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(REPRESENTATIVE NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW ENGLAND
HISTORIANS VIEW MANIFEST DESTINY)

by (Mary T. Bush)

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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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INTRODUCTION

The study of the writing of American history is a rather neglected field of research. Work done to date has concentrated on such aspects as the Turner frontier thesis, the urban reinterpretation of Arthur Schlesinger, economic interpretations ranging from Charles A. Beard to David Potter, to more recently, upon the use of the social sciences as a methodological help in the investigation of historical events.

One of the neglected fields, but yet one of import for the entire span of American history, is how American historians have viewed their country's destiny, its rise from colony to world power. Their views on this subject inevitably colored their interpretations, and in turn their interpretations may have influenced the course of events and therefore the making of American history.

The purpose of this research is to investigate nineteenth-century American historiography with particular reference to representative nineteenth-century New England historians whose Harvard-centered efforts quite dominated the writing of American history in that era.

In the line of previous writing in this field there is a general work entitled Manifest Destiny by Albert Weinberg. There are some works on American historiography such as the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American

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Historiography; H. Hale Bellot's American History and American Historians; The Middle Group of American Historians by John Bassett; Michael Kraus' A History of American History; and Harvey Wish's The American Historian.

There are also biographies of some of the nineteenth century historians such as Howe's The Life and Letters of George Bancroft; Elizabeth Stevenson's Henry Adams; and James Garraty's Henry Cabot Lodge. Then, there are the works of the historians themselves, such as Bancroft's History of the United States, or Parkman's A Half-Century of Conflict.

These works are either general histories, historiographical surveys and interpretations, or individual biographies. As such, they provide hints of a synthesis which might be effected by an intensive study of the works of representative New England historians of the nineteenth century on the question of Manifest Destiny. To date such a subject has been untouched.

The approach to the problem has involved the searching out and analyzing of the extant writings--histories, articles, letters of the historians listed in the table of contents. An endeavor has been made to relate their views to opinions current in the public affairs of their day, and where possible, the impact of their views upon those affairs.

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The first chapter has dealt with the general concept of Manifest Destiny and the views of New Englanders, in particular, on the future of their country. This chapter has briefly summarized the phases of expansion from colony to world power. In each of these phases an attempt has been made to relate the movement to the destiny of the country and to show contemporary attitudes on the expansion.

The succeeding chapters have dealt with the specific representative historians chosen for this study. An attempt has been made to show the views of these New Englanders on expansion in the period in which they lived or in the period of which they wrote.

Since New England produced a number of important nineteenth-century historians, some mention should be made regarding those selected for this study. Among the important writers were George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, Henry Adams, John Fiske, Henry Cabot Lodge, William Prescott, John Motley, Jared Sparks, Edward Channing, Justin Winsor, and Richard Hildreth. Only the first five mentioned are included in this study. Some of the others were excluded because of the theme of their writings. Some were excluded, in spite of their themes, because of the nature of their writings.

William Hickling Prescott, while an important historian, limited himself to the history of Spain and the Spanish conquests of Mexico and Peru. Hence, he is excluded

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from this study although his stress on literary form popularized the reading of history by Americans.

John Lothrop Motley confined his writing chiefly to non-American themes of the Rise of the Dutch Republic and to building his history around the Dutch rebellion against Philip II. Thus, he too has been excluded.

Another important New England historian was Jared Sparks. Unlike Prescott and Motley, his themes were American, but the bulk of his work was that of editor of diplomatic correspondence of the American Revolution and of the works of Franklin and Washington. While Sparks did write some biographies, he wrote no histories as such for he felt a nation's history could be told through the lives of its famous men. His biographies shed little light on Sparks' views on Manifest Destiny.

Edward Channing was something of a bridge between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He has been excluded from this study because, except for two short works which furnished no key to his ideas on expansion, his writings especially his History of the United States and The

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Jeffersonian System were published in the present century, the former in seven volumes between 1905 and 1932, and the latter in 1906.¹

Justin Winsor and Richard Hildreth were possible subjects for this study. However, after a perusal of their works, they too were eliminated.

Justin Winsor was a student, a librarian, and a friend of knowledge. He helped to make the scientific study of American history possible by making available materials. In this way he stimulated others. He was important as an historical editor and as a student of bibliography of American history, as well as a writer of American history. In his writings Winsor dealt with the early history of the country--the Anglo-French duel, and then of the Westward Movement. However, except for a few instances he said

¹ Channing does give some views on the expansion of the country. In speaking of the year 1846, he wrote that it was the "destiny of the United States to extend to the Pacific and as far south as the arid portions of Mexico." (Edward Channing, A History of the United States, New York, Vol. V, The Period of Transition 1815-1848, p. 550.) In summarizing the period 1815-48 he wrote, "'Manifest destiny' urged them on to the acquisition of Florida, to the regaining of Texas on the South, and to the possession of the lands westward from the crest of the Rockies to the shores of the Pacific. . . ." (Ibid., p. 614.)

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little about expansion.² Indeed, Frederick Jackson Turner wrote that Winsor preferred to allow his classified events tell their own story whereas he might "have elaborated his conception of the westward advance into a philosophy of the movement."³

Another historian, Richard Hildreth, was also eliminated from this study. Although he wrote a six-volume History of the United States, Hildreth wrote to relate "plain facts in plain English . . . with . . . no aim but truth."⁴ He opposed idealization of the founding fathers in contrast to Bancroft's writings. He tried to deprive his history of any ulterior purpose of propaganda or glorification. Bancroft's biographer, Russel Nye, has claimed that Hildreth wrote as an antidote to Bancroft's "effulgent,

² Winsor did look upon the victory of Great Britain in 1760-61 as inciting a westward movement and he saw that an argument against Great Britain's taking Canada in 1763 was the fear that the westward movement of the colonies would pave the way for independence. (Justin Winsor, The Mississippi Basin, The Struggle in America Between England and France 1697-1763, Boston, 1895, p. 418.) He also wrote that the demand for a western existence was "a part of the first pulsation of resistance to the mother country, and harbingered the American Revolution." (Justin Winsor, The Westward Movement-The Colonies and the Republic West of the Alleghenies 1763-1798, Boston, 1897, p. 2.) He also wrote in terms of "the inevitable expansion of the British people" (*Ibid.*, p. 48), and the "inevitable westward march." (*Ibid.*, p. 63.)

³ Frederick Jackson Turner, "Review of Westward Movement," American Historical Review, April 1898, Vol. 3, p. 556.

⁴ Alfred H. Kelly, "Richard Hildreth" in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, (ed.) by William T. Hutchinson, New York, 1950, p. 27.

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flowing narrative and his dramatic presentation of events."⁵ Hildreth had no grand theme, for history was just past politics. Although he played his part in molding the future history of his country, he has left no significant ideas regarding his views on the expansion of his country.

Thus, this study has included the views of only five New England historians--Bancroft, Parkman, Fiske, Adams, and Lodge--in relation to their ideas on Manifest Destiny. Of the five historians considered, each had his own views on the growth of the country from colony to world power.

Bancroft, Parkman, and Fiske had grand themes. Bancroft supported the idea that Providence from the beginning had destined the United States to achieve great things. Parkman wrote in terms of the inevitability of the triumph of the English-speaking race. Fiske looked upon America's history and destiny as a part of an evolutionary process. Lodge had no grand theme or thesis, but in general he was a nationalist and an expansionist. Henry Adams, in the early period was critical of methods rather than of measures. In the later period of his writing, he was at best a limited expansionist, and he expressed great fears for the future of the English race and of the world in general.

⁵ Russel Blaine Nye, Brahmin Rebel, New York, 1944, p. 186.

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Through this study it should be clear that the historian cannot operate in his own time and be completely detached from events of the time. These men were influenced by the times in which they lived. Bancroft abandoned the ideas of aristocratic New England to champion the ideas of democracy during the Age of Jackson. Fiske was influenced by the evolutionary ideas of Darwin and Spencer. Henry Adams was influenced by the scientific and technological developments of the time. Henry Cabot Lodge was influenced by the political scientists, the sociologists, and by the ideas of Alfred Mahan. Only Parkman seemed to ignore the trends of the time, especially that of the Westward Movement of 1846.

Through this study it should also be clear that each of these historians was conscious of a special mission for America. Each had his concept of the meaning of Manifest Destiny.

It is hoped that this study will contribute to the field of American historiography.

CHAPTER I

THE AMERICAN MISSION AND MANIFEST DESTINY

John Fiske in his American Political Ideas told the story of a dinner party in Paris during the American Civil War. At the party toasts were being given to the glories of the United States and to its future. The first speaker's toast went thus:

Here's to the United States bounded on the north by British America, on the south by the Gulf of Mexico, on the east by the Atlantic, and on the west by the Pacific Ocean.

The second speaker, feeling this was too limited, offered the following:

Here's to the United States,--bounded in the north by the North Pole, on the south by the South Pole, on the east by the rising, and on the west by the setting sun.

The third speaker, feeling this also was too restricted, toasted thus:

I give you the United States bounded on the north by the Aurora Borealis, on the south by the precession of the equinoxes, on the east by the primeval chaos, and on the west by the Day of Judgment.¹

These toasts are characteristic of the ideas of the American dream of the nineteenth century often styled as Manifest Destiny. However, this idea of Manifest Destiny did not originate in nineteenth century America.

¹ John Fiske, American Political Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint of Universal History, New York, 1885, p.101-2.

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From earliest colonial days men in America wrote with confidence of the future of the United States and rejoiced in its progress. Many saw their country as an area set aside by God for heavenly experiments. In viewing their history, Americans have often described themselves as agents of destiny--as a new chosen people ordained by God to guide the rest of the world out of the wilderness and into a new promised land. This destiny has been described as the American dream, or the American mission, or a national idealism. It has meant a basic belief in the innate goodness of the country.

One way by which the nation has tried to reach the fulfillment of its dream is through expansion. This has been accomplished by moving westward at the expense of the Indian tribes, or by acquiring territorial acquisitions from foreign powers. These territorial acquisitions were first of contiguous, and then of a non-contiguous nature.

Beginning with the seventeenth century settlers, Americans have been wont to point out with a great deal of optimism their seemingly limitless environment. They have connected expansionism with the operation of moral ideals and with the operation of natural laws in relation to

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national action. "America's incorporation of all adjacent lands was the virtually inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission delegated to the nation by Providence itself."²

By the 1840's this American dream became known as Manifest Destiny. Although Manifest Destiny has meant different things to different people, in general it has expressed a dogma of supreme self-assurance and ambition. H. M. Chittenden has described the term as "a favorite catch phrase with political rhapsodists in the United States," but he has also claimed it was "neither fatalism nor determinism but an assumed natural tendency of events, more or less subject to influence by man's volitional interference."³ For Chittenden the phrase was limited to the political evolution of the United States, and referred chiefly to the expansion of the national domain.

Merle Curti has defined the idea of Manifest Destiny as the belief that "fate had decreed the inevitable physical expansion of the United States to the Pacific."⁴ Albert Weinberg in his study of the topic has viewed American expansionism as an ideology with fifteen different aspects

² Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History, Gloucester, 1958, p. 1-2.

³ H. M. Chittenden, "Manifest Destiny in America," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 117, January 1916, p. 48.

⁴ Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought,

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such as the idea of providential mission, the idea of natural right, the idea of self-defense, and the idea of the white man's burden. According to him, in each phase, expansion has appeared for a reason such as the inevitable working of Providence or the dictate of highest international morality. Weinberg's general view of the philosophy of Manifest Destiny was the idea that "one nation has a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and consequently unique rights in the application of moral principles."⁵

In an essay on Manifest Destiny, John Hawgood referred to the idea as the desire of the American people to extend their territory "until it comprehended the whole mainland of North America and certain strategically placed islands both to the east and to the west of that continent . . ."⁶

Hawgood has claimed that it can mean "whatever any generation or indeed any man cares to make of it in the course of justifying the acquisition of territory."⁷

Although the term is American, the concept of the idea does not belong exclusively to Americans. Almost all peoples at some time have wanted to extend territories, and to explain and justify this expansion to the world. Indeed

⁵ Weinberg, op. cit., p. 8.

⁶ John A. Hawgood, "Manifest Destiny," in British Essays in American History (ed.) H. C. Allen and C. P. Hill, New York, 1957, p. 122.

⁷ Ibid., p. 123.

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there are parallels between the American doctrine of expansion and doctrines advocated more recently by other nations attempting to justify their expansion or their independence.

At the same time, Manifest Destiny as the concept of an American mission has not always dealt exclusively with territorial acquisitions. Some writers have seen it as the American destiny to spread the ideas of liberty, or to assume a place of world leadership, or to civilize and Christianize. Again, this is not new in America. Among the early Hebrews, the Greeks, and the ancient Chinese can be found dreams of destiny or mission. Edward Burns has claimed that among great nations it has been common for the nation to want to assume "a white man's or a brown or yellow man's supremacy over weak and retarded peoples."⁸

Having seen some general idea of the concept of Manifest Destiny, the next thing is to trace the development of this idea as it is related to the American dream or mission. Throughout, it will be clear, that when the country expanded, or when there was the desire to expand, there was found one or more reasons why that area should become a part of the American possessions.

⁸ Edward McNall Burns, The American Idea of Mission; Concepts of National Purpose and Destiny, New Brunswick, 1957, p. 5.

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Probably the urge of Manifest Destiny has been present since the settlers first landed on Roanoke Island, and attempted unsuccessfully to plant a colony. In the establishment of permanent English colonies there were many allusions to the fact that America occupied a unique place and had a special destiny among nations of the earth. This theme was especially evident among New England writers who tried to show that God had a special interest in New England as a holy experiment in Christian living.

Edward Johnson in The Wonder-working Providence of Zion's Saviour in New England set forth the idea that New England's founders were soldiers of Christ enlisted in a holy war or a crusade against the powers of evil--"the Lord Christ intends to achieve greater matters by this little handful than the world is aware of."⁹

John Fiske felt this exemplified the general sentiment of early New England writers.

Harvey Wish has recently compared New Englanders to the Israelites wandering through the wilderness to a promised land under the guidance of God. They were a chosen people guided by a new Moses in the person of William Bradford or

⁹ John Fiske, The Beginnings of New England, or the Puritan Theocracy in its Relation to Civil and Religious Liberty, Boston, 1889, p. 244.

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John Winthrop. As an example Wish cited Cotton Mather's Magnalia Christi Americana which contained the theme of the Puritans as the chosen people trying to build a New Jerusalem despite the snares of Satan.¹⁰

In general, the founders of the Massachusetts Bay colony and of the Plymouth colony held a conviction of the supreme inspiration by which they acted. The attitude in Massachusetts Bay has been described in the following manner:

They had the means of knowing the mind and will of the Supreme Being . . . for the rule, government, and conduct of a community of human beings in a social, civilized state; that the Divine will was communicated by revelation, transmitted through a Book.¹¹

Thus, God assumed the responsibility for all that followed in the attempt to administer the commonwealth according to his will.

¹⁰ Harvey Wish, The American Historian, New York 1960, p. 18. It is interesting to note that Perry Miller has written that despite analogies, with Moses and the tribes of Israel, the New Englanders were not refugees seeking a promised land, but only English soldiers, scholars, and statesmen hoping that they, or their children, or friends might rule there. (Perry Miller, The New England Mind, Cambridge, 1953, p. 5.)

¹¹ George E. Ellis, The Puritan Age and Rule--In the Colony of Massachusetts Bay--1629-1685, Boston, 1888, p. 168.

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The Puritans believed in a seemingly limitless environment. They saw in their coming to the New World that "God had chosen the Saints of all his people and led them out of Egypt into Canaan . . ."12

Van Tassel envisioned the Puritans as feeling:

God's purpose was to set up a model so that the world might see a specimen of what shall be on all the earth in the Glorious Times which are expected.'13

Thus, the early New Englanders conceived of themselves as having been chosen as the elect ones to carry on the work of God. Wish has said that this Puritan interpretation of history with its idea of a Divine Providence shaping the destiny of America as the elect of all nations was the basis for Bancroft's nationalism in the nineteenth century and the basis of "the chauvinism of those like him who espoused the expansionist doctrine of Manifest Destiny."14

This concept of American mission and destiny continued in the later writings of New England, and in the writings and speeches of those from other parts of the country. In the works of philosophers, historians, and men

12 David Van Tassel, Recording America's Past: An Interpretation of the Development of Historical Studies in America, 1607-1884, Chicago, 1960, p. 10.

13 Ibid., p. 10-11.

14 Wish, op. cit., p. 71.

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of letters in the nineteenth century there was evidence that America occupied a unique place and had a special destiny among the nations of the earth.

Emerson, Thoreau, and Alcott were examples of the belief that America was to become a beacon light to an unenlightened world.¹⁵ James Fenimore Cooper and Washington Irving told of the promise that lay in the wilderness, while Walt Whitman found the democratic faith in the cities, and envisioned a greater America of the future.¹⁶

In the nineteenth century Daniel Webster doubted that anyone possessed an imagination fertile enough to tell what the progress of the United States might be in the next fifty years. He wrote:

There is nothing to check them till they touch the shores of the Pacific, and then they are so much accustomed to water that that's a facility, and no obstruction.¹⁷

¹⁵ Timothy Paul Donovan, Henry Adams and Brooks Adams, The Education of Two American Historians, Norman, 1961, p. 159.

¹⁶ In 1835 Cooper asked, "Where shall we find a parallel to our progress, our energy, our increasing power?" (Burns, op. cit., p. 7.) Walt Whitman called the United States "the custodian of future humanity," and exclaimed, "What an age! What a land! Where elsewhere one so great?" (Ibid., p. 7.)

¹⁷ Burns, op. cit., p. 7. (Quoted from the Works of Daniel Webster, II, Boston, 1869, p. 212.)

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In the 1860's Orestes Brownson declared that of all of the states of the Western Hemisphere, the American republic alone had a destiny, "or the ability to add anything to the civilization of the race."¹⁸ In the post Civil War period, the idea of a special American mission remained. One phase of this mission, which will be shown later on, was the taking up of the so-called White Man's Burden. This was looked upon by some as the duty or obligation of the United States.

Thus, in the minds of many from earliest days there evolved the concept of an American mission--that the United States had been divinely appointed to perform great tasks in the history of mankind. While this idea was found in all sections, it was particularly evident in New England. One way this mission was to be accomplished was by physical expansion.

One of the first evidences of this urge for expansion as fulfilling the idea of Manifest Destiny was found in the generation before the American Revolution. During this period the colonists supported Great Britain in the wars against the French and Indians to remove a barrier imposed by the French and to expand into the region beyond the Allegheny Mountains. The Peace of Paris ending this struggle was but a prelude to independence, but it did provide for the

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

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expansion of the American colonists at the expense of the French, for the French surrendered to the English all of their territories east of the Mississippi River.

After this achievement, the colonists soon met with another barrier to expansion in the form of the Proclamation of 1763. The colonists charged that Britain was preventing their going into an area which they considered as their heritage. By 1774, with the Quebec Act which gave the desirable hinterland to the loyal colony to the North, thus restricting colonial expansion except through Georgia to the Mississippi, the colonists felt the mother country was interfering with their mission.

During the Revolutionary period the colonists used the argument that by law of nature and of God, the Americans were entitled to all of the rights of Englishmen. By 1776 they had decided that a government of their own was their natural right. Weinberg quoted John Adams in 1776 as writing, "It is the will of heaven that the two countries should be sundered forever."¹⁹ By the time of the Declaration of Independence and the successful waging of the Revolutionary War, the Americans looked upon themselves as the champions of the rights of man. This was a part of the American mission. They would preserve and perfect democracy.

¹⁹ Weinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 17. (Quoted from The Works of John Adams, (ed.) C. F. Adams, Boston, 1856, Vol. I, p. 230.)

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This revolutionary expansionism was motivated by natural rights and a desire to spread the ideas of democracy. At the same time, some representatives to the peace conference in Paris in 1783 were talking in terms of further expansion, and were suggesting that Great Britain give up part or all of Canada to the United States. This demand was probably partially the result of land hunger, and partially the result of the desire for commerce and security. At any rate the Americans did not succeed in acquiring unconquered Canada in 1783,²⁰ but the American Revolution is rightly considered as a phase of American expansionism. God had decreed independence, the colonists believed.

In the post Revolutionary period there were many predictions that the country would eventually spread over the continent of North America, or would at least spread its ideas to the Pacific coast.²¹ During this period expansionism became an issue as settlers spread into Kentucky and Tennessee. Soon difficulties arose over the use of the

²⁰ At the peace treaty Franklin and Jay rejected the French idea of an Indian state under Spanish protection. The opposition was based on the idea such a plan would interfere with American expansion. Franklin also suggested that Great Britain give up Canada. (Hawgood, op. cit., p. 127.)

²¹ For the ideas of Adams and Jefferson, see Hawgood, op. cit., p. 127-8 and Weinberg, op. cit., p. 40.

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Mississippi River. With the population of the West, the United States felt that Western loyalty might depend on the right of free navigation on this River. The people of the West felt that free navigation was necessary to the development of the Western soil and failure to care for the soil was "inconsistent with the immense designs of the Deity."²² Finally this right to use the Mississippi was acquired from Spain through the Pinckney Treaty of 1795.

When France took possession of Louisiana from Spain, a new era in American expansionism began. France was considered as dangerous to American security. By 1803 some were claiming for the United States the right to exercise dominion over the continent. The New-York Evening Post expressed it thus:

The country is ours; ours is the right to its rivers and to all the sources of future opulence, power and happiness . . .²³

The United States did not, in 1803, have to prove that the continent belonged to America. In that year, Napoleon agreed to sell the Louisiana area to the Americans. Thus, the nation, an independent republic, embarked upon

²² Weinberg, op. cit., p. 26. This is quoted from an address by a convention of Kentucky to the United States Congress in 1789.

²³ Ibid., p. 31. This is quoted from the New-York Evening Post of January 28, 1803.

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expansion with the acquiring of this vast territory. One barrier to the accomplishment of the mission of continental expansion was eliminated. In this area too, there was the idea that this acquisition was in accord with the mission of spreading the blessings of American liberty.

After the Louisiana Purchase, it became evident that the expansionist fever was growing. Americans began to look toward new areas for security, for commerce, or because of the idea of natural limits. The Louisiana Purchase had extended the boundary to the Rocky Mountains in the West. Jefferson then sent Lewis and Clark to explore this area and to find a route to the Pacific. This promoted settlement in Oregon.

In the meantime, another phase of expansionism was occurring at the expense of the Indians. Many of the Western pioneers looked upon the Indians as barriers to expansion. From the first days of the republic, the Americans claimed that their right to the soil was superior to that of the Indians. They would use the land to a greater advantage than the original settlers. Americans justified dispossession of the Indians on the ground that it was necessary for the carrying out of the American mission and for the extension of civilized communities. Sometimes the Indians yielded their lands without too much of a struggle--sometimes through bribery or peaceful coercion. At other times they were

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forcefully removed from their lands to make way for the white settlers. This Indian conflict was one of the issues involved in the War of 1812. Indeed this mode of expansion at the expense of the Indians lasted most of the nineteenth century. Helen Hunt Jackson exposed many of the evils of the American policy in her work, Century of Dishonor.²⁴ This and other protests led to concern for the Indians and caused the American government to take some steps to improve the welfare of the victims of their destiny. By this time, however, most of the Indian lands had been appropriated by the white population.

As some Americans were busy appropriating Indian lands, others began to look toward Florida. The idea began to develop that the natural boundary of the South was the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. Many felt Florida was of no use to Spain, whereas it would be a benefit to the United States. In this respect it would be a part of the American mission to annex Florida. Gouverneur Morris claimed that Florida was "joined to us by the hand of the Almighty."²⁵

In the course of events leading to the War of 1812, southern expansionists looked to the war as a means whereby the country might annex Florida. At the same time, northern

²⁴ Helen Hunt Jackson, Century of Dishonor, New York, 1881, x-457 p.

²⁵ Weinberg, op. cit., p. 49. (Quoted from Annals of Congress, 7th Congress, 2nd session, column 204.)

expansionists were talking in terms of the annexation of Canada. As will be seen in relation to Henry Adams, the United States did eventually acquire West Florida through somewhat questionable means. Finally, a treaty with Spain in 1819 gave the Americans their natural boundary to the south when Spain gave up claims to East Florida, thereby opening the way for the next period of expansion. By this same treaty, the United States gave up any claims to Texas in agreeing to the new boundary line. These claims were to be reasserted in the 1830's.

Thus, in the period before, during, and after the War of 1812, there was talk of expansion to the natural boundaries of the United States. Although this was not accomplished to the north, it was accomplished to the south in the case of Florida. Albert Weinberg has described this desire to expand to the natural boundaries as "geographical predestination"--the idea that "nature or the natural order of things destined natural boundaries for nations in general and the United States the nation of special destiny in particular."²⁶

After the treaty with Spain in 1819, the Rocky Mountains became something in the way of natural boundary. Soon people talked of surmounting this barrier and taking

²⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

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territory to the ocean. By the 1820's the continental idea of Manifest Destiny was a rather general topic of conversation although it was not called Manifest Destiny.

This period after the war of 1812 was marked by a rise of nationalism, and the nationalists in general were sympathetic to the cause of expansion until it became involved with the slave issue. Even Alexis deTocqueville was imbued with the idea of expansion, for in 1835 he wrote:

At a period which may be said to be near . . . the Anglo-Americans will cover the immense space contained between the Polar regions and the tropics, extending from the coasts of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific Ocean.²⁷

Possible areas for expansion might include Cuba, Texas, which proclaimed its independence from Mexico in 1836, and the Oregon area which since 1818 had been jointly occupied by the United States and Great Britain. It was in the period of controversy over the Texas and Oregon issues that the phrase Manifest Destiny came into its own. The credit for the term has been given to John L. O'Sullivan, editor of the monthly publication Democratic Review and of the New York Morning News. In the use of the term, again there is conveyed something of the idea of American mission.

²⁷ Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America (trans. by Henry Reeve), World Classics Edition, London, 1946, p. 284.

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In the November 1839 Democratic Review, in an editorial on "The Great Nation of Futurity," O'Sullivan pictured the United States in the future as follows:

The far reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles; to establish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of the Most High--the Sacred and the True. Its floor shall be a hemisphere--its roof the firmament of the star-studded heavens, and its congregation an Union of many Republics, comprising hundreds of happy millions, calling, owning no man master, but governed by God's natural and moral law of equality, the law of brotherhood . . .²⁸

While this editorial did not use the word Manifest Destiny, it did express the future hopes of the democratic nation.

Julius Pratt has written that the first appearance of the specific term was in an article in the combined July-August 1845 issue of the Democratic Review which carried an article on the annexation of Texas denouncing opponents of annexation and urging all to unite behind the movement especially since other nations were trying to thwart American policy and check "the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions."²⁹ This,

²⁸ Julius W. Pratt, "The Origin of 'Manifest Destiny'" American Historical Review, Vol. 32, July 1927, p. 797.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 798.

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according to Pratt, was very similar to an article in the July 9 Morning News which omitted the word manifest and which was also attributable to O'Sullivan.

In the January 5, 1846, issue of the Morning News, in a letter signed by O'Sullivan the word manifest was omitted but he spoke of "this destiny to overspread the whole American Continent with an immense democratic population."³⁰

However, Pratt felt that it was an editorial in the December 27, 1845, New York Morning News under the title, "The True Title," which set Congressmen talking about Manifest Destiny. The article affirmed the legal right of the United States to the Oregon area, and then stated that even without a legal right based on discovery, exploration, settlement, and continuity, the United States would still have the strongest claim to the area:

. . . and that claim is by right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us . . . The God of nature and of nations has marked it for our own; and with his blessing we will firmly maintain the incontestable rights He has given, and fearlessly perform the high duties he has imposed.³¹

³⁰ Ibid., p. 798. This was found by Pratt in the files of the New York Historical Society and was also printed in the New York Weekly News for January 3, 1846.

³¹ Ibid., p. 796.

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Pratt claimed that this term, Manifest Destiny, used in relation to the Oregon issue "proved to be such a convenient summing up of the self-confident nationalist and expansionist sentiment of the time that it passed into the permanent national vocabulary."³²

Thus, in the two decades before the Civil War, the term Manifest Destiny came to be used in conjunction with territorial expansion, and it came to connote something of the idea of American mission. Providence had set apart the continent for the Americans and for the spreading of the blessings of democracy. The obtaining possession of the North American continent was to be a means of the fulfillment of the ideal of democracy. Expansion and freedom were associated in an important relationship. Expansion was essential to the American national mission of national purpose of championing the rights of man.

The first use of the term Manifest Destiny in Congress was in relation to the Oregon issue. By 1845-46, the United States and Great Britain were in disagreement as to proper boundaries between the new nations in the West. The Americans had been claiming the 54°40' boundary, while the British refused to recognize this. This first use of the term in Congress was made on January 3, 1846, by Rep. Robert Winthrop of Massachusetts, in opposing the end

³² Ibid., p. 798.

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of joint occupation of Oregon. He was critical of expansionist ideas and identified Manifest Destiny as follows:

I mean that new revelation of right which has been designated as the right of our manifest destiny to spread over this whole continent. It has been openly avowed in a leading administration journal that this . . . is our best and strongest title--one so clear, so pre-eminent, and so indisputable, that if Great Britain had all other titles in addition to her own, they would weigh nothing against it. The right of our manifest destiny! There is a right for a new chapter in the law of nations; or rather in the special laws of our own country; for I suppose the right of a manifest destiny to spread will not be admitted to exist in any nation except the universal Yankee nation.³³

At the same time, there were many expansionists in the country who felt that the United States had a higher and better title to Oregon under the laws of nature. Independent of prior right of discovery, or prior right of settlement, or any other rights, Oregon was felt by many as destined by God to become a part of the United States and to belong to a free people. Weinberg has claimed that in the Oregon issue "expansionism took up arms against legality and in its new independence adopted the bold doctrine that the true title was the title by manifest destiny."³⁴ He has claimed that this was in direct line from the Puritan doctrine of the

³³ Ibid., p. 795.

³⁴ Weinberg, op. cit., p. 131. Some also felt the annexation of Oregon would rid the Continent of British power and thus preserve freedom.

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superiority of the divine law to the human positive law whereby they believed laws not in accord with the law of God were not true laws and were not binding.³⁵

In relation to the Oregon issue and American expansion, the matter was eventually settled more in relation to the legal claims than to the true title by any manifest destiny. The boundary between the United States and Canada was established at the forty-ninth parallel. Probably one reason the expansionists were willing to compromise in 1846 was because of the fear of Mexico and the Mexican War.

In the 1840's, aside from the Oregon question, the best example of the workings of the expansionists was in relation to Mexico and her territories. In this connection motives for expansion included natural development, spreading the ideas of American liberty, and preventing European political interference which would be dangerous to American freedom.

In 1836, Texas had proclaimed its independence of Mexico, but the latter had refused to recognize this. The United States, while recognizing Texan independence, had refused to annex the area of Texas which was asking to be admitted to statehood. This was because of the slavery issue and because of a fear of a war with Mexico. However,

³⁵ Ibid., p. 131.

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there was a growing interest in Texas and also in the California and New Mexican territories. Many felt these areas were destined for a union with the American republic.

By the 1840's there were fears that Britain and France were trying to establish political influence in Texas. This was looked upon as a threat to American democracy and security. Americans also feared Great Britain in California. Some began to talk of annexing all of Mexico and Canada to preserve American free institutions. Professor Rippey has claimed that "manifest destiny never pointed to the acquisition of a region so unmistakably as when undemocratic, conservative Europe revealed an inclination to interfere or to absorb."³⁶

This fear of foreign influence in Texas, coupled with other factors, including the desires of the Texans, and the election of 1844, finally led to the annexation of Texas in 1845. Thus, again the country had expanded, and again it was a part of the American mission. They would regenerate those formerly under Mexican rule; they would spread the blessings of freedom and protect the area from foreign institutions of an absolute nature.

³⁶ J. Fred Rippey, The United States and Mexico, New York, 1926, p. 29.

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When Mexico refused to recognize this annexation, a special minister, John Slidell, was sent to Mexico in an attempt to secure recognition of the Texas annexation with the Rio Grande as the boundary, to try to purchase California and New Mexico, and to settle claims' issues. Shortly after the Mexican Government's refusal to negotiate, fighting broke out in disputed territory between the Mexicans and the Americans. This led to the American declaration of war in 1846.

The Mexican war is often referred to as an expansionist war. The people of the United States were convinced by 1845-46 that they should extend their domain to the Pacific. Again, the idea was based on that of natural development, but also on the idea of regenerating the Mexican subjects with the blessings of American democracy. This latter would be incidental to the real desire of acquiring valuable land, especially California, which President Polk had been willing to purchase from Mexico. As the war dragged on, some began to talk of conquering and keeping all of Mexico as well as California and New Mexico. Many felt it was a part of the American mission to improve the general conditions on the continent--to deliver the people from Mexican bondage.

In spite of the expansionists' wishes the treaty following the Mexican War did not include Mexico proper, but it did include California, the New Mexican cession, and the recognition of the Texas boundary at the Rio Grande. Some have charged that the people of the United States were not really interested in improving the conditions of the Mexicans, but that they used this as an excuse to disguise their land hunger. Weinberg has claimed that the interest in land enabled the expansionists to have a greater sympathy for the inhabitants than would have been possible without the land interest.³⁷ He wrote that this mission of regeneration placed "preeminent weight upon the welfare of the patriot's own nation as the bearer of highest values," and he saw that in regenerating others there was also the possibility of "enhancing the vitality of the chosen people itself."³⁸

H. C. Chittenden has also written of this phase of expansionism as being in accord with the interests of mankind. He admitted that the people of the United States were convinced of the importance of extending their domain to the Pacific. He did not believe that this was solely out of the desire for physical expansion. He said the interests of the people of the region as well as civilization in general,

³⁷ Weinberg, op. cit., p. 187.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 189.

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motivated the Americans along with the desire for natural development. Chittenden considered that the United States had the obligation to the world, to its own political future, and to the welfare of the people in the territories to wage the Mexican war. Chittenden wrote that whatever the opinion regarding the means by which the Mexican territory was transferred to the United States, "one must acknowledge that the end was in accord with the best interests of civilization."³⁹ He was of the opinion that the action of the United States was prompted, "not by a lust of territory, but by the fulfillment of a duty to civilization . . ."⁴⁰

In these opinions there is again the idea of the connection of Manifest Destiny with the American mission. The United States was acting as an agent of Providence, acting for the good of civilization, and acting on a higher ground than mere lust for territory.

Following the Mexican War, there was some talk about expansion, especially to the South. Because in this period eyes were also fixed upon the slavery issue, there was not much accomplished in the way of annexing territory. Yet, the inaugural of President Pierce is an example of this talk:

³⁹ Chittenden, op. cit., p. 50.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 51. This idea of civilizing is a contrast to the home policy in relation to the Negroes or the Indian wards.

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. . . The policy of my Administration will not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion. Indeed . . . our attitude as a nation and our position on the globe render the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction eminently important for our protection, if not in the future essential for preservation of the rights of commerce and peace of the world.⁴¹

The Pierce Administration sought at times Cuba, Mexican territory, and Hawaii. Cuba was perhaps the focal point. Many looked upon the island as a natural appendage to the United States. There was some talk of seizing Cuba by force if Spain refused to sell it. However, during this pre-Civil War period, the goal was not obtained. In fact, the only territory acquired by the United States in the 1850's was the Gadsden Purchase acquired from Mexico in 1854. This was a small area purchased with a view toward the eventual building of a transcontinental railroad, and it was the final contiguous territory annexed to the United States. Then in the decade of the 1860's the Americans temporarily turned from expansionism as they fought the American Civil War. By this time they had spanned the continent from East to West.

In the immediate post-Civil War period, the general idea of Manifest Destiny was not too popular. The Civil War by shattering somewhat the optimism of the '40's and by

⁴¹ Quoted by Thomas A. Bailey in A Diplomatic History of the American People, 5th edition, New York, 1955, p. 311.

reminding the American people of the inadequateness of their political institutions in solving some of the problems of society, weakened the demand for territorial expansion.

Many Americans felt it better to improve what they had rather than to embark on foreign ventures. Reconstruction problems and problems connected with industrial and technological growth occupied the attention of the majority of the people.

An exception to this was Secretary of State William Seward "whose brain was constantly busy with schemes of annexation,"⁴² and who succeeded in 1867 in securing the purchase of Alaska from Russia. The opponents of this expansion felt America was establishing a dangerous precedent by acquiring noncontiguous territory. Many felt the territory was barren and useless. Nevertheless, the treaty of purchase finally passed the Senate, and the House of Representatives at length agreed on the appropriation of \$7,200,000 for the purchase. In the arguments in support of the purchase there was allusion to the inevitable workings of Manifest Destiny and to the gain for republican institutions by the banishing of Russia from the continent.⁴³

⁴² Carl Schurz, "Manifest Destiny" Harper's Magazine, Vol. 87, October, 1893, p. 737.

⁴³ For the specific statements, see Bailey, op. cit., p. 399-403.

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Except for the purchase of Alaska, the Americans, in the period between 1867-90 seemed to be limiting Manifest Destiny to their continent, and they did not regard the acquisition of outlying territory as desirable. In this period, attempts on the part of Seward to annex Santo Domingo and the Danish West Indies ended in failure.

By the 1890's, however, there developed what came to be called a new Manifest Destiny. By this time, the Reconstruction problems no longer occupied the attentions of the whole nation. The American continent itself had been subdued. The American nation was competing with Europe for markets and sources of raw materials. Europe itself was embarking on what has been styled as the new imperialism. Hence, Americans began to talk again in terms of Manifest Destiny. Another factor which aided the development of the new Manifest Destiny was the application of the Darwinian laws of survival of the fittest to nations. Writers like John Fiske, Josiah Strong, and John Burgess wrote in terms of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic races. Alfred Mahan in writing on The Influence of Sea Power stressed the idea that the nation with the largest navy would control the

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world. This nation would also need colonies as bases for defense and coaling and repair stations.⁴⁴

Carl Schurz described this new concept of Manifest Destiny as "the acquisition of such territory, far and near, as may be useful in enlarging our commercial advantages, and in securing to our navy facilities desirable for the operations of a great naval power."⁴⁵ This new concept was that of incorporating not only contiguous territory, but also of acquiring noncontiguous areas far and near which would prove advantageous to the nation.

There were many in the United States who were opposed to this concept of Manifest Destiny. Some felt that the acquiring of noncontiguous territory would present a vulnerable point of attack. As an example of this, in 1893 a treaty of annexation of the Hawaiian Islands was drawn up. There was some opposition on the part of those who thought it was breaking with the past. These favored a homogeneous people, a small navy and an aloofness from world politics

⁴⁴ Julius W. Pratt in The Expansionists of 1898, Baltimore, 1936, gives a good explanation of the new movement in Chapter I entitled "The New Manifest Destiny." In spite of this new movement, John Hawgood has claimed that after 1871 most Americans accepted the idea that "the Dominion of Canada actually preferred its allegiance to the British Crown to the alternative of seeking admission to the American Union." (Hawgood, op. cit., p. 143.)

⁴⁵ Schurz, op. cit., p. 738.

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instead of the annexation of a nonhomogeneous people in another continent. Carl Schurz complained: "If we acquire Hawaii, we acquire not an addition to our strength, but a dangerous element of weakness."⁴⁶

Most Americans did not hold the concept of Carl Schurz and many believed that the new idea of Manifest Destiny meant that "American expansion could not be resisted by Americans themselves, caught, willingly or unwillingly, in the toils of an inevitable destiny."⁴⁷ Many saw that it was necessary for the United States to act to prevent the Hawaiian Islands from falling into the hands of an Asiatic or European power. This would interfere with American dominion in the Pacific. In spite of this, the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands was delayed until the Spanish-American War added support for the annexation. Annexation thus became a war measure. McKinley claimed shortly after the battle of Manila, "We need Hawaii just as much and a great deal more than we did California. It is manifest destiny."⁴⁸ The

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 744. Schurz saw Manifest Destiny as "the preservation of the exceptional and invaluable advantages they now enjoy, and the growth . . . of a vigorous nationality in freedom, prosperity, and power." He feared that in acquiring tropical lands there would be a decline in national traditions and character leading to "turbulence, demoralization and final decay." (Ibid., p. 746.)

⁴⁷ Weinberg, op. cit., p. 254.

⁴⁸ Charles Olcott, The Life of William McKinley, Boston, 1916, Vol. I, p. 379.

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motives here were not so much connected with the American mission of regeneration or of spreading liberty, but with the American mission of becoming a great Pacific power

The next phase in which there is seen the idea of expansion was in the Spanish American War and its results. The ostensible purpose of this war was the liberation of Cuba. In the course of the war, the United States Congress passed the Teller Amendment which disavowed any desire to annex Cuba even though this island in the pre-Civil War times had been looked upon as a natural appendage. In the course of the war, the United States took some parts of the Spanish Empire--Manila, Guam, and Porto Rico. The war, while a war to liberate Cuba, whetted the appetites of the expansionists.

When the war was over, the question of spoils was important. Expansionists in the country were demanding all of the Philippine Islands, Guam, and Porto Rico. Territorial development was an expression of the Manifest Destiny of the nation. The Philippine Island question occupied a good deal of the time at the Paris Peace Conference.

President McKinley in his instructions to his delegates on the subject of the Philippines alluded to the American mission when he wrote:

The march of events rules and overrules human action
We can not be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and new responsibilities which we must meet and

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discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.⁴⁹

Thus, if the Philippine Islands were annexed by the United States, it would be a part of the plan of Providence. The United States had a duty or responsibility forced on it by destiny.

In his specific instructions to the peace delegates on October 25, 1898, McKinley told them to demand all of the Philippine Islands, even though only Manila had been captured, and this after the armistice had been signed. In later explaining his action, the President said there was no alternative. He did not want to give the islands back to Spain; he did not want to turn them over to commercial rivals in the Orient, France or Germany; he did not want to leave them to themselves since he considered them unfit for self government. Thus, he saw that the United States had to take them, had to educate, had to Christianize them.⁵⁰ This was a duty which could not be avoided.

⁴⁹ Bailey, op. cit., p. 516. (Quoted from Foreign Relations, 1898, September 16, 1898, p. 907.)

⁵⁰ Bailey, op. cit., p. 520. Tyler Dennett has claimed that this American policy "had been adopted in great ignorance of the actual facts in the islands, and in a blissful and exalted assumption that any race ought to regard conquest by the American people as a superlative blessing." (Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, New York, 1922, p. 629.)

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At the Peace Conference, America also took Guam and Porto Rico claiming these by right of conquest. As a result of the Spanish American War, the United States, for reasons of increased power, commercial needs, and duty, embarked upon an imperialist policy. In this policy, the majority of the nation saw themselves as carrying out a mission similar to the mission of the Puritan settlers of the seventeenth century.

In the period after the annexation of the Philippines, the United States had to use force to put down a revolution of the Filipinos demanding independence. In putting down this insurrection the Americans used the idea that force was a necessary means of fulfilling the duty of extending civilization to the less fortunate. This was the idea of the white man's burden. In the long run, the putting down of the insurrection would be of benefit to the island population. The war against the insurgents was fulfilling the American mission. This was difficult to understand in 1899, but it is a fact that when the revolution was put down, a civil government was established in the islands, and there was developed a political capacity among the people. By 1916 ultimate independence was promised; this was granted in 1946. In this area, therefore, expansion was not permanent. Once the Americans had fulfilled their mission, they withdrew. Yet, there are many who would claim that this withdrawal had nothing to do with the American mission idea.

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There were also examples of the idea of mission and Manifest Destiny in relations between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean area in the twentieth century. In relation to Latin America as early as 1823 with the Monroe Doctrine, the United States claimed that its rights in the Western Hemisphere were superior to those of Europe. In 1901 they were claiming to have a paramount right in relation to any canal that might be built across the Isthmus of Panama.

In accord with this idea, America finally secured from Great Britain the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 which had provided for a joint endeavor in canal building on the part of the two nations. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 gave the United States the exclusive right to build and to regulate the canal. When Theodore Roosevelt had difficulties with Colombia over the canal, he used American forces to prevent Colombia from landing troops to suppress a revolt of the newly proclaimed republic of Panama. When the Panama revolution succeeded, Roosevelt was able to negotiate a treaty with Panama which provided for the canal zone and which made the building of the canal possible. From the point of view of American mission, this is important in that Roosevelt used the idea that he was doing this in the interests of mankind. He told Congress:

I confidently maintain that the recognition of the Republic of Panama was an act justified by the interests of collective civilization. If ever a

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Government could be said to have received a mandate from civilization . . . the United States holds that position with regard to the interoceanic canal.⁵¹

Thus the expansion of the United States in acquiring the Canal Zone and the right to build the canal was considered as another phase of the American mission.

In the nineteenth century one of the factors involved in continental expansion had been the idea of self-defense. There had been the desire, especially in Texas, California, and Oregon to keep out European ideas and influences. In the twentieth century, the United States often intervened in Latin American affairs, not out of a desire for land, but out of the desire to maintain peace in the western hemisphere.

In 1904 Theodore Roosevelt announced what has been called the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The general idea was that the United States had the right and duty to intervene in countries of the Western Hemisphere, requested or not, to preserve or restore order, in order to prevent European powers from intervening. Roosevelt referred to this as the "exercise of an international police power."⁵²

⁵¹ Bailey, op. cit., p. 544. (Quoted from Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 275.) By 1934 F. D. Roosevelt claimed that because the canal served all nations in peaceful commerce the United States was "a trustee for all the world in its peaceful maintenance." (Weinberg, op. cit., p. 346. Quoted from Baltimore Sun, July 12, 1934.)

⁵² Bailey, op. cit., p. 558. (Quoted from Congressional Record, 58 Congress, 3 session, p. 19.)

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Albert Weinberg has claimed that this concept was derived from that of Manifest Destiny. He said the idea had "the notion of America's preeminent moral distinction and that of its representation of Providence by virtue of this distinction."⁵³ This was the idea that America was commissioned by Providence to preserve the rights of man on this continent. Later this idea was extended so that it became the duty of the United States to intervene abroad in matters which were to the interests of the United States. The classic example of this was the American participation at the Algeiras Conference to help settle the dispute between France and Germany in 1906. Roosevelt felt it was in the interests of the United States to preserve world peace in 1906.

Thus, the interventions in Latin America in the twentieth century were not for imperialism but out of duty to protect the nations of Latin America. Weinberg has claimed:

. . . the traditional conception of America's manifest destiny as guardian of America was partially eclipsed by the conception . . . that America was the representative in the Western Hemisphere of the interests and ideals of the Teutonic civilization.⁵⁴

⁵³ Weinberg, op. cit., p. 421.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 431. For the most part the Latin American republics resented this mission claimed by the United States. With the Good Neighbor policy of F. D. Roosevelt, the United States abandoned the idea of single-handed intervention.

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The purchase of the Danish West Indies in 1917 closed the epic of territorial Manifest Destiny. This last expansion was based chiefly on the idea of self-defense. After the outbreak of World War I, there was the fear that Germany might absorb Denmark and thus claim a legal title to the Danish West Indies. The United States opened negotiations with Denmark for purchase, claiming that if Germany forced Denmark to cede the islands to her, the United States would seize them to prevent Germany from getting them. Denmark soon found it was impossible to refuse the proposal for sale and accepted the treaty. This expansion was based on the idea of political necessity and self-defense.

Thus the epic of American territorial expansion came to a close in 1917. In the post World War I period, some claimed that it was the destiny of the United States to extend her moral influence. Yet, the nation refused to join the League of Nations and seemed to ignore this concept. In the post World War II period the country is attempting to take a lead in trying to make the spirit of democracy prevail. The new American mission seems to be that of leader of the free world against the forces of Communist opposition. Whether American expansionism is dead will have

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to be decided in the years to come. At this time, any such revival in the near future seems hard to envision in view of the American commitments to the world.⁵⁵

In this chapter an attempt has been made to point out the general concept of the term of Manifest Destiny, and then to see the operation of this concept in American history. This has been done by showing some of the earliest ideas in regard to the purpose of the founding of some of the English settlements, and then by tracing the actual expansion of the country from the time of the French and English wars to the purchase of the Danish West Indies in 1917. It has not been the purpose to weigh the methods or merits of the individual cases of expansion. Rather an attempt has been made to discuss the idea of expansion from the point of view of motives in order to show that in many instances there were similarities. Sometimes these motives were for reasons of natural growth, or self-defense, or moral regeneration, or for spreading the blessings of liberty. From this it would seem evident that one of the themes

⁵⁵ Writing in 1935 Albert Weinberg said that ". . . history has shifted from America's mission of expansion to leadership in an international stabilization demanding that the long manifest destiny of continental dominion be left for ever unfulfilled." (Weinberg, op. cit., p. 477-8.) It would seem that this is even more true in the decade of the 1960's.

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dominating the minds of the leaders of the nation has been the idea that America has occupied a special destiny among the nations of the earth.

With this idea in mind, the next chapters will be devoted to the ideas of representative American historians of the nineteenth century in relation to the idea of Manifest Destiny. The attempt will be made to show how these historians viewed the expansion of their country, and to try to determine what prospects they saw for the future.

CHAPTER II

GEORGE BANCROFT AND THE PROVIDENTIAL MISSION OF AMERICA

Although George Bancroft was a most successful nineteenth century American historian, today he is a name ambling through the past, his books seldom read or discussed except in relation to American historiography. In this connection, especially in relation to the American mission and Manifest Destiny, Bancroft has left his imprint. As an historian and politician he viewed the expansion of the country as part of a very careful plan of Divine Providence. America's mission was divinely ordained. This idea pervades his writings. Under the guidance of God, America had grown, had done great things, and was destined to be an example to the world.

1. Background and General Appraisal

George Bancroft, Brahmin rebel, was born in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1800, as the hopeful, optimistic nineteenth century was opening. The era of his life was one of momentous change and one which has left a marked impression on American political, social, economic, and intellectual life. In the year of his birth, Thomas Jefferson was elected President. As he was growing up, the American population was rapidly increasing; pioneers were moving across the mountains

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to the West; cities were springing up in former wilderness areas. Yet, as he was growing up, Massachusetts still lived in the spirit of the past century, firmly entrenched in Federalism and concerned primarily with the business elements.

Bancroft, the son of a Yankee minister, was brought up in the surroundings and traditions of the aristocratic Brahmin caste. These traditions were Federalist and conservative. Like so many others of his class, he attended Phillips Academy at Exeter, New Hampshire, in preparation for Harvard University. In his senior year at Harvard, he won the Bowdoin essay contest for a work entitled "The Use and Necessity of Revelation". In this essay he attacked the rationalists, the deists, and the evangelical faiths which proclaimed truths developed through their own minds. In contrast, he stressed the need of revelation, and set forth his belief in the existence of an all wise Providence which directed and controlled the universe.

The future historian graduated from Harvard in 1817, second in his class. After graduation, he remained at the University and started to prepare for the ministry. Within a short time he was sent by President Kirkland of Harvard to Gottingen, Germany, for further study. Here it was intended that he would become a learned theologian and Bible critic. At Gottingen, he became uncertain as to his future choice of

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professions, and while not abandoning the ministry completely, he did begin a shift of emphasis from theology to the classics and history. In 1820, he received a degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Gottingen, and then attended lectures at the University of Berlin. After some travel on the continent, he returned home in 1822.

The school year 1822-23 found Bancroft at Harvard as a Greek tutor. Here he attempted to reform the teaching procedures by introducing German methods. These efforts proved unpopular, and Bancroft soon left Harvard. In 1823, he and Joseph Cogswell, Harvard librarian, established Round Hill school for boys which was to be an experimental school modeled on the German methods. In the meantime, he had also begun a preaching career which ended unsuccessfully in 1823. After about eight years, Bancroft had tired of his teaching career, so he sold his interest in Round Hill to his partner and divorced himself from any connection with the school. Most of the rest of his life was spent either in making history by dabbling in the field of politics, or in writing history, a pursuit which gained for him the title of "dean of American historical writing."¹

¹ Russel Blaine Nye, Brahmin Rebel, New York, 1944, p. 85.

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By this time, he had also become interested in the party ideas of Jefferson. In 1826 he had been asked to give the Fourth of July Oration at Northampton, Massachusetts, celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the nation. Although he had no known political affiliation at the time, in this his first public political oration, he showed that his sympathies lay with the Jeffersonians for he claimed:

. . . in the science of government, as elsewhere, the deliberate convictions of mankind, reasoning the causes of their own happiness, their own wants and interests, are the surest revelations of political truth . . . The popular voice is all powerful with us; this is our oracle; this, we acknowledge is the voice of God.²

This firm belief in democracy was to be a basic tenet throughout his life.

By now Bancroft could be styled as a Brahmin rebel. First, the son of a minister, he abandoned the ministerial profession; then, he rebelled against New England teaching methods and imported German methods; then, in conservative, aristocratic New England, he became a rebel in politics by casting his lot with the party of Jefferson and Jackson.

² Ibid., p. 87. This was in contrast to Francis Parkman who wrote in 1875, "My political faith lies between two vicious extremes, democracy and absolute authority; each of which I detest the more because it tends to react into the other. I do not object to a good constitutional monarchy, but prefer a conservative republic where intelligence and character and not numbers, hold the reins of power." (Wilbur R. Jacobs (ed.), Letters of Francis Parkman, Norman, 1960, II, p. 82.)

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In the midst of his early historical writing, the first volume of which he published in 1834, Bancroft became active in politics. Having supported Van Buren in 1836, he was appointed Collector of the Port in Boston in 1837. In 1844, as a delegate to the Democratic national convention, he helped James K. Polk to secure the Presidential nomination, and he then worked for his election on the expansionist Democratic platform of 1844. That same year, he ran unsuccessfully for the governorship of Massachusetts. After the inauguration of Polk, Bancroft's loyalty to the President was recognized with his appointment as Secretary of the Navy. In this capacity, as will later be demonstrated, he showed himself as an ardent expansionist in regard to Texas and California, and he helped Polk in the settlement of the Oregon dispute with Great Britain. As Navy Secretary, he also introduced certain reforms, and he saw the establishment of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis. In the fall of 1846, Bancroft, who had always been interested in the diplomatic field, was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to England, a position which he held until 1849 when the Whig Administration of Zachary Taylor appointed a successor.

By this time, Bancroft had decided he could find in American history the opportunity of discovering truths of universal importance. He would express these truths for the

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benefit of the human race. Thus, he decided to devote full time to a career of writing history. While abroad he had collected documents from various countries which he hoped to use in his projected History. Most of the rest of his career, except for a period from 1867-74 during which he served as Minister first to Prussia and then to a united Germany, he spent in the District of Columbia devoted to this pursuit. Here he was free of all sets and honored by members of all circles.

It has been said that Bancroft as an historian "combined some of the greatest merits and some of the profoundest defects ever united in a single author."³ G. P. Gooch has said that "American history came of age with Bancroft."⁴ Bancroft's theme was to trace the gradual emergence of liberty from its early beginnings in the colonies through the years. Unlike Henry Adams and John Fiske, Bancroft thought history rested on philosophy rather than science. Hence, his was a religio-philosophico approach in contrast to the later scientific historians.

Bancroft perceived the world was in a constant state of progress or advancement, and he believed the historian should write of these changes and discuss the evidences of

³ T. W. Higginson, "George Bancroft," Nation, Vol. 52, January 22, 1891, p. 66.

⁴ G. P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1952, p. 377.

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human progress. His philosophy was built around the idea of "an unbounded faith in mankind and in man's inherent natural goodness."⁵ It was his opinion that man, having been given reason by God, could discern the truth, and he felt that government was expressed by the will of the masses. Thus, man was able to rule himself by divine guidance and progress toward a higher state.

From 1834 to 1875 Bancroft published a ten volume work entitled History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent. Although he had intended to bring the text down to his time, the ten volumes encompassed only the colonial and revolutionary periods. To this History was later added a two volume unit on the formation of the American Constitution, published in 1883. The original History went through numerous additions. In 1876 a revision, styled the Centenary Edition reduced the original ten volumes to six. Finally, in what was known as the Author's Last Revision, the original History and the two volume work on the Constitution were condensed in a six volume edition.

As has been pointed out, the general theme of the History was that the gradual federalization of the colonies had been present in American history since the beginning.

⁵ Nye, op. cit., p. 100.

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"He built his History about a central theme, the sovereignty of the people and their right to exercise it freely."⁶ His "comprehensive humanity and liberal economy pervade almost every chapter of the volumes . . ."⁷ Bancroft always kept before him a belief in the cause of freedom and human rights. He conveyed the idea that the United States was the hope of the world, and through it freedom would be spread elsewhere. To him history was more than a mere record of past events; "it was God's plan for the advancement of mankind translated into action."⁸

Bancroft's recent biographer, Russel Nye, has described Bancroft as convinced that history was:

...but the record of a divine plan manifested in the past, and that the divine plan proved that mankind was intended by God to progress toward a future state wherein principles of truth, justice, beauty, and morality--perceived intuitively through Reason--might guide and raise it.⁹

⁶ Nye, op. cit., p. 304. In a letter to Bancroft, October 18, 1878, Francis Parkman said: "Your object is the opposite of mine. You trace the development of American independence, while I shall try to show the fall of French absolutism." (Jacobs, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 117.)

⁷ W. O. Johnson, "History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent," North American Review, Vol. 80, April 1855, p. 392.

⁸ Nye, op. cit., p. 196.

⁹ Ibid., p. 101-2.

Nye has written that Bancroft's history was a record of events:

... which in their steady march from tyranny toward liberty, from heterogeneity to homogeneity, from scattered colonies to federated republic, illustrated in a single sweep the inevitability of man's progress and the unity of humanity.¹⁰

Nye has claimed that Bancroft said what the people thought:

... that theirs was a God-directed nation, a divinely inspired state destined to bring safely into the world as an example to mankind a government found in freedom and grounded in liberty, a nation built on a belief in the worth and dignity of the common man.¹¹

Thus, Bancroft's writings displayed a spirit of lofty patriotism, an enthusiastic love of country, and a firm belief in Divine Providence. Someone has said that his history demonstrated the idea that the best government rests on the people not on the few, that the voice of the people was the voice of God, and that the History itself was "little less than a divine revelation" since Bancroft seemed to be proclaiming, "Thus saith the Lord!"¹²

Critics of the historian have charged that his love of country was sometimes too exalted to be discriminating; that he often indulged in digressions; that his references

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 102.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 102-3.

¹² Odell Shepard, "Philosopher Politician," Nation, Vol. 159, September 9, 1944, p. 301.

were not always accurate; that he transposed parts of quotations and sometimes blended from several quotations; that he sometimes became too partial to a theme and exaggerated its importance. One critic once charged that his great admiration for the United States "colored his pages so highly that the historian seemed to give place to the eulogist, and the leading personages of the story to be uniformly represented as saints or heroes."¹³ Another has claimed that his early volumes were uncritical and that "the men and events of the Colonial period were wrapped in a haze of golden mist from which they were long in emerging."¹⁴ John Bassett wrote that the early volumes were "marred by his enthusiasm for democratic institutions, leading him to fervid outbreaks in praise of liberty."¹⁵ He wrote: "He assumed that the United States was founded on a plan superior to that of other nations, and that their growth verified his theory."¹⁶

¹³ F. Bowen, "Bancroft's History of the United States," North American Review, Vol. 74, April 1852, p. 508.

¹⁴ James T. Adams, "History and the Lower Criticism," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 132, September 1923, p. 310. Adams claimed that some voices were raised in criticism to suggest that "the history of the United States was not that of the Kingdom of Heaven." (Ibid., p. 310.)

¹⁵ John Spencer Bassett, The Middle Group of American Historians, New York, 1917, p. 182.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 184.

Harvey Wish has said that Bancroft reflected many of the romantic tendencies associated with German historians. He claims that Bancroft liked to make strong moral judgments, and that he felt that justice lay with the common man and Jacksonian democracy, yet he says:

. . . he often engulfed the personality of the individual within a blurred nation group whose fate was already determined long ago in the 'germ' of remote folkways and racial characteristics.¹⁷

Michael Kraus had written that modern scholarship tends to be dissatisfied with "his loud and uncritical Americanisms" and "with his omissions of certain factors, particularly the economic conflicts."¹⁸ Yet, he points out what many others have also pointed out, that at the time of his writing, this was the type of history being written. Most will admit that his mistakes were mistakes of his generation. In his Author's Last Revision, there were some changes in approach; some of the inflated prose disappeared; there were fewer references to Divine Providence, and there was a less aggressive spirit of nationalism. Yet, Nye has claimed that the guiding principle remained the same--"the

¹⁷ Harvey Wish, The American Historian--A Social-Intellectual History of the Writing of the American Past, New York, 1960, p. 75. Nye has written that Bancroft was not identified with all elements of Jacksonianism, and that he was more of a Jeffersonian operating within Jackson's party "not wholly agreeing with, and not wholly condemning his natural or his adopted body of political doctrine." (Nye, op. cit., p. 305.)

¹⁸ Michael Kraus, A History of American History, New York, 1937, p. 231.

progress of the colonies toward independence was still God-ordained, and the hand of destiny evident in every event of the long march toward revolution."¹⁹ A. Stevens once wrote of his volumes that they contained the idea:

There is a God; this God is not merely in the distant heavens; but here among us men; the history of these North American lands is thus tending to a pre-ordained result.²⁰

Having seen something of the historian's background and having in general appraised his work, it is the purpose of this chapter now to turn to Bancroft's works, and to trace his attitudes toward the Manifest Destiny of the country. Bancroft's views toward expansion and growth come from two chief sources, his History and his Letters. Bancroft's History deals with the first two phases of Manifest Destiny--the colonial expansion and the expansion as a result of the American Revolution. Bassett has claimed that his History is "our great defense of the rise of the American nationality, our most fervent great apology for the war of independence with all its untutored Americanism."²¹ In his History, it is easy to perceive his ideas in regard

¹⁹ Nye, op. cit., p. 287.

²⁰ A. Stevens, "George Bancroft," National Magazine, Vol. 6, 1854, p. 69.

²¹ Bassett, op. cit., p. 203.

to the future greatness of the country. For the views of the historian during the period of the Manifest Destiny movement of the 1840's, there are his Letters, especially those written in regard to the Texas and Oregon issues.

2. Bancroft and the Mission of America

In his Preface to his History, Bancroft set forth his theme and purpose. He claimed, "The maturity of the nation is but a continuation of its youth. The spirit of the colonies demanded freedom from the beginning."²² He justified dwelling on the colonial period because "it contains the germs of our institutions."²³ He felt the seeds of liberty were sown in the colonial times, and he aimed to give a full picture of the progress of American institutions. Bancroft pointed out that his object was:

. . . to show how the change in the condition of our land has been accomplished; and as the fortunes of a nation are not under the control of a blind destiny, to follow the steps by which a favoring Providence, calling our institutions into being, has conducted the country to its present happiness and glory.²⁴

²² George Bancroft, History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent, Boston, 1834-75, Vol. I, p. vii. For purposes of this work, unless otherwise stated in the footnotes, all the references to the History are from the original ten volume edition published between 1834 and 1875 by Little Brown and Company. Many of the same ideas are found in the Author's Last Revision published between 1883 and 1885.

²³ Ibid., p. vii.

²⁴ Ibid., Introduction, p. 4.

This will be the theme throughout his writings. Americans had the destiny to enlighten the world, or America was the agent of Providence in promoting universal freedom. Bancroft then tried in his volumes to point out the workings of Providence in relation to the early colonial settlements, in relation to colonial events, especially the wars with the Indians and the French, and then in relation to the American Revolution.

In his discussions of the early explorations and settlements, it is not difficult to see the idea of progress and the idea that Providence had a hand in the projects. Bancroft ranked the achievements of Cabot as second only to Columbus in "boldness, success, and results."²⁵ Columbus' feat won the admiration "which was due to an enterprise that seemed more divine than human . . .,"²⁶ while Cabot's voyage acquired for England "such a right to North America as this indisputable priority could confer."²⁷ Bancroft claimed that Englishmen never abandoned the hope of planting a colony on the continent discovered by Cabot although for some years conditions were unfavorable to this project. The same idea

²⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

of eventual progress is found in his discussions of the results of Raleigh's expeditions, which he said, "diffused over England a knowledge of America, as well as an interest in its destinies, and sowed the seeds, of which the fruits were to ripen during his lifetime, though not for him."²⁸

Throughout his discussions of the permanent colonial settlements, Bancroft wrote of Providence and liberty and progress. In discussing the restoration in Virginia in 1610, after a period of scarcity and misery, Bancroft claimed that those who had been spared, aware of the dangers avoided, were inspired with a trust in Providence.²⁹

In the settlement of New England there was also mention made of the workings of Providence when he wrote:

The mysterious influence of that power which enchains the destinies of states, overruling the decisions of sovereigns, and the forethought of statesmen, often deduces the greatest events from the least commanding causes.³⁰

Bancroft believed that the people of the United States should cherish the memory of those who founded a state on the basis of democratic liberty. He saw the early settlers scattering "the seminal principles of republican

²⁸ Ibid., p. 110.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 141.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 266.

freedom and national independence," and he thought they enjoyed in anticipation "the thought of their extending influence and fame which their grateful successors would award to their virtues."³¹ The Pilgrims were instruments paving the way for others, and in regard to them, Bancroft quoted Bradford as to their influence:

Out of small beginnings, great things have been produced; and as one small candle may light a thousand, so the light here kindled hath shone to many, yet in some sort to our whole nation.³²

Bancroft likewise thought that Providence had a hand in planting the Massachusetts Bay Colony for he wrote:

. . . it seemed better to depend on the benevolence of Providence, than to endure the constraints of the English laws and the severities of the English hierarchy; and who could doubt that, at the voice of undefiled religion, the wilderness would change to a Paradise for a people who lived under a bond with the Omnipresent God?³³

Again in writing of the early Massachusetts government, he alluded to the future as follows: "While a happy destiny was thus preparing for Massachusetts a representative government, relations of friendship were established with the natives."³⁴ Bancroft also pointed out the possibilities

³¹ Ibid., p. 323.

³² Ibid., p. 323.

³³ Ibid., p. 339-40.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 361.

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of expansion when he wrote of the desire of the Puritans to remain exclusive and to keep others out. He cited the fact that there was much room for expansion elsewhere: "The wide continent of America invited colonization; they claimed their own narrow domains for 'the brethren!'"³⁵ He saw that these first emigrants to Massachusetts were watched in England, and when they were able to surmount their difficulties, new emigrants came. He believed that the people in England "began to apprehend a special hand of Providence in raising this plantation, and their hearts were generally stirred to come over."³⁶

In general, Bancroft thought conditions in New England by 1640-42 were good with a growth of towns and people "and strangers, as they gazed, could not but acknowledge God's blessing on the endeavors of the planters."³⁷ At the same time, the colonists themselves believed that they were being favored by God, Bancroft thought. He wrote: "Doubt not," said the emigrants to the people of England, "God will raise our state and build his Church in this excellent clime."³⁸

³⁵ Ibid., p. 366.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 382.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 415-6.

³⁸ Bancroft, History of the United States of America From the Discovery of the Continent (Author's Last Revision), New York, 1883-85, Vol. I, p. 102.

Thus, Bancroft in discussing the early period of colonial history, felt the high idea of the English was to plant permanent Christian colonies, to establish for the oppressed and enterprising, places of refuge and abode, in the midst of liberty. "Heaven and earth," he wrote, "seemed never to have agreed better to frame a place for man's commodious and delightful habitation."³⁹

In the later colonial events, Bancroft also wrote much of progress, expansion, Providence and liberty. In discussing the Connecticut Charter of 1662, Bancroft said it disregarded the claims of Spain on the Pacific and extended Connecticut's limits to the Pacific. His comment was:

How strange is the connection of events! Winthrop not only secured to his state a peaceful century of colonial existence, but prepared the claim for western lands.⁴⁰

Bancroft recognized the importance of the conquest of New Netherlands by the English, in that it brought the whole Atlantic coast under English possession. While he did not mention the idea of Manifest Destiny, he did write, "Our country had obtained geographical unity."⁴¹ He also viewed the English-Indian contests of 1674-75 as quarrels over the

³⁹ Ibid., p. 88.

⁴⁰ Bancroft, History, Vol. II, p. 54. This and all succeeding references to the History are taken from the ten volume work.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 315.

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area of expansion, as the English gradually became interested in the interior regions. "How could jealousies fail to get excited?" he asked.⁴²

By 1688, on the eve of King William's War in the colonies, Bancroft saw the twelve oldest colonies with a population of about 200,000 people. He looked upon this colonization with the principles upon which it was founded as "the most momentous event of the seventeenth century. The elements of our country, such as she exists today, were already there," he wrote.⁴³ He saw that people had broken away from the European influences and had laid the foundations of the American republic. He perceived that this American freedom "had then the principle of life, but was unconscious of its vitality."⁴⁴

Throughout his work, Bancroft expounded on the idea of great faith in the people. This is the spirit of the nineteenth century in which he was writing. The people alone were present in power. He wrote:

⁴² Ibid., p. 215.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 451.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 214.

Like Moses, they had escaped from Egyptian bondage to the wilderness, that God might there give them the pattern of the tabernacle. Like the favored evangelist, the exiles in their western Patmos, listened to the angel that dictated the new gospel of freedom. Overwhelmed in Europe, popular liberty, like the fountain of the sacred Arethusa, gushed forth profusely in remote fields.⁴⁵

Like Fiske and Parkman, Bancroft also placed emphasis on the importance for American liberty, of the emigrations from the Teutonic races. He believed the Anglo-Saxon mind had an instinct for freedom; this would be important for the future. The American colonies were founded on popular freedom, and he felt they would set an example to other nations claiming:

And now the happy age gave birth to a people which was to own no authority as the highest, but the free conviction of the public mind.⁴⁶

Thus, in the first volumes of his History, Bancroft wrote of the origins of the country, trying to point out that our institutions had been founded on popular freedom, and that from the beginning these colonies had been guided by Divine Providence. Indeed, the spirit of freedom established in the colonies was a part of the divine plan for eventual independence and national greatness.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 451-2.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 464.

Bancroft's next task was to portray the English-French struggle which resulted in an expansion of the English-speaking race in North America, and which also paved the way for American independence. Again the theme is the same:

. . . as we trace the progress of commercial ambition through events which shook the globe from the wilds beyond the Alleghanies to the ancient abodes of civilization in Hindostan, we shall still see that the selfishness of evil defeats itself, and God rules in the affairs of men.⁴⁷

Bancroft alluded to the English-French struggle of 1689-1763 in reference to a dispute between the two nations in 1628-9. During this earlier struggle, both Port Royal and Quebec fell into the hands of the English. Although these areas were acquired after the peace had been proclaimed, and consequently were restored to the French, Bancroft wrote that "the event might fairly be deemed of importance, as pregnant with consequences."⁴⁸

At the time of King William's War, the beginning of the long struggle for the control of the West, Bancroft pointed out the expansionist desires of the English settlers. He wrote:

To protect the frontier and invade and conquer Canada, was the ruling passion of the northern colonies; but the summer was lost in fruitless preparations, and closed in strife.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 466.

⁴⁸ Bancroft, History, Vol. I, p. 334.

⁴⁹ Bancroft, History, Vol. III, p. 53.

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Again, he wrote, "In its relations towards Canada, New York shared the strong passion for conquest which gradually extended to all the colonies."⁵⁰

In these wars Bancroft felt the English-Iroquois friendship was important. "How wonderful are the decrees of Providence," he wrote.⁵¹ Like Parkman, Bancroft saw the contest between the English and the French as a contest between the representatives of "autocratic liberties" and the representatives of "absolute despotism."⁵² Bancroft saw that the dangers of the first war taught the colonies the need of some type of union. In writing of a Congress called by Massachusetts in 1690, Bancroft believed that this was one of the things preparing for eventual union and independence. As far as the results of the first war, in writing of the failure of the English in the western area of expansion, Bancroft gave a hint for the future of the United States when he said:

But England was never destined to acquire more than a nominal possession of the Mississippi . . . France obtained under Providence, the guardianship of Louisiana, not, as it proved, for its own benefit, but rather as the trustee for the infant nation by which it was one day to be inherited.⁵³

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 57.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 149.

⁵² Bancroft, History, Vol. II, p. 465-6.

⁵³ Bancroft, History, Vol. III, p. 203.

In relation to expansion, Bancroft felt the Peace of Utrecht ending Queen Anne's War was of great consequence, since England received Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay territory. However, the treaty did not bring any permanent peace. Bancroft wrote: "The wilderness that divided the settlements of the contending claimants could but postpone hostilities."⁵⁴ He perceived that the limits of jurisdiction between England and France were not easy to adjust. Thus, there would arise boundary disputes leading to future wars. In 1748-49, when France and England were claiming unlimited possessions, Bancroft styled some of the English claims of the boundary of Acadia as "preposterous" by the law of nations and "untenable" by interpretation of treaties.⁵⁵ Yet, he felt the decision had to be made by strength of arms.

Bancroft looked upon the final French-English struggle (1754-63) as the conflict between two basic systems. He wrote:

There in the Western forest, began the battle which was to banish from the soil and neighborhood of our republic the institutions of the Middle Ages, and to inflict on them fatal wounds throughout the continent of Europe.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 339.

⁵⁵ Bancroft, History, Vol. IV, p. 72. Bancroft also saw the English desires of extending southward. "Dreams of the conquest of Florida, with the possession of the Bahama Channel--of the conquest of Mexico and Peru, with their real and imagined wealth--rose up to dazzle the minds of the restless." (History, Vol. III, p. 402.)

⁵⁶ Bancroft, History, Vol. IV, p. 110.

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Bancroft described the war as:

. . . an encounter of parties of reform against the unreformed; and this was so profoundly true, that all the predilections or personal antipathies of sovereigns and ministers could not prevent the alliances, collusions, and results necessary to make it so.⁵⁷

The great question he felt was:

Shall the continued colonization of North America be made under the auspices of English Protestantism and popular liberty, or shall the tottering legitimacy of France, in its connection with Roman Catholic Christianity, win for itself new empire in that hemisphere?⁵⁸

Thus, Bancroft felt that there were great differences between the competing powers in North America, -- "on the one hand monarchy, claiming to be absolute; on the other, free thought which was becoming the mistress of the world."⁵⁹ He saw feudal institutions on the decline in Europe, and did not feel that Providence had "set apart America for the reconstruction of the decaying framework of feudal tyranny."⁶⁰ Thus, the British colonies were destined to triumph.

In relation to the Peace of Paris, 1763, which Bancroft called "momentous for America,"⁶¹ the historian had great confidence in the Teutonic race which:

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 277.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 277.

⁵⁹ Bancroft, History, Vol. V, p. 20.

⁶⁰ Bancroft, History, Vol. IV, p. 459.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 452.

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. . . with its strong tendency to individuality and freedom, was become the master from the Gulf of Mexico to the Poles; and the English tongue, which, but a century and a half before, had for its entire world a part only of two narrow islands on the outer verge of Europe, was now to spread more widely than any that had ever given expression to human thought.⁶²

In the results of the conflict Bancroft saw a challenge to the English:

Go forth, then, language of Milton and Hampden, language of my country, take possession of the North American continent! Gladden the waste places with every tone that has been rightly struck on the English lyre, with every word that has been spoken well for liberty and man! Give an echo to the now silent solitary mountains, gush out with the fountains that as yet sing their anthems all day long without response; fill the valleys with the voices of love in its purity, the pledges of friendship in its faithfulness; and as the morning sun drinks the dewdrops from the flowers all the way from the dreary Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, meet him with the joyous hum of the early industry of freemen! Utter boldly and spread widely through the world the thought of the coming of the apostles of the peoples' liberty, till the sound that cheers the desert shall thrill through the heart of humanity, and the lips of the messenger of the peoples' power, as he stands in beauty upon the mountains shall proclaim the renovating tidings of equal freedom for the race!⁶³

Thus, Bancroft saw in the English-French struggle for expansion, a victory for England and that nation's lead in the struggle for liberty. This struggle was destined to bring fruits to the cause of freedom for mankind. As a

⁶² Ibid., p. 456.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 457.

result of the war "this continent from the Gulf of Mexico to where civilized life is stayed by the barriers of frost"⁶⁴ became the heritage of the English. Yet, the historian saw the English entrenched on the continent only as "the transient trustee to transfer it from the France of the Middle Ages to the free people, who were making for humanity a new existence in America."⁶⁵ He saw the Western territory acquired as "one massive forest, interrupted only by rocks, or prairies or waters, or an Indian cleared field for maize."⁶⁶ This was the area into which the settlers began to move in 1763, which movement helped to bring on the famous Conspiracy of Pontiac and then the Proclamation of 1763.

Bancroft, like many other historians, viewed the next phase in Manifest Destiny, the complete separation of the American colonies from Great Britain, as the subsequent step in a logical development. In the midst of the wars, Bancroft saw the colonies developing a character of their own; he saw national freedom and independence gaining vigor. He wrote that the colonies:

. . . were not like blocks of marble from the quarry . . . they resembled living plants, whose inward energies obey the Divine idea without effort or consciousness of will, and unfold

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 460.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 460.

⁶⁶Bancroft, History, Vol. V, p. 110.

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simultaneously their whole existence and the rudiments of all their parts, harmonious, beautiful, and complete in every period of their growth.⁶⁷

Bancroft said this growth of the colonies created much wonder in England, and again he made reference to Providence:

Happy America! to which Providence gave the tranquility necessary for her growth, as well as the trials which were to discipline her for action.⁶⁸

In setting the stage for the Revolution, Bancroft was of the opinion that the French and Indian menace had kept the colonies in submission. Once this danger was removed, the colonies moved toward independence. Bancroft believed the American Revolution sprang from ideas that had been ripening in the minds of the people, especially the idea of freedom of the individual.

Throughout his discussion on the causes of the revolt, Bancroft repeated his idea of Divine Providence controlling and directing the American mission or the American destiny. He saw as one of the basic causes for discontent the fact that Britain tried to contain the population east of the Ohio Valley, and thus interfere with their desires for expansion. He saw that the Americans had a great fever for expansion, writing, "Nothing could restrain the Americans from peopling the wilderness. To be a free

⁶⁷ Bancroft, History, Vol. IV, p. 55.

⁶⁸ Bancroft, History, Vol. III, p. 371-2.

holder was the ruling passion of the New England man."⁶⁹ Yet, while the Americans "were everywhere intent on extending the boundaries of the English empire,"⁷⁰ England did not dare to colonize the Western domain "lest colonies so remote should renounce their dependence."⁷¹ To Bancroft, the very refusal by England to develop the area west of the Alleghenies opened the way for pioneers, for those discontent and weary of life, to settle in the area, ignoring the Proclamation of 1763. These people accepted "from nature their title-deeds to the unoccupied wilderness."⁷² Thus, the West became something like a City of Refuge for the poor "where the wilderness guarded his cabin as inviolably as the cliff or the cedar top holds the eagle's eyrie."⁷³ Bancroft felt that these pioneers gave to the people of the American colonies "'the dangerous example of erecting themselves into a separate State, distinct from and independent of the authority' of the British King."⁷⁴ Thus, one of the factors

⁶⁹ Bancroft, History, Vol. V, p. 165.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 243.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 340.

⁷² Bancroft, History, Vol. VI, p. 506.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 33-4.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 399. He is quoting a letter from Dunmore to Dartmouth, 1774. Bancroft thought the commercial policies of England were contributing causes of the Revolution. The Navigation Acts were "the headspring which colored all the stream." (History, Vol. V, p. 159.)

motivating the American Revolution, was the spirit of independence among the western woodsmen. Yet, he felt there were other causes also, and he did not feel that this spirit of independence was confined solely to the western pioneers.

For Bancroft, the American Revolution did not occur instantaneously. It grew naturally out of a series of past events:

It grew out of the soul of the people, and was an inevitable result of a living affection for freedom, which actuated harmonious effort as certainly as the beating of the heart sends warmth and color and beauty to the system. The rustic heroes of that hour obeyed the simplest, the highest, and the surest instincts of which the seminal principle existed in all their countrymen. From necessity they were impelled by a strong endeavor towards independence and self-direction; this day revealed the plastic will which was to attract the elements of a nation to a centre and by an innate force to shape its constitution.⁷⁵

The Revolution was a progressive step. Great Britain acting in the capacity of a mother had bred men capable of laying the foundations of their own empire. Bancroft believed this was the workings of Providence. He asked:

⁷⁵ Bancroft, History, Vol. VII, p. 302.

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And why should man organize resistance to the grand design of Providence? Why should not the consent of the ancestral land and the congratulations of every other call the young nation to its place among the powers of the earth?⁷⁶

In speaking of the actual coming of the Revolution, Bancroft wrote in terms of Providence, progress, and freedom:

The people of the continent obeyed one general impulse, as the earth in spring listens to the command of nature, and without the appearance of effort bursts forth to life in perfect harmony. The change which Divine wisdom ordained, and which no human policy or force could hold back, proceeded as uniformly and as majestically as the laws of being, and was as certain as the decrees of eternity. The movement was quickened, even when it was most resisted; and its fiercest adversaries worked together effectually to its fulfillment. The indestructible elements of freedom in the colonies asked room for expansion and growth. Standing in manifold relations with the governments, the culture, and the experience of the past, the Americans seized as their peculiar inheritance the traditions of liberty. Beyond any other nation, they had made trial of the possible forms of popular representation and respected the activity of individual conscience and thought.⁷⁷

Bancroft sensed that the American colonists entered the war reluctantly and that they did not want to consider that their relations with England were destroyed. They were

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 23. Even the choice of leader was part of a carefully arranged plan for ". . . God had selected not Kaunitz, nor Newcastle, not a monarch of the house of Hapsburg, nor of Hanover, but the Virginia stripling, to give an impulse to human affairs, and as far as events can depend on the individual, had placed the rights and destinies of countless millions in the keeping of the widow's son." (History, Vol. III, p. 468.)

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 21-2.

interested in maintaining the rights of mankind and the English liberties as well. He believed that the reluctance of George III to yield gradually forced upon the colonists the conviction that they must govern themselves. The Declaration of Independence was "silently and steadily prepared in the convictions of all the people. . . ."78 The popular desire "was the voice of the harbinger, crying in the wilderness."79 The people "claimed its right to sit in judgment on the greatest question ever raised in the political world."80

Bancroft praised Jefferson in his Declaration of Independence as being able:

. . . with instinctive perception to read the soul of the nation, and having collected in himself its best thoughts and noblest feelings, to give them out in clear and bold words, mixed with so little of himself, that his country . . . found nothing but what it recognized as its own.81

After independence, Bancroft saw the nation turning toward the future. He wrote, "Hope whispered the assurance of unheard of success in the pursuits of public happiness through faith in natural equality and the rights of man."82

78 Bancroft, History, Vol. VIII, p. 247.

79 Ibid., p. 248.

80 Ibid., p. 249.

81 Ibid., p. 463.

82 Bancroft, History, Vol. IX, p. 32.

Thus, Bancroft saw that gradually the American colonies were separated from the mother country. He believed that it was the mission of America to substitute the natural equality of man for that of hereditary privilege. He thought that the authors of the American Revolution were aiming at the welfare of mankind. As America moved forward in her career, he saw that "the multitudes of every clime gazed towards her example with hopes of untold happiness, and all the nations of the earth sighed to be renewed."⁸³ This was just a further step in the advancement of mankind. He expected that the accomplishment of American independence:

. . . would agitate the globe, would assert the freedom of the oceans as commercial highways, vindicate power in the commonwealth for the united judgment of its people, and assure to them the right to a self-directing vitality.⁸⁴

Bancroft looked upon the Revolution as something of a mission of world regeneration claiming:

All nations . . . are brothers, and each is responsible for that federative humanity which puts the ban of exclusion on none . . . The very idea of the progress of an individual people, in its relation to universal history, springs from the acknowledged unity of the race.⁸⁵

⁸³ Bancroft, History, Vol. IV, p. 12.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

Thus, the American Revolution was to be something of a light shining brightly in the darkness, giving example and encouragement to others. In the same vein he remarked:

The present is always the lineal descendant of the past. A new form of political life never appears but as a growth out of its antecedents. . . In civil affairs, as much as in husbandry, seed time goes before the harvest, and the harvest may be seen in the seed and the seed in the harvest.⁸⁶

Once the Revolution had been accomplished, Bancroft wrote in terms of the future expansion. In discussing the peace treaty and the new boundaries of the United States, he commented:

In time past republics had been confined to cities and their dependencies, or to small cantons; and the United States avowed themselves able to fill a continental territory with commonwealths.⁸⁷

Therefore, in the phases of Manifest Destiny covered in his History, George Bancroft showed himself to be a firm believer in the idea of the gradual progress of mankind under the auspices of the voice of the people and always under the watchful guidance of Divine Providence. America was to represent the age of equality and brotherhood which were coming into life.

⁸⁶ Bancroft, History, Vol. IX, p. 436.

⁸⁷ Bancroft, History, Vol. X, p. 592.

In the period of the constitutional crisis of the Articles of Confederation, Bancroft still saw the hand of Providence as guiding America. Although independence had been proclaimed, the vastness of the country prevented a strong unity, and the sentiments of unity "existed only in the germ."⁸⁸ He felt the government of the Articles of Confederation was weak having "not enough vital force to live."⁸⁹ However, in the midst of state jealousies and struggles, "a higher spirit moved over the darkness of that formless void. That which then flowered bore the seed of that which was to be."⁹⁰ Thus, again the hand of Providence intervened to prevent the country's death. The Articles of Confederation, although a failure, "contained the elements for the evolution of a more perfect union."⁹¹ Throughout the whole period of constitutional crisis, Bancroft continued to stress the hand of Providence and the progressive laws of history.

Because of the economic, social, political, and foreign difficulties, he saw the need of a stronger, more perfect union "for the fulfillment of a divine plan for the

⁸⁸ Bancroft, History, Vol. IX, p. 437.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 446.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 446.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 450.

creation, through the agency of the American national genius of the first perfect republic," and he perceived that "a superior power of intelligence and love shaped its course."⁹²

Bancroft also looked upon this period as important because it established a policy for the admission of new states which allowed for the growth and expansion of the country. He was convinced that the public domain gave energy to the union because it bound the people together "by securing one vast territory in the West . . . to be filled under the laws of the United States, alike by emigrants from them all."⁹³ Bancroft saw the germs of continental expansion in this land policy. He wrote:

. . . the American mind, in the strength of independence, foresaw its expansion. The rising states beyond the mountains were clamorous for the unobstructed navigation of the Mississippi, which might lead to the acquisition by treaty of all the land east of that river; and the boundary on the south as well as of Georgia, as of Florida, had never been adjusted with Spain.⁹⁴

In concluding this section on expansion in the period of the Constitutional-forming period, it might be well to quote a question which the historian raised:

⁹² Nye, op. cit., p. 290.

⁹³ George Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States of America, New York, 1883, Vol. I, p. 227.

⁹⁴ Bancroft, Constitution, Vol. II, p. 162-3.

Will it, within less than a century, extend its limits to the capes of Florida, to the mouth of the Mississippi, to the region beyond the mouth of the Mississippi, to California, to Oregon, to San Juan? Will it show all the Spanish colonies how to transform themselves into independent republics?⁹⁵

Through this question, he is foretelling what did happen to the infant republic in the course of the nineteenth century. Bancroft said that the people in the formation of their new government "looked with astonishment at their present success and at the future with unclouded hope."⁹⁶

Although his formal histories deal with America's mission only through the Constitutional period, Bancroft has also shown himself to be an ardent expansionist during the period when the term Manifest Destiny was being popularized. This was the decade when the Americans were clamoring for Texas, Oregon with a boundary of 54°40', California, and some or all of Mexico. It was the era in which America reached her continental limits. Bancroft's views during this period, which was the period of his political activity, are found chiefly in his correspondence.

Having worked for Polk's nomination for the Presidency in 1844, George Bancroft became a member of the official family as Secretary of the Navy. In this capacity

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 334-5.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 335.

he gave Polk valuable assistance in attaining his aims-- settlements of the Texas and Oregon questions, and the acquisition of California.

Prior to the Democratic Nominating Convention of 1844, Bancroft had written to Martin Van Buren, a prospective candidate, of the fever for the annexation of Texas, trying to convince Van Buren that Texas had to be an issue in the campaign. He wrote, "Texas must immediately become American or will soon be British."⁹⁷ In thus pleading, Bancroft lost the following of some in his native state of Massachusetts because most Northerners, especially ardent abolitionists in New England, opposed the annexation of Texas as opening the way for the extension of slavery in that area.

However, Bancroft himself was anti-slave, and he felt that the annexation of Texas would be a blow to the slave interests, since at least the slave trade would be prohibited here. If Texas were an independent republic, it could import foreign slaves, and there would be a revival of the slave trade with all of its horrors. Thus, Bancroft pleaded for the annexation of Texas, as the Boston Times phrased it, as a means for "an extension of the area of freedom."⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Mark A. DeWolfe Howe, The Life and Letters of George Bancroft, New York, 1908, Vol. I, p. 250.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 287.

While desiring the annexation of Texas, Bancroft hoped to achieve it peacefully. In 1845 he wrote to a correspondent, Henry Wikoff, that the United States was conciliatory toward Mexico:

I hope war is permanently out of fashion in the civilised world; but at least I hope and trust that savage custom is not to intrude itself into the relations of American republics with each other.⁹⁹

In spite of this, Bancroft soon found himself as acting Secretary of War in the temporary absence of Secretary Marcy. In this capacity, on June 15, 1845, anticipating the action of Texas which should make it a state in the union, Bancroft issued the following order to General Zachary Taylor:

. . . to make a forward movement to the western frontier of Texas with a view to occupying a site 'best adapted to repel invasion, and to protect what, in the event of annexation will be our western border. You will limit yourself to the defence of the territory of Texas, unless Mexico should declare war against the United States.'¹⁰⁰

This was the move which precipitated the Mexican War as Mexico felt Taylor was advancing into Mexican territory. Then, in July, at the request of Polk, Bancroft ordered Taylor "'to move as near the boundary line, the Rio Grande, as prudence will dictate.'¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 288.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 288.

¹⁰¹ Nye, op. cit., p. 152.

The general theme of Bancroft's correspondence in 1845 was the hope that war would be avoided, and that difficulties with Mexico would be settled peacefully. Yet, he was at the same time making preparations lest the war could not be avoided. Bancroft realized the important part the navy would play in a war with Mexico, especially in regard to California.

The United States was desirous of acquiring California, and this it hoped to do peacefully. One of the goals of the famed Slidell Mission of 1845-6 was to purchase the area. Bancroft realized that in the event of a war with Mexico, American interests in California would have to be protected.

By the fall of 1845, the United States was trying to get the American Consul at Monterey, Larkin, to carry on peaceable intrigues for the secession of California by voluntary action of the people, and then for the establishment of a republic which would be annexed at a later date by the United States. This never occurred, but Bancroft issued orders to the American commander of the Pacific fleet, Commodore Sloat, ordering him to avoid any action which might be considered as aggression; yet, Sloat was to protect the interests of the Americans in California, and if a war should

occur he "must occupy San Francisco at once, and such other ports as the strength of his force might permit."¹⁰² Sloat was also to preserve friendly relations with the inhabitants of California. Yet, if war came, the American fleet in San Francisco would land a force in California and would act to discourage foreign powers, especially England, from seizing California and Oregon. The general idea was to avoid a show of force, to protect the lives and property of nationals, and to allow any overt act to come from Mexico.

Bancroft also had a plan for Fremont who had already made two trips to the West. He wanted Fremont to make a third expedition to the Rockies and beyond into California and Oregon. This would provide information for settlers. Also, in the event of war, Fremont would have a body of hand-picked men exploring in California or near it in Oregon. In his Memoirs Fremont said of Bancroft, "His mind was alive to the bearing of actual conditions, and he knew how sometimes skill and bold action determines the advantages of a political situation."¹⁰³

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 15. For Bancroft's letters expressing hopes for a peaceful solution of the Mexican difficulties, see Howe, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 280, 289.

¹⁰³ Quoted in Nye, op. cit., p. 152.

When war did break out between the Mexican and American troops in the disputed territory, but before the news had reached Washington, President Polk, in a cabinet session, May 9, reviewed the situation of the rejection of the Slidell mission and wanted to ask Congress for a war declaration. All of the cabinet, except Bancroft, agreed. Bancroft wanted to wait for something in the way of an act of aggression by Mexico. When news of the clash arrived later the same day, Polk called the cabinet into session again, read the war message, and this time Bancroft gave his approval. Thus, he was an expansionist; yet, he preferred to gain his goals without having the United States seem in the position of aggressor.

After the outbreak of war, Bancroft showed his enthusiasm for the acquisition of California. In June of 1846 he wrote to Commodore Sloat:

You will take such measures as will best promote the attachment of the people of California to the United States, will advance their prosperity, and will make that vast region a desirable place of residence for emigrants from our soil.¹⁰⁴

At about the same time, Bancroft wrote to Samuel Hooper of Boston:

From the best judgment I can form, Commodore Sloat could not have heard of hostilities before May 17, perhaps not so soon. Within three weeks after that, our flag ought to have been flying at Monterey and San Francisco. . . I hope California is now in

¹⁰⁴ Nye, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

our possession never to be given up. We were driven reluctantly to war; we must make a solid peace; that shall open the west to religious freedom, political rights, schools, commerce, industry. The time will come when you may pass on railroads and steamers from Boston to San Francisco.¹⁰⁵

In this, while there is no mention of Divine Providence, there is the idea of spreading the ideas of democracy, of giving the people some voice.

In July he wrote to Sloat:

The object of the United States is, under its right as a belligerent nation, to possess itself entirely of Upper California . . .¹⁰⁶

In the midst of difficulties with Mexico, Bancroft was also instrumental in the Oregon compromise. President Polk had had as one of his aims, the settlement of the Oregon boundary at the 54°40' parallel. England had not been willing to accept this boundary. Bancroft, in August 1845 in a letter to William Strugis, wrote regarding the area:

The present and all future colonists of Oregon prefer connection with a government that leaves them to govern themselves to one that asserts authority.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Howe, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 286.

¹⁰⁶ Nye, op. cit., p. 158. Howe claims that in later life Bancroft felt he had never received enough credit for the part he played in adding California to the union. (Howe, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 291.)

¹⁰⁷ Howe, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 279.

Bancroft felt that England would have been unable to keep the territory if all of it were ceded to her. He thought her fleet would be powerless there.

In December 1845 he wrote:

I hope Great Britain will take such steps as may lead to a final, peaceful settlement of the whole matter on an equitable basis . . . but so sure as Great Britain continues in the same tone of unreasonable demand, the country will with great unanimity nerve itself for the crisis.¹⁰⁸

When the crisis seemed to resolve itself by a compromise at the forty-ninth parallel, he was of the opinion that the United States had gone as far as it could go and would make no more offers. If Great Britain rejected the American offer and did not offer anything further, then "we shall undoubtedly go forward and colonise the Pacific coast without further ado," he wrote.¹⁰⁹

Although Bancroft left the cabinet in 1846 for a diplomatic position as minister to Great Britain, he continued to show a great interest in the Mexican War as a means of expansion. To the President in December of 1846 he wrote:

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 281.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 284. In 1872 while he was minister to Berlin, Bancroft represented the American side of the San Juan Boundary dispute which dealt with an Oregon boundary dispute. Maps and charts he had had drawn in 1846 helped settle the case in favor of the American cause.

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. . . if Mexico by delay seeks to weary us into retreat, let America use the same policy; shut up the anarchists within narrow limits, keep up the blockade, and abide the issue. The wishes of Europe have thus far been with us. . . Men hope to see Mexico regenerated through us.¹¹⁰

This letter, thus, contains the idea that America's purpose or mission was service to mankind by spreading the American democratic ideas.

By May 1847, he was writing Polk that because of the American victories, England was preparing "to hear of our negotiating for half, or two-thirds, or even the whole of Mexico. . . They see our growth to be certain."¹¹¹ In October of 1847 he showed his desires for an increase in territory in a letter to Secretary of State James Buchanan. He claimed that all of Europe and the United States expected such an increase, stating:

The cry of no more territory, which the whigs have substituted for their adoption of the Wilmot proviso, is the most absurd they could have chosen, and will ensure their defeat except with a candidate who by life and position is pledged to the opposite policy.¹¹²

With the final victory pending, Bancroft, from London, congratulated the President and hoped for an honorable peace; but he wrote, if Mexico refused this, "then our duty

¹¹⁰ Howe, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 4-5.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 118.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 23.

is manifest to hold the country and await the counsels of futurity."¹¹³ He also reported that it was becoming common in England "to expect the absorption of all Mexico."¹¹⁴

Thus, throughout this significant period in American history, George Bancroft, as a cabinet member and as a member of the diplomatic corps, supported the administration in its expansionist policies. While in this period, there is not the evidence of his great emphasis on the workings of Divine Providence, there is still the idea of the sovereignty of the people and their right to exercise it freely. It is evident that in this period he was an extreme nationalist and a firm believer in democracy. The significance by which he judged the period can be seen in a letter he wrote to James Buchanan, American Secretary of State:

Your four years in the State Department have been of the utmost importance. Oregon settled, Texas acquired, California and New Mexico purchased, these are great events, such as no future secretary of State can hope to be engaged in.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 28.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 28.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 42. In later years Bancroft wanted to do something for the memory of President Polk under whom America extended her territory. He hoped to use his papers and write a biography, but this was never done. He did revise an article on Polk in Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, in which he judged his administration "perhaps the greatest. . . certainly one of the greatest." (Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, New York, 1888, Vol. 5, p. 55.)

It has been the purpose of this chapter to trace the attitudes and views of the historian, George Bancroft, in relation to the Manifest Destiny of America. This has been done through an examination of his historical writings and of his views as a public figure.

In general, Bancroft was a great believer in the progress of man under the watchful eye of Providence. He felt that humanity was always advancing and adding new discoveries to the past. Institutions and people that had passed away had been "but a step in the ladder by which humanity ascends towards the perfecting of its nature."¹¹⁶ Continuity was important for his history. In this respect he wrote:

No period of time has a separate being; no public opinion can escape the influence of previous intelligence. . . We are the children and the heirs of the past, with which as with the future, we are indissolubly linked together. . .¹¹⁷

In one of his letters Bancroft wrote:

Each page of history may begin and end with Great is God and marvellous are his doings among the children of men; and I defy a man to penetrate the secret laws of events without something of faith.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Bancroft, History, Vol. IV, p. 10.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

¹¹⁸ Howe, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 77.

This was his basic working principle which he joined with his faith in democracy and "he could not but see and demonstrate the hand of God in every token of popular progress."¹¹⁹

Thus it was that Bancroft in his History, in his other writings, in his addresses, always alluded to the importance of Providence in guiding the nation in fulfillment of its destiny, and to the idea that government by the people or popular democracy was best.

Bancroft emphasized these two ideas in a memorial address on the Life of Abraham Lincoln when he said:

That God rules in the affairs of men is as certain as any truth of physical science. . . . Eternal wisdom marshals the great procession of the nations working in a patient continuity through the ages. . . . The deeds of time are governed, as well as judged, by the decrees of eternity.¹²⁰

He also claimed that under American auspices the vine of liberty took deep root and filled the land saying, "The fame of this only daughter of freedom went out into all the lands of the earth; from her the human race drew hope."¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 322.

¹²⁰ George Bancroft, Memorial Address on the Life and Character of Abraham Lincoln, Washington, 1866, p. 3.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 5-6. Bancroft secretly wrote President Andrew Johnson's first message to Congress in 1865, and in this, too, he made mention of ". . . that Invisible Hand that has led us. . ." (Nye, op. cit., p. 231.)

America had grown as a divinely ordained republic, drawing her existence from what was good of former centuries. It was now to be the manifest destiny of the United States to lead the world toward freedom. The United States was to be the hope of the world.¹²²

Bancroft believed that the future greatness of the country could not be predicted, for he wrote, "The sources of glory to our country like the stars of heaven cannot be counted."¹²³ In an essay on The Progress of Mankind, Bancroft said that the United States had been so extended in the nineteenth century "that a similar increase, twice repeated, would carry THE STARS AND STRIPES to the polar ice and to the isthmus."¹²⁴ In the same essay, he also repeated the American mission saying, "Our country is bound to allure the world to freedom by the beauty of its example."¹²⁵

¹²² On the backs of the binding of his History volumes when first published, there was an emblem showing an eagle on top of a globe surrounded by the words of Bishop Berkeley, "Westward the Star of Empire takes its way." (Howe, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 323.) Berkeley had used "course" instead of "star." This emblem was missing from the Author's Last Revision.

¹²³ Orin William Long, "George Bancroft" in Literary Pioneers, Early American Explorers of European Culture, Cambridge, 1935, p. 126. This is taken from Bancroft's Fourth of July Oration in Gottingen in 1820.

¹²⁴ George Bancroft, Literary and Historical Miscellanies, New York, 1855, p. 496.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 516.

Thus in his writings, George Bancroft revealed a belief that Providence had guided the destiny of the United States, and he expressed hopes for the future greatness of the country in the years to come. His purpose is probably best stated by quoting from the inscription on his Worcester Monument:

Historian of America, he made it the high purpose of a life which nearly spanned the century to show her part in the advancement of man, and from the rare resources of his genius, his learning, and his labor, to ennoble the story of her birth.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ Nye, op. cit., p. 302.

CHAPTER III

FRANCIS PARKMAN HISTORIAN OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH DUEL

Although the term Manifest Destiny was not popularized until the 1840's, evidences of this movement were found in the generation before the American Revolution when the colonists supported Great Britain in the French and English Wars which had as their object the removal of the barrier imposed by the French. Francis Parkman, the American historian of this Anglo-French duel has studied the ideas and attitudes which prompted this urge for expansion. He has given a detailed account of the background of the struggle, of the struggle itself, and of the significant results of this struggle.

Mason Wade, describing Francis Parkman as "perhaps the greatest American historian; certainly the greatest writer among that goodly nineteenth century company of Sparks. . . Bancroft. . . Adams. . . Fiske. . . Winsor,"¹ has referred to him as "a Brahmin of the Brahmins and the last great figure of that caste."² Parkman has also been called "a Tacitus" and the "Herodotus of American History."³ It is

¹ Mason Wade, Francis Parkman, Heroic Historian, New York, 1942, p. v.

² Ibid., p. vi.

³ Joe Patterson Smith, "Francis Parkman," in The Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, (ed.) William T. Hutchinson, New York, 1950, p. 49.

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the purpose of this chapter to consider Parkman's views on Manifest Destiny, especially in connection with the English expansion on the North American continent at the expense of the French and Indians.

1. Background and General Appraisal

Francis Parkman was born in Boston in 1823, the son of a Unitarian clergyman. As a child, he spent much time at his grandfather's farm in Medford, Massachusetts. Here he gained his first love for the forest and for exploring. As a youth he attended private schools, and then Harvard University. Before the end of his sophomore year, he had planned a career of writing for himself. He did attend Harvard Law School; but like John Fiske, he soon abandoned law, and because of an inheritance from his grandfather which freed him of the necessity of making his own living, he spent most of his time reading history in preparation for a career in writing.

Because of his ancestry, he took a personal interest in the early history of the United States. He took for his particular task the English-French struggle for the continent.

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Parkman felt that this field of American history was "uncultured and unreclaimed."⁴ No one had yet portrayed the history of the American Indian or of the American forest.⁵

Parkman believed the historian should narrate events in the spirit of the times in which they occurred. Hence, he spent about five years gathering materials for his works. In 1845 he began a journey through Pennsylvania, western New York, and the Great Lakes, collecting documents wherever he could. The following year he started on his famous trip to the West and the Oregon Territory. On the Oregon trip, he lived for a time among the Indians and observed their ways and customs. This was primarily a fact-finding journey which he hoped would help him in writing his future history. On his Western journey, Parkman became ill and suffered during most of his life from sickness and tension affecting his sight, brain, nerves, and digestive system. This illness curtailed his activity in the ensuing years, but through his travels he felt he was better able to visualize the scenes and events about which he wrote.⁶

⁴ Wade, op. cit., p. 298.

⁵ Samuel Morison says that by the time Parkman was through with his work "there was no question but that North American colonial history was a 'respectable' and 'scholarly' subject. The trouble was to get young men to write about anything else!" (Samuel Morison, The Parkman Reader, Boston, 1955, p. 14.)

⁶ Parkman claimed his error on the Oregon trip was starting out on "this long pilgrimage with all the vehemence of one starting on a mile heat." (Wade, op. cit., p. 291.)

As a member of the Brahmin group, a descendant of the wealthy ruling class, Parkman stood against the growth of equalitarian government and against any humanitarian faith in the natural goodness of the masses. Although he disliked Puritanism, he himself was marked by some of its characteristics. "He was harsh by nature and a lover of hard truths; a rigorous ascetic who spared neither himself nor others."⁷ His basic allegiance was to the eighteenth century doctrine of rationalism, and to the doctrines of the Federalist spokesmen. He did not give himself to the age in which he lived, and none of the pressing ideas or issues of the nineteenth century caused him much concern--slavery, expansion, or the Civil War. Thus, in looking for Parkman's views on Manifest Destiny, attention is centered on the expansionist movement of the eighteenth rather than of the nineteenth century.

As his general theme Parkman stated that he wanted to write the story of the French and Indian War:

. . . the War that ended in the conquest of Canada for here as it seemed to me, the forest drama was more stirring and the forest stage more thronged with appropriate actors than in any other passage of our history. It was not till some years later that I had enlarged the plan to include the whole course of the American conflict between France and England, or . . . the history of the American forest; for this is the light in which I regarded it."⁸

⁷ Wade, op. cit., p. vi.

⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

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As Fiske is styled as a popular historian, Parkman is classed as a romantic historian. He attempted to transport the reader to a new world whose history was a drama played out by an heroic company.

Parkman attempted to carry out his theme in twelve volumes published between 1851 and 1884. However, each volume was a separate work, and there was no continuous narrative. In general he believed the whole American conflict of France and England was the clash of two conflicting systems. He interpreted the struggle in the Half-Century of Conflict in the same manner as he interpreted it in Pioneers of New France. He believed that the eventual conquest of Canada by England was an event of momentous consequence in American history; he set out to show how and why it occurred, and the results of the conquest. Although Parkman wrote of French heroism, piety, and persistence, his story was also the struggle of "English liberty against French absolutism, Protestant freedom against Catholic authority, with victory to the forces of light and progress."⁹ Parkman, for this theme, has had "extravagant praise" and "carping criticism."¹⁰

⁹ Morison, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁰ Wilbur L. Schramm, Francis Parkman, Representative Selections with Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes, New York, 1938, p. xcvi.

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He has been praised by William Dean Howells and by John Fiske, the latter of whom claimed he was "the most deeply and peculiarly American" of the American historians and also "the broadest and the most cosmopolitan."¹¹ Mason Wade says he was the first of the American historians to see the importance of the wilderness struggles which made America--"the first to recognize that they were not mere backwoods skirmishes but conflicts of more than local importance and with considerable influence in the course of events in the European world."¹² Allan Nevins has claimed that his great ability lay in conveying the impression of "vividness," and resurrecting men and movements and scenes from the past.¹³ Henry Adams in a letter to Parkman wrote:

Taken as a whole your works are now dignified by proportions and completeness which can hardly be paralleled by the 'literary baggage' of another historical writer in the language known to me today.¹⁴

On the other hand, Parkman has been criticized by French Canadian churchmen, and by Canadian and American historians, and by some of the romantic idealizers of the

¹¹ John Fiske, "Francis Parkman," Atlantic Monthly, Volume 73, May 1894, p. 674.

¹² Wade, Heroic Historian, p. 447.

¹³ Quoted by Schramm, op. cit., p. cxii.

¹⁴ Francis Parkman, The Discovery of the Great West: LaSalle, New York, 1956, Editor's Note, p. viii. (This work edited by Wm. R. Taylor used the text of the Little Brown Company edition of 1869.)

Indians. Some have criticized him as being partial to New England, of having an imperfect knowledge of Western history, of neglecting essential matters of other histories in favor of New England, Anglo-Saxon superiority. Many do not agree that French rule alone was responsible for the downfall. These would cite the geographical and economic weakness as reasons for the downfall of the colony, along with the sparse population due to the failure of immigration.¹⁵ Wilbur Schramm, while being generally favorable to Parkman, admitted that he did fail to appreciate the religious and political system, and that he did blow the bugle for New England where he got some of his prejudices.¹⁶ Schramm said that Parkman was an ethical rather than a religious man, and because he never accepted the supernatural, he can be accused of an imperfect sympathy with those who believed in supernatural manifestations. However, Schramm did not feel him guilty of intellectual or scholarly dishonesty.¹⁷

Mason Wade, while expressing high regard for Parkman, admits that he could not be considered as an impartial historian. Wade claims that he began with the idea that the

¹⁵ Schramm, op. cit., p. c.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. ci-cii. Schramm claimed this was not done consciously, or intentionally, but was done because of his background and New England traditions.

¹⁷ Ibid., xcix.

story of New France showed the superiority of the Protestant English civilization over the Catholic French civilization and he kept that view. He says: ". . . his environment made him recoil before reality."¹⁸ Wade says Parkman believed firmly in his class and its superiority to all others.

Harvey Wish has claimed that Parkman blended the charm of literary historians with an upper class awareness of the common man. However, he feels "his view of the Indian was prejudiced and reflected the racial errors of the day."¹⁹ He also claims that he depicted all of the rules and regulations governing French Canada, but ignored some of the same restraints where they existed in New England. Wish has described Parkman as "eager to establish a flawless picture of utter subservience and illiteracy on the French side in contrast to free Anglo-Saxon institutions."²⁰ He also feels the historian was unaware of the significance of the economic history of the time.

¹⁸ Wade, Heroic Historian, p. 452.

¹⁹ Harvey Wish, The American Historian-A Social-Intellectual History of the Writing of the American Past, New York, 1960, p. 91. Wade also believes Parkman did not make the most of the opportunity of dealing with the Indians. He sees little evidence of deep penetration of Indian thinking. (Wade, Journals, Vol. II, p. 400.)

²⁰ Wish, op. cit., p. 99.

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Louis Filler has claimed that Parkman as the last of the Boston Brahmins, was marked "by anti-democratic bias, lack of interest in great events and popular movements of his time, and smug satisfaction with a circle and town which became less and less the country's hub."²¹ He claimed he was an heroic historian only in relations to the trials in writing his book, and that "he managed to miss almost everything that was significant in his lifetime. . ."²²

William Eccles has recently written that while Parkman's basic theme was debatable, it did enable him to select and organize material in a simple framework, and it made good literature. He believes there is a certain romantic appeal to the work; he thinks the work is of less value as history because of its uncritical approach. He is of the opinion that Parkman conveyed distorted impressions of the society of the times. He has claimed that Parkman did not understand the Indian, and that he could never forgive the French for being French, Roman Catholic, and ruled by an absolute monarch. He concluded his appraisal with the hope that:

²¹ Louis Filler, "Heroic Historian," Nation, Vol. 156, February 6, 1943, p. 211.

²² Ibid., p. 212.

... before too many years have passed, Parkman's works will be relegated to the same shelf as those of his contemporaries. . . where they will be consulted more by students of American literature or historiography than by the students of history.²³

Thus, it is in accord with this last view, an emphasis on historiography, that the works of Parkman are to be considered in the remainder of this chapter.

2. Parkman and the Mission of America

Although Parkman was apparently unaware of the significance of the westward surge of the 1840's, he studied thoroughly the phase of Manifest Destiny in the Anglo-French duel. He wrote that the subject of his series was to be France in the New World--"the attempt of Feudalism, Monarchy, and Rome to master a continent, where, at this hour, half a million of bayonets are vindicating the ascendancy of a regulated freedom. . ." ²⁴ From point of view of order of his story, not from point of sequence in writing, the first important idea that Parkman tried to convey, was that because of basic differences in early settlements, events augured well for the English system. This is the theme of Pioneers of France in the New World. It is the story of basic contrasts.

²³ W. J. Eccles, "History of New France According to Francis Parkman," William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 18, April 1961, p. 175.

²⁴ Francis Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World, Boston, 1907, p. xv.

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In New France, Parkman saw feudalism being overborne by centralization, and he saw monarchy triumphant in power, and Rome trying to reconquer abroad what had been lost at home through the Reformation. Thus, he saw the three powers of king, noble, and Jesuit attempting to colonize in the new world. Yet, he believed that "New France was all head, and the lean lank body would not thrive."²⁵ At the same time, he saw New England strengthening itself.

Throughout the Pioneers as well as in his other works, Parkman distinguished between the liberty of New England and the absolutism of New France, claiming:

The one was the offspring of a triumphant government; the other, of an oppressed and fugitive people; the one, an unflinching champion of the Roman Catholic reaction; the other, a vanguard of the Reformation.²⁶

Parkman's idea was that each followed its natural law of growth and each came to its natural result. With his New England upbringing, he saw that area as one of material progress where every man could aspire and reach this progress. Although he admitted that socially New England suffered from oppressions exercised by dominant opinion, he claimed that politically she was free. He felt that New England grew as

²⁵ Ibid., p. xvi.

²⁶ Ibid., p. xvi.

an example of expansive energy--as the result of the aggregate efforts of the people toiling to gain wealth. On the other hand, the expansion of New France was a vain attempt to seize control of the continent, but he wrote:

Borne down by numbers from without, wasted by corruption from within, New France fell at last; and out of her fall grew revolutions whose influence to this hour is felt through every nation of the civilized world.²⁷

In trying to present the background for the future struggle, Parkman set forth with a good deal of romanticism, the heroism, the faith, and the mission of the French, but he felt that from the beginning the colony was destined to crumble in spite of her glorious deeds and in spite of the self-devotion of her heroes and martyrs. Yet, he admitted that as far as early expansion was concerned, France was the true pioneer of the West:

They who bore the fleur-de-lis were always in the van, patient, daring, indomitable. And foremost on this bright roll of forest chivalry stands the half-forgotten name of Samuel de Champlain.²⁸

Parkman believed that conditions in New France were in part responsible for the downfall. He said there were no special allurements except a harsh climate, savage Indians,

²⁷ Ibid., p. xviii.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 181.

disease, and a soil "barren of gold."²⁹ All settlers had to be French Catholics. No foreigner nor Huguenot was allowed. Thus, there was no real motive for emigration from home.

Like John Fiske, Parkman saw that the clash between the French and the Iroquois in 1609 was:

...the beginning and in some measure doubtless the cause of a long suite of murderous conflicts, bearing havoc and flame to generations yet unborn. Champlain had invaded the tiger's den; and now, in smothered fury, the patient savage would lie biding his day of blood.³⁰

Thus, Parkman saw the greatest difficulties for New France from 1616 on as being a lack of settlers, struggles, against the climate, discords, and Indian problems. Also he saw the fur traders as having no interest in settlement and population, but merely interested in their own personal gain.

While Canada was so struggling, Parkman depicted the foundations of Plymouth being laid--"a commonwealth destined to a marvellous vigor of development."³¹ He felt the English colonization obeyed a natural law:

The English colonist developed inherited freedom on a virgin soil; the French colonist was pursued across the Atlantic by a paternal despotism better in intention and more withering in effect than that which he left behind.³²

²⁹ Ibid., p. 219.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 360.

³¹ Ibid., p. 437.

³² Ibid., p. 441-2.

Parkman did admit that Puritan New England denied rights of freedom to all who differed with Puritan theology; yet, he felt the basic idea of freedom did take root in New England and did grow. With New France it was different. "She was consistent to the last. Root, stem, and branch, she was the nursling of authority. Deadly absolutism blighted her early and her later growth."³³

Parkman believed these differences pointed to the future destinies of each area. In describing an early conflict between France and England for Acadia, an unauthorized attack by the English on the French who held Acadia, he predicted the final outcome:

In an obscure stroke of lawless violence began the strife of France and England, Protestantism and Rome, which for a century and a half shook the struggling communities of North America and closed at last in the memorable triumph on the Plains of Abraham.³⁴

Parkman continued the same general theme of the Pioneers in his Old Regime in Canada. In this latter work he attempted to show the methods France used to keep its hold, why it achieved some success, and why it failed:

. . . out of the tomb of Canadian absolutism came voices not without suggestion even to us. Extremes meet, and Autocracy and Democracy often touch hands, at least in their vices.³⁵

³³ Ibid., p. 439.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 330. This was in 1615.

³⁵ Francis Parkman, The Old Regime in Canada, Boston, 1898, p. ix-x.

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In relating some of the difficulties between administrations in French Canada and in discussing its weaknesses he claimed:

Nothing is more noticeable in the whole history of Canada after it came under the direct control of the Crown, than the helpless manner in which this absolute government was forced to overlook and ignore the disobedience and rascality of its functionaries in this distant transatlantic dependency.³⁶

Parkman, after reading the correspondence of governors and intendants, was convinced that one of the faults of Louis XIV's rule was "the excess of benevolence," the fact that he did for the colonists "what they would far better have learned to do for themselves."³⁷ Parkman compared the conditions in New France with those of a child who:

. . . held always under the rule of a father, in the main well-meaning and kind, sometimes generous, sometimes neglectful, often capricious, and rarely very wise,--such were the influences under which Canada grew up. If she had prospered, it would have been sheer miracle. A man, to be a man, must feel that he holds his fate, in some good measure, in his own hands.³⁸

Parkman said that because of this absolute authority, the seigniors and habitants often went to the "domain of savage freedom."³⁹ He contrasted the quarrels and disorders

³⁶ Ibid., p. 202. This would involve quarrels between leaders of Church and state.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 279. W. J. Eccles has pointed out that less state aid would more likely have caused the colony to thrive less. (Eccles, op. cit., p. 166.)

³⁸ Parkman, Old Regime, p. 462.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 462.

in New France to the conditions in a neighboring English colony where "perfect order prevailed with no other guardians than a few constables chosen by the people themselves."⁴⁰

However, Parkman noted that the political and religious differences of the rival colonies did not explain the whole situation; he believed that attempts to apply the New England institutions to New France "would have wrought nothing but mischief."⁴¹ He thought the people in New France were not ready for self-government. While he believed the Church and State were right in exercising authority over people not aware of the rudiments of self-government, he saw the faults of Church and State in New France in that they exercised too much authority and "instead of weaning the child to go alone, kept him in perpetual leading strings, making him, if possible, more and more dependent, and less and less fit for freedom."⁴² In contrast, he felt the English trained their people to adopt and maintain a system of self-rule "totally inapplicable to their rivals."⁴³ The English "grew up in utter neglect and continued neglect was the only boon they asked."⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 463.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 463.

⁴² Ibid., p. 463.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 463-4.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 464.

Thus, there is again the idea that there was more stable freedom in New England. This, Parkman felt, helped to unite the area while the people in New France remained "in a state of political segregation, like a basket of pebbles held together by the enclosure that surrounds them."⁴⁵

However, Parkman, like John Fiske, also claimed that the differences of historical antecedents did not alone explain the difference between the two colonies. He felt that the Anglo-Saxon race was peculiarly fitted to self-government, whereas the French Celt was different. The former submitted its action "to the guidance of reason" and had "the judicial faculty of seeing both sides of a question."⁴⁶ The latter he felt saw the end clearly, reasoned about it clearly, and yet his impulses and passions turned him away from it. He described the French Celt thus:

. . . he is impatient of delay, is impelled always to extremes, and does not readily sacrifice present inclinations to an ultimate good. He delights in abstractions and generalizations, cuts loose from unpleasing facts, and roams through an ocean of desires and theories.⁴⁷

In respect to the general backgrounds, therefore, Parkman has given his opinion on the differences of the French and English systems, differences which account for

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 464.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 465.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 465.

the success of one and the failure of another. The same general theme runs throughout--the inevitability of victory for a nation of progress over a nation opposed to progress. As far as he was concerned, New France suffered from social corruption, too much benevolent control, and "intellectual torpor."⁴⁸

As a part of the general background, Parkman also depicted the work of the Jesuits and the exploits of LaSalle. Each of these played its part in events leading to the struggle for the continent. In his The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century, he told the tale of Jesuit activity, and tried to show how the failure of Jesuit policies helped in the downfall. Yet, still there is the idea of the inevitability of British victory and French decline.

Parkman saw that the virtues of the Jesuits shone "amidst the rubbish of error, like diamonds and gold in the gravel of the torrent."⁴⁹ Yet, he wrote, "We may smile at the futility of the object."⁵⁰ He thought the Jesuits aimed to build on a foundation purely and supremely Catholic, and the founders of New France agreed to the policy. He perceived that this led to certain evils including the temporal

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 432.

⁴⁹ Francis Parkman, The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century, Boston, 1867, p. 553.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 187.

rule by Churchmen. "The unchecked sway of priests has always been the most mischievous of tyrannies; and even were they all well meaning and sincere, it would be so still," he said.⁵¹

In discussing the cause of Jesuit failure, Parkman ascribed it to the guns of the Iroquois, but he claimed the Iroquois did not change the destiny of New France. He described what might have happened if the Jesuits had been able to curb or convert the ferocious bands:

(tamed savages) would have been distributed in communities through the valleys of the Great Lakes and the Mississippi, ruled by priests in the interests of Catholicity and France.⁵²

Parkman thought that the Indians would then have developed the habits of agriculture and would have suppressed their war-like instincts. The decline of the population of the Indians would have been arrested, and the Indians through their fur trade "would have put forth a vigorous growth."⁵³ As a result, France would then have occupied the west with traders and settlers while:

. . . as yet the colonies of England were but a weak and broken line along the shore of the Atlantic; and when at last the great conflict came,

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 252. He criticized the fact that the activity of the Jesuits determined that the activity of Quebec would be centered in religion, saying the Jesuits looked on Quebec as having "well-nigh celestial atmosphere." (Ibid., p. 252.)

⁵² Ibid., p. 551.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 551.

England and Liberty would have been confronted, not by a depleted antagonist, still feeble from the exhaustion of a starved and persecuted infancy, but by an athletic champion of the principles of Richelieu and Loyola.⁵⁴

Parkman then claimed that the policies of the Iroquois brought the plans of the French to ruin by destroying the fur trade, the life blood of New France, thus making the early years of the colony unhappy ones. Yet, he claimed the Iroquois could not be given credit for changing destiny:

The contest on this continent between Liberty and Absolutism was never doubtful; but the triumph of the one would have been dearly bought, and the downfall of the other incomplete. Populations formed in the ideas and habits of a feudal monarchy and controlled by a hierarchy profoundly hostile to freedom of thought would have remained a hindrance and a stumbling block in the way of that majestic experiment of which America is the field.⁵⁵

Again in discussing the Jesuits, he brought up the idea of destiny thus: "The Providence of God seemed in their eyes dark and inexplicable; but from the standpoint of Liberty that Providence is clear as the sun at noon."⁵⁶

Thus, Parkman was of the opinion that the Jesuit failure to unite the Indians in a common allegiance to God and King, weakened the colony, but he did not believe that, even with success, their efforts would have resulted in any more than a delaying process in the eventual English triumph

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 552.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 552.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 552-53.

In this depicting of the early history of the colony of New France, Parkman devoted one volume to the efforts of LaSalle to help the French along the line of expansion. Parkman saw the intendant, Talon, as trying to occupy the interior of the continent and trying to hem in the English on the East and to secure a port on the Gulf of Mexico to keep the Spanish in check. Parkman said that LaSalle, when his journeys led him to the valley of the Ohio and to the Illinois plains, hoped to lead French civilization into the area. LaSalle's aim was the control of the valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi and the use of half of the continent. However, the Jesuits opposed this plan, for they wanted the area for converting the Indians and thought that the fur traders would interfere with their pursuits. Thus, LaSalle was a dangerous rival for control of the West.

In discussing the failure of LaSalle's scheme at successful colonization of the West, Parkman saw the project was too vast for one man, and he believed that he "dared too much, and often dared unwisely; attempted more than he could grasp; and forgot, in his sanguine anticipation, to reckon with enormous and incalculable risks."⁵⁷ Yet, Parkman recognized the importance of the area for the future. In regard to the claiming by LaSalle in 1682, of the possession of the Louisiana country, Parkman wrote:

⁵⁷ Parkman, LaSalle, p. 245.

On that day, the realm of France received on parchment a stupendous accession. The fertile plains of Texas; the vast basin of the Mississippi, from its frozen northern springs to the sultry borders of the Gulf; from the woody ridges of the Alleghenies to the bare peaks of the Rocky Mountains. . . passed beneath the sceptre of the Sultan of Versailles. . .⁵⁸

Parkman looked upon LaSalle as a hero "of a fixed idea and a determined purpose."⁵⁹ He thought America owed him much "for, in this masculine figure, she sees the pioneer who guided her to the possession of her richest heritage."⁶⁰ In a final appraisal of the French-Mississippi explorations, Parkman gave some hint of the future destiny when he claimed: "Where LaSalle had plowed, others were to sow the seed."⁶¹

Up to this point, it has been the purpose to examine Parkman's works in regard to the background for the struggle which resulted in the final removal of the French as a barrier to English expansion. In this, Parkman has pointed out the basic differences in settlement between the two. He has also pointed out the work of the Jesuits and of the explorer, LaSalle, and the connection of their labors with the destiny of New France. The next point is to discuss the actual struggle between the rival powers.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 226-7.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 318.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 319.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 346.

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Parkman claimed that the first important struggle between the two rival powers came under Count Frontenac's rule. In his Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV, he depicted the methods by which the French strove to check the English colonies. Again, Parkman tried to show how France was battling against a fate which her own organic weakness made inevitable. This is the story of "the opening of the grand scheme of military occupation by which France strove to envelop and hold in check the industrial population of the English colonies."⁶²

Parkman saw the beginnings of the first great crisis between the French and the English in the rival claims of New York and New France for controlling the Western lands and sharing the fur trade. At this time, Governor Dongan of New York saw the French establishments in Illinois and on the lower Mississippi and the Great Lakes. He feared that next they would seize the avenues of communication throughout the West, and confine the English colonies to a narrow strip along the sea. Parkman claimed that by 1685-86, both areas wanted to build forts to exclude the other, and the English were claiming the right to trade with the Indians. This was the beginning of violent rivalry between the English

⁶² Francis Parkman, Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV, Boston, 1902, p. v-vi.

and the French in the West. Parkman pointed out that at this time rivalry also existed in the North where the English were attempting to establish posts on Hudson's Bay, and on the Lakes; and the French were claiming a right to the Iroquois country and the upper lakes. Of this Parkman wrote: ". . . it is clear that the claim of prior discovery and occupation was on the side of the French."⁶³ It was in the midst of this rivalry that Count Frontenac arrived and renewed the Canadian spirit and energy and prepared them to face their fortunes.

In King William's War (1689-97), Parkman saw the northern conflicts as not important, and he thought they should be considered as episodes compared with the issue of whether France or England should be in control of the interior of the continent. In this first struggle, Parkman saw that the English system of neglect "though wholesome in most respects, made them unfit for aggressive action for they had neither troops, commanders, political union, military organization, nor military habits."⁶⁴ Thus, the English colonies, in the beginning, were separate, jealous of one another, and incapable of acting together.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 168.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 414-5.

Parkman, in describing the nature of French policy, indicated that although the French had the immediate advantages, their success would not endure long, claiming:

Her geographical position determined the nature of her pursuits; and her pursuits developed the roving and adventurous character of her people, who, living under a military rule could be directed at will to such ends as their rulers saw fit. The grand French scheme of territorial extension was not born at court, but sprang from Canadian soil, and was developed by the chiefs of the colony, who, being on the ground, saw the possibilities and requirements of the situation, and generally had a personal interest in realizing them. The rival colonies had two different laws of growth. The one increased by slow extension, rooting firmly as it spread; the other shot offshoots, with few or no roots, far out into the wilderness. It was the nature of French colonization to seize upon detached strategic points, and hold them by the bayonet, forming no agricultural basis, but attracting the Indians by trade and holding them by conversion. A musket, a rosary, and a back of beaverskins may serve to represent it, and in fact, it consisted of little else.⁶⁵

In regard to French expansion, Parkman repeated that one of the reasons for the numerical weakness of New France was the policy of exclusion practiced by the French government by not allowing Huguenots to emigrate. He thought that if the Huguenots had been allowed to go to the new world, "the valley of the west would have swarmed with a laborious and virtuous population, trained in adversity and possessing the essential qualities of self-government,"⁶⁶ and another

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 415-416.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 416-417.

France would have grown beyond the Alleghanies "strong with the same kind of strength that made the future greatness of the British colonies."⁶⁷ Yet, Parkman said this was not to be the case, and thus, he felt the French lost an opportunity which might have led to greatness.

At the time of Frontenac there were two opposing policies in Canada in regard to expansion. The first was that of confining the population to the borders of the St. Lawrence, and leaving the West to the keeping of the Jesuits. The other was that of expansion and occupying the interior of the continent with military posts and fur trading posts. Frontenac favored the latter, in spite of Jesuit opposition, feeling it would secure the West for France and keep the English from the northwest, and save the Canadian fur trade. Control of the interior would also give Canada easy access to the Mississippi Valley and would be a barrier between the Five Nations and the Western Indians, allies of the French.

Parkman saw Frontenac's opposition to abandoning the posts as the desire to save the area for the French. Parkman said that Frontenac's policy was the true policy, and he felt that because of the political, social, and commercial conditions of Canada, only strong military troops could keep

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 417.

the Canadians from the interior. Eventually Frontenac's policy prevailed. In the meantime, the first conflict ended in a return to the status quo ante bellum.

In appraising the results of this first war between the English and the French, Parkman did not agree that Canada withstood the united force of all the British colonies, because most of the colonies took no part in the war. The first war left the great question of the control of the interior of the continent at issue for future wars, but in the meantime the policy of Frontenac developed. Thus, Parkman saw the French occupying forts to the West, and he saw a New France developing at the mouth of the Mississippi. At the same time, the English colonies remained east of the Allegheny Mountains. The first phase of the conflict proved little and did not succeed in blocking French expansion. Thus, the Manifest Destiny of the English race was not yet manifest.

In portraying the later struggles, Parkman pointed out that the colonial wars involved matters of great importance, yet were incidental to the European struggle. By 1702, with the outbreak of Queen Anne's War, the frontier was being attacked by both parties. Then, England decided upon a policy of expansion in an attempt to become the sole empress of the North American continent. Parkman was of the opinion that the British attempt to reduce Acadia, Canada,

and Newfoundland, and then to move against the Spanish in Florida was not so visionary as perhaps it seems to modern readers. He claimed that the armament threatening Canada in Queen Anne's War was stronger in proportion to her means of defense than that which finally defeated her in 1763; yet, the plan failed for "there was no Pitt to direct and inspire, and no Wolfe to lead. . ."⁶⁸ "To make America a British continent would be an achievement almost worth Blenheim or Ramillies, and one, too, in which Britain would be the gainer,"⁶⁹ he wrote.

As a result of Queen Anne's War, France did lose Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the Hudson's Bay territory to England, and Louis XIV acknowledged the Iroquois as British subjects which, according to Parkman, "became in future the preposterous foundations for vast territorial claims of England."⁷⁰ Parkman felt the Peace of Utrecht did not resolve questions necessary for future peace, such as boundaries between Canada and the British colonies and Western boundaries. Thus, the embers of the war were still smoldering. He said the greatest problem still to be solved was:

⁶⁸ Francis Parkman, A Half-Century of Conflict-- France and England in North America, Boston, 1901, Vol. I, p. 162.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 163.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 181.

. . . whether France or England should hold the valleys of the Mississippi and the Great Lakes, and with them the virtual control of the continent. This was the triple problem that tormented the northern English colonies for more than a generation, till it found a solution at last in the Seven Years War.⁷¹

Following Queen Anne's War, Parkman said that for a time New York was the only rival of Canada for the control of the West. He believed thus:

It was a fatal error in the rulers of New France that they did not in the seventeenth century use more strenuous efforts to possess themselves by purchase, exchange, or conquest, of this troublesome and dangerous neighbor.⁷²

If New York were in the hands of the French, Parkman wrote:

. . . the fate of the continent would probably have been changed. The British possessions would have been cut in two. New England, isolated and placed in constant jeopardy, would have vainly poured her unmanageable herds of raw militia against the disciplined veterans of Old France intrenched at the mouth of the Hudson. Canada would have gained complete control of her old enemies, the Iroquois, who would have been wholly dependent on her for the arms and ammunition without which they could do nothing.⁷³

However, this did not come about; and in the post-Utrecht period, New York waged single-handed a conflict to control the western fur trade, while Canada aimed at keeping the western Indians at peace and at preventing trading

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 185.

⁷² Ibid., p. 273.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 273. Parkman thought New France might have been able to purchase the area during the reign of Charles II.

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relations between the Iroquois and the western tribes, which relations would have been injurious to French interests. At the same time, Parkman claimed that there was a great impulse on the part of the French in Louisiana, to explore the West for motives of wealth, opening trade routes with New Mexico, or acquiring control of lands beyond the Mississippi. Thus, the French in the Louisiana territory were thinking in terms of continental expansion.

Parkman said that in the period after Utrecht, the colonial conflict of King George's War (1744-48) was not decisive since it resulted in a return to the status quo. He saw the results as merely a breathing spell for the final struggle of 1754-63 which determined which power would control the continent.

On the eve of the Seven Years War, Parkman contrasted the conduct and methods of the two rival claimants to the Western domain. The general idea here was that the English were not as yet thinking of continental greatness or Manifest Destiny. He depicted them as living in their separate colonies with no common aims or interests and not dreaming "of a future of collective greatness to which the possession of the West would be a necessary condition."⁷⁴ Parkman looked

⁷⁴ Parkman, Half-Century of Conflict, Vol. II, p. 45

upon any westward movement of these English-speaking peoples as in obedience to natural laws, since there was no incentive given them by King, governors, or assemblies.

On the other hand, he saw that the representatives of the crown in the French colonies were men of ambition. He wrote, "Achievement was demanded of them. They recognized the prize."⁷⁵ In view of this, soon after 1713, the French began to repent of their concessions, and began to claim with few exceptions, that the whole of the North American continent was theirs by right. Parkman said that the French thus ignored the voyages of the Cabots, and claimed the continent because of Verrazzano and Ribaut. In the beginning Parkman thought the English "seemed neither to understand the situation, nor see the greatness of the stakes at issue."⁷⁶

However, after 1748, English traders began to take an interest in the trans-Allegheny area, and crossing the mountains, they began to assert rights to lands claimed by the French for the past seventy years. Parkman was of the opinion that by this time both powers recognized the significance of the region. If the English could control the Ohio, they could cut France in two. If the French held it, they could shut their rivals between the Alleghenies and

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 46.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 46.

the sea and control the Western tribes, and turn them against the English borders. Parkman believed the English had a powerful weapon in the "cheap, excellent, abundant" goods which would form the bond between the English and the Western tribes.⁷⁷

This then is the background of that final struggle as depicted by Parkman. In speaking of the history of that conflict, Parkman wrote, "Here history is a great and significant drama, enacted among untamed forests with a distant gleam of courtly splendors and the royal pomp of Versailles."⁷⁸ In his account of the Seven Years War, he attempted to show how valiantly and for a time successfully, New France battled against the fate which, according to Parkman's earlier ideas, was inevitable, in view of the law of progress and the organic weakness of the colony. For Parkman, the issue of the war was the question of whether France should or should not remain in North America.

The historian perceived that Britain had an interest in keeping France alive on the American continent, for as long as France threatened the colonies, those colonies would look to the mother country for support and would remain loyal. Parkman wrote:

⁷⁷ Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Boston, 1910, Vol. I, p. 50.

⁷⁸ Parkman, Count Frontenac, p. vi.

If by diplomacy or war, she had preserved but half, or less than half, of her American possessions, then a barrier would have been set to the spread of the English speaking races; there would have been no Revolutionary War; and for a long time at least, no independence.⁷⁹

In this respect, Parkman, like John Fiske, looked upon the colonial aspect of the Seven Years War as sowing the seeds of the American Revolution.

In discussing the struggle, Parkman was quick to point out that in the beginning it was a strife between the united and concentrated few against a divided and discordant many. He said that the hope of France lay in the internal disputes and clashes of interest in the English colonies. In discussing the English apathy, lack of unity and jealousy, Parkman pointed out that in 1754 the New York Assembly refused to get excited at a French fort built at a considerable distance from the Ohio. The Assembly claimed there was no evidence or information that this was an invasion of the British colonies. Parkman commented, "So blind were they as yet to 'manifest destiny.'"⁸⁰ Yet, in spite of this apathy and lack of interest, Parkman saw the struggle as one "of moral and intellectual torpor against

⁷⁹ Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. I, p. 5.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 174.

moral and intellectual life; of barren absolutism against a liberty, crude, incoherent, and chaotic, yet full of prolific vitality."⁸¹

Although the historian wrote in terms of the law of progress, he did feel that America owed much to the ambitions and weakness of Louis XV and to the vanity of Pompadour. He stated it thus:

It was the fatuity of Louis XV and his Pompadour that made the conquest of Canada possible. Had they not broken the traditionary policy of France, allied themselves to Austria, her ancient enemy, and plunged needlessly into the European war, the whole force of the kingdom would have been turned, from the first, to the humbling of England, and the defence of the French colonies. The French soldiers left dead on inglorious continental battlefields could have saved Canada, and perhaps made good her claim to the vast territories of the West.⁸²

In depicting the course of the War, Parkman described some of the significant events furthering the cause of Manifest Destiny. One of the heaviest blows the French received, he thought, was the fall of Fort Frontenac since it cut New France in two and placed some of the western posts in jeopardy. Then, the value of the fall of Fort Dusquesne was that it "opened the Great West to English enterprise, took from France half her savage allies, and

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 365.

⁸² Ibid., p. 4.

relieved the western borders from the scourge of the Indian war."⁸³ Thus, these are related to the opening of the West for the English.

Parkman believed that "one of the great battles of the world," at least measured in terms of results, was the battle of Quebec, after which, "half a continent had changed hands at the scratch of a pen."⁸⁴ After the fall of Quebec Parkman saw that there was no choice but to surrender.⁸⁵

Parkman described the Peace of Paris as marking "an epoch than which none in modern history is more fruitful of grand results."⁸⁶ It led to "a new chapter in the annals of the world . . . with the triumph of Wolfe on the Heights of Abraham began the history of the United States."⁸⁷

Parkman saw the Seven Years War as making England a great power by giving her commercial supremacy and mastery over North America. It ended the story of New France. France, having lost her eastern lands to Great Britain,

⁸³ Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 169.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 391.

⁸⁵ Parkman had great praise for the spirit and courage of the French at Quebec, saying their defense "deserves a tribute of admiration." (Ibid., p. 396.) He felt the King "not the servants whom he had abandoned to their fate, was answerable for the loss of New France." (Ibid., p. 391.)

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 423.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 423.

surrendered to Spain the holdings beyond the Mississippi which Parkman claimed were "destined at a later date to return to her hands and finally to swell the growing empire of the United States."⁸⁸ Parkman also claimed that the war "supplied to the United States the indispensable condition of their greatness, if not of their national existence."⁸⁹ Parkman wrote that if the British at the battle of Quebec had foreseen that the conquest of Canada was a stepping stone to American independence, "their swords would have dropped from their hands, and the heroic fire have gone out within their hearts."⁹⁰ He believed the significance of the conquest was that it:

changed the political aspects of the continent, prepared a way for independence of the British colonies, rescued the vast tracts of the interior from the rule of military despotism, and gave them eventually, to the keeping of an ordered democracy.⁹¹

Even though the provinces soon began to show symptoms of revolt, he considered the war was still a great English victory:

⁸⁸ Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War After the Conquest of Canada, Boston, 1870, Volume II, p. 256.

⁸⁹ Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. I, p. 6. Parkman said that during some of the peace discussions, fears were voiced that the colonies might spread over the continent and grow independent. (Ibid., Vol. II, p. 418.)

⁹⁰ Parkman, Conspiracy of Pontiac, Vol. I, p. 135.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. ix.

. . . nothing could rob her of the glory of giving birth to the United States; and, though politically severed, this gigantic progeny were to be not the less a source of growth and prosperity to the parent that bore them, joined with her triple kinship of laws, language, and blood.⁹²

He also saw the victory as a great blessing to Canada--"a happier calamity never befell a people than the conquest of Canada by British arms."⁹³

Thus, like John Fiske, Parkman saw as one of the greatest results of the triumph, the spread of the English-speaking nationality. The Peace of Paris:

. . . secured the opportunities and set in action the forces that have planted English homes in every clime and dotted the earth with English garrisons and posts of trade.⁹⁴

At the same time, Parkman saw the American colonies as beginning shortly to show symptoms of revolt. While it was not his purpose to narrate the events of this phase of Manifest Destiny, he did give something of the challenge for the future.

Parkman said that the American colonies did not break away from a decrepit power, but broke away in an hour of England's triumph, and having broken away, they grew to a mighty power, and he believed the future looked bright. He described it as follows:

⁹² Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 427.

⁹³ Parkman, Old Regime, p. 468.

⁹⁴ Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. II, p. 427.

Those who in the weakness of their dissensions needed help from England. . . have become a nation that may defy every foe but that most dangerous of all foes, herself, destined to a majestic future if she will shun the excess and perversion of the principles that made her great, prate less about her enemies of the Present, resist the mob and demagogue as she resisted Parliament and King, rally her powers. . . to make firm the foundation on which that prosperity rests and turn some fair portion of her vast mental forces to other objects than material progress and the game of party politics.⁹⁵

Parkman wrote that the United States, having tamed and peopled the savage continent, had to prove that the rule of the masses could be a success:

that democracy can give the world a civilization as mature and pregnant, ideas as energetic and vitalizing, and types of manhood as lofty and strong, as any of the systems which it boasts to supplant.⁹⁶

To this point, the attempt has been made to set forth the ideas of the romantic historian, Francis Parkman, regarding the struggle on the part of the English to remove the barriers to expansion imposed by the French, especially the final war "which controlled the destinies of America and was the first in the chain of events which led on to her Revolution with all its vast and undeveloped consequences."⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 428-9.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 428.

⁹⁷ Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac, Vol. I, p. 101.

While Parkman did not go into the Revolutionary struggle, he did narrate the events in the Indian-American aspect of expansion following the conquest of Canada. Parkman saw in the conquest of Canada the doom of the Indians. He portrayed the attempt on the part of the Indians to avert the westward movement and prevent their own extermination in his Conspiracy of Pontiac.

In pointing to the future, Parkman claimed that as a result of the Seven Years War the Indians were "destined to melt and vanish before the advancing waves of Anglo-American power which now rolled westward unchecked and unopposed."⁹⁸ He pointed out that the settlements beyond the Alleghenies, before the Conspiracy, were thin and scattered and the progress of settlement had been retarded by Indian hostilities. The Conspiracy of Pontiac depicted the futile attempt on the part of the Indians led by Pontiac to prevent the English from expanding west of the Alleghenies. These were the lands which had been claimed by France and England, and won by England, but lands which also belonged to the Indians.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. ix.

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In describing the results of the final surrender, again Parkman implied that it was inevitable:

England had crushed her hereditary foe, and France in her fall, had left to irretrievable ruin the savage tribes to whom her policy of self-interest had lent a transient support.⁹⁹

Having discussed the battles of the conspiracy and the final defeat of the Indians, Parkman romanticized and set forth again the great possibilities of the United States.

In writing of Pontiac after the defeat, he said:

Little could he have dreamed, and little could the wisest of that day have imagined, that within the space of a single human life, that lonely lake would be studded with the sails of commerce; that cities and villages would rise upon the ruins of the forest. . . Yet it needed no prophetic eye to foresee that, sooner or later, the doom must come. The star of his peoples' destiny was fading from the sky. . . .¹⁰⁰

Thus, the doom of the Indians was another step in the expansion of the United States, according to the historian.

While Parkman in his monumental work depicted the removal of the French and Indian barriers to English and American expansion, his first published work, The Oregon Trail, has shown him as ignoring the greatest westward movement in history. When Parkman took his trip to the Oregon Territory in 1846-47, America's march to the Pacific was advancing as the nation pursued its Manifest Destiny

⁹⁹ Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac, Vol. II, p.298.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 300.

westward to the ocean. Most historians will admit that Parkman was practically oblivious to the movement. In the work he did describe the spring of 1846 with emigrants in St. Louis preparing for journeys to Oregon and California; yet, there is no mention made of their being a part of the manifest destiny movement.¹⁰¹ He showed himself as having little or no understanding of the movement, saying:

I have often perplexed myself to divine the various motives that give impulse to migration; but whatever they may be, whether an insane hope of a better condition in life, or a desire of shaking off restraints of law and society; or mere restlessness, certain it is that multitudes bitterly repent the journey, and, after they have reached the land of promise, are happy enough to escape from it.¹⁰²

In the work Parkman also mentioned a report from an Indian he met on the trail, telling him of Mexican and American clashes from which one could infer that war had been declared; yet, Parkman made no other reference to the Mexican War.¹⁰³ Mason Wade has claimed that Parkman was "too young and too typical a Bostonian to be an objective observer."¹⁰⁴ Wade feels the most serious handicap of

¹⁰¹ Francis Parkman, The Oregon Trail, Boston, 1901, p. 3.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 9-10.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 355.

¹⁰⁴ Wade, Heroic Historian, p. 222.

Parkman as a student of the West "was the very inherited wealth that made the trip possible."¹⁰⁵ He says Parkman's class held property more sacred than man himself and "only this abandonment of property could give him an inkling of the great drama that was being played out before his unseeing eyes."¹⁰⁶ Wade, in trying to explain the failure of Parkman to see the destiny of the West being fixed during his Western trip, has written:

He lived so much in the past that he ignored too much of the present, though there is more of the pageant of the West in 1846 in the Journal than in the Oregon Trail. . . By force of environment and heredity he was blind to the profound social forces at work in the West; by tradition and taste he was contemptuous of the masses, and so he found the company of foreigners more congenial than that of the men who were making America out of the wilderness. He had only amused contempt for the democratic spirit of the emigrants and for the Jacksonianism of the West; he had no understanding of the forces behind the westward movement, which upon reflection he likened to the hordes of Huns who swarmed over Europe in the last days of Rome.¹⁰⁷

In later describing his trip Parkman wrote that while he and his companion were at the foot of Pike's Peak, the companion remarked that the time would come when the area would be settled. In referring to this Parkman mentioned:

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 223.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 255.

¹⁰⁷ Wade, Journals of Francis Parkman, Vol. II, p. 403. Because of his attention to the Indians, Wade claims the historian's "missed opportunities are such as to make the Western historian weep. . ." (Ibid., p. 402.)

We condoled with each other on a prospect so melancholy but we little thought what the future had in store. We knew that there was more or less gold in the seams of these untrodden mountains; but we did not foresee that it would build cities in the waste and plant hotels and gambling houses among the haunts of the grizzly bear. . . . We knew that. . . . year after year, the trains of emigrant wagons would creep in slow procession toward barbarous Oregon or wild and distant California; but we did not dream how Commerce and Gold would breed nations along the Pacific. . . . We were no prophets to foresee all this; and had we foreseen it, perhaps some perverse regrets might have tempered the ardor of our rejoicing.¹⁰⁸

Thus, Parkman himself later admitted that he did not understand the westward movement taking place during his Oregon journey.

In conclusion, therefore, it would seem correct to describe Parkman's Manifest Destiny to that of the colonial period. His important ideas on American expansion dealt with the expansion of the English at the expense of the French, and then, in a more limited aspect, the expansion of the Americans at the expense of the Indians after the Peace of Paris. From point of view of American historiography, his views are important because this was the first phase of the movement which did not receive the title Manifest Destiny until the 1840's.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted by Wade in Heroic Historian, p. 224-5.

CHAPTER IV

JOHN FISKE - EXPONENT OF DARWINIAN MANIFEST DESTINY

Historian John Fiske might aptly be called the exponent of an evolutionary type of Manifest Destiny. Like Bancroft and Parkman, his works concentrated on the early history of the country. His idea of the American mission was that through a gradual evolutionary process the English-speaking people of the American continent were destined to be leaders and to spread the American democratic system. In his writings he frequently mentioned the American destiny and the destiny of the English-speaking peoples.

1. Background and General Appraisal

John Fiske was born in Hartford, Connecticut, on March 30, 1842. He was descended from Philadelphia Quakers on his father's side and Puritans on his mother's side. His name was Edmund Fisk Green; but when his mother, Mrs. Green, remarried and the boy was to remain with his maternal grandparents at Middletown, Connecticut, the Fisk family, he changed his name to express identification with that family and took the name John in honor of several illustrious Fisks, especially his great grandfather.¹

¹At first he spelled his name Fisk. When at Harvard in 1860 an error in the catalogue spelled it Fiske, he retained that spelling--one which had been used by some of his ancestors.

The story of Fiske's boyhood precocity would rival that of the usual child protégés. By the age of six he had committed hundreds of dates to memory and had begun to study Latin. At the age of nine, he had read much of Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, and had started the study of Greek.² At fourteen years, he led prayer meetings and taught Sunday school. His religious enthusiasm was to be short lived, however, and soon he began to avoid Church dogmas, and became a free thinker. Yet, he retained his love of learning, and at the age of sixteen he was studying about twelve hours a day. He had a good memory and "yearned to possess all learning"³

After special preparatory work, the future historian entered Harvard University as a sophomore. By this time he was wandering away from the tenets of orthodox religion, and under the influences of Spencer and Darwin he soon became the champion of evolution in the United States. At Harvard he earned a reputation as an intellectual radical and an atheist. He had failed to win a scholarship in his first year simply because of his cutting prayers.

² In a letter to his mother in 1850, he claimed at eight years to have read about 200 volumes. From 1858-1863 he claimed to have read 445 volumes or 193,400 pages. Ethel Fiske (ed.), The Letters of John Fiske, New York, 1940, p.1, 114.

³ Thomas Sergeant Perry, John Fiske, Boston, 1906, p. 12.

After finishing his undergraduate work in 1863, Fiske went on to Harvard Law School, graduating in 1865. After one case, which he won, he decided law was not his calling, and he determined to abandon it for other fields. Early he had demonstrated a competent mastery of the art of writing. Even as an undergraduate he had contributed to the National Quarterly Review, the North American Review, and the Atlantic Monthly, so it is not surprising that he would turn to some form of composition. At first this was philosophical, and then historical.

Along with his writing, Fiske was appointed a lecturer in Positive Philosophy at Harvard in 1867. This was of short tenure, and he was dismissed on charges of being an atheist and a naturalist.⁴ However, from 1872-79, he did serve as assistant librarian at Harvard where he was considered to be in an innocuous capacity and safely muzzled. During this period Fiske gradually drifted toward the field of American history.

In this respect, in 1878 he was asked by a friend, Mrs. Augustus Hemenway, to give six lectures on American History at Old South Meeting House in Boston. Following

⁴ Perry, op. cit., p. 26. In 1871 the Board of Overseers opposed his nomination for instructor in history because of his liberal ideas.

this he gave lectures at University College in London, invited by Huxley, and other Englishmen, and at Washington University in St. Louis. His lectures on the whole were very favorably received; his optimism delighted his listeners. Then, he decided to write history, along with continuing his lectures and dabbling in the field of philosophy.

In 1881 Fiske entered an agreement with Harper's for the preparation and publication of a History of the American People from the Discovery of America to the Inauguration of President Garfield, in two or three volumes. After about six years of work which saw his plan practically completed, he became dissatisfied with the result because he had been forced to condense so much. Thus, he refused to consent to the publication. Harper's was not interested in any other agreement, and the contract was annulled. Then, he expanded his theme, developing a new conception of American history to fill several volumes, which theme would be a philosophic as well as an historic presentation showing the development of the country through colonial experiences to its compact political organization as a nation.⁵ While planning and shaping his history, Fiske continued his lecturing. In 1884

⁵ This was in spite of a letter to a Mr. Hale regarding the teaching of history at Harvard wherein he said: "It is not colonial history that I thirst after. . . it is the medieval history and the study of early institutions which comes exactly within my especial line of studies."
 (Ethel Fiske, op. cit., p. 379.)

he was appointed a non-resident professor of history at Washington University, and every year he gave a series of lectures. From 1889-1893, he delivered 527 lectures on historical subjects along with some in philosophy.

Today Fiske is best remembered for his labors in the field of American history, and he is often referred to as a popularizer of American history. Among his works in this field are: The Discovery, Conquest, and Colonization of America; Old Virginia and Her Neighbours; Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America; New France and New England; The American Revolution; The Critical Period; and American Political Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint of Universal History.

H. Morse Stephens has described John Fiske as "the most brilliant and successful of the popular writers of history in the United States in the last decade of the nineteenth century."⁶ William G. Brown has said: "Fiske deserves a higher rank among the writers of history than any other American since Parkman. . .!"⁷ While some have charged that he sacrificed truth for popular applause, John Clark has denied this and claimed that no one approached the

⁶ H. Morse Stephens, "John Fiske as a Popular Historian," World's Work, Vol. 5, April 1903, p. 3359.

⁷ William Garrett Brown, "The Problem of the American Historian," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 92, Nov. 1903, p. 658-9.

interpretation of American history "with so wide and varied a knowledge bearing on the aspect of the subject, with a mind so free from . . . prejudice, with so keen a philosophic insight. . ."8

Fiske's greatest merits have been classed as "simplicity of style," "charm of manner," and "delicate interpretation of the past through modern phrases and modern instances."⁹ Of Fiske's histories, Lyman Abbott has written: "We do not know anything in historical literature quite parallel in this respect to Mr. Fiske's American histories."¹⁰ Abbott felt Fiske talked and told more than wrote. Today most historians and critics agree that there is probably not much new in the way of original research or new discoveries in the volumes. Thus, Fiske is more important as an interpreter than as a discoverer. R. Ogden was of the opinion that Fiske knew best what was thought and written and that he had a faculty for setting forth what he knew. He commented, "His chosen and successful role was that of popularizer of useful knowledge."¹¹

⁸ John Spencer Clark, The Life and Letters of John Fiske, Boston, 1917, Vol. II, p. 341.

⁹ Stephens, op. cit., p. 3360.

¹⁰ Lyman Abbott, "Histories of John Fiske," Outlook, Vol. 69, Nov. 16, 1901, p. 709.

¹¹ R. Ogden, "John Fiske, Popularizer," Nation, Vol. 73, July 11, 1901, p. 26.

Many critics of Fiske have cited as his chief defects a certain carelessness about detail. Harvey Wish has claimed that because of his involvement in popular lectures as a means of earning a living, Fiske could not spare the time to peruse large amounts of original sources. Because his books were often lectures he had delivered, he frequently toned down adverse opinions or avoided difficult concepts.¹² Unlike the scientific historian, Fiske had to be careful not to tire his audience with too many details, and he did not have to prove his generalizations. His work was often too easygoing, and sometimes it lacked the proper dignity. However, he did give a new perspective to American history. Thomas S. Perry said that American history ceased to be "a somewhat provincial record, and became part of a greater and wider sequence."¹³ Another has written that his usefulness as an historian:

lay largely in his ability to bring home to the average American a conviction of the continuity of the national life and the significance of the crises that attended the various stages of its development.¹⁴

¹² Harvey Wish, The American Historian--A Social-Intellectual History of the Writing of the American Past, New York, 1960, p. 111.

¹³ Thomas Sergeant Perry, "John Fiske: An Appreciation," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 89, May 1902, p. 633.

¹⁴ Unsigned editorial, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 88, November 1901, p. 283.

For Fiske, the important thing in his history was to arrange facts already acquired in such a way as to have the readers understand why things happened as they did. T. S. Perry has said:

His knowledge was so abundant that the growth of the American people appeared in its right proportion as an incident in the world's history. . . .The incidents were woven into a larger web, and so acquired a new importance which had not been before suspected.¹⁵

2. John Fiske and the Mission of America

Having seen the background of the historian and some of the general characteristics of his writings, it is now the purpose of this chapter to discuss the ideas of John Fiske in regard to the American mission or in regard to his concept of Manifest Destiny. In general he displayed a spirit of optimism as his comprehensive scheme developed. Like Bancroft and Parkman, Fiske felt that the future belonged to the superior English-speaking peoples. Although he never completed his plan, he chose as his object to present to his countrymen:

the drama of American civilization, of which the political organization of the United States was the crowning feature, as an evolutionary development from antecedent causes, and of great significance to the future civilization of the world.¹⁶

¹⁵ Perry, John Fiske, p. 41.

¹⁶ Clark, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 456.

Carrying out his scheme, Fiske first tried to show that the expansion of European thought during the latter half of the fifteenth century in relation to the nature and extent of the earth's surface, along with the desire for new products, led to the exploration which resulted in the discovery of America. Then he tried to explain how the European political and social disturbances in the next centuries, along with the desire for individual betterment, led to the migration of peoples to North America in great numbers. Next, he tried to depict the success of England in the colonial struggles, which success led to the English conquest of most of North America. Then he showed how eighteenth century England tried to subject the colonists to restrictions repugnant to the ideas of civil liberty and English law, all of which resulted in the successful revolt of the thirteen colonies against the mother country, and in the establishment of a federated government. Finally, he set forth the idea that this form of government was the direct outgrowth of English ideas of liberty developed through centuries of struggles in England. These ideas matured in colonial America.

In the period of the federation form of government, he aimed to show that the government had acquired great accessions of territory until it reached to the Pacific, and it had proved itself to be a successful form of political

organization, and one that was exerting an influence on all forms of government in the world. In short, he aimed to set forth the causes leading to the discovery, and transplanting to America of the better elements of European civilization which had developed to the improvement of mankind.

In his writings Fiske tried to apply the evolutionary principle to history searching for continuity and orderly development. Fiske's theme, according to one biographer, John Clark, "was a branch of the Renaissance movement connected with the uprising of the European mind in the 15th and 16th centuries," and the distinguishing characteristic of this theme, according to Clark, was the "breadth of view in which the scheme is conceived, a conception which. . . enabled him to trace both cause and effect in interpreting this great chapter in modern history."¹⁷ Clark said that Fiske was most impressed by the fact that "while this new form of government possessed many unique features, it was in genesis a distinct product of Evolution. . ."¹⁸ This is the idea that Fiske saw in America's development--an illustration of the theory of evolution applied to the history of civilization.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 459.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 489.

Clark's view was that this theme of Fiske was far greater than Parkman's since it involved tracing the history of America back to the Renaissance:

in whose genesis was reflected the persistent struggle between the militant and industrial forces of civilized society during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; together with setting forth the conditions of its birth, and what it stands for politically by virtue of its national existence of over a century.¹⁹

Having set forth the scheme of Fiske, the next step is to see the unfolding of this scheme through direct reference to Fiske's writings--an unfolding which gives the general ideas of Fiske in regard to the expansion of the nation. In his two-volume Discovery of America, Fiske set forth three main ideas--the importance of the discovery of America, the evolutionary process of the discovery, and the superiority of the English-speaking continent. In this work he hinted at the future greatness of the continent.

Fiske saw the pre-Columbian voyages as of little historic importance because they produced little effect in either the eastern or the western hemispheres "beyond cutting down a few trees and killing a few Indians."²⁰ No

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 468.

²⁰ John Fiske, Discovery of America with Some Account of Ancient America and the Spanish Conquest, Boston, 1892, Vol. I, p. 255.

real contact was established between the two halves of the world, so Fiske thought it was wrong to ascribe to Leif Ericsson and his friends the discovery of America. He attached much greater importance to the voyage of Columbus, referring to it as "in many respects the most important event in human history since the birth of Christ."²¹ He stated:

No ingenuity of argument can take from Columbus the glory of an achievement which has, and can have no parallel in the whole career of mankind. It was a thing that could be done but once. On the other hand, when we regard the Discovery as a long and multifarious process, it is only by a decision more or less arbitrary that we can say when it began or when it ended. It emerged from a complex group of facts and theories, and it was accomplished through a multitude of enterprises in all quarters of the globe.²²

Fiske was of the opinion that the generation witnessing the accomplishment could not understand the grandeur of it. For him, 1492 was the year in which contacts between the eastern and western halves of the planet were begun and "the two streams of human life which had flowed on for countless ages apart were thenceforth to mingle together."²³ He believed the voyage was unique in the history of mankind

²¹ Clark, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 106. This was in a lecture entitled "The Era of Maritime Discovery."

²² Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. II, p. 553.

²³ Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. I, p. 446.

and that nothing like it had been done before nor would ever be done again. In a prophecy perhaps rather ironical in the modern space age he claimed, "No worlds are left for a future Columbus to conquer. The era of which the great Italian mariner was the most illustrious representative has closed forever."²⁴

Yet, time and again Fiske reiterated that the discovery was a gradual process, an evolutionary process, "not such a simple and instantaneous affair as is often tacitly assumed."²⁵ Thus, the discovery of America was seen as unique, but a gradual, orderly development, over a long period of time. In this connection it is also to be noted that Fiske held a similar view in relation to later settlements of the continent. In discussing the Oregon situation and the Cook and Gray expeditions followed by Lewis and Clark, he wrote, "The progress across the continent begun by Champlain was thus completed, two hundred years later by Lewis and Clark."²⁶

Having set forth the idea of the importance of the discovery of America, Fiske then set forth his second important theme which he developed more fully in later works --

²⁴ Ibid., p. 446.

²⁵ Fiske, Discovery of America, Vol. II, p. 16. This same idea is found elsewhere in the same volume on p. 164, 212, 552, 544.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 544.

the idea of the destiny of the English-speaking peoples over the non-English peoples. In describing the voyage of Cabot at the time of the Spanish and Portuguese colonization, he wrote:

The power for whom destiny had reserved the world empire of which these southern nations--so noble in aim, so mistaken in policy--were dreaming, stretched forth her hand, in quiet disregard of the papal bulls, and laid it upon the western shore of the ocean. It was only for a moment and long years were to pass before the consequences were developed. But in truth the first fateful note that heralded the coming English supremacy was sounded when John Cabot's tiny craft sailed out from Bristol channel on a bright May morning of 1497.²⁷

Fiske stressed that Cabot's voyage was not comparable to the scientific triumph of Columbus, since once Columbus had showed the way, it was easy for others to follow. However, Fiske felt that the decline of Spain's colonizing activity augured well for the English settlements.

In searching for the reason for the success of England in early colonization and the reason for the superiority of the English-speaking people, Fiske attributed the success to the fact that England gave full play to individualism and "developed a type of natural character unsurpassed for buoyancy."²⁸ Because the English soil had

²⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 567.

been friendly to all types and varieties, there had evolved "a race of men in the highest degree original and enterprising, plastic and cosmopolitan."²⁹ This policy "combined with their successful preservation of self-government. . . has won for men of English speech their imperial position in the modern world."³⁰

Fiske viewed the British as being better able to devise methods adopted to colonization. He saw that the English were always able to triumph over the other European races either defeating or absorbing them, but "always proving its superior capacity."³¹ Whatever the circumstances of the struggle, Fiske wrote:

...not the least interesting circumstance connected with the discovery of this broad continent is the fact that the struggle for possession of it has revealed the superior vitality and methods that first came to maturity in England and now seem destined to shape the future of the world.³²

Thus Fiske has set forth his two themes in relation to his concept of Manifest Destiny--the fact that the discovery of America was a gradual evolutionary process going far back in the history of mankind and then, that because of

²⁹ Ibid., p. 568.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 569.

³¹ Ibid., p. 569.

³² Ibid., p. 569.

the superiority of the English-speaking race, that race was destined to triumph over other colonial powers. This last idea was borne out in many other writings of the historian, particularly in relation to his early colonial histories.

In discussions of Old Virginia and Her Neighbours, The Dutch and Quaker Colonies, and The Beginnings of New England, and New France and New England, Fiske set forth ideas which pointed to the possible future of the colonies. These ideas in general conveyed the importance of the English colonies and the reasons for their successes over other powers--Spain, Holland, France. He stressed the reasons pointing to the success of the American mission and then the importance of this success. In particular, there are the ideas of the sifting of the nation for the germs of a new order, the planting of these germs in America, and their final fruition into the federal government of the United States. Colonial history and colonial policy were stepping stones to national greatness.

As other historians and as the early New Englanders themselves, John Fiske first stressed the importance of the Puritan migration, and then set forth the importance of freedom and self-government for the success of the English colonies. Although the Plymouth colony did not achieve great things in itself, Fiske believed it assumed an

importance "which belongs to the beginnings of a new era,"³³ when it was examined in relation to what came afterward. The Puritan influence was destined to grow deeper with the progress of civilization. He thought that if the Puritans had not come to the United States, the Virginia type of society might have become supreme and the western continent might have lost in richness and variety of life. In discussing this Puritan migration to New England, Fiske saw the workings of Divine Providence. In describing the type of New England colonist, he quoted part of a sermon of 1688 by William Stoughton that it was "the simple truth" that "God sifted a whole nation that he might send choice grain into the wilderness."³⁴

Fiske claimed that in the light of their historic results, the Puritans had a sublime mission. This mission fitted into the historian's concept of national mission.

He wrote:

The men who undertook this work were not all free from self-consciousness. They believed that they were doing a wonderful thing. They felt themselves to be instruments in accomplishing a kind of 'manifest destiny.' Their exodus was that of a

³³ John Fiske, Beginnings of New England or the Puritan Theocracy in Its Relation to Civil and Religious Liberty, Boston, 1889, p. 87.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 148.

chosen people who were at length to lay the everlasting foundations of God's kingdom upon earth. Such opinions which took a strong colour from their assiduous study of the Old Testament, reacted and disposed them all the more for illustrations and precedents, and to regard it as an oracle, almost as a talisman. In every propitious event they saw a special providence, an act of divine intervention to deliver them from the snares of an everwatchful Satan. This steadfast faith in an unseen ruler and guide was to them a pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night. . . It gave them clearness of purpose and concentration of strength and contributed toward making them like the children of Israel, a people of indestructible vitality and aggressive energy.³⁵

Fiske realized that his idea of the Puritan mission caused writers to throw a romantic haze about things and perhaps to interfere with the true historical perspective. Yet, he claimed there was a value to their enthusiasm which led the New Englanders to regard themselves as the chosen people, soldiers of Christ. It was this spirit which overthrew Charles I and which resulted in the development of freedom of thought and speech. Fiske himself was imbued with much of the same optimism. The Puritan migration fitted in with his concept of national mission or destiny.

One important point that Fiske made in regard to the success of the English colonies over Spain, Holland, and France--which was a recurrent theme in his writing--was the importance of self-government. He placed great emphasis on freedom and self-government as the cause of English colonial

³⁵ Ibid., p. 242-43.

greatness. He thought American history had shown as false the idea that republics had to be small, and that only absolute monarchy would be able to maintain order throughout a vast territory. He wrote that in the political body "this spirit of freedom is as the red corpuscles in the blood; it carries life with it."³⁶ He saw the American nation equipped as no other nation had ever been to combine sovereignty with liberty, union of the whole with life in the parts.

In all of his works, he stressed the importance of English principles of freedom. One of the conspicuous consequences of the discovery of America, he believed, was the fact that the colonial empire for England and for Holland grew directly out of their conflicts with Spain. Spain tried to subdue the English and Dutch peoples and to suppress the principles of liberty which they represented. England's attack on the Spanish commerce helped pave the way for English colonial settlement.

Thus, the discovery of America opened for colonization a large area "for the possession of which the lower and higher types of European civilization and social polity were to struggle."³⁷ The conquest of the area gave to the ideas

³⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁷ John Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbours, Boston, 1897, Vol. I, p. 10.

of the victors and to their type of system "an unprecedented opportunity for growth and development."³⁸ For Fiske, the beginning of success for colonial England was to be traced back to the sixteenth century struggle between Spain and England. "The defeat of the Invincible Armada was the opening event in the history of the United States. It was the event that made all the rest possible."³⁹ England could not establish successful colonies until she had control of the sea routes, and this she did by defeating the Armada.

Again in his Dutch and Quaker Colonies, Fiske stressed the importance of self-government as one of the keys to successful colonial policy. His idea was that the right of the towns and villages to govern themselves while not impairing national unity was "doubtless the most important prerequisite for success in founding colonies."⁴⁰ He thought that if the people in a village were accustomed to manage their own affairs, they would do it if transported into the wilderness. Thus, his thesis was that England was destined to be a pre-eminent colonizer because she had self-government. By watching the kind of political seed sown in

³⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 39.

⁴⁰ John Fiske, The Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America, Boston, 1899, Vol. I, p. 151.

colonial America, he believed one could tell something of the fruition attained by the country from which it came. He cited the free government in the New England colonies following models from home, but modified to meet the new needs.

In contrast, the Dutch did not immediately produce any free institutions in New Netherland. Fiske concluded that the difference in colonial development toward self-government of the English and the Dutch was due to the fact that the English political liberty at home on a national scale was much more thoroughly organized than that of the Dutch.⁴¹

In discussing the English conquest of New Netherland, a step in the line of expansion, Fiske wrote that it would be difficult to defend Charles II's conquest on any canons of political morality, yet in reference to its place in the chain of historical events it "was an event scarcely second in magnitude to the conquest of Canada in later days."⁴² He saw it as the first link in a chain of events that brought about the conquest of Canada by bringing the British and French frontiers into important contacts:

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 258-63.

⁴² Ibid., p. 388-89.

It gave to the English the command of the commercial and military centre of the Atlantic coast of North America, and by bringing New England into closer relations with Virginia and Maryland, it prefigured and made possible a general union of Atlantic states.⁴³

This step by which New Netherland became New York, Fiske thought was momentous because it transferred to English hands a strategic center of antagonism to New France and "brought about an approach toward unity of political development in the English colonies and made it possible for them at length to come together in a great Federal Union."⁴⁴ Thus, again there is the idea of a gradual evolutionary approach.

From the commercial and military point of view, Fiske felt the conquest was significant in that New Netherland "commanded the continent."⁴⁵ The area served as a military bulwark for New England and the southern colonies and later played an important role in the American Revolution and the War of 1812.

Throughout his works on colonial history, Fiske also stressed the importance of the frontier for the future. Like Frederick Jackson Turner, Fiske saw that one of the most important factors in American history was the existence of the perpetually advancing frontier--an area won by hard

⁴³ Ibid., p. 339.

⁴⁴ Fiske, Dutch and Quaker Colonies, Vol. II, p. 2.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 243.

fighting, an area where life was more romantic, but more sordid; and an area where democracy assumed its most distinctively American features. In describing colonial Virginia in 1624 he said that the Indians had already moved westward and that the frontier was receding, and from then on:

a perpetually receding frontier of barbarism was to be one of the most profoundly and variously significant factors in the life of English speaking America until the census of 1890 should announce that such a frontier could no longer be definitely located."⁴⁶

Thus, in the earlier colonial period John Fiske saw certain factors or conditions which augured well for the future of the English colonies. The destiny of nationhood was gradually emerging. He felt that in the system of representative government inaugurated by England there "lay the future possibility of such gigantic political aggregates as the United States of America."⁴⁷ He wrote that it was through English self-government that England, alone among the nations of Europe, was able to found durable colonies and to send forth colonists:

⁴⁶ Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbours, Vol. I, p. 224-5. Fiske thought the end of the frontier would be one of the important factors in making 20th-century America different from 19th century America. (Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbours, Vol. II, p. 270.)

⁴⁷ John Fiske, "The Federal Union," Harper's Monthly, Vol. 70, February 1885, p. 410.

capable of dealing successfully with the difficult problem of forming such a political aggregate as the United States have become. For obviously the preservation of local self-government is essential to the very idea of a federal union.⁴⁸

Fiske believed that by the time of the War of the Spanish Succession there was dawning the idea of a community of interests among the colonies. He has summarized his views on colonial history as follows:

And thus we begin already to see how the history of the American people down to the present day, is simply the inexorable logical outcome of the peculiar conditions under which the people began to occupy the different portions of the American soil.⁴⁹

He saw in the establishment of the English colonies, whether in New England, Virginia or New York, the strength of self-government, and he attempted to show that the fruition of the idea of self-government led to the establishment of the federal union. This might be styled as his first concept of the destiny of the American nation.

Further evidence of the American mission was found in the writings of the historian in regard to the generation before the American Revolution when the colonists supported Great Britain in the colonial wars against the French and Indians. These wars were fought to remove a barrier imposed by the French and to make possible the expansion of the

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 416.

⁴⁹ John Fiske, "Maryland and the Far South in the Colonial Period," Harper's Monthly, Vol. 66, February 1883, p. 425.

English colonies into the region beyond the Allegheny Mountains. In his writings, Fiske discussed this next phase of Manifest Destiny, the winning of the continent for the English-speaking peoples. In this discussion one notes an extreme nationalism and confidence of spirit, qualities so characteristic of the nineteenth century America in which the writer lived.

By 1753 Virginia and the other colonies could not be treated alone. The struggle against the French became continental--"the stream of Virginia history became an inseparable portion of that majestic stream in which flows the career of our Federal Union."⁵⁰

Just as the difference in systems of government paved the way for the destruction of the Spanish and Dutch colonizing powers, Fiske thought the same was true in the more consequential struggle between the English and the French. He praised the French zeal in colonization, and he thought that the monarch had a great interest in the colony. He was of the opinion that any suffering of Canada at the hands of Louis XIV was due more to excessive care than to neglect since his system was one of watchfulness and surveillance "for which the old regime in France was so notable."⁵¹

⁵⁰ Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbours, Vol. II, p. 400.

⁵¹ John Fiske, New France and New England, Boston, 1902, p. 102.

In comparing the attitudes of Great Britain and France toward their colonies, he referred to England's interest as "lax unconcern"⁵² while pointing out the French desire for uniformity and unity. He concluded:

To attain the ideal of religious unity the strongest inducement for an energetic and progressive population to migrate was relinquished, and the interesting possibility of the growth of a Huguenot New France side by side with a Puritan New England was rejected.⁵³

Fiske believed that LaSalle gave the French the idea for their colonial policy. "The conception of New France as a great empire in the wilderness was taking a distinct shape in his mind,"⁵⁴ he wrote. LaSalle hoped to extend the fur trade, build up the French colonies, convert the Indians, establish a town at the mouth of the Mississippi River, and effect a military occupation of the Mississippi Valley. Fiske saw LaSalle's plan of a military occupation of the Mississippi Valley east to the Appalachians as an attempt to keep the English from going westward. Fiske claimed that this became the policy of the French in North America, and in attempting to carry it out, France fought and lost the Seven Years War.

⁵² Ibid., p. 90.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 91.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 120.

Fiske said that the chief criticism of the French plan was its vastness. There were not enough people to carry it out; yet, he mentioned that LaSalle believed that if he increased fur trade and agricultural opportunities, New France would grow. Fiske concluded: ". . . he entirely failed to understand the inherent weakness of colonization that was dependent upon government support."⁵⁵ This idea he often repeats.

Fiske described the conflict between the French and English for the possession of the continent as irrepressible:

It was the strife between absolutism and individualism, between paternal government carried to the last extreme and the spontaneous life in communities that governed themselves in town meetings. Alike in Europe and America each party was aggressive and uncompromising.⁵⁶

He also pointed out that the Indian problem complicated affairs. When the governments were at peace, the Indians often caused bloodshed.

One of the significant factors in the battle for the continent, according to Fiske, was the English-Iroquois friendship. This helped to turn the tide for the English. He saw the first battle of Ticonderoga in 1609 in which about a dozen Indians were killed as important in marking

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 122.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 233. Here Fiske seemed to ignore the restraints and restrictions of the New England society.

the beginning of the hostility between the French and Indian Iroquois power in North America. He believed that a break between the French and Iroquois was destined to come anyway, but he concluded:

A few shots of an arquebus on that July morning had secured for Frenchmen the most dangerous enemy and for Dutchmen and Englishmen, the most helpful friend that the imperious American wilderness could afford.⁵⁷

In writing of the French and English struggle, Fiske had two main themes. The first was that the inevitable results of the conflict would be a British victory because of the superiority of the English system. The second was that these wars paved the way for the American Revolution-- another phase in the Manifest Destiny movement. During this struggle germs of confederation were sown. Thus, again there is the evolutionary process of history connected with the destiny of the nation.

To Fiske, the seventy years of struggle between France and England were "far grander than the struggle between Rome and Carthage . . . for primacy in the world."⁵⁸ He looked upon the events of the eighteenth century in their

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 71. In The Dutch and Quaker Colonies, Vol. I, p. 255, Fiske repeated this idea and in comparing Champlain's victory over the Mohawks at Ticonderoga to Montcalm's victory in 1758 over the English at Ticonderoga, he wrote that the former was "an event of prime importance in American history, while Montcalm's is but a subordinate incident."

⁵⁸ Fiske, Beginnings of New England, p. 277.

causal relations as conspicuous in America. It was impossible to view the French and Indian War except against the background of the overall issue of the rivalry for the mastery of the continent.

In eighteenth century Virginia, outposts of English civilization began to creep inland across the mountains. In Virginia itself a westward movement was occurring between 1727-49 which helped to determine the character of all the states. Up until about 1748 the English-French rivalry had resulted in several wars. The only one of these significant from the colonial point of view was the War of the Spanish Succession which resulted in England's receiving Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay territory. By 1748, the French and English colonial rivalry came to a crisis over the Ohio Valley.

Fiske thought that by 1748 the French began to see the disadvantages of scarcity of numbers distributed over long exterior lines. By 1748 English settlers were approaching the Appalachian Mountains, and the Ohio Land Company had been formed. The advance of the English frontier was an advance against the center of the whole French position, and the French became alarmed thinking that in the event of conflict, the English with their influence over the Mohawks, would be able to control the Niagara River. Fiske said that the French saw the English traders in the Ohio

Valley establishing strong influence over the natives, and they began to fear that England would control routes and sever New France in two.

Fiske said that by the time of the war, but not yet recognized, the English colonies had drifted into a continental state of things, hastened by increased population, which had caused the English population to move toward the Ohio Valley. He claimed:

It was no longer a conflict between New France and New England in the narrower sense, but between New France and the entire world of English America. Under these circumstances the next war that should break out must be a continental affair. ...⁵⁹

Of this war's outbreak in the Ohio Valley, he commented, "Thus inauspiciously for the English began the mighty war that was to put an end to the dominion of Frenchmen in America. . ."⁶⁰ In the general struggle Fiske claimed that New France was rigidly regulated and protected, a condition which he thought resulted in a paralysis of the political and social system and eventual defeat. He commented:

It is to the self-government of England. . . that we are to look for the secret of that boundless vitality which has given to men of English speech the uttermost parts of the earth for an inheritance.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 278.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 293.

⁶¹ Fiske, "The Town Meeting," Harper's, Vol. 70, January 1885, p. 272.

The idea again was that of the importance of self-government. "If coddling and fostering could make a colony thrive, the French in Canada ought to have dominated North America," he wrote.⁶²

In discussing the battle of Quebec, which Fiske felt decided the fate of Canada, he saw this as:

one of the greatest scenes in the history of mankind, the final act in the drama which gave the North American continent into the keeping of the English race instead of the French. . .⁶³

He wrote of the "tremendous and world wide nature of the issues that were decided in 1759."⁶⁴ Wolfe's victory, he thought, marked "the greatest turning point as discernible in modern history."⁶⁵

In his praise of Pitt's ability in the course of the war, Fiske set forth the idea that this war was indeed a step in the future greatness of the United States, and Pitt had helped plan the victories which cleared the way for the westward movement into the Mississippi Valley "insuring us the ultimate control of the fairest part of this continent."⁶⁶

⁶² Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbours, Vol. I, p. 240.

⁶³ Fiske, New France and New England, p. 358-9.

⁶⁴ Fiske, Dutch and Quaker Colonies, Vol. I, p. 111.

⁶⁵ Fiske, American Political Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint of Universal History, New York, 1885, p. 54.

⁶⁶ John Fiske, The American Revolution, Boston, 1891, Vol. II, p. 18.

Pitt's triumphs "decided that this new and greater Europe should become for the most part a new and greater England,-- a world of self-government, and of freedom of thought and speech."⁶⁷ From these ideas, therefore, it might be concluded that Fiske looked upon the wars between France and England in the 18th century as playing a decisive role in the shaping of the American nation. The French no longer would be a barrier to expansion. He wrote:

Never did destiny preside over a more fateful contest: for it determined which kind of political seed should be sown all over the widest and richest garden plot left untilled in the world.⁶⁸

As long as Fiske had chosen the field of American history for illustrating on a broad scale the doctrine of evolution as applied to human history, it should not be surprising that he looked upon the American Revolution as another evolutionary step. He saw that the colonial struggle between the English and the French sowed the seeds for this revolt. As long as the colonial wars were being waged, England was conciliatory toward the colonies. However, after the war was over, and the French were overthrown, then measures were taken which led to the American Revolution.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 18-19.

⁶⁸ John Fiske, "Francis Parkman," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 73, May 1894, p. 674.

Throughout his story of this epic, he again stressed the idea of political freedom. He thought the people were moved by self-preservation of their political freedoms. England, which he felt had been the defender of personal liberty and local self-government, he now saw as arrayed against the principles of public justice.⁶⁹ He referred to the attitude of England as "strange," "humiliating," and "self-contradictory" and blamed it on the policy of George III.⁷⁰

In the quarrel with the mother country, Fiske said there were two solutions to the problem. Great Britain might have let the colonies elect representatives to the British Parliament, or Britain might have left the right of levying taxes in the colonial legislatures. The former, Fiske felt would have been impractical; the latter, practicable. He thought Britain should have recognized that "in accordance with the entire spirit of the English Constitution, the right of levying taxes in America resided only in the colonial legislatures,"⁷¹ for here alone were the American freemen adequately represented. He did admit that the American question was a new problem, and that there

⁶⁹ Fiske, The American Revolution, Vol. I, p. 98.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 98.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 35.

was no adequate precedent to guide the British. If Britain exempted any part of the British Empire from taxation, it would seem like she was destroying the political unity of the Empire.⁷²

Fiske believed that independence came only after all hope of peaceful solution had disappeared. It was brought about by "the settled conviction of the people that the priceless treasure of self-government could be preserved by no other means."⁷³ This idea slowly grew in the people, and once the Declaration of Independence was issued, there was no turning back. To Fiske this was the "only course that could preserve their self-respect, and guarantee them in the great part which they had to play in the drama of civilization."⁷⁴ Thus, independence was a means of fulfilling their destiny. Fiske quoted Judge Drayton of South Carolina in trying to make his point: "'A decree is gone forth not to be recalled, and thus had suddenly risen in the world a new empire, styled the United States of America.'⁷⁵

In discussing the significant events of the American Revolution, Fiske constantly alluded to the destiny of the nation. In describing Pitt's greatness, he referred to him

⁷² Ibid., p. 33-4.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 196.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 194.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 197.

as being interesting to the Americans "as standing in the forefront of that vast future in which we are to play so important a part."⁷⁶ He also pointed out that it was fortunate that Pitt had wrested the western territory from the French in the previous war. It would have been difficult to obtain it in the course of the Revolution from France, with whom we were framing an alliance. Also in pointing out that during the course of the war immigrants moved into the frontier areas, Fiske looked upon this as an important step in expansion. "Thus by decrees was our grasp firmly fastened upon the western country, and year by year we grew stronger."⁷⁷ He also saw the military victories of George Rogers Clark extending the United States to the Mississippi in spite of opposition of France and Spain to United States expansion into that valley.

In relation to the results of the war, John Fiske felt the Peace of Paris was a great triumph of modern diplomacy and an aid in expansion. If it had not been well managed, the United States might have been confined between the Atlantic and the Allegheny Mountains, and then, he wrote:

⁷⁶ Fiske, The American Revolution, Vol. II, p. 20.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 107-8.

...our westward expansion would have been impossible without further warfare in which European powers would have been involved; and the form of our Federal Union would doubtless have been effectively hindered, if not, indeed altogether prevented.⁷⁸

In this connection, Fiske described the opposition of France and Spain to American expansion. He claimed that France opposed leaving the land between Tennessee and Western Florida in the hands of the Americans since it would open up the possibility of expansion. He also quoted the Spanish representative in the preliminary peace negotiations as predicting something of the future of the country when he said, "This federal republic is born a pygmy. A day will come when it will be a giant, even a colossus formidable in these countries."⁷⁹

Thus, John Fiske saw in the establishment of independence a further step or a fulfilling of the idea of Manifest Destiny. However, he did not envision any great or long separation of England and the former colonies. In keeping with his idea of the superiority of the English-speaking peoples, he did not look upon the Revolution as bringing ruin to the British Empire. He wrote:

⁷⁸ John Fiske, The Critical Period in American History, Boston, 1883, p. 35.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 19. This Spanish minister, Aranda, also predicted the United States would get Florida and Mexico and suggested that Spain and France should try to prevent the growth of the "dreaded colossus." (Ibid., p.19.)

It was not understood that English America and English Britain were bound together by commercial and social ties so strong that no question of political union or severance could permanently affect them.⁸⁰

In the period immediately following the Revolution, Fiske saw the next step in the development of full nationhood. This was the period styled as the critical period of American history. For Fiske, it was important as the period of the creation of the national domain which helped expansion. In this period, there were conflicting land claims and the states eventually gave their lands to the government of the Articles of Confederation. Fiske saw that the vast importance of the lands between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi became more apparent "as the westward movement of the population went on."⁸¹

In depicting the period following the American Revolution, Fiske looked upon it as a turning point in the development of political society in the western hemisphere. Events of the era were "fraught with more tremendous alternatives of future welfare or misery for mankind than is easy for the imagination to grasp."⁸² He again stressed the importance of liberty and self-government for future success.

⁸⁰ Fiske, The American Revolution, Vol. II, p. 5.

⁸¹ Fiske, The Critical Period, p. 207.

⁸² Ibid., p. vi.

He said that while many enemies compared the United States to the Roman Republic and expected its fall, this was a false analogy:

The Romans knew no free government except in a primary assembly. . . whereas the people of the United States were all English in speech and blood and there were not such differences in degrees of civilization, and the American people were familiar with the principle of representation having practiced it in England and America.⁸³

He did recognize the importance of local government as essential for the future of the country. He wrote that if the day ever came when local affairs were administered from Washington, and when the states lost their self-government:

...on that day the progressive political career of the American people will have come to an end, and the hopes that have been built upon it for the future happiness and prosperity of mankind will be wrecked forever.⁸⁴

For Fiske, the post-American Revolution period was thus the next step in the evolutionary process preparing the way for national sovereignty under the federal system.

Most of the ideas of Fiske which have been discussed to this point have come from his writings of the earlier period of American history. This was his primary field of

⁸³ Ibid., p. 59.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 238.

concentration. However, a few of his essays do show his expansionist attitude during the middle period of American history.

In discussing Thomas Jefferson in his Essays Historical and Literary, he upheld Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana as the "most important act of his presidency" and one which gave to the United States "its imperial dimensions."⁸⁵ He perceived that it was desirable to get rid of the European influence at the mouth of the Mississippi River. In commenting on the death of Jefferson he showed his sympathy with the President's designs:

He had lived long enough to see the fruition of his work, to see the American people in full sympathy with him. . . . Could there have been a nobler triumph for this strong and sweet nature?⁸⁶

In his essay on Andrew Jackson, Fiske looked upon the War of 1812 as dealing the first blow to separatist tendencies and thus helping to create a stronger nation--a nation able to fulfill its mission. He gave the impression of general sympathy with the western war-hawks when he said of Henry Clay:

⁸⁵ John Fiske, Essays, Historical and Literary, New York, 1902, Vol. I., p. 177.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 180.

It was the much loved statesman, 'Harry of the West,' the eloquent Henry Clay, that had prevailed upon the country to appeal to arms in spite of the wrath of the New Englanders and the misgivings of President Madison.⁸⁷

In the same essay Fiske pointed out the importance of the Westward Movement for the future. He believed the pure American spirit first came to maturity in those who moved into Kentucky and Tennessee. He was of the opinion that although the importance of the Westward Movement went unnoticed for a long period, few have failed to comprehend its importance in the political development of the United States. With this movement beyond the Alleghenies, there developed a fierce spirit of Americanism which helped to drive the country into the War of 1812. This movement was also important in driving the Indians from their hunting grounds, an event eventually helping the downfall of the Red men. Along this line of the importance of the West for American development, Fiske claimed that Jackson's victory at New Orleans decided that henceforth the Mississippi River "belonged indisputably to the people of the United States."⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 278. In an essay, "Daniel Webster and the Sentiment of Union," Fiske said that Webster's opinion that the War of 1812 was unnecessary and injurious to the country, was "probably like most New Englanders of that time mistaken." (Ibid., p. 371.)

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 252.

Fiske did not consider in any detail the Manifest Destiny movement of the 1830's and 1840's. However, he does imply support of Van Buren's policy against the annexation of Texas because of its connection with the slavery issue. He wrote that Van Buren would have been the Democratic presidential candidate in 1844 "but because he bravely opposed the annexation of Texas as a reenforcement to the slave power, he was unable to secure the nomination."⁸⁹ It is difficult to see this, though, as a positive stand against expansion in this area.

In the same period, in discussing the debate on the Oregon question, Fiske reported that Senator McDuffie of South Carolina laughed at the idea that the remote area of Oregon might be of use to us. Fiske himself claimed:

It was because of this short sightedness which was shared by all our Eastern statesmen, that we consented to divide the disputed territory with Great Britain.⁹⁰

Fiske thought that if the western opinion had prevailed, "the whole of that magnificent country now known as British Columbia might have been ours, and in all

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 360.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 221.

probability without a war."⁹¹ This would seem to indicate he would have favored the expansionist slogan of "54040' or fight" used by the Democrats in the campaign of 1844.

In conclusion to this chapter on John Fiske, it might be well to comment on some of his views toward Manifest Destiny as found in his American Political Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint of Universal History. One of the essays in this series is very aptly titled Manifest Destiny. In the American Political Ideas, Fiske repeated the idea of American history as an evolutionary process; he stressed the importance of the preservation of local self-government for maintaining a rich, powerful, national life, and then he pointed to the future greatness and potentiality of the English-speaking peoples.

The author wrote: "The government of the United States is not the result of special creation but of evolution."⁹² American history was descended "in unbroken continuity from the days when stout Arminius in the forest of northern Germany successfully defied the might of imperia

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 221. There is nothing in Fiske's writings in relation to the later age of imperialism, but William R. Thayer writing in 1902 claimed that he disapproved of the war with Spain, but acquiesced in its results, at least to the extent that he "detached himself from the Anti-Imperialists with whom he had first sympathized." (W. R. Thayer, "John Fiske," Harvard Graduate Magazine, Vol. 10, 1902, p. 38.)

⁹² Fiske, American Political Ideas, p. 6.

Rome."⁹³ More directly, he saw American statesmanship as the fruition of the work of Englishmen such as DeMontfort. His idea was that the two branches of the English race held a common mission of establishing a higher civilization and a more permanent political order.⁹⁴

In searching for a cause of the durability of the Federal Union, Fiske thought the preservation of local self-government was important in maintaining national life. Without this local self-government, the union might have been converted into an imperial centralizing government. The flexibility of the federal union, Fiske claimed, made it "the only kind of government according to modern ideas that is permanently applicable to a whole continent."⁹⁵

To Fiske writing in 1885, the idea of Manifest Destiny meant the future of the Anglo-Saxon race and huge dimensions of the United States. In his essay Manifest Destiny, he tried to show that the English conquest of North America was "the most prodigious event in the annals of mankind."⁹⁶ The success of England over other colonial

⁹³ Ibid., p. 7.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 92.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 125.

rivals, he thought, proved which kind of civilization was higher and sturdier as to its political life. The power winning this colonial victory was "clearly destined hereafter to take the lead in the world, though the rival powers could not in these days fully appreciate this fact."⁹⁷

He saw that when the English colonies, based on English political ideas were planted, removed from European checks, the growth was rapid and steady, and principles of self-government were put into operation. Even in the American Revolution, the struggle was a political struggle in behalf of the principles the English people had held dear. As a result of this Revolution, there were two Englands "prepared to work . . . toward the political regeneration of mankind."⁹⁸

In his predictions for the future, Fiske was more optimistic than the future has warranted. He was of the opinion that the United States could probably support a population of about 1500 millions, and by the close of the twentieth century the population of the English race in the United States would be 600 or 700 millions. He thought this

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 127. These same general ideas are found in three articles in Harper's, Vol. 70, 1885, entitled "The Town Meeting," January 1885, p. 265-72; "The Federal Union," February 1885, p. 407-18; and "Manifest Destiny," March 1885, p. 578-90.

⁹⁸ Fiske, American Political Ideas, p. 129.

huge population could be kept together under a federal system, for he felt the destruction of Rome was due to its strongly centralized government.

In 1885 he looked upon the federal system as "the finest specimen of constructive statesmanship the world has ever seen."⁹⁹ Thus, he considered that federalism was the most important principle which had come from colonization, containing within itself the seeds of permanent peace between nations which he thought would come "in the fulness of time."¹⁰⁰ He believed that as long as that principle of federalism was unimpaired in the United States, "there is no reason why any further increase of territory or of population should overtax the resources of our government."¹⁰¹ He predicted that in the United States a century from his writing there would be a political aggregation "immeasurably surpassing in power and in dimensions any empire that has as yet existed."¹⁰²

In an overly optimistic vein, he wrote:

. . . the work which the English race began when it colonized North America is destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that is not already

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 133.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 134.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 139.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 139.

the seat of an old civilization shall become English in its language, in its political habits and traditions, and to a prominent extent in the blood of its people.¹⁰³

Twentieth century events in Asia and Africa would no doubt be surprising to Fiske if he were around to view the rise of the numerous independent states. He himself foresaw the day when four-fifths of the human race would trace its pedigree to English forefathers, when the race would be spread over both hemispheres, and when it would maintain commercial supremacy. He saw the English language as becoming the dominant language, and the Anglo-American ideas of local self-government combined with federation, destined to be dominant factors in the future development of the political organization of the world.¹⁰⁴ This was a logical application of the doctrine of evolution to the developing interests of humanity, and it pointed to America's place in universal history. Thus, his Manifest Destiny was in relation to the future of the English race.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 145. Fiske was also optimistic in regard to British colonization in Africa. He predicted that "within two or three centuries the African continent will be occupied by a mighty nation of English descent, and covered with populous cities and flourishing farms, and with railroads and telegraphs. . ." (Ibid., p. 141.)

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 145.

At the time of his writing (1885), he saw the United States as the strongest nation of the world. He felt that with toil and labor it would come about that one could speak of the United States "as stretching from pole to pole--or with Tennyson to celebrate 'the Parliament of men and the federation of the world.'"¹⁰⁵ Thus, Fiske had what has been referred to as a "cheery confidence in the future."¹⁰⁶ This future would be a part of the evolutionary historic process already begun, and it would be a future in which the English-speaking races would dominate. The following quotations bear out this idea. In the first, referring to his concept of history, he stated that in the days to come as the solidarity of the Teutonic race became clearer:

. . . the more will the student of history be impressed. . . that the founding of modern Germany, the maritime supremacy of England, and the winning of the Mississippi valley for English speaking America, were but the different phases of one historic event, coherent parts of the one vast conception which marks its author as the grandest of modern statesmen.¹⁰⁷

In the second quotation he was referring to his own nation when he wrote:

¹⁰⁵ Fiske, The Critical Period, p. vi.

¹⁰⁶ Perry, John Fiske, p. 42.

¹⁰⁷ Fiske, The American Revolution, Vol. II, p. 19-20.

As we stand upon this threshold of that mighty future, in the light of which all events of the past are clearly destined to seem dwindled in dimensions and significant only in the ratio of their potency as causes; as we discern how large a part of that future must be the outcome of the creative work, for good or ill, of men of English speech, we are put into the proper mood for estimating the significance of the causes which determined a century ago that the continent of North America should be dominated by a single powerful and pacific nation instead of being parcelled out among forty or fifty small communities, wasting their strength and lowering their moral tone by perpetual warfare, like the state of ancient Greece, or by perpetual preparation for warfare, like the nations of modern Europe.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Fiske, The Critical Period, p. vi-vii. It is interesting that one of Fiske's biographers; John Clark, has claimed that Fiske would have found in 1917 that the sending of troops to Europe was "the legitimate evolutionary outcome from what he affirmed was the greatest event in human history since the birth of Christ. The voyage of Columbus . . . in 1492." (Clark, op. cit., Vol. I, p. xvii.)

CHAPTER V

HENRY ADAMS PATRICIAN INTERPRETER OF MANIFEST DESTINY

Henry Adams might be classed as a patrician interpreter of Manifest Destiny. He belonged to the American patrician class which is probably the closest the country has come to an aristocracy. "He belonged to the American royal family with a political tradition of greatness and continuity unequalled in the country's history."¹ The Adams family fit into what many believe is a pattern of American conservatism. Most of the family were skeptical of the large promise of democracy and of absolute faith in the wisdom of the people. They believed more in a natural aristocracy upon whom political leadership was incumbent, and they felt they belonged to this natural aristocracy. "Somewhere, one feels, they agreed with the ancien regime, and its kings and nobles. . ."² Henry Adams was the grandson of the sixth President of the United States, John Quincy Adams; he was the great-grandson of the second President of the United States, John Adams; his own father was influential

¹ Mason Wade, "Angelic Porcupine", Commonweal, Vol. 45, February 21, 1947, p. 470.

² Edward N. Saveth, "Henry Adams: Waning of America's Patriciate," Commentary, Vol. 24, October 1957, p. 302.

in state and national politics and served as United States Minister to London. Henry Adams, a member of the fourth generation, became a man of letters rather than of politics. As a nationalist and patriot, as a man interested in science, philosophy, and history, he had much to say about the mission of America.

1. Background and General Appraisal

Henry Adams was born in 1838 in a typical New England house in Boston, the fourth of six children of Charles Francis and Abigail Brooks Adams. His childhood was not unusual, and he was brought up in the political traditions of the Adams family. His father was one of the publishers of the Boston Whig, which reflected strong anti-slave sentiments so common in New England. When the Whig party crumbled, Charles Francis Adams and others organized the Free Soil Party in opposition to the extension of slavery in any territory. In 1848 the elder Adams ran unsuccessfully for the Vice-Presidency on the Free Soil ticket.

At the age of sixteen, Henry Adams went to Harvard. Here he read much, wrote for the Harvard Magazine, and was the class day orator in his senior year.³ The fall of 1858,

³ Of Harvard he claimed, "Socially or intellectually, the college was for him negative and in some ways mischievous." (Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams; An Autobiography, Boston, 1918, p. 65.)

following his graduation from Harvard, he and a group of fellow graduates sailed for Europe for two years of study and travel. He lived for a time in Berlin where he attended law lectures at the University, but he soon found himself in difficulty because of insufficient German and Latin. Then, he went to a state operated German school to learn the language, "the first act of his life which was his own deliberate choice."⁴

After about three months in the state school, Adams left for a trip through Germany, finally settling in Dresden. The following year he travelled through Germany, Austria, and Italy, writing impressions for the Boston Courier. He returned to Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1860 in time to vote for Abraham Lincoln for President.

During the secession crisis of 1861, Henry Adams' father served as a Congressman, and the son assumed the position of congressional secretary. In 1861 Charles Francis Adams was appointed minister to Great Britain. Here too, the son served as secretary to his father.

While in England, and unknown to his father, he wrote a series of articles, unsigned, for the New York Times regarding opinion in England about the Civil War. Finally,

⁴ Elizabeth Stevenson, Henry Adams, A Biography, New York, 1955, p. 23.

one article, in which he expressed some criticism of British manners, was published with his name in the Boston Courier, and was reprinted in the Manchester papers. This caused some embarrassment to his father, some hard feelings abroad, and ended his journalistic writings from London.

In 1861, Adams was bored with some of his English life, but later he grew more content as his father sent him on various missions, and as he saw importance in the work of his father during the course of the war. One thing that bothered him was that others were home doing much more for the war effort.

In London, during the early Reconstruction days, he was critical of the actions of Congress "violating the rights of minorities more persistently than the worst pro slavery Congress could do. . ."5

In 1868, the Adams family returned home, and the following year Henry Adams became an independent journalist. Adams claimed he was disillusioned with the sordidness of the Reconstruction politics of the Grant Administration and

⁵ Ibid., p. 71.

was renouncing public life. However, he always retained an interest in politics and had the acquaintance and friendship of many political leaders.⁶

In his new career, Adams wrote critical articles for the North American Review and other papers, including a series of annual political reviews begun in 1869 and published in the North American Review under the title "The Session."

In 1870 Henry Adams took a teaching position at Harvard, and he assumed the editorship of the North American Review which went with the Harvard appointment. He hoped to make the North American Review "a regular organ of our opinions."⁷ He had had no formal historical research, and he was opposed to the ruling theories of education then in vogue at Harvard. He tried to reform the system by requiring collateral reading and substituting discussions for recitation. In his Education, "Failure" is the title of the chapter dealing with this experience. However, one student,

⁶ Some feel Adams would not have accepted a public post if it were offered to him. James T. Adams disagreed with this. He claimed that his inherited instinct and sense of duty would not have allowed him to decline. He wrote that Adams had remarked that he would never refuse a duty imposed on him by the government. J. T. Adams was of the opinion that no president ever invited him to fill an office. (James Truslow Adams, Henry Adams, New York, 1933, p. 102.) Oliver Wendall Holmes claimed Adams wanted an office "handed to him on a silver platter." (Quoted by Herbert Edwards in "Henry Adams: Politician and Statesman," New England Quarterly, Vol. 22, March 1949, p. 51.)

⁷ Stevenson, op. cit., p. 119.

Henry Cabot Lodge, claimed the course was the first one to make him think, saying, "Mr. Adams aroused the spirit of inquiry and controversy in me. . ." ⁸ Adams' teaching was personal and stimulating and gave all the opportunity to learn.

While at Harvard in 1872 Adams married Marian Hooper and soon sailed for Europe with a year's leave from the University. By January 1874, he was again teaching and editing the North American Review. Yet, he did not stay at either position very long. A quarrel with the publisher of the Review caused him to resign from that post, and his dissatisfaction with the content and matter of his course caused him to give up the teaching profession in 1877. ⁹

After Harvard, Adams decided to go to Washington where he had been asked to edit some manuscripts. This was the real beginning of his formal historical work. In 1877 he finished editing Documents Relating to New England Federalism--1800-1815. Two years later he finished his biography of Gallatin which set forth the idea that statesmanship begins in morals and from that base proceeds to a practical application. He considered Gallatin as the most

⁸ Ibid., p. 117.

⁹ Of his many educations, "Adams thought that of school teacher the thinnest." (Adams, Education, p. 307.)

admirable figure of the Jeffersonian period. Henry Steele Commager has referred to the work as "the best political biography."¹⁰

The next project for the historian was a trip to Europe to visit Madrid, Paris, and London to collect data for his monumental History. He returned to Washington in 1880 where he continued his investigations for this History, the most important of all his works. After his wife's death in 1885, he lost interest in most affairs, but he did complete the History, a nine-volume work published between 1889-91 and entitled The History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison. Commager has referred to this as "the finest piece of historical writing, in our literature."¹¹

The publication of his History marked the end of the first period of Adams' life. From 1891 to his death in 1918 he spent his time in travelling throughout the world, in writing, and in theorizing. His chief works during this period were an essay, The Tendency of History, read in

¹⁰ Henry Steele Commager, "Henry Adams," in The Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, (ed.) by William T. Hutchinson, New York, 1937, p. 195.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 195. In 1891 Adams wrote, "There are not nine pages in the nine volumes that now express anything of my interest or feelings; unless perhaps some of my disillusionment. . ." (Jacob C. Levenson, The Mind and Art of Henry Adams, Boston, 1957, p. 217.)

December 1894 in place of the Presidential Address of the American Historical Association; and A Letter to the Teachers of American History published in 1910. In these Adams was attempting to draw up a philosophy of history. In 1913 he published his famous Mont-Saint Michel and Chartes. Finally, his autobiography, The Education of Henry Adams, was published after his death. An insight into his attitudes and viewpoints during his life is also furnished by collections of letters edited by Worthington Ford and Harold Cater. During this latter period of his life Adams had a somewhat pessimistic outlook and talked much of despair, degeneration, and decay.

Someone once commented that Henry Adams could not be typed, that he was "like the stained glass of Chartes, different in every light."¹² Another has described him as "an enigma to his contemporaries" and "an intellectual non-conformist."¹³ Mason Wade has claimed that few Americans "have been such thorough citizens of the world as Henry Adams."¹⁴ These are but a few of the descriptions of Henry

¹² Frances Quinlivan, "Irregularities of the Mental Mirror," Catholic World, Vol. 143, April 1946, p. 58.

¹³ M. Whitcomb Hess, "The Atomic Age and Henry Adams," Catholic World, Vol. 172, Jan. 1951, p. 256. The general idea in these descriptions is that when people start to analyze his meanings or discover his implications, they become confused by the multiplicity of his mind.

¹⁴ Wade, op. cit., p. 470.

Adams. His best views on the early mission of America are found in his History, which might be referred to as the literary monument of the first part of his life. His other works also give some of his ideas and beliefs.

It has been said that Adams in the opening of his History "gives the keynote for the understanding of the character of the American people at the opening of their expansion as a nation across the American continent."¹⁵ His work is a political, military, and diplomatic history. Adams considered that his history was not romantic as European history was. He perceived his history "to be the rise of a new American nationality in the civilized society of the Western world."¹⁶

The historical works of Adams tried to explain the shift in political power from New England to the West, from agriculture to industry, from the individual to the mass. He attempted to reveal the decline of the intellectually aristocratic traditions. Adams wanted to make politics symbolize social development. Adams wanted the readers to

¹⁵ H. Morse Stephens, "Some Living American Historians," World's Work, Vol. 4, July 1902, p. 2326.

¹⁶ Levenson, op. cit., p. 121.

judge what share the individual possessed in creating or shaping the nation; he believed the nation could be understood only by studying the individual.¹⁷

Adams also wanted to show that events in history were interrelated. It was impossible to explain American history as an independent branch. In his historical research he had traced the thread of human liberty back to the beginnings in the forest in Germany. This brought him out at last to the westward movement of democracy in the forests and lands of the Mississippi during the period of Jeffersonianism.

Throughout his works, as will be shown, Adams reflected a concern for the United States and her future and sometimes manifested this concern "behind a facade both blunt and subtle."¹⁸ He expressed little confidence in the ability of the average man to govern himself in the modern technological world, and he was concerned for the moral tone of the United States. He was a nationalist and a patriot; yet, he did not laud the inevitable superiority of the United States to every other nation; rather, he limited his praise "for what he conceived as the superiority of certain ideas and

¹⁷ Henry Adams, The History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, New York, 1889-91, Vol. IX, p. 226.

¹⁸ Timothy Paul Donovan, Henry Adams and Brooks Adams --- The Education of Two American Historians, Norman, 1961, p. 6.

institutions larger than the geographical boundaries of any country, but best observed in the United States."¹⁹ "America had a destiny to fulfill before the world and its realization was dependent upon the maintenance of good intentions as well as good deeds,"²⁰ he thought. Donovan claims this sense of mission was found in the Adams family, and Henry and his brother, Brooks, believed that an understanding of the past was necessary to accomplish the mission.

In the line of praise and criticism of Adams' writing, Ferdinand Schevill has said that in the eyes of his fellow craftsmen, "the History ranks as his greatest work."²¹ James T. Adams has claimed the History was "the best and most scholarly history of its period and it is likely long to remain so."²² Gamaliel Bradford has admitted that the History was important and enduring but felt that "as a whole, there is a lack of broad, structural conception, a tendency to obscure large movements by detail, sometimes diverting and sometimes tedious."²³ Schevill, too, admitted that the work

¹⁹ William Jordy, Henry Adams, Scientific Historian, New Haven, 1952, p. 18.

²⁰ Donovan, op. cit., p. 12.

²¹ Ferdinand Schevill, Six Historians, Chicago, 1956, p. 169.

²² James T. Adams, "Henry Adams and the New Physics," Yale Review, n.s., Vol. 19, Dec. 1929, p. 285.

²³ Gamaliel Bradford, "Henry Adams" in American Portraits 1875-1900, Boston, 1920, p. 51.

suffered from "a too detailed, and finally tedious pursuit of the minute fluctuations in the long-spun-out diplomatic exchanges between Washington and its European antagonists."²⁴ Thus, like most historians, Henry Adams has received praise and some criticism. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the view of Adams on his country's mission or destiny. Again, it is well to remember that his views were colored to a certain extent by his surroundings and his family traditions.

2. Adams and Early Manifest Destiny

In considering Adams' views on the expansion of his country, it is well to start with his monumental work, the History. Some think that he wrote this multi-volume work to clarify in his own mind the meaning of American history in order to later formulate his laws of history. Adams himself wrote:

The scientific interest of American history centered in national character, and in the workings of a society destined to become vast, in which individuals were important chiefly as types. . . Should history ever become a true science, it must expect to establish its laws . . . from the economical evolution of a great democracy. North America was the most favorable field on the globe for the spread of a society so large, uniform, and isolated as to answer the purposes of science. . . The interest of such a subject exceeded that of any other branch of science, for it brought mankind within sight of its own end.²⁵

²⁴ Schevill, op. cit., p. 170.

²⁵ Adams, History, Vol. IX, p. 222, 225.

In his Education, Adams said that he had published his dozen volumes of history:

. . . for no other purpose than to satisfy himself whether, by the severest process of starting with the least possible comment, such facts as seemed sure, in such order as seemed rigorously consequent, he could fix for a familiar moment a necessary sequence of human movement.²⁶

Thus, he was interested in the scientific aspects of history, and he was interested in the proper sequence of human movement. This history is the best source of information on Adams' love for America and prospects for the future.

Ernest Samuels has said that Adams' History became "the great masterwork of his maturity. All else was preparation for it or tributary to its progress."²⁷ Carl Becker has described the work as one which "for clarity, light construction, and sheer intelligence applied to the exposition of a great theme, had not then, and has not since been equalled by any American historian."²⁸ Henry Steele Commager has said:

With the exception of Francis Parkman's France and England in North America, it is the only major work yet produced by an American historian of which it can be justly said that age cannot wither it nor custom stale its infinite variety.²⁹

²⁶ Adams, Education, p. 382.

²⁷ Ernest Samuels, The Young Henry Adams, Cambridge, 1948, p. 299.

²⁸ Quoted by Harvey Wish in The American Historian, New York, 1960, p. 172.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 172.

Adams himself, in explaining to Charles Milnes Gaskell in 1884 why the History might be dull reading to an Englishman, said:

I am writing for a continent of a hundred million people fifty years hence; and I can't stop to think what England will read.³⁰

Adams also claimed in 1899 that his History was merely an introduction to the nineteenth century and would serve the future historian with a fixed starting point.³¹

For Adams, history was a means by which the present might be understood. Timothy Donovan has said that Adams could never escape the deep patriotism which he had for America, but he did become disillusioned in the promise of American life, especially since he was aware of the country's earlier promise of achievement.

In the North American Review of October 1876 in a review of VonHolst's History of the United States, Adams set forth the idea that the historian should sometimes contemplate:

As one stands in the presence of the primitive energy, the continent itself seems to be the result of agencies not more unlimited in their power, not more sure in their processes, not more complete in their results, than those which have controlled our political system.³²

³⁰ Worthington Chauncey Ford (ed.), Letters of Henry Adams, Boston, 1930-38, Vol. I, p. 357.

³¹ Jordy, op. cit., p. 16.

³² Quoted by Donovan, op. cit., p. 166.

While Bancroft tried to assure Americans that their destiny was the special charge of the Deity, Adams was more of the scientific historian. He believed that the "laws of human progress were not matters for dogmatic faith, but for study."³³ He thought that America was not exempt from the common burdens of humanity and could not delude itself "with hope of evading laws of Nature and instincts of life."³⁴ History should be organized on a scientific hypothesis. Thus, Adams' works are in the line of scientific history.

In executing his History, about nine-tenths of it portrayed the action of American democracy: He used whatever history, geography, statistics, newspapers, and other accounts could offer to give a clear sketch of American life in 1800-1817. The general subject was the emerging American nation which had been the result of democratic and technological revolutions because so little history had been enacted on its own territory. To Adams, "Washington was the symbol of America on the point of trying to master a continent and create on its soil a single republican nation."³⁵

³³ Ernest Samuels, Henry Adams, the Middle Years, Cambridge, 1958, p. 353.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 353.

³⁵ Levenson, op. cit., p. 118.

In the History Adams placed before his readers certain ideas and questions. He felt it was improbable "that America should under any circumstances follow the experiences of European development."³⁶ "That the destinies of America must be decided in America was a maxim of true Democrats. . ."³⁷ He considered the era between 1800-1817 an important one for historians trying to discover the nature of the American character. He believed the reaction of the nation to this new Jeffersonian thought brought about a new civilization. ". . . American civilization was born not coincidentally with the Revolution, but with the inauguration of President Jefferson."³⁸ The period of Adams' History was important because it was the period in which the American government settled into permanent shape, and American character was being defined. The political facts, the economic development, the intellectual and emotional tones influenced the creation of the national temperament. "He needed nothing less than the whole scene of Western civilization to show the pressures exerted upon the new American civilization."³⁹

³⁶ Stevenson, op. cit., p. 259.

³⁷ Adams, History, Vol. IV, p. 134.

³⁸ Stevenson, op. cit., p. 232.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 236-7.

As a scientific historian, Adams considered that in American history during this period the scientific interest was greater than the human. He thought this provided great opportunity for the student to study the evolution of a race. William Jordy has claimed that Adams wanted to prove that centralized nationalism triumphed over all obstacles flung in its path. Jordy has written that the people in Adams' work "comprised the energy behind the actions of his statesmen."⁴⁰ Adams saw the American people:

. . . as at once the embodiment and the culmination of all national power. . . a kind of mystical prime mover in history. . . As such the people almost mechanically determined national destiny.⁴¹

Thus, Adams' subject dealt with the steady growth of this vast population. In his nine volumes, he weighed the conflicts that could occur. His general idea was that if the leaders failed, the people themselves would come to realize the importance of national unity proving that "democratic nationalism was the overarching virtue sheltering all other popular virtues."⁴²

Adams' general picture of the country in 1800 was one of disillusionment with the promise of American life. He thought the American character was in low esteem. In the

⁴⁰ Jordy, op. cit., p. 98.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 87.

⁴² Ibid., p. 109.

earlier days "every new settlement represented an idea and proclaimed a mission."⁴³ Yet, he felt that in 1800 there was no such character or moral purpose belonging to colonization. He described the westward pioneers thus:

. . . pioneers were at work, cutting the forests with the energy of so many beavers, and with no more express moral purpose than the beavers they drove away. The civilization they carried with them was rarely illumined by an idea. . . No wonder that foreign observers, and even the educated, well-to-do Americans of the sea coast, could seldom see anything to admire in the ignorance and brutality of frontiersmen, and should declare that virtue and wisdom no longer guided the United States!⁴⁴

Adams saw that there were difficulties in expansion, and wrote, ". . . Nature had decided that the experiment of a single republican government must meet extreme difficulties."⁴⁵ He thought that no civilized nation yet had had to deal with such serious physical difficulties and there was no guarantee that these could be overcome. ". . . the idea of ever bringing the Mississippi River. . . into close contact with New England must have seemed wild."⁴⁶ Adams said that although the Americans had set up a republican experiment embracing half the continent, they were not confident of

⁴³ Adams, History, Vol. I, p. 177.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 177-8.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

their success. He thought they had to be aroused to feel the necessity of scientific training. In depicting their geographical destiny, he said that Nature seemed to mean that Pennsylvania should reach toward the Chesapeake. "Every geographical reason agreed that the Susquehanna, the Potomac, and the James should support our homogeneous people."⁴⁷ Yet, in the beginning, the impression was that "ages must probably pass before the interior could be thoroughly settled."⁴⁸

In commenting on Jefferson's inaugural in which he spoke of the country as having room enough for descendants of a hundred or a thousand generations, Adams said, "No prudent person dared to act on the certainty that when settled, one government could comprehend the whole. . ."⁴⁹ In depicting conditions of 1800, Adams saw little manifest destiny feeling among the people. He said the people west of the mountains were:

. . . partly disposed to think themselves, and the old thirteen States were not altogether unwilling to consider them, the germ of an independent empire which was to find its outlet, not through the Alleghenies to the seaboard, but by the Mississippi to the Gulf.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 131.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 156.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 156.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

Thus, Eastern and Western settlements did not touch. There were great physical obstacles to expansion.

Hence, in his survey of conditions in 1800, Henry Adams pointed out conditions which made it difficult to expand. His idea was not so much that expansion was inevitable, or that God had ordained the conquest of the continent. His idea was that Nature had placed geographical and physical obstacles in the way. The people would have to devise ways and means of conquering these deterrents. "As an independent people, with half a continent to civilize, they could not afford to waste time in following European examples, but must devise new processes of their own,"⁵¹ he wrote. Americans had to use energies to build roads and canals to conquer the obstacles Nature had put in their paths.

In viewing expansion much of Adams' history of the Jefferson administration dealt with the purchase of Louisiana, an important phase of Manifest Destiny of the newly established American republic. This was the first territory acquired, and it set the pattern for future expansion.

Henry Adams was a master of the study of diplomacy, and he depicted the background of the purchase with the intrigues at the Spanish court. He saw France acting through

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 73-74.

Spain and exercising great influence on the Union. Spain's empire dwarfed the United States; her seaports closed all rivers by which the United States could reach the Gulf of Mexico, and the valley of the Ohio as far as Pittsburg was at the mercy of the King of Spain with products marketed only by the permission of the Spanish king. He wrote:

. . . from Fernandina to Natchez. . . and thence northward on the western bank of the Mississippi River to the Lake of the Woods. . . Spanish authority barred the path of American ambition. . . every Southern or Western state looked to the military occupation of Mobile, Pensacola, and New Orleans as a future political necessity.⁵²

Adams saw that the Southern and Western States were eager for the central government to expel Spain from these areas. He perceived as the fixed purpose of the Western settler the desire to drive the Indians and the Spaniards from the country and to take their lands. Thus, he saw as "the cardinal point of foreign policy"⁵³ on the part of the Americans the breaking up of the Spanish possessions. As early as 1800 in this respect, he alluded to the idea of manifest destiny when he mentioned that the Americans wanted to establish popular rights and political independence "throughout both continents."⁵⁴ Adams wrote, "Sooner or

⁵² Ibid., p. 338.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 340.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 340.

later, no doubt, Louisiana must have become a part of the American Union."⁵⁵ Yet, he thought that the Spanish court intrigues brought about the way the results were reached.

In discussing the Louisiana crisis and the sale of the area by Spain to France, followed by the announcement of the removal of the right of deposit, Adams depicted the interest of the Westerners, claiming that Tennessee and Kentucky were eager for war. He wrote:

... the existence of the Union and the sacrifice of many thousand lives seemed in the opinion of competent judges, likely to be risked by allowing Bonaparte to make his position at New Orleans impregnable.⁵⁶

Adams thought the closing of New Orleans seemed to make war inevitable, for the West appeared willing to use force if necessary to regain the right of deposit. Adams believed that the resolutions of the Western state legislatures forced Jefferson to act by sending a Minister Extraordinary to see about the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas. The chief American interest according to Adams was not to keep France from Louisiana, but to secure New Orleans, Florida, or the right of deposit. He pictured Jefferson throughout the episode as being desirous of obtaining American rights by peaceful means. "The essence and genius of Jefferson's statesmanship lay in peace," he wrote.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Ibid., P. 345-346.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 421-422.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 445.

In relation to the final purchase, Adams thought the safest way for Congress to have annexed or extended control over the Louisiana area was through a constitutional amendment. Yet, he did admit the delay might have turned the scale and caused Bonaparte to sell the area to someone else. Adams considered the first important deficiency in the treaty was its failure to define the boundaries which, he claimed, Napoleon intentionally concealed, and which if known, "would have prevented a long and mortifying dispute."⁵⁸ Adams was definite on one point which he discussed in greater detail later. He said that both sides conceded that "the Floridas were not included in the sale."⁵⁹

In discussing this step in American expansion, Adams described the extent of the purchased area:

. . . the news arrived that Monroe had bought New Orleans; had bought the whole west bank of the Mississippi; had bought, Heaven only knew what! the whole continent!--excepting only West Florida, which had been the chief object of the mission.⁶⁰

Adams saw the purchase as increasing the success of Thomas Jefferson. He claimed that everyone agreed the purchase changed the whole structure of the government making the central government independent of the States and

⁵⁸ Adams, History, Vol. II, p. 43.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

⁶⁰ Henry Adams, John Randolph, Boston, 1882, p. 84-5.

master of an empire. He felt this forboded the destruction of states rights. "No Federalist measure had ever approached it in constitutional importance," he wrote. "The whole list of questionable federalist precedents was insignificant besides this one act."⁶¹ He said that Jefferson continued to think the purchase unconstitutional, and that he had helped to make the constitution a blank piece of paper.⁶²

Then, questioning by what authority the Union could "accept this destiny,"⁶³ Adams said it was an independent act of the President and twenty-six senators affected by the treaty making power. In commenting how, after the treaty was signed, the Senate passed a bill authorizing the President to take possession of the new territory and exercise all powers of government until Congress should provide for the area, Adams said, "Of course the authority thus conveyed was despotic, but so was the purchase itself; circumstances allowed no delay. . ."⁶⁴ Of the purchase itself, he wrote:

By an act of sovereignty as despotic as the corresponding acts of France and Spain, Jefferson and his party had annexed to the Union a foreign people and a vast territory, which profoundly altered the relations of the States and the character of their nationality.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 89.

⁶² Adams, History, Vol. II, p. 94.

⁶³ Adams, John Randolph, p. 89.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 94.

⁶⁵ Adams, History, Vol. II, p. 94.

Yet, while Adams was critical of some of the incidents involved in the purchase, he thought of the area as an object "of utmost value," and he thought that Livingston was right in securing "his main object at any cost."⁶⁶ This success of Livingston he referred to as "the greatest diplomatic success recorded in American history."⁶⁷ It was "an event so portentous as to defy measurement."⁶⁸ Whether the constitutional views were right or wrong, "the Louisiana purchase possessed an importance not to be ignored."⁶⁹

Viewing the political consequences of the purchase, Adams wrote:

Within three years of his inauguration Jefferson bought a foreign colony without its consent and against its will, annexed it to the United States by an act which he said made blank paper of the constitution; and then he who had found his predecessors too monarchical and the constitution too liberal in powers. . . made himself monarch of the new territory and wielded over it, against its protests, the powers of its old kings.⁷⁰

Yet, Adams seemed to be against methods more than results. He was critical of Napoleon, claiming he had no right to sell the area because either it belonged to Spain

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 47.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 48. He felt it was unparalleled because it cost so little. In no treaty signed "did the United States government get so much for so little." (Ibid., p. 49.)

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 49.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 130.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 130.

or, if French property, he needed the approval of the French Chamber which he did not get. In this connection in a letter to James Russell Lowell in 1879, the historian wrote:

That brigand. . . swindled Spain out of Louisiana, and then sold us that province in violation of his contract with Spain. The more I have studied the matter, the less I am impressed with the dignity of our own government in this transaction. I need no proof, however, of Bonaparte's rascality, which is well established.⁷¹

Thus, while Adams looked upon this first expansion of the United States as one of the important elements in the defining of the character of the government, and while he realized the great consequences of the purchase, he was somewhat critical of the policies used in acquiring the area. He did not set forth the idea that Louisiana belonged to the United States by inherent right, nor did he mention the hand of Providence. In quoting Gouverneur Morris in the Louisiana debate, Adams referred to Morris' saying "that 'all North America must at length be annexed and that it would have been Utopian to restrain the movement.'"⁷² Adams made no comment on this idea except to claim that it was old Federalist doctrine resting on broad construction which the Republican party had earlier denounced as "monarchical."⁷³

⁷¹ Harold Dean Cater, Henry Adams and His Friends, Boston, 1947, p. 92.

⁷² Adams, History, Vol. II, p. 99.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 99.

Adams' writings on the period immediately after the Louisiana Purchase seem to indicate that he was not a firm believer in the frontier thesis or in the importance of the West. In writing of the Burr Conspiracy during this time, Adams claimed Burr had no intention to separate the Western states by force from the Eastern, but Burr never denied he might establish a Western Empire with the consent of the people. Adams thought such a dissolution "would have struck a blow more nearly fatal to democracy throughout the world than any other 'crisis' . . ."74 Yet, he believed the Burr Conspiracy revealed the "precocious expansionism of the West" and "confirmed that in eighteenth century terms, the United States was overextended geographically and likely not to survive the power of centrifugal forces."75

Adams was of the opinion that the greatest gains to civilization could be made on the Atlantic coast within the protection of civilized life. In the Education in criticizing American society, he said, "West of the Alleghenies the whole country might have been swept clean, and could have been replaced in better form within one or two years."76 Thus, he did not have such high regard for the western expansionists.

74 Ibid., p. 188.

75 Levenson, op. cit., p. 134.

76 Adams, Education, p. 328.

In describing the voyages of Lewis and Clark, Adams called their crossing of the continent "a great feat, but nothing more."⁷⁷ The explorations added "little to the stock of science or wealth."⁷⁸ He thought it would be years before the vast region west of the Mississippi could be brought within the reach of civilization. For him, the technological revolution going on in the East was more important than westward expansion:

While Lewis slowly toiled up the Missouri River, thinking himself fortunate if he gained twenty miles a day against the stream, the engine which Robert Fulton had ordered from the works of Watt and Bolton in England had been made, and Fulton returned to New York to superintend its use.⁷⁹

After the Louisiana Purchase, much of Adams' History dealt with two questions of expansion--the Florida issue and the War of 1812. The Florida issue had to do with the desires for southern expansion, while there was connected with the War of 1812 the idea of possible expansion northward into Canada. It was in discussing both of these issues that Adams showed himself to be a scholar in the field of diplomacy.

Adams saw as one of the greatest weaknesses of the Louisiana treaty the fact that it left the boundaries ill-defined. He depicted the methods by which Jefferson and

⁷⁷ Adams, History, Vol. III, p. 216.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 215-6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 216.

Madison sought to acquire the territory of Florida through what Adams considered as "the bribery of France."⁸⁰ Adams claimed that the Florida policy was the only major lapse in moral leadership during the administrations of Jefferson and Madison.⁸¹ Adams went into great detail in relation to the Florida issue because he felt it was important for an understanding of the politics and government of the time. "Florida actually engrossed the attention of the government," he wrote.⁸²

Throughout the discussion, he portrayed the great southern desire for expansion at the expense of Spain, claiming that the "cardinal point of foreign policy" was that the Spanish possessions in America must be broken up.⁸³ He wrote:

Among the varied forms of Southern ambition, none was so constant as the wish to acquire the Floridas which at moments decided the action of the government in matters of utmost interest.⁸⁴

Adams believed the North was indifferent to the issue but that the South^r and the government which was southern in character were vitally concerned. "Jefferson's overmastering

⁸⁰ Jordy, op. cit., p. 84.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 84.

⁸² Adams, History, Vol. III, p. 23.

⁸³ Adams, History, Vol. I, p. 340.

⁸⁴ Adams, History, Vol. III, p. 22.

passion was to obtain West Florida," he wrote.⁸⁵ Adams claimed that every Southerner from the Potomac to the Mississippi "expected and required that by peace or war Florida should be annexed to the Union; and the annexation of Louisiana made that of Florida seem easy."⁸⁶ Again, he claimed, "The Floridas could not escape the government's grasp."⁸⁷ Thus, Adams portrayed the expansionist fever of the Southerners for Florida.

Adams first discussed the American claim to West Florida as part of the Louisiana purchase. Adams described this theory, based on the ideas of Robert Livingston as "at first sight preposterous,"⁸⁸ yet he claimed that the idea that West Florida might be claimed as a part of the Louisiana purchase was "a turning point in the second administration of Jefferson."⁸⁹ Throughout the entire discussion, Adams expressed the view that West Florida was never considered a part of the original Louisiana purchase, in spite of the opinions of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Livingston. He wrote:

⁸⁵ Adams, History, Vol. II, p. 245.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 246.

⁸⁷ Adams, History, Vol. III, p. 20.

⁸⁸ Adams, History, Vol. II, p. 68.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 249.

There was hardly a shadow of substance in this assumption, in itself an insult to Spain, put forward without the sanction of France, and calculated to embarrass relations with both powers. . . .⁹⁰

However, Adams saw that after John Randolph "boldly stated this shadowy claim as an express title,"⁹¹ "no diplomatist would have doubted what meaning to put upon the new code of Republican society."⁹² Time and again, Adams repeated his original idea that West Florida was not a part of the purchase and that the Spanish government was in the right in denying the claim.

In the midst of the Florida issue Adams saw the Spanish minister, Godoy, as conspiring with Talleyrand to deprive the United States of Texas. Adams, while of the opinion that West Florida was never a part of the Louisiana Purchase, thought that Texas was.⁹³ He considered this conspiring between Spaniard and Frenchman as an attempt to deprive the United States of property which Napoleon had bought from Spain and sold to the United States. This was

⁹⁰ Adams, John Randolph, p. 87. (Adams in his History, Vol. II, p. 68-72, described in detail the reasons for the American claim to West Florida as a part of the Louisiana Purchase.)

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 87.

⁹² Adams, History, Vol. II, p. 380.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 256.

an indication that Talleyrand knew the instincts of the American people "and their ambition to use the entire continent for their experiments."⁹⁴

Adams discussed the attempts on the part of the administration to get recognition by Spain of West Florida and Texas as part of the Louisiana purchase, and the attempt at the same time to purchase East Florida as another place for Southern expansion. Spain, however, refused to recognize the former, and refused to sell the latter. Adams was not in sympathy with the administration's methods. He claimed Jefferson had intrigued with Napoleon and had tried to gain his objective short of force. He wrote, ". . . Spain was partly to be frightened, partly to be bribed into the sale of Florida."⁹⁵ Adams described the policy as feeble and a failure. "It was feeble . . . because it threatened war without backing its threats by real force."⁹⁶

Adams wrote that if Jefferson had ordered troops to occupy Texas, he probably would have been supported. If he had acquired this as Louisiana land, Spain might have declared

⁹⁴ Adams, History, Vol. I, p. 301.

⁹⁵ Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin, Philadelphia, 1879, p. 336.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 347-8. Adams depicted Gallatin as opposed to the demands for Florida. He thought Livingston or Monroe should have insisted on a boundary at the time of the Louisiana Purchase. As long as they did not, Gallatin felt it was impossible to hold Spain responsible. War would cost more than the value of Florida. (History, Vol. III,

war and dragged France into a war with the United States. In this event Jefferson might have seized Florida, and might have made an alliance with Great Britain which would have led to the eventual defeat of Spain and France and perhaps a Spanish patriot uprising in South America.⁹⁷ Yet, this did not happen.

Thus, in the course of the depicting of the expansionist desires for Florida, Adams showed how the United States first claimed West Florida as a part of the Louisiana Purchase. This was not recognized by Spain. Then he pictured the government as being willing to give up this claim if Spain would agree to sell all of East and West Florida to the United States. However, by 1806 Spain announced she would not consent to alienate Florida; later she agreed to negotiate; then the negotiations fell off. Adams pictured the American desire for Florida as a part of the expansionist movement. Florida closed the mouths of several rivers which had the greater part of their course within the United States. Hence, Florida under another power would be a danger to American commerce. However, Adams also pictured the Florida issue as a means used by Napoleon to control President Jefferson.⁹⁸ Whenever Napoleon felt the

⁹⁷ Adams, History, Vol. III, p. 80-1.

⁹⁸ Adams, History, Vol. IV, p. 115.

United States was becoming pro-British or anti-French, he would offer some help in regard to Florida. Adams claimed the administration feared offending Napoleon because of their belief that "he alone could give Florida to the United States without the expense and losses inevitable in a war."⁹⁹ Adams felt the administration was motivated by expansionist desires rather than French sympathies.

Adams also discussed the Florida policy in connection with the War of 1812. Prior to the outbreak of the war, some Americans had moved into West Florida as the Spanish power waned. In one of the areas of West Florida, these settlers staged a revolution, established their own government, and issued a proclamation of independence. Then they urged the annexation of the territory to the United States. This was during the Madison Administration. Adams said that the President faced a dilemma since the territory they had declared independent, he had long appropriated for the United States. Also, Madison considered that he had no authority to use the military forces beyond the national limits without the approval of Congress.

⁹⁹ Adams, History, Vol. III, p. 140. Adams said that the ordinary person did not know what was being done and believed the administration was obeying the beck and call of Napoleon. In reality, the administration was doing what it felt essential for its Florida policy.

Adams depicted Madison as an expansionist, fearful of losing the area, and at the same time seeing the danger of the area passing into the hands of a third party. Thus, the President ordered the military occupation of this part of West Florida. Adams claimed that this was an act of war against Spain, and he said that Napoleon himself never committed a more arbitrary act "than that of marching an army without notice into a neighbor's territory, on the plea that he claimed it as his own."¹⁰⁰ He thought that Madison had ignored the rules of consistency and caution in pursuit of what he considered a proper object, and he referred to the Proclamation ordering that the area be taken possession of in the name of the United States as "one of the most remarkable documents in the archives of the United States government."¹⁰¹

Madison ordered the seizure of the area, and then sent a message to the convention which had proclaimed independence and asked for annexation, "to the effect that their independence was an impertinence; and that their designs on public lands were something worse."¹⁰² The idea here was that the area had already belonged to the United States. Adams then commented that in his Proclamation, Madison had said that

¹⁰⁰ Adams, History, Vol. V, p. 309.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 310-11.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 312.

these four districts of West Florida would "not cease to be a subject of fair and friendly negotiations and adjustment' with Spain."¹⁰³ Adams wrote that it was hard to reconcile the idea of how a people legally a part of the United States could remain the subject of negotiations with a foreign power. Madison's reasoning, according to Adams, was that the district by right was a part of the United States, but it had remained in Spanish hands awaiting a negotiation for actual delivery. Then when the Spanish authority was subdued, the President took possession.

In discussing the Congressional reaction, Adams mentioned that Henry Clay defended the course, explaining that an act of 1803 authorizing the President to take the ceded Louisiana territory was still in force. Adams said Clay's opinion was neither weaker nor stronger than the arguments by which the Louisiana Purchase itself had been sustained. "Fate willed that every measure connected with that territory should be imbued with the same spirit of force or fraud which tainted its title,"¹⁰⁴ he wrote. He said that the Southern States needed the Floridas and did not care how they were taken. Adams said that a Virginia Republican after October 1803 would have been startled to learn:

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 314.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 321.

. . . every President, past or to come, had the right to march an army or send the navy of the United States at any time to occupy not only West Florida, but also Texas and Oregon, as far as the North Pole itself, since they claimed it all, except the Russian possessions, as a part of the Louisiana purchase with more reason than they claimed West Florida.¹⁰⁵

Adams also stated, ". . . in fact West Florida did not belong to Louisiana, either as a Spanish or an American province and could not be treated as though it did."¹⁰⁶ He pointed out the inconsistency as seen by Congress. If West Florida was a part of the Louisiana Purchase, then the part of it still held by Spain should belong to the United States. If this were not the case, "the President in ordering the seizure of part of West Florida had violated the Constitution and made war on Spain."¹⁰⁷

Adams pointed out in later years that the United States obtained a formal grant from Ferdinand VII of Spain, by a clause inserted into the Treaty of 1819 by which Spain ceded to the United States "in full property and sovereignty" all her territories east of the Mississippi "known by the name of East and West Florida." By this, Adams said Ferdinand "intended to discredit, and did in fact, ignore,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 321.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 322-3.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 325.

the usurpations of the United States."¹⁰⁸ He said that the admission in the Treaty of 1819 that Ferdinand was still sovereign over territory called West Florida:

... threw discredit on the previous acts of President and Congress and . . . created a chaos which neither proclamations, Acts of Congress, treaties, nor decisions of the courts . . . could reduce to order. History cannot tell by what single title the United States hold West Florida.¹⁰⁹

Thus, in the case of American expansionism into West Florida, Henry Adams was critical of the methods employed by the government and denied again and again that West Florida was a part of the Louisiana purchase, while at the same time he considered that Texas was a part of the purchase area.

Adams also depicted the expansionist designs of the United States into the rest of West Florida and East Florida during the war of 1812. Adams claimed the Southern people entered the War of 1812 with the hope of obtaining this area. Adams perceived that the call for a force of some 1500 militia from Tennessee was not for the defense of the lower country "but for conquest . . . to support the seizure of Mobile, Pensacola and St. Augustine."¹¹⁰ In the course of war, Congress did approve and authorize the President to seize Florida west of the Perdido or to occupy Mobile, but the Congress did not approve the seizure of East Florida.

¹⁰⁸ Adams, History, Vol. VI, p. 237.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 237.

¹¹⁰ Adams, History, Vol. VII, p. 206.

Adams was critical of government policy in regard to the remaining Florida area and claimed that while the whole truth in relation to East and West Florida was not known, "so much was notorious . . . as to warrant the British minister in protesting 'against an attempt so contrary to every principle of public justice, faith, and national honor."

In the midst of the War of 1812 in accord with an Act of Congress, the United States did take possession of Mobile. This expansion was accomplished without bloodshed, and it became the only permanent gain of territory during the war. However, an act of Congress forbade any occupation of East Florida and Adams commented that this stopped "the deranged plans of Georgia and Tennessee."¹¹²

In conclusion, it seems valid to say that Henry Adams found fault with the Florida policy of the administration. Again, as with Louisiana, it was more opposition to methods than to results. He never denied the national necessity of possessing in West Florida the mouths of the rivers which were vital to highways of the Mississippi territory. Adams thought that if Jefferson had wanted power rather than justice, he should have taken Florida when Spain was helpless in Napoleon's grasp, and when the risk of war

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 32.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 216. This area was acquired by the Treaty of 1819 between Spain and the United States.

with France involved the compensating chance of standing "at the head of the coming popular movement throughout the world."¹¹³ Instead, he claimed Jefferson preferred to play the diplomatic game which was "unsafe" and "unfair to himself."¹¹⁴

Adams said that in the end "far more than half of the territory of the United States was the spoil of the Spanish Empire, rarely acquired with perfect propriety."¹¹⁵ William Jordy has claimed that Adams tried to establish the essential integrity of Jefferson and his intellectual acumen and the righteousness of his cause. He is of the opinion that Adams puffed up his better qualities to prepare for deflation in instances like the Florida issue. However, while Adams criticized the politics of Jefferson or Madison, Jordy has written that he never denied their sincerity of purpose or the impulses of their sincerity "with the single major exception of their Florida policy."¹¹⁶ Adams described the Florida policy as "their only major lapse in moral leadership. . ."¹¹⁷ In pursuing their Florida policy, Jefferson and Madison lost what was more valuable--"the moral leadership which belonged to the head of a democracy."¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Adams, History, Vol. III, p. 81.

¹¹⁴ Levenson, op. cit., p. 115.

¹¹⁵ Adams, History, Vol. I, p. 340.

¹¹⁶ Jordy, op. cit., p. 84.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 84.

¹¹⁸ Adams, History, Vol. IV, p. 339.

The other event connected with expansion during this period was the War of 1812 in its relations to Canada and the West. In the minds of many people, the War of 1812 was fought for the purpose of obtaining commercial rights on the high seas; for others it was a war for westward expansion at the expense of the Indian tribes; for others it was a war to achieve the conquest of Canada and Florida. As Adams' views on the Florida issue have already been considered, this discussion will be confined to his views on expansion westward at the expense of the Indians and on expansion to Canada at the expense of the British.

In relation to the Western Indians, Adams was again somewhat critical of the administration policy. In theory, he claimed Jefferson's policy toward the Indians was to protect them from white contact, but in practice the policy offered rewards for extinction since the government claimed the territory of every extinct tribe on the basis of paramount sovereignty. Adams believed that Jefferson encouraged his agents to tempt the tribal chiefs into debt in order to obligate them to sell their lands. Thus, his idea was that the administration saw the Western Indians as thwarting American expansionist attempts.

He pictured the Indians as desiring to keep the whites at a distance, while the whites united to extend their boundary. Because of the white advances toward their valuable

land, Adams said that the Indians had "no choice but to depend on British assistance."¹¹⁹ Adams claimed that the American treaties for land cessions, many of which were forced on the Indians, opened an aggressive policy which "must end in war."¹²⁰

Adams also charged that William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana territory was motivated by reasons of personal glory in his Indian policy. Harrison believed a war with England was imminent, and he hoped to crush the Indians before the British could openly aid them. Adams claimed that President Madison did not want war with the Indians especially since he was aware of the British sympathy for the Indians. In spite of the views of the administration, Adams said, "Harrison's personal wish could not be doubted."¹²¹

In the midst of the conflict between Indians and whites over land cessions, the Indians under Tecumseh formed a Confederacy and demanded the return of their lands. The governor refused this. Eventually the famous battle of Tippecanoe ensued in which the Indians attacked the Americans, resulting in great American losses, and then the Indians fled. Adams looked upon the results of this battle as important because it became "a point of pride throughout the Western country. . ."¹²² Adams saw this battle as establishing

¹¹⁹ Adams, History, Vol. VI, p. 83.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 84.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 92.

Harrison as the leader of any future campaigns against the Indians. Adams said that the Americans realized that a war with Britain would mean an Indian war; yet, he claimed many were of the opinion that there would be an Indian war in 1812 whether there was a British war or not.

When the war did break out and when the Indians warred against the United States, Adams looked upon the Indian campaigns as "costly beyond proportion to their results."¹²³ He considered it as an expensive method of acquiring territory and he thought that for once the United States paid something like the value of the land. He wrote:

The campaigns of Tippecanoe, the surrender of Detroit and Mackinaw, the massacre at Fort Dearborn . . . the murders along the frontier, and the campaign of 1813 were the price paid for the Indian lands in the Wabash Valley.¹²⁴

Thus, as a result of the War of 1812, the Americans succeeded in forcing most of the tribes to submit to the government's authority thus paving the way for more peaceful expansion.

Adams also dealt with the war of 1812 from the point of view of the American desire for expansion into Canada. In commenting on a speech of Henry Clay, noted War Hawk,

¹²³ Adams, History, Vol. VII, p. 101.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 141. He does claim that because of British losses, the British were no longer considered powerful, and the Indians abandoned their dependence on England.

Adams described it as "full of Western patriotism."¹²⁵ Clay had talked of the Kentucky militia being alone competent to place Montreal and Canada under the power of the United States. Adams commented:

. . . the speech marked the beginning of a school which was for fifty years to express the national ideals of statesmanship, drawing elevation of character from confidence in itself, and from devotion to ideas of nationality and union, which redeemed every mistake committed in their names.¹²⁶

Yet, Adams thought that in 1812 along the Atlantic coast the appeal of the Westerners had little success.

He saw that the problem of the northwest Indians and their connection with the British traders helped to bring on the desire among some for the annexation. He believed the American press also pushed the idea of the war being imminent since "the conquest of Canada became the favorite topic of newspaper discussion."¹²⁷ The War Hawks took up this cry. These leaders of the twelfth Congress--Clay, Calhoun, Grundy--he described thus:

¹²⁵ Adams, History, Vol. V, p. 189. Clay had said, "The conquest of Canada is in your power." (Ibid., p. 190.)

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 190.

¹²⁷ Adams, History, Vol. VI, p. 118. Adams thought the question of impressment of seamen became more important after 1811, calling it more of "an afterthought to make out a cause of war against England, after finding the public unwilling to accept the cause at first suggested." (Ibid., p. 117.)

None of the new leaders could remember the colonial epoch, or had taken a share in public life except under the Constitution of 1789, or had been old enough to feel and understand the lesson taught by opposition to the Federalist rule. . . Bent on war with England, they were willing to face debt and probable bankruptcy on the chance of creating a nation, of conquering Canada, and carrying the American flag to Mobile and Key West.¹²⁸

Adams admitted their ideas had a certain appeal and they succeeded in getting Clay--"the boldest and most active leader of the war Republicans"¹²⁹--elected Speaker. Thus, he saw the War Hawks as the leading expansionists. He thought that Grundy "laid more weight on the influence of turning the minds of the northwestern Indians towards hostilities"¹³⁰ than to the issue of impressments.

In discussing the issue of Canada, Adams claimed that throughout the whole course of the debate the Congressmen openly talked of conquests to be made in Canada. He quoted John Randolph, who protested that all during the debate he had heard one word, "Canada, Canada, Canada!"¹³¹ Yet, Adams estimated that only about one-third of the members of Congress believed that war was the best policy. He said that although

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 123.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 124.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 140.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 146. (In his History, Vol. II, Adams had claimed that under Jefferson the Republicans did not want a quarrel with England and did not want Canada. p. 344.)

the President stood midway between the followers, he "never failed to approve the acts and meet the wishes of the war members."¹³²

Adams did not give too much credence to the idea of war for territory, saying:

Probably these appeals carried weight with the Western people; but even earnest supporters of war might doubt whether men of sense could be conciliated or persuaded by such oratory, or by descriptions of Harrison's troops at Tippecanoe.¹³³

That Adams was not too sympathetic to the administration's policy in regard to war is seen by his claim that it had been more difficult for the five years before to find excuses for peace, than to find a cause for war in 1812. He did not deny that grievances existed, but he thought they had been endured and might be endured a little longer. Adams perceived that by 1811-12 the Virginia school had undergone a great revolution and that by 1811 there were great similarities between the Republicans and Federalists. In general, Adams wrote as if the causes for war were not too grave. Among the causes as stated he said there was "an insinuation that the hostile spirit of the Indians was connected with their neighborhood to Canada."¹³⁴

¹³² Ibid., p. 175.

¹³³ Ibid., p.143.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 223.

Adams felt the War of 1812 was remarkable for the fact that it was vehemently thwarted by a large group of citizens "who were commonly considered, and who considered themselves, by no means the least respectable, intelligent, or patriotic part of the nation."¹³⁵ Adams admitted it was difficult for later generations to see the opposition to the war:

That the war was as just and necessary as any war ever waged, seemed so evident to Americans of another generation that only with an effort could modern readers grasp the reasons for the bitter opposition of large and respectable communities which left the government bankrupt and nearly severed the union. . .¹³⁶

Adams blamed the war on a series of mistakes and said that probably "four-fifths of the American people"¹³⁷ felt the war could be avoided.

Adams claimed that Madison's war "was the boldest and most successful of all experiments in American statesmanship, though it was also among the most reckless."¹³⁸ As far as purposes of strategy, he felt that the interests of New York, New England, and the Union required that the defensive campaigns be fought in Canada and "even the most

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 224.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 224.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 225.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 418.

extreme Federalist could scarcely be believed blind to an idea so obvious."¹³⁹ He thought that in 1813, if the Americans had had better leadership, they might have found means to compel the British to evacuate at least Upper Canada.¹⁴⁰

Adams viewed the peace treaty as merely an end of hostilities, leaving claims to be settled at a future date. However, Adams, like most other historians, saw that the United States gained much by postponing these settlements to a later time.

With the conclusion of the war, Adams saw great results for the United States as the government appeared "as a glorious national representative" and "from the moment of peace the national government triumphed over all its immediate dangers."¹⁴¹

So again, Adams was somewhat critical of some of the administration policies leading to the war. However, once the war had been declared, he saw there was no alternative except to unite behind the government. As a result of the war, he saw a strengthening of the national government.

¹³⁹ Adams, History, Vol. VII, p. 383.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 187.

¹⁴¹ Adams, History, Vol. IX, p. 81.

Throughout his discussions of the Florida issue and the War of 1812, Adams made no mention of the decrees of Providence or of the inevitability of the American conquest of the continent. He merely tried to show the workings of the administrations of Jefferson and Madison. In doing this, he pointed out both strengths and weaknesses. On one point, however, there was conveyed the idea of the American mission as a leader of democracy. This was in relation to the revolts in the Spanish American colonies. In this respect, Adams thought the United States appeared unwilling to let Cuba or Mexico pass under the domination of England or France. The Americans desired to exclude European influence from the hemisphere in order to establish popular rights and political independence throughout the continent. Adams expressed the belief that the booty of the revolutions would benefit the Americans more than anyone else; he seemed to agree that these revolutions would open "an endless vista of democratic ambition."¹⁴²

In his appraisal of the Jefferson and Madison administrations, Henry Adams had some thoughts on the future of the country. In 1817 on Madison's retirement, Adams saw the limits of civilization advancing rapidly westward. With

¹⁴² Adams, History, Vol. IV, p. 302.

the Indian problem and with foreign problems having disappeared, he considered that all obstacles to the occupation and development of the continent were removed. He wrote:

The continent lay before them, like an uncovered ore bed. They could see, and they could even calculate with reasonable accuracy, the wealth it could be made to yield.¹⁴³

Adams said that during the administrations of Jefferson and Madison, the government had accomplished much using the idea that it was the rightful interpreter of its powers. He claimed the government had performed "every essential function of a sovereignty . . . without an instance of failure, though not without question."¹⁴⁴

Adams' idea was that nothing of the future of the country was settled until 1815. Some felt it would divide into several nationalities. He said of this:

Such a destiny . . . was not necessarily more unfortunate than the career of a single nationality wholly American; for if the effects of divided nationality were certain to be unhappy, those of a single society with equal certainty defied experiences or sound speculation.¹⁴⁵

Adams saw that by 1815 the unity of the nation was established; the American character was fixed; it would not follow Europe. He looked upon North America as "the most

¹⁴³ Adams, History, Vol. IX, p. 173-4.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 193-4.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 219.

favorable field on the globe for the spread of a society so large, uniform, and isolated as to answer the purposes of science."¹⁴⁶

In concluding his History, Adams voiced the opinion that in North America a single homogeneous society could reach a population of three or four hundred million if there were no disturbances, and he thought the United States would be free from disturbances. Thus, American history offered the best opportunity to study the evolution of race. Adams' conclusion implied a possible expansion for he closed with the question: "What object, besides physical content, must a democratic continent aspire to attain?"¹⁴⁷ He asked a series of questions which followed from his conclusion that the traits of American character were fixed in 1815. Through the questions, he attempted to predict the future. He claimed then that history would require another century of experience to answer such questions. Thus, he tried to tell something of American character and to prophesy in regard to the future of American democracy.

There is little in the works of Henry Adams that gives an insight to his views on Manifest Destiny between 1817 and the post Civil War period. In one issue, however, he did

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 242.

appear to be sympathetic to American expansionism, and that was in regard to Oregon. In discussing Gallatin's views on the issue, Adams said that Gallatin conceded that the title to the contested territory was defective, and that neither nation could show an indisputable right to the territory, "but America had all the chances in her favor, and . . . war was the least effective policy."¹⁴⁸ Adams' comment was that this policy was "a thoroughly common-sense view so obvious that neither government could long resist it."¹⁴⁹ In his History, he maintained that the doctrine of contiguity on which the United States could rest their most valid claim to Oregon "was as valid then as it afterward became. . ."¹⁵⁰

In regard to the Texas issue, Adams had little to say. As was noted before, in his History he did claim that Texas, but not Florida, was a part of the Louisiana purchase. However, Adams did not go into the issue in the period after the United States and Spain signed the Treaty of 1819 by which Spain relinquished claims to Florida, and by which the boundary between the two nations was established exclusive of any American claim to Texas. In his Gallatin, he did mention that Gallatin opposed the annexation of Texas on

¹⁴⁸ Adams, Gallatin, p. 671.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 671.

¹⁵⁰ Adams, History, Vol. II, p. 301. He was discussing the Louisiana boundaries.

grounds of treaties and on grounds of opposition to slavery. "Every moral conviction and every life-long hope of Mr. Gallatin," he wrote, "were outraged by this act of our government. The weight of national immorality rested incessantly on his mind."¹⁵¹ Adams made no comment on the matter, but he did consider Gallatin as an outstanding statesman.

3. Adams and New Manifest Destiny

To this point Henry Adams' views on Manifest Destiny have been discussed in relation to the period particularly of Jeffersonian republicanism, and chiefly in relation to his History. Adams himself lived in a period of New Manifest Destiny in which the United States began to look outward and to embark upon imperialistic ventures. During this period Adams watched the growing industries of the country; he saw the older families yielding to the new captains of industry. He also became dismayed by the changes in politics and morals. During this period he tried to develop a science of history which he felt might bring into sight some new, unsuspected path for civilization to pursue. For this period of national development, Adams' Letters and a few of his essays give his views on the nation's destiny.

¹⁵¹ Adams, Gallatin, p. 676-7.

At first he viewed the period with some enthusiasm; then, he developed a pessimism. Edward Saveth has claimed that Adams had a personal motive for national expansion-- "the conviction that the family work of a hundred and fifty years fell at once into the grand perspective of true empire building."¹⁵² Saveth believed that Adams' foreign policy during this period was based on natural law and historical experience. He referred to him as a Social Darwinist who believed that there would be a struggle for existence among nations.

In the post Civil War period, Adams spent much time in Washington, and saw the failure of the earlier attempts at expansion--failure because of the Reconstruction problems and because of the American desire to subdue the continent first. In an article of 1870 he wrote that foreign affairs during 1869-70 was divided into two headings and in regard to each he felt "the single controlling interest has been found in the extension of national territory."¹⁵³ The two possibilities he mentioned were northward or toward the tropics. His idea was that the department of foreign affairs had always operated on one uniform policy and had developed one principle, "the steady absorption of all neighboring territory."¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Saveth, op. cit., p. 306.

¹⁵³ Henry Adams, "The Session," North American Review, Vol. III, July 1870, p. 54.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 54.

Adams was critical of William Seward's policies as Secretary of State in the post war period in that his policy of expansion went "somewhat too far and too fast for the public."¹⁵⁵ As a result of this, he saw a policy of reaction set in under President Grant.

During the Grant administration one of the issues in foreign affairs was the Alabama claims' controversy. In the midst of the difficulties with England over this issue, Senator Charles Sumner made an intemperate speech against Great Britain and implied that the United States would accept Canada instead of the large indemnity he said was owed. Adams referred to this speech as "the maddest,"¹⁵⁶ and he hoped his friends would not be drawn too far by Sumner. Yet, he did feel that the essential obstacle to a settlement of the Alabama claims was the British occupation of Canada since every question of Anglo-American relations "has been primarily and principally considered . . . in its separate bearing on the subject of annexation."¹⁵⁷ Adams in 1870 did give the impression of expecting the eventual union of Canada and the United States when he wrote:

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁵⁶ Ford, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 208.

¹⁵⁷ Adams, "The Session," p. 55.

it is clear in what direction the path must lie, and that sooner or later, probably pacifically, but at any rate inevitably, the end will be reached by its means.¹⁵⁸

In relation to the tropics, he saw the issue more difficult. The Grant administration had hoped to acquire a harbor at Santo Domingo. Adams believed the refusal of the Senate to ratify such a treaty showed the government opposed to southern expansion. He claimed the foreign policy was unsteady, and he thought it was going to be difficult to check the growth of the country. He believed that resistance made in 1870 to annexation of areas little fitted to enter into the duties of the American State would ultimately yield to the growing public indifference to the States themselves. Thus, in 1870 Adams seemed to convey the idea of inevitability of expansion. Someone has remarked that Adams had "a thirst for unshared American hegemony among imperial powers,"¹⁵⁹ and yet "he gazed in perplexity at the international scene where America was coming into a leading role."¹⁶⁰

In the 1890's American foreign relations dealt with Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, Latin America, China and other areas. During this period Henry Adams began to voice concern for the future.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁵⁹ Levenson, op. cit., p. 294.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 301.

In 1891 he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge:

On the whole I am satisfied America has no future in the Pacific. She can turn South indeed, but after all, the west coast of South America offers very little field. Her best chance is Siberia. Russia will probably go to pieces. She is rotten and decrepit to the core and must pass through a bankruptcy, political and moral. If it can be delayed another twenty-five years, we could Americanise Siberia, and this is the only possible work that I can see open on a scale equal to American means.¹⁶¹

One of the issues to which Adams gave attention was the Venezuela Boundary Dispute. In this issue, President Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Richard Olney, demanded that Great Britain arbitrate a boundary quarrel with Venezuela. The American government claimed any attempt on the part of Great Britain to expand at the expense of Venezuela would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Adams considered that Venezuela was a poor case for Cleveland to have chosen because of the impossibility of understanding its merits "but if it were not Venezuela now, it would be Cuba in the spring, or Canada at some other time . . . we are hardened to civil war, and fall into sharp drill . . . easily,"¹⁶² he wrote.

In general, Adams was not too concerned over the Venezuela issue, but he was somewhat critical of Cleveland, complaining of Cleveland's "denseness" and predicting the

¹⁶¹ Ford, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 511.

¹⁶² Ford, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 92.

country would break. "I see no hope of safety," he wrote, "except in severing the ties that connect it with Europe, and in fortifying ourselves as an independent centre."¹⁶³

Eventually the controversy was settled to the satisfaction of the participants and the United States.

The most serious crisis in American foreign policy in the 1890's was in relation to Spain regarding affairs in Cuba. This eventually involved the United States in the Spanish American War and led to the acquiring of the American Empire. Henry Adams was a firm believer in Cuban independence. When the Cleveland administration seemed reluctant to interfere in the Cuban crisis, Adams tried to influence national policy through his friend, Senator Cameron. He wanted to work behind the scenes, for he wrote in February 1896 to Brooks Adams, ". . . do not allude to my doings either in letter or in conversation."¹⁶⁴

In another letter in October 1896 he wrote:

. . . I am still knocking my head on the Cuban question, and the more I knock, the more hollow it resounds. That we must recognise the independence of Cuba next winter is, I think, as nearly inevitable as any matter of future policy can be.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁶⁵ Cater, op. cit., p. 393.

In the same letter he mentioned that Cleveland was as hostile to Cuba as "to every instinct of old fashioned freedom. . ."166

In December 1896, Adams' recommendations regarding Cuban independence were printed as a Senate Report of the fifty-fourth Congress, having been submitted by his friend Senator James Cameron. Adams had worked hard and anonymously for Cuban freedom; then he saw "that question of principle resolve itself into a minor problem of American expansionism."16

Adams was in Europe when the Cuban crisis of 1898 occurred. Enjoying himself in Paris, he wrote that he had no desire to return to the United States except for the Cuban matter "which is always threatening a crisis."168 Once the war broke out, he considered that his fighting was over. He had been working for two years, trying to get the people excited over Cuba. He wrote, "I never was afraid of a Spanish war. I'm not afraid of it now. I think its costs easily measurable. . ."169

166 Ford, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 96.

167 Levenson, op. cit., p. 291.

168 Ford, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 146.

169 Ibid., p. 163.

As far as the war itself, Adams did not expect it to be of long duration. In a letter to John Hay in May 1898, he expressed surprise that Spain would fight at all. He thought the government at home would collapse first.¹⁷⁰

During the war, Adams seemed to view events with mixed emotions. To Elizabeth Cameron from Vienna he wrote in May 1898:

As for the war, it is a God send to all the young men in America. Even the Bostonians have at last a chance to show that they have emotions . . . our political propoganda /is / so much more successful than we ever imagined. Economically America is strong as the Rocky Mountains; the shock of war had merely demonstrated our strength. . . We are already an Asiatic Power!¹⁷¹

To John Hay in the same month he was not so enthusiastic:

As you know, this war is none of mine. My scheme was a very different one, and if war had followed, it would have been Spain's act and all the Spanish American States would have been openly on our side. The Maine affair upset everything. The true culprits were Cleveland and Olney. . . Our great object is henceforward to make peace. All my interest is set on that point, and to keep us out of European chaos. It seems to be no easy matter for Europe is like a sinking ship that drags us all down in the vortex.¹⁷²

It would seem then that Adams favored the American aid to Cuban independence, but he was fearful that as a concomitant, the United States might get itself involved in European affairs.

¹⁷⁰ Cater, op. cit., p. 438.

¹⁷¹ Ford, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 178.

¹⁷² Idem, p. 180.

In a peace plan Adams described to John Hay, May 26, 1898, he called for the independence of Cuba, complete autonomy to Porto Rico, and withdrawal of Spanish military and naval occupation there, with the United States guaranteeing this. He also wished for the American withdrawal from the Philippines, retaining only a harbor for a coaling station, and no indemnity. However, he did think the terms "ought to imply of necessity the annexation of Hawaii and the purchase of St. Thomas. These are essentials in a settlement that abandons the idea of conquest."¹⁷³ The one important idea here, which was repeated time and again, was that the United States should get out of the Philippine Islands.

Adams was concerned that the United States was getting itself involved deeper than he had expected. He had not been prepared for this. He had already expressed this to John Hay:

. . . the cardinal (sp.) Major President is more of a problem to me than all the Balkan Peninsula. . . I see only the steady development of a fixed intent. . . he has gone far beyond me, and scared me not a little. . . In his place I should have gone to bed and stayed there. What does he want next? What should I want in his place? To clear out of the West Indies! That is as good as done!--Hawaii! He can take it with a word! But what of China? . . . of the East? . . . of Europe? By the horns of the man, I know not where the ambition of the man may stop, for he holds the sceptre of the world. . .¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 183.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 176.

Adams was concerned about getting Spain out of America, but he was not anxious to get involved elsewhere. He voiced fears of expansionism. To his brother Brooks he wrote:

I want peace. I want it quick. I want it at any reasonable sacrifice. I want it before we are obliged to annex Spain itself in order to save our own heads. I want it before all Europe is dragged into a war of partition over the Canaries. . . the Philippines and all the rest. . . I want it in order to recover our true American policy which Congress has abandoned and McKinley has betrayed, but which must be the basis of every future extension towards Asia. I want to save Cuba from the sugar planters and syndicates whose cards McKinley will play and who are worse than Spain. . . At the rate things go, my hair stands on end with horror at the prospect before us. . . nothing can save Europe.¹⁷⁵

Similar fears were voiced by Adams to Mabel LaFarge and to Elizabeth Cameron. To the former he wrote that he feared there would be more difficulty in quieting down the American ambitions than there would in bringing Spain to terms.¹⁷⁶ To the latter, in referring to his famous Cameron report of 1896, he wrote that some who feared it in 1896 were in 1898:

. . . asserting rights that turn me pea green. Only yesterday Hay swallowed, without a tremor, two or three continents, and told two or three Kaisers to go hang. Tomorrow the country would scream with delight at a war with Europe. . .¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ Cater, op. cit., p. 438.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 436.

¹⁷⁷ Ford, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 191.

In the beginning Adams was opposed to the American policies in relation to the Philippine Islands. However, his opinion seemed to change in the course of deliberations. At least he felt it was useless to fight the issue.

In a letter commenting on the treaty he wrote that he was not going to get alarmed about the situation, saying:

I've won all my stakes. The Spaniards are almost out of Cuba and wholly out of Porto Rico. Our country has asserted its right and power even more emphatically than I tried to assert it. . . The Philippines are not or were not in my scheme, but the President has taken all and more than I wanted, and has stuffed the Philippines on top.¹⁷⁸

In his letters, he often referred to the desire of trying to get out of the Philippines, but he could see no way out. The United States would have to stay in the Philippines and fight a costly war with the insurgents. He thought the energies of the country were too vast to prevent this, and from point of view of European powers, he could see no escape. He had earlier written, "I blame no one for opposing imperialism; I am no Napoleon myself."¹⁷⁹ Yet, he also wrote:

We must protect Manila and the foreign interests which in trying to protect the natives from Spain, we were obliged to assume responsibility for.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 195. In this same letter, Adams claimed he was still a strong supporter of McKinley and said that nothing short of "mortal sin" would turn him into an enemy of McKinley.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 202.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 208.

Adams had little sympathy for the idea of expansion to civilize the native peoples. In this line he wrote:

I turn green in bed at midnight if I think of the horror of a year's warfare in the Philippines, and chaos in the West Indies, where nine men out of every ten in our force must go into hospitals, and we must slaughter a million or two foolish Malays in order to give them the comforts of flannel petticoats and electric railways. You know how I hate the civilized being, and especially loathe him in the tropics.¹⁸¹

By 1899 Adams had begun to realize that in the Philippines and even in Cuba the United States was involved in some bad risks, but he wrote that "a political situation is stronger than all the wishes and wisdom of man."¹⁸² By August 1899, Adams began to question how the United States which could not manage the Philippines could deal with the powers of Europe which he believed were "bent on mastering Asia which means the world."¹⁸³

He voiced concern to John Hay, writing:

But I wish we were out of the Philippines. . . It leads us cul de sac in the tropics and leads us away from our true line due west. . . The North Pacific is my line, . . . our own race . . . my instruments. . . I should like to see the government declare its avowed Cuban policy for the Philippines even at the cost of inconsistency.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Ford, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 208.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 212.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 234.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 358. (By this time he was of the opinion that the Cuban policy had shown "singular sagacity." Ibid., p. 360.)

To Brooks Adams he voiced the concern that the United States in the Philippines was repeating the errors of Spain and England, and he voiced a hope that the United States could escape from the Philippine excursion and "return to concentrating our efforts on the North Pacific."¹⁸⁵ He voiced concern lest affairs in the Philippines would lead us to support England in the south of China, while the "true road leads to the support of Russia in the north--in both cases meaning our foothold in Asia. . ."186

Adams also dealt in a limited way with another phase of American foreign policy connected with expansionism--the Open Door Policy of Secretary of State John Hay. Adams wrote that he took little concern in the statement. He thought that Hay had succeeded in embarrassing Russia, but as far as the agreement, he felt it bound "no one to anything and perhaps that is the reason why everybody assents."¹⁸⁷

Arthur Beringause has recently written that Brooks Adams supported the Open Door Policy, "while Henry complained that the world would be knocked into a cocked hat by this tampering with unknown forces."¹⁸⁸ Henry Adams himself

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 359.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 359.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 281.

¹⁸⁸ Arthur Beringause, Brooks Adams--A Biography, New York, 1955, p. 207.

wrote that his relations with Hay were rather awkward since he was "dead opposed to all his policy, except in Cuba."¹⁸⁹

In relation to an Isthmian Canal, Adams feared that Senate objections to the proposed Nicaraguan route might result in a Senate attempt "to annex Central America and conquer Mexico" as a part of its treaty making power.¹⁹⁰ He believed that a united Western Europe would be able to defeat the United States regarding the canal. This he felt would "smash the Monroe Doctrine," "secure South America to Europe," and "shut us up in the north."¹⁹¹ However, by 1901 he was against any new Nicaraguan canal treaty. "In another twenty years it will be safe," he wrote.¹⁹²

One other example of expansionism brought criticism from Adams. He was opposed to the Samoan Treaty of 1899 "which violated every profession of both our parties and all our administrations."¹⁹³ Nevertheless, the treaty for the division of Samoa between Germany and the United States was put into operation.

¹⁸⁹ Ford, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 383.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 281.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 306.

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 328.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 265.

Then, finally in this period, Adams voiced a general criticism of President Theodore Roosevelt's expansionist designs in Canada. Adams wrote that Roosevelt wanted "a slice of Canada," but he said, "If I were he, I should not dare to continue the old game. . ."194

In general, Henry Adams was an American nationalist. In the beginning he seemed to give approval to some imperialistic policies. After 1899, his enthusiasm waned, and he grew pessimistic. He could not see how the acquiring of an overseas empire could recapture any of the old American spirit. Donovan in writing about his imperialism has said:

On more serious reflection he concluded that expansion, while inevitable, simply added more unfamiliar pieces to the American jigsaw puzzle. This, coupled with the tremendous increase in the expenditure of energy, led him to abandon all hope that the American dream could be reclaimed.195

In any respect, Adams was opposed to war as an instrument of expansion because he felt it was expensive and "always a blunder, necessarily stupid, and usually avoidable."19

As Adams took a dim view of American expansionism, he also took a dim view of the world in general in the 1890's. He expressed concern for the welfare of the United States

194 Ibid., p. 384.

195 Donovan, op. cit., p. 180.

196 Beringause, op. cit., p. 233. The author has quoted a letter from Henry Adams to Brooks Adams, Nov. 3, 1901.

and that of the world. As early as 1893 he had stated that the world was getting "awfully rickety" and that the United States would follow "more or less" the rest of the world.¹⁹⁷ This is in contrast to his ideas of 1862 when he looked upon the career of the country as "positively unlimited except by the power of the imagination." He wrote:

. . . these are great times. Man has mounted science and is now run away with it. I firmly believe that before many centuries more, science will be the master of man . . . science may have the existence of man in its power . . . Not only shall we be able to cruize in space . . .¹⁹⁸

By the twentieth century he began to fear this scientific power. He was aware of the economic forces transforming the nation, and was repelled by what he saw. He sought an objective science of government that would make it a matter of fixed procedure. He believed history could be controlled by knowledge of history and social laws. He thought this science of history might bring into sight some new, unsuspected path for civilization to pursue. When science failed to provide all the necessary answers, Henry Adams could not make the needed adjustments. "His investigations . . . confirmed his original fear, that the world

¹⁹⁷ Ford, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 33.

¹⁹⁸ Worthington Chauncey Ford, A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-65, Boston, 1920, Vol. I, p. 135.

and the men within it were the purposeless victims of capricious fate."¹⁹⁹ He saw man heading toward degradation.

To his brother Brooks he wrote in 1901:

. . . I still think it most likely that the world will break its damned neck within five and twenty years; and a good riddance. . . I incline now to anti-imperialism. . . I incline to abandon China, the Philippines, and everything else. I incline to let England sink; to let Germany and Russia try to run the machine, and to stand on our internal resources alone.²⁰⁰

Adams expressed a similar idea to Mabel LaFarge and calculated the collapse by 1932.²⁰¹ Thus, science would eventually lead to the collapse of the universe. In describing this problem with particular reference to the people of the United States in the future, Adams wrote:

Three hundred million people running an automobile of a hundred million horsepower, at full speed, without roads to run on, and without the smallest idea where we are going or want to go. . .²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ Donovan, op. cit., p. 123.

²⁰⁰ Cater, op. cit., p. 504. There are some who feel Adams set forth these theories as jokes and that he never wanted his readers to take him or his theories seriously. Howard Mumford has written that Adams wanted to discourage historians from imitating science. (Howard Mumford, "Henry Adams and the Tendency of History," New England Quarterly, Vol. 32, March 1959, p. 85.)

²⁰¹ Cater, op. cit., p. 533.

²⁰² Ford, Letters of Henry Adams, Vol. II, p. 408.

From these ideas of Adams, one would get the impression that he saw no future for the United States. In other respects, however, he voiced concern lest the Atlantic civilization be destroyed, and he suggested organizing a bulwark to preserve this civilization.

At first Adams began to fear the threat of a Russo-German world supremacy which he felt would occur in about ninety years. Although America was temporarily at the top, he feared that in three or more generations, Russia and Germany, if they worked together, would be able to overwhelm the United States at any point of contact. As early as 1896 he had predicted to his brother Brooks a Russian-American polarization, claiming the trend was toward the formation of an American center and a Russian center forming across Asia. At the same time, but for only a short time, he feared the possibility of a German-Russian alliance. Adams thought the United States should aid England and France to perfect an Atlantic system against central and Eastern Europe. He wrote:

. . . we can foresee a new centralization of which Russia is one pole, and we the other with England between. The Anglo-American alliance is almost inevitable.²⁰³

²⁰³ Cater, op. cit., p. xv.

Thus, Adams, one-half century before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, talked of organizing an Atlantic combination as a bulwark to preserve the civilization of the West.

By the turn of the century Adams considered there was not so much to fear from Germany since that country lacked coal, a coast, and colonies. He then saw the last struggle for power coming in China. He thought if Russia organized China as an economical power, "the little drama of history will end in the overthrow of our clumsy western civilization."²⁰⁴ His idea was that if Russia organized China with the Siberian system, the western bloc would never be able to compete. "In that event," he wrote, "I allow till 1950 to run our race out."²⁰⁵

Shortly after this, Russia became involved in the Russo-Japanese War. After that, Adams saw that Russia had fifty years of reorganization before her and wrote of "the practical extinction of Russia for years to come."²⁰⁶ This would again leave Germany in the East face to face with the Atlantic combination.

²⁰⁴ Ford, Letters of Henry Adams, Vol. II, p. 402.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 402.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 442.

It is difficult to summarize Henry Adams' views on the national destiny. He once suggested that the central theme of his theory of history was "chaos without meaning."²⁰⁷ In his History, he showed the people groping toward a national destiny; he showed them expanding in Louisiana and in Florida; he showed them carrying through the War of 1812. In this latter struggle they failed to achieve one objective, Canada, but they did remove the Indian threat and open the way for westward expansion. He tried to show the role of leadership in a growing democratic society. Throughout the events, he tried to show the shift in political power from New England to the West, from the aristocratic class, of which he himself was a member, to the democratic elements. In this period he was critical more of the methods of expansion or attempted expansion than with the results. However, he never alluded to the idea of Divine Providence guiding the nation as did Bancroft, or to the inevitability of continental conquest as did Fiske.

In regard to Manifest Destiny in the period in which he lived, Henry Adams at first supported some expansionist plans, but he became disillusioned with the progress of expansionism, feeling it was going too far. He himself

²⁰⁷ Donovan, op. cit., p. 39.

later claimed that he was an anti-imperialist. By the turn of the century Adams viewed the destiny of the United States and that of the world in a pessimistic light. Instead of the United States carrying democracy throughout the world, he viewed the United States and the world as becoming the servants of science. He was not sure the United States or the world could be saved from destruction, and the older he got the more pessimistic he became. By 1910 he wrote, "I see nothing in the present society that seems worth preserving, and nothing that is worth substituting for the present."²⁰⁸

Adams was convinced that war, imperialism, and power politics had achieved little. In reality, he probably had an intense love for his country and its preservation, yet this was covered "with feigned indifference."²⁰⁹ In his thinking and writing on the American mission, Henry Adams represented a transition from the democratic faith of the early nineteenth century to the realities of the twentieth century.

²⁰⁸ Ford, Letters of Henry Adams, Vol. II, p. 554-5.

²⁰⁹ Donovan, op. cit., p. 166.

CHAPTER VI

HENRY CABOT LODGE SCHOLAR-POLITICIAN EXPANSIONIST

In spite of fame in the field of historical writing, and in spite of his forty years in national politics, most Americans associate the name of Henry Cabot Lodge with his participation in the struggle with Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. Regardless of personal sympathies, Lodge's leadership in the fight against Wilson gave him an assured place in history. However, it is not the purpose of this research to discuss this struggle, but rather to examine the views of Lodge, the historian-scholar-politician, in relation to the expansion of the United States. In doing this, it soon is evident that he was an extreme nationalist and an ardent expansionist.

1. Background and General Appraisal

Henry Cabot Lodge was born May 12, 1850, in Boston across the street from the home of George Bancroft. Although his own roots did not stretch back to the Pilgrims or the Puritans, he was related to many of the famous people of New England, people who had been prominent in the social and political life of the nation for generations. Since the first Cabot did not arrive in New England until about 1700, and the first Lodge did not arrive until around 1800, the family

pre-eminence was due more to wealth and intellectual ability than to any priority of residence.¹ Thus, by birth and ancestry, and later by education, books, and honors, he was one of the Brahmins--one of the socially elect of the community--"one of the local deities."²

Unlike most of the Boston Brahmins, Lodge's background lacked the clerical strain so often associated with New England. His father, John Ellerton Lodge, was a Boston merchant, the owner of ships engaged in the China trade. His great-grandfather was George Cabot, Federalist-President of the Hartford Convention of 1814, and friend of Washington and Hamilton. His mother was Anna Cabot Lodge, member of another socially prominent New England family claiming descent from John Alden.

During his boyhood, young Lodge spent his winters in Boston, and his summers at Nahant, a resort where his grandfather, Henry Cabot, had an oceanside home. This was in the period of the growing conflict between the North and the South. The entire Lodge family was strongly anti-slavery.

¹ Henry Adams referred to Lodge as "Boston incarnate--the child of local parentage." (Edward Lowry, "Lodge, the Very Best Butter" in Washington Closeups: Intimate Views of Some Public Figures, Boston, 1921, p. 182.

² Mark Sullivan, "Henry Cabot Lodge, A Massachusetts Institution," World's Work, Vol. 44, September 1922, p. 474.

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Throughout his life, "Lodge never admitted any doubt as to the absolute correctness of the North's stand."³ Lodge thought that those who had lived during the Civil War period had "a more tender sentiment about their country . . . and they are less dispassionate no doubt, in judging America and the American people than others. . ."⁴

Like most of the sons of wealthy and prominent Bostonians, Henry Cabot Lodge, an only son, began his formal education in private schools, including a Latin school run by a Mr. Dixwell. By the spring of 1866, Lodge had finished his work at the Dixwell school, and at the age of sixteen, he and his family set out for a year's stay in Europe. Accompanying the family was Constant Davis, a young man who was to act as a tutor to Lodge during the trip, helping to prepare him for Harvard in 1867.

After the sojourn in Europe, the family returned to Boston, and young Henry Cabot Lodge entered Harvard in the fall of 1867. That Lodge did not work too hard might be deduced from a later comment:

³ John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge A Biography, New York, 1953, p. 13.

⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

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I meant to go through college . . . with the least possible trouble and effort . . . with the minimum of mental labor, and in this, too, I succeeded.⁵

In general Lodge enjoyed Harvard and felt it had been a valuable experience for later life, yet he claimed it was also "the story of an idle and unprofitable boy."⁶ He described his career at Harvard as "singularly devoid of either distinction or interest."⁷

It was at Harvard in 1870 that Lodge came in contact with Henry Adams who was teaching a history course. This was the beginning of a long friendship between the two historians. Lodge went to Adams' course because of a fondness for history and a curiosity about the period of the Middle Ages. Soon he was interested and aroused. "For the first time I got a glimpse of what education might be and I really learned something," he reported.⁸

Shortly after graduation in 1870, Lodge married Anna Cabot Davis, the sister of Constant Davis, Lodge's European tutor. The couple left for a European honeymoon where Lodge hoped to acquire "the experience needed by a young man of independent fortune and literary tastes."⁹

⁵ Henry Cabot Lodge, Early Memories, New York, 1925, p. 188.

⁶ Ibid., p. 193.

⁷ Ibid., p. 180.

⁸ Garraty, op. cit., p. 28.

⁹ Ibid., p. 31.

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After his graduation, Henry Adams had advised Lodge to make an historio-literary career. Adams thought the profession would pay much in money and reputation, and he was of the opinion that the great literary historians were dying off. However, on his return from Europe, Lodge entered Harvard Law School in 1872, and he received his law degree two years later. He had no desire nor intention of studying law, but he felt it would be of value to him as a form of education. Although admitted to the bar, he turned to history as his profession, taking the advice of Henry Adams. In fact, while studying law, in 1873 he had served as the assistant editor of the North American Review of which Adams was the editor. During this same period, Lodge was beginning to take an interest in Republican politics.

By 1876, Henry Cabot Lodge had earned his Ph.D. from Harvard; then he began to teach a course there in American colonial history. In this capacity, he served as assistant to Adams, and received no pay from the university, but from Adams himself who was busy preparing his History and offering a new course in American history.

Lodge found teaching difficult and tried to make the students do as much work as possible. Yet, he himself labored with diligence, and his studies during this period became the basis for one of his later works, his Short History of the English Colonies in America published in 1881.

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Of his work in this field, Lodge wrote:

My lectures at Harvard led me to make an elaborate study of manners, customs, and social conditions in the colonies as they appeared here and there in the original sources.¹⁰

When Henry Adams resigned from Harvard in 1877, Lodge took over Adams' course while still teaching his own. He remained at Harvard for two years, engaged in both teaching and historical writing.

In 1877 Lodge published his first work, the Life and Letters of George Cabot. This was to prove that his great-grandfather was not a secessionist. There were mixed feelings about the book, and Henry Adams who wrote a favorable review admitted that it was "avowedly partisan" in presenting the facts.¹¹

After 1876, Lodge, having left the editorship of the North American Review, began writing for the Nation and the Atlantic Monthly. In 1879, he became co-editor of the International Review with John T. Morse, Jr. He served in this capacity for four years, and he also helped Morse edit the American Statesmen Series. In this series, Lodge contributed the volumes on Hamilton, Washington, and Webster.

¹⁰ Lodge, Early Memories, p. 268.

¹¹ Garraty, op. cit., p. 54.

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While Lodge was doing his historical research, he became more interested in politics. In 1879, he was nominated and elected as the Republican candidate for state legislature from the Nahant district of Massachusetts. He served two one-year terms and then was defeated.

In 1884, Lodge was nominated for Congress from the sixth Massachusetts district, but lost the election. He returned to his historical writing, but two years later he won the seat in Congress. He remained in that position until 1893 when he was elected to the United States Senate, a seat once held by Daniel Webster and Charles Sumner. Lodge served in this capacity until his death in 1924. During this period of his service in the Senate, the United States became a dominant power in world affairs, and Lodge became something of an institution in Massachusetts. He was referred to as "a scholar in politics" when he first entered public life.¹² Someone wrote of him, "There is an atmosphere about him of tradition, of legend, myth. . ."¹³

While in the Senate, Lodge continued his historical writings. These writings consisted of biographies of Alexander Hamilton, Daniel Webster, and George Washington; an autobiographical account, Early Memories; a two-volume

¹² Oscar G. Villard, "Henry Cabot Lodge, a Scholar in Politics," Nation, Vol. 119, November 19, 1924, p. 539.

¹³ Lowry, op. cit., p. 183.

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work entitled The Story of the Revolution; a one volume Short History of the English Colonies in America; a short work entitled The War with Spain, originally published as a series of magazine articles in Harper's Monthly in 1899. In this latter work, Lodge described the political causes, remote and proximate, of the Spanish-American War, and gave the opinions of the imperialists and anti-imperialists. In this, as will be shown, he had something in common with Fiske and Parkman, for he believed in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and in the decadence of the Latin race.

Besides these works, Lodge published several collections of essays including The Democracy of the Constitution and Other Essays; Historical and Political Essays; Studies in History; A Fighting Frigate and Other Essays and Addresses. He also published collections of speeches and addresses, many of which were his important speeches in Congress. These were published under the title of Speeches and Addresses, 1884-1909, and War Addresses 1915-17. With Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge published Hero Tales from American History, which work had as its purpose to present examples of patriotism and "to stir admiration for high character and brave deeds in the nation's past."¹⁴ Finally, one of the

¹⁴ Harrison John Thornton, "Theodore Roosevelt" in The Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, (ed.) by William T. Hutchinson, New York, 1937, p. 234.

best sources of information on the historian-politician comes from the collection of letters published by him under the title Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918. Besides these works, Lodge was a frequent contributor to many magazines.

As other historians and public figures, Lodge's writings and actions have been the subject of criticism. Karl Schriftgiesser has written, "He was born superior, and he took pride in his superiority. . ."¹⁵ A contemporary claimed, ". . . under the captious crustiness there was a very real man whom one could not but like, respect, and grow to love. He was a true scholar and a true friend. . ."¹⁶

In his life Lodge tried to see events of his time in relation to those which had gone before, and to those which would follow after. In relation to his historical ideas, he held to a "continuous theory" and tried to extract knowledge from the past, and having assembled it, to wield it against the problems of the present. "He brought knowledge from the past; he lent vision to the future."¹⁷

¹⁵ Karl Schriftgiesser, The Gentleman from Massachusetts, Boston, 1944, p. 78.

¹⁶ Mrs. Winthrop Chanler, Roman Spring, Boston, 1934, p. 194.

¹⁷ Unsigned editorial, "Henry Cabot Lodge, American Statesman and Scholar," North American Review, Vol. 220, Dec., 1924., p. 198.

A critic once wrote of him:

There is nothing in Henry Cabot Lodge's career to furnish a text to youth, to inspire young men. He was a compromiser of compromisers; for office and party loyalty he sold himself not once but endless times. . . . Men will read his books; a few his speeches; they will find nowhere the divine affairs and never will it be truthfully claimed for him that he broadened the range of American idealism, . . . or advanced in anyway the brotherhood of man.¹⁸

In defense of Lodge, Ernest H. Abbott has claimed that he had exceptional mental gifts and unquestioned learning, and that his opponents acknowledged him as an able relentless fighter. Abbott said that it was true that his name was "unattached to any constructive measures," but the reason for this according to Abbott was that in the field of foreign affairs, the names of legislators are not usually affixed to treaties and foreign policies. However, he argued that Lodge was influential on the side of American independence, self-defense, and self-reliance.¹⁹

Arthur Fell Low has written that while Lodge had been described as the "Boston chill," he was the "most scholarly, the best read, and the ablest of living American statesmen."²⁰

¹⁸ Villard, op. cit., p. 541.

¹⁹ Ernest H. Abbott, "Henry Cabot Lodge," Outlook, Vol. 138, November 19, 1924, p. 437-438.

²⁰ Arthur F. Low, "Living American Statesmen, Henry Cabot Lodge," Forum, Vol. 65, March 1921, p. 267, 272.

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Robert Washburn has claimed that Lodge had "a superb mental machine,"²¹ while Frank B. Tracy in 1905 wrote that Lodge had kept Massachusetts "hot with partisan rage ever since he entered the United States Senate, and his thoughts and actions are today among the chief political concerns of every public man and newspaper in the state."²² Yet, Tracy felt that Lodge had a nationalistic outlook, and he ranked him high as a thinker, historian, and writer.

Clinton W. Gilbert claimed that Lodge "has read much but absorbed little; he is well educated in the narrow sense of the schoolmaster, but he has no philosophical background."²³

In regard to his specific writings, Lodge has been accused of giving vent to personal sympathies in consequence of which "he is always the Federalist historian."²⁴ Because of this, Frank Anderson said that Lodge could explain the services of Hamilton and Marshall in effective fashion, but he was prevented from doing justice to the ideas and policies of Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin. He wrote:

²¹ Robert Washburn, "Quick and the Dead," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 137, January 1926, p. 119.

²² Frank B. Tracy, "Henry Cabot Lodge," New England Magazine, (n.s.) Vol. 33, November 1905, p. 300.

²³ Clinton W. Gilbert, "Henry Cabot Lodge," in Mirrors of Washington, New York, 1921, p. 141.

²⁴ Frank Maloy Anderson, "Review of A Fighting Frigate and Other Essays and Addresses," American Historical Review, Vol. 8, April 1903, p. 573.

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The author's accuracy and fairmindedness prevent misstatements of fact; his partizanship is that of tone, emphasis, and implication; but it is after all partizanship, not history.²⁵

In a similar vein Karl Schriftgiesser wrote that the biography of Hamilton was "the first of his many books in which prejudice supplanted scholarship, and his strong anti-democratic leanings found full expression."²⁶

In regard to his Story of the Revolution, John Bigelow praised his "graphic and vigorous, often eloquent language," but he believed that some of the statements had doubtful meaning, and some political issues were incomplete.²⁷

Frank B. Burrows claimed that Lodge's contributions to American history were "those of a scholar and man of letters."²⁸ Schriftgiesser has said that Lodge himself regarded his colonial history as "long and cumbrous" and Schriftgiesser commented that it was "worthy criticism."²⁹ Yet, Ernest Abbott claimed that his books "are likely to remain permanent additions to a branch of American literature."³⁰ After the

²⁵ Ibid., p. 573.

²⁶ Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 94.

²⁷ John Bigelow, Jr., "Review of The Story of the Revolution," American Historical Review, Vol. 5, January 1900, p. 363.

²⁸ Frank Burrows, "Our Senior Senator," New England Magazine, (n.s.) Vol. 42, July 1910, p. 613.

²⁹ Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 42.

³⁰ Abbott, op. cit., p. 439.

publication of his Washington, Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Lodge, "You have now reached what I am still struggling for: a uniformly excellent style."³¹ It is through an examination of these historical works and of his speeches and writings while in Congress that Lodge's views on Manifest Destiny become evident.

2. Lodge and Manifest Destiny

In his early works, Lodge saw the seeds of American history being sown in colonial times, with the development of a hardy group of colonists. In his colonial history, he alluded to an idea on which he elaborated later, the superiority of the English race. In speaking of the people of North Carolina and their early lack of leaders, he thought that the fact that the people eventually raised themselves in the scale of civilization and built up a strong and prosperous state was "a strong proof of the vigor and soundness of the English race."³²

In trying to show the influence of colonial history on the destiny of the United States, Lodge wrote:

³¹ Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, New York, 1925, Vol. I, p. 8.

³² Henry Cabot Lodge, A Short History of the English Colonies in America, New York, 1881, p. 157.

The thirteen struggling colonies which then fringed the Atlantic coast have become masters of a continent, and a chief factor in the affairs of civilized mankind. They are still working out their incompleated destiny; but the great forces which have been developed and which in their conflict have made the history of the United States, are to be found rooted deep down among the people of the colonies who founded the nation. . . . By the light of colonial history we can see the causes which have influenced that of the United States and understand the inevitable character of the national development.³³

Although Lodge's works did not deal specifically with the English-French struggle, he did point out that in 1760 there was a struggle for supremacy in colonization, and the English prevailed and dominated the world. Lodge considered that of the nations of the earth, the few who had ruled the world and made its history had been those possessing the genius of colonization. Lodge perceived that the English race possessed this genius for colonization beyond its borders since it was adventurous, enterprising and could adapt to new conditions.³⁴ Lodge enumerated further on this idea of English supremacy in his discussions of the Spanish American War.

The historian devoted much time to the phase of American expansion accomplished at the expense of the English through the American Revolution. He believed that the

³³ Ibid., p. 519.

³⁴ Henry Cabot Lodge, "Colonialism in the United States," in Studies in History, Boston, 1884, p. 375.

English colonies could not begin their career as a nation until they had won recognition of their independence. Once this was achieved, the colonial forces began to play a part and worked out their destiny on "the broad stage of national history."³⁵

In commenting on the causes of the Revolution, Lodge felt that the colonial policy of England had forced independence on the Americans. "A few concessions, a return to the old policies, and all would have been well," he wrote.³⁶ His idea was that the concessions came too late and that the colonies "were lost by sheer stupidity and blundering on the part of the king and ministers."³⁷ Thus, considered by itself the Revolution was not inevitable. Yet, from another point he did consider it as inevitable--from the point of "the inexorable result of the great social and political forces which had long been gathering and now were beginning to move forward."³⁸ This was the movement for democratic government because of the abuses of aristocracy and monarchy. His idea was that the Americans had been governing themselves

³⁵ Lodge, Short History of Colonies, p. 501.

³⁶ Henry Cabot Lodge, The Story of the Revolution, New York, 1898, Vol. I, p. 14.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

for one hundred fifty years, and that they understood the values of liberties and were quickest to feel and resent changes.

Lodge saw the resistance of the Americans as meaning . . . the great democratic movement had begun, that a new power had arisen in the world, destined for weal or woe, to change in the coming century the forms of government and of society throughout the civilized nations of the West.³⁹

The American Revolution started the great democratic movement, and let loose a new force of people ready to battle for their rights. He claimed, "The separation of the North American colonies from the mother country was probably inevitable. It surely would have come sooner or later, either in peace or war."⁴⁰

In the removal of this English barrier, Lodge envisioned the continental expansion of the United States. In commenting on the exploits of George Rogers Clark during the war, he wrote, "He opened the way, never to be closed again to the advance of the American pioneers, the vanguard of the American people in their march across the continent."⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 227. Lodge later voiced the idea that the Spanish-American War was also inevitable since "Spanish colonial despotism and the free government of the United States could not exist longer side by side." (Lodge, Story of the Revolution, Vol. II, p. 239.)

⁴¹ Lodge, Story of the Revolution, Vol. II, p. 28.

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As far as the results of the American Revolution and the connection with the American mission, Lodge wrote:

To the world it meant the beginning of a democratic movement, so very plain to all now. It was the coming of a new force into the western world of Europe and America.⁴²

He thought that democracy had produced a new force against which the old system could not stand. "The great movement which overthrew the world's equilibrium brought new forces into being, and changed society and government, began in America. . .," he wrote.⁴³

While Lodge saw that the making of the nation would be a long conflict, he perceived that, in the period leading to the supremacy of the nation against the states, the Americans were also busy fulfilling continental Manifest Destiny. He described it thus:

. . . another great movement had been going forward, which was itself indeed a child of the national spirit and the outcome of the instinct of a governing race. We began to widen our borders and annex territory, and we carried on this appropriation of land upon a scale which, during this same period has been surpassed by England alone.⁴⁴

In tracing this territorial growth of the United States, Lodge commented, "We had an empire in our hands stretching from ocean to ocean."⁴⁵ He believed that the

⁴² Ibid., p. 224.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 231.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 245.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 245.

American democracy had made a great nation, and that eventually the United States would become a world power. This he considered was the result and meaning of the Revolution of 1776 to America and to mankind. In answer to the question asked in 1783 of whether the Americans could successfully govern themselves and make a nation, Lodge said that the answer "is the history of the United States."⁴⁶ Thus, Henry Cabot Lodge saw in the American Revolution the beginnings of American continental expansion and the spreading of the lessons of American democracy to other parts of the world.

Lodge's view on American expansion from the Revolutionary War to the beginnings of new imperialism are found in his biographies and in some of his essays. However, these ideas are more in the way of hints or allusions, as Lodge concentrated on the period of expansionism during which he himself was living.

In his George Washington, the author had great praise for this American leader and portrayed him as an expansionist ahead of his times. He was of the opinion that Washington and Hamilton alone of that time realized "the imperial future which stretched before the United States. It was a difficult thing for men who had been colonists to rise to a sense of national opportunities."⁴⁷ Washington, Lodge

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 244.

⁴⁷ Henry Cabot Lodge, George Washington, Boston, 1889,

thought, "had passed rapidly to an accurate conception of the probable growth and greatness of the country. . ."⁴⁸

Lodge said that Washington saw that the opening of the western country by means of inland navigation was the first step toward empire, and he was the first to see that there was a need to make it easy for settlers to move to the west.

In describing Washington's ideas of this empire of the future, Lodge wrote that they "were quite as extended as those of the pioneers, and much more definite."⁴⁹ He said he hoped to build up the Atlantic states and bind them to the settlers over the mountains. Then time would do the rest. Lodge commented, ". . . the sequel showed that he was right."⁵⁰ Lodge agreed with Washington that the "true and first mission of the American people was the conquest of the continent . . . for in that direction lay the sure road to national greatness."⁵¹

Lodge alluded to the future American mission in discussing foreign policies during the Washington administration. The one common idea of this time was that the

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 7-8.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 164.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 165.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 218.

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Americans should hold themselves aloof from the politics of Europe. Lodge wrote that except for Washington, the Americans had not foreseen:

. . . that they should march steadily forward on a course which would drive out European governments, and sever the connection of those governments with the North American continent. After a century's familiarity this policy looks so simple and obvious that it is difficult to believe that our forefathers could have considered any other seriously.⁵²

In writing of Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality, Lodge said that it told the world America's interests were for the welfare of the American people. He said that the United States saw as its allotted tasks in 1793, "the conquest and mastery of the continent."⁵³ In his Alexander Hamilton, Lodge described this Proclamation as "one of the great cornerstones placed by the wisdom of the Washington Administration, and upon which the fabric of national greatness was founded."⁵⁴

Lodge also praised Hamilton as an expansionist. He wrote that Hamilton believed in the ascendance of the United States in the affairs of the Americas, and that he planned the conquest of the Floridas and sustained Jefferson in his purchase of Louisiana. Lodge remarked, "It was a great work."⁵⁵

⁵² Ibid., p. 132-3.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 147-8.

⁵⁴ Henry Cabot Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, Boston, 1882, p. 151.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 279.

Of expansionism during the Jeffersonian period, Lodge had few comments. Like his friend, Henry Adams, he had been brought up in the Federalist traditions. In some of his studies, he was critical of the foreign policies of Jefferson, but except as was mentioned on the preceding page, he had little to say of the Louisiana purchase. In regard to the war of 1812, he seemed to approve of the war, but he said nothing specific about the expansionists during the war, except that because of England's policies, "the young nationalists dragged the country into the war of 1812."⁵⁶ He did see that the purpose of the war was gained even though the peace treaty was silent as to the specific objects for which the country had declared war. The United States proved it existed as a nation and the "wretched colonial spirit . . . had perished utterly, and . . . not even its ghost has since crossed our political pathway."⁵⁷

Lodge was likewise silent on expansionism in the decade of the 1840's. In his Daniel Webster he mentioned that Webster had opposed the annexation of Texas by resolution and the acquisition of territory as foreign to the true spirit of the republic, but he made no comment.⁵⁸ In an

⁵⁶ Lodge, "Colonialism in the United States," p. 342-3.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 343.

⁵⁸ Henry Cabot Lodge, Daniel Webster, Boston, 1883, p. 282.

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essay on Webster, he referred to his being in the Senate "for the miserable years of the Mexican war, with its schemes of conquest, all of which he opposed steadfastly and vigorously. . ."59 Again, he made no comment. However, in discussing expansionist Secretary of State William Seward, he said that Seward "saw clearly that the duty of the hour was to admit California. . ."60

In regard to foreign affairs during this period, Lodge frequently tried to point out that in spite of the Farewell Address of Washington and the Monroe Doctrine, neither Washington nor Monroe sought to limit the United States in its hemisphere or in the world, saying:

They were wise men with wise policies but they could not read our unknown future nor deal with problems beyond their ken. They marked the line so far as they could foresee the course then, and were too sagacious to lay down rules and limitations about the unknowable, such as the doubting and timid of a later generation would fain attribute to them. Isolation in the United States has been a habit, not a policy. It has been bred by circumstances and by them justified. When the circumstances change, the habit perforce changes too, and new policies are born to suit new conditions.61

From this view written about the early history of the United States, one can glean something of Lodge's own views during the period of new Manifest Destiny.

59 Lodge, "Daniel Webster," in Studies in History, p. 317.

60 Henry Cabot Lodge, Historical and Political Essays, Boston, 1892, p. 31.

61 Lodge, Story of the Revolution, Vol. II, p. 247.

3. Lodge and the New Manifest Destiny

To this point it has been shown that Henry Cabot Lodge, in his writings, pointed out that the colonial period, the Revolutionary period, and the early period of national government were important as influencing the future course of American events. He wrote of the preparations for the conquest of the continent; he wrote of the mission of American democracy, and the superiority of the English-speaking race. However, Lodge's chief ideas on expansion are found in relation to the period of new imperialism. By this time Lodge was in Congress as the gentleman-scholar.

By the 1880's the American continent had been subdued; the political reconstruction had been accomplished; Americans were becoming interested in trade and foreign markets. In general it was a period in which the United States began to look outward. In the next decade there would be problems regarding the annexation of Hawaii, problems with Spain resulting in war, and problems in relation to acquiring Pacific possessions. During this period, Henry Cabot Lodge kept abreast of the times in relation to the changed national outlook toward foreign affairs. His patriotism and his family background of overseas trade stimulated an interest in far-away places and in the development of a navy which might be used to extend America's dominion into the Pacific.

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James Garraty in speaking of Lodge commented, "He brought also a sense of America's growing importance in the world, and her destiny to join the hierarchy of great powers."⁶² Julius Pratt, one of the scholars of American expansionism, has claimed that Lodge "preached with the greatest fervor the twin gospels of expansion and sea power."⁶³ Pratt felt Lodge was "thoroughly imbued"⁶⁴ with the ideas of the new Manifest Destiny. Along the same line, Karl Schriftgiesser wrote, "Ancestrally, connubially, and economically Henry Cabot Lodge was destined to be an Imperialist."⁶⁵

The Administration of Benjamin Harrison (1889-93) was the first to give much evidence that it had been influenced by the ideas of Alfred Mahan, and Lodge showed himself under this influence. This should not be surprising since his home overlooked the sea, and the money earned by his ancestors had come from the sea. Then, in his second term in Congress, Lodge was placed on the Naval Affairs Committee. Since Lodge anticipated the day when the United States would spread its territories overseas, he saw that the United States had to have a new navy. Thus, he supported

⁶² Garraty, op. cit., p. 146.

⁶³ Julius Pratt, The Expansionists of 1898, Baltimore, 1936, p. 204.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 231.

⁶⁵ Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 110.

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the recommendations of the Navy Policy Board for an enlarged navy and fleets in the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific.

Lodge's general views on expansion during this period were set forth in an article published in the Forum in 1895. This showed him to be an ardent expansionist. Although a staunch Republican, Lodge admitted that territorial expansion had been one of the cardinal principles of the Democratic Party. In 1895, Lodge believed that the principle had been "utterly abandoned"⁶⁶ by the Cleveland administration. In the article Lodge praised Washington's neutrality policies and the Monroe Doctrine. Lodge did not interpret Washington's policies as anti-expansionist. He wrote:

He never for an instant thought that we were to remain stationary and cease to move forward. . . He could not himself enter into the promised land, but he showed it to his people stretching from the Blue Ridge to the Pacific Ocean. We have followed the teachings of Washington. We have taken the great valley of the Mississippi and pressed on beyond the Sierras. We have a record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century. We are not to be curbed now. . . It is not the policy of the United States to enter . . . upon the general acquisition of distant possessions in all parts of the world. Our government is not adapted to such a policy, and we have no need of it, for we have ample field at home; but . . . while in the United States themselves we hold the citadel of our power and greatness as a nation, there are outworks essential to the defence of that citadel which must neither be neglected nor abandoned.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," Forum, Vol. 19, March 1895, p. 15.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

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Lodge perceived that there was a definite policy for Americans to pursue in regard to expansion. He did not consider that the lands of South or Central America to be desirable additions of territory. He marked the area of expansion as follows:

. . . from the Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean there should be but one flag and one country. Neither race nor climate forbids this extension, and every consideration of national growth and national welfare demands it. In the interests of our commerce and of our fullest development we should build the Nicaraguan Canal, and for the sake of our commercial supremacy in the Pacific we should control the Hawaiian Islands and maintain our influence in Samoa.⁶⁸

Lodge thought the United States should have at least one strong naval station, and at this time he declared that when the canal was finally built, Cuba "will become to us a necessity."⁶⁹ Also, since "commerce follows the flag,"⁷⁰ he argued that the United States should build up a navy strong enough to protect the coast and to protect Americans in all parts of the globe.

He concluded with a plea for American interest in expansion:

The great nations are rapidly absorbing for their future expansion and their present defense all the waste places of the earth. It is a movement which

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 16-17.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 17.

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makes for civilization and the advancement of the race. As one of the great nations of the world, the United States must not fall out of the line of march.⁷¹

Lodge's general idea here was that by 1895, the Americans were masters of a continent, and now the next step was expansion beyond. Lodge also endorsed the policy of expansion of the 1890's as he discussed the meaning of the American Revolution, for he wrote:

Sooner or later it was bound to return to the ocean which it had abandoned temporarily for the easier opportunities of its own land. Sooner or later it was sure to become a world power, for it had grown too powerful, too rich; it had too many interests; it desired too many openings for its enterprise to remain shut up even by the ocean borders of a continent.⁷²

As an expansionist, Henry Cabot Lodge was most critical of much of the foreign policy of the Cleveland administration, characterizing it as "bad" and "a policy of retreat and surrender."⁷³ This was in spite of the fact that on several occasions Lodge had voiced the view that the nation in its relations with foreign nations "should act unitedly and support the administration regardless of party."⁷⁴ This was the idea that party politics should cease at the water's edge.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 17.

⁷² Lodge, The Story of the Revolution, Vol. II, p.246.

⁷³ Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," p. 8.

⁷⁴ William Lawrence, Henry Cabot Lodge, A Biographical Sketch, Boston, 1925, p. 61.

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The Senator was especially critical of the Cleveland administration's stand in regard to Hawaii. In 1893 Lodge had supported Harrison's treaty of annexation with Hawaii after a successful uprising had occurred on the islands against the illiberal policies of the native ruler, Queen Liliuokalani. Lodge thought that it was time for the United States to take decisive action in regard to Hawaii. The United States had an economic stake in the islands, and with their military and strategic factors, he envisioned the islands as keys to the control of the Pacific. National interest would not let some other nation take over the islands. "We cannot afford," he wrote, "to have a Gibraltar on the pathway of American commerce in the Pacific."⁷⁵ Thus, the United States should take over the islands to prevent another power from doing so and "to prevent their Government, society, and business from breaking up and going to ruin."⁷⁶

Before the Senate could act on the treaty of annexation, Grover Cleveland had taken over as President. He recalled the treaty because of opposition to imperialism and because of the manner under which the revolution had taken place in Hawaii. James Garraty has claimed that the Hawaiian

⁷⁵ Garraty, *op. cit.*, p. 150. (Quoted from Boston Journal, January 31, 1893.)

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 150.

problem "was too complex to allow for any final judgment on the rights and wrongs of the case," but for Lodge the importance to America of the islands "outweighed all other considerations."⁷⁷ In the end, the Cleveland policy failed; the queen was not restored; eventually, Cleveland did recognize the new republic. However, annexation was delayed.

Lodge continued to denounce Cleveland's Hawaiian policy. In February 1894, he claimed that the foreign policy could be summed up in one word, "Hawaii," and he charged that "the crusade preached by the administration in behalf of the savage queen has humiliated the United States and has had absolutely no other results."⁷⁸ Later he lamented, "We have made a pitiful exhibition of ourselves in Hawaii. . ."⁷⁹

His pleas for annexation continued both in his writings and in his speeches. In 1895 he pleaded that it was the duty of his country to annex the islands. He was of the opinion that the majority of the people in Congress and in the country as a whole desired the United States to control

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 151.

⁷⁸ Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Opportunity of the Republican Party," Harper's Weekly, Vol. 38, February 17, 1894, p. 150.

⁷⁹ Henry Cabot Lodge, "Results of a Democratic Victory," North American Review, Volume 159, September 1894, p. 277.

the islands and put an end to the disorders. He denied that the sole interest was to protect American property, but claimed that there was need to assist the people in keeping peace and order. He viewed the American policy as one of inaction and retreat:

. . . I cannot bear to see the American flag pulled down where it was once run up, and I dislike to see the American foot go back where it has once been advanced.⁸⁰

In a speech on March 2, 1895, in an effort to save an appropriation for an Hawaiian cable, Lodge saw that there was a need for the islands and there was a need for sea power. He contended that even if the Hawaiian Islands were populated by a low race of savages, they would be important because of their position. "On that ground and that ground alone we ought to possess them. . . The main thing is that those islands lie there in the heart of the Pacific, the controlling point in the commerce of that great ocean."⁸¹

In this speech Lodge set forth the idea that unless the United States acted the islands might come under British domination. This would be unwise since the British might use the islands as a naval center against the United States for

⁸⁰ Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Duty to Hawaii" in Speeches and Addresses, 1884-1909, Boston, 1909, p. 177.

⁸¹ Lodge, "Naval Policy of the United States" in Speeches and Addresses, p. 181-2.

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control of the Pacific. Lodge saw the annexation of Hawaii as a part of a larger policy. The country needed a navy, and it needed to build a canal across Central America. He considered that a large navy would be the most effective and the cheapest defense. His expansionist feeling was evident when he said:

We are a great people; we control this continent; we are dominant in this hemisphere; we have too great an inheritance to be trifled with or parted with. It is ours to guard and extend.⁸²

While denying that the United States should embark upon an unlimited policy of acquiring colonial possessions, he did affirm, "But . . . we hold the citadel of our greatness here on this continent within the borders of the United States, but we should not neglect the necessary outworks."⁸³

Although the resolution for the Hawaiian cable failed to come to a vote, Lodge continued to press for the annexation of the islands. Writing in Forum, he set forth his views and criticized the administration for setting aside what he felt were established policies and traditions, saying that the "unbroken policy of the United States for fifty years" had been to "maintain our influence and control in Hawaii with final annexation as the result."⁸⁴ He thought Cleveland had

⁸² Garraty, op. cit., p. 152.

⁸³ Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, p. 206.

⁸⁴ Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," p. 8.

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worked to break down American control over the islands, and that even though he finally recognized the new Republic, he was still hostile toward the new government.

Lodge charged that the administration was trying to break down a policy essential to the United States from the commercial and military point of view, and he feared that the policies of the administration might result in putting the Hawaiian people under the influence of Great Britain. Thus, by 1895, Lodge was known as a leading imperialist of the nation. Yet, his pleas for Hawaii went unheard until the Spanish-American War.

Besides Hawaii, Lodge was also critical of the policies of the Cleveland administration in relation to Samoa. He viewed this area as one of military and commercial interest to the United States in the Pacific. The United States had the harbor of Pago Pago, but years ago he said they had "unwisely"⁸⁵ declined to control the islands. In 1895, Lodge feared that the administration was trying to abandon Samoa to England. Along this line he wrote:

The policy of the administration in regard to Samoa, if it had not been for the perversity of the German Emperor and of public opinion in the United States, would have been a complete success, because in international affairs, it is always so easy to surrender your own interests in favor of some other nation.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 10.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

In this area, Lodge's fears seemed unfounded for the United States retained its control of Pago Pago.

There was one area in 1895 in which Lodge showed himself in agreement with the policies of President Cleveland. This was in relation to the British-Venezuela boundary dispute. In this area he could point to the fact that politics stopped at the water's edge, for he upheld the administration and the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1895 when Britain and Venezuela were quarrelling over their boundaries, Lodge was concerned about what he thought was an attempt on the part of Great Britain to expand in Latin America. He was of the opinion that the United States had duties and responsibilities in this regard, saying:

We must be leaders in the Western Hemisphere. We must protect our coasts and hold the commerce of that hemisphere. We do not meddle with the affairs of Europe. Neither Great Britain nor Europe must be permitted to interfere with our affairs or gain new territory here.⁸⁷

Lodge wanted Great Britain to submit the boundary dispute to arbitration. He claimed that the American people by 1895, having conquered the continent and having finished the task of political reconstruction, were turning their eyes toward interests beyond the borders. "They are resolved,"

⁸⁷ Lodge, "The Monroe Doctrine" in Speeches and Addresses, 1884-1909, Boston, 1909, p. 238-9.

he said, "that the United States shall not sink in the scale of nations . . . and that it would fulfill abroad as at home the great destiny to which it has been called."⁸⁸

In this issue the Senator felt that Great Britain was violating the Monroe Doctrine by encroaching upon the territory of a South American state and refusing the American demand to arbitrate. Lodge urged the United States to resist the British demands when he said:

If Great Britain is to be permitted to occupy the ports of Nicaragua and, still worse, take the territory of Venezuela, there is nothing to prevent her taking the whole of Venezuela or any other South American state. If Great Britain can do this . . . France and Germany will do it also. . . The supremacy of the Monroe Doctrine should be established and at once--peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must.⁸⁹

Thus, Lodge saw Great Britain attempting to expand in the Western Hemisphere under the guise of a boundary dispute. He was in agreement with the message of Cleveland of December 1895, urging Congress to appropriate funds to establish a commission to determine the boundary which the United States would then defend. As one writer commented, the President and the Senator "became brothers before the war god."⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 239.

⁸⁹ Henry Cabot Lodge, "England, Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine," North American Review, Vol. 160, June 1895, p. 658.

⁹⁰ Villard, op. cit., p. 540.

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Lodge did not want a war with Great Britain over the issue. However, if war followed a firm American stand, the expansionist Senator saw a certain value for he believed that such a war would bring Canada into America's hands. He admitted there would be dangers to American property and coastal cities, yet in the end, ". . . the British Empire on this continent would have ceased to exist. . ."91

When the issue was finally submitted to arbitration, Lodge looked upon this manner of settlement as a victory for the United States. In appraising the results in relation to Lodge's policies, James Garraty has written:

From the broader viewpoint, the incident marked a gigantic step forward for the expansionist idea Lodge promoted so strongly. It led directly to the strengthening of the Navy as well as of Monroeism, and greatly awakened public interest in hemispheric defense and aggressive imperialism.92

There were two other areas besides Cuba, where the expansionist eyes of Henry Cabot Lodge had at least gazed before the Cuban crisis leading to the Spanish-American War. One was to the North; one was to the South.

As was mentioned in the Venezuela crisis, Lodge looked upon a war as a means of bringing Canada into America's hands. On several occasions Lodge at least implied the

91 Garraty, op. cit., p. 162.

92 Ibid., p. 165.

desirability of annexing Canada. In writing of Charles Sumner and his famous speech on the Alabama Claims in which Sumner advocated the annexation of Canada as payment for Civil War damages by England, Lodge described Sumner's plan as "feasible" and claimed that "if we had taken Canada at that time, many questions would have been laid to rest forever."⁹³ Yet, he also admitted that the Alabama settlement was perhaps a wiser and safer course, but Sumner's view was "none the less strong, intelligent, far-seeing, and final."⁹⁴

In 1895 in the Forum article Lodge mentioned that there should be but one flag from the Rio Grande to the Arctic. In the same article in justifying a change in tariff policies aimed at higher tariffs for Canada, Lodge at least held open the door for annexation when he wrote: "If Canada desires the advantages of our great market, let her unite with us either entirely or as to tariffs."⁹⁵

Two years later in writing to Speaker Thomas Reed in an attempt to convert him to his "large" policy, Lodge commented:

⁹³ Lodge, Early Memories, p. 288.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 288.

⁹⁵ Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," p. 10.

I believe entirely that Canada ought to become part of the United States. I should not think that we should go to war for it, but I believe that it ought to come and that nothing would conduce so much as that to our permanent peace and welfare. All our troubles with England, except during the Civil War. . . have grown out of the fact that she has colonial possessions on this continent.⁹⁶

However, except for these expressions of the desirability of annexation, Lodge made no positive attempts to encourage the annexation of Canada.

To the South there was an area of interest, the Danish West Indies. In 1896, Lodge heard rumors to the effect that the Danish government was willing to sell its possessions in the West Indies. Although no one else seemed interested, Henry Cabot Lodge, "burning as he was with expansionist fever,"⁹⁷ introduced a resolution in January 1896 asking for an investigation of the rumor to sell. In this resolution he voiced the idea of the need for the islands for coaling stations. He also voiced the idea that they should be sold to no other power of Europe, saying, "It is in the interest of the United States that no opportunity should be offered for any of the great powers of Europe to secure additional territory in America."⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Garraty, op. cit., p. 185.

⁹⁷ Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 150.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 150.

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Lodge also urged the purchase of Greenland which he thought would prove as valuable as Alaska. Although his plan fell on deaf ears, the Senator reintroduced similar resolutions in 1897 and 1902. In 1898, Denmark consented to the sale, and Lodge introduced a Senate resolution giving authority for the purchase and providing for the necessary funds. He himself submitted a report in which he declared the islands "occupy a strategic position and are of incalculable value to the United States."⁹⁹ After the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Denmark was unwilling to sell, claiming this might be considered "diplomatic discourtesy to Spain."¹⁰⁰

In the 1890's while Lodge was writing and speaking in terms of the annexation of Hawaii, the retention of Samoa, the building up of the American navy, the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the desirability of expansion North and South, he also became a leading spokesman for the freeing of Cuba from Spanish rule. It was in following this that America embarked upon its imperialistic ventures in the Pacific.

In a speech before the Republican State Convention of Massachusetts in 1896, Lodge voiced the view that Cuba had to be saved from destruction, calling the Spanish power

⁹⁹ Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, p. 226.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 227.

in the island an "anachronism."¹⁰¹ He saw that if Cuba were free, her markets would belong to the United States and American control of the Gulf of Mexico would be secure. He quoted from a speech made by Senator Charles Sumner before a similar convention in 1869:

The day of European colonies has passed, at least in this hemisphere where the rights of men were first proclaimed and self-government first organized.¹⁰²

Lodge also set forth his views on the establishment of a free and independent Cuba in the spring of 1896 in the midst of a Senate debate on a resolution to recognize Cuban belligerence. Lodge in advocating support for the bill said:

Our immediate and pecuniary interests in the island are very great. They are being destroyed. Free Cuba would mean a great market for the United States; it would mean an opportunity for America's capital . . . it would mean an opportunity for the development of that splendid island. . . But we have also a broader political interest in the fate of Cuba. . . She lies right athwart the line which leads to the Nicaraguan Canal.¹⁰³

In this part of his speech, Lodge placed great emphasis on the commercial value of Cuba and its strategic value. He also announced that he was prepared "to put our duty on a higher ground than either of those, that this is the broad ground of common humanity."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Lodge, "Speech before the Republican State Convention of Massachusetts" in Speeches and Addresses, p.278.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 278.

¹⁰³ Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, Cambridge, 1931, p. 46-7.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 47.

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In writing in Forum in May 1896, Senator Lodge spoke in terms of the American duty to Cuba. He pointed out that the Cuban question was not new and that the Americans had always been sympathetic with the Cuban patriots and interested in the fate of Cuba. He wrote:

Every reasonable man who gives any thought to the subject will admit that the fate of Cuba is of great importance to the United States; that under no circumstances should we permit Spain to transfer the island to any other European power; and that when war has broken out in the island the problem becomes acute, presents issues which we must not neglect, and is likely . . . to give use to responsibilities . . . which we could not decline.¹⁰⁵

In answer to the question of what the United States should do in the midst of the new Cuban rebellion of 1895-6, Lodge saw it as the duty of the United States to recognize Cuban belligerency and to offer its offices to secure independence of the island. He charged that the Cleveland administration was acting with great indifference and had "thus far ranged itself upon the side of Spain."¹⁰⁶ He believed that the Americans would "not long suffer the Cuban war . . . to go on indefinitely without any attempt on their part to bring it to an end."¹⁰⁷ Again, as in his Senate speech, he noted that dangers to American property, and the

¹⁰⁵ Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Duty to Cuba," Forum, Vol. 21, May 1896, p. 279-80.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 285.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 286.

ruin of American commerce were reasons for action, but he also saw the need of action stemming from the violations of the laws of humanity:

The interests of humanity are the controlling reasons which demand the beneficent interposition of the United States to bring to an end this savage war and give to the island peace and independence. No nation can escape its responsibilities. . . We have a responsibility with regard to Cuba. We cannot evade it, and if we seek to do so, sooner or later we shall pay the penalty.¹⁰⁸

Lodge thought that if the Administration declined to meet its responsibilities, the people would put in power another which would not neglect its duty. However, the Cleveland administration maintained a policy of neutrality and gave no recognition to Cuban belligerency in spite of Mr. Lodge's pleas.

As a member of the national platform committee of the Republican party in 1896, Lodge's influence was seen in the foreign policy plank which was the answer to the Cleveland administration's policies. It read:

Our foreign policy should at all times be firm, vigorous, and dignified . . . our interests in the Western Hemisphere should be carefully watched and guarded. . . The Hawaiian Islands should be controlled by the United States and no foreign power should be permitted to interfere with them. The Nicaraguan canal should be built, owned, and operated by the

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 287.

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United States. . . The United States should actively use its influences and . . . good offices to restore peace and give independence to . . . Cuba . . .¹⁰⁹

In his campaign speeches he also argued for a more aggressive foreign policy. In the election of 1896, Republican candidate, William McKinley was elected, and Lodge hoped for the fulfillment of some of his policies.

In December of that year, Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania introduced a resolution recognizing the independence of Cuba. This was largely at the instigation of Henry Adams. Lodge gave support to this measure at first, but he was deluged from protests by business men fearing war. Lodge was of the opinion that such action by the government would not lead to war, and he also denied that a war would hurt business. He also denied that he and McKinley were trying to force a war before the Republican administration took office.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Schriftgiesser, *op. cit.*, p. 160. It is interesting that in 1895 in "Our Blundering Foreign Policy" Lodge referred to Cuba as a "necessity" of the United States, (p. 17), while now he was talking in terms of independence. It is interesting also to note that the Republicans had denounced the Democrats as expansionists in the 1850's, while in the 1890's the Republicans became the expansionists

¹¹⁰ Lodge did talk to McKinley at Canton after his election. In a letter to Roosevelt, Lodge wrote that McKinley did not want to get the United States involved in a war as soon as he came to power. "He would like the crisis to come this winter and be settled one way or the other before he takes the reins." (Lodge, Selections, Vol. I, p. 240.)

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However, after the Secretary of State, Charles Olney, declared that even if the Cameron resolution passed Congress, it was merely an expression, and that recognition was an executive function, enthusiasm for the Cameron resolution began to wane. Even Senator Lodge changed his tactics and announced opposition to the resolution. "If we cannot have action, I see no use in agitating discussion," he said.¹¹¹ Thus, the Cameron resolution died on the calendar, never having been called up for a vote.

The failure of the resolution did not mean that the matter was closed as far as Senator Lodge was concerned. In 1897 he wrote to Speaker Reed, complaining of Reed's lack of enthusiasm for expansion and trying to convert him to his large policy of expansion and sea power. In this he again expressed a desire for recognition of Cuban independence when he wrote, "My desire is to get Europe out of America."¹¹²

In 1897 and 1898 the Senator was urging preparedness and defense. He believed in defense through expansion, but James Garraty has written that "to many, his defense-mindedness seemed more like belligerent expansionism than national self-protection."¹¹³

¹¹¹ Garraty, op. cit., p. 184.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 184.

¹¹³ Garraty, op. cit., p. 154.

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By 1898, like many others, Lodge perceived that a war with Spain over Cuba was fast approaching. He did not ignore the possibilities of expansion through this war. In that year he wrote to Henry White, American diplomat in England, predicting that "there may be an explosion any day in Cuba which would settle a great many things. We have got a battleship in the harbor of Havana, and our fleet is masked at the Dry Tortugas."¹¹⁴ A short time after this, the Maine was destroyed in the Havana harbor.

After the explosion of the Maine, Lodge urged caution until the facts were known. There are some who are of the opinion that Lodge schemed with Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in regard to sending Admiral Dewey to the Philippines. Pratt and Schriftgiesser have written that Lodge visited Roosevelt in the Navy Department in February of 1898 while Secretary of the Navy Long was away. They have claimed that the two together started sending orders for the distribution of ships, and that they sent a telegram to Dewey ordering him to see that, in the event of war, the Spanish fleet did not leave the Asiatic coast, and ordering Dewey to proceed to the Philippines.¹¹⁵ Walter Millis has stated that "the two

¹¹⁴ Allan Nevins, Henry White Thirty Years of Diplomacy, New York, 1930, p. 130. (Quoted from a letter from Lodge to White, January 31, 1898.)

¹¹⁵ Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 176; Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, p. 226.

conspirators had concocted" the telegram to Dewey.¹¹⁶ Lodge's recent biographer, James Garraty, has written that Lodge approved of Roosevelt's plan for Dewey to be ready to attack the Spanish fleet in the Philippines, but that there "seems no reason to doubt Lodge's own word that he played no part in writing or sending the cable, for he was always of the opinion that it had been a wise and necessary step."¹¹⁷

By April of 1898, Lodge, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, cooperated with the President's efforts to avoid a conflict. Yet, he felt that unless it was proved that the Maine was destroyed by an internal explosion, Spain should bear the blame. He thought a war might be avoided in this case, by Spain's paying reparations and recognizing Cuban independence. However, this was not to be the case. After much deliberation President McKinley delivered his war message to Congress April 11, 1898.

Two days after the war message, Lodge made a speech in the Senate on intervention in Cuba and introduced a resolution for the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that Spain relinquish its authority and government on the island, and withdraw its land and naval forces. The

¹¹⁶ Millis, op. cit., p. 112.

¹¹⁷ Garraty, op. cit., p. 186, note 5.

resolution also directed the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces to carry the resolution into effect. In his speech the Senator claimed that if war could not be avoided, it would be fought on high grounds and from noble motives to prevent Spain from bringing ruin to Cuba. He said, "We do not ask their lands. We do not ask their money. We ask peace in that unhappy island. . ."¹¹⁸

As he saw it, the United States represented the spirit of liberty and the new times, while Spain represented the spirit of the medieval past. The two countries could not be left to live side by side.

Once the war had been declared, Lodge saw in it the great possibilities for American expansion. By the first of May, Dewey had succeeded in defeating the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Immediately there arose an argument over what to do with the Philippine Islands on the conclusion of the war. Before long Lodge was concentrating on building up support for taking all of the islands. He referred to the islands as "a foothold in the East" offering "vaster possibilities than anything that has happened to the country

¹¹⁸ Lodge, "Intervention in Cuba" in Speeches and Addresses, p. 308.

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since the annexation of Louisiana."¹¹⁹ He perceived that the Philippines were more important than any other acquisition the United States might get from the war. Since he considered that annexation would be to the political and economic advantage of the United States, he worked to convert the administration to a strong Philippine policy.

In May 1898 after Dewey's victory at Manila, he wrote to his friend Henry White in England that "we must on no account let the islands go," and that "they must be ours under the treaty of peace." He added, "We hold the other side of the Pacific, and the value to this country is almost beyond imagination."¹²⁰

The following month he wrote to his friend Roosevelt:

The feeling of the country is overwhelmingly against giving the Philippines back to Spain. That is clear to the most casual observer. Bryan has announced that he is against colonization, and Cleveland, in a ponderous speech has come out against war as much as he dares and utterly against annexation. We shall sweep the country on that issue. . . The Republican conventions are all declaring that where the flag once goes up it must never come down.¹²¹

Lodge associated the fall of Manila with his idea of the superiority of the English over the Latin race when he commented:

¹¹⁹ Garraty, op. cit., p. 197.

¹²⁰ Nevins, op. cit., p. 136.

¹²¹ Lodge, Selections, Vol. I, p. 313.

Unfit to rule, the war which she had drawn down upon her own head had driven her . . . from the East, and a new flag and a new power in their onward march had risen up in the Orient. The youngest of nations had come again to the edge of that marvelous region, the cradle of the race, whence the Aryans had moved westward so very long ago.¹²²

Besides the Philippines, Lodge looked elsewhere for expansion. He wrote to Theodore Roosevelt about the possibility of Porto Rico, saying "Porto Rico is not forgotten and we mean to have it," and in the same letter he expressed the opinion that the administration was fully committed "to the larger policy that we both desire."¹²³ A week later to Roosevelt he admitted he was in no hurry "to see the war jammed through,"¹²⁴ since he believed the United States would come out better at a slower pace. He was confident of final success as he wrote:

We ought to take Porto Rico as we have taken the Philippines and then close in on Cuba. Let us get the outlying things first. The Administration I believe to be doing very well and to be following out a large policy.¹²⁵

Of the campaign for Porto Rico, Lodge wrote that the American successes were so fast and complete that:

¹²² Henry Cabot Lodge, The War with Spain, New York, 1899, p. 220-21.

¹²³ Lodge, Selections, Vol. I, p. 300.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 302.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 302.

... a claim to the island had been established of such an undeniable character that, when it came to signing the protocol, there was no possibility of withholding from the United States the cession of Porto Rico.¹²⁶

In the months following the outbreak of war, Lodge saw his dreams for the annexation of Hawaii realized, and he was elated. At first he was concerned that there was opposition to the annexation of the islands even though the war had demonstrated a need for them. He hoped the President would act without Congress, but he thought the attitude of the minority in not giving the Administration "this important military measure" was discreditable.¹²⁷

In June and July of 1898 the Senator worked for the annexation of the islands. To Roosevelt in June he wrote:

. . . the President has been very firm about it and means to annex the Islands anyway. I consider the Hawaiian business as practically settled. The whole policy of annexation is growing rapidly under the irresistible pressure of events.¹²⁸

A week later he wrote, "I am devoting all my strength to securing the annexation of Hawaii."¹²⁹ A short time later he was very confident since they had broken down

¹²⁶ Lodge, War with Spain, p. 188.

¹²⁷ Lodge, Selections, Vol. I, p. 302.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 311.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 313.

the filibuster of opposition, and he expected the islands would soon be annexed.¹³⁰ When the Hawaiian Islands were finally annexed by a joint resolution of Congress, Lodge rejoiced to Roosevelt, " . . . we succeeded in passing the Hawaiian annexation very handsomely--it is a very great victory and very important."¹³¹

Thus, Lodge saw one of his early objectives achieved as something of a military measure in the course of the Spanish-American War.

At one time during the war the Senator also talked in terms of the outright annexation of Cuba as "inevitable" because he doubted that the Cubans could create a stable government, and he felt an American protectorate would be too complicated and unnatural for the American government.¹³² However, he found no support for this idea.

With the conclusion of the war, Lodge perceived that the making of the peace would be fraught with difficulties, especially in regard to the disposition of the Philippines. He was concerned that the Administration seemed to be hesitating about the islands. He wrote to Roosevelt as follows:

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 317.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 323.

¹³² Garraty, op. cit., p. 194.

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I hope they will at least keep Manila which is the great prize, and the thing which will give us the Eastern trade. Everything will depend on the character of the Peace Commission.¹³³

Thus, territorial expansion found its justification in the control which it would give to markets and trade routes.

Senator Lodge had hoped to be a member of the Peace Commission, but lack of seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee prevented this. Nevertheless, he tried to influence, as much as possible, those who would be making the treaty. He felt the majority of the people favored taking all of the Philippine Islands, even though only Manila had been conquered, and that, on the day after the armistice. He was aware that at the outbreak of the war people did not expect American participation in behalf of Cuba to result in its entrance into political affairs in the Orient. However, as he saw it:

. . . there the flag was, there it fluttered victorious, and the stream of events, so much more powerful than human plannings when they are the outcome of world forces, moved relentlessly on.¹³⁴

Expansionist Lodge saw the course of events running in an inevitable fashion and felt they could not be stopped. He considered these forces let loose by the Spanish war to be

¹³³ Lodge, Selections, Vol. I, p. 337. Three days earlier he had written to Henry White in England, urging him to use his influences with Ambassador Hay who he expected would be on the peace commission. (Nevins, op. cit., p. 136.)

¹³⁴ Lodge, War with Spain, p. 227.

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world forces, "and they presented their arguments with . . . the silence and unforgiving certainty of fate."¹³⁵ As he viewed the situation, there was no alternative to the Americans keeping the Philippines. The United States had to replace Spanish sovereignty to "meet the responsibilities . . . come . . . in the evolution of time. . ."¹³⁶ He wrote that the peace commissioners, too, "heard in all this, as the great master of music heard in the first bars of his immortal symphony, 'the hand of fate knocking at the door.'"¹³⁷

Once the treaty was drawn up with the cession of Guam, Porto Rico, and the Philippines to the United States, Senator Lodge led the fight for the ratification of the treaty against the anti-imperialists. In December 1898, he wrote to Roosevelt of the anticipated difficulties:

We are going to have trouble over the Treaty. How serious I do not know, but . . . I cannot think calmly of the rejection . . . by a little more than one third of the Senate. It would be a repudiation of the President and humiliation of the whole country in the eyes of the world, and would show we are unfit as a nation to enter into the great questions of foreign policy.¹³⁸

Lodge had worked in the election of 1898 for a Republican Congress, fearing the Democrats might repudiate the expansionist results of the war. Finally, after a

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 228.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 229.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 229.

¹³⁸ Lodge, Selections, Vol. I, p. 368.

bitter fight, the Treaty of Paris was approved by a vote of 61 to 29 on February 6, 1899.

Lodge had worked behind the scenes, guiding the treaty through its numerous difficulties. He had publicly defended the treaty on the Senate floor, saying:

I want to get this country out of war and back to peace. . . I want to enter upon a policy which shall enable us to give peace and self-government to the natives of those islands. The rejection of the treaty makes all these things impossible.¹³⁹

Of the final passage, the Senator admitted, "It was the closest, hardest fight I have ever known, and probably we shall not see another in our time where there was so much at stake."¹⁴⁰

Lodge later wrote that the Americans were "too strong, too high spirited, too confident" to avoid the responsibility which had come to them with Dewey's victory. "The hand of fate was knocking at the door of the American Commissioners in Paris. To that knock all doors fly open and . . . but one answer could be given."¹⁴¹

In his general appraisal of the results of the Spanish-American War, Henry Cabot Lodge's ideas resembled those of John Fiske or Francis Parkman. He saw this struggle

¹³⁹ Millis, op. cit., p. 400.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 403; Garraty, op. cit., p. 202; Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 183.

¹⁴¹ Lodge, War with Spain, p. 232.

as a part of the conflict between the English-speaking on the one side, and the French and Spanish on the other for the control of the New World--a conflict which had been going on for some three hundred years. In this struggle he saw the Spanish lands in North America passing "from the hands of the men who could not use them into those of the men who could."¹⁴²

Lodge looked upon the expulsion of Spain from the Antilles and from the Philippine Islands as a conclusion of a long struggle "between the people who stood for civil and religious freedom and those who stood for bigotry and tyranny as hideous in their action as any which had ever cursed humanity."¹⁴³ He thought that Spain had ceased to rule her once vast empire because she had proved herself unfit to govern and "for the unfit among nations, there is no pity in the relentless world forces which shape the destinies of mankind."¹⁴⁴ Lodge saw American expansion as inevitable in the Western Hemisphere, and the final expulsion was "merely the last and final step of the inexorable movement in which the United States had been engaged for nearly a century."¹⁴⁵ Thus, by the "pressure of ever-advancing

¹⁴² Lodge, War with Spain, p. 4.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

settlement," the United States drove Spain from the Western Hemisphere in what Lodge described as a movement "at once natural and organic, while the pause on the sea-coast was artificial and in contravention of the laws of political evolution in the Americas."¹⁴⁶

As a result of this movement, Lodge saw that "the English speaking people owned at last one-half of the New World, and had shut out Europe from all control in the other half or in the great islands of the West Indies."¹⁴⁷

Once this had been accomplished and after a sufficient time in which the Americans engaged in solving domestic problems, Lodge perceived that it was again inevitable that the Americans would look beyond their lands and seek to extend their interests in other parts of the world. The Senator saw this achieved as a result of the Spanish-American War.

This conflict resulted in the awakening of the American people to the fact that they had risen to a world power. As he expressed it:

The great fact is the abandonment of isolation, and this can neither be escaped nor denied. There is no inconsistency with the past. It is the logical result of our development as a nation.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 233. Lodge thought that the remaining Danish, French, and Dutch possessions were too small to constitute an exception to the general proposition.

¹⁴⁸ Lodge, The Story of the Revolution, Vol. II, p. 246.

With the war, he saw the Americans as realizing that having built up a great world power, "they must return to the ocean which they had temporarily abandoned, and have their share in the trade of our country and the commerce of every sea."¹⁴⁹ Thus, the Americans could no longer "be indifferent to the fate on the other side of the remote East."¹⁵⁰

The Senator was elated that the Americans now saw that their future course of trade and empire would be in the Pacific. He wrote:

. . . our footing has been made and in the East we shall remain; because we are entitled to and will surely have, our share of the great commerce with the millions of China from whom we shall refuse to be shut out.¹⁵¹

Lodge also looked upon the growing connection with the Hawaiian islands thus:

. . . the culmination of the annexation movement in the very year of the Spanish War was not accident, but . . . it all came from the instinct of race, which passed into California, only to learn that its course was still westward, and that Americans, and no one else must be masters of the crossroads of the Pacific.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Lodge, War with Spain, p. 234.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 234.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 235.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 235.

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From this it can be perceived that Lodge considered it was destined as the mission of America first to conquer the continent and then to expand to the regions of the Pacific. This was the inevitable destiny.

The historian saw one other important result of the war, and that was that it marked the beginning of a real friendship between the British and the Americans. Lodge looked upon this as "more fraught with meaning to the future of mankind than the freedom of Cuba or the expulsion of Spain from this hemisphere."¹⁵³ Once united in friendship, it would be hard to set limits. This was a marked change in attitude since the days of the Venezuela crisis and the first treaty of annexation with Hawaii.

Unlike Henry Adams, Henry Cabot Lodge did not himself predict a conflict between East and West, but he did write that if in the future such a conflict did occur--a conflict between the Slavs and some of Europe against the English-speaking people, "between military socialism of Russia and Germany, against the freedom and individualism of the United States and Great Britain," he was certain that future historians would date:

¹⁵³ Garraty, *op. cit.*, p. 198. Until 1898 Lodge had been referred to as "a most deliberate and determined tail twister of the British Lion." (Villard, *op. cit.*, p. 539.) British sympathy for the American cause in 1898 changed his viewpoint.

...the opening of the new epoch and of this mighty conflict, at once economic and social, military and naval, from the war of 1898, which in three months overthrew the empire of Spain in the Antilles and the Philippines.¹⁵⁴

Thus, in general he saw as fruits of the war, the establishment of friendly relations with England, the expulsion of Spain from the Western Hemisphere, the American entrance into the Pacific by the annexation of the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands, a foothold in the East, and the fact that the United States had risen to be one of the great world powers. This, along with the development of a powerful navy, would satisfy the expansionist appetite.

In the post Spanish-American period, Senator Lodge continued his belief in American expansion. He was concerned with some of the mutterings of discontent over the administration of the Philippines and Porto Rico, and over some of the happenings in Cuba which became a virtual protectorate of the United States through the Platt Amendment. He saw that serious trouble or disaster at the beginning of the colonial policy might harm the administration and might produce harmful effects on the nation as a whole. He voiced this concern to Theodore Roosevelt as follows:

. . . for if some political cataclysm was the result, it might mean the definite abandonment of the course upon which we have embarked--the only course I think fit for a really great nation.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Lodge, War with Spain, p. 236.

¹⁵⁵ Lodge, Selections, Vol. I, p. 406.

This course was expansionism.

Once the Peace Treaty had been signed, many of the anti-imperialists began to urge freedom for the people of the Philippines, while the imperialists urged the retention of the islands. The election of 1900 was fought on that issue as well as others.

Lodge's chief thoughts in this respect were found in a speech he delivered in the Senate on March 7, 1900, entitled "The Philippine Islands." In this speech Lodge tried to point out that expansionism was not a party affair--that Democrats as well as Republicans favored expansion. His idea was that most of the Americans accepted the fact that the Philippine Islands belonged to the United States and that the country was responsible for them before the world. He believed the Americans had the duty to suppress disorders there and to establish a civil government. He denied that the Americans should leave the islands, saying:

I shall not argue our title to the islands by the law of nations, for it is perfect: No other nation has ever questioned it. . . I believe we are in the Philippines righteously as we are rightfully and legally.¹⁵⁶

Thus, he denied the charges of those who said the United States had no right to take or retain the islands. He pointed out, in answer to those who criticized taking the

¹⁵⁶ Lodge, "The Philippine Islands," in Speeches and Addresses, p. 325-6.

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islands without the consent of the governed, that there were many examples of acquiring territory without the consent of the governed, such as Louisiana and Florida. He dismissed the forebodings in regard to the Philippines, claiming they were the same as those in regard to Louisiana in 1803:

The downfall of the republic has been constantly and confidently foretold many times since the foundation of the government, . . . and always when a great expansion of territory took place. Never has it come true.¹⁵⁷

Lodge declared that he was proud of the long record of American expansionism through which there had been spread the principles of liberty. Since he considered the Filipinos unfit for self-government, and since he opposed handing them over to a European power, he thought:

... duty of the highest kind and interest of the highest and best kind impose upon us the retention of the Philippines, the development of the islands, and the expansion of our Eastern commerce.¹⁵⁸

In concluding his speech, Lodge expressed his faith in the race and nation, and again he spoke in terms of the inevitability of expansion, due to the spirit of the race and the instinct of the American people. He said:

This mighty movement westward, building up a nation and conquering a continent . . . has not been the work of chance or accident. It was neither chance

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 338.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 367. Garraty has noted that trade with the Philippines and China never assumed the proportions that Lodge anticipated. (Garraty, op. cit., p. 206.)

nor accident which brought us to the Pacific and which has now carried us across the great ocean even to the shores of Asia . . . but . . . it was inevitable, if we followed the true laws of our being, that we should be masters of the Mississippi and spread from its mouth to its source.¹⁵⁹

In 1900, Lodge saw only two alternatives--to reject the Pacific or to follow "the true laws of our being, and then we shall stretch out in the Pacific."¹⁶⁰ He concluded by defining what to him was the American mission:

I do not believe that this nation was an accident. . . I have faith that it has a great mission in the world--a mission of freedom. I believe it can live up to that mission. . . I wish to see it master of the Pacific. I would have it fulfill what I think is its manifest destiny, if it is not false to the laws which govern it.¹⁶¹

In the election of 1900 the Imperialists were vindicated with the re-election of William McKinley, and the United States continued to retain the Philippine Islands. Henry Cabot Lodge also continued his beliefs in American expansionism.

Lodge had long been a firm advocate of an Isthmian Canal. In his speech on foreign policies in the Forum in 1895, he had mentioned the need for this. In 1900 to Henry White, he wrote of the same need:

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 368.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 370.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 372-3.

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The American people will never consent to building a canal at their own expense, which they shall guard and protect for the benefit of the world's commerce, unless they have virtually complete control. . . . The American people mean to have the canal and they mean to control it.¹⁶²

Thus, Lodge supported the repeal of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the adoption of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, ratified in 1901, which gave the United States control over an Isthmian Canal. The acquiring of the Canal Zone and the building of the canal was considered as a necessity for the fulfillment of the American mission in the Western Hemisphere.

From the positive point of view, Lodge's ideas on American expansion included the building up of strong defenses and the acquiring of overseas possessions, especially with a view to the expansion of American commerce. From what might be regarded as a negative point of view, Lodge firmly advocated keeping foreign powers out of the Western Hemisphere.

Lodge had always been a firm believer in the Monroe Doctrine. He considered that it had been designed to secure the independence of the American continent and the safety of the United States. He looked upon the Doctrine as helping to promote the peace of the world and as saving the United States from having dangerous neighbors.¹⁶³ In 1911-12, there was

¹⁶² Nevins, op. cit., p. 154-5.

¹⁶³ Henry Cabot Lodge, "International Events Which Precipitated the Monroe Doctrine," Congressional Digest, Vol. 6, April 1927, p. 116.

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developed by him what was referred to as the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

At this time there were unfounded rumors that the Japanese were attempting to establish a naval base on the west coast of Mexico. Some attempt had been made by an American syndicate to dispose of a profitable concession in the vicinity of Magdalena Bay in Lower California. Lodge opposed the occupation of this area by an eastern power, and although Mexico denied Japan was attempting any concessions there, on July 31, 1912, the Senator introduced a resolution which in general declared that the United States disapproved of the transfer of strategic spots in the Americas to non-American private companies which might be acting as agents for a foreign power. Senator Lodge denied that this was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine since it rested on the older doctrine of self-defense, but Thomas Bailey has claimed that it was an extension, and was intended to be so by its author.¹⁶⁴

Although some felt the resolution unnecessary, it was approved by a 51-4 vote. The chief significance of the resolution was that it restricted the activities of private foreign companies, and for the first time the principles of the Monroe Doctrine were applied to an Asiatic Power.

¹⁶⁴ Thomas A. Bailey, "Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 48, June 1933, p. 226.

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Although many felt it was unimportant, it was a warning to foreign powers and it did illustrate the expansive powers of the 1823 Doctrine.

Lodge's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was also seen in relation to the Moroccan crisis and the Algeciras Conference. In this respect, it was not territorial expansion but an expansion of American political activities which the Senator supported. Lodge believed that criticism of the American participation in the Algeciras Conference was based on erroneous conceptions of the Farewell Address and of the Monroe Doctrine. He himself saw a connection between the policies of Washington and Monroe and the Algeciras Conference. He recalled that the United States had fought a war with the Barbary pirates, and in 1863 and 1880, the United States and Europe had signed treaties with Morocco regarding international protection of a lighthouse, the opening of ports, and the defining of rights of foreigners. Thus, the Americans had participated in other conferences and had a right to attend the Algeciras Conference, especially because of the commercial interests.

Against the charges that the conference was military and political as well as commercial, Lodge wrote that Washington's policy:

. . . does not in the least exclude, and never has been held to exclude the United States from agreements with one or more European powers as to matters affecting trade and commerce, or from international

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conventions which are entered into for the improvement of conditions in war, or for the promotion of the world's peace.¹⁶⁵

As he perceived, the American participation at the conference was in strict conformity with previous policies. The United States would not be drawn into alliances or war, yet the nation would use its influence to prevent wars. In this respect he wrote:

. . . we seek no territory anywhere, we desire none; in Europe it could not be forced upon us, and our only purpose in any dealings relating to European affairs would be to protect our own commercial interests and to advance the cause of peace and good will among nations.¹⁶⁶

In a speech in the Senate on the same topic, Lodge set forth as something of a twentieth century mission for America:

It is the policy of the United States to be at peace, but more than that, the policy and interests of the United States alike demand the peace of the world, and it is not to be supposed for a moment that we are never to exert a great moral influence or to use our good offices for the maintenance of the world's peace. . . the phrase 'entangling alliances' does not mean that we should not unite with other nations on common questions, on the settlement of rights of commerce, as to the rights of our citizens in other countries, or in the promotion of those great and beneficent objects which are embodied in international conventions.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Monroe Doctrine and Morocco," Harper's Weekly, Vol. 50, March 10, 1906, p. 333.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 333.

¹⁶⁷ Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 222-3.

Thus, the United States had as its purpose to use its moral influence to promote the peace of the world. However, it might be noted that in 1919 Henry Cabot Lodge opposed the American participation in the League of Nations. He had not been opposed to the idea of an organization for world peace, but he had doubts about the organization of the League of Nations, and he would not support it unless certain reservations were added which modified the League. These reservations were rejected by Woodrow Wilson. Hence, the United States failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles with its incorporated League of Nations.

In view of his previous ideas, it would seem that Lodge should have been ready for American membership in the League of Nations. However, he could not accept that League from Woodrow Wilson, his political opponent. He argued that the membership in the League of Nations was too far beyond the traditions and developments of the nation. He considered this type of international commitment too dangerous. In 1919 Henry Cabot Lodge, historian and Senator, did not consider American membership in the League of Nations as vital to the fulfillment of the American mission. He thought the Americans could best carry out their policies and best accomplish their purposes in their own way without any international association membership.

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After the war, Lodge continued to serve in the Senate until his death in 1924. His writings and speeches during this period were necessarily limited because of advancing age. With the passage of the years, the ardent flames of expansionism were gradually subdued. Senator Lodge was content with the American Empire as it then was established. Yet, few would deny that his thoughts and actions, especially in the 1890's, were among the chief political concerns of the public of his day.

Henry Cabot Lodge, historian, scholar, and politician, was an expansionist and a believer in the American doctrine of Manifest Destiny. In his early historical writings he tried to show the influence of colonial history on the future of the country. Here the seeds of American greatness were sown. In the discussion of the American Revolution, Lodge portrayed two movements--that of the spreading of democratic ideas to other nations and that of the beginnings of the territorial conquest of the continent. In his biographies of Washington and Hamilton, the historian also alluded to the future expansion of the United States.

It was in relation to the period of new Manifest Destiny, the period of the 1890's, that Lodge proved himself as the most ardent expansionist. He advocated what has been referred to as the "large" policy--the acquiring of overseas territories and the building up of a navy. During this time

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Lodge advocated the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, the retention of Pago Pago, the acquiring of the Danish West Indies. He advocated ridding the Western Hemisphere of Spanish influence, through freedom for Cuba. Once the United States became involved in the Spanish-American War, Lodge was anxious to acquire as much territory as possible. He again supported the annexation of Hawaii; he supported the movement for Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands. He worked behind the scenes to secure the ratification of the Treaty of Paris with the inclusion of the Philippines.

After the war was over, he urged a successful colonial policy; he urged the retention of the conquests, and supported the exclusive control of a Panama Canal by the United States. Then he supported Theodore Roosevelt in his attendance at the Algeciras conference relating to difficulties in Africa.

Throughout his career, Lodge always approved of the Monroe Doctrine and opposed any attempt on the part of foreign countries to expand in the Western Hemisphere. This was shown in his attitude toward Britain in the Venezuela boundary dispute, and in the Lodge Corollary of 1912.

In his works, there is no grand theme or thesis as is found in the works of Parkman or Bancroft. However, by examining individual cases or areas, it is evident that he felt the Americans had a mission to conquer the continent

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and then to expand overseas. In general, Lodge's ideas for expansion were of a non-altruistic nature. He felt, for example, that the acquiring of the Philippine Islands would benefit the American nation. In a speech before the Republican National Convention of 1900, he stated it thus:

We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. While we regard the welfare of these people as a sacred trust, we regard the welfare of the American people first. . . We believe in trade expansion.¹⁶⁸

Whatever his type of expansionism, Henry Cabot Lodge was an expansionist, and as an historian, as a Senator, and as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1896 on, he did much to influence the public acceptance of the American mission in the age of new Manifest Destiny.

¹⁶⁸ Weinberg, op. cit., p. 313. (Quoted from Official Proceedings of the Twelfth Republican National Convention . . . 1900, p. 88.)

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This research has attempted to view the ideas of some representative nineteenth-century New England historians on the topic of Manifest Destiny. In general, it was not intended to evaluate their writings from the point of view of good history or accuracy, but rather to discuss their ideas as related to the field of American historiography.

It is well to point out that these were not the first who had been conscious of a special American mission. Throughout history, writers, thinkers, and preachers have conceived of Americans as agents of destiny and have written of the future of their nation with an air of confidence. They have thought in terms of limitless boundaries of the nation. In their works, the ideas of mission, expansion, and destiny have been connected. While this idea of American mission has been found throughout the country, it has been especially prominent in the New England area. Hence, these nineteenth-century historians were merely following a tradition.

Although the term Manifest Destiny did not originate until the decade of the 1840's, Americans from the earliest colonial days talked in terms of mission and expansion.

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Indeed territorial expansion was often justified on the grounds that it was necessary for the fulfillment of the special American mission.

At first this American destiny was being fulfilled with the removal of continental barriers to expansion--by the extending of the American boundaries to the Pacific, with the removal of the French, the Indians, the English, the Spanish, and the Mexicans. This first concept of destiny was to build up at home a civilization with a good life for all within the expanding continental domain--the idea of consolidating the national domain and of expanding it into contiguous areas at any given moment.

After the Civil War, the idea of the American destiny in the world came into its own. National destiny lay beyond the seas on the grounds of national interest or on the basis of a moral obligation to advance liberty and democracy.

In fulfilling this American destiny, territories were sometimes acquired through peaceful cessions, through warfare, or through purchase. In the nineteenth century these representative New England historians wrote of this American destiny and its fulfillment.

George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, John Fiske, Henry Adams, and Henry Cabot Lodge depicted various phases of Manifest Destiny.

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All of these historians were born in New England, and with the exception of John Fiske, all were born in Massachusetts. Thus, their American history in general, had the social conditioning of the Boston area. Indeed, three, Parkman, Adams, and Lodge, were born in Boston proper. They grew up in an age when the Federalist party had met or was meeting its downfall; the first part of the century saw the ascendancy of the Jeffersonian Republicans, to be followed shortly by the advent of the age of Andrew Jackson. Yet, for a long time New England remained loyal to the Federalist traditions.

With the exception of John Fiske, all of these historians could be classed as members of the Brahmin class. They were members of influential families, families of wealth and social and political prominence. Because of this, they enjoyed the opportunity for travel abroad--for study, for research, or for pleasure. Except for John Fiske, therefore, they were not troubled with the task of earning a living, since they enjoyed private inheritances.

All of the group received university educations at Harvard in an age when the products of Harvard dominated the life of Massachusetts. Through their writings it is easy to judge that all were ardent nationalists and patriots. Henry Cabot Lodge and George Bancroft actually participated in political life in addition to their careers in historical writing.

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As representatives of the traditions of conservative New England, Adams, Lodge, and Parkman had a general distrust for the rule of the mobs, although they all upheld the democratic system to that of absolutism. They did not have confidence in the average man's ability to govern himself. On the other hand, George Bancroft, a true Brahmin rebel, sang in praise of democracy.

Fiske, Parkman, Bancroft, Lodge, and Adams all wrote of the superiority of the English-speaking peoples. Fiske thought that Asia and Africa would one day be dominated by that race. Adams saw the dangers to the Western civilization, and he wrote in terms of a bulwark of North Atlantic states to preserve the civilization, not only of the English-speaking peoples, but the civilization of the West. As patriots and nationalists all had some vision of the special American mission. Fiske, Bancroft, and Parkman had grand themes permeating their works; Lodge, while having no thesis, was truly a believer in American expansion; Henry Adams, while sometimes difficult to interpret, certainly could be classed as a limited expansionist.

In general, Bancroft wrote in terms of the progress of the American people under the guidance of Providence. He believed that Providence had decreed that in 1763 the English, victorious over the French, would lead in the struggle for the cause of freedom. Then, he saw Providence directing the

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Americans to independence over Great Britain for the benefit of freedom and democracy. Once independence was achieved, he thought the United States would go on to conquer the continent. Thus, he was a believer in Manifest Destiny during the colonial and revolutionary periods.

From his activities in the period of his political career, Bancroft showed himself as an expansionist to the extent, that if war with Mexico could not be avoided, the United States, while not appearing as the aggressor, should be prepared to acquire California. In regard to Oregon he was satisfied with the settlement of 1846 at the forty-ninth parallel. Throughout his life, he remained an extreme nationalist and a firm believer in democracy and in the guidance of Providence in all phases of American history.

It is well to point out, however, that Bancroft's extreme nationalism and patriotism allowed him to admit of no defects and colored his pages of history. His writings and views were influenced by the period of the 1840's in New England when democracy, humanitarian reform, and expansion were all in vogue. Another influence of the time was Transcendentalism--a faith in the progress and the divine perfectibility of man.

From the point of view of history, Bancroft often ignored economic, social, and geographic events. He did not provide much documentation. He often indulged in digressions,

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and was not always objective and accurate. His style was often pompous and inflated. Yet, his history is important in understanding the national temper of the nineteenth century. His writings showed that he was proud of his country and that he had a great love for the democratic spirit. He saw that the world was in a state of advancement, and he saw that the historian should write of these changes and discover evidences of human progress. He saw in the United States a goal to which other civilizations should strive. Thus, from the point of view of historiography, Bancroft's ideas on the American mission and Manifest Destiny are important.

Francis Parkman, although he lived and travelled West in the period in which continental Manifest Destiny was taking place, ignored that phase, and thus his ideas on expansion dealt with the earlier period. He concentrated on the Anglo-French duel. His Manifest Destiny dealt with the removal of the barrier imposed by the French, and then with expansion by the American people after the Peace of Paris of 1763. Hence, he devoted his writings chiefly to the colonial period, portraying the causes, the course of events, and the results of the defeat of the French in 1763. Although he saw France as the true pioneer of the West, he thought the French colony was destined to crumble because of its system. To him it was a conflict between absolutism and liberty.

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For Parkman, 1763 marked an epoch in modern history and opened a new chapter in the annals of the world. The importance was not so much the triumph of the British in this phase of Manifest Destiny, but the fact that the continent was given over to democracy. Within a short time, the Indian, too, would vanish before the westward advance of the Americans.

Again, it is well to point out that in this day and age, Parkman's works are not considered so valuable as history. He is not looked upon as an impartial historian. His basic theme of the inevitable victory for the forces of light and the nation of Progress over the forces of darkness and the nation opposed to Progress has been disputed. France's fall came about as much from geographical conditions and from the weaknesses of the economic life as from the system of French absolutism. Thus, Parkman lacked an awareness of the importance of economics in history. He complained about state aid, and yet he ignored the fact that England also subsidized her colonies.

As an historian he shaped his work in accord with his nature and beliefs. Hence his history, his views on Manifest Destiny revealed his prejudices and those of his time--a belief in Protestant, Anglo-Saxon supremacy. He was also influenced by Social Darwinism since the struggle between the English and the French resulted in what he considered

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was the survival of the fittest. Parkman also failed to see that the Indians were struggling to maintain their homelands in the face of the approaching English.

From the point of view of American historiography and in relation to Manifest Destiny, Parkman is important because he pictured the destiny of the English race and the expansion of the English at the expense of the French and the Indians. His idea of the American mission was the idea of the expansion of the English-speaking race.

John Fiske, the only one of the group not a product of Massachusetts, and not of independent wealth, saw the expansion of the United States as an evolutionary process for the superior English-speaking peoples. The discovery of America was a part of a gradual, orderly development. He discussed the causes for the success of the English in colonization, the successful ridding of the continent of the barriers to English colonization--the Spanish, the Dutch, and the French. Freedom and self-government were the reasons for the English success. Colonial history and colonial policy were stepping stones to national greatness.

Fiske thought that England alone of the nations was able to found durable colonies, and he thought that the final conflict between England and France was inevitable because of the superiority of the English system. He also looked upon the American Revolution as another means of the fulfilling of

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colonial destiny, for the Peace of Paris of 1783 made possible the westward expansion of the United States. Fiske made much of the importance of this movement for America.

While Fiske did not discuss in his writings the expansionism of the 1840's or of the 1890's, it would seem from his writings that he expected the conquest of the American continent. By 1885, the idea of Manifest Destiny to Fiske meant the future of the Anglo-Saxon race and the huge dimensions of the United States. He proved to be most optimistic about the future of the country, and he thought that increases in territory and population would not overtax the resources of the government. In general, he saw great possibilities for the country and for the English-speaking people as a whole.

Like the others, John Fiske was influenced by the social conditions of his time. In his works, the theory of evolution is most important. In relation to the first period of American expansion at the hands of the French, Fiske, like Parkman, ignored economic and geographical factors and blamed the defeat on the political system. He too blamed the weakness of Canada on too much coddling by the government, but he ignored the English colonial restrictions and probably overestimated the self-restraints of the New England people. He was convinced that Englishmen and Americans had as a common mission to establish a higher civilization and a more important political order than any that had gone before.

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Thus, like the others, he was of the opinion that the future belonged to the English-speaking race. Unlike Bancroft, he did not attribute progress to a watchful Providence.

Although Fiske contributed little new to history, he is significant from the point of view of this research because of his interpretation and popularization of the ideas of evolution in relation to the American mission and to the Manifest Destiny of America and of the English-speaking race, even though he erred in his optimistic views that the English language, race, political system, and traditions would extend to every land on the earth's surface.

Of the five historians considered, Henry Adams was the one most difficult to analyze in regard to Manifest Destiny. As a member of the aristocratic classes, Adams had little faith in the ability of the average man to govern himself. In his History, he could be considered as a nationalist. As a scientific historian, Adams tried to portray the emerging American nation between 1800-1817. In this he showed himself somewhat disillusioned with the promise of American life.

In this period, he discussed the American expansion in the Louisiana area, in the removal of the Indian barrier to the West, in relation to the annexation of East and West Florida. He also discussed the expansionist fever in the War of 1812. He was always conscious of the American desire for expansion, north and south. He never denied the natural

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necessity of possessing areas such as West Florida or Louisiana, but he was critical of the methods used to achieve these objectives.

In general, he had little to say in relation to Manifest Destiny during the middle period; but through his letters, there is much on his views during the period of new imperialism. Adams saw no future for the United States in the Pacific. Unlike Henry Cabot Lodge, he opposed the policies of President Cleveland in the Venezuela Boundary dispute. However, he did favor Cuban independence, and through his friend, Senator Cameron, he was responsible for the introduction of a resolution in Congress recommending Cuban independence. At the same time, he was opposed to the United States getting involved in European affairs.

Adams supported the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and of St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, but he opposed other involvements, especially in the Pacific area. By 1899, he began to voice his fears of expansionism. Yet, although he opposed American participation in the Philippine Islands, he could see no way out, and felt the United States had to assume the responsibility there. He also, by this time, opposed the country getting involved in Samoa.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Henry Adams became disillusioned with the progress of American and of the world. He saw degradation, and he feared for the human race

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at the hands of science. He voiced concern lest the Atlantic community be destroyed. Thus, while in his History he was a nationalist, critical of the methods of expansion rather than expansion itself, in the later period he began to oppose the idea of imperialism and feared for the country and the world at the hands of science, as the people groped toward their destiny.

Thus, Henry Adams was a patriot who reflected a national outlook. He was interested in national expansion, yet he seemed to think that continental expansion brought the United States into the web of Napoleon's deception, and that expansion beyond the continent brought the United States into the web of imperialism.

Adams was probably the best and most scholarly historian of the five considered in relation to this research. He began his writings with the idea that America had a unique destiny, a good future compared to European powers. He asked more questions in his History than any of the other historians. In this respect Adams, appealing to the intellect, wanted the readers to participate in an analysis. He himself felt another century would be required before his questions could be answered.

His predictions of trouble from an expanding Germany and of an ultimate division between East and West are interesting in the light of twentieth century history. In

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this respect he was like the Social Darwinians who believed that the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest ruled the human world.

Adams did not leave any indelible, all pervasive mark on history; yet, as a nineteenth-century New England historian, he made a contribution to American historiography. He tried to discover the meaning and significance of the American life. He was trying to find proof that the American dream could come true, but he could not find the answer. His views on the expansion of the country and the expansion of the English-speaking race are of significance in the light of twentieth century history. His emphasis on the value and worth of the Atlantic civilization are also interesting in the present day.

Henry Cabot Lodge, like Fiske and Parkman, connected the idea of the American destiny with that of the destiny of the English-speaking race. He saw the seeds of American greatness sown in the colonial period, and he considered that the English race possessed the genius of colonization. Lodge thought that the expansion of the Americans at the expense of the English was the start of a great democratic movement, through which he envisioned the continental expansion of the United States. Throughout his early writings there were allusions to the future greatness and expansion of the country.

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In the period of new Manifest Destiny, Lodge became a leading spokesman for the expansionist group. He was critical of some of the policies of the Cleveland administration and voiced fears that Cleveland was ignoring the urge of the people toward Pacific dominion. He was one of the early advocates of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the Danish West Indies. He supported the so-called "large policy" which aimed at making the United States the dominant power in the Western hemisphere, possessing a great navy and owning and controlling an Isthmian canal, having naval bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and contesting on at least even terms with the greatest powers for naval and commercial supremacy in the Pacific area.

In view of this, Lodge favored getting rid of Spain in the Western hemisphere; he wrote first in terms of annexation of Cuba, and later of its independence. With the Spanish-American War, he supported the American annexation of Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippine Islands in spite of anti-imperialist objections. Again, he saw in the Spanish-American War, a triumph for the English-speaking race, and a triumph for the United States which had risen to world power. This he viewed as a part of the expansionist movement begun during the earlier period of American history.

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After the Spanish-American War, Lodge again supported the annexation of the Danish West Indies. He urged the retention of the Philippine Islands, and the exclusive control over an Isthmian canal. He also opposed the occupation of any part of the Western Hemisphere by foreign powers or foreign syndicates, developing what has become known as the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. He also supported the American participation at the Algeciras Conference as a means of promoting world peace. However, for political and personal reasons, although he should have been ready for American membership in the League of Nations, his idea of the American mission did not go so far as to include the American participation in the League of Nations.

Henry Cabot Lodge was a devoted patriot, scholar, and statesman. Like the other nineteenth-century New England historians discussed in this work, his histories are not widely read. Yet, it cannot be denied that in the period of his writing career, he emphasized the destiny of the English race, and in the period of his political career he worked to accomplish this destiny. Other than George Bancroft, he was the only one who participated actively in public life. In comparison with Bancroft, Lodge, in this political career, played a much longer role in trying to further the cause of Manifest Destiny. His contributions to the history of American history are important in this respect. The United

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States had wealth, extent, and power lying between the two oceans. It should hold fast to its ideals and strive to promote these ideals in the rest of the world. Certainly Lodge was influenced by the economic, social, and political factors of his time. At the same time, he exerted an important influence on the course of national expansion. For him, the American mission had first been to conquer the continent and then to expand overseas.

It would seem then that the idea of Manifest Destiny has been an important concept in American history. This idea was especially evident in the nineteenth century. The idea stimulated the people to action. It was often used to justify the extension of the national domain. It certainly influenced the country in the period of new imperialism. Indeed there are parallels between the earlier American mission of spreading the spirit of democracy and extending the area of freedom, and the American mission today as leader of the free world against the forces of totalitarian aggression. In this latter respect, it is the American mission, and the mission of the English-speaking peoples as spoken of by Fiske, Parkman, Lodge, and Bancroft, and the mission of the Atlantic community of which Henry Adams wrote.

It would also seem then that these New England historians produced a large amount of written work. They expressed in their own way, in regard to one or more phases,

the drama of the United States in its path from colony to world power. They discussed the removal of the various barriers which made this expansion possible. Sometimes they ignored some of the motives or factors in this history. Parkman and Fiske, for example, ignored the geographical and economic factors in relation to the fall of New France. Sometimes they showed too much partisanship--as in the case of George Bancroft and his admiration of the Jacksonian system.

As has been pointed out, today their histories do not stand well the tests of true historical writing. Some of the works are outmoded in style and thought. Others are considered as too partial or uncritical, as in the case of Fiske, Parkman, or Bancroft.

Some of the predictions of these historians have come true, as, for example, Henry Adams' telling of the impending United States-Russian areas of conflict. Some of their predictions have proved false, as, for example, Fiske's optimism of the spreading of the English race and language to Africa. Some of their predictions are yet to prove true or false.

At any rate, these historians are important in that they laid the foundations. They helped to portray the American character. They stimulated others to research. Their histories dominated the scene of historical writing during the nineteenth century, and it is of interest and

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importance to see how these Harvard historians viewed the various phases of expansion as the American people pursued a destiny onward beyond the Allegheny and Rocky Mountains, finally reached the Pacific Ocean, and later even encountered the oriental civilizations in the Pacific.

All the historians have seen the Americans as agents of destiny, as a new chosen people guiding the rest of the world. They have exhibited the belief in the innate goodness of man. They have interpreted the methods by which the United States reached its fulfillment. This fulfillment was through the gradual removal of barriers to expansion. It is the story of the rise of the country from colony to world power. In this respect, these nineteenth-century New England historians have made a contribution to the field of American historiography.

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This is an editorial which points out that Bancroft's theme is that of Divine Providence guiding the history of North America.

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Thayer praises Fiske for lifting American history to a point of popular favor.

Tracy, Frank B., "Henry Cabot Lodge," New England Magazine, (n.s.) Vol. 33, November 1905, p. 299-306.

The author ranks Lodge high as a thinker, historian, and writer, and as a nationalist in outlook.

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Turner explains why Justin Winsor was omitted from this study--because of his failure to develop a philosophy regarding expansion.

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This article is highly critical of Lodge's political career. Author claimed that he always stood on the side of the privileged and that he never advanced the brotherhood of man.

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This is a discussion of Parkman's works and of some of the weaknesses of the French system in Canada.

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This is an unsigned editorial critical of Lodge in relation to his opposition to the League of Nations.

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This is an appraisal of Lodge's views regarding foreign affairs. It discusses Lodge's opposition to the League of Nations.

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This is a biographical sketch which points out Fiske's belief in the evolution of American history.

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This is an unsigned editorial praising Parkman for his works.

APPENDIX 1

ABSTRACT OF

REPRESENTATIVE NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW ENGLAND
HISTORIANS' VIEW MANIFEST DESTINY¹

The nineteenth century in America witnessed, among other things, a development and growth of historical writing. This writing centered in the New England area and was dominated by graduates of Harvard University. Important from the view of American historiography was the way in which these historians viewed their country's destiny. While the idea of Americans as agents of destiny had been present throughout the country's history, a great emphasis on this mission is noted in the historical works of the nineteenth century. Indeed the application of the term Manifest Destiny to American territorial expansion occurred in this period.

In this research, the attempt has been made to trace the development of this idea of Manifest Destiny and then to trace the views of the selected historians in relation to that idea. This has been done by a reading and analyzing of the extant writings of five individuals--George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, John Fiske, Henry Adams, and Henry Cabot Lodge.

¹ Mary T. Bush, doctoral thesis presented to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ottawa, 1963, xiii-370 p.

The effort has been made to interpret the views of these historians on expansion from the earliest attempts at the removal of continental barriers--the Indians, the French, the Spanish, the Dutch, and the English. The research has also considered the attitudes of the selected historians in relation to the period of Manifest Destiny of the 1840's, during which American boundaries were extended to the Pacific, and the period of the new Manifest Destiny of the 1890's whereby the United States acquired lands outside its continental confines.

These historians, all strong nationalists and patriots, and all believers in the superiority of the English-speaking race, have written of the idea of mission or Manifest Destiny in connection with this territorial expansion. They have also written of the concept in the sense of spreading the ideas of liberty and democracy.

George Bancroft is important to American historiography because he saw this American mission as divinely ordained. He portrayed Providence as guiding American expansion from the earliest periods. Under the guidance of God, America had grown, had done great things, and was destined to be an example to the world.

Francis Parkman confined his writing chiefly to the expansion of the American continent through the removal of the barriers imposed by the French and by the Indians. He

wrote of the background of the Anglo-French duel, the course of events, and the results of the struggle. In spite of numerous shortcomings, he is important in depicting the idea of the inevitable expansion of the English-speaking race.

John Fiske is important to American historiography because of his interpretation of the idea of evolution in relation to the American mission. He wrote in terms of expansion at the expense of the French, the Dutch and the English. He saw the final triumph of the colonists over the British as making possible the westward expansion of the United States. He also wrote of the Manifest Destiny of the English race, pointing out the future greatness and potentiality of the race.

Henry Adams in his History dealt with the American desire for expansion from the period of Jefferson through the War of 1812. He never denied the necessity of expansion in such areas as West Florida and Louisiana, but he was critical of the methods used to achieve these objectives. In the period of New Manifest Destiny, Adams became fearful of the United States assuming responsibility in outlying areas and he began to oppose imperialism. His views on the expansion of the country and the English-speaking race are of significance in the light of twentieth century history.

Henry Cabot Lodge saw in the English race a certain genius for colonization as he depicted the removal of the English barriers to continental expansion. In the period of the 1890's Lodge was one of the greatest exponents of expansion. He supported all efforts which would make the United States the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. He also supported the acquiring of an overseas empire as a result of the Spanish-American War. His views are important because as a statesman as well as an historian, he did exert an important influence on the course of national expansion.

Thus, each of the historians considered had his own concept of American Manifest Destiny. Each expressed in his own way, influenced by family background, by Social Darwinism, by science and technology, or by other factors, what this American mission involved. Although their works are now generally considered as outmoded, although they often ignored economic, geographic, or social factors, and although they often revealed prejudices, they are important to American historiography. Because they dominated the scene of historical writing during the nineteenth century, their ideas are important. They have interpreted the methods by which the United States attempted to fulfill its mission in its rise from colony to world power.