the eighteenth century however, she had neither a sufficient degree of industrialization nor the political strength to enforce her rules of trade.

Perhaps even more basic than the above, was the practical aspect of the trade's operation. This was of course, the fleet system which transported all cargo to both sides of the Atlantic. Without this, Spain's desire to exploit her colonies was doomed. A study by Pierre Chaunu demonstrates the immense difficulties in keeping the fleets running as the colonial period progressed. [8]

Chaunu studied the problem of accurately calculating the amount of food and water necessary for a trans-atlantic trip

when it was virtually impossible to know how long the voyage would take. By looking at the duration of specific voyages, Chaunu discovered that the difference between the shortest and longest outgoing trip varied by as much as a factor of two. Furthermore, the homecoming trip by nature of the route and meteorological conditions among other reasons, took much longer. Provisions weighed down small ships substantially yet larger ships carrying not much more crew encountered other inconveniences. These related to speed of travel, time spent in loading and unloading the cargo and increased taxes.

Chaunu points out that the convoy system accounted for 85%-95% of all the ships and cargo involved in the Indies trade.[9] Yet the very nature of the system which was designed for security and self-support reasons was also a hindrance to the effective running of the trade. Travelling in convoy meant that trips took longer and there were often delays in the preparations and carrying out of a journey overseas and back. "Les temps morts", as Chaunu describes it, was another negative factor in the convoys, for in every journey of two years to the Indies, some 18.5 months were lost in waiting for the ships to assemble, to be loaded and so on.[10] Finally, the historian comments on the high percentage of losses in ships and crew due to hurricanes, enemy attacks, disease and starvation. On an Indies trip lasting two years, Chaunu calculated a 15%-25% crew mortality rate, and this could increase to 35% if the trip lasted three years.[11]

Chaunu's research then, shows how the Spanish fleet system was untenable if the crown expected a successful mercantilistic relationship with her colonies. This failure coupled with internal political and economic peninsular problems laid the door open for a situation in which the colonies increasingly began to depend on themselves. This change began in the seventeenth century and extended into the following century.

Notwithstanding, not all areas of the Indies were able to develop solutions to their economic problems and it must be understood that difficulties in Spain did affect the entire Indies to varying degrees. Some areas, notably the Caribbean islands, among them Santo Domingo, suffered more than others. Having no developed industry of their own, Spain's West Indian islands should have relied entirely on Andalusian commerce. Yet in the first two decades of the eighteenth century, ships coming from Spain almost disappeared from Caribbean waters.

As a result, these colonies had no choice but to depend on foreign contrabandists. These included the French who were the main purveyors of goods until the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the English who, through the terms of the 1713 treaty, obtained the coveted Asiento which was the license to supply slaves to the Indies. Hence, during the first quarter of the century, other European nations took advantage of Spain's inability to send provisions to her colonies. Foreigners controlled 5/6 of the trade between Spain and America and most of the ships were foreign made and manned.12

Due to these foreign intrusions, Spain was losing her foothold in the Caribbean and by 1713, some of the areas ostensibly under her control passed to other hands. England governed the islands of Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica, Providence, San Andres, Bahia, Corn, Bahamas, the Central American coast from Cabo Camaron,(Honduras) to Bocas del Toro,(Panama) and British Guyana. France's territories included the islands of Martinique, Guadalupe, Saint Domingue and French Guiana. For their part, Denmark had held part of the Virgin Islands and the Dutch owned Curacao, some minor islands and part of Guiana as well. The remaining areas were under Spanish control but they were poorly populated with large areas of undefended coastline.[13]

Bourbon Attempts at Reform

In view of this general situation, Spanish economists of the early eighteenth century realized that important reforms were necessary if the crown wanted to retain her overseas possessions. Jeronimo Uztariz and Bernardo de Ulloa were the two best known Spanish economists of the first half of the century. Although they were fundamentally mercantilists, they agreed that Spanish colonial policy of that time was unfeasible. Uztariz stressed the importance of decreasing taxes on Spain's exports to the Indies so as to control the colonies growing dependence on foreign merchants. He believed it was vital to strengthen industry on the Peninsula so as to send Spanish products rather than imported manufactured goods overseas.

Ulloa advocated reform in the fleet system to the Indies. To increase the efficiency of the Carrera de Indias, Ulloa explained it must be re-organized throughout to ensure annual sailings to the colonies. Both economists were aware that Spain needed the Indies and they knew her raw materials were of prime importance to the Spanish economy.[14]

During the second decade of the century, Philip V initiated reform in his colonial policy. Three important changes in particular took place between 1717 and 1728. Firstly, in 1717 the Casa de Contratacion, the organ which organized and governed the Indies trade, moved from Seville to Cadiz. This was partly because the large ships of the eighteenth century could no longer navigate the Guadalquivir. Soon after, the Consulado followed suit and was transferred from its traditional seat in Seville to Cadiz.

Three years later in 1720, the crown published a lengthy document: the Proyecto para Galeones y Flotas del Peru y Nueva Espana y para Navios de Registro y Aviso. The Proyecto was a statute which re-organized the Indies trade while at the same time returned to the archaic system of fleets and galleons which had virtually been abandoned since the beginning of the century. In it were measures designed to stimulate commerce and increase the crown's revenues from the colonies. The overlying theme in the Proyecto was that the Carrera de Indias be run as an institution which would once more benefit both sides of the Atlantic.

The methods to do this, as laid out in the first half of the statute were not entirely successful because the basic structure of the fleet system remained essentially the same. In the first four chapters, there were arrangements for the frequent and efficient dispatching of ships, strict timetables and regulations for the ships to and from the Indies and the rulings which ordered that only Spanish constructed ships be included in the fleets.

The second half of the document was more innovative as it focused on customs regulations, the duties of the Treasury officials and the manner in which ships were to be loaded. It provided details on cargo tax rates which were reduced so as to stimulate an increase in the volume of overseas trade. Moreover, the rates were not only lowered but the method by which goods were shipped also changed. From 1720, items were taxed by volume rather than quantity. This encouraged the export of high quality goods rather than bulk goods. In this way, mass goods production in the Indies was protected because low cost items were not sent from Spain. Finally, customs officials were not permitted to open any packages. This was designed to encourage high quality manufacturing but amounted to legalizing contraband in that French and English textiles and metals could now be shipped directly to the colonies.[15]

The third change took place in 1728 when the crown, following the Dutch and English tradition, created the first of its chartered companies in the Indies. This was the Compania de

Guipuzcoa or Caracas Company which would be later followed by the less successful Barcelona Company designed to supply the islands of Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Margarita. In the case of the Caracas Company it was meant to increase the export of cocoa to Spain and regularize annual ships bringing supplies to the Peninsula. The companies were part of the Bourbon plan of a restricted and centralized trade network in the Indies. As ships would travel between Spain and the colonies more often, it was further assumed that the amount of contraband would decline. Moreover, the Company provided a coastguard fleet to stop foreign ships trading with the local merchants. This was the first time that a formal patrol had been created in the Indies and it became a guideline for subsequent guardacosta patrols in the Spanish Caribbean.[16]

The innovations of the first decades of the eighteenth century reconsidered and attempted to reform Spain's political economy which had remained unaltered for centuries. In the three examples above, there was a prevailing interest in developing and utilizing the colonies more effectively. Above all, the economists of the time believed it was crucial to change the tax and customs structure. In doing this, the aim was to re-activate the Spanish economy and foreign trade at the same time. What became evident however, was that the Hapsburg political and economic structures remained firmly in place through the first half of the century. As a result, change in colonial policy had only limited degrees of success.

Unfortunately, none of the Bourbon reforms outlined above made an impact on Santo Domingo. The reason these reforms failed on the island was due, in part, to the fact that Spain's wars affected the Caribbean for much of the first half of the eighteenth century. Hence, it is not surprising that the socio-economic situation on the island was desolate:

> ...the rural areas were depopulated, the cities in a ruined and miserable state, the agriculture was in decline, trade dead and the public spirit so discouraged, that entire families were leaving the island with each passing moment, with the hope of finding a happier future in the neighbouring Antilles or Tierra Firme...[17]

A more important point which contributed to the isolation of Santo Domingo from Spain and the failure of the early Bourbon reforms was the geographical location of the island. It did not lie on any of the direct routes for the fleets or galleons sailing from Spain and consequently, could not benefit from reforms instituted early on in the Bourbon era. Santo Domingo's location, combined with the lack of anything but the most basic peninsular supplies from 1720 on, increased the island's poverty. When most of these provisions did arrive, they were extremely expensive. The Seville and Cadiz merchants realized that what the colonies needed most besides foodstuffs were low cost goods, like wax, paper, nails, buttons and so on. Since

there was very little profit to be made on these, the merchants and their contacts in the House of Trade correspondingly made every effort to delay in sailings to the Indies. Thus, colonial residents were even more in need of the ships' cargoes when they arrived and were willing to pay much more than the peninsular value of the goods.

Spain would have had more incentive to supply Santo Domingo if, as in the case of the Mexican and Peruvian mining regions, the island had provided something truly prized by the crown. Santo Domingo however, had long lost its importance to Spain. It was among the first areas to be discovered and her native population was correspondingly quickly decimated by European disease. Moreover, the Spaniards had been unable to establish thriving communities on the island as New World immigrants preferred instead to move on in their search for gold and silver. Thus, the island became merely a base for further exploration. The desire for mineral wealth, which was quickly exhausted on Santo Domingo, drove the Spaniards to settle on other islands and the mainland. As a result, Santo Domingo was soon bereft of her native population and it was not replaced by an adequate Spanish one.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the Dominican population was so small that the crown was forced to send families from the poverty-stricken Canary Islands to re-populate the colony.[18] The island's few towns besides the capital were in a sorry state and earthquakes in 1701 and 1751 caused further

destruction. Subsistence agriculture and livestock raising were the only livelihood on the island. Moreover, by 1697, French settlements populated the most fertile half of the island. With the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick, Spain recognized French occupation on the western half of the island from Cabo Rosa on the north to Punta de la Beata on the south shore. Spain did not however formally cede the territory until the end of the eighteenth century. In the meantime, the French established a large and prosperous population which supported itself by growing tropical products for the European market. In conclusion, one cannot but help comparing this prosperous commercially-oriented colony to the Spanish half of the island so somberly described by Moreau de St. Mery:

> ...it must be regarded with great sadness that the first colony of the New World, has fallen into such an abandoned state in which she has been languishing for such a long time...[19]

The Growth of Contraband Trade in Santo Domingo

The fact that Spain was unable to provide Santo Domingo with the manufactured items she needed, and the fact that the few that did arrive via other Spanish colonies came on the rare navios de registro, left the island no other option. She relied on contraband from foreign merchant ships. By the eighteenth century, it increasingly became the response to Spain's

unfeasible colonial policy. Contraband in Santo Domingo was:

> ...the answer to the monopoly and taxes established by the crown. Besides, for the residents of Santo Domingo, there did not appear to be any other way to obtain supplies other than by illicit means, for the isolation of the city from Atlantic navigation routes prevented European manufactured goods from arriving along normal channels...Santo Domingo...had no other choice but...to continue her contacts with foreigners along the rivers on the south shore of the island and...with the French across the borders...[20]

Consequently, Dominican merchants relied on English, French, and Dutch ships travelling to their own colonies to provide the Spanish island with textiles, paper, wax, flour, hardware, wine, aguardiente, oil, vinegar, cheese, and ham.

There were two important factors which made contraband particularly viable for Santo Domingo. One was geographical, in that the island's location was very tempting for foreign merchant ships. Foreign traders were well aware of the colony's needs and found it convenient to sell their cargo to the island's merchants. The second was a political one, as the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht made contraband easier to hide on foreign ships and as a result, more accessible to Dominicans.

Most foreign ships in the Caribbean sailed close to Santo Domingo en route to their destination. This was especially true of ships bound for Jamaica. As the prevailing trade wind in the Antilles is easterly, the most common course for English ships was to position themselves in the correct latitude before reaching the Caribbean islands. Then, they would run down with the wind to Jamaica, passing both Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo. On the return trip, there were two choices, both of which brought English ships close to Spanish coasts. One route was through the Windward Passage between Cuba and Saint Domingue and the other was to sail through the Gulf Passage past Havana and through the Gulf of Florida. Commerce between North America and the English or French islands was even more tempting for contrabandists: the route to and from the North American ports was through the Windward Passage to Jamaica or past Puerto Rico to the other islands. During the eighteenth century, any ships using these routes past Santo Domingo could use the excuse of needing water or wood to come into the Macoriz river or the small outlying islands of Beata or Saona. Once anchored, they sold their wares to the Dominicans.[21]

The signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 gave the English considerable commercial advantages in the Indies. Through the South Sea Company, she received the Asiento which gave England the sole license to provide slaves for the Indies. Spain granted England the Asiento for the next thirty years together with land and port facilities for the "refreshment" of the

slaves. Aside from the Asiento, England also received permission to send 500 tons of merchandise on a Navio de Permiso to the Indies each year. These goods were to be sold at the fairs in Veracruz and Portobelo.[22]

The South Sea Company was a semi-official body: its privileges were granted under a formal treaty between England and Spain and it had the public backing and support of London. Nonetheless, for the most part, it was under little or no government supervision. Its directors in England and their representatives in the Spanish colonies operated independently of the English crown. Spain always distrusted the Asiento and the Navio de Permiso as sources of contraband. Hence, the Spanish crown at times impeded slave trading and delayed licenses for the annual ships. In the years from 1713-1739, only eight Navio de Permiso voyages took place.[23] The crown received other complaints as well. English ships often illegally carried Spanish passengers and, taking advantage of the situation in the colonies, they reputedly made a business of capturing Indians and selling them as slaves to the English possessions.

The English denied all accusations and insisted that their profits were only moderate and not what they had expected them to be. They complained that the Spanish crown demanded too high a percentage of the annual ship and balked at the ruling that the ship's cargo had to be sold before the Spanish ships arrived. As for the Asiento, the Company protested that private merchants undercut their prices but provided inferior quality

slaves.[24]

It is debatable to what degree the English remonstrances were valid because it is clear that the Asiento was in fact a successful mechanism for introducing contraband into the Spanish colonies. Behind the legality of the Asiento, the English brought European goods to Santo Domingo using Jamaica as their base in the Indies. One scholar estimates the value of illegal goods brought into Spanish America under the Asiento at £5.000.000 in the period from 1700-1739.[25] Bribery was a way of life. Spanish officials and soldiers alike were not above participating in the business.[26] Supplies and clothing which were allegedly necessary for the slaves were carried on Asiento ships only to be sold later to the island's merchants. Furthermore, when the Asiento ships stopped in Santo Domingo or along the coasts to trade with the Dominicans, they merely had to show their slaves as proof of their right to drop anchor. In other words, "the slave trade was only a blind which served to give the appearance of legality to the system".[27] It is no wonder then that the company directors refused to open the account books to the Spanish crown for inspection, despite the fact that the latter was one of the chief stockholders in the firm.

The annual ships also contributed to illicit commerce. Both the Prince William in 1730 and the Royal Caroline in 1733 returned to England with considerable profits from the sale of contraband goods. It appears that the former carried £200.00 while the latter arrived with £150.00 aboard. These ships

transported basic goods needed in the Indies which the company's American representatives distributed through the hinterland from New Spain to Chile. In exchange for the illegal goods, the Spanish sold the English such local products as cacao, tobacco, sugar, cochineal, indigo, hides, wool, balsalm and quinine. These items were taken back to Europe and distributed to London, Amsterdam, Hamburg and even Cadiz. The end result was that Spain no longer held a monopoly over her colonies' produce and a decline in the market value for these followed.[28]

Throughout the 1720's and 1730's, contraband provided manufactured goods for the colonies and the Spanish monarchy became increasingly aware that foreign powers were replacing it as supplier to the Indies. Furthermore, between 1720-1739, there were only four fairs in Portobelo. All of these were failures because Tierra Firme was overrun with contraband merchandise and did not need items sent from Spain. Moreover, the English wares were considerably cheaper than the Spanish equivalents so there was little incentive for the colonies to purchase anything. By 1737, Spanish commercial exports to the Indies had dropped from 15,000 tons annually to only 4,000.[29] The merchant houses in Seville and Cadiz protested as they saw their profits dwindling and the crown watched its revenues from the Indies trade shrink from one year to the next.

Spain's Reaction to Illicit Trade

Ostensibly, Spain's answer to the problem of contraband

in the Caribbean was the licensing of corsairs who patrolled the colonial coastline and stopped any foreign vessel suspected of carrying illicit cargo. It has been suggested that the development of this system was one of "punishment rather than prevention".[30] Spain was unable to put an end to illicit commerce because it was too firmly entrenched in the area. As a result, she evolved a system which severely punished traders in illicit commerce as well as the innocent merchants of the nations which protected them.

As will be seen during the course of this thesis, this system of Spanish punishment was conducted on rather abritrary terms. Although there were detailed statutes which laid out the methods of seizing foreign vessels and witholding their cargo, it will become evident that the decision of declaring a prize as valid was affected by international politics. In times of war, there were more bona-fide prizes while in peaceful years it frequently was difficult for Spanish authorities to retain captured ships. In other words Spanish crown aggression towards foreign ships in Caribbean waters was in direct relation to international provocation.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the corsairs did have an effect on illicit trade in the West Indies. From the late 1720's foreign ships were under increasing attack from Spanish privateers. These corsairs not only investigated ships anchored near Spanish shores but proceeded to stop and search ships at sea, vessels which were sailing legally from one port to another.

They became so active that the international community began to put pressure on the Spanish crown to control them and reprisals against Spanish ships began in the 1730's. England demanded the sum of £95,000 as compensation for depredations caused by the corsairs as well as sums owed to them from the Asiento. Spain agreed to pay the amount suggested. However by June 1739 the payment was overdue and Caribbean privateers continued to attack English ships. In the most famous incident,an English captain named Jenkins arrived back in London with an account of his ship having been attacked and his ear brutally cut off by the privateer Fandino.[31]

The case of Jenkins, corsairs enforcing searches on the high seas and, above all, the threat to English commercial trade in the West Indies, were major reasons for England declaring war on Spain in October 1739. Although there were other factors involved, the War of Jenkin's Ear was certainly due in large part to the corsairs of the Spanish West Indies. Both countries fervently wanted to protect their territories and trade in the Caribbean and thus, the war became, "...the first European war to be fought expressly for West Indian ends."[32]

The War of Jenkin's Ear, which extended into the War of Austrian Succession lasting until 1748, demonstrated that the corsairs were, as historians suggest, successfully punishing foreign contraband traders. Privateers benefited the crown in other ways as well. Firstly, Madrid's problem of supplies was largely solved and, what was more, without any financial

outlay. By allowing the corsairs to take foreign ships and permitting the prizes' cargo to be publicly auctioned, Spain was letting contraband enter her colonies freely. Secondly, captured ships and their artillery were frequently added to Spanish fleets which improved colonial naval defense. Finally, the taxes paid on prizes by privateers provided some crown revenue which otherwise would not have been generated. In other words, the crown through licensing corsairs, developed a technique which both utilized and profited from contraband trade in the West Indies.

What Spain did not foresee were the diplomatic complications the corsairs would cause. The decade of war lasting from 1739-1748 was an English reaction against their own vessels being seized and colonies threatened by Spanish privateers. The body of legislation that the crown developed to organize and control corsair activities in the Indies was both affected and influenced by international relations throughout the century. Policy for the corsairs was a delicate issue and the crown had to be flexible and sensitive to political change. This then, is the subject of the following chapter.

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Chapter 2: Spain and Santo Domingo: The Corsair and Crown Policy

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Caribbean was a contrabandist's haven. English, French, and Dutch merchant ships anchored in Spanish ports and sold to the residents of Santo Domingo, Cuba and Puerto Rico such basic and varied supplies as flour, wine, textiles and hardware. In return, the Spanish colonies fared much better than if they had relied on crown ships and their infrequent trips from Cadiz. Dealing locally avoided the paying of taxes, over-priced peninsular goods and long months of waiting for supplies which might never arrive.

The crown realized there was a dilemma. Early in the century, it was clearly impossible to send the colonies all the items they needed, yet to allow foreign or inter-colonial trade was tantamount to endorsing her colonies' economic independence. The solution was to find a formula whereby the overseas dominions could obtain the supplies they so desperately needed but one, which at the same time, would control and perhaps eradicate contraband trade. To provide needed supplies from domestic sources over the long term, the crown ultimately resorted to a variety of expedients, including a chartered company and mail boats. Admittedly, the results were disappointing.

Over the short term, however, the answer lay in the promotion of corsairs. These individuals were given permission to arm and outfit ships at their own expense, and cruised the Caribbean in the crown's name, nominally stopping all ships engaged in illicit trade. In fact, of course, even vessels which were involved in legal activities became the privateers' prey.

This amounted to altering the function of an already existing institution. In the seventeenth century, Spain encouraged her corsairs to stop foreign pirates from raiding the colonies and this was essentially a defensive reaction. By the eighteenth century, however, she decided that the corsairs' mission was to stop contraband trade and punish foreigners for their predatory commercial practices. In short, Spain now passed to the offensive.[1]

The solution to the problem of contraband appeared straightforward at first. England and Holland were well aware that Spain prohibited any trade with her overseas possessions and could not justifiably complain about most of the techniques she used to enforce her laws. Nonetheless, the eighteenth century privateers became, in fact, a difficult issue for the peninsular authorities.

The reason for this is clear. Indeed, the corsairs were beneficial to the crown only as long as they adhered to the legislation governing their activities. Once they deviated from the rules for their operation, they were a liability to Madrid and an embarrassment to the crown for under such circumstances, foreigners were able to gain redress from Spanish courts. Such difficulties did not normally arise in time of war. As far as the international community was concerned, Spain was merely protecting her colonies from foreign aggression or carrying out legitimate reprisals. In reality however, by taking enemy ships, Spain was equipping the Caribbean islands with provisions

she could not send herself. Nonetheless during periods of peace it was not easy to account for privateers who continued attacking foreign ships since it was sometimes difficult to prove that the corsairs' prizes had actually been involved in illicit trading. Nonetheless, these attacks had to continue as the supply problem remained acute even in peacetime.

The crux of the problem in the eighteenth century then, was that although the corsairs brought great benefits to the colonies, conversely they often threatened Spain's diplomatic relations. The crown's position was difficult as the international political atmosphere from one decade to another dictated the varying degree of acceptability of the corsairs. On the other hand, for these ambitious entrepreneurs cruising the Caribbean, international politics meant nothing. Once holding a license, the goal was to capture ships, pay off their capital investment and crew and make a healthy profit themselves.

This chapter will endeavour to describe the complex effect of the corsairs' activities down to 1763. It will show how the crown's position fluctuated continuously during the century. As will become evident, she devised specific legislation and policies which promoted the corsairs when they were an asset and discouraged them when their exploits were less acceptable.

The Janus-Faced Crown

It was during the 1720's that Spain purported to control contraband trade by creating a squadron of ships to protect

her colonial coasts from foreign intruders. In colonial papers they were referred to as guardacostas but crown legislation called them corsarios and they were more popularly known by that name. In the mid 1720's Jose Patino who was then Intendente General de la Marina and President of the Casa de la Contratacion, founded a group of guardacostas to patrol the Caribbean coasts.[2] At the same time, the Governor of Santo Domingo published a decree (Bandos) in the capital of the island prohibiting trade between the city's merchants and foreign ships. As well, the first licenses to residents of Santo Domingo were granted and men like Jose and Pedro Campuzano began capturing ships in large numbers.[3]

The island certainly needed the foreign ships' supplies but the local government was not always consistent about how to most effectively acquire them. Only a year after Governor Francisco de la Rocha's proclamation, the crown attorney (Fiscal) of the Audiencia, accused the Governor of colluding with the local residents as they openly traded with two Dutch frigates anchored in Macoriz. For his part, the Governor accused a judge (Oidor) of the Audiencia of supporting the Campuzano brothers when it was evident that their actions were not all legal.[4] The members of the colonial government clearly had double standards of behaviour and ambiguous feelings but the Audiencia's attitude was most likely a reflection of Madrid's ambiguity on the subject and her lack of legislation specifically directed towards the Dominican authorities.[5]

If the colonial government was not consistent in its views, this is partially explained by crown policy. In times of war, Royal Cedulas arrived from Madrid promoting the licensing of residents who wanted to go on corsair expeditions. In March 1727, the Governor of Santo Domingo received an order to stop all English ships sailing near the island and confiscate their cargo. Six months later, Philip V ordered that privateer licenses be granted freely and assistance given to these men. In June 1728, yet another Cedula arrived encouraging corsair expeditions and advising the Audiencia to pronounce their verdicts on captured ships promptly so that the corsairs would not be held back.[6]

Yet once hostilities between Spain and England ended, the attitude towards the corsairs in Santo Domingo changed. In 1729 an order issued from Seville to the Governors of the Indies stated that no more ships were to be taken after June 1728 except those that were clearly involved in contraband trade. All other ships were to be returned to their captains immediately along with financial compensation for damages and delays. This order however, did not convince the English. They continued to complain of unjust seizures of ships after peace was re-established and in September 1730, the commander of the English squadron in the Caribbean wrote a bitter letter to Governor de la Rocha:

> I had hoped that with the peace agreement between our two lords, the Kings of Spain and England, that this would end the

> reprisals and piracies committed by the subjects of the Catholic King against those of my Majesty ...I hope that your Excellency will make all the necessary efforts to impede these actions and to maintain the honour of the Spanish nation...for the Spaniards are known to be the thieves of the whole world... they are pirates and enemies and (commit) the most villainous crimes on the pretext of protecting their coasts...[7]

In fact the animosity between the two nations due to the continued seizure of ships by Caribbean corsairs forced the Marques de la Paz, Jose Patino, to sign yet another agreement with the English ambassador to Spain, Benjamin Keene. Spain promised to finish paying all the damages incurred to ships taken after the signing of the Treaty of Seville in 1729 and further, that the colonial governors would forbid corsairs from taking any English ships travelling legally between their own colonies. The colonial governors were to control the issuing of corsair licenses more carefully and ensure that the corsairs followed the Ordenanzas. For her part, England promised to prohibit and stop any illicit trade by her ships along the coasts of the Indies. Obviously however, this English commitment was not honoured.

Nonetheless ten months later, Patino issued another order to the colonies stating privateers must be controlled more

closely and have sufficient financial backing before receiving a license. Any man whose behaviour was not in keeping with the Ordenanzas del Corso would be removed from the service and reported to Madrid. The Spanish crown would not tolerate anything which might challenge her peace with England and as a result, privateers were officially persona non grata between 1729 - 1739, although the reality was rather different. In 1739 however, the political atmosphere changed once more and Spain openly encouraged the licensing and arming of expeditions. This orderly alternation then, between encouragement in times of war and foreign-induced limitations in times of peace was to characterize crown attitudes over the entire course of the eighteenth century.[8]

With a general impression of how the crown's actions varied during the course of the eighteenth century, it is now possible to examine some specific areas of policy with regard to its legislation on corsairs. There are three areas worth discussing in some detail. Firstly, there were the Ordenanzas del Corso which were the governing statutes controlling privateers and which during the course of the century, were re-written and amended several times. Secondly, there was the licensing of corsairs and it will emerge that the eligibility for and receiving of a license varied from one decade to another. Lastly, the decision to consider a captured prize as valid or not also varied, depending on the date of the seizure.

The Ordenanzas del Corso

The Ordenanzas of the eighteenth century were all based on the original Ordenanzas del Corso of 1674 to control piracy in the Indies. Although these were re-written and adapted to circumstances in 1718, 1754, 1762 and 1779, the basic content of the documents did not change. Rather, the emphasis and details of certain sections altered depending on the time period in which they were written. Furthermore, the preamble for many of the eighteenth century corsairs' licenses is a copy of the 1674 legislation followed by the pertinent amendments. Consequently, an examination of the 1674 Ordenanzas is necessary before any further discussion of privateer legislation is possible.

The Ordenanzas del Corso, dated Madrid, February 22, 1674 were the crown regulations to be followed by:

> ...those who reside in the Indies...who arming ships on their own account...sail along these coasts in search of foreign ships which engage in piracy and hostility against our nation...

Two of the nineteen sections deal with the granting of licenses and how a ship was to be outfitted. The backer or armador of the expedition had to prove he had funds to pay for the expedition and guarantee his responsibility for it. In return, he received civil and criminal jurisdiction over the sailors and soldiers in his employ. As for the crew, they were not to be

taken from any of the crown fleets or galleons or from any colonial garrison. Nevertheless, colonial officials were expected to assist the armador and supply his ship with provisions at any port of call. If more crew was needed after the expedition set out, the captain could take on men at any port in the Indies having first advised the officials there. The crew of a corsair was to receive the same considerations and exemptions as any man serving on a crown ship and those showing themselves to be exemplary in battle, were to be given extra wages. Contracts to serve on a corsair were for a fixed period of time and once signed on to a particular expedition, the men were not allowed to break contract.

Captured ships were taken to the port where the corsair had been armed unless another Spanish port was closer. Once there, the Governor, District magistrate (Corregidor) or other person in authority was responsible for the sentencing of the ship and preparation of a report to be sent back to Spain. The value of the prizes was to be distributed by the treasury officials. One third of the prize's value covered the corsair's provisions, one third went to the cost of the ship and artillery and the final third went to the armador and his crew. The crown did not demand any duties from the prize so that the corsairs could support themselves adequately and finance more expeditions.

Prisoners were not to be sent back to Spain but handed over to the colonial authorities for punishment. If there was any attempt by the pirate ship to produce false documents, the

ship and cargo were to be guarded and the prisoners taken into custody until the Audiencia decided on the ship's sentence. Lastly, these regulations were not to be disobeyed in any way and the officials of the Indies were to follow the Ordenanzas precisely and punctually so as not to impede the corsair or crew.[9]

The main difference between the Ordenanzas of 1674 and 1718 was that in 1674, the crown encouraged corsairs in every way possible whereas the 1718 legislation outlined a much more onerous set of procedures. In the original Ordenanzas, it was not difficult to receive a license and the proceedings for declaring a prize valid were uncomplicated. The crown did not demand any duties or taxes from ships captured by corsairs. In fact, there was considerable idealism about how the system was to work.

By 1718, the tone of the Ordenanzas had changed. Philip V realized there was considerable fraud among the corsairs and colonial officials alike. Declaring a ship a valid prize had become an arbitrary decision. As a result, the Ordenanzas of 1718 were considerably more detailed as regards the taking and sentencing of a ship and it outlined punishment in cases where legislation had not been followed.

Before receiving a license, the armador had to supply the colonial authorities with complete information on his ship and artillery and provide the names of his captain and crew. Once sighting a possible prize, the corsair could not contemplate

taking it unless it was an enemy ship carrying alien cargo, Spanish produce or unacceptable documentation. On pain of death, no corsair was to stop either a Spanish or allied ship. Moreover, it was forbidden to unload any of its prizes' cargo at sea.

None of the above details appeared in the 1674 legislation. Neither was there any detail on the procedures once a ship had been captured. In 1718 however, the Ordenanzas stated that the cargo from a seized ship was to be guarded fastidiously until the Audiencia pronounced its sentence. To avoid any theft, three keys were necessary to unlock the Royal Warehouse where the ships' cargo was stored. One was given to the Intendente, one to the armador, and the last to the captain of the foreign ship. Cargo which might spoil before the court proceedings were completed was sold through public auction and the proceeds deposited in the Royal Treasury until the sentence was decided.

The distribution of the value of the prize differed from the 1674 Ordenanzas as well and in this regard, the 1718 legislation remained essentially the norm for the rest of the century. Two-thirds went to the armador and the other third went to the officials and crew of the corsair. Before this money was distributed, the authorities discounted the expenses incurred from the unloading of the prize, the guarding of the ship and the costs of the court proceedings. Finally, the crown took 8% of the value of the prize which was known as the Almojarifazgo tax.

Lastly, although the authorities were to encourage corsair expeditions, they were expected to be aware of the controversies

and fraudulence connected with the capturing of prizes. The Ordenanzas stated that the authorities were to help the armadores outfit their expeditions and assist in enlisting the crew. They were expected to keep the court proceedings on captured ships brief and above all, consult Madrid if any difficulties arose which the Audiencia could not solve.[10]

By the 1730's there was rampant illegal trading between Spanish and foreign merchants along the coasts of Santo Domingo and the other Spanish islands in the Caribbean. As a result, there were several amendments to the 1718 Ordenanzas related to what was considered a valid prize. In May 1734, a Royal Cedula ordered that any foreign ships either anchored or sailing in "suspicious areas" were to be taken as valid prizes. Furthermore, if ships in the above situation were stopped and Spanish produce found aboard, this would be conclusive evidence that the ship had been trading with the colonies. These changes in the legislation however, only complicated the issue considerably. As will be seen in the sections below, it was often difficult to prove whether a ship had been anchored or carrying produce from a Spanish colony. Bitter law suits between corsairs and prize owners ensued as well as a souring of diplomatic relations, particularly between Spain and England.[11]

If the Ordenanzas of 1718 controlled the corsairs' activities more than those of 1674, the purpose of the new Ordenanzas in 1754 was to curtail privateering freedom even more. By then, the corsairs were seemingly stopping any and every

vulnerable foreign ship, raiding it and considering it a valid prize regardless of the circumstances. As a result, the new legislation clearly stated the areas of safe passage for foreign ships and the manner in which the corsair was to behave when he confronted a foreign vessel. Any violence, extortion or threats would be severely punished. Punishment was also due if it was discovered that the prize or corsair captains had been introducing merchandise into the colonies clandestinely. To avoid partisan decisions by the Audiencia, copies of the court hearings were to be sent to Spain where a fair sentence would be decided upon and sent back to the Indies. Finally, in an effort to reduce the number of prizes taken, the duties owed to the crown increased after 1756. Aside from the Almojarifazgo tax which the authorities had not been too careful about collecting, the crown also expected a further 5% of the total value of each prize after February 1756.[12]

As one might expect, the war of 1761-1762 between Spain and England had an effect on the Caribbean corsairs. As in other times of war, they were an asset and legislation towards them became favourable once more. In the Ordenanzas of 1762, all duties owed to the crown were abolished in order to encourage expeditions against the enemy. Here, as in the other Ordenanzas of the eighteenth century, crown policy towards the corsairs was a reflection of Spain's diplomatic relations and international politics. And, as will be seen, the granting of licenses to corsairs and the means by which a prize was declared valid was yet another extension of this theme.[13]

Licenses for Corsairs: The date dictated the ease with which they were granted.

During the 1739-1748 period of war against the English in the Caribbean, the court at Madrid promoted the licensing of colonial corsairs to such a degree that the strict regulations contained in the Ordenanzas were often overlooked. In 1739, the crown declared that anyone who wished to mount an expedition against the English was to be issued a license. To that effect, it appears that even fishermen outfitted their boats. These successfully captured four English sloops at the beginning of the war.[14]

A much more startling departure from the Ordenanzas was the acceptance by the colonial government of foreign corsairs who acted on behalf of Santo Domingo. During the 1740's, the most noteworthy example was Martin Hixiart, a French captain whose ship was outfitted in Martinique but whose armador was a resident of a Spanish colony. In July and October 1745, Hixiart successfully seized an English packet boat and a frigate and brought them into the port of Santo Domingo. The residents greeted the ships enthusiastically and Governor Zorilla immediately declared them to be valid prizes. The reason for this quick decision was that aside from their cargoes of logwood, ivory, wax and some gold, the ships were carrying hundreds of black slaves. Between the two prizes, there were a total of 425 slaves who were sold for a "moderate price" to the eager Dominicans.

Ferdinand VI was understandably concerned when word arrived that a French corsair had sold his prizes and cargo to the Dominicans. Did this action not actually constitute commerce between a Spanish colony and a foreign nation? Granted, the slaves were needed on the island but how did the local authorities also justify the sales of the logwood and ivory? Furthermore, although the corsair was French and therefore exempt from Spanish taxes, was it fair that the crown lose out on the Almojarifazgo tax? The Council of the Indies was unable to give sound advice to the King because there was in fact, no precedent for this particular situation. Consequently, rather than reprimanding the Audiencia, the crown turned a blind but disapproving eye on the event.

In 1747, Hixiart once again brought two slave ships into Santo Domingo. The following year another French corsair, armed at St. Louis, captured an English frigate with 30,000 pesos worth of cargo. In both of these cases, the crown did not like the situation but realized that the island greatly benefited from the foreign cargo. What was more, the corsairs had provided the island with slaves and other items at no cost to the court in Madrid.

Governor Zorilla received a letter in October 1747 which approved of the Hixiart expeditions both for bringing such valuable cargo to Santo Domingo and because his men had spent their share from the prize on the island before leaving it. The sale of the slaves was already having an effect on the cocoa

plantations and the crown commended Zorilla for his efforts. Finally, as if to justify Hixiart further, mention was made of the damages caused to the enemy in the losses of their ships. In response, Zorilla wrote in reference to the French privateer's prizes:

> Such prizes are considered...of great necessity for the provisions and defense they offer...(and) for the sale of supplies and other things needed on this island in a time of war...they give great benefit to the residents of the island...for many years no Register (ship) has come from Spain and so with these the island is helped.[15]

A similar situation rose during the war in 1761-1762. The French corsair this time was Augusto Buenaventura de Messendern, a Lieutenant from Saint Domingue who commanded the brig, El Emprehendedor, outfitted in Martinique against the English. He arrived in Santo Domingo in October 1761 having seized an English packet boat off Puerto Rico. The Dominican government's acquisition of Messendern's ship and prize however, were quite different from Hixiart's case sixteen years earlier.

Whereas Hixiart profited from his association with the island, Messendern did not. First, the authorities embargoed his ship and prize on the pretence that they were carrying contraband. Then they imprisoned the Frenchman and part of his crew and dismantled his ship to equip their own. After three

months, the Treasury officials returned the ship (but not its cargo) to Messendern and he was free to go. Instead, the French corsair applied for and received a license to sail under a Spanish flag and he chose a well-known captain of that time, Lorenzo Daniel, to command his vessel. From that date on, it would appear that Messendern's experience was one of manipulation and deceit by the Dominican authorities.

It appears that Messendern captured numerous Dutch and English ships from 1761-1763 which were re-armed as Spanish warships or corsairs. In one two-month period, his prizes totalled more than 30,000 pesos and the number of active corsairs on the island grew from one to seven. Yet Messendern received scant rewards. Either the local authorities undervalued the cargo from his prizes or left the decision so long that the produce rotted and was worthless. In one instance, they arbitrarily seized items considered necessary as war supplies rather than first putting them up for public auction. Any efforts to retrieve what was owed to this French corsair were futile, and in the end he returned penniless to San Luis de Cayos. According to his calculations, Messendern believed the Dominicans owed him 96,495 pesos.[16]

If the crown and its representatives endorsed corsairs during periods of war, they were anything but supportive during the peaceful decade of 1750-1760. This ten year span was marked by a serious discussion of how, by 1748, the corsairs had overstepped the boundaries of legality and had become an

embarrassment to the crown. There then followed a reconsideration of the duties and expectations of the Caribbean privateers. Two reports from this period reflect the atmosphere both in Spain and in Santo Domingo and show a marked change in to whom and how corsair licenses were to be granted. The first was from Governor Francisco Rubio to the Marques de Ensenada and is dated September 1751. The second was written a year later in September 1752 and was a report from D. Jose de Carvajal y Lancaster to the King. From the latter report, there emerged a new set of Ordenanzas in 1754 which contained stricter legislation for the granting of licenses and organization of expeditions in the years to come. The main point in Rubio's report was the bad effect the corsairs were having on the foreign community. He stressed the importance of only issuing licenses to accredited persons who had sufficient financial backing to mount properly organized expeditions. If the correct men were chosen in the initial phase, Rubio believed that the cruel and corrupt behaviour of the corsairs could be controlled. This point is reminiscent of Patiño who, twenty years earlier, had recommended that corsair licenses be controlled and issued with care. Nonetheless, Rubio pointed out the difficulty of assessing whether a licensed captain would actually comply with the regulations for, as the Governor wrote:

> ...rare is the time that they will carry out their mission for no matter how honest and prudent is their conduct...at sea they become the most terrible of pirates...taking as prizes (ships) at every encounter...[17]

Carvajal y Lancaster's report was similar to Rubio's but he stressed the need to control contraband more effectively. The initial reason for promoting corsairs in the earlier part of the century had been to control contraband in the Caribbean. By 1750 however, Carvajal y Lancaster explained that they were no longer serving the crown's interests. The corsairs were pirates who actively pursued all ships regardless of their nationality, route or cargo. He recommended that a new force to patrol the colonies be created and the corsairs disbanded. A specific land patrol would be organized and the Windward Fleet (Armada de Barlovento) would become responsible for protecting the coastal waters.

Carvajal y Lancaster portrayed the corsairs as desperate and unpleasant individuals in his report. He agreed with Rubio that men in dire financial need would not be reliable once they were at sea. Yet he stressed that only men in such difficult circumstances would in fact, contemplate the profession. He explained:

> To become a corsair is to expect to support oneself, as one does in any other occupation ...one or two or more (men) put their capital together, organize an expedition and then go out...after this miserable group have sailed under harsh conditions for many days and see that their supplies are diminishing with haste they become more and more

> desperate to find a prize. And when they finally do, are they likely to observe the legislation from the crown? Will they declare to the court any evidence which could threaten receiving the fruits of their prize? I think myself, that it is to expect too much from such persons and such circumstances...[18]

Both Rubio and Carvajal y Lancaster spoke in very different tones than had been heard ten years before. Whereas in the war years, licenses had been granted to such financially insecure individuals as fishermen and even to foreigners, the peaceful decade of 1750 produced legislation which seriously curbed the Caribbean corsairs.

Fluctuating legislation: Was every captured ship a valid prize?

Throughout the colonial period, the Spanish concept of possession was that any item produced in the colonies was forevermore Spanish. Consequently, any merchandise believed to be Spanish in origin and found aboard a foreign ship was automatically considered to be contraband.[19] This situation immensely distressed the other European colonial powers. Not only were their ships stopped on the high seas but then they were carefully searched for any cargo, which although it had been purchased legally, might then be identified as Spanish.

Yet how could the Spanish colonial authorities prove that a certain cargo item on a foreign ship was actually Spanish in origin? Many commonly found articles such as cacao, logwood and livestock could be found on any of the Caribbean islands. Moreover, it was conceivable for a foreign vessel to be carrying cargo which was originally Spanish but then purchased through the Asiento. Finally, there were instances of Dominican ships sailing with cargoes of cacao, logwood and skins to other islands in the Caribbean to trade them for urgently needed flour. Any of the above was a viable explanation for finding "Spanish" cargo on a foreign ship. Besides, it was in Dominican interests to declare a ship a valid prize whenever possible because the island was always in need of supplies. Thus, it was a delicate issue indeed and one which, as will be so often seen in this thesis, was manipulated depending on the date when the Spanish captured the ship.

An example of the Dominican authorities working a situation to their advantage was the case of the Dutch pinque, Jorge Cornelius Calf, taken in 1724 by Benito Socorras. The privateer captured the ship off Santo Domingo on its return voyage from Curacao to Amsterdam with a cargo of cacao, tobacco, logwood, cotton, skins and sugar. The court proceedings which followed after the ship arrived in Santo Domingo took years to complete as the Dominicans were determined to keep the ship but they had no concrete proof that it had been involved in any illegal activity. For one thing, Socorras had seized the ship at sea. Not

having been anchored or sailing near the shore, the authorities could not prove that the pinque had been trading with Spanish merchants. For another, she had been travelling directly from a Dutch colony back to Amsterdam so neither her route nor her destination could be queried. The only other possibility was to prove that the pinque was carrying illegally acquired Spanish goods and it took until 1738 to decide on this verdict.

The defense for the Cornelius Calf stated that what was important was not where the cargo originated but whether it had been legally traded and sold. Witnesses explained that all the cargo for the ship had come to Curacao by legitimate means and been loaded directly on the pinque. The Dominican authorities however, did not believe this and they went on to show that the Cornelius Calf's cargo had been brought illicitly to Curacao from Caracas, Rio de la Hacha and other parts of Tierra Firme. According to the authorities, none of the cargo originated in Curacao and experts examining the cacao and skins recognized them as Venezuelan. Nonetheless, in reading the lengthy court hearing, the witnesses for both sides were, in fact, unsure of their statements and although the Spanish eventually won the case, it was not clear that the outcome was altogether fair.[20]

By 1750, the Spanish were no longer able to claim captured ships as prizes so easily. In 1752, Governor Rubio received an order to advise the crown of any complaints by the English ambassador regarding the taking of ships after the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. In September 1753, a list arrived

in Madrid from the ambassador of six English ships seized by Dominican privateers. In the court hearings which followed, only one of the six was declared a valid prize. In several cases, the circumstances were similar to the Cornelius Calf in that the English ship had been stopped at sea or had been travelling between English colonies. The Spanish authorities however, decided that in these cases, corsairs had acted illegally. The corsairs paid the court costs and the damages incurred to the English. The English were then freed and given permission to sell their cargo to the residents of the island.

One of the six ships was the sloop Industria which the English claimed had been taken enroute to Jamaica. The evehts in this case were mysterious as the Dominican authorities had no knowledge of the sloop but were concerned about a corsair, Tomas Rendon who had disappeared about the same time. The Spanish became convinced that the crew of the Industria had murdered Rendon but they were unable to prove it. Correspondence travelled back and forth between the Governors of Santo Domingo and Jamaica but neither the sloop nor the privateer ever reappeared.21

Although English ships continued to attack Spanish colonies in the Caribbeean during this decade, the Spanish crown did not encourage reprisals. In the spring of 1751, English corsairs attacked N.S. de las Tres Fuentes off Santo Domingo and there was friction between the English and Spanish corsairs near Havana. Several months later, the English seized various

Dominican boats off the coast of the island of Saona. To make matters more difficult for the privateers, they were not receiving the value of their prizes until the crown accepted the colonial sentence. As of 1752, no captured cargo was released for auction, except perishable goods, unless permission was received from Madrid. An order to this effect was repeated in 1756 so it would seem that the corsairs had problems both in retaining their prizes and in receiving profits from them throughout the decade.[22]

Throughout this chapter, the subject has been crown policy towards the corsairs and how it fluctuated during periods of war and peace. Ample evidence has been given to demonstrate that the popularity of corsairs and the need for them varied from one decade to the next in the eighteenth century. The Ordenanzas del Corso were the clearest example of this but the attitudes of the colonial authorities, the distribution of privateering licenses and the terms by which a corsair was considered valid or not also demonstrated how the same events evoked different reactions at different times. The first two chapters of this thesis have provided important background and general information on the topic at hand. The following two chapters will discuss the Dominican corsairs in depth. Chapter Three examines the mechanics

of eighteenth century corsair expeditions out of Santo Domingo and Chapter Four studies the careers of three Dominican corsairs of the time period.

FOOTNOTES

1. AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 800. Extracto Formado de los Proyectos y Dictamenes dado al Rey sobre Puntos de Corso en America. San Lorenzo, 30 Octubre, 1752.
2. G. Walker Politica Espanola y Comercio Colonial, 1700-1789 (Barcelona 1979) Chap. VII.
3. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 258. Testimonio de Autos de los Bandos publicados, asi en la ciudad como en las demas de la tierra dentro de esta Isla sobre las Providencias que el Sr. Presidente, Governador y Capitan General ha dado en impedir los ilicitos comercios en las costas de esta Isla contra extranjeros, en vitud de las repetidas ordenes que estan expedidas sobre este asunto. Santo Domingo, 13 Octubre, 1724. See Chapter 4 for details on the Campuzanos.
4. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 258. Carta del Fiscal de la Audiencia de Santo Domingo, D. Juan Carrillo Moreno a S.M. 2 Abril, 1725. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 309. Autos sobre la presa de la fregata inglesa, El Dorado por D. Jose Campuzano y Polanco. Santo Domingo, 1729-1730.
5. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1098. Carta del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Manuel Azlor a S.M. 10 Noviembre, 1762.
6. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 309. Op. Cit. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2167. Carta del Governador de la Havana a S.M., 8 Octubre, 1729.
7. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1072. Carta del General de la Esquadra Inglesa, D. Carlos Estuardo (sic), al Governador

de Santo Domingo. 2 Septiembre, 1730. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1072. Real Cedula a los Governadores de Indias. Sevilla, 14 Diciembre, 1729.

8. AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 653. Real Cedula a los Governadores de Indias. Madrid, 28 Agosto, 1739. See also:dAGI, Indiferente General, leg. 800. Declaracion. Sevilla, 8 Febrero, 1732. Lastly: AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 800. Minuta de D. Jose Patino. Madrid, 20 Diciembre, 1732.

9. AGI, Contaduria, leg. 1064, Ramo 6. Ordenanzas del Corso. Madrid, 22 Febrero, 1674. F. 11-18.

10. AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 652 Ordenanzas prescribiendo las reglas con que se ha de hacer el Corso contra Turcos, Moros, y otros Enemigos de las Corona (Madrid, 1718).

11. AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 652. Real Cedula a los Governadores de Indias. San Ildefonso, 9 Agosto, 1738. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2167. Carta del Governador de la Havana, D. Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas a S.M., 6 Junio, 1739.

12. AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 654. Real Cedula a los Governadores de Indias. Buen Retiro, 7 Febrero, 1756. See also AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 800. Minuta de la Ordenanza del Corso. s.f.

13. AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 654. Ordenanzas prescriviendo las reglas con que se ha de hacer el Corso de Particulares contra Enemigos de la Corona. (Madrid, 1762).

14. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 243. Minuta al Governador de Santo Domingo. San Lorenzo, 10 Diciembre, 1740. See also AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2167. Carta del Governador de Cuba, Cagigal a S.M. 9 Enero, 1740.

15. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 277. Minuta de Consulta. Consejo de Indias, 22 Julio, 1747. See also the follpwing: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 920. Minuta al Governador de Santo Domingo. Madrid, 6 Octubre, 1747;AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1072. Memorial de D. Francisco Duarte, Contramaestre de la balandra, San Antonio, de la que es Capitan, Martin Hixiart. Santo Domingo, 1745; AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1098--Carta del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Pedro de Zorilla de San Martin al Marques de Ensenada. 26 Marzo, 1749.

16. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 922. Consulta, Consejo de Indias, 7 Enero, 1771. See also the following: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 927. Memorial de D. Pedro Iesca, apoderado de D. Pedro Hervier, legatario Universal de D. Ventura de la Gadia que con su paquebot, El Emprehendedor, apreso a un paquebot ingles en la punta de Puerto Rico sobre cuyo hecho se estan siguiendo autos. Santo Domingo, 21 Mayo, 1771; Also, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 975. Testimonio de Autos sobre dos balandra apresadas por Lorenzo Daniel. Informe del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Manuel Azlor. 20 Febrero, 1762; AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 984. Informe del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Jose Solano, 24 Marzo, 1774.

17. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1098. Carta del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Francisco Rubio al Marques de Ensenada. 10 Septiembre, 1751.

18. AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 800. Informe de D. Jose Carvajal y Lancaster. Madrid, 17 Septiembre, 1752.

19. See R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1936) pp. 39-41.

20. AGI, Escribania de Camara, leg. 9B. Testimonio de Autos sobre el apresamiento que hizo el Capitan D. Benito de Socorras, del pinque nombrado Jorge Cornelius Calf, su Capitan, Nicolas Vandermeer, Teniente de los Estados de Holanda, seguido por los derechos y el Sr. Fiscal de S.M. que se declaro por de comiso por esta Real Audiencia y chancelacion a donde fueron por apelacion de la determinacion del Sr. Presidente. Santo Domingo, 1725-1738. Also refer to: AGI, Contaduria, leg. 1064, Ramo 6. Autos Fiscales del Consejo contra Benito Socorras Aguero, Capitan de una fregata corsaria de Santo Domingo sobre diferentes presas hechas por el y le acompaña otros autos formados por los Oficiales Reales de esta Caja sobre la misma materia y comisos y denuncias hechas al mismo Capitan. Santo Domingo, 1689, 1724, 1731, 1734, 1735.

21. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 266. Carta del Marques de Ensenada a D. Jose Ignacio de Goyeneche. Buen Retiro, 24 Marzo, 1752. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 275. Lista de varias embarcaciones que reclama la nacion Britanica a

la corte de Espana por haber sido apresadas recientamente por las guardacostas Espanoles y conducidas a Santo Domingo, en contravencion de la buena correspondencia que se debe observar entre las dos naciones, en virtud de los Tratados de Paz. 1753. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 278. Minutas de Consultas, Consejo de Indias, 19 Octubre, 1753;and AGI Santo Domingo, leg. 920. Consulta, Consejo de Indias, 19 Octubre, 1753.

22. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 283. Real Cedula a los Governadores de Indias. Aranjuez, 26 Junio, 1752. In Autos sobre la aprehension de la goleta francesa, La Laureona...F.81v.-84. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 942. Testimonio de Autos sobre lo executada por Ingleses con el aviso NS de las Tres Fuentes y de otros insultos contra otras embarcaciones espanoles. Santo Domingo, 1757; and AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 654. Orden General a los Governadores de Indias, Madrid, 27 Enero, 1756.

Chapter 3: The Dominican Corsairs: Their Expeditions and Prizes

Given the vagaries of war and seafaring, each corsair expedition was a unique experience. Since privateers, unlike pirates, operated under the protection of the law, however, a statutory framework stereotyped their activities to a much greater degree than would otherwise have been the case. Thus, it is possible to describe the "typical" voyage, without pretending that the legal ideal which it represented constituted a behavioral norm. Nonetheless, despite the distance between statute and reality, the legal obligations which corsairs assumed implied a series of highly procedural steps, which have left extensive traces of their activities in colonial and metropolitan archives. This documentation permits modern historians to put flesh on the bare bones of law, and allows them to be certain that the ideal had more than a passing resemblance to reality.

In what follows, corsair expeditions are examined from the time an armádor applied for a license to the moment when he paid off his crew with their share of the prize's cargo. Rather than drawing on evidence from one particular expedition, and in order to give a more complete picture of the period, the material for the chapter comes from a variety of voyages organized between 1720 and 1775. As seen in Table I below, there is a certain uneveness of privateer activites during the time period. This is best explained by comparing the frequency of corsair incidents with the historical periods of peace and war in

which they occurred. Logically, there were more expeditions and prizes during the decade of war from 1739-1748 and in 1761-1762. The period before 1739 was generally peaceful, marked by two single years of hostilities between the Spanish and English in 1718 and 1727. Hence, there were fewer expeditions and prizes. Lastly, the years following 1763 were once more peaceful and the unusually high proportion of incidents is due to one particular corsair's efforts (Lorenzo Daniel) in 1774. For that reason, Table I, which shows the number of prizes taken between 1720-1774 demonstrates that corsair activities are best understood by the period in which they happened rather than by studying them in isolated years. With that in mind, the tables in this chapter which refer to specific aspects of corsair expeditions and prizes will do so in terms of historical periods of war and peace.

The chapter concentrates on the granting of licenses, corsair ships and their crew, the prizes themselves; their size, cargo and site of capture, the legal proceedings for a prize once she was brought into Santo Domingo, what happened to both the corsairs and the prisoners while the government determined the sentence and finally, the consequences of the tribunal's decision to consider a prize as legitimate or not. The material for this chapter comes from the data in Appendices I and II which compile information on 159 corsair expeditions and their prizes. The first appendix contains information from which tables were drawn to form an integral part of the chapter. The second appendix has information which, although it compliments and expands on

Table I. Corsair Incidents

Years	Number of Incidents
1763-1774	24
1761-1762	16
1749-1760	16
1739-1748	85
1720-1739	18
Total	159

the material found in the first appendix, was not in itself complete enough to make any conclusions in tabular form.

Licenses for Corsairs

To organize a corsair expedition, an armador had to obtain a license. The initial Ordenanzas del Corso of 1674 specified that the King was the only authority entitled to do so but, of course, this was impractical for the Indies. Accordingly, the crown decreed that colonial governors could grant licenses to appropriate individuals.[1] In the case of Santo Domingo, the Governor granted a license for three to six month periods once the armador had provided certain information. This included proof of his solvency, the name of the ship he wanted to use with details of its armament and number of crew needed, the name and credentials of the captain to command the ship and lastly, an understanding that he would not take a ship belonging to a nation at peace with Spain unless it were involved in illicit trade.

In the preceding chapter the document itself was discussed. It was shown that it was lengthy and that its format did not change substantially over the course of the eighteenth century. Often it included the 1674 Ordenanzas in the preamble and then specific permission for the armador to outfit his expedition. An example of such a license was that granted for three months to Manuel Ignacio de Orbaiz, a resident of Santo Domingo by Governor

Alfonso de Castro on January 15, 1740. Orbaiz was given permission to:

> undertake corsair activities along the coasts and waters coasts and waters of these Indies and for the said time, may take all and any ships belonging to pirates and enemies of the crown, whether they be merchant on war ships. Permission is granted to search inlets, rivers and bays where merchant ships might be trading, and once apprehending them their cargo is to be registered and the ship brought to this port or that which is closest so that the Governor and Treasury officials can proceed as per the Royal Decrees. I ask order and require that wherever the said Joseph Antonio (the captain of the ship) should arrive, he is to be given all honours, liberties, privileges and considerations which he might need and ask for in the Royal name of His Majesty ....[2]

There was no particular time of the year when more licenses were requested or distributed although, during war years, the crown encouraged the Governor to grant more licenses. Furthermore, it was possible to hold several licenses at once from various governments over a short period of time. In June and July 1720, Benito Socorras received licenses from the Governors of Cartagena

and Santiago de Cuba to outfit expeditions. Soon after, he obtained a license from the Governor of Barbacoa, Cuba and one from the Governor of Santo Domingo.[3]

Finding sufficient financial backing to obtain a license was the main difficulty for the armador. Although the crown supported corsairs on the whole, colonial officials did not always believe they were an asset to the island. Local merchants found it easier and cheaper to deal directly with foreign traders. The corsairs, by bringing in captured cargo and thus making contraband a legal commodity, not only increased the sale price of the cargo, but also discouraged foreign traders from coming to the island. As a result, it is not surprising to read that the Governor of Santo Domingo made it difficult for the Campuzano brothers to find backers for their expeditions in the late 1720's. The Campuzanos complained to the crown that the Governor only accepted the backing of a selected three or four merchants of the city. Understandably, the merchants were not likely candidates to finance corsair expditions and so the Governor had virtually cut off support to all the armadores. In April 1728, the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies wrote from Madrid that the governor must grant licenses more freely to those men who had the support of any financially secure resident of the island. [4] With this, the crown was clearly encouraging the corsairs of Santo Domingo and ended the letter by praising them for their good work.

The documentation on corsair activities allows the compilation of a substantial list of armadores and captains which are in Appendix III. There are six armadores whose names appear most frequently in the Dominican documents. As one might suspect, those individuals who financed the majority of expeditions did so during the war years from 1739-1748. These were: Silvestre Firpo, Domingo Herrera, Francisco Ayala and Gonzalo Castro. Jose Campuzano was active in the pre-1739 period and he follows in order of importance. Finally, there is Antonio Serrano who financed many of the expeditions during the war of 1761-1762.

It is not so easy to conclude who the most active captains were. Many of them only appear once or twice in the documentation as commanders of corsairs. Perhaps they then moved on to other jobs having led an expedition as an interim occupation. Or perhaps they received a corsair license from another Spanish colony and so disappear from the Dominican papers. Others were captains for a while and then became armadores while still other captains commanded one ship while financing another. Nonetheless, it seems that the names of Diego de Sanchez Toro in the 1740's and Lorenzo Daniel in the 1750-1775 period, were most often cited as privateer captains.

There are some difficulties in ascertaining the roles all these individuals played in corsair activities. Many of the names in the documentation do not indicate whether the men were armadores or captains of an expedition. While some deductions could be made, there is a considerable list of unspecified names

in Appendix III. For example, while it is clear that Manuel Lechuga was a prominent captain in the 1740's, the documentation only mentions him in that specific role twice. Thus, though it is possible to identify the names of Dominicans involved in privateering, this is not always the case with the actual roles they played.

Outfitting an Expedition

With a license in hand, the armador prepared for the expedition. The ship he used was either owned entirely by him, in part with another financier or with the Captain he chose to lead the expedition. Throughout the eighteenth century, the most common type of ship used by Dominican corsairs was a sloop, as seen below in Table II. This was a fast single-masted ship with one deck. Schooners were also used to a lesser extent. The corsairs did not use bigger two and three masted vessels like frigates, brigs and packet-boats too often. Benito Socorras used one in the capture of a prize off Saona in 1720 but this was a rare instance. During the War of Jenkins' Ear, piraguas, a type of canoe, were used, presumably for local patrols of the island and there are references to other small vessels. All the ships, however, tended to carry sufficient arms to engage in gunnery combat with their prizes.[5]

The ships themselves often had a curious and mixed history. Governor Azlor discovered in 1761 that the corsair La Fortuna, armed in Cayos de San Luis with a French license was actually

the same sloop as the Spanish San Antonio bought by Lorenzo Daniel in Jamaica. Daniel outfitted his ship with Spanish and French crew and then travelled with licenses from both countries at the same time although neither country was aware of the other's license. When he found out, Azlor informed the Saint Domingue and Daniel's license was cancelled immediately.[6] Once the colonial authorities declared a prize valid, the privateers often outfitted it as another corsair, especially if it was a bigger and faster ship than their own. Such was the case with the Bedford, a packetboat from Philadelphia displacing 120 tons. Spanish corsairs captured the ship and she was sold in public auction in Martinique to Santiago and Cesar Mendez in August 1761. The following month, the Mendez brothers armed the ship in Santo Domingo with 14 cannons, and 166 crew. She sailed under the command of Ventura de Messendern, a lieutenant from Saint Domingue.[7] The authorities however, were not always advised when a corsair exchanged one ship for another. During one of Lorenzo Daniel's expeditions in the 1770's, he captured a Bermudian sloop near Puerto Rico which was larger, faster and better armed than his own. In the battle to take the sloop, Daniel's ship was wrecked and many of his crew drowned. Unconcerned, Daniel simply took the sloop as his, found more crew in Puerto Rico and continued the expedition. He arrived back in Santo Domingo and no-one noticed the difference for some time.[8]

Appendix I does not provide enough data on the size of a corsair crew to make any precise statements. Notwithstanding,

Table II. Corsair Vessel Types

Type	Number of Incidents
Frigate (a)	2
Brig (b)	1
Packet Boat (c)	3
Schooner (d)	5
Sloop (e)	38
Galley	1
Barge	5
Total	55

(a) Three-masted, ship-rigged vessels, usually with two gun decks

(b) Small two-masted, ship-rigged vessel.

(c) Similar to either a frigate or, more often, a brig.

(d) Two-masted vessel with fore-and-aft rigging.

(e) Small one-masted vessel.

the information given in Table III enables one to make some comments on crew sizes and how they changed over time. The number of crew aboard a corsair varied but usually there were between 50 and 60 men. In the 1720's, expeditions were smaller and there were sometimes only 20 men aboard but from 1720 on, there was a minimum of 40 crew. In 1741, the sloop Triton carried 115 men which was unusual, but in the 1760's there were often more than 70 on board. Since the men received no salary, but rather a pre-determined share of any prize taken, it was an advantage if the crew was small. On the other hand, after 1740 when crews were often larger, the prize cargo was more valuable.

The armador contracted his men for a specific period of time and during a long expedition there might be a turnover of crew. Jeronimo Monje boarded Benito Socorras' corsair, San Francisco Javier in Puerto Rico in August 1723. Joseph de Aleman y Moliero, notary, boarded the Francisco Javier in Santiago de Cuba in December 1723 and Francisco Exmeresildo got on the ship at Puerto de Principe in April 1724.[9] The crew were not always trained soldiers or sailors but rather men in search of work and adventure. Jose del Rosario, age 23, was a stonecutter from Havana who found work on a corsair operating out of Puerto Rico in the 1740's. Jeronimo de la Candelaria was a black criollo from Havana, a tailor by profession and he worked on a Cuban corsair during the same time period. Both these men were captured from their respective ships and sold as slaves. They eventually turned up in New York and Philadelphia trying to get back to the closest Spanish port.

Table III. Corsair Crew Size



Often corsair crew members were asked in a court testimony why they had chosen this particular profession. More often than not, they would simply reply that they had to earn their living and this was what was available.[10] This comment is surely a reflection of the unemployment problem in the Spanish West Indies by the eighteenth century. At the same time however, the lack of job opportunities was precisely the reason for the success of such entrepreneurial activities as privateering.

Once the armador had chosen his ship and crew, he stocked the ship with provisions for the expedition. This was no small job! In Appendix IV there is information on the many items armadores needed for their ships and the costs they entailed. Between April and December 1740, Domingo Herrera, one of that decade's important armadores, bought the following for his corsair: 462 lbs. of gunpowder, 300 lbs. of shot, over 300 lbs. of cannon wick, 300 lbs. of cannon balls, 15 muskets and 50lbs. of cord.[11] These were the items most commonly purchased but there are also references to such things as lances and machetes. Lastly, the armador purchased the food stuffs, spare pieces of rigging, candles, wine and any necessary tools for repairs at sea. Although he attempted to outfit the ship with all the possible things he needed, the crew often raided a prize for supplies the moment it was captured. The crew of Domingo Sanchez' El Rosario went aboard the English Caesar three times after capturing it in the fall of 1748. They took clothing from the crew as well as cheese, oil, gunpowder, and muskets.[12]

The Corsairs' Prizes

Dominican corsairs captured merchant and warships throughout the eighteenth century. Certain aspects of the expeditions changed over time: the average corsair ship became bigger because all vessel types became larger over the course of the century. Hence, crews became bigger as well. On the whole however, one is able to generalize about privateer vessels. The same is true of the prizes and particularly so as regards their size, nationality, place of capture and cargo.

Not only were sloops the most common ship used by the corsairs, they were also the vessel type privateers captured most often. Of 159 ships taken from 1720-1774, 85 were sloops. Looking at Appendix I, it is interesting to see that sloops were consistently taken more often than any other type of vessel. Schooners were also popular prizes just as they were frequently used as corsairs. Navios and frigates, the largest ships were rarely captured. They appear as prizes during the War of Jenkins' Ear and it can safely be assumed that in most of these cases they were warships. The only other two frigates taken in the period were in 1724 and 1730 so one can not conclude that later expeditions always took larger ships. Indeed, the prey of the privateer did not change substantially over time. The breakdown of ships captured then is as follows:

Table IV. Prize Vessel Type

Type	Number of Incidents	Percentage
Frigate or Ship	12	9.7
Brig	5	4.0
Packet Boat	9	7.3
Schooner	36	29.2
Sloop	51	41.4
Other	10	8.1
Total	123	100.0

Over half the ships were captured during the decade 1739 to 1748 when Spain was at war with England. Of the 149 for which there is information, 79 were taken at this time.[13] Consequently, looking at the nationality of the prizes, it is no surprise to see that most of them are English and Dutch. Of the 149 entries, 39% are English and 44% are Dutch. By comparison, the French and Danish entries are few. Over the whole period only 11% of the prizes were French and nearly all of the Danish ships date from Lorenzo Daniel expeditions in 1774.

Ships were taken from all over the Caribbean. At times, privateers took prizes in the outlying lesser Antilles and Turks Islands north of Santo Domingo but in general, the most patrolled areas through the whole time period were those close to home. As a result, a study of the prizes shows that most of them were taken in the waters around Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. During the 1739-1748 period, many corsairs ventured to Tierra Firme and took vessels near Caracas, Curacao and Coro. On either side of the war however, expeditions south were infrequent and were reserved for only the most ambitious of corsairs: the Campuzano brothers in the 1720's and Lorenzo Daniel in the 1750-1760 decade. For the other privateers, there was enough to keep them busy around Santo Domingo and perhaps the extra expense of mounting a longer expedition was not worth the risk of coming back empty-handed.

For many of the prizes of the War of Jenkins's Ear, cargo lists are not available. Nevertheless, in examining the cargo

Table V. Prize Flag

	Period				
	1720-1739	1739-1748	1749-1760	1761-1762	1763-1774
Flag					
English	9	30	2	9	8
Dutch	8	40	10	4	3
French	0	8	3	0	6
Danish	0	1	0	1	7

aboard the remaining prizes for the whole period, more than any other item, black slaves figure in the registers. Sometimes corsairs captured ships carrying only five or six slaves but often prizes arrived in Santo Domingo with literally hundreds of slaves aboard. In 1729, the Campuzanos' three corsair ships captured two English ships with a total of 189 slaves. In 1730, Manuel Marocho took an English frigate with 176 slaves aboard. In two separate expeditions in 1745 a ship armed by Martin Hixiart took two English frigates with 25 slaves and two years later Silvestre Firpo's vessel took a 22 cannon frigate carrying 192 slaves.[14]

These slaves were extremely necessary for the island because as discussed in Chapter 1, the major problem in Santo Domingo at the beginning of the century was its lack of working population. Throughout the period running from 1720-1774, slaves arrived on the island and made a major impact on the economy. As the island was in such dire need of a labour force, the value of these prizes was higher than those carrying other cargo items. The corsairs who took ships with slaves were sure to have their prize declared valid very quickly and receive a considerable sum of money as their share. The local authorities valued the two Campuzano ships at over 35,000 pesos and Manuel Marocho's at 20,347 pesos. Nearly twenty years later Firpo's ship was also worth upwards of 30,000 pesos.[15]

Black slaves were not the only commodity needed on the island at this time. The corsairs provided the local inhabitants

with various other items that were also in great demand. From 1720-1775, the eight most common items taken off the prizes were: slaves, textiles, skins, aguardiente, cacao, sugar and wood. An exception to this information as tabulated below is the cargo from Lorenzo Daniel's expeditions in 1774. For some unknown reason the items aboard the prizes at this time were completely different. For one thing there do not appear to have been any slaves aboard although this may be a fault of the documentation. Instead, there were large amounts of wood, tobacco and skins. As well, the registers list other items like bricks, iron and metal cooking pots.

There were of course other items that the islanders needed and obtained in lesser quantities from the prizes. Some of these were: cheese, flour, salt, treacle, salted meat, dyewood, wine, beer and coffee. Ivory was on many of the prizes during the 1740's and small amounts of gold and silver appeared on the registers sporadically throughout the time period.

Legal Procedures for Prizes

Once the corsairs stopped a ship and decided its cargo or documents were suspicious, they escorted it into the nearest Spanish port. Attention then focused on whether the captured vessel was a buena (good) or a mala (bad) prize. The Reales Cedulas of 1734 and 1738 advised the colonial governors to search any foreign ship, especially Dutch or English ones, for Spanish produce or contraband.[15] There was nothing the crown feared more than her colonies becoming self-sufficient by acquiring

Table VI. Prize Cargo, 1720-1770

Item	Percentage
1. Slaves	18.2
2. Textiles	11.4
3. Skins	7.4
4. Aguardiente	6.7
5. Cocoa	6.0
6. Sugar	4.0
Wood	4.0
Wax	4.0

Note: This table does not include Lorenzo Daniels's expeditions in 1774. Information on the cargo from those prizes is in Appendix I.

basic commodities via contraband rather than from Spanish flag vessels.

The point of the lengthy legal proceedings then, was to ascertain if the ship had either 1) been anchored in Spanish waters or 2) been travelling on a route that did not lead directly to her destination. Either of these two situations could imply that the ship had been selling contraband to the colonies or else acquiring Spanish goods for her government. Such charges, however, were not always easy to prove. Perhaps the ship had dropped anchor only long enough to send men ashore for water or wood. Or perhaps the weather had been bad and the ship had been blown off course. Most difficult of all to prove was whether certain cargo such as cacao or logwood was actually from a Spanish colony or in fact from Curacao or Jamaica where they were also cultivated.

All these complex issues became the subject of the legal hearings carried out by the Intendants, Governors or Ministros de la Marina and the form of these did not change much over the century.[16] The first step was a visit to the captured ship when she arrived in the harbour. The Treasury officials went aboard to examine the cargo and seal or lock it so that neither the ship's crew or the corsairs would have access to it. At times, the cargo was unloaded and stored in the Royal warehouses. A Fiscal and a Guardamayor assisted the officials and a notary wrote down details of the cargo and the ship: its fittings, rigging, number of cannon and so on.

Following this, there was a period of questioning of both the crew of the privateer and the captured ship. Standard questions were put to both groups. Spaniards were asked where they had taken the ship, what its cargo was, if there had been any slaves on the ship, if there had been any resistance by the foreign crew and whether the captain of the corsair had treated the prisoners well as they proceeded to Santo Domingo. The questions to the prisoners pertained to their port of departure and destination, what they had been doing when the corsairs discovered them and why. Curiously enough, the foreigners would often blurt out that they had in fact been trading with Spaniards and mention where and with whom.[17] They would say that they did not know that it was illegal to trade with the Spanish colonies. They were also asked about the cargo on their ship and if they had had any slaves aboard. Finally, every witness gave his name, age, and place of birth.

After the testimonies, the Fiscal usually had enough evidence to state whether the ship was a valid prize or not. If it was not, the cargo and ship were returned and the ship continued its trip. More often however, the ship was declared buena and the next step of examining the cargo and placing a value on it took place. The government named two men to estimate the value of the ship's cargo. One of these men was usually an Alferez (Subaltern). Then, there were another two men, often a master carpenter and master caulker, who placed a value on the ship itself. The procedure was very detailed as each and every

part of the prize received a value. A summary of this is illustrated below for the French sloop taken by Joseph Antonio Bautista in 1743.[18]

Although the Ordenanzas stressed how important it was to complete the legal proceedings as quickly as possible, these seldom took less than a couple of months to complete and often up to a year or longer.[19] As early in the century as 1728, the crown told the Audiencia of Santo Domingo to complete the cases on prizes immediately or the corsairs would be unable to continue their service to the crown.[20] The delays were due to a variety of reasons. Sometimes there was a backlog of cases and at other times there was a complication in the case requiring further investigation. After 1752, it meant waiting for the sentence to be approved by Madrid before the ship and cargo were put up for auction.[21] At the worst, there might be an appeal by the foreign nation contesting the sentence which inevitably meant an even longer wait. What happened to both the corsairs and prisoners then, while they waited for the court's sentence?

Waiting for the Sentence on a Prize.

Many of the corsairs experienced considerable financial difficulty while waiting for a verdict on a particular prize. Manuel Lechuga took a Dutch sloop, La Mistela, off the coast of Caracas in 1748. Due to the controversy over the ship's sentence however, the crown did not resolve the case until 1756. When the ship was finally declared buena, Lechuga received his share of

Table VII. Value of a French Sloop, 1743 (in Pesos).

Item	Value
30 Mules	23 each
514 Pounds blackberries	.8 each
6 Slaves	130-150 each
2 Dinghies	4 each
Ship's hull, pump, masts, canoe	650 total
Main sail	140
Fore sail	15
Top sail	17.5
2 Anchors with cables	50
10 Iron and wooden water barrels	24

5,200 pesos.[22] In the meantime, the corsair presumably had to pay his crew out of his savings so as not to tarnish his name as a worthy captain. Joseph Antonio Salazar must have found himself in even more difficult circumstances as he wrote to Madrid in 1764. His ship N. S. Concepcion had been responsible for the capture of six ships. He did not know the verdict on any of the ships, although two of them had been sent out on "missions of service to the King" The other four were sitting in the harbour slowly rotting.[23] The deterioration of a ship and her cargo affected the corsairs directly for the less they were worth by the end of the court case, the less the corsair could expect to receive from his expedition. The most extreme example of a pending case was that of ten prizes taken 1751-1752 by Domingo Sanchez' sloop N. S. Popa, which had not been resolved by September 1771.[24] To make matters more difficult, the armador was theoretically responsible for the expenses of a captured ship's upkeep and prisoners' care while the case was in progress. In fact, he was only supposed to cover these expenses if the court decided the ship was not a valid prize. Otherwise, the Treasury Officials deducted the amount from the value of the prize before the armador received his share. Nevertheless, there are examples of armadores paying for the prisoners' and ships' upkeep before the court announced the sentence. Lorenzo Daniel paid 430 pesos to cover the period from April to June 1762 while the case of his prize, the English brig, Nancy was in court. These expenses included food and water for the prisoners and a

watchman and candles to guard the prize. During the unloading of the ship's cargo, costs included the wages, food and aguardiente for the men and extra refreshments for the Treasury Officials. Then there were the fees of the men who appraised the cargo, the notary, the Guardamayor and lastly, a mysterious 100 pesos for gratificaciones.[25]

With these sorts of costs, it was not unusual for the armador to take prisoners to his house. There were not often more than ten officers and crew to be provided for and one can assume that the care was the most basic. It was public knowledge that Jose Campuzano took home some of the prisoners from his prize in 1728 while awaiting the court's verdict.[26] A more detailed example is that of the prisoners from the English Bonito taken by Juan Beltrand's brig, El Dichoso in 1751. Beltrand first took the prisoners to his own house but after a few days, he moved them to a friend's house named Diego Felipe. After several more days however, the prisoners' scandalous behaviour brought complaints from the whole neighbourood and a notary went to Felipe's house to investigate. There he met a woman who took care of the house and she gave a vivid account of the prisoners' fights with each other and their threats to the neighbors. One night the woman had arrived to find "blood running over the floor and out of the front door as they tried to kill a young black girl". The notary was horrified and made other arrangements for the men for the duration of the legal hearing.[27]

The captured captains often fared better than their crew especially if the Audiencia permitted them to sell some of their cargo. The Governor gave permission on the pretense that the case might take a long while to be resolved and in the meantime, some of the cargo might be ruined. In actual fact it is more likely, that as the island was always in desperate need of provisions, a chance was not to be missed to obtain them. In December 1748, Edward Sparks received a license from the Dominican government to sell some of his cargo while the case of his ship Caesar was in court because "the city needs supplies". He sold 72 barrels of flour weighing 12,650 lbs, 30 small barrels of butter, beer, cider, cheese, and soap.[28] In June 1751, three months after John Macleave's Bonito had been in the harbour of Santo Domingo the Governor was persuaded to let the English captain sell his perishable cargo:

> ...and realizing that the captured cargo is of natural and perishable kind and the cost of keeping pigs and sheep fed high when it would be more useful to sell them publicly...and considering the great need of things our people need in these times when supplies are not to be found anywhere...we believe you should order all these things to be sold by public auction...[29]

As a result, Macleave sold the animals to the local residents

as well as the salt meat, butter and flour from the Bonito.

The Verdict on a Prize

When the legal proceedings were over, the sentence on the prize dictated one of two possibilities. The court decided that based on the evidence, the ship was either buena or mala. If she was mala, the authorities returned the ship, cargo and crew to the captain. The armador paid the expenses and sometimes the court costs depending on the case. If he was unable to pay these, they became the Audiencia's responsibility. The estimate of the expenses incurred varied tremendously depending on whose calculations they were based, the foreign captain's or the armador's. Macleave and the crew of the Bonito remained in Santo Domingo for 26 months awaiting their sentence which eventually fell in favour of the English. During this time, the ship sank in a storm in the harbour and unfortunately, the officials in charge of the case had not noted the details of the ship's size very carefully. Thus when it came to repaying Macleave the English captain demanded more than 16,000 pesos. The Audiencia simply refused to pay such an exorbitant amount, especially when the man had made a considerable profit from selling his cargo to the islanders. Finally, the Audiencia agreeed to pay Macleave 5,200 pesos and the case ended.[30]

If the court declared the prize buena, the procedure was straightforward as long as there was no appeal to the sentence. An appeal meant months or even years of delay. To begin with, the Spanish ministers stalled by saying that they had not yet

received copies of the case from Santo Domingo. Often, they waited for the captain rather than his ambassador to make the appeal and this took time if the captain was in jail or out of funds. Then, the Consejo did not allow new evidence in a court appeal and this acted against the claimants. If the Consejo did decide that for diplomatic reasons, it was best to return the ship, a Cedula was issued accordingly. Nonetheless, the colonial authorities could protest that the Cedula was forged or that the value of the ship could only be restored at the port where the court case had taken place. This meant a long and costly trip and by this time, the ship and cargo might have been sold. Thus, it was virtually impossible to get back the original value of the cargo. As a consequence, claimants usually turned to their own governments where they might receive a more efficient and complete solution to their problem.[31]

In most cases then, when a prize was considered valid, there were no appeals. If the armador wanted to keep the ship because it was larger or in better condition than his own, he did so after paying the required duties for it. Otherwise, both the ship and her cargo were put up for public auction. The buyers were most often officials, merchants or other corsairs. In the case of the Dutch pinque, Cornelius Calf in 1725, Subaltern Nicolas Guridi and Sergeant Diego Garcia bought some of the sugar, hats, cloth and silk. The biggest buyer however, was Robert Gilbreth who acted in the name of Samuel Colet, the representative for the Asiento of the South Sea Company in Santo

Domingo. He paid cash for the rest of the pinque's cargo of skins, tobacco, brazilwood, and barrels of lemon and orange peel.[32] The money from this and all auctions was then deposited in the Treasury. The Treasury Officials deducted various amounts from the sales before the armador and his crew received their share.

First, there were the expenses of having looked after the prisoners, the ship, the anchorage fees and various officials' wages. Then there was the amount demanded by the crown. This sum varied depending on how positive the crown felt towards privateering activities. In 1674, no duties to the crown were mentioned in the Ordenanzas. By 1718, the crown wanted 8%, the almorjarifazgo tax from all prizes. And in 1733, the crown demanded not only the 8% of the prize's value but another 5% as well. At the beginning of the War of Jenkin's Ear, the crown reduced its dues to the almojarifazgo alone, and by 1745, declared that no duties were to be paid for the duration of the war. Nonetheless, corsairs were obliged to pay tax the profit from the sale of the prize's cargo.

After 1748 with peace restored, prizes continued to be exempt from duties and taxes. When the crown discovered however, that nothing had been paid on the profits from the sale of the cargo belonging to the Dutch Principe de Orange, it enforced strict control once more. In a Royal Cedula dated February 1756 and then in the Ordenanzas of 1762, Madrid stated that both the 8% and 5% were due from each and every prize. By this later

date of course, Spain was at war again with England. Governor Azlor wrote from Santo Domingo requesting that the privateers be freed from paying any duties as decreed during the previous war of the 1740's. In fact it is not really clear to what extent the crown's decision to free corsairs of paying duties during war periods was carried out. There is evidence that some almojarifazgo was paid on prizes throughout the 1740's. After the war, individual armadores made appeals made to the crown by individual armadores to be reimbursed for money they had paid in taxes during the war. What is certain, is that all armadores were expected to pay some sort of tax to the crown throughout the period 1720-1774 but the type of tax and the amount varied depending on the crown's desire to extract this sum.[33]

After the officials deducted all the expenses, taxes, and duties from the total value of the prize, they divided the rest proportionately between the armador and his crew. The armador received half the amount. The other half went to the Captain of the ship who got three shares, the Lieutenant who received two shares, the officials (pilot, quartermaster, carpenter, doctor, etc.) with their one and a half shares and finally the rest of the crew who received one share each. An example of this breakdown is the distribution of the cargo value from a Dutch schooner captured by Diego de Toro's El Vitogue in 1747.[34] In the distribution of the cargo from a French sloop in 1743, the armador, Manuel Ignacio Orbiz and the captain, Joseph Antonio Bautista fared better. The value of the prize was 2,360 pesos

after all the deductions. The armador received 1,171 reales and because there were only 12 crew aboard, each of these received 97 pesos as his share. [35]

The last step of all was to determine the fate of the prisoners from the prize. It is not entirely clear what happened to the prisoners in every case. In 1724, the Fiscal of Santo Domingo, D. Juan Carrillo Moreno, suggested an extreme plan. He was determined to rid the island of illicit commerce and believed that the captains of the prizes should be executed and the crews serve on Spanish galleys. Four years later, the Governor complained to the Crown about Carrillo's plan and indeed it seems that the death penalty was never enforced. Nonetheless, prisoners often did serve on the ships returning to Spain. Once they arrived, the Intendente de Marina decided what to do with them. During the wars with England, prisoners remained in jail and their expenses were recorded to bill the English once peace was restored. [36]

This chapter gave an overview of corsair expeditions and the procedure for claiming a prize during the period in this thesis. In conclusion, it can be said that although there were some points of difference over the time period in terms of numbers of ships taken and their cargo, it is more useful to be aware of the many similarities among 18th century corsair expeditions. In general, armadores outfitted sloops with 50-60 men and captured English or Dutch sloops in the waters around Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. They carried black slaves and

Table VIII. Distribution of the Value of a Dutch Prize, 1747

Value of the Prize:	534.0 pesos
Minus 8% Almojarifazgo	67.0 pesos
Expenses	19.5 pesos
To be Distributed	411.0 pesos

Share of the armador = 205.5 pesos

Crew's Share = 205.5 pesos (74 shares)

other basic commodities desperately needed to supply the island. During periods of war, there were always more expeditions and prizes.

Finally, the legal proceedings to declare a prize valid or not were lengthy and their outcome depended more often on the political atmosphere of the time than on the actual details of the prize's capture. Likewise, the corsairs' share of the prize varied depending on the different duties owed to the crown which changed from decade to decade. With this general impression in mind then, it is now possible to examine the specific details of three prominent Dominican corsairs of this period.

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FOOTNOTES

1. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 309. Expediente sobre la presa de la fragata por D.Jose Campuzano, 1728. Resolucion de S.M. Madrid, 4 Mayo 1728.
2. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 264. Testimonio de Autos sobre el apresamiento que hizo el Capitan Joseph Antonio Bautista, con la lancha nombrada la galera Victoria, a la nacion francesa de una balandra cargada de mulas y otros efectos. Santo Domingo, 1743.
3. AGI, Contaduria, leg 1064 Ramo 6. Testimonio de los patentes, certificaciones y otros instrumentos de servicios especiales executadas por mar y tierra por el Capitan de Mar y Guerra, D. Benito de Socorras. s.f.
4. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 309. Expediente sobre la presa..por D. Jose Campuzano. Memorial de D. Pedro y D. Jose Campuzano, 1728.
5. See Appendix I for references to artillery aboard corsairs.
6. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1098. Carta del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Manuel Azlor, 20 Julio, 1761.
7. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 984. Informe del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Joseph Solano, 24 Mayo, 1774.
8. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 986. Informe del Fiscal de Santo Domingo con Testimonio de Autos del infeliz estado en que hallo los asuntos del corso a su arrivo a dicha Isla. 26 Abril, 1779.

9. AGI, Escribania de Camara, leg. 9B. Testimonio de Autos sobre el apresamiento que hizo el Capitan D. Benito de Socorras, del pinque nombrado Jorge Cornelius Calf su Capitan Nicolas Vandermeer, Teniente de los estados de Holanda segundo por los dichos y el Sr. Fiscal de S.M. que se declaro por de comiso por esta Real Audiencia y chancelacion a donde fueron por apelacion de la determinacion del Sr. Presidente. Santo Domingo, 1725.

10. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1072. Testimonio de Autos obrado sobre la entrada de la balandra inglesa (Polly) y conducido por cuatro espanoles. Santo Domingo, 11 Noviembre 1748.

11. See Appendix IV.

12. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1072. Declaracion del Capitan Edward Sparks, Dueno del Cesar. Santo Domingo, 11 Noviembre 1748. This behaviour made it difficult and embarrassing for the crown when it was decided, as in the case of the Cesar, that the ship was not a valid prize and had to be returned to the English. Since none of the Spanish crew could or was prepared to give testimony as to what exactly and how much had been taken of the ship before reaching Santo Domingo, the English never received what had been aboard as she sailed to Jamaica.

13. Information on the prizes is not always complete. In Appendix I, there are 123 entries with information on the type of ship the prize was but there are more entries, namely 149, which give the prize's nationality.

14. See Appendix I for information on the years 1729, 1730, 1745.

15. AGI,Santo Domingo, leg 652. Real Cedula, San Ildefonso, 9 Agosto 1738. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2167. Carta del Governador de la Havana, D. Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas, 6 Junio 1739.

16. Ordenanzas del Corso, (1718) Capitulo 2. Ordenanzas del Corso. (1762) Capitulos 3, 4.

17. See "Observations" in Appendix II for examples of this.

18. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 264. Testimonio de Autos sobre el apresamiento que hizo el Capitan Joseph Antonio Bautista... Santo Domingo, 1743.

19. Ordenanzas del Corso, (1718) Capitulo 15. Ordenanzas del Corso, (1762) Capitulo 34.

20. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 309. Expediente sobre la presa por...D. Jose Campuzano. Real Cedula al Governador de Santo Domingo. 6 Junio, 1728.

21. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 283. Testimonio de Autos sobre la aprehension de la goleta francesa La Laureona, que con el corsario de su comando apreso a sotavento de esta puerto, Lorenzo Daniel. Santo Domingo, 1752.

22. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 920. Consulta del Consejo de Indias. Madrid, 30 Julio 1756.

23. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 975. Testimonio de Autos sobre la venta de los barcos y cargazones, presas del corsario del cargo de Diego Serrano, su armador, D. Juan Antonio

Salazar, 1764.

24. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1071. Informe, Madrid 11 Septiembre, 1771.

25. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 975. Testimonio de Autos sobre la aprehension del bergantin ingles nombrado El Nancy. Santo Domingo, 1761-1763.

26. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 236. Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 22 Noviembre 1728.

27. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 275 Testimonio de Autos del articulo controvertido entre partes, la una D. Domingo Cevallos, armador y la otra, Juan Miclave (sic), Capitan, prisionero, sobre alimentos y litis (sic) expensas. Santo Domingo, 1751, Cuaderno 5.

28. AGI, Santo Domingo leg. 1072. Declaracion del Capitan Edward Sparks... Santo Domingo, 11 Noviembre 1748.

29. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 275. Testimonio de Autos...entre Domingo Cevallos...y...Juan Miclave. 1751.

30. AGI. Santo Domingo, leg 266. Carta del Oidor de la Audiencia de Santo Domingo, D. Antonio de la Villa Urrutia Salcedo a D. Julian Arriga. Santo Domingo, 20 Julio 1755.

31. R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763. (Oxford, 1936) pp. 24-39.

32. AGI, Escribania de Camara, leg. 9B Testmonio de Autos sobre el apresamiento que hizo el Capitan D. Benito de Socorras... Santo Domingo, 1725. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1098. Consulta del Consejo de Indias. Madrid, 1 Septiembre 1728.

33. Ordenanzas del Corso, (1674). Capitulo 12. Ordenanzas del Corso, (1718). Capitulo 3. Ordenanzas del Coso, (1762). Capitulo 46. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 920. Consulta del Consejo de Indias, Madrid, 21 Julio 1755; AGI, Santo Domingo leg. 1098. Extracto de Consulta del Consejo de Indias, Madrid, 1 Septiembre, 1763; and AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 654. Real Cedula a los Governadores de las Indias. Buen Retiro, 7 Febrero, 1756.

34. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 265. Testimonio de Autos obrados sobre la entrada en este puerto de la goleta apresada a la nacion holandesa por el Capitan Diego de Toro que lo es de la balandra, El Vitoque. Santo Domingo, 1747.

35. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 264. Testimonio de Autos sobre el apresamiento que hizo el Capitan Joseph Antonio Bautista... Santo Domingo 1743.

36. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 258. Carta del Fiscal de la Audiencia de Santo Domingo, D. Juan Carillo Moreno. Agosto, 1724. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 944. Carta del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Manuel Azlor a D. Julian Arriaga. 25 Marzo, 1771; and AGI, Caracas, leg 924. Asiento por el cual la concede S.M. permiso para que pueda navegar dos navios cada ano de 40 o 50 canones con registro de Caracas con las calidades y condiciones que se expresa. Madrid, 25 Septiembre 1728.

Chapter 4: Privateers meet their Prey: Three Biographical Sketches.

A description of corsair activities would be incomplete without touching upon the biographies of some of the leading privateering captains. The scientific advantages of institutional and quantitative approaches to history are evident. Nonetheless, the flavour of the times, like the scent of the events, is often best communicated by the life experiences faithfully detailed in the archival documentation. In that respect, the careers of the three Dominican privateers discussed below are particularly significant. Their experiences typify corsair methods and official attitudes at different times in the eighteenth century, and allow one to provide the human dimension of a business characterized by its face to face contact.

These particular privateers were chosen for several reasons. Firstly, they each represent a different time period of the thesis so that together, they cover the time span from 1720-1779. Secondly, they were not all equally successful as regards the number or value of prizes captured. In fact, by looking at Appendix III it is clear that there were other corsairs who backed or commanded as many or more expeditions as the three men below. This is, however, a good explanation for having selected these men since the wish to describe a "typical" corsair outweighed that of portraying only the most famous.

Jose Campuzano Polanco was active in the early 1700's. He and his brother Pedro financed many successful expeditions while at the same time, attaining positions of local authority. Domingo Cevallos' career unfolded in the 1750's, a decade of armistice

between England and Spain. His activities demonstrate the point that corsair expeditions continued in peace as in times of war, while the details of his career show how privateering was affected by the crown's changing attitudes. Lorenzo Daniel was by far the most important of the Dominican corsairs in the latter part of the century. His activities lay to rest any notion of Spanish colonial corsair expeditions as being small and inconsequential. Finally, the three men were characteristic of the Dominican corsairs in all time periods in that they were essentially entrepreneurs. They did not limit themselves to searching for prizes, but rather used every opportunity to participate in whatever venture came their way.

Jose Campuzano Polanco

Campuzano Polanco was one of the most energetic corsairs of the early part of the eighteenth century. Between 1718-1730, he engaged in some twenty-seven different campaigns and took over fifty ships. He was well known for his bravery and for his knowledge of the coasts and waters around Santo Domingo and Tierra Firme. Campuzano was born into a respectable family on the island around 1680 and was a soldier in the garrison of Santo Domingo early in his career. His father was a civil servant in the island government, his brother a Lieutenant Colonel in La Vega and one of his other relations was a Dominican priest on the island. By the mid-1720's, Campuzano was a Lieutenant Colonel himself and also an alderman (Regidor) of

Santo Domingo.[1]

It was possibly the Campuzano family's social status and financial background which helped Jose mount his first expeditions in 1718. During this war with the English, Campuzano sent out two ships. He held a license from the government of Santo Domingo and captured various ships until he lost his own to the enemy. Undaunted, he immediately outfitted a 20 cannon frigate and securing a license from the Viceroy of New Spain, the Marques de Valero, continued to take English ships. Between 1726 and 1727, Jose and his brother Pedro captured more than twenty English and Dutch ships. By 1730, Jose commanded three ships which cruised the waters from Santo Domingo to the coast of Tierra Firme taking English, French and Dutch ships with cargoes of slaves, flour, sugar, cotton, salt meat and small amounts of gold and silver.[2]

The corsair did not, however, always collect his share of prizes very easily. During Campuzano's career, there were three specific incidents which demonstrate how the local government manipulated events to their advantage when for diplomatic reasons, it was not convenient for him to keep a particular prize. The cases in point were: Campuzano's attempt to take a Dutch frigate off Venezuela in the early 1720's, his capture of six English ships near the island of St. Croix in 1727 and finally, his seizure of the English frigate El Dorado off Santo Domingo in 1729.

In the case of the Dutch frigate, Campuzano arrived near

Caracas with the intention of taking on a cargo of cacao and sailing to Veracruz. The interim Governor, Antonio Abreu, immediately despatched Campuzano to Puerto Cabello to capture a 36 cannon Dutch frigate, which was threatening the area. Campuzano spent more than 2,000 pesos in arms, ammunition and supplies to outfit the ship and sailed to Puerto Cabello where he expected to find the 150 men promised to him by Abreu. The corsair did not in fact find the men and being undermanned, was only able to capture the frigate's skiff. Campuzano brought the skiff into Guayra, the closest port and it was initially declared a valid prize.

Nonetheless, within a short time, the Governor reversed his decision believing that Campuzano had had a personal interest in the goods aboard the Dutch ship. Consequently, the authorities embargoed the ship and its cargo and imprisoned the corsair during the court procedures. Campuzano was let out of jail after the case but he was condemned to ten years hard labour. This charge, however, must have been reversed when the new Governor of Caracas heard Campuzano's appeal because by 1726, the corsair was once again active in Santo Domingo.[3]

In March 1727, Campuzano captured six English ships off the island of St. Croix which belonged to an illegal population there. There was ample evidence to prove the validity of the prizes. For one thing, Spain and England were at war and for another, the ships carried cargoes of dyewood from Spanish territory. Nonetheless, by August of the same year the Governor

of Santo Domingo had not yet declared the ships legal prizes and so Campuzano appealed to the authorities in Madrid. The crown took Campuzano's side and in June 1728, a Royal Cedula ordered the Dominican Governor to assist the corsairs in their expeditions since they were a great service to the crown. In the specific case of the Campuzano brothers, the colonial government was to complete court proceedings on their prizes immediately.[4]

In 1728, Jose Campuzano was both a Lieutenant Colonel and an alderman in Santo Domingo and he held a license to outfit two sloops as corsairs. In June of that year, the most controversial prize of his career sailed into the harbour of Santo Domingo. This was the English frigate, El Dorado, carrying a cargo of sugar and aguardiente. When it arrived, the Governor, Francisco de la Rocha Ferrer, declared the ship a valid prize but deposited the cargo in the Royal warehouses of the city. Campuzano protested to the crown and wrote that the Governor was maliciously attempting to destroy the corsairs on the island. By delaying the distribution of the profit from the ships and cargo, the armadores ran out of funds, their crews felt cheated and no more expeditions were being organized. Campuzano pointed out the success of de la Rocha's plan as many of the armadores and sailors had left the island and gone to Santo Marta, Cartagena and Portobelo where the authorities encouraged corsairs. The crown however, did not pursue the issue of the Governor's hostile attitudes possibly because it recognized the

animosity between Campuzano and de la Rocha. Instead, the Fiscal responded that the Governor was not supporting more expeditions because the corsairs put themselves in overly dangerous situations in their interests to serve the crown.

A more truthful explanation might have focused on the date of El Dorado's capture. Negotiations for peace between England and Spain began in March 1728 and Campuzano took the Dorado two months later in June. The crown decided that all ships taken after June 22 were to be returned to their captains except those that had been trading illicitly. Campuzano assured the crown that he had seized the ship on June 20 and his pilot testified that the ship had been carrying contraband. The English, however, disputed the date of the ship's capture and denied that she had been carrying any illegal cargo. So, if one cared to read between the lines of the response to Campuzano one could see that the Fiscal supported the Dominican authorities. By the spring of 1728, not only were the corsairs no longer needed, they were actually posing a threat to peace between the two nations.

While appeals for the release of the Dorado to the corsairs went back and forth to Spain, the ship and her cargo deteriorated in the harbour of Santo Domingo. For more than a year the ship remained anchored in the harbour by which point it was close to sinking. As for the cargo, the sugar on board was taken off and deposited in the Royal warehouses but by November 1728, it was beginning to melt due to the damp conditions. During

all this time, the cost of maintaining the ship (two or three men had to pump water out of the ship daily), looking after the prisoners and paying for the protection of the cargo, fell to Campuzano. Finally in May 1730, two years after the Dorado had arrived in Santo Domingo, Campuzano received 2,000 pesos from the Treasury Officials to compensate him for his expenditures. Nonetheless, it was not until July 1733 that the crown ordered the Audiencia to release the Dorado's cargo to the corsair. Since by then it was worthless, Campuzano was reimbursed for the losses and damages to the prize dating from the day of its capture some five years before.[5]

The above description suggests that Campuzano was a much maligned person, continually frustrated in his exploits as a privateer. The documentation, however, makes it clear that he was a cruel and fearless character. In 1728, a Consulta the Consejo de Indias in Madrid described Campuzano's recent activities which included maltreating the crew from one of his prizes at his home while awaiting the verdict on a ship. No official had dared question Campuzano's behaviour towards the foreign prisoners and the corsair actually threatened a Fiscal of the Audiencia if any action was taken against him. Evidence shows that his wife also a menace. In one instance she accosted a Fiscal as he came out of mass for not releasing her husband who, at that time, was in jail for killing the crew from two French barges he had seized. Campuzano's wife then went on and wrote "indecorous" letters to both the Archbishop and the Governor of

the island on her husband's behalf.[6]

On land, Campuzano threatened officials. At sea he intimidated other sailors. When he led the expedition which captured the Dorado, Campuzano had two sloops under his command. One of these took a Dutch sloop near Puerto Rico carrying donkeys, pigs and chickens. Campuzano ordered his men to take the chickens and pigs on board as provisions and then to burn the Dutch ship. On the same expedition, he also took two English vessels. One was taken for no apparent reason after leaving Barbados with a full cargo. After capturing it Campuzano left the Captain and seven sailors to die on the island of Bequia, near St. Vincent. When the Marques del Patiño received news of this in Madrid, he immediately sent an order to Governor de la Rocha in Santo Domingo to control, "...these wild corsarios...who live recklessly, giving orders freely to their men as they see fit..."[7]

In May 1730, Campuzano left Santo Domingo with his two ships, N.S. Popa and the Maria and captured the English brig, Hannah, sailing from Philadelphia to Jamaica. Campuzano attacked the ship off the north coast of Santo Domingo and in his description of the encounter, Captain William Annis gives a vivid picture of the corsair:

> After 50 or 60 shots, the sloop told us to send our skiff or else they would continue firing on us. By then, the second sloop was close to us and the Captain shouted

to us to tell him where we had come from and what the nature of our cargo was. Answering, I then sent our skiff to pick up the Spanish captain, Polanco and the Lieutenants of each of the sloops. They came aboard with fourteen sailors. They took hold of all our weapons and then shouted to their ships, "Buena presa". One of them put a pistol to my quartermaster's head and said, "Where is your silver? If you don't tell me, I'll shoot" Polanco took my watch and that of a passenger, Juan Felipe. Then they obliged us to set sail for the island of Saona with them. During the trip, they looted my men's chests. Once we reached Saona, they bound my hands and took much of our cargo and loaded it on to their ships. Then they forced us to sail another two hours to the island of Catalina. All through the night Polanco kept asking me questions about my destination, and why I had been sailing so close to Santo Domingo. Then he told his mates to unload more of our cargo onto their ships. He wounded my pilot seriously with his sword and threw him below deck. After these pirates had taken all

> they wanted, Polanco laughed in my face. As he let me free, he shouted, "Go off on your business"[8]

Following Annis' testimony, there is a list of the cargo which Campuzano and his men took from the Hannah. It includes items such as: 40 barrels of biscuit, 20 barrels of ham, a desk, various tools, 17 pieces of canvas, one cannon, 24 cannon balls, 12 muskets, 6 swords, 2 barrels of gunpowder, 20 lbs. gunshot and 24 of lead, 2 compasses, 6 pigs, 8 hens, 1 duck, 144 bottles white wine, 2 barrels and 72 bottles of beer, 48 bottles of aguardiente, various pieces of china, clothing, and two silver watches. This considerable record of food, armaments and other provisions would have outfitted Campuzano's ship very well and one also assumes that he made a profit selling what he did not need to merchants in Santo Domingo.

Although the violence and illegality of Campuzano's action was evident, it was a year and a half before Patiño ordered Campuzano to repay the value of the ship's cargo to Annis. One cannot assume however, that Annis received any compensation. Governor Alfonso de Castro responded to Patiño in July 1732, that Campuzano and his family had moved to Cartagena.

Had Campuzano's name become so tarnished by then that he had had to leave the island? Perhaps, for after this, there is no further mention of the corsair. By 1733, Campuzano would have been in his fifties and he may well have fixed his residence permanently in Cartagena. In the 1750's, a Jose Campuzano

Polanco, born in Coro in 1724 and later appointed Regidor and Alcalde provincial in Santo Domingo appears in the documentation. This man was most likely Campuzano's son. There is however no mention of the younger Campuzano as a corsair so possibly by this time, the family had turned to other activities.[9]

Domingo Cevallos

With the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 and the agreement to re-establish trade with Spain in 1750, the English hoped their ships would be able to sail safely through the Caribbean. They were mistaken, as throughout the 1750's, Dominicans continued to patrol the waters around their island and Puerto Rico. After ten years of uninterrupted hostilities, the signing of a peace agreement did not deter these men from a job at which they excelled. In 1752, the Governor of Jamaica wrote four different letters to the Governor of Santo Domingo complaining about the corsairs and:

> ...the damages they have done to English ships...and the many unjust captures they have made...many merchants of Jamaica complain that a number of their ships have been taken to Santo Domingo by the corsairs and condemned unjustly there...[10]

Then, in the fall of 1753, the English ambassador at Madrid presented a list of six ships to the Marques de Ensenada. The ambassador claimed these ships had been taken illegally by

Dominican corsairs and he added:

> ...it cannot be omitted mentioning that the taking of these ships was accompanied by great acts of cruelty and insult, not only against the crews of the ships, but also against the English nation in general.[11]

Two of the six ships on the ambassador's list were prizes of one Domingo Cevallos. This man was a Dominican of great expertise and initiative who was not only involved in corsair activities but also ran supply ships throughout the Caribbean in the 1750's. The two ships he seized in 1751 were the Bonito, travelling from New York to Jamaica and an unnamed ship under Archibald Ramage sailing from New York to Curacao. At the end of the legal proceedings, neither of the ships were declared valid prizes, but as in most other instances, there was a lot of controversy and bitterness before the Audiencia made its final decision.

Cevallos' ship was El Dichoso, carrying twenty men and commanded by his brother Pedro Jose Cevallos. The crew was young, many were in their twenties and they came from Santo Domingo as well as Campeche, Tenerife and Portugal. In March 1751, the Dichoso captured the Bonito, a 60 ton brig, with six cannons and a cargo of flour, butter, wine, salted meat, pigs and four slaves.

The description of the capture varied depending on whether the witness was English or Spanish. In his appeal to the Spanish

authorities, Captain John Macleave explained that the Dichoso surprised him with two cannon shots late on the night of March 28, 1751, four leagues south of the island of Mona. Then Cevallos and his men came aboard and ripped open the chests and trunks looking for contraband. Not finding anything, they took the ship's papers and license as possible evidence of an illegal stop on their route. Cevallos hesitated but his crew convinced him that the ship be taken to Santo Domingo for further enquiries. Once there, the English prisoners received next to no food or water while the case was in court. After 26 months on the island, the Audiencia declared the ship an illegal prize. By then however, the ship had sunk and the English never received what they considered adequate compensation for the loss of the ship and her cargo.

Cevallos on the other hand, presented quite a different account. He said his ship first sighted the Bonito at dawn on March 28 coming away from the shore near Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico. Chasing it all day, he captured the ship late that night off Puerto Rico and brought it into Santo Domingo. Among the cargo aboard the Bonito, Cevallos found freshly picked oranges, lemons and lettuces. The fact that the produce was unmistakenly Spanish and that the Bonito had been sighted on the shoreline of Puerto Rico was enough to convince the corsair of the prize's validity. Furthermore, other crew members giving evidence during the case declared they had seen sierras romanas aboard the Bonito. These were the tools used for cutting dyewood and the consensus was

that the English ship had been en route to Honduras for dyewood.

In October 1753, the Consejo in Madrid gave its verdict. Several members, Felipe Arco, Jose Moreno, and Pedro Leon took the side of the corsairs. The majority of the Consejo however, stated that the ship had been taken illegally as it travelled between the two English colonies of New York and Jamaica. Moreover, the Consejo had no conclusive evidence that the ship had been trading with any Spanish colony or carried Spanish cargo. Consequently, it decided that the Bonito be returned and the corsairs held responsible for paying the damages.

Cevallos' second prize in 1751 was an English sloop which he captured a league from Curacao. It had a crew of six and a cargo of 223 barrels of flour. In his testimony, Cevallos explained that the ship had seemed suspicious because he had seen the captain throwing documents into the sea. When he boarded the ship, the corsair found the ship's license to be faulty and he discovered an old contract to cut dyewood in Honduras. The English of course, denied throwing anything overboard and stated that they had been sailing directly from New York to Curacao. With such sparse evidence and feeling international pressure building against the corsairs at a time when Spain and England had restored peaceful relations, the Spanish crown declared the prize invalid and returned the ship and cargo to Ramage.[12]

Losing two prizes did not ruin Cevallos' image as a corsair. In the following two years, Cevallos and the Dichoso captured and kept the share from the cargo of a Dutch packetboat,

Abrahan Isaac, which had gold and silver among its cargo. He also took a French packetboat with salt, aguardiente and sugar. By then, Cevallos had a larger crew working for him; when he seized the 12-man Dutch vessel, he had about 50 sailors aboard his ship.

Throughout the 1750's, this Dominican organized other business ventures at the same time as commanding corsair expeditions. From 1754-1757 and in 1760, he sent ships to the Windward Islands with Spanish produce and brought them back to Santo Domingo laden with flour, rigging, fish, wine, wax, oil, cheese and biscuit. In 1759, he took a shipload of families to the newly founded communities in Samana on the north coast of the island and brought produce back to Santo Domingo.[13]

The proof of his financial success is a list of items belonging to Cevallos and his wife, Dona Michaela de Castro. He owned two houses and four black slaves worked in the one in which he lived. Aside from the furniture, the contents of the house included; various pieces of pearl, emerald and gold jewelry, silver candlesticks, plates and cutlery, crystal, fine china and a tea set. He half-owned the Dichoso with Juan Beltrand and held a half-share in a packet-boat which he used for his expeditions to the Windward Islands.[14] This inventory of possessions shows that there were modest fortunes to be made for enterprising Dominicans in the eighteenth century. In this way, Cevallos represents the entrepreneurial side of the privateers, a most important part of their personality, because

he was equally at home commanding corsairs as organizing supply ship expeditions.

Lorenzo Daniel

Of all the Dominican corsairs, Lorenzo Daniel was the most energetic. His success was unique, his ships were the largest, and his expeditions were the most violent. Over a twenty-five year period between 1750-1775, he took more than seventy English, French, Danish and Dutch ships. His own ships usually carried more than twelve cannons, 50 crew, and ventured beyond the waters of Santo Domingo down to the Windward Islands and the north coast of Tierra Firme. In descriptions of Daniel's career, there are examples of burning unwanted ships, abandoning prisoners to die and maltreating his own crew. Popularly known as "Lorencin", Daniel was clearly "el terror de los contrabandistas" in the second half of the eighteenth century. It is doubtful, however, that they were the only ones to fear him.[15]

Documentary sources deal almost entirely with accounts of the corsair's expeditions, and battles. Scant personal information and little data exist on the legal proceedings of the captured prizes. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that Daniel had good relations with the officials in Santo Domingo which perhaps influenced some court sentences. Like Cevallos, Daniel was an ambitious man who did not miss an opportunity to further his career. Unlike his contemporaries however, this Dominican did everything on a much larger scale, whether it

was taking ships engaged in illicit trade or enemy vessels during war periods, transporting troops, ammunition, or provisions from Santo Domingo to other Caribbean Islands or undertaking patrols of the island with government officials and soldiers. By discussing an example of each of these activities, it will become evident that Lorenzo Daniel was a man of multi-faceted talents.

In August 1752, the corsair received what may have been his first license to patrol the north coast of Tierra Firme including Maracaibo, Coro, Cumana, and the island of Margarita. His ship was the N.S. Amparo outfitted with twelve cannons and other artillery. Shortly after setting out, he captured a Spanish ship dealing in contraband trade and three Dutch ships carrying cargoes of tobacco, skins and wood. One of the Dutch ships was anchored outside Puerto Cabello and when Daniel spotted it he let off a volley of cannon shots. The Dutch sailors abandoned the ship immediately and headed for the mainland. The corsair then proceeded to sink the vessel and send his crew in canoes after the Dutch sailors. The battle on the shore between the Spanish on one side and the Dutch and Indians on the other, ended badly for Daniel. His quartermaster died, a sailor was injured and he was forced to retreat with the remainder of his crew.[16]

Ten years later, Daniel had a license for an expedition to the Windward and Leeward islands. First he sailed from Santo Domingo to Isla Deseada where he went ashore and captured ten blacks as slaves. He then went on to Marie-Galante, battled

with four ships at once and seized one carrying sugar, cotton and coffee. His prize was leaking badly so Daniel decided to take some of the cargo and artillery but leave the crew and burn the ship. Off the island of Margarita, the corsair audaciously considered taking on a fleet of twenty-eight ships but decided against chasing the ships because his own vessel was badly damaged. Once his corsair was repaired, Daniel sailed to St. Vincent where he captured three English prizes and took numerous prisoners.[17]

In 1762, while Spain and England were at war, Daniel seized six ships. In June he took on two English corsairs armed with twenty-six cannons between them off the coast of Puerto Rico. The enemies' ships were bigger and better-armed than Daniel's but after a battle of five and half hours, the English surrendered.

Daniel's most famous prize of the war, however, was in December 1762. He left Santo Domingo with ten other war and transport ships bound for Cuba with supplies and troops. Four days after setting sail, the ships were separated and a forty-eight strong English squadron came into view. Daniel's and seven of the other ships took refuge in an inlet of Saint Domingue. The next day, Daniel heard cannon shots and ventured out to find the missing Spanish ships in battle with two English corsairs. Daniel attacked one of these alone and realizing it was better armed than he, decided the only way to overpower it was to fight man to man. Within half an hour of reaching the English corsair, it was on fire and the crew had surrendered. The

Spanish expedition then continued on its journey and arrived safely in Cuba. What is noteworthy here is that Daniel's ship was much smaller than his enemy's. Moreover, Daniel carried 75 men, and 8 small cannons while the English had 105 men aboard, 18 large cannons and numerous other pieces of artillery.[18]

After the war, Daniel's expeditions were particularly successful. In one document describing two short campaigns, from June 1773 to March 1774, he took 34 sloops, schooners and guayros and 12 barges belonging to England, France, Denmark, and Spain. They had all been trading illicitly in the area around Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. In another, the prizes taken by the Dominican corsairs for the first half of the 1770's are listed. Daniel was responsible for the largest proportion of them in that he captured 63 of the 70 Dutch, English, French, Danish and Spanish ships listed. The total value of the prizes was 75,517 pesos of which the armadores, captains and crew of the corsairs received the sum of 16,937 pesos.[19]

Besides capturing prizes, Daniel was active in other ways. During 1761, he took three different trips around the island and Saint Domingue as a patrol ship or in the transportation of troops. His passengers for these trips included: the Lieutenant of the Batallion of Infantry, the newly named Governor of Puerto de Plata, various engineers and up to 130 soldiers from the garrison at Santo Domingo. In each case, the Royal Treasury paid for the expenses of the trips but Daniel supplied the ship and crew without a fee.[20]

The following year after capturing a Dutch schooner off Tierra Firme and taking it to Guayra, the Dominican received word that there were arms and ammunition for Santo Domingo in Puerto Cabello. Daniel went immediately and loaded the ships under his command with the needed cargo for the island. Later in 1762, he also brought a cargo of salt from the island of Margarita to Santo Domingo. Finally in December of the same year, he took soldiers to Cuba for the war against the English.[21]

Considering the success of Daniel's campaigns and expeditions, Governor Azlor wrote to the crown in November 1762 asking that the corsair be commended. He described Daniel's career in great detail and put forward his name as the next captain of the port of Santo Domingo. In fact, it is unlikely that Daniel was appointed to this post because there is no further mention of it in the documentation. He did sail to Spain in 1763 with his 70 ton ship N.S. Luz for an unknown reason so perhaps he was going to recommend himself. He did not stay in Spain long though and when he returned, he arrived with provisions for the island.[22]

Ten years later, Daniel received a commission from the Audiencia of Santo Domingo. The colonial government asked him to eliminate various settlements established by foreign intruders who were turtle fishing on the island of Saona, near Santo Domingo. Daniel burnt the camps to the ground and brought back three prizes to Santo Domingo at the same time.[23]

Due to the variety of his activities, it is no surprise that Daniel was a clever businessman with official connections. In April 1762, he captured the Dutch schooner, Morday, off Caracas and the local authorities in Guayra declared it a valid prize. He was then to bring the ship back to Santo Domingo to complete the legal proceedings. Daniel however, decided to sell half the cargo and he pocketed some 2,377 pesos before proceeding to Santo Domingo. In his defense to the angry officials in Santo Domingo, Daniel explained that the Governor of Caracas had given him permission to sell part of the Morday's cargo. Furthermore, the Treasury Officials had been persuaded to tax the Morday as if she had been an enemy ship rather than one engaged in illicit trade, so cutting the taxes due to the crown by 1,415 pesos.[24]

Then in 1779, in a lengthy report to the crown by the newly appointed Fiscal Civil of Santo Domingo, Lorenzo Hernandez de Alba, it transpired that Daniel and the Treasury Officials of the island had sold some twenty-six prizes privately, bypassing the required legal proceedings. The Fiscal discovered that Daniel and the other corsairs sold their prizes within days of bringing them into the harbour. In the enquiry which followed, witnesses could not name the buyers of the ships or the whereabouts of the sold cargo.

The money from the sales of the ships and their cargo was paid in full and directly to Daniel or his associate, Francisco Cotes. In this way the clandestine behaviour was even more

difficult to uncover as there were no intermediaries. In cases where the captain of a captured ship attempted to trace his ship after discovering it was no longer in the harbour, Daniel merely paid him off. In their defense, Daniel and the Treasury Officials stated that the legal proceedings on prizes were so lengthy that the ships and cargo were worth nothing by the time a sentence was issued. Fiscal Hernandez de Alba sent a report of the affair to Madrid but an answer or a request for a further enquiry is not available so the outcome of Daniel's dealings is not known. The Fiscal however, blamed the Officials rather than the corsair who did not, in his eyes, have any responsibility for the affair. He explained that Daniel, as all corsairs:

> are in the end, men of the sea whose capabilities do not extend to comprehending the intricacies and necessary respect of issues in which the Royal Treasury has an interest.[25]

Actually, it seems highly improbable that an astute man like Daniel did not know the rules. Rather, he knew them all too well, while at the same time, manipulating the situation around him to his best advantage.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, there is little personal data on Lorenzo Daniel. For Campuzano and Cevallos, material exists which provides insight on the background and personality of the men. For Daniel, this is not so easy. What is evident is that he was a resident of Santo

Domingo all his life except for ten years, when he was banned from the island for illicit trading of flour. Nonetheless, his reputation was known throughout the Caribbean and there is one good description of the corsair which is an appropriate conclusion to this sketch:

> Lorenzo Daniel and his protege Antonio Sanchez (are known for)...their extortions and violence which they have brought upon these waters under the cover of being corsairs. The shameful protests from our neighbours, both national and foreign, increase the bad name of both these men who take cargo from ships on legal routes...They treat their prisoners cruelly, leaving them to die on whatever remote coast or island so as to make attempts to claim the ship back impossible...the poor unhappy crews of these corsairs live in the utmost misery, unable to live on the tiny amounts they receive from the prizes' cargo...his (Daniel's) atrocious behaviour had become the terror of these islands and coasts...if he did not have the protection of the government of Santo Domingo, he would not have a safe piece of territory to set foot on in any other part, without mortal risk to his person. For he is

> looked upon with hatred and viewed as the unversial enemy. It is indeed a strange thing for he should be a rich man or at least comfortable, with all the ships he has captured...in fact he is poor, unhappy, and burdened with debts and hardly has with what to feed himself. Perhaps this is because the money disappears...or because, as many testify, he has little interest in maintaining himself but rather, is one of those men who is content with the fame of his wild escapades and arrogant acts...[26]

Having studied the achievements of Campuzano, Cevallos and Daniel, a clear picture of the Dominican corsair emerges. As individuals, their careers were highly successful but what remains to be seen is the impact they made as a group over time on the island. In the final chapter of this work, the focus will be on the economic benefits the corsairs brought to Santo Domingo and how by 1750, the island was prospering in population and economic growth such as had not been seen for more than two centuries.

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FOOTNOTES

1. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 237. Memorial de D. Jose Campuzano Polanco, 1733. It is not clear what Campuzano's father's position was in the island government. Documentary sources state that he was "secretario de V.M." for 48 years. His brother held the same position for 36 years. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 257. Memorial del Rvdo. P.Fr. Gregorio Semillan Polanco, Orden de Predicadores, Provincial que ha sido de la provincia de Sta. Cruz. Santo Domingo, 1723, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 295. Informacion hecha ante la Real Justicia de esta ciudad a pedimento del Sr. D. Jose Campuzano, residente en ella y vecino de la Isla de Santo Domingo de Indias sobre justificar haber servido a S.M. segun y como en su pedimiento expresa. Cadiz, 1723; and AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 309. Autos sobre la presa de la fregata inglesa El Dorado por D. Jose Campuzano y Polanco, Santo Domingo 1729-1730.

2. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 236. Consulta, Consejo de Indias, Madrid, 12 Abril 1728. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 295. Informacion hecha ante la Real Justicia de esta ciudad...Cadiz, 1723; and AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1072. Cuaderno de los Autos sobre las presas que el Teniente Colonel, D. Jose Campuzano Polanco hizo habiendo salido de este puerto con patente del Sr. Presidente D. Francisco de la Rocha y con ellas fue a Sta. Marta donde se declararon

por buenas y legitimas presas. Santo Domingo, 1730.

3. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 295. Minuta del Consejo, Madrid, 8 Mayo 1723. See also : AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 295. Memorial de D. Jose Polanco, Santo Domingo, 12 Junio, 1723.

4. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 236. Consulta, Madrid, 12 Abril 1728. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 295. Informacion hecha ante la Real Justicia de esta ciudad...Cadiz, 1723. 1723.

5. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 242. Real Cedula a la Audiencia de Santo Domingo. Sevilla, 13 Marzo 1733. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 309. Autos sobre la presa...El Dorado. Santo Domingo, 1729-1730.

6. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 236. Consulta, Consejo de Indias, Madrid, 22 Noviembre 1728.

7. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 309. Autos sobre la presa...El Dorado. Santo Domingo, 1729-1730.

8. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1072. Carta de Guillermo Annis a D. Ignacio de Arrendondo, abordo el Hannah, Septiembre, 1730.

9. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 278. Titulo del Alcalde Provincial de Santo Domingo. 28 Octubre 1758. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 281. Titulo del Regidor de Santo Domingo. 28 Octubre 1758; AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 921. Consulta, Consejo de Indias. 1764; AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 927. Memorial de D. Jose Campuzano Polanco, Regidor Decano y Alcalde Provincial de la isla de Santo Domingo, 1763, and

AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 943. Oficio del Governador de Santo Domingo a D. Jose Ignacio Goyeneche. Santo Domingo, 19 Diciembre 1759.

10. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 307. Cartas del Governador de Jamaica, Edward Trelaconis (sic) al Governador de Santo Domingo. Marzo-Septiembre, 1752.

11. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 275. Lista de varias embarcaciones que reclama la nacion Britanica a la corte de Eapana por haber sido apresadas recientamente por las Guardacosas Espanoles y conducidas a Santo Domingo en contravencion de la buena correspondencia entre las dos naciones, en virtud de los Tratados de Paz. (1753).

12. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 266. Carta del Marques de Ensenada a D. Jose Ignacio de Goyeneche, Buen Retiro, 24 Marzo 1752. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 266. Carta de D. Antonio de Villa Urrutia Salcedo, Oidor, a D. Julian de Arriaga. Santo Domingo, 20 Julio 1755; and AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 274. Expedientes causados sobre varias embarcaciones inglesas que fueron apresadas por las guardacostas y conducidas a Santo Domingo. 1752.

13. See Chapter 5, Table IX, for complete information on these activities.

14. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 275. Expedientes...sobre varias embarcaciones inglesas...apresadas por las guardacostas... 1752.

15. A. Sanchez Valverde, Idea del valor de la Isla Espanola

Serie I, Vol, I (Trujillo, 1957). pp. 141-143.

16. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 283. Testimonio de Autos sobre la aprehension de la goleta francesa La Laureona que con el corsario de su comando apreso a sotavento de este puerto Lorenzo Daniel. Santo Domingo, 1752.

17. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 975. Testimonio de Autos sobre la aprehension que hizo el corsario del cargo de Lorenzo Daniel de porcion de negros en la isla de San Vincente. Santo Domingo, 1762.

18. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 921. Consulta, Consejo de Indias, Madrid, 23 Marzo 1765. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2513. Relacion de los servicios que de orden del Sr. Presidente Governador y Capitan General de esta isla ha hecho el Capitan Lorenzo Daniel a S.M. antes del rompimiento con los Ingleses y en el ingreso a saber. Santo Domingo, 1763.

19. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1071. Estado General de las presas que se han hecho y introducido en este puerto de Santo Domingo de la isla Espanola por las Guardacostas de el armados por D. Ignacio Hinojosa, D. Isidro Cordero y D. Gregorio Pimental con la division de su total producto. Santo Domingo, 20 Agosto 1776. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1098. Informe del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Jose Solano. 25 Mayo, 1775.

20. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2513. Relacion de los servicios... de Lorenzo Daniel...Santo Domingo, 1763. See also:

AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2513. Carta del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Manuel de Azlor a D. Julian de Arriaga. 4 Noviembre 1763. For a brief period at this time, Daniel was captured by the English and imprisoned in Jamaica. He escaped however, and by April 1762, he was back in Santo Domingo.

21. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2513. Relacion de los servicios de...Lorenzo Daniel. Santo Domingo, 1763.

22. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2513. Carta del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Manuel Azlor a D. Julian de Arriaga. 4 Noviembre, 1763. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2513. Carta del Marques del Real Tesoro a D. Julian de Arriaga. Cadiz, 3 Febrero 1764. Also see Chapter 5, Table IX.

23. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 922. Consulta del Consejo de Indias. Madrid, 6 Junio 1744. See also: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1071. Informe, Santo Domingo, 18 Febrero 1773.

24. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 921. Consulta del Consejo de Indias. Madrid, 27 Marzo, 1765.

25. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 986. Informe del Fiscal de lo Civil de Santo Domingo, con Testimonio de Autos del infeliz estado en que se hallo los asuntos del corso a su arriba (sic) a dicha isla. Santo Domingo, 26 Abril 1779.

26. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 986. Informe del Fiscal...Santo Domingo, 26 Abril 1779.

Chapter 5: Conclusion: The Corsairs and Santo Domingo

The purpose of this final chapter is to show how Santo Domingo's socio-economic situation changed over the course of the 18th century and to indicate the role of the privateers in this evolution. This Caribbean island was a poor and sparsely populated colony at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Half the buildings in the capital city were in ruins while the number of inhabitants and the territory under its control were both fractions of what they had been two hundred years before.[1]

By the 1770's however, the island's population had grown substantially and it was involved in various agricultural and small scale industrial activities. The main reason for the island's recovery was the result of her trade with the French who occupied the western part of the island. Notwithstanding, the corsairs also played an important role. Ironically, of course, this success jeopardized the continuation of privateering and by 1779, the occupation of corsair was destined to become an anachronism.

The Economic Recovery of Santo Domingo

During the first half of the century, the crown attempted to improve conditions on the island in several ways. She sent funds (El Situado) regularly via Mexico to finance the Audiencia officials, troops and garrison on the island. Madrid also tried stimulating tobacco cultivation by encouraging a tobacco

monopoly. Finally, there were attempts to repopulate the island. Between 1720-1764, forty ships carrying 483 families from the poverty-stricken Canary Islands sailed to Santo Domingo. Many of these immigrants, however, either died or deserted the island soon after their arrival. As a result, none of these Bourbon ideas improved the Dominican economic situation and the island's population did not increase either.[2]

In his work on Santo Domingo, the 18th century prebendary, Antonio Sanchez Valverde described the underpopulation in the colony. Most of the island's residents lived in the capital city. The rest lived in dispersed villages throughout the island whose populations numbered less than five hundred. These included: Cotuy, Santiago, Vera, Azua, Banica, Hincha, Monte de Plata, Bayaguana, and Higuey.[3] With such a small population, the labour force was not sufficiently large to work the sugar cane fields or to cultivate cotton, tobacco or cacao as it had done at the beginning of the colonial period. Consequently, as stated in the first chapter, subsistence agriculture was the prime occupation of the Dominicans.[4]

From the second half of the century on however, the island's economic situation improved. Evidence of this is seen in the population growth of Santo Domingo in that, by 1780, there were more than 100,000 residents.[5] Of this number, 25,000 lived in the capital of Santo Domingo and another 26,000 in Santiago. The city of Santo Domingo had been rebuilt completely; most of its buildings were of stone and the streets were paved.

When Moreau de Saint-Mery visited the city several years later, he also commented on the handsome aspect of the city with its two-storey houses built in a simple and uniform manner.[6] Besides the two large centers, a number of smaller towns had either been rebuilt after the earthquake of 1751 or else established to house the growing population and keep the French from occupying the unpopulated parts of the island. Between 1736-1768 these included; Montecristi and Puerto Plata (1736) on the north coast, Dajabon (1740) near the Bahia de Manzanillo, Sabana (1760) and Santa Barbara de Samana (1756) in the east and San Rafael de la Angostura and San Miguel de la Atlaya (1768).[7]

Aside from the development of new communities on the island, various churches and factories were rebuilt or renovated in the growing cites of Santo Domingo and Santiago. Religious orders established churches in Boya, Higuey, Seybo, Azua, Banica, and Hincha. Finally, masonry and brick factories were built throughout the island.[8]

The economic revival on the island by the third quarter of the century was remarkable. Sugar mills were active around Santo Domingo and on the south part of the island. Between the Nizao and Ozama rivers, 11 mills functioned and there were another 19 or 20 near the capital. Aside from these, many cacao plantations re-appeared near Santo Domingo and to the west beyond the Nizao river as well as areas for cultivating indigo and cotton. In the interior of the island around Santiago and La Vega, the population occupied themselves by raising livestock and

growing tobacco.[9]

The increase in population, renewed construction, and agricultural activities on Santo Domingo were primarily due to two factors. The most important one was the trade that developed between the French and Spanish territories on the island. Ste. Domingue had a very large population of black slaves; in 1780, the slave population in the French colony was 350,000 compared to only 14,000 in Santo Domingo.[10] Consequently, the French were prepared to sell slaves to Santo Domingo as well as tools and other possible provisions the Spanish needed.

For their part, the Spanish sold cattle in considerable numbers to their neighbour. In fact, they provided 4/5 of the livestock needed by the French and these sales produced three million pesos for Santo Domingo annually. Moreover, besides the cattle, items including dried and salted meat, skins, mules, horses and tobacco crossed into the French territory.[11] As a result, most historians maintain that more than any other factor, the cattle trade prompted Santo Domingo's economic revival.[12]

The Impact of the Corsairs on Santo Domingo

The second factor which affected Santo Domingo however, is of more immediate interest to this thesis for it is evident that the corsairs were vital to the recovery of the island. Firstly, the cargo from their prizes introduced many basic necessities to the island which were not sent from Spain. The prizes' slaves worked in the sugar cane and cacao plantations and

Governor Zorilla wrote to Madrid in 1745, that the cultivation of these products was improving greatly.[13] Secondly, the sales from the prizes opened Santo Domingo as a market to buyers from other parts of the Caribbean. By auctioning the cargoes and slaves at lower prices than on the other side of the Atlantic, Santo Domingo drew interest from other Spanish and foreign colonies alike. Many came to buy goods from Santo Domingo and presumably some established themselves permanently on the island. An example of a foreign buyer was Robert Gilbreth of the Asiento who paid cash to the island's treasury for the majority of the Cornelius Calf's cargo in 1727.[14] One can measure the economic value of the prizes more concretely. In 1742, Govenor Zorilla sent impressive statistics to Madrid. In one seven month period of the war with England between November 1741 - June 1742. the value of the prizes totalled 53,586 pesos. A lesser amount of 32,648 pesos was given for the period from April 1743 - September 1744.[15] Several years later, while the two countries were still at war, the Governor stated that the value of the English prizes in the first months of 1747 was 70,000 pesos. Zorilla claimed that contraband trade had diminished under his governorship and that the prizes were of "great benefit" to the island.[16] Finally, it is possible to calculate the average value of individual prizes from 1720- 1779. From the prize value figures given for 102 entries in Appendix I, an average of 9,753 pesos was computed for each prize brought into Santo Domingo.

The fiscal value of the privateers' prizes is not so

compelling. By looking at the prizes which paid the Almojarifazgo in Appendix I, only 48% of the ships appear to have paid this tax. Moreover, by looking at the annual figures of Almojarifazgo paid into the Treasury of Santo Domingo between 1740- 1764, it seems that the prizes contributed a minute portion of the total sum.[17] One must remember of course, that during war periods, privateers were not expected to pay any taxes to the crown but in any event, it is clear that the economic contribution of the prizes to the island far surpassed their fiscal one.

It is noteworthy that during the decade 1751 - 1761, a time of peace for Spain, no Almojarifazgo entries appeared in the account ledgers. The evidence in Chapters Three and Four support this fact that there were far fewer prizes taken at this time. One can not conclude however, that the corsairs were not active or continuing to contribute to the island's economy in other ways. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Domingo Cevallos was running supplies throughout the Caribbean during the 1750's. Others like Jaime Aponte, Antonio Salazar and Lorenzo Daniel also occupied themselves sailing between Santo Domingo and other ports to procure items for the island when corsair activity was not popular with the crown. In Table IX, there is information on this aspect of the Dominican corsairs activities. The time period includes the wars at either end of the 1750 decade but the majority of entries are for the years from 1749-1760.

The names of the men and their ships are given, where they

sailed to and what cargo they brought back to Santo Domingo.[18] The ships used for these expeditions were usually sloops and in some cases the ships' names are just as familiar as the men who commanded them; NS Altagracia, NS Rosario, EL Vitoque, El Dichoso, NS Popa, and NS Luz were all ships which at other times sailed as corsairs. Some of the ships are not immediately recognizable but their captains are; Domingo Cevallos commanding the San Antonio y las Animas, Antonio Milcoviche and the San Francisco Javier, Juan Antonio Pantoja and the San Antonio de Padua.

The cargo aboard the ships listed in Table IX was greater and more valuable in the 1750's than during either of the wars. Evidently, pursuing prize cargo during war periods was more lucrative than running ships for supplies. With the exception of slaves, items aboard the ships in this table were similiar to prize cargo. In both types of expeditions, there were cargoes of flour and sugar, cacao, wine and textiles. In this respect it is interesting to observe that Santo Domingo required generally the same types of goods regardless of the time period. Moreover, it appears that many of the same men were introducing these items throughout the years covered by this thesis but they acquired them for the island by different methods according to the date.

In other words, it is obvious that corsair activities went hand in hand with legitimate trading. Not only were the same individuals and ships involved in both but frequently, the

activites occurred simultaneously. By looking at Appendix I, and Table IX, there is evidence that some of the expeditions had mixed purposes. What began as a supply ship trip also became a privateering voyage and vice versa as well. In 1743, Domingo Herrera went to Puerto Rico to collect lard for Santo Domingo and he also captured a Dutch sloop off a ship off the island of Mona. At the same time Lorenzo Daniel captured a ship off Tierra Firme in 1762, he also brought arms and ammunition back to Santo Domingo from Porto Cabello.

The Effect of Changing Crown Policy on Santo Domingo and the Corsairs.

Toward the second half of the 18th century, the crown produced a series of policies in an attempt to improve the economic situation in the Indies while, at the same time, maintaining control over her colonies. After the founding of the Caracas Company in 1728, the crown decided to encourage other chartered companies to increase trade between specific ports in the Indies and Spain. In 1748, the Barcelona Company began to trade with Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Margarita. Modelled on the Caracas Company, it was to send one or two ships annually back and forth across the Atlantic and its most active period was from 1757-1765. Then, in 1764, mail ships began to sail from the north coasts of Spain to the West Indies. While their main purpose was that of bringing crown legislation and official correspondence to the colonies more quickly, these vessels may

also have carried small packages of needed provisions.

Nonetheless, after 1765, most of the methods to increase contact between Spain and the colonies were replaced by comercio libre, direct trade between specified ports in the Indies and Spain. On October 16, 1765, a Royal Decree opened trade from Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Margarita and Trinidad to the ports of Barcelona, La Coruna, Gijon and Santander in Spain.[19] One must conclude however, that none of innovations were very successful at either restricting contraband or replacing corsairs as suppliers for Santo Domingo. The data from Appendix 1 and the evidence in Chapter four demonstrate that the Dominicans corsairs continued well into the 1770's.

At the end of the 1770 decade however, there were two legislative innovations which would have an influence on the corsairs. In 1778, Charles III announced new regulations for trade between Spain and the Indies. The Reglamento's purpose was to promote comercio libre and to eliminate the taxes, expenses, and bureaucratic complications which had increasingly damaged commercial relations between Spain and the Indies. This statute in fact, was essentially the same legislation as comercio libre established in the Caribbean in 1765. The difference in 1778 was that it now extended throughout the Indies to include all the colonies except Mexico and Venezuela.[20]

Of more direct importance, were the Ordenanzas del Corso, published on July 1, 1779. Fifty of its fifty-five sections were identical to the preceding Ordenanza of 1762. The last

three sections gave the corsairs certain advantages over their predecessors. They could borrow from the crown to outfit their expeditions, and the crown granted compensation to families of wounded or deceased corsairs. Madrid decided to pay certain sums for each cannon and prisoner aboard a prize which the men would receive aside from the value of the ship and her cargo. Finally, the corsairs would receive an extra 25% over the value of the prize if either the corsair and prize had engaged in battle or if the prize carried more cannons then the corsair.[21]

The crucial difference in the 1779 Ordenanzas however, was not in the final sections of the legislation but rather in an additional document attached to the Ordenanza. It was directed to the Royal Armada and stated to what extent the Armada could benefit from capturing prizes. If a ship belonging to the Armada took an enemy warship or corsair, the officials and crew would receive the entire value of the prize. If the Armada took a merchant ship, two-thirds of the value would go to the its personnel. The remaining third would be deposited in the Marine Treasury primarily as a pension fund for families who lost relatives in combat. If the crown decided to keep any captured ship which carried more than twenty cannons, the Navy officials and crew would be paid a sum corresponding to the size of the captured ship.[22]

The idea of using members of the Armada as corsairs had been mooted in the 1750's when the Spanish and English restored peaceful relations. The concept then was to replace private

corsairs with navy men from the Armada so that the crown could control the situation more carefully. At that time, Carvajal y Lancaster stated that the Armada had neither the men, the ships or the necessary budget to finance coastguard patrols. He could only assure the English that the colonial governments would grant licenses to appropriate individuals with credentials.[23] The Ordenanzas of 1779 then, suggest an important policy change towards the corsairs. Although the legislation still provided for privately financed corsairs and granted them certain favours, the decision to allow and encourage the Royal navy to stop illicit merchant or enemy warships was to have an effect on the corsairs.

The decision to increase freedom in trade both within the colonies and to a variety of ports in Spain along with a more numerous and financially powerful group taking part in the capture of prizes could only decrease the importance of the corsairs in Santo Domingo. For one thing, the need for them to supply the island was slowly diminishing. Illicit trade was no longer predominant because most items could now be obtained legally and it would be increasingly difficult to prove that a ship had been trading illegaly. England even went as far as encouraging Spanish ships to trade within certain limits of her Caribbean ports.[24] As well, the Royal navy was a large and co-ordinated body which could seriously hamper individual coastguard operations in the West Indies. Gradually then, corsair expeditions were neither as necessary nor as valuable to either

the crown or the colony of Santo Domingo. Lorenzo Daniel's expeditions in the 1770's were perhaps a fitting climax for a group of men whose role in the economic recovery of their island had been fulfilled.

Conclusion

The central theme of this thesis has been how during most of the 18th century, corsair expeditions succeeded in bringing supplies to Santo Domingo which otherwise would have been difficult or impossible to acquire. The emergence of privateers however, was not an isolated development, independent of the crown-colony relationship. Rather, it was a direct consequence of the circumstances in Santo Domingo at the beginning of the century.

Spanish crown policy for the Indies had created a situation which increasingly affected both the Peninsula and the colonies adversely. The Peninsula role was to supply the colonies with the manufactured imports she required and in turn, the colonial role was to accept these from the annual Cadiz fleets. Inter-colonial and foreign trade were not permitted and local industry forbidden. With rising taxes to be paid on Spanish imports and the decline of ships from Cadiz, it was clear that the situation, especially on the poor island of Santo Domingo, could not continue. Moreover, Santo Domingo and the other Spanish islands in the Caribbean depended on foreign contraband to such an extent that the crown's economic and political power

was being threatened. As a result, Madrid decided to legalize the introduction of goods to the island which would otherwise have been considered contraband. By instituting privateers then, the island's deficiences were a major spur to the emergence of these Dominican entrepreneurs.

The cargo aboard the prizes as seen in Appendix 1, was an indication of the need for supplies on the island. As it was pointed out in Chapter 1 however, the main problem on Santo Domingo was its lack of labour. Consequently, more than any other item, it was the slaves from the prizes which were important for the island. A large and healthy population was necessary to cultivate the cacao and sugar plantations and the large black population on Saint Domingue is evidence of this fact. By 1750, the Dominican corsairs alone were responsible for bringing hundreds of black slaves to the island. In the period from 1729-1750, the entries in Appendix 1, indicate that a minimum of 1,313 slaves arrived in Santo Domingo.[25] It is not surprising then that the post 1750 period was the time when the island's sugar, cacao, indigo and cotton economies were revived. A further indication that the corsairs were fulfilling a need on the island is the degree to which the armadores were willing to finance the outfitting of ships and crew. During individual years, numerous expeditions set out independently from the island or sometimes the same ship would make several excursions. In 1724, 7 different expeditions left the island, in each of 1741 and 1742, there were 11 expeditions. There were 13 in 1745 and up

to 15 in 1762. Had there not been a market for the prizes' cargoes, a decline in the number or size of the expeditions surely would have followed.[26]

In fact, there was never a suggestion that Santo Domingo could not use or sell the items from the prizes. The cargo was sold to the islands' residents or to colonials who came from other parts of the Caribbean for slaves and provisions.[27] With the advent of the Barcelona Company in 1745 and comercio libre in 1765, one might have suspected the island to be overwhelmed with other sources for provisions. This was not so, for the corsairs were nearly as active in the 1760-1774 period as they were in the 1740 decade.

If the deficiencies of Santo Domingo were an incentive for the development of the corsairs, they were at the same time, a major threat to colonial policy. During the early years of the Bourbon era, there was a strong desire to restructure and re-activate the Spanish and colonial economies. Nevertheless, Madrid was unable to radically change the Hapsburg traditions which had been in place for 200 years. Similarly, foreign commercial interests in the Indies was a major threat because Spain was being eclipsed as both a seller and buyer in her own colonies. As a consequence, by encouraging privateers in the Caribbean, she was saving the expense of financing a coastguard to patrol the waters around her colonies. More important, she assured supplies for the island without admitting the inability to send them herself.

In this sense,, the crown's regulations regarding the corsairs represented much more than a controlling function. The Ordenanzas, Reales Cedulas and court sentences on prizes all reflected the crown's desire to provision her colonies with foreign contraband when circumstances permitted. Modification of legislation was usually a reaction to international politics. It did not mean that the crown's support of the corsairs had diminished for Madrid realized that they were an effective foil. Numerous examples of this attitude appeared in the preceding chapters. Aware that slaves were an urgent necessity for Santo Domingo, the crown was willing to allow foreign corsairs like Martin Hixiart and others to supply the island in the 1740's. When Augusto Messendern's ship and rigging was needed in 1761, the existing legislation ensured that he contributed them to the island.

There were also methods of guaranteeing that part or all of prize's cargo remained on Santo Domingo. The case of the Cornelius Calf in 1724 is an example of how a court hearing secured the prize's cargo for the island regardless of whether the ship had actually been engaged in illicit trade. While awaiting the outcome of a sentence, a captured captain was frequently allowed to sell the perishable cargo from his ship. Finally, even when a ship was declared mala, the crown managed to take advantage of the foreign ship's cargo by requesting the captain to sell part of it before continuing to his destination.

In conclusion, the corsairs were a locally developed

solution to the problem of procuring supplies for Santo Domingo. They were entrepreneurs who saw their chance to improve economic conditions on the island while at the same time, acquiring considerable profits for themselves under illegal conditions. As for the crown, her attitude was representative of the early Bourbon period. She manipulated the already existing situation of contraband commerce to benefit both the island and herself. Until the Bourbons developed and put their economic reforms into practice, the privateers provided the antidote to ineffectual colonial policy. The cumlative effect of the Bourbon reforms of comercio libre, the Reglamento, and the addition to the 1779 Ordenanzas del Corso, did affect Santo Domingo and the corsairs in that other markets and individuals gradually replaced earlier patterns. By the 1760's and 1770's however, Santo Domingo had made a great economic recovery by using her own resources and her dependence on Madrid was weaker than ever. In this way then, the Dominican corsairs were one of the indicators of Spanish America's growing tendency towards self-reliance.

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FOOTNOTES

1. A. Sanchez Valverde, Idea del valor de la Isla Espanola (Trujillo, 1957). p. 132
2. Ibid.
3. F. Moya Pons, Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo. (Santiago, Republica Dominicana, 1977).
   A. Sanchez Valverde, Op. Cit., p. 131.
4. J. Gabriel Garcia, Compendio de la Historia de Santo Domingo. Tomo I, p. 202.
5. There is some discrepancy in the figures. F. Moya Pons, Op. Cit., pp. 306-307, says there were more than 80,000 residents on the island but Sanchez Valverde, Op. Cit., p. 146, states there were up to 120,000 islanders for the same time period.
6. F. Moya Pons, Op. Cit., p. 308
7. A. Sanchez Valverde, Op. Cit., pp. 133-136
8. A. Sanchez Valverde, Ibid., pp. 139-140
9. F. Moya Pons, Op. Cit., pp. 30-309
10. A. Sanchez Valverde, Op. Cit., p. 169
11. F. Moya Pons, Op. Cit., p. 309
12. F. Moya Pons, Ibid., pp. 249, 303-304 A. Sanchez Valverde, Op. Cit., pp. 141-143
13. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 277. Minuta de Consulta, Consejo

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14. AGI, Escribania de Camara, leg. 9B. Testimonio de Autos sobre el apresamiento que hizo el Capitan D. Benito de Socorras del pinque nombrado Jorge Cornelius Calf, su Capitan Nicolas Vandermer, Theniente de los estados de Holanda. Santo Domingo ,1725.

15. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 264. Carta del Governador de Santo Domingo, D. Pedro Zorilla a S.M. 20 Julio, 1742.

16. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1098. Minuta al Governador de Santo Domingo, Madrid, 28 Marzo 1748.

17. See AGI, Santo Domingo, legs. 290, 291, 292, 1048 and Contaduria, legs. 1069A, 1069B.

18. There were almost certainly other corsairs who also ran ships for supplies during this time period. The entries on this table however, only include the familiar names found in Appendix I.

19. See V. Vazquez de Prada," Las Rutas Comerciales entre Espana y America en el siglo XVIII", Anuario de Estudios Americanos 15: 1968, pp. 197-241.

20. R. Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain. (Princeton, New Jersey, 1958). pp. 122-123.

21. Ordenanza de primero de Julio 1779 prescribiendo las reglas con que se ha de hacer el Corso de Particulares contra Enemigos de la Corona. in AGI, Biblioteca, 304/21.

22. Ordenanza de primero de Julio de 1779. Adicional a las

Generales de la Real Armada, sobre presas que hicieron los Navios y demas Vageles de ella. in AGI, Biblioteca, 300/20.

23. R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1936). p. 538.

24. See J.H. Parry, and P.M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies. (London, 1957). Chapter 9.

25. This figure only represents the documented number of slaves. One would have to consider the 1740 prizes in Appendix I which do not have their cargoes listed and the entries which list slaves but do not say how many there were aboard.

26. See Appendix I.

27. J. Gabriel Garcia, Op. Cit., p. 213.

Table IX.

Supply Ships for Santo Domingo Commanded by Corsairs, 1741-64

No.	Year	Armador/Captain	Vessel Name and Type	Port	Cargo	Value (pesos)
01	1741	D. Cevallos	Sloop	From Curacao		261*
02	1742	D. Cevallos	San Antonio y Las Animas Sloop	From Maracaibo	Cocoa Wool Wood	4,492*
03	1742	D. Cevallos	San Antonio y Las Animas	From Cuba	Sugar	313*
04	1743	D. Herrera	La Chata	From Puerto Rico	Lard	526
05	1744	D. Herrera	La Real Susana Sloop	From Puerto Rico		277
06	1745	D. Sanchez Moreno	N.S. Altagracia Sloop	From Coro	Cocoa Salt Textiles	535
07	1746	J. Rodriguez	N.S. Altagracia	From Curacao	Textiles Wine	
08	1746	F. Gallardo de La Rocha	N.S. Rosario	From Guayra	Cacao Textiles	6,265
09	1746	J. Rodriguez	N.S. Altagracia Sloop	From Curacao		1,359
10	1748	F. Gallardo	N.S. Aguas Santas Sloop	From Guayra	Cacao Textiles	15,776
11	1749	J. Olave	N.S. Amparo Sloop	From Coro	Salt	222
12	1749	J. Olave	N.S. Amparo Sloop	From Cartagena	Textiles	200*

13	1749	M. de los Reyes Forco	Sta. Barbara (Alias, El Dichoso) Brig	From the Canaries	Wine	3,805*
14	1749	J. Giran	N.S. Amparo Sloop	From Coro		
15	1750	J.A. Pantoja	N.S. Concepcion Sloop	From Guayra	Cacao	3,799
16	1750	J. Olave	La Bonita Sloop	From Curacao		3,276
17	1750	A. Milcoviche	San Francisco Javier Sloop	From Puerto Rico		334
18	1751	F. Garrosari	San Francisco Javier Sloop	From St. Eustatius		1,815
19	1751	J.A. Pantoja	N.S. Dolores Schooner	From Curacao	Flour Lard	2,749
20	1751	P. Cevallos	El Dichoso Brig	From Guayra	Cacao	
21	1751	J.A. Salazar	N.S. Rosario Sloop	From Guayra	Cacao Sails Textiles	7,068
22	1751	L. Daniel	N.S. Popa Sloop	From Rio de la Hacha		
23	1752	L. Daniel	N.S. Popa Sloop	From Cuba	Skins Sugar Wood	367
24	1753	A. Salazar	N.S. Rosario Sloop	From Windward Islands		2,277
25	1753	F. Soto	N.S. Rosario Sloop	From Cumana		159
26	1753	D. Sanchez	N.S. Amparo Sloop	From St. Thomas	Medicine	

27	1754	D. Sanchez	San Tomas Sloop		Flour	
28	1754	J.S. Pantoja	San Antonio de Padua	From Coro	Cacao	
29	1754	L. Daniel	N.S. Popa Sloop	From Cuba	Cacao Skins Wood	
30	1754	J.A. Salazar	San Antonio Sloop	From Curacao		4,186
31	1755	D. Cevallos	N.S. Altagracia Packet Boat	From Windward Islands	Flour	
32	1755	J.A. Salazar	N.S. Altagracia Brig	From Caracas	Cacao	
33	1757	J.A. Salazar	San Antonio y Las Animas	From Windward Islands		1,318
34	1757	D. Cevallos	N.S. Altagracia Packet Boat	From Windward Islands		3,258
35	1758	J.A. Salazar	La Sabana Sloop	From Windward Islands		
36	1758	D. Cevallos	Sto Cristo de la Salud Sloop	From Coro		1,123
37	1759	D. Cevallos	Sto Cristo de la Salud Sloop	From Windward Islands		3,134
38	1759	D. Cevallos	Sto Cristo de la Salud	From Coro		
39	1760	D. Cevallos	Sto Cristo de la Salud	From Windward Islands		

40	1761	M. Crespo	N.S. Luz Schooner	From Puerto Rico	266
41	1761	J.A. Salazar	N.S. Concepcion Sloop	From Jamaica	3,177
42	1764	J. Ponte	El Emprehendedor Packet Boat	From Jamaica	Liquor
43	1764	L. Daniel	N.S. Luz Sloop	From Spain	
44	1764	L. Daniel	Tomas Caulican Brig	From Martinique	
45	1764	L. Daniel	N.S. Luz Sloop	From Vera Cruz	Hats Skins

* Value calculated from almojarifazgo paid.

Sources: AGI, Santo Domingo, legs. 290, 291, 292, 1048,
AGI, Contaduria, legs. 1069A, 1069B

Glossary

Aguardiente	: Liquor
Alcabala	: Sales tax
Alcalde Provincial	: Rural judge
Almojarifazgo	: Import/Export tax
Armador	: Financier or backer of a corsair expedition
Asiento	: License to supply black slaves to the Indies
Audiencia	: High court, some of the same functions as a legislative council
Buena	: Good, in this thesis, a valid prize
Carrera de Indias	: Navigation, commerce between Spain and the Indies
Cedula	: Royal letter, the form by which a royal decree was communicated to the colonies
Comercio libre	: Direct trade between ports in the Indies and Spain first established in the second half of the eighteenth century
Consejo de Indias	: Council of the Indies, Penisular governing council responsible for the colonies
Consulta	: Document expressing the opinion of the Council of the Indies on a subject as requested by the crown

Corregidor	: District magistrate
Corsario	: Privateer. The word is used as a noun referring to either the individual or the ship. In documentary sources, guardacosta also appears in the same context.
Fiscal	: Crown attorney
Gratificaciones	: Gratuities
Guardamayor	: Chief guard
Guayros	: Small boats
Ingeniero	: Engineer
Intendente	: Intendant, an eighteenth century official, representative of the crown
Mala	: Bad. In this thesis, a captured ship not considered a valid prize.
Marina (Ministro)	: Ministry of the Navy, one of the six ministries in eighteenth century Spain. An Intendente de la Marina was a naval intendant, a local official of that ministry.
Mercancia	: Supplies, dry goods
Navio de Permiso	: English merchant ship allowed to sail to the Indies
Navio de Registro	: Spanish merchant ship allowed to sail to the Indies outside the Carrera de Indias
Official Real	: Treasury Official
Oidor	: Audiencia judge

Ordenanza	: Ordinance
Peso	: Basic Spanish unit of currency
Presidio	: Garrison, fortress
Regidor	: Member of the town council
Tierra Firme	: Mainland South America, specifically present day coasts of Venezuela and Columbia
Viveres	: Provisions, fresh goods

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
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(1664-1764)




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
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



Diario de nabegacion, desde el Puerto de la Coruña, a el de la Ha-
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APPENDIX I: CORSAIRS AND THEIR PRIZES, 1720-1774

No.	Year	Armador/Captain	Corsair Vessel	Prize Vessel	Prize Cargo Value (Pesos)	Location
001	1720	(A) J. Campuzano (C) C. Azero	Sloop	English Ship	Mercancias Viveres Cheese	
002		A. Diaz de la Rabia		Dutch	Cheese Silver	
003	1724	(A) J. Ignacio Orella		English		South Santo Domingo
004	1724	J. de Mesa		Dutch		South Santo Domingo
005	1724	T. Traspuesto		English		South Santo Domingo
006	1724	(A) B. Socorras (C) P. Pluma	Frigate	Dutch		South Santo Domingo
007	1724	(A) J. Ignacio Orella (C) G. Garcia		Dutch	Cocoa Tobacco Skins	
008	1724	J. Perez (1)		English		North Santo Domingo
009	1724	B. Socorras	Frigate	Dutch Pinque 22 Crew	Cacao Sugar Salt Skins Cotton Log Wood	South Santo Domingo
010	1726			Dutch Pinque		
011	1728	(A) J. Campuzano (C) F. Salcedo		Dutch Sloop	Donkeys Chickens Pigs	Puerto Rico

012	1728	(A) F. Campuzano (C) F. Salcedo		English Sloop	Salted Meat Candles	
013	1728	(A) J. Campuzano (C) F. Salcedo	24 crew	English Frigate 13 Crew	Sugar Cotton Ginger Aguardiente Silver (2)	Lesser Antilles
014	1729	(A) J. Campuzano	Sloop	English Packet Boat	193 Slaves 35,000 (3)	South Santo Domingo
015	1729	(A) J. Campuzano	Sloop	English Sloop	96 Slaves Textiles Flour Silver	Tierra Firme
016	1729	(A) J. Campuzano	Sloop	Dutch Sloop	6 Slaves Textiles	Tierra Firme
017	1729	A. Mendieta		Sloop	Aguardiente Flour Textiles	
018	1730	(A) M. Marocho (C) N. Domingo	Sloop	English Frigate	176 Slaves 29,347	
019	1740	(A) J.A. Bautista	Sloop	Dutch	118*	
020	1740	(A) F. de Ayala (C) F. Gallardo		Dutch	1,219*	
021	1740	(A) F. Sierra D. Herrera (C) F. Herrera		Dutch	5,184*	
022	1741	(A) A. Echavarria (C) J.A. Bautista		English	725	
023	1741	(A) F. Guerrero M. Marocho (C) F. Valencia		English	1,972	
024	1741	(A) F. Ayala (C) J. Olave	Barge	Dutch Sloop	Textiles Wax Slaves 2,682	South Santo Domingo
025	1741	(A) A. Gallardo	Sloop	English	5,379	

		(C)	J.A. Gallardo		Schoon.		
026	1741	(A)	G. Castro		English	80	
		(C)	J.A. Pantoja		Schoon.		
027	1741		F. Gallardo		Dutch	721*	
028	1741		F. Guerrero	Sloop	Dutch Sloop	5,885*	
029	1741		F. Guerrero	Sloop	Dutch Sloop	932*	
030	1741		F. Guerrero	Sloop	Danish	2,807*	
031	1741	(A)	G. Castro	6 Guns	French	Cocoa	Lesser Antilles
		(C)	D. Sanchez	115 Crew			
032	1741		F. Ayala		Dutch	3,682*	
033	1742	(A)	F. Gallardo	Sloop	English Packet Boat	38,818	
		(C)	A. Gallardo				
034	1742	(A)	J. Olave		English Sloop	500	
		(C)	J. Garcia				
035	1742	(A)	F. Ayala	Sloop	English Packet Boat	1,390	
		(C)	J. Olave				
036	1742	(A)	G. Castro	Sloop	Dutch Sloop	Mules 1 Slave 540	
		(C)	J.A. Bautista				
037	1742	(A)	G. Castro		English Schoon.	Slaves 2,760	
		(C)	I. Munoz				
038	1742	(A)	G. Castro	Sloop		25 Slaves 2,775	
		(C)	A. Echavarria				
039	1742	(A)	J.P. Camacho J.A. Bautista	Sloop	Dutch	311	
		(C)	F. Gonzalez				
040	1742	(A)	F. Ayala M. Orbay		Dutch Sloop	1,636*	
		(C)	M. Araya				
041	1742	(A)	F. Ayala		Dutch Schoon.	Skins Textiles 487	Puerto Rico
		(C)	M. Araya				

042	1742	(A) M. Orbay (C) I. Moreno	20 Crew	Dutch Schoon.	Mules Horses Skins 438	Puerto Rico
043	1742	(A) D. Herrera (C) M. Araya		Dutch	488*	
044	1743	(A) G. Castro (C) A. Echavarria		English Plantage (4)	Slaves 3,965	
045	1743	(A) F. Gallardo (C) J. Pereira	Barge	French Canoe	Slaves 4,936# (5)	
046	1743	(A) F. Gallardo (C) J. Pereira	Barge	French Canoe	Slaves	
047	1743	A. Echavarria		Dutch Packet Boat		
048	1743	(A) D. Herrera (C) [illegible]. Valencia	Sloop 57 Crew	Dutch Sloop	Skins Aguardiente Mercaderias 1 Slave 1,255#	Puerto Rico
049	1743	M. Orbay		English Schoon.	470 (6)	
050	1743	M. Orbay		English Schoon.		
051	1743	M. Orbay		English Schoon.		
052	1743	(A) F. Ayala		French Bote	Slaves 1,402	
053	1743	J.A. Pantoja J. Romero		English Bote	5 Slaves 855	South Santo Domingo
054	1743	(A) D. Herrera (C) I. Munoz		Dutch Schoon.	381	

055	1743	(A) G. Castro D. Herrera (C) D. Sanchez de Toro		English Brig	1,466		
056	1743	(A) M. Orbaiz (C) J.A. Bautista	Galley	French Sloop	30 Mules 2,695		Puerto Rico
057	1743	(A) F. Ayala D. Herrera (C) M. Araya		French Sloop	2,394*		
058	1744	D. Sanchez Moreno		English Sloop	2,432		
059	1744	D. Sanchez de Toro		English Packet Boat	9,150		
060	1744	F. Valencia	Sloop	English Frigate	1,424		
061	1744	F. Valencia		English Schoon.	1,200		
062	1744	D. Sanchez de Toro		English Brig	3,015		
063	1744	F. Valencia		English Schoon.	2,840		
064	1744	D. Sanchez de Toro		English Sloop	1,509		
065	1744	D. Sanchez Toro		English Schoon.	1,188*		
066	1744	D. Sanchez de Toro		English Sloop	678		
067	1744	(A) F. Ayala (C) M. Acosta		French	Slaves 1,402*		
068	1744	J.J. Estanislao	Barge	French	159*		
069	1745	(A) D. Herrera (C) D. Sanchez de Toro	Schoon. 50 Crew	Dutch Schoon. 29 Crew	Skins Cacao Textiles Aguardiente 808#		Tierra Firme

070	1745	(A) D. Hererra (C) D. Sanchez de Toro	Schoon. 50 Crew	Dutch Schoon. 16 Crew	Skins Cacao Textiles Aguardiente 612#	Tierra Firme
071	1745	(A) D. Herrera (C) D. Sanchez de Toro	Schoon. 50 Crew	Dutch Sloop	Skins Cacao Aguardiente 960#	Tierra Firme
072	1745	F. Valencia		English Brig	193 Slaves Ivory 25,136	
073	1745	(A) M. Dupli (C) M. Hixiart	Sloop 50 Crew	English Packet Boat	221 Slaves Ivory Logwood (8)	Puerto Rico
074	1745	M. Lechuga		Dutch Sloop	Mules 534#	Tierra Firme
076	1745	(A) D. Herrera (C) D. Sanchez de Toro	Sloop		2,214*	
077	1745	(A) F. Ayala	Sloop		1,000*	
078	1745	(A) D. Herrera G. Castro (C) M. Lechuga	Sloop		5,506*	
079	1745	(C) M. Lechuga	Sloop		328*	
080	1745	(C) M. Lechuga		Dutch Sloop	1,190#	
081	1745	M. Lechuga		Dutch Sloop	1,366#	
082	1745	M. Lechuga		Dutch Sloop	474#	
083	1745	(A) P.V. de la Torre (C) F. Guerrero		Dutch Sloop	733#	

084	1746		M. Lechuga	Dutch Frigate	Tobacco Cacao Iron Aguardiente 469#	Puerto Rico
085	1746		M. Lechuga	Dutch Sloop	Mercadurias 651	Tierra Firme
086	1746	(A)	F. de la Rosa	Dutch Schoon.	Sugar Aguardiente Gold	South Santo Domingo
		(C)	D. Gonzalez			
087	1746		D. Herrera	Dutch Sloop	2,195*	Tierra Firme
088	1746		D. Herrera	Dutch	560*	Tierra Firme
089	1746	(A)	M. Castillo	Dutch Frigate		
		(C)	F. Guerrero			
090	1746				405*	North Santo Domingo
091	1747		P. Riviera de Brig La Brose	English Brig	Butter Candles Cheese Meat Rigging Textiles	South Santo Domingo
092	1747	(A)	S. Firpo	English 22 Guns Frigate	192 Slaves Ivory Wax Dyewood 30,000	
			D. Sanchez Moreno			
		(C)	J. Sanchez			
093	1747	(A)	M. Dupli	English Packet Boat		
		(C)	M. Hixiart			
094	1747	(A)	S. Firpo	Dutch Sloop	5,975*	
095	1747	(A)	S. Firpo	Dutch Sloop	8,382* (9)	
		(C)	D. Sanchez			
096	1747	(A)	S. Firpo	Dutch Sloop		
		(C)	D. Sanchez			

097	1747	(A) S. Firpo (C) D. Sanchez			Dutch Sloop		
098	1748	(10)			English Frigate	Beer Butter Salt Meat Textiles Wax 3,750	
099	1748	(A) S. Firpo (C) J. Del Real		Schoon.	Dutch Sloop	3,507	
100	1748	M. Montero (C) M. de Tilbe				149	
101	1748	(A) S. Firpo (C) D. Sanchez			Dutch Sloop	10,047* (11)	
102	1748	(A) S. Firpo (C) D. Sanchez			Dutch Sloop		
103	1748	(A) S. Firpo (C) D. Sanchez			Dutch Sloop		
104	1749	(A) S. Firpo (C) D. Sanchez		Sloop	Dutch Sloop	657*	
105	1749	(A) S. Firpo (C) D. Sanchez		Sloop	Dutch Schoon.	250*	
106	1749	(A) S. Firpo (C) D. Sanchez		Sloop	Dutch Schoon.	1,116*	
107	1749	(A) S. Firpo (C) D. Sanchez		Sloop	French Schoon.	688*	
108	1750	(A) F. Ayala L. Jimenez (C) I. Munoz		Barge		Slaves	
109	1751	(C) F. Garrosari			English Sloop	None, crew provisions only.	North Santo Domingo
110	1752	A. Podio		Schoon.	Dutch Sloop	Skins Textiles	South Santo Domingo
111	1752	(A) F. de la Rocha Gallardo (C) D. Cevallos			French Schoon.	Salt Sugar Aguardiente 2 Slaves	North Santo Domingo

112	1752	(A) A. Milcoviche (C) L. Daniel	Sloop		French Schoon. 16 Crew	Textiles 15,000	South Santo Domingo
113	1753	(A) A. Milcoviche (C) L. Daniel	Sloop 12 Guns		Dutch Sloop 22 crew	Textiles Sugar Coffee Slaves	Tierra Firme
114	1753	(A) D. Cevallos (C) P. Cevallos	50 Crew		Dutch Packet Boat	Logwood Skins Cacao Tobacco Silver Gold 7,566	Puerto Rico
115	1753	(A) R. Gonzalez J. Zamorano (C) F. Gorrosari	73 Crew		Dutch Sloop	Blackberry Cedar Livestock Mahogany Skins Slaves 5,897	
116	1754	A. Echavarria			English Schoon. 7 Crew	None, crew provisions only. 225	South Santo Domingo
117	1754	(A) D. Sanchez Moreno	(12)		Dutch	Textiles	Puerto Rico
118	1760	(C) L. Daniel			Dutch Ship		South Santo Domingo
119	1760	(C) L. Daniel			Dutch Ship		South Santo Domingo
120	1762	(A) I. Hinojosa (C) L. Daniel	Sloop		English Packet Boat	Mercancia Pulses 3,181	South Santo Domingo
121	1762	(C) L. Daniel	Sloop		English Brig	Viveres 495	South Santo Domingo
122	1762	(A) A. Messendern (C) L. Daniel	Packet Boat		Dutch Ship		South Santo

					10 Guns		Domingo
123	1762	(A) A. Messendern (C) L. Daniel	Packet Boat	Dutch Ship			South Santo Domingo
124	1762	(C) L. Daniel	Packet Boat	Dutch Packet Boat			
125	1762	(C) L. Daniel	8 Guns 75 Crew	English Sloop			South Santo Domingo
126	1762	(C) L. Daniel			25 Slaves 3,179#		Lesser Antilles
127	1762	(C) L. Daniel	Sloop	Dutch Schoon. 8 Guns 45 Crew	Cacao Skins Textiles 4,488		Tierra Firme
128	1762	(A) A. Serrano (C) J.R. Perry	Sloop	English Schoon. 8 Crew	Aguardiente Coffee Sugar Treacle 2,355		
129	1762	(A) A. Serrano (C) J. R. Perry	Sloop 118 Crew	English Schoon. 6 Crew	Flour Mercaderias Wine 9,835		Puerto Rico
130	1762	(A) A. Serrano	Sloop	English Schoon. 8 Crew	Salt Treacle 2,684#		Puerto Rico
131	1762	(A) A. Serrano	Sloop	Danish Guairo 10 Crew (14)	None (15) 250#		Puerto Rico
132	1762	(A) A. Serrano	Sloop 118 Crew	English Sloop	Slaves Viveres 467		Puerto Rico
133	1762	(A) A. Serrano (C) J. de la Rosa	Sloop		27 Slaves 608*		
134	1762	J.B. San		English	934#		

			Marcos		Schoon.		
135	1762				English Sloop		
136	1764	(A) S. Firpo (C) F. Cierto		Sloop	English Brig	136 Slaves 2,684#	Lesser Antilles
137	1774	(C) L. Daniel			Danish Sloop	Tobacco	Puerto Rico
138	1774	(C) L. Daniel			Danish Sloop	Skins Tobacco	Puerto Rico
139	1774	(C) L. Daniel			Danish Schoon.	Skins Tobacco Wood	Puerto Rico
140	1774	(C) L. Daniel			French Sloop	Skins Tobacco	Puerto Rico
141	1774	(C) L. Daniel			French Schoon.	Wood	Puerto Rico
142	1774	(C) L. Daniel			Danish Sloop	Mercancia Wood	Puerto Rico
143	1774	(C) L. Daniel			English Sloop	Tobacco Wood	Puerto Rico
144	1774	(C) L. Daniel			Danish Schoon.	Tobacco Wood	Puerto Rico
145	1774	(C) L. Daniel			English Schoon.	Blackberry Indigo Logwood Skins	Puerto Rico
146	1774	(C) L. Daniel			Danish Sloop	Wood	Puerto Rico
147	1774	(C) L. Daniel			English Schoon.	Aguardiente Biscuit Bricks Wood	Puerto Rico
148	1774	(C) L. Daniel			English Sloop	Tobacco Wood	Puerto Rico
149	1774	(C) L. Daniel			French Sloop	Mercancia Tobacco	Puerto Rico

150	1774 (C) L. Daniel	Danish Schoon.	None	Puerto Rico
151	1774 (C) L. Daniel	English Sloop	Wood	Puerto Rico
152	1774 (C) L. Daniel	Dutch Schoon.	Wood	Puerto Rico
153	1774 (C) L. Daniel	Dutch Schoon.	Wood	Puerto Rico
154	1774 (C) L. Daniel	French Bote	Aguardiente Flour Iron Liquor Skins Wine	Puerto Rico
155	1774 (C) L. Daniel	Dutch Schoon.	Flour Skins Tobacco	Puerto Rico
156	1774 (C) L. Daniel	French Schoon.	Flour Salt Tobacco	Puerto Rico
157	1774 (C) L. Daniel	French Schoon.	Mercancias	Puerto Rico
158	1774 (C) L. Daniel	English Sloop	Tobacco Wood	Puerto Rico
159	1774 (C) L. Daniel	English Sloop	Coffee Metal Pots Skins Tobacco	Puerto Rico

* Value of prize calculated from amount of almojarifazgo paid.

\# Both the value of prize and amount of almojarifazgo known.

(1) Perez was a local authority in Samana investigating the loss of two Spanish fleet vessels, La Tolosa and NS Guadalupe.

(2) Sugar 324 tons; Cotton 9 sacks; Ginger 40 sacks; Aguardiente 14 pipas; Silver 40 pesos.

(3) Combined value of prizes nos. 14 and 15.

(4) Small vessel.

(5) Combined value of prizes nos. 45 and 46.

(6) Combined value of prizes nos. 49, 50 and 51.

(7) Small vessel, similar to dinghy.

(8) Ivory: 2 tons; Logwood: 16 tons.

(9) Combined value of prizes nos. 95, 96 and 97.

(10) French corsair, unnamed, outfitted in Ste. Domingue.

(11) Combined value of prizes nos. 101, 102 and 103.

(12) 5 corsairs, see Appendix II.

(13) Combined value of prizes nos. 123 and 124.

(14) Small vessel. Prize crew was English.

(15) The cargo was allegedly on the shore but it was never found.

Appendix II. Corsairs and Prizes -- Miscellaneous Information

No.	Ship Name (Corsair)	Ship and Captain Names (Prize)	Coming/Going	Observations
001	La Firme	*Port Royal		
002	La Modista	@Elias Cueten	From Curacao	
004	La Modista	@Guillermo Cascabel		
006	N.S. Populo y San Francisco Javier		From Puerto Rico	
007			From Curacao	
008		@Peter Coram	To Curacao	
009		@Nicolas Vandermer	From Caracas To Amsterdam	
013			From Barbados To London	15 Prisoners
014	N.S. Popa			
015	La Maria			
016	Santa Cruz			
018	La Santissima Trinidad San Antonio y las Ani[illegible]			
019	San Antonio y las Animas			
021	El Triton			
022	El Triton			
023	N.S. Altagracia			
024		@Jacobo Pluma	From Tierra Firme To Puerto Rico	Prize had trade agreement in Puerto Rico.

025	N.S. Rosario			
026	El Triton			
030	El Triton			
031	El Triton	*La Angelica de Martinica		
032	N.S. Rosario			
033	N.S. Rosario			
035	El Rosario el Amparo y N.S. Altagaracia			
036	El Triton			
037	N.S. Angustias y San Antonio			
038	N.S. Altagracia			
039	El Rosario			
041	N.S. Mercedes		From Curacao	
042	Santo Domingo y San Francisco		From Curacao To Puerto Rico	
047		@Roberto Guillermo		
048	San Joseph y El Carmen (Alias, El Vitoque)	@Juan Miguel	From Curacao	
055	N.S. Mercedes y San Antonio			
056	La Victoria			
060	El Vitoque			
062	El Vitoque			
063	El Vitoque			
069	El Vitoque	@Juan Pitre	From Curacao To Caracas	Prize had trade agreement in Puerto Sepi.

070	El Vitoque	@Juan Guiles	From Curacao To Caracas	Prize had trade agreement in Caracas.
071	El Vitoque	@Domingo Henriquet	From Curacao To Caracas	
073	San Antonio		From Guinea To Jamaica	22 Prisoners
074	N.S. Dolores (Alias, La Envidia)		From Curacao To Martinique	
076	El Vitoque			
077	El Rosario			
084	La Mariana		From Curacaq	In trying to escape, prize sank off Coro. Only cargo saved.
085	La Mariana	*La Mistela		
086	La Aurora			Gonzalez reprimanded for having too few crew. Prize could have overpowered corsair.
089		@Leonardo Van Krigh		
091	El Amable		From Lancaster England To Jamaica	Brose was a French Corsair armed in St. Louis, Saint Dominigue.
094	El Vitoque			
098	San Antonio			French Corsair armed in St. Louis, Saint Domingue.
109		*La Susana	From Puerto de Anguilla To North American Coasts	Ship lost while court proceedings underway.

110	N.S. Popa	*La Catalina @Guillermo Pescador		
111	El Dichoso	*La Marquesa de Chastenoye		Prize had license to collect salt from Saint Domingue government.
112	N.S. Amparo	*La Laureona	To Rio de la Hacha	Prize en route to collect cargo of Mules.
113	N.S. Amparo	*La Concordia o Savana Grande		
114	El Dichoso	*Abrahan Issac	From Curacao To Amsterdam	
115	N.S. Dolores (Alias, La Tramposa)	*Principe de Orange @Jacob Flanigon		
116	N.S. de la Porteria	*Molly @John Barnet		Prize turtle fishing with license from Jamaican Government.
117	1. El Rubi 2. La Concordia 3. La Fortuna 4. -- 5. --	*La Elisabet		Prize anchored to trade on Puerto Rico and Isla Margarita.
120	N.S. Luz	*El Triton @Abraham Hall	From London To Jamaica	
121	N.S. Luz	*El Nancy		Prize originally French had been captured by English.
122	El Emprehendedor	*San Antonio		

123	El Emprehendedor	*Isabela @Antonio Corso	From Curacao To Santo Domingo	
126	La Soledad			
127	N.S. Luz	*El Morday		7 Prisoners Prize bigger vessel than Corsair.
128	N.S. Concepcion y Animas		From Martinique To Puerto Rodelan	
129	N.S. Concepcion y Animas	*El Diogenes Bretana		
130	N.S. Concepcion y Animas	*El Clareo	From Tortola To New York	
131	N.S. Concepcion y Animas		To Puerto Rico to trade	Prize cargo left on shore but never found.
132	N.S. Concepcion y Animas	*San Nicolas		
133	N.S. Concepcion y Animas			
134	San Juan Bautista	*El Morday		
135	San Juan Bautista			
136	San Antonio y El Rosario	*El Emperador 2Julian Arleson		
137	N.S. Rosario			
138	N.S. Rosario			
139	N.S. Rosario			
140	N.S. Rosario			
141	N.S. Rosario			

142 N.S. Rosario

143 N.S. Rosario

144 N.S. Rosario

145 N.S. Rosario

146 N.S. Rosario

147 N.S. Rosario

148 N.S. Rosario

149 N.S. Rosario

150 N.S. Rosario

151 N.S. Rosario

152 N.S. Rosario

153 N.S. Rosario

154 N.S. Rosario

155 N.S. Rosario

156 N.S. Rosario

157 N.S. Rosario

158 N.S. Rosario

159 N.S. Rosario

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* Indicates name of ship.

@ Indicates name of captain.

APPENDIX III. ARMADORES AND CAPTAINS OF DOMINICAN CORSAIR EXPEDITIONS, 1720-1764

No.	Armador	Incidents
01	Ayala, Francisco	10
02	Bautista, Jose Antonio	2
03	Camacho, Juan Pedro	1
04	Campuzano, Jose	7
05	Castillo, Manuel	1
06	Castro, Gonzalo	8
07	Cevallos, Domingo	1
08	Dupli, Miguel	3
09	Echavarria, Antonio	1
10	Firpo, Silvestre	14
11	Gallardo, Alexo	4
12	Gallardo, Francisco	4
13	Gonzalez, Rodrigo	1
14	Herrera, Domingo	11
15	Hinojosa, Ignacio	1
16	Jimenez, Luis	1
17	Marocho, Manuel	2
18	Messendern, Augusto Ventura de	2
19	Milcoviche, Antonio	2
20	Olave, Juan	1
21	Orella, Jose Ignacio	2
22	Orbay, Manuel Ignacio	3
23	Rocha, Francisco de la	1

24	Rosa, Fernando de la	1
25	Sanchez Moreno, Domingo	1
26	Serrano, Antonio	6
27	Sierra, Francisco	1
28	Socorras, Benito	1
29	Torre, Pedro de la	1
30	Zamorano, Jose	1

No.	Captain	Incidents
01	Acosta, Manuel	2
02	Araya, Miguel	4
03	Azero, Cristobal	1
04	Bautista, Jose Antonio	3
05	Cevallos, Domingo	2
06	Cevallos, Pedro	1
07	Cireto, Francisco	1
08	Daniel, Lorenzo	12
09	Domingo, Nicolas	1
10	Echavarria, Antonio	2
11	Gallardo, Alexo	1
12	Gallardo, Francisco	1
13	Gallardo, Juan Antonio	1
14	Garcia, Gonzalo	1
15	Garcia, Jose	1
16	Garrosari, Francisco	2
17	Gonzalez, Diego	1
18	Gonzalez, Felipe	1
19	Herrera, Francisco	1
20	Hixiart, Martin	3
21	Lechuga, Manuel	2
22	Moreno, Isidro	1
23	Munoz, Isidoro	3
24	Olave, Juan	2

25	Pantoja, Juan Antonio	1
26	Pereira, Jose	2
27	Perry, Juan Rosario	2
28	Pluma, Pedro	1
29	Real, Joseph del	1
30	Rosa, Juan de la	1
31	Salcedo, Francisco	3
32	Sanchez, Jose	1
33	Sanchez de Toro, Diego	16
34	Tilbe, Manuel	1
35	Valencia, Francisco	2

No.	Unspecified	Incidents
01	Ayala, Francisco	1
02	Diaz de la Rabia, Antonio	1
03	Echavarria, Antonio/Augustin	2
04	Estanislao, Juan Jose	1
05	Gallardo, Francisco	1
06	Guerrero, Francisco	3
07	Herrera, Diego	2
08	Lechuga, Manuel	6
09	Mendieta, Antonio	1
10	Mesa, Juan	1
11	Montero, M.	1
12	Orbay, Juan Manuel	3
13	Pantoja, Juan Antonio	1
14	Perez, Julian	1
15	Podia, Antonio	1
16	Riwiera de la Brose, Pedro	1
17	Romero, Juan	1
18	Sanchez Moreno, Domingo	1
19	Sanchez Toro, Diego	5
20	San Marcos, Juan Bautista	1
21	Socorras, Benito	1
22	Traspuesto, Tomas	1
23	Valencia, Francisco	4

APPENDIX IV: PROVISIONS TO OUTFIT CORSAIRS, 1740-53.

No.	Year	Armador	Item	Cost (Pesos)	Observations
01	1740 Mar.	D. Sanchez	2 Quintales Pulvora	50	Para su corso
02	1740 Apr.	D. Herrera	1 Quintal Cuerda Mecha	8	
03	1740 May	F. Rocha	1. 1 Quintal Cuerda Mecha 2. Esmeriles	1. 8 2. 39	Para su balandra corso
04	1740 Jun.	F. Rocha A. Louzel	4 Pedreros	20	Para su balandra corso
05	1740 Sep.	D. Herrera	1. 15 Fusiles 2. 2 Quintales Polvora 3. 2 Fanas Cuerda Mecha	2. 100	Para habilitar su corso
06	1740 Oct.	F. Gallardo	1. 50 Libras Polvora 2. 2 Arrobas Cueroa 3. 6.5 Fanas Cuerda Mecha	2. 2	
07	1740 Dec.	D. Herrera	1. 2 Quintales Polvora 2. 3 Quintales Balas, Plomo 3. 2 Quintales Cuerda Mecha	158	Para peltrechear su balandra corso El Triton
08	1740 Dec.	D. Herrera D. Cereceda A. Maldonado	28 Fanas Cuerda Mecha		
09	1741 Jan.	D. Cevallos	15 Fusiles		Para peltrechar su balandra que fue a negocios del real servicio
10	1741 May	M. Ruiz	2 Fanas Cuerda	4	

11	1741 Aug.	A. Gallardo	1. 12 Quintales Bizcocho 12 Lanzas	29.5 29.5	Para su balandra corsaria
12	1741 Aug.	G. Castro			
13	1741 Sep.	M. Marocho	8 Arrobas Bizcocho	24	Para armamento de una piragua de corso
14	1741 Oct.	G. Castro	1. 1 Quintal Polvora 2. 1 Arroba de Polvora 3. 2 Arrobas Cuerda	1. 100 2. 11 3. 11	
15	1741 Oct.	G. Castro	2.5 Quintales Bizcocho	18	Para abastimentar su corsario
16	1741 Oct.	G. Castro	4 Arrobas Bizcocho	29.5	Para su balandra corsaria
17	1741 Oct.	G. Castro	2 Fanas Cuerda Mecha		Para municionar su balandra corsaria
18	1741 Oct.	G. Castro F. Guerrero	13 Fanas Cuerda Mecha		
19	1741 Oct.	G. Castro F. Ayala M. Dublan	8 Quintales Bizcocho		
20	1741 Oct.	M. Dublan	2 Arrobas Bizcocho	12	
21	1741 Oct.	F. Ayala	1 Quintal Bizcocho		Para su piragua de corso
22	1741 Nov.	A. Gallardo J. Romero	300 Libras Polvora		
23	1742 Jan.	J. Romero	1.700 Cartuchos		Para equipar su balandra corsaria que fue a Puerto Rico
24	1742 Jan.	J. Romero	744 Libras Plomo		Para fundar balas del paquebot corsario Diligente

25	1742 Jan.	F. Ayala	1. 19 Fanas Cuerda Mecha 2. 6 Fanas Cuerda	2.	12	Para sus embarcaciones de corso
26	1742 Jan.	A. Gallardo J. Romero J. Carmona	42.5 Quintales Bizcocho			
27	1742 Feb.	G. Castro	1 Arroba Polvora		6	
28	1742 May	D. Cevallos J. Calivera	1.025 Libras Bizcocho			Para bastimentar las balandras que fueron a Puerto Rico a negocio del real servicio
29	1742 Jul.	D. Herrera	212 Libras Polvora			
30	1742 Jul.	G. Castro	1. 17 Fanas Cuerda 2. 1 Quintal Cuerda Mecha	2.	8	Para su corsario El Triton
31	1742 Aug.	F. Guerrero	2 Fanas Cuerda Mecha		4	Para su corsario
32	1742 Nov.	M. Marocho	.5 Arroba Polvora		3	
33	1742 Dec.	D. Herrera	1. 3 Quintales Polvora 2. 13 Fanas Cuerda Mecha		175	Para habilitar sus embarcaciones de corso
34	1743 Jan.	J. Carrera	1.5 Arrobas Polvora		9	
35	1743 Jan.	G. Castro	1. 16 Fanas Cuerda Mecha 2. 3 Quintales Polvora 3. 1 Quintal Cuerda Mecha		124	
36	1743 Feb.	G. Castro	1. 6 Arrobas Polvora 2. 2 Quintales Balas de Plomo		87	

37	1743 Mar.	F. Valencia	3 Quintales Polvora		Para conducir a Puerto Rico
38	1743 May	F. Gallardo	1 Arroba Polvora	6	
39	1743 May	D. Herrera	1. 16 Arrobas Polvora 2. 6 Quintales Polvora	250	
40	1743 May	G. Castro F. de la Rocha D. Herrera J.A. Bautista	1.807 Libras Polvora		
41	1743 Jun.	F. Ayala G. Cruzado P. Ponce L. Pablo	225.5 Libras Polvora		
42	1743 Jul.	F. Ayala	1 Arroba Polvora	6	
43	1743 Jul.	O. Herrera	5 Quintales Polvora 2 Quintales Balas Fusil	175	Para sus embarcaciones de corso
44	1743 Jul.	D. Cevallos	2 Arrobas Polvora	12	
45	1743 Jul.	J. Carrera	1 Arroba Polvora	6	
46	1743 Aug.	D. Herrera	1. 2 Quintales Polvora 2. 2 Arrobas Balas Fusil 3. 3 Esmeriles	62.5	
47	1743 Aug.	D. Herrera N. Heredia J. Lorenzo	500 Libras Polvora		
48	1743 Sep.	D. Herrera	3 Quintales Polvora	75	
49	1743 Dec.	D. Herrera G. Castro	558 Libras Polvora		

		F. Jimenez P. Rojas M. Acuna			
50	1744 Jan.	D. Herrera	500 Quintale Polvora	125	
51	1744 Feb.	J.A. Pantoja	36 Cartuchos Fusil		Para pasar a Puerto Rico a negocios del real servicio
52	1744 Mar.	F. Valencia	3 Quintales Polvora	75	Para conducir a Puerto Rico
53	1746 Mar.	J. Aponte	8 Fanas Cuerda Mecha	8	Para su fregata armada en corso
54	1746 July	M. Marocho	3 Fanas Cuerda Mecha	6	Para la habilitacion de sus corsos
55	1746 Oct.	M. Maroco.	2 Fanas de Cuerda	4	Para su corsario
56	1747 Mar.	M. Marocho	2 Fanas Cuerda Mecha	2	Para su balandra de corso
57	1747 Jun.	F. Ayala	1. 25 Libras Polvora. 2. 3 Fanas Cuerda		
58	1747 Nov.	S. Firpo	900 Libras Polvora		
59	1748 Aug.	S. Firpo	900 Libras Polvora	375	Para municionar sus embarcaciones de corso
60	1748 Sep.	F. Ayala	182 Libras Polvora		
61	1749 Jun.	D. Herrera	1. 337 Libras Polvora 2. 1 Quintal Polvora	2. 25	
62	1751 Jan.	F. Garrosari	137 Libras Polvora		

63	1751 Feb.	F. Garrosari	1. 2 Fanas Cuerda 2. 1 Esmeril 3. 20 Machetes		
64	1751 Mar.	D. Cevallos	1. 6 Fanas Cuerda 2. 150 Libras Polvora 3. 4 Pedreros		
65	1751 Dec.	A. Milcoviche	4 Fanas Cuerda		
66	1752 Jan.	F. Gallardo	8 Fanas Cuerda		
67	1752 Aug.	A. Milcoviche	1. 200 Libras Polvora 2. 2 Fanas Cuerda	1. 219	
68	1752 Nov.	S. Carballa	600 Libras Polvora		Para la habilitacion de su corsario
69	1753 Jan.	J. Zamora	100 Lanzas		Para remitir en su balandra a comando de J.A. Pantoja a la nueva poblacion de Monte Cristi
70	1753 Apr.	F. Gallardo	1. 200 Libras Polvora 2. 13 Fanas Cuerda Mecha 3. 100 Balas		
71	1753 Apr.	F. Gallardo	50 Palenquetes y Angelotes		

Source: AGI, Santo Domingo, legs. 290, 291, 313

All costs are in pesos.