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
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
FOR THE DOCTORATE IN PHILOSOPHY

ON THE FIRST FRIDAY OF APRIL 1932

by

PIERRE BANCE

- 1932 -



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## ARE WE FREE?

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## ARE WE FREE?

Among the different characteristics of human nature there is one in particular which the Creator has lavished upon us all to an extraordinary degree. Tho we may not care to admit it, the truth of the matter is that we all are curious. Yes, that we are naturally curious no one can deny in the face of innumerable instances which prove the truth of this assertion.

A man walking down Sparks St. suddenly stops and stares at the top of a building. Within a few moments he will be in the center of a large neck-craning crowd whose sole interest in life appears to be staring at the top of the building in question. What is the reason of this? Plain unadulterated curiosity!

What, if not the spirit of inquisitiveness, prompts a child to pester its mother with an endless string of questions, and urges man to delve more deeply into the various branches of science? Without a doubt we are indeed curious and, as human nature does not change, so were our ancestors right back to Adam and Eve.

Curiosity may have killed the proverbial cat, but nevertheless thru it philosophy was born, because, as Plato and Aristotle said, when man began to wonder philosophy came into existence. Yes, when intellectual man thru his power of reason first attempted to grasp the why and wherefore of things, he was laying, unknowingly if you will, the corner stone of that great edifice of philosophy which was

destined to assume more gigantic proportions than the loftiest sky-scraper and dwarf all other man-made scientific structures into insignificance.

The progress of humanity is due to the fact that individuals vary from the human average in all sorts of directions, and that their originality is often so attractive or useful that they are recognized as leaders and setters of new ideals.

Among the variations, every generation of men produces some individuals exceptionally preoccupied with theory or speculation. Such men find matter for perplexity and astonishment where no one else does. Their imagination invents explanations and combines them. They store up the learning of their time, utter prophecies and warnings, and are regarded as sages. Philosophy, etymologically meaning love of wisdom, is the work of this class of minds, regarded with admiration, if not with envy, even by those who do not understand them or find much truth in their assertions.

Philosophy then, beginning in wonder, is as old as the human race, and the cradle of humanity was at the same time the cradle of philosophy. For hundreds and even thousands of years great intellects have been contributing to make philosophy one of the most delightful, as it is surely one of the most important, of all branches of study. Naturally enough there is no infallible guide for philosophers and it is not surprising to note that from time immemorial philosophers have entertained diametrically opposed views on practically every

possible subject. To a great extent, however, the progress of philosophy from the hazy, error-laden conceptions of antiquity to the clear-cut, razor-sharp tenets of Scholasticism, is due precisely to this extraordinary divergence of opinions, as there is no greater incentive for a philosopher to expose and prove his contentions in a clear and forceful manner than the scorn and ridicule of those who do not see things in the same light as he.

Philosophy, taken in a wide sense, forms such an enormous and unwieldy mass of learning that it is impossible for a man, tho he may study all his life, to master it in its entirety. For this and other reasons, the particular sciences, or, as Aristotle calls them, the partial sciences, are excluded from it, and what remains is taught under the name of philosophy.

Philosophy, taken in this latter sense, is divided into various departments, the most interesting of which, in our estimation, is psychology because it contemplates that which is most noble and sublime in man: his immortal soul made to the image and likeness of Almighty God Himself, and lifting man from stark animality to the exalted plane of an intelligent creature.

One of the most intricate as well as perhaps the most widely misunderstood topics in this branch of philosophy is the much discussed question of liberty, and it is our intention to explain in an as lucid and simple a manner as possible the Thomistic teaching on this delicate point of the psychology of the human act.

Man is indeed a wonderful creature; he is the only being in all creation who enjoys the privilege of acquiring knowledge in two distinct ways. Animals know thru their senses, God and angels know thru their intelligence, but man, reasonable animal that he is, has faculties for the acquisition of knowledge both in the sensuous and in the intellectual order. Above his sensuous appetite he has an intellectual appetite or will by which he tends to the good known by his intelligence. The intellectual appetite is obviously far superior to the sensuous appetite because its object is good in general whereas that of the sensuous appetite is good only in particular. Thus far most, if not all, philosophers agree. They come to the parting of the ways however, when they attempt to proclaim the attributes of man's superior appetite, and the greatest stumbling block is without doubt the question of liberty.

Is man free? "Most certainly", some will exclaim. "Nothing of the kind", others will answer, and still another group will reply: "Yes and no".

What a variety of opinions! At first sight it would almost seem impossible to make head or tail of the matter, tho really it is not so bad as that.

Do you recall the story of the tower of Babel? The work progressed very nicely to a certain point, but then, altho the laborers were doing their best to build the tower, they were unable to make any further headway. And for an exceedingly good reason -

they could not understand one another. Similar predicaments are still with us and it is for no other reason than this that philosophers as well as laymen are always tearing one another's opinions to pieces.

Quite obviously before deciding whether or not man is free it is essential to understand and agree upon the meaning this word conveys to our minds - otherwise our discussion, instead of being philosophical, would be more like that which invariably takes place when a sewing society sets its tongues wagging - and so, in order to establish a solid basis for intelligent argumentation, we shall endeavor to give an idea of what we understand by the word 'Liberty'.

Liberty, in a general way, may be defined as freedom from subjection, or the faculty of choosing between two or more objects, but philosophically speaking, Liberty is considered as man's elective will in choosing the means toward the end. From the above definition one may note that a practical judgment of the mind is required because, in order to make a choice, the good to be chosen must previously be presented to the elective will, otherwise there would obviously be nothing from which to choose. Furthermore it may be advisable to add that the elective will is not obliged to accept this judgment. Were it so, Liberty would of course be destroyed.

Before going any farther, it is evident that a human act is either free or determined and, in the latter case, that the determining agent is either extrinsic or intrinsic to the subject who performs

the act. Liberty consequently is divided into two classes, or, in other words, there are two kinds of Liberty: 'Liberty from Constraint' and 'Liberty from Necessity'. This division is also based on the fact that Liberty is an immunity as well as an indifference.

In order to avoid any confusion due to the possible ambiguity of the word indifference, it is not inopportune at this point briefly to explain the Scholastic concept of that term.

When we claim that Liberty is an indifference we by no means wish to imply that it is the power to choose without motive. Thomas Reid may have been a good Scotchman but he certainly was anything but a good philosopher and when he insisted that indifference to motives constitutes freedom he made a very serious mistake. According to Reid and the Scotch School, when a man gives a beggar a certain five cent piece rather than a certain other nickle the man is free because he chooses the money without a motive since one coin is as good as the other. The Scottish philosopher obviously did not understand that without a motive there can be no voluntary act and consequently no Liberty. This kind of Liberty, styled 'Liberty of Indifference' by modern philosophers is not worthy of the name of Liberty because a choice made for absolutely no reason properly speaking is not a choice at all, but rather a purely spontaneous determination. One is free and consequently master of one's acts only inasmuch as one performs them intelligently and with a knowledge of one's motive or motives.

Therefore the indifference on which Liberty reposes is the undetermined and at the same time the enlightened power to act or to abstain from acting.

Having made this distinction in the meaning of the word indifference, we are now in a position to treat of the two classes of Liberty in a detailed manner.

Liberty from Constraint is an immunity from any extrinsic determining agent. A man enjoying this class of Liberty is free from repression, compulsion, violence, and outside necessity. It is important to note, however, that any example offered in illustration of this statement is merely hypothetical. To give an instance in which a man absolutely loses his Liberty from Constraint is impossible because such is never the case.

Man's will in fact cannot be constrained in its consent, and the act of consenting is essentially spontaneous. Due to the fact that it proceeds from man's inorganic faculty of will, a voluntary act cannot be forced or prevented by an exterior agent. The object of man's will is universal good and, as we shall see later, the will cannot refuse to tend to it, but in the case of a particular good which is not a good from every angle, the will is free to tend to it or not. Apart from the necessary and instinctive tendency of the will to good in general, or, let us say, to happiness, the will is absolutely its own master and nothing can force it to consent to something of which it disapproves. Even God Himself, who naturally has the power to destroy man's will,

is unable to constrain it because then the consent would come from God and not from man's will. All the other human faculties, whether they be material or immaterial, may be constrained in their function by some sort of extrinsic agent and we consequently perform involuntary acts, but the consent given by the will is never involuntary. Thus a man may be forced to do manual or intellectual labor, but no existing power can force him to want to do the manual or intellectual labor in question, and we may well say with St. Augustine that nothing is so much in the power of the will as the will itself. It is therefore of the utmost importance to bear in mind that the tendency of the will to a particular good cannot be forced and that it is in a relative sense only that the following examples serve as illustrations.

The freedom of reading, writing, or going for a walk if one chooses, typify relative Liberty from Constraint, while on the other hand a slave most certainly does not enjoy relative Freedom from Constraint. Nor does a man walking along a railroad track when he hears a train coming, or the victim of a thug who is threatened with death unless he immediately hands over his money and valuables. We assume of course in the two preceding examples that the track-walker has no intention of committing suicide and that the man with a gun poked in his face does not consider it a pleasure to be shot, and the reason for which the above mentioned people are deprived of their Liberty from Constraint in a relative but not in an absolute manner is because relatively speaking they are not immune from an extrinsic agent which determines their will to act, while in an absolute way they are completely immune from the said agent.

Thus the track-walker is forced to get off the track but he is not forced to want to do it.

This type of Liberty, as may readily be perceived, properly speaking is really not Liberty.

Liberty from Necessity, also known as Liberty of Indifference or simply Liberty, is an immunity from any intrinsic determining agent which necessarily determines the will to act. It consists not in an immunity from all violence but rather in an immunity from all necessity. It is only indirectly that Liberty is opposed to violence and constraint; its direct antithesis is necessity. This is a rather important point and it is interesting to note that Victor Cousin, a French philosopher, fell into a serious error because he was not well enough versed on the concept of Liberty. He imagined that the antonym of Liberty is Violence, and built a theory on this false principle. According to him, spontaneous the necessary acts are free because, as he believed, where there is no violence there is Liberty. Thus a man absorbing nourishment is free because his act is spontaneous the necessary. Such a theory is of course ridiculous and if it were true, animals and even plants would enjoy Freedom because they too perform spontaneous the necessary acts. Violence then is only indirectly opposed to Liberty; it is necessity and not violence that is incompatible with true Liberty because plant, beast, and man may be influenced by violence while man, and man alone, may be immune from necessity.

Liberty from Necessity is essentially a contingency as it

consists in a possibility, that is to say, in the power of consenting or of not consenting, of wanting or not wanting a thing, and of wanting a thing or wanting another thing. Whence we have three kinds of Liberty from Necessity: 'Liberty of Contradiction', which is the faculty of choosing between two contradictories and is the power to act or to abstain from acting, such as to write or not to write; 'Liberty of Contrariety', which is the faculty of choosing between two contraries and is the power to act one way or another, for instance to be good or to be bad; and 'Liberty of Specification', which is the faculty of choosing between two different objects, for example to go for a walk or to play the piano.

Liberty is also divided into physical and moral Liberty. The former is an immunity from a physical agent or necessity which necessarily determines the subject one way or another and the latter is an immunity from a moral necessity or bond. This bond, incidentally, is the law which creates the obligation to do or not to do a certain thing.

Bearing these notions of Liberty in mind, let us now examine the opinions of the different schools of philosophy on the subject.

Almost two thousand years ago the Jewish people refused to believe that Our Blessed Lord was truly the Son of God, notwithstanding the fact that He fulfilled all the prophecies concerning the Messiah and performed astounding miracles before their very eyes. Even to-day thousands of misguided souls, clutching at the last straws of hope in a

crumbling doctrine, turn a deaf ear to the voice of the Church which, alone standing erect in the midst of the moral ruins surrounding it, unfalteringly and incessantly points out the sure way to salvation, not only to its own children but to every other human being as well. For some people then, it would seem that evidence is not the criterion of certitude and it is consequently not at all surprising to realize that a certain group of philosophers or rather, of so-called philosophers, denies the existence of Liberty as we understand it and claims that free will is nothing more than a myth.

They are grandiloquently known as Determinists and, according to their theory, all acts of man's will, even those apparently free, are adequately and inevitably determined by some necessity. Determinists are divided into two classes, due to the fact that one group asserts that the will is moved by an exterior or extrinsic necessity while another affirms that it is by an interior or intrinsic necessity that man's will is unavoidably moved to act. Whence, Fatalism and Determinism proper. These two sources of error have long been the haven of many a weary traveler along the path of life and, even at the present day, not a few of our fellow men are unable to tear themselves away from their magic spell. Would it not be wonderful tho, if such theories really were true? No liberty - no responsibility - no punishments, one can hardly blame Fatalists and Determinists for trying to uphold their contentions and it seems a shame to make their dream castles vanish into thin air by tearing the foundations out

from under them. However, the philosopher's mind must overrule his heart and we shall consequently proceed to our task of disillusionment by enumerating, criticizing, and rejecting the various tributaries of the above mentioned doctrines.

According to Fatalists, man's will is inevitably determined to act by superhuman forces, and Fatalism may be considered as mythological, metaphysical, and theological.

Mythological Fatalism teaches that the superhuman force in question is a blind fate. Stoics and astrologers contend that man is completely in the grip of fate and that he cannot possibly escape from it. "What is written, is written", they proclaim in a solemn tone. Why get excited? Just take things as they come. Certain legends of ancient Greece, particularly that of Oedipus, take the existence of this fate for granted.

Not a very energetic doctrine, to say the least, but it is very easily refuted. In the first place such a fate does not exist because if it did exist, well, it would be most unfortunate for each and every one of us, for can you imagine this fate shaping out our lives, our eternal happiness or everlasting damnation without giving us a chance to do something about it? We should be rewarded or punished without deserving it - could anything be more ridiculous? And besides, this doctrine of Fatalism is not directly opposed to the existence of man's free will. If you remember, we demonstrated that man's Liberty properly consists in an immunity from an intrinsic determining agent.

The blind fate of Fatalism then, if it did exist, would be nothing more than an extrinsic agent determining man's will to act and would consequently only deprive man of Liberty from Constraint - which is by no means the essence of Liberty - and would have no effect on his Liberty of Indifference, or in other words, on his Liberty properly speaking.

The Metaphysical School of Fatalists states that there is no effect without a cause, that the effect exists only inasmuch as it pre-existed in its cause, and that every effect has not only a universal or general cause but also a particular and determined one. Consequently, according to this reasoning, there is no such thing as a free cause.

There is a certain amount of truth in their statement and Metaphysical Fatalists are a trifle less illogical than their Mythological brethren, but they distort the meaning of a perfectly true principle in order to base their theory upon it. Every effect, we admit, has a determined cause if by determined cause it is understood that the cause has a concrete existence, but we most emphatically object to their claim if its interpretation implies that the cause is determined in its causality, or, in other words, that the cause is determined to such an effect rather than to another effect.

There is no reason why a universal cause or even a particular cause should not produce different effects. A cause acts necessarily or freely according as to whether the effect produced is necessary or not and who can claim that all existing effects are necessary?

Take the world for instance - mutable and composed. It bears the marks of contingency and is of course an effect, otherwise it would have existed from all eternity. Being an effect it is obviously not necessary. Its cause, therefore, did not act necessarily and was free to create it or not to create it. This free cause is consequently free to create as many effects as it pleases and is in no way determined to any particular effect. God's will furnishes us with a striking example - It always was, actually is, and ever shall be free to create as many different beings as It wishes.

Man's will with respect to particular goods is endowed to a certain extent with this divine prerogative. A particular good is far from the general or universal good which is, so to speak, the quintessence of finite goods. It is merely a good in certain respects and not in others. For instance, going for a walk in below zero weather is good for one's health but it cannot be considered a good with respect to a frozen ear which more often than not is the result of such a venture. A particular good then, not being a 'bonum undequaque bonum' is not a necessity and for that reason man's will is not determined to such a particular good rather than to another particular good, or, in other words, a particular cause such as man's will is not determined to a certain effect rather than to another effect. A sculptor's will, for example, is not inevitably determined to the modeling of a statue of a man rather than to that of a woman because both effects are particular goods.

Having thus taken the wind out of the sails of Metaphysical Fatalism we shall now turn our attention to Theological Fatalism which is a much more plausible theory and deserves careful consideration.

For Theological Fatalists, such as Calvin and the Jansenists, the blind fate of Mythological Fatalism is replaced by God Himself. God knows everything, they assert, and the future is an open book to Him. Consequently all our so-called free acts are foreseen and predetermined from all eternity and we are really not free at all.

Predetermination is a nefarious doctrine and is responsible for the damnation of innumerable souls because those who believe in it think that even before their birth they have been destined to Heaven or Hell and that nothing they can do will change the course of events. What is the use of leading a good life? If I am destined to Heaven or Hell I shall arrive at my destination anyway, so why not eat, drink, and be merry? Never did the devil concoct a more fiendish and more subtle plot for the perdition of mankind.

At first glance it would seem that such a theory appears quite reasonable but a close study of its tenets strips it of its plausibility and exposes it in all its absurdity.

The entire system is based on an incorrect conception of God and his attributes. One must remember that God is eternal and that His being, His knowledge, and His operations are infinitely superior to ours. There is no past or future for Him - nothing but the eternal present. Past, present, and future exist only relatively

to created humanity. One cannot consequently say that God knew before He created a man that the man was destined to Heaven or Hell, because there is no before for God. The creation of man and even of a particular man existed in the mind of God from all eternity and was obviously not an idea that struck God in the same sudden way that ideas come to our minds out of a clear sky. Pre-determination then is based on anthropomorphism which is the error of attributing to God a mind and nature similar to our own. Not particularly flattering to God - and, to make matters worse, Theological Fatalists who believe in eternal reward or punishment, ipso facto brand God as unjust. They trip on the skirts of common sense and insult God at every utterance. It is not difficult to detect the flaw in their theory tho, if one has even a faint notion of his Creator's nature and one must obviously conclude that Theological Fatalists have absolutely no right to claim that the omniscience of God is incompatible with human liberty.

So much for Fatalism in its various branches - let us now turn to Determinism proper and examine the credentials it presents for our acceptance.

Determinism, as we have already stated, maintains that all our acts are adequately and inevitably determined by their antecedents and, like Fatalism, it is divided into various branches. This division is based on the nature of the antecedents which, according to Determinists, explain the lack of freedom in our actions.

Thus we have mechanical or physical, physiological, social, and psychological or intellectual Determinism. We shall consider each one of these systems in particular.

Mechanical or Physical Determinists contend that the world is characterized by movement; it is ever changing and all its movements are linked to the movements that precede them as well as to the movements that follow them - wheels within wheels, so to speak. They conceive our globe as an immense piece of mechanism in which every cog, no matter how small and insignificant it may be, has an important part to play, so important in fact, that without it the rest of the machinery would be unable to function. To form an idea of this conception one might imagine a gigantic clock. If the smallest tooth on the smallest wheel be missing, the clock will no longer run. Thus everything depends on everything else, every piece is absolutely necessary, and all the pieces are intimately linked together in an unbroken chain.

But what has this to do with man's free will? Well, Mechanical Determinists claim that free will is incompatible with this determination of the material world. Even tho man's soul be absolutely distinct from his faculties of sensation, they claim that nevertheless thoughts are not independent from sensation, or, in other words, from this mechanical movement. Thus our thoughts and movements, directly or indirectly, are determined by our bodies or with our bodies, and Liberty is of course excluded.

In refuting this theory we do not deny that mechanical

movement may be determined as they claim but we would like to know where this movement began. How do Mechanical Determinists account for it? Returning to our example of a clock, we readily understand that the clock has not been going forever and that it must have been made and set in motion by a superior cause. Is it not perfectly logical to draw the same conclusion in the case of the mechanical movement in this world? Was not the world, like the clock, created and set in motion by a superior cause? The superior cause in the first instance was the watch-maker who made the watch and wound it up and in the second case a Superior Cause, or, in other words, God was the agent that brought the world into existence and set it in motion. Mechanical movement is therefore an effect of a superior cause and, as such, is naturally under its power. It is not at all out of order then that a mechanical force be directed by a superior cause. Such a state of affairs is quite possible, for if one mechanical movement can effect another mechanical movement, why should a force which is superior not be able to direct another which is inferior? In the physical order there are numerous examples of different physical forces exerting an influence on one another. Consider the tides, for instance, in which the gravity of the earth pulls the water in one direction while the attraction of the moon pulls it in a different one. Mechanical, or we may call them physical and chemical forces, rule the movements of land, air, and sea but we have examples of the submission of these great mechanical forces to a superior one which completely masters them.

In plants they are subject to a vital force which brings about the development and reproduction of the species; in animals mechanical forces and the vital force into the bargain are under the influence of a still superior force which is sensibility. In the above cases the forces which are submitted to a superior force do not produce any effect at all but rather the particular effect to which the superior or guiding force necessarily impels them.

Our contention is that in the case of man the physical and chemical forces, the vital force, and sensibility also all are submitted to the superior force of man's reasonable will which to a certain extent has control over them. Man's will is an immaterial faculty the source of which is an immortal soul. Why then should not this spiritual force direct the movements of material forces to which it is infinitely superior? Such is undoubtedly the case and man's will, being above this torrent of mechanical movement, is not carried away by it and consequently enjoys the privilege of Freedom.

Physiological Determinists contend that our volition is necessarily determined by temperament, heredity, passions, habits, and so forth. They usually take a criminal as their example. An investigation of a thief's ancestry, for instance, nearly always discloses the fact that his mother and father were also thieves. Stealing runs in his blood, this school of Determinism claims, and he just can't help it, his will being necessarily determined to such actions by heredity.

Far be it from us to deny that inclinations, passions, habits, and

numerous other physiological influences restrain Liberty to no small extent. A man's acts are free, as we have already stated, only inasmuch as they are reasonable and deliberate. Thus intoxication deprives man of his power of reasoning and deliberating and he is not immediately responsible for his actions. Vicious habits may quite easily diminish if not entirely annihilate a man's Liberty and he can blame his misdemeanors on his temperament instead of on himself, but is it not stretching the point to deny that all men are responsible for their acts, or, in other words, are free, just because some men do not have to shoulder responsibility? One might as well claim that all men are fools just because some men are mentally deficient. Furthermore, if heredity, temperament, and the various other influences explain the unreasoned and undeliberated acts of man's will, what about its acts which are the fruit of reason and deliberation and to which it gives its consent?

Social Determinism is very similar to Physiological Determinism. It claims that environment and social conditions necessarily determine man's will, and bases its assertion on the following argument. If you examine statistics of certain moral acts in certain places you will learn that these acts show a remarkable constancy. Thus, in the United States for instance, the number of suicides occurring each year is practically the same. Looking over these statistics for the past fifty years or so one can compute an average and form a surprisingly accurate idea of the number of suicides that will take place the fol-

lowing year in that country. Murders, lynchings, illegitimate births and crimes of all sorts all occur on a certain average in different countries, states, and provinces. This fact leads the followers of Social Determinism to declare that man is not free, because, they claim, if he were free his moral acts would vary.

Here again we do not deny that social influences such as education, home, and environment may have a great influence on human acts. Without the slightest doubt a child who has received a good religious education and has been brought up in a home that patterned itself on that perfect home in Nazareth has an infinitely greater chance of leading a virtuous life than his unfortunate brother of the slums who lacks even a rudimentary education and who has been brought up in surroundings of moral and physical filth. This much we willingly concede. The statistics mentioned, however, do not prove anything.

As we have already pointed out in the refutation of Psychological Determinism, all of man's acts are not free. Deliberation and reflection are required to constitute a free act. How many suicides were preceded by reflection? Very few, if any. The same may be said of murders, fornications, and the entire gamut of crimes for which statistics have been so painstakingly compiled by Social Determinists. Do you imagine for a minute that the perpetrators of these crimes which have such serious consequences would have gone ahead with their actions if they had paused to reflect? Most emphatically not. They were carried away by their passions and were not responsible for their

acts. Why, even under normal circumstances many people fail to reflect; how then can we expect a man under the stress of a violent passion of despair or rage to reflect calmly and deliberately upon what he is about to do? A very large percentage of our acts is obviously controlled by passion, self-interest, or routine and, as such, cannot be imputed to us.

Furthermore, free acts do not proceed from a will that acts without purpose. Whence it follows that in more or less similar circumstances men will have more or less the same intentions and it is consequently a similar spontaneous desire that causes men to act in a uniform and constant manner.

Even if we were to admit that in certain cases social conditions totally deprive man of his Liberty, it would be most illogical to conclude that because some men are not free all men are not free. Social as well as Physiological Determinists should remember that the conclusion to be drawn from an argument must be contained in the premises.

Psychological or Intellectual Determinism is more in vogue than any other deterministic system because it is advocated by no less an authority than the well-known German philosopher Leibnitz. Mathematician as well as philosopher, he formulated the famous principle of sufficient reason according to which "nothing can be true or real for which there is not a sufficient reason for its being so", and on this principle he based his theory of Psychological

Determinism. According to Leibnitz the will is necessarily determined by the greatest good offered to it. The strongest motive, consciously or unconsciously, dominates the will and consequently deprives it of Liberty, because if the will while indifferent made a choice without being determined by the strongest motive, it would be contrary to the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, according to Leibnitz, a man who is offered the same position by two different firms and at two different salaries is not free to choose the position offered by the firm that will pay a lower salary because it would be contrary to the principle of sufficient reason. His will, being determined by the greatest good offered to it or by the strongest motive, must necessarily choose the position at the higher salary.

To refute this theory of Psychological Determinism it is not even necessary to prove that the principle on which it is based is insufficient to explain the existence of realities. A far more simple course is open to us and we simply intend to show that the theory of Leibnitz is contradicted by facts.

Does it never happen that a choice has to be made between two things that are absolutely equivalent? Let us suppose that on a hot summer's day two friends walk into an ice cream parlor and each orders a glass of lemonade. The two glasses are brought to them on a tray and each thirsty man takes one. Why did the man who took the first glass take the glass he took instead of the other one? Both glasses were of the same size and contained exactly the same

amount of lemonade so how in the name of common sense could the man who made the choice have been determined by the strongest motive or the greatest good?

Furthermore, even if the will has to choose between two objects which are not similar and consequently are not equally desirable, it is incorrect to claim that the will is compelled to choose the better because it is determined by the strongest motive or the greatest good. Let us suppose that a man has to make a choice between two houses of unequal value. If you wish, he is not free to prefer the cheaper one because it is impossible for the will not to prefer that which reason points out to it as better but if, instead of considering the relative value of the houses, he considers each one separately as a particular good then he is free to choose whichever house he pleases. He is not bound to choose one house in preference to the other because, as neither house is a general or universal good, neither house can necessarily determine his will to choose it. He may therefore freely choose the cheaper or the more expensive one because both are particular goods. He would of course be foolish to choose the cheaper one but after all can he not be foolish if he wants to? There is a great deal of truth in the following inscription over the door of a certain South American insane asylum: Los que estan aquí no lo son, los que no estan lo son.

The theory of Liberty, we might add, is not a contradiction

to the principle of sufficient reason. Let us return to our example of the two glasses to demonstrate this fact. If the man takes the glass on his left rather than the glass on his right his motive for doing so is not objective because both glasses, being exactly similar and equally desirable in every respect, are objectively equal motives. His sole motive for taking the one on his left rather than the one on his right is his desire to take a glass and his desire is realized when he makes a choice and takes one. His choice then is without an objective motive but has sufficient reason in a subjective motive which is his desire to use his will.

We have just gone over the list of philosophers who reject the idea of Liberty and have found that Fatalists and Determinists are among its bitterest enemies - they directly attack Liberty and attempt, unsuccessfully as we have seen, to prove its non-existence. There are others, however, who indirectly reject Liberty by propounding philosophical theories that are incompatible with it and our thesis would hardly be complete without pausing for a moment to consider their views.

Pantheists and Sensualists both indirectly reject the idea of Liberty.

According to Pantheism, whose best known exponent is undoubtedly Spinoza, there is no distinction between the world and God. There is but one substance, one infinite and necessary substance - God. All things, whether they be material or spiritual, are modifications

of this one necessary substance and our voluntary acts are therefore necessarily determined by their antecedents to the detriment of Liberty.

Sensualism is either materialistic or positivistic.

Materialists such as Hobbes and Holbach claim that matter is the only cause of all phenomena of life whether it be vegetative, sensitive or intellectual, and, in their opinion, the immaterial or the spiritual does not exist.

Positivism is the result of Auguste Comte's mental aberrations. It is the familiar old doctrine of Materialism embellished with a few more errors and, according to it, spiritual substance, person, and faculties do not exist.

Since Sensualism denies the existence of the immaterial, it must necessarily assert that all our ideas originate in our senses. Knowledge must originate in our senses because there is no place else for it to originate, and Sensualism proclaims that feelings, emotions, ideas, and even judgments all are attributable to transformations and combinations of impulses and sensations. Cognition in a word, as expounded by Sensualists, is completely sensuous and there is no such thing as intellectual cognition or a human intellect. Consequently Liberty does not exist because, as we shall presently see, only an intelligent being can be free.

Both Pantheism and Sensualism are absurd and contrary to experience. Such theories, particularly the first, have comparatively

few supporters at the present day and it is not our intention to go to the trouble of refuting them at any great length. We mentioned them merely for the purpose of completeness and, after having thus scrutinized and rejected the various adverse opinions to the existence of man's free will, we shall now proceed to our task of treating the question from a Thomistic standpoint and shall show how and when man is blessed with this great prerogative of Liberty.

Is man free and, if so, to what extent? This is the problem which we shall attempt to solve in our thesis. Its importance cannot be overlooked or overestimated because the entire social and moral order is based upon man's Freedom, and we shall therefore make every possible effort to arrive at a satisfactory solution in as concise and direct a manner as possible.

Man has indeed many privileges. His senses are marvelous organs and nothing on earth could persuade him to part with any of them. Then he has his reason - infinitely superior to his material senses - by which, so to speak, he is likened to his Creator. Scholasticism adds to this array of man's privileges the glorious attribute of Liberty and claims that man's will in tending to a particular good is free or, in other words, enjoys Liberty of Indifference. It is understood of course that man's will is considered as that of a living human being. We are not referring to man's will after death and whether angels, good or bad, are endowed with Liberty is of no

concern to us in this thesis. It is further assumed by Scholasticism that the man whose will they claim to be free in its tendency to particular goods is a normal man in every respect. It is not to idiots, imbeciles, and those under the influence of sleep or intoxication, hypnotism or any other imaginable condition producing abnormality that Scholastics refer when they claim that man is free, but rather to an ordinary normal human being.

The Angelical Doctor teaches that man's will is not free in its tendency to its last end which is happiness but that human will, in choosing the means of procuring its last end or happiness, enjoys Freedom from Constraint and Liberty of Indifference. The will of each and every intelligent being - and only of an intelligent being - insofar as it tends to a particular good is not necessarily determined to one good rather than to another and is therefore responsible for its act.

We have already sufficiently demonstrated that man's will is endowed with Liberty from Constraint. It behooves us now to prove that man's will must necessarily tend to its last end and that it enjoys Liberty of Indifference in its tendency to particular goods but, before going into the proof, we wish to make it clear that we by no means contend that man is free in all his actions or that all men, when they are free, have the same extent of Freedom. Many of our actions cannot be termed free because of the lack of a deliberate choice. Social and physiological influences also contribute to

decrease the Liberty of a man's actions and it is almost obvious that a man is not always free, and, when he is free, that he does not always enjoy the same degree of freedom. Let us then dwell for a few moments upon the factors on which Liberty depends for its existence and which account for the different degrees of Freedom in human acts.

Freedom depends on deliberation to such an extent that it cannot exist without it. Liberty varies in a direct ratio with deliberation, i.e., the more an act has been deliberated the more it is free, and the less it has been deliberated the less it is free. Thus, ignorance or stupidity diminish deliberation and consequently Liberty, while sleep, intoxication, and hypnotism completely destroy Liberty because no deliberation is possible under those conditions. It is hardly necessary to add that where there is no Liberty there is also no responsibility, for do not the Scriptures tell us that: "Blessed is the man who could have transgressed the law, yet did not; who could have done evil, yet did not"?

From the above statements one might be lead to conclude that a man in a state of intoxication is not responsible for his actions. It is true that, while drunk, the man is not responsible for his actions and, insofar as his actions are concerned, he is not immediately free but was there not a time when the man was sober and did he not know that if he partook of too large a quantity of alcohol he would become intoxicated? Considering the question from this angle the man is responsible for his actions while drunk, because he is responsible for

getting into that state and we may say that while drunk he is immediately free and that the responsibility of his actions should be attributed to him unless, of course, he became intoxicated against his will. We are altogether justified in concluding that, if in certain cases man is not immediately free and responsible for his actions, in the vast majority of instances he is mediately or remotely free and, as such, responsible for his actions because he is responsible for getting into a condition in which he will not be free.

Freedom also depends on the conformity of our actions with the moral judgment of our reason. Man's power of reason has its source in an immortal soul and, being the most noble of human faculties, it is the most worthy to direct man to his last end which is happiness. It is thru our reason that we realize the difference between partial and universal good, it is thru reason that we arrive at the conclusion that certain particular goods are harmful to us and must be avoided. That then which reason points out to us as bad diminishes our Liberty. Vicious habits and passions, for instance, decrease a man's Liberty and, if he be completely enslaved by them, annihilate it altogether.

Freedom finally depends on the extent to which our human acts really procure happiness. This point, incidentally, is closely connected to the preceding one, for is it not obvious that the more a human act is in conformity with the dictates of reason which alone is able to distinguish between real and apparent good, the more the said act will really be conducive to man's happiness?

As most of us can unfortunately recall from experience, there are times when the practical judgment of our reason proposes to our will a certain partial good which is only apparently good. Our will gives its consent and we tend to this good by performing a certain action, the satisfaction derived from performing the act being most harmful to us from the standpoint, let us say, of our dependence upon God. To choose such a good constitutes a sin which we have the power but not the right to commit. Thus, a Catholic who is forbidden to eat flesh meat on a day of abstinence is physically free to eat meat if he pleases but he is not morally free to do so. The freedom to sin is not essential to Liberty because a sin consists in tending to something bad after making a choice between good and evil which is considered for the moment as an apparent good. Liberty is not the power to choose between good and evil (because the object of our will is good) but rather the power of choosing between two or more goods and, if evil happens to be chosen, it is under the guise of apparent good.

Let us consider a saintly man such as the Holy Father who is remarkable for his virtue and who is surrounded by virtuous men every day of his life. One can see at a glance that such a man is much less likely to commit sin than another man who has become luke-warm in his faith and who has contracted all sorts of bad habits. Would we be justified in concluding then that the Vicar of Christ is less free than this other man? Most certainly not. Besides the fact

that freedom to sin is not essential to Liberty, is it not true that His Holiness can make choices between multitudes of goods to which the other man cannot possibly tend? The man who sins can, it is true, perform certain actions which are beyond the pale of the virtuous man's activities but the act of sinning is a great imperfection which prevents the sinner from performing superior acts of virtue, and we are consequently perfectly correct in stating that the more a man's acts are in conformity with the dictates of his reason and the more they procure his real happiness, the more the man is free.

Freedom to sin is the power of choosing between two contraries or of acting one way or another. This corresponds to our definition of Liberty of Indifference and reminds us that Liberty of Indifference is divided into three classes, namely Liberty of Contradiction, of Contrariety, and of Specification. It is important to note at this point that in order to be free a man need not necessarily be endowed with the three above mentioned kinds of Liberty of Indifference. It is evident that one of them is sufficient, provided other conditions are not lacking, in order that a man may be termed free because in all three man is master of the actions he performs and the responsibility is imputed to him. It is not at all necessary that Liberty, in order to exist, should be without limits.

These few elucidations on the nature and extent of Liberty complete, we believe, the preliminary notions which are essential to a thoro grasping of our thesis and we shall now proceed to prove our contention that man's will must necessarily tend to its last

end or happiness while in tending to a particular good it enjoys the privilege of Liberty of Indifference.

Man, as everybody knows, is a reasonable being and, having this faculty of reason, it is only natural to expect him to make use of it. But what good is this faculty to him? There are three opinions on this question.

There always have been, still are, and undoubtedly ever will be individuals who claim that reason, so to speak, is almighty. They place it as a Goddess upon a pedestal and are confident that thru it they can know everything.

Others, who perhaps at one time shared the above opinion but who realize that appalling mistakes have been made by those who profess their belief in an omniscient reason, have come to the conclusion that reason can never be relied upon and must be rejected.

Thus Rationalists, who assert that everything can be explained by reason, must of course reject the dogma of the Holy Trinity because it is quite obvious that the existence of one God in three Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, each a distinct Person but all three nevertheless making but one God, could never be demonstrated by human reason alone.

Traditionalists, on the other hand, believe that human reason is so weak that thru it one cannot even arrive at the conclusion of God's existence without the aid of Divine Revelation. Such is of course not the case, because even without revelation a reasonable

human being can deduce God's existence from the movement which exists in the world, from the essential subordination of efficient causes, from the existence of contingent beings, from the different degrees of perfection in beings, or from the order existing in the world.

An old but ever new proverb tells us that "In medio stat virtus". How much truth it contains! Instead of going to extremes and exaggerating or minimizing the powers of our faculty of reason, why not be more conservative and, altho scientists may be unable to explore the supernatural or even to solve certain problems within their own domain, why not admit that there are numberless treasures of knowledge to which we may gain admittance by means of this magic key? No one denies that there are mysteries which reason can never fathom, but it does not necessarily follow that all knowledge is shrouded in impenetrable mystery.

The question of Liberty is not beyond the scope of our reason - it is not a mystery upon which God alone can shed light. Instead, it is a truth which is accessible by means of human reason and altho, as might easily be expected, the searchlight of reason does not dissipate every tittle of darkness when it endeavors to pry into the very roots of Liberty, one must not imagine just because our knowledge of Liberty is not one hundred per cent complete, that it is impossible to throw any light at all on the subject. An astronomer, for instance, knows very little about the different planets which compose our solar system

but he does not on that account doubt the truth of his discoveries or give up in despair and claim that because complete knowledge of the planets can never be acquired all further study is useless.

We are in the same circumstances or, more exactly, in far more favorable circumstances with regard to human Liberty. Very little about Liberty is unknown to us and that part which is unknown and perhaps unknowable does not concern its existence. Let us therefore now go into the proof of our thesis with the complete assurance that our powers of reason are fully capable of guiding us to a correct and satisfactory solution.

Among the various proofs to which we may have recourse in upholding the truth of our contention that man's will is free in its tendency to particular goods, none is more there or more convincing than a metaphysical proof based on reason, for not only does this type of proof establish the fact that we are free beyond a shadow of doubt, but it even goes so far as to show why we are endowed with Freedom. It is thru this argument derived from the nature of man that the philosophers of the past victoriously upheld the banner of Liberty against the onslaughts of Determinism and it is thru this self same argument that we intend to follow in their footsteps.

Man, we claim, is free because he is intelligent. An extremely broad statement, if you will, but just as true as it is broad.

In the first place Liberty, as we have already stated, cannot exist without intelligence, because man acts freely or,

in other words, is responsible for his actions only inasmuch as he is enlightened at the moment of giving the consent of his will. A free act must have a motive - a free act requires intelligence. Let us go over the different acts of the cognitive faculties that naturally precede the full voluntary act in order to impress this fact more forcibly on our mind. Quoting Cardinal Mercier, "the first prerequisite condition is knowledge: sensuous representation gives birth to ideas, among which are one or more objects capable of serving as motives for the will. Simple representation, first of all sensuous, afterwards intellectual, is succeeded by spontaneous judgments on the part of the sense-instinct or estimating faculty and of the reason proper concerning the goodness and badness of the objects represented. This rough estimation, putting a certain personal value upon the objects, provokes spontaneous movements of the lower and higher appetitive faculties so that an incipient yet real like or dislike for the object occurs. These tendencies arouse attention and the mind begins to reflect upon the advantages and disadvantages of the objects as well as upon the favorable or unfavorable inclinations their different aspects produce on the will, and on these matters the mind forms a series of judgments which together make up the process of deliberation. This deliberation does not go on forever; an end is put to it as soon as the reflecting mind cuts short its self-imposed discussion by making a decision and the decision is immediately followed by

a deliberate volition of the act decided upon".

Since man's intelligence is the only natural means by which man can be enlightened at the moment of giving the consent of his will, and, since to be free enlightenment is absolutely necessary, it is perfectly obvious that Freedom goes hand in hand with intelligence. Wherever you find intelligence there also you will find Liberty and incidentally, the greater is the intelligence the greater also will be the Liberty.

When we claim that man is intelligent we have no intention of stirring up the old question of the impressed species and the intellect agent. We merely wish to bring out the fact that man has an immaterial and inorganic faculty of intelligence the object of which is absolutely distinct from that of the senses. Scholasticism tells us that "sensus est particularium, ratio vero universalium". Particular beings such as plants, animals, and men are the object of our senses and we can either see, smell, hear, taste, or feel them but supposing we go a little higher on the scale of knowledge and consider natures, essences, and so forth how could our material senses grasp such objects which exist only in the abstract and which are 'entia rationis', not 'entia realia'?

Once we enter the world of ideas to which Plato was so greatly attached, once we leave matter behind us and soar into abstraction, our material senses are of absolutely no use to us. Operari sequitur esse and it is evident that a faculty which

grasps an immaterial object must, like its object, be immaterial also. Can you imagine anything more ridiculous than a man trying to carry an angel in his arms?

Man then has something spiritual about him; he has a spiritual faculty in his soul and that faculty is absolutely free from matter in its existence, in its operations, and in every other respect.

Matter is fundamentally and always contingent and, as a quantity, it cannot escape time and space. Take any material example you wish and you cannot help but realize that such an object of one or more of our material senses at one time did not exist and, at some future time, shall cease to exist. Consider a house for instance. At a certain time that house and even the materials of which it is composed, did not exist and it is equally certain that, at some future time, the house and materials will no longer exist. Furthermore, the faculty by which such a material object is known is also material and consequently contingent. The human eye for instance, thru which the color and outline of the house are known, like the house itself is material and contingent - it did not always exist and will not always exist. In this respect cognition in men and animals is absolutely identical.

Thus we understand that a material faculty can acquire a knowledge of a material object, but what happens in the case of a

spiritual faculty such as man's intelligence? Being free from matter, this spiritual part of man must also be free from the conditions under which matter exists because, as a certain author remarks, it would make one laugh to be told that a soul, a thought, or an idea is round or square, white or yellow, hot or cold. Yes, thru its immateriality man's intelligence is free from the limitations which follow in the wake of matter. It is not quantitative - time and space do not confine it. Spirituality sweeps away all restriction and, so to speak, paves the way towards the Infinite. God, pure and perfect spirit, is the very essence of the Infinite and everything spiritual partakes of infinity according to the degree of its spirituality. There is indeed something God-like in man's intelligence and thru it he shares the divine power on a small scale, for how could one otherwise explain the extraordinary authority which man exercises over nature?

Consider man as a physical being, that is to say, merely as an animal and you must admit that he is nothing to boast about. Other animals are stronger and more agile than he. Their senses are far better developed than his. As Pascal so aptly remarks, "man is but a reed; a vapor, a drop of water is enough to kill him". Man is indeed a most insignificant creature and an ant or a cricket is far stronger than he in proportion to their respective sizes. Man, were he as strong as an ant, would be able to lift ten

times his weight with ease, yet how many men can lift a bag of potatoes without considering that they have done a hard day's work? Man, were he as agile as a cricket, would think nothing of jumping over the Empire State Building, but even jumping at conclusions is too great a task for the average man. Yes, from a physical standpoint, man is indeed a weak, sickly, and pusillanimous creature but, in spite of all his shortcomings, in the words of Bossuet (whom we quote in his own language lest their beauty and charm be lost in the process of translation):

"L'homme a presque changé la face du monde; il a su dompter par l'esprit les animaux, qui le surmontaient par la force; il a su discipliner leur humeur brutale et contraindre leur liberté indocile. Il a même fléchi par adresse les créatures inanimées: la terre n'a-t-elle pas été forcée par son industrie à lui donner des aliments plus convenables, les plantes à corriger en sa faveur leur amertume sauvage, les venins même à se tourner en remèdes pour l'amour de lui? Il serait superflu de vous raconter comme il sait ménager les éléments, après tant de sortes de miracles qu'il fait faire tous les jours aux plus intraitables, je veux dire au feu et à l'eau, ces deux grands ennemis, qui s'accordent néanmoins à nous servir dans des opérations si utiles et si nécessaires. Quoi plus? Il est monté jusqu'aux cieux pour marcher plus sûrement, il a appris aux astres à le guider dans ses voyages; pour mesurer plus également

sa vie, il a obligé le soleil à rendre compte, pour ainsi dire, de tous ses pas. L'homme a un certain instinct de chercher ce qui lui manque dans toute l'étendue de la nature. Il fouille partout hardiment, comme dans son bien, et il n'y a aucune partie de l'univers où il n'ait signalé son industrie.

Pensez maintenant, Messieurs, comment aurait pu prendre un tel ascendant une créature si faible et si exposée, selon le corps, aux insultes de toutes les autres, si elle n'avait en son esprit une force supérieure à toute la nature visible, un souffle immortel de l'Esprit de Dieu, un rayon de sa face, un trait de sa ressemblance!"

Yes, animals existed long before the creation of man but they have not left any prints of reason in the sands of time. Man tho has conquered the world; he left his trace behind him wherever he roamed and it is the archaeologist's greatest delight to unearth the evidence of primitive man's ingenuity for the admiration of the twentieth century. Why this difference? Can it be for any other reason that matter cannot master matter but that it requires spirit to mold matter to its will - that spirit by which man is likened to the Great Architect? How much more emphatic would not Bossuet have been had he lived at the present day instead of in the seventeenth century. The vast strides made by science in the past three hundred years would indeed amaze him, were he here to witness them. The steam engine, the typewriter, the cinema, telephony, telegraphy, radio, television, automobiles, airplanes, submarines, all prove that man, tho a reed, is undoubtedly a dominating reed. God Himself tells us that He made man to His own image and

likeness. Since God is a Spirit it is evident that it is not thru his material body that man resembles his Maker but rather thru his spiritual soul and intelligence. Small wonder then, if man's intelligence even remotely resembles that of his Creator, that he should dominate the entire world and have all other creatures at his feet.

Man then beyond a shadow of doubt has a spiritual faculty of intelligence and, just as the object of his material faculties is material, so also the object of this immaterial faculty must be immaterial.

Intelligence, whether it be human, angelical, or divine has the same common formal object which is being, not merely the abstract, undetermined, transcendental notion of being, but being in its innumerable determinations such as essences, natures, genus, species, and so forth. The intellect knows nothing but being. The objects which the mind knows are of diverse natures: substances and accidents, material and immaterial beings, real and possible beings, contingent beings and the Necessary Being. Now all these different objects have but one characteristic in common - they all are beings. Therefore the only formal reason of anything being apprehended by the mind is its being which is the common and adequate object of the intellect. Yes, the proper object of the mind is the universal or the abstract. *Universalia sunt ubique et semper.* Impervious to time and space, they are permanent,

unchanging, incorruptible. They make up the absolute world of essences which Plato opposed to the sensible, contingent, and mutable world; they make up that world of ideas from which Sensualists are forever excluded. Thru our intelligence then we perceive the universal, we make universal judgments and consequently know not only being but truth itself which is being in its general characteristics and in its universality.

One who admits that man is intelligent ipso facto admits also that man has a will. A short demonstration will make this statement very clear. As we have so often repeated, knowledge in man is either sensuous or intellectual. Man's senses are radically distinct from his mind, the object of his senses being the particular and that of his mind the universal.

Now it is a fact of experience that whenever a subject has not its perfection it tends to its perfection and, once its perfection has been attained, the tendency ceases and a state of rest ensues. While tending to its perfection the subject is 'in statu viae', but when the perfection has been attained it is 'in statu termini' insofar as that particular perfection is concerned. The human eye, for instance, has only one function and that is to see. If it be closed or blinded, it tends to see and, as it were, makes an effort to see but, once it sees, the tendency no longer exists and, possessing its perfection, the eye rests. The eye goes from 'in statu viae' to 'in statu termini'; from 'in potentia' to 'in actu'.

It is another fact of experience and a far more obvious one too, that man with respect to knowledge, either sensuous or intellectual, is most certainly not 'in statu termini'. It is absolutely unnecessary to dwell at any length on the fact that man's knowledge, of whichever category it may be, is far from complete and perfect. His senses do not convey to him all possible sensuous knowledge. His eye - even with the aid of television - does not see everything; his ear, even tho he may possess an eleven tube superheterodyne radio receiver, grasps only a fraction of existing sounds and harmonies. Yes indeed, the vast majority of the objects of his material senses are never known to man at all.

The same thing may be said of the object of his mind which is being or truth. Who would be foolish enough to state that man knows all truths? Even a child of ten has enough sense to realize that no matter how clever a man may be he can never know everything. The most a scientist can do is to propose theories and, strangely enough, it seems that each eminent scientist builds up a theory which is altogether incompatible with the theory which another scientist proposes on the same subject. If, as Browning claims, "ignorance is not innocence, but sin", it looks very much as if none of us would ever reach Heaven because the truths of which we are ignorant are at least a million billion times more numerous than those

with which we are acquainted.

Man then with respect to knowledge, either sensuous or intellectual, is obviously 'in statu viae' and consequently lacks his perfection. For this reason he tends to his perfection and, as knowledge is either sensuous or intellectual, both his senses and his mind tend to their respective perfections. It therefore naturally follows that in man there are two tendencies or appetites: one, a sensuous appetite corresponding to his senses; the other, an intellectual appetite corresponding to his mind.

The sensuous appetite which is divided into concupiscible and irascible appetites need not be further considered.

The intellectual appetite tho, which is of particular interest to us, is nothing more than human will which is usually defined as the inorganic faculty which has for its object the good known by the intelligence. Mind and will then are intimately connected and cannot exist separately. The mind acts on the will by furnishing it with an object, namely a good, to which it can tend - nihil volitum nisi praecognitum - and the will influences the mind by allowing it to act or by preventing it from acting, but the important point is that the will, so to speak, has its root in the intelligence or, as St. Thomas puts it, "voluntas consequitur intellectum".

Let us now, in order not to lose our bearings, cast an eye back over the matter we have already covered. Up to this point

we have proved that Liberty can exist only in an intelligent being, that man has a spiritual faculty of intelligence and consequently a spiritual faculty of will. We have but a step farther to go to prove that human will is free in its tendency to particular goods.

Our proof is based on the following statement of St. Thomas. "A faculty", the Angelical Doctor tells us, "is necessarily determined to act by its object only when the object is really adequate or, in other words, only when the object completely satisfies the faculty's tendency to act".

Let us examine our own different faculties to see if experience confirms this assertion. Suppose we choose our sense of sight from among our material faculties of cognition and subject it to a thoro inspection. In the first place it is obvious that the sense of sight and the organ of sensation or the eye do not determine themselves, and that sensation is not caused by their action alone but by some outside cause, that is, by some visible object. Imagine we have a person with a normal sense of sight and a normal eye but that there is no visible object before him only, let us say, an odor or a sound. What will be the result? His eye of course will not see anything because the object in question is not an adequate object for his faculty. It is not the formal object of the faculty of sight but rather of the faculties of smell or hearing. Suppose tho that a visible object,

a book for instance, had been present. The eye would have seen it. Why? Because it would have been the formal object of the faculty. It would have completely satisfied the faculty's tendency to act and the faculty in the presence of its adequate formal object would necessarily have had to act, that is, the eye would necessarily have had to see the book.

Furthermore, the same remark applies to our spiritual faculty of intelligence. Its formal object, as we have already proven, is being or truth, and in the presence of its formal object the intelligence cannot remain indifferent. Suppose the mind makes a judgment in which two terms, a subject and a predicate, are joined together by the copula 'to be', thus: the human soul is immortal. If the mind understands that the predicate can be correctly, or shall we say logically, predicated to the subject or, in other words, that there is truth in the judgment, it cannot remain indifferent but is determined to affirm such a judgment because the truth therein contained is the formal object of the faculty of intelligence, because such truth is the adequate object of the mind and completely satisfies the mind's tendency to act.

It is evident then that if a faculty, whether material or spiritual, is necessarily determined by its object to act, there must be an adequation between the object and the faculty and the object must completely satisfy the faculty's tendency to act.

Now from our definition of human will let us deduce its formal object. If will follows intelligence, it can tend to anything that intelligence can present to it as a good. If will follows intelligence, the field of its object is as large as the field of the object of intelligence - both are universal. Man's intellectual appetite or will then, immaterial and infinite like mind, has the same capacity to universal good that the mind has to universal truth. Its adequate formal object consequently is good in its universality just as the adequate formal object of the mind is truth in its universality.

We may therefore conclude that the only adequate formal object of the will is 'bonum undequaque bonum' which, lacking nothing, is obviously perfect and therefore completely satisfies the will's tendency to act. An adequation can only exist between the will and universal good because the intellectual will has a universal capacity. Now when an adequation exists between a faculty and its object, the object must evidently satisfy the faculty's capacity and, in the presence of such an object which is the perfection of the faculty, it naturally follows that the faculty loses its freedom and is necessarily determined to act. When universal good therefore is presented to man's will by his intelligence, his will is no longer free but must necessarily grasp this supreme, absolute, total, or infinite good which alone can give him perfect happiness or, as St. Thomas puts it, "illud

solum bonum,quod est perfectum,est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle". This, incidentally, is exactly what happens in the case of the elect who are enjoying the Beatific Vision.

But let us return to earth where good, alas, is but particular or partial. Any good existing in this world, if closely examined, contains an element of bad or, in other words, no good is a good from every aspect in which it may be considered. Reading and studying, from the standpoint of acquiring knowledge, is obviously a good for it is conducive to our perfection but, if it be considered from the standpoint of the physical strain on our eyes, it is certainly not a good. And so it is with every appetible thing in this world - attractive on one hand, repulsive on the other. When the mind examines such objects it sees that they exist by the being they possess and that they do not exist by the being they lack, that they are attractive for their being and repulsive for their lack of being. Now this lack of being, this aspect under which a good may be considered not a good, this standpoint from which the object is not appetible is obviously an imperfection in the object. When we say that the object is not perfect, however, we use the term in a relative and not in an absolute manner. In claiming, for instance, that a moving picture reel, attractive from one standpoint and repulsive from another, is not perfect, we do not wish to convey the impression that the reel in itself is not perfect but rather that the reel, altho perfect in itself and no

matter how fine an example of the art it may be, is imperfect relatively to the spectator whose eyes it fatigues. All goods existing in this world then are imperfect, not in themselves perhaps, but relatively to the man whose will tends to good.

What must we conclude from this fact? Just this.

There is obviously no adequation between particular goods and our intellectual faculty of will which has a capacity for universal good. Particular goods are not really perfect; they are 'bona', if you will, but not 'bona undequaque bona'; they all lack something and consequently cannot satisfy the will's tendency to act. How then can they necessarily determine the will to act? How could a man who is able to lift one hundred pounds and no more, be able to lift a ton? How can a faculty whose object is universal good be determined, forced, or dominated by an imperfect, inadequate, particular good?

One would have to be extremely illogical, we think, after studying this proof to refuse to admit that human will is free in its tendency to particular goods and, unless one wishes to turn one's back to the light of evidence, one cannot deny the correctness of Scholasticism in its assertion that "human will, in the present condition of things, must necessarily tend to universal good, while in its tendency to particular goods, if it be in a normal state, it enjoys the privilege of 'Liberty of Indifference'."

In case our readers may feel inclined to class us with La Palice and censure us for devoting so much space to the proof of a statement which is almost obviously true, it must be remembered that some people are more sceptical than others, sometimes so sceptical in fact that they insist on proof before they are willing to admit anything. It is for this class of individuals, may we hasten to add, that we have had recourse to a syllogistic metaphysical demonstration. Such a laborious procedure tho is not necessary for the average man because he admits the existence of facts of which he is certain. Unlike Pyrrhonists who doubted their own existence, he does not demand a proof in order to admit that the sun is shining, that the weather is warm, or that he has a headache. He realizes that he not only sees and feels what is going on outside of him but also that he feels what is taking place inside his own being. Just as a normal man feels that he is energetic or tired, healthy or ill, happy or sad, so also, and to no less a degree, does he feel that he is free. He is conscious of Freedom in his actions and, as Bossuet says: "Un homme qui n'a pas l'esprit gâté n'a pas besoin qu'on lui prouve son franc arbitre, car il le sent; et il ne sent pas plus clairement qu'il voit, ou qu'il vit, ou qu'il raisonne, qu'il se sent capable de délibérer et de choisir".

Let us trace the entire course of a human act such as

giving alms to a beggar, for instance, to see if we are really conscious of our Liberty. Suppose when walking along a street I observe a mendicant standing on the corner and holding a tin cup on which he depends for his sustenance. As I approach the spot, I become more aware of his presence; my attention is aroused and is concentrated on him. I notice his shabby clothing, his unkempt countenance, and his mournful expression. Immediately I feel sorry for him and begin to wonder what I should do. I deliberate as to whether or not I should drop a coin into his cup; I meditate on my motives to help him or not to help him and perhaps say to myself: I suppose I really should be charitable. What is a nickle or a dime to me? It means a great deal to him tho. But after all why should I encourage begging? It is against the law. There are places in which such people can obtain free board and lodging. How do I know that this person is not a fraud? Perhaps he has a home and even an old age pension. Perhaps he is not in need at all and is just begging in order to collect enough money to become intoxicated. I wonder what I should do?

Is it not obvious that before performing a human act which requires deliberation each and every one of us feels free? Not infrequently our Freedom is embarrassing, for is it not quite often difficult to put an end to our deliberation and make up our minds?

Even when I have finally made a choice and decide, let us say, to give the man a coin, do I not feel at the moment of doing so that I am free and that I am assisting this eleemosynary because I want to? Do I not feel that at any time I can avail myself of the fair sex's privilege and change my mind if I so choose?

And finally after having performed this act of charity do I not walk off contented and light-hearted in the satisfaction of knowing that I have done a good deed which is pleasing to Him who said that the man who gives even a glass of water to the poor in His name shall not go unrewarded? Where would this feeling of satisfaction come from if I had been inevitably determined to act as I did?

To the unlettered, our metaphysical argumentation no doubt means very little and one may well imagine the astonishment of a round-eyed, open-mouthed yokel on being informed that he has immaterial faculties with universal objects. Most people prefer something tangible - they so to speak like to be able to see, touch, and feel the subject of their discussion and are far more likely to understand and give their assent in that case.

How then can any reasonable creature, no matter what his education may be, fail to realize that he is free when before, during, and after the performing of a human act the voice of his own experience cries out from his very soul and continually

proclaims the existence of his Liberty? How can a man doubt his Freedom when all men consider it their most priceless privilege? Yes, thruout the whole history of the world humanity in every condition and in every age of life has proclaimed the existence of Freedom by being insanely jealous of it and by making a loud outcry whenever it is threatened. Whether a nation be civilized or not, the first concern of its ruler is to give his subjects sufficient Liberty. The only thing in common between a cannibal tribe on the Island of Borneo and a great empire renowned for its culture and prowess is this ubiquitous passion for Liberty. No nation can exist in a state of servitude. Man as a unit of the nation feels that he is free; he insists on his rights and will let no one deprive him of them. Patrick Henry, the American statesman, voiced this same sentiment a little more than a century ago. At that time the British were in possession of Boston and the Americans in that region were practically reduced to servitude. They were stripped of their most cherished rights: they were not permitted to vote, they had no representation in Parliament, they were heavily taxed, and many other outrages were inflicted upon them. Fearing that the British intended to march south and impose their will in the same adamantine manner upon his part of the country, the immortal Henry in a stirring address raised his voice in protest and urged that the Virginia militia be armed for the protection of their rights.

He brought his appeal to a close with these never to be forgotten words: "Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but, for me, give me liberty, or give me death."

Why do you suppose that Toussaint L'Ouverture, who had spent most of his life as a slave on a sleepy West Indies island, suddenly sprang from his lethargy and, at an age when most men's energy is on the decline, became a human thunderbolt and plunged into the thick of international affairs with such amazing initiative and courage as to deserve the name of the great Haitian General and Liberator?

Yes, every civil war, insurrection, rebellion, and revolution is caused by a violation of someone's rights; no man will calmly see his Liberty trampled underfoot - he will take any means to rid himself of his oppressor and will not rest until he has succeeded in doing so.

But why need we refer to the exploits of liberators in order to establish the existence of Liberty when even a child barely out of the cradle proclaims it in no uncertain manner? We all know that children hate to be told what to do and want to have their own way in everything. Altho they are unaware of what Liberty is, they are fully conscious of it and protest vigorously whenever their will is crossed.

As a child cannot possibly be accused of having set opinions on this abstruse question of Liberty, it is evident that it is in the essence of a human being to feel that he is free. One does not need to be very observing to notice from personal experience and from observation of his fellow men that every reasonable person is conscious of his Liberty. Even Determinists admit it but, in order to wriggle out of this refutation of their theory, they claim that man's consciousness of his Liberty is nothing more than an illusion - an illusion due to the fact that man is unaware of the causes of his determinations.

According to Spinoza, we know our acts but ignore the motives which make us act, and man considers as possible that which in reality is necessary because the causes of his acts are unknown. Hobbes and Bayle, two staunch defenders of Determinism, rush forward with numerous examples to establish the truth of their assertion. The needle in a compass, a weathercock, a spinning top, a leaf carried away by the wind, were they conscious, would all think that they were free because they would ignore the causes of their determinations. Determinists even drag in hypnotism in their attempt to justify themselves and point out that a hypnotized person whose acts are of course necessarily determined by the hypnotizer, is under the impression of being free. Liberty then is nothing but an illusion, the same illusion that exists in the mind of the

dreamer or of the drunkard who wrongly imagines that he is acting freely.

John Stuart Mill further declares that a direct consciousness of the Freedom of the will is a figment and that the feeling of Liberty is impossible. "To be conscious of free will", says he in his Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, "must mean to be conscious before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way. Consciousness tells me what I do or feel. But what I am able to do is not a subject of consciousness". Obviously enough only what is actual is knowable and our powers become disclosed only in the acts they enable us to exercise. A so-called free act then, is not knowable until it is actual and, as soon as it is actual, the faculty which produces it is no longer undetermined and Liberty is consequently excluded.

We must of course admit that only what is actual is knowable and that the faculty which produces the act is not undetermined at the moment of producing the act in question, but one must remember that there is a great difference between a free act and a desire, between the actual doing and the power to do. The actuation of the faculty of will must be taken into consideration and the best way to make this clear is by having recourse to introspection.

We all are aware on one hand that the causes of many of

our determinations are unknown, that certain acts of will take place in spite of ourselves and are attributable to objective motives which are responsible for them. How often, for instance, does not a man feel thirsty or sleepy without knowing why? He wants to drink or sleep in spite of himself and ignores the motive or motives which are responsible for his determination.

Then again the causes of many of our determinations are known to us. There are acts which we have a motive for willing but to the willing of which we are not irresistibly determined by the motive. Thus a student who is endeavoring to win a diploma has a motive to gain it but the motive does not necessarily impel him to gain it - he is free to change his mind whenever he pleases. In this latter class of acts there are two stages: hesitation and decision, indetermination and determination. On comparing these two states one becomes conscious that in going from hesitation to decision, from indetermination to determination, the faculty of will has been actuated - something coming from the subject's will has been added to the desire and has converted it into a decision or into a determined free act. Our own personal every day experience confirms this. Every time we make a decision we realize that the decision has been brought about by our own consent. We feel that if we had not so desired our will would not have given its consent to such and such a particular good; we even

feel that the particular goods presented to our will and to which we do not give our consent will always remain 'in potentia' with respect to our will and will never be 'in actu' or become determinations because the actuation of the faculty of will is lacking. Yes, man is indeed aware of the fact that his will is in complete control of his acts.

Moreover, the examples of the magnetized needle, spinning top, rotating weathercock, and fluttering leaf do not prove anything against man's consciousness of his Liberty. Altho, as we have already stated, the causes of our determinations are unknown in certain cases, it must be remembered that in the vast majority of instances the causes of our determinations are known to us and the examples given do not hold good under these circumstances. Even if the different examples offered by Determinists were intelligent, it is not of their own Liberty that they would be conscious but rather of their absolute dependence. An intelligent leaf, for instance, far from imagining that it is free would immediately realize that it is carried along by the breeze and is altogether dependent upon it. Furthermore the above illustrations merely bring in Liberty from Constraint which, properly speaking, is not Liberty at all. The same intelligent leaf would of course have a will and, as it was swept away by a gust of wind, its Freedom proper or Liberty of Indifference would not be violated because nothing could force it to want to be swept away by the wind.

The above examples then carry no weight when they are proposed as a refutation to our contention that man is conscious of his Liberty. Even the case of hypnotism does not give Determinists any support in their argument because being hypnotized is not a normal state of man and, when we claim that man is conscious of his Liberty, we refer to a man in a normal condition - not hypnotized, intoxicated, or dreaming - and even if it were true that a hypnotized man labors under an illusion concerning the consciousness of his Liberty, it would prove nothing in the case of a man in a normal condition. As to a hypnotized person being under the impression that he is free - well, that point is open to discussion. Anyone who has seen a demonstration of this extraordinary power realizes that the subject beyond a shadow of doubt depends entirely on the hypnotizer, and certainly does not give the impression that he believes himself free. His blank stare and unnatural manner rather lead one to conclude that he is not only constrained but even obsessed by the hypnotizer's will. Supposing tho that he did consider himself free - he would be in the same position as the dreamer who believes that his dreams are real and, unlike the man in a normal condition who is capable of reflection, he would not be in a position to control his belief. The example of a hypnotized man is therefore inefficacious to overthrow our contention

that we all are conscious of our Liberty.

Supposing tho that Liberty really were an illusion. Would that fact prove the correctness of Determinism? Far from it. An illusion, as everyone knows, is an inexact perception of an object. Optical illusions are very common and it is not at all unusual to be shown a sheet of paper with two doctored-up lines drawn across it and then be asked if the two lines are parallel or not. Immediately one answers in the affirmative because the lines really appear as if they would never meet no matter how far they may be prolonged, but it is as surprising as it is discomfiting to learn, in attempting to verify this statement, that the lines are far from parallel and bulge a great deal in the center. This invasion in the field of mathematics is not without reason and we merely wish to ask Determinists one question. Could one have had the illusion that the two lines in question were parallel if one had never seen parallel lines or, more exactly, if parallel lines had never existed? "No", they will be forced to answer. Well then, we reply, how could one have the illusion of a free act if a free act does not exist and has never existed? and while our determined friends, who no doubt are determined not to allow us to prove that they are undetermined, are thinking up an answer we will go on with our thesis for, if we had to await a logical reply from them, the end of the world would undoubtedly interfere

with our work.

In case our more or less philosophical refutation of the Determinists' contention that man's consciousness of his Liberty is but an illusion may add to the average man's bewilderment, it is our intention at this point to refute their statement in a more simple manner, in so simple a manner in fact, that a woman, a child of seven, or even a policeman can grasp the refutation without the slightest difficulty.

Fénelon obligingly points out the way in one of his letters on religion. There is a much more simple course than arguing with these so-called philosophers who deny that man is conscious of his Liberty. Let us suppose instead that one of these men is happily married and has a family. Being comfortably well off, he is able to afford servants and, like every other man, he has a few intimate friends. Let us further suppose that his wife runs away with another man, that his children despise him, that his servants rob him, and that his friends go back on him. What do you think our strange philosopher would do? Does it strike you that he would not be the slightest bit surprised or angry and would calmly say: "Oh well, there is no use in complaining. I cannot blame them because they are not free; they were determined to act as they did." We all know what a man would do under those circumstances and it is plain to see that Determinists who deny the existence

of Liberty in a general way are forced to admit it in such and such a concrete instance. Yes, a Determinist can say what he pleases but down in his heart he knows that he himself as well as every other normal man is conscious of his Liberty.

In case any of our readers might happen to be of a Kantian turn of mind, it is not inopportune at this point to prove our contention by the fact that the moral law necessarily supposes the existence of Liberty. This proof, incidentally, was the only conclusive one for Kant who, for some reason or other, was unable to grasp the proofs drawn from the will's universal object and from consciousness.

We do not propose to dwell at any length on the fact that a moral law exists. It is obviously necessary to social life and since the days of Adam and Eve all nations, no matter how barbarous they were, took its existence for granted. Why, even the most uncivilized tribes of savages who have never seen a white man or heard of the true God have very strict laws regarding marriage or rather what they call marriage, and any infidelity is most severely punished. It is perfectly obvious that without a moral law there can be no peace or order and even animals themselves are submitted to a natural moral law at the time of bringing their young into the world.

The first effect produced by the existence of this moral law is that it engenders a sense of duty in every man's breast.

Yes, man has obligations to certain actions which his reason and his conscience point out to him. Do we not all feel obliged to honor our parents, for instance? Let us consider this or any other obligation which is common to each and every one of us and see just what it contains. Every duty, we find, encloses an element of necessity and an element of Liberty but the necessity is in the moral and not in the physical order. There is indeed a great difference between a physical and a moral necessity.

Suppose a man wishes to commit suicide and leaps from the top story of a high building. It is plain to see that he will necessarily strike the ground due to the fact that gravity pulls him towards the center of the earth. Here we have a necessity which comes from the physical law of gravitation and even if the man changed his mind an instant after jumping, he would still crash to the ground. The reason for this is that a physical law acts in such a way that that which is subject to it is absolutely helpless and is unable to resist it.

Ontologically speaking, in a physical necessity the physical law is an efficient cause which contains the effect in itself in such a manner that that which is subject to the said law has absolutely nothing to do in the determination it receives.

A moral necessity however is totally different. Every man, we have said, feels that it is necessary for him to honor his

parents. If, however, while honoring them he suddenly wishes to change his mind, is he not perfectly free to do so? Instead of being unable to resist the necessity as in the case of the necessity coming from a physical law, in this instance man is far from helpless and passive. He is so independent, in fact, that he can refuse to do his duty. When a necessity comes from a moral law such as in the case of a man honoring his parents, the moral law then is a final and not an efficient cause and cannot produce its effect without the cooperation of the person subjected to it.

A physical law therefore completely destroys Liberty in a hypothetical sense, that is, it annihilates Freedom from Constraint while not effecting Liberty of Indifference or Liberty proper, but a moral law respects both categories of Liberty.

It consequently follows that duties and obligations in which there is an element of moral necessity and the moral law itself on which they repose would not exist unless Liberty were already existing.

If one does away with the idea of Liberty one cannot logically claim that a man is responsible for his actions. How can a man be punished for his actions unless he is master of them and how can he be master of them unless he is free? A man, let us suppose, commits a certain crime. To be responsible

for it he must have wanted to commit the crime - otherwise it could not be imputed to him. He is responsible for his action, in other words, only when at the time of performing it he is free to perform it or not to perform it and acts according to his own volition. Suppose a hunter hears a rustle in the underbrush and sees a blurred form slinking by. Thinking it a deer he shoots and on investigation finds out that he has killed a fellow hunter. The man will not be held responsible for the killing for the simple reason that he had no intention whatsoever of committing a crime, altho at the time of the shooting he was free to shoot or not to shoot. Suppose again that an aviator's plane catches fire over a thickly populated section of a city. The only thing for him to do is make a parachute leap and let the plane crash. He will not however be strapped in an electric chair if the falling plane kills one or more people because he was not free at the time of leaping out to prevent the plane from crashing. If the plane tho had been in perfect running order and the aviator had leapt out and allowed it to crash for no good reason, then he would indeed be held responsible for any deaths his act might cause.

It is obvious then that it is not sufficient that a person perform an action to be responsible for it. In order that an action may be imputed to a person that person must be master of the action, that is, he must have been in such a position

that he could either perform the action or not perform it and he must act according to his own volition.

The courts of justice in every civilized, and perhaps we might add uncivilized, land are fully aware that Liberty and responsibility go hand in hand. Why do you suppose that during a trial witnesses are called in and questioned and such great pains are taken to visualize the exact circumstances under which the misdemeanor occurred? The sole purpose is to establish whether or not the accused was acting freely and if so, the extent of Freedom under which he acted.

If, during a trial, alienists conclusively prove that the accused was insane, no matter how heinous a crime he committed he will not be held responsible for it. If the fact is brought out that the accused was mentally deranged as the result of a blow received in a scuffle, he will not be held responsible for his actions from then on.

If, however, it can be proved that the accused was in full possession of his faculties and acted deliberately and voluntarily; if, for instance, it can be shown that while in a normal state of mind he carefully planned every detail of a certain murder and then deliberately carried out his plan to the letter, it is obvious that he will be held strictly responsible for his action.

Then again if his mind were muddled thru intoxication, his responsibility would probably be decreased altho, as we have

already mentioned, no matter how intoxicated he might be he could never properly claim entire irresponsibility.

Yes, Liberty is indeed essential to duty and responsibility, and it naturally follows that punishments and rewards also presuppose its existence.

How could the courts punish criminals if they were not responsible for their actions and were not free? Why punish a man for performing an act that he could not avoid? Why reward a man for doing something which he could not help doing? Why is it the general feeling in the city of Ottawa that the murderer Cassidy should hang? Why did the whole world lavish its honors on Lindbergh a few years ago for his epoch-making transatlantic flight? Because both Cassidy and Lindbergh were fully responsible for their actions. The profligate knew what he was doing when he deliberately killed a man in cold blood and the dauntless airman also knew what he was doing when he turned the nose of his plane in the direction of the distant shore of France. Yes, they both knew what they were doing and everybody else is aware of that fact. Everybody knows that they both were responsible for their actions, everybody knows that both of them were free and everybody also knows that they chose very different ways of advertizing their freedom to their fellow men: Cassidy in a cowardly manner shot down a defenceless man while Lindbergh showed his heroism by performing a practically impossible feat.

Yes, every man knows that he is responsible for his actions and that Cassidy, Lindbergh, and all other normal men are too. It is for this reason and no other that we instinctively wish to punish a malefactor and reward the man who does his duty heroically or even conscientiously.

Furthermore, how could God, who is perfect justice, either reward or punish us after death unless we are responsible for our actions? If we are not free to do good and avoid evil would it not be unjust either to reward or punish us? Is it not more reasonable to assume that Our Blessed Lord on the day of Judgment will open the gates of Heaven to those who have truly loved Him and have shown their love by observing His commandments and those of His Church and who, were they again in the same circumstances, would not necessarily have to act the same way? Do you think Our Lord would condemn other souls to an eternity of unspeakable suffering in Hell for not having observed His commandments and those of His Church unless, during their sojourn on earth, they were in a position to accept or reject these commandments and rejected them because they wanted to?

The atheistic Determinists vigorously deny it (we brand them as atheists because it is evident that a Determinist cannot be anything else but an atheist), the truth of the matter is that God will either reward or punish man according to the degree of love which man has shown for his Creator, and the degree of

of heavenly bliss as well as the degree of suffering in Hell will be proportioned to the degree of man's love for God. Is it not obvious that the Immaculate Virgin Mary who loved God with her whole heart and who loved Him to such an extent that she never once offended Him, should occupy a higher place in Heaven than the sinner who repents for his sins on his deathbed? Is it not also obvious that the sinner who has lived a life of continuous crime should suffer more in Hell than a person who dies with just one mortal sin on his or her conscience?

Yes, our status in the world to come depends altogether on our love for God, and as love without Liberty cannot exist we must conclude, unless we wish to pass for atheists, that man has duties, that man is responsible for his actions, and that man is free.

Everybody knows that man in his system of social life lives under a scheme of laws which public authority enforces by threats of punishment. This social arrangement has existed from the remotest antiquity because men always believed that they were free. Does it not seem more likely that a handful of Determinists should be mistaken in their conception of Freedom rather than the entire human race? St. Thomas tells us that when all reasonable men share the same opinion on a certain question their common opinion is correct. All men, for instance, agree that water in a liquid state is wet. We may therefore

conclude that water really is wet because all reasonable men consider it so. All men, or rather all reasonable men, have always contended that the human will is free. Is not the fact obvious? Have not laws always existed? Have not rewards and punishments always been realities from the first day of the creation of mankind and even before that time in God's heavenly home? Has not advice always been offered? Have not commands always been given? Have not threats always been made? Does not man every day of his life by word and by action show that he is free? "Determinists do not", you may answer but are you quite sure that such is really the case? Suppose a person accosts a Determinist and strikes him a violent blow on the nose. Are you gullible enough to believe that the Determinist will calmly press a handkerchief to his battered organ and will smilingly walk off as if nothing had happened? Did it ever occur to you that the theory of Determinism may be nothing more than an excuse to justify a vicious mode of living? If a man's will is necessarily determined, then that man is not responsible for his actions and he need not make any effort to conquer his wicked passions. He will not have to struggle to overcome the many obstacles which are placed on the path of everyone's life. He will be able to blame nature and not himself for his weaknesses and his failings. He will wait for happiness to come to him instead of making an effort to capture it himself. Nirvana and

other equally ridiculous doctrines are rooted in the insidious theory of Determinism, and no man who believes in it can ever amount to anything. What have Buddhists, Confucianists or Mohammedans ever done in the way of contributing to the advance of science? We have no hesitation in stating that quite probably there is not a single sincere Determinist in the entire world and that Determinism is merely held as an excuse for a life of laziness and luxury.

All great men have upheld the inviolability of human will and the existence of Liberty. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Lucretius, Origines, St. Augustine, Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, and more latterly Descartes, Fenelon, Bossuet, and Kant were among the philosophers who defended its existence. Yes, all men who have contributed to the betterment of their fellows and to the uplifting of society have firmly believed that the human will is free in its tendency to particular goods. All of Peter's successors have added the weight of their authority to this belief. All Christians, whether they have gone down in history as great men or whether they live an unobtrusive life with their good works known only to God and to themselves, are of the same opinion concerning Liberty and we may conclude from this fact that Liberty really exists for, as a certain author remarks, it is unthinkable that error could be the principle of so much good any more than truth could be the principle of so

much evil. Must we not then conclude with St. Thomas that a moral and a free act are but one and the same thing?

Having thus proved conclusively that human will is free in its tendency to particular goods, let us now clarify a few notions on the nature of Liberty. In the first place just what is required to constitute it? Liberty, as we have already stated, is of three categories: Liberty of Contradiction, of Contrariety, and of Specification. Let us consider these three aspects as subjective. There is however an objective element in a free act because if the subject or the will had no object to which to tend, there would be no act at all and consequently no Freedom. The objective element in question is the object or the good to which the will tends. Now suppose that the will necessarily had to tend to a certain object. There would obviously be no Liberty in that case. Liberty then requires that the will be not necessarily forced to tend to such and such an object; therefore it is essential that there be a lack of determination or, in other words, an indifference. This indifference tho can be considered from two standpoints, objective and subjective. Objective indifference consists in an indifference in the object to determine the will and subjective indifference is an indifference in the will to tend to a certain object. Suppose now that the will is subjectively indifferent, that is to say, that it is

not determined in itself to tend to a certain object, but that the object is not objectively indifferent to the will. The object then will of course necessarily determine the will to tend to it and Liberty will not exist. The first requisite for the existence of Liberty consequently is objective indifference, that is, the object must not necessarily determine the will to tend to it.

Suppose further that there is objective indifference but that the will is forced subjectively to tend to a certain object. Freedom will also be excluded in this case so we may conclude that in order that a human act may be really free, it is essential that there be subjective as well as objective indifference.

Now it so happens that in the three categories of Liberty proper, namely in Liberty of Contradiction, of Contrariety and of Specification, there is subjective indifference. From our definitions of these three classes of Liberty, it is apparent that the subject in all three cases is free to make a choice: he can either choose between two contradictories - acting or not acting - between two contraries - love and hate - or between various objects - studying or loafing. Since there is subjective indifference in each one of these categories of Liberty, it is evident that just one of them suffices - provided there is objective indifference also - in order to constitute freedom. Scholastics claim that the essence of Liberty consists in objective indif-

ference and, on the part of the subject, that Liberty of Contradiction is required and is sufficient. The reason for this is that man seldom enjoys the other two classes of Liberty and, if they were absolutely necessary to the constitution of the essence of Liberty, man would of course not be free.

This brings us to the very interesting question of the limits of human Liberty, which of course are taken into consideration by Scholastics when they say that Liberty of Contradiction is sufficient and necessary, on the part of the subject, to constitute a free act.

Liberty, as we have already stated, does not need to be limitless in order to exist. Its limits are quite elastic and vary a great deal with each category of Liberty.

In the case of Liberty of Contradiction the elasticity of its limits is aptly displayed and our own consciousness, unassisted by the metaphysical proof of the universal object of the will, suffices to bring out the fact that man in a normal condition is always free except when his will is presented with universal good which, being the will's absolute perfection, necessarily compels it to act. Outside of this one case man always enjoys Liberty of Contradiction, man is always free to act or not to act and, as universal good is never directly the object of our will in this life, we may say that man's Liberty of Contradiction or his power to choose between acting and not acting is really

without limits.

There is quite a difference tho in the case of Liberty of Contrariety. With this particular type of Liberty there is a great deal more restriction for, as we have so often repeated, the object of man's will is good. This being so, man cannot choose evil (if he does so it is of course under the guise of apparent good) and Liberty of Contrariety, which consists in being free to choose between two contraries, is consequently annihilated when one of the contraries is evil in any way. We gave as an example of Liberty of Contrariety the power of choosing between love and hate. We say that a man is free either to love or hate a fellow man. This example properly speaking, is really not an example of Liberty of Contrariety because hating a fellow man is evil and, as man cannot choose between good and evil, he really has no Liberty of Contrariety at all in this instance because he really has no choice at all. It follows then that Liberty of Contrariety exists only when the two contraries between which a choice is to be made are both particular goods.

Liberty of Specification throws still another light upon the question. Scholastics assert that this type of Liberty exists only with respect to particular goods which have no connection with universal good and that there can be neither Liberty of Contrariety nor of Specification with respect to goods which

are conditions leading to the possession of the universal good. Thus a man is free either to shave or to go for a walk because both these actions, which are of course particular goods, have no connection whatsoever with the possession of universal good. Furthermore, a man does not enjoy Liberty of Contrariety or of Specification with respect to his existence on this earth and he cannot argue that it is preferable not to exist than to exist or that he would rather have been created an angel than a human being because his existence in this vale of tears is, we know, a condition leading to universal good. Man naturally wants to be happy and for that reason is not free to reject the means which lead to happiness. He does not accept the means for themselves but rather for that to which they lead. Even tho the means might not always be pleasant - and one need not be particularly perspicacious to realize that life has its disagreeable side - man accepts the means of life as a good because it leads to the eternal happiness of Heaven, just as a mariner whose vessel is on the point of being swamped throws overboard part of his cargo and considers this means a good, altho he obviously does not want to lose his cargo, because it permits him to reach his destination in safety.

Longfellow had the right idea when he penned the lines:

"Tell me not in mournful numbers,  
Life is but an empty dream!-  
For the soul is dead that slumbers,  
And things are not what they seem."

Liberty of Specification, we claim, exists only when the two goods from which a choice is to be made are in no way connected

with universal good. If one of the alternatives is not a good however, there is no Liberty for, we repeat once more, the object of the will is good and nothing else. But, after all, is there any such thing as a good which is in no way connected to universal good? Is there any such thing as an absolutely indifferent act from the standpoint of morality? Most theologians agree that in the natural moral order no individual act can be indifferent. All our possible free actions are either good or bad, never indifferent. Some moralists do claim that all our operations are indifferent and that their goodness or badness depends on the intention of the person who performs them. Such an opinion is of course not tenable. Suppose a certain tyrant is persecuting the Church. An over zealous member of the Church comes along and assassinates him to spare the Church further hardships which are about to be imposed upon it by the victim of the murder. The murderer's motive was good but could one claim that his act was morally good? Most certainly not, because murder is never justified. Yes, if it were true that the morality of an action depends only on the intention of the perpetrator, there would no doubt be many crimes committed for the totally unjust reason that the end - tho it may be good in itself - justifies the means. Our actions then are intrinsically good or bad and just as he who touches pitch must necessarily be defiled, so the man who

tells a lie, no matter under what circumstances, cannot escape the smirch of sin.

Certain undeliberated actions, such as swatting a mosquito for instance, are of course morally indifferent because they are instinctive and have nothing to do with the obtention of universal good but we maintain that man's only morally indifferent actions are the ones he performs without deliberation and reflection.

In the case of Liberty of Specification or of any other class of Liberty however, man's actions must be deliberate and reflected upon - otherwise they could not be termed free - and when a man deliberates and reflects before acting how can his action be indifferent? Yes, when a man deliberates and reflects before acting - and this excludes instinctive and unconscious actions - he acts freely, reasonably, and to attain a certain end, an end incidentally which itself cannot be indifferent because no sane man could possibly tend to an indifferent end, an end therefore which must be either good or bad. Unlike the sword of Damocles, our free will cannot be suspended between good and evil and the object to which it tends is undoubtedly good or evil because there is no other alternative. It follows consequently that even our most insignificant free acts have a bearing on the universal good in one way or another, and are either pleasing or displeasing to God.

A moment ago we referred to man's choice between shaving and going for a walk as an example of Liberty of Specification, but once more as in the case of Liberty of Contrariety we are forced to make a distinction in our example because, as we have just demonstrated, there is no such thing as a free act which has no relation to universal good. It may seem at first glance that shaving or going for a walk has little to do with our happiness in the world to come but if we analyze these acts at all carefully the connection becomes obvious.

Suppose a man who shaves off his long beard does so for the purpose of disguising himself so that he will be able to fool a bank teller and cash a worthless check, is not the act of shaving evil?

Suppose, on the other hand, that the man becomes a medical doctor and shaves off his beard in order to avoid carrying germs from one patient to another (we do not know whether or not beards - of the long variety particularly - are instrumental in the spreading of infection, but we have always understood them to be unsanitary and unhygienic encumbrances), is not his motive worthy of praise?

If the man who goes for a walk does so for the purpose of improving his health so that he may serve God better, is he not performing a good action? If however he knows that the walk will have a deleterious effect and will prevent him from going

to church on Sunday, would he not be blamable if he insisted on taking a stroll?

In a word, when the ulterior motive of a seemingly morally indifferent act is brought to light, it becomes apparent that the said act is either good or bad and, as such, evidently has a connection with universal good. One must necessarily conclude, we believe, that all of man's free acts are either good or bad; and, bearing in mind the fact that good alone is the object of man's free will, is it not obvious that Liberty of Contrariety and Liberty of Specification are thereby considerably curtailed? As Liberty of Contradiction is the only type of Liberty which normal man enjoys in his free acts at all times and without limits, as Liberty of Contradiction implies complete subjective indifference and as without it there could not always be subjective indifference because the other two categories of Liberty in which there is also subjective indifference more often than not are wanting due to the fact that their limits are so narrow, is it not perfectly logical to assert that Liberty of Contradiction is required and is sufficient to constitute a free act, provided objective indifference is not lacking?

Lest our discussion of the limits of Liberty might lead one to believe that human Freedom does not extend very far, it would not be out of place at this point to counteract that impression by delineating the domain over which Liberty does

hold sway.

Man, we repeat at the risk of monotony, has immaterial and material faculties, both classes of which produce operations subject to Freedom. We shall therefore consider each class separately in our endeavor to bring out the fact that man's Freedom does indeed cover much territory.

One has but to consider man's two intellectual faculties of will and of mind in order to realize how free we really are. There is only one case in which human will is necessarily determined to tend to its object; it is only when universal good presents itself to his will that man, as it were, loses control of his will and must necessarily tend to the object. We have already established the facts that the will cannot be forced and that universal good is never directly the object of man's will in this life. Does it not follow then that man is never necessarily determined to tend to any good in this life and that he consequently enjoys Freedom in each and every one of his actions upon which he has deliberated and reflected?

In the case of our intelligence may we repeat that its object is truth. One may object tho that the mind like the will is not free in the presence of its adequate object. Any evident truth, we admit, being the adequate object of the mind forces the mind to embrace such a truth, and the mind is not free to accept or reject it. Let us suppose for a moment that man has a mind

but no will. What would make the mind seek its object? Nothing. There would be nothing to impel the mind to go after truth. The mind would never reach its goal and such a mind might just as well not exist at all. Will is obviously essential and, in view of the fact that will depends on Liberty, it is apparent that there is a connection between Liberty and intelligence.

The fact that it is an effort to use one's head or to make one's mind seek truth is amply demonstrated in every school and college where practically every student requires continual prodding to make a success of his studies. Knowledge no doubt is very agreeable to possess but the acquisition of knowledge more often than not is an extremely irksome task. We all want knowledge but how many of us are willing to overcome the many difficulties which have to be surmounted before obtaining it? How many of us begin a course of study with great enthusiasm and then, before it is half thru, give the whole thing up and try to justify our action with the famous excuse of 'I have'nt time?'

Knowledge is a particular good and, as such, has its unpleasant angle. Is it not obvious then that a strong will is required to prevent the mind from shirking its task? Is it not obvious that it altogether depends on a man's will whether his intelligence shall develop or not? The mind like the body improves with exercise and it is absolutely certain that no

weak-willed man will ever develop either bodily or mentally. History unequivocally points out that all its great men possessed minds which, great tho they were, paled when compared to their wills.

Our brief study of will and mind consequently establishes the fact that the operations of these two faculties are encompassed in the vast domain of Liberty. Let us now consider it in relation to our material faculties and their operations.

Man, as we have already proved, is always privileged with Liberty of Contradiction in each and every one of his deliberated and reflected upon actions, and this fact becomes more obvious in the case of the operations which proceed from his material faculties, because that which falls under the senses is far more easily grasped than that which does not. If we see a man strolling thru the woods stop and pick a flower, sit down to rest, and then wander on again, we realize that he performed these various actions because he wished to and each and every one of the movements of his material faculties emphasizes the fact that man is free and that his various organs perform different functions at the command of his will. Freedom then covers a very large field, almost as large as that of the will. We say almost as large due to the fact that man's material faculties, unlike his immaterial ones, can be subject to violence. Suppose a burglar has been captured by two or

three men who grasp him securely in order that he may not escape. The burglar's body is no longer free. He would like to run away, he would like to fight his way out, but he cannot. His arms and legs are pinioned for several hours until the police reluctantly tear themselves away from a game of checkers and finally decide to do their duty. Yes, violence is the only thing that can annihilate the Liberty of our material faculties and, as it seldom happens that we have to suffer violence, it is obvious that our material faculties are practically as free as our immaterial ones.

There are of course certain operations in every living man with which human will and consequently Liberty has little or no immediate connection. A human being breathes, digests his food, grows up, and finally dies independently of whether he wishes to or not. But what more can one expect from a mere human being? If we were in a position to make every single decision concerning ourselves, if we could decide whether we should die or not, and if so, in what year and from what sickness, would our will still be human? Would we not rather be in the same class as God Himself? No mere mortal with a body and soul could enjoy more Freedom than we; we have as much Freedom as is consistent with fallen human nature and the decision as to our death is about the only one which we cannot make. Can we not either hold our breath or breathe more rapidly than usual, can

we not either fast or gorge and thereby affect digestion, can we not either lengthen or shorten our days by our mode of life, can we not almost choose the kind of death we must endure by a knowledge of the principles of cause and effect, can we not even commit suicide if we feel so inclined? What more could a human being desire in the way of Liberty? Just think. There is only one choice, namely the choice of dying or of not dying, which we cannot make. That is the only blemish on the slate of Liberty. In a few of our other actions our will can only intervene indirectly while in the vast majority of them we are in complete control. Can we not truly claim then, insofar as our material faculties are concerned, that Liberty covers the vast majority of our actions?

If any earthly king had half as many subjects to watch over as the number of human acts which are included in the scope of Liberty, Margaret Sanger would certainly have the right to become agitated because the hugeness of their number would certainly defy computation. Liberty, like our guardian angel, follows us all thru life and not a single one of our deliberated and reflected upon actions, whether they proceed from organic or inorganic faculties, is unaffected by its influence. It is only after having piloted us thru this life that it takes its departure with our guardian angel because then its services, like those of the angel, are no longer required.

God has given us our Liberty and our guardian angel for the sole purpose of leading us to him and once we have arrived at our destination and are in the presence of Universal Good our Freedom is a thing of the past. We must then necessarily tend to God and the only Freedom we have is in choosing the means to show our love and adoration.

Yes, we are indeed free and our Freedom, notwithstanding certain limitations, is nevertheless very easily perceived by any reasonable creature who is willing to introspect himself. Our own consciousness proclaims our Freedom and, if a methodical demonstration be required, the metaphysical argument based on the adequate object of human will or the Kantian demonstration constitutes an absolutely irrefragable proof of its existence. We have seen that the various claims of Determinists are unreasonable and contrary to experience. How then can anyone doubt the existence of Liberty? "The mysterious thing about Liberty", St. Augustine once remarked, "is not its existence, but the fact that some people doubt its existence."

If the pages of history had been turned back two thousand years or more and we were living at a time when philosophy and religion were more or less embryonic, it might not be surprising to hear Liberty denounced; but, since the beginning of the Christian era, it is almost impossible to

believe that there can be people who refuse to admit its existence. No true Christian could ever hold so unethical an opinion for did not Our Blessed Lord furnish the world with the most amazing proof of the existence of Liberty when He endured His Passion and Crucifixion for the redemption of mankind?

Jesus Christ was truly man and His sufferings and Death were indeed a vindication of human Liberty. His actions were the supreme triumph of Liberty for they had been deliberated and reflected upon from all eternity and is it not so that the more a human act has been deliberated and reflected upon, the greater is the degree of Freedom? When an ordinary man performs a free act he deliberates and reflects, it is true, but his deliberation and reflection are of extremely short duration. Must not then the apex of Liberty have been reached by Jesus when the actions He performed had been preceded by eternal deliberation and reflection?

In order to perform a free act the subject who performs it must know what he is doing and must be willing to perform the said act. Let us now follow Jesus along the road to Calvary to see whether these conditions have been realized or not.

To say that Our Blessed Saviour was unaware of what was

about to happen to Him is about as ridiculous a statement as a person could make. Just because He took a human form does not mean that He no longer had His divine intelligence and power. Jesus was and is God to Whom the future as well as the past is always an open book. And even had He not been God, the Scriptures would have sufficed to inform Him of the minutest details of His Passion and Death. The prophets foretold the dreadful ordeal He had to undergo. They described most vividly how He would be whipped, crowned with thorns, struck and spat upon. They foretold His betrayal by Judas, His Crucifixion, and His burning thirst. They even prophesied the exact words which Our Divine Master would use on different occasions.

In spite of knowing the humiliations and sufferings which were in store for Him, Jesus ardently wished to endure His Passion and Crucifixion. Not once did His determination to die wane. How impatient He was to suffer His Baptism of Blood, so impatient and determined to undergo it that when Peter, to whom the Master was speaking of His future humiliations and death, tried to persuade Him to change His mind, Our Blessed Lord, the Paragon of gentleness and meekness, became angry and called Peter Satan because he did not understand the things of God. Yes, Jesus wanted to die for our salvation and, when the soldiers came to capture Him, He

unhesitatingly revealed His identity and offered no resistance when they dragged Him away. Any ordinary man would have been glad to have his friends defend him on such an occasion but not so Our Blessed Lord who reprimanded one of His apostles for drawing his sword, because He wanted to be brought before the judges, He wanted to be condemned, He wanted to die.

What did Jesus do during his trial? Did He attempt to defend Himself? Did He endeavor to deny or to mitigate the accusations that were hurled at Him? Far from it. He made no attempt whatsoever to defend Himself. He did not refute the witnesses who were testifying against Him. He made no denials but made things worse for Himself by either admitting the accusations or remaining silent. He admitted that He was spreading a new doctrine and proclaimed that He is the Son of God. He could have saved Himself by performing a miracle but He refused to do so. Yes, Our Lord's behavior during his trial signed his own death warrant.

And then the Cross! Who but God Himself could ever imagine the terrific sufferings that Jesus endured for each and every one of us? Most of us know how painful it is to have even a splinter penetrate our flesh, but can we possibly conceive the excruciating torment of thorns sinking into our brow and of nails piercing our hands and feet? We all know how painful it is to make even a short journey when we are

worn out with fatigue and weariness, but can we ever conceive the ghastliness of Our Lord's ascent of Mount Calvary with a heavy cross on His bruised and sacred shoulders? Can we ever picture the effort it was for Jesus to make that trip? He was so weak from the blows He had received that He could scarcely walk and the Jews, fearing that He would die on the way, constrained Simon the Cyrenean to carry the cross behind Him. We all know the pangs of thirst, but can we ever imagine how parched Our Blessed Saviour's mouth and throat must have been after all He had gone thru and how He craved a cooling draft. Think of how horrible His potion of vinegar and gall must have been.

Yes, Jesus knew that all this was in store for Him but nothing could move His will. He suffered and died, as St. Augustine said, "when He wished, because He wished, and as He wished." Our Blessed Lord's bitter Passion and Death on the cross were the most sublime acts of Liberty that a human being could ever perform because all the conditions for a free act had been fulfilled to the supreme degree, and His Passion and Death take on all the more significance when one realizes that Jesus was true God as well as true man. It is unbelievable that an Almighty God could so love His weak and sinful creatures as to endure unspeakable sufferings and even give up His life for their salvation. What an example of love, what an example of

self control! Jesus had no sins for which to atone; it was merely to open the gates of Heaven to us that Our Blessed Saviour was born of the Virgin Mary. Can you imagine an Omnipotent God, whose will is law and who could annihilate the universe if He wished, can you imagine such a God allowing Himself to be beaten and insulted, allowing Judas' foul lips to touch His immaculate ones, allowing Himself to be dragged into court, judged and crucified? Can you imagine the Creator of Heaven and earth and the Judge of the living and the dead allowing Himself to be subjected to the humiliation of being judged by Pilate? Can you imagine the love and patience of innocent Jesus who not only did not seek revenge for the outrages inflicted upon Him by His persecutors but even went so far as to ask His Father to have mercy on them? It is plain to see that only God could have possibly acted in that way and that no man, had he been in Our Lord's place, would have hesitated to use His power and cast his oppressors into Hell.

Yes, Jesus loved us so much that He endured infinitely more than was necessary for our redemption. One drop of His Precious Blood, one blow on His sacred flesh, one insult hurled at Him would have sufficed to wipe out our sins, but Our Lord's love was so great that He wanted to endure the Passion and Crucifixion for us, and when He did so, not only did He redeem mankind but He also gave the greatest example of Liberty that

the world can ever see. Oh Jesus, Who did so love us that  
You freely endured Your Passion and Crucifixion for our  
redemption, grant that we may return that love. Thru Your  
infinite merits and those of Your Immaculate Mother, grant  
that we may show our love for You by making a proper use  
of our divine prerogative of Liberty and some day attain  
to the happiness of Heaven for all eternity!