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ALTERITY, SOCIAL ORDER, AND THE MEANING(S) TO SECURITY

by
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There is a crack, a crack, in everything. That's how the light gets in.

Leonard Cohen¹

¹ Leonard Cohen, "Anthem", *The Future*, Sony Music (1992).

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Abstract

This thesis provides a genealogy of security. The first two chapters situate it in relation to the discipline of International Relations and present the approach to develop the genealogy. It is argued that what has enabled the lack of problematization of the concept of security within the discipline is precisely the security project of the discipline itself: the securing of an ontological ground through the deployment of epistemological precepts that pervade the way the discipline is predominantly understood and its evolution is retroactively (re)written. I argue that the discipline itself is enabled by, and is a manifestation of, "sovereign thought" - i.e. a form of knowledge inextricably related to the articulation of the sovereign State as the predominant form of social order in modernity. What is revealed is how the structure of sovereign thought occults its generative principles and enables a framing of issues and problems *via* objective knowledge while simultaneously masking its role as a frame. It is this deployment of knowledge that enables the naturalization of "security." These first two chapters provide the groundwork and the rationale for the genealogical investigation found in the second part of the thesis. The three following chapters apply this approach to the relationship between the meaning(s) to security and the production of social order. This genealogy is developed by tracing the intimate complicity between the meaning to security and the articulation of social order *via* alterity. These chapters are constructed around three *interregna*: the shift from Roman Republic to Empire and the advent of Christianity; the shift from Christendom to sovereign State in the classical age; and the advent of the modern sovereign State and the present mutations of sovereign order. Through this genealogy it is argued that our present articulation of "security" serves as a mechanism of depoliticization in the service of sovereign order increasingly deployed throughout the social above and below statal space. Finally, I argue that it is within the context of modernity and its intimate relation with the advent of democracy that a new horizon of possibility to articulate a counter-discourse to security is opened up.

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Introduction

The Context

"Our work is our words, but our words do not work anymore."¹ In this way, Ken Booth - a self-proclaimed "fallen realist"² - embarked upon his Plenary Address at the Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association (BISA) a decade ago. Booth's words can be seen as a crystallization of the *malaise* that had befallen the discipline of international relations as it attempted to grapple with the momentous occasion of the Cold War's end and the concurrent dissolution of its markers that, to paraphrase Gilles Deleuze, made theory in our discipline unworthy of the event. Booth's words, more specifically, addressed the concept of security which can be seen, in its inextricable relation with the questions of power and order in the discipline, as the site where the anxiety of the dissolution of the markers would be most acutely felt.

That this anxiety would be felt so intensely in relation to security should not be understood in the same way as, for example, the anxiety facing Sovietologists in the realization that their object of analysis was disappearing before their eyes, for "security" had very rarely been addressed in the discipline as a concept to be studied. As Barry Buzan suggests, until the 1980s, although there had been a plethora of empirical work dealing with "national security

¹ Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation", *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.4 (1991), p. 313.

² See Ken Booth, "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist" in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1997), pp. 83-119.

problems and issues”³, there had been very little work done in the discipline addressing the concept of security.⁴ Security had thus, throughout the better part of the existence of the discipline, *been used profusely as a word to help frame objects of analysis, while surreptitiously escaping the framing’s grasp*. Furthermore, for a good part of the discipline’s practitioners, most evidently in the sub-discipline of Strategic Studies, this form of blind deployment of the concept of security has continued unabated regardless of its relatively recent increased problematization, particularly since the end of the Cold War. This does not mean, of course, that there were no rumblings in the discipline concerning the concept of security and its definition before the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the concept of security has been a site of contestation as to *whom* or *what* is to be secured as well as *how* to provide “security” from a variety of standpoints which have been retroactively considered as being part of the “discipline” since its inception.⁵ However, in this contestation, it is not the concept of security that is

³ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Boulder: Lynne Rienner (1991), p.3.

⁴ Two notable exceptions brought up by Buzan are John Herz, “Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma”, *World Politics*, Vol.2 (1950), pp.157-180, and Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (1962), Ch.10, pp.147-165. This Wolfers piece was originally published in December 1952 in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXVII, No.4. That these two pieces appeared at the outset of the 1950s, and that both are critical of a purely realist approach to International Relations, provides an insight into the intimate relation between realist scholarship and the unreflexive deployment of the concept of security.

⁵ For an example of the former, the “idealist” Woodrow Wilson, in addressing congress asking for a declaration of war on April 2nd, 1917, explicitly ties security to “governments” and, in particular, to the security of democratic governments and, by extension, democracy : “We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a Government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic Governments of the world.” Woodrow Wilson, “The World Must be Safe for Democracy”, in John A. Vasquez (ed.), *Classics of International Relations*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall (1986), p.17. For an example of the latter, the “functionalist” David Mitrany, at the Peace Aims Conference held at Oxford in 1944, discussing the recent proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which was to lay the blueprint for the United Nations, proposed a broadened understanding of how security was to be achieved: “If security is conceived merely as a matter of policing the worlds against

contested - i.e. the *meaning* of what security is - but its referents or the means by which to obtain security defined as freedom from threats. Furthermore, throughout the post-war period the discipline was virtually dominated by an understanding of security as freedom from military threats with its referent being the nation-state under the sign of “national security”. By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, this understanding of security began to be questioned from without the discipline and the prevailing opinions of the caretakers of the State. This contestation was primarily voiced by academics and institutions addressing trans-border issues and problems in the midst of, and fueled by, an increasing awareness and mobilization around social and environmental causes.⁶

Why is it that such a central concept to the discipline remained unproblematic for so long? Why is it that the questioning of the post-war deployment of “national security” articulated itself primarily from without the discipline of International Relations? How has the end of the Cold War produced the conditions of possibility for a re-articulation of the security discourse? Is this re-articulation a redefinition of the meaning of security or is it but a redeployment of the same meaning to different referents and issues? These are some of the questions that can be gleaned from both the relationship between the discipline of International

the use of violence it is doubtful whether countries will long hold together on this issue while at the same time they strive harshly against each other in shipping and aviation, for raw materials and trade. Indeed, in the economic field division is likely to be even more violent than between 1919 and 1939. Our very social ideals make it so. [...] International arrangements for joint economic action would go far towards protecting state, from economic aggression. [...] Indeed, one is perfectly justified in going further, and saying that only by such means could we prevent aggression altogether.” David Mitrany, “The Road to Security”, *Peace Aims Pamphlet*, No.29, London: National Peace Council (1944), pp.13-14.

⁶ See Lester R. Brown, “Redefining Security”, *Worldwatch Paper*, No.14, Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute (October 1977); *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*, The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, New York: Simon and Schuster (1982); and *Our Common Future*, The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1987).

Relations and the concept of security as well as in attempting to grasp the significance of the multiplication of referents and sectors in which the use of “security” becomes prevalent.

The end of the Cold War has given a sense of urgency and immediacy to the debate around *whom* and *what* is to be secured and/or made secure. What the markers of certainty of the Cold War conferred upon the concept of security is precisely that: security! The security of knowing whom and what was to be secured, the security of a discipline which could confidently patrol its disciplinary borders, the security of building upon a hallowed ontological ground of States, Power and Order. Although this security was occasionally perturbed by musings from within and without the discipline - particularly since the early 1970s - they were treated precisely as that: theoretical musings by intellectuals about a world that *should* be, disregarding the world that *is*. The end of the Cold War, however, has not only led to the collapse of the figure of the enemy of the West, but also to the collapse of a particular articulation of the security of security: of who and what is to be secured, of the borders of the disciplinary citadel, of the ground beneath its feet, of the epistemological distinctions which allowed for the existence of a world “out there”. In this sense, what has occurred with the event of the end of the Cold War, what has happened with regards to the (in)security of security, goes far beyond the strictures of the Cold War while concurrently belonging to the Cold War as the culmination of certain epistemological, ontological and political precepts that lie at the heart of modernity. It is thus the roots of the above-mentioned anxiety that I would like to examine here. It is an anxiety that is deep-seated and one whose origins are hidden, repressed by the disciplining of the discipline of International Relations and a long standing complicity between security and social order that has been occulted in modernity through a retroactive (re)writing of the past

through the modern lens. It is precisely this complicity that, I believe, must be brought out into the open to understand the anxiety of the Cold War's end.

This should in no way, however, be read as a final end and an immaculate beginning as if we have, in one fell swoop, moved from an era called "modernity" to some type of "post-modern" world understood as a new set of markers to propel us into the 21st century. On the contrary, the symbolic economy of modernity and its ontotheological exigencies continue to attempt to fulfill its promise despite the dissolution of its markers: to find certainty, to secure security in, what I prefer, following William Connolly, to refer to as, "late modernity."⁷ However, now the referent objects of "security" have multiplied; securitization has increasingly spilled over and under statal space through a widening of its agenda to include environmental, economic and social objects, and increasingly pervaded social and political space through a deepening of its agenda through referent monikers such as "societal security" and "human security" as well as the post-September 11th institutionalized designation of "homeland security." A designation whose referent blurs the borders between the traditional connotation of "national security" as the defense of national territory by and for the State in the rarefied atmosphere of "international relations", and the defense of a shared *oikos* by all who belong. The primordial concern that provides the impetus for this thesis is precisely the way in which security is being redefined while maintaining a particular understanding of the political, an

⁷ The term "late modernity" echoes the way in which Connolly addresses "post-modernity" vis-à-vis "modernity" and will find explicit resonance in the unfolding of this thesis. As Connolly explains: "Modern agencies form and reform, produce and reproduce, incorporate and reincorporate, industrialize and reindustrialize. In modernity, modernization is always underway. Even its latest self-critical fashions, such as 'post-modernism,' are rapidly refashioned into elements within it. The ambiguous legacy of the term 'modern' supports this perpetual process of self-critique and absorption. [...] The aspiration to become post-modern is one of the paradigmatic ways to be modern." William E. Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1993), pp. 2-3.

understanding that brought our world to the brink of nuclear annihilation, to the systematic extermination of populations, to the wanton despoliation of the planet, all under the cloak of rational necessity. After the end of the Cold War and in the promise of a “new world order”, the concern resides in the way in which modernity will continuously (re)configure its markers of security - to secure security - through an understanding of the political that carries with it the possibility of depoliticizing wider and deeper spheres of social and political space.

The Predicament

Alarms as standard features on new cars; gated communities cropping up in American suburban areas; the elaboration of plans for missile systems to guard against missile launches from “rogue” states and meteors from outer-space; a burgeoning industry to secure corporate and personal information through data encryption and government attempts to secure a right to access this information; the discourses on “geo-economics”, “environmental apocalypse” and that of “the war on drugs”; the sharp increase of security measures in airports and embassy chancelleries; the growing proportion of security as a budget item at summits for acronym organizations such as the G8, WTO, IMF, APEC, etc., as well as at sporting mega-events like the Olympics and the World Cup; the standardization and sharing of information regarding flows of people between members of the European Union; the installation of surveillance cameras on street-corners in major cities and in private homes; the multiplication of biometric technologies such as fingerprint, hand geometry, iris and retinal scans as well as facial recognition software; etc.,etc.,etc... Through the methods and discourse of economic, environmental, social and informational control, the notion of *security* seems to be increasingly

pervading territorial and non-territorial social and political space. Is this an inevitable effect of an inexorable teleological romp fueled by the mutually-catalyzing pair of technology and capitalism in an increasingly dangerous world? Or is it something else. Is - as Star Trek® Federation arch-enemy the Borg preach - “resistance futile”? Or are there ways to alternatively address this phenomenon to reveal sites of resistance and possible proxy futures to the One imagined with prevalence at present?

The above developments characterized a pre-September 11th world⁸, before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that prompted U.S. Senator from Arkansas Tim Hutchinson to utter these words on September the 12th on the floor of the U.S. Senate:

We all woke up yesterday and prepared to go about our normal business in a world that looked the same as it did the day before. Today, everything is different. The New York skyline has changed and so has the geopolitical landscape of the world. We stand at the violent birth of a new era in international relations and national security.⁹

Within the context of security and the processes that were sequentially iterated in the paragraph above, one could ask if anything has changed? This, of course, is not to make light of the horror of the event or to denigrate the loss of thousands of innocent people to their families and friends. I would like to concur with a comment made by a colleague a few days after the event, after having also spent that Tuesday glued to the set watching the events unfold in shocked disbelief: “I do not ever want to experience a day like that again.” Furthermore, in no way is it an acceptance of the act as something that should be apprehended as any other daily occurrence, regardless of the number of people who die daily at the hands of others. It should

⁸ Indeed, the paragraph was written months before September 11th.

⁹ Tim Hutchinson, “Floor Statement on Terrorist Act”, *Press Release*, U.S. Senate (September 12, 2001).

be deplored as a catastrophic act of violence against innocent people without political, economic or social remittance. In the post-September 11th “for us or against us” climate, both within and without academe,¹⁰ words such as these are unfortunately becoming a necessary precondition to any discussion on the matter. To say that not much has changed also does not preclude the possibility of a series of catastrophic events beginning with the present military action in Afghanistan and the eventuality of an expansion of the U.S. “War on Terror”, originally labeled, but quickly retracted, “Operation Infinite Justice” (much to Jacques Derrida’s dismay!¹¹). Or the use by every regime under the sun using the “terrorist” moniker to legitimate the use of force against a myriad of types of dissent. In this context, to say that not much has changed does not forestall discussion on the multiple equations such as that of “security vs. freedom” used to curtail civil rights, or that, oddly enough, between “security vs. sovereignty” used by U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci in his call for a continental security perimeter entailing the harmonization of immigration and refugee policies.¹² Finally, to say that not much

¹⁰ Within academe, see the work of the American Council of Trustees and Alumni spearheaded by Lynne Cheney and which has been active in attempting to discredit, intimidate, isolate and marginalize voices which are even moderately critical of U.S. policy since September 11th. See, in particular, Jerry L. Martin and Anne D. Neal, *Defending Civilization: How Our Universities are Failing America and What Can Be Done About It*, A Project of the Defense of Civilization Fund, American Council of Trustees and Alumni, Revised and Expanded (February 2002). <http://www.goacta.org/Reports/defciv.pdf>

¹¹ This dismay refers to Jacques Derrida’s usage of the term “infinite justice” to articulate the basis for a position that would precisely deconstruct the hubris through which the “war on terror” has been deployed. As Derrida illustrates: “...the deconstruction of all presumption of a determinant certitude of a present justice itself operates on the basis of an infinite ‘idea of justice,’ infinite because it is irreducible, irreducible because it is owed to the other, before any contract, because it has come, the other’s coming as the singularity that is always other.” Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, London: Routledge (1992), p.25. Derrida addresses this recent use of “infinite justice” in Jacques Derrida, “La langue de l’étranger”, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Janvier 2002), p.27.

¹² “Security before sovereignty, U.S. envoy urges”, *The Ottawa Citizen*, September 19, 2001, Special Section, p.C3.

has changed should not obviate the fact that the word “security” has become ubiquitous since September 11th and shows no signs of abating. Yet this is precisely the point. If anything, September 11th has served as a catalyst to practices and processes that were already in place. In other words, the traumatic experience of the event (“trauma” used here in relation to the symbolic order into which the event irrupted), was subsequently symbolized - i.e. made “sense” of through the prevalent frame - in real-time over the hours, days, weeks and months since, by inserting itself into a pre-existing chain of equivalences around the signifier “security” and spreading like wildfire through the already established practices and processes of security. In doing so, these practices and processes are both re-confirmed and re-enforced while simultaneously serving as conduits through which new equivalences, new practices, new processes have begun to operate. It is precisely the symbolic order into which this event violently ingressed that is at issue here and the politics of security of this order that are being problematized.¹³

The Approach

At its most general level, this symbolic order is understood as being that of “modernity.” Yet modernity itself was not immaculately conceived, regardless of the fact that it is occasionally referred to by “birth.” Furthermore, the politics of security is not the province of modernity and

¹³ On the resonances of the past upon a post-September 11th world, see David Campbell, “Time is Broken: The Return of the Past In the Response to September 11”, *Theory & Event*, Vol.5, No.4 (2002), http://direct.press.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4campbell.html in which the author apprehends the response to 9-11 as having a Cold War like structure. See also James Der Derian, “The War of Networks”, *Theory & Event*, Vol.5, No.4 (2002), http://direct.press.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4derderian.html, in which the author presents quotes from the 1993 World Trade Center attack which are virtually indistinguishable from what could be said in the context of 9-11.

claims a long lineage, one to which I don't profess to know its "birth." However, one way that this question of security can be addressed, is to trace back as far as possible its common and prevalent usage in order to understand its present articulation. Through numismatic evidence, as well as other forms of official inscriptions, it is known that "security", as *securitas*, was widely deployed from the beginnings of the Roman Empire as a word intimately associated with the Roman Imperial order. To use such a modern conception as "propaganda" to refer to its use may not be doing it justice but, in essence, and by comparing it to other words used in similar instances, such as "eternity;" "justice;" "generosity;" "freedom;" "peace;" "wealth" or "victory," one can safely surmise that it was used positively as a slogan of Empire. From this end, one can begin to re-trace the interrelationship between "security" and social order. It is precisely this that is offered in chapters Three, Four and Five. In other words, after situating this work in relation to the discipline of International Relations, addressing the question of ontology that enables this disciplining, and proposing an alternative optic from which to provide this re-tracing in chapters One and Two, what will follow is a genealogy, *qua* "history of the present,"¹⁴ of the intimate relationship between the meaning(s) of security and the articulation and production of social order. However, to do so, another dimension which I find to be intimately related to both the meaning(s) given to security and its relation to social order will be indispensable: an engagement with alterity, or "otherness."

In engaging with alterity, the continuous thread which weaves its way through this

¹⁴ As Michael Shapiro notes, "In order to show the lines of force that are no longer visible in the present, genealogy goes back to the point of emergence, the historical moment at which an interpretation emerges as dominant...In order, then, to show the textual practice associated with genealogy, it is necessary to heed the identification of the historically shifting interpretations of space that give the contending discourses their predicates". Michael J. Shapiro, *Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), p.12.

work, what is meant is the way that “otherness” is negotiated in the process of social institution. In other words, how otherness both enables the foundation and performative maintenance of particular articulations of social order and simultaneously how particular articulations of social order will inform what “otherness” *is* in each. This simultaneous movement, I will argue, should also be apprehended with regards to the meaning of security. This is to say that not only is the meaning to security central to the articulation of social order, but the articulation of social order is central to the deployment of a particular meaning to security. It is here that the complicity between the meaning(s) of security and social order can be most clearly revealed. In parenthesizing the “s” in meaning(s), what is being denoted is the way a particular articulation of social order will present a singular meaning to security and its accompanying referents while simultaneously occulting the possibility of other meanings and referents. The “s” thus stands for that excess of meaning that is always already occulted in specific articulations of social order.

What is important to note here is that although “security” is the central concern of this thesis, it is how the meaning(s) to security are associated to social order and its negotiation with alterity that forms the kernel of the analysis. The major part of the argument’s development is thus consecrated to the way in which alterity is negotiated in the production, deployment, and maintenance of social order. From this staging, textual examples of the use of security are examined in relation to how their meaning is informed by the way in which otherness is articulated in specific forms of order and, simultaneously, how this meaning is central in the production of these forms. In approaching the issue of security in this way, there is but a cursory engagement with the security literature. In particular, there is little engagement with the literature that utilizes the concept of security as a given to frame issues and problems in terms

of “real” threats objectively apprehended in a world “out there”. As alluded to earlier, it is precisely what enables this perspective, what constitutes this horizon of possibility, that is at issue here. Furthermore, although this thesis intermittently addresses the issue of gender when the occasion presents itself, it does not provide a consistent commentary on the articulation of gender in the relation between security and social order. Although such a commentary could and should be envisaged, it would presently require some extensive elaboration that is better left for a project explicitly devoted to addressing the complicity between security and social order from a gender optic. The same is true for post-colonialism. Although the European encounter with the new world and the articulation of the non-western “other” are an inextricable part of the constitution of the Western “self”, its articulation of alterity, and its constitution of knowledge, it is regrettably omitted from this work in view of the amount of elaboration it would necessitate to treat it as it deservedly should. Again here, a full project consecrated to this complicity from a post-colonialist perspective is necessary.

In attempting to provide an understanding of what enables the present deployment of the security discourse around a singular, naturalized, meaning, another dimension of this work is brought to the fore. In addressing the articulation of the meaning(s) to security as it is deployed in the Roman Imperial order, what is revealed is how early Christianity presents a counter-discourse to the discourse of Empire that can be found in the earliest of Christian writings: those of St. Paul. This discourse takes the form of a *negative* meaning to security, a discourse *against* security, one that apprehends security as *sin*. Through a particular reading of the Pauline discourse, I associate this meaning of security with an understanding of the early Christian Pauline discourse as a political movement that problematizes the Imperial order

through a discourse which reveals, accepts, and sustains contingency in its fidelity to the event of resurrection and revealing the excess to the discursive economy of Empire. This reading, in other words, presents the early Christian Pauline discourse as a sort of deconstructionism *avant la lettre*. Although this aspect of early Christianity is covered over in its subsequent institutionalization, it is instructive in attempts to address our present security predicament. It is raised here since it is a significant example that does not quite fit into the process outlined above where a singular meaning to security occults the possibility of other meanings and referents. This is not to say, however, that there are not times where two meanings to security are synchronically present. As will be addressed, such synchronicity is precisely found in *interregna*, in periods where, as Antonio Gramsci succinctly put it, “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”¹⁵; where there is a contestation of meaning and order. *Interregna*, are central to this work in that it is precisely in these moments of contestation, of shifts in meaning and the articulation of power and order, that we can best identify the intimate complicity between the meaning(s) to security and the articulation and production of social order. However, what is found in the early Christian Pauline discourse is *not* a contestation between two self-same ontological structures with, albeit, different negotiations with alterity. What is offered in the counter-discourse of security is a disruption of the discourse of Empire, a counter-discourse that does not seek to supplant it, but to unremittingly destabilize it. This is done by revealing the contingency of its foundation while simultaneously providing a groundless ground based upon the fidelity to the event of resurrection to articulate a new subjective

¹⁵ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds. and trans.), New York: International Publishers (1971), p.276.

disposition and a new *ethos*. It is precisely in this revelation and articulation that the importance of this counter-discourse of security can be instructive within the present context of the articulation of order in modernity deployed through the coupling security/sovereignty.

It should be evident from the above elucidations, that the question of foundation is also central to the present work. It is also with regards to the question of foundation that the understanding of the political that guides the present thesis finds its roots. It is precisely security's role in the articulation of political foundation that is at issue here. The importance of security in the deployment and maintenance of a ground for politics is succinctly hinted at by James Der Derian in commenting that "[n]o other concept [...] packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of 'security.'"¹⁶ Although these issues are examined in more detail throughout the first two chapters, what should be briefly alluded to here is that what is meant by the *political*, what makes this work a *political* study, is an understanding of this term gleaned from a distinction explicitly made by certain authors such as Claude Lefort, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy¹⁷ between the political (*le politique*) and politics (*la politique*). Whereas "politics" is concerned with what Simon Critchley succinctly describes as the "the facticity or empirical event of politics"¹⁸, i.e. the institutions and the practices,

¹⁶ James Der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard", in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), *The Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993), p.95.

¹⁷ See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, "Ouverture" in Luc Ferry, Jean Luc Nancy, Jean François Lyotard, Étienne Balibar, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Rejouer le politique*, Paris: Galilée (1981), p.15, and Claude Lefort, *Essais sur le politique. XIXe-XXe siècles*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1986), pp. 19-20. For a detailed and critical elaboration of the consequences of this distinction see Simon Critchley, "Re-tracing the political: politics and community in the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy", *The Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993), pp.73-93.

¹⁸ Simon Critchley, "Re-tracing the political: politics and community in the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy", *The Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press

relations and activities of politics that are the object of social scientific analysis, “the political” is concerned with what founds the above empirical event as “politics” - i.e. with the ground(ing) of social order. In combining a concern with alterity with this understanding of the political, the approach taken here can be termed, following the work of Claude Lefort, but changing somewhat its meaning, a *theologico-political* optic.¹⁹

The approach is, therefore, not “social scientific” but more akin to philosophical work. This is not to say that there is a complete disregard for political institutions, practices, relations and activities, but that these are always already apprehended and addressed within the broader context of what enables them. In this sense, the primary concern is with *symbolic* orders and their foundation, *discursive* economies and their articulation, *power/knowledge* formations and their manifestations. In other words, concerns that could be labeled “post-modern” or “post-structural” or, along more negative lines, “anti-foundationalist”, “anti-humanist” or “anti-Enlightenment.” Such issues will be addressed in due time. However, what needs to be done at present is to elucidate the general argument, the structure, and the potential contributions of the thesis.

The Argument

The argument of this thesis has, as alluded to earlier, been spurred by the way in which the concept of security has been articulated in the discipline of International Relations. That is to say, this thesis attempts to provide an understanding of why and how the concept of security

(1993), p.74.

¹⁹ See Claude Lefort, “The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?” in Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), pp.213-255.

is predominantly deployed to frame problems and issues while simultaneously it evades the framing's grasp - i.e. it is naturalized and its meaning is self-evident. However, although I am spurred by the question of the usage of security within the context of International Relations, it is the broader context of security's role in the production and maintenance of social order in relation to alterity *tout court* that is engaged. In this sense, I do not mark a difference between security's usage in International Relations and its usage in founding social order. In fact, I see security's usage in International Relations as a further, and intimately modern, manifestation of its use in the articulation of social order - i.e. an order effected on a global scale. At its most general level, therefore, the argument states that there is a longstanding complicity between the meaning(s) of security and the articulation and production of social order. A corollary to this argument is not only that security does not have a singular meaning, but that in the revelation of this complicity, the space is created to enable alternative possibilities to the current security predicament. In other words, since security *qua* protection from threats from a particular articulation of what "others" are is intimately related to the articulation of a specific form of order and the subjective dispositions that it produces in its performative process of ordering, it is possible to envisage "possible proxy futures".

The first two chapters of the thesis will situate it in relation to the discipline of International Relations, the epistemological and ontological precepts that inform and enable the discipline, and will present the approach by which the genealogy of the relationship between the security and social order *via* a concern with alterity will be developed. These two chapters therefore set the ground for what is to follow. However, they also simultaneously present a preliminary argument regarding security's use within the discipline that spurred the present

investigation. From the standpoint of meta-theory taken in Chapter One, it is argued that what has enabled the lack of problematization of the concept of security within the discipline, what has made “security” a self-evident device through which problems and issues are addressed, is precisely the security project of the discipline itself: the securing of a certain ontological ground through the deployment of epistemological precepts that pervade the way the discipline is predominantly understood and its evolution is retroactively (re)written. In particular, what I posit in an examination of the way in which the foundation of the discipline and its evolution are predominantly understood, is that the disciplinary space of International Relations is articulated according to epistemic Realist tenets from the outset of its self-understanding as a discipline. Furthermore, I argue that these tenets inform the retroactive (re)writing of the discipline’s foundation and shape the predominant view of the discipline’s evolution. In short, the argument is that there is not, and has never been, a neutral disciplinary space. From this positioning and preliminary argumentation in Chapter One, I move to provide a deeper explanation of security’s deployment within the discipline by addressing directly the ontological bases that enable the epistemological disciplining of the discipline of International Relations in Chapter Two. In this chapter, I argue that the discipline itself is enabled by, and is a manifestation of, “sovereign thought” - i.e. a form of knowledge inextricably related to the articulation of the sovereign State as the predominant form of social order in modernity. In this elaboration what comes to the fore, is how the structure of sovereign thought precisely occults its generative principles and enables a framing of issues and problems *via* objective knowledge while simultaneously masking its role as a frame. It is therefore this deployment of knowledge, I argue, that has enabled the naturalization of “security” - i.e. its successful deployment in

framing issues and problems while avoiding the framing's gaze. Finally, in developing an optic to genealogically address the complicity between security and social order *via* alterity, I argue, it is necessary to provide a standpoint that precisely works upon, and makes visible, this framing. It is within this context that the *theologico-political* optic is elaborated.

These first two chapters, therefore, provide the groundwork and the rationale for the genealogical investigation into the intimate relation between security, social order and alterity. From this genealogical investigation the central argument regarding the complicity between security and social order is elaborated through an examination of three historical periods, loosely built around specific *interregna* addressed in chapters Three, Four and Five. Each of these chapters, furthermore, present sub-arguments regarding the above complicity. The first sub-argument is that the early Christian discourse as it is articulated through the work of St. Paul as it pertains to the question of security, can be seen as a counter-discourse that disrupts the discourse of Roman Imperial order. The second, relating to the shift from "divine order" to "sovereign state", is that the contestation between what security means and is associated to in each of these orders is central to the transition leading to the foundation of a temporal, sovereign order in the classical age. The third, relating to the articulation of the meaning(s) to security in modernity, is that security is not only a central element in the articulation of the modern order in its intimate complicity with the structure of sovereign power, but that this structure simultaneously informs what security *is* as it is deployed in inextricable relation with what Michel Foucault called the "biopolitical"²⁰. Through a constellation of works by Giorgio

²⁰ See, in particular, Michel Foucault "Right of Death and the Power over Life", in Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*, Robert Hurley (trans.), Harmondsworth: Penguin (1981).

Agamben on bare life; Claude Lefort on power, alterity, ideology and democracy; Michel Foucault on biopolitics, Carl Schmitt on the political; it is argued that security serves as a mechanism of depoliticization in the service of sovereign order. Furthermore, this depoliticization not only manifests itself at the level of the state as the primary referent of security, but is increasingly deployed throughout the social in the production of that order above and below statal space in the multiplication of referents that the deepening and widening of security entails. In other words, I argue that the deployment of the security discourse to the question of international relations, a deployment in which the discipline of International Relations is central, is but another manifestation of the intimate ties between security and the deployment of social order. Furthermore, I argue that since security has always been related to the constitution and maintenance of “internal” order, its relatively recent use (since the end of World War Two) with regards to the relations between States can be seen as a manifestation of the creation of a global sovereign order from a position of mastery in which a singular meaning to security has been gradually forged. With the pervasive deployment of the sovereign structure and its attendant logic beyond the liminal spaces of State borders, this singular meaning of security, it is argued, is increasingly deployed above and below statal space.

Finally, I argue that it is within this context of modernity and its intimate relation with the advent of democracy that a new horizon of possibility to articulate a counter-discourse to security is opened up. Democracy is understood here, following Lefort, as the recognition of the indeterminacy at the heart of any attempt at positive foundation. In this sense, as with

Plato's *pharmakon*,²¹ the *poison* - i.e. what has enabled this situation; the dissolution of the markers of certainty of the *Ancien régime* - is also the *cure*, since this dissolution is part and parcel of what democracy *is*. Therefore, since security is intimately related to the production and performative maintenance of foundations that must appear as undisputable truths, it is in this recognition at the heart of democracy that a counter-discourse to the security discourse of modernity is enabled. This discourse is one that operates *against* security in interminably revealing the contingency underlying foundation's perpetual ordering.

The Structure

The first two chapters of this thesis help to situate the work within the context of international relations theory, as well as within the broader ambit of political theory, by engaging with epistemological and ontological considerations. Chapter One primarily addresses the thesis vis-à-vis the discipline of International Relations by providing a preliminary answer to the way in which security is predominantly deployed in the discipline. Addressing the self-image of the discipline not only allows for a relatively self-contained and manageable engagement with the way the discipline is apprehended as whole, but permits me to address a central way in which the discipline has disciplined its b(order)s. In other words, it allows some insight into how the discipline has performatively secured its ontological grounding through epistemological fiat. This chapter therefore provide a deconstructive reading of the discipline by addressing the question of the foundation of its self-image. Such an approach to the discipline is certainly not

²¹ On the *pharmakon*, see Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy", in *Disseminations*, Barbara Johnson (trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1981), pp.61-171.

taken for its sheer delight as a form of “play” as some detractors of deconstruction like to condescend to those employing this activity. It is taken for two specific reasons. Firstly, it helps to situate the thesis in relation to the discipline of International Relations by revealing the mechanisms by which the present work is kept at its margins through the way the foundation of the discipline’s self-image is retroactively (re)written and performatively articulated. In saying this, it is not a wish to be at the center that I am voicing as if it were simply a question of disciplinary “choice” to be or not to be included within the disciplinary fold. On the contrary, it is precisely a disruption at/of the b(order)s that I seek. Secondly, such a reading of the self-image of the discipline enables the insertion of the disciplining of the discipline of International Relations into the broader problématique of Chapter Two. This insertion thus constitutes the first part of Chapter Two where an engagement with the discipline continues while simultaneously developing an understanding of the structure of sovereignty and its attendant logic. In continuing to contribute to the disruption of the b(order)s alluded to above, the second part of chapter two moves on to develop the approach deployed in this thesis to address the question of security: an approach articulated around the notion of alterity and a particular understanding of the political through what is termed a theologico-political optic.

The three following chapters apply this approach to the question of the meaning(s) of security and its complicity with the articulation and production of social order. As highlighted above, these chapters are broadly constructed around certain *interregna*. These *interregna* are - i.e. the shift from Roman Republic to Empire and the advent of Christianity; the shift from Christendom to sovereign State in the classical age; and the advent of the modern sovereign State and the present mutations of the sovereign order. What should be made clear here,

however, is that this is not a work of history even though it is historically informed and elaborated. What is sought is a philosophical understanding of the articulation of the meaning(s) of security in its complicity with the founding and maintenance of social order. In this sense, I hope to be excused from ambitiously attempting to cover two millennia in 200 pages. I can only, in this instance, provide a piddling number of brush strokes upon the enormous and constantly changing canvas of history. Brush strokes of my choosing and persuasion upon a canvas of our incessant re-creation. What is hoped is that, as with abstract impressionist painting, one can apprehend a touching, memorable and coherent image if one moves back far enough. Furthermore, the work's non-historical character will also be disclosed in its method which is composed of a variety of different formats. There are some historical accounts, historical exegeses, close readings of philosophical arguments, authorial juxtapositions, theoretical development, etymological investigations and deconstructive activity. Finally, reflecting a concern with disciplines and their disciplining, I have made a conscious effort to infuse the work with as much transdisciplinarity as possible. In this enterprise, I bring to bear insights from Social Theory, Political Theory, Philosophy, Anthropology, Archeology, Sociology, History, Literature, Psychoanalysis and Biblical Studies in the development of this thesis's argumentation.

The (Un)Disciplinary Contributions

Although there is an explicit engagement throughout this work with what has come to be called the discipline of International Relations, it is an engagement that, as was alluded to earlier, can be understood as emanating from its margins. In this sense, it may not be considered as an

“International Relations Thesis” if one adheres strictly to the (inter)national and the discipline’s self image. This is due to the fact that what is posited in the coming pages is that “International Relations” is part of the problem rather than part of any solution regarding humans being-in-the world. Yet there is an explicit engagement with the discipline here in part because it is my academic background, but mostly because I perceive it as a site where we find the most ambitious attempt to effect order at a global scale. Furthermore, it is precisely the discipline’s occultation of this role - i.e. its attempt to see itself as a mere spectator on the world stage, that makes it the most ill suited for this ambition if one is attempting to address order politically. This is not to say that there has not been much critical work engaging international politics, world order, and global change, particularly over the past twenty years. On the contrary, many of the most innovative, interesting and important texts addressing political and social issues and ideas have come from these quarters. Indeed, this is another reason to remain engaged in addressing the discipline of International Relations that is demanded in addressing these issues which have traditionally been under its purview. Finally, it is important to note that when I am addressing “International Relations” here, I am addressing the disciplining of the discipline’s prevalent self-image and not the myriad of different works which may or may not be considered as being under its moniker. What is of concern here is that disciplinary institution with its mythical history tracing its roots back to Thucydides and recounting its “birth” with the victory of “realism” over “idealism” in the inter-war period and that which is indebted to this fabulous foundation but is now concerned with solving technical problems with concepts, categories and frameworks without any mention of their historical provenance. I do not see the present work within this depoliticized context and it is precisely this depoliticization that spurs it on. This

thesis therefore provides an engagement with the political in both senses of the word - i.e. it engages the issue of the political and is politically engaged in attempting to contribute to the development of a political project that attempts precisely to critically and politically engage the concept of security and the sovereign order of modernity. The present work thus seeks to make an original contribution following in the footsteps of such works as, *inter alia*, James Der Derian's *On Diplomacy*; Simon Dalby's *Creating the Second Cold War*; David Campbell's *Writing Security*; Rob Walker's *Inside/Outside*; Cynthia Weber's *Simulating Sovereignty*; Jens Bartelson's, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*; Michael Dillon's *Politics of Security*; and Michael Shapiro's *Violent Cartographies*.²²

The most general and central contribution made by this work is the elaboration of a genealogy of the relationship between the meaning(s) of security and the articulation and production of social order *via* a concern with alterity. It is, to my knowledge, the first explicit and sustained genealogy addressing security *tout court* of these proportions.²³ Secondary contributions include the deconstructive reading of the self-image of the discipline around the

²² James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Oxford: Blackwell (1987); Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics*, London: Pinter (1990); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992); R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1993); Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995); Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995); Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, London: Routledge (1996); and Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping the Cultures of War*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1997).

²³ I say "explicit" here because many of the above texts either address security as a derivative part of their main focus of examination - such as in Der Derian, Walker, Weber, Bartelson and Shapiro - or, if addressing security explicitly, it is either with reference to a particular case which is historically framed - as is the case in Dalby and Campbell. The closest counterpart would be Michael Dillon's work which has had a profound influence on my work. However, Dillon's etymological work on security serves to elucidate the connections between the political, the tragic and the ethical and, thus, an analysis of the connections between security and the articulation of social order, though implicit, are not explicitly fleshed out.

question of foundation; the elaboration of the theologico-political optic beyond Lefort's formulation of the term; a sustained examination of the early Christian Pauline discourse of security and its reading *via* Alain Badiou's reading of St.Paul; a sustained examination of the transition from divine order to sovereign state from the standpoint of the security discourse; and an attempt to combine Lefort and Foucault's understandings of power in modernity. Finally, it is hoped that through all this hybridization, a coherent picture emerges that will paint security and our present predicament in a new light. A light through which I can make a modest contribution towards understanding the need to, following Michael Dillon, "*out-live* the modern politically."²⁴

²⁴ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought*, London: Routledge (1996), p.1.

Disciplinary Sojourns ...

In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such a Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied that of the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars: in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Discipline of Geography.

Jorge Luis Borges¹

Disciplines constitute a system of control in the production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action of an identity taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules.

Michel Foucault²

Quo Vadis International Relations? This question, written over a decade ago as an inquisitive title to an article addressing the state of the discipline of International Relations, may seem outdated to some while remaining persistently current to others. As part of what can be described as “the meta-theoretical turn” in and around the discipline in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this question aptly characterizes the sign of those disciplinary times: a time of “greater

¹ Jorge Luis Borges, “Of Exactitude in Science”, in Jorge Luis Borges, *A Universal History of Infamy*, (trans.) by Norman Thomas di Giovanni, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. (1972).

² Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, New York: Pantheon Books (1972), p.224.

openness” and “critical self reflection”³, the heralding of a new “era”⁴ or, more ambitiously, of a “next stage”⁵ of International Relations theorizing. If one adheres to the frame of reference which the predominant self-image of the history of the discipline has bestowed upon us - the realist triumph over idealism, the behaviouralist revolt against traditionalism, and the liberation of pluralism from orthodox subjugation - we might expect, over a decade later, a rather different set of disciplinary circumstances than the *plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose* in which we presently find ourselves. This is certainly not to say that there has been no important “critical” or “post-positivist” work addressing the global political predicament done in the last decade. On the contrary, one could say that there has been a plethora of very insightful and significant texts that may fall under the above rubric and an expansion of publishing space addressing such issues. Yet with regards to the self-understanding of the discipline, its “self-image” - understood here as the discourse *on* International Relations - the debate around the present and future content and contours of the discipline, about what is at stake and whither “we” are going, no longer seems to play the central role it did to foster (often heated) discussion amongst preoccupied academics. This may seem to be an odd turn of events in the discipline, considering the acceleration of change in, and the fluidity of, global circumstances over the past decade. One may then ask why it is that International Relations as a discipline has not maintained some form of “inter-paradigmatic” space to address the future

³ Thomas J. Biersteker, “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), p. 263.

⁴ Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), p.235.

⁵ Mark Hoffinan, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.16, No.2, (1987), p.244.

shape and direction of the discipline in the face of the latter transformations. It is as if the impasse of the “Third Debate”, the impasse of incommensurability, in effect exhausted the potential of addressing the discipline meta-theoretically, leaving scholars to their own devices, each conducting their own research from their own standpoint, engaging in specific and specialized debates with no desire to engage the discipline and its direction as a whole. To paraphrase Mark Neufeld’s own paraphrase of Edward Albee’s famous play, it is as if the discipline itself had become afraid of meta-theory.⁶ Where has this meta-theoretical space gone? Has that neutral forum in which the International Relations community could engage its discipline, debate its past, present, and future, simply vanished?

In situating the present work in relation to the discipline of International Relations - a disciplinary prerequisite of any dissertation - I would like to take up this question as the central concern of this chapter while concurrently elaborating certain commitments vis-à-vis ontology and epistemology and the political that will guide this thesis. In developing these disciplinary exigencies and answering the above question, this *prise de position* will argue that the space of meta-theory *qua* neutral disciplinary space whence to address the discipline has not vanished since it has *never been there in the first place*. In other words, the self-image of the discipline as a standpoint from where it is possible to apprehend the discipline as a whole is always already a political space which manifests itself as political precisely in the way in which it is depoliticized. In this way, the discipline of International Relations will be apprehended as a specific site of securitization, as an indispensable manifestation of the modern security project:

⁶ Mark Neufeld, “Who’s Afraid of Meta-Theory?”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.23, No.2 (1994), pp.387-393.

of securing what the political *is*. In doing so, what is necessary is to take the discipline as “discipline” seriously - i.e. not just a word that we can gloss over, a meaningless appendage to the words “International Relations” which can be substituted by “field” or “subject”. What must be done is to take seriously the implication of “discipline” with authority, subjection, obedience and order: the disciplining of the discipline of International Relations. In addressing the discipline of International Relations in this chapter, the question of security may explicitly take a back seat but it is never far away. Indeed it is ever present for what is at issue here is the way in which, *via* the articulation and performative maintenance of a certain foundation deployed through the self-image of the discipline, a specific political economy⁷, a particular discursive constellation, is enabled that secures a particular political space and meaning of the political. Conversely, it is precisely this disciplinary security project that has secured the meaning of “security” within the discipline of International Relations. It is this security project that has enabled the deployment of the concept of security to frame problems and issues within the discipline while simultaneously enabling security to evade analytical scrutiny. From this double ground(ing), our current security predicament seems natural and inevitable, or, to use another word suffused with meaning: “real”.

⁷ Political economy is used here in terms which I have articulated elsewhere within the specific context of globalization: “... the “*political*” in “global political economy” takes on an alternative meaning in that it is the appearance/occultation of the generative principles by which society is configured and “*economy*” does not refer only to so-called “economic structures” but to a broader understanding of the economy of signs which provide a particular ordering of the world. Both these terms can be seen as mutually constitutive: the economy of signs provides a particular ordering of the world and is enabled through the concealment of the generative principles by which a particular place for politics is established while, concurrently, the occultation of these generative principles through appearance/occultation is precisely enabled by the economy of signs which masks the principles of its own institution.” Miguel de Larrinaga, “(Re)Politicizing the Discourse: Globalization Is a S(h)ell Game”, *Alternatives*, Vol.25, No.2 (Apr.-June 2000), p. 159.

Why we have always been realists

The discipline of international relations can be perceived as having traditionally been characterised by (i) a discourse about itself, what Steve Smith characterises as the various “self-images” of the discipline⁸ - the discourse *on* “International Relations” as a discipline; (ii) a discourse which purports to be a discourse *on* (inter)national relations⁹ - i.e., an attempt to theorize about the relations between states and (gradually) has included other actors under the moniker of “nonstate actors”¹⁰ (inter)acting in the world “out-there”; and (iii) a discourse by those who actively participate in this world, those actors acting within this world that are theorized about by academics - what could be termed as the “international relations discourse”. The way in which these discourses are characterised, their perceived relative importance, and the relationship posited between them, informs the way the field has disciplined its knowledge since its self-acknowledged inception. This way of viewing International Relations allows for

⁸ See Steve Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory”, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press (1995), pp1-37.

⁹ The term *(inter)national* is parenthesized when used in the context of theory to call attention to the construction of the inside and the outside and the reification of the latter which takes place in international relations theory and in the practice of modern politics. *International* is not parenthesized, and *International Relations* capitalized, when addressing the discipline or field of International Relations because this is the way it sees itself - i.e. occulting the radical interdependency of so-called domestic and international politics and disciplining its disciplinary borders. For a similar use of capitalization and parentheses around the use of international relations see the work of Michael Dillon. In particular Michael Dillon, “The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity”, *Current Research in Peace and Violence*, Vol.XIII, No.3 (1990), pp.101-124, Michael Dillon, “Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the “New World Order” to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order” *Alternatives*, Vol.20, No.3 (1995), pp.323-369, and Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought*, London: Routledge (1996).

¹⁰ The term “nonstate”, widely used in the discipline in the attempts to broaden the referents within its purview, already betrays a certain privileging of the state as sovereign presence. The way in which these “nonstate” entities are treated as “actors”, and the choices behind which “actors” are deemed worthy of the moniker are also central to the disciplining of the discipline. With regards to “nonstate actors” within this context see Richard K. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique”, *Millennium*, Vol.17, No.2 (1988), pp. 244-251 in particular.

the possibility of providing an understanding of the discipline's self-formation. An understanding that strives to apprehend the political behind the creation of the discipline's self-images, and thus affords a more adequate positioning of this thesis *vis-à-vis* the discipline.

The way the discipline has traditionally been mapped as a successive series of "Great Debates" provides a good entry point for apprehending the way in which International Relations has continually, and retroactively, disciplined its knowledge¹¹. What has come to be known as the "First Debate" of the discipline of international relations can be precisely apprehended within the context of a retroactive distinction made between "idealism" and "realism" at the level of (i) the discourse on "International Relations" based upon divergences in the relationship between (ii) the discourse on (inter)national relations and (iii) the international relations discourse. This "First Debate" is traditionally seen as the inaugural debate of the discipline and is commonly described as pitting the "realists" against the "idealist" Founding Fathers. This commonly held view is based upon the assumption, (re)written into the history of International Relations and transmitted by authors including a number of self-acknowledged realists¹², that the foundation of the discipline can be found in the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Politics at Aberystwyth in 1919. According to this narrative, the discipline was dominated by the "idealists" in what has come to be known as the "idealist phase" or "idealist wave" of international relations theory during the 1920s and early 1930s, to which opposition developed in the late 1930s and early 1940s under the guise

¹¹ It should be noted that this characterization of the discipline is used here because of its dominance in the way the discipline addresses itself and the way it has been predominantly taught.

¹² See, for example, Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations (1947), and Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson (eds), *Principles and Problems of International Relations*, New York: Knopf (1950).

of “realism” that eventually “won the debate”. Conventional treatments of the history of the discipline of International Relations have thus attempted to explain its development and the ascendance of realism to its dominant status primarily through the way events in the 1930s (such as the Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and the rearmament of Germany), precipitating the failure of the League of Nations and the breaking out of World War II, revealed the failure of the “idealist” project and the wisdom of a “realist” understanding of the world. This understanding, as the story goes, was more in tune with the “realities” of the international system.¹³

This received wisdom, this historical rendering of the birth of the discipline that populates most international relations textbooks, becomes deeply problematic through an understanding of the way through which the discipline has disciplined its knowledge. This can primarily be evidenced through the fact that “idealism” was never a self-acknowledged school of thought and neither was International Relations perceived as a discipline under the supposed “idealist phase”. Most of what is understood to be the “idealist” school of thought has been vehicled through the *post facto* understanding of the inter-war period articulated by

¹³ See for example Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations (1947); William T.R. Fox, “Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience”, *World Politics*, Vol.2, No.1 (October 1949), pp.67-80; Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), pp.47-65 and John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998). For a more nuanced treatment which nonetheless comes to the same general conclusion see William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations Theory Then & Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation*, London: Harper Collins (1991). There is, of course, nothing wrong in contextualizing the development of theory in light of world events. However, what is eschewed here is a position that attributes realism’s success to its supposed “fit” as an objective form of knowledge vis-à-vis a world existing independently in relation to the latter and, furthermore, seeing this “fit” as the *ultima ratio* regarding the dominant position of realism within the discipline.

realists.¹⁴ One has only to look at how Welsh industrialist David Davies envisaged the objective behind the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Politics as being “for the study of those related problems of law and politics, of ethics and economics, which are raised by the prospect of a League of Nations,”¹⁵ to understand that what was later to be seen as the foundation of a discipline lacked a discourse about itself: a disciplinary “self-image”.

What the above objective reveals is not only the way the subject matter of (inter)national politics was seen within the context of a study entailing multiple standpoints and other self-acknowledged disciplines such as diplomatic history, international law and political philosophy, but also its very precise and practical orientation related to the development of institutional responses in the aftermath of the devastation of the first World War. This insight, of course, is nothing new. Countless historical treatments of the discipline have apprehended the multidisciplinary that infused the study of international politics and the institutional orientation characterizing this study in the inter-war period.¹⁶ However, what is important to reveal is the way through which the foundation of the discipline of International Relations has

¹⁴ See *inter alia*, Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations (1947); William T.R. Fox, “Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience”, *World Politics*, Vol.2, No.1 (October 1949), pp.67-80; Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, New York: Columbia University Press (1959), Arnold Wolfers, “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference”, *World Politics*, Vol.4, No.1 (October 1951), pp.39-63.

¹⁵ Cited in Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press (1986), p.56.

¹⁶ See, *inter alia*, William T.R. Fox, “Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience”, *World Politics*, Vol.2, No.1 (October 1949), pp.67-80; William C. Olson, “The Growth of a Discipline”, in Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969*, London: Oxford University Press (1972), pp.1-29; Alan Sked, “The Study of International Relations: A Historian’s View”, *Millennium*, Vol.16, No.2 (Summer 1987), pp.251-262, Steve Smith, “Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science”, *Millennium*, Vol.16, No.2 (Summer 1987), William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations Theory Then & Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation*, London: Harper Collins (1991) and John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998).

in large part been unproblematically recounted in the form of a debate between clear and distinct opposing schools of thought *within* an already constituted disciplinary space rather than as a fabulous retroactive (re)writing. The elaboration of an originary myth exemplified by the fact that, as John Vasquez paradoxically admits, “the terms *idealists* and *utopians* were never used by those scholars who were guided by the paradigm. It was applied to them by the realists...”!¹⁷

What this understanding of the origins of the discipline of International Relations reveals is the way through which the disciplining of the discipline has been “realist” from the outset - i.e. that there never was a “debate”. By positing a foundation *prior* to the “First Debate,” the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Politics at Aberystwyth provides the possibility for the traditional account of the birth of the discipline to continue to be largely seen as unproblematic. Furthermore, what also remains hidden from view in this account are the wider debates within other disciplines and their impact upon the discipline of International Relations enabling the latter to articulate itself, as if in a disciplinary vacuum, only with regards to its identified antagonist. This is particularly the case with regards to the debates in the United States in the field of political theory. Although it is beyond the purview of this thesis, the battles around pluralism and statism during the 1920s are worthy of a detailed examination with regards to the possible mutually advantageous conceptual and

¹⁷ John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998), p.33, note 2. The paradox here lies in the use of paradigm as that which “guides” idealists, while the use of the concept of paradigm does not appear in the discipline until the 1970s after its appropriation from the work of Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1962).

theoretical complicity between Political Theory and International Relations.¹⁸

What the myth of the “First Debate” therefore allows *for* realism through the establishment of a prior foundation is thus an occultation of its generative principles: the possibility of disciplining its knowledge in an opposition to a manufactured selfsame antagonist (a discursive enemy to securitize its disciplinary borders), and the legitimization of its existence within what appears to be a pre-existing, neutral disciplinary space and thus the occultation of the fact that, from a disciplinary optic, *we have always been realists*.¹⁹

Realism/Idealism and the disciplining of the discipline

This “Great Debate” characterisation of the birth of the discipline is a crucial element in the disciplining of the content and relationships between the three discourses of International Relations adumbrated earlier. The enduring legacy of the idealist/realist dichotomy enabled by such a foundational myth constrained the horizons of possibility with regards to the “discourse on International Relations”- i.e. the self-image of the discipline and its meta-theoretical articulations. As Rob Walker explains in addressing the differentiation between “realism” and “idealism” in the discipline:

Not only have the major theoretical disputes in the discipline been couched explicitly in these terms, but the history of thinking about international politics in this century is

¹⁸ For an excellent genealogy of the origins and development of political theory and its relationship to the social sciences see John G. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. With regards to the above debates see, in particular, Chapter 5.

¹⁹ The way in which this foundation has been appropriated and has allowed for a realist disciplinary consolidation may account for David Davies’ reaction to the dominance of realism by showing regret regarding his establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair by writing “I wish to God I had never initiated this proposal”. Cited in Ken Booth, “Security in anarchy: utopian realism in theory and practice”, *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.3 (1991), p.528.

conventionally organized within these categories. As something like a founding myth, this polarity has come to be treated as a relatively unproblematic ground on which major theoretical disputes can be, if not resolved, at least codified and left in peace. It has become the point beyond which metatheoretical disputes need be pursued no further.²⁰

This organization of the discipline according to this originary - and profoundly gendered²¹ -opposition between realism and idealism has articulated itself through a series of binary opposites - the “marshalling,” as Justin Rosenberg explains, “of *is* against *ought*, *power* against *morality*”²² - and thus consolidated the realist position by constraining the methodological and epistemological horizons of the discipline²³. In the articulation of these oppositions an empiricist epistemology rooted in the positivistic tradition is inherently privileged in that *is* presupposes an understanding of the world as an object of knowledge and *power* within this objectified world can be measured. Regardless of the inherent ambiguities with regards to the relationships between *is/ought* and *power/morality* found within the thinking of “classical realists” such as E.H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, John Hertz, Arnold

²⁰R.B.J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.31, No.1 (1987), pp.69-70.

²¹ On the realist portrayal of idealism as “feminine” see in particular, Sarah Brown, “Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations of Gender Inequality”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.4 (1988), pp.461-476.

²² Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, London: Verso (1994), p. 29.

²³ One may argue that this “fundamental” opposition is not a retroactive fabrication but follows from a long tradition in which the Kantian distinction between moral freedom and natural necessity is a central aspect. However, this reading itself can be seen as a realist (mis)interpretation of the above distinction. As Jens Bartelson explains: “[T]he very distinction between realism and idealism logically is a *realist* one: to say that how the world ought to be arranged is distinct from the way the world actually is, is one thing, but then to infer that how the world ought to be arranged *ought* to be kept distinct from the way the world actually is, is in itself to give *is* an advantage over *ought*. [...] [T]he distinction between realism and idealism as we know it would scarcely have made sense to Kant, even if the distinction as we know it today is reminiscent of Kantian thought.” Jens Bartelson, “The Trial of Judgment: A Note on Kant and the Paradoxes of Internationalism”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.39, No.3 (1995), pp.265-266.

Wolfers, Hedley Bull, and even Hans Morgenthau²⁴, the narrative of the advent of realism based upon this foundational myth reads as a victory over the deficient idealism in the quest for better theory. It is thus apprehended as a progressive disenchantment in the development towards a value-free, social scientific understanding of international politics in which these heroic figures play their part in gradually uncovering the Truth about international politics: the objective laws which govern the relations between States.²⁵

The realist disciplining of International Relations can thus be seen as a positivist enterprise, one which imbues conventional narratives of the development of the discipline. In the realist development of International Relations as a “social science”, the disciplining done in opposition to its retroactively manufactured selfsame antagonist permits a view of the discipline which presents, as James Der Derian suggests, the meaning of realism “as uniform,

²⁴ See E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939*, London: Macmillan and Co. (1939); Reinhold Neibuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, New York: Scribner's (1932) and Reinhold Neibuhr, “A Protest Against a Dilemma's Two Horns”, *World Politics* Vol.2, No.3 (1950), pp.338-344; John Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1951); Arnold Wolfers “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.67, No. 2 (1952), pp. 481-502; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press (1977); and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Knopf (1948). For an exposition of some of the inherent ambiguities found in the writings of these authors see, for example, the chapters on realist writers in Francis Beer and Robert Hariman, *Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in international relations*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press (1996).

²⁵ This is not to say that many of those who were characterised as “idealists” did not adhere to some tenets of positivism. As Nick Rengger and Mark Hoffman characterize the study of international relations during the interwar period as one which concerned the causes of war: “This entailed a fundamental shift away from the focus on the diplomatic history of individual wars to a concern with the phenomenon of war in general. It laid the basis for the later development of general theories of international relations and implicitly incorporated positivist assumptions about the nature of causation and the bases of knowledge.” Nick Rengger and Mark Hoffman, “Modernity, Postmodernism and International Relations”, in Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham and Mo Malek (eds.), *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, New York: St. Martin's Press (1992), p.128. The point made here concerns the way in which the caricatured division articulated by realists between “realism” and “idealism” helps to consolidate a positivist optic.

self evident and transparent.”²⁶ In articulating itself in terms of the way the world *is* versus the way it *ought* to be through a form of knowledge that precisely states this claim, a technorationalist optic that, as Richard Ashley suggests, “is said to inhabit the domain of the ‘is’ rather than the domain of the ‘ought’ and hence its truth requires no normative defence”²⁷, the inextricable complicity between realism and positivism can thus be seen as the disciplining constituent - i.e. that which disciplines the discipline of International Relations through a specific articulation of the discourses which constitute it.

In its development as a “social science” under the aegis of realism - what will, following David Campbell, henceforth be designated as *epistemic Realism*²⁸ - the disciplining of the relationship between the discourse on (inter)national relations and the international relations discourse was also enabled. Through its opposition to “idealism” and the epistemological and

²⁶ James Der Derian, “Introduction: Critical Investigations”, in James Der Derian (ed.), *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, New York: New York University Press (1995), p.1.

²⁷ Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press (1986), p.282.

²⁸ Campbell understands epistemic realism as a form of analysis “whereby the world comprises objects the existence of which is independent of ideas or beliefs about them” and which sanctions “two other analytic forms: a *narrativizing historiography* in which things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for themselves; and a *logic of explanation* in which it is the purpose of analysis to identify those self-evident things and material causes so that actors can accommodate themselves to the realm of necessity they engender”. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), p.4. Campbell includes both realism and marxism as two understandings of the world (power politics and economic respectively) which can be subsumed under this rubric. Although I am somewhat in agreement with this conceptualization with regards to these two “isms” (the complexity of Marx’s thought may be difficult to contain under these conditions) which Campbell, quite rightly, portrays as caricatures, the present concern is directed more specifically towards Realism as a form of identification within the self-image of the discipline of International Relations. In capitalizing Realism, I want to thus distinguish a particular disciplinary form of epistemic realism as it pertains to the realist “tradition” in International Relations theory. In its inextricable relation to positivism, I follow the understanding of positivism put forth by William Connolly as a “doctrine which either denies that there is an internal relation between belief and action, or treats the beliefs of the human objects of social inquiry as dispositions to behave in specified ways.” William E. Connolly, *Appearance and Reality in Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1981), p.23.

methodological commitments which this opposition accredited, realist scholarship was able to articulate a universalizing rational gaze upon the world and thus appear to be fulfilling the exigencies of a “value free” social science, a purveyor of truths beyond the constraints of space and time. In so doing, those working within the discipline, those who enunciate the discourse on (inter)national relations, were to be seen as disinterested observers applying objective conceptual frameworks whose correspondence to objective facts existing in a world “out there” allows for the uncovering of universal truths, uniformities akin to those found within natural science and verified through the use of scientific method.²⁹ A corollary of apprehending the constitution of knowledge in this way relates to the approach taken to language. Although taken up in more detail later, it is important to highlight at present that in the separation between subject and object, value and fact, an understanding of language is articulated which is referential - i.e. language is seen precisely and transparently (or at least precision and transparency are the ideals that are sought) as referring to objects existing in the “real” world, “an unobtrusive conduit between thoughts or concepts and things”³⁰, instead of language or, more appropriately, discourse being constitutive of the “world”.³¹

²⁹ See Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), and Steve Smith, “Positivism and beyond” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) for good overviews of the positivist tradition and their relationship to international relations theory.

³⁰ Michael J. Shapiro, “Textualizing Global Politics”, in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York: Lexington Books (1989), p. 14.

³¹ Discourse is a more appropriate understanding to use in that, as Michael Shapiro notes, it “implies a concern with the meaning- and value-producing practices in language rather than simply the relationship between utterances and their referents”. Ibid. On the question of language within the context of international relations see also Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press (1987); Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations”, *International*

This understanding of the production of knowledge entails a very specific articulation of the relationship between the discourse on (inter)national relations and the international relations discourse or, within the context of disciplinary parlance, that between “academics” and “practitioners”. In understanding themselves and their work as being objective, the “academics” of the discipline apprehend the “practitioners” from a *sovereign* distance: they are seen as participants in the practical articulation of world order, an order that is precisely the object of study which academic theorizing attempts to correspond to. Regardless of the fact that they both belong to a same social space, “academics” in the discipline, by positing a knowing subject, concomitantly ordain an exteriority vis-à-vis society and thus occult their own direct participation in the creation of world order. What enables this concealment with regards to epistemology, is the belief that the knowledge that they articulate is a more or less accurate representation (depending on the robustness of their knowledge as measured by scientific criteria of evaluation) of an external reality that can be transparently described through precise language. It is precisely this faith in the knowledge produced that provides the sole conduit between “academics” and “practitioners” and the disciplining between the discourse on (inter)national relations and the international relations discourse. In other words, the claims to value-free scientific knowledge create the possibility of occulting the location of the production of knowledge in a specific social and political time and space: that, as Robert Cox reminds us, “theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose”.³²

Studies Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3 (1990), pp.269-293; and Michael Dillon, “The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity”, *Current Research in Peace and Violence*, Vol.XIII, No.3 (1990), pp.101-124.

³² Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press (1986), p. 207; Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations”, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol.106, No.3

That this theorizing was *for* the caretakers of the State and, in particular, considering its post-war role as a superpower and the predominance of American scholarship in the articulation of this role, *for* the United States has become increasingly evident.³³ Indeed, *for* who and *for* what the advent of realism was *for* is made abundantly clear by Stanley Hoffmann in his analysis of the development of international relations as an American social science::

Indeed there is a remarkable chronological convergence between their (policy-makers) needs and the scholars performances.[...] What the leaders looked for, once the cold war started, was some intellectual compass which would serve multiple functions: exorcise isolationism, and justify a permanent and global involvement in world affairs; rationalize the accumulation of power, the techniques of intervention, and the methods of containment apparently required by the cold war.[...] Realism, however critical of specific policies, however (and thus self-contradictorily) diverse in its recommendations, precisely provided what was necessary.

However, in this concealment of generative principles, what is occulted is not only the socio-political context in which academic theorizing takes place but also, and as a consequence of this concealment, the existence of a *politicized* relation between “academics” and “practitioners” even though it is simultaneously maintained that this knowledge provides an indispensable guide for the formulation of policy. This paradox has been succinctly raised by Hoffmann:

The champions of a science of international affairs have, on the whole, declared their independence from philosophy and their allegiance to objective empiricism. And yet, most of them wanted to draw consequences for the real world from their research: the greater the drive to predict (or the tendency to equate science, not just with

(Summer 1977), pp.47-48.

³³ See, in particular, the continuing controversy regarding political bias in International Relations scholarship started by Peter Monaghan, in the article “Does International Relations Scholarship Reflect a Bias toward the U.S.?”, *Chronicle of Higher Education* (September 24, 1999), p.A20 and the ensuing letters to the editor in the October 29th edition of the *Chronicle*. For an interesting article on the links between the CIA and International Relations scholarship see Chris Mooney, “For Your Eyes Only: The CIA Will Let You See Classified Documents - But at What Price?”, *Lingua Franca*, (November 2000), pp.35-43. This article is also found at <http://www.cia-on-campus.org/mooney.html>.

intelligibility but with control and prediction), the greater the inclination to play the role of wise adviser - or of the engineer.³⁴

The disciplining between the discourse of (inter)national relations and the international relations discourse under the auspices of realism and positivist knowledge articulates itself through this paradox. Academics within the field act as if their utterances are but theoretically informed descriptions of the “real world” and, therefore, are not part of its active construction while concurrently providing *prêt-à-porter* knowledge to practitioners through claims of scientific rigour, neutrality and universality. From an epistemological viewpoint, it is thus the pretensions of positivist knowledge that allow for both the unreflexive blind spot of academics with regards to the constitution of their knowledge claims as well as the depoliticization of the relationship between academics and practitioners. As Roger Tooze explains

Because of its claims as knowledge (as opposed to any substantive empirical referents and policy concerns it may serve) positivist knowledge of society predisposes its own use over other forms of knowledge in the policy process. Positivist knowledge claims to provide policy-makers with a category of knowledge that is neutral in value: it has status, is universal, is immediately usable and can continually be refined on the basis of an unproblematic ‘reality’.³⁵

The epistemological and methodological commitments that enabled the disciplining of the discipline of International Relations have themselves simultaneously been enabled by the self-image of its foundation (re)presented in the form of the “First Debate”. In this way, both the history of the advent of the discipline and its epistemological and methodological commitments under the aegis of epistemic Realism have retroactively appeared as

³⁴ Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations”, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol.106, No.3 (1977), pp. 54-55.

³⁵ Roger Tooze, “International political economy and the national policy-maker”, in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, *Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, practitioners and the trade in ideas*, London: Routledge (1994), p.58.

unproblematic - i.e. as a natural progression in the quest for better theory. The form of knowledge resulting from this mythical foundation has thus allowed for a depoliticization of the study and practice of world order in terms of both the self-image (re)presented *via* the discourse of “International Relations” as well as the way in which the particular relationship between the discourse on (inter)national relations and the international relations discourse it bestows has been articulated. It is also within this context that an understanding of what has been characterized as the “Second Debate” within the discipline should be framed.

The “Second Great Debate” and the discipline of progress

The “Second Debate,” represented as one pitting “Traditionalists” against “Behavioralists” in the late 1950s and early 1960s, precisely reflects the way in which the privileging of methodological issues in the articulation of the self-image of the discipline abetted the disciplining of the latter. By providing the illusion of substantive contestation at the heart of the discipline while simultaneously consolidating the latter by providing it with procedures for securing truth via standards of verification and proof, this “New Great Debate” between “Traditionalism vs Science”, as it was characterized by one of its key proponents and players³⁶, further distanced the discipline from the question of ontology while concurrently strengthening its realist foundation. One can ask oneself again here if this debate can be described as a debate at all? Indeed, with regards to the opposition between the “intuition” and “judgement” of the “traditionalists” and the “rigor” and “precision” of the “behavioralists,” the deck is already

³⁶ See Morton A. Kaplan, “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs Science in International Relations”, in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), pp. 39-61.

stacked if one's criteria revolve around the way in which the world *is* versus the way it *ought* to be. In other words, the result of this Second Debate as it has been (re)written into the discipline is a foregone conclusion as it is cast in terms that the disciplining of the discipline has demanded from its own foundation. Through tropes of progress, of tradition vs modernity³⁷, it is thus no surprise to find amongst the victors magnanimity within the debate itself. Furthermore, within the context of this "debate", and in contrast to the last, the intellectual currents in other disciplines were proudly displayed and discussed as a benchmark to which the "backward" discipline of International Relations could aspire.³⁸ Amidst the hubris of victory, of "demonstrat[ing] that the war between rigor and imagination in international politics is not only over" we find out that it was "a 'phony' war all along"³⁹, one that can turn the backward status of international politics as a social science "into a scientific discipline

³⁷ The moniker "traditionalist" is one used by their opponents such as Morton Kaplan and David Singer and one that has been used predominantly in the countless (re)iterations of the disciplinary debates. So-called "traditionalists" such as Hedley Bull and Hans Morgenthau use the designation "classical" to identify themselves. See Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach", in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), pp. 20-38 and Hans Morgenthau, "Common Sense and Theories of International Relations", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.21, No.2 (1967), pp.207-214. In contrast, it should come as no surprise that the "behavioralists" prefer to generally discard the "ist" by labelling themselves around the "scientific" - i.e. "behavioral science" or "social science", except for one telling exception: modernist. See J. David Singer, "The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence", in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), p. 65.

³⁸ As David Singer illustrates, while attempting to bring the insights of the "traditionalists" into the scientific fold while simultaneously disparaging their work as a stepping stone towards true knowledge : "In some of the social sciences, progress has been steady and impressive; in others, it has been more halting. It would seem that those disciplines which are the most advanced are precisely those in which imagination and insight have been combined with -not divorced from - rigor and precision [...]. Until systematic observation, operationally derived evidence, and replicable analytical procedures were introduced, skilful rhetoric and academic gamesmanship carried the day." J. David Singer, "The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence", in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), pp.83-84.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.64.

worthy of the name” by having the “warring camps come together in collaboration if not in sublime unity”.⁴⁰

Having waged the “war” on the epistemological terrain of the realist disciplining of the discipline not only enables the privileging of a methodology that claims to more robustly and comprehensively account for the way in which the world *is* but also allows the question of ontology to be completely bypassed with authority.⁴¹ This short-circuiting of ontological questions is precisely what enables the conviviality with which the “vanquished” are brought aboard since, as Steve Smith argues “[b]ehaviouralism was not so much an attack on the assumptions of Realism as a dispute about the most appropriate methodologies”.⁴² In this sense, the “Second Debate” seems to operate in large part within the context of the discourse *on* International Relations in the sense of articulating its self image as a social science.

Although the discourse *on* (inter)national relations did not see any substantive change with regards to “the definition of who acted over what issues with which resultant patterns”⁴³, it did, however, undergo an important change with regards to its relation to the international relations discourse. What the behavioralist “revolution”, or “revolt” as it has come to be known, did introduce, is a much more ardent will to truth and the faith that scientific methodology could, through cumulative knowledge, increasingly approximate the “real”

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.86.

⁴¹ As David Singer argues in addressing two disciplines - history and philosophy - which could potentially bring such questions to the fore: “these disciplines have gone almost as far as they can go in adding to social science knowledge in any appreciable way.” Ibid., p.82.

⁴² Steve Smith, “The Dominance of American Approaches to International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.16, No.2 (1987), p.201.

⁴³ Ibid.

world. In other words, with regards to the discourses adumbrated above, that *the discourse on (inter)national relations could, over time, increasingly approximate the international relations discourse*. This, of course, was a main issue of contention between the so-called “traditionalists” and “behavioralists” and an example from the Hedley Bull-David Singer exchange is particularly telling. In responding to the discursive closure which framed the debate in terms of the tropes of progress, Hedley Bull laid out the predicament that the “scientific approach” confronted in its attempts to transform the discipline:

The difficulties that the scientific theory has encountered do not appear to rise from the quality that international relations is supposed to have of a ‘backward’ or neglected science, but from the characteristics inherent in the subject matter which have been catalogued long enough: the unmanageable number of variables of which any generalization about state behavior must take account; the resistance of the material to controlled experiment; the quality it has of changing before our eyes and slipping between our fingers even as we try to categorize it; the fact that the theories we produce and the affairs that are theorized about are related not only as subject and object but also cause and effect, thus ensuring that even our most innocent ideas contribute to their own verification or falsification.⁴⁴

Singer’s answer to these concerns is to foreclose the discussion through his faith in his tools of the trade. Bull’s attempt to meet Singer on his own terrain in his reference to the “unmanageable number of variables” which “must be taken into account” is confidently dismissed through talk of the endless number of variables that “analytical tools permit us to work with” and their subsequent reduction through “factor analysis”, “correlational patterns” and “causal linkages”⁴⁵; his charge with regards to “controlled experiments”, rebuffed through

⁴⁴ Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach”, in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), p.30.

⁴⁵ J. David Singer, “The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence”, in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), p.72.

faith in “simulations”, “natural” and “*ex post facto*” experiments⁴⁶ ; and his concern with the evanescence in the face of categorization, disregarded as pessimism and countered through arguments of “validity” and “reliability”.⁴⁷ However, the most important and revealing part of the exchange for our present purposes, barely occurs at all. Bull’s final point about the complex relations between “subject and object” and “cause and effect” that ensure the contribution of our “innocent ideas” to their own verification/falsification - and, thus, directly engages the relationship between the discourse *on* (inter)national relations and the international relations discourse - is explicitly eschewed by Singer, deserving only a brief footnote:

The final point, regarding the effect of findings and concepts on the very world under examination is by no means trivial, but neither is it compelling. Space precludes a treatment of the ‘contamination’ problem here, but the reader will find helpful discussions in Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York 1961), and Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco, 1964).⁴⁸

Why does this point deserve such a cursory dismissal that it can not be dealt with systematically as are the others? Why, if it is not deemed “trivial,” is it not deserving of “space”? Precisely because it is *not* trivial, because it *cannot* be dismissed without moving outside of the terrain delineated by the victors, without moving beyond the abhorrently pejorative term of “contamination”, and of the tropes of disease, of tainting, of defiling, of polluting something *pure from the outside*. Both Kaplan and Singer are able to dismiss Bull’s charge that behavioralists “are likely to mistake models for reality”⁴⁹ by turning it against the

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.73.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 74-75.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p.72, footnote 15.

⁴⁹ As Kaplan interprets Bull’s argument in Morton A. Kaplan, “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs Science in International Relations”, in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to*

“traditionalist” who, through implicit assumptions, “is more likely to mistake his model for reality” or, by reminding us of the timeless wisdom of “generations of philosophers (East and West)” that tell us that “we can never describe the ‘real’ world [...] but only *representations* of reality”.⁵⁰

What cannot be so easily dismissed here is how Singer’s comments regarding “contamination” of some pure essence, points directly to an understanding of the *model as full presence*, of the model as the “real.” What must be guarded against in this “contamination” from outside the model of the social, is precisely the sociality of the researcher himself, who thus succumbs to what Claude Lefort calls the positivist fiction “of placing society before society, by setting down as principles that which can only be apprehended from an experience which is already social.”⁵¹ This “fiction” is privileged as presence and the model is what must be perfected in that “we must (and do) strive for the truest representation”⁵², while patrolling and securing the borders between the discourse on (inter)national relations and the international relations discourse through a dismissal of the problematization of the relationship between the two: the telling silence of the “Second Great Debate” of the discourse on International

International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), pp. 57.

⁵⁰ J. David Singer, “The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence”, in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), p.76.

⁵¹ Claude Lefort, *Essais sur le politique. XIXe-XXe siècles*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1986), p. 256. “de mettre la société avant la société, en posant comme éléments ce qui n’est saisissable que depuis une expérience déjà sociale.” My translation.

⁵² J. David Singer, “The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence”, in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1969), p.76.

Relations.

The “Second Debate”, although maybe not in terms of a “debate”, is thus a crucial element in the disciplining of the discipline. Its dismissal as a “phony war” by its adherents and critics alike⁵³, although somewhat true from an ontological perspective, should not conceal its importance in the articulation of epistemic Realist epistemology in that this inscription upon the self image of the discipline paved the way for what came to be known as “structural realism” or “neo-realism”.⁵⁴ In addressing the consequences of the debate, Nick Rennger and Mark Hoffman explain that “[r]ather than overthrowing Realism, it reinforced its classically derived conclusions with quantitative ‘scientific’ research.”⁵⁵ However, on another register, one upon which the importance of this debate is understood strictly in terms of methodological

⁵³ Echoing Singer’s comment Steve Smith replays it through a paradigmatic lens by stating that “the ‘debate’ between the Traditionalists and the Behaviouralists was really a phoney war; there was not a real battle to fight as they were within the same paradigm.” Steve Smith, “The Dominance of American Approaches to International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.16, No.2 (1987), p.201.

⁵⁴ The rationale behind this shift within the realist tradition is said to be rooted in an attempt to move beyond the reductionist arguments of traditional realists and rid the discipline of its subjectivist tendencies through the use of structuralist arguments. As Richard K. Ashley argues: “For the neorealist rescue of power politics, this structuralist move was decisive. By appeal to objective structures, which are said to dispose and limit practices among states (most especially the anarchic structure of the modern state system), neorealists seemed to cut through the subjectivist veils and dark metaphysics of the classical realist thought. Dispensing with the normatively laden metaphysics of fallen man, they seemed to root realist power politics, including concepts of power and national interest, securely in the scientifically defensible terrain of objective necessity”. Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press (1986), p.263. Ole Wæver goes one step further in explicitly associating the advent of realism to the ground prepared by the “second debate”: “The really new thing about neo-realism is its concept of science [...] In this sense the shift from realism to neo-realism can be seen as a delayed and displaced victory for the ‘scientific’ side of the second debate.” Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), p. 162.

⁵⁵ Nick Rennger and Mark Hoffman, “Modernity, Postmodernism and International Relations”, in Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham and Mo Malek (Eds.), *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, New York: St. Martin’s Press (1992), p.129

“progress” and the victory of the “scientific paradigm”⁵⁶, the “Second Debate” tends to occult the question of ontology and hide the fact that it is realism that is constitutive of the discipline of International Relations. As John Vasquez argues with regards to the Second Debate and the dominance of realism in IR: “the amount of attention the behavioural revolt has received has tended to obfuscate the role the realist paradigm has played and continues to play in international relations inquiry”⁵⁷ It is within the context of what has come to be known as the “Third Debate” that the discourse on International Relations (re)counts the emergence of genuine alternatives to realism and thus an apparent loosening of its command of the discipline. What must be asked, however, is how this debate can be apprehended from a standpoint that sees the disciplining of the discipline as a realist project from its inception - i.e. as one in which its self-image attempts to always already conceal this disciplining through the illusion of a pre-existing and neutral disciplinary space.

The “Third Debate” and the discipline of paradigmaticism and pluralism

“Paradigm” and “pluralism” are the words which predominantly infuse the narrative of the “Third Debate,” also known as the “inter-paradigm debate”. The reference to “paradigm”, as is well known in the lore of the development of the discipline, refers to the adaptation of the

⁵⁶ See, in particular, Arend Lijphart, “International relations theory: great debates and lesser debates”, *International Social Science Journal*, Vol.26, No.1 (1974), pp. 11-21 and Arend Lijphart, “The structure of the theoretical revolution in international relations”, *International Relations Quarterly*, Vol.18, No.1 (1974), pp. 41-74.

⁵⁷ John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998), p.42.

work of Thomas Kuhn in the philosophy of science⁵⁸ to the discipline of International Relations and was originally used by Michael Banks in an article addressing the state of the discipline after the behavioral revolution.⁵⁹ Ironically, the adaptation of Kuhn's work on "scientific revolutions" to the discipline caused somewhat of a revolution in the discourse on International Relations - i.e. in the way in which the self-image of the discipline is articulated. In fact, what could be called "paradigmatism" became the optic through which the discipline made sense of itself from its inception through to the developments which have been elaborated upon above.⁶⁰ Paradigmatism can thus be seen as the frame through which the discipline has been retroactively (re)written. Enabled by the naturalization of paradigmatic thinking as something that existed *prior* to its elaboration by Kuhn and its adaptation by Banks, paradigmatism thus animated the self-image of the discipline in the understanding of its "debates" from its inception. In other words, the use of "paradigms" adheres to the logic of truth as correspondence as they are apprehended as something "real" to which each is given a corresponding label.

As an illustration of paradigmatism, two key examples, among many, can be brought to bear. In the first instance, the appraisal of Kuhn by Margaret Masterman with regards to the imprecision of the author's usage of the term - i.e. that he uses the term twenty one different ways - betrays the logic of truth as correspondence in that it is precisely the lack of precision

⁵⁸ See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Second Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1970).

⁵⁹ See Michael Banks, "The evolution of international relations theory", in Michael Banks (ed.), *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books (1984), pp.3-21.

⁶⁰ Some hints of this frame permeate the narrative above and have been explicitly addressed. In particular, see the comment on the quotes by John Vasquez in footnote 20, Steve Smith in footnote 52 and the work of Arend Lijphart mentioned in footnote 55.

in identifying what a paradigm *is* that forms the basis of the critique.⁶¹ What Masterman is doing is to posit the existence of some “thing” called a paradigm and calling Kuhn on his inability to properly describe the latter. This is not to say that the critique itself is unwarranted since it correctly addresses a problematic aspect of a theory upon an epistemological terrain about which Kuhn’s work is rather ambiguous. However, what this argument reveals is how paradigmaticism, under the cloak of a self-evident truth, can be seen as an important disciplinary tool in the development of the discipline and its self-image through the occultation of its generative principles. A second important example which can be seen as the obverse side of the coin in relation to the above, can be found in Yosef Lapid’s oft quoted and discussed article on “The Third Debate”⁶² that has been simultaneously criticised and lauded as a benchmark in providing a view of the “state of the discipline” with regards to this debate while providing a cautious endorsement of post-positivist work in the discipline.⁶³ It is precisely within this context of post-positivism in relation to a “concern with meta-scientific units”⁶⁴ (that he also calls “paradigmaticism”) that Lapid’s logic of truth as correspondence can be revealed. Lapid’s argument entails the elaboration of what he terms a “shopping list” of examples of these unit

⁶¹ See Margaret Masterman, “The Nature of a Paradigm”, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1970), pp. 59-89. The title of Masterman’s piece is also a clear indicator of the basis of her critique.

⁶² See Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), pp.235-254

⁶³ See Kal J. Holsti, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All?”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), pp. 255-261, and Thomas J. Biersteker, “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), pp. 263-267 as responses to Lapid.

⁶⁴ Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), pp.239-241.

types amongst the literature in International Relations - “models”, “paradigms”, “research programs”, “research traditions”, or “discourses” - to disclose that “[t]he common denominator of these endeavours is the implicit belief that the substitution of new meta-theoretical constructs for more traditional units of scientific appraisal is somehow essential to locating and stimulating genuine theoretical growth.”⁶⁵ Interestingly, this understanding of “paradigmatism” by Lapid is criticised by Thomas Biersteker because of its breadth in that he “finds it difficult to resist the positivist impulse to decry the imprecision of language that lumps together paradigms, traditions, disciplines, research programs and discourses”.⁶⁶ Is it not, however, precisely the contrary that is occurring here? Is it not the *precision* of multiple words describing a same “thing” that is at issue and, thus, Lapid’s adherence to the logic of truth (albeit multiple) as correspondence? Lapid occults the generative principles of his own discourse in that the optic through which he understands this state of the discipline is precisely “paradigmatism” while simultaneously “paradigm” is but one example among many of the “meta-scientific structures” that he painstakingly lists. Here again, what is taken as given, what is seen as natural, what is not questioned, is the way in which the paradigmatic frame stealthily disciplines the discipline.

This brings us to the question of pluralism. Escorting paradigmaticism in the “Third Debate” is the predominant concern with theoretical pluralism. In fact, one could say that a paradigmatic understanding of the discipline *enabled* the articulation of a pluralistic frame of reference at the heart of the discipline’s self-image. This is not to say that before the “invention” of paradigms there did not exist a plurality of work attempting to make sense of

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 240-241.

⁶⁶ Thomas J. Biersteker, “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), p. 263.

some “world” using various forms of knowledge apprehending processes, structures, and events which are presently understood and framed as being above and below - thus beyond - the strictures of the borders of the modern State and its particular sovereign logic. In the 1970s when the perception that certain processes, structures, events, which seemed beyond the reach of State decision-making, and could thus be considered a “threat” to the fundamental tenets of the disciplining of the discipline, were felt to have an impact upon our daily lives- whether it be the ascendance of telematic communications or the multinational corporation, the impact of the oil crises and the Vietnam war, the student counter-cultural movement or the growing awareness of global environmental/social/economic problems - general interest reflected in newspaper and magazine articles as well as scholarship addressing these issues in and around various disciplines became abundant. However, what enabled any of this work to be considered part of the disciplinary self-image, what provided the disciplinary space - something that did not occur until the beginning of the 1980s - is an understanding of the discipline that could afford the simultaneous existence of various knowledge claims without the necessary supplantation of one over another. In other words, the way in which the self-image of the discipline had (re)written its past. Marxism is a case in point: although marxisant understandings of world order *via* theories of imperialism are as old as the discipline according to its self-image, they do not appear as part of the latter until the self-understanding of the discipline in terms of paradigms became available.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Ole Wæver brings this point of Marxism within the discipline to the fore by comparing the establishment of the IR department in Aberystwyth in 1919 with Lenin’s writing of *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* in 1916 in contrast to its relatively recent disciplinary acceptance. See Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), p.151.

Although, as was elaborated above, the concept of paradigm and paradigmaticism can be read as serving to further the disciplining of the discipline, this came at a price: the broadening of the discipline to accommodate what were congealing and being congealed into other “paradigms”. Through a specific reading of the concept of paradigms it was possible for other knowledge claims to pry open the doors of the discipline and try to gain a small foothold upon its terrain. This terrain, however, was hard fought in that what the Third Debate became, and could not get past with regards to the discourse on International Relations, was precisely a debate about the Third Debate. As Ole Wæver explains:

In contrast to the two previous debates, it increasingly was seen as a debate not to be won, but a pluralism to live with. In the first two debates, it was expected that one side would eventually win and International Relations would evolve as a coherent discipline in the winning camp. In the third debate, one increasingly (mostly implicitly) got the self-conception that the discipline *was* the debate. ‘International Relations’ was this disagreement, not a truth held by one of the positions. Each saw a side of reality that was important but could only be told from its perspective, not translated into the other two, nor subsumed in some grand synthesis. The discipline was thus in some sense richer for having all three voices but also potentially in danger of fragmenting.⁶⁸

In contrast, therefore, to the way in which the other two debates were (re)presented in the discourse on International Relations, the “Third Debate”, was to be understood as one that was characterized by the existence of mutually exclusive “paradigms” and the discipline itself seemed to be reduced to a debate about the debate. However, what is important to underscore is *why* the debate was seen as what constituted the discipline itself and to discern the way in

⁶⁸ Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), p. 155. Wayne Cox and Claire Turenne Sjolander echo this perception of the discipline with regards to the Third Debate: “Throughout the decade of the 1980s [...] the discipline of international relations found a new subject for evaluation - itself.” Wayne S. Cox and Claire Turenne Sjolander, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, in Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne S. Cox (eds.), *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner (1994), p.3.

which this “debate about the debate” was predominantly characterized in the discipline. It is in understanding the articulation of this self-image that one can reveal the continuance of the disciplining of the discipline in the face of what to some appeared to be the death knell to the dominance of epistemic Realism in the latter. What must be remembered within the context of the present argument, however, is that there never was a situation that saw the dominance of epistemic Realism *in* the discipline since the discipline itself was structured *as* realist from the earliest articulations of its self-image - i.e. there never was a neutral disciplinary space.

From this standpoint, that the discipline was “richer for having all three voices but also potentially in danger of fragmenting” signifies the political operation at work in attempting to secure the discipline *via* the discourse on International Relations: to maintain discipline within the discipline while patrolling its borders from the threat of chaos, the threat of anarchy. It has been argued that the theoretical pluralism of the “Third Debate” was a case of Marcusean “repressive tolerance”⁶⁹ in that it allowed the illusion of tolerance and freedom within the discipline while concealing the hegemonic status of realism in the latter. This is undoubtedly true as empirical studies by both implicit supporters of the paradigm such as Kal Holsti⁷⁰ as well as those less sanguine about its dominance such as Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker⁷¹

⁶⁹ See Steve Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genalogy of International Relations”, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press (1995), p.20 and Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), p. 151.

⁷⁰ See Kal J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*, Boston: Unwin Hyman (1985).

⁷¹ See Hayward R. Alker Jr. and Thomas J. Biersteker, “The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.28, No.2 (1984), pp.121-142.

and John Vasquez⁷² make clear. What is important to understand, however, is *how* this “repressive tolerance” worked; what are the mechanisms at work in enabling the “Third Debate” to mask the continuation of the disciplining of the discipline under the illusion of pluralism and tolerance. Although a deeper and more comprehensive answer to this question with regards to ontology will be marshalled later, from an immediate disciplinary perspective, it is precisely through Wævers’ comment of the discipline being “richer for having three voices” and “in danger of fragmenting” that a response can be articulated.

As alluded to above, what enabled the pluralistic frame of reference as a central part of the disciplinary self-image was the importation of the concept of paradigms into the discourse on International Relations. Not only did this concept allow a (re)writing of the disciplinary past, but also permitted the possibility of what appeared to be the coexistence of knowledge claims in the creation of a broadened disciplinary space without a direct threat - the “hazards of ‘intellectual knockouts’”⁷³ to quote Holsti’s endorsement of pluralism - to the realist disciplining of the discipline. This is not to say that this was some form of conspiracy theory - i.e. a premeditated gesture by some archetypal realist villains commanding the discipline from the backrooms of ISA conferences. As advanced above, the concept of paradigms enabled other knowledge claims to gain a modest foothold upon the “disciplinary space” created by the new (re)articulation of the discipline’s self image. It also allowed, however, to avoid a deep disciplinary crisis, a crisis of the legitimacy of the discipline itself as it had conducted its

⁷² See John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998).

⁷³ Kal J. Holsti, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All?”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), p.256.

relations vis-à-vis other knowledge claims - i.e. by making them invisible with regards to the disciplinary self-image. In order to begin to understand the way in which the “Third Debate” contributed to the disciplining of the discipline one must address how the concept of paradigm itself is predominantly read within the discipline’s self image.

With regards to the “plurality of voices” of the discipline in relation to the concept of paradigm, it is important to relate that, predominantly, its use with regards to the self-image of the discipline is stripped of many of the insights put forward by Kuhn’s understanding of the concept and is employed as a synonym for a “world view.” In this sense, as Wæver presents it above, it is understood as presenting different aspects of the same “real” world, “a side of reality that was important but could only be told from its perspective”, thus operating according to the positivist logic of truth as correspondence. From this standpoint, the predominant response enabled is one that, as Holsti explains, sees in the “Third Debate” a sign of maturity in the discipline “because there is an increased recognition and acceptance of multiple realities, and hence of multiple theories”⁷⁴ but - and this is the caveat usually brought to bear upon theoretical pluralism - “there is no foundation of theory superior to a keen understanding of the facts of international relations, past and present.”⁷⁵

From this optic, the reason for “pluralism”, the reason for the advent of new “paradigms” in the self-image of the discipline, stems from a need for the latter to make sense

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.261.

⁷⁵ Ibid. For an excellent treatment of Holsti’s handling of the “Third Debate” to which some of these comments are indebted, see Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), pp. 51-54.

of the “multiple realities of a complex world.”⁷⁶ However, these “multiple realities” can only be made sense of if they are apprehended as “facts” from a superior vantage point, by subsuming them under the orbit of the present “foundation”. What is this “foundation”? It is the epistemological and methodological commitments of the disciplining of the discipline. Holsti’s understanding of the place of pluralism in the discipline, as Mark Neufeld explains, “serves to ensure that the discipline keeps progressing in its quest for even truer descriptions of reality.”⁷⁷ The utility of theoretical pluralism here is thus a further manifestation of the will to truth that was adumbrated above with regards to the “Second Debate”: to the faith in a closer and closer approximation of the “real” world through scientific methodology and cumulative knowledge. In other words, that the discourse on (inter)national relations could, over time, increasingly approximate the international relations discourse. Within this context and this reading of the “Third Debate”, “progress” in the discipline could thus remain unimpeded.

Through the grafting of theoretical and conceptual formulations from other “paradigms”, such as “cooperation”⁷⁸ and “hegemony”⁷⁹ and the ability to address new “actors” and the accretion of a panoply of new “facts”, it was possible for epistemic Realism to broaden its research agenda while maintaining its epistemological and methodological

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.256. Along the same understanding see Oran Young, “International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions”, *World Politics*, Vol.39, No.1 (1986), pp.104-122.

⁷⁷ Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.52.

⁷⁸ See for example the articles in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1986).

⁷⁹ See for example Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1984).

stance. This is not to say that this was a monolithic movement or, again, a “conspiracy” of some sort. In fact, it could be said that if any real “debate” within the discipline actually occurred, it was the variety of debates under the aegis of what Ole Wæver calls the “neo-neo synthesis” or the *rapprochement* between neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists: i.e. debates regarding “[r]egime theory, co-operation under anarchy, hegemonic stability, alliance theory, trade negotiations, and Buzanian security analysis”.⁸⁰ While not monolithic, this “synthesis” can now be seen as the post-“Third Debate” manifestation of the epistemic Realist disciplining of the discipline. It coalesces around the epistemological and methodological assumptions whose evolution is (re)written into the narrative of the self-image of the discipline.

As Wæver explains:

No longer were realism and liberalism “incommensurable” - on the contrary they shared a “rationalist” research program, a conception of science, a shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy (Waltz) and investigate the evolution of co-operation and whether institutions matter (Keohane).⁸¹

Although in agreement with Wæver about the assumptions that compose this synthesis, it is important to note that, from the perspective developed here, “incommensurability” never entered the picture of the way in which epistemic Realism articulated itself through the “Third Debate”. In fact, it is precisely by eschewing incommensurability *via* its own epistemological stance, one that *does* find a vantage point from which to assess rival knowledge claims, that this “synthesis” was able to come about. Although Popperian falsificationism had to a large extent been discredited by the Kuhnian work on paradigms, it is Lakatos’s answer to Kuhn,

⁸⁰ Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), p. 164.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 163

developing criteria for the evaluation of scientific theories through the concept of “research program”,⁸² that became the foundation for an epistemic Realist “progressive” agenda.⁸³ In a sense, this agenda can be seen as using Kuhn against himself by finding in the new criteria a way to resume “normal science” after what was recounted in the discipline’s self image as a period of “revolutionary science”.⁸⁴

Ironically, it is precisely this possibility for assessing truth claims that led to the perceived impasse of the “Third Debate”, to the inability to get beyond the debate itself, to Thomas Biersteker’s lament of “yet another preface to a major project [...] yet another call to a new beginning, another meta-theoretical debate for the consumers of international relations

⁸² See Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1970), pp. 91-196.

⁸³ Although much of the work under the aegis of epistemic Realism occults its epistemological foundations by taking them as given, the references to Lakatos are predominant in work where epistemology becomes a central point of discussion. One particularly telling example is Robert Keohane’s assessment of “structural realism” using Lakatosian criteria in the disciplinary ground breaking exchange in the compilation *Neorealism and its Critics*. See Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press (1986), pp.158-203. The pervasiveness of the use of Lakatos in political science and the social sciences in general is brought to the fore by John Vasquez. Responding to a citation by Ian Lustick that “between 1980 and 1995 the Social Science Citation Index lists an annual average of 10.5 inches of citations to the work of Lakatos”, Vasquez maintains “that Lakatos is very much at the epistemological core of political science”, John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998), p.247, note 4. For a view into the continuing relevance of Lakatos to International Relations theory see the articles by Vasquez, Waltz, Christensen and Snyder, Elman and Elman, Schweller, and Walt in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.91, No.4 (1997).

⁸⁴ As Nick Rengger and Mark Hoffman explain: “the confusion surrounding the concept of a ‘paradigm’ and the use, misuse and abuse of the term within the social sciences also reinforced the nascent scientism in the study of international relations. This resulted primarily from emphasizing the necessity for ‘normal science’ and the need for a ‘paradigm shift’ in the discipline rather than emphasizing ‘revolutionary science’ as the desirable norm. The effect was an intellectual schizophrenia in which positivist epistemology was held in abeyance during periods of paradigm change but would reassert itself with the return to ‘normal science’. Nick Rengger and Mark Hoffman, “Modernity, Postmodernism and International Relations”, in Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham and Mo Malek (Eds.), *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, New York: St. Martin’s Press (1992), p.130.

theory.”⁸⁵ Set upon the terms of epistemic Realist knowledge claims, the “Third Debate” had nowhere to go: it was not a debate at all. As Wayne Cox and Claire Turenne Sjolander explain: “the Third Debate was never a true debate precisely because it avoided advancing criteria that would permit choice between paradigms.”⁸⁶ In a sense, the epistemic Realist disciplining of the discipline got to have its cake and eat it too by avoiding a crisis of legitimacy through the broadening of its research agenda in its search for a better approximation of “reality” and appearing to be one among many (or at least one of the members of the various troikas that developed ⁸⁷) “competing paradigms” while concurrently freezing dissent through their own epistemological warrant.

In light of this contention, one could put forward the argument “what about post-positivism?” - i.e. what about the link between the “Third Debate” and the ushering in of a

⁸⁵ Thomas J. Biersteker, “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations”, *International Relations Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), p.266.

⁸⁶ Wayne S. Cox and Claire Turenne Sjolander, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, in Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne S. Cox (eds.), *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner (1994), p. 4.

⁸⁷ Paradigm mapping in the self-image of the discipline seems to always come in threes. Interestingly, there is broad consensus on the labelling of one of the “actors”, or elements, of the “troika” - i.e. realism. One notable exception is Robert Gilpin’s preference for the moniker nationalism. This may partly be due to the fact that Gilpin is addressing his positions from the optic of political economy (with the other positions being marxism and liberalism), hence the interchangeable use of mercantilism as another label for the first position. Another argument that could be put forward is that Gilpin understands these “positions” as “ideologies of political economy”. By using “realism” Gilpin would be making an assertion about the nature of the realist paradigm *qua* ideology. One should thus ask oneself, from what vantage point does Gilpin apprehend these three “ideologies”. On this point - i.e. on the epistemological assumptions behind his own perspective - Gilpin remains conspicuously silent. See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1987). With regards to the other “paradigm monikers”, we find as the two other actors of the troika labelled as pluralism/ liberalism/globalism/global society/world society/multi-centric and structuralism/Marxism/neo-Marxism/globalism (again)/global-centric. For discussions on these various typologies and who uses them see Steve Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory”, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press (1995), p. 18 and Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), p.154.

cornucopia of theoretical voices in a brave new post-positivist era, a “next stage in the development of International Relations theory”,⁸⁸ founded upon the ruins of “the embattled and rapidly fading El Dorado of positivist science?”.⁸⁹ The easy answer to this question with over a decade of hindsight would, of course, be, to paraphrase Jean Baudrillard, that “it never took place”. However, this is not a satisfactory answer. One must ask *why* it never took place, why the “Third Debate” may be seen as an impasse. In answering this question I stand in agreement with Ole Wæver, Mark Neufeld and Steve Smith who, in their own different ways, understand the “Third Debate”, or inter-paradigm debate, as being very different from the post-positivist challenges to the discipline.⁹⁰ Again here, what must be understood is the way in which this “debate” is characterized in the discipline’s self-image. The most important point to make in this regard relates to the way in which the “paradigms” are apprehended in the “Third Debate”. Regardless of the prevalent use of the word “ontology” in the examination and comparison of “paradigms”, the manner in which the latter are perceived has very little to do with a philosophical understanding of ontology - i.e. of how and why what is *is*. Instead, simply and directly, the “debate” invites the question of what is?⁹¹ In doing so, what is always already

⁸⁸ See Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1987), Vol.16, No.2, p.244.

⁸⁹ Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), p.244.

⁹⁰ See Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) pp.149-185, Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995) and Steve Smith, “Positivism and beyond”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) pp.11-44.

⁹¹ Wæver treads along a similar path albeit from a constructivist position on ontology : “‘Ontology’ as the issue of ‘what is’ has become a fashionable label for that which was discussed in the third debate (the inter-paradigm debate): basic images of international relations, for instance state-centric versus pluralist. More seriously, the

presupposed is a mind-independent reality that just *is* and a direct correspondence between our concepts and the world. What *is* in this particular instance are the *paradigms themselves* and these paradigms are thus not addressed ontologically but *epistemologically*. As Didier Bigo explains the epistemological approach to International Relations theory:

The epistemological approach consists then of contrasting the relative merits of the globalist, institutionalist, realist and neo-realist, dependentist and culturalist approaches. We seek to 'test' them, to nuance them, to diversify them, to combine them...in short we analyse these discourses as if they were objects in themselves, free from the institutional circumstances of their utterance. The stances taken are not apprehended in relation to the motives behind their positioning and the particular trajectories of their promoters. This leads to the belief that the symbolic efficiency of the contending arguments resides in their greater or lesser degree of adherence to the description and explanation of the facts, that their reputation signifies qualities intrinsic to the value of the utterances, and that a critique of the latter is carried out through an analysis of their content.⁹²

Although this can be read within the same frame as the epistemic Realist position on paradigms elaborated upon earlier as different facets of a same reality, such a position, as alluded to earlier with regards to the work of Lapid, can also adhere to a certain reading of the tenet of incommensurability. However, its understanding and use of paradigms as internally consistent and mutually exclusive objects - closed systems of meaning - maintains a positivistic optic: a vantage point from which to address the characteristics of each paradigm.

term ontology should refer to more basic questions about what 'stuff' the world is made up of: relations, processes, action, units (self-conscious, present to themselves and relating to other units each given in and of themselves), consciousness, the march of the world spirit, or power? [...] This devaluation of 'ontology' can have confusing effects regarding the conception of debates. Real 'philosophical' ontology was not discussed until the fourth debate [what Wæver understands as the debate around positivism and post-positivism], whereas the watered-down version of ontology can be applied to that which was discussed in the third debate (then without the term)." Ole Wæver, "The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate", in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) p. 177, note 7.

⁹² Didier Bigo, "Grands Débats dans un Petit Monde: Les Débats en relations internationales et leur lien avec le monde de la sécurité", *Cultures & Conflits: Sociologie Politique de l'International*, No. 19/20 (automne/hiver 1995), p.7. My translation.

It is within this context that the connection between the “Third Debate” and post-positivism is untenable. Indeed as, Wæver notes, it is not surprising that the issue of incommensurability arose out of Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science since “only to those who have believed in complete communication can walls of incommunicability and incommensurability appear”.⁹³ Ironically, in relation to the multiple metatheoretical exegeses on the debate itself, one of the authors that is most exuberant in extolling the virtues of a post-positivistic turn in the discipline is one of the authors whose optic on theoretical pluralism effectively forecloses the connection between the “Third Debate” and post-positivism. Lapid’s position becomes one that short-circuits ontological issues and, as Wæver notes, turns “the debate of post-structuralists (and others) with rationalism [...] into a question of epistemology (how do we know?) And something closer to the second debate (on a higher level).”⁹⁴ Not surprisingly Lapid *qua* subject, as Biersteker remarks, “does not develop much of a critical stance on [post-positivist] activity itself”⁹⁵ and the treatment of his object occults that “[i]t is not pluralism without a purpose, but a *critical* pluralism, deigned to reveal embedded power authority structures, provoke critical scrutiny of dominant discourses, empower marginalized populations and provide a basis for alternative conceptualizations”⁹⁶ that is at issue in post-positivism.

⁹³ Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) p. 172.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.156.

⁹⁵ Thomas J. Biersteker, “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations”, *International Relations Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (1989), p.265.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.264.

Although the issue of “post-modernism” *qua* “relativism” will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Two, what is important to highlight here is how it is a positivist optic that enables the establishment of a connection between the “Third Debate” and post-positivism and provides the conditions of possibility for John Vasquez, for example, in his attempt to elaborate new criteria for appraising theory, to maintain that “the debate on post-modernism need not lead to a dividing discipline and an acceptance of a relativism where there are many incommensurable empirical perspectives with no way of comparatively evaluating them for fear of silencing a voice.”⁹⁷ To ascribe the culpability of the impasse of the “Third Debate” upon post-positivism and, more precisely, on post-modernism, thus misses the mark. This impasse is, rather, predicated upon an optic articulated *via* positivist knowledge claims and thus the short-circuiting of ontological questions through a self-image that can but privilege epistemological questions. In other words, the discourse on International Relations, the meta-theoretical self-image of the discipline, provides an understanding of the “units” of the discipline as self-enclosed systems of meaning - i.e. as “objects” of knowledge. What is further foreclosed from this standpoint of treating “ontology” as what *is* - i.e. of the self-image of the discipline not taking ontology seriously - are precisely the insights that post-positivism can bring to bear upon the discipline with regards to, *inter alia*, Being (e.g. Heidegger), becoming (e.g. Nietzsche), presence (e.g. Derrida) and alterity (e.g. Levinas). This is, furthermore, not something that can be circumvented since the optic by which the discipline is disciplined always already forecloses the question of ontology. In other words, it is precisely the occultation of this question that secures the foundation of the disciplinary citadel. Whether the inter-paradigm

⁹⁷ John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998), p.238.

“debate” is understood from a standpoint of different facets of the same reality or as different incommensurable “realities”, and even if we are so bold as to call them “discourse rather than “paradigms”, their objectification as full systems of meaning will always betray a positivistic optic. As Ernesto Laclau explains with regards to ideology:

If we entirely do away with the notion of “distortion” and assert that there are only incommensurable discourses, we merely transfer the notion of a full positivity from an extra-discursive ground to the plurality of the discursive field. This transference retains entirely the idea of a full positivity. In the same way that we have a naturalistic positivism we can have a semiotic and phenomenological one.⁹⁸

The “Third Debate” and its “beyond”

If it becomes problematic to associate the “Third Debate”, or “inter-paradigm debate”, to “post-positivism” since this “debate” is founded upon a positivistic optic and is an intrinsic part of the disciplining of the discipline, could it then be said, as Wæver does, that we have reached a “fourth debate”?⁹⁹ This would make sense if one apprehends the existence of a neutral disciplinary space, an arena in which competing “paradigms” put forth their respective positions. However, if one posits, as I do, that there never existed a neutral disciplinary space where such a debate would take place, then the meaning of “post-positivism” vis-à-vis the discipline completely changes. Should we, or can we, even talk about “post-positivism” as if it were a position *after* positivism - i.e. the chronological replacement of the “fading El Dorado” of positivism - or, at least, the less ambitious *alternative* to positivism - i.e. an

⁹⁸ Ernesto Laclau, “The death and resurrection of the theory of ideology”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.1, No.3 (1996), p.203

⁹⁹ Ole Wæver, “The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) pp.156-170.

incommensurable stance that can be chosen according to one's own sensibilities as a "paradigm"?¹⁰⁰ Even accepting Wæver's position on the inter-paradigm debate and his attempt to move the discipline's self-image beyond the impasse of the "Third Debate", the attempt to envisage this "beyond" as a new "debate" *within* the discipline falls prey to the disciplining of the discipline as it is reflected in its self-image. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find Wæver's model of the "fourth debate" founded upon the distinction made by Robert Keohane between "rationalists" and "reflectivist" - i.e. as an axis upon which rationalism and reflectivism run in opposite directions *ad infinitum*.¹⁰¹

Addressing the extreme rationalist position of "rational choice" and that of the reflectivists of "deconstructivism" as two extremities on an axis running away from each other Wæver misses the mark.¹⁰² From an understanding of the discipline as epistemic Realist from the outset, as what constitutes the disciplining of the discipline, there is not only no neutral

¹⁰⁰ Within the context of the position of incommensurability this is one of the stances taken from a positivist optic with regards to "choosing" one paradigm over the other. Since there is no rational criteria to make this choice, the argument goes, then the choice must be one of temperament or sensibility. This point is well illustrated by Mark Neufeld in his assessment of James Rosenau's position on incommensurability. As Neufeld remarks: "...Rosenau affirms that 'the way in which analysts become adherents of one or another approach is not necessarily based on intellectual or rational calculation'. What then is the explanation for paradigm choice? By definition, the explanation must be found outside the realm of reason and argumentation. Rosenau's answer is consistent, if disconcerting: 'our temperaments', he affirms, '...are the central determinants of which approach we will find more suitable'." Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.57.

¹⁰¹ See Ole Wæver, "The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate", in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) p. 165, figure 7.3. To be fair, Wæver explicitly addresses the way in which this dichotomy enables a consolidation between neo-realists and neo-institutionalists that is, in reference to Keohane, "partly argued by reference to some unnamed academics who 'are content with interpreting texts'" Ibid., p.165. Furthermore, with regards to the consolidation issue, his comments with regards to the absolute /relative gains debate as the logical "apex of the neo-neo programme" enabling a boom for "the most mathematical modellers in the discipline", provide some valuable insight with regards to the tack followed by epistemic Realism. Ibid., p.166.

¹⁰² See Ibid., p.169, figure 7.4.

disciplinary space upon which such a debate could occur, but also no standpoint from which to neutrally, objectively, observe its occurrence.¹⁰³ In apprehending the discipline and its disciplining in this way, Wæver's articulation of the fourth debate could be seen precisely as a contribution to the disciplining of the discipline inasmuch as it creates a favourable space for his own constructivist project in his articulation of the disciplinary self-image - i.e. a "'post-radical' reflexivism' - i.e. reflexivists not sticking to the post-structuralist guerilla war against the 'system', but also conducting concrete analysis in dialogue with the establishment"¹⁰⁴ - while simultaneously occulting his own standpoint. Although constructivist approaches are sensitive to the social construction of meaning - hence Wæver's characterization of a kinder, gentler form of reflexivism - their epistemological reliance on pre-given units (whether "agent" or "structure" in their sequential bracketing) and on an analytical distinction between subject and object (explaining the lack of attention to the performativity of Wæver's own discourse) indicate a complicity with epistemic Realist tenets.¹⁰⁵ It is precisely this complicity that enables Wæver's "dialogue with the establishment" and explains how constructivism can be

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.169.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ This is well articulated by David Campbell while intimately relating the point to a quest for the security of foundation. As Campbell explains, with regards to Alexander Wendt's reliance upon a pre-given body as the "material substrate of agency": "Wendt retreats in the end to the (supposedly) secure foundations of the body politic because his moral commitment to an 'epistemic realism' whereby the world comprises objects independent of ideas or beliefs about them." David Campbell, "Political Prosais, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World", in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward Alker (eds.), *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1996), p.13. For a very good critique of constructivism with regards to its inability to circumvent these epistemological commitments see Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.3, No.3 (1997), pp.365-392. Within the context of the difficulties of structuration to address the sovereignty problematique, see Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), pp.44-49.

apprehended as an answer to Robert Keohane's call for "a synthesis between rationalistic and reflective approaches".¹⁰⁶

Keohane's project for grand synthesis is precisely founded upon keeping the epistemological foundations of the discipline intact. Nowhere is this clearer than in his paternalistic siren's song to feminist scholars, warning them to stay away from the nihilistic one-way street of "postmodernism" and to follow what his vantage point considers to be the most productive path for the discipline: "an *alliance* between [...] what I call 'neoliberal institutionalism' and [...] an emerging feminist standpoint theory of international relations"¹⁰⁷ - i.e. what he takes the liberty of (re)labelling "feminist institutionalism".¹⁰⁸ In Cynthia Weber's response to Keohane's article she identifies the results of the will to mastery that underlies the latter's position with regards to "postmodernism", the response has particular relevance to my present disciplinary concerns and it reveals the important contribution that feminism can make to an understanding of the disciplining of the discipline:

First feminist post-modernism cannot be made to serve the laws of science or the goals of the discipline.[...] For Keohane's text, the position feminist post-modernism takes in relation to social laws makes it a perversion - an aberrant set of practices which cannot be recuperated by science or the discipline. [...] Second because it is unable to identify with feminist post-modernism, Keohane's text is unable to fetishise it. Fetishism demands coherence, whereas feminist post-modernism presents itself as multiple. It

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in James Der Derian, "The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance and Speed", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.34, No.3 (1990), p.296. Keohane's will towards greater unification and synthesis is quite rightly eschewed by Der Derian in favour of "learning to live with irreconcilable differences and multiple identities - in high theory and everyday practice." Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Robert O. Keohane, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.18, No.2 (1989), p. 250. The use and emphasis of the word alliance here betrays the optic by which Keohane apprehends theory in the same way in which he apprehends the self-contained objects he seeks to analyse.

¹⁰⁸ See Ibid., p.248.

appears in Keohane's text as an enigma whose meaning cannot be mastered and which therefore becomes a source of anxiety for he who attempts to master it. [...] Yet Keohane's authorial scientific/disciplinarian anxiety - his textual blind rage - must be dealt with. All that remains is the spatial strategy of banishment. [...] Unable to place feminist post-modernism within a boundary [...], Keohane's text places feminist post-modernism outside of the boundary it constructs around good science and good international relations theory.¹⁰⁹

With regards to the self-image of the discipline, instead of the existence of a neutral arena where paradigms debate, or even of a space created by the mutually exclusive subject positions of incommensurable "paradigms", one could say that epistemic Realism has been the arena all along. However, what enables the continued existence of this arena is for it not to appear as an arena as such. What we thus have in this arena, or on this stage, is a play. Not a play with a pre-written script that must be followed strictly and written by some "one," but an improvisational play, with certain characters (paradigms) and certain scenario encounters (the "Great Debates" of the discipline) spontaneously designed to captivate the viewer to the point of forgetting where they are and transporting them into the story line. Having them live vicariously through the characters but, of course, not being able to change the story themselves. The story line itself is bare, comprised only of a few general formulas following the "timeless" unwritten rules of a good story (the narrative(s) of modernity) around a title such as "The Will to Truth": the story of the hardships of a little discipline built by great men whose enduring faith in progress and scientific methodology allowed it to overcome adversity in its desire to cover over greater and greater expanses of the "real" of international relations with an indistinguishable likeness of the latter like Borges' map made by Cartographers Guilds

¹⁰⁹ Cynthia Weber, "Good Girls, Little Girls, and Bad Girls: Male Paranoia in Robert Keohane's Critique of Feminist International Relations", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.23, No.2 (1994), pp.346-347.

following their Discipline in the quotation at the outset of this chapter. What about the end of the story? It is precisely the end that is at issue here. The point is precisely to think through this end...

What Wæver addresses as a “fourth debate” would take place inside this play: within the disciplining of the discipline. The opposition between “rational choice” and “deconstructionists” should not be seen as one between two extreme characters within the play running away from, or even violently opposing each other on the stage. It is the play itself that is at issue here. It is the disciplining of the discipline that must constantly be confronted to itself and its disciplinary procedures incessantly revealed as it permanently, performatively, reactivates its own rules. With regards to the discipline’s self-image, what has come to be called “post-positivism” and, more specifically “post-modernism”, should not be seen as an “alternative” account of what the world *is*, a new point, arrow, circle, category on the disciplinary map seen from above - from a sovereign distance - but as a revelation of the cracks that always already appear in the disciplining of the discipline itself. This problematization of the discipline, however, should not be seen as solely the province of what is considered to be “post-modernism” or exclusively addressed at a meta-theoretical level, but is an inextricable part of all the work that makes evident the invisible frames through which problems and issues are addressed in the discipline. Within this context, the contributions of feminist and post-colonial scholarship are essential in revealing the gendered and ethnocentric optic that these frames produce, and how this disciplining serves to vehicle certain interests under the cloak of “objective” knowledge. Furthermore, since the discipline is itself a product of modernity and the modern *episteme*, approaches that are reflexive with regards to the foundation(s) of

modernity are central to this problematization. Irrespective of the quarrels between what Nick Rennger and Mark Hoffman call “critical interpretativists” and “radical interpretativists”,¹¹⁰ or that Steve Smith refers to as “minimal foundationalism” and “anti-foundationalism”,¹¹¹ they all contribute, in one sense or another, to questioning what enables this disciplining in the first place. Furthermore, as will be seen in the next chapter, this characterization of positions with regards to foundation is, in itself, problematical.

All this scholarship works upon the disciplinary frame, reveals it as a frame through which the discipline is disciplined and, simultaneously, how the discipline’s disciplining produces it as a frame. Within the present meta-theoretical context, it is in revealing the way in which the discipline articulates its foundational myths, continually (re)writes itself, patrols its borders and the borders of the discourses which compose it - in essence, how it *secures* itself - that is at issue. It is primarily in this sense that the approach taken in this thesis can be seen as (un)disciplinary. Its concern with the discipline of International Relations is evident. However, it is unable to position itself within a disciplinary space like a point on a map for it expects none to exist without always already being a map maker in silent complicity with the science of map making; a science that is precisely what is found suspect from my present *prise de position*. The position vis-à-vis the discipline taken in this thesis is certainly an engagement *with* International Relations, but not an engagement *in* International Relations as a discipline.

¹¹⁰ Nick Rennger and Mark Hoffman, “Modernity, Postmodernism and International Relations”, in Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham and Mo Malek (Eds.), *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, New York: St. Martin’s Press (1992), pp.132-134.

¹¹¹ Steve Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory”, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press (1995), pp.28-39.

David Campbell and Michael Dillon make this point succinctly in situating their work *vis-à-vis* the discipline:

The object is then not to add to international relations, but to re-disclose some of the framework within which the discipline itself, together with the issues it has tried to make its own, may be re-addressed as part of a much wider historical and global problematic. It is a contribution, then, to a re-engagement with the conditions which enable the production and re-production of international relations' knowledge rather than an engagement in international relations.¹¹²

Undertaking a deconstructive treatment of the self-image of the discipline both enables and calls forth a re-engagement *vis-à-vis* the conditions of possibility of the discourse on International Relations beyond the epistemological conditions that warrant its existence as a discipline and serve to discipline the discipline. Far from leaving the self-image of the discipline in a state of unreconstructable rubble, this reading insists upon a re-inscription of the discipline with regards to the conditions that enable its formation as knowledge in the first place and, thus, of a mode of inquiry suitable to this task. Most importantly with regards to the present endeavour is an understanding of the articulation of the underlying story line and its ontological and ontotheological exigencies, of the rationalist will to truth and its desire to objectively approximate an impossible "real" world and, thus, performatively construct the world in its image. In the disciplinary parlance elaborated at the outset of this chapter, the importance of the discourse *on* International Relations, resides in the warrant it bestows, through the epistemological lens of its own self-understanding, upon the circumscription of, and the patrolling of the borders between, itself, the discourse *on* (inter)national relations, and the international relations discourse.

¹¹² David Campbell and Michael Dillon, *The political subject of violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993), p.3.

With regard to the discipline of International Relations, it is precisely this disciplinary security project that can explain the conceptual deployment of “security” to objectively apprehend problems and issues occurring in a world “out there” while surreptitiously escaping the disciplinary gaze. What is now important to acknowledge and elucidate is that this warrant is retroactively (re)written into the discipline from the standpoint of epistemic Realism. In other words, the above warrant is informed by the exigencies of the modern *episteme* and the naturalization of the ontological Sovereign ground to which it is intimately associated. From this explanation of the conceptual deployment of security one must, therefore, move to a deeper explanation. One that will provide an understanding of the conditions of possibility of this disciplining of the discipline while simultaneously preparing the ground for the approach taken in addressing the deep and longstanding complicity between security and social order. This explanation, as well as the development of the tools necessary to provide a genealogy of the relationship between the meaning(s) of security and the articulation and production of social order *via* a concern with alterity, will now be addressed.

... (An-)Archical Musings:

HAMLET: Do you see nothing there?

QUEEN GERTRUDE: Nothing at all; yet all that is I see.

Shakespeare¹

... there is a paradox of immanence and transcendence in perception. Immanence, because the perceived object cannot be foreign to him who perceives; transcendence, because it always contains something more than what is actually given.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty²

Ontology and its pertinacity

Epistemology, ontology and the modern state of sovereignty

The question of ontology is central to the present inquiry. One may then ask why, in addressing the foundation of the discipline of International Relations, this question was not explicitly shouldered and centrally displayed from the outset of the previous chapter. This should particularly be the case when the thesis ventures an understanding of International Relations, the disciplining of knowledge regarding world order, as a security project *per se*: as a project of securing a particular ontological ground(ing). Furthermore, the question of ontology opens up consequential issues relating to the way in which International Relations is inextricably related to a particular categorization of being engendered from/through Western metaphysics, to the commitments of Enlightenment reason, to the modern *episteme* and its legacy incarnated in a specific understanding of the political organized around and through the *problématique* of

¹ William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act III, Scene IV.

² Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, Northwestern University Press (1964), p.16.

Sovereignty. These questions are crucial to an understanding of both the advent of International Relations as a discipline and, as elaborated in detail in further chapters, an understanding of security within this ontological context as well as in relation to the late modern predicament. The reason that the question of ontology has not been the guiding thread from the outset of this reading on the advent of the discipline of International Relations is precisely because the founding of the discipline under the aegis of epistemic Realism, the further disciplining afforded by the “behavioral revolt” and the “Third Debate” - i.e. the retroactively (re)written self-image which this disciplining has presented - can be seen as a circumventing of ontological questions through the privileging of epistemology. In other words, in articulating itself in terms of the way in which the world *is* versus the way it *ought* to be through a form of knowledge that precisely asserts this claim, an epistemological stance that finds truth as correspondence to objective facts existing in an unproblematically described world “out there” (whether in the form of the “world” of “international relations” themselves or that of its theories), the social scientific disciplining of International Relations becomes primarily a methodological enterprise warranted by unquestioned epistemological precepts, “[t]he disciplining of scholarly procedures by constant appeals to epistemological privilege.”³

This question of epistemology, in being privileged as *the* way in which to begin to apprehend the way the world *is*, simultaneously covers over questions of what exactly it is that is being studied and how, when, where and why “subjects” and “objects” of knowledge are constituted. As William Connolly explains:

³ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/outside: international relations as political theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1993), p.159.

The primacy of epistemology short-circuits ontological issues by assuming that once the right procedure for attaining truth as correspondence or coherence or consensus is reached, any remaining issues will either be resolved through that method or shown to be irrelevant. The primacy of epistemology thereby treats the ideas of subject, object, representation, and knowledge as if they were already fixed in their range of application. The attraction of this perspective resides in its claim to bypass issues that might otherwise contaminate, derail or confound the operational self-confidence of the human sciences.⁴

By articulating itself beyond the strictures of time and space *via* the elaboration of conceptual frameworks whose perceived correspondence to objective facts allows for what is expounded as universal truths to be revealed, the disciplining of the discipline under the auspices of epistemic Realism thus occults the way in which its understanding of “subject[s], object[s], representation, and knowledge” is historically constituted and ultimately arises out of contingency while simultaneously being an attempt to master the latter. This is not to say, however, that there is no *use* of history in epistemic Realism. On the contrary, although the occultation of the social and political context in/from which theorizing takes place through the promise of value-free social science gives the illusion of a production of knowledge *ex nihilo*, simultaneously, epistemic Realism marshals a long tradition of “realist” thinkers from Thucydides through Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau who are used to display the enduring legacy of a “realist” understanding of the amaranthine “reality” of power politics. A “reality” beyond time and space evidenced, as Kenneth Waltz suggests, “from ancient China and India, to the Greek and Italian city states and unto our own day.”⁵ It is in this possibility of understanding world order from an objective vantage point outside itself that can clinically

⁴ William E. Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1995), p.6.

⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press (1986), p.341.

calculate present power configurations and secure national interests through rational means-ends calculation while simultaneously tying back this understanding of the world to a long tradition of thought, a canon of power politics, that the importance of ontology (and its dissimulation) to the disciplining of the discipline can be revealed.

The “short-circuiting” of ontological issues that Connolly posits above can be seen as being enabled by an understanding of knowledge that confers upon objects an underlying essence whose meaning and identity are fixed and can be unproblematically represented through language. Indeed, the assertion by epistemic Realism of understanding the world as it *is*, is precisely a claim to a definition of knowledge as the knowing of *what* something *is*, its quiddity or essence. In this way, and as foreshadowed above, this epistemological claim resonates with a metaphysical presupposition that has been the foundational pretense of Western philosophy: what, following Derrida, can be termed the “metaphysics of presence.”⁶ Although a more detailed exegesis of this notion will be taken up later, the primary concern with it here relates to the way in which epistemic Realism works within, indeed is *founded* upon, a system of metaphysical oppositions while simultaneously occluding questions related to it by privileging an epistemological stance that naturalizes a specific ontological ground. More specifically, what is essentialized in the epistemic Realist rendering of world order, what is given as foundation, is, as Richard Ashley suggests, “...that the structure of world political authority, may be understood to consist of a number of states, and domestic societies, each an identical *sovereign*

⁶ For the initial articulations regarding the metaphysics of presence in Derrida, see Jacques Derrida, *Of grammatology*, (trans.) Gayatri C. Spivak, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press(1976) and Jacques Derrida, *Writing and difference*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1978).

presence, already given....”⁷ This “whatness” of world politics founds itself through a system of binary oppositions that find their equivalence in the multitude of dichotomies that have driven the history of metaphysics and structured the latter such as subject/object, self/other, inside/outside, man/woman, mind/matter, speech/writing, true/false, order/disorder, rational/irrational. These binary oppositions operate to give the first term of each the illusion of full presence, or plenitude, through the second term being an undesirable, inferior, derivative of the first - i.e. one that, in its relative *absence*, lacks the *presence* of the first.

Within the context of world order as characterised by Ashley above, the binary opposite of sovereignty/anarchy is of central concern at this stage of this study since it serves to naturalize and reify one “thing”: the State.⁸ To the question of the “whatness” of world order, the profoundly gendered⁹ answer given by epistemic Realism is the *presence* of sovereign states operating under conditions of its *absence* in the form of anarchy or, in terms of the problem-solving horizon that this opposition discursively circumscribes, the *anarchy problematique*. It is through this binary opposition and its articulation, what Ashley has termed “heroic

⁷ Richard K. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.2 (1988), p.229.

⁸ This is not to say that other binary opposites are not as central to the articulation of world order. On the contrary, they all importantly contribute to the articulation of a specific discursive economy which affirms the way the world *is*, instead of it being something else. Issues relating to the constitution of the subject, reason, truth are an integral part of this thesis and will be more explicitly elaborated as they become pertinent to the argument. The point elaborated here relates to the more overt and foundational ontological assumption of epistemic Realism and not the multitude of underlying associations which contribute to this particular ordering of the world.

⁹ As Jill Steans explains: “Gender has been denied salience as an issue in International Relations because the discipline has been seen as constituted by a system of states which relate to one another in a context of anarchy.[...] The invisibility or marginalisation of gender issues in the study of International Relations is a consequence of methodological individualism which begins with a high level of abstraction, taking the state to be the key actor.” Jill Steans, *Gender and International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity (1998), p.46.

practice”¹⁰, that the state becomes the unquestioned centre of meaning and understanding of world order. As Ashley suggests:

The heroic practice - the commitment to the hierarchical sovereignty/anarchy opposition - supplies a necessary condition for the binding inference of the anarchy problematique from the absence of central rule. Put differently, the absence of central rule is determinative with respect to the anarchy problematique only thanks to heroic practice, that is, only on the condition that the opposed terms of the heroic practice are taken to exhaust interpretive possibilities.¹¹

Through the effectiveness of the sovereignty/anarchy opposition and its articulation under the terms of heroic practice, there is thus a foreclosure of the possibility of understanding world order and politics in any other way than by an understanding of what *is* predicated upon the Sovereign presence of the state. Through epistemological privilege and the ontological ground(ing) upon and through the state enabled *via* the sovereignty/anarchy opposition, epistemic Realism can thus engender an unquestioned foundation upon which to interpret and act upon world order. Irrespective of the attempt within epistemic Realism’s increasing scientificity to abstract from “state” to “unit” to increase its universal reach in both time and space and to distance itself from overt normative decision, the sovereignty/anarchy opposition enables a certain circularity that maintains the privileged position of the State as the heart of international political theorizing. As Barry Buzan succinctly illustrates

¹⁰ “Heroic practice” can be seen as the term that Ashley uses to illustrate the way through which the metaphysics of presence articulates itself within the context of the particular dichotomy of sovereignty/anarchy. As Ashley explains: “The heroic practice is as simple as it is productive. It turns on a simple hierarchical opposition: a dichotomy of *sovereignty* versus *anarchy*, where the former term is privileged as a higher reality, a regulative ideal, and the latter term is understood only in a derivative and negative way, as a failure to live up to this ideal and as something that endangers this ideal.” Richard K. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematic”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.2 (1988), p.230.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.239.

In the international system, anarchy does not mean the absence of government *per se*, but rather that government resides in the units of the system. If those units are states, then they will claim sovereignty, which is the right to treat themselves as the ultimate source of governing authority within the territorial limits of their jurisdiction. Since the claim of sovereignty automatically denies recognition of any higher political authority, a system of sovereign states is by definition politically structured as an anarchy.¹²

In relation to the disciplining of the discipline of international relations, the ontological primacy that this binary opposition confers upon the state provides an identity marker that helps to distinguish what *is* international relations theory from what is *not* theorizing in the discipline. This disciplinary triage separating the International Relations “wheat” from the non-International Relations “chaff”, revolves precisely around an unquestioned sovereign ground(ing) from which, as Jens Bartelson explains, “sovereignty is constituted as a primitive presence from which all theorizing necessarily must depart, if it is to remain international political theorizing”.¹³ For this reason, the Peace of Westphalia becomes, for the discourse on (inter)national relations under the aegis of epistemic Realism what the First Debate has been for the discourse of the “self-image” of the discipline: its condition of disciplinary possibility. As David Campbell explains:

For international relations it is this rendering of the Westphalian moment which constitutes the condition of possibility for the discipline. It establishes the point of origin necessary to suggest that, in contrast to the religious and political structures of the

¹² Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers(1991), p.21. This type of circular argumentation is articulated in Kenneth Waltz’s treatise of epistemic Realism *Theory of International politics* in contrast to the functions performed by differentiated “units” in the domestic [hierarchical] political structure: “The states that are the units of the international-political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform. Anarchy entails a relation of coordination among the system’s unit, and that implies their sameness [...] so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units.” Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House (1979), p.93. Jens Bartelson’s analysis of Waltz in *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* is particularly pertinent here and one to which this argument is indebted.

¹³ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.24.

preceding millennia, the history of modern Europe since the peace of Westphalia has been a history of sovereign states acting in a multistate system. [...] It is this historical narrative of the rise of the state in Western Europe which has been ahistorically deployed by a tradition of international relations scholarship (realism) to suggest the naturalness of its representation of international politics and to undergird a statist discourse of international relations.¹⁴

Since a more detailed unsettling of this condition of possibility - the *caesura* between orders enabling this foundational narrative - makes up a substantial part of following chapters of this work, I will not at present elaborate upon its substantive content. Its immediate pertinence is related to the way in which it has served to discipline the discipline and, in particular, the way in which this is effected through the use of history.

The use of history found in the articulation of what *is* international relations from an epistemic Realist standpoint can be understood as *presentist* history. That is, as explicated by Bartelson, a historiographical paradigm that “regards the past as a projection of the present, by projecting a version of this present onto the past”.¹⁵ This form of historiography can be understood in contrast, indeed in reaction to, *finalist* history, i.e. a history which “treats the present as a projection of the past, by projecting a version of that past onto the present”¹⁶. This is a form of history that can be understood as a teleological unfolding towards some ideal end state such as the Hegelian unfolding of Spirit and only understood from the transcendental vantage point of its maturity or its end, as exemplified by Hegel’s famous owl of Minerva which

¹⁴ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), p.47. For a historical treatment of Westphalia revealing that in the discipline international relations its use is premised on the construction of an imaginary past based upon a more contemporary sovereign optic, see Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, *International Organization*, Vol.55, No.2 (Spring 2001), pp.251-287.

¹⁵ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.55.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

“begins its flight only with the onset of dusk”.¹⁷ Presentist history also finds a vantage point outside history. However, here the standpoint is enabled by ageless Truths, “objective” laws that govern the subject matter from outside history, from above it. As Bartelson colourfully explains:

... presentism finds its Archimedean foothold above history; the owl - allegedly shot down - is now instead firmly fixed in the celestial ceiling, scornfully contemplating past mistakes in view of present standards blown into timeless truths; if presentist history happens to be rewritten, then this is done in the light of new and better historical evidence.¹⁸

It is important to note that both these historiographical forms are an outgrowth of modernity, of what Claude Lefort would call a symbolic order no longer couched in theological terms and inextricably tied to representations of an “otherworldly pole”; of an order that, in its radical indeterminacy, is precisely *historical*. Although a more substantial context of this question will be adduced further on, suffice to convey here that these forms of history are attempts to (re)establish what Lefort calls “society ‘without history’ at the very heart of historical society”.¹⁹ What must be asked, however, is in the name of *whom* is this society established? In the name of *whom* are these historiographical forms articulated? In the name of *Sovereign Man*. As Bartelson suggests, “[w]hat is at stake here is the question of man’s sovereignty over the past; both finalism and presentism affirm the possibility of writing history from a point over

¹⁷ Quoted in *Ibid.* p.56.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p.57.

¹⁹ Claude Lefort, “Outline of the Genesis of Ideology in Modern Societies”, in Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*, John B. Thompson (ed.), Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press (1986), p.201.

and above it, while making man the hero within it.”²⁰ Sovereign Man thus becomes the actor on the stage of history acting upon the world and having the world act upon Him from a standpoint of self-interested pristine rationality (or, if He isn’t, then his actions be considered folly). Sovereign Man also provides the condition of possibility - as the Peace of Westphalia enables the discourse on (inter)national relations and the First Debate enables the “self-image” of the discipline - for the international relation discourse: the production of the “practitioners”, or the “real” actors acting within the world that are supposedly “theorized” about by academics.

It is thus within the horizon created by this troika - Sovereign man, Sovereign State and Westphalian State system - that the disciplining of the discipline takes place. It reveals how the question of ontology in terms of the “whatness” of world politics is central to the way in which the “rich tradition” of realist scholarship, and the “enduring truths” of power politics supposedly chronicled by the latter, are retroactively (re)written into its disciplinary self-image. As Robert Cox suggests:

Having arrived at this view of underlying substances, history becomes for neorealists a quarry providing materials with which to illustrate variations on always recurrent themes. The mode of thought ceases to be historical even though the materials used are derived from history. Moreover, this mode of reasoning dictates that, with respect to essentials, the future will always be like the past.²¹

Future like the past and the past through the present are thus enabled by fixed essences, sovereign presences. This “arrival”, however, should be understood as being inextricably tied to the advent of modern historicity as a form of knowledge, that is itself wedded to the

²⁰ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.55.

²¹ Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press (1986), p.212. Cox’s “substances” here refer to the nature of man, the nature of the state and the nature of the state system implicitly addressing, as I have done here, Waltz’s three levels of analysis.

development of the modern discourse of sovereignty and its simultaneous articulation of state and system. In other words, the modern state and the modern state system as subjects and objects of historical knowledge are enabled by a form of knowledge constituted simultaneously with the modern form of sovereignty and its demarcation between the domestic and the (inter)national, the inside from the outside, as they are politically articulated in modernity. As Bartelson explains with regards to forms of sovereignty including the modern²²:

Without a proper mode of knowledge to render it intelligible, sovereignty cannot exist, and loses its capacity to organize political reality through a demarcation of inside from outside, of Same from Other. Without a proper form of sovereignty, knowledge loses its power to organize reality, and to constitute objects and fields of inquiry as well as criteria of validity and truth.²³

With regards to the modern form of sovereignty, the demarcation between the inside and outside, the same and other, of knowledge articulates itself through epistemological ground(ing) and its corresponding short circuiting of ontological questions, of questions about itself: “[w]hat now is outside knowledge is opinion and ideology; what is inside knowledge is brought under the sway of epistemic foundations.”²⁴ The consequences of this insight for the present understanding of both epistemic Realism and the disciplining of the discipline are important inasmuch as the complicity between sovereignty and knowledge not only reveals the way in which epistemic Realism operates in the service of the prevailing order, but also the inherent difficulties of thinking beyond the sovereign frame. This “thinking beyond” could thus be seen as having very little to do with a facile inclusion of “units” and/or “institutions” into the

²² Bartelson, following Foucault’s categorization of *epistemes* considers the way in which sovereignty/knowledge articulate themselves in three periods: the Renaissance, the classical age and modernity.

²³ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.83.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.241.

epistemic Realist mix; nor of simply appending “social construction” to “agents” and “structures”; nor even of counterposing different “ontologies” if they are understood as “what is”, whether it be a web of sub-, trans-, and/or non-state “actors” or forces and relations of production and “classes”. All of the above, apprehended under the aegis of an unquestioned presence, maintaining the existence of underlying essences understood from the standpoint of an optic at a sovereign distance from them, fall within the orbit of the modern sovereign frame and the scientificity of its knowledge. Once this is understood, it does not however follow that we can provide a clear access to some form of “post-sovereign” thinking which might banish some ideological shroud that covers some other “real” through the illumination of a new enlightenment. On the contrary, what this understanding should evoke is the ponderousness of the sovereign frame and the quasi-unattainability of a position free of its sway. However, it also brings to the fore the *question* of sovereignty, of taking sovereignty seriously, beyond its dismissal *via* reification (Realism) or epiphenomenization (Marxism). It is here that the appeal of Bartelson’s understanding of sovereignty and its intimate relation to knowledge is significant and merits further consideration and supplementation. In particular, what becomes important to explore at present is how sovereignty can be apprehended as *atopic* - i.e. a discourse which *produces* ontological presence rather than embodying ontological content itself. It is within this context that one can provide a deeper understanding of the rationale behind the relative lack of scholarship addressing the concept of security in contradistinction to its prevalent conceptual deployment of “security” to address issues and problems. This understanding is intimately related to the way in which the complicity between security and social order articulates itself.

Sovereignty and parergonality

To apprehend sovereignty in the way elaborated above, Bartelson employs the problem of the *parergon* - from the greek compound of *para* (beside) and *ergon* (work) - as an analogy to articulate the sovereign problematique. Addressing the *parergon* in relation to its use “in ancient readings on art”, he articulates the concept with regards to aesthetic discourse and mentions it in relation to the Kantian reintroduction of it in his *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* with regards to the problem of “the relation of the frame or an ornament to the work of art itself and its background”.²⁵ It is in presenting the solution to this problem, that Bartelson apprehends the possibility of understanding sovereignty as atopic. Following the treatment of the *parergon* by Jacques Derrida in *The Truth in Painting*, the author presents the solution of this problem in the following way:

...a frame, a line of demarcation, an ontological divide, or a geographical or chronological boundary all assert and manifest class membership of phenomena, but the frame or line itself cannot be a member of either class. It is neither inside, nor outside, yet it is the condition of possibility of both. A *parergon* does not exist in the same sense as that which it helps to constitute; there is a ceaseless activity of *framing*, but the frame itself is never present, since it is itself unframed.²⁶

In interpreting sovereignty as analogous to the *parergon*, Bartelson provides some invaluable insight into both the difficulties of understanding sovereignty according to the social scientific frame, of attributing to it “a fixed reference [...] or, by the same token, assum[ing] the ontological presence of sovereignty”, and the possibilities, by moving sovereignty to “a non-

²⁵ Ibid., p.51.

²⁶ Ibid.

place”, of explaining how, in the case of modernity²⁷, the line between the domestic and the international “is drawn and perpetually redrawn inside knowledge. And how, subsequently, the domestic and the international are constituted as self-evident.”²⁸ Sovereignty can thus be read as that which produces ontological presence in that it enables the demarcation between inside and outside, that it unremittingly, performatively, (re)traces while simultaneously (with)drawing from each towards the other. As Bartelson explains the fram(ing) that “is” the *parergon*, quoting, and supplementing, Derrida’s first reading of the latter: “it is ‘an outside which is called inside the inside to constitute it as inside’. And conversely: it is an inside which is called outside the outside to constitute it as outside.”²⁹ David Carroll’s reading of Derrida’s treatment of the *parergon* goes further to explain that “the frame itself - even as it delineates an inside and an outside [...] permits and even encourages, a complicated movement or passage across it both from inside-out and outside-in.”³⁰ In this respect, this way of understanding the articulation of sovereignty in terms of “a point of passage from inside to out”³¹ shows striking affinities to the reading by Giorgio Agamben of the paradox of sovereignty as a “zone of indistinction”. Building upon Carl Schmitt’s juristic definition of sovereignty *via* the notion of the state of

²⁷ As was alluded to earlier, the line between the domestic and the international, and thus their understanding as objects of knowledge, are particular to the modern sovereign frame, it is but the modern articulation of the inside/outside for Bartelson. As the author notes: “...what is constituted as inside and outside respectively, varies dramatically throughout the history of political ideas, and does so in strict interdependence with changes in knowledge.” *Ibid.*, p.52.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.51-52.

³⁰ David Carroll, *Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida*, London: Methuen (1987), p.136.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

exception³², Agamben provides an understanding of the operation of sovereignty, “as a complex topological figure in which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law, outside and inside, pass through one another”³³.

The consequences of this understanding of sovereignty as concerns its apprehension *via* knowledge, as well as its complicity with *particular* forms of knowledge, is central to the present chapter in its articulation of the rudimentary elements of an approach to the complex relations between sovereignty and security in modernity. Furthermore, in relation to the understanding of the discipline of International Relations presented in the previous chapter (that itself enabled the present reading), what should be becoming evident is not only that unless one addresses this issue from the liminal space of the (un)discipline, the role of sovereignty vis-à-vis the discipline, the political, and security and its present (re)definition cannot properly be understood, but that the sovereign operation *is* the disciplining constituent of the discipline: that which disciplines the discipline. As alluded to above, the operation of sovereignty is impossible to apprehend from an optic that would attribute to the latter a fixed ontological presence since it is precisely sovereignty which enables such presence.³⁴ In this sense, any form of knowledge

³² Schmitt's famous dictum that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” interprets sovereignty as being both without and within the legal order: without the law in having the power to decide to suspend the existing legal order in self-defined exceptional circumstances, yet remaining within the law as he to whom the juridical order grants the power to suspend its own validity. The consequences of Agamben's reading is central to the way in which sovereignty will be more extensively addressed in Chapter Five, in particular with regards to law, power, violence and the biopolitical. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Massachusetts: MIT Press (1985), p.5.

³³ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p. 37.

³⁴ As Jacques Derrida explains in his treatment of parergonality: “No ‘theory’, no ‘practice’, no ‘theoretical practice’ can intervene effectively in this field if it does not weigh up and bear on the frame, which is the decisive structure of what is at stake, at the invisible limit to (between) the interiority of meaning (put under shelter by the whole hermeneuticist, semioticist, phenomenologist and formalist tradition) *and* (to) all the

that would attribute a fixed essence to sovereignty is always already in complicity with the latter. Furthermore, since the separation of subject and object and the possibility of objective knowledge are enabled by such assumptions of fixed essences, then the promise of “value free” social scientific knowledge is also always already in the service of the logic of sovereignty. The form of knowledge articulated *via* sovereignty in modernity is one that precisely occults its generative principles; where what is made-present becomes simply present - it *is* - a self-evidence enabled precisely by its own standpoint remaining unquestioned, hidden like the never-present frame of the *parergon*. It is here that the disproportion between the profuse deployment of the concept of security in framing and addressing problems and issues and the paucity of attention to the concept itself can be clearly understood in relation to the sovereign frame. In other words, with regards to the central argument made in this thesis, it is precisely security’s intimate complicity with sovereignty as a form of social order that has enabled its surreptitious evasion of the analytical gaze.

In elaborating the argument of the logic of sovereignty along this tack we also find affinities with what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari conceptualize, albeit upon a much broader historical canvas than that of the modern sovereign state, as the “State model”.³⁵ For the authors, there is a certain mutually reinforcing conformity between the form of thought and the State form:

It is easy to see what thought can gain from this: a gravity it would never have on its own, a center that makes everything, including the State, appear to exist by its own

empiricisms of the extrinsic which, incapable of seeing or reading miss the question completely.” Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1987), p.61.

³⁵ See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1987), pp.374-380.

efficacy or on its own sanction. But the state gains just as much. Indeed by developing in thought in this way the State-form gains something essential: a whole consensus.[...] If it is advantageous for thought to prop itself up with the State, it is no less advantageous for the State to extend itself in thought, and to be sanctioned by it as the unique, universal form.³⁶

Within this context, what Deleuze and Guattari understand as “arborescent thought” can be used to underscore the argument made vis-à-vis the logic of sovereignty made above, for the tree “plots a point, fixes an order”³⁷ - an order based upon a knowing, thinking subject, a consistent conceptual matrix, and the objects in the world to which these concepts are applied. As I have elaborated elsewhere³⁸, in doing so, this type of thinking ordains an exteriority with regards to the object of analysis that is seen as occurring in a world “out there”. Furthermore, in keeping with the above quote by Deleuze and Guattari, this order occults a world constructed through mutually constitutive dualisms (roots-branches) by concealing the roots under the earth and exposing the trunk and the branches, giving the illusion of self-engenderment, unity and multiplicity.³⁹ Returning now to the paradox of sovereignty, the hidden eye of sovereignty thus simultaneously circumscribes what *is* from a position that is without the *is*, from a position of sovereign detachment, yet it resides within the *is* but only as an object of knowledge not as that

³⁶ Ibid. p.375.

³⁷ Ibid. p.11.

³⁸ See Miguel de Larrinaga, “(Re)Politicizing the Discourse: Globalization Is a S(h)ell Game”, *Alternatives*, Vol.25, No.2 (Apr.-June 2000), pp.145-182.

³⁹ As Deleuze and Guattari explain “The tree and root inspire a sad image of thought that is forever imitating the multiple on the basis of a centered or segmented higher unity. If we consider the set branches-roots, the trunk plays the role of opposed segment for one of the subsets running from bottom to top: this kind of segment is a “link dipole”, in contrast to the “unit dipoles” formed by spokes radiating from a single center. Even if the links themselves proliferate, as in the radicle system, one can never get beyond the One-Two, and fake multiplicities.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1987), p.16.

enabling their production. In the paradox of sovereignty, therefore, thinking politics finds its limit. It is a limit that appears as a self-evident resolution or, as Rob Walker depicts it, “a very powerful, even elegant answer to the deeply provocative question as to how political life is possible at all”.⁴⁰ As with the royal eye of Queen Gertrude in the quote by Shakespeare at the beginning of this chapter, all that *is* it sees. Yet, as Hamlet despairs to reveal, there is something lacking from the position of that all-seeing eye: the spectre of the murdered King, the ghost that stands for the complicity in the creation of the *is*. What this quote also brings to the fore is the relationship between the visible and the invisible, between the temporal and the spiritual, a coupling that Shakespeare was in a privileged position to apprehend, living in the in-between of the transition to a secular sovereign order. As Claude Lefort explains, within the more specific register of mortality/immortality, “[n]o one has done more to unveil the complicity between the representation of immortality and death, or their relationship with sovereignty, than Shakespeare.”⁴¹ It is within this context that Bartelson’s work on sovereignty as *parergon* needs to be supplemented. This supplement that can be elaborated through a reading of the way Bartelson himself treats paregonality, a reading that reveals a lack.

The application of the logic of the *parergon* to understand the paradox of sovereignty is a significant achievement that provides important insights into the relationship between sovereignty and knowledge and its consequences with regards to thinking politics. Indeed, it can be seen as the most significant conceptual contribution of Bartelson’s *A Genealogy of*

⁴⁰ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1993), p.64.

⁴¹ Claude Lefort, “The Death of Immortality?”, in Claude Lefort *Democracy and Political Theory*, (David Macey trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.274.

Sovereignty as an extensive and detailed genealogical treatment of the relationship between forms of sovereignty and forms of knowledge.⁴² However, the development of the argument regarding the apprehension of sovereignty vis-à-vis the problem of the *parergon* is very brief and the elaboration with regards to the *parergon* itself is given short shrift. One could, of course, say that the second half of the book, the detailed treatment of the relationship between sovereignty and knowledge through an analysis of the discourse on sovereignty in three historical periods, is itself a thorough elaboration of the argument of parergonality. This would be an accurate statement. Yet, what is lacking with regards to the *parergon* is an explanation of the (con)text in which Derrida's reading of the *parergon* is situated - a reading that is the veiled source of Bartelson's insight. What is lacking are the consequences of pursuing this reading with regards to Bartelson's own conclusions in the book and elsewhere⁴³ of employing a particular reading of Kant's concept of reflective judgement as a way to navigate between the dichotomies between necessity and freedom and universalism and pluralism. A reading that attends to the paradoxes of internationalism.

The problem addressed here is not with Bartelson's intentions of enabling a reflection on change and morality in international politics, nor with the radical contingency of history and sovereignty that he articulates, but with the way in which the consequences of Derrida's reading of the *parergon* are occulted. This occultation permits a reading of the Kantian concept of

⁴² With regards to the importance of this contribution in relation to Bartelson's book see, for example, the reviews by Cynthia Weber and Bob Jessop. Cynthia Weber, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.91, No.1 (1997), pp. 229-230 and Bob Jessop, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.26, No.1, pp.162-164.

⁴³ See Jens Bartelson, "The Trial of Judgment: A Note on Kant and the Paradoxes of Internationalism", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.39, No.3 (1995), pp. 255-279.

reflective judgement as “lack[ing] foundation outside itself”⁴⁴, and of providing a self-engendered foundation to address the paradoxes of internationalism. The importance of my reading of Bartelson through Derrida lies not primarily in its specific content, but in the questions that it raises with regards to the reading of sovereignty elaborated above and its intimate connection to both the question of foundation and that of alterity central to the elaboration of this thesis.

As aforementioned, Bartelson’s development of the question of the *parergon* was itself framed by its circumscription as an aesthetic concern, as a concept used in “ancient readings on art” and then its reintroduction by Kant in his third Critique. Yet, *parergon* was a word that was widely used in ancient Greece, and can even be found in many political texts, extending its meaning from the literal *para* (beside) and *ergon* (work), to “beside the main subject, subordinate, incidentally”.⁴⁵ It is also in this sense that Kant briefly uses the term in his *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, in terms of “‘ornaments’ [*parerga*], i.e. those things which do not belong to the complete representation of the object internally as elements, but only externally as complements, and which augment the satisfaction of taste, do so only by their form; as, for example, [the frames of pictures or] the draperies of statues or the colonnades of palaces.”⁴⁶ It is this formal use of *parergon*, one that uses the widely circulated understanding mentioned above, one in which the *parergon* appears as incidental, extraneous, detachable from the work of art that is of present concern. Derrida’s reading of the *parergon* is precisely a deconstruction

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 277.

⁴⁵ Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Lexicon: Abridged from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1979), p.531.

⁴⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, (J. H. Bernard, trans), New York: Hafner (1951), pp.61-62.

of this use, one that reveals, taking Kant's logic to its limit, the central intrinsic role of the *parergon* as effectively constitutive of the *ergon*, as a supplement from the lack in the work but a lack simultaneously produced by the frame itself: "both *product* and *production* of the frame"⁴⁷. It is this essential supplementarity that is occulted: the *ergon* extrinsically offers itself as complete, as full presence, as self-engendered and, thus, enables the possibility of apprehending the *parergon* as something extraneous and marginal. Furthermore, in order for the *parergon* to be apprehended as some "thing", what is at play here is precisely what enables the apprehension of the *parergon* in terms of passage between inside-out and outside-in or, in more Derridean terms, of a parasitic contamination between inside and outside, and the non-presence of the frame: that "[t]here is no natural frame. There is fram[ing], but the frame does not exist."⁴⁸

Yet Bartelson's debt to Derrida is dissimulated, implicitly addressed in footnotes rather than gracing the main text along with the mention to Kant. Why is this so? Why the furtive circumscription of the lineage of *parergon* as solely relating to aesthetic concerns? Granted, Derrida's text *The Truth in Painting* can be read as a deconstructive reading of the work of art from both within and without the frames of both art and theory but, as with the (a)typical Derridian oeuvre, it is much more. In particular, it is also a deconstructive reading of Kant's *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* and, more specifically and pertinently, that the concept of reflective judgement *itself* is subject to the logic of parergonality. Through a number of instances, Derrida reveals how what is considered marginal and supplementary is central to the

⁴⁷ Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1987), p.71.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.81.

foundation of what appears to stand on its own: that the third Critique depends on something outside itself for its own foundation.⁴⁹ As Irene Harvey explains: “as dependent on what is outside itself for its law, the third *Critique*, is not giving itself its own law is not an example of itself, but rather forms an example within a schema that is outside of itself.”⁵⁰ In relation to the question of judgment, Derrida’s reading, *contra* Bartelson’s reading of Kantian reflective judgment above, points to the impossibility of self-foundation with regards to reflective judgment; that, in a sense, judgement is always already determinant, always already determined by what is outside of itself for its law.⁵¹ In turn, as Harvey explains, “via Derrida’s

⁴⁹ Although the complexities of the multiple layers of the argument with regards to this framing are outside of the purview of this work, what can be pertinently expressed here is that Derrida reveals (i) the way in which the use of the *parergon* in Kant’s *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* is itself framed by its use in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*; (ii) how it is also framed by the analytic of concepts in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; and (iii) how Kant’s choice and order of examples of *parerga* (frame, garment, column) take on the status of Exemplar and inscribe themselves, in being seen as augmenting taste solely by their form, into the opposition form/matter. See *Ibid.*, pp.42-71 *passim*. In relation to the question of the exemplar in *The Truth in Painting*, see in particular, its treatment by Irene E. Harvey in “Derrida, Kant, and the Performance of Parergonality”, in Hugh J. Silverman (ed.), *Derrida and Deconstruction*, New York: Routledge (1989), pp.59-76. With particular pertinence to this thesis, with regards to (i) and (iii), Derrida reveals the importance of the Christian schema in providing the anchor for foundation in Kant’s work. With regards to (i), Derrida addresses the way in which the use of *parerga* in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* become necessary to Kant’s project in this work according to the logic of supplementarity outlined above. As Derrida explains: “The *parergon* inscribes something which comes as an extra, exterior to the proper field (here that of pure reason and of *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*) but whose transcendent exteriority comes into play, about onto, brush against, rub, press against the limit itself and intervene in the inside only to the extent that the inside is lacking. It is lacking *in* something and it is lacking *from itself*. Because reason is ‘conscious of its impotence to satisfy its moral need,’ it has recourse to the *parergon*, to grace, to mystery, to miracles. It needs the supplementary work”. *Ibid.*, p.56. In relation to (iii), Derrida articulates his reflection on this opposition beyond aesthetics with relation to Christian creationism *via* Heidegger’s reading of the relation between the form/matter coupling and the latter: “Its wholesale usage by aesthetics allows us to conceive of it as a deportation from the domain of art. Christian creationism would, according to Heidegger, have brought with it a ‘particular incitement’, a supplementary motivation for considering the form-matter complex as the structure of every entity, the *ens creatum* as the unity of *forma* and *materia*. Though faith has disappeared, the schemas of Christian philosophy remain effective.” *Ibid.*, pp.65-66.

⁵⁰ Irene E. Harvey, “Derrida, Kant, and the Performance of Parergonality”, in Hugh J. Silverman (ed.), *Derrida and Deconstruction*, New York: Routledge (1989), p. 63.

⁵¹ Kant’s understanding of the relation between reflective and determinant judgment and its relation to foundation is well exemplified in the following: “The reflective judgment, which is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires on that account a principle that it cannot borrow from experience,

deconstructive operations one can begin to see or hear that the critique itself rests on insecure or uncritical foundations, and, further, that another logic, that of parergonality [...], orients and organizes in a constitutive manner the demand for a transcendental logic which would ground all others.”⁵²

Bartelson’s insight with regards to the parergonal logic of sovereignty is a substantial contribution to the understanding of the complicity between sovereignty and knowledge and the way in which an apprehension of this logic necessitates an approach which does not attribute to sovereignty a fixed ontological presence since it is precisely sovereignty which enables such presence. In Bartelson’s reading of sovereignty, this is done using both deconstructive (to lay bare the assumptions of sovereign self-presence) and genealogical strategies (to trace the complicity between power and knowledge). Yet Bartelson’s conclusions step back from what he may perceive as an abyss by securing his standpoint to Kantian reflective judgment and prophetic history⁵³ understood with reference to self-grounding or self-foundation with an

because its function is to establish the unity of all empirical principles under higher ones, and hence to establish the possibility of their systematic subordination. Such a transcendental principle, then, the reflective judgment can only give as a law from and to itself. It cannot derive it from outside (because then it would be the determinant judgment); nor can it prescribe it to nature because reflection upon the laws of nature adjusts itself by nature, and not nature by the conditions according to which we attempt to arrive at a concept of it which is quite contingent in respect of nature.” Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, (J. H. Bernard, trans), New York: Hafner (1951), p. 16.

⁵² Irene E. Harvey, “Derrida, Kant, and the Performance of Parergonality”, in Hugh J. Silverman (ed.), *Derrida and Deconstruction*, New York: Routledge (1989), p.76.

⁵³ Bartelson here relies on a reading of Kant’s *Contest of the Faculties*: “This short essay deals with the possibility of historical knowledge from a prophetic vantage point. What we are seeking to know, says Kant, ‘is not a history of the past...but a history of future times’. Such a predictive history must necessarily be *a priori*, and this is possible only if the historian himself produces the events he predicts: the historian must become prophet. Here as in the *Critique of Judgement*, experience or reason alone is insufficient to warrant progress, but prophesy must nevertheless be based on some event which suggests that man is both *cause* and *author* of his own improvement.” Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), pp.234-235.

acutely gendered "Sovereign Man" as the locus of the intelligibility of sovereignty at the end of modernity. As Bartelson explains:

With this last step, the genealogical series of modernity is completed; man is not only the author of his own deeds, concepts and representations, and creator of his own history and self-knowledge; his sovereignty is no longer confined to nature and culture, but also encompasses the source of his finiteness and the limit to his creative powers; having usurped Time, man is not only king but also God. He is released from the duality of his political condition and the alienation fostered by it; he stands not at the end of history, but at its beginning, always ready to remake it. But if God was killed by the king, and the king was killed by man, who is going to kill man, and thus make sovereignty once more unintelligible; who is next to draw a line in the water?⁵⁴

While genealogy *via* Foucault and deconstruction *via* Derrida enable Bartelson to apprehend the logic of sovereignty, the author thus steps back from pursuing the consequences of the strategies that he deploys. This in no way should be seen as an inconsistency in Bartelson's thinking. Not only is his novel reading of Kant compatible with his understanding of sovereignty and provides very fruitful avenues for thinking beyond the strictures of the usual interpretations of Kant within the discipline of International Relations, but the debt that both genealogy and deconstruction, as well as critical international relations theory, owe to Kantian critique should not be understated.⁵⁵ Yet Bartelson displays a certain anxiety in his refusal to let go of some of the aspects of the self-presence of Sovereign Man, of participating in the activity of parergonal framing. The rationale behind this position and this move with regards to international political theorizing is made clear in Bartelson's conclusion:

Precisely this loss of parergonality is the destructive upshot of critical international political theory today; the insight that modern knowledge has man as its privileged foundation and that this foundation is as contingent as the modern subject itself makes

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.236.

⁵⁵ See, in particular, Kimberly Hutchings, *Kant, Critique and Politics*, London: Routledge (1996).

the fact of sovereignty less self-evident and all the more fragile, but it does not do what earlier versions of epistemic and ontological criticism did; it does not tell us where to go from here, neither as political scientists nor as citizens. [...] if epistemic change is essentially political, it also involves the political responsibility of deciding upon sovereignty, a decision which we for the moment seem unfit to make.⁵⁶

Although Bartelson's concern is understandable, I believe it more irresponsible to simply occult the consequences of the radicalization of a critique that Kant himself inaugurated as if it were simply a question of choice, a decision taken from the position of a sovereign lawgiver. In this sense, Bartelson should not lose sight of what the event *is* as it is apprehended according to "effective history" - i.e. the genealogy that enables his important insights. As Foucault explains:

An event, consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked "other".⁵⁷

What must be taken into account, what must be taken seriously, is the decision itself, what enables the decision, and what violence and consequences the decision enables. Although these questions with regards to sovereignty will be addressed in chapters Four and Five, the present concern is to provide the elements of an approach that will address sovereignty as it articulates itself according to the logic of parergonality while simultaneously being attentive to the non-

⁵⁶Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995),p.248.

⁵⁷ Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", in Michel Foucault *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Ithaca: Cornell (1977), p. 154. In this sense, I agree with Cynthia Weber's criticism of Bartelson's conclusion in her review of *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. As Weber explains: "... while critical theory helps us to recognize the limitations of parergonality, 'it does not tell us where to go from here'. Yet, I would argue that this is the case only if we follow Bartelson's advice that epistemic change 'involves the political responsibility of deciding upon sovereignty, a decision that we for the moment seem unfit to make'. Instead - and still in a Foucauldian vein - that we might at this juncture in the genealogy of sovereignty/knowledge accept the undecidability of sovereignty and remain attentive to where it takes us." Cynthia Weber, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.91, No.1 (1997), p. 230.

masterable excess, the alterity to which Derrida's deconstructive reading above points towards. In order to do so, in order to prepare the (groundless) ground for this approach, we must return to the root of the concern that guides Bartelson's anxiety: the question of foundation.

Alterity and the Political

Sovereignty and the question of foundation

The question of foundation can be seen as the *problématique* through which, not only Bartelson's anxiety, but that of the discipline of International Relations itself can be apprehended. In fact, the treatment of the disciplining of the discipline undertaken in the previous chapter was precisely all about foundation: how the ground for the discipline is performatively produced *via* the disciplining of the discipline. Furthermore, the parergonal logic of sovereignty elaborated upon above is also all about the question of foundation: how this logic is that of the institution of a ground, of the circumscription of what *is*. It is also, as will become increasingly clear, intimately related to the question of the political and the question of security, of the securing of a ground(ing). In this sense, Steve Smith may be partly right in characterizing the question of foundation, or what he calls the "debate" between "foundationalism/anti-foundationalism", as "the most important one for the future of international theory [...] return[ing] [it] to a more humble, and more central, place within the human sciences."⁵⁸ What is meant by "partly right" here is that although the importance and the centrality of the question of foundation are accepted, as well as the humility that its questioning should engender, its

⁵⁸ Steve Smith, "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press (1995), p.30.

characterization as a *debate* (a term that, as was addressed in Chapter One, should always arouse suspicion), and one *between* foundationalism and anti-foundationalism is eschewed. It should, however, come as no surprise that the question of foundation with regards to international relations theory is framed by Smith in this way. It has been (re)produced along these lines in accordance with its framing within the broader ambit of political theory. A framing from which the question in International Relations has drawn its sustenance.⁵⁹ Furthermore, it can also be argued that it is precisely this framing that provides the sustenance for Bartelson's anxiety.

Recalling the elaboration with regards to the disciplining of the discipline of International Relations in Chapter One, in view of the lack of a neutral disciplinary space and the short-circuiting of ontological issues that this disciplining both enabled and necessitated, it should not be surprising that the question regarding foundation was primarily addressed at the margins - i.e. the liminal space of the (un)discipline. The paltry amount of engagement by authors adhering to epistemic Realist tenets with the critical literature, and the paucity of any such sort of engagement in addressing the question of foundation,⁶⁰ are further evidence of the way in which

⁵⁹ On this, and the way in which the question of foundation will be addressed henceforth, see Marc Doucet, "Standing Nowhere (?): Navigating the Third Route on the Question of Foundation in International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.28, No.2 (1999), pp. 289-310. Through collaboration on this question in Miguel de Larrinaga and Marc Doucet, "Navigating the Interstices Between the 'Grand Either/Or': Claude Lefort, Otherness and the (Re)thinking of the Global Political Economy", paper presented to the 68th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Brock University (June 1996) and endless discussion on the subject I have drawn my own sustenance on the question. We stand in reciprocal and insolvent debt. For a slightly different treatment of the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist "debate" that nonetheless questions the way it has been articulated in international relations theory see Paul Saurette, "'I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.25, No.1 (1996), pp.1-28.

⁶⁰ As mentioned in Chapter One, Robert Keohane's treatment of feminism in Robert Keohane, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.18, No.2 is a case in point. See also Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches"

the disciplining of the discipline has taken place. In other words, the question of foundation, as an explicit and central concern, can only be enabled within a context in which foundation is already in question. This is not simply a tautology in the sense that, as elaborated earlier, the logic of sovereignty through which the disciplining of the discipline is animated is precisely the institution of a ground and the simultaneous effacement of the principles through which, and standpoint from which, this ground is instituted. In this sense, from the standpoint of the disciplining of the discipline, the question of foundation is impossible. Moreover, since the question of security is inextricably intertwined with the question of foundation, of the securing of a ground, from the standpoint of the disciplining of the discipline, the question of security is *also* impossible. This not only brings to bear upon security's profuse use but elusive nature *within* the discipline, but also provides some clues as to why the problematization of the concept of security in the early 1980s was primarily spearheaded from *without* the discipline or at its margins.

Yet, if we follow Derrida and the logic of the supplement, it is precisely this condition of impossibility that enables its condition of possibility - i.e. that the (im)possibility of full presence calls forth the possibility of questioning the claim to it. Yet this questioning precisely takes place at the limit, in the marginal space between what is the discipline and what is not, even though (and exactly because!), the issue is central to the *is* of the discipline, to the securing of its existence. It is thus within the context of a dialogue revolving around the possibilities of "post-positivist" international relations theory that the question of foundation is explicitly

International Studies Quarterly, Vol 32 (1988) pp.379-96. For a particularly poor grasp of the issues involved see John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security*, Vol.19, No.3 (Winter 1994/5), pp.5-49

addressed. Indeed one could even go as far as to say that “post-positivism” is nothing less than this questioning of the epistemic Realist foundations of the discipline, a questioning upon which the *is* of the discipline is precisely what is at stake. This can be exemplified by the way in which attempts to define what “post-positivism” *is*, beyond the differences that institute and are instituted therein between “foundationalism” and “anti-foundationalism”, are articulated in diametrical opposition to what “post-positivism” itself identified as the presuppositions of the discipline’s “orthodox” orientation. As Jim George’s attempt to synthesize the commonalities underlying the variety of approaches, under what he characterizes as “Critical Social Theory (CST)”,⁶¹ illustrates:

There are four major themes to the agenda of dissent at the heart of the various social theory challenges to orthodoxy in the past two decades or so. The first emphasizes the inadequacy of the positivist/empiricist approach to the study of human society and politics. The second, concerning the process by which knowledge is constituted, stresses social, historical, and cultural themes rather than those reliant on “cogito” rationalism, notions of autonomous individualism, or variants on the “sense data” or “correspondence rule” formats. The third rejects as futile the foundationalist search for an objective knowledge external to history and social practice. The fourth emphasizes the linguistic construction of reality.⁶²

⁶¹ Critical Social Theory (CST) is an umbrella term used by Jim George to encompass work within the discipline of international relations rooted in the arguments of critically oriented philosophical traditions such as the Frankfurt school, feminist theory and post-modernism. See Jim George, “International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (September 1989); Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.34, No.3 (September 1990); and Jim George, “Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the New/Old World Order”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.22, No.2 (Summer 1993). Ironically, this term which undoubtedly is strategically articulated to provide an alternative to “post-positivism” and the connotations that this term implies in its persistent relation to positivism is given meaning through themes which are diametrically opposed to it.

⁶² Jim George, “International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33 (1989), p.272. A more detailed elaboration upon these points can be found in Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.34 (1990).

With regards to “post-positivism” itself - or within “Critical Social Theory”, or as an outcome of the “critical turn”⁶³ - this same move is repeated, albeit as an explicit engagement with the question of foundation as it pertains to the grounds for, and intent of, critique. This site of inherent tension and abstruseness has been in large part (re)produced according to the way in which debates regarding the status of critique in political thought have been characterized as what Richard Bernstein has called the “Grand Either/ Or”: of *either* “forced reconciliation” or “radical dispersion”.⁶⁴

Indeed, the articulation of the Either/Or logic weaves its way through, and is thus reinforced by, authors who see themselves on either side of this “great divide” to define the purpose of critique with regards to international relations theory. On the side of “forced reconciliation”, the bold assertion of critical theory as *the* “next stage in international relations theory”⁶⁵ made by Mark Hoffman, and alluded to in Chapter One, represents the most self-evident and controversial example.⁶⁶ A less sanguine yet still clear example of “forced

⁶³ See Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, London: Macmillan (1990).

⁶⁴ As Richard Bernstein explains: “We seem then to be drawn into a grand Either/Or: *either* there is a rational grounding of the norms of critique or the conviction that there is such a rational grounding is itself a self-deceptive illusion”. Richard J. Bernstein, *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity*, Cambridge: MIT Press (1991), p.8. Within the context of international relations theory these two variants have been primarily understood and defined as “Critical Theory”, influenced by, *inter alia*, the Frankfurt School and Gramsci, and “postmodernism” influenced by French scholars such as Lyotard, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan etc...

⁶⁵ Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1987), Vol.16, No.2, p.244.

⁶⁶ Its controversial status is exemplified by the way in which this claim was precisely what sparked the “debate” on foundation with regards to international relations theory expressed *via* the dialogue between Hoffman and Nick Rengger. Interestingly, from the argument articulated presently, it is the assertion of the possibility of a new firm foundation to orient the future of international relations theory that provoked the explicit discussion of the question. For Rengger’s response to the original Hoffman piece see Nick J. Rengger, “Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.1, (1988), pp.81-89. See also

reconciliation” can be found in the way in which Andrew Linklater addresses the promises of “critical theory”. Although receptive to some aspects considered “postmodern” - e.g. in his attunement to questions regarding the subject, power and discipline *via* the work of Foucault⁶⁷ as well as the appeal to difference and to the inherent difficulties surrounding universalism⁶⁸ - Linklater nevertheless falls back upon the need to provide a way to articulate a unifying project to guide international relations theory. Armed with the conviction “that the current sense of disciplinary crisis and uncertainty about future directions is not, in the long term, beneficial to the field”, the author quells this anxiety by proposing, *via* critical theory, “a vision of international relations which, when articulated more fully, can give directions to the field as a whole.”⁶⁹ The need to articulate a unifying project for the field as a whole is inextricably intertwined with what is seen as necessary in elaborating an emancipatory political project from

Hoffman’s response to the latter in Mark Hoffman, “Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.1 (1988), pp.91-95. It should be made clear that the dialogue engendered here did not follow blindly and adamantly an either/or logic in the way, as exemplified above, epistemic Realism addressed “postmodernism” as essentially irrelevant and nihilistic. Indeed, in being reflexive, and on the margins of the (un)discipline there was an attempt at dialogue and the possibilities of combining aspects of both approaches. For example, after Rengger’s critique of Hoffman, the latter’s response to Rengger pointed towards a comparative examination of both schools of thought. As Hoffman notes: “There are of course similarities between the programmes and procedures of radical interpretivism on the one hand and critical theory on the other - perhaps more than may appear on the surface, certainly enough to form the basis of a ‘conversation’”. Mark Hoffman *Op.Cit.*, p.94. On the other side of the “divide” this dialogue provoked Jim George to ask the question “Is it possible or desirable to integrate elements of a Critical Theory approach with post-structuralist themes?”. Jim George, “International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33 (1989), p.276. However, as will presently be seen, the way in which the purpose of critique *vis-à-vis* international relations theory is apprehended by those adhering to each side serves to reinforce the Either/Or logic.

⁶⁷ Andrew Linklater, “The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.21, No.1 (1992), p. 80.

⁶⁸ Linklater tries to a certain extent to navigate between the Either/Or precisely through an attunement to the limits of both in this case by acknowledging that there ought to be “limits to universalism, just as there ought to be limits to difference”. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, London: Macmillan (1990), p.209.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.79.

the critical theory vantage point. In this, the difference between Either and Or with regards to the relation between theory and practice is a crucial issue. As Jim George and David Campbell explain:

Whereas Critical Theory wants to realize in practical political terms what traditional theory only contemplates, post-structuralism assumes that such theory is already practice. To understand society and politics in this sense is to ground theory not *in* practice, but *as* practice.⁷⁰

Within the context of international relations theory, by grounding theory *in* practice, critical theorists thus emphasise the *restructuring* of international theory along the lines of its emancipatory enterprise and thus find the need to provide an unquestionable foundation from which to elaborate a political project. Conversely, on the side of “radical dispersion”, by perceiving theory *as* practice, the focus remains on the *reinterpretation* of international theory/practice *via* genealogy and deconstruction in order to “give power no place to hide”.⁷¹ This position is seen as eschewing restructuring since, as George and Campbell note, “it looks for no distinction between ‘truth’ and power, for it expects none.”⁷²

This equation of truth with power implies the inability of privileging any theory that claims to restructure the “Enlightenment Project” since there is no guarantee that the alternative foundation will not bring about its own forms of domination. As Mark Poster notes:

⁷⁰ Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.34, No.3 (September 1990), p.280.

⁷¹ Bradley Klein, following Foucault, as quoted in Jim George, “Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the New/Old World Order”, p.228. The association of reinterpretation and restructuring to critical theory and post-structuralism is taken up and developed by Nick Rengger and Mark Hoffman in “Modernity, Postmodernism and International Relations”, in Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham and Mo Malek (eds.), *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, New York: St. Martin’s Press (1992).

⁷² Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.34, No.3 (September 1990), p.281.

Having abandoned the assumption of the transcendent unity of truth, of truth as a totalizing closure, poststructuralists redefine the position of the theoretical subject and its relation to politics. The place of theory cannot be a center, a privileged locus, a solid point of origin for the progressive movement of society, either in a liberal or a Marxist sense. When theory is the ground for politics, the results are invariably authoritarian as the Jacobin and Leninist examples indicate.⁷³

From the standpoint of positing foundation, however, this attempt to reject the privileged place of theory as foundation for practice and guarantee of truth, is apprehended as inevitably and inherently conservative.⁷⁴ Although, from the standpoint of critical theory, “postmodernism” does not explicitly put forward a theoretical project of emancipation since, as we have seen, such a project would end up privileging a particular discursive ground(ing) at the expense of others, it does claim to offer an emancipatory dimension, an ethico- political engagement, precisely through its stance towards truth and theory. As George and Campbell remark: “[i]t is in the act of not privileging that it offers emancipation and liberation.”⁷⁵ From this reading, it is thus in “radical dispersion” itself, in eschewing and working against the possibility of a universally valid foundation from which to ground critique, that “postmodernism” provides its critical practice. As Jim George discusses with regards to what he calls the “new critical conversation”:

⁷³ Mark Poster, *Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1989), p.16.

⁷⁴ Habermas framed the “postmodern” turn as a retreat from the challenge of the Enlightenment rather than an advance beyond the latter. As Nancy Fraser explains, within the context of Habermas’s view of Foucault: “...it is Habermas’s contention that although Foucault’s critique of contemporary culture and society purports to be postmodern, it is at best modern and at worst antimodern.” See Nancy Fraser, “Michel Foucault: A ‘Young Conservative?’”, in Michael Kelly (Ed.), *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault Habermas Debate*, Cambridge: MIT Press (1994), p.185.

⁷⁵ Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.34, No.3 (September 1990), p.281.

...it represents an appeal for a new Socratic spirit combining a genuine humility before knowledge with a critical attitude that accepts no givens, takes nothing for granted, acknowledges nothing axiomatically, questions all presuppositions, challenges all arbitrarily imposed boundaries, and always asks why.⁷⁶

If the positing of even a minimal foundation such as Linklater's attempt above has the effect of slipping back into a totalizing discourse in which its foundation is characterized by closure, on a new articulation of what *is*, of the occultation of its generative principles and the ensuing marginalization of alternatives, then its anti-foundationalist counterpart, in its wholesale rejection of Truth and its desire for fully reflexive dispersion is in danger of slipping into its opposite: into the Truth of non-truth and the dream of full transparency founded on the absence of foundation.⁷⁷

What we find, therefore, in the articulation of "post-positivism", is an explicit engagement with the question of foundation addressed *via* the *problématique* of modernity but which, despite its reflexive orientation, (re)produces the same logic that characterizes the critique of disciplinary orthodoxy: either the *presence* of foundation, albeit one that is "minimal" in that it "accepts that a cautious, contingent universalism is possible and necessary in both ethical and explanatory fields"⁷⁸, or its *absence* implying ethical and explanatory relativism - i.e. where "even the minimal foundationalism of critical interpretative theory is abandoned"⁷⁹. It is

⁷⁶ Jim George, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.33, No.3 (September 1989), p.273.

⁷⁷ On these points in relation to Jim George's position seen through a Nietzschean optic see Paul Saurette, "'I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.25, No.1 (1996), pp. 22-23.

⁷⁸ Nick Rengger and Mark Hoffman, "Modernity, Postmodernism and International Relations", in Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham and Mo Malek (eds.), *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, New York: St. Martin's Press (1992), p.133.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

through this binary opposition of foundation as presence and anti-foundation as absence, one that is articulated from the standpoint of foundation⁸⁰, that the anxiety illustrated above with regards to the work of Bartelson and Linklater is enabled.

Within the broader ambit of political thought, this is also the optic from which the work of authors such as Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Lyotard are derided as destructive, dangerous, nihilistic, relativist or inconsequential with regards to the realm of politics. Yet if one reads the authors themselves on such questions as the enlightenment, truth, emancipation and foundation, it is clear that their position cannot easily be circumscribed by simply adding the prefix “anti”.⁸¹ How can we then inscribe and employ the work of these authors beyond the impasse of this Either/Or? How can we move beyond the anxiety of the consequences of where this thought can lead us if we acknowledge its indispensability in apprehending the logic of

⁸⁰ As Marc Doucet explains: “[...] the point of departure that is privileged by the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate is *foundation understood as presence* insofar as the term foundation draws its equivalence with the positive existence of some sort of essential ground. In other words, the terrain of the debate, by means of a political act, privileges the *meaning* assigned to foundation that is invoked by the primary term of the dichotomy.” Marc Doucet, “Standing Nowhere (?): Navigating the Third Route on the Question of Foundation in International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1999), Vol.28, No.2, pp. 293-294.

⁸¹ Although a detailed elaboration of the myriad of ways in which the work of these authors resist an “anti” label is outside of the purview of this thesis, I will point towards some examples mirroring the terms used above: Foucault’s comment on the enlightenment that “one has to refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative [here being ‘for’ or ‘against’ the Enlightenment]: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism (this is considered a positive term by some and used by others, on the contrary, as a reproach); or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality (which may be seen once again as good or bad)”, Michel Foucault “What is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*, New York: Pantheon (1984), p.42; Derrida’s comment on emancipation that “[n]othing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal”, Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds.), *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, New York: Routledge (1992), p. 28; Deleuze’s comment on truth that “We always have the truths we deserve as a function of the sense of what we conceive, of the value of what we believe”, Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Hugh Tomlinson (trans.), London: Athlone Press (1983), p.104; or Lyotard’s comment on foundation that “If we remain within opinion, what will be just ultimately is that upon which people agree that it is just. It is common opinion. This is an extraordinarily dangerous position.” Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud, *Just Gaming*, Wlad Godzich (trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1985), p.76

sovereignty and the operation of the political? In this, Derrida provides a clue bringing us back to the question of the *parergon* and its apprehension while simultaneously addressing how deconstruction stands in relation to the Either/Or:

Philosophy wants to arraign it and can't manage. But what has produced and manipulated the frame puts everything to work in order to efface the frame effect, most often by naturalizing it to infinity, in the hands of God (one can verify this in Kant). Deconstruction must neither reframe nor dream of the pure and simple absence of the frame. These two apparently contradictory gestures are the very ones - and they are systematically indissociable - of what is here deconstructed.⁸²

The elements of the sovereignty *problématique* that is of present concern can all be found inextricably intertwined within this quote: the question of the frame or, here, of the logic of sovereignty and its dissimulation, the question of alterity *qua* transcendence and its articulation within modernity, and the question of how foundation *qua* framing should be apprehended beyond Either its unproblematic acceptance and (re)production Or the dream of its negation. In order to provide the tools necessary to develop a genealogy of the relationship between the meaning(s) of security and the articulation and production of social order *via* a concern with alterity, what must be articulated is an approach that lays bare the operation of sovereignty, that considers the consequences of its logic, in order to provide an understanding of how both the political and security are imbricated in the operation of this logic in modernity. In reference to our present security predicament, the understanding sought is how sovereignty's complicity with security is instrumental in the way in which the (re)definition of security leads to a securitization of social space which, in essence, amounts to the latter's depoliticization.

⁸² Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1987), p.73.

Alterity and the question of foundation

In an oft cited and widely read review article that attempts to address Jacques Derrida's "political turn" - i.e. the recent *oeuvres* by the author that more explicitly address questions of a political character⁸³, Mark Lilla addresses Derrida's simultaneous engagement with "the modern messianic writings of Levinas and Benjamin" in the following terms:

Derrida's turn to them [Levinas and Benjamin] in these new political writings bears all the signs of intellectual desperation. He clearly wants deconstruction to serve some political program, and to give hope to the dispirited left. He also wants to correct the impression that his own thought, like that of Heidegger, leads inevitably to a blind "resolve," an assertion of will that could take any political form.⁸⁴

In addressing this "assertion of will" and the relativism that it implies, Lilla's multiple salvos against Derrida's "political turn" inevitably bring us precisely to the anxiety which justifies his critique - i.e. what he perceives to be the ambivalence at the heart of this political thought:

But politics on the left, no less than on the right, is not a matter of passive expectation. It envisages action. And if the idea of justice cannot be articulated, it cannot provide any aim for political action. According to Derrida's argument, all that remains to guide us is decision, pure and simple: a decision for justice or democracy, and for a particular understanding of both. Derrida places enormous trust in the ideological goodwill or prejudices of his readers, for he cannot tell them why he chooses justice over injustice, or democracy over tyranny, only that he does. Nor can he offer the uncommitted any reasons for thinking that the left has a monopoly on the correct understanding of these ideas. He can only offer impressions, as in the little memoir he has published in *Moscou aller-retour*, where he confesses to still being choked with emotion whenever he hears the *Internationale*.⁸⁵

Again we see here the source of an anxiety that we have seen before, an anxiety predicated upon

⁸³ With regards to the texts addressed by Mark Lilla, see, *inter alia*, Jacques Derrida, *Spectres de Marx*, Paris, Galilée (1993); *Force de loi*, Paris: Galilée (1994); *Politiques de l'amitié*, Paris: Galilée (1994); *Moscou aller-retour*, St. Étienne: Éditions de l'Aube (1995); and *Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!* Paris: Galilée (1997).

⁸⁴ Mark Lilla, "The Politics of Jacques Derrida", *The New York Review of Books*, June 25, 1998, pp. 36-41.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

a certain interpretation of what the political *is* and its relation to the decision. Furthermore, what is interesting about Lilla's text is that his engagement with Derrida is precisely enabled by the more explicit articulation of what the latter understands as politics. In other words, Lilla would not see the "dangers" of deconstruction as it pertains to politics in Derrida's earlier works since, as with many of his detractors, Derrida and deconstruction can be seen as inconsequential to politics if it is not addressing politics proper: it is mere wordplay, a form of literary criticism that Derrida applies to dead white male philosophers. However, once he puts himself on what Lilla perceives as being the terrain of the political, he deems it necessary to reveal the inherent dangers of the "dark and forbidding works of Jacques Derrida", the "anti-humanism", "politics of pure will" and, God forbid!, the "theological overtones" of his work on politics.⁸⁶

It is clear that Lilla addresses Derrida through the optic of the Either/Or, as an example of the inherently nihilistic "radical dispersion" that now mischievously insinuates itself into overt political discourse and thus deserves an intellectual (and personal) attack. What this quote also reveals, is how this optic and its resulting anxiety is predicated upon a particular understanding of the political: one which is rational, radically secular and necessitates a firm self-engendered ground upon which the decision of politics is to be taken. What is thus necessary to move beyond the way in which Derrida and other authors labelled as "postmodern" or "poststructural" are automatically inscribed within the logic of the Grand Either/Or and, thus, perceived as either apolitical or espousing a politics that inevitably leads us to the abyss of nihilism or, as Lilla hints at, fascism, is to begin with a different understanding of what is involved in this thinking and a different understanding of the political. This undertaking is

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.41.

obviously not without risk, as if somehow this path, as Lilla disparagingly remarks, “could only lead us into the democratic promised land, where all God's children will join hands in singing the national anthem.”⁸⁷ Indeed, no thinking is without risk, and we should be very suspicious of a thought that thinks itself *secure* enough to be risk free. Lilla's transference of this assuredness to “poststructuralism” is but the violent hubris that underlies the faith he has in his foundation and the politics he erects upon it. What is at stake here, and the way in which the Either/Or impasse can be outstripped, is precisely to understand the political as that which enables this assuredness of what politics *is*. In other words, it is to engage in a politics that always already acknowledges the risk of thinking and the weight that bears upon the political decision.⁸⁸

It is with this in mind that one can provide an alternative understanding of the work of the authors of “radical dispersion”. A way that apprehends their work as always already engaged, as always already political in being about the political, regardless of the explicit content of their work or the particular subject matter at hand.⁸⁹ In this, the commonality that

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.41. Lilla's reference to the “national anthem” here is made in reference to the earlier scathing remark the author makes, excerpted above, with regards to Derrida's emotional response to the *Internationale*.

⁸⁸ On this question of the “risk of thinking”, see Michael Dillon's concerns with regards to his articulation of a Heideggerian understanding of the politics of security. In concluding his remarks on the dangers of thinking the limit of thought, Dillon states: “Nothing, then, is without danger. Certainly not, of course, the *traditional* thought of the political upon which our modern (inter)national politics of security rely. Dealing with dangerous discourses of danger should, therefore, encourage caution, but there is simply no escaping the risk. For this risk is the risk which mortal freedom necessarily entails.” Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security*, London: Routledge (1996), p.32.

⁸⁹ The elaboration above with regards to Derrida's *The Truth in Painting* is a case in point. An example, among many, of the intellectual movement to discern and elaborate upon the political articulated in the work of “postmodern” or “postructuralist” authors can be found in the series of books by Routledge edited by Keith Ansell Pearson and Simon Critchley entitled *Thinking the political* which precisely engages the interface between the political and continental philosophy. See Jon Simons, *Foucault and the Political*, London: Routledge (1995), Richard Beardsworth, *Derrida and the Political*, London: Routledge (1996), Daniel W. Conway, *Nietzsche and the Political*, London: Routledge (1997), Miguel de Beistegi, *Heidegger and the*

underlies the work of these authors is insightfully elaborated by Richard Beardsworth:

Whatever the differences of conceptual thought, strategy and tone between, among others, the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe [...], Jean-Luc Nancy, there has been an agreement in France that a distinction is warranted between political organization and the 'remainder' [*le reste*] of all attempts to organize politically: that is, a distinction is to be made between a political community and what necessarily exceeds this community, or is left out of account by it, in the process of its (self-)formation.⁹⁰

This list, as Beardsworth himself maintains, is certainly not exhaustive. Other authors such as Alain Badiou, Cornelius Castoriadis, Hélène Cixous, Emmanuel Lévinas, Claude Lefort, and Jacques Rancière, are also central in the articulation of such an understanding of political foundation and that which exceeds it. Furthermore, many recent works by authors addressing the social and the political such as Giorgio Agamben, Judith Butler, William Connolly, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Slavoj Žižek have extended the ambit of these theoretical developments out of their place of origin as well as in relation to a concerted effort to integrate them into a new post-marxist political project for the left.⁹¹ Furthermore, it should also be noted that, beyond and before France, the spectres of the thought of Nietzsche and of Heidegger cast a long shadow over these celebrations in their attempt to struggle with what it means to think politically and ethically after the "death of God" and the "end of politics" in a politics of calculable ends. The task shouldered is thus to confront this thought - an onerous task and one

Political, London: Routledge (1998), Yannis Stavrakakis, *Lacan and the Political*, London: Routledge (1999), James Williams, *Lyotard and the Political*, London: Routledge (2000), Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, London: Routledge (2000). See as well the special issue of the journal *Alternatives* entitled "Re-engaging the political", *Alternatives*, Vol.25, No.1 (2000).

⁹⁰ Richard Beardsworth, *Derrida and the Political*, London: Routledge (1996), p.xiii.

⁹¹ The series of books by Verso entitled *Phronesis* edited by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe is the most prominent example of this movement.

not without its own dangers - armed with the conviction that its neglect, or occultation, of burying our heads in the sand of an unquestioned metaphysical foundation , is *itself* a path towards nihilism⁹² through the foreclosure of alterity, through the perpetuation of the illusion of self-engenderment and the technological mastery of what is that such self-engenderment implies.

I am reminded here of the old joke about the person who is on their hands and knees frantically searching for their keys under the umbrage of a streetlight. A second person comes along (usually characterized as a police officer) and asks them what they are doing. They say that they have lost their keys and are trying to find them. The second person then asks where the keys were lost and the first person responds "over there somewhere", pointing towards some bushes in the dark. The second person then asks: "Why are you looking for them here?" The kneeling person responds, pointing up to the streetlight: "Because there is more light here!". The streetlight can be seen as foundation, allowing us to see from a vantage point, but a pre-determined space, that uses its exterior, the darkness that forms the circle of light, to constitute it (within which the keys are obviously not!). To find the "keys", you cannot go into the dark and root around since your eyes are blinded by the light of the streetlight. Your

⁹² This, of course, stands in diametrical opposition to those (the examples of Robert Keohane and Mark Lilla having been explicitly addressed in this thesis) who make the simplistic equation that addressing nihilism in modernity (as did Nietzsche) automatically means being nihilistic and/or that confronting the consequences of this thought is a slippery slope towards nothingness. As Michael Dillon explains: "The impossibility of metaphysical foundations is now the starting point for political thought. In this sense, too, not only is it not nihilistic thought, it is thought designed to overcome the nihilism which is immanent in metaphysics." Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security*, London: Routledge (1996), p.129. Similarly, in reference to the ethical *via* a reading of Nietzsche, William Connolly suggests: "[Nietzsche] tears down affirmations, constantly pressing us to admit that every construction also destroys and that every affirmation spawns a series of risks and foreclosures. What ethical directives is one willing to endorse upon reception of these truths? The nihilist is the one who refuses to entertain this question, who refuses to affirm when the ambiguity of existence comes into view. He would rather endorse nothing at all than affirm the ambiguity of existence." William E. Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity*, Second edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1993), pp.167-168.

solution lies in standing at the limit of the shadow given off by the streetlight, in that liminal space in-between light and dark, between political foundation and the remainder of any such act, and hope to catch a glimmer given off by the “keys” from some stray or reflected beams from the streetlight.

It is within this context and tradition of thinking this excess, of thinking alterity, that I would like to place the present work. Furthermore, it is with the conviction - both political and ethical - that this excess *must* be thought, *must* not remain unthought, that the present work derives its sustenance. The contention made here, explaining the reason why the topic chosen was chosen in the first place, is that the complicity between sovereignty and security is the (non)site that most ambitiously and most effectively enables the occultation of this excess in late modernity. In other words, and in terms that will gradually be made clear, securitization, which always already appeals to the logic of sovereignty, is the manoeuvre of depoliticization *par excellence*. In turn, and implicitly articulated in the earlier elaboration with regards to sovereignty in this chapter, it is contended here that the apprehension of both the logic of sovereignty and the latter’s complicity with security in late modernity requires precisely such an optic. This approach will be, drawing from the work of Claude Lefort, designated as *theologico-political*.⁹³

⁹³ See Claude Lefort, “The Permanence of the Theologico-Political”, in Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), pp. 213-255.

The theologico-political

The use of this hyphenated term *theologico-political* will undoubtedly provoke a sense of unease, or anxiety, to those firmly steeped in the social-scientific tradition. This anxiety with regards to the discipline of International Relations is predicated upon inextricably interrelated assumptions such as that of the autonomy of the political *qua* “object of analysis” which conditions epistemic Realist scientific inquiry.⁹⁴ This view of the political rests upon the belief that there is a radical break between medieval and modern political orders that institutes the (inter)national as a secular world order founded upon the sovereignty of states⁹⁵ and that there are inherent dangers perceived in associating the religious with the political that, in modernity, implies irrationality of decision and intractable conflict.⁹⁶

The underlying premises of this anxiety are, of course, not solely the province of epistemic Realism but also of other “epistemic realist” social-scientific approaches to world order, whether of “liberal” or “marxist” variants. For the former, the religious is also effectively

⁹⁴ The quintessential example of this move within the discipline of International Relations is that articulated by Hans Morgenthau in his canonical text *Politics Among Nations*. As Morgenthau expounds: “Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintains theirs. [...] The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political ones. As political realist, he cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of politics. And he parts company with other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere.” Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf (1973), pp.11-12.

⁹⁵ The understanding of Westphalia operating as a condition of possibility to the discipline of International Relations addressed earlier in this chapter is, strictly speaking, what is understood here.

⁹⁶ After all, what Westphalia symbolizes for the discipline is precisely the resolution of intractable religious antagonisms through the advent of the rational, secular (inter)national order. Conflicts in the world today whether it be Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Israel, Lebanon, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia that appear to have a “religious” component are either addressed as conventional conflicts between conflicting nationalisms using religion as a justification or, they are addressed as “ethnic and religious” in the same breath and qualified as intractable. In both cases there is a concerted effort to imply that the religious is outside of the realm of the “rationality” of secular politics.

divorced from the political in being bracketed as part of the private sphere⁹⁷, as one among many private interests and thus analyzed as such. Conversely, in marxisant accounts the religious (*qua* “opium of the people”) is apprehended as part of the dominant ideology of society, masking and abetting the “real” material interests of the ruling class. Yet, it should come as no surprise that, in line with the understanding articulated above with regards to “thinkers of excess”, some relatively recent work considered “postmodern” reveals an increasing interest in problematizing the secular. In other words, these works question the legacy of secularism in the same way as other such works problematize the legacy of Enlightenment rationalism to which secularism is inextricably intertwined.⁹⁸ Beyond this critique of the secular, there has also been increased interest in the interface between “postmodernism” and theology. Although one would expect “postmodernism” to be an opponent of religion, due to its skepticism towards “truths” and metanarratives, its sensitivity and sympathy towards alterity and its resistance towards closure and self-engenderment, serve as conditions of possibility for dialogue between the “postmodern” and the religious.⁹⁹ This dialogue is obviously not

⁹⁷ This bracketing also operates to privilege public reason vis-à-vis the “irrational” morality of the private sphere thus excluding moral and religious belief from the public sphere. See William E. Connolly, *Why I am Not a Secularist*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1999).

⁹⁸ See, inter alia, John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason*, Oxford: Blackwell (1990); John Milbank, *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture*, Oxford: Blackwell (1997); Andrew Shanks, *Civil Society, Civil Religion*, Oxford: Blackwell (1995); Phillip Blond, *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology*, London: Routledge (1998); Graham Ward (ed.), *The Postmodern God*, Oxford: Blackwell (1997).

⁹⁹ This is particularly the case with regards to the work of Jacques Derrida and the ambiguity which his work reveals towards the religious. Much of this can be apprehended in relation to the crosspollination which has occurred between Emmanuel Lévinas and Jacques Derrida, in the readings of each other and those who have explicitly addressed the fruitful tension between them. See, in particular, Howard Coward and Toby Foshay, *Derrida and Negative Theology*, Albany: State University of New York Press (1992); John D. Caputo, *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press (1997); John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.) and *God, the Gift, Postmodernism*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press (1999). See also the books in the *Religion and Postmodernism Series* from the University of

articulated in terms of God *qua* presence, of an “ontological” God or of the ontotheological proof of God. Neither is it synonymous with the *via negativa* of negative theology and the apophatic, although the latter’s contradictions have been a source of engagement and fruitful elaboration.¹⁰⁰ Here the standpoint taken is one that is succinctly echoed in Michael Dillon’s Heideggerian reading of security:

It is important to add that while such thinking is neither religious nor a secular thought, and so neither does it draw upon their attendant faiths, it nonetheless also entails a rethinking, rather than a rejection, of the reverence for beings and Being that is inspired by the experience of being: and of the sacred, which being such a peculiar (human) part of the event of Being evokes. Neither secular nor religious - categories that gained their contemporary currency through the way in which the dissolution of Christendom gave advent to Modernity - reverence of the sacred are at issue in it (not resolved dogmatically) either.¹⁰¹

In addressing the notion of “theology” as the first term of this hyphenated compound word, what is thus *not* meant is theology with regards to the social scientific study of religious groups or movements or theology *qua* the study of the “nature” of God or religious “truths” (even though these latter elements may be seen as manifestations with regards to what is meant here). Rather, the theological is apprehended here as alterity or “otherness”. This alterity,

Chicago Press edited by Mark C. Taylor.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials”, in Howard Coward and Toby Foshay, *Derrida and Negative Theology*, Albany: State University of New York Press (1992), pp.73-142. With regards to the relationship between Derrida’s concept of *différance* and negative theology John Caputo explains: “However highly it is esteemed, *différance* is not God. Negative theology is always on the track of a ‘hyperessentiality’, of something hyper-present, hyper-real or sur-real, so really real that we are never satisfied simply to say that it is merely real. *Différance*, on the other hand, is less than real, not quite real, never gets as far as being or entity or presence, which is why it is emblemized by insubstantial quasi-beings like ashes and ghosts which flutter between existence and nonexistence, or with humble *khôra*, say, rather than with the prestigious Platonic sun. *Différance* is but a quasi-transcendental anteriority, not a supereminent, transcendent ulteriority.” John D. Caputo, *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press (1997), pp.2-3.

¹⁰¹ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security*, London: Routledge (1996), p.130.

however, does not simply refer to “otherness” in the sense of *an* other but to a notion of the “other” outside the binary opposition between self and other *qua* subjects - i.e. a pre-ontological, pre-ethical, pre-political otherness. Without losing sight of the manifold differences, complexities and oppositions that the work of the following authors give rise to - whether it be, *inter alia*, the “concepts” of *illéité* in Lévinas, *différance* in Derrida, *différence* in Deleuze, *écart* in Merleau-Ponty, *l'évènement* in Badiou, *aletheia* in Heidegger, *le réel* in Lacan, *la division originaire* in Lefort, etc... and the “practices” of deconstruction in Derrida, genealogy in Nietzsche, archaeology and genealogy in Foucault, of paralogy in Lyotard, of nomadology of Deleuze, etc... - they all point towards an ineradicable otherness, an unmasterable excess that always already escapes the ground(ing) of what *is* whether it be a concept, subject, State etc....

The alterity, or otherness at issue here in the use of the term “theologico” is thus precisely that excess that always already escapes ontologization - i.e. that dehiscence accompanying any attempt at closure and self-engenderment. It is for this reason that the title of this chapter refers to (an-)archival musings. This title does *not* therefore imply the absence of government or central authority, or existence within a state of nature, or any such utopia as the term may commonly connote (although an etymology of this reduction would be interesting indeed). The (an-) is understood here precisely as what always already escapes the positing of an *arkhê*, the positing of a beginning or ultimate principle, the positing of a foundation from which all knowledge may be grounded. Emmanuel Lévinas is the thinker who has most engaged this notion of the an-archival. As Levinas states, with particular resonance to the subject at hand:

The notion of anarchy we are introducing here has a meaning prior to the political (or antipolitical) meaning currently attributed to it. It would be self-contradictory to set it

up as a principle (in the sense anarchists understand it). Anarchy cannot be sovereign, like an *arche*. It can only disturb the State - but in a radical way, making possible moments of negation *without any* affirmation. The State then cannot be set up as a Whole.¹⁰²

It must be said here that I am aware of the violence at work in my text. In bringing the multiple into the fold of the same, I am not doing justice to the heterogeneity that characterizes the work outlined above. This is a heterogeneity that is not only necessary but which subsists precisely because of this necessity. This alterity must therefore be envisaged not only in relation to that which is revealed in the singular works, concepts, practices illustrated above, but also in the multiplicity that this rhizome of works, concepts, practices manifests and the infinite assemblages that can be articulated between them.¹⁰³ Although this does not forestall the violence perpetrated in the present text, I believe that it is, as Derrida would say, a “lesser violence”¹⁰⁴ than that articulated *via* a metaphysics of presence. Furthermore, this meta-

¹⁰² Emmanuel Levinas, “Substitution”, in Emmanuel Lévinas, *The Levinas Reader*, Sean Hand ed., Oxford: Blackwell (1989), note 2, p.119. This understanding of the an-archical has also surfaced in relation to international relations particularly with regards to the question of the ethical and responsibility that is always already present in its articulation. See David Campbell and Michael Dillon “The political and the ethical” in David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds., *The Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993), pp.161-178; David Campbell, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida and Ethics after the End of Philosophy”, *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, Vol.19, No.4 (1994), pp.455-484; and David Campbell, “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World”, in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1996), pp.7-31.

¹⁰³ In using the concept of “rhizome” here I follow the way in which Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari use the term to illustrate a different form of thought than the “state thought” - also conceptualized as “tree thought” - elaborated upon earlier in this chapter. In distinction - but not in dualistic opposition - to trees which provide an order through the plotting of a point, a central, sovereign, fixed, point of view from which the world is apprehended, rhizomes - which “assume[s] diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions [e.g. couchgrass] to concretion into bulbs and tubers [e.g. potatoes]” - provide a different optic with the world since “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be”. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1987), p.7.

¹⁰⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, Alan Bass (trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1980), p.313, note 21.

philosophical move (for lack of a better term) also enables me to employ concepts from disparate authors in various assemblages relating to alterity, a use of concepts akin to Deleuze's metaphor, raised in a conversation with Foucault, of theory being "like a box of tools"¹⁰⁵

In addressing the notion of the political as the second term of our compound word, what is referred to here is a differentiation made between "politics" (*la politique*) and "the political" (*le politique*) by, *inter alia*, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy and Claude Lefort¹⁰⁶. This distinction has since been appropriated by other authors in a variety of projects such as attempts to articulate a post-marxist political project for the left, an ethics of deconstruction, and the development of alternative understandings of issues traditionally under the purview of orthodox international relations theory.¹⁰⁷ Following these authors, this distinction is most succinctly developed by Richard Beardsworth: "I understand the term 'politics' as designating

¹⁰⁵ Gilles Deleuze, "Intellectuals and Power: A conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze", in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), *Language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1977), p.208. Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, the creation and use of concepts is the primary task of philosophy. As Deleuze and Guattari explain: "philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts." Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, London: Verso (1994), p.5.

¹⁰⁶ See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, "Ouverture" in Luc Ferry, Jean Luc Nancy, Jean François Lyotard, Étienne Balibar, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Rejouer le politique*, Paris: Galilée (1981), p.15, and Claude Lefort, *Essais sur le politique. XIXe-XXe siècles*, Paris: Éditions du seuil (1986), pp. 19-20.

¹⁰⁷ With regards to post-marxist theory see Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London: Verso (1990) and Slavoj Žižek, *For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor*, London: Verso (1991). On ethics and poststructuralism see Simon Critchley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*, Oxford: Blackwell (1992). Within the context of the application of this distinction to International Relations, see David Campbell and Michael Dillon "The end of philosophy and the end of international relations" in David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds., *The Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993); Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security*, London: Routledge (1996); Marc Doucet, "Standing Nowhere (?): Navigating the Third Route on the Question of Foundation in International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1999), Vol.28, No.2 pp.289-310; Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner (1999) and Miguel de Larrinaga, "(Re)Politicizing the Discourse: Globalization Is a S(h)ell Game", *Alternatives*, Vol.25, No.2 (Apr.-June 2000), pp.145-182.

the domain or practice of human behaviour which normativizes the relations between a subject and its others (other human subjects, nature, technics, or the divine). I understand the term the 'political' as the instance that gathers or founds such a practice *as a practice*.¹⁰⁸ In other words, what is meant by "political," is *not* the examination of particular political institutions, practices, relations, and activities which, significantly, can be seen as the level at which the social sciences operate. Rather, what is of particular interest in this thesis is precisely *le politique* as this ground(ing), as the foundation established through a political instance, the undecidability *and* the decision that institute foundation¹⁰⁹, pre-delimiting the terrain upon which the operation of "politics" conducts itself.

In addressing the hyphen of this compound - i.e. the relationship between the theological and the political - I follow in broad terms the work of Claude Lefort. Although he might not share the way in which the "theological" is articulated above - i.e. through the meta-philosophical move of inscribing it with regards to the alterity evidenced in the work of a multiplicity of "thinkers of excess"¹¹⁰, his work is instrumental in enabling this inscription.

¹⁰⁸ Richard Beardsworth, *Derrida and the Political*, London: Routledge (1996), p.158, n.1

¹⁰⁹ As Slavoj Žižek explains the difference between "politics" and the "political" : "the difference between "politics" as a separate social complex, a positively determined sub-system of social relations in interaction with other subsystems (economy, forms, culture...) and the "Political" [*le Politique*] as the moment of openness, of undecidability, when the very structuring principle of society, the fundamental form of the social pact, is called into question - in short, the moment of global crisis overcome by the act of founding a "new harmony". The "political" dimension is thus *doubly inscribed*: it is a moment of the social Whole, one among its subsystems, *and* the very terrain in which the fate of the Whole is decided - in which the new Pact is designed and concluded." Slavoj Žižek, *For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor*, London: Verso (1991)

¹¹⁰ Lefort's thinking with regards to alterity is principally indebted to the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Although a detailed elaboration is outside of the purview of the present argument, Lefort's debt towards Merleau-Ponty revolves around the relationship between the visible and the invisible, the notion of flesh, and the notion of quasi-reversibility. From this Lefort articulates his notion of "originary division", *division originaire*, alluded to above. For Lefort's relationship *vis-à-vis* Merleau-Ponty see in particular, Claude Lefort,

Furthermore, no one, in my opinion, has done more to explicitly elucidate the relationship between alterity and the political - i.e. the way in which alterity always already informs, and is informed by, the articulation of social space via a theologico-political matrix than Lefort. What is *not* envisaged in the elaboration of this compound word is a relationship between the theological and the political based upon displacement, or subordination, of one over the other. On the contrary, for Lefort and as it will be used here, the theologico-political is taken as a logical and a historical “given”, what the author calls a theologico-political formation or matrix, *une formation théologico-politique*. I do not understand this “given”, however, as some form of primary “essence” but precisely the division between the visible and the invisible excess that always already accompanies any positing of essence, any positing of what *is*. It is thus from within the dynamic interplay “between the already politicized theological and the already theologized political”¹¹¹ that the theologico-political provides an optic to examine the way in

“Flesh and Otherness”, in Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith (eds.), *Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press (1990), pp.3-26 and Claude Lefort, “Philosophie et non-philosophie”, *Esprit* (June 1982), pp.101-112.

¹¹¹ Claude Lefort, “The Permanence of the Theologico-Political”, in Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.250. It is the inherent tension between the theological and the political which, in itself, provides the vantage point from which to apprehend mutations within representational systems. As Lefort notes: “Rather than attempting to redefine relations between the political and the religious in order to assess the degree to which one is subordinated to the other and to examine the question of the permanence or non-permanence of a sensitivity to religious thought in modern society, might not it be more appropriate to posit the view that a theologico-political *formation* is, logically and historically, a primary datum? We might then be able to see in the oppositions it implies the principles of an evolution or, if we prefer to put it this way, the principle of a symbolic operation which takes place in the face of events; and to detect how certain schemata of organization and representation survive thanks to the displacement and transference on to new entities of the image of the body and of its double nature, of the idea of the One, and of the mediation between visible and invisible, between the eternal and the temporal.” Ibid., p.249. What remains constant, for Lefort, is this inherent tension. This permanence thus provides a vantage point, according to the author, from which to understand the above-described shifts. This permanence is well described by the author in contradistinction to the changeable nature of the terms of representational systems: “The essentials remain unchanged: the theologico-political is revealed in the deployment of a system of representations whose terms may be transformed, but whose oppositional principles remains constant.” Ibid.p. 294.

which alterity is articulated in the foundation of particular symbolic orders. Within the context at hand, this optic is central to understanding the way in which the meaning(s) of security articulate themselves *vis-à-vis* different manifestations of the state form and, in particular, to apprehend security's complicity with the logic of sovereignty in modernity and its relation to the political.

As alluded to earlier with regards to the logic of sovereignty, in apprehending the political *via* a theologico-political optic, one must move beyond the strictures of what has traditionally been the purview of political science *qua* science in terms of its ontological and epistemological commitments as a "social science". The use of the term "social science" within this context pertains to the way in which "epistemic realism" was elaborated in the previous chapter and here addressed in relation to the broader ambit of the study of society.¹¹² Unlike social sciences and, in particular, the social scientific understanding that has permeated the discipline of International Relations from its inception that, by positing a knowing Subject, concomitantly ordains an exteriority *vis-à-vis* the social, the approach to be taken in order to apprehend the political must be inherently reflexive¹¹³ - i.e. in taking into account the political process of social institution, it concurrently takes into account its own institution. However, this approach must not dream of the possibility of full reflexivity; the phantasmagoria of a paralysing fully transparent reflexivity, a world without frame and without the activity of framing, a world of pure circulation and pure becoming. What such a reflexive stance

¹¹² See chapter one, note 28, p.13.

¹¹³ A reflexive orientation, in the words of Mark Neufeld, "is one whose starting point stands in radical opposition to that of positivism in that it rejects the notion of objective standards existing independently of human thought and practice". See Mark Neufeld, "Reflexivity and International Relations Theory", *Millennium*, Vol.22, No.1 (1993), p.56.

simultaneously calls forth is the normative dimension of any such institution, the inescapability, within the context of the present *problématique*, of an ethico-political decision whenever one invokes the word “security”: be it *for* “security” or *against* “security”.

This approach, rather than a “social scientific” analysis to the subject of security, is obviously not chosen arbitrarily. However, it is also not solely based upon a personal normative project, even though such an approach - in revealing the inescapability of a normative decision - calls forth such an engagement. As was alluded to above with regards to both the disciplining of the discipline and the logic of sovereignty enabling this approach, it is primarily chosen in response to the conviction that there is a complicity between the deployment of a social scientific discourse as a form of knowledge and the logic of sovereignty in modernity. Since the logic of sovereignty enables and secures the what *is*, *qua* object of knowledge that is the concern of a social scientific approach, the latter is always already unable to apprehend the way in which the logic of sovereignty operates and the way in which the discourse of security is deployed. In other words, the logic of sovereignty creates a blind spot in the deployment of a form of knowledge at a “sovereign distance” from the social. It is a blind spot that is simultaneously necessary for sovereignty to maintain itself as sovereign, but which obviously precludes the use of this form of knowledge in the task of understanding the logic which institutes it. Within the present context, the use of such an approach to elucidate the relationship between security and sovereignty risks not seeing the forest for the trees since in apprehending this complicity from a sovereign vantage point, one is deploying a form of knowledge that is precisely enabled by this relationship - i.e. a form of knowledge that is political not in reference to its subject matter, but in the operation of securing the existence of an *is via* the occultation

of its generative principles. With regards to the discipline of International Relations and the question of security, what is elucidated further here is both the way in which the disciplining of the discipline is effected *via* this form of knowledge and the way in which the question of security evades this knowledge's gaze.

In keeping with the elaboration on the political above and following Lefort, in apprehending *the political*, we must therefore go beyond the appearance and existence of particular institutions, relations and activities - the level at which the social sciences operate - to take into account the way in which *the political* reveals itself through a double movement - i.e. *appearance (apparition)* and *eclipsing (occultation)*. In this, Lefort intersects the early thinking of Martin Heidegger and the way in which Heidegger understands the relation between truth and the political, where the political arises through *aletheia*, where "truth is the truth of disclosure in which revealing and concealing are intimately involved".¹¹⁴ It is through an

¹¹⁴ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security*, London: Routledge (1996), p.86. Lefort's intersection with Heidegger is profound in the sense that in Lefort's attempt to return the thinking of the political to its classical roots - i.e. as an understanding of forms of society *qua* regimes - appearance/eclipsing relates precisely to the way to apprehend the institution of different forms of society. Similarly, the Greek term *aletheia* is one which Heidegger examines in attempting to grapple with what is at issue with the Greek understanding of *polis*. As Miguel de Beistegui explains in relation to Heidegger's earlier writings on the political: "to translate *polis* idiomatically by state or nation is, from the very start, to close off the very possibility of grasping that which is at issue in the word *polis*. It is to translate a world into another world, an epoch into another epoch. Thus, if, as Heidegger claims, a world or an epoch is indeed defined in terms of its relation to truth, it is also to translate one experience of truth into another one. Yet since that originary experience of truth is what is fundamentally at issue for Heidegger in our relation to the Greeks, it is to lose any possibility of a genuine dialogue with the Greek world. In the move to the nation or the state, that is, in the move to the modern conception of the political, it is precisely this experience of the *polis* as the site of a relation to truth that is lost. This, however, does not mean that the state is no longer a happening of truth; yet it is a happening of this mode of truth or *aletheuein* which consists in the uttermost covering up of the happening itself." Miguel de Beistegui, *Heidegger and the political*, London: Routledge (1998), p.120. The question of *aletheia* here as "truth" should not be interpreted as truth as correspondence but, as Michael Dillon explains with regards to Heidegger's later conclusions, in terms of the "opening of presence". As John Caputo explains: "Insofar as truth is thought in the traditional 'natural' sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, *aletheia*, unconcealed in the sense of the opening may not be equated with truth, rather, *aletheia*, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can only be what it is in the element of the opening." Quoted

acknowledgment of this double movement of *appearance* - i.e. the way in which appears the process by which society orders and unifies itself according to its constructed divisions - and *eclipsing* - i.e. the way in which the establishment of a particular place for politics concurrently entails the concealment of the generative principles by which it is configured - that it is possible to understand the process of social institution as a political process.¹¹⁵

What can be criticized with regards to contemporary social sciences is a neglect of the second dimension of this double movement - i.e. the way in which there is a concealment of generative principles and, by extension, of other possible forms of social institution. Furthermore, and inextricably related to the above, what is disregarded by social science but potentially apprehended by political philosophy, using Lefortian terminology, is that the institution of the *form* of society, the "*mise en forme*" of the social, is always already conditioned by the way in which the relationship between the social and its excess, or *alterity*, is articulated.¹¹⁶ This articulation implies simultaneously a giving meaning (*mise en sens*) and

in Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security*, p.47. Heidegger's later thinking with regards to disclosure turns to the question of the event via the term *Ereignis*.

¹¹⁵ As Lefort explains: "The political is thus revealed, not in what we call political activity, but in the double movement whereby the mode of institution of society appears and is obscured. It appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and unified across its divisions become visible. It is obscured in the sense that the locus of politics (the locus in which parties compete and in which a general agency of power takes shape and is reproduced) becomes defined as particular, while the principle which generates the overall configuration is concealed." Claude Lefort, "The Question of Democracy", in Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.11.

¹¹⁶ In order to apprehend the process of social institution, and not to fall into the trap of also articulating dichotomies governing social practice - here between what *is* social and *is not* social - we must think of the *mise en forme* as transcending the limits of the social itself - i.e. what Lefort calls a "world experience" (*une expérience du monde*). As the author notes: "But we must again stress that the shaping or institution of the political cannot be reduced to the limits of the social as such. As soon as we posit as *real* the distinction between what is social and what is not social, we enter the realm of fiction. We have just said that the principle of internalization which enables us to conceptualize the political presupposes a mode of discriminating between the various markers that organize the experience of coexistence; and that experience is inseparable from the experience of the world, from the experience of the visible and the invisible in every register." Claude Lefort,

a staging (*mise en scène*) of social relations. The process of social institution implies a *mise en sens* in that the social space is made intelligible through a particular articulation of dichotomies, of intersubjective meanings, and of divisions that establish the norms by which social practice is governed. Social institution also implies a *mise en scène* in that this social space contains through a multiplicity of signs (*mille signes*)¹¹⁷, a *symbolic order* providing a “quasi-representation” of itself as a particular form of regime. While social sciences takes what this giving meaning and staging produces as given, it is how this *mise en sens/mise en scène* articulates itself with regards to the social and its excess that is of present concern and which, for Lefort, philosophy is more apt to grasp. In the context of this thesis, it is precisely the giving meaning and staging of the word security that is at issue, and how this meaning is articulated differently according to different *mise en forme* of the social. In other words, what social science cannot deliver is an understanding of security beyond what security *is*. Furthermore, this blind spot in terms of our modern understanding of security is no accident but it is by design according to the logic of sovereignty and the form of knowledge deployed therein.

In order to apprehend the way in which the logic of sovereignty articulates itself in relation to security in modernity, I must address what can be seen as the terrain upon which this complicity between sovereignty and security in modernity is forged. This terrain is precisely the long standing complicity between security and the articulation and production of social order. In addressing this terrain, the next two chapters will provide a genealogical reading *via* a theologico-political optic of two opposed meanings to security. Both are found in modernity

“The Permanence of the Theologico-Political”, in Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.219.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p.257.

but we have witnessed the virtual disappearance of one, security as *sin*, at the expense of the other, security as *freedom from threats*. The conceptual opposition between these two meanings will be traced back to the political opposition between the Roman Empire and the early Christian Pauline discourse and the particular giving meaning and staging upon which these meaning(s) of security rest with regards to the articulation of the social and its excess. This reading will not only provide the terrain upon which to examine how and why the modern logic of sovereignty is complicit with a particular meaning to security, but will also provide some insight into what is at stake and what is required to articulate a political project *against* security.

What a theologico-political optic can bring to bear upon the sovereign frame is precisely the laying bare of the logic of sovereignty, it is not “sovereign thought” since the latter precisely operates from a position through which its generating principles are occulted. To bring back the notion of the *parergon*, the logic of sovereignty operates as a framing where the frame does not exist. The difference between sovereign thought and that which bears upon the latter is evident in the opposing quotes that introduced this chapter. Between the “all that is” of Queen Gertrude and the “something more” of Merleau-Ponty a world of difference is revealed: a difference that always already lays bare the logic of sovereignty.

Oddly enough, although the outlines of this oddity have begun to be sketched in this chapter, a theologico-political matrix reveals the way in which this logic operates within the supposedly “secular” world of modernity and *via* a particular meaning to security as will be evidenced in Chapter Five. It also has the added benefit of enabling an apprehension of “pre-modern” *mise en forme* of the social. This is an important pre-requisite for the genealogical examination in the next two chapters of the meaning(s) to security as they pertain to the Roman

Empire and its subversions *via* the early Christian Pauline discourse, as well as the transition from divine order to sovereign state elaborated upon in Chapter Four. It enables us to see the different meanings to security articulated in Imperial Rome, early Christianity *via* St. Paul, Christendom, and the State in the classical period, as being an inextricable part of different socio-political configurations and their concomitant symbolic orders. In other words, it is possible to apprehend these meanings to security as being intimately related to the way in which the political is articulated in each.

What this optic enables therefore is to apprehend the political in both the giving meaning and staging of the meanings to security with regards to these different *mise en forme* of the social. In this sense, these *mise en forme* are all addressed in relation to the political rather than seeing their comparison as one between “apples and oranges” *via* the usual (re)writing done from a secular optic that takes as given the division between what is political and what is religious. Social scientists take the separation of the religious and the political as a given which warrants historical empirical study in order to understand its disengagement. Even if they attempt to theoretically assess this phenomenon - because of the importance placed upon the religious over centuries with regards to the exercise of political power - they succumb, according to Lefort, to either relativism, from a systemic approach, or determinism, from an evolutionary or dialectical approach.¹¹⁸ In contradistinction, the philosopher, by understanding

¹¹⁸ As Lefort points out: “Now this approach brings us up against a double difficulty: on the one hand, history, like society before it, loses all depth: the phenomenon of the separation [between the political and the religious] becomes an index of one general system among others, and science assumes a resolutely relativist stance. When this happens, science conceals the condition of its own formation and, along with them, the basis for the claim that its operations have universal validity, as it is the fact of separation which allows it to identify the specificity of politics. Alternatively, we have a combination of a dialectical or evolutionary theory and an idea that the elimination of religion from the political field marks the formation of a rational, or potentially rational, type of society in which institutions and practices appear, or begin to

the political in the broader sense of the generative principles of a society, automatically includes religious phenomena, although never as coterminous with the political, as an inextricable part of the political process of social institution. The particular relevance of the religious phenomenon, as was elaborated upon earlier, resides in the fact that it points to a fundamental and inherent condition of social being: i.e., that social being can not fully contain its own meaning, its own foundation. And what must be repeated is that this is not, as will be more explicitly elaborated in chapters Four and Five, only a condition of “pre-modern” understandings of social space even though sovereign logic would enable such a reading.

Indeed, within the context of understanding social space within modernity, this argument is succinctly articulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe with regards to what they understand as being the *infinitude of the social*. Following the, much maligned and misunderstood, Derridian notion of “*il n’y a pas de hors texte*”¹¹⁹, Laclau and Mouffe see the social as an impossible object of discourse. As Laclau explains, set against the concept of social

appear, for what they really are. But in that case, the separation of the religious and the political tells us nothing in itself; its meaning is established by reference to a law of historical development or to the laws of the dynamic of social structures.” Claude Lefort, “The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?”, in Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.221.

¹¹⁹This misinterpretation is succinctly articulated by John D. Caputo: “Derrida’s justly famous, but unjustly notorious, declaration, ‘There is nothing outside the text’ (*il n’y a pas de hors texte*) , has been widely interpreted as a denial of reference, as if Derrida thinks there *is* nothing other than words and texts. That, were it construed as a metaphysical claim, would constitute a sort of linguistic Berkeleyanism, incoherent on its face (texts are after all material objects), with which Derrida has nothing in common.” John D. Caputo, “The Good News About Alterity: Derrida and Negative Theology”, *Faith and Philosophy*, Vol.10, No.4 (October 1993), p.454. Derrida’s declaration should, rather, be seen precisely as an ungrounding movement within the context of the foundation of such metaphysical claims. As Michael Ryan explains: “...Derrida will say that deconstruction reveals beneath the foundation of metaphysics an indefinite root system that nowhere touches the ground in a transcendental instance that would itself be without roots or ancestors. Worded differently, there is no outside to the text, if by “text” we mean the nontranscendable, unfounded radicality of differentiation and supplementation.” Michael Ryan, *Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (1982), p.11.

totality:

Against this essentialist vision we tend nowadays to accept the *infinitude of the social*, that is, the fact that any structural system is limited, that it is always surrounded by an 'excess of meaning' which it is unable to master and that, consequently 'society' as a unitary and intelligible object which grounds its own partial processes is an impossibility.¹²⁰

Thus the religious and the philosophical share a fundamental bond in that they both believe that society cannot be self-contained in terms of an understanding of itself and that self-engenderment, self-begetting, pure immanence (and the drive towards mastery which accompany these) are precisely attempts to occult this excess. In other words, what is occulted is that a dimension of society's own meaning and, thus, its own foundation in the act of founding, always already finds itself outside of, or beyond, itself. As Lefort explains:

What philosophical thought strives to preserve is the experience of a difference which goes beyond the differences of opinion (and the recognition of the relativity of points of view which this implies); the experience of a difference which is not at the disposal of human beings, whose advent does not take place *within* human history, and which cannot be abolished therein: the experience of a difference which relates human beings to their humanity, and which means that their humanity cannot be self-contained, that it cannot set its own limits, and that it cannot absorb its origins and ends into those limits. Every religion *states* in its own way that human society can only open on to itself by being held in an opening it did not create. Philosophy says the same thing, but religion said it first, albeit in terms which philosophy cannot accept.¹²¹

In apprehending the political from a theologico-political optic, in concerning oneself

¹²⁰ Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London: Verso (1990), p.90. For a reading of Derrida's work which follows along these lines see Drucilla Cornell, *The Philosophy of the Limit*, New York: Routledge (1992).

¹²¹ Claude Lefort, "The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?", in Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.223. In addressing the terms of religion *vis-à-vis* philosophy, Lefort makes clear the differences between the two through the example of Christ: "...what philosophical thought cannot adapt as its own, on pain of betraying its ideal of intelligibility, is the assertion that the man Jesus is the Son of God: what it must accept is the meaning of the advent of the representation of the *God-Man*, because it sees it as a change which recreates humanity's opening on to itself..." Ibid.

with the act of founding and the way in which alterity is articulated therein, what becomes of central concern are the historical sites at which the ground(ing) is established. It is in the periods of *interregnum* that the questions of undecidability and of the decision are most acute. Furthermore, with regards to the central concern with security in this thesis, it is interestingly in these periods of the in-between, that new meanings to security are most apt to be forged. It is in the periods where meaning as whole is most unstable and contested, that the discourse on security becomes a central concern. This is, in itself, a strong indication of the complicity of the discourse of security with the way in which certain *mise en forme* of the social articulate themselves: particular configurations of law, power, and knowledge. In the following three chapters, it is precisely these interrelations and articulations that are considered while concurrently continuing to elaborate, as a sort of underlying *basso continuo*, a more general philosophical trajectory regarding foundation begun in Chapter One. Each of the next three chapters will contain the examination of three *interregna*: the shift from Roman Republic to Empire and the advent of Christianity, the shift from Christendom to sovereign State in the classical age, and the advent of the modern sovereign State and the present mutations of the sovereign order. These will enable me to examine the way in which the founding of different symbolic orders condition the horizons in which mutations in the security discourse take place - where meanings to security are done and undone - and reveal the deep complicities between the concept of security understood *positively* as a freedom from threat and the State form. Concurrently, what is brought to the fore in this genealogy, is how epistemic Realist (re)inscriptions of security from the standpoint of modern sovereign thought work to naturalize the concept of security by apprehending its meaning as unchanging and occulting its inextricable relation to the production and maintenance of social order.

Imperial *Securitas* and the Sin of Security

It is possible to provide security against other ills, but as far as death is concerned,
we men live in a city without walls.

Epicurus¹

For we know in part. And we prophesy in part.

Paul - I Corinthians 13:9²

Security and its Genealogies

In a brief genealogical sketch of the concept of security *via* the *Oxford English Dictionary*, James Der Derian highlights the way in which the meaning of “security” has travelled down two seemingly contradictory paths. The first, brings us to the way in which security is conventionally understood today referring to a “condition of being protected, free from danger, safety”.³ The second presents a meaning that is in some sense antithetical to the first by referring to security as “a condition of false or misplaced confidence in one’s position”.⁴ This meaning of security, is illustrated by Der Derian through quotes from Shakespeare’s *Macbeth* - “Security is Mortals cheefest Enemie”; Edmund Burke - “The supiness, neglect, and blind security of my friend, in

¹ Epicurus, *The Vatican Sayings*, No. XXXI

² *The Holy Bible*, King James Version, New York: American Bible Society (1999).

³ James Der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), *The Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993), p.97.

⁴ Ibid.

that, and every thing that concerns him”; as well as a number of sermons from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, highlighting the way in which the word was used *negatively* where one must guard against the *sin* of “security” or suffer the consequences.⁵ Michael Dillon also treads upon this genealogical path of security from its etymological roots from the Latin compound of *sine* (without) and *cura* (care) giving us the derivation *securitas/securus*.⁶ How is it possible that *sine cura* can be taken to mean both something sought and something to be avoided? As both Der Derian and Dillon suggest, this contestation of meaning reveals a radical ambivalence at the heart of the word security, one which Dillon perceives as pointing towards “the very dynamic behind the way in which security operates as a generative principle of formation for the production of political order”.⁷

This ambiguity inherent to security is an important insight with regards to the mutually constitutive character of security and insecurity (ergo Dillon’s preference for the use of the term (in)security) and, as will be seen, the way in which security articulates itself vis-à-vis the political. However, what is also important to pursue and to understand, is the *why* and the *how* behind both the development of the meaning of security as *sin*, and the hegemony of the present conventional understanding of security - the *positive* meaning of being free and protected from threats - and the concurrent virtual disappearance of the second meaning adumbrated above.

⁵ As Der Derian illustrates: “‘They... were drowned in sinneful security’ (1575); ‘This is a Reflection which... should strike Terror and Amazement into the securest Sinner’ (1729); one, claiming, that ‘It is an imaginary immortality which encloses him in sevenfold security, even when he stands upon its very last edge’ (1876).” Ibid.p.98.

⁶ See Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, London: Routledge (1996), pp.125-128. Dillon also traces the Greek etymology of security through the word *asphaleia* (the privative of the verb *sphallo*) meaning “to avoid falling, error, failure, or mistake” p.124.

⁷ Ibid. p.127.

In other words, why do we have two apparently antithetical meanings of security and why is it that one of these meanings of security, as Der Derian suggests, “went underground”?⁸ The next two chapters will show the alternative understanding of security as *sin via Christianity* can be read both in terms of the development of a counter-discourse to the autonomous discourse of security of the Roman Empire and as a disruption of the latter, and (ii) that this disappearance of the alternative meaning to security is associated to the shift in symbolic order from one in which society is ordered via an unconditional, otherworldly, source (*un pôle inconditionné, extramondain*)⁹ to use the terminology of Claude Lefort, to one that is, or rather must appear to be, self-engendered through, what Michael Dillon calls, “the war against alterity”¹⁰: that of the modern secular Sovereign State. In following the rise and fall of the discourse of security as *sin* what is ultimately sought is an understanding, *via* a form of genealogy, of the multiple logics behind the relationship between a positive discourse of security and one that can be read as being *against* security. This understanding, I argue, is crucial to an understanding of our present security predicament in relation to the concept’s (re)definition and the articulation of sites of resistance to the pervasive securitization of territorial and non-territorial social and political space.

It should be clear from the previous chapter, that the above mentioned “shift” in symbolic orders should not be seen as a shift from a purely transcendent understanding of the world to one that is purely immanent. As will also be more explicitly fleshed out later, although

⁸ James Der Derian, *Op.Cit.* p. 97.

⁹ Claude Lefort, *Essais sur le politique. XIXe-XXe siècles*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1986), p.26.

¹⁰ Michael Dillon, “The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol. XIII, No.3 (1990), p.115.

this shift is often seen in these terms, neither of these extremes provide the possibility to circumscribe a place for politics. On the contrary, both the shift from the “divine” to the “secular” and the development of the seemingly contradictory meanings to security should be apprehended within the context of specific articulations and, indeed, negotiations of *the relationship between the transcendent and the immanent* and thus not of the supplanting of one for the other. In seeing this shift purely as one that moves from the transcendent to immanent, one could be imputing a teleology of disenchantment that, within the present context of negative and positive meanings to security, would negate the presence of the two meanings synchronically. For example, in a study of the metaphors surrounding the “modern” meaning of security, Paul Chilton also briefly addresses the contradictory genealogy of the term and directly connects the shift from a negative to a positive meaning to “the transmutations of society in the early modern period, and in particular with the rise of a political culture predicated upon the nation-state”.¹¹ This understanding, however, disallows the possibility that these two meanings may have also originated in close relation, indeed opposition, to each other with regards to different ways of negotiating the relationship between the transcendent and the immanent, the universal and the particular, regardless of the fact that we are presently left with an overwhelmingly singular meaning.

What needs to be investigated, therefore, are the conditions of possibility for the development of these two antithetical meanings as well as how and why these two meanings associate themselves with two particular symbolic orders, two specific forms of

¹¹ Paul A. Chilton, “The meaning of Security”, in Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (eds.), *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press (1996), p.193.

law/power/knowledge. In doing so, I echo the question (and the answer) that Ayse Ceyhan addresses to Dillon's work in her survey of critical security studies:

We could ask ourselves here [...] how we passed from this ambiguous, even uncertain, signification, to an essentialist conception of security. The answer may necessitate a deepening of the analysis by integrating other factors such as religion, the relations between the religious and the political, etc.¹²

In a general sense, what is elaborated here is an understanding of the way in which different *mise en forme* of the social in their articulation of alterity and, consequently, their symbolic articulation of power and ontology *via* particular forms of knowledge, inform the meaning(s) of security and vice-versa. Although historically informed, this exegesis should not be seen as a historical work, as a search for concrete causal chains of "facts" but as a philosophical understanding of the way in which power articulates itself in shaping the "reality" of human experience, an understanding of subject formation in its relation to power. In this, what is sought is an understanding of *origin* not in the sense of finding once and for all a concrete beginning found in the "facts" of "history", but the way in which the conditions of possibility of politics are established through the founding of a terrain upon which the latter operates: what was developed in the previous chapter as *the political*.

¹² Ayse Ceyhan, "Analyser la sécurité: Dillon Waever, Williams et les autres", *Cultures & Conflits: Sociologie Politique de l'International*, No. 31-32 (1998), http://conflits.org/article.php3?id_article=328. My translation.

The sin of security and the discourse of Empire

As aforementioned, the negative meaning to security of false or misplaced confidence, of being *without care*, follows a trajectory channeled primarily through a religious context.¹³ What is it that remains central here, and in the sermons that Der Derian discloses? How is it that security is able to mean *false*-assurance instead of meaning a *true*-assurance of being free from danger? How is being *sine cura* a negative instead of a positive condition? In order to answer these questions and understand the context in which this meaning of security articulates itself, one must ask another one: in relation to what (or whom) are assurances false and is confidence misplaced? Within the context of the conventional understanding of security, the answer to this question would precisely be *security* - i.e. having a false sense of security. In other words, being in a condition of insecurity while thinking that one is secure: a hubristic stance. However, here it is the condition of security *itself* that connotes false-assurance. It is *security* that is a *sinful*

¹³ Der Derian's examples from both Shakespeare and Burke presented above should not detract from this view. Shakespeare's writings can productively be read, as Stephen Collins suggests, "as discursively mediating a historically creative process of meaning redefinition which suggests the substitution of a self-consciously defined concept of secular order and identity for the received idea of a divine cosmos." Stephen L. Collins, *From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1989), p.41. See also the treatment of Shakespeare's Richard II within the context of the duplication of human and divine natures in the body of the king in Ernst H. Kantorowicz *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1957), Chapter II, pp. 24-41. On Shakespeare and religion see Carl Ackermann, *The Bible in Shakespeare*. Columbus: The Lutheran Book Concern (1971) and G. Wilson Knight, *Shakespeare and Religion*, London: Routledge (1967). Although this shift will be addressed in more detail later, suffice to say here that Der Derian's quote from Shakespeare's Macbeth above can be seen as reflecting the "divine" element of the mediation between symbolic orders as can the numerous references to matters religious such as prayer, judgment, faith, repentance, sin, mercy, atonement and redemption in Shakespeare's works. With regards to Edmund Burke, despite Leo Strauss's reading of him as a profoundly modern thinker who, in his critique of reason, contributes to the inexorable slide towards morally relativistic historicism, it is important to acknowledge in Burke's writing an awareness of a universal moral order having its source in divine will. This is the Burke who can declare, in a way that can be intimately associated with Der Derian's quote by him above, that "[t]rue humility, the basis of the Christian system, is the low, but deep and firm, foundation of all real virtue." Edmund Burke "A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly", *The Works of Edmund Burke*, Vol.II, London: Bohn's Standard Library (1886), p.536. For the Straussian reading of Burke see Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1965), pp. 294-323.

stance. In other words, assurances are false and confidence is misplaced in *being sine cura*. In order for this to be considered as true one must occupy a standpoint from which security is something that is not or, rather, *should* not be sought. It is thus not two different “meanings” of security that we are confronted with here, but two meanings to security - i.e. the same meaning apprehended from two different *systems* of meaning. The contention here, is that this negative understanding of security comes to be associated with a symbolic order where meaning is founded upon something radically outside of the temporal sphere, from an otherworldly source, a transcendent Other and a particular understanding and negotiation of the relationship between the spiritual and the temporal, the transcendent and the immanent. From this optic security is a “sin” - assurances are false and confidence is misplaced - when one attempts to anchor faith in a self-present, self-engendered self and its actions, where faith is not seen as something which has its source in an “outside” to this self: from God in His grace.

This understanding of security as it pertains to biblical reference can be traced back to the Epistles of St. Paul who, in I Thessalonians 5:3, writes: “When people say, ‘There is peace and security,’ then sudden destruction will come upon them as travail comes upon a woman with child, and there will be no escape.”¹⁴ It is important to note that this is the only example in the Bible of the use of the negative meaning of security adumbrated above¹⁵ and thus provides the unique scriptural source for its subsequent use in this way. Furthermore, the significance of this source is underscored if one considers that Paul’s Epistles are believed to be the oldest surviving Christian texts and, of these, Paul’s First Letter to the Thessalonians is considered the

¹⁴ *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

¹⁵ Although some bible versions translate “security” here as “safety” it is important to note that it is found as the latin *securitas* in the Biblia Vulgata and as the greek *asfaleia* in the 1550/1894 Textus Receptus.

oldest (ca. 50 A.D.). These particularities are significant inasmuch as they situate this negative meaning to security within a particular self-understanding of early Christianity and its relation to a specific social and political conjuncture. Before addressing this quote in detail, however, there are many substantive issues that must be addressed, beginning with the context in which Paul's Epistles were written.

Although I am not ready, nor is it necessary here to attempt to elucidate a comprehensive historical account of the social and political intricacies of the *interregnum* through which Rome went from a Republic to an Empire, it is nonetheless important to provide some germane circumstances within which (and more importantly *against* which) the Christian message attributed to Paul articulates itself. Indeed, regardless of the exact date of their writing or even their authenticity for that matter¹⁶, Paul's Epistles were written with the context of the early Roman Empire in mind, in the wake of the shift from Roman Republic to Roman Principate under Octavian Augustus Caesar (27 BC -14 AD) that had brought with it a remarkable consolidation of representations of power in the office of the *princeps* both within Roman politics proper and in the ruling of the provinces of the Empire.

With regards to the centralization of the representations of power in the realm of Roman politics, the constitutional settlement of 23 BC led to the adoption by Augustus of the power

¹⁶ The question of authenticity is central to the research agenda of Pauline studies. Although I Thessalonians from which our above quote is taken is considered "indisputably" authentic other texts such as Colossians and II Thessalonians remain in dispute. However, since this study solely addresses the way in which this meaning of security articulates itself in relation to a particular understanding of the world and Pauline writings as expressing an explicit (anti)philosophy, questions regarding the writings as being written by Paul himself or of distinguishing between the theology of the letters or the theology of Paul are largely irrelevant. For an interesting critique of Pauline studies with regards to authenticity using the Khunian notion of paradigms see Darrell J. Doughty, "Pauline Paradigms and Pauline Authenticity", *Journal of Higher Criticism*, Vol.1, No.1 (Fall 1994), pp. 95-128. On the question of authenticity in biblical studies in general, see Andrew K.M. Adam, *What is Postmodern Biblical Criticism?*, Minneapolis: Fortress Press (1995), Ch.2, pp. 27-43.

of the office of tribune of the people, or *tribunicia potestas*, providing him with the power of veto and the direct proposition of measures to the popular assembly. As will be subsequently elucidated with regards to the way in which sovereign power articulates itself, an important aspect of this office included the notion of tribunician inviolability (*sacrosanctitas*), a form of sacred protection, that attributed the *tribunicia potestas* to Augustus until his death.¹⁷ The *tribunicia potestas* had until then been only vested in plebeians and its attribution to Augustus enabled him to be seen as a defender of their interests.¹⁸ Symbolically, this title thus allowed Augustus to be perceived as more of a protector than a ruler, a perception confirmed in the bestowing of the title of “father of the fatherland”, or *pater patriae*, to him in 2 B.C.¹⁹ This centralization within the realm of tribunician power was accompanied by a consolidation of Rome’s power over its provinces with the granting to Augustus of the proconsular imperium, the *imperium maius quam proconsulare*. The main thrust of this grant was to give Augustus

¹⁷ Although Augustus portrayed himself as a savior of the Republic after years of instability, these measures can be seen as an important circumvention of what characterized the spirit of the republican constitution: time limits and precise definitions of duties. It is for this reason that the year 23 is widely seen as the end of the republic and the beginning of the principate. Giorgio Agamben notes in a discussion on the link between *sacratio* and the constitution of political power the political importance of the adoption of this office in the shift from republic to principate: “The inviolability of the [plebeian] court is founded upon the mere fact that when the plebeians seceded, they swore to avenge the offences committed against their representatives by considering the guilty man a *homo sacer* [a man who could be killed but not sacrificed][...] nothing shows the end of the old republican constitution and the birth of the new absolute power as clearly as the moment in which Augustus assumed *potestas tribunicia* and thus becomes *sacrosanctus*. (*Sacrosanctus in perpetuum ut essem*, the text of *Res gestae* declares, *et quoad viverem tribunicia potestas mihi tribueretur*, ‘So that I may be forever sacrosanct, and that the tribunitian power may be attributed to me my whole life).” Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.84.

¹⁸ As W. Eder suggests: “If by taking over the *tribunicia potestas* he also obligated himself to consider the protection and prosperity of the plebs his permanent responsibility - so much the better.” W. Eder, “Augustus and the Power of Tradition: The Augustan Principate as Binding Link between Republic and Empire”, in Kurt A. Raaflaub and Mark Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and His Principate*, Berkeley: University of California Press (1990), p.110.

¹⁹ The importance of this title for Augustus in terms of the way in which he wanted to be portrayed in the eyes of the populace is clear in its deliberate placing at the end of the “Deeds of the Divine Augustus”, *Res gestae Divi Augusti* - i.e. his *elogia* to be read before the senate after his death to immortalize his legacy.

the unprecedented power to overrule the authority of provincial governors in their own provinces and, in particular, command over their legions.²⁰

The above developments establishing the foundations of support for subsequent holders of the position of *princeps* were accompanied by measures towards a consolidation of divine power. During the reign of Octavian Augustus, a series of traditions were established that henceforth gave the emperor symbolic authority with regards to the divine. The title Augustus itself, meaning “revered” or “exalted” and given originally to Octavian by the Senate, provided the latter and his successors with semi-divine status during their lifetimes. Under Augustus the path was also paved for him and his successors to be deified after death. The deification of Julius Caesar by decree and through the building of a temple to the “Divine Julius” allowed for the subsequent deification of Augustus by his son Tiberius - an act which became common practice henceforth.²¹ A more concrete consolidation of divine power under the aegis of the Roman state can be found in the adoption by Augustus of the title for life of high priest of the Roman state religion, *pontifex maximus*, subsequent to the death of its previous holder Lepidus. Although Julius Caesar held this post for twenty years before his death, it is with Augustus that *pontifex maximus* becomes a standard part of the titlature of succeeding emperors.²²

²⁰ See W. Eder, “Augustus and the Power of Tradition: The Augustan Principate as Binding Link between Republic and Empire”, in Kurt A. Raaflaub and Mark Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and His Principate*, Berkeley: University of California Press (1990), pp. 71-122.

²¹ Due to this deification, Augustus was also able to use the title of son of God, *divi filius*, throughout his political career. This designation however, seems unique to Augustus and was not used by his successors. The use of this title within the context of the development of a Roman imperial cult, however, may have resonated within Christian circles with regards to its use in terms of Christ as son of God. See Kim, Tae Hun, “The Anarthrous υἱὸς θεοῦ in Mark 15,39 and the Roman Imperial Cult” *Biblica*, Vol. 79, Fasc. 2 (1998), pp. 221-241.

²² See in particular Lily R. Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor*, Middleton: American philological association (1931).

What is imperative to add, in concordance with the theologico-political optic articulated in this thesis, is that these “temporal” and “spiritual” consolidations of representations of power should not be conceptually separated since they are inextricably related in the founding of the emperor cult. Furthermore, what follows also pertains to the *mise en forme* of the social as it is articulated in relation to the early Christian Pauline discourse, a point that will be more explicitly elaborated upon later. The separation of the spiritual and the temporal in understanding the articulation of power in Imperial Rome would be a (re)inscription of the Christian dual ontology and its successor, the modern separation between the secular and the divine, upon a *mise en forme* of the social in which such a division was nonexistent. This division has severely limited the historical understanding of the symbolic order through which Roman imperial power articulated itself. Both classical and religious history, each from their side of the modern divide, have failed to see the way in which this articulation is politico-religious. As Richard Horsley explains:

The emperor cult, which appeared to be neither political fish nor religious fowl, did not sit comfortably into the agenda of either classical (political) history or Christian-influenced history of religions. Thus in this fields and others, the thesis that imperial power relations became constituted in these institutions and networks requires a serious shift in the ways in which power, politics and religion in the early Roman empire have been understood.²³

Furthermore, this understanding of the way in which the *mise en forme* of the social articulates itself during the early Empire (and early Christianity) puts into question an understanding of power *qua* physical force - i.e. the brute understanding of power which populates much of Realist scholarship. In contradistinction to this view, what must be apprehended is the way in

²³ Richard A. Horsley, “Introduction” in Richard A. Horsley (ed.) *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Harrisburg, P.A.: Trinity Press International (1997), p.12.

which power is articulated symbolically through the *mise en forme* of the social, and the way in which this power manifests itself through the manifold of relations in/through the social, constituting the subjects and providing a quasi-representation of the social body. As S.R.F. Price explains with regards to the articulation of power *via* the Roman Imperial cult:

Force is, however, a very different concept from power. [...] The cities and provinces of Asia, where there was no legion stationed, were not forced to obey the emperor from fear of his deployment of violence. That is, power was not a possession of the emperor, wielded over his subjects and supported ultimately by force; power is a term for analyzing complex strategic situations. [...] ... power does not necessarily reside primarily in politics, or the “efficient” aspects of the state. If power is taken as an analytical term, it makes it easier to see that there are manifold relations of power which pervade and constitute society. Religion just as much as politics is concerned with power. In other words, there is no reason to privilege politics over the imperial cult.²⁴

The deification of emperors and their close association to the institutions of Roman state religion as part of the articulation of the Roman Imperial cult were symbolically bolstered by the use that the Romans made of their Gods. Roman gods, many of them imported from the Greek pantheon with changes in nomenclature and in their relative importance, were expected to be in the service of the Roman state and its Emperor.²⁵

²⁴ S.R.F. Price, “Rituals and Power”, in Richard A. Horsley (ed.) *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Harrisburg, P.A.: Trinity Press International (1997), pp. 67-68. Price’s position is clearly indebted to Foucault’s understanding of power as he makes clear in the use of the following quote from *History of Sexuality Vol. 1*: “Clearly it is necessary to be a nominalist: power is not an institution, a structure, or a certain force with which certain people are endowed; it is the name given to a complex strategic situation in a given society.” Quoted in *ibid.*, p.67.

²⁵ On the use of Gods to support the cult of the Emperor see D.F. Kennedy, “‘Augustan’ and ‘anti-Augustan’: Reflections on Terms of Reference,” in Anton Powell (ed.), *Roman Poetry and Propaganda in the Age of Augustus*, London: Bristol Classical Press (1992). This, of course, is diametrically opposed to the exclusivity of Christian monotheism and the way in which the Christian religion positioned itself with regards to terrestrial power. As Joseph Strayer explains: “They were quite ready to admit that the same god might have many names and many forms, and that new divinities might be added to their pantheons. Many local gods had to be combined to form Jupiter, and a Roman of the early Republic would not have recognized all the divinities worshiped under Augustus [...] The only salvation with which they were concerned was the salvation of the state - its continuous existence on this earth. [...] Thus instead of setting up goals and standards which might conflict with those of the state, Greek and Roman religion lived only through and for the state, and almost by necessity had the same objectives.”, Joseph R. Strayer, *Medieval*

In addition to Gods and Goddesses, the Romans used a large number of figures that personified ideas or virtues. These allegorical figures known as personifications illustrated abstract ideas closely associated with the Roman state and Roman life. Notions such as Courage, Victory, Peace, Wealth, Honor, Fortune were given figure and were primarily disseminated throughout the Roman empire on the reverse side of Roman coins. What is important for the present study is the use of Security (*Securitas*: usually depicted as a cross-legged seated woman holding a scepter, or patera) as one of the personifications widely used since the beginning of the Imperial *Pax Romana*.²⁶ The use of coins to disseminate imperial slogans was standard practice and they played an important political role as an early form of propaganda, a vehicle to spread the empire's ideology within Rome proper and in the provinces.²⁷ This political use of security is acknowledged by Michael Dillon: "*Securitas* also acquired a certain political prominence, occurring in imperial mottos and on emblems and coins. As for example with the motto *Securitas Publica* - the 'safety', or immunity of the empire, in defence of which the emperor toiled."²⁸ Its importance, however, should not be understated. *Securitas, Securitas Publica, Securitas Rei Publicae, Securitas Perpetua, Securitas Augusti,*

Statecraft and the Perspectives of History, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1971), pp.324-325.

²⁶ Personal research reveals numismatic evidence of the use of *securitas* on roman coins since at least Nero 54-68 A.D., and such coins would thus have been in circulation during the time of Paul.

²⁷ See Niels Hannestad, *Roman Art and Imperial Policy*, Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press (1998). There is an issue of contention with regards to this argument that relates to the direct involvement of the *princeps* and/or the senate in the dissemination of these slogans through the use of coin imagery. This point, however, is not of direct concern here in that it is primarily the political impact of this dissemination and not the premeditated intent which is of interest. For arguments surrounding this issue see B. Levick, "Propaganda and the Imperial Coinage", *Antichthon*, Vol.16 (1982), pp. 93-107 and A. Wallace-Hadrill, "Image and Authority in the Coinage of Augustus", *Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol.76 (1986), pp.66-87.

²⁸ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, London: Routledge (1996), p.125.

Securitas Imperii were all struck into Roman coins at one time or another during the lifetime of the Empire to articulate various facets of a notion of security inextricably associated with the Roman state and Roman life and their *self-representations*, the symbolic order that structures the Roman Empire as One.

This evolving use of *Securitas* can thus, since the early Empire, be seen as part of the development of an explicit and autonomous²⁹ political discourse of security. This discourse indeed resonates with our contemporary usage of this term as being something positive and implying a freedom from threats. It may also seem to articulate itself around a remarkably similar referent to the one we are intimately familiar with: the symbolic order of State power and the latter's articulation and circumscription *vis-à-vis* the social. In some of its many different iterations, relating *securitas* to the people *qua* citizens and to the re-public *qua* "thing" of the people we find resonances with regards to uses of the term in recent history and the present such as "public security", "national security" and the current post-September 11th "homeland security" that symbolically blur the distinctions between State and the people. Within the context of the early Roman Empire, this reference to the *res publica* can be seen as a way not only to tie back to the past but also, and inextricably related to the latter, to conceal the changes of the transition from Republic to Empire. Augustus and his early successors were very mindful to maintain this symbolic link to the republic. Indeed, Augustus was to be perceived as

²⁹ The term "autonomous" here is used within the context of what Foucault understands as a discursive formation that has reached a threshold of positivity. As Foucault notes: "The moment at which a discursive practice achieves individuality and autonomy, the moment therefore at which a single system for the formation of statements is put into operation, or the moment at which this system is transformed, might be called the *threshold of positivity*." Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, New York: Pantheon Books (1972), p.186. I am indebted here to the way in which Jens Bartelson uses this Foucaultian understanding of autonomy in his work on sovereignty in Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.88.

saving Rome and restoring the Republic from the throes of civil war while simultaneously providing the symbolic means for its extinction and surpassing. As Meier explains:

...Augustus could only defeat the Republic thoroughly and definitely by restoring it. Jean Béranger pointed to this paradox: “*res publica amissa* - la République persiste; *res publica restitua* - la monarchie du principat l’a évincée.” In other words, the alternative could be realized only if a monarch succeeded in insinuating himself into the role of the foremost defender of the Republic. Then, finally, the turning point in the history of Roman legitimacy was reached.³⁰

Within other utilizations of *securitas* we thus find references to the eternal and continual, to the Emperor and to the Empire, that are inextricably intertwined with the emperor cult. In essence, we have here the same meaning of freedom from threats but also an implication of inviolability and a securitization of the divine sphere of the Emperor, the infinity in space and time of the Empire and thus a more manifest symbolic demarcation and circumscription of a place of power increasingly separate from the social.

What can be gleaned from this reading, is how the security discourse of the early Empire is inextricably intertwined with the *mise en forme* of the social through both a masking of division *within* the social body while simultaneously reinforcing the division between the social

³⁰ C. Meier, “C. Caesar Divi filius and the Formation of the Alternative in Rome”, in Kurt A. Raaflaub and Mark Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and His Principate*, Berkeley: University of California Press (1990), pp.69-70. Augustus’s *Res Gestae* read to the senate after his death is also replete with these contradictions contrasting, for example the title, “The achievements of the Divine Augustus, by which he brought the world under the empire of the Roman people, and of the expenses which he bore for the state and people of Rome” with “The dictatorship was offered to me by both senate and people in my absence and when I was at Rome in the consulship of Marcus Marcellus and Lucius Arruntius [22 BC], but I refused it”; or “My name was inserted in the hymn of the Salii by a decree of the senate, and it was enacted by law that my person should be inviolable for ever and that I should hold the tribunician power for the duration of my life” and “In my sixth and seventh consulships [28-27 BC], after I had extinguished civil wars, and at a time when with universal consent I was in complete control of affairs, I transferred the republic from my power to the dominion of the senate and people of Rome.”

and its increasingly transcendent Other articulated as a new configuration of power. A configuration that was, with regards to the transcendent and the immanent, exemplified by the formation of the emperor cult. Furthermore, this securitization is also central in the depoliticization of the Roman social order under Empire. The establishment of the emperor cult as part of the *mise en forme* of the social is a profoundly political act that leads to a constraining of the space within which any politics can take place. This should not only be seen in terms of what we would understand as “politics” from a secular understanding of the latter, but also in the way in which the power of decision with regards to the religious is reconfigured in the early Empire. For example, recalling the adoption by Augustus of the title for life of *pontifex maximus* and, thus of the fusion between the titles of *princeps* and *pontifex* for subsequent emperors, it is important to point out that this accumulation of symbolic capital came at the expense of the legitimating function of sacerdotal colleges that had been a rich source of patronage appointments for the political elite. This situation, although within the realm of the “religious”, can be apprehended as one of the countless examples by which the advent of Empire entailed a depoliticization of Roman social space. As Richard Gordon explains:

It is a truism that at Rome religion and politics were inextricably intertwined; but the converse is also true: the abolition of politics involved also the break-down of the republican religious synthesis predicated upon the appropriation of religious authority by the political elite. The emperors took over the religion of Rome.³¹

It is thus within this context and the deployment of the Imperial security discourse that we should understand the advent of Christianity and, more specifically for our present purposes, of the understanding of security found in Paul’s Epistles. However, before moving on to

³¹ Richard Gordon, “The Veil of Power”, in Richard A. Horsley (ed.) *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Harrisburg, P.A.: Trinity Press International (1997), p.131.

consider how this understanding can be apprehended as a fundamental disruption of the logic of Empire and its accompanying security discourse, it is important to provide a sense of what precisely is meant here by the “logic” of Empire as a form of State. In other words, a slight detour is necessary to address what is meant here by “State” and the way in which State power articulates itself in keeping with the elaboration on the theologico-political in the previous chapter.

Society against the State and the State (of) society

In understanding this association between the Roman Empire *qua* State power and an autonomous discourse of security, I do *not* imply a facile equation between the Roman Empire and the *modern* State. Indeed, the logic of Empire is qualitatively different from that of the territorially circumscribed, modern sovereign State. This is a crucial point found wanting from much of realist scholarship where the “State” may be (re)presented by the gene, individual, tribe, city-state, kingdom, civilization and empire, all subscribing to the same pre-determined logic of power maximization and self-help among self-regarding, territorially bounded units under conditions of anarchy. My understanding of the State may be able to subsume the modern State and the Roman Empire under the rubric of “state forms”, but this is not predicated upon different entities subscribing to similar logics. Rather, this reading is predicated upon an understanding of configuration(s) of State power, a broader conception of “State” based upon a particular anthropological understanding of the articulation of the state form supplemented by a theologico-political optic.

In his anthropological work on what he terms “primitive societies”, Pierre Clastres

develops an understanding of the articulation of State power through what may seem, at first glance, an unlikely route: his examination of the beliefs and practices of South American peoples. What makes some societies “primitive”, according to Clastres and taking his cue from classical anthropology, is that they are societies *without* a State: “they are societies whose bodies do not possess separate organs of political power.”³² In other words, primitive societies are societies where power is not *separated* from society, where a “distinct political sphere cannot be isolated from the social sphere.”³³ This is not to say that these societies are societies without power or an articulation of the political, but that society is not divided between the dominating and the dominated, between those who command and those who obey. In primitive societies power is the power of society as a unitary whole. It is precisely this political dimension of “primitive societies” that is occulted in classical anthropology and the predominant understanding of these societies as they are employed in other disciplines. This is a blind spot that is predicated upon ontological and epistemological presuppositions, of an understanding of power and the political understood from the standpoint of the State. A viewpoint that permeates Western civilization and its re-presentation. As Clastres explains:

...[T]he model to which political power is referred and the unit by which it is measured are constituted *in advance* by the idea Western civilization has shaped and developed. From its beginnings our culture has conceived of political power in terms of hierarchized and authoritarian relations of command and obedience. Every real or possible form of power is consequently reducible to this privileged relation which a priori expresses the essence of power. If the reduction is not possible it is because one is on this side of the political, so that the absence of any command-obedience relationship ipso facto entails the absence of political power. Hence there exist not only societies without a state, but

³² Pierre Clastres, *The Archeology of Violence*, New York: Semiotext(e) (1994), pp. 87-88.

³³ Ibid. p.88.

also societies without power.³⁴

For Clastres, what this standpoint fails to apprehend, in its tight association between the State, power, the political, and the social, is that these societies without a State are *not* apolitical, are *not* infra-social, as if somehow the “absence of a State marks their incompleteness, the embryonic stage of their existence, their ahistoricity”.³⁵ In contrast to this evolutionist ethnology, an understanding predicated upon becoming-State, a becoming-from-absence understood from the standpoint of the State, Clastres understands these societies without a State as being cognizant of the possibility of State power. In constituting themselves in ways in which to prevent division, to prevent domination, to forestall “Its” institution, they are societies *against* the State. The essential political question around which Clastres articulates his *problématique* is precisely that of division.³⁶

What is of interest here is not the question of the *origin* of the State, a question that

³⁴ Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State*, New York: Zone Books (1987), p.16. Clastres sees Western political thought, from its inception, as providing an understanding of the political founded upon a division between the dominating and the dominated and thus of an idea of society and of humanity thinkable only in these terms. As Clastres maintains: “From its dawn in Greece, we know that Western political thought has been able to discern the essence of the human and the social in the political (man is a political animal), while also seizing the essence of the political in the social division between the dominating and the dominated, between those who know and thus command and those who do not know and thus obey. The social is the political, the political is the exercise of power (legitimate or not, it matters little here) by one or several over the rest of society (for better or worse, it matters little here): for Heraclitus, as for Plato and Aristotle, there is no society except under the aegis of kings; society is unthinkable without its division between those who command and those who obey, and there where the exercise of power is lacking, we find ourselves in the infra-social, in non-society.” Pierre Clastres, *The Archeology of Violence*, New York: Semiotext(e) (1994), p. 88.

³⁵ Pierre Clastres, *The Archeology of Violence*, New York: Semiotext(e) (1994), p. 90.

³⁶ In this, he takes his cue from the way this question - a question that must remain central to any understanding of the political - is succinctly posed by Étienne de la Boétie in his work *Le discours de la servitude volontaire* written in 1547-48: “why do people consent to their own enslavement? See Étienne de la Boétie, *Le Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*, Paris: Payot (1978). This edition also includes texts on de la Boétie’s work by, *inter alia*, Clastres and Claude Lefort.

ceaselessly eludes Clastres himself,³⁷ but the insights that he provides with regards to the way in which power articulates itself *via* the State, and the logic underlying the mechanisms of its prevention. In other words, by eschewing a standpoint from the State, Clastres can provide an understanding of the articulation of power through the conditions of *Its* non-emergence. Throughout his work, Clastres outlines different mechanisms that primitive societies use to ward off the establishment of State power.³⁸

³⁷ In this our position is closer to that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their critique of the position of Clastres on the question of origin and which will be more explicitly elaborated later. As the authors explain: "The more deeply Clastres delved into the problem [of the origin of the State], the more he seemed to deprive himself of the means of resolving it. He tended to make primitive societies hypostases, self-sufficient entities (he insisted heavily on this point). He made their formal exteriority into a real independence. Thus he remained an evolutionist, and posited a state of nature. Only this state of nature was, according to him, a full social reality instead of a pure concept, and the evolution was a sudden mutation instead of a development. For on the one hand, the state rises up in a single stroke, fully formed; on the other, the counter-State societies use very specific mechanisms to ward it off, to keep it from arising. We believe that these two propositions are valid but that their interlinkage is flawed. [...] We will never leave the evolution hypothesis behind by creating a break between the two terms, that is by endowing bands with self-sufficiency and the State with an emergence all the more miraculous and monstrous". Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1987), p. 359.

³⁸ Of these, the ones associated with the role of the chief and of war are particularly important since they are those that could most easily be misconstrued from the standpoint of the State. In primitive societies, chieftainship is not the location of power in the sense of being the place from where to have power *over* society. On the contrary, the role of the chief is precisely to ward off this division by being responsible for maintaining the unity of society. Of course, he is chief according to some qualifications such as his proficiency as an orator (to relay ancestral Law, mediate disputes and as a spokesperson in intertribal encounters), as well as his hunting and warring skills, but these competencies are never allowed to be translated into political authority. It is precisely authority that is lacking in the space of chieftainship. As Clastres explains, "*the chief's word carries no force of law*". (Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State*, New York: Zone Books (1987), p. 206. Author's italics). The role of war in primitive societies is also seen by Clastres within this same context of forestalling division. War, according to Clastres, performs a necessary political function in that the permanence of its possibility allows for both the maintenance of an undivided We (the prevention of division in society and the conservation of ancestral Law in its opposition to Others), while concurrently ensuring the dispersion of societies, the physical separation of groups. It is important to note that this understanding eschews the notion of a generalized war of conquest, a primordial Hobbesian war of "all against all", since this would instill what these societies are precisely trying to prevent: "the establishment of domination and power that the victor could forcibly exercise over the vanquished". As with the way in which the role of the chief is articulated, war thus works in these societies according to a centrifugal logic, a logic of the multiple, a logic working against a unification founded upon division. It thus works against the centripetal logic of the One, the logic of the State. See Pierre Clastres, *The Archeology of Violence*, New York: Semiotext(e) (1994), pp.139-167, *passim*.

Clastres's insights with regards to apprehending what constitutes the State from an optic that understands societies without a state as societies against the state, are important here inasmuch as they attribute both a sociality and a politicality to these societies. The possibilities of understanding alternative forms of society, politics and power that are occulted if one is mired in an understanding of the political predicated upon a form of knowledge associated with the State form. What can also be inferred from this proposition, is the impossibility of returning and apprehending a pure "state of nature" a pre-political, pre-social world from which - by using the latter as a constitutive exterior - to anchor and constitute a natural and inextricable relation between State, society, politics and power.³⁹ Furthermore, and central to ensuing arguments, what is also transmitted through Clastres is an understanding of the State as a particular form of the articulation of power, founded upon social division and defined, as succinctly put by Deleuze and Guattari, "by the perpetuation and conservation of the organs of power"⁴⁰. Organs that are at a sovereign distance from the social.

From a theologico-political optic, this understanding of the State form and of the possibility of concatenating alternative understandings of society, politics and power must be supplemented by the way in which the religious articulates itself. In other words, the way in which alterity is negotiated in these different societal forms as well as in different forms of State

³⁹ This is not to say that there is not an inextricable relation between society, politics and power, but that the relation between these are not exclusive to the State form. A form which precisely founds this exclusivity through its counterposition to a state of nature. As Clastres explains: "If political power is not a necessity inherent to human nature, i.e., in man as a natural being (and there Nietzsche is wrong), it is a necessity inherent in social life. The political can be conceived apart from violence; the social cannot be conceived without the political. In other words, there are no societies without power." Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State*, New York: Zone Books (1987), p.23.

⁴⁰ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1987)

power - i.e. of a power disengaged from the social. In this, the work of Marcel Gauchet is particularly pertinent not only because of his attempt to elaborate a “political history of religion” but also due to his overt debt to the work of Clastres in doing so. For Gauchet, the articulation of the religious, or the way that alterity is negotiated in Clastres’s “primitive societies”, in societies *against* the State, is one that accords “a radical dispossession of humans in relation to what determines their existence and of an inviolable permanence in the order bringing them together”.⁴¹ The dispossession referred to here relates to the way in which all facets of actuality in primitive societies are intimately related to ancestral Law, to a permanent reactivation of the received wisdom of a foundational past established by “Ancestors, Heroes, or Gods”⁴² that provide the codes for daily existence. Within this context, alterity is negotiated through a division between this ancestral foundational past and the society that permanently conforms with the latter. This division confers upon this foundational past a radical alterity *vis-à-vis* society, an inaccessibility based on a temporal disjunction, simultaneously placing this society in a perpetual state of indebtedness towards, or rather, “*fromwards*” this foundational past manifested *via* ancestral Law. In this sense, religion in these societies may come closest to reflecting the Latin origin of the word religion in the composite form *re-ligare*, to tie back.⁴³ In being *received*, the wisdom of the foundational past provides a way to conserve society, to

⁴¹ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.23.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.24.

⁴³ Arendt uses this notion to characterize Roman religion: “...literally meant re-ligare: to be tied back, obligated, to the enormous, almost superhuman and hence always legendary effort to lay the foundations, to build the cornerstone, to found for eternity.” Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, New York: Viking Press (1960), p.121. However, it seems more appropriate in this context of “primitive societies” than in relation to the state form as Arendt utilizes it above. I am indebted to Gilles Labelle for this interesting insight.

protect it from any change, any alteration of the way in which society articulates itself and functions. Most importantly for the purposes of the present problématique, religion in “primitive societies”, what Gauchet calls “first religion” (*religion première*), is a central element in what was earlier elucidated as the warding off of societal division, of the manifestation of the State form. Indeed, this notion of “first religion” concords well with the oratorical skills of the chief in primitive societies to relay ancestral Law since the chief is not ordering society from a standpoint of power *over* society, power of decision, force of law, but is a conduit of the foundational past. The chief is thus a messenger of ancestral Law upon which the whole of society and society as a whole is indebted. As Gauchet explains:

Radical dispossession is thus a means toward ultimate political equality which, although it does not prevent differences in social status or prestige, does prohibit the secession of unified power. There can be no privileged status among the living in an inviolable received order. Everyone is placed on the same level, the role of the leader being restricted to extolling the wisdom of ancestors and recalling the unalterable and necessary permanence of things. ⁴⁴

What the radical temporal alterity of “first religion”, a division between society and its foundational past, enables, therefore, is an articulation of power that remains power *of* society as a unitary whole by forestalling the appearance of division through society, the establishment of power *over* society, the appearance of the One.

What occurs, with the “emergence” of the State, according to Gauchet, is a fundamental and, for him, an irreversible transformation of the relationship between society and the religious Other, as well as of the social relations between humans themselves. Again here, as with the origin of the State in Clastres, what is particularly pertinent is the way in which alterity is

⁴⁴ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), pp.25-26.

negotiated in the State form. In this sense there is a circumvention in the present work of an evolutionary argument characterized by a temporal rupture between societies without and societies with a State, a scission that Gauchet describes in Nietzschean terms as one that “severs history in two”⁴⁵. This is an event that occurs for him around 3000 B.C. in Mesopotamia and Egypt.

This rupture, however, can be disputed on factual grounds and, in terms of the trajectory of the present work, *should* be disputed on theoretical grounds. On factual grounds, ever-mounting archaeological evidence on proto-neolithic (10,000 to 8,500 B.C.) and even pre-neolithic known “civilizations” (such as Mugharet el-Wad, Jericho and Çatal Hüyük) continue to push back the date of this scission as new settlements are discovered. This evidence will incessantly reveal the problem of coexistence between “primitive” societies and State societies, bringing us directly to the theoretical aspect of the argument. On theoretical grounds, such a break contributes to a form of evolutionary determinism that forecloses the possibility of alternative political forms to that of the State - i.e. alternative societal forms in their negotiation with alterity - from existing in conjunction with the State form. These two arguments are succinctly presented by Deleuze and Guattari in a critique of the lack of inter-disciplinarity between ethnology and archaeology that spurred by an analysis of the work of Clastres and has explicit resonance with regards to Gauchet. As the authors explain:

As long as archaeology is passed over, the question of the relation between ethnology and history is reduced to an idealist confrontation, and fails to wrest itself from the absurd theme of society without history, or society against history. *Everything is not of*

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.34.

*the State precisely because there have been States always and everywhere.*⁴⁶

What is suggested here, as a corollary to this proposition, is that *there have been social forms against the State always and everywhere*. And *this* proposition, as will later be made more explicit, is central to the present study in that it opens up the possibility of apprehending alternative political forms and forms of power that are not related to the State-form division of ruler and ruled. The major thrust of this critique is not to question the radical difference that separates the articulation of alterity in societies against the State and State societies, to replace this scission by some type of progressive development such as a marxisant reading based upon factors of production, but to put into question the historical dimension of this break: the “before” and “after” of the advent of the State. For now, it is important to keep this critique in mind when one addresses Gauchet’s treatment of the articulation of alterity in the State form.

As concerns this State form and its relationship to alterity, instead of division passing between society and its foundational past and thus being a central part of the warding off of the State, alterity is articulated in the present: the deities existing in “real time”, the religious Other finding itself in the presence of society and society in the presence of this, now necessarily, *invisible* but re-presented Other. This presence of the religious Other *in* society, of an Other *qua* infinite presence, implies a manifestly different articulation of social relations. As Gauchet suggests, “the crucial point is that divine otherness, whatever its shape, has been transported into the social space and the nonhuman has been incorporated into the structure of human

⁴⁶ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1987), p.429. Authors’ italics. This does not, however, mean that a fully articulated State form has always existed. Rather, as Paul Patton describes the position of Deleuze and Guattari on this point, “the form of the State has always existed even if only as a virtual tendency resisted by other processes within a given social field.” Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, London: Routledge (2000), p.6.

ties.”⁴⁷ In negotiating the division between the visible and the invisible, there is a necessarily hierarchical articulation of power manifesting itself in the social space since there is a necessity for someone to vehicle the divine will - to re-present that which comes from the invisible - in the realm of the visible. Whether it be those chosen by society to serve non-human representations of God(s) and act as spokespersons of the divine will or the extreme form of the incarnation of this invisible in the person of the ruler as a living God, what is central to this articulation of alterity, that we find in the State form, is the division between those who speak and act in the name of the God(s), who thus command *via* their privileged access to the invisible, and those who obey. As Gauchet explains:

With the State’s appearance, the religious Other actually returns to the human sphere. While it of course retains its exteriority relative to the State, the religious penetrates and is embodied in the State. In short, the religious severance separates humans from their origin beforehand in order to forestall the sudden appearance of a division between them. Once a mechanism for domination appears, the severance occurs inside human society and separates humans from each other.⁴⁸

In both these cases, what is in evidence is the relation of alterity to social foundation: what was seen in the previous chapter as being an inextricable part of the political process of social institution. In both of these social forms, and in keeping with the understanding of “excess” in Chapter Two, the ordering principle can be apprehended in terms of a radical alterity in a relation of quasi-absolute exteriority to the social: one temporal, the other spatial⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p. 36.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.35.

⁴⁹ Indeed, as with Lefort’s understanding of originary division, Gauchet posits the ineradicability of alterity and the necessity of the human species to articulate it somehow in the founding and maintenance of any social form. As Gauchet remarks: “To put it bluntly another way: there is a transcendent element in history regulating a reflexive relation through which the human race actually chooses from a number of possible ways of being”. *Ibid.*, p.12.

In the case of the “first religion” of primitive societies, division passes between the social and its foundational past, an inaccessible past that conserves the unity of the social while preventing division within. In the case of the State form, division passes between the visible social and the invisible divine subject and its infinite self-presence, ordaining division within and the separation of the organs of political power from the social body: an onto-theological foundation.

Importantly, what this distinction between temporal and spatial exteriorities also brings into play is the difference between a *received* order, in the social form of “first religion”, a social form whose collective practices are ordered in its unremitting articulation of its foundational past, and a self-present *required* order open towards the future from the present - i.e. what Gauchet calls the “necessity of becoming” (*la nécessité du devenir*).⁵⁰ With the articulation of alterity in spatial terms characteristic of the State form, with the present transcendent presence of the Other *within* society and its concomitant social division, what is also extant is the possibility of contestability: a relativization of the absolute exteriority of this Other, where, as Gauchet explains, “the same gods are brought back within reach and, in practice, become socially questionable”.⁵¹ What accompanies this possibility of contestability is the necessity for the State to constantly demonstrate the legitimacy of its power, to ceaselessly continue to

⁵⁰ Marcel Gauchet, *Le désenchantement du monde: une histoire politique de la religion*, Paris: Gallimard (1985), p.30. My translation. The Oscar Burge translation to “principle of change”, seems to me to miss some of the immediacy and the performativity behind what Gauchet is trying to describe as well as the resonances with regards to the ontology of authors such as Nietzsche.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.36. It is for this reason that Gauchet’s overall project can be seen in terms of a “disenchantment”. First religion, in this context, is not a proto-religion but the most consistent and proficient form of religion in that its temporal division makes contestation an impossibility while simultaneously binding society to its order in a way that becomes unrealizable in State form religion. As Gauchet explains: “Once this religious exteriority occupied a space as a god-subject governing the world in the present, it was relativized rather than deepened. Such a god could be communicated with, his decrees interpreted, and the application of his laws negotiated.” Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.13.

provide an answer to a question: "What is this world worth compared to its Other?"⁵² It is within this context that one should understand the necessity of becoming, the necessity to constantly make the visible worthy of its invisible and, thus, the impossibility of stasis. In other words, a necessity that is beyond the grasp of power itself.⁵³

It is now possible to return to our discussion of the Roman Empire and to see it within the above theologico-political understanding of the State form, its relation to alterity, and its articulation of power in terms of social division. As alluded to earlier, Empire can be seen as a particular configuration of the State form operating according to a specific logic: a specific negotiation of alterity with regards to the necessity of becoming. In keeping with this configuration, Empire can be seen as articulating itself according to what Gauchet understands as the "logic of universal expansion" (*logique de l'expansion universelle*⁵⁴). This expansionary logic should not be seen as being predicated upon a purely horizontal logic of extension but understood as being intimately associated with the vertical dynamic of State form, alterity and its articulation *vis-à-vis* social division. In other words, the dynamic of the necessity of becoming in Empire is channeled *via* a continuous amplification of the vertical separation between the social and the organs of power, between the immanence of the "mere mortals" who

⁵² Ibid., p.49. The author posits extremes such as an attempt to fully live for the hereafter embodied in the gnostic refusal or, more germane to the present discussion, an attempt to bring the hereafter to life as was the case of theocracy.

⁵³ As Gauchet notes within the context of the dynamic resulting in monotheism and a God severed from the world of the visible (an issue which will be addressed in the next chapter): "This gap between terrestrial powers and the divine principle underpinning their superior status, broadens inexorably and cannot be completely controlled by any power. Through it, we enter into the age of potentially unlimited, even if unrecognized, questioning. There is now something permanently beyond the reach of power: what sustains power will soon be able to be used against it." Ibid., p.50.

⁵⁴ Marcel Gauchet, "Des deux corps du roi au pouvoir sans corps. Christianisme et politique", *Le débat*, No.14, (juillet-août 1981), p.142.

obey and the relationship with transcendence of those who command. As Gauchet explains:

...[O]nce the state becomes a separate entity, part of its function is to expand and assimilate. The prospect of conquest is inscribed in the chain of subordination and is an active and integral part of the political division. In practice, the power relationship precludes a state of equilibrium [*équilibre statique*]. Those above the common run of mortals are obliged to assert that they are increasingly higher, different, and removed from the others. Power continually strives to increase itself. This internal distance between the ruling authority [*instance souveraine*] and its subjects [*assujettis*] is what makes the unlimited absorption of the external world both conceivable and feasible.⁵⁵

It is this vertical dynamic, therefore, that provides the impetus for the logic of universal expansion of Empire: the imposition of a universality founded upon mastery stretching to the limits of its own creation, to the entire known “civilized” world, the Imperial *oikoumene*. It is in these terms that one should understand the consolidation of power under Augustus that characterized the shift from Roman Republic to Roman Empire considered at the outset of this chapter. It is this vertical dynamic that can be seen as being at play in the symbolic coalition of temporal and spiritual power and its concomitant security discourse. In other words, these are indices of the incessant negotiation with alterity, of the necessity of becoming. In this context, one can actuate, on a different register, the way in which the problematic of identity/difference and the performative nature of identity as it has been used to understand the modern nation-state in international relations theory and apply it to the logic of Empire. In relation to the modern nation-state, the point is most clearly and succinctly highlighted by David Campbell:

...[S]tates are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never fully be revealed. This paradox inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be)

⁵⁵ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.41. Terms in parenthesis from the original french.

always in a process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death.⁵⁶

Although the question of division within the modern nation-state and the way in which the latter modifies the above understanding of its reproduction will be addressed later, the immediate issue of concern here is how one can understand this permanent need of reproduction within the context of the vertical separation between the social and the organs of power. With regards to the logic of Empire, this same incessant need for re-presentation - i.e. the performative articulation of a discourse to unremittingly confirm the authenticity of the existing order's foundation - can be seen as being at work. However, instead of a horizontal tension around the maintenance of what must appear as a self-engendered essence, the naturalization of the State's identity secured *via* a constitutive outside composed of other self-engendered Others, the tension that motivates the logic of Empire arises from its relation to the vertical Other of transcendence. In other words, this tension arises from the necessity of the visible to live up to the invisible in order to confer legitimacy upon social division, to make this division seems as a natural and inevitable part of the social order(ing). Without the relentless amplification of the vertical separation between the social and the organs of power that characterizes the expansionary logic of Empire, the legitimacy of Imperial rule cannot be secured. With regards to the Roman Empire, this logic is befittingly illustrated by what C.R. Whittaker understands as the "ideology of *imperium sine fine*, an empire without limit, [that] remained central to the Roman stereotype of a good emperor, proclaimed on coins or inscriptions and inserted in

⁵⁶ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), p.11. The questioning of the ontological status of the state within international relations theory was first developed by Richard K. Ashley in "The Poverty of Neorealism", *International Organization*, Vol.38, No.2 (1984).

panegyrics.”⁵⁷ Here too “stasis would be death”. However, with regards to the logic of Empire, the absence of ontological status is accompanied by the pre-ontological scission of what was elaborated in Chapter Two as the “excess” and the way in which the latter manifests itself in the logic of the One characterizing the Imperial State form.

In apprehending the State form in spatial terms and the logic of Empire in terms of an expansionary logic, what should *not* be deduced is an understanding of Empire and an articulation of power associated with a modern understanding of territorial circumscription. As has been seen, both spatiality and expansion here are not associated with a logic of territoriality but rather to a *logic of transcendence*: to the circumscription of the organs of power with regards to a form of alterity manifested in the present, to an invisible transcendent Other. Of course, the notion of territoriality is not wholly absent from the Roman understanding of Empire, but what is important to make clear is that territoriality does not govern the logic of power. Indeed, within the context of the field of international relations, this issue is succinctly raised by Michael Shapiro in the preface of his book *Violent Cartographies* providing the backdrop for his narrative of resistance to the dominant strategic understandings of war and security.⁵⁸ In an unsettling of a realist strategic interpretation of the politics of the Roman Empire as presented by the work of Edward Luttwak⁵⁹, Shapiro, with reference to the work of

⁵⁷ C.R. Whitaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press(1994), p.36.

⁵⁸ Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping the Cultures of War*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press(1997), pp. ix-xiii. See also the way in which this issue was previously raised by Shapiro in his treatment of the universalizing impulse found in the representational practices of the Benetton company in Michael J. Shapiro, “Images of Planetary Danger: Luciano Benetton’s Ecumenical Fantasy”, *Alternatives*, Vol.19, No.4 (1994), pp.433-454.

⁵⁹ See Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1976).

Whittaker, addresses the way in which the modern strategic frame employed by Luttwak is blind to the relationship between the “territorialization of Rome’s collective identity” and the “emerging construction of its moral/cosmological significance”.⁶⁰ Within the context of a theologico-political optic and the understanding of the State form and the logic of Empire as it is articulated above, this moral/cosmological significance comes into sharp relief. This relief is hinted at by Shapiro, with particular reference to what he terms the Roman Empire’s “ecumenical fantasy” since Augustus:

Contrary, then, to Luttwak’s security-oriented reconstruction, the Roman boundary was less territorial (indeed, Roman mapping of territorial extension was very imprecise) than cultural, based as it was on the radical distinction between the cultivated and the barbarian. In effect, the Romans had a markedly ontological model of space. Roman limiting boundaries had a more symbolic or religious significance than a geometric or scientific one. The practice of the Roman geographic imaginary was aimed more at enclosing sacral space than at establishing military strategy.⁶¹

Indeed, and finding resonance in the expansionary logic of Empire adumbrated above, Whittaker states that, “[t]he pressure to expand was too great and was not controlled by strategy.”⁶² The author thus argues against the existence of a concerted strategic policy with regards to the frontiers of the Roman Empire and the absence of a precise territorial border physically defending the “inside” from an analogous enemy to be found on the “outside”. As Whittaker explains within the broader context of empires in general: “[a]s long as an imperial state has neighbors, the neighbors are necessarily inferior and the state has no frontiers in our sense. That

⁶⁰ Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping the Cultures of War*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1997), p. xii.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.xiii. Shapiro’s understanding of “ontological” here relates to the identity affirming dimensions of the articulation of space.

⁶² C.R Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press(1994), p.66.

is a conclusion that applies to all early empires.”⁶³

Roman physical presence on the frontier did thus not consist of the policing of a border *line* which would segregate self from other, but of a border *land* as a zone of confluence and assimilation. As Whittaker discerns: “[t]he difference is, of course, profound. A frontier separates and differentiates; it is a limit of bureaucratic order and administration. A frontier zone, what the French call a *frange pionnière*, by contrast, unites and integrates those who are culturally diverse.”⁶⁴ These zones were constituted as staging areas for possible further conquest, points from which to regulate trade and from which the empire could exercise its jurisdiction *via* the enforcement of Roman law. What is significant to note in relation to the Roman Empire is the importance of the relationship between law and conquest in its mastery of the *oikoumene*. This expansionary logic, founded upon the perfection of the law of Empire and its symbolic imposition via the Law in reference to the quasi-absolute transcendence of its place of power, is portrayed by Gauchet:

One sole power above all recognized powers, the only king of kings reigning upon a reunified world once and for all under his law: unsurpassable ideal, an inescapable horizon for any domination with pretensions to go beyond its limits, iron law of the political in its paroxysmal illimitability (illimitation paroxystique).⁶⁵

As was addressed earlier, although an optic founded upon a modern understanding of

⁶³ Ibid., p.66.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 72-73.

⁶⁵ Marcel Gauchet, “Des deux corps du roi au pouvoir sans corps. Christianisme et politique”, *Le débat*, No.14, (juillet-août 1981), p.142. My translation. In relation to the law providing the source of stability and success of the Roman empire, Hannah Arendt, explains : “Conquest as well as empire building [...] had been carried out successfully only by governments which, like the Roman Republic, were based primarily on law, so that conquest could be followed by integration of the most heterogenous peoples by imposing upon them a common law.” Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Cleveland: Meridian Books (1958), p.125.

security would provide an “egregious misreading of Roman practices of imperial space”⁶⁶, we *do* however have an autonomous discourse of security as an inextricable part of the symbolic order of the Roman Empire. If the modern strategic frame is unable to understand the way in which space is articulated in symbolic and religious terms in the Roman Empire (a point with which there is agreement here on a multiplicity of registers) but we also have an autonomous security discourse that is obviously not associated with the frame of reference of the modern territorial state, then what is this security discourse bound to? How and around what does it articulate itself? As with the way in which the State form was addressed earlier, I would like to offer a preliminary answer to these questions through the way in which a discourse *against* security articulates itself: that of the sin of security found in St. Paul’s Epistles and the way in which these can be read as part of a subversive discourse, a discourse of the subversion of Empire.

Pauline subversions of Empire

It is within the above context of a *Pax Romana* under the very manifest aegis of Rome and the mastery of Roman law, and the explicit articulation and extension of a discourse of the “security” of Empire intimately associated with the indivisible power of the emperor, that one must understand the quote of Paul Epistles presented earlier in this chapter. From a viewpoint founded upon the assumption of truth as correspondence, the initial movements of Christianity into the adjoining realms of the Empire can be seen as being facilitated to a large degree by the

⁶⁶ Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping the Cultures of War*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1997), p.xii.

imposition of Roman law and the prevailing “peace” and “security” that accompanied the latter.

Richard Horsley explains the academic context of this view:

Recent studies of the “social world” of Paul and the “social function” of his apocalypticism perpetuate a depoliticization of his anti-imperial apocalyptic gospel similar to previous theologically grounded interpretations. Such studies have relied on the “functionalism” that dominated North American social science in the 1950s and the 1960s. Taking the dominant political-economic system as a given, this approach focuses primarily on how sects or cults are “functional” for the system.⁶⁷

If one examines this “peace” and “security” discursively and understands the early Christian Pauline discourse politically, the negative understanding of security found in I Thessalonians can be read precisely as both a counter-discourse to the security discourse of Rome and a disruption of the logic of Empire articulated through a radically different understanding of the relationship between the transcendent and immanent, the universal and the particular. The understanding of security as *sin* can thus be read as central in articulating an alternative understanding of the political while concurrently exceeding the political as such, exceeding its specificity as political: indeed an interruption of the ontology of Empire as a particular articulation of the State form. It can be read as an inherently and radically anti-Statist intervention that fundamentally imperils that upon which the power of Empire is founded, its entire discursive economy, and the One that gathers it.

It is presently necessary to go back to Paul’s Epistles for a thorough examination of I Thessalonians 5 to attempt to grasp the way in which it puts forth an opposed meaning to security in relation to a different giving meaning and staging - i.e. a particular *mise en forme* of the social - and a disparate articulation of the relation between the transcendent and the

⁶⁷ Richard A. Horsley, “Paul’s Counter-Imperial Gospel: Introduction” in Richard A. Horsley (ed.) *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Harrisburg, P.A.: Trinity Press International (1997), p.143.

immanent. I quote the chapter in full:

But as to the times and the seasons brethren, you have no need to have anything written to you. For you yourselves know well that the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night. When people say, "There is peace and security," then sudden destruction will come upon them as travail comes upon a woman with child, and there will be no escape. But you are not in darkness, brethren, for that day to surprise you like a thief. For you are all sons of light and sons of the day; we are not of the night or of darkness. So then let us not sleep, as others do, but let us keep awake and be sober. For those who sleep sleep at night, and those who get drunk are drunk at night. But, since we belong to the day, let us be sober, and put on the breastplate of faith and love, and for a helmet the hope of salvation. For God has not destined us for wrath, but to obtain salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us so that whether we wake or sleep we might live with him...⁶⁸

In examining this passage, Helmut Koester counterposes the prophetic and apocalyptic language of "times and seasons and the emphasis upon the suddenness and inevitability", and the metaphor of the thief and that of labor located in the passage that, according to the author, are found within both the Jewish and early Christian tradition of apocalyptic language⁶⁹, to the use of the slogan "peace and security" which does not find any resonance in the apocalyptic tradition. The term "peace", here *eirēnē*, is, according to Koester, "never used by Paul for the description of a false illusion of peace". Furthermore, as alluded to earlier, the term "security" as *asphaleia* is only used by Paul in this particular instance "[b]ut is widely used for the security that is guaranteed by treaties or promises or by strong defenses, like 'security of the cities' or 'safe conduct'".⁷⁰ In completing his examination, Koester concludes:

It is a political term. As a political slogan, *eirēnē kai asphaleia* = *pax et securitas* is

⁶⁸ *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

⁶⁹ Helmut Koester, "Imperial Ideology and Paul's Eschatology in I Thessalonians", in Richard A. Horsley (ed.) *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Harrisburg, P.A.: Trinity Press International (1997), p.161.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.161-162.

best ascribed to the realm of imperial Roman propaganda. If this interpretation of the phrase is correct, it would imply that Paul points to the coming of the day of the Lord as an event that will shatter the false peace and security of the Roman establishment. Of course, such a view is entirely in keeping with older Jewish and later Christian apocalyptic protest against imperial establishment.⁷¹

Apart from addressing the question of towards what or whom this message is directed (within our own particular context this being the discourse of security of the Roman Empire), Koester also brings to the fore the question of false, or misplaced, confidence that is central in trajectory that this meaning of security takes until its virtual disappearance by the 19th century. Yet what is important to highlight in Koester's analysis, is the ambiguity present in his understanding of "peace and security" as corresponding to a concrete state of peace and security. In other words, it is not to peace and security as real and transparent states of being (which would be true or false depending upon the outcome of the action from those who threaten) that Paul refers to, but to precisely the *discourse* of "peace and security": to those who utter this slogan, to those who have faith in what the slogan promises to offer. In this, the understanding of Holland Hendrix comes closer to the present analysis:

Scholars have wondered who this people is who are saying 'peace and security.' Some interpreters think that it's the first lapsed Christians. They're no longer serious about the end time coming immediately. I tend to think, though, that it refers to those who are supportive of the imperial rule, the peace and security of Augustan and imperial governments. So that Paul is saying, "Those who are on the side of Augustus will reach their end first. Divine wrath will come upon them first." So Paul is very clearly drawing here a remarkable antithesis between the rule of the emperor, on the one hand, and the rule of God, the Kingdom of God, on the other hand."⁷²

This "antithesis" can not *only* be read as one that simply opposes two comparable systems of

⁷¹ Ibid., p.162.

⁷² Holland L. Hendrix, "From Jesus to Christ: The First Christians", *Frontline*, PBS Series, Show #1610W (Air date April 6, 1998).

Transcript: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/etc/script1.html>.

“rule”, a diametrical opposition between two hierarchical and juridical constructs⁷³, two State-forms (as we would, in hindsight, regarding the “future” of Imperial Rome and Christianity). Although in addressing “peace and security”⁷⁴, I Thessalonians indeed gives voice to the security discourse of the Roman Empire, what it offers in return can *also* be read as a discourse that fundamentally disrupts the logic of Empire instead of an analog replacement. What I believe to be of prime significance, is the philosophical and political import of this message attributed to Paul as it relates to the question of the meaning of security. Its content is thus neither read in a theological sense as it relates to the integrity of Christian scripture and its formal exegesis, nor in a religious sense as an article of faith. Its content has to do with the possibility of apprehending this message as a subversion of Empire, a subversion of the State-form and its

⁷³This is not to say that Hendrix necessarily understands the antithesis in these terms. The clarification is primarily directed to the reader. The use of “Kingdom of God” by Hendrix should not necessarily be interpreted as an equivalent to the hierarchical, juridical attributes of the Roman Empire. As Thomas Sheehan’s interpretation attests: “As Jesus preached it, the kingdom of God had nothing to do with the fanciful geopolitics of the apocalyptists and messianists - a kingdom up above or up ahead - or with the juridical, hierarchical Church that Roman Catholics used to find in the phrase. Nor did the term primarily connote territory, spiritual or otherwise. Rather, it meant God’s act of reigning, and this meant - here lay the revolutionary force of Jesus’ message - that God, as God, had *identified himself without remainder with his people*. The reign of God meant the *incarnation of God*.” Thomas Sheehan, *The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became Christianity*, New York: Random House (1986), p.60.

⁷⁴ Although outside of the purview of this thesis, a similar examination of the ways in which both the Roman empire and early Christianity use the notion of peace, e.g. *Pax Aeterna* as a slogan of Empire and *Pax Vobis* as a Christian salutation, may glean some important insights with regards to the political significance of these discourses. For example, as Dieter Georgi illustrates with resonance to some of the points adumbrated at the outset of this chapter with regards to the Roman Empire and, indeed with the contemporary world: “The *Pax Romana* is based on the theory of an eternal Rome, whose foremost representatives are divine and immortal, as well as the power of the Roman army and Roman money. The result - not only in the view of the rulers - was deliverance from foreign domination and internecine warfare, self-determination, and the freedom to form coalitions with others in a world civilization and world economy that people thought they could enjoy freely but that in fact enslaved them to principle of achievement and the constraint of possessions. The *Pax Christi* is based on acceptance of human existence with all its limitations and mutual interdependence. The *Pax Christi* means the freedom and the surrender of all privileges by everyone. This renunciation of privilege, according to Romans 5, is the true authority which moves and shapes the world.” Dieter Georgi, “God Turned Upside Down”, in Richard A. Horsley (ed.) *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Harrisburg, P.A.: Trinity Press International (1997), note 17, p.154. See also Klaus Wengst, *Pax Romana and the Peace of Jesus Christ*, Philadelphia: Fortress Press (1987).

articulation of power, a subversion of this intimately familiar meaning of security.

In this excursus, my primary companion is the reading of Paul by Alain Badiou in his remarkable text *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*. What Badiou's text enables is an unpacking of this quote that provides an alternative reading to that which would counterpose a selfsame form of order to that of Empire. Although this latter reading is the most self-evident if one emphasises the apocalyptic and prophetic peculiarities of the passage, the alternative reading proposed here proves more fruitful in addressing our current security predicament. Badiou's interest in Paul is first and foremost philosophical and political. For the author, what is important in Paul is the way in which he apprehends and articulates the *event* of the resurrection (what Badiou calls the "Christ-event", *l'événement-Christ*) as a disruption of the available referents, as an unsettling of the prevailing discursive economy of mastery and its established meanings, while simultaneously opening up the possibility of a new form of universal subjectification that "grounds" itself solely in its fidelity to this event. Indeed, the importance of Paul, according to Badiou, lies in the way in which his articulation of the Christ-event provides the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a universal politics of Truth⁷⁵ in the contemporary conditions "...of the monumental figure of the destruction of all politics (the beginnings of the military despotism named 'the Roman Empire')...."⁷⁶ This reading of Paul is not to be seen, however, as mere curiosity of things past. Rather, it is framed in what the author sees as a present necessity that finds resonance in the above conjuncture: to find ways to

⁷⁵ This formulation of "politics of Truth" is culled from Žižek's reading of Badiou which has been instrumental in the current elaboration and will be addressed in more detail later. See Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso (1999), Ch.3.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.8. My translation.

outstrip the impasse of cultural and historical relativism (as a topic of opinion, a political program and a research agenda) in its inability to counter - indeed, its complicity with⁷⁷ - the global logic of capital. What is consequential with regards to this reading in the context of this thesis is an intimately related issue of present necessity: the logic of the accruing securitization of social and political space and, thus, of the depoliticization of more and more spheres of social and political life. What this reading enables is to begin to grasp the complicity of security with a particular understanding of what the political *is* through the way in which, and under what conditions, a discourse *against* security can be articulated. It is precisely this discursive deployment that can be read in the understanding of security enunciated in the quote presented earlier from I Thessalonians. It is within this context that the underlying articulation of the negative meaning to security can be understood.

In order, however, to present a clear picture of how Badiou understands Paul and the event of resurrection, there is a need to present what the event denotes for Badiou and how it articulates itself *vis-à-vis* the State-form. This is not only due to the fact that Badiou's text on Paul rests upon a foundation elaborated in previous work that is not made explicit in *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, but also because this foundation, at its most abstract,

⁷⁷ Using Deleuze's notions of de-territorialization and re-territorialization, Badiou sees the ever-increasing fragmentation of identities as being driven by the necessities of global capital in its incessant creation of new markets. As Badiou explains: "Deleuze used to say it precisely: capitalist de-territorialization needs a constant re-territorialization. Capital requires, in order for its principle of motion to homogenize its space of operation, the permanent appearance of subjective and territorial identities, whose only demand is to be exposed, in the same way as the others, to the uniform prerogatives of the market. The capitalist logic of common equivalence and the logic of identity and culture of communities or minorities form an articulated whole." Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.11. My translation. Although I do not share the exclusiveness of this "articulated whole", in the sense that the multiplication of identities and its consequences, I believe, exceed the grasp of the logic of capital, there is an acceptance here of the Deleuzian notions of de-territorialization and re-territorialization which will be later used within the context of the logic of securitization.

supplements previously raised concerns relating to ontology, epistemology, order, and the state form. Badiou's central work that provides the philosophical foundation for his reading of Paul, *L'être et l'événement*, articulates precisely such an articulation in relation to being and the event. This text, in attempting to offer a comprehensive philosophy of being, cannot be done justice within the strictures of the present work. However, some of its precepts are essential in understanding the way in which his reading of Saint Paul articulates itself with regards to the State-form. It will thus be addressed only as it concerns the present *problématique*. The use of Badiou's work here should therefore not be seen as a wholehearted adherence to the author's system of thought. Rather, its employment should be understood specifically in terms of how Paul can be read in a way that politicizes his interventions *contra* a Roman Empire as a particular expression of the State form apprehended in terms of a specific articulation of law, power and knowledge.⁷⁸ Badiou can be seen as among those thinkers who acknowledge the gap between any political organization and the "remainder" of all attempts to organize politically. In his case, this gap can be understood in terms of the relation between *Being* - seen here within the context of a positive ontological order accessible via mathematical science as its particular form of knowledge - and the *event* that, in some sense, can be seen as standing in relation of excess to the latter. However, Being *qua* ontological order, should not be seen as directly equivalent to the State-form, since Being, at its most elemental, is associated with multiplicity. As Simon Critchley explains, "multiplicity is the general law of being, what Badiou means by

⁷⁸ This is not to say, however, that Badiou's thought is antithetical to the precepts elaborated in this work. As much as his thinking may be characterized as being firmly against an understanding of "postmodernism" *qua* radical dispersion and incredulity towards the possibility of truth. See in particular Žižek's reading of Badiou in Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso (1999).

être. Every situation is a multiplicity composed of an infinity of elements.”⁷⁹

It is within this context that Badiou frames the basis for his elaborate reading of ontology from what he calls the decision of “the one isn’t”, *l’un n’est pas*.⁸⁰ What Badiou calls a “situation,” “consistent multiplicity,” or “presented multiplicity” are, however, *structured* multiplicities; they are structured inasmuch as, under the mathematical theory of the multiple - the operation of ontology - they are under the law of being “counted-as-one”. There (in)exists a gap therefore between the pure multiple - the multiplicity that is given and not counted, and the presented multiplicity that, in being “presented” has always already been counted-as-one. This gap is (in)existent, in the sense that, in order for a multiplicity to be counted-as-one as the result of an operation, in order for it to be presented, there must (in)exist an irrepresentable in excess of the presentable to give the latter its consistency and for providing the possibility for the multiplicity to be counted as a “multiplicity”. In other words, this irrepresentable can be seen as *both* the pure multiple - that which has not been counted - as well as the operation of the count itself that cannot be counted since it is that which does the counting. This (in)existent irrepresentable is apprehended, from the immanent standpoint of the situation, as no-“thing” since every-“thing”, by definition, is counted under the law of being counted-as-one. As Badiou explains: “from the moment that the whole of the situation is under the law of the one and of consistency, it is necessary, from the immanence of a situation, that the pure multiple, absolutely

⁷⁹ Simon Critchley, “On Alain Badiou”, *Theory & Event*, Vol.3, No.4 (2000), par.16.
http://128.220.50.88/journals/theory_&_event/v003/3.4critchley2.html

⁸⁰ Alain Badiou, *L’être et l’évènement*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1988) p.31. In this, Badiou attempts to break with the philosophical tradition since Parmenides in viewing ontology in terms of reciprocity between being and the one which he exemplifies through Leibniz’s famous dictum: What is not *one* being is not one *being*.

irrepresentable according to the count, be *nothing*.”⁸¹ This nothing in its originary appellation of *Void*, can thus be seen as the excess of every situation. It is that which enables the existence of the situation and gives the multiple its consistency. As such, if Being is presented as pure multiple, then the Void is “the name of Being as Being” and ontology is its theorization⁸². However, for the situation, the void *must* remain irrepresentable in order for the latter to maintain its consistency, to continue to exist. Therefore, the situation as a presented multiplicity is permanently imperiled by its own void and from the logic of the multiple we come to the logic of the one. As Badiou explains:

Any presented multiplicity is subject to the danger of the void, which is its being as such. The consistency of the multiple reverts to this, that the void which is in situation (hence, under the law of being counted-as-one), the name of the inconsistency cannot itself be presented or fixed. [...] It is required to forbid the presentation’s encounter with its own void that would amount to being its catastrophe, that is to say the presentative becoming of inconsistency as such, or the ruin of the One.⁸³

It is now possible to articulate the way in which the State-form is associated with Being for it is precisely in order to foreclose the above possibility, to keep the void from being presented, to maintain the consistency of the situation, that the structure of the situation is always already redoubled by a meta-structure (i.e. the presentation is re-presented): what Badiou calls the “State of the situation”, *l’état de la situation*⁸⁴. Here Badiou is using two senses of the word state, state as “state of things” and “State” in the political sense. He thus introduces the way in which the ontological order associates itself with both a particular form

⁸¹ Ibid., p.66. My translation.

⁸² Ibid., pp.70-72.

⁸³ Ibid., p.109. My translation.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.111.

of knowledge and a specific understanding and deployment of the political operating under the logic of the One. The State is the One under which all consistent multiplicities are counted as one, an “apparatus of capture”, to use terminology used by Deleuze and Guattari, to which anything included in the situation belongs. As with the latter’s understanding of the conformity between the State and an “image of thought covering all of thought”⁸⁵, Badiou associates this ontological order(ing) accessible via Knowledge, the symbolic inscription of the “situation”, with the State-form. Here we have affinities with the intimate complicity between what is understood as “epistemology” and “ontology” in International Relations that we delineated in the previous chapter and the way in which sovereign logic articulates itself in the deployment of a particular form of knowledge which occults its generative principles -i.e. where what is made-present becomes simply present - it is - a self-evidence enabled precisely by its own standpoint remaining unquestioned.

As with the reading of Lefort’s understanding of social sciences that was presented in Chapter Two, this accessibility is possible precisely because the order itself is structured by Knowledge, is *given* order through re-presentation, through its inscription into a particular symbolic order. Indeed, within the context of Badiou’s thought, it is only through re-presentation that the presentation can protect itself from the remainder that escapes symbolization - i.e. from the Void. In being the one that counts the situation as one, the count of the counted-as-one of the situation, the State of the situation is a structure that is intrinsically *separate* from that of the situation while simultaneously being *bound* to the latter since it is, after all, *its* state. As Badiou explains:

⁸⁵Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1987), p.374.

In this way, with regards to the situation and its native structure, the state of the situation can be said to be alternately separated (or transcendent) and bound (or immanent). This connection of the separate and the bound characterizes the state as meta-structure, count of the count, or one of the one. It is by it that the structured presentation is endowed with a fictional *being*, who seemingly dismisses the danger of the void and, since completeness is counted, lets reign the universal security of the one.⁸⁶

The State of the situation according to Badiou thus articulates itself in a space in between the transcendent and the immanent and, in this way, intersects the concerns with alterity elaborated earlier and foreshadows the space of the articulation of sovereignty which will begin to be addressed in the next chapter. As with Deleuze with whom his thought bears a close proximity,⁸⁷ Badiou can be (mis)understood as purely a “thinker of immanence”. This should not, however, be seen as a detraction from his use within the present theologico-political context. On the contrary, this position allows us precisely to understand how the State form articulates itself within the bounds of a theologico-political matrix, as an articulation of an onto-theological transcendence, while providing, through the event, apertures for the disruption of that order, alternative political possibilities. As with the understanding of the theologico-political elaborated in Chapter Two, Badiou includes the religious as an inextricable part of the process of social institution and does not attempt to apprehend the religious and the political as separate spheres.⁸⁸ What remains central here with regards to the State form is the necessary

⁸⁶ Alain Badiou, *L'être et l'évènement*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1988), p.115. My translation.

⁸⁷ See in particular Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1999) and Alain Badiou, “Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*”, in Constantin Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, New York: Routledge (1994), pp.51-69. Both are thinkers of, *inter alia*, multiplicity and of the event with the primary difference, according to Badiou, being an adherence to either a mathematic (Badiou) or organicist (Deleuze) scheme of the multiple, being and ontology.

⁸⁸ Indeed, Badiou sees a compatibility between divine infinity and the finiteness of Greek cosmology in that the thought of Being as such remains unaffected by this infinite/finite coupling. As the author explains: “The

gap between the presented multiplicity and its re-presentation, and how this gap articulates itself hierarchically within the context of a fictional being that, through its totalizing Knowledge, its counted completeness, *secures* the order from what constitutes it by occulting its generative principles. As Žižek explains with regards to Badiou's understanding of the relationship between Knowledge, the event and Truth:

The texture of Knowledge is, by definition, always total - that is, for Knowledge of Being, there is no excess; excess and lack of a situation are visible only from the standpoint of the Event, not from the standpoint of the knowing servants of the State. From within this standpoint, of course, one sees 'problems', but they are automatically reduced to 'local', marginal difficulties, to contingent errors, what Truth does is to reveal that (what Knowledge misperceives as) marginal malfunctionings and points of failure are a structural necessity.⁸⁹

From the standpoint of this Knowledge and its ontological order(ing), from the standpoint of State thought, what is occulted is the fact that it is but a particular form of knowledge and its order(ing) that are at play. What is *secured* is precisely the very structure of this order, the logic of the One and the separation of the organs of political power, through the (de)politicizing move of occulting the generative principles of order. As with the way in which Clastres understands the blind spot of classical anthropology vis-à-vis societies without a State - as pre-political and (de)void of power - from this standpoint, the event, that articulates itself out of the excess of every situation, appears as if out of nothing precisely because the generative

possibility of this continual disposition of the ontological discourse is obviously founded on the fact that the metaphysical age of thought, translating the question of Being into that of the supreme-being, the infinity of the God-being may remain underscored by one thought where the being-as-such remains essentially finite. The divine infinity only designates this transcendental "region" of the being-in-totality where we do not know any longer in which meaning the essential finitude of the being is exercised." Alain Badiou, *L'être et l'évènement*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1988), p.161. My translation.

⁸⁹ Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso (1999), p.131.

principles of the ontological order(ing), its constitutive exterior, is occulted. This is where we find the event and why the event seems to appear out of *nothing* and thus disrupts the symbolic order, the entire ontological edifice. It is within this context that the first few sentences of Paul's passage can be apprehended:

But as to the times and the seasons brethren, you have no need to have anything written to you. For you yourselves know well that the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night.⁹⁰

From whence does this day come for it to come like a thief in the night? Precisely from outside of the purview of the state of the situation, from the *nothing*; from the excess of this order of Being. Within the context at hand, it is the ontological order(ing) of the Roman Empire that can be apprehended as the State of the situation, one that is "disrupted" - in the sense of revealing something beyond the totality re-presented by the Knowledge of Being - through the event of Christ's resurrection. However, according to Badiou's reading of Paul, he does not address explicitly the Roman Empire as such. Rather, this order is expressed in terms of two discourses - the Jewish and the Greek - that, according to the author, "Paul considers as the two coherent intellectual figures of his world".⁹¹ These discourses are thus not apprehended as fixed identities of what could be understood as particular "peoples" nor are they understood as constituted and legalized religions, but as what Badiou calls *subjective dispositions*, as coherent discourses in distinction to which Paul articulates the Christian discourse. For Paul, according to Badiou, the

⁹⁰ *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

⁹¹ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.44. My translation. In fact, Badiou is rather elusive in articulating the discourse of Empire as a coherent discourse. In order to articulate these discourses more directly with regards to the Roman Empire I will follow Jean-Luc Nancy's understanding of the *ordo romanus* as "Hellenistic Judaism, given Roman form". Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1991), p.138

Jewish discourse, whose subjective figure is that of the prophet who, in the deciphering of signs, attests to divine transcendence, and the Greek discourse, whose subjective figure is that of the sage who, in his apprehension of the natural totality, understands the place of the subject within the rational deployment of the cosmic order, are "*the two faces of a same figure of mastery*".⁹² These two discourses are thus mutually constitutive inasmuch as the Jewish discourse of the sign and divine transcendence operates as the exception to the Greek discourse of cosmic totality. In other words, the Jewish discourse operates in terms of a divine transcendence in relation to (and only to) the Greek cosmological order. Concurrently, the circumscription of the latter as a total order is precisely enabled by the exception to this order of divine transcendence. To these two discourses of mastery, or of the *Law* - the first through the direct mastery of the totality by the sage and the second through the mastery of the Judaic literal tradition and the decipherment of signs by the prophet, Paul offers the Christian discourse of the apostle which, in articulating itself neither from the totality of the Greek *logos* nor from the exception of Judaic prophecy but from the singularity of the event of resurrection, delivers neither mastery nor Law. Indeed, Paul's writings are not articulated in the form of a narrative or a theoretical treatise articulating a system of thought but as a multiplicity of interventions that can be understood as a correspondence of a militant to groups of the converted.

What Paul is after, according to Badiou, is the articulation of a *universal singularity* or the possibility of generating a universal discourse from the singular Christ-event. The universality of the Greek and Jewish discourses is always-already foreclosed not only in their exclusive presupposition of one another, but also in their articulation as discourses of mastery,

⁹²Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.45. My translation.

discourses of obedience under a particular Law. These discourses, although expounding universality, are always-already particular in their defining of a specific community in opposition to what excludes it. In this sense, these are discourses that are "Statist" inasmuch as each one "enumerates, names and controls the parts of a situation",⁹³ while simultaneously excluding what remains uncounted - i.e. that which is not re-presented, or, with particular pertinence here, what Jacques Rancière calls "the part of those that have no part".⁹⁴ To the mastery of what Badiou designates as "discourses of the Father" (the gendered articulation of these discourses should not be lost on us⁹⁵) with explicit resonance, as was alluded to earlier, to the title of *pater patriae* in the discourse of Empire, Paul, according to Badiou, counterposes a discourse whose figure is not one of obedience *via* authoritative mastery, but one of pure fidelity to the possibility opened up by the event: the "discourse of the son".⁹⁶

With regards to the explicit discourse of mastery of the Roman Empire, however, the

⁹³ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.80. My translation.

⁹⁴ See Jacques Rancière, *Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1999), p.9. There are many similarities between Badiou and Rancière which prove fruitful within the context of the present development. As aforementioned in Chapter Two, as with Badiou, Rancière apprehends the possibility of politics as something which occurs rarely and as emanating from the excess of the prevailing order and disrupts the latter. The order of Badiou's "State of the situation", is comparable in its present reading, to that of "the police" in Rancière: "the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution". *op cit.*, p.28.

⁹⁵ See in particular Spike Peterson's treatment of "gendered states" using, as in this work, a broadened notion of State to include "early states" such as the Athenian *polis* in order to understand "the institutionalization of centralized authority, gender and class stratification, organized warfare, and justificatory ideologies". V. Spike Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously", in V. Spike Peterson, *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner (1992), p.34. See also Rebecca Grant, "The sources of gender bias in international relations theory", in Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, *Gender and International Relations*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press (1991), pp.8-25.

⁹⁶ On the use of *divi filius* by Augustus and its relation to early Christianity see Kim, Tae Hun, "The Anarthrous $\nu\iota\omicron\varsigma$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ in Mark 15,39 and the Roman Imperial Cult" *Biblica*, Vol. 79, Fasc. 2 (1998), pp. 221-241.

opposition between the latter and the early Christian Pauline discourse may contain more directly contiguous elements than Badiou's interpretation proffers. Granting that the "discourse of the son" advances a disruptive articulation with regards to the Imperial discourse of the father and of the fatherland best exemplified in the title of *pater patriae*, it should also be pointed out, as alluded to earlier, that the deification of Julius Caesar permitted Augustus to use the title of son of God, *divi filius*. Due to the widespread use of this title throughout his political career, it is possible, in this instance and others that follow, that the Pauline discourse was more overtly confrontational than Badiou's portrayal permits. What remains central, however, is both the way in which the Pauline discourse articulates itself as one where a figure of mastery under the Law is eschewed and can thus be apprehended as a form of ontological subversion, as an attempt at the disruption of the logic of the One in its different discursive manifestations.

It is within this context that the articulation of the early Christian Pauline discourse may be read as a disruption of the discourse of mastery of Empire in general, and the deployment of its autonomous discourse of security in particular. In this, the counterposing between the verses directly addressing the "peace and security" slogan of Empire and those that follow are particularly instructive:

When people say, "There is peace and security," then sudden destruction will come upon them as travail comes upon a woman with child, and there will be no escape.[counterposed with] But you are not in darkness, brethren, for that day to surprise you like a thief. For you are all sons of light and sons of the day; we are not of the night or of darkness. So then let us not sleep, as others do, but let us keep awake and be sober. For those who sleep sleep at night, and those who get drunk are drunk at night.⁹⁷

Notwithstanding the apocalyptic tone of the first part of the passage (an issue that will be taken

⁹⁷*The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).*

up in more detail later), a tone that can be read as an attempt to use the tropes to which Paul's listeners/readers would be accustomed, what is important to underscore in apprehending the "Christ-event" as a subversion of Empire is its relation to Truth alluded to earlier, as well as the latter's intimate relation to the constitution of the subject. To put it as simply as possible, Badiou understands Truth in relation to a purely subjective fidelity to the event. This is not to say, however, that Truth is something "made up" by some pre-existing subject since the subject is defined as subject *through* its fidelity to the event. It comes *after* the event. Neither, and intimately related to the above, can the subject *know* the Truth since its universality transcends the locality of the subject which thus relates to the Truth through *belief*, through its fidelity to the event. It is thus not associated with the "factual" existence of some event and its apprehension by some universal subject. On the contrary, it can actually be seen as being precisely *against* conditions from which you would need to establish this type of empirical factuality. As Badiou explains with regards to the Christ-event: "We will object that "truth" designates here, for us, a simple fable. This is correct, but what is important is the subjective gesture grasped in its potential of founding the generic conditions of universality."⁹⁸

Within the context of the Christ-event, this subject always already articulates itself as a *divided* subject *via* two subjective paths: what Paul articulates as that of the *flesh* and that of the *spirit* that have as objects Death and Life respectively. It is in this sense that Badiou understands Paul's aphorism in Romans 8:6 "The thought of the flesh is death, the thought of the spirit is life."⁹⁹ What must be kept in consideration, according to the author, is that this

⁹⁸ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.6. My translation.

⁹⁹ As translated by Badiou in *Ibid.*, p.59.

opposition has nothing to do with the Platonic opposition between body and spirit, a point that has been lost, “after centuries of Platonic (and thus Greek) reuse of this motif”.¹⁰⁰ Through its fidelity to the event of resurrection, the formation of the Christian subject is thus the formation of a divided subject, a subject that carries within her two stances towards the world. As Žizek explains:

So when St Paul speaks of Death and Resurrection - rising to the eternal life in Christ - this has nothing to do with biological life and death but, rather, provides the co-ordinates of the two fundamental “existential attitudes” (to use this modern term anachronistically). This leads Badiou to a specific interpretation of Christianity which *radically dissociates Death and Resurrection*: they are not the same, they are not even dialectically interconnected in the sense of gaining access to eternal life by paying the price of suffering which redeems us from our sins. For Badiou, Christ’s death on the cross simply signals that “God became man”, that eternal Truth is something immanent to human life, accessible to every human being. The message of the fact that God had to become [sic.] man to die (to suffer the fate of all flesh) in order to resurrect is that Eternal life is something accessible to humanity, to all men as finite mortal beings: each of us can be touched by the Grace of the Truth-Event or Resurrection and enter the domain of Eternal Life.¹⁰¹

Life and death are thus fundamental attitudes *within* the subject, the positing of a fundamental division within the subject that counterposes itself precisely to the objects of Greek and Jewish thought and, by extension, subverts the discourse of self-presence of Empire with its *place* and *totality under the law*¹⁰². It is within this context that the metaphors of “light” and “dark”,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Slavoj Žizek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso (1999), p.146.

¹⁰² As Badiou remarks in his discussion of the divided Christian subject: “In the Greek discourse, the object of thought is the realized cosmic totality. This real induces the philosophical desire to adequately occupy the place which is measured out to you, a place upon which thought can recapture its principle. What thought identifies as real is a place, a dwelling, which the sage knows he has to consent to. For Paul, the Christ-event, which shears and undoes the cosmic totality, indicates precisely the vanity of place. [...] For the Jewish discourse, the object is a chosen belonging, the exceptional alliance of God and its people. All of the real is stamped by the seal of this alliance, and it is gathered and manifested in the observance of the law. The real is ordered from the commandment. The exception that constitutes it is only conceivable through the

“drunk” and “sober” in the passage above can be read. Furthermore, what is offered in return is not life *after* death in some form of biological sense, but a community (un)founded on the affirmation of life *over* death *qua* subjective dispositions¹⁰³: “death is that part of the divided subject that again and always must say “no” to the flesh, and holds itself in the precarious becoming of the “but” of the spirit.”¹⁰⁴ It is precisely this “but” that can be read in the counterposed “but” of the passage above, a “but” that acknowledges the dual dispositions of the subject. This can thus permit a reading of “destruction” that is *not at all physical*, but an inextricable part of the redistribution of the subjective dispositions under Grace. To the way of the flesh, the way of Death and of the Law, Paul counterposes Grace: “what comes to be without being grounded in any predicate, what is trans-legal, what happens to all without ascribable reason. Grace is the opposite of the law, in that it is what comes without being due”.¹⁰⁵ In other words, Grace is always already in overabundance.¹⁰⁶ It is within the context

immemorial dimension of the Law. For Paul, the Christ-event is heterogenous to the law, pure excess over any prescription, grace without concept or appropriate rite.” Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.60. My translation.

¹⁰³ In this sense, the ambiguity regarding the meaning of the word *parousia* as a technical term referring to the second coming or as a political term relating to the status of the community can be apprehended. See Helmut Koester, “Imperial Ideology and Paul’s Eschatology in I Thessalonians”, in Richard A. Horsley (ed.) *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, Harrisburg, P.A.: Trinity Press International (1997), p.158,

¹⁰⁴ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.72. My translation. This, of course, does not eliminate biological life and death but constitutes a doubling, in a sense, of both. As Žižek explains: “We thus have two lives, the finite biological life and the infinite Life of participating in the Truth-Event of Resurrection. Correspondingly, there are also two deaths: the biological death and Death in the sense of succumbing to the ‘way of all flesh’.” Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso (1999), p.147.

¹⁰⁵ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), pp.80-81. My translation.

¹⁰⁶ The question of the “overabundance of grace” is a central Pauline theme and may allow a reading of Paul as a ‘deconstructionist’ *avant la lettre*. Apart from addressing the law with regards to the subject, Badiou counterposes law and grace as different types of multiplicities in a way strikingly similar to the distinction made by Derrida between law and justice in relation to deconstruction. As Badiou explains: “The Law

of this “overabundance” of Grace, the “contingence of what happens to us”¹⁰⁷ that Badiou sees the possible articulation of universality in opposition to law “which is always state law, law of the control of parties, particular law”¹⁰⁸.

Contrary to what has been the “traditional” understanding of the way in which universality articulates itself, for Badiou, as Žižek explains, “it is Law itself which, ‘universal’ as it may appear, is ultimately ‘particularist’ [...], while Divine Grace [in its overabundance, in enabling a multiplicity beyond itself] is truly universal, that is, non exclusive, addressing all humans independently of their race, sex, social status, and so on.”¹⁰⁹ To the false universality of Empire, founded upon the transcendence of its Law and easingly articulated through the Emperor cult, Paul thus counterposes the universality (un)founded *via* the truth-event and the constitution of the Christian divided subject that sustains and perpetuates the contingency of the event, the overabundant excess to the State of the situation. In a sense, what Badiou sees in the Christ-event, in opposition to the transcendence of the Law of Empire and the emperor cult, is a bringing-to-immanence of God through the death of Christ, which in Resurrection,

commands a mundane predicative multiplicity, it gives to each part of the whole what is their due. The grace of the event demands a multiplicity in excess of itself, non-describable, that overflows in relation to itself as it does with regards to the fixed distributions of the law.” Ibid., p.82. My translation. In relation to the law which is deconstructible, Derrida posits an “idea of justice” which “seems to be irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, without recognition or gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, without reason and without rationality.[...] This kind of justice, which isn’t law, is the very movement of deconstruction at work in law and the history of law, in political history and history itself, before it even presents itself as the discourse that the academy or modern culture labels ‘deconstructionism’.” Jacques Derrida, “The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, London: Routledge (1992), p.25.

¹⁰⁷ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.85.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso (1999), p.147.

(re)inscribes a certain *transcendence within immanence*. This (re)inscription is manifested via the multiplicity in excess of itself demanded by the Grace of event and the division within the Christian subject instituted by the latter. Furthermore, this (re)inscription and its subject are maintained through faith - i.e. through the constant negotiation of the “no” to the flesh and the precarious “but” of the spirit.¹¹⁰

In keeping with this elaboration, and particularly that of the articulation of the flesh and the spirit within the subject, one could, and should, ask what comes of sin? How does the question of sin articulate itself within the present context and, bringing us back to the beginning of this chapter, how can we understand the Imperial meaning to security as sin? In this, it is the connection between the Law and sin that is important to ascertain. Badiou’s interpretation of Paul on this issue centers on his renowned passage in Romans 7:

What then shall we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet, if it had not been for the law, I should not have known sin. I should not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, “You shall not covet.” But sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, produces in me all kinds of covetousness. Apart from the law, sin lies dead. I was once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin revived and I died, and the very commandment that promised life proved to be death to me. For sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, deceived me and through it, killed me.¹¹¹

The relationship between law and sin is complex and one that Badiou reads in Paul through Romans 7 as a theory of the subjective unconscious articulated around the opposition life and death. Addressing this excerpt in relation to the way life and death were elaborated above, reveals a close association between sin, the law and death. Although, as clearly enunciated, sin

¹¹⁰ Indeed, as Badiou states, “the death of Christ is *the staging of an immanentization of spirit*.” Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.73.

¹¹¹ *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

is not the law, it is also clear that it is precisely *enabled* by the law. In other words, with the law, with prohibition, comes both obedience to the law and the unconscious desire for its transgression. In this sense, the “ways of the flesh” is not a disregard for the law by a subject but it is precisely the law that, in the place of the subject installs desire for the prohibited object and thus enables *sin*: what Badiou defines as “*the life of desire as autonomy, as automatism*.”¹¹² If, under the law, the autonomous desire for the object is on the side of life, as life of sin, then the subject passes to the side of death. In other words, the possibility of the affirmation of life through the subject is rendered impossible through the alliance between life and the unconscious automatism of desire by which this “involuntary subject [enabled by the law] is only capable of inventing death”.¹¹³ It is in this context, according to Badiou, that Paul’s revival of sin under the law and his death in Romans 7 above should be read and which also provides a particular understanding of Paul’s assertion in Romans 7:20 that “...if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.”¹¹⁴ It is perhaps through this context of Prohibition, transgression and automatism that one can read the odd repetitiousness that we find in the above quoted verses “For those who sleep sleep at night, and those who get drunk are drunk at night.” It is evident that the way of the flesh, the way of death here *qua* sleep is precisely supplemented by the question of desire through drunkenness. The wording of this passage through repetition may also be read as the compulsion to repeat of the unconscious automatism of desire that takes the place of the subject where the first iteration is desire

¹¹² Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.83. My translation. Author’s italics.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* My translation.

¹¹⁴ *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

speaking/acting through and the second is that of the result to the self. It is precisely this disposition of life and death under the law that Paul wants to subvert *via* Resurrection. What is important to point out here is the close association that is revealed in this reading between sin, autonomy and death. In Badiou's reading, sin *qua* the autonomy of desire always already implies the desire for autonomy (in its etymological sense of the association between *auto* - self and *nomos* - law) yet, paradoxically, this desire for autonomy produces precisely its opposite. Instead of enabling the subject the maturity and responsibility to freely and rationally establish a universal moral order under the law (here the foundations for Kantian ethics should be evident¹¹⁵), the law installs the autonomy of desire in the place of the subject, evacuating will and intentions in the automatism of the transgression of the law and the morbid fascination with the object of transgression: death.

It is within this context that Paul's position with regards to the Imperial slogan of "peace and security" can be read and it is precisely in this way that the discourse of security can be apprehended as *sin*. In other words, the autonomous discourse of security can be apprehended as a manifestation of this autonomy of desire and desire for autonomy under Roman Imperial law and of the fascination with death that it engenders. Furthermore, this discourse is one that is *effective* under Roman Imperial law precisely because of the way in which the disposition of the "self" under this law articulates itself *via* the autonomy of desire and its object *qua* death. Indeed, the question of death and, in particular, the fear of death is not a modern phenomenon.

¹¹⁵ See Immanuel Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Thomas K. Abbot (trans.), New Jersey: Prentice-Hall (1949). Badiou explicitly addresses Paul's position as being radically anti-Kantian: "We could hardly imagine a more anti-Kantian disposition than that which, naming 'sin' the autonomy of desire when its object is directed by the command of the law, designates the effect of the latter as the advent of the subject in the place of the dead." Ibid., p.84. My translation.

It is a question that was central to the Greeks and to Greek philosophy and which finds its most unambiguous effectuation in Plato's *Phaedo* where, in the account of Socrates' death, Plato gives voice to the call of philosophy:

For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when this time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?¹¹⁶

Of course, this quote is only to be understood within the context of the Platonic opposition of body and spirit, or soul, where the body is an impediment to the acquisition of knowledge and where true knowledge of the whole can only be attained once the soul is liberated from the body. But, as was alluded to earlier, it is precisely in opposition to this enduring division that Paul's project concerning "flesh" and "spirit" can be read. If it is read in this way, Paul's intellectual trajectory can, ironically, be seen as being closer to the Epicurian tradition that ran in explicit opposition to that of Platonic forms and the positing of an immaterial soul, and had as a central concern to banish the fear of death. This banishment was not articulated through the positing of an afterlife, (which only perpetuates the concern with death) but, on the contrary, by apprehending death as annihilation and, thus, of no threat and concern to the living.¹¹⁷ Within

¹¹⁶ Plato, "Phaedo", in Benjamin Jowett (trans.), *Dialogues of Plato*, New York: Pocket Books (1955), p.76.

¹¹⁷ On the influence of Epicurian thinking on Paul see Norman Wentworth DeWitt, *St. Paul and Epicurus*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1954). The Epicurian resolution to the problem of death is to ward off fears engendered both by the frightening nature of the portrayal of gods in life and of the afterlife in Babylonian and Greek mythology and is primarily developed in Epicurus's *Letter to Menoeceus*. As Epicurus states: "Accustom yourself to believing that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply the capacity for sensation, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life a limitless time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly understood that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no

this context, the quote by Epicurus that introduced this chapter can be read as an explicit attempt to dissociate security from the fear of death even though still implying a protection from threats.

Through Badiou's reading, Paul provides a different optic on death: not an attempt to provide an alternative understanding of what death *is* in relation to a fully present "self", but as being constitutive of the self *via* a subjective disposition. Paul posits here an explicit relation between this disposition and the law in that it is precisely under the law that this disposition is enabled in the articulation of autonomous desire on the side of life with its object being death, and the subject "dying" on the side of death. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the law, the articulation of autonomous desire is "an active, full category"¹¹⁸, occulting the excess that constitutes it, the subject occupying the place of death. Paul's political project is thus to subvert this disposition with regards to life and death by transposing the subject onto the side of life, enabling the subject to affirm life, while relegating sin to the place of death. The question underlying Paul's project is succinctly elaborated by Žižek:

...how can I break out of this vicious cycle of the Law and desire, of the Prohibition and its transgression, within which I can assert my living passion only in the guise of their opposite, as a morbid death drive? How would it be possible for me to experience my life-impulse not as a foreign automatism, as a blind "compulsion to repeat" making me transgress the Law, with the unacknowledged complicity of the Law itself, but as a fully subjectivized, positive "Yes!" to my Life?¹¹⁹

It is within this context that we can understand the verses that follow those addressing

longer." Epicurus's *Letter to Menoeceus*, <http://www.epicurus.net/menoeceus.html>.

¹¹⁸ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.85. My translation.

¹¹⁹ Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso (1999), p.150.

the way of the flesh, the Law and desire elaborated upon above:

But, since we belong to the day, let us be sober, and put on the breastplate of faith and love, and for a helmet the hope of salvation.¹²⁰

The metaphors of daylight and sobriety can be read here as an association between the way of the spirit and the breaking with Law and desire. Furthermore, the interesting metaphoric militarization of faith, love and salvation with the use of “breastplate” and “helmet” points precisely to the purveyor of the Law, the State of the situation *qua* Roman Empire and the tools of the enforcement of the Law - i.e. the *defensive* tools that, from the subject position afforded *via* the Law, seem intimately related to the provision of “peace and security”. Yet what is offered in return, from the disposition of the spirit, in faith, love and salvation, de-militarizes these tools, disrupts them, even makes them look ridiculous, grossly out of place from the standpoint of the affirmation of life. In the articulation of the Pauline discourse it is, as was elaborated above, resurrection as the Christ-event that provides the answer to the question voiced by Žižek above. It is resurrection that can redistribute the places of life and death and provide this affirmation to life, a redistribution enabled through *breaking with the law*. It is important here to distinguish between this breaking *with* the law and the breaking *of* the law. In positing the breaking *of* the law, one always already falls into the logic of prohibition and transgression, into the “vicious cycle” of the il-legal that the Pauline discourse is precisely attempting to subvert. In breaking *with* the law what is posited is a standpoint that is a-legal, that does not participate in the economy of prohibition and transgression and, because of this a-legality, enables a “fully subjectivized” affirmation, a unity of thinking and doing in the fidelity

¹²⁰ *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

to the event. This, however, does not mean that the Pauline discourse is devoid of any form of law, but only of the Law as it is articulated and apprehended by the State of the situation, what Badiou calls “the commanding force of the letter (*la force de commandement de la lettre*) [...] that separates [the subject’s] thinking from all power”.¹²¹ In developing this argument, the author employs Paul’s affirmation in II Corinthians 2:3 that “the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life.”¹²²

In the disruption of the Law of the letter, the particularist law of the State of the situation, a law under which, according to Badiou, “the subject presents itself as a disjointed correlation between the automatism of doing and the impotence of thought”¹²³, the Pauline discourse operates a “de-literalization” (*délittéralisation*) of the subject articulated *via* salvation, in which “the divided subject supports thought in the empowerment of doing”.¹²⁴ This is an operation impervious to the letter. In other words, the Law of the letter and the letter of the Law, deployed *via* the State of the situation generates a *caesura* between thought and action, “theory” and “practice”, in that action is predicated upon the logic of Prohibition and transgression, a disposition which operates in sin, while thought is unable to prescribe action to a figure of the subject on the side of the dead that it deems powerless.¹²⁵ Salvation, a justification of life where sin is revealed, is the operation by which this rift is outstripped. What

¹²¹ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.87. My translation.

¹²² *The Holy Bible*, King James Version, New York: American Bible Society (1999).

¹²³ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.88. My translation.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Badiou employs here the Lacanian interpretation of the *cogito* which radically disrupts the self-present subject of Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum* by positing the divided subject of “there where think I am not, there where I am I do not think” (*là où je pense je ne suis pas et là où je suis je ne pense pas*). Ibid., p.87.

is needed for this operation is a passage to awareness of the divided subject, a passage that would reveal, in one of its subjective dispositions, a “trans-literality”, the articulation of “a trans-literal law, a law of the spirit.”¹²⁶

It is within this context that the sentence in the first excerpt of the passage “you have no need to have anything written to you” can be read. As was alluded to before, such an operation cannot come from within the State of the situation, from within the logic or the reason deployed via the Law. It must be enabled by something that, from the latter, appears as *nothing*, an irruption heterogenous to the law: the overabundance of Grace wedded to the fidelity to, the faith in, the event. Through grace, through an acknowledgment of its overabundance enabled by the fidelity in the event, through the acknowledgment of the divided subject, the subject comes to life, comes to the side of life.

The subject is then impelled to declare publicly its faith in the event, to attain its full subjectivization through a public declaration, a declaration that life and death are not ineluctably distributed as they were under the Law, that a new articulation of life and death is possible through another form of law. The trans-literal law that is revealed through this operation engendered by the event, a law beyond the Law is, according to Badiou, what Paul calls *love*. Through the subjective disposition of the spirit and the declared faith in the event, love makes law through pure affirmation, a thought/action that gives principle and consistency to the subject. This love, according to Badiou, should not be seen as a love without limits towards a transcendent Other, “an oblatory love, by which we would forget ourselves in the direction of

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.91.

the other [...] a narcissistic pretension”¹²⁷, but a love that must begin from self-love, a self-love enabled by the love for the Truth-event and which then can spread to others.¹²⁸ It is in this way, according to the author, that a true universalism can be articulated. A universalism that does not come from above bringing the other to the same, from a point above that circumscribes a whole, but from a lateral spread outside of the purview of the knowledge of the Law, a rhizomatic dissemination of thought/action through the manifold of differences, in-different to the latter, that carries the power of salvation.

Finally, the question of hope must be addressed. It must be addressed since it is central to the discourse while also providing a possible weak point in this reading due to its close association with the Last Judgement in apocalyptic and eschatological discourse. It is evident that the question of hope is intimately associated to the question of justice. Through faith, the question of justice is one that constitutes a demand, as Badiou illustrates through Paul’s declaration in Romans 10:10: “For man believes with his heart and so is justified”¹²⁹. In eschatological discourse hope in relation to justice is primarily associated with the hope for judgement, for the Final Judgement as that time at which justice would be served, thus legitimating the faithful and punishing the perfidious. To this interpretation, Badiou counterposes an understanding of hope which “refers to endurance, to perseverance, to patience; it is the subjectivity of the continuation of a subjective process”¹³⁰ or, in other words,

¹²⁷ Ibid., p.94.

¹²⁸ It is within this context that Badiou thinks we should read the Old Testament injunction “love your neighbour as you would love yourself”. Ibid.

¹²⁹ *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

¹³⁰ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.99. My translation.

faith in the faith in the event which, in relation to justice may, in some senses, show similarities to Derrida's conception of a justice always already to come.¹³¹ Badiou's argument highlights the fact that Paul makes very little use of prophetic or apocalyptic language in his Epistles. Furthermore, as I elaborated earlier, much of this language can be understood within the context of attempting to appeal to the markers through which his audience would perceive his message and can always be read through the reading proposed above. According to Badiou, Paul seems to indicate in his references to hope, that the latter does not refer to an objective victory - i.e. a "real" event of judgement, of reward and punishment, but to a subjective victory gained precisely through perseverance, a victory that Paul elucidates in Romans 5:2-5:

Through him we have obtained access to this grace in which we stand, and we rejoice in our hope of sharing the glory of God. More than that, we rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint us...¹³²

The subjective dimension here can be elucidated, according to the author, in the way in which hope refers to "the ordeal that has been overcome, and not to that in the name of which it has been overcome."¹³³ In other words, there is no reference here to a result at the end of a process, but that hope dwells in the process itself, the process enabled by grace, and perpetuated *via* the faith in the event. Furthermore, in affiliating hope with a final judgement, one would, in a sense

¹³¹ See Jacques Derrida, "The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority'", in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, London: Routledge (1992), pp.3-67. As Derrida articulates it, "[j]ustice remains, is yet, to come, *à venir*, it has an, it is *à-venir*, the very dimension of events irreducibly to come. It will always have it, this *à-venir*, and always has. Perhaps it is for this reason that justice, insofar as it is not only a juridical and political concept, opens up for *l'avenir* the transformation, the recasting or refounding of law and politics." p.27. The temporality at play here is what displays similarities with regards to Badiou although the latter may be less sanguine with regards to the messianic tones which sometimes populate Derrida's characterizations.

¹³² *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

¹³³ Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.101. My translation.

evacuate the positive affirmation enabled by the fidelity in the event and engendered through love since it would be a faith which would be sustained by the threat of punishment. As Badiou states, through an optic with Nietzschean overtones “the legitimization of the law and of love by hope is then purely negative. Hope is traversed by the hatred of the others, by resentment. But conceived in this way, it seems difficult to reconcile hope with the reconciliation in the universality of thought and of power that Paul names love.”¹³⁴

Badiou notes that the line between these two readings of hope, the one around judgement and the other around perseverance, is one that is precarious; it is a fault line throughout the history of Christianity, and one whose “political resonances are still felt”.¹³⁵ Although this issue will be one to which I will return in some ways later, it is important to raise it in the concluding remarks of this chapter with regards to our present concerns. Through a reading of Christianity which, among other things, intimately associates hope with the apocalypticism of a Final Judgement, understands the division between flesh and spirit through the verticality of the body/soul Platonic lens, plays upon the ambiguities of incarnation and privileges a fire and brimstone vengeful God found primarily in the Old Testament¹³⁶, we can

¹³⁴ Ibid., p.100. Badiou, in many instances, explicitly reconciles Nietzsche with his reading of Paul and even apprehends him as his secret rival: “The same desire of opening up a new epoch in the history of humanity, the same conviction that man can and must be overcome, the same certitude that we have to do away with culpability and the law”. Ibid., p.76. This reconciliation obviously implies a misreading by Nietzsche of Paul which the author spends some time elucidating.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p.100.

¹³⁶ This is not to say that we do not find references to, for example, the imminent coming of the Final Judgement in the New Testament only that they are more prevalent in the Old Testament and are seldom found in Paul. As Bernard McGinn illustrates: “In the New Testament, the presence of the Danielic figure of 1,260 days in John’s Apocalypse (see 11.3 and 12.6), as well as the identification of the seven heads of the Beast with seven Roman rulers (Apoc. 13), hint at predictive imminence, while the Apocalyptic Discourse of the Synoptic Gospels Jesus warns against attempts to predict the day or the hour of his return (see Matt. 24.36, Mark 14.32).” Bernard McGinn, “The End of the World and the Beginning of Christendom”, in Malcolm Bull (ed.), *Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World*, Oxford: Blackwell (1995), p.60.

envisage a line of flight of Christianity that provides an explanation for its multiple excesses, its acts of violence, of abuse, of domination, of disdain, of inhumanity; one which, in its most extreme configurations, can be read as imperiously territorializing from a transcendent God's Eye view over an abject immanence. This is also the Christianity that can be interpreted as positing a counter-discourse to the autonomous discourse of security of the Roman Empire, a counter-discourse that would oppose a self-same antagonist, an analogue replacement, operating under a similar, albeit, as addressed in the next chapter, different, logic. This Christianity is one that articulates itself as a manifestation of the State form i.e. a Christianity that is called by the siren song of the logic of the One.¹³⁷ Through a radically transcendent Other, this Christianity can counterpose to the hubris of the security of mortal life its own hubristic securing of the security of the afterlife. It is through this Christianity that, as subsequently seen, in the multiple contradiction of its collapse, enabled the articulation of the modern Sovereign State, its thought, and its politics of security.

The other line of flight of Christianity that can be envisaged, one that is precisely enabled by Badiou's reading of St. Paul, is one which disrupts the logic of Empire, disrupts the logic of the One and the transcendence of its law. Instead of being a manifestation of State thought and State form, it has more in common with Clastre's primitive societies, with the installation of mechanisms to ward off the advent of the One, of the hierarchical subjection to a transcendent

¹³⁷ As Gauchet remarks: "The unfolding of transcendence was accompanied by the completion of history: the second coming has never ceased to counterbalance the Incarnation, and the infinite distance opened up by God's son becoming man was supposed to be ultimately cancelled out by Christ's second coming, this time as a glorious king. Here we have the unshakable buttress, the ultimate bulwark of resistance by which the Christian vision continued to be related to the philosophy of the One. Once everything originating in analogical or miraculous consubstantiality of the visible and the invisible had been removed, there was still the prospect of a final reabsorption of this world into the other." Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.122.

Other. Through an immanentist first move, and the positing of alterity in its midst, this position disables the God's eye of the Law while still providing the space to posit a trans-literal law *via* love. With regards to security, this reading also apprehends the security of Empire as a hubristic stance, but it does not pretend to replace it by its own opposite version. It *disrupts* this discourse of security, it reveals its intimate connections to forms of law/power/knowledge. From a more humble optic towards being, it posits an acknowledgment of the precariousness of the human condition with, however, the firm belief that the standpoint upon which it stands, one that recognizes the division of the subject, the excess to any situation etc..., is a more humane way to engage with being-in-the-world. This point is well articulated in the redistribution of the places of life and death that Badiou sees in Paul, and can be addressed in relation to the final verse of the passage of Paul which I have been examining:

For God has not destined us for wrath, but to obtain salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us so that whether we wake or sleep we might live with him.¹³⁸

In examining this verse, the questions addressed above with regards to the two readings of Christianity are explicitly highlighted. To the resentment enabled by destiny and wrath, there is a clear affirmation of life, an affirmation enabled through the revelation of *sin*, not as something that *is*, tied back to some original sin, but as a particular disposition. It is a revelation that, in its awareness of the divided subject "whether we wake or sleep", permits the redistribution of life and death. This redistribution is not a simple reversal which would instate the way of the spirit as full presence while simultaneously occulting the way of the flesh, but an acknowledgment of the divided subject, an acknowledgment which, as was apprehended above,

¹³⁸ *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version, Ignatius Press (1994).

articulates itself through the “no” to the flesh, while simultaneously holding itself in the “precarious becoming” of the “but” of the spirit.

What we see here is precisely the logic articulated in the previous chapter with regards to the question of foundation and its excess. As in the standpoint articulated in Chapter Two with regards to the foundation/anti-foundation debate and the question of the *parergon*, Paul’s answer *via* this reading is also one which does not reframe, in the positing of a law that would provide a secure foundation for the way of the spirit which would again evacuate subjective will and intentions while simultaneously occulting the way of the flesh. Furthermore, it also does not dream of the absence of the frame which would disavow the way of the flesh in articulating the way of the spirit only in terms of a precarious becoming, in a pure circulation of a-legal multiplicity thus eschewing the necessity of both subjective dispositions.

This brings us to the question of what this all means with regards to our present predicament. Although I will be in a better position to address these issues once we trace the advent and the logic of the sovereign State in the next two chapters, it is nonetheless both possible and important to address this issue briefly. The importance I place on this Pauline reading is both its ability to help us begin to grasp some of the complicities and complexities between security, the State form, the political, knowledge, the law, etc..., and also the conditions under which a discourse against security can *be*. In our age where such a discourse seems so foreign as to be impossible, where the present frame of reference always already forecloses such a possibility, it is imperative to understand how and why this foreclosure articulates itself. Reading Paul as a counter-discourse to Imperial Rome shows the way in which, at one time, such a discourse against security became possible - i.e. how it opened up

new horizons of possibility, new articulations of political space. Regardless of what one may think of Christianity, regardless of the question of faith in God, what the Christian discourse did to change the face of the world through the articulation of new subjectivities, through the articulation of new forms of social and political space, cannot be denied. As was seen above, much of what Christianity brought forth may resemble what came before it and what has come out of it in its complicity with the articulation of modern forms of social order - i.e. in terms of the violence and domination deployed in and through its name, as well as through the name of the modern Sovereign State. However, the other possibilities inscribed in its margins and which intersect with a multiplicity of other such possibilities, as well as its articulation of a discourse against security are, I think, reason enough to merit close attention. Furthermore, it should be noted here, with regards to the Roman Empire, that the similarities that we may find between our present predicament and the latter merit close attention and will, in some senses, be addressed again. However, it should be made clear here that any such similarities should not be taken as part of some perennial forces, or laws, which transcend history, from “outside”, which pass over us mere mortals as comets in the sky, but are part of the baggage that we, as living beings bring from our interpretations of the past and the way in which we have since been performatively inscribing these in our presents and into our futures.

As concerns Badiou’s disruptive reading of St. Paul and his elaboration on the event, which also intersects with a multiplicity of other readings and projects on the margins, with a manifold of standpoints acknowledging the excess to any situation, what can be gleaned with regards to our present? The possibilities of the articulation of a Truth-event today in the same form as that deployed by the early Christian Pauline discourse poses considerable difficulties

primarily due to the way in which science has become the optic through which the world is apprehended. As Zizek succinctly explains:

Although the Truth-Event does designate the occurrence of something which, from within the horizon of Knowledge appears impossible (think of the laughter with which the Greek philosophers greeted St Paul's assertion of Christ's Resurrection on his visit to Athens), today, any location of the Truth-Event at the level of supernatural miracles necessarily entails a transgression into obscurantism, since the event of Science is irreducible and cannot be undone. Today, one can accept as the Truth Event, as the intrusion of the traumatic Real that shatters the prevailing symbolic texture, only occurrences which take place in a universe compatible with scientific knowledge, even if they move at its borders and question its presuppositions - the 'sites' of the Event today are scientific discovery itself, the political act, artistic invention, the psychoanalytic confrontation with love....¹³⁹

As has been elaborated in chapters One and Two, the optic through which this thesis is being developed in its relation to social science moves precisely along these imposed margins and attempts to question these presuppositions by concerning itself with the way in which their founding takes place. However, does Zizek not miss what may be the most obvious of "sites" of the Event, one which is explicitly political? Could we not see democracy as the pre-eminent site for the event? An event that has happened but that has been simultaneously foreclosed through calculative thought? The next chapter will begin to address this question by exploring the conditions enabling the foreclosure of the position against security elaborated above to show why and how the negative meaning of the *word* security is occulted while the *concept* of security coalesces around the positive meaning of protection from threats. Moving away from the beginning of Christianity I will now address how this negative meaning articulates itself in Christianity *qua Christendom* - i.e. in terms of the first line of flight elaborated in these concluding remarks - and then move to the latter's "end" and, thus, to the advent of the

¹³⁹ Slavoj Zizek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: Verso (1999), p.142.

sovereign State, its articulation of the political, and the conditions of possibility for the deployment of the modern discourse of security.

IV

From Divine Order to Sovereign State and the Meaning(s) to Security

But concerning the Generall Salvation, because it must be in the Kingdome of Heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the Place. On one side, by *Kingdome*, (which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetuall security against enemies, and want) it seemeth that this Salvation should be on Earth. For by Salvation is set forth unto us, a glorious Reign of our King, by Conquest; not a safety by Escape: and therefore there where we look for Salvation, we must look also for Triumph; and before Triumph, for Victory; and before Victory, for Battell; which cannot well be supposed, shall be in Heaven.

Thomas Hobbes¹

There is scarce truth enough alive to make societies secure; but security enough to make fellowships accurst. Much upon this riddle runs the wisdom of the world.

William Shakespeare²

In Chapter Three, the question of security was explicitly raised with regards to two apparently antithetical meanings to security that were both discursively active in the early modern period, but in which one eventually became hegemonic while the other withered into the margins, living only in the “private” space of the church, found today only through literary excavation into sermons of the past.³ It is this discursive “phenomenon” that prompted me to attempt to ascertain the way in which these two discursive dispositions were generated in the *interregnum* that saw the advent of the Roman Empire as a specific *mise en forme* of social space and the

¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), pp.491-492.

² William Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, Act III, Scene II

³ As was seen in Chapter Three, Der Derian’s genealogical excavation reveals its persistence in sermons from the 16th to 19th century. See James Der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), *The Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993), p.97.

disruption of that space *via* the articulation of a new subjective disposition by the early Christian political movement articulated *via* the Pauline discourse. What was revealed in that excursion is how and why the early Christian Pauline discourse was able to deploy a negative meaning to security as part of its disruption of the Imperial State form that itself relied on a positive meaning of security in the securing of its symbolic order, in the masking of its social divisions and the simultaneous maintenance of the separation between the social and the symbolic place of the organs of power.

In this chapter, I will begin by addressing the way in which the Christian order founds itself as an order. To do so, I will focus on the differences between what I elaborated in the previous chapter in relation to the Roman Imperial order, and the way in which order articulates itself under the aegis of the irresolvable tension at the heart of the Christian dual ontology - i.e. the division between the visible and the invisible catalysed *via* the Christian dogma of Incarnation. Furthermore, with regards to the Christian subjective disposition, Badiou's reading of the Pauline divided subject will be counterposed to Gauchet's understanding of the way in which the Christian subject is divided to provide the basis for an engagement with the Christian articulation of order *via* Christendom. This engagement will enable a reading of the way in which the meaning to security as sin articulates itself in Christendom primarily around the doctrine of *contemptus mundi*: of "contempt for the world". From this elaboration, I will consider some aspects of Christianity that provide the conditions of possibility for a mutation of order in order to set the stage to address another *interregnum* - i.e. the one that sees the advent of the sovereign State. In doing so I will offer a first reading concerned with the articulation of the negative meaning to security within the Christian order and then move on to

provide a second reading that will concern itself with the (re)emergence of the positive understanding of security through the advent of the sovereign State. In this way I will address these two meanings to security not in terms of the way in which they came to be, but precisely in terms of how the negative meaning elaborates itself within the Christian order and how this meaning is eventually occulted leaving the positive meaning as the sole reference to what security *is* in a new *mise en forme* of the social, a new giving meaning and staging of law, power and knowledge, and the articulation of a new subjective disposition therein. Again here, the concern is one that is preeminently *political* in the way in which this term was articulated in Chapter Two, the ground(ing) established through a political instance, the institution of foundation, and the way in which alterity is negotiated in the articulation of foundation.

In contradistinction to the structure of Chapter Three, however, this chapter does not present a disruptive reading of the Christian order but attempts to reveal the way in which the transition from one order to another - from divine order to sovereign state - is one between foundations in which the opposition between meaning(s) to security and their referents are a central constituent. This shift is one between State forms and their attendant ontological and epistemological tenets in which the articulation of divine order *via* Christendom, however, paves the way for the advent of the sovereign State. The chapter will then move on to begin to set the stage to consider the question of modernity, that will be the central concern of Chapter Five, and the way in which alterity is negotiated in it, while paying close attention to how this negotiation informs the way the political is thought and the discourse of security is deployed. What I argue, however, is that the positive understanding to security deployed in the early articulations of sovereignty and the post-Westphalian classical age does not constitute a clear

break with the past and continues to bear the ontological traces of the divine order in having to address the concerns of the Christian dual ontology in the articulation of temporal order. With regards to security and its intimate complicity with the articulation of social order, this means that a modern understanding of security as protection from external threats in the form of self-same enemies - an understanding that epistemic Realists (re)write into history, in particular since the advent of the Westphalian system - is not yet present. On the contrary, the meaning(s) to security and the referents to which it is associated reflect a concern with internal order and the maintenance of this order's continuity that are inextricably intertwined with the early articulations of sovereignty as a way to found a temporal order while attending to the tensions and contradictions of that of the divine.

In a sense, this chapter and Chapter Five will bring together the concerns relating to the logic of sovereignty entertained in Chapter Two with those addressing the meanings to security at the beginning of Chapter Three, by revealing the relations between the two, apprehending their complicity from a theologico-political optic. As was done in the previous chapter, it should be made clear again here that the following treatment should not be seen as a historical enterprise, but rather a philosophical understanding of the foundation of the divine order and the transition between the latter and the modern sovereign State, the way in which law, power and knowledge are articulated in relation to alterity through this transition, and the way in which subjective dispositions are formed therein, informing how security is given meaning.

From Divine Order...

The Caesura Between the Visible and the Invisible and the Sin of Security

Although the reading of Paul helped to elucidate what a position against security can look like as a disruption of the State form, the reading of Christianity that gained wide currency and eventually became hegemonic is one that articulated itself through this form. The reasons for this outcome, what led towards the positing of an analogue replacement to the *mise en forme* of the social under the Roman Empire are varied and complex and are outside of the purview of this thesis. Furthermore, in addressing this issue, one would also open up for discussion what permitted the rise of the Christian Empire and, conversely, the fall of the Roman Empire. These issues are beyond both my present concerns and my competencies and are of such complexity and immensity as to make any engagement with them trivial. However, I will offer some general remarks within the more restricted context of theologico-political considerations and the discussion regarding the logic of Empire in the previous chapter in order to understand the way in which the negative meaning of security articulates itself in Christendom and how the contradictions in the logic of the Christian Empire enabled the formation of the modern sovereign State and the concurrent loss of this negative meaning.

The logic of Empire, with the transcendent presence of the Other within society, of gods existing in “real time” above and throughout the visible world, impels a concomitant necessity to constantly make the visible worthy of the invisible through what Gauchet calls a “necessity of becoming”. This necessity, beyond the reach of power, accounts for the expansionary nature of the Imperial form through an unending process of increased separation between the social and the place of power. With the Christian dogma of incarnation, what is enabled is an

articulation of order that is very different than that associated with the logic of Empire above, while not completely incompatible with it as a manifestation of a State form. This difference resides in the way in which incarnation points to an ineradicable division between the visible and the invisible. This division, although not absolute, introduces a fundamental tension that the articulation of order under the aegis of Christianity, and, as will be seen, of the “secularization” of order out of Christianity, will have to contend with. As Gauchet explains:

The Christian dogma of the Incarnation was the catalyst which unleashed the dynamic interplay of these contradictions. It was living testimony, at the heart of faith, of the irretrievable split between the two self-substantiating orders of reality. When God adopted a human form, he emerged as wholly other, so different and remote that without the assistance of revelation he would have remained unknown to humans. But at the same time the terrestrial sphere acquired autonomous substantiality and became ontologically complete, gaining enough dignity for the Word to become flesh. Through their mystical union in Christ, the human and the divine were differentiated, as the hierarchical intermixture of the earthly abode and the kingdom of heaven broke down into its basic constituents. However powerful the past, and whatever attempt was made to maintain the cosmic entanglement of the visible and the invisible, henceforth there would be an inexhaustible sustaining mystery at the heart of the belief system, namely, the mystery of separation and otherness condensed into the figure of the Saviour.⁴

Incarnation gives the visible world to itself and enables the acting within it. Yet giving the world to itself implies precisely a fracture between the visible and the invisible, a fracture that, on the side of the invisible, is predicated upon the notion that God can only reach us through the Word becoming flesh. The invisible is thus, in some senses, inaccessible - i.e. there exists an abyss between the human and the divine, an abyss that is impossible to create without incarnation since any other type of contact with the divine would precisely indicate a form of intertwining of the visible and the invisible. Henceforth, under the aegis of Christianity, the possibilities of

⁴ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.77.

articulating social order, whether in an imperial form or otherwise, would have to take into account this dual ontology. Under the aegis of Christianity, the path towards the Imperial form and its logic as it was articulated in the Roman Empire, with its inextricable intertwining of the visible and invisible and its vertical dynamic, would be inexorably obstructed. This does not mean, of course, that a verticality was not at play within the Christian manifestation of the State form. Indeed, this question of verticality will be central to the ensuing elaboration on Christianity and the Christian subject. However, in what Gauchet calls “the transition from a system demanding the merger of the visible and the invisible, to one ensuring their mutual separation”⁵, this verticality is focused on the tension between the visible and the invisible rather than the limitless verticality of the co-penetration between visible and invisible that was addressed in Chapter Three.

The ambiguities contained within incarnation can be read as both an “immanentization of spirit”, as was seen in Badiou, that opened up the possibility of realization in the visible world, while simultaneously effecting a *caesura* between the visible and invisible that, although foreign to the Roman Empire’s intertwining of the visible and the invisible, could be seen as a rearticulation of the State form albeit in relation to a radically different ontological basis.⁶ I want to state here that I am not imputing some form of teleological understanding, a “natural”

⁵ Ibid., p.78.

⁶ This does not contradict Badiou’s reading of Paul but reveals how the ambiguities of incarnation contain the seeds for this simultaneous double move. This ambiguity and its consequences are presaged in Badiou and are found in Paul himself: “Wholeheartedly faithful to the pure event, Paul is satisfied with the metaphor of the ‘sending of the son’. And thus, for Paul, it is not the infinite that died on the cross. Of course, the construction of the site *off*/for the event (*site événementiel*) demands that the son was sent to us, rescinding the void of transcendence, be imminent to the way of the flesh, to death, to all the dimensions of the human subject. This does not in any way result in that Christ is an incarnated God, or that we may think of Him as a finite becoming of the infinite.” Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l’universalisme*, Paris: PUF (1997), p.78. My translation.

progression of the State form from its beginnings to its fully developed self in the form of the modern Sovereign state. This would imply a beginning, something eschewed in the previous chapter; an end, something that this thesis rejects; and a “motor”, for example a linear progression or a dialectic, both of which do not characterize the position taken here. There are certain logics that characterize different *mise en forme* of the social since there is alterity, since there always already is something beyond what is posited as being. Furthermore, this alterity is negotiated in certain ways that produce certain contradictions and certain dynamics. But their overall course, the way in which certain forms succeed each other, and their concrete manifestations are ultimately contingent - i.e. they could have occurred in a myriad of different ways.

Within the present context, it is not as if the possible structural compatibility of Christianity with the State form automatically made Christendom the successor to the Roman Empire. This transition was enabled by multiple transformations within the way Christianity was articulated as well as within the Empire itself. A case in point is the receptivity of Christianity in the Roman Empire. Without the conditions that would permit the popular reception of Christianity in Empire, its subsequent rise to Christendom would never have been enabled. Circumstances such as the breakdown of the republican religious order elaborated upon in the previous chapter and the relativization of traditional customs and practices under the conformity of Roman law, particularly in the provinces, were central changes within societies caught in the vortex of Imperial expansion. Over time, these mutations created the space for the articulation of alternative politico-religious and legal possibilities. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the political and bureaucratic machinery of the Roman Empire provided the

structure within which Christianity was able to deploy itself institutionally. Although there is no doubt that the existing arrangements, the “oppressive machinery of Roman centralism”⁷, were exploited, the relative disengagement between the temporal and spiritual spheres enabled through incarnation necessitated the articulation of a new form of institutionalization. As Gauchet remarks:

The Church’s position, ambition and role made it a wholly original institution: the first bureaucracy to give history meaning, the first administration of ultimate meaning. It had to administer a definitely determined doctrine and body of regulations. On the one hand it had to constantly redefine them, dispel the shadows, remove uncertainties, and determine their dogmatic content; on the other it had to examine all their possible ramifications, so as to maintain a living communication between the spirit and the letter. The Church’s claim to authority arises from a central openness onto the abyss of truth, to which it continually calls attention, while striving to mitigate the vertigo the abyss induced. Hence the inherent equivocation of its understanding to train the faithful and control belief.⁸

Due to its necessity to structure itself with regards to the division between the human and the divine, the Church was not only the purveyor, organizer and interpreter of dogma but also had the responsibility of policing souls. The position of the Church may thus seem tenuous in having to articulate itself in the tension between the visible and the invisible. Indeed, it created a state of perpetual negotiation between the two that was very difficult to maintain. However, since the source of its foundation and legitimacy resided precisely in this division, it perdured despite the various attempts throughout the Middle Ages to dissipate its tension. As Joseph Strayer illustrates:

This is a very difficult theory to apply in any specific situation; even in the Middle Ages

⁷ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.134.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

extremists on both sides sought to modify it. It was easy to push it into theocracy, as many ardent supporters of the papacy did. It was somewhat more difficult to explain it away as giving the church mere moral authority, with no coercive power, yet this feat also was accomplished. But these extreme positions never gained many adherents, and Western peoples continued to believe in the two coordinate powers. Men were subject to both, they had to obey both, and if there was a conflict there was no logical, often no honourable way out. One loyalty had to be sacrificed to another, and while the balance of loyalties might shift, the conflict of consciences remained.⁹

This brings up the question of the way in which the Christian subjective disposition is articulated. In an inextricable relation with the institution of the Church, its legitimacy, and the endurance of this tension, the *caesura* traversing the Christian order also passed through the Christian subject - i.e. the subjective disposition of its adherents.¹⁰ As was seen in the previous chapter, the Christian subject is a divided subject. Badiou's reading of Paul, however, posits a division that is quasi-horizontal in that between the "no" of the flesh and the "but" of the spirit there is definitely a privileging of life over death, although both are apprehended as subjective dispositions in their immanence first, enabled by the fidelity to the event of Resurrection. What is elaborated here, most explicitly by Gauchet, is a division of the subject much more conditioned by verticality; a division that is more conditioned by transcendence/immanence rather than immanence/transcendence, informed by the platonic articulation of soul/body. As Gauchet depicts:

⁹ Joseph R. Strayer, *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1971), pp.323-324.

¹⁰ The relation between the shift in symbolic order and the subjective disposition with regards to the transition from Empire to Christendom can here be contrasted to that indicated by David Campbell who, in seeing no shift in the way the symbolic order was articulated, assumes a similar ordering of identity/difference. As Campbell remarks: "When Christendom emerged as the resolution of the identity crisis in the Roman Empire, it was deeply embedded in the infrastructural relations of power of the empire; there was no discrete historical breach which gave rise to a completely original ordering of identity and difference.", David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), p.50.

There is a dual tension, one in faith's relation to itself, and the other in its relation to external reality. These individuals inwardly isolated from the world were still outwardly subjugated to it, both as corporeal and social beings. They had to win their spiritual autonomy by first turning against that part of themselves dependent on physical reality and controlled by it. Their individual liberty was won at the price of a personal split. In other words, the religious division was played out within them, it traversed and dwelt in them. But at the same time, God had willed and organized the sensory world from which we must separate ourselves in order to reach the heavens. How could the sensory be totally rejected when it was judged worthy of the Word-Made-Flesh? So if we are to radically distance ourselves from the sensory, we must also to some extent consent to it.¹¹

The differences between Gauchet's Christian subject and Badiou's could not be more striking. Freedom here is seen as something that comes at the price of the division of the subject not, as in Badiou, precisely enabled by this division. Furthermore, this division engenders a freedom found *via* a turning-inward of the subject to gain access to the invisible while simultaneously making of the temporal world a place that, although worthy of acceptance due to the fact that God has seen it as a place worthy of incarnation, is only to be consented to since it is secondary and not eligible to be fully affirmed. This acquiescence is very different from the affirmation of life in the temporal world evidenced in Badiou and enabled by the way the division articulates itself *via* the "no"/"but".

These need not be seen necessarily as contradictory readings and can, in their tension, enable an understanding of changes within Christianity's re-representation of itself. Badiou's reading is, first of all, a reading of Paul and not a reading of Christianity *tout court*. Furthermore, this reading is distinctively anti-Platonic and anti-dualistic (hence Badiou's reading

¹¹ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.131.

of ontology from l'un n'est pas¹²). It is precisely this optic that enables such a novel reading. In the long development from the early Christianity apprehended and elaborated upon by Badiou in relation to the Pauline discourse, to the coalescence of its mythic self-representation as a unified world order under the aegis "Christendom" in the Middle Ages, the verticality of the relationship between the spiritual and the temporal apprehended by Gauchet was gradually forged as the primary representation of the articulation between the invisible and the visible. Since the appeal to the invisible world always already brought up the question of the messenger's legitimacy, the predominant means of reinforcing this verticality was the debasement of the temporal world and, thus, the development of a doctrine of *contemptus mundi*. As alluded to earlier, the line of flight of Christianity that culminates in the articulation of Christendom is not solely a product of Biblical interpretation but also of intellectual currents found within the Roman Empire and part of the Greco-Roman civilization. Indeed, with regards to the way in which the doctrine of *contemptus mundi* finds its roots, Jean Delumeau writes:

The scorn of the world and the contempt for mankind propounded by Christian ascetics stemmed equally from the Bible (the Book of Job, Ecclesiastes) and from Greco-Roman civilization. This theme was particularly favored by Plutarch, for example, who quoted the *Iliad*'s comment that "Of all that moves and breathes, nothing is more wretched than man." Similarly, a mosaic found in Pompeii affirms that *Mors omnia aequat*. The first centuries of Christianity also saw dualist anthropologies (Orphic, Platonic, and Stoic) grafted onto the biblical message by the great Cappadocian doctors, by Saint Augustine and by Boethius. Even Eastern "hyperspiritualism" infiltrated Christianity, where it modified the meaning of certain passages of Saint Paul, portrayed the body as a prison, and overrode the creation of man as described in Genesis. [...] Equally foreign to the Bible was the theme of the Fall into the sensible and the multiple, both of which notions derive from Platonism and its posterity.¹³

¹² Alain Badiou, *L'être et l'évènement*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1988), p.31.

¹³ Jean Delumeau, *Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th-18th Centuries*, New York: St. Martin's Press (1990), p.9.

The influence of Platonism and, in particular, the division between body and soul upon this articulation of Christianity should thus not be underestimated. Furthermore, it is indicative of this influence that those who are considered to be the most important figures of the early Christian Church, Origen and Saint Augustine, were both heavily indebted to Platonism in the articulation of their thought.¹⁴ Of the two, of course, Saint Augustine is the one that had the most profound impact upon the subsequent development of a Christian world order. In his articulation of the theme of the two cities - i.e. the Earthly City (*civitas terrena*) and the City of God (*civitas dei*) - Augustine brings to the fore an explicitly political representation of both the *caesura* between the spiritual and the temporal and the theme of *contemptus mundi* underpinning the latter. As Augustine expounds with regards to the loves that constitute the two cities:

These are the two loves: the first is holy, the second foul; the first is social, the second selfish; the first consults the common welfare for the sake of a celestial society, the second grasps at a selfish control of social affairs for the sake of arrogant domination; the first is submissive to God, the second tries to rival God; the first is quiet, the second restless; the first is peaceful, the second trouble-making; the first prefers truth to the

¹⁴ This, of course, does not mean that what is articulated by these thinkers is a pure form of Platonism nor, for Augustine, the form of neo-platonism articulated by Plotinus. The incarnation precludes a privileged access to the invisible which would claim to be analogous to the mediation furnished by the perfect mediator known as Christ. For this reason, Jean Elshtain, in her development on Augustine's *De Trinitate*, a work that explicitly addresses the relationship between faith and knowledge, states: "Augustine's much-heralded neo-platonism here gives way, in part. He upends the Platonic dialectic by forsaking the notion that human beings might ever obtain clairvoyant knowledge of transcendent forms. We can, at best, approximate, analogize, allegorize." Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Augustine and the Limits of Politics*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press (1995), p.54. In fact, Augustine, among others, in order to be able to integrate themes and ideas from ancient philosophy, consistently attempts to discredit the latter by accusing it of appropriating truth from the source of divine providence. For Augustine, the task is thus to wrestle this truth away from ancient philosophy and hand it back to its rightful possessors. As Hans Blumenberg illustrates through a quote from Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*: "But if those who are called philosophers, especially the Platonists, say something that is true and consistent with our faith, not only do we have no need to be afraid of this, but we may take over the property in this truth from those who are its unrightful possessors.... What they possess as their silver and gold they have not produced for themselves; they have derived it, as though from a mine, from the shafts of divine providence, which rules everywhere." in Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, Cambridge: MIT Press (1983), p.70.

praises of those who are in error, the second greedy for praise, however it may be obtained; the first is friendly, the second envious; the first desires for its neighbor what it wishes for itself, the second desires to subjugate its neighbor; the first rules its neighbor for the good of its neighbor, the second for its own advantage [...]: the first city is that of the just, the second that of the wicked. Although they are now, during the course of time, intermingled, they shall be divided in the last judgment; the first being joined by the good angels under its King, shall attain eternal life; the second, in union with the bad angels under its king, shall be sent into eternal fire.¹⁵

What we find here is a clear articulation of the *caesura* that is produced through the Christian incarnation. Contrary to various misreadings of Augustine, including what is alleged to be the most famous by Charlemagne¹⁶, which would attribute to Augustine the idea of the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth, the above quote clearly indicates how this form of reconciliation favouring the establishment of a theocracy is strongly eschewed by the author. In fact, what we find is a mechanism that would perpetually reinforce the division by employing a final separation effected *via* the Last Judgement as a yardstick.

There is, thus, *never* a reconciliation between the temporal and spiritual worlds, even after the end of time. Yet, conversely, before the Final Judgement, there is an impossibility of a complete scission between the two and it is within this tension that both forms of love - one the love of God and the other a sinful love of self - manifest themselves within the temporal order. It is important to note that, for Augustine, although the question of the Last Judgement

¹⁵ Saint Augustine, "Literal Commentary on Genesis", XI, 15.20, in *The Essential Augustine*, Second Edition, Vernon J. Bourque (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett (1974), p.201.

¹⁶ Many authors contend that Charlemagne was heavily influenced by Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* and acted through a misreading of Augustine's intentions. See Heinrich Fichtenau, *The Carolingian Empire*, trans. Peter Folz, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1957), p.64 and R.H.C. Davis, *A History of Medieval Europe*, London: Longman (1974), p.139. There is, however, dissent among historians with regards to this point which, in relation to the influence of Augustine on the early Middle Ages, is raised by James Der Derian who cites A.S. Carlisle who, in his *History of Medieval Political Theory*, questions his influence on political relations. See James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Oxford: Blackwell (1987), p.69.

is central and forms part of a definite eschatology, it is not viewed in relation to some form of millenarian apocalypticism. In fact, Augustine was opposed to any attempts to decipher the meaning of the present in relation to the coming end or to determine its time. As Bernard McGinn explains:

[Augustine] maintained a strict agnosticism toward all attempts to determine the time of the end. While his teleology of history is certainly eschatological in that the temporal process is given shape and meaning by its telos in the Last Judgment that will separate the sheep from the goats, Augustine immanentized eschatology by moving the history within the soul - the world of ages and their goal are the model for the true meaning of history, the moral development of the believer.¹⁷

In this way, Augustine prepares the site for the role of the Church as delineated above in providing meaning in relation to the “abyss of truth” and the policing of souls. It is evident from his quote, addressing the theme of the two cities *via* the question of two forms of love, it is through the Christian subject that Augustine apprehends the question of the political. In the articulation of this tension, Augustine enables the possibility of ameliorating the temporal condition by looking up to the *civitas dei* for divine inspiration through faith. However, this amelioration is always depicted in relation to *contemptus mundi*.

Regardless of the fact that the Last Judgement does not, in Augustine, become the pervasive nodal point from where to decipher the meaning of the present with regards to an imminent future, with an end there must be a beginning. Within the context of the temporal world, this beginning is articulated here with regards to the original sin of the Adamic myth which becomes inherited in the *civitas terrena*.¹⁸ It is within the context of this fallen world,

¹⁷Bernard McGinn, “The End of the World and the Beginning of Christendom”, in Malcolm Bull (ed.), *Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World*, Oxford: Blackwell (1995), p.62.

¹⁸ As Augustine explains: “We have already stated in the preceding books that God, desiring not only that the human race might be able by their similarity of nature to associate with one another, but also that they might

separated from the *civitas dei* that earthly political life is seen as originating in sin. In reference to the quote by Augustine above, to the just society of the *civitas dei* with its eye on the Truth of the heavens in quiet submission, Augustine counterposes the wicked, selfish quest for domination and the desire of subjugation of the *civitas terrena*, in its restless, hubristic quest to be a rival to God.

Within this context, it is easy to see how security could maintain a negative connotation in being a condition of misplaced confidence, an assurance in the selfish earthly power of the *civitas terrena*, blind to the Truth of the *civitas dei*. Yet this does not mean a position strictly against security, but only against security as it manifests itself in relation to a self-reference in the temporal world. It is thus a transferring of security to the Truth of the *civitas dei*, in the moral development of the believer with “his” eyes on the divine and its manifestation in the temporal sphere, in “Christ and the Church, that is, [...] the King and that city which he founded”¹⁹. Any other assurance is always already sinful and misplaced, is part of the false assurances of the temporal world. In this context, Augustine clearly delineates his position in relation to the reign of King Solomon, “or any other king whatever [...]. For in the very great

be bound together in harmony and peace by the ties of relationship, was pleased to derive all men from one individual, and created man with such a nature that the members of the race should not have died, had not the two first (of whom the one was created out of nothing, and the other out of him) merited this by their disobedience; for by them so great a sin was committed, that by it the human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death. And the kingdom of death so reigned over men, that the deserved penalty of sin would have hurled all headlong even into the second death, of which there is no end, had not the undeserved grace of God saved some therefrom. And thus it has come to pass, that though there are very many and great nations all over the earth, whose rites and customs, speech, arms, and dress, are distinguished by marked differences, yet there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities, according to the language of our Scriptures. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit; and when they severally achieve what they wish, they live in peace, each after their kind.” Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, Book XIV, Chapter I, New Advent (1997) <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120114.htm>

¹⁹ Ibid., Book XVIII, Chapter 29.

mutability of human affairs such great security is never given to any people, that it should not dread invasions hostile to this life. Therefore the place of this promised peaceful and secure habitation is eternal".²⁰ Yet the Church must also somehow coexist with the impious city, the temporal order. In this, Augustine uses peace as a unifying narrative, for "every man seeks peace [...] even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed into a peace that suits them better."²¹ In this way, Augustine can, while maintaining the tension between the temporal and the divine and the disposition towards the temporal of *contemptus mundi*, provide through his eschatology, as James Der Derian suggests, "an instrument to reconcile and enforce religious ethics and secular laws: a vision of the last days of heavenly perfection [that] will ensure a peaceful and well ordered terrestrial society."²² In other words, a way to have the faithful adhere to the temporal order. As Augustine illustrates:

The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away. Consequently, so long as it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city, though it has already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered; and thus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in regard to what belongs

²⁰ Ibid., Book XVII, Chapter 13.

²¹ Ibid., Book XIX, Chapter 12.

²² James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Oxford: Blackwell (1987), p.65.

to it.²³

In this way, moreover, the Church can maintain its universality amidst diversity by calling “citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained” although, under the aegis of a very important caveat: “so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced.”²⁴ Paradoxically, within this context, the unifying narrative of peace also enables, as Der Derian suggests, the possibility of “unit[ing] the sword with the cross”²⁵, the inauguration of the just war doctrine within the Christian tradition.²⁶ Furthermore, through the above caveat, the power of the Church manifests itself in the policing of souls and is able to structure the social order from its “otherworldly pole”.

It should be evident from the above elaboration that Augustine opens up the horizons

²³ Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, Book XIX Chapter 17. Although outside of the purview of this work, the question of how the notion of peace is articulated during the medieval period is an immense topic which deserves more attention. One of the major insights which research in this area has gleaned is that in its many textual manifestations we find representations of peace which go way beyond the traditional modern definition of it as the absence of war. Peace was instrumental in the articulation of social order. See, in particular, Diane Wolfthal (ed.), *Peace and Negotiation: Strategies of Coexistence in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, Turnhout: Brepols (2000).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Oxford: Blackwell (1987), p.63.

²⁶ Ironically, the just war doctrine in line with Christian precepts did much to expand the ambit and possibility of war in relation to its articulation under Roman law by addressing the question of faith: “The selected examples and Augustine’s reinterpretation of them significantly altered the just war doctrine. First, his doctrine reinterpreted the delimitations Cicero had established in his *justa belli ulciscunter injurius*, which held that a clear violation of the pre-existing rights of the injured (that is, just) party was necessary to justify a war. But in Augustine’s scheme, in which faith as well as property could be subject to injury, the scope of not only compensatory but also punitive damages was enlarged. Consequently, Cicero’s concept of proportional violence was diminished in favour of militant piety, as would be proven in the holy wars.” Ibid.

of possibility for the advent of secularism²⁷ yet, concurrently, the latter's political resolution also opens up the possibility of the foundation of a Christian social order under the letter of the Law via an ontologization of sin, by setting down what sin *is* from a sovereign optic. As Jean Delumeau, explains, "the science of sin took on a new dimension with Saint Augustine, who would henceforth rein as master of this immense field. Christian theology would later adopt his famous definition: 'sin is all action, word, or greed opposed to the eternal law'".²⁸ The Truth of the Christian Law secured to the "otherworldly pole" becomes that which structures the social order and informs the Christian subjective disposition in the way articulated above. Furthermore, this firm anchor of Truth is to eliminate contingency, to eliminate the precariousness upon which the divided Christian subject, seen in Badiou's reading of Paul, was able to affirm life. Christianity absorbs within it all contingency and rearticulates it within its own frame of reference. An excellent example of this is highlighted by William Connolly in his treatment of the relation between Christian morality and the uncanny: "Augustine subdues the uncanny *within* morality by investing it in an omnipotent, benevolent god who commands

²⁷ On this see, in particular, William E. Connolly, *The Augustinian Imperative: a Reflection on the Politics of Morality*, Newbury Park: Sage (1993).

²⁸ Jean Delumeau, *Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th-18th Centuries*, New York: St. Martin's Press (1990), p.191. The ontologization of sin is understood here in contradistinction to the way in which sin was apprehended in the previous chapter through Badiou's reading of Paul - i.e. sin being seen as something that *is* instead of being intimately associated with a subjective disposition. Within Augustine this articulates itself in the distinction between venial and mortal sin. As Delumeau explains within the context of who maintains the authority to remit transgressions of the law: "These doubts ended with Saint Augustine who clarified the venial-mortal distinction in such a way that his version has dominated all later theology. He explains that venial sin - *crimina levia, quotidiana, venialia* - do not take away the life of the soul, which remains united with God. In these cases one loves the flesh and what is transitory, not against but outside of God. Such transgressions thus do not cause damnation and are remitted through prayer, fasting and charity. In contrast, mortal sins - *crimina letalia, mortifera* - are incompatible with the grace that they extinguish. They cause the loss of the right to Heaven granted by baptism, and they can be remitted only by the church, by virtue of the keys given to Saint Peter. In this way Augustine establishes a lasting and absolute demarcation between those crimes that do or do not deserve everlasting fire." Ibid., p.195.

morality and exceeds its dictates.[...] [This] represses the uncanny *within morality*, because now any identification of it there constitutes impiety against the mysterious god who commands it. Piety is the key Augustinian weapon, [...] *a self-protective tactic*”²⁹.

What we have here is thus a particular reading of the way in which a certain Christian line of flight begins to (re)territorializes itself under the aegis of the State form and a specific articulation of law/power/knowledge. Although there are a myriad of factors behind the way in which this particular articulation was enabled and, as will be seen, Augustine is by no means the only discursive chain operating in opening up the possibility of the latter, the Augustinian discourse is undoubtedly an important nodal point from which Christianity drew sustenance in the development of its self-representation as Christendom. It is thus perhaps not a coincidence that the term *christianitas*, as a precursor to Christendom, appeared around 400 AD, during Augustine’s lifetime.³⁰

Before moving on to explicitly consider how the contradictions of this order enabled the advent of the modern sovereign State and the consequent disappearance of the negative meaning to security, I would like to make a final point by following a specific trajectory that will begin to engage with these contradictions while providing a specific reading of how security articulates itself with regards to the symbolic order of Christendom. In this much too brief

²⁹ William E. Connolly, *The Augustinian Imperative: a Reflection on the Politics of Morality*, Newbury Park: Sage (1993), p.136.

³⁰ See Bernard McGinn, “The End of the World and the Beginning of Christendom”, in Malcolm Bull (ed.), *Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World*, Oxford: Blackwell (1995), p.59. As McGinn notes, “Between the first appearances of the term *christianitas* around the year 400 AD, when it was employed largely in the sense of the correct practice of Christian religion and in the nascent European vernaculars of the ninth century and after to identify the territory in which the Christian religion was rightly observed (the sense of the old english *christendome*), decisive changes restructured the entire Roman *oikumene*.” Ibid.

argument, considering the breadth of the topic discussed, I would like to bring to fruition the tension between Badiou and Gauchet alluded to earlier by reading Badiou's Paul against the present reading of Augustine. In other words, to investigate the tension between a particular reading of early Christian thought against one of Christendom. This reading centres upon Badiou's reading of the Law in Paul and how it can be apprehended with regards to the way in which Christendom articulates itself through eternal Law. As will be remembered, Badiou's reading of Paul highlights the way in which, from the standpoint of the law, the excess that constitutes the subject is occulted and the subject operates under the illusion of full presence. This presence is illusory in that, under the letter of the Law, the law installs the autonomy of desire in the place of the subject, evacuating will and intentions in the inexorable logic of Prohibition and transgression and the morbid fascination with the latter's object: death. Finally, the deployment of the letter of the Law *via* the State of the situation engenders a *caesura* between thought and action in that the latter only operates under the logic of Prohibition and transgression while thought is unable to prescribe action in apprehending a dead, powerless, subject. The question to be asked is, therefore, how would this understanding apply to Christendom and the letter of eternal Law?

With regards to the question of presence, what we find in the anchoring of Truth to eternal Law is the evacuation of contingency. This purgation of contingency can be apprehended as an attempt to eliminate the unmasterable excess accompanying any situation. What occurs with the transformation of Christianity outlined above is precisely an attempt to eliminate the alterity of this excess through the fixation of the markers of certainty to the Other of the letter of eternal Law. Recalling Badiou's treatment of the Law and, in particular, how

the Law is apprehended as giving to each part of the whole what is their due, what we find through Augustine and his articulation of the order upon which we find peace is precisely this: it is "the disposition of beings equal and unequal, by designating to each one the place that is suitable".³¹ What is lost is thus the grace of the event of resurrection, the event that demands a multiplicity in excess of itself, the possibility of the affirmation of life. The policing of souls can thus be seen in terms of the way in which Jacques Rancière understands the term "policing" in relation to the ordering of the "visible and the sayable."³² Here, it is from the site of the invisible that the ordering takes place; the ordering of beings, *via* a "rule governing their appearing, a configuration of *occupations* and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed."³³

As was seen, the Christian subject, whether apprehended through Badiou's reading of Paul or Gauchet's understanding of the specificity of Christianity, is a divided subject. However, there is an important difference between the two. Gauchet's Christian subject is the subject under the letter of divine Law, of transcendence/ immanence rather than immanence/transcendence, of interiority, submission, and of a vision of the temporal order as something to be endured even though it simultaneously opens up the possibility of making the world intelligible. This intelligibility, however, under the letter of divine Law, will always already be tainted by the doctrine of *contemptus mundi* and the optic of a fallen world. What

³¹ Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, Book XIX, Chapter 13. This is not to say that there is not in Christianity an *ethos* of equality, indeed as will be seen later, it is an inextricable outcome of its dualist structure. However, it is an equality which manifests itself under the apportioning of the Law.

³² Jacques Rancière, *Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1999), p.29.

³³ *Ibid.*

would be expected under the Law, according to Badiou's reading, would be to find, in the place of the subject, the autonomy of desire, the logic of Prohibition and transgression, and a fascination with death. Is this not precisely, in some senses, what develops in the *longue durée* of Christianity *qua* Christendom? Is there not an ever-deepening disposition towards the world in the form of *contemptus mundi* and an ever more morbid fascination with death and of the fear in the latter? Indeed, Jean Delumeau's impressive historical inquiry *Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th-18th Centuries*, that was referred to earlier, traces the continuity and expansion of the *contemptus mundi* doctrine between these centuries and its intimate connection to a theology of sin and an evangelism of fear.³⁴ In Badiou's terms, this reveals how, in trying to manage the logic of Prohibition and transgression, the Church and the subjective disposition enabled by the latter represented an increasing contempt for the temporal world and deployed ever-more vivid depictions of the terrible punishments that could be bestowed by the "infinitely kind" God. These, in addition to increasingly macabre visions of the afterlife for the sinner, served as the mechanisms to police souls. The result was the development of a collective guilt complex, a culture of anxiety and an obsession with death. However, in contradistinction to the subjective disposition that Badiou depicts in relation to the beginning of the Roman Empire, here we have the same logic of Prohibition and transgression although the object of desire death is not to be found in relation to an intermixed temporal/spiritual sphere. Because of the inherent duality of the symbolic order, the object of

³⁴ Jean Delumeau, *Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th-18th Centuries*, New York: St. Martin's Press (1990). With regards to the field of international relation Delumeau's work is taken up by David Campbell in *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), pp.54-56.

desire is found precisely in the spiritual sphere, the macabre torture of the afterlife, the death after death or, as Augustine describes it, “the second death, of which there is no end”.³⁵ Paradoxically, therefore, the obsession with death of desire under the letter of Canon Law in relation to the particular configuration of Christianity, can be seen as an obsession with death as it is figured after death, an obsession with making the invisible grotesquely visible as in the paintings of Hieronymus Bosch³⁶, an obsession through which full presence is only apprehended in relation to the place of the divine.

Within the context of security, this policing of souls meant that the latter was always already mediated *via* the otherworldly pole, found only in relation to the divine. What is thus *not* found in Christendom is an articulation of a security discourse related directly to its various “enemies at the gate” since any such discourse would precisely be seen as emanating from the hubris of installing oneself in the place of God, as *sin*. Regardless of the potential “threats” to Christendom as perceived from our modern optic, it is the relationship between the temporal and the spiritual that mediated both the understanding of danger and the waging of war because the subjective disposition articulated *via* Christianity disabled any other possible optic. It is for this reason that Delumeau can state:

It might easily be thought that any civilization - in this case Western civilization from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries - which was besieged (or believed itself to be besieged) by a multitude of enemies - Turks, idolaters, Jews, heretics, witches, and so on - would not have had time for much introspection. This might have been quite logical, but exactly the opposite happened [...] It was as if the aggressivity directed against the enemies of Christendom had not entirely spent itself in incessant religious

³⁵ Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, Book XIV, Chapter I.

³⁶ See, for example, his visions of hell in the triptychs *The Garden of Earthly Delights* (c.1504) and *The Last Judgement* (c.1505).

warfare, despite constantly renewed battles and an endless variety of opponents. A global anxiety, broken up into “labelled” fears, discovered a new foe in each of the inhabitants of the besieged city, and a new fear - the fear of one’s own self.³⁷

From the optic developed here, it is precisely because the symbolic order of Christendom, its articulation of law/power/knowledge in its relation to the alterity of the transcendent Other, that this apparent paradox takes place. Within the context of some of the factors delineated, such as the dualism inherent to Christianity through the incarnation and the necessity of maintaining the latter, the subsequent self-representation of Christendom in terms of the *civitas terrena* and the *civitas dei* and the doctrine of *contemptus mundi*, as well as the particular disposition of the Christian subject in its orientation towards the divine it is easy to understand how security can only come from the Truth of the letter of eternal Law and the relation with the otherworldly pole that institutes and informs what *is* through faith. In this sense, what is revealed is the intimate relationship between security, Truth, and what is articulated *via* a specific form of knowledge as what *is* - i.e. the primary ontological referent in the specific *mise en forme* of the social. In the present context, *via* the ontological duality of Christianity, the articulation of the social through its mediation with the otherworldly pole makes the latter a more intimate and primary political relation than that which is commonly seen as driving the dynamic of security in modernity: the Schmittian understanding of the political as the opposition between friend and enemy. Yet, as will be seen, the situation in/of modernity with regards to the political and security is infinitely more complicated than it may seem, a complication that both reveals the inherent difficulties of thinking beyond its frame but simultaneously opens up the possibility of

³⁷ Jean Delumeau, *Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th-18th Centuries*, New York: St. Martin’s Press (1990), p.1.

thinking otherwise about both the political and security. In beginning to address these issues, what must be first set forth are the continuities and discontinuities characterising the shift from the above *mise en forme* of the social to that articulated in modernity - i.e. that of the Sovereign state.

Christianity and the Seeds of Modernity

One of the major insights brought to the fore in Delumeau's book on the theology of sin and the evangelism of fear, is the way in which "the Renaissance appears far gloomier than is ordinarily taught."³⁸ Yet it should come as no surprise that this periodization of history has been retroactively (re)written as "Renaissance", to distinguish itself from its "middle" or "dark" age Other. This periodization is articulated from the modern standpoint of the mid-nineteenth century since, from a secular optic, it is in the Renaissance that the seeds of what was to become the "modern" age and its *mise en forme* of the social are commonly perceived to be found.³⁹ The circumstances that bring us to the modern State of the situation should not simply be seen as a secularizing process that turned its back on transcendent authority nor, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest, primarily as "the affirmation of the powers of *this* world, the

³⁸ Ibid., p.556.

³⁹ It was in the mid 1800s that the term Renaissance was formulated by, among others, Jules Michelet, Jacob Burckhardt and John Addington Symonds. See Jules Michelet, *Renaissance*, Paris: Histoire de France (1855); Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (2 vol.) S.G.C. Middlemore trans., New York: Harper & Rowe (1958), translated from the original German (1860) by Middlemore in 1878; and John Addington Symonds, *The Renaissance in Italy* (7 vol.), New York: Modern Library (1875-1886). Interestingly, Michelet's coining of the term coincided with the advent of the Second Republic and the Second Empire in France, the establishment of universal suffrage and attempts at accommodations between Church and State. Michelet makes clear where his sympathies lie: "Three sons of serfs, heroic workers, cut the three stones where the new Church is founded: Columbus, Copernicus and Luther", Jules Michelet, *Renaissance*, Paris: Histoire de France (1855), p.310. My translation.

discovery of the plane of immanence”.⁴⁰ Rather, it should be apprehended as emerging from the dualist ontological structure upon which the Christian order was founded and maintained and the contradictions that it fostered. In this, I follow the trajectory set before us by Gauchet in apprehending Christianity as “*a religion for departing from religion*”.⁴¹ Moreover, I take a cue from the work of Lefort who has done, in my opinion, the most to detail the way in which the contradictions of the Christian order enables a new *mise en forme* of the social and how the new negotiation of/with alterity in this new articulation informs the dynamics of the modern social order. What is enabled through the work of these authors, and of others that can come to either supplement or play against it *via* a theologico-political optic, is both a particular understanding of what, where, and how the political and security are thought to be in modernity and the critical space to envisage alternative possibilities.

Some of the characteristics of modernity enabled through the articulation of the *mise en forme* of Christendom and, in particular, the division between the temporal and the divine through which it was founded, have already been alluded to or can be apprehended by pursuing and extending its logic. The possibility for a secular understanding of the world, for example, can only be enabled by a clear distinction between secular and divine worlds, a disjunction between the visible and the invisible, a “yawning gap” as Gauchet explains, “hermeneutically impossible to close”.⁴² Instead, therefore, of seeing the advent of a secular understanding of the world as a “confrontation between religion and its other”, it should be seen as an opposition

⁴⁰ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2000), p.71.

⁴¹ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.4.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.134.

between different negotiations with alterity, “as so many internal conflicts which set opposing interpretative options of divine difference against each other”.⁴³ Furthermore, although the Christian God is one existing in “real time” and with whom an intimate connection is possible through an inward retreat from the temporal world, it is also a God that is wholly other. In other words, it is a God radically absent from this visible world that leaves humans to their own devices not only in their relation to deciphering and interpreting the divine but also in understanding their world. This self-sufficiency enables the possibility for humans to make the world intelligible for themselves, the possibility of separating reason from faith and subject from object. As Gauchet explains:

The world’s objectivity is the result of a radical separation from God, which moreover frees and institutes the cognitive subject in humans by making it autonomous in relation to divine understanding and withdrawing it from the hierarchy of beings. There is no intellectual access to a God radically separated from the world, so humans are now on their own, with only the light of their investigative faculties to assist them before this silent totality that resists their aspiration for meaning. [...] On the one hand we find the strongest affirmation of God’s splendor; on the other, the autonomy of human reason. Not only does the separation of the deity allow humans to begin understanding the beyond, it also provides the initial foundations for making the world intelligible, independent of God.⁴⁴

The scission between the temporal and the divine can thus be seen as providing the horizon upon which the potentialities of modernity can be actualized. In this sense, what are apprehended as “civilizational advancements” traced back through the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, can be seen, from the present optic, as precisely being enabled by the religious and not in opposition to the latter. In other words, any form of what can be apprehended as

⁴³ Ibid., pp.59-60.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.53.

“opposition” to the religious in the unfolding of Western “civilization” is always already part of the theologico-political matrix as it is articulated in Christianity and is not an autonomous movement that would gradually displace the latter.

One important example of this can be found in the realm of science. Although much has been written about the way in which the Renaissance was characterized by a rediscovery of the philosophy, literature, and science of antiquity, it is important to note that, within the scientific realm in particular, this rediscovery was accompanied by new theories and new solutions to problems that were enabled by the frame of reference in which they were articulated. From a position of relative backwardness in comparison to Indian, Chinese and Islamic scientific traditions, it was only through original answers to old questions and the development of new methods that a truly European scientific tradition was established and flourished. As Joseph Strayer explains:

European science had for a long time been derivative and imitative. It was only in the last part of the thirteenth century and during the fourteenth century that European scholars began to break away from accepted doctrines and to do original work in science. [...] If Europeans had simply continued to repeat the old, basically Aristotelian explanations of natural phenomena, the study of science might have died out in Europe as it did elsewhere. It was the existence of alternative explanations and the controversies which they caused which made science an intellectually rewarding study.⁴⁵

In providing an explanation for this phenomenon the theologico-political matrix of Christianity, or its institutional manifestation in the form of the Church for that matter, remain oddly excluded from a modern, secularist, vantage point. A now famous example utilized by Thomas Kuhn in the development of his theory on scientific revolutions is a case in point. In his

⁴⁵ Joseph R. Strayer, *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1971), pp.317-318.

elaboration on the Copernican revolution, Kuhn's main argument revolves around the anomalies of the Ptolemaic system that prompted the shift to a Copernican paradigm. Of course, the author mentions other factors apart from the internal contradictions spurring the astronomical crisis such as "social pressure for calendar reform [...], medieval criticism of Aristotle, the rise of Renaissance Neoplatonism".⁴⁶ However, the role of the Christian frame of reference in spurring the criticism of Aristotle and its connection to Neoplatonism is sidelined. This is not to suggest that Kuhn's argument is not valid, but to highlight the way in which a secular (re)writing of such an event may miss central insights with regards to the factors that inform the possibilities for particular articulations of scientific knowledge. Although it is understandable that Kuhn would provide such a reading without the use of a theologico-political optic, it is less understandable that he would omit the way in which the institution of the Church itself would also transmit and encourage scientific knowledge. This is a point succinctly made by Paul Feyerabend in elucidating the role of the Church in relation to the same Copernican revolution:

A truth that was found by scientific means was not pushed aside. It was used to revise interpretations of Bible passages apparently inconsistent with it.[...] On the other hand the Church was not ready to change just because someone had produced some vague guesses. It wanted *proof* - scientific proof for scientific matters. Here it acted no differently from modern scientific institutions: universities, schools and even research institutes in various countries usually wait a long time before they incorporate new ideas into their curricula.[...] But there was as yet no convincing proof of the Copernican doctrine. Hence Galileo was advised to teach Copernicus *as a hypothesis*; he was forbidden to teach it *as a truth*.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Second Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1970), p.69.

⁴⁷ Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method*, Revised Edition, London: Verso (1988), p.136. Feyerabend is addressing here a letter written in 1615 by Cardinal Roberto Bellarmino in response to an inquiry by a Carmelite Monk named Paolo Antonio Foscarini regarding the reality of the Copernican system. For a more extensive treatment

Here we find not only an implicit connection in the way in which reason and objective knowledge were enabled through the Christian articulation of the theologico-political matrix, but how even its institutional manifestation can be seen as being explicitly instrumental in fostering its development. In keeping with these observations, reason should, therefore, not be seen as being antithetical to Christianity and to the Church. In fact, not only was the possibility of its autonomy enabled by Christianity, but it was employed and deployed by the Church after the Reformation and right into the Enlightenment. Indeed, the Enlightenment itself can be apprehended as being explicitly enabled by the Church in its deployment of reason. For example, contrary to accounts of the advent of the Enlightenment and of the jurisdiction of reason over faith that it entails, that understand the latter as a break with the dogmas of Christianity from a movement outside of it - either as part of a general process of secularization⁴⁸, the rediscovery of the pagan values of antiquity⁴⁹, or the rise of modern science⁵⁰ - Frederick Beiser reveals the way in which the Protestant Church not only deployed reason as a weapon against its enemies, but also played a central role in the way in which scripture was apprehended and the Church's role in English society were circumscribed with regards to the doctrines of salvation. As Beiser explains:

Rationalism did not arise from the new natural philosophy extending its domain into the sacred sphere, or from the spread of freethinking or materialism. Rather, the authority

of the latter see Paul Feyerabend, *Farewell to Reason*, London: Verso (1987), Chapter 9 "Galileo and the Tyranny of Truth", pp.247-264.

⁴⁸ See Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the 19th Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1975).

⁴⁹ See Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment*, New York: Norton (1966).

⁵⁰ See Norman Hampson, *The Enlightenment*, Harmondsworth: Penguin (1968).

of reason grew because it combatted the Church's many enemies, justified its constitution, and proved a guide to salvation. Indeed most of the leading seventeenth-century rationalists were clerics, and even dissenters and freethinkers had religious motives for their rationalism.⁵¹

This, of course, does not mean that the advent of a secular understanding of the world did not take place, but that the theologico-political matrix of Christianity was intimately involved in providing the impetus for its articulation and a new *mise en forme* of the social in which a novel negotiation with alterity is produced. Furthermore, what should be kept in mind is that this identification of the seeds of modernity is not in contradiction with what went before in relation to the authority of the Church and the articulation of law/power/knowledge in Christendom, but part of the inherent tensions produced by its articulation of alterity. Indeed, insofar as this State of the situation tended to increasingly separate Truth from the temporal world as the orthodoxy of the letter of the Law and the adherence to faith structured the social order ever-more rigidly, it also simultaneously deployed reforming forces towards the personalization of religion and, as will now be addressed, opened up the horizon of possibility for the sovereignty of reason and the reason of sovereignty. As Gauchet explains:

Herein lies the entire paradox of this unprecedented authoritarian enterprise. The Church's dogmatic rigidity and its incredible goal of directing the faithful contributed more than anything else to entrench the spirit of freedom it continually opposed. Its unique attempt to make the community of inner beings participate in God's living mystery, largely brought about the demise of independent investigation's staunchest enemy: the spirit of custom and the received order. The Church's desire to go beyond adherence to the letter and to obtain wholehearted acquiescence, made it the major instigator of the demand to understand over and above obligations to believe. These socially substantial but historical improbable beings, who determined themselves by their own knowledge, whether in relation to the beyond or their equals here-below, appeared

⁵¹ Frederick C. Beiser, *The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1996), p.17.

in and through the Church, even when they opposed it.⁵²

...to Sovereign State

The "Otherwordly Pole" and the King's Two Bodies

It is within this context of the Christian articulation of the theologico-political matrix, of its development within the tension between the wholly transcendent Other and the temporal world, as well as the manifold of contradictions contained therein and of potentialities enabled by this tension, that we can understand the advent of the modern sovereign State and its specific articulation of law/power/knowledge. What is important to ascertain presently is how, more explicitly, the logic of the sovereign State was enabled in relation to this articulation of the theologico-political matrix - i.e. how this logic was actualized with regards to the contradictions and potentialities enabled by the latter. In this, the way in which the theory and the problem of the King's Two Bodies articulates itself through the middle ages by precisely navigating through the tensions between the temporal and the spiritual provides some central insights.⁵³ It is

⁵² Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.138 This is particularly revealed in the way in which heresy played an increasingly important role in the ordering of the social, a heresy precisely enabled by the growing importance of the letter of the Law, its bureaucratization and its policing of souls. As Gauchet explains, in describing Christianity: "We could even call it the religion of heresy, in so far as it was the only religion with a systematic project for recruiting and training souls by bureaucratizing interpretation. The more rigidly orthodoxy asserted itself and tightened its recruitment procedures, the more its truth appeared to come from beyond human reason, from beyond official language, since it was accessible primarily through inner experience. Dogma's prerogatives and the rights of conscience tended to jointly consolidate each other." Ibid., p.80. In this way, the Reformation should be apprehended as part of Christianity's continuity, an actualization of one of the potentialities inherent to its negotiation between the invisible and the visible.

⁵³ A detailed historical elaboration of the King's Two Bodies is outside of the purview of this work. Furthermore, it has also been magisterially done by Ernst Kantorowicz who brought attention to the crucial importance of the theory in the development of medieval political thought. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1957).

important to briefly highlight the way in which we find a gradual shift in the articulation of power *vis-à-vis* alterity that can precisely be traced through the way in which the theory of the King's Two Bodies is apprehended and its problems assumed throughout the middle ages. In this, I retrace through some of what has already been elaborated by weaving a specific genealogical thread pertaining to the advent of the sovereign State and its understanding of security through the tensions of Christianity's symbolic order and its dual ontology.

As was elaborated earlier, the ontological articulation of Christianity precluded the absorption of the profane into the sacred or the sacred into the profane. Yet, what does develop, and which is traced by Kantorowicz from the 11th century onward, is a symbolic negotiation between them in the person of the King. What must be remembered is that this type of negotiation was a risky proposition because it could easily be interpreted as an attempt to take the place of the first, and perfect, mediator in the form of Christ. In a study of certain anonymous logical and political tractates written around 1100 AD, probably by a Norman cleric, Kantorowicz reveals the way in which this question of mediation and impersonation had been circumvented by making the distinction between Christ and King as one in which Christ was mediator by nature while the King was mediator by grace. As Kantorowicz explains:

The King is a twinned being, human and divine, just like the God-man, although the king is two-natured and geminate by grace and only within Time, and not by nature and (after the Ascension) with Eternity: the terrestrial king *is* not, he *becomes* a twin personality through his anointment and consecration.⁵⁴

Here is a representation of the king as a double being, both human and divine, a christocentric representation that we find in the high middle ages, that Kantorowicz calls "christ-centered

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.49.

kingship". This representation was applied to both king and bishop, who were simultaneously "*personae mixtae* (spiritual and secular) and *personae geminatae* (human by nature and divine by grace)"⁵⁵. Kantorowicz suggests that at the time of their writing, these tractates were expressing the thoughts of a bygone era, finding their roots in an earlier period and providing an understanding of the political role of the king and the religious role of the bishop found in the monastic period from 900 to 1100 AD. that was still primarily articulated according to the imperial model.⁵⁶

What we find in the second half of the 11th century, is a radical transformation, engendered by the Church, of the negotiation between spiritual and temporal power which had previously characterized the Christian accommodation during the medieval period. The Gregorian Reforms and the quarrels over Investiture, the struggle for authority over appointments in the Church, handed to the latter the monopoly of spiritual power and served as a catalyst for the establishment of a secular basis for temporal power. As Kantorowicz explains:

...the victory of the revolutionary Reform Papacy in the wake of the Investiture Struggle and the rise of the clerical empire under papal guidance, which monopolized the spiritual strata and turned them into a sacerdotal domain, negated all efforts to continue or renew the king-priestly pattern of liturgical kingship which the Anonymous so fiercely defended. On the other hand, the new territorial states which began to develop in the twelfth century were avowedly secular despite considerable borrowings from the ecclesiastical and the hierarchical model, secular law, including secularized canon law rather than the effects of the holy chrism, were henceforth to justify the holiness of the

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.59

⁵⁶ As Kantorowicz explains: "The ideas of the Norman Anonymous, [...] found no resonance in either the ecclesiastical or the secular camps. [...] the pattern of Christ-centered kingship for which he fought belonged to the past. He is the champion of the Ottonian and early Salian period as well as of Anglo-Saxon England, and his tractates actually sums up the political ideas of the tenth and eleventh centuries." Ibid., p.60.

ruler.⁵⁷

This transformation, initiated by the Church in its attempt to claim the monopoly of spiritual power and to become the sole mediator between heaven and earth, conversely enabled the relative autonomy of the temporal world *vis-à-vis* that of the spiritual. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum similarly pursue this crucial shift and the impact it had on the elaboration of the modern State. As the authors explain:

This unprecedented initiative in the history of civilizations led directly to accreditation the idea of a self-organizing Church, separated from the rest of society, and could only provoke, in contradistinction, the invention of the concept of the State which imposed itself, in turn, as the necessary result of the full dissociation of the political system with respect to the cultural and religious system.⁵⁸

Although Badie and Birnbaum's tone is less cautious than Kantorowicz and is, perhaps, too deterministic, it does effectively relate, in my opinion, the importance of this transformation to the subsequent symbolic mutations that will bring about the development of the sovereign State. What is central to these mutations, is the way in which the autonomy of temporal power is gradually articulated through the tension of the Christian dual ontology by insisting upon the sacral dimension of its institutions. In the face of the Church's ambition and claim to mediate, as Gauchet explains, "national monarchies had to provide themselves with an equivalent religious rationale and were thus led to exploit the possibility of a politics of unmediated terrestrial autonomy whose origins were derived from the religion of mediation."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.60.

⁵⁸ Bertrand Badie et Pierre Birnbaum, *Sociologie de l'État*, Paris: Bernard Grasset (1979), p.161. My translation.

⁵⁹ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.89.

It is thus within this context that the writings of Norman Anonymous were produced and, therefore, reflected a politico-religious configuration that was rapidly waning. Yet in the doubling of the King, despite its liturgical language and ecclesiastical optic, we do find the precursor of the King's Two Bodies, its "high-medieval equivalent".⁶⁰ In view of the above transformations, during the late-medieval period, a transition took place through which the Christ-centered kingship was replaced by one articulating itself in relation to God the father and anchored in Law and, in particular, Roman Law. As Kantorowicz explains:

...as opposed to the earlier "liturgical" kingship, the late-mediaeval kingship by "divine right" was modelled after the Father in Heaven rather than after the Son at the Altar, and focused in a philosophy of the Law rather than in the - still antique - physiology of the two-natured mediator.⁶¹

There is here an interesting parallel occurring within the context of the temporal sphere in association with our earlier articulation of the Church's increasing reliance on Canon Law. Indeed, as the author suggests, "[h]enceforth a papal *Christus in terris* was sided by an imperial *deus in terris*."⁶² Particularly under the imperial reign of Frederick II (1212-1250 AD) and his reliance on Roman Law, there is an articulation of temporal power very similar to that of the Roman Empire even though couched in "ecclesiastical thought, touched by Canon-Law diction, and infused with quasi-christological language".⁶³ The emperor's position *vis-à-vis* the Law

⁶⁰ Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1957), p.87.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.93.

⁶² Ibid., p.92.

⁶³ Ibid., p.102. As Kantorowicz explains: "The chief arguments of Frederick and his legal advisers derived from or were determined by Law - more accurately Roman Law. In fact, the emperor's dual function of "lord and minister of Justice" descended from the *lex regia* or was linked to it, [...] that is, it descended from that famous law by which the Quirites of olden times used to confer the *imperium* together with a limited right of creating law, and of law exemption, on the Roman *princeps*. And therewith a strictly law-centered ideology begins to

was one in which, although not legally bound to it - thus, legally, he was considered above the Law - he nevertheless bound himself to it and lived in accordance to its letter - "his subjection was a *velle*, and not an *esse*."⁶⁴ Yet the form of Law to which he considered himself bound here, is one precisely enabled by the possibilities opened up by Christianity to make the temporal world intelligible: the power of legal Reason. Indeed, this is made clear in a written address by Frederick II to the senators and people of Rome:

Both all-powerful Reason, who commands the kings and Nature impose upon us the obligation to enhance in the times of our imperium the Glory of the City.... In accordance with Civil Law we profess our obligation with a word most worthy [of majesty].... For although our imperial majesty is free from all laws, it is nevertheless not altogether exalted above the judgement of Reason, herself the Mother of all Law.⁶⁵

What must be kept in mind here, is that this is an exaltation to the notion of Reason, an elevation of Reason, and Justice, to the status of a quasi-deity - i.e. an end in itself, worshipped like the deities of Rome.⁶⁶ It is only later that reason is brought into the orbit of the State, legally articulated as an instrument of statecraft as *raison d'état* and, later still, that we find reason to have jurisdiction over faith. In other words, we are still operating within a logic of Empire here albeit one that operates within the Christian articulation of the theologico-political matrix but also one in which the symmetry of the old christomimetic articulation is replaced by what Kantorowicz calls a "law-centered kingship". In other words, an articulation of order where the

supersede the stratum of the mystery-like christomimesis predominant in earlier times." Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.105.

⁶⁵ Quoted in Ibid., pp.105-106.

⁶⁶ This exaltation was not only the province of Frederick II and his advisers, but as Kantorowicz remarks, "[t]he lawyers and Civilians [...] were generally fond of playing with the notion of reason and of hallowing Reason as well as Justice like ancient deities." Ibid., p.107.

King and the Law began to provide the symbolic bearings of order independently from the Church. The shift from the logic of Empire to that of the sovereign State or, as Gauchet depicts it, "the inversion of its dynamic, the toppling of its axis from the exterior towards the interior"⁶⁷ necessitated, however, one further ingredient: a corporeal representation. As Kantorowicz resumes:

In the Age of Jurisprudence the sovereign state achieved a hallowing of its essence independent of the Church, though parallel to it, and assumed the eternity of the Roman empire as the king became an "emperor within his own realm". But this hallowing of the *status regis et regni*, of state institutions and utilities, necessities and emergencies, would have remained incomplete had not that new state itself been equated with the Church also in its corporational aspects as a secular *corpus mysticum*.⁶⁸

The paradox that develops in the wake of the actions of the Church of further dividing the *sacerdotium* and the *imperium* along spiritual and temporal lines and, thus, disabling the christomimetic representation of order, is that in both institutional representations of Church and Kingdom that were becoming increasingly self-sufficient, we find a symbolic interpenetration; a borrowing of symbols of each into the other "until finally the *sacerdotium* had an imperial appearance and the *regnum* a clerical touch."⁶⁹ These were not established symbols, but precisely symbolic mutations that developed in their attempts to performatively articulate their identity vis-à-vis each other. This is a crucial point revealing the difference between the imperial logic of the Roman empire seen in Chapter Three in its intermixture of temporal and spiritual and the inexorable vertical dynamic and its horizontal logic of extension,

⁶⁷ Marcel Gauchet, "Des deux corps du roi au pouvoir sans corps. Christianisme et politique", *Le Débat*, No.14 (Juillet-août 1981), p.139.

⁶⁸ Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1957), p.192.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.193.

and the situation within Christendom - i.e. how the temporal order articulates itself through the Christian dual ontology. In this latter articulation, the vertical path, the path towards the symbolic articulation of Empire, is blocked off by the separate, yet still symbolically inextricably intertwined, spiritual order: the “other” that serves to constitute the temporal world. In this sense, the paradoxical formulation of the “emperor within his own realm”, brought to the fore by Kantorowicz above, reveals the way in which the notion of *imperium*, connoting a form of order without limits, is brought down to earth, circumscribed territorially and, where there was formerly a broadening of order, there is a gradual shift towards a deepening of order within the limits of territorial boundaries.⁷⁰

Of the mutually enabling symbolic mutations that occurred, the most important for the advent of the representation of the sovereign State was that which developed around the notion of *corpus mysticum*.⁷¹ The term *corpus mysticum*, does not find explicit use in the biblical tradition. Although the term *corpus Christi* was used metaphorically by St. Paul to designate Christian society and, through a retroactive (re)reading, came to be used to signify the Church, the term *corpus mysticum*, is traced by Kantorowicz to Carolingian theologians who referred to it in relation to the consecrated host and, thus, not explicitly in reference to social order. Yet, around the middle of the twelfth century, a reversal took place whereby the *corpus Christi* came to designate the consecrated host and the *corpus mysticum*, “which originally had a liturgical

⁷⁰ On the paradox of the “emperor within his own realm”, see Claude Lefort, “Nation et Souveraineté”, *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000), p.32.

⁷¹ With regards to international relations and, in particular, to the questions of foreign policy and identity, this theme of *corpus mysticum* is elaborated upon in David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), pp.88-91.

or sacramental meaning, took on a connotation of sociological content.”⁷² As the Church began to represent itself as *corpus mysticum* what is found simultaneously in the temporal sphere is the representation of the latter as “holy empire”, as *sacrum imperium*.⁷³ Furthermore, through the distinction between *corpus Christi* and *corpus mysticum* there is the emergence of an understanding of the “Lord’s two Bodies”, that is very different from the twin natures of Christ seen above with regards to the christomimetic articulation. Here there are not two *natures* in the same body, one divine and the other human, but two *bodies*, an individual body and a collective body. As elaborated in the twelfth century by Gregory de Bergamo: “One is the body which is the sacrament, another the body of which it is the sacrament... One body of Christ which is he himself, and another body of which he is the head.”⁷⁴ It is here that we find the origins of the King’s Two Bodies as it was articulated with regards to the spiritual sphere. What was needed to fully engender this transition, was the evacuation of its sacral connotations and the possibility of articulating it as a juristic abstraction. In this, according to Kantorowicz, Thomas Aquinas provided the mechanism:

That last link to the sphere of the altar, however, was severed when Aquinas wrote: “It may be said that head and limbs together are as though one mystical person”. Nothing could be more striking than this *bona fide* replacement of *corpus mysticum* by *persona mystica*. [...] a notion reminiscent of, indeed synonymous with, the “fictitious person,” the *persona repraesentata* or *ficta*, which the jurists had introduced into legal thought and which will be found at the bottom of so much of the political theorizing during the

⁷² Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1957), p.196.

⁷³ Kantorowicz is clear in understanding this as a mutually constitutive phenomenon. As the author remarks: “This does not imply causation, either in the one way or the other. It merely indicates the activity of indeed interrelated impulses and ambitions by which the spiritual *corpus mysticum* and the secular *sacrum imperium* happened to emerge simultaneously - around the middle of the twelfth century.” Ibid., p.197.

⁷⁴ Quoted in Ibid., p.198.

later Middle Ages.⁷⁵

From this point, we see a long trajectory through which *corpus mysticum* is articulated in a chain of equivalences with other terms such as the Aristotelian *corpus morale* or *corpus politicum* and, interestingly, the (re)inscription of the term *patria* with regards to the meaning it had in Antiquity as the admixture of “political, religious, ethical, and moral values for which a man might care to live or die”.⁷⁶ However, this term is now taken out of its imperial context and brought into the circumscription of what would become a limited tangible, measurable, concrete, territorial (b)order.⁷⁷

It is within this context that the theory and the problem of the King’s Two Bodies finds itself fully articulated. Within the temporal world, there is thus also a doubling of the body of the King. One body, the “body natural”, a body that is mortal and subject to passions, and another body, the “body politic”, an immortal body of which the King is the head and his subjects are the members. Together, these two bodies constitute a Corporation. It is through this symbolic representation of the social body that the State is made flesh, that the State appears as substantial through its circumscription in the form of a body and that political power becomes symbolically embodied in the image of a sovereign. However, this is certainly not yet an articulation of the modern sovereign State nor of the logic of sovereignty - i.e. it remains an

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.202.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.232.

⁷⁷ As Kantorowicz suggests, “[i]n other words, the loyalty to the new limited territorial *patria*, the common fatherland of all subjects of the Crown, replaced the supra-national bonds of a fictitious universal Empire”. Ibid., p.247. This point is very important inasmuch as the notion of territorially circumscribed borders enables the subsequent deployment of technology in relation to geo-power. I would argue, however, that, notwithstanding the materiality of a circumscribed (b)order, the bonds of the *patria*, are no less fictitious. On this, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, Revised Edition (1991).

articulation of alterity where law/power/knowledge, where meaning and order, are still firmly anchored to an otherworldly pole, to a foundation predicated upon an unconditional exterior source. As Claude Lefort succinctly summarizes:

The prince was a mediator between mortals and gods or, as political activity became secularized and laicized, between mortals and the transcendental agencies represented by a sovereign Justice and a sovereign Reason. Being at once subject to the law and placed above the laws, he condensed within his body, which was at once mortal and immortal, the principle that generated the order of the kingdom. His power pointed towards an unconditional other-worldly pole, while at the same time he was, in his own person, the guarantor and representative of the unity of the kingdom. The kingdom itself was represented as a body, as a substantial unity, in such a way that the hierarchy of its members, the distinction between ranks and orders appeared to rest on an unconditional basis.⁷⁸

In this representation, the head of the king is of utmost importance since it is from the head that the body politic gains meaning and order and, although meaning and order come from an unconditional above, this representation of the body politic as one body and one head serves to further remove this articulation of temporal power and its legitimacy from that of spiritual power on earth: the Church. A very clear example of this is relayed by Jacques Le Goff addressing the work of jurist John of Terrevermeille who wrote three treatises between 1418 and 1419 supporting the legitimacy of the future king Charles VII and that would subsequently be used to serve the cause of Henry IV in the late sixteenth century. As Le Goff conveys:

The author holds that the “mystical or political body of the kingdom [*corpus mysticum sive politicum regni*]” must obey the head, which represents the essential unifying principle and assures order within society and the state. It is the principal member (*membrum principalium*) that the other members must obey. And, since a two-headed society would be monstrous and anarchic, the pope is merely a secondary head, a *caput*

⁷⁸ Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey trans., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1998), p.17.

*secundarium...*⁷⁹

The difference in the possibilities enabled here in the articulation of temporal power *vis-à-vis* the Church in comparison to the constraints which we saw in the christomimetic articulation is striking. The symbolic image of the *corpus mysticum qua* body politic thus unleashes a manifold of potentialities that, through the contradictions inherent to the King's Two Bodies, will eventually move from a separation from the power of the Church in providing meaning and order, to enabling the questioning of the otherworldly pole. In other words, of confronting the symbolic order articulated with regards to a (w)ho(l)ly Other.

Accompanying the configuration of space through incorporation, is a re-articulation of time. Through most of the middle-ages, time was articulated and transmitted by the Church according to Augustinian concepts of Time and Eternity. Inextricably intertwined with the whole doctrine of *contemptus mundi* elucidated earlier, "*tempus*" as Kantorowicz suggests, "was the exponent of transitoriness; it signified the frailty of this present world and all things temporal, and bore the stigma of the perishable."⁸⁰ Time was thus apprehended as finite, created by God, and lasting from Creation to the Last Day. Counterposed to this understanding of time, was the privileged Eternity of God, outside of Time. Beginning in the mid-twelfth century, particularly through a revival of the Aristotelian doctrine of the "eternity of the world" and its

⁷⁹ Jacques Le Goff, "Head or Heart? The Political Use of Body Metaphors in the Middle Ages", in Michel Feher, Ramona Naddaff and Nadia Tazi (eds.), *Fragments for a History of the Human Body*, New York: Zone (1989), p.23

⁸⁰ Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1957), p.275.

subsequent radicalization by the Averroists⁸¹, the question of time became a central philosophical problem. The issue became a source of great debate, and theologians and philosophers attempted to address it by revising the Augustinian dualism of Time and Eternity. In this, what was arrived at was the rekindling of a concept that had slipped into disuse under the sway of the Augustinian dualism: that of *aveum*, or “eon”, “belong[ing] to the angels and celestial Intelligences, the ‘eviternal’ beings which were placed between God and Man.”⁸² In essence, what was done with the introduction of the *aveum*, was to split the difference by introducing a third term “placed” as Thomas Aquinas defined it “between *aeternitas* and *tempus*.”⁸³ Having been created by God and sharing in terrestrial time, but also immortal and surviving the Last Day, angels and their place in/out of time opened up the possibility of permanency and continuity in the temporal world and some form of sempiternity in the latter. Although this may seem trivial from a secular optic, akin to counting the angels on the head of a pin, it was, on the contrary, central to the way in which order and meaning were eventually rearticulated in terms of the modern sovereign State. Indeed, Jens Bartelson succinctly teases out the long term consequences of this novel understanding of time in terms of political ontology, epistemology and ethics. Within the context of ontology, what this understanding of time will eventually enable is the possibility of apprehending the body politic as something distinct from, and outlasting, its ruler. With regards to the epistemic consequences, what is central is the novel understanding of past, present and future that is enabled and the use of

⁸¹ Christian scholars, such as Siger of Brabant, who adhered to the teachings of Averroës. Averroës (1126-1198) was an Arab philosopher and one of the principal Arab interpreters of Aristotle’s works.

⁸² Ibid., p.281.

⁸³ Quoted in Ibid.

resemblance and exempla as a basis for understanding and action. Finally, with regards to the theory of the State that can henceforth begin to be articulated, what is also important to consider are the ethical consequences of this understanding in the externalization of the ethical negativity that was found in the temporal world - a negativity that I articulated earlier *via* the Augustinian contemptus mundi - to outside the borders of the body politic in the form of a contingency beyond the grasp of political knowledge.⁸⁴ Yet we are still within the theologico-political matrix, and these transformations are not only gradual, but also continue to straddle the temporal and the spiritual, and work themselves through the contradictions of the Christian ontological duality. As Kantorowicz suggests with regards to the question of temporality:

what had been an epidemic in the thirteenth century became endemic in the fourteenth and fifteenth: one did not accept the infinite continuity of a "World without End," but accepted a quasi-infinite continuity; one did not believe in the uncreatedness of the world and its endlessness, but one began to act as though it was endless; one presupposed continuities where continuity had been neither noticed nor visualized before; and one was ready to modify, revise, and repress, though not to abandon, the traditional feelings about limitations in Time and about the transitoriness of human institutions and actions.⁸⁵

With regards to the King's Two Bodies, this question of the transitoriness of human institution is obviously a central concern and is an inextricable part of its articulation. As seen, in the doubling of the body of the King, his mortal body is counterposed to the immortality of the body politic to which he is the head. In the symbolism that gives life to this representation, it is specifically the King's Crown that becomes a nodal point for the articulation of sovereign rights *vis-à-vis* the body politic. In its symbolic articulation with regards to the King's Two

⁸⁴ See Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), pp.97-101 *passim*.

⁸⁵ Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1957), p.283.

Bodies, the Crown was both above, or superior to, the members of the body politic, including the mortal body of the king, while simultaneously coinciding with the latter in his immortal and dynastic form. The Crown, furthermore, appeared in itself as a composite body, a body of "an aggregate of the king [who was also its guardian] and those responsible for maintaining the inalienable rights of the Crown and kingdom."⁸⁶ The Crown thus served as a central symbol of continuity. Moreover, it also, through the phrases "head and Crown" and "realm and Crown", provided a link between king and territory that expressed this continuity in metaphysical terms - i.e. in being beyond both king and territory. As Kantorowicz explains:

...as opposed to the pure *physis* of the king and to the pure *physis* of the territory, the word "Crown" when added, indicated the political *metaphysics* in which both *rex* and *regnum* shared, or the body politic (to which both belonged) in its sovereign rights. It may be helpful to recall the perhaps decisive factor: the value of perpetuity inherent in the Crown. For the Crown, by its perpetuity, was superior to the physical *rex* as it was superior to the geographical *regnum* while, at the same time, it was on a par with the continuity of the dynasty and the sempiternity of the body politic.⁸⁷

The theory of the King's Two Bodies, in its long trajectory, thus provided, from a secular standpoint, the accoutrements necessary for the development of the modern sovereign State: territorial circumscription, a self-representation in terms of *patria*, the enactment of the rule of Law and the possibilities of the continuity of order. Paradoxically, this occurred through

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.381.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.341. Indeed, what is operating here is the attempt to give to the articulation of monarchical power permanence in time by bringing transcendence into the temporal world. As Claude Lefort explains: "A whole segment of the history of beliefs remains hidden from us if we ignore how transcendence was transferred into the frontiers of worldly space; and whilst this transference into that space was in part unconscious, it was also the result of deliberate efforts on the part of the politicians and jurists who were striving to elevate monarchical power above all *de facto* powers, to give it a different kind of life to that enjoyed by mortal institutions and mortal men, and to give the state something it lacked and which it had once possessed when it was rooted in a divine land: *permanence in time*." Claude Lefort, "The Death of Immortality", in Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey trans., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.269.

the sacralization of temporal sovereignty, as a result of processes initiated by decisions by the Church through the power of its mediating role. As Gauchet explains:

The religious process of autonomizing a sector of profane sacrality received its ultimate expression within the framework of its emerging political form, whereby the inner realization of the political community acting within the gestating State incarnated the principle of terrestrial integrity. Faced with the will, incarnated in the Church, to make the world part of heaven, this new type of sovereign, representing the nation, lent flesh to the human order's independent legitimacy. This legitimacy was derived unmediated from God, attesting his separation and the legitimacy of his creature's sphere. This was no "secularization" of power, but a transformation of sacrality, which arose from breaking away from its clerical form.[...] There were two broad social aspirations, at once exclusive, complementary, and equal - living testimony to the insoluble tensions in the Christian mode of being-in-the-world.⁸⁸

Indeed, it is within this context that the usage of the term sovereignty, and what is broadly attributed as its earliest articulation in modern terms, can be read. Jean Bodin's "modern" understanding of sovereignty in *Les six livres de la République* (1576) as indivisible and complete, in which the different "attributes of sovereignty" presuppose each other, complement each other, and compose a totality under the aegis of "the power of making and unmaking law" that is the "unique attribute of sovereign power"⁸⁹, is simultaneously articulated in relation to the transcendent majesty of God in the form of divine and natural law to which "all the princes of the world are subject [...] His yoke is upon them, and they must bow their heads in fear and reverence before His divine majesty. The absolute power of princes and sovereign

⁸⁸ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), pp.157-158.

⁸⁹ Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, M.J. Tooley trans., Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1955), Book I, Chapter X. http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin_1.htm. The other attributes of sovereignty, the making of war and peace, the instituting of high officials of the State, the final resort of appeal and having the right of pardon, are, as Etienne Balibar suggests, "the facets of a same reality, always simultaneously present. It goes without saying that they can be neither divided nor delegated. The removal of one of them would call into question all of sovereignty and, conversely, it must be supposed that they form a *totality*, to which nothing is missing." Etienne Balibar, "Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l'état, le peuple", *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000), p.60.

lords does not extend to the laws of God and of nature.”⁹⁰ In relation to this transcendent anchoring, Bodin’s theory of sovereignty articulates itself through a chain of resemblances from the individual, to the family, to the commonwealth, all relying on images of incorporation and culminating in an image of sovereign foundation based upon absolute power and authority in the person of the monarch and the privileging of the monarchical state form.⁹¹ As much, therefore, as we see here an explicit use of the term sovereignty and many elements that can be attributed to the modern conception of the term in its intimate association with the modern State form, it is evident that Bodin’s understanding of sovereignty is not only explicitly anchored to the otherworldly pole, but is also, through the use of pre-modern forms of knowledge, a (re)articulation of the sacral within the secular. As Bartelson explains:

For all its superficial modernity, the entire logic of Bodin’s theory of sovereignty is dependent on infinite resemblances and exempla which multiply throughout his discursive universe, and the forces of antipathy and sympathy which connect microcosm and macrocosm together in a divine and harmonious order; without God at the apex of the entire construct, there can be no sovereignty.⁹²

⁹⁰ Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, M.J. Tooley trans., Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1955), Book I, Chapter VIII.

⁹¹ As Bodin states: “The statesmen, the philosophers, theologians, and historians who have praised monarchy above every other form of state, have not done so to flatter the prince, but to secure the safety and happiness of the subject. But if the authority of the monarch is to be limited, and subjected to the popular estates or to the senate, sovereignty has no sure foundations, and the result is a confused form of popular state, or a wretched condition of anarchy which is the worst possible condition of any commonwealth. These matters should be weighed carefully, and the deceptive arguments of those who would persuade subjects to subordinate the king to their own pleasure, and impose laws on him, should be exposed as leading to the ruin not only of the monarchy, but of the subject.” Ibid., Book VI, Chapter VI. It is important to note that these chains of resemblances enable a profoundly gendered discourse in which individual, family and commonwealth and the anchoring in divine law mutually reinforce each other to articulate an implicit and explicit masculinist understanding of order. As Bodin illustrates: “I have said that the crown ought to descend in the male line, seeing that gynecocracy is directly contrary to the laws of nature. Nature has endowed men with strength, foresight, pugnacity, authority, but has deprived women of these qualities. Moreover the law of God explicitly enjoins that the woman should be subject, not only in matters concerning law and government, but within each particular family.” Ibid., Book VI, Chapter V.

⁹² Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.142.

Furthermore, the use of the term sovereignty by Bodin can itself be read as what Gauchet calls above “a testimony to the insoluble tensions in the Christian mode of being-in-the-world”. Notwithstanding its self-explicit reference to the republican tradition, the use of sovereignty by Bodin can be seen as both a way to distinguish the form of order from that of empire - whose (re)institution, as alluded to earlier, was obstructed by the Christian dual ontology - and to designate the profane sacrality of majesty. As Nicholas Onuf explains:

Although the emphasis is on rule, effectuated through supreme power, *imperium* is conceptually unsuitable because it locates rule at the level of the empire and not the republic. Writing in French, Bodin uses the term *souveraineté*, not only to solve the semantic problem presented by the word *imperium* and its cognates, but also to suggest the majesty of rule.”⁹³

As much as the King’s Two Bodies provided some measures that enabled a form of legitimacy that articulated itself within the dual ontology of Christianity, the “insoluble tensions” in the latter would eventually make this uneasy co-existence untenable. The contradictions of the monarchical order’s representation as a unified social order while simultaneously attempting to secure its legitimacy and foundation outside of itself would eventually seal its fate. The dual ontology of Christianity, and the gradual dissolution of the symbolic and institutional interpenetration of its two spheres to a point at which this separation is taken as given creates the conditions for the ontological independence of the temporal order. Paradoxically, the more this sphere is sacralized, the more what had been left unfigurable is symbolically given figure in the temporal order, the more the temporal sphere’s autonomy is attested. As Gauchet summarizes:

⁹³ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, “Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History”, *Alternatives*, Vol.16, No.4 (1991), p.437.

The sovereign now ceases to be the living incarnation of the bond between heaven and earth, the personified union of the visible order with its invisible foundation, which is what sovereigns had been from time immemorial. He may plead his "divine right" but his role has changed, despite the apparent terminological continuity. He no longer makes the [in]visible⁹⁴ carnally present but symbolizes its absence. He no longer welds this world to the other but testifies to their separation. In actual fact he attests that God's difference leaves the human community completely to itself. This is how the political body's ontological independence, and its ability to set its own laws, comes to be embodied in the development of sovereign power. The State's logic becomes one of restoration.⁹⁵

The *mise en forme* of the social in which order was conferred through the reconciliation of the transcendent and the immanent in the body of the prince, giving body to the society in the sense that all its members knew their place within the social body through an anchoring to the otherworldly pole, was untenable. As society becomes symbolically seen as one, as a social body with the sovereign at its head, meaning and order could no longer stem from an absolute, or a divine Law since, symbolically, the legitimacy of power no longer came from this absolute. Rather, it was incorporated in the sovereign who legitimised him or herself symbolically as a representative of society, a society seen as a social body. As a result, the discourse purporting to find meaning and order anchored in an otherworldly pole "outside" of society became laden with contradictions. It is thus within the context of the *mise en forme* of the social in its monarchical form that the place of power could no longer be occupied by a singular figure through which meaning and order could be symbolically secured to Otherness or an external referent. What the State must primarily restore is a securing of foundation within the fold of the

⁹⁴ This is an important error in the translation through which the passage, if this were "the visible," would not make sense. It is *l'invisible* in the original French. See Marcel Gauchet, *Le désenchantement du monde: Une histoire politique de la religion*, Paris: Gallimard (1985), p.65.

⁹⁵ Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.57.

temporal world. And to do so, to wrestle security away from the otherworldly pole.

The securing of security in the temporal sphere

It is often remarked that with Hobbes we find both the rationale for the modern understanding of security and the conditions of possibility for its use within the context of international relations. Indeed, any good Realist worth his salt, with particular reference to the canonical scholars within the tradition - *inter alia* Morgenthau, Bull, Waltz, Gilpin - will, at some point or another, authoritatively throw down the Hobbesian gauntlet to anchor their discourse either by apprehending it as timeless wisdom or, more cautiously, expounding the clarity with which the thinker exposes how and why the world *is* the way it is at the time and place of his writing. This time and place, as was seen in chapters One and Two, is one that is retroactively apprehended as the beginning of the modern State system, as the close conjunction of the writing of the *Leviathan* (1651) and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) attests. Furthermore, as David Campbell suggests, even when Hobbes is criticized within the discipline (including by some of the canonical writers mentioned above), in particular those who (quite rightly) question the applicability of the Hobbesian schema to international relations, “they support the contention that *Leviathan* stands as a recording of important facts in a historical narrative to educate his and subsequent generations about the perils of their ways”.⁹⁶ As concerns “international relations” *qua* the relations between States, the transference of the Hobbesian state of nature by analogy to the level of the international system has thus been a source of criticism to crude

⁹⁶ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), p.63.

renditions of realism, of a “warre of all against all” in the international sphere by realists and non-realists alike.⁹⁷ Yet the Hobbesian logic with regards to the fundamental elements of the modern security dilemma and the rationale behind the formation of States remains. For example, from a not-yet-canonical scholar but one who is, quite rightly, considered to have most deeply delved into the question of security from a neo-realist perspective, Barry Buzan writes on the question of the relation between security and freedom:

Unacceptable chaos becomes the motive for sacrificing some freedom in order to improve levels of security, and in this process, government and state are born. In the words of Hobbes, people found states in order to “defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly.”⁹⁸

Although Buzan makes clear that he is addressing an “image” of the state of nature proposed by Hobbes, it becomes nonetheless an unquestioned central tenet for the subsequent articulation of the different facets of security addressed in his oft quoted book. The power and centrality of the Hobbesian logic as it articulates itself from this image of the state of nature is indubitable and what it does, with regards to the modern understanding of security, is very clear in the neat equation between security and freedom. Furthermore, the deployment of this image should be not only clear in what may be perceived as mere theoretical articulations under the

⁹⁷ See, for example, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Order*, New York: Columbia University Press (1977), pp.46-52 and Hedley Bull, “Society and Anarchy in International Relations”, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, London: Allen & Unwin (1967). See also, from a more neo-liberal institutionalist perspective still firmly entrenched in epistemic Realist tenets, Robert O. Keohane, “Hobbes’ Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society”, in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sørensen (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War* Boulder: Westview Press (1995), pp.165-187.

⁹⁸ Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Boulder: Lynne Rienner (1991), p.38.

aegis of epistemic Realism, but also, as the post-September 11th security frenzy and erosion of civil rights can attest, to the way in which this logic of security governs us. What should be questioned is the reason behind the positing of this state of nature in the first place. That Hobbes has provided an immense contribution to the modern understanding of what security *is* through the way in which it has been perpetually disseminated and (re)written since the time of its writing is obvious. Yet the Hobbesian state of nature and its articulation of what it means to be secure according to the latter is not, as alluded to above, the result of a chronicling of the facts of his time and an archaeological project to understand the beginnings of social order, but a strategic, political, move to articulate the basis for social order over and against a state of nature that always already exists in real time at the heart of the social order - i.e. the perpetual threat of anarchy within the state, the perpetual threat of “fall[ing] again into a Warre amongst themselves”.⁹⁹ As Campbell maintains, “it is the fear of slipping *back into* the state of nature should men give up allegiance to the sovereign power in the state, rather than an argument that men should proceed *from* the state of nature *to* the state, which is the force behind Hobbes’s reasoning”.¹⁰⁰

The state of nature is thus held in abeyance, but it remains within the sovereign order. In this sense, the state of nature is not the constitutive outside of sovereign order, since its relation to the order must appear explicit, but is related according to another logic: the logic of sovereignty itself. The logic of this “holding” can be seen in terms of what Giorgio Agamben calls a relation of *abandonment*. The *ban*, that Agamben also equates with the *exception*, is a

⁹⁹Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), p.225.

¹⁰⁰David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), pp.63-64.

relation through which what is outside, in this case outside the juridical order, is always already included through the “suspension of the juridical order’s validity - by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the exception and abandon it.”¹⁰¹ The juridical order, the self-foundation of modern order, thus constitutes itself as order by maintaining itself in relation to the state of exception/state of nature which is “two sides of a single topological process in which what was presupposed as external (the state of nature) now reappears, as in a Möbius strip or a Leyden jar, in the inside (state of exception).”¹⁰² In this, the violence of the state of nature, the violence of the a-social state in which life is characterized by “continually feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”¹⁰³, reappears as the violence of the State and its legitimate use of force; in the indistinction between violence and law or, in Derridean terms, the mystical foundation of authority of sovereign power. As alluded to in Chapter Two, what is abandoned is that which is exposed to the power of sovereignty, of the possibility of deciding the “between” of the state of nature and law, of outside and inside inasmuch as they are rendered indistinguishable from each other in the zone of indistinction that sovereignty enables. Although the consequences of this logic will be more explicitly addressed in Chapter Five, its intimate relation to the Hobbesian state of nature here deserves mention. As Agamben explicitly addresses:

¹⁰¹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.28. As Agamben maintains in the more abstract relation between rule and exception while illustrating its applicability with regards to the state of nature: “*The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it.* The state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension”. Ibid., p.18.

¹⁰² Ibid., p.37.

¹⁰³ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), p.186.

The state of nature [...] is the being-in-potentiality [...] of the law, the law's self-presupposition as "natural law." Hobbes, after all, was perfectly aware, as Strauss has underscored, that the state of nature did not necessarily have to be conceived as a real epoch, but rather could be understood as a principle internal to the State revealed in the moment in which the State is considered "as if it were dissolved".¹⁰⁴

This gives us an important reading of how order is established through what must appear as the positing of an *a priori* realm of disorder and contingency, an *a priori* that always already threatens to dissolve the polity, making, as James Der Derian suggests, the "search for security through sovereignty [...] not a political choice but a necessary reaction to an anarchical condition".¹⁰⁵ But the question of why this articulation takes place has not yet been answered. This answer, however, can be elucidated by taking into consideration the quote that started this chapter. In it, Hobbes explicitly articulates his argument around the question of salvation and the Christian dual ontology of the temporal and spiritual sphere. In fact, what is done is to redefine Salvation in purely secular terms based upon the logic of the state of nature and the order that is enabled by its *a priori* positing i.e. an order "ordained by men for their perpetuall security against enemies, and want".¹⁰⁶ What is being done here is precisely a wrestling of security from the spiritual sphere to the temporal sphere. Because of the power of the security discourse, because security, as Michael Dillon argues, and as we have implicitly articulated in our own trajectory on the meaning(s) of security, "is intimately connected with truth"¹⁰⁷ it

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp.35-36. Agamben quotes Hobbes here (*ut tanquam dissoluta consideretur*) from Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: The Latin Version*, Howard Warrender ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press (1983), pp. 79-80.

¹⁰⁵ James Der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard", in Ronnie D. Lipchutz, *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press (1995), p.30.

¹⁰⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), pp.491-492.

¹⁰⁷ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, London: Routledge (1996), p.123.

becomes the linchpin to the establishment of a secular, self-engendered, order. The battle for meaning of security, a battle that plays itself out between the policing of souls “in Heaven” and the policing of bodies “on Earth”, is the one upon which the entire edifice of order remains in the balance. It is a battle that must be won at any cost.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, although one can appreciate the way in which security is given meaning in Hobbes in terms of what we understand as security today from a secular optic, it is crucial to apprehend that its articulation is elaborated with one eye firmly on the spiritual sphere. In other words, Hobbes had to contend with the possibility that the fear of God, or hell fire, may be more persuasive than the fear of violent death underpinning his philosophy. Although, as addressed below, Hobbes maintains the need to rely on God in the final instance to support the legitimacy of the State, implicit in his theory there is a need to evacuate “invisible powers” from the minds of “men”.¹⁰⁹

The meaning of security that we have grown accustomed to is neither “natural” nor simply a construction enabled by a long process of secularization, but is inextricably tied to the *longue durée* of the Christian ontological dualism and to the battle for truth and order that it engendered. Having found a way to begin to fold truth and order into the temporal sphere by taking hold of the meaning of security, Hobbes enables the articulation of the metaphysics of presence of the modern State, the establishment, as Hardt and Negri call it, of a “transcendent

¹⁰⁸ Although outside of the purview of this thesis, it would be fascinating to read Hobbes’s various interventions with regards to St. Paul, interventions which, in the *Leviathan* verge on obsession, against Badiou’s reading of Paul.

¹⁰⁹ Although I eschew the way in which Leo Strauss understands the radical break between the ancients and the moderns, his opposition between reason and revelation, as well as his project of the restoration of classical political philosophy, the author clearly articulates the consequences of Hobbesian thinking in this respect: “...the whole scheme suggested by Hobbes requires for its operation the weakening or, rather, the elimination of the fear of invisible powers. It requires such a radical change of orientation as can be brought about only by the disenchantment of the world, by the diffusion of scientific knowledge, or by popular enlightenment.” Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1968), p.198.

political apparatus”¹¹⁰ upon which meaning and order are no longer anchored to an otherworldly pole. In the process of humans being left to their own devices, alone in the world and masters of their own salvation, truth, order, and security are no longer strictly articulated as something natural, stemming from somewhere beyond the temporal sphere, but precisely as having to be manufactured by natural “man” via natural reason. As Hobbes expounds in the introduction to the *Leviathan*:

For by Art is created that great Leviathan called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the *Sovereignty* is an Artificiall *Soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body...¹¹¹

The incorporation of the State and its intimate connection with sovereignty, is thus an artificial creation, albeit, by imitation, created by the art(ifice) of “man” in his image as natural and, as Michael Dillon explains in reference to this same quote, whose “primary function [...], principal *raison d’être*”, is “the security of the state and its people”.¹¹² This State of the situation, of course, does not appear out of thin air and is not a radical break with all that came before it. It not only, as was elaborated above, articulates itself out of the contradictions engendered by the Christian dual ontology, but it also employs and (re)deploys facets of the Christian imaginary in the construction of the new symbolic order.

Apart from the question of salvation elucidated above, it is also evident that both the notion of *contemptus mundi* and the fascination with death engendered by Christianity, in

¹¹⁰ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2000), p.84.

¹¹¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), p.81.

¹¹² Michael Dillon, “Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol. XII, No.2 (1989), p.91.

particular as it related to the myth of the Fall,¹¹³ were central to the Hobbesian formulation of the state of nature and the *raison d'être* of the State and, thus, of the possibility of the articulation of the modern sovereign State as a source of legitimate order. Furthermore, as with Bodin, Hobbes's predilection towards a monarchical system is based upon the perceived need to maintain some form of otherworldly symbolic anchor, however tenuous in a world where the markers of certainty of the old order are dissolving, to maintain the legitimacy of the Sovereign who, as William Connolly maintains, "though created by an earthly pact, is accountable to God in the last instance."¹¹⁴ Yet, simultaneously, in understanding order *qua* the State as an artificial creation of man in his image, a creation attained *via* reason faced with the purpose of securing the State and its people, the possibility of an order that appears, and must appear, as self-engendered is enabled. In contrast to the employment and deployment of an exalted quasi-divine reason elaborated earlier when discussing Frederick II, reason here is brought into the orbit of the State as the basis of its creation and deployed to secure its maintenance. In the emergent order, its legitimacy, and the meaning of security that founds and circumscribes it is unequivocally different. Security, truth, and order are no longer secured, are no longer anchored

¹¹³ In the utilization of both *contemptus mundi* and the question of death, the myth of the fall is central to Hobbes. With regards to *contemptus mundi*, this is apprehended generally with regards to the state of nature but also explicitly in relation to the myth of the fall. In finding examples in scripture of the rights of the monarchy and a justification of why the power of the sovereign should be absolute, Hobbes brings up the fall in relation to the incapacity of man and woman to judge for themselves between good and evil" Whereupon having both eaten, they indeed take upon them God's office, which is Judicature of Good and Evil, but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright." Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), p.260. As pertains to death, again, although it is pervasive in the *Leviathan*, it is also explicitly related to the fall: "Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that Eternall life, which Christ had obtained for them, the texts next before alledged seem to make it on Earth. For as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise, and Eternall life on Earth, even so in Christ all shall be made alive; then all men shall be made to live on Earth; for else the comparison is not proper." *Ibid.*, p.480.

¹¹⁴ William E. Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1993), p.35.

to a fixed pole of meaning “outside”, but must find their stability, coherence, and perpetuity in the artifice of “man”. In other words, it finds its foundation in an articulation of order that identifies itself *as* order, as seen above, in contradistinction to its opposite *qua* the contingency of the state of nature and the threat of violent death to which it is intimately wedded. As Stephen Collins succinctly summarizes:

The most conspicuous consequence of substituting the secular state for the ‘divine cosmos’ as the source of order, security, and meaning in the world was heightened consciousness of personal mortality. As Hobbes noted in *De Cive*, temporal death was to be feared as greatly as eternal death. Man’s awareness of motion and flux as natural, and of order, security, and immutability as contrived, led him self-consciously to identify purpose and meaning in the temporal world. Man lived for life not life after death.[...] Man aggrandized in order to secure what was not securable.¹¹⁵

With security now finding itself inextricably intertwined in the articulation of the temporal symbolic order, indeed as its most essential constitutive principle, it becomes radically dynamic precisely because of its (im)possibility in its temporal articulation. Although, as has been seen, security has never been static, always inextricably related to the (re)presentation/(re)production of order that, to a certain extent, has always included a performative element in the securing of its identity, power, and legitimacy, the radical indeterminacy characterizing what Claude Lefort calls “the dissolution of the markers of certainty”¹¹⁶ of the monarchical order and the simultaneous attempts to articulate a foundation upon a shifting ground that is always already in question, provides the conditions for the inexorable logic between security and its constitutive excess - between security and insecurity -

¹¹⁵ Stephen L. Collins, *From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1989), p.39.

¹¹⁶ Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey trans., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1998), p.19.

to become the central principle deployed by the logic of sovereignty to anchor an order that is made to appear as self-engendered.

One central issue in relation to foundation and the articulation of order in modernity is that of language. It is important to raise at this juncture due to the way in which the relation of language to the question of order is made most explicit in the philosophical attempts to articulate foundation upon a sovereign order that is to appear as self-engendered. In other words, language is intimately related to the way in which sovereign logic gradually becomes what institutes order in modernity and reveals the complicity between this logic and particular forms of knowledge as it was elaborated upon in Chapter Two. The referential conception of language taken for granted in most epistemic Realist understandings of the world and that has come under much criticism from “critical” approaches to international relations - i.e. an understanding that appeals to the notion of correspondence of statements to the world (of referents), or what was addressed in Chapter Two as “truth as correspondence” - becomes a central concern precisely in relation to the profound symbolic transformations of social relations elaborated upon above. Despite their similarities, one central difference between sovereignty as it is understood by Bodin and as it is understood by Hobbes, stems from the forms of knowledge that underlie and structure each understanding and, thus, the way language is apprehended.¹¹⁷ From a knowledge, based upon resemblance and exempla, we move to one founded upon, as Bartelson suggests following Foucault, “on representation and mathematical

¹¹⁷ Indeed, as Jens Bartelson explains: “The epistemic edifice underlying Bodin’s reasoning is thoroughly demolished in the early seventeenth century, while the logical core of the theory of sovereignty is retained, articulated and refined during the same century, until it becomes the centerpiece of the new cognitive order.” Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.143.

constructability".¹¹⁸ In this, the understanding and purpose of language is fundamentally transformed. As Floyd Merrell explains:

The classical age's task was that of constructing a universal method of analysis that would yield knowledge by arranging signs in such a way that they mirrored the universe, the order of things. The paradigmatic model was that of classification: if things could be arranged as they should be on a flat plane, they would create a legitimate picture of the object of analysis.[...] Signs no longer have any value apart from that which they represent; the written word and things no longer resemble one another; writing is now merely the arrangement of signs, the relations between them, which are potentially capable, by *comparison*, of representing the world. Comparison, through measurement (focus on primary qualities), and analysis (focus on parts and their relations), constitutes the dream of *mathesis universalis*, the general science of order.¹¹⁹

In apprehending this shift, Hobbes again provides an entry point in his treatment of language and its intimate relation to the question of sovereign order.¹²⁰ This is not to say that Hobbes takes for granted a referential understanding of language. Far from it, since it is precisely the *absence* of any such discussion that can be seen as taking it for granted and that characterizes much of epistemic Realist literature. Indeed, Hobbes is very well aware and explicit about the constitutive power of language and its intimate relation to the maintenance of order. In the name of Reason, he can thus intimately associate sedition to the metaphorical use of language. As Hobbes puts forth:

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.139.

¹¹⁹ Floyd Merrell, *Signs Grow: Semiosis and Life Processes*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1996), p.191. See also Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, New York: Pantheon (1970), Chapter 5.

¹²⁰ The privileging of Hobbes here is due to the explicit connections which the latter makes between language and political order and to offer some continuity with what was elaborated before. This is not to say, of course, that other thinkers of the period did not address language explicitly in its relation to order and truth, a referential understanding that eschews ambiguity in the mapping of the *mathesis universalis*. Indeed, the work of Bacon, Descartes and Locke, all explicitly address the question of language in this way. Furthermore, ambitious projects to create new artificial languages as an instrument of thought by, for example, John Wilkins and Gottfried Leibniz can be seen as the extreme manifestation of this undertaking.

first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; *Reason* is the *pace*; Encrease of *Science*, the *way*; and the Benefit of man-kind, the *end*. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senselesse and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.¹²¹

In the use of *ignes fatui*¹²² here, Hobbes can both maintain a referential understanding of language *and* reveal its constitutive power. For the author, it is only words articulated through the light of Reason into strict, non-ambiguous, definitions that correspond to the world, while words fraught with ambiguity and metaphors do *not* signify anything but illusion and are dangerous to the maintenance of order by breeding “contention, and sedition, or contempt.” In other words, a questioning of the legitimacy of the sovereign.¹²³ Despite the fact that Hobbes himself uses a metaphor in *ignes fatui* to launch this one of multiple attacks on metaphors found in the *Leviathan* (“Leviathan” itself being a metaphor!¹²⁴), the aim of the author is clear: the maintenance of sovereign order is inextricably related to a purging of ambiguity from language

¹²¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), pp.116-117.

¹²² *Ignes fatui*, literally “fool’s fire”, it is the phosphorescent light which is often seen at night in marshy ground and is composed of gases released by decomposing matter commonly known as a “Will O’ the Wisp”. It is primarily used to signify a misleading, and dangerous, influence in that this light would frequently fool travellers into thinking that it was the flickering light of lanterns or a dwelling and lead them off the beaten path onto dangerous ground.

¹²³ Although not in explicit reference to this passage, Michael Dillon highlights this dual conception of language in Hobbes in contrast to Locke’s more rigid referential definition, and also its intimate connection to order: “Hobbes’ conception of language was, nonetheless, in certain respects significantly different from that of Locke; in that he explicitly regarded it as a constitutive as well as a referential and expressive thing, and built his political philosophy upon that understanding. He was also even more alert than Locke to the intimate connection between language and power, insisting on its operation as a system of (geometrical) reckoning for the constitution and continuous policing of political order as a regime of constituted truth and reality...” Michael Dillon, “The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol. XIII, No.3 (1990), p.105.

¹²⁴ Indeed, as Michael Ryan writes: “For what is the ‘Leviathan,’ the analogy between the state and natural being, but a metaphor? [...] Hobbes’s entire theory, then, rests on a linguistic form - metaphorical displacement, transposition and analogy - that he will later exclude and banish as seditious.” Michael Ryan, *Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (1982), p.4.

via Reason and Science that enables the clear association of words to things, truth to reality.¹²⁵

Central to the question of language in Hobbes with regards to the present concerns, is the way these associations are also applied in relation to the divine register. As was elaborated above, despite enabling modern understandings of security and sovereign order, Hobbes articulates these with one eye firmly on the spiritual sphere and necessitates the referent of God in the final instance. Yet the divine sphere cannot remain immune from the question of language. However, the eschewing of ambiguity and its intimate association with the question of truth and reality threatens to sever the link to this final referent. Hobbes is able to reconcile the two with regards to the foundation of a Christian Commonwealth by making the question of faith one of very few elements: “it is necessary to believe”, as William Connolly explains, “only that ‘Jesus is Christ’ and that Christ is the Savior who promises a second coming of the Kingdom of God”.¹²⁶ Simultaneously, however, Hobbes makes “natural reason” the “undoubted word of

¹²⁵ This, of course, is not only the province of the disciplining of the multitude but also a guide for thought and action to the sovereign and its councillors. As Hobbes explains with reference to the role of counsel: “he ought to propound his advice in such form of speech as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore *rash and unevident Inferences*; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact or of opinion); *obscure, confused, and ambiguous Expressions*; also all *metaphoricall Speeches, tending to the stirring up of Passion*, (because such reasoning and such expressions are useful only to deceive or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the Office of a Counsellor.” Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), p.307.

¹²⁶ William Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1993), p.36. Hobbes, however, makes very clear that the “Kingdom of God” is not to be thought of as being presently manifested on earth in order to make the sovereign the unique pole of allegiance and legitimacy. In fact, any deviation from this interpretation is considered not only an abuse of scripture, but the paramount abuse. As Hobbes expounds: “The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the Kingdome of God, mentioned so often in Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that being dead, are to rise again at the last day...”, Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), p.629.

God".¹²⁷ By thus providing only the elements of faith necessary for the continuity of authority as well as eliminating the grounds for doctrinal dispute, all scripture not related to these elements can come under the scrutiny of reason. As Connolly remarks: "[e]verything in scripture which appears to be at odds with our natural reason must either be brought into alignment with it or treated as a transcendent mystery beyond human understanding."¹²⁸

With regards to the association between truth and reality, this alignment with reason is particularly well illustrated in the way Hobbes addresses scripture as it relates to rituals of consecration such as the process of transubstantiation as part of the Eucharist:

But when by such words the nature or qualitie of the thing it selfe, is pretended to be changed, it is not Consecration, but either an extraordinary worke of God, or a vaine and impious Conjuraton. But seeing (for the frequency of pretending the Change of Nature in their Consecrations), it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a Conjuraton or Incantation, whereby they would have men to beleeeve an alteration of Nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of mans Sight and of all the rest of his Senses.¹²⁹

Here, scripture must evidently be brought under the authority of reason and the strict association of words to things. The possibility of one signified being transformed from one signifier to another and, more importantly, that this transformation, through the process of transubstantiation, is the province of the Church in a manifestation of its authority, has the potential to subvert the authority of the sovereign and must therefore be brought under the sway of its power/knowledge. Indeed, in the dissolution of an anchoring to a transcendent "Other" that provides meaning and order, the legitimization of sovereign power and the structuring of

¹²⁷ Thomas Hobbes as quoted in *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), pp.633-634.

social order is inextricably linked to the deployment of a knowledge based upon epistemic certainty and a strict relation of words to things *via* representation. As Bartelson elucidates:

...the quest for epistemic certainty and the quest for stable representations are connected to the quest for security, peace and social order, and this in three different ways: first, through supplementation, since epistemic certainty sustains and reinforces the order upheld by the sovereign, and conversely; second, through articulation, since stable representation articulates and legitimizes sovereign power, and conversely; and third, through duplication, since the positions allotted to words and things by a knowledge based on representation are duplicated by the position of the sovereign and the positions which the sovereign allots to subjects, objects and concepts within political and social order.¹³⁰

The loss of a transcendent authority, of an alterity outside of the temporal world to convey meaning and order, is thus accompanied by an attempt to discipline ambiguity or, as Michael Dillon explains, “to limit and normalise the semantic and expressive alterity inhering within language”.¹³¹ Yet, this ambiguity cannot be eliminated since it constitutes the condition of possibility of proper meaning and its inextricable relation to sovereign power. As with the necessity of the permanent threat of the state of nature at the heart of the social order elaborated upon above, ambiguity, such as that produced by metaphoric displacement, must remain present as a threat to order, to maintain what must appear as the full presence and universality of sovereign meaning. Indeed, as Michael Ryan illustrates from a Derridean perspective:

The open possibility of displacement which metaphor represents (once done once, the law that would prevent it from happening again endlessly has already been broken) makes the absolute propriety of meaning and sovereignty impossible. This is why it must be banished. Like sedition, it indicates a fissure in the supposed plenitude and universality of sovereign meaning. Where possibility of sedition manifests itself, there sovereignty is shown its limit. Where metaphoric displacement begins, there also the

¹³⁰ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.152.

¹³¹ Michael Dillon, “The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol. XIII, No.3 (1990), p.104.

power of sovereign law as the absolutely proper name of a universal meaning is shown its limit. Both of these limits are necessarily “internal”; their very possibility retroactively conditions what they limit. There is no sovereign meaning outside of the possibility of displacement, which is therefore a condition of possibility of sovereign meaning. And there is no political sovereignty outside the possibility of sedition. Without sedition, there would be no necessity for sovereignty.¹³²

It is precisely in the way metaphor “must be banished”, in the *abandonment* of metaphor as it was made manifest earlier in relation to the state of nature, that the logic of sovereignty operates. Within this context, the distinction between propriety of meaning and metaphor is the province of sovereignty itself inasmuch as they are rendered indistinguishable from each other in the zone of indistinction of sovereign power. In this sense, Hobbes’s own use of metaphor in admonishing metaphor or in providing an analogy of what the common-wealth *is*, is entirely consistent with the articulation of sovereign power. It is, therefore, as if Hobbes were writing from the position of the sovereign himself and it is this stance that accounts for the force of his discourse. This is witnessed by the common acceptance of this blatant contradiction without reserve and, thus, reveals the imprint upon thought of the limits imposed by this logic. This blind spot is also manifested in the way in which sovereignty eludes the application of the knowledge to which it is inextricably intertwined. In other words, in providing the conditions of possibility for the quest for epistemic certainty and the representation of the world by comparison through measurement and analysis, the sovereign must remain exempt from the application of this knowledge and the order it deploys. As Bartelson suggests:

If the tacit presence of the sovereign is what guarantees the continuity between language and world which is integral to both representation and analysis, he himself cannot be represented within the same knowledge, either as part of the political structure, or in its

¹³² Michael Ryan, *Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (1982), p.5.

ideological underpinnings. Being the condition of representability, the sovereign escapes representation and disappears in front of our eyes at the moment when analytic reason attempts to reach its secret foundation.¹³³

We thus come back here to the logic of the *parergon*, of the framing and the non-presence of the frame as it was elaborated upon in Chapter Two, but at its inception in relation to the articulation of social order amidst the dissolution of the markers of certainty. Despite the loss of a transcendent other to convey meaning and order and the simultaneous attempt to articulate these through a form of knowledge founded upon “natural reason”, the last instance of the “Other” remains in the form of the impossibility of applying this knowledge to the sovereign. In other words, the possibility of re-presenting it, as Bartelson explains, “must remain closed to analysis in order to be wide open to faith.”¹³⁴

In relation to the question of language in Hobbes elaborated upon above, the Christian imaginary also remains central. Here, the myth of the Fall is afresh deployed in the realm of language *via* the tower of Babel, where the language “gotten and augmented by Adam [...] was again lost.”¹³⁵ Disseminated by man in his forced dispersion from the fall of the tower, its unity was replaced by “the diversity of Tongues that now is,[...] [that] in tract of time grew every where more copious.”¹³⁶ It is this linguistic “anarchy” that is to be tamed to regain the unity of language under the aegis of the sovereign and the deployment of its reason. In the inextricable relation between the state of nature in its “physical” and “linguistic” senses, both are thus

¹³³ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.152.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books (1968), p.101.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

submitted to the question of security in relation to its meaning of protection from threats. As

Paul Chilton affirms:

After Babel, the divine authority of words is lost, language has fallen with the tower, and is afflicted with confusion and danger. It is a linguistic anarchy into which reason and order has to be reimported - an analogue of the anarchy of nature into which sovereignty and security are introduced.¹³⁷

What must be made clear here, before turning more explicitly to “modernity” in Chapter Five, is that the way in which security is articulated here, in what might, following Foucault, be called the “classical age”, is not yet the understanding of security that we are witness to today. Even though it is indubitably constitutive of this meaning in that we find some elements with regards to questions of law, power and knowledge and their articulation in the constitution of order as it is manifested today, there remain a multitude of relevant transformations of which I will attempt to sketch a few in the following chapter. Furthermore, it must be stressed that this transition to “modernity” and the meanings to security associated with it is certainly not a clear cut issue and one that can be addressed in terms of clean historical breaks or precise origins. Unlike the positing of a clear origin informing an unequivocal understanding of what the modern State and State system *are*, based upon a retroactive understanding of the latter traced back to the Westphalian originary myth upon which a fully articulated state system and its attendant logics are clearly understood from the standpoint of the pristine rationality of a modern technoscientific optic, these transformations are, as seen, characterized by a manifold of symbolic continuities and breaks, of contradictions and syntheses, of interpretations and reinterpretations all apprehended and articulated through the available epistemological and ontological horizons

¹³⁷ Paul A. Chilton, *Security metaphors: cold war discourse from containment to common house*, New York: Peter Lang Publishing (1996), p.14.

which themselves are also never fixed or mutually exclusive.

In keeping with the above, I would like to provide an illustration of how the meaning of security associated to the above articulation of order manifests itself, while concurrently going against the epistemic Realist rendition of the Westphalian myth.¹³⁸ What is revealed through this example is both the enduring complicity between the meaning(s) to security and social order and the way in which epistemic (re)writings of security *via* the Westphalian myth obscure this relation by positing post-Westphalian States as pre-constituted actors acting according to an understanding of security based upon the protection from the threat of self-same others. The example used here is the *Act of Security* of 1704, passed by the Scottish Parliament over a half century after Westphalia and of which the following is an excerpt:

...the foresaid estates of Parliament convened or meeting are hereby authorised and impowered to nominate and declare the successor to the Imperial Crown of this Realm, and to settle to the succession thereof upon the heirs of the said successor body, the successors, and the heirs of the successors body, being always of the Royal Line of Scotland and of the true Protestant Religion. Providing always, That the same be not successor to the Crown of England, unless that in this present session of Parliament, or any other session of this or any ensuing Parliament during her Majesties reign there be such conditions of government settled and enacted, as may secure the honour and sovereignty of this Crown and Kingdom, the freedom, frequency and power of Parliaments, the religion, liberty and trade from the nation of English, or any foreign, influence...¹³⁹

The *Act of Security* has been used as an example of the positive understanding of security as

¹³⁸ What is disputed here is not what the treaty of Westphalia contributed or did not contribute to the constitution of the modern sovereign State but to the way in which it serves as an unproblematic foundation for a retroactive understanding of State and State system logic and its corresponding understanding of what security *is* under the aegis of Epistemic realism. Direct attention to Westphalia also reveals the way in which the shift towards a symbolic order predicated upon the modern sovereign State was much more gradual than the epistemic Realist depiction of the Westphalian myth suggests. See, in particular, Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth", *International Organization*, Vol.55, No.2 (Spring 2001), pp.251-287.

¹³⁹ Act of Security (1704), *Acts of Parliament of Scotland*, xi, 136, c.3.
<http://www.scotnet.de/shared/actsec.htm>

freedom from threats and its “modern” manifestation in being intimately associated to the security of the State.¹⁴⁰ This view is in some senses correct in that what was at stake was the freedom from threats of the Scottish Kingdom, and that this security was in some senses articulated in relation to a temporal “other” in the form of the “nation of English, or any foreign, influence.” Yet in the articulation of what is to be secured in this Act, we find the primary referent being intimately associated with questions of incorporation and continuity with reference to both the body and the Crown and to the coincidence of state and religion. Of course, this should come as no surprise since the *Act of Security* was passed by the Scottish parliament as part of its policy to attempt to maintain the autonomy and continuity of the Scottish Crown faced with what was perceived as the threat of Hanoverian succession: the planned succession to Queen Anne by Princess Sophia of Hanover if the former could not provide an heir. The planning of this succession was prescribed by the English *Act of Settlement* of 1701 restricting succession to the Imperial Crown to Protestants.¹⁴¹ In essence, the *Act of Security* enabled the estates of the Scottish Parliament, rather than the English Parliament, to choose the successor to Queen Anne to the throne of Scotland unless certain conditions regarding the continuity of the Scottish Parliament as well as civil and religious liberties, were guaranteed. The use of a positive understanding of security as entailing a certain freedom from possible threats to the prevailing order is thus evident here. Furthermore, it can also, to a certain extent, be read with regards to the question of Scottish independence in attempting to

¹⁴⁰ See James Der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, in Ronnie D. Lipchutz, *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press (1995), p.28 and Mark Neocleous, “Against Security”, *Radical Philosophy*, No.100 (March/April 2000), p.9.

¹⁴¹ See Act of Settlement (1701), *Acts of Parliament of Scotland*. <http://www.scotnet.de/shared/actsettl.htm>.

“secure” guarantees in relation to a temporal “other” in the form of England. Yet it is *not* an understanding of security that falls within a logic predicated upon self-contained, pre-constituted units operating within an anarchical self-help international system. The explicit use of “security” here is thus *not* understood in relation to a strict delimitation between internal and external sovereignty as it pertains to a pre-existing State within a state system. It is, rather, intimately associated with the performative production and articulation of order which, although manifesting features that may retroactively be ascribed to the modern sovereign State, is also, in the assertion of these features, profoundly enmeshed in addressing and navigating the symbolic markers of legitimacy of a gradually dissipating age and its attendant contradictions. This is not to say, of course, that concerns over the continuity of the Crown and a fascination with royal lineage and its role in the institution of order evaporate completely in the wake of “modernity.” Continuing or recent debates over this issue in Britain with regards to reinstating of the monarchy in Russia, Yugoslavia, or the very recent case of Afghanistan, attest to this. However, the primacy of this question in the constitution of order and the formulation of policy, as well as its explicit relation to what constitutes “security”, reveals the way in which security is not articulated upon an understanding of State logic and the political based upon self-present entities identifying danger in terms of self-preservation from a self-same “other”.¹⁴² Indeed, in

¹⁴² This primacy is further evidenced in the way in which the *Act of Security* was received by England. Although this act received royal assent from Queen Anne in 1704, in response, under the threat of the establishment of separate monarchs for England and Scotland and, thus, of what was perceived as political stability, the English Parliament passed the *Alien Act* in 1705. This act can be seen as an explicit reaction to the *Act of Security* denying Scottish independence by forcing the acceptance of the Hanoverian succession to Queen Anne or begin negotiations for parliamentary union under the threat of an English ban on Scotland’s main exports as well as the imposition of the status of “alien” to Scots not already living in England, eventually leading to unification through the *Acts of the Union* in 1707. Again here, although one can clearly discern what can be, from a modern optic, designated as “tools” of “foreign policy” in the threats levied against Scotland, it is the acceptance of Hanoverian succession which is the central concern for England, and the basis for its

the classical age, as was elaborated above and as Bartelson, explains, “when security refers to the state, it does not do so in terms of a preconstituted entity that wishes to preserve itself from an identifiable danger; rather, it points to the identity of the state as that which has to be rendered secure in the first place.”¹⁴³ Furthermore, what this example again reinforces is that the meaning to security is never fixed and is intimately related to the constitution of order. In particular, it reveals the way in which security is inextricably associated to sovereignty as its logic gradually becomes central in the articulation of order. As the meaning of “sovereignty” evolves in its mutually-constitutive relation with specific forms of knowledge, and its logic gradually becomes entrenched to inform the modern political space and what the political *is via* the deployment of the form of knowledge intimately associated with it and the subjective disposition it engenders, so goes the meaning to security.

In view of the way in which security is understood in the *Act of Security* elaborated above, one can appreciate its association with sovereignty from the following retroactive understanding by Andreas Osiander of how sovereignty articulates itself in this period:

For a long time after Jean Bodin popularized the concept in the late sixteenth century, political theorists and practitioners alike attached more importance to its domestic, than to its external side. They were concerned with the power of its rulers over their subjects and only marginally with relations among rulers, much less peoples.¹⁴⁴

If one thus provides a more nuanced, historically informed, treatment of how the concept of sovereignty evolves, a treatment that Osiander should be given credit for in his attempt to dispel

threats.

¹⁴³ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.164.

¹⁴⁴ Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth”, *International Organization*, Vol.55, No.2 (Spring 2001), p.281.

the Westphalian myth which underpins epistemic Realist apprehensions of international order, one can understand how the meaning to security as it is articulated in the *Act of Security* is intimately associated to the gradual articulation of order *qua* sovereignty. Thus, even within the frame of reference of understanding sovereignty as some janus-faced “thing” having a “domestic” and an “external” side, it is possible to apprehend this connection. However, this thesis, most explicitly in Chapter Two, sees sovereignty *not* as such a “thing” that would have an internal and an external side, but as the purveyor of this demarcation. It is precisely a logic that enables the *determination* of the inside from the outside from a standpoint, a non-place of indistinction, itself created *through* this operation. It is not that less attention is paid to a pre-existing “external” side to sovereignty and its concurrent understanding to security, but that what is principally articulated in the determination of order, in the determination of what *is* inside/outside in the constitution of order, is articulated in terms of the possibility of disorder within the social body and the concomitant concerns with continuity and the transcendent structure of social order. In other words, there is no discourse of security oriented towards the protection from the threats of self-same others here because, in the articulation of its markers of order, sovereign power does not express and present an external “face” founded on self-presence amidst self-same others. What such a (re)writing founded upon the Westphalian myth affords, however, is not only a naturalization of the State and of the State system, but a naturalization and, thus, a depoliticization of security itself - i.e. an occultation of the intimate complicity between the deployment of a particular security discourse and the performative articulation of social order.

If the development of what is presently understood as security in its intimate association

to the articulation of sovereign order is not characterized by clean breaks, clear origins, or an unequivocal shift in the markers of order, the same can be said about the obverse “side of the coin” with regards to evidence of the use of a negative meaning to security as a prevalent feature of sermons from the 16th up until the 19th century. Its gradual disappearance in relation to the discursive economy of social order is intimately related to the way in which order increasingly becomes articulated in temporal terms and the concurrent evacuation of the need to even refer to the other-worldly pole in articulating a this-worldly understanding of what it means to be secure. Conversely, it should also come as no surprise that the negative meaning to security is in evidence from the 16th century onwards, in the transition from one form of order and its attendant crises, since it is precisely in this transition that an antagonism concerning the privileged site of order and security would play itself out and would be explicitly articulated.

In this context, the quote by Shakespeare at the outset of this chapter, exemplifying the astuteness common to his work with regards to the world around him, provides an illustration of the crisis of order amidst the dissolution of the markers of certainty through some word-play around the meaning of security. That “there is scarce truth enough alive to make societies secure”, reveals traces of the dissolution of the intimate connection between truth and security as it was elaborated upon earlier in relation to a social order anchored to an otherworldly pole and a subjective disposition articulated in terms of Christian duality. In this context, what makes “secure” is understood as that which derives from the letter of eternal Law and that institutes and informs what *is* through a primary mediation with the divine. In the “but security enough to make fellowships accurst”, the positive meaning to security *qua* freedom from threats is revealed here in a negative light, as something that impedes the possibility of friendship. What

is interesting about this passage is the distinction made between the *active* act of securing and the *substantive* state of security. At first glance, in understanding the transition from divine order to sovereign state as one from a fixed order to one that is in flux, you would expect the *substantive*, the existing condition of being secure, to be found on the side of truth and the anchoring to the otherworldly pole. Yet it is an active form that is found here: it is *truth* that *secures*. The substantive “security”, is found precisely in that which impedes friendship in that it is a certain amount of that which is stated as a condition of being secure that makes “fellowships accurst”. However, it is also possible to provide a reading of this passage through which the placement of substantive and active forms of security in Shakespeare’s riddle not only makes sense, but also reveals something about the way in which security articulates itself in the maintenance of order in modernity.

In the first instance, in the articulation of the “making” of security, the latter refers to truth: it is truth that provides security, makes societies secure. There is thus an acknowledgement here of a process of securing *via* truth. Truth is apprehended as something that was at one time plentiful but now scarce, and it is in this scarcity that society is no longer made secure. In other words, society’s security is eroded through the scarcity of truth. Although there is an apprehension of an active process of making, there remains here something that is occulted: how truth secures society in the first place and the way in which this securing originally and performatively transforms the social. Although there is an emphasis on making, since truth is the eternal anchor upon which society is made secure, to be secure is not seen in terms of social transformation - i.e. it is only the lack of being made secure that is seen in these terms as truth becomes scarce. In the second instance, however, instead of security referring

to something else such as truth, it does not refer to anything but itself - i.e. it is *self-referential*. It is from this position of self-referentiality that it impinges upon the constitution of friendship. Here it is not something that makes secure but security itself that “makes”, not through an active process but simply through its self-referential being, “fellowships accurst”. It is the fact that security *is* that indicates and informs social transformation. Why would “security enough” - implying that more “security” would make this condition worse - “make fellowships accurst”? What does this negative meaning to security refer to? It refers precisely to (in)security, to the inextricable relation between security and insecurity as it manifests itself in the dissolution of the markers of certainty. Yet Shakespeare here is no proto-Hobbesian, or a Hobbes *avant la lettre*. On the contrary: what the author reveals is not a primordial state of insecurity but an imposed state of security that impinges upon the constitution of friendship. It is thus not insecurity itself that makes “fellowships accurst” and thus a need, informed by reason, to form a “common-wealth”, but the insecurity brought about by a self-referential concept of security! What Shakespeare reveals here, the “wisdom of the world” that he imparts in his riddle, is precisely what is occulted in modern understandings of security: the performative aspect of securing - i.e. that securing fundamentally transforms the object which is secured. In other words, that it is through “security” that a state of affairs called “insecurity” can be enabled and, thus, the ambiguity and complexity of (in)security in modernity. Indeed, as Michael Dillon succinctly sums up in a way that applies remarkably well to Shakespeare’s riddle:

This active, privative and ambiguous character of security is better appreciated in earlier than in more modern usage, where a conversion of securing into universal, ubiquitous, unambiguous security always threatens to take place; suppressing the recognition that there is no security without securing. It suppresses the recognition, in other words, that securing is an assault on the integrity of whatever is to be secured. Modern usage, moreover, proposes that there is a state of affairs - insecurity - and the negation of that

state of affairs - security - and by doing so thoroughly represses the complexity not only of the act of securing but also of the inextricable relation between security and insecurity. It offers, instead, a simple dialectical opposition together with the implied promise that insecurity can always be mastered in principle if not in current practice.¹⁴⁵

In the position taken against security in this riddle, the prescience (in both its figurative and literal senses) of Shakespeare's words is truly astounding. There is, of course, no embracing of contingency here: this position is one that longs, to a certain extent, for an anchoring in divine truth amidst the dissolution of its markers. Furthermore, what is understood by "security" in the second part of the passage is evidently not related to external threats, to some form of self-present self in the face of self-same others. It is, rather, again here intimately related to the constitution of order amidst the dissolution of the markers of certainty and the effects upon the social and the concomitant (re)articulation of subjective dispositions therein. Although further examined in the next chapter, this (re)articulation, is characterized by an untying of previous social bonds to, as Étienne Balibar suggests, reversing the Althusserian understanding of interpellation¹⁴⁶, "interpellate subjects into individuals, that is, to ignore or to neutralize the intermediary "bodies", the "belongings" that confer to individuals their particular identity, and that could be claimed, either against each other, or against the law or the sovereign himself."¹⁴⁷

What this reading of Shakespeare's riddle thus provides with regards to the

¹⁴⁵ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, London: Routledge (1996), p.122.

¹⁴⁶ For Althusser, ideology functions, via "hailing" or "interpellation", to constitute, or "construct", individuals as subjects.

¹⁴⁷ Étienne Balibar, "Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l'état, le peuple", *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre-Octobre-Novembre 2000), p.61. Figuratively, the original cover of *Leviathan*, with its body of the Leviathan composed of a multitude of self-same bodies, *not facing each other but facing the head of the King*, provides an apt illustration.

understanding of the shift in the *mise en forme* of the social from divine order to sovereign state and the inextricability between security and insecurity found therein, is an understanding of the intimate relation between security and order as well as the way in which the latter informs subjective dispositions. These are aspects related to security that become lost in modernity's wake. In this context, it should also come as no surprise to see the negative meaning to security gradually dissipate and "go underground". It remains used, as I have noted before, in sermons into the 19th century but no longer relating to social order but in indicating the hubris of this-worldly self-assurance in the actions of individuals. It thus continues to be employed under the increasingly "private" auspices of the space of the Church and applied to the faithful.

Having provided, in this chapter and the previous one, a genealogical reading of the meaning(s) to security and their intimate relation to the articulation of order *via* a theologico-political optic, as well as having provided an understanding of how and why we are left, in modernity, with only positive meanings to the term, I will now finally turn to the question of security in modernity. In doing so I will further develop the central argument of this thesis by revealing security's continued complicity with the way in which order is continually (re)founded, articulated, and deployed *via* law/power/knowledge and, thus, its relationship to the political. In doing so, I will *not* now discard the theologico-political optic used so far as if the entry into something called "modernity" would make such an optic obsolete. On the contrary, this optic, understood here in relation to a concern with alterity as was elaborated in Chapter Two, is more important than ever when one turns to examine the metaphysical closure that characterises the "modern" understanding(s) of security. In terms that were previously used, the understanding of the way in which transcendence continually informs an immanence that *is* immanent precisely

through the performative occultation of its generative principles - i.e. an immanence within transcendence - can be apprehended as such only from a standpoint that finds transcendence within immanence. In other words, a standpoint that acknowledges that to every act of founding there is always already an excess. Nowhere is this truer than in “modernity”, because nowhere is the occultation of this excess more radical. With regards to security, this occultation manifests itself by the complete concealment of the generative principles of the security discourse and, in particular, its intimate relation to the production and maintenance of social order. In other words, “security” is naturalized in that its meaning(s) and referents are apprehended as self-evident and unquestioned while, simultaneously, “security” naturalizes the social order in which it is discursively deployed by performatively producing and sustaining this same order. Despite the attempts to seal every crack in the positing of a self-engendered foundation in modernity and the role of “security” in this enterprise, it should be also stated that nowhere are the possibilities to disrupt such an understanding more fruitful, because nowhere has there been the conditions of possibility afforded by what Lefort calls the “democratic adventure” - i.e. the possibilities opened up in apprehending the indeterminacy that all attempts at absolute foundation in modernity are subject to. It is to this tension between radical concealment and radical indeterminacy and its attendant concerns that I now turn.

Sovereignty, Modernity, Security; or Democracy and the Dangers of Depoliticization

What is essential, in my view, is that democracy is instituted and sustained by the *dissolution of the markers of certainty*. It inaugurates a history in which people experience a fundamental indeterminacy as to the basis of Power, Law and Knowledge, and as to the basis of relations between *self* and *other*, at every register of social life.

Claude Lefort¹

...from the highest biological point of view, legal conditions may be nothing more than *exceptional states of emergency*, partial restrictions which the will to life in its quest for power provisionally imposes on itself in order to serve its overall goal: the creation of *larger* units of power. A state of law conceived as sovereign and general, not as a means in the struggle between power-complexes but as a means *against* struggle itself [...] would be a principle *hostile to life*, would represent the destruction and dissolution of man, an attack on the future of man, a sign of exhaustion, a secret path towards nothingness.-

Friedrich Nietzsche²

In *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, Hans Blumenberg presents the dual legacy of the Enlightenment in terms of two distinct logics which manifest themselves in the modern age: one of “self-assertion” and one of “self-grounding”.³ Of the two, “self-assertion” is one that is apprehended as being unprecedented while the other, “self-grounding”, is seen as being the articulation of a “modern” solution, a solution based on rationalism, to a pre-modern problem.

¹ Claude Lefort, *Essais sur le Politique (XIXe-XXe siècles)*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1986), p.29. My translation.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Douglas Smith (trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press (1996), p.57.

³ See Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, Cambridge: MIT Press (1983). Within the present context, the way in which it is addressed with regards to the work of Carl Schmitt in Chapter 8 is particularly pertinent.

In this context, Blumenberg posits an understanding of secularization that “should be described not as the transposition of authentically theological contents into secularized alienation from their origin but rather as the reoccupation of answer positions that had become vacant and whose corresponding questions could not be eliminated.”⁴ In addressing Blumenberg’s distinction between “self-assertion” and “self-grounding” as well as the questions of rationalism and reoccupation that it entails, Chantal Mouffe reads Blumenberg with regards to self-foundation and pluralism:

Following Blumenberg’s lead allows us to grasp that rationalism, far from being essential to the idea of self-assertion, is in fact a residue from the absolutist medieval problematic. The illusions of providing itself with its own foundations which accompanied the labour of liberation from theology should now be abandoned and modern reason should acknowledge its limits. It is only by coming to terms with the radical implications of the pluralism of values (in its strong Nietzschean or Weberian version) and with the impossibility of a total harmony that modern reason frees itself from its pre-modern heritage.⁵

In a similar vein, although in relation to a very different political project than Blumenberg’s, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, put forward two “modes” of modernity, or “two modernities”. The first is intimately related to what we have already seen, what they call the “discovery” of the plane of immanence, as a “radically revolutionary process [...] that destroys its relations to the past and declares the immanence of the new paradigm of the world and life. It develops knowledge and action as scientific experimentation and defines a tendency towards a democratic politics, posing humanity and desire at the centre of history.”⁶ The second mode

⁴ Ibid., p.65.

⁵ Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, London: Verso (2000), p.133. See also “For a politics of democratic identity”, lecture given by Mouffe at a conference entitled *Globalization and Cultural Differentiation* (March 19-20, 1999), MACBA: Museu d’Art Contemporani de Barcelona, http://www.macba.es/english/09/09_04.html.

⁶ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2000), p.74.

of modernity, according to the authors, can be understood as a reaction to the first, a “counterrevolution” that “since it could neither return to the past nor destroy the new forces, sought to dominate or expropriate the force of the emerging movements and dynamics [...], pos[ing] a transcendent constituted power against an immanent constituent power, order against desire.”⁷ Underlying these understandings of modernity lies the long shadow of Max Weber whose own ambivalent understanding of its articulation, irrespective of the way in which he has been (re)read through the one-way glass of positivist social sciences, has enabled a reflection upon the paradoxes contained in its deployment.⁸

I would like to posit, at the outset of this chapter, a similar understanding of what “modernity” entails. I also understand it in dual terms, albeit in somewhat different ones than those above, and operating according to relatively different dynamics due to their roots and

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Weber’s ambivalent reading of modernity and its influence upon the development of the critique of modernity is well illustrated by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri: “Weber’s analysis was quickly taken up by the writers engaged in the critique of modernity, from Heidegger and Lukács to Horkheimer and Adorno. They all recognized that Weber had revealed the illusion of modernity, the illusion that the antagonistic dualism that resides at the base of modernity could be subsumed in a unitary synthesis investing all of society and politics, including the productive forces and the relations of production.” Ibid., p.90. The ambivalence at the heart of Weber’s reading of modernity has been productively read within the context of the discipline of International Relations by Rob Walker who, in addressing this ambivalence, was able to read the way in which both “sides” of modernity in Weber impact upon international relations theorizing. As Rob Walker explains: “The difficulty, however, is that Weber’s own account of modernity is distinctively two-sided. Although he offers a qualified, even resigned accommodation to modernity, Weber also offers a paradigmatic indictment of modernity as a realm in which both meaning and ethical life are rendered increasingly problematic. This is the side of Weber that becomes visible once the discipline of international relations is situated not within the aspirations of social science but in relation to the enigmatic claims about a tradition of political realism. It is this historicist side of Weber that it is possible to see the effect of a more negative reading of modernity on the theory of international relations.” R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1993), p.55. In other words, within the context of International Relations *qua* social science, what is occluded is precisely the ambivalence at the heart of Weber’s reading of modernity, an ambivalence which is itself constitutive of International Relations. For relatively recent works related to Weber’s writings which, in one way or another, contest an orthodox reading of the latter see Asher Horowitz and Terry Maley (eds.), *The Barbarism of Reason: Max Weber and the Twilight of Enlightenment*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1994) and David Owen, *Maturity & Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault, & the Ambivalence of Reason*, London: Routledge (1994).

logics. In this, the work of Giorgio Agamben on sovereignty and that of Claude Lefort on democracy will be of primary interest, particularly in relation to apprehending the articulation of law/power/knowledge and its intimate relation to the production of subjective dispositions within modernity. This elaboration will lead to a brief excursus into the questions of the biopolitical and ideology. From this staging of the dynamics of social order in modernity, the question of the intimate relation between the meaning(s) to security and the articulation and maintenance of social order will be taken up anew within the modern context. Furthermore, I will continue to trace this deployment of security discourses in relation to alterity *via* a theologico-political optic. In this elaboration, I will address the way in which the meaning of security is predominantly articulated in relation to the liberal “domestic” order and examine the transition to its use within the context of the (inter)national in the post-war period - i.e. its use within the disciplinary context of International Relations. This transition will specifically address the question of the political in the constitution of (inter)national order through a critical reading of the work of Carl Schmitt bringing us to the issue of security and depoliticization and to the central concern of the chapter. What I argue is that the deployment of a security discourse to the (inter)national can be seen as the beginnings of the bringing to order of the modern world as a whole from an imperial gaze above the latter. Since security has always been intimately associated with the articulation of “internal” social order, its application to the (inter)national can be seen, in a sense, as an internalization of the (inter)national - i.e. an apprehension of the latter from a position of mastery. In this, Schmitt’s role is central in elaborating a conception of the political that articulates itself around the external relationship between Us and Them. Based upon the elaboration regarding the disciplining of the discipline in Chapter One, this

understanding of the political can be seen as the central tenet of the discipline of International Relations as the site at which to think, articulate and deploy this (inter)national sovereign order. Within the context of the present security predicament - i.e. the redefinition of security and the consequences of the widening and deepening of its ambit for politics and being-in-the-world - I develop this *problématique* further in relation to the zone of indistinction of sovereignty as well as in relation to what Claude Lefort calls “invisible ideology” - i.e. what he understands as the articulation of ideology in today’s Western industrial societies.

The sovereign nomos and the democratic invention

In his work *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Giorgio Agamben traces what he sees as being the originary structure upon which sovereign power is founded to a juridical category of archaic Roman law whose significance is preserved in the writings of Pompeius Festus: *homo sacer* (sacred man) who, after being judged on account of a crime, may be killed by anyone without being accused of homicide but may not be sacrificed. In being so, *homo sacer* is exposed to a particular form of violence through a double exclusion. As Agamben explains:

This violence - the unsanctionable killing that, in his case, anyone may commit - is classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither as the execution of a condemnation to death nor as sacrilege. Substrating itself from the sanctioned forms of both human and divine law, this violence opens a sphere of human action that is neither the sphere of *sacrum facere* nor that of profane action.⁹

For Agamben, the space constituted through this operation is precisely the sphere of

⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), pp. 82-83.

sovereignty, the “first properly political space of the West”¹⁰, constituted as “an excrescence of the profane in the religious and the religious in the profane, which takes the form of a zone of indistinction between sacrifice and homicide.”¹¹ Despite the evident interest manifested in this thesis on the meaning(s) to security as they deployed themselves within the context of the articulation of order in relation to the Roman Empire and the early Christian Pauline discourse, the attribution that Agamben gives to archaic Roman law in the articulation of the structure of sovereign power is not of primary interest here. Although Agamben vividly illustrates instances within antiquity and throughout history in which this structure can be revealed, it is the conditions for its institution as the primary structure for the articulation of order in modernity, its emplacement as such, and the way in which the modern subject is constituted *qua* subject therein that are of present concern.

As was elaborated upon in the previous chapter, sovereign power, according to Agamben, articulates itself through the structure of the exception. It is precisely this exception that is revealed in the figure of *homo sacer*; a figure that in its relation to the juridical order is included only with regards to its exclusion - i.e. of its capacity to be killed. The life of *homo sacer* is what Agamben calls bare life, a form of life which the author defines in relation to the two Greek words for “life”: *zōē*, the “simple fact of living common to all living beings” and *bios*, which is politically qualified life, “the form or way of living proper to an individual or group”.¹² In his development regarding the distinction between *zōē* and *bios*, Agamben reads

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 84.

¹¹ Ibid., P. 83.

¹² Ibid., p.1.

Aristotle's articulation of these terms as an opposition that manifests itself politically - i.e. as one in which "simple, natural life is excluded from the *polis* in the strict sense, and remains confined - as merely reproductive life - to the sphere of the *oikos*, 'home'."¹³ Through this opposition between *zoē* and *bios*, one can apprehend both the possibility of separation of animality and humanity and the enabling of the circumscription of what life in the *polis* entails - i.e. the politically qualified life of *bios* as it defines itself in relation to the exclusion of the bare life of *zoē*. Agamben's central argument with reference to this opposition relates to the way in which the structure of sovereignty, a structure which, as we have seen, articulates itself according to a logic of inclusive exclusion, enables the insertion of bare life into the *polis* and its production therein and, thus, the politicization of bare life in modernity. As Agamben explains:

... the entry of *zoē* into the sphere of the *polis* - the politicization of bare life as such - constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought. It is even likely that if politics today seems to be passing through a lasting eclipse, this is because politics has failed to reckon with this foundational event of modernity.¹⁴

Agamben's project is thus precisely to reckon with this "event" by tracing the continuity of the figure of *homo sacer* in history, elucidating the structure that enables the politicization of bare life in modernity and, thus, paradoxically, the depoliticization of the political sphere. He does this by elaborating upon how this structure is paradigmatically evidenced in the concentration camp, the essence of which is precisely the materialization of a permanent state of exception, a zone of indistinction where the *exception* becomes the *rule*, inhabited by the bare life which

¹³ Ibid., p.2

¹⁴ Ibid., p.4.

it itself produces. There are undoubtedly problems, unresolved tensions and unanswered questions within Agamben's work as there are in any attempts to grapple with issues of this magnitude at a meta-conceptual level and their material manifestations throughout history (the present work obviously included!). Furthermore, in understanding the extreme case of the concentration camp as the "*nomos*" of the modern there are implicit dangers involved, ranging from slipping into an understanding of the Holocaust as a necessary part of the West and modernity to the occultation of the mundane violence of sovereignty in all its manifestations. Yet there are some central aspects of Agamben's work that resonate deeply in attempting to elucidate past and present dispositions and paradoxes. For this reason, his work has recently received widespread attention in philosophical circles, social theory and even within the context of international politics.¹⁵ Of particular relevance here is not only the structure of sovereignty, which has already been intermittently addressed in previous chapters, but also the way in which Agamben is able to relate the question of sovereign power to that of biopolitics, a connection not explicitly fleshed out by the student of the biopolitical *par excellence*: Michel Foucault.

In the *History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*, Foucault presents the argument that, beginning in the mid 16th century, but manifesting itself fully by the late 18th, a shift occurs in the articulation of power. This shift can be seen as a reversal from the deployment of sovereign power via the right of putting its subject to death through, for example, public executions as a juridico-political practice, to one centered around life. This unprecedented articulation of power and knowledge deployed an understanding of the political and a use of political techniques that were focussed

¹⁵ See the articles in the special issue of *Alternatives*, "Zones of Indistinction: Territories, Bodies, Politics", edited by Jenny Edkins and R.B.J. Walker, Vol. 25, No.1, (2000).

upon the administration of life based upon biological existence. As Foucault explains:

For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence, the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its fatality; part of it passed into knowledge's field of control and power's sphere of intervention.¹⁶

It is thus the governing of populations and living bodies through disciplinary institutions and the subjective dispositions enabled and articulated through the latter, *via* “technologies of the self” that Foucault understands through the concept of “biopower”, and it is this biopolitical articulation that Agamben seeks to “correct”, or “complete”, by revealing the “hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power.”¹⁷ In other words, Agamben eschews what he sees as Foucault's understanding of the distinction between sovereign power and biopower by arguing that biopolitics is, and always has been, precisely the power of sovereignty in its production of bare life -i.e. that “*the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.*”¹⁸ That Foucault understood these different forms of power as either diachronically exclusive or as a gradual displacement in which biopolitics prevails as the modern paradigm is unclear. Indeed, as Peter Fitzpatrick points out, for Foucault, in *Discipline and Punish*, “the two powers co-exist forming a ‘scientifico-legal complex’ or ‘a single process of “epistemologico-juridical” formation.’”¹⁹ Furthermore, he

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*, Robert Hurley (trans.), Harmondsworth: Penguin (1981), p.142. See also Michel Foucault, “La ‘Gouvernementalité’” in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. III, Paris: Gallimard (1994), pp.635-657.

¹⁷ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.6.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Peter Fitzpatrick, “Bare Sovereignty: *Homo Sacer* and the Insistence of Law”, *Theory and Event*, Vol.5, No.2 (2001), par.13. http://erato.mse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.2fitzpatrick.html.

demonstrates how in the elaboration of his notion of “governmentality”, central to his articulation of biopower, Foucault apprehends the continued role of sovereignty in tandem with the disciplinary mechanisms of population management.²⁰ Yet what is clear, is that Foucault never explicitly developed the intimate connections between these two forms of power and did not, as does Agamben, see biopolitics outside of the modern problématique. For Agamben, therefore, biopolitics predates anything that we could characterize as “modernity” in that it is intimately related to the production of bare life, the figure of *homo sacer* and the structure that accompanies the latter: the sovereign exception. In this way, Agamben can state that “biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biological life at the heart of the modern State therefore, does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond [...] between modern power and the most immemorial of the *arcana imperii*.”²¹ This is not to say that Agamben does not see the articulation and institution of the modern State as something qualitatively different from what came before it (as the quote above implicitly suggests), or that the advent of something called “modernity” did not take place. Indeed, for Agamben, “modernity” can be traced back to the writ of *Habeas corpus* of 1679 where the double bind of subjective individualization and

²⁰ Ibid. See Michel Foucault, “La ‘Gouvernementalité’” in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. III, Paris: Gallimard (1994), pp.635-657. Michael Dillon and Julian Reid raise the same issue by stating that “Foucault himself in fact noted that there is a complex relation between different orders of power, including those of sovereignty and governmentality. But he did not explore that relationship in any detail. Neither did he engage in retheorizing sovereignty in ways that would allow him to do this. It served him to accept the traditional account of sovereignty, as power over death, that relied on different metaphysical fictions to underwrite the paternity of the law after the death of God”. Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, *Alternatives*, Vol.25, No.1 (2000), p.128. See also Michael Dillon, “Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the ‘New World Order’ to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order”, *Alternatives*, Vol.20, No.3 (1995), pp.323-368.

²¹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.6.

structures of power articulates itself *via* the notion of “body”, which is “neither the old subject of feudal relations and liberties nor the future *citoyen*, but rather a pure and simple *corpus*.”²² In this, the modern sovereign subject is one through which the exercise of sovereignty is displaced in that it is disseminated into each individual body, and it is thus constituted “through the repetition of the sovereign exception and the isolation of the *corpus*, bare life, in himself.”²³ What is emphasized by Agamben in addressing *Habeas corpus*, is the way in which what is apprehended as one of the fundamental cornerstones of the advent of modern democratic society - a writ that protected personal freedoms against State arbitrariness through the necessity to “have the body” at trial - simultaneously presents the subject *qua* body subjected to sovereign power, the body of *homo sacer*, bare life. As Agamben explains:

If it is true that law needs a body in order to be in force, and if one can speak, in this sense, of “law’s desire to have a body,” democracy responds to this desire by compelling law to assume the care of this body. This ambiguous (or polar) character of democracy appears even more clearly in the *habeas corpus* if one considers the fact that the same legal procedure that was originally intended to assure the presence of the accused at the trial and, therefore, to keep the accused from avoiding judgement, turns - in its new and definitive form - into grounds for the sheriff to detain and exhibit the body of the accused. *Corpus is a two-faced being, the bearer both of subjection to sovereign power and of individual liberties.*²⁴

From this original articulation, Agamben proceeds, with particular reference to the French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizens of 1789, to reveal the way in which the declarations of rights as they are established in modern nation-states - i.e. the development of “human rights” inextricably intertwined with the advent of “national” and “popular” sovereignty - should be

²² Ibid., p.123.

²³ Ibid., p.124.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.124-125.

seen precisely as the inscription of bare life in the new juridico-political order through the figure of the “citizen” and the ties between birth and nation that this figure implies. As Agamben notes:

Declarations of rights must therefore be viewed as the place in which the passage from divinely authorized royal sovereignty to national sovereignty is accomplished. This passage assures the *exceptio* of life in the new state order that will succeed the collapse of the *ancien régime*. The fact that in this process the “subject” is, as has been noted, transformed into a “citizen” means that birth - which is to say, bare natural life as such - here for the first time becomes [...] the immediate bearer of sovereignty. The principle of nativity and the principle of sovereignty, which were separated in the *ancien régime* (where birth marked only the emergence of a *sujet*, a subject) are now irrevocably united in the body of the “sovereign subject” so that the foundation of the new nation-state may be constituted.²⁵

Agamben thus acknowledges something qualitatively different in the advent of the modern sovereign State and the way in which the subject is articulated therein. Furthermore, he also reveals how this new articulation of order and its attendant subjective disposition are indebted to the collapse of the *ancien régime*. However, the underlying conditions of possibility - i.e. what enables the eventuality of the sovereign structure establishing itself as the new *mise en forme* of the social - is not explicitly addressed. That modernity can be traced to the writ of *Habeas corpus*, while appealing with regards to Agamben’s argument in relation to the ties between modernity, democracy and biopolitics, is historically questionable in that, as Peter Fitzpatrick suggests, cases utilizing *Habeas corpus* can be traced back to the 11th century.²⁶ More importantly, with regards to the relation that Agamben makes between natality and the nation, “clos[ing] the open circle of man’s birth”²⁷ *via* citizenship, abstracts from the

²⁵ Ibid., p.128.

²⁶ Peter Fitzpatrick, “Bare Sovereignty: *Homo Sacer* and the Insistence of Law”, *Theory and Event*, Vol.5, No.2 (2001), par.11. http://erato.mse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.2fitzpatrick.html.

²⁷ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.128.

phenomenological experience of birth as well as other factors impinging upon existence by binding positive law to political existence in such a way as to not leave space for what occurs outside of the juridico-political sphere.²⁸ What can be posited in contrast to Agamben's position would be the impossibility of closing the "circle of man's birth". In other words, that what he calls the "fiction" that "*birth* immediately becomes *nation* such that there can be no interval of separation [scarto] between the two"²⁹, must take into account the irreducibility of alterity that constitutes the experience of birth and its role in the constitution of the social. In this, as well as in understanding how alterity continues to play a part in social institution in modernity, Lefort's work regarding the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty provides an entry point.

Although often neglected in employing Lefort's work on democracy, totalitarianism and the institution of the social, the influence of Merleau-Ponty's thought on his work is central to the way in which the former understands and deploys these notions. The basis of the work of Merleau-Ponty can be seen as an extension to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In fact,

²⁸ This can be understood with regards to Agamben's relation to Arendt's understanding of birth as political birth, by which man inserts himself in the human world through speech like a second, distinctly human, natality. A critique of this understanding of birth is found in the work of Claude Lefort. In addressing a quote by Arendt from *The Totalitarian System* regarding the relation between birth and foundation Lefort states "In this way a sharing operates between what is of the order of the beginning and what is of the order of permanence. The brute fact of natality accounts for one and the other, since the birth of each new man guarantees the possibility of political foundation or re-foundation, and that nevertheless its detachment from the chain of beings imperils the continuity of the group. However, this reasoning is founded upon a triple abstraction: that of an individual who, from birth, would not already be caught in a network of relations bearing the stamp of a culture; that of laws which would come to stabilize a *natural* change, even though they are constitutive of all modes of coexistence; those of a society which would not be submitted, in time, to tensions susceptible of modifying its equilibrium and to undermine the legitimacy of the laws until requiring a reconfiguration of the political order. This triple abstraction permits the elision of the question of history, that is to say, the gestation of new modes of legitimacy and new styles of existence which operate in the thickness of the social, under the juridico-political surface - gestation which can only be analysed after the fact without being able to impute it to a single order of factors." Claude Lefort, *La Complication: Retour sur le Communisme*, Paris: Fayard (1999), pp.207-208. My translation.

²⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.128.

this extension can be seen as a retrogression in the sense that Merleau-Ponty attempts to go beyond the dualism of body-world posited by Husserl to a more primordial conception - i.e. that of the "flesh of the world" (*la chair du monde*). In doing this, Merleau-Ponty goes beyond the notion of meaning, central to Husserl's phenomenology, by basing his thinking upon what Jean-François Lyotard explains as "a more originary contact with the world".³⁰ Accordingly, for Merleau-Ponty all phenomenality plays itself out within this flesh of the world. In remaining within the flesh of the world, this appearance, or as Lefort describes it, this *genesis*, can be seen as a paradoxical reversal of the flesh of the world upon itself. As Lefort explains, within the context of birth:

A singular sensible emerges from the mass of the sensible by a sort of coiling up, and through redoubling, turns back upon itself - that is to say, at the same time, upon the whole sensible - so that a double doubling occurs, the body becoming at once sentient and sensible and distinct from the external world that it continues to belong to, to adhere to.³¹

The relationship between sentient and sensible in Merleau-Ponty is one which stands in between dualism and monism. In his notion of the flesh of the world, Merleau-Ponty rejects a subject-object dichotomy and, thus, sentient and sensible are seen as being part of the same flesh. However, sentient and sensible are not one and the same. Although the boundary between them is unclear, there is a difference between them which manifests itself as a circularity between two

³⁰ Jean-François Lyotard, *Phenomenology*, Brian Beakley (trans.), New York: State University of New York Press (1991), p.89. Since Husserl's phenomenology stresses experience as it is lived and interpreted, meaning becomes the central concept. For Merleau-Ponty, as Lyotard notes, "the very notion of meaning is secondary". Ibid.

³¹ Claude Lefort, "Flesh and Otherness" in Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith (eds.) *Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty*, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press (1990), p.5. The context of birth is used by Lefort throughout this article as a particular illustration of the broader context of phenomenality as such. The paradoxical nature of the reversal of the flesh of the world is succinctly explained by Lefort: "Paradoxically, everything comes to pass as though simultaneously the body emerged from the flesh of things and transported into the things the flesh of its own body." Ibid.

phases of the same movement. As Merleau-Ponty notes:

If one wants metaphors, it would be better to say that the body sensed and the body sentient are as the obverse and the reverse, or again, as two segments of one circular course which goes above from left to right and below from right to left, but which is but one sole movement in its two phases.³²

For Lefort, Merleau-Ponty's conception of the relationship between sentient and sensible, as illustrated by this notion of "circularity", suggests the reversibility of the sentient-sensible which articulate their difference in that they "never exactly overlap, that they slip away at the very moment they are about to rejoin".³³ Although Lefort admits that Merleau-Ponty's late writings suggest a shift to move beyond the notion of reversibility, an inclusion of the idea of alterity through the notion of laterality³⁴, he nevertheless bases his critique of the latter upon reversibility, and the symmetry that this dynamic implies, through an illustration of the differences between the experience of the child and that of the adult: a relationship that he sees as asymmetrical. This notion of asymmetry, according to the author, resides in that the infant, in coming to the world - i.e. in coming into being - does so "into a world that the other sees, whereas it does not see it as one world".³⁵ The fact that the world is always seen as having been

³² Maurice Merleau-Ponty as quoted by Claude Lefort in *Ibid.*, p.6.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.7. This notion of reversibility is well illustrated by Lefort: "The body is capable of seeing itself, touching itself, hearing itself, because it keeps on being the same in this double experience. There is, for instance, an imperceptible shift from the touching to the touched when the right hand touches the left hand that is touching something else outside, a shift that reveals the reversibility of the sentient-sensible." *Ibid.*

³⁴ Merleau-Ponty does, according to Lefort, take Otherness into account within the context of *laterality*, in which the original sentient-sensible division calls forth a transfer of this experience from one body to another. As Merleau-Ponty explains: "there is finally a propagation of these exchanges to all the bodies of the same type and of the same style which I see and touch - and this by virtue of the fundamental fission or segregation of the sentient sensible which, laterally, makes the organs of my body communicate and founds transitivity from one body to another." *Ibid.*, p.8.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.9. As Lefort further explains: "Nonetheless, before he sees distinct, single things, before space unfolds itself before him and tends to be deep and differentiated, before the object appears as distinct and identified,

seen by another is further compounded by the notion that the infant, in coming into a constituted world, an existing symbolic order, is “immediately, and even before coming to this world, taken into a web of wishes, expectations, and fears of which he will never possess the meaning.”³⁶ These issues, according to Lefort, highlight a basic asymmetry between the experience of the infant and that of the adult that point in the direction of a debt in relation to something external, a debt towards the Other. This idea of debt is most clearly illustrated by Lefort in his discussion regarding speech. For the author, speech is indissociable from perceptive life and, within the development of a child, it is speech from an Other which gives identity to things and, more importantly within this context, an original identity to the infant through his name - i.e. a debt from the outside which can never be repaid due to its permanent externality.³⁷ As Lefort explains:

To be named [...] testifies to an original an irreducible transcendence.[...] The divergence (*écart*) between my name and myself does not coincide with the divergence between me seer and me visible. The name was imprinted on me and at the same time bound to remain outside me, above me.[...] The name is a sign of the irreversible, and of otherness in myself.³⁸

In positing asymmetry - i.e. in disputing the Merleau-Pontean notion of symmetry, Lefort points towards transcendence, to the ontological impossibility of pure immanence. For

the infant does not feel the distinction between the within and the without. The look of the other opens the world to him.” Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.,p.10.

³⁷ In giving identity to things - i.e. in distinguishing between things, according to the author, the child is brought into the realm of law. As Lefort notes: “The other gives names, and in a certain sense, introduces the child into the sphere of law whenever he says ‘this is red, and not yellow’, or ‘this is a house, and not a boat’. So he makes it clear that things have an identity on the outside. They are closed upon themselves, as it were, sealed with their names.” Ibid.,p.11.

³⁸ Ibid.,pp.11-12.

the author, it is this neglect of the Other, what he calls the *third one*, that impeded Merleau-Ponty from moving beyond sociological analysis to an apprehension of the political.³⁹ In moving from the level of the individual to that of the social, quasi-reversibility allows Lefort to solve the above problem encountered by Merleau-Ponty and utilize the latter's conceptual underpinnings in order to address the political. This involves, for Lefort, a shift from the flesh of the world which, according to him, does not allow for a differentiation between disparate types of *mise en forme* of the social, to "social flesh" (*la chair du social*). As with the example of the child elaborated upon above, within the context of the social space, it is an Other, the "other place" (*lieu autre*) in this case, which confers identity. In other words, the "other place" can be seen as circumscribing the social space and, furthermore, depending on how it is configured, allows for us to distinguish between different types of regimes. For Lefort, as with the birth of a child as an individual body, the social is born of an original division between asymmetrical terms - immanence and transcendence - that point to the existence of the *lieu autre*. For Lefort, the notion of laterality as it is put forth by Merleau-Ponty, is unable to account for the identity of a social space - i.e. the fact that we see ourselves as pertaining to a same social space. In the eyes of Lefort, this relationship must be based upon something beyond the duality of the relation of the flesh to itself, there is a need for a "third one". Lefort agrees with the notion of laterality but this laterality must be mediated from another place. Unlike Arendt, who sees the possibility of societal self-foundation through speech/action and

³⁹ As Lefort notes: "...in my opinion, he did not succeed in leaving the frame of sociological analysis. What he considered essential was the web of purely social relations, so he did not get rid of relativism by comparing the different types of social structures. He did not admit that there was a cleavage between political forms of society, the *régime* as is said in French, especially between modern democracy and totalitarianism." Ibid., p.12.

understands the latter in terms of a second, “political”, natality, Lefort asserts that society cannot institute itself and if it claims to have done so, it is because it already exists.

This, in no way, “disproves” Agamben’s thesis, but may provide the space for a more nuanced argument that would eschew the quasi-totalizing consequences of mutually constitutive relationship between sovereign power and the articulation of the sovereign subject. In other words, there may be ways to adhere to Agamben’s understanding of the structure and logic of sovereignty, and accept its inextricable link with the biopolitical and the politicization of life, while simultaneously apprehending an excess to the sovereign structure and its mutual constitutive relation to the subjective dispositions it enables. In doing so, it is important to present a particular reading of the conditions of possibility in which sovereign power articulates itself in continuity with what has come before in this work: the insights of a theologico-political optic and the understanding of crisis of modernity, and modernity *qua* crisis, within the context of the dissolution of the markers of certainty.

The question of the theological in *Homo Sacer* is addressed by Agamben *via* the notion of the sacred. In this sense, the author sees the proximity between sovereignty and the sacred as “not simply a secularized residue of the originary religious character of every political power, nor merely the attempt to grant the latter a theological foundation” but precisely, as has been addressed above, in terms of “the originary form of the inclusion of bare life in the juridical order”.⁴⁰ In this, Agamben persistently attempts to reveal the diachronic continuity of *homo*

⁴⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.85.

sacer as the figure that grounds sovereign authority.⁴¹ However, this continuity does not necessarily preclude an understanding of the articulation of the sovereign structure within the context of the theologico-political. In fact, the theologico-political can enable a reading that would provide the conditions of possibility for the foundation of the sovereign structure as *the* juridico-political paradigm of modernity. In this sense, Blumenberg's notion of reoccupation alluded to earlier can be set to work in order to understand how the dual ontology of Christianity and the dissolution of the markers of certainty of its order enabled the sovereign structure to occupy answer positions that had become vacant. In other words, in articulating itself as "an excrescence of the profane in the religious and the religious in the profane", the sovereign sphere and its attendant structure was very well suited to articulate itself in between the two poles of the Christian dualism as an attempt to provide a resolution to the crisis engendered by the dissolution of the ties to the otherworldly pole. As was elaborated upon in the previous chapter, the path towards world empire was obstructed due to the articulation of the ontological duality of Christianity. That there was a dissolution of the symbolic order that

⁴¹ This is evidenced in his treatment of the work of Kantorowicz to which attention was drawn in the previous chapter. In addressing Kantorowicz, Agamben attempts to reveal the continuity of the sacred life that grounds sovereign authority by paying close attention to a funeral rite for French kings in which a wax effigy of the latter is treated as the living king for seven days after his death. In addressing this rite, Kantorowicz's admits that this ceremony had pagan antecedents but that these did not have any influence upon the French ceremony and, thus, uses it in relation to the doctrine of the King's Two Bodies as an integral part of Christian political theology. Agamben, faults Kantorowicz's dismissal for occulting the consequences of the rite for his general thesis of the intimate relation between the doctrine of the King's Two Bodies and Christian theology. Instead, Agamben affirms the continuity of sacred life and the absoluteness of sovereign power by associating this rite with Roman imperial consecration and the figure of the emperor's colossus which significantly changes the meaning of the doctrine of the King's Two Bodies. As Agamben suggests: "... the king's political body cannot simply represent [...] the continuity of sovereign power. The king's body must also and above all represent the emperor's sacred life, which is isolated in the image and then, carried to the heavens, or, in the French and English rite, passed on to the designated successor. However, once this is acknowledged, the metaphor of the political body appears no longer as the symbol of the perpetuity of *dignitas*, but rather as the cipher of the absolute and inhuman character of sovereignty. The formulas *le mort saisit le vif* and *le roi ne meurt jamais* must be understood in a much more literal way than is usually thought: at the moment of the sovereign's death, it is the sacred life grounding sovereign authority that invests the person of the sovereign's successor." Ibid., p.101.

was ordered *via* its ties with the otherworldly pole does not preclude the necessity of having to somehow engage with this duality since the questions that it poses - about the transcendent and the immanent, the visible and the invisible - even in its dissolution, must be resolved. What sovereignty thus offered was a quasi-transcendent structure in between the temporal and its Other that could provide the foundation of order by giving answers to a number of questions through the peculiar way in which this structure articulates itself according to a logic of inclusive exclusion. Furthermore, what the sovereign structure enabled, and this in relation to Foucault's notion of biopolitics, was a form of policing to replace the policing of souls: the policing of bodies and minds through disciplinary institutions and technologies of the self. Furthermore, it is in this mutation of power from what Foucault calls pastoral power to bio-power that we can understand the next shift in the meaning of security. As Foucault suggests in addressing the mutation of pastoral power:

It was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world, but rather ensuring it in this world. And in this context, the word *salvation* takes on different meanings: health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents.⁴²

In order to understand the how and why of this mutation, however, one has to address the other side of the "modern" coin as it is elaborated here in reference to the "crisis" of modernity. What must be understood, is that this "crisis" in instituting "modernity", also ushers in what Claude Lefort would call the "democratic adventure". In reference to the quote by Lefort that begins this chapter, democracy can be seen precisely as being "instituted and

⁴² Michel Foucault, "Afterword: The Subject of Power", in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Second Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1983), p.215.

sustained” by the “*dissolution of the markers of certainty*” of the *Ancien régime*. In theologico-political terms, the loss of access to the otherworldly pole as the ultimate guarantee of social order, enables a situation in which the social is fundamentally indeterminate, where “society is constantly in search of its own foundations”.⁴³ At the root of this transformation is the symbolic mutation of the *Ancien régime* addressed in the previous chapter. As the radical alterity of the spiritual Other from which the social was ordered turns out to be impossible to maintain given, as Lefort and Gauchet explain, that “any attempt to rejoin the place of the other engages [power] in a live commerce with the social body”⁴⁴, the monarchical symbolic order becomes untenable and institutes a rupture with this radical alterity while simultaneously folding the question of otherness within the social.

From a State of the situation in which the social order was articulated from a place of power for which the King gave it figure *via* his body, the symbolic mutation at work in the dissolution of these markers produces a *mise en forme* of the social in which the place of power is unfigurable or, as Lefort represents it, “[t]he locus of power becomes an *empty place*.”⁴⁵ A central aspect of this dissolution is thus the disincorporation of the social, of a dissolution of the representation of the social *qua* body. Yet this does not mean that alterity simply disappears, but that access to this Other *qua* “other place” is occulted and is brought into the social sphere *via* division, that is, what is alluded to in the Lefort quote at the outset of this chapter as the

⁴³ Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.229.

⁴⁴ Claude Lefort and Marcel Gauchet, “Sur la démocratie: Le politique et l’institution du social”, *Textures* (1971), p.16.

⁴⁵ Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, David Macey (trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1988), p.17.

“relations between *self* and *other*, at every register of social life”. In other words this division manifests itself, *inter alia*, between newly minted “individuals”, between state and society and between self-same societies in the articulation of the (inter)national. As Lefort states in relation to the breaking down of the old certainties that democracy engenders, it “is not the dimension but the figure of the *other* that it abolishes”.⁴⁶ Furthermore, as Lefort’s quote suggests, this indeterminacy and disincorporation bears upon the foundations of Law, Power and Knowledge but also on the relationship between these three that become, as Lefort suggests, “disentangle[d]”.⁴⁷ It is within this context that the biopolitical, and the work of Foucault, can be productively supplemented to that of Lefort in the articulation of the modern *mise en forme* of the social.⁴⁸

Before moving on to the way in which the biopolitical articulates itself in relation to the modern *mise en forme* of the social, one more comment relating to Lefort’s understanding of democracy is necessary. In apprehending democracy in terms of a fundamental indeterminacy, the above elaboration intersects with the discussion of foundation considered in Chapter Two and the questions regarding the “event” of democracy at the end of Chapter

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.229.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.17. As Lefort explains: “Once power ceases to manifest the principle which generates and organizes a social body, once it ceases to condense within it virtues deriving from transcendent reason and justice, law and knowledge assert themselves as separate from and irreducible to power.” Ibid., pp.17-18.

⁴⁸ This elaboration of links between the work of Lefort and that of Foucault is particularly inspired, although articulated in somewhat different terms, by a comment made by Marcel Gauchet on this matter. “Hence it is *simultaneously* true that modern power works toward accumulating knowledge and universally promulgating the norm (Foucault) and that its historical specificity is to recognize knowledge’s autonomy and the law’s independence (Lefort). Both features must be thought together: modern power is the most extraordinary agent of knowledge that has ever existed, but only insofar as it does not seek to promulgate its own knowledge; it is the most all-pervasive, most obsessive law makers, but only because it does not seek to impose its own law.” Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, Oscar Burge (trans.), Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997), p.198.

Three. For what is instituted as the “democratic adventure” is precisely the perpetual questioning of foundation that animates the present thesis, the *ethos* that drives it, and the form of critical thought to which it can be said to belong. Indeed, far from being perceived as being anti-Enlightenment, as many anti-“postmodern” treatise seem to suggest, Lefort’s understanding of democracy as being founded upon the recognition of the very absence of any positive foundation enables us to apprehend this type of thought as being closest to the Enlightenment’s critical spirit. As David Campbell suggests in relation to Lefort’s notion of democracy and with particular reference to deconstruction:

This rendering of democracy highlights some surprising intersections. First, it demonstrates that at the core of modernity and the Enlightenment there is an indeterminacy with regards to the foundation for action and being.[...] Second, reason, which is normally figured as the Enlightenment answer to the problem of the demise of certain foundations, is itself a principle that cannot rationally ground its own privilege, and is thus subject to the same sort of indeterminacy it seeks to overcome. Third, democracy as an ethos of disturbance is the political form that is both attuned to and derived from these conditions of indeterminacy in the modern era. [...] [These propositions] point to an interesting conclusion. It is that deconstruction, the form of critical thought that is both enabled by and responds to the challenges and dangers of indeterminacy, and is considered by many to be antithetical if not hostile to the Enlightenment, reason, and democracy, is in actuality that which is among the closest to these goals.⁴⁹

In being enabled by and responding to indeterminacy, deconstruction can thus be seen as being enabled by and responds to the democratic *ethos*. In this sense, it is not politically ambivalent but can be seen as being always already political even when it is not explicitly taking what could be considered a “political stance”, or addressing what would be deemed a “political issue” (i.e. in contradistinction to another category of issue, be it “social”, “economic”, “philosophical”,

⁴⁹ David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1998), p.197.

etc...). Furthermore, in this context, the comments made by Mark Lilla about Derrida that I addressed in Chapter Two can be re-engaged in a new light. The author's comment that Derrida "cannot tell [his followers] why he chooses justice over injustice, or democracy over tyranny, only that he does"⁵⁰, or the nihilistic slippery slope that he seems to suggest one embarks upon by adhering to "the Heideggerian messianism of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction"⁵¹, become empty gestures from a position that would see the essence of democracy precisely as an awareness of the contingency of all "essences". In other words, the democratic entails a recognition that the positing of essences always already implies a certain violent *coup de force*⁵² founded, in the final instance, only on itself and that, to safeguard democracy, we must always maintain that awareness by constantly opening up what is being enclosed.

It is here that one can most explicitly apprehend the double dynamic that fuels "modernity", as well as the impossibility of its absolute overcoming. On the one hand, the dissolution of the markers of certainty disincorporates the social and disentangles the foundations of Law, Power and Knowledge enabling an awareness of the indeterminacy of incontestable foundation. On the other, this condition sets off an interminable quest to find a ground, and a radical preformativity in its perpetual maintenance. In not having access to a pole outside of the social to anchor a firm foundation, the quest for foundation becomes an incessant pursuit for self-engenderment within what has become, following Lefort, 'historical society'.

⁵⁰ Mark Lilla, "The Politics of Jacques Derrida", *The New York Review of Books*, June 25, 1998, p.41.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² See Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority'", in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, London: Routledge (1992), pp.3-67.

In this, “Man” and the “State”, and the relationship between the two via the notions of “nation” and “community” enabled by sovereignty⁵³, become the referents upon which to anchor foundation by both seeking *sovereignty over the past* through, as was seen in Chapter Two, either presentist or finalist history, and *sovereignty over the present* through the shift from the classical to the modern *episteme*. An *episteme* by which “Man” and “State” become simultaneously subjects *and* objects of knowledge, both transcendental and empirical. In relation to the question of democracy, the absence of foundation beyond question leads to an endless oscillation between subject and object that fuels a perpetual quest for sovereignty, transparency *qua* “reality”, and self-engenderment, while simultaneously revealing these as impossibilities. As William Connolly, following Foucault’s notion of the “empirico-transcendental doublet”⁵⁴, succinctly elaborates in relation to modern “Man”:

The transcendental doublet is a being whose role as governing *subject* of action and inquiry is perpetually chased by the compulsion to clarify opaque elements in its desire, perception, and judgment by converting itself into an *object* of inquiry. Each time the results of a new analysis of itself are brought back to the subject it is moved; it never reaches the solid ground it seeks to stand upon. The pursuit itself has become irreducible. The subject (“man”) is haunted by an indispensable and unconquerable double - an immense expanse of shade - that repeatedly compromises its sovereignty, transparency, freedom, and wholeness. This shadow provides both a condition of subjectivity and a sign of the impossibility of acquiring the stability the subject presupposes.⁵⁵

⁵³ As Jens Bartelson explains: “modern sovereignty focuses on the relation between man and state; the modern subject and the modern state are linked inside knowledge, and the concepts of nation and community are used to express their unity and cover over the problematic character of this unity.” Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.189. One can also supplement Bartelson here *via* Agamben by positing that the covering over of this problematic unity is in part done through the notion of citizenship which enables the inscription of bare life in the new juridico-political order.

⁵⁴ See Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York: Random House (1970), p.318.

⁵⁵ William Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1995), p.11.

Within this context, the dynamics behind what was elaborated in chapters One and Two regarding epistemic Realism's rationalist "will to truth", its short-circuiting of ontological questions and its desire to objectively approximate an impossible "real" world and thus performatively construct a real world in its image, becomes clear. It is in this way that these processes can be most clearly understood as being intimately related to modernity. Furthermore, it is also easy to see how the sovereign structure and its attendant logic is the source of order in this situation of modernity by both perpetually internalizing the excess produced through this oscillation in articulating itself *via* a logic of inclusive exclusion and incessantly redeploying the markers of order (inside from outside, self from other, subject from object) while simultaneously, as Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, succinctly put it, "summoning a form of life amenable to its sway."⁵⁶

Biopolitics, bourgeois ideology and security

The disentanglement of Law, Power and Knowledge that accompanied the dissolution of the markers of certainty of the *Ancien régime* necessitated a reconstitution of the relationship between these three. It is specifically through the sovereign structure in its articulation as the modern form of social order that this relationship can be seen as being reconstituted.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Dillon and Reid's comment here is explicitly related to their reading of Agamben's understanding of sovereignty and bare life. Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency", *Alternatives*, Vol.25, No.1 (2000), p.128.

⁵⁷ In this, I depart considerably from Lefort who in his analysis of modern societies has rarely addressed the question of sovereignty explicitly. A rare exception to this is a recent article to which I have already referred: Claude Lefort: "Nation et Souveraineté" *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000), pp.25-46. In this article Lefort refers to the notion of sovereignty explicitly, problematizing the relation between nation and sovereignty as well as addressing the question of external sovereignty. However, the understanding of sovereignty which is presented does not go beyond its juridico-political understanding. This brings up a further differentiation vis-à-vis the work of Lefort in the present text which may have already permeated the

Following Lefort, one could say that Law, Power, and Knowledge are effectively disentangled with the dissolution of the old order. This is done *de jure* through institutional separation to guard against the possibility of refusion. However, *de facto*, the disentanglement can also be

work. This is related to Lefort's quest for a "revival of political philosophy" through the traditional analysis of regime differentiation. As has been seen, there is undoubtedly an adherence to Lefort's understanding of democracy in this work, as well as a myriad of other contributions which he has made to an understanding of the political. Furthermore, there is adherence here to the notion that totalitarianism issues forth from the conditions in which democracy is instituted and institutes with the dissolution of the markers of certainty. What is problematized here is the notion that democracy is, in itself, a separate form of regime which can be categorized as a "type" alongside totalitarianism. Although Lefort's thinking is very complex and very difficult to categorize, hence the possibility of reading him as he is read in this work, the development of this typological approach makes it so that Lefort, as Simon Critchley has pointed out, "runs the continual risk of conflating democracy with liberal democracy." Simon Critchley, "Retracing the political: politics and community in the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean Luc Nancy", in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), *The political subject of violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993), p.81. This risk was also highlighted in questions asked by Jacob Rogozinski, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy to Lefort following his presentation of "The Question of Democracy" at the *Centre de recherches philosophique sur le politique de la rue d'Ulm*. These questions all revolved around the issue of the possibility of identifying a certain totalitarian aspect in democratic societies. See Denis Kambouchner, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Claude Lefort, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière, Jacob Rogozinski, and Philippe Soulez, *Le retrait du politique*, Paris: Galilée (1983), pp.86-87. In contrast, what is advanced here is that democracy is instituted, not as a regime, but a political force, movement and *ethos* enabled by the dissolution of the markers of certainty and the awareness of the contingency of undisputable foundations and of the irreducibility of the antagonistic elements present within the social which the sovereign structure and its attendant logic seeks to regulate and control. Totalitarianism, however, should not be seen as its most extreme manifestation but, following Agamben's analysis of the concentration camp, should be seen as a breakdown, or crisis, of the sovereign structure and its attendant logic "where the state of exception begins to become the rule", its materialization. See Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), pp.168-169. However, this should not be seen as a discounting of democratic institutions, since these institutions can be seen as mechanisms by which the complete breakdown of the sovereign structure is kept at bay by incessantly revealing the excess to the production of bare life of the sovereign structure. Conversely, however, this does not mean that the present institutions make us immune to totalitarianism as the liberal fiction would have us believe. On the contrary, what is needed is a perpetual multiplication of institutionalized practices, equivalences quilted around "democracy", to constantly open up areas where division is being occulted through closure. In this, the project of radical and plural democracy put forward by, inter alia, Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau seems to me particularly pertinent. As Mouffe suggests: "What we need is a hegemony of democratic values, and this requires a multiplication of democratic practices, institutionalizing them into ever more diverse social relations, so that a multiplicity of subject-positions can be formed through a democratic matrix. It is in this way - and not by trying to provide it with a rational foundation - that we will be able, not only to defend democracy, but also to deepen it. Such a hegemony will never be complete, and anyway, it is not desirable for a society to be ruled by a single democratic logic. Relations of authority and power cannot completely disappear, and it is important to abandon the myth of a transparent society, reconciled with itself, for that kind of fantasy leads to totalitarianism. A project of radical and plural democracy, on the contrary, requires the existence of multiplicity, of plurality and of conflict, and sees in them the *raison d'être* of politics." Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, London: Verso (1993), p.18. For a detailed elaboration of this project see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso (1985).

read as a reconstitution of the relationship between the three. This reconstitution is articulated in a radically different form and is thus, for the most part, invisible in relation to the previous frame of reference. As alluded to earlier, Foucault highlights a shift that occurs in the deployment of power and the articulation of order that sees power based upon the juridico-political practices of the state in its right over death, to one articulated through political techniques focussed on the administration of life. In this articulation, the law recedes in its role of producing order while power is deployed *via* knowledge through a manifold of institutionalized practices. As Foucault explains:

I think we have here an important rupture: whereas the end of sovereignty is found in itself and that it draws its instruments from itself in the form of law, the end of government is in the things that it administers; it is to be found in the perfection, the maximization or the intensification of the processes that it administers, and the instruments of government, instead of being laws, will be diverse tactics. Regression, consequently, of the law, or rather, with regards to the perspective of what the government must be, the law is certainly not the major instrument. Here again, we find the theme which can be found throughout the 17th century and that is explicitly manifest in the 18th century in all the texts of the economists and physiocrats when they explain that it is certainly not through the law that we can effectively accomplish the ends of government.⁵⁸

The privileging of new political techniques over the law as the principal factor in the articulation of the new form of order can also be revealed in the way in which the central actor in the articulation and administration of biopower - i.e. the police - can be perceived. Contrary to the present understanding of the police as purely an enforcer of the law, the police of the 17th and 18th centuries, although part of the juridical administration, were concerned with individuals in a role much broader than simple juridical subjects in that its end was to "increase, from the

⁵⁸ Michel Foucault, "La 'Gouvernementalité'" in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. III, Paris: Gallimard (1994), p.646. My translation.

inside, the powers of the state”⁵⁹ through the creation of a strong and healthy society for the latter. In this, the functions of the police were far removed from the simple enforcement of the laws. As Foucault explains:

Men and things envisioned as to their relationship to property, what they produce, men’s coexistence on a territory, what is exchanged on the market. It also includes how they live, the diseases and the accidents which can befall them. What the police see to is a live, active, productive man.⁶⁰

The police thus were intimately involved in the production and maintenance of social life. By being involved in all the quotidian aspects of life, it attempted to provide a solid basis for social life and to maintain a well organized community.

In relation to knowledge, what is deployed is a knowledge which is not explicitly related to “power” and does not appear as being deployed as such yet maintains an occulted complicity with it. It is a form of knowledge with reasoning “man” at its centre as the origin and end of universal truth and meaning. It is a form of knowledge that arrests the logic of the transcendental doublet in the figure of reasoning man who, by acknowledging his limitations as being those that are essential to his being a rational human being, “obeys them“, as Richard K. Ashley suggests, “because they are the transcendental conditions of the possibility of reasoning man’s autonomy and power.”⁶¹ It is the figure found in the Kantian subject, the subject of modernity, whose critical optic amidst the dissolution of the markers of certainty is limited by

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.721.

⁶⁰ Michel Foucault, quoted in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Second Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1983),p.139.

⁶¹ Richard K. Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War”, in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of Modern Politics*, New York: Lexington (1989), p.265. This reflection on knowledge is primarily influenced by Ashley insightful treatment of “Sovereign Man.”

its obedience to reason and its political obedience to the political principle that incarnates the latter: the modern sovereign State. Indeed, as Foucault suggests:

The question, in any event, is that of knowing how the use of reason can take the public form it requires, how the audacity to know can be exercised in broad daylight, while individuals are obeying as scrupulously as possible. And Kant, in conclusion, proposes to Frederick II, in scarcely veiled terms, a sort of contract - what might be called the contract of rational despotism with free reason: the public and free use of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee of obedience, on condition, however, that the political principle that must be obeyed itself is in conformity with universal reason.⁶²

In keeping with these considerations on law, power and knowledge, what can be supplemented here, is that it is precisely the disentanglement of Law, Power and Knowledge that necessitates this new deployment of power. A deployment that is itself enabled by the sovereign production of a life amenable to it. The disincorporation of the social body leads to its replacement by the production of individualized bodies as well as through the concept of "population" that enables the ordering of the social through processes of rationalization, organization, and homogenization, what Foucault calls "normalization", *via* discipline and biopower. Within this context, it will now be argued, one can understand the deployment of bourgeois ideology as it is understood by Lefort and, as will be seen, the articulation of a new form of security discourse, a new meaning to security, in complicity with the articulation of the liberal social order.

Foucault's relationship with the notion of ideology is one that is tenuous at best. In relation to his notion of truth-effects and his understanding of subjectification and of the practices of power/knowledge, there is little room for what is traditionally understood as ideology. As the author has explicitly stated in an interview:

⁶² Michel Foucault quoted in *Ibid.* p.314, Note 19.

The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to use for three reasons. The first is that, whether one wants it to be or not, it is always in virtual opposition to something like the truth. Now I believe that the problem is not to make the division between that which, in a discourse, falls under scientificity and truth and that which falls under something else, but to see historically how truth-effects are produced inside discourses which are not in themselves either true or false. The second inconvenience is that it refers, necessarily I believe, to something like a subject. Thirdly, ideology is in a secondary position in relation to something which must function as the infrastructure or economic or material determinant for it. For these three reasons, I believe that it is a notion that one cannot use without precautions.⁶³

However, Foucault does engage with the notion of the bourgeoisie. In the *History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*, Foucault provides a critique of Marxist accounts of bourgeois sexual values that are apprehended as a form of repression and exploitation of the working class, by arguing that these were applied by the bourgeoisie to itself in a process of "self affirmation".⁶⁴ This does not, however, preclude the fact of class domination, only that these strategies and practices were part of the self-constitution of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, as Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow explain, in relation to Foucault's understanding of power, "his point is that power is exercised on the dominant as well as the dominated; there is a process of self-formation or autocolonization involved. In order for the bourgeoisie to establish its position of class domination during the nineteenth century, it had to form itself as a class."⁶⁵ In this context,

⁶³ Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power", in Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon (ed.), New York: Pantheon (1980), p.118.

⁶⁴ As C.G. Prado explains, "Most Marxists see bourgeois sexual values and practices as designed to restrict sex to the productive business of procreation and diminish its potential as a counterproductive distraction. Against this view, Foucault maintains that, in deploying sexuality, the bourgeoisie is less concerned with the manipulation of the working class than with institutionalizing its own special status. Foucault contends that in deploying sexuality the bourgeoisie 'provided itself with a body to be cared for,' a body defined and catered by a technology of sex." G.C. Prado, *Starting with Foucault: An Introduction to Genealogy*, Boulder: Westview Press (1995), p.109.

⁶⁵ Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Second Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1983), p.186.

within the broader ambit of biopolitics, Foucault makes his position abundantly clear:

One could say that the strategy of moralization (health campaigns, workers' housing, clinics, etc.) of the working class was that of the bourgeoisie. One could even say that it is this strategy which defined them as a class and enabled them to exercise their domination. But, to say that the bourgeoisie at the level of its ideology and its projects of economic reform, acting as some sort of real and yet fictive subject, invented and imposed by force this strategy of domination, that simply cannot be said.⁶⁶

Foucault's reticence to associate "bourgeois" and "ideology" can thus be seen as stemming from the way in which "bourgeois ideology" connotes a *de facto* class division and the deliberate masking and reinforcing of this division through ideology. In other words, that ideology was somehow separate from some underlying "real", through which an underlying truth based upon a material determinant was being hidden by the dominant class. This would, in a sense, disengage knowledge and power, or create a gap in between them, through which it could be construed that the bourgeois would knowingly apply "biopolitics" to the proletariat. However, there is a way of articulating ideology which would circumvent these problems while providing an added dimension to the processes of normalization elaborated upon while engaging with the notions of birth, alterity, disincorporation and social division addressed above.

In keeping with the concerns with democracy and the irreducibility of alterity addressed above and, thus, supplementing the direct correspondence between biopower and subjectification with the issue of an excess that must be negotiated, there is a need to address the issue of re-presentation. In this, I do not follow authors such as Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord in which a collapse of representation brings us into a world of pure simulation or

⁶⁶ Michel Foucault quoted in *Ibid.*

spectacle, regardless of the fact that these elements are undoubtedly present within the social.⁶⁷

Yet, representation does not necessarily entail the direct re-presentation of an underlying “real”, and it is in this that Lefort’s understanding of ideology can be compatible with the practices of normalization of biopolitics and the concerns about ideology raised by Foucault.

Lefort’s understanding of ideology is directly related to the dissolution of the markers of certainty of the *Ancien régime*. In fact, ideology only appears within the context of the “predicament” of modern forms of social space in which the place of power becomes inoccupable in the sense that it can no longer be tied to one source. The emptying of the place of power that occurs with the progressive transition from so-called “pre-modern” to “modern” forms of social space is a *symbolic transformation* since it results from a change in how the relation between the social and alterity is negotiated in the institution of the social. As was alluded to earlier, that there has been a progressive secularization of the modern social space does not imply a disappearance of what the religious phenomena points to - i.e., an inaccessible or Otherness. On the contrary, Otherness is very much a constitutive part of the institution of the social in modernity as well as of the implantation of the sovereign structure and the articulation of its attendant logic therein. It is just negotiated in different forms since it is diffused within a strictly temporal articulation of order. However, as was elaborated upon

⁶⁷ See Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations*, New York: Semiotext(e) (1983), and Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, New York: Zone Books (1994). In this I follow Ernesto Laclau who argues: “For the requirements of a politics based upon universality compatible with an increasing expansion of cultural differences are clearly incompatible with some version of postmodernism - particularly those which conclude from a critique of foundationalism that there is an implosion of all meaning and the entry into a world of ‘simulation’ (Baudrillard). I don’t think that this is a conclusion that follows at all. As we have argued, the impossibility of a universal ground does not eliminate its need: it just transforms the ground into an empty place which can partially be filled in a variety of ways (the strategy of this filling is what politics is all about).” Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, London: Verso (1996), p.59.

earlier, within modernity there is a fundamental indeterminacy at work since meaning and order are no longer symbolically conveyed via an unconditioned exterior source symbolically secured to Otherness. As Ernesto Laclau notes, in relation to Lefort, the shift from a “pre-modern” order in which there is a “strict fixation between social signifiers and signifieds” gives way to a “modern” order which “tends to become a pure logic of the circulation of signifiers.”⁶⁸

It is within this context that one can understand the production and function of ideology in Lefort. Within this understanding of the *why* of ideology, the general function of the latter in modern forms of social space, where the alterity of social being is occulted, is to produce a variety of *discourses on the social*, ideological discourses which are meant to provide meaning and order by occulting the indeterminacy at the heart of modernity and masking social division. Yet, within modernity, within the context of the “pure logic of the circulation of signifiers”, there is a tendency for discourse to multiply in all directions. Ideological discourse, therefore, tends to be very disjointed and thereby often contradictory since it has no single referent to which it can be anchored. Since ideology in modern social space cannot represent itself as an absolute, it must constantly reproduce itself in all social spheres and in all directions in order to mask social divisions. Contrary to “pre-modern” social spaces in which “Divine Law” could give meaning to these divisions, in modernity ideology serves to mask divisions that incessantly run the risk of becoming apparent.⁶⁹ Within this context, one can apprehend what actuates the

⁶⁸ Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London: Verso (1990), p.192.

⁶⁹ As John Thompson notes: “As a discourse on the social, ideology must remain within the social sphere, must avail itself of the resources of the social in order to carry out its task of sealing every crack. This is, however, a risky, conflict-laden undertaking. For ideology always runs the risk of appearing as a discourse, a particular discourse in the service of a particular group or class; and hence its capacity to dissimulate social and temporal divisions is constantly threatened by the possibility that the very attempt to dissimulate will become apparent to all.” John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction”, in Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society*:

processes of normalization, the discursive practices of rationalization, organization and homogenization, examined by Foucault. It should be pointed out that the understanding of “discourse” here has nothing to do with a division between ideal and material worlds, or theory and practice, but “discourse itself as a practice.”⁷⁰ In this, one can follow the way in which Laclau and Mouffe transcend the distinction between the ideal and the material by affirming “the material character of every discursive structure”⁷¹ - i.e. a position that sees such a structure as “not a merely ‘cognitive’ or ‘contemplative’ entity [but as][...] an *articulatory practice* which constitutes and organizes social relations.”⁷² Yet there remains a role for ideology to play here. However, ideology is not understood as a discourse of dissimulation of an underlying “real”, but as a discourse re-presenting the Foucaultean discursive practices. Ideology here should be understood, as John Thompson explains in relation to Lefort, “as a fold or crease (*repli*) of the social discourse on itself, a kind of discourse following the instituting discourse and seeking to cover over the divisions instituted therein.”⁷³ In this sense, ideology implies a certain verticality, or transcendence to enable its articulation and maintenance. This verticality is, in a sense, provided by the quasi-transcendentality of the sovereign structure in its position between the temporal and its Other.

Bureaucracy, Democracy and Totalitarianism, Cambridge: MIT Press (1986), pp.16-17

⁷⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language*, New York: Pantheon (1972), p.46.

⁷¹ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso (1985), p. 108.

⁷² Ibid. p.96.

⁷³ John B. Thompson, “Ideology and the Social Imaginary: An Appraisal of Castoriadis and Lefort”, *Theory and Society*, Vol.11 (1982), pp.666-667.

This notion of ideology can thus be apprehended as being very different from the meaning given to the term by traditional Marxists. Furthermore, it responds to Foucault's concerns about ideology while simultaneously enabling its use within the context of his work. Whereas the Marxist understanding tends to postulate ideological discourse as generally unified and homogeneous (even though it may elicit a counter discourse), Lefort tends to see ideological discourse as contradictory within the movement of the discourse itself as it attempts to mask or, in Laclauian terms, "suture"⁷⁴, social division. This point is important inasmuch as ideology is not only perceived here as not being imposed by one class upon another since it works to render coherent and naturalize the symbolic order as such in which classes are formed as classes, but it is also not the product of a willing subject but a movement within discourse as it attempts to seal the cracks between itself and the instituting discourse to present the illusion of a natural order.⁷⁵ Furthermore, as was alluded to before, this understanding of ideology is not articulated in relation to a concealing of "natural" divisions within society or a "real" process unfolding with regards to production and class struggle (e.g., Marx's metaphor of ideology as a *camera obscura*⁷⁶), from which one can deduce the order of law, power and

⁷⁴ See Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London: Verso (1990), pp.89-92.

⁷⁵ Lefort is clear on this point: "I do not mean that the discourse emanates from a particular agent, or from a series of agents who would simply be representatives of the dominant class. In so far as it is presented as a discourse on the social, extricating itself from the social, ideological discourse develops in an impersonal way; it conveys knowledge which is supposed to arise from the order of things." Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society*, John B. Thompson (ed.), Cambridge: MIT Press (1986), p.206.

⁷⁶ This metaphor conveys the misprision of ideology as a false, or ocularly distorted, image of a "real". As Martin Jay explains: "Here the contrast is between a false vision that is reversed and inverted and a true one that is straightforwardly adequate to the object it sees. The darkness and obscurity of the closed box is also implicitly set against the transparent clarity of a *camera lucida*, in which ideology is banished in the glare of the enlightenment." Martin Jay, *Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique*, New York: Routledge (1993), p.135.

knowledge. Lefort explicitly addresses these issues in a critique of Marxist approaches to ideology by arguing that the historical and divided character of society can only be apprehended through the symbolic order which develops with the institution of the social. In other words, unlike traditional Marxist approaches, which see ideology as a separate domain (*comme un domaine séparé*)⁷⁷ and a possibility of apprehending an underlying “real” as such, for Lefort, the “real” *can only be apprehended through the symbolic order as discourse* that forms part of the institution of the social which shapes the oppositions and practices existing in society.⁷⁸ Finally, with regards to a distinction between “science” and “ideology”, Lefort’s critique of social sciences, elaborated upon in chapters One and Two, reveals the way in which ideology can be articulated as scientific “truth.” For Lefort, “social science”, if we recall, can be seen in terms of the positivist fiction “of placing society before society, by setting down as principles that which can only be apprehended from an experience which is already social.”⁷⁹ Ideology works precisely in this way: it effectively seeks to naturalize, or render transcendent, ideational constructs which act as signifiers for the symbolic order through the illusion of a neutral, universal, *discourse on the social*, a discourse that works to be perceived as something other

⁷⁷ Claude Lefort, *Les formes de l'histoire*, Paris: Gallimard (1978), p. 282.

⁷⁸ Even more nuanced approaches such as that of Gramsci which open up the possibility of viewing the primacy of social relations of production as conditioned by a symbolic order, can be read as conveying the existence of an underlying “real”. As Slavoj Žižek explains, the duality of ideological hegemony and physical coercion in which the ruling class resorts to the latter when its power is effectively threatened, fails to consider the symbolic impact of the physical violence *itself* - i.e. that ideological apparatuses “always-already prepare the ground for the exercise of physical violence” by determining “its very impact (the fascination with physical violence, the panic which seizes us when we are confronted with it, is a symbolic fact).” Slavoj Žižek, “Invisible ideology: political violence between fiction and fantasy”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.1, No.1 (February 1996), p.16.

⁷⁹ Claude Lefort, *Essais sur le politique. XIXe-XXe siècles*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil (1986), p. 256. My translation.

than a particular *social discourse* through the occultation of its generative principles.

Within the context of the present work, this understanding of ideology was employed in the analysis of the self-image of the discipline of International Relations in Chapter One in relation to the three discourses of the discipline - i.e. difference between the discourse *on* "International Relations", the discourse *on* (inter)national relations, and the international relations discourse. What should be made clear, however, is that insofar as epistemic Realism is apprehended as an ideology, it does not follow that it is "false", as opposed to "true" - i.e. that it is a fiction masking some underlying "real." This is precisely the point: it *is* true, it "works", it is an inextricable part of the *techne* through which social order, and indeed world order, is structured. One final point to be made is that underlying the movement of naturalization is that of (de)politicization inasmuch as to seek to naturalize an ideational construct is, in a sense, to seek to (de)politicize it by removing it from the realm of contestation; it just *is*. However, if one understands the political as a process of ground(ing), of establishing foundation through an occultation of generative principles, then this process of (de)politicization must take its brackets seriously. This is to say that any process of (de)politicization is a profoundly *political act*.⁸⁰

Turning to the question of bourgeois ideology, according to Lefort, this is an ideology that reached its apogee in the nineteenth century, and was instrumental in attempting to provide a discourse that would conceal the above-mentioned divisions and fill the void left behind with

⁸⁰ As I have said elsewhere: "In bracketing the *de* in *depoliticised* what is revealed is the way in which any "depoliticisation", through a double movement of appearance and eclipsing, is a profoundly political act since there is an attempt to occult the political foundations through a discourse which is inherently politicized. In this sense, depoliticization creates its own aporia since its condition of possibility can only be achieved through a political act." Miguel de Larrinaga, "(Re)Politicizing the Discourse: Globalization is a S(h)ell Game", *Alternatives*, Vol.25, No.2 (2000), p.153.

the withering of the religious referent. This was done, according to the author, through a discourse that gave the illusion of being a social discourse which is external to the social, "an interpretation of the real from the real,"⁸¹ through which the privileging of positive knowledge and the rejection of the transcendent referent provided an image of the social order and the order of the world. This new discourse is one that articulated this order precisely through a "split between *ideas* and the supposed *real*",⁸² where abstract ideas were represented by capitalized words. As Lefort explains:

The text of ideology is written in capital letters, whether it is a question of Humanity, Progress, Nature, Life, or of the key principles of bourgeois democracy inscribed on the pediment of the Republic, or even of Science and Art, but also of Property, Family, Order, Society, Nation; it may be a conservative or progressive version of bourgeois discourse, or a socialist or anarchist version of anti-bourgeois discourse.⁸³

What is important to point out again here, is that ideology is thus a matter of the constitution of the social space as a whole, and not simply of a tool of exploitation of one class over another. It is precisely around these capitalized signifiers that subject positions coalesce within the social space. In seeking to erase the religious or mythical through these abstract notions, what is done is exactly the opposite: it is the articulation of another transcendence *via* the ideas themselves. These capitalized referents simultaneously enable the objectification of the social but also potentially imperil the validity of the order.⁸⁴ What must be understood is that these

⁸¹ Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society*, John B. Thompson (ed.), Cambridge: MIT Press (1986), p.205.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ As Lefort explains: "The words "family", "property" and "society", but also "freedom", "equality", "progress" or "science", crystallize a knowledge which dispenses with all justification. But the point of certainty is untenable, the transcendence of the idea is vain. For that which is sought but cannot be attained is something

ideas are not only representations, but also norms that imply a certain way of acting within the diverse facets of society. In order to maintain a distance from its object, the discourse on the social must present the image of the guarantor of the rule that substantiates, in itself, the embodiment of the idea in the social relation. According to Lefort, this brought about the emergence of various stereotypical images representing, *inter alia*, the “bourgeois”, the ‘boss’, the ‘minister’, the ‘family man’, the ‘teacher’, the ‘militant’, etc.”⁸⁵ Furthermore, the articulation of social order through these ideas as norms takes the form of a series of dichotomies that dissimulate social divisions - e.g. worker/bourgeois, uncivilized/civilized, mad/sane, child/adult.⁸⁶ These dichotomies oppose those who adhere to the rule and thus form the image of a “natural” being and a society above nature, and an “other” who, “in not having access to the rule, is deprived of the status of subject.”⁸⁷ In this, the creation of a “natural” and cohesive character, the antagonisms through the social are effectively occulted and (de)politicized. Furthermore, one can see here how the ideological discourse as a re-doubling of the discursive practices of normalization, help to confirm the social order by re-presenting it back to the social through a discourse of naturalization articulated around the illusion of the difference between the “real” and the “idea”. Moreover, one needs to take into account the role of the sovereign structure and its attendant logic in both enabling and maintaining these dichotomies and this distinction.

which lies beyond the social, a certainty about the social as such, *a referent whose very loss is at the origin of ideology.*” See Claude Lefort, *Ibid.*, p.211 (emphasis added).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p 206.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.206-207.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

According to Lefort, the strength of bourgeois ideology resides in the multiplicity and the disjointedness of its discourses. In patterning itself in accordance to the differentiation of the social institutions in bourgeois society, this ideological form allows for a dispersion of discourses that, in not speaking from a central place, makes it difficult to reveal as ideology. Paradoxically, however, this strength is also a weakness since the multiplicity of discourses within the numerous facets of bourgeois society, as well as the need to advance images in order to guarantee rules, increases the risk of revealing the socially engendered nature of the discourses through internal inconsistencies and incompatible representations. For Lefort, bourgeois ideology is caught in an unending task of attempting to provide markers of order by occulting their generative principles within a society that is constantly producing opportunities to undermine these referents. It is for this reason that the author sees bourgeois ideology as having no "safety catch".⁸⁸

Within this context appears a new discourse of security. In the previous two chapters, two meanings to security were addressed in relation to different *mise en forme* of the social: one negative *qua* security as sin and one positive *qua* protection from threats. To these, one can add a third one, traced by James Der Derian, that becomes popular in the 19th century. As the author explains in relation to the two other meanings to security that we have already presented:

Mediating between these two senses of security is a third. In the face of a danger, a debt, or an obligation of some kind, one seeks a security, in the form of a pledge, a bond, a surety. From the 1828 *Webster*: "Violent and dangerous men are obliged to give security for their good behaviour, or for keeping the peace." In Markby's *Elementary*

⁸⁸As Lefort explains: "The ideological discourse that we are examining has no safety catch; it is rendered vulnerable by its attempt to make visible the place from which the social relation would be conceivable (both thinkable and creatable), by its inability to define this place without letting its contingency appear, without condemning itself to slide from one position to another, without thereby making apparent the instability of an order that it is intended to raise to the status of essence." *Ibid.*, p.213.

Law (1874), the word is given a precise financial meaning: "I shall also use the word security to express any transaction between the debtor and creditor by which the performance of such a service (one capable as being represented in money) is secured. A security could also be 'represented' in person. Shakespeare again, from *Henry IV*: "He said, sir, you should procure him better Assurance, the Bardole: he wold not take his Bond and your, he'd like not the Security."⁸⁹

The example by Shakespeare here is interesting in its own right. As has been seen, writing in the *interregnum* from divine order to sovereign state put Shakespeare in the privileged position of apprehending, and contributing to, the contestations over meaning during his lifetime. That Shakespeare utilized this understanding of security is consistent with what was seen of him in the previous chapter. In the context of Shakespeare's "riddle," it was revealed how the author could be seen as being sensitive to the effects upon the social and the concomitant (re)articulation of subjective dispositions that the dissolution of the markers of certainty produced - i.e. the "untying" of the old social order and its reconstitution vis the sovereign structure. In this context, the necessity of pledges, bonds or sureties between "individuals" should come as no surprise. What is more germane to the present analysis, however, is precisely how the new order was instituted - i.e. an examination of those examples that attest to the word's codification within language and law. What is interesting about these two cases is that each one portrays a different facet of the evolving order.

In relation to the codification of language, the Webster dictionary entry is particularly interesting in the way in which the security discourse is reversed. This reversal can be seen as concomitant with the shift in the articulation of power from the juridico-political to the

⁸⁹ See James Der Derian, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), *The political subject of violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1993), p.98.

biopolitical. Instead of apprehending security as the state's protection of the social order from "violent and dangerous men," security is *reversed* and brought *through* the criminal who gives a pledge, a security, to society that he will behave in accordance with the "good" and the "keeping" of peace - i.e. what the social order had articulated as the natural order of things. This meaning to security can be seen as being intimately related to what Foucault called the production of "docile bodies"⁹⁰ through the disciplinary component of biopower. In the shift from an overtly juridico-political order to biopower, punishment for those found guilty of a crime went from, as was alluded to earlier, public executions or torture, to the normalization of detention through the prison in which the standard form of punishment became one which was carried out in secret by physically removing the offender from society behind prison walls. Between these two forms of punishment, Foucault identifies a third one in *Discipline and Punish*⁹¹, that appears at the end of the classical age, spurred by the French Revolution and humanist concerns. This form of punishment replaced the ever more atrocious displays of sovereign power upon the criminal body with a more "humane" and efficient form in accordance with social contract theory. The aim of this form was thus not to display the power of the sovereign, who was required to act with every breach of the law, but to shift the obligation to the social - i.e. making society as a whole the victim under the capital signifier of "Humanity." As Dreyfus and Rabinow succinctly explain:

The standard by which justice operates was no longer the power of the sovereign and the truth of the confession but rather the "humanity" which all parties to the social

⁹⁰ See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Alan Sheridan (trans.), New York: Pantheon Books (1977). In particular, Part 3, Chapters xix to xxiv, pp.135-169.

⁹¹ See Ibid. Part 2, Chapters ix - xiv, pp.73-114.

contract share. Punishment, accordingly, must be modulated, made more lenient, for it is not only the criminal who is implicated in each of his actions, but the whole of society. Hence the limit of punishment - and its target - is the humanity of each subject. [...] The new form of punishment must thus both redress the wrong done to society and bring the offender back to his rightful and useful place in society.”⁹²

It is within this context that one can understand why “[v]iolent and dangerous men are obliged to give security for their good behaviour, or for keeping the peace.” The links between the criminal and the social - i.e. the attempt to reform the criminal through the production of “docile bodies” - as well as the fact that incarceration was not the dominant paradigm of punishment, thus requiring a “security” from the offender vis-à-vis society after being suitably punished⁹³, all point to this understanding of security as being intimately tied to the beginnings of the production of biopolitical order.

The second example used by Der Derian, from Markby’s *Elementary Law*, addresses the financial meaning of security in the form of a “bond”, a meaning of security that is widespread today in the form “securities.”⁹⁴ Although this example is exclusively and explicitly concerned with debtor creditor relations, i.e. relations among individualized “individuals”

⁹² Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Second Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1983),p.148.

⁹³ With wholesale incarceration not yet an option, punishment was normalized through a complex classification and codification of laws to suit particular crimes to particular punishments. What was sought was a transparency of correspondence between the act and the punishment. As Foucault explains: “Exact relations are required between the nature of the offence and the nature of the punishment; he who had used violence in his crime must be subjected to physical pain; he who has been lazy must be sentenced to hard labour; he who has acted despicably will be subjected to infamy.” Michel Foucault, quoted in *Ibid.* One can apprehend in this transparency, an attempt to naturalize the system of punishment, to make it seem as if, elaborated upon above, it was the natural order of things.

⁹⁴ This use was legally enshrined in the United States through the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which created the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to ensure the following of market rules by firms, agencies, organizations and exchanges dealing with “securities” to protect investors. See “The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry,” *U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission*, <http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml>

involved in a financial relation, it takes as given other relations implicitly related to these. In other words, relations associated to the context in which this “individual” takes place. In this usage, there is thus again the implication of the “individual” and “society”, as well as that of the “state” as guarantor in the final instance. In other words, this example, and this understanding of security, are inextricably related to the liberal bourgeois order. One can, therefore, apprehend this example as one intimately involved with a broader understanding of security as a capitalized marker of bourgeois order - i.e. a discourse of security deployed initially and primarily through the discourse of 18th century liberalism. In a brief review of the liberal use of security, Mark Neocleous lists a multitude of usages of the word by liberal thinkers, *inter alia*:

That John Stuart Mill could declare that security is “the most vital of all interests” and that “security of person and property ... are the first needs of society” was one of the achievements of eighteenth-century liberalism, which treated security and liberty as more or less synonymous. Adam Smith, for example, refers to the “liberty” and “security” of individuals in the same breath, while Montesquieu claims that “political liberty consists in security or, at least, in the opinion one has of one’s security”. Bentham in his work of the 1780s suggests that “a clear idea of liberty will lead us to regard it as a branch of security”. Almost identical claims are made by a range of other writers in the liberal tradition...⁹⁵

What we find in this articulation of “Security” is thus a (re)configuration of its meaning. This (re)configuration can be apprehended here with regards to the relation between the “state” and the newly articulated “society” and “individual”.

The intimate association of security and liberty, and security’s role as a prominent signifier of bourgeois ideology can be read in different ways. In the first instance, it can be read, at the level of the individual, in terms of the securing of private property - i.e. the liberty of the individual to secure property. Within this context, as Neocleous suggests, “[l]iberalism’s radical

⁹⁵ Mark Neocleous, “Against Security”, *Radical Philosophy*, No.100 (March/April 2000), p.9.

recoding of the politics of order in the eighteenth century turned politics into a range of “security measures” consistent with liberal principles. The concept of security thus became the ideological guarantee of the independent and self-interested pursuit of property within bourgeois society.”⁹⁶ Furthermore, and intimately related to the above, within the context of the relation between the state, society and the individual, this “security” can be apprehended as simultaneously an individual and a societal good, and one in which society as a whole is responsible for its achievement. Indeed, as Emma Rothschild points out, in relation to Condorcet’s outline of a new Declaration of Rights in 1793: “the constitutional scholar Alengry explained Condorcet’s conception of security, in 1904, as ‘close to the Anglo-Saxon idea of *Habeas Corpus*. It was to be ensured, henceforth, by society: by the ‘social pact’ or the ‘social guarantee’ of a universal civil society.”⁹⁷ Security, in other words, was central to the process of articulating the bourgeois social order and, with regards to the transition to the latter, to a rearticulation of the political from one understood as a contract between autonomous individuals and the sovereign to one in which the political is seen to naturally emanate from the social itself.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ In this regard, Mark Neocleous brings forth examples of the triad “liberty, security, property” found in Adam Smith but also “in diverse places in the late eighteenth century, from Blackstone’s *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1769) to the French declaration that the ‘Rights of Man’ are ‘liberty, property, and security’”. Ibid.

⁹⁷ Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol.124, No.3 (1995), p.62.

⁹⁸ As Michael Shapiro explains in contrasting the understanding of the political of Hobbes and Smith: “With Smith, the ‘social’ had become the primary alibi for the political. The very meaning of politics had shifted from the Hobbesian notion of a contract between previously wholly sovereign individuals and their general representative equivalent, the monarch, to a notion of the political arising from the social. The political had developed a ‘social referent,’ and once this happened, the problem of sovereignty became one of managing the social configuration.” Michael J. Shapiro, “Sovereignty and Exchange in the Orders of Modernity”, *Alternatives*, Vol.16, No. (1991), p.454.

One of the ways in which this circumscription of the political within the social is enabled is in the appearance of a discourse in which the security of the social, as a pact or guarantee, is understood in relation to a protection *from* the State. In the retroactive equation, at the outset of the 20th century, of Condorcet's conception of security with the writ of *Habeas Corpus*, a writ, as was seen, that is perceived as a mechanism through which State arbitrariness in its treatment of the accused is disabled, one can see precisely from whom society is to be secured: from the arbitrary power of the State. In this context, what is also evidenced in the development of liberalism, is the eventual retrogression of the role of "the police" in society from what was addressed earlier as its important role in the articulation and administration of biopower, to the present more limited understanding as enforcer of the laws. However, as with the treatment of *Habeas Corpus* by Agamben, it may well be that the anchoring of security to the question of the social in an attempt at social-self assertion, simultaneously (re)inscribes the social into deeper complicity with the sovereign structure and its attendant logic. As Agamben writes:

It is almost as if, starting from a certain point, every decisive political event were double sided: the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflict with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals' lives within the state order, thus offering a new and dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves.⁹⁹

These readings provide some clues into how security is essential in the articulation of early modernity, of bourgeois ideology, and the deployment of biopolitics. In the first instance, we see how the security discourse enables the sealing of cracks in the social, of masking social

⁹⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.121.

division through the (re)configuration of security around the social. Its pretension to universality, of a social “pact” or “guarantee”, conceals the fact that not only is “security” articulated with regards to a particular part of the social - i.e. the property owners - but that the “security measures” established would thus be turned against those who have no part. In the second instance, we see how security is central to the self-constitution of the social - i.e. its representation *qua* “civil society” in opposition to the State. This re-presentation is one in which the social appears as self-engendered - i.e. a society that appears to itself as a coherent and transparent whole. It is a re-presentation without remainder, immanent to itself, from which the politics of a “people” seems to issue. What is occulted from this self-image of the social is its complicity with the sovereign structure in deploying the markers by which this perception is enabled.¹⁰⁰ Security, in other words, can be seen as one of the concepts in bourgeois ideology by which the generative principles of, and the divisions within, the social are occulted. The social space thus appears as natural, unitary, and transparent: a neutral space in which politics can be (self-)engendered. In other words, security can be seen as an important way in which the

¹⁰⁰ On this issue of “people”, it is interesting to follow Agamben’s argument that within the Western political tradition, and within its languages, one finds an ambiguity at the heart of the concept *people* which always contains within it both an allusion to the citizenry as a unitary body politic while simultaneously indicating those who belong to inferior classes. In this context, and in relation to the intimate complicity of the latter with the sovereign exception, Agamben writes: “Such a widespread and constant semantic ambiguity cannot be accidental: it surely reflects an ambiguity inherent in the nature and the function of the concept *people* in Western politics. It is as if, in other words, what we call *people* was actually not a unitary subject but rather a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the one hand, the *People* as a whole and as an integral body politic and, on the other hand, the *people*, as a subset and fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies; on the one hand, an inclusive concept that pretends to be without remainder while, on the other hand, an exclusive concept known to afford no hope; at one pole, the total state of the sovereign and integrated citizens and, at the other pole, the banishment - either court of miracles or camp - of the wretched, the oppressed and the vanquished. There exists no single and compact reference for the term *people* anywhere [...]. This also means, however, that the constitution of the human species into a body politic comes into being through a fundamental split and that in the concept of *people*, we can easily recognize the conceptual pair identified earlier as the defining category of the original political structure: naked life (*people*) and political existence (*People*), exclusion and inclusion, *zoē* and *bios*.” Giorgio Agamben, *Means without end: Notes on politics*, Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (2000), pp.30-31.

social space is (de)politicized. In the process, security itself is not apprehended politically - i.e. as a political relation - it just *is*. However, in attempting to render these constructs natural or non-political, what occurs is the reification of the illusion of self-engenderment - i.e. that the social can contain its own meaning, its own foundation. Nevertheless, self-contradictions run the risk of becoming evident since ideology in modern forms of social space exists precisely because these are no longer seen as founded on an unconditioned exterior source. Thus, any attempt at naturalization continually runs the risk of unveiling itself as merely another social discourse in a sea of indeterminacy instead of the mastery of the “real” that it claims to be.

There is one further way in which security can be seen as being related to the deployment of the liberal order. This relation is inextricably linked to the use of security measures as instruments of governmentality. As security is brought into the realm of calculability, as it is brought under the aegis and then through the “art of government” or, as Foucault citing Guillaume de la Perrière delineates, of the “right disposition of things that we take charge of to bring them to a suitable end”,¹⁰¹ security can be understood as a differentiated instrument of governance from either the law or discipline. As Agamben explains, drawing from Foucault’s understanding of security:

While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, discipline wants to produce order, while security wants to guide disorder. Since measures of security can only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and individual initiative, Foucault can show that the development of security coincides with the development of

¹⁰¹ Michel Foucault, “La ‘Gouvernementalité’” in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. III, Paris: Gallimard (1994), p. 643. My translation.

liberal ideology.¹⁰²

This quote highlights security's engagement with disorder instead of the production of order as it pertains to its instrumentalization. Yet this "disorder" is not the disorder of the Hobbesian primeval, yet always-present, "state of nature", but a disorder that is always already produced as such: where "traffic", "trade", and "individual initiative" are always already, in some part, "normalized" as they articulate themselves through security measures. The intimate association between security and liberalism is, therefore, not only one associated with the naturalization of the liberal social order, but is also intrinsic to liberalism in its application as a technology to channel the disorder that this order produces and necessitates for its continued existence. In other words, the institutionalization and application of "security measures" can be seen as co-constitutive with the "disorder" that they seek to channel since the channels through which these "disorders" manifest themselves are those shaped by these same security measures. With regards to the State, this is well illustrated by Michael Dillon who, in quoting Kenneth Dyson, understands the State's role in the production of order as one which "also and simultaneously 'defines disorder, and creates disorder and preserves its right to suppress that disorder.'"¹⁰³

With regards to a *vue d'ensemble* of this situation in relation to alterity, what has been addressed so far are the ways in which the folding of otherness within the social, of the rearticulation of the "relations between *self* and *other*" addressed earlier, were effected in relation to the division between "Individuals" as well as those between a "State" and its

¹⁰² Giorgio Agamben, "Security and Terror", *Theory and Event*, Vol.5, No.4 (2002), par.2. http://direct.press.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4agamben.html

¹⁰³ Michael Dillon, "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the 'New World Order' to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order", *Alternatives*, Vol.20, No.3 (1995), p.338.

“Society”. What will now be addressed is how this division is simultaneously displaced outside the borders of the sovereign state in relation to self-same others and the creation of the (inter)national order.

The (inter)national, Schmitt, and the political

The advent of the biopolitical goes hand in hand with the advent of the (inter)national. Notwithstanding the “Westphalian myth”, the (inter)national is not a product of the classical age, but is intrinsically a product of modernity. This is not to say that Westphalia did not contribute to its articulation but, as we have seen, the preoccupation of the state during the classical age was one of internal order and a continued adherence to some of the dualistic strictures of Christendom, and the relations between states were mediated through these concerns. Indeed, the emergence of the sign “international”, its first textual manifestation, as Der Derian suggests, coincides synchronically with the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in that it is found in Jeremy Bentham’s *Principles of Morals and Legislation* of 1789. In this work, the distinction is made between “internal law” and the “law of nations.”¹⁰⁴ Despite its original elaboration within the realm of law, its appearance is more intimately related to the relationship between certain political technologies and the shifts in knowledge through which sovereignty deploys the modern *episteme* in relation to “Man” and, in relation to the articulation of the “international”, the “State”. In other words, as with the articulation of “Sovereign Man”,

¹⁰⁴ James Der Derian, “The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations”, in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of Modern Politics*, New York: Lexington (1989), p.3. The novelty of the word is explicitly noted by Bentham. As Der Derian quotes: “The word *international*, it must be acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law which goes commonly under the name of the *law of nations*.” Ibid.

who becomes simultaneously the subject and object of knowledge, so are the “Sovereign State” and the “International System” to be understood as such. This argument has significantly been put forth by Bartelson from which the following, rather lengthy, quote is its explicit elaboration:

On the one hand, sovereignty establishes the transcendental conditions of possibility of the modern state as subject, telling us in the abstract what is a state and what is not, and what a state is and what it is not. Sovereignty differentiates the state ontologically and ethically from other forms of political life, and furnishes us simultaneously with the conditions for knowing the state as such. As a consequence, if what was other to the state in the Classical Age was what went before it and constituted its fictitious prehistory - a state of nature - then what is other to the modern state is what is over and above it: a state of war between states. On the other hand, it renders the state susceptible to empirical knowledge as an object; sovereignty is no longer withdrawn from knowledge and reflection, but inserted there as its prime target. Sovereignty not only establishes the transcendental limits of political knowledge but constitutes its proper objects: the modern state and the international system do not only emerge as the outcome of transcendental reflection and speculative dialectics. Both the sovereign state and the international system are established within the field of empirical beings as logically and historically interdependent, and opened to historical and empirical investigation according to a set of finite methods and procedures.¹⁰⁵

When addressing the “transcendental doublet” earlier, we identified its “solution” in the articulation of a form of knowledge revolving around reasoning Man’s obedience to reason and the Sovereign state as the political principle that incarnates the latter. From this understanding, we can apprehend why and how this form of knowledge would be deployed with regards to the State which simultaneously (re)confirms this application. What one sees in this application is the profusion of technical and administrative knowledge applied to the State and oriented simultaneously towards its inside *and* its outside - a separation that sovereignty itself enables - under the aegis of *raison d’état*. This is not to say, of course, that *raison d’état* does not pre-

¹⁰⁵ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), p.189.

date modernity. In fact, its conceptual elaboration is popularly attributed to Machiavelli.¹⁰⁶ Yet, according to Foucault, although this dating is not necessarily incorrect, it may be better attributed to *anti-Machiavellian* works of the age.

What Foucault understands as *raison d'état*, he finds in a variety of works relating to the art of governing, books that are closer to technical manuals than philosophical treatises, that appear in the mid to late 1500s and in which we find an attempt to answer a general question: "how to introduce the economy, that is to say the manner in which to properly manage individuals, goods, riches as it can be done inside a family, as a good father as head of the family can [...] how to introduce this attention, this meticulousness, this type of relationship of the father towards his family within the management of a state?"¹⁰⁷ What Foucault alludes to in his discussion of these works is that, instead of being associated to ends such as that of the maintenance of a Prince in power or to external ethical considerations, the concern of this literature was purely the state as an end *in itself*. And it is *this* that can be understood as *raison d'état*.¹⁰⁸ Although this tradition, therefore, has a long lineage, it is only with the advent of modernity and the articulation of the State as both subject and object of knowledge, that this could become the central principle of order. It is thus within this context that we see the

¹⁰⁶ See Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History*, Boulder: Westview Press, (1984).

¹⁰⁷ Michel Foucault, "La 'Gouvernementalité'" in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. III, Paris: Gallimard (1994), pp.641-642. My translation.

¹⁰⁸ As Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest: "[t]he tacticians of the *raison d'état* were concerned with the state as an end in itself; the state freed from a larger ethical order *and* from the fate of particular princes. For them, political rationality no longer sought to achieve the good life nor merely to aid the prince, but to increase the scope of power for its own sake by bringing the bodies of the state's subjects under tighter discipline." Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Second Edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1983), p.137.

deployment of techno-administrative knowledge to *both* the State without - i.e. the international - through diplomatico-military technologies, and the State within, through what we have already described as “the police.” As Foucault explains:

In this way, *raison d'état*, outside of the theories which formulated it and justified it, takes shape in two large assemblages of political knowledge and technology: a diplomatico-military technology which consists in ensuring and developing the power of the State through a system of alliances and by the organization of an armed apparatus; the search for a European equilibrium, [...]. The other is constituted by the “police”, according to the meaning that was given to this word then: that is to say the entirety of the means necessary to increase, from the inside, the power of the State. At the juncture of these two great technologies, and as a common instrument, one must place interstate trade and currency circulation: it is through the enrichment by trade that we expect the possibility of augmenting the population, the workforce, production and exports, and to provide oneself with strong and voluminous armies.¹⁰⁹

One can see here, not only the deployment of techno-administrative knowledge to this new janus-faced understanding of the State, but also the importance of the liberal bourgeois order in its maintenance - i.e. in enabling the material deployment of these technologies. This can, therefore, be seen as the *modus operandi* of the modern nation-State: the disciplining of ambiguity both within the State and of the relations between States. In this articulation of order, what can be apprehended in regard to alterity, is the way in which its gradual annihilation within the State, leads to a displacement of otherness to the outside. In other words, the increased naturalization and normalization of the social as transparent and unitary *via* techno-administrative knowledge, evacuates alterity from within the social order and its State to its self-same other “outside”, but an “outside” that is itself beginning to be subjected to the same

¹⁰⁹ Michel Foucault, “Sécurité, Territoire, Population”, in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits 1954-1988*, Vol. III, Paris: Gallimard (1994), pp.641-642. My translation.

knowledge in the form of the (inter)national.¹¹⁰ This shift can be exemplified through another instance of the relatively recent concern with the (inter)national: the advent of the notion of “Foreign policy”. As David Campbell suggests, it is “as recently as the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries [that] organizations bearing the appellation “foreign” or “external” first appear in a systematic form.”¹¹¹ In this “foreignness” we can also discern a clue into some of the ways in which this order will articulate itself as it develops. In this “foreignness” what is divulged is the way in which this process, in the ever-closer ties that it binds between territory and identity, citizens and States, nations and the articulation of their origins, in their difference to “others”, will be instrumental in the advent of nationalism that will play an important role in the 19th century and, in particular, by the First World War.¹¹²

In keeping with our elaboration on the complicity between security and the articulation of order, we would expect, then, to find here, finally, the development of a discourse of security as we understand it today - i.e. a discourse of national security based upon the identification of

¹¹⁰ This is succinctly echoed by Michael Shapiro following Žižek’s Lacanian optic: “This mythologizing of origin, which constructs the society as a naturally bounded and consensual community, is a political story that those seeking legitimacy for a national order seek to perpetuate. But disorder continues to haunt the order. The mythic disorder of the state of nature, supposedly supplanted by consensual association as society comes into being, continues to haunt the polity. It is displaced outside the frontier and attributed to the other.” Michael Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping the Cultures of War*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1997), p. 150. Although the argument is developed with regards to the Hobbesian state of nature, the point can be made with regards to all forms of mechanisms at giving the illusion of a natural and consensual community. Whether it be an originary state as in this example, the historical (re)writing of a nation’s origin as in nationalism, the naturalization effected through bourgeois ideology and biopolitics as in the present example, or the mythologizing of the origins of a discipline as we elaborated with regards to International Relations in Chapter One.

¹¹¹ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press (1992), p.75.

¹¹² As David Campbell suggests: “This growth [of large scale bureaucracies for foreign policy] coincided with, and contributed to, a range of developments that led to the intensification of social power in the nation-state, produced the category of ‘citizen’, and established nationalism as the primary form of social identity by the time of World War I”, *Ibid*.

external threats. This would be entirely consistent with what we have seen until now. Yet, this is *not* exactly what we find. In fact, in the articulation of the (inter)national, the discourse of national security is conspicuous by its relative *absence*. Within the context of liberal thought, “security”, as could be expected from the elaboration above, was not understood with regard to the freedom from external threats. A good example of this is brought up by Emma Rothschild concerning Adam Smith’s comments regarding expenditures on defence. This is an instance in which “security” could easily be used in this sense, but is not. As Adam Smith’s wording reveals: “the first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from violence and invasion of other independent societies.”¹¹³ However, Rothschild does raise another example that she apprehends as the first “great public uses of “security” in the new, national sense,”¹¹⁴ in the pre-Congress of Vienna treaty of the First Peace of Paris of 1814 through which “France was to become, under the ‘paternal government of its Kings,’ a guarantee of ‘security and stability’ (*‘un gage de securité (sic) et de stabilité’*) for Europe.”¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna itself also makes mention of “security” as a principle under which was subsumed the call to enlarge the States near or adjacent to France to forestall future aggression.¹¹⁶ Yet, this is hardly an understanding of “national security” as freedom from outside threats in an anarchical world, but of the security of *Europe*, in which an *internal*

¹¹³ Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol.124, No.3 (1995), p.62.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.64-65.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.65.

¹¹⁶ Alan Axelrod and Charles L. Phillips, *Encyclopedia of Historical Treaties & Alliances*, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn (2001).

geopolitical re-carving by Great Powers will result in a more secure order under the principles of balance of power. This may seem like hair splitting, but it is an important difference that will make itself more evidently central in the pages to come. What does appear here, however, can be referred to within the context of the diplomatico-military technologies that were referred to earlier in terms of an understanding of the (inter)national in their extreme; in the practical application of techno-administrative knowledge in the service of managing state power by redrawing boundaries and re-balancing capabilities irrespective of the wills and lives of peoples “on the ground.” This, of course, is a practice that will be repeated time and time again through the colonial scramble of the late nineteenth century (the consequences of which we continue to feel today) to the parcelization of the former Yugoslavia through the Dayton accord. Another peculiarity of this example is that the Congress of Vienna and its mechanism the Concert of Europe can be read with reference to the employment of its influences to stem the tide of liberalism. Cynthia Weber’s analysis of the discourse of intervention in the Concert of Europe reveals how monarchical government was seen as a primary source of stability and representative government was not to be tolerated.¹¹⁷ In this context, the use of security above may be more akin to, or at least resonate with, the classical understanding of the terms as it was elaborated upon in the previous chapter.

Throughout the end of the 19th century and into the mid 20th, security remained primarily the province of liberal discourse. Irrespective of the deepening and widening of *raison d’état* and its assemblages of political knowledge and technology through, for example, the advent of

¹¹⁷ See Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), pp.40-60.

geopolitics in the late 1800s and its inextricable ties with the imperial expansion and territorial acquisition of the same period,¹¹⁸ the meaning of security did not articulate itself pervasively around these developments in the constitution of order. What was needed was a way to wrestle the meaning of security from its liberal foundation by constituting it around a different understanding of the political than that of liberalism, an understanding that would not primarily be articulated as emanating from a space understood as being neutral and deliberative and the possibility of a natural harmony of interests therein. It is here that the legacy of Carl Schmitt becomes particularly pertinent.

The legacy of Carl Schmitt, and his contribution to the political Realist understanding that pervades thinking about (inter)national relations today, has been conveniently left out of the narrative of the self-image of the discipline of International Relations examined in Chapter One. Notwithstanding recent attempts to clarify some of these links, with particular reference to the thinking of Hans Morgenthau,¹¹⁹ it is understandable why this conspicuous omission

¹¹⁸ Geopolitics as a field of study has been retroactively (re)written around “founding fathers” Halford Mackinder and Friedrich Ratzel who approached the subject through, as Gearóid Ó Tuathail, suggests “Cartesian perspectivalism.[...] The basis of this attitude is the Cartesian divide between an inner self and an outer reality, between an internal mind and an external world of objects. On the outside is a preexistent world, flooded with light and surrounding the self on all sides; on the inside is a domain of pure mental functioning tied to a perceptual apparatus upon which the luminous scene of the surrounding world makes an impression. The relationship of the intellect to the world, therefore, is that of a viewing subject and a viewed object.” Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press (1996), p.23.

¹¹⁹ See Hans-Karl Pichler, “The Godfathers of ‘Truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’s Theory of Power Politics”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1 (1998), pp. 185-200, and Martti Koskeniemi, “Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International Relations”, in *The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2000), pp.17-34. This connection is also brought up by George Schwab in his introduction to Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, George Schwab (trans.), Cambridge: MIT Press (1985), p.xi. With regards to the first article see also Jef Huysmans, “Know your Schmitt: a godfather of truth and the spectre of Nazism”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.25, No.1 (1999), pp.323-328. In this article, Huysmans, quite rightly in my view, criticizes Pichler for detaching Schmitt’s political engagement with Nazism from the content of his theories and their application to Morgenthau through a history of ideas

would be effected due to the fact the Schmitt was a member of the Nazi party from 1933 to 1936 and, as Jef Huysmans notes “explicitly provid[ed] legal justifications for the Nazi regime and its policies, thus becoming for some the *Kronjurist* of the Nazis”¹²⁰ Yet Schmitt can definitely be seen as one of the godfathers of political realism and was arguably its most influential thinker by enabling the possibility of thinking the (inter)national as political. What is argued here, is that it is precisely through this understanding of the political that it was possible to articulate a security discourse in the way in which it is understood today. This is not to say, of course, that without Schmitt this would not have occurred, or that Schmitt singlehandedly changed the meaning(s) to security. The processes of *raison d'état* addressed above and the conjuncture of the waning of the Second World War were also deeply complicit with this transformation. Yet, Schmitt’s legacy in this rearticulation of the understanding of security should not be underestimated and neither should his impact upon the disciplinary codification of this understanding of security *via* the discipline of International Relations and its most extreme naturalization and techno-rational instrumentalization via the sub-discipline of Strategic Studies. In this, there is obviously a rejoining with the concerns raised in chapters One and Two.

Schmitt’s understanding of the political can be seen as stemming precisely from his critique of liberalism. As a jurist, it is the question of law in liberal states that provides the point of entry for his critique as he focusses upon the liberal constitutional theory of the state and the

approach.

¹²⁰ Jef Huysmans, “Know your Schmitt: a godfather of truth and the spectre of Nazism”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.25, No.1 (1999), p.323.

parliamentary conception of politics. For Schmitt, as Paul Hirst explains:

In the former, the state is subordinated to law; it becomes the executor of purposes determined by a representative legislative assembly. In the latter, politics is dominated by “discussion”, by the free deliberation of representatives in the assembly. Schmitt considers nineteenth-century liberal democracy anti-political and rendered impotent by a rule-bound legalism, a rationalistic concept of political debate, and the desire that individual citizens enjoy a legally guaranteed “private” sphere protected from the state.¹²¹

It is precisely within the context of this “protection” that we find the meaning to security put forward by bourgeois ideology and elaborated upon earlier. In general, Schmitt’s argument is aimed at some of the issues that were addressed above - i.e. at the growing depoliticization of society and at the increasing techno-rational administration of the social. Following Weber’s pessimistic view of modernity, Schmitt laments the transformations and processes I have traced *via* Foucault with the advent of modernity. As Schmitt explains, with particular resonance to our present political predicament and explaining his current appeal to both the left and the right:

The kind of economic-technical thinking that prevails today is no longer capable of perceiving a political idea. The modern state seems to have become what Max Weber envisioned: a huge industrial plant. Political ideas are generally recognized only when groups can be identified that have plausible economic interests in turning them to their advantage. Whereas, on the one hand the political vanishes into the economic or technical-organizational, on the other hand the political dissolves into everlasting discussion of cultural and philosophical-historical commonplaces, which, by aesthetic characterization, identify and accept an epoch as classical, romantic, or baroque.¹²²

To this, Schmitt will counterpose an understanding of the political based upon fundamental

¹²¹ Paul Hirst, “Carl Schmitt’s Decisionism”, in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, London: Verso (1999), p.8.

¹²² Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, George Schwab (trans.), Cambridge: MIT Press (1985), p.65.

antagonism, this is what the left has taken in its present critique of liberal democracy¹²³, where the “specific political distinction to which political action and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”¹²⁴ It is *here* that the necessary element to wrestle security out of its liberal slumber is found - i.e. out of its meaning coalesced around the protection of private sphere against the State. It is through this understanding of the political that it is possible to wrap security around the modern sovereign State as its most elemental organizing principle. As Leo Strauss notes, in relation to Schmitt’s concept of the political:

Security is relinquished not because war would be something “ideal”, but because it is necessary to return from “splendid vicarage”, from the “comfort and ease of the existing status quo” to the “cultural or social nothing”, to the “secret, humble beginning”, “to undamaged, non-corrupt nature” so that “out of the power of a pure and whole knowledge...the order of the human things” can arise.¹²⁵

In this, of course, sovereignty is the recipient of security. As Schmitt’s most famous dictum goes: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”¹²⁶ Schmitt’s decisionism is thus based

¹²³ See, in particular, Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, London: Verso (1993), Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, London: Verso (2000) and the pieces in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, London: Verso (1999).

¹²⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, George Schwab (trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1996), p.26.

¹²⁵ Leo Strauss, quoted in Jef Huysmans, “The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.27, No.3 (1998), p.582.

¹²⁶ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, George Schwab (trans.), Cambridge: MIT Press (1985), p.5. The use of “he” in this dictum also reveals something interesting about Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty and the political. Although Schmitt’s work is not a recipe for totalitarianism in that there is to be the maintenance of a separation, albeit tenuous, between law, power, and knowledge, the necessity to incarnate the sovereign as “he” betrays one of the tendencies towards totalitarian ideology as understood by Claude Lefort of an attempt to reestablish the image of the body through a series of equivalences between the people, the party, the leadership around the figure of the Egocrat. See Claude Lefort, “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism”, in Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*, Cambridge: MIT Press (1986), pp.292-306. With regards to Schmitt, Étienne Balibar brings up this question: “...Schmitt never stops stumbling on the fact that the State can be ‘personified’ as a subject, while the people cannot. Why this dis- symmetry, if not because the notion of the people implies a multiplicity (even a conflictuality) which resists absolute unification (maybe even through

on an understanding of sovereignty in which the latter articulates itself according to a logic of inclusive exclusion in relation to the law. It is the exception, in other words, that maintains the rule, the whole edifice of the legal system for, “[t]he rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception. In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.”¹²⁷ This torpidity is aimed at the liberal understanding of law as being that which founds the State. As Étienne Balibar suggests, with Schmitt, “the instituting process goes from the State to the law and not from the law to the State”.¹²⁸ Yet the sovereign cannot be completely outside the law; “[a]lthough he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety.”¹²⁹ In other words, the sovereign is both inside and outside the legal order on the sense that in a state of exception, an emergency that calls for extraordinary measures, it is inscribed in the constitution itself that the decision to suspend the constitution is that of the sovereign. It is through the exception that is revealed “a specifically juristic element - the decision in its absolute purity”.¹³⁰

To the relative self-engenderment of liberalism of a society that appears to itself as a

totalitarian means)? Étienne Balibar, “Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l’État, le Peuple”, *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000),p.56. My translation.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p.15.

¹²⁸ Étienne Balibar, “Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l’État, le Peuple”, *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000),p.51. My translation.

¹²⁹ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, George Schwab (trans.), Cambridge: MIT Press (1985),p.7.

¹³⁰ Ibid.,p.13.

whole, transparent, and without remainder and through which the political is, albeit illusorily, understood as emanating from the “People”, Schmitt counterposes the horrific monstrosity of an absolute self-engenderment that reduces “the state to the moment of the decision, to a pure decision not based on reason and discussion and not justifying itself, that is, to an absolute decision created out of nothingness.”¹³¹ In this, the transcendence that was central to the articulation of sovereignty, as Étienne Balibar suggests, “is not abolished, but it is brought back into the hollow of immanence: it coincides with the internal power of negation that permits the temporal order to found itself on itself.”¹³² It is precisely for this reason that Schmitt can derive a positive theory of the political out of the indeterminacy at the heart of modernity. There is undoubtedly some *recoupement* between Schmitt’s understanding and reaction to modernity and the vitalist critique of the Enlightenment that we find in Nietzsche.¹³³ Indeed, the quote at the outset of this chapter contains elements that could be read this way. However, there is no contingency here, the decision is absolute to precisely eliminate any chance of contingency, to absolutely occult the indeterminacy at the heart of modernity, to eliminate struggle or antagonism within. In this way, Schmitt’s position can be seen as an adaptation of his explicit influences - i.e. Bodin, Hobbes and Donoso Cortés - to the modern articulation of knowledge identified with regards to the transcendental doublet. It is here that we can see the absolute

¹³¹ Ibid.,p.66.

¹³² Étienne Balibar, “Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l’État, le Peuple”, *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000),p.56. My translation.

¹³³ See Richard Wölin, “Carl Schmitt, the Conservative Revolutionary: Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror”, *Political Theory*, Vol.20, No.3 (1992), pp.424-447. See also Jef Huysmans, “The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.27, No.3 (1998), pp.569-589.

difference between an understanding of the political in terms of a manifold of antagonism through which the political is revealed, and the full depoliticization that Schmitt's understanding deploys. As Slavoj Žižek explains:

However, the question remains: does Schmitt actually provide an adequate theoretical articulation of the logic of *political* antagonism? The answer is *no*: his assertion of the political involves a specific disavowal of the proper dimension of political antagonism, and it is precisely this disavowal which determines Schmitt's rightist orientation [...] Let us begin with a question: what is politics proper? Schmitt's well known answer (a social situation which involves the opposition between friend and enemy), radical as it may appear, is *not radical enough*, in so far as it already displaces the *inherent* antagonism constitutive of the political on the *external* relationship between Us and Them.¹³⁴

Indeed, it is in Schmitt's privileging of the *border* as the site from which sovereignty is established, of the limit at which inside/outside, security/insecurity, order/disorder, rationality/irrationality, enter a zone of indistinction, that this depoliticization is most acutely revealed. The border is, as Balibar suggests, "the site *par excellence*, at which are *suspended*, the checks or the guarantees of the 'normal' juridical order (it is truly, the modern State of law, the *antidemocratic condition of democracy*), the site where the 'legitimate use of violence' takes the form of a preventive counter violence."¹³⁵ In Schmitt's understanding of the political, we have, as Žižek suggests, a form of disavowal of the political, "the most cunning and radical version of this disavowal [...] the attempt to depoliticize the conflict by bringing it to its extreme, via the direct militarization of politics."¹³⁶ It is at the site of the border and within the

¹³⁴ Slavoj Žižek, "Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post Politics", in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, London: Verso (1999), p.27.

¹³⁵ Étienne Balibar, "Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l'État, le Peuple", *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000), p.56. My translation.

¹³⁶ Slavoj Žižek, "Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post Politics", in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, London: Verso (1999), p.29. On the question of politicization and depoliticization and the aporias in Schmitt's thinking see also Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, George Collins (trans.), London: Verso

context of militarization that security will, from the outset of the post-War period, primarily operate.

Post-War security, (re)definition, and the dangers of (de)politicization

That “security” understood within the context of “national security” with all its military connotations was something new in the waning days of the second World War, is evocatively recounted by Mark Neocleous:

In the summer of 1945, a few days before Hiroshima received its abject lesson in US military power, Joseph E. Johnson, chief of International Security Affairs in the US State Department, commented that “the abstract noun ‘security’ has acquired a very concrete significance for us”. There had been, he thought, a significant change in the attitude towards security, which could be witnessed by the fact that it had become “impossible to read a newspaper, or leaf through a magazine, or go to a dinner party” without being aware of the widespread discussion of the concept. A few months later in the autumn of that year a range of civilian and military heads of different parts of the US state testified before a Senate committee on the unification of the military services; whereas talks on the same issue eighteen months previously had barely used the term “security”, by the 1945 talks the term was on everyone’s lips, in conjunction with the concept of the nation - “national security”. The most forceful advocate of the concept, Navy Secretary Kames (sic) Forrestal, commented that “national security” can only be secured with a broad and comprehensive front, adding that “I am using the word ‘security’ here consistently and continuously rather than ‘defense’.” The idea appeared so new that one Senator commented, “I like your words ‘national security’.”¹³⁷

Indeed, the discourse of “national security” is thus a relatively recent phenomenon, intimately related to the US engagement in the war in two theatres of operation, the invention of nuclear weapons and a war machine of global reach. As Simon Dalby remarks, in response to a hypothetical question by Michael C. Williams relating to what to put in the hole left by security

(1997).

¹³⁷ Mark Neocleous, “Against Security”, *Radical Philosophy*, No.100 (March/April 2000), p.8.

if we take the concept away:

Maybe the answer is that there simply is not a hole. After all, the hole is in many ways a relatively recent creation. Despite the frequent invocation of the name of Thomas Hobbes as the architect of contemporary notions of security, it was only in the middle of this century that security became the architectonic impulse of the American polity and, subsequently of its allies.¹³⁸

In a way, Dalby is quite right about the invocations of Thomas Hobbes and this is a point that I made abundantly clear in the first two chapters of this work with regard to the disciplining of the discipline and the deployment of sovereign knowledge. However, on another register, the invocation of Thomas Hobbes may not be too far off the mark. This is not, at any rate, on account of “timeless truths” as epistemic Realists would have us believe, since as was seen, the Hobbesian understanding of security, predicated upon a pre-modern *episteme*, was inward-oriented, concerned with internal order. Yet, is this not precisely the point? As we have seen throughout this work, security *has always been about “internal” order*. Is this not again the case here? Based upon a different *episteme* and the conjuncture it has enabled, is “national security” not about the ordering of the world, operating on both registers of what Foucault has (re)articulated as *raison d'état*? Is “national security” not, therefore, a meaning to security that orders the world from “above”, deploying techno-administrative knowledge through a techno-rationalistic gaze to the *nomos* of the earth¹³⁹, while simultaneously enabling a deepening and widening of the biopolitical within?

¹³⁸ Simon Dalby, “Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1997), pp.20-21.

¹³⁹ The use of *nomos* here, literally “law” in Greek, is understood in its Schmittian signification which is, for him, more originary than the latter, an understanding of *nomos*, as Étienne Balibar explains, meaning “a division, distribution and organization of the earth.” Étienne Balibar, “Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l'État, le Peuple”, *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000),p.53.

In this, “security” is intimately complicit with sovereign power and the power of sovereignty. As such, it is the instrument of (de)politicization and the production of bare life *par excellence*. As Agamben suggests, in addressing the dangers related to security measures within the context of the event of September 11th, “[b]ecause they require constant reference to a state of exception, measures of security work towards a growing depoliticization of society. In the long run, they are irreconcilable with democracy.”¹⁴⁰ Leaving the question of democracy in suspension for the moment, this is, of course, nothing new. As has been seen, security in its intimate complicity with order has always been about securing a ground - i.e. a ground beyond contestation and, thus, in relation to the original meaning of “contestation”, from the Latin *contestari*, the impossibility of calling it to witness. In this sense, *pace*, Barry Buzan, drawing on W.B. Gallie, security is *not*, “an ‘essentially contested concept’,”¹⁴¹ regardless of its recent contestation over referents. Its grounds of contestation are not related to itself, but to the order of truth it is implicitly complicit with. Security can thus be seen as the instrument of (de)politicization *par excellence* even though this simultaneously makes it eminently and imminently *political*. This now requires further contextualization to understand our present predicament.

Returning to these “new words” of “national security”, as was alluded to in the introduction to this work,¹⁴² we do find some references to the use of security in terms other than its new militarily oriented use. Wilson’s association of security with “democratic

¹⁴⁰ Giorgio Agamben, “Security and Terror”, *Theory and Event*, Vol.5, No.4 (2002), par.5.
http://direct.press.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4agamben.html

¹⁴¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers (1991), p.7.

¹⁴² See Introduction, footnote 3.

Governments” is a case in point.¹⁴³ Yet, this usage is more intimately related to that of liberalism elaborated upon earlier in that it is precisely democracy that is to be secured. We then see, at the end of the Second World War, some examples of reactions to the prevalence of the “national security” discourse from more functional, or social, understandings of the (inter)national also associated with a liberal understanding of the world. The case of David Mitrany’s call, at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, for joint economic action as a source of security in reaction to an understanding of the latter as “policing the world against the use of violence”,¹⁴⁴ is a clear example of this approach. From a clearly liberal perspective, Friedrich Hayek, in 1944, makes the distinction between “a good and a bad variety of individual security, associated respectively with ‘the commercial and military types of society.’ The good security, for Hayek, includes ‘the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all’; the bad security is ‘the security of the barracks’.”¹⁴⁵ A final interesting example, and one that, surprisingly, comes from an author of the retroactively (re)written canon of Realism, is that of E.H. Carr, who called in 1945 for a system of “pooled security” based upon “security for the individual” in order to “divorce international security and the power to maintain it from frontiers and the national sovereignty that they represent.”¹⁴⁶ Despite these calls, what we find, as we did in

¹⁴³ Woodrow Wilson, “The World Must be Safe for Democracy”, in John A. Vasquez (ed.), *Classics of International Relations*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall (1986), p.17.

¹⁴⁴ David Mitrany, “The Road to Security”, *Peace Aims Pamphlet*, No.29, London: National Peace Council (1944), pp.13.

¹⁴⁵ Friedrich Hayek, quoted in Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol.124, No.3 (1995), p.93. Note 36.

¹⁴⁶ E.H. Carr, quoted in Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol.124, No.3 (1995), p.57.

relation to security as sin, is that these understandings, in relation to the (inter)national, “go underground”.¹⁴⁷

The final example given, by E.H. Carr, is an interesting one besides its relation to his canonical status in the disciplining of the discipline and the fact that there is a normative agenda put forward which completely contradicts the realist caricature of him being the “founding father” of the modern call to examine the world as it *is*. What is interesting is precisely the ends of Carr’s normative project - i.e. of divorcing security “from frontiers and the national sovereignty that they represent.” This is a call that seems almost directly addressed to the Schmittian understanding of the political. What is done, in the first few years of the post-War period and throughout the Cold War, is precisely the *opposite* of Carr’s call: it is a continued reinforcement of the notion of security that is *all* about borders and *all* about sovereignty, and an understanding of the political that enables this articulation.

This shift is also highlighted by Arnold Wolfers in one of the only works addressing directly the concept of security in the immediate post-war period. In addressing the concept of “national security” in relation to that of “national interest”, Wolfers identifies the way in which “national interest” had gone from being associated with the internal interests of society as a whole in opposition to “narrow and special economic interests of parts of the nation”, to one

¹⁴⁷ Within the context of functionalist variants, it is important to note that functionalist theory is remodified to adhere to the new understanding of security through, a clear distinction between “high” and “low” politics in its neo-functional reincarnation. Thus enabling a division between “national security” issues where functionalism is seen as quasi-ineffective, and economic and social issues where it can flourish. For good overviews of functionalist and neofunctionalist theory see Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, London: Faber and Faber (1973) and R.J. Harrison, *Europe in Question: Theories of Regional Integration*, London: George Allen and Unwin (1974). In relation to liberalism, the meaning of security is also effectively cut in two where “individual security” is the province of “domestic” politics, while “national security” is that of “international relations”.

in which “national interest” became synonymous with “national security interests”.¹⁴⁸ In this shift, the “national interest” concern moves to the question of the border, not only in relation to a protection from threats but also, conversely, to a concern with “sacrificing the less inclusive national community to the wider but in their opinion chimeric world community.”¹⁴⁹ It is here that the border thus becomes crucial in the provision of order *via* sovereignty, in deploying the markers to distinguish self from other and, in relation to Realist tenets, the conditions of possibility for politics inside the State and anarchy and contingency without.

What is most ironic about all this is that this meaning to security is baptized and performatively maintained at the point at which the State starts to *become unable to provide it*. Here the ambivalences at the heart of the word “security”, with regards to its performative/constative meaning, are most acutely revealed. As Michael Dillon reminds us, “[w]hen talking about security we must never forget, however much the dead substantive security threatens to make us do so, that because security is also a verb some heavy security is going on in order to produce the condition of security.”¹⁵⁰ With the opening up of the skies to warfare during the Second World War, where a third dimension to warfare is opened up¹⁵¹ - from, *inter alia*, the V2 attacks on London, to the firebombing of Dresden, to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, to the nuclear incinerations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - it becomes increasingly

¹⁴⁸ Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (1962), p.148.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, London: Routledge (1996), pp.121-122.

¹⁵¹ See Paul Virilio’s evocative description of his personal experience during the Second World War in Paul Virilio, *Essai sur l’insécurité du territoire*, Paris: Stock (1976).

impossible to constatively guarantee security to the people “on the ground.” The performative/constative oscillation, and obvious (de)politicization,¹⁵² that will ensue is even evident before the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear weapon in August of 1949. As early as 1946, in response to a question regarding the relationship between the Bikini tests and an upcoming UN conference on arms control, US President Truman, replied: “The Russians, are more rather than less likely to come to an effective agreement for the control of atomic energy if we keep our strength and continue making bombs.”¹⁵³ In the ensuing advances in delivery systems from bomber capabilities to ICBMs, SLBMs, ALCMs, GLCMs, SLCMs and the evolution of doctrines from massive retaliation to flexible response, to the situation of mutually assured destruction, the constative guarantee of security became thinner and thinner while the performativity of security became increasingly important, and techno-rationalist knowledge on the administration of the *nomos* of the earth took on industrial proportions. In this industry and administration, the discipline of International Relations and, in particular, its sub-discipline of Security Studies¹⁵⁴ flourished, albeit through an increasingly aseptic discourse and a complete

¹⁵² On this, in relation to the “*fabulously textual*” feature of the nuclear arms race during the Second Cold War, Jacques Derrida states: “Today, it is on the basis of that situation - the limit case in which the limit itself is suspended, in which therefore the *krinein*, crisis, decision itself, and choice are being subtracted from us, are abandoning us like the remainder of that subtraction - it is on the basis of that situation that we have to re-think the relations between knowing and acting, between constative speech acts and performative speech acts, between invention that finds what was already there and the one that produces new mechanisms or new spaces.” Jacques Derrida, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)”, *Diacritics*, Vol.14, No.2 (Summer 1984), pp.22-23.

¹⁵³ Harry S. Truman as quoted in Martin Sherwin, “How Well They Meant”, in William M. Evan and Stephen Hilgartner (eds.), *The Arms Race and Nuclear War*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall (1987), p.56.

¹⁵⁴ On strategic studies see, in particular, Bradley Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1994). In western universities, Peace and Security courses which, until the 1950s, were primarily focussed around the study of international institutions such as the League of Nations and the UN, began to be supplemented by courses on Strategic Studies. Furthermore, institutions solely devoted to strategy, such as the International Institute of Strategic Studies, were also established. See A.J.R. Groom, “Paradigms in Conflict: the strategist, the conflict researcher and the peace

circumvention of ontological questions. Armed with the “high” politics concept of security at its heart, the discipline(s) were conferred status and importance in the wanton (de)politicization that it was complicit in performatively creating. Although these issues took an increasingly ethereal countenance, akin to counting angels on the head of a pin, they always remained about territory and borders. Regardless of the constant attempt to circumvent territory, to find ways to penetrate it and destroy it, the whole system hinged upon a simple line through which a curtain of iron had been drawn and upon which a zone of indistinction between security and insecurity hung in the balance. The ethereality of the situation should, however, not be lost on us in a final word on the Cold War and its administration of the *nomos* of the earth. In a way, the sovereign State during the Cold War, and in particular that of the United States and the USSR with their power of decision, took on, as Étienne Balibar suggests in a different context, “the theologico-political function of the *kathèkon*, as that which ‘holds back’, or ‘postpones’, the apocalypse.”¹⁵⁵ Yet, as Derrida points out, “Apocalypse means Revelation, of Truth, *Unveiling*”.¹⁵⁶

Unveiling came about, not with the coming of apocalypse, not with a bang, but with a whimper, at least from the standpoint of nuclear strategists or those who apprehended the world, as Rob Walker evocative depiction suggests, “through the polished prisms of the theory

researcher”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.14, No.2 (April 1988), pp.104-105.

¹⁵⁵ Étienne Balibar, “Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l’État, le Peuple”, *Les Temps Modernes*, No.610 (Septembre - octobre - novembre 2000), p.55.

¹⁵⁶ Jacques Derrida, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)”, *Diacritics*, Vol.14, No.2 (Summer 1984), p.24.

of the modern state".¹⁵⁷ Yet, if one takes an alternative standpoint, it did come with what seemed, at first glance, as a bang. This is not the "bang" of those who proclaimed the end of history and the triumph of the strange (con)fusion of liberalism and capitalism that they adhered to, but with the shaking of the foundation of those loud trumpeters of "national security" and the military purity of their definition of the term. As was alluded to in the introduction, calls for an alternative to a military understanding of "national security" had been in evidence since the 1970s and continued into the 1980s, primarily through academics and institutions addressing trans-border issues and apprehending a need for mobilization around social and environmental causes.¹⁵⁸ To these were added commissions and their published reports calling for a redefinition of security.¹⁵⁹ These early attempts at calling for a redefinition of security, as well as many of the flood of such calls that have marked the post-Cold War world, were deployed in order to bring these problems onto States' agendas and, thus, to increase the relative importance of their

¹⁵⁷ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/outside: international relations as political theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1993), p. 65.

¹⁵⁸ One of the first, if not the first, explicit call for the expansion of the scope of security came from Lester R. Brown in a *Worldwatch* paper in October 1977. As Brown argues, with regards to environmental concerns: "The overwhelmingly military approach to national security is based on the assumption that the principal threat to security comes from other nations. But the threats to security may now arise less from the relationship of nation to nation and more from the relationship of man to nature. Dwindling reserves of oil and the deterioration of the earth's biological systems now threaten the security of nations everywhere." Lester R. Brown, "Redefining Security", *Worldwatch Paper*, No.14, Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute (October 1977), p.6. See also Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, Vol.8, No.1 (Summer 1983), pp.129-153. Within the discipline of international relations, see Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, London: Weatsheaf Books (1983).

¹⁵⁹ Two of the most prominent, and influential examples of these, were the reports of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by Olof Palme, and the World Commission on the Environment and Development, chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland. See *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*, The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, New York: Simon and Schuster (1982), and *Our Common Future*, The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1987).

status by labelling them as “security issues.”¹⁶⁰ Conversely, such attempts were made to demilitarize the concept of security, or take it out of the orbit of the sovereign State, in order to make the latter an instrument of emancipation. In other words, to achieve some “real” form of security in opposition to the State.¹⁶¹ Yet both these understandings, without denying the positive intentions of those who employ them, are either premised upon a liberal understanding of law, the State, power and order or a (mis)understanding of security as somehow separate from the constitution of order - i.e. an understanding of security as either some “real” state that can be sought, or as something that can be formulated beyond its present strictures. From the first viewpoint, what is thought and sought, is that the magnification of the issue would politicize the latter and lead to open deliberation by rational self-aware subjects upon which decisions would be made and implemented by a State whose identity is fixed and is in the service of the common good of its people. From the second viewpoint, what is thought and sought is an understanding of security that can be wielded against the prevailing order to open up alternative possibilities of its use. Both of these project a normative standpoint with regards to the State: it is either the solution or the problem. However, in both cases, security is seen as a tool to be employed to get things done - i.e. it is seen positively.¹⁶² Yet, what we find primarily from the end of the Cold War to the present, is either a deployment of these issues as

¹⁶⁰ See, for example, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.68, No.2 (1989), pp.162-177.

¹⁶¹ See, for example, Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.4 (1991), pp.313-326.

¹⁶² On this question of a normative standpoint with particular reference to ecology and sovereignty, see Ken Conca, “Rethinking the Ecology-Sovereignty Debate”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.23, No.3 (1994), pp.701-711.

a new panoply of threats towards the State's "national security", or the articulation of a security discourse based upon an analogous meaning, *qua* protection from external threats, yet deployed above and below what has been traditionally understood as statal space: the liminal space of the national (b)order. From the "war on drugs", to "geo-economics", to "environmental security", to "migration security", to "rogue states", to "resource security", to "information security", to "biological security", to "terrorism", to "anarchism", to *disorder itself*, a manifold of possible threats are being assessed, categorized, operationalized, and acted upon under the aegis of "national security". From "personal security", to "home security", to "job security", to "internet security", to "food security", to "financial security", the word "security" pervades our vocabulary, our lives, our being-in-the-world. At the liminal space where representatives of (inter)national order meet - summits, olympics, state visits - or work - embassies, chancelleries, headquarters - security is increasingly tightened and visible. At points of entry for the movement of people and goods - airports, border checks, docks - or even within the public spaces of large cities, surveillance and searches are ever-present. As was discussed in the introduction to this work, of course September 11th has been a catalyst to these processes, yet the techno-administrative knowledge behind them was already present, deployed, and proliferating. To what can this be attributed in the "New World Order", that held the promise of the end of the fear of nuclear annihilation and of a brave new world of addressing common problems with common solutions and where security could be used to the benefit of "humanity"?

The point is precisely that the order has *not* changed, it has mutated, it has accelerated, it has deepened and it has widened, but it has not *changed*. And without a change of order, there is no change to the meaning(s) to security. This is, of course, not a radically new insight,

yet in revealing the complicity between the meaning(s) to security and the articulation of order as it has transpired through disjunctions, contradictions, continuities and discontinuities, one can better grasp the present predicament. That this is not a new insight can be evidenced in the warnings about redefinition that have cropped up intermittently in the literature on the subject. For example, Daniel Deudney's caution with regards to environmental issues, echoing Schmitt's understanding of the political, that "[n]ational security thinking and action is all premised upon a relatively sharp distinction between 'us' and 'them', between friend and foe [...] In contrast, in the environmental sphere 'we' - not 'they' - are the enemy."¹⁶³ Or Simon Dalby's prescience in maintaining that "[s]imply tacking on 'ecological' or 'common' or 'sustainable' may not be enough to shift the focus away from neorealist assumptions and the practices of security as imposed force."¹⁶⁴

The present order is one that continues to operate in accordance with the modern *episteme*. However, some mutations are definitely occurring. Techno-administrative knowledge is increasingly refined, pervasive, amalgamating, deterritorializing and reterritorializing. The policing of bodies and minds of biopolitics, through disciplinary institutions and technologies of the self, is becoming more subtle and more effective. Inextricably intertwined with the above, as well as with the pervasiveness of the security discourse, is the question of the deployment of sovereign power and its attendant logics. Increasingly,¹⁶⁵ the sovereign order's ability to

¹⁶³ Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.19, No.3 (1990), pp.467-468.

¹⁶⁴ Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse", *Alternatives*, Vol.17, No.1 (1992), p.121.

¹⁶⁵ Agamben follows Schmitt in understanding this process as one that began with the First World War but can be seen as intensifying in the post war world.

continually maintain itself in its decision, deploying the binary markers of inside and outside, law and violence, *physis* and *nomos* is breaking down. This by no means can be perceived as an “erosion” of sovereignty as if the latter was some solid thing “eroded” from outside. On the contrary, as we have seen, sovereignty is not a thing but a “complex topological figure,” that is a purveyor of binary markers in that its power resides in the impossibility of distinguishing between these markers. What this means is that the exception is becoming the *rule* as it overflows its spatiotemporal boundaries. As Agamben explains:

What happened, and is still happening before our eyes is that the “juridically empty” space of the state of exception (in which law is in force in the figure - that is, etymologically, in the *fiction* of its own dissolution, and in which everything that the sovereign deemed *de facto* necessary could happen) has transgressed its spatiotemporal boundaries and now, overflowing outside them, is starting to coincide with the normal order, in which everything again becomes possible.¹⁶⁶

With the concentration camp, as alluded to before, Agamben sees the materialization of the state of exception, where “bare life and the juridical rule enter into a threshold of indistinction.”¹⁶⁷ Today, this materialization should be recognized, he says, “in all its metamorphoses into the *zone d’attentes* of our airports and certain outskirts of our cities.”¹⁶⁸

What can be posited here is that it is precisely in those liminal spaces where we encounter (in)security, that we can find the materialization of the exception and the production of bare life. This is not only to be apprehended within the context of fixed (b)orders, however, but also in the deterritorializations and reterritorializations of (b)orders at summits, events, and

¹⁶⁶ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.), Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998), p.38.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.174.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p.175.

makeshift refugee camps. Indeed, as Jenny Edkins has shown, the NATO military action in Kosovo can be read in this way: where the production of bare life in the refugee is simultaneously the production of NATO's sovereign power.¹⁶⁹ What this further suggests, is that sovereignty itself is in flux, being perpetually deterritorialized and reterritorialized, being transmitted *via* the war machine as well as the manifold of capillaries that are constituted by the processes of "globalization".

In understanding these processes, and the war on alterity that techno-administrative knowledge wages as well as the (de)politicization of the politics of security, one should (re)address the question of ideology. In conjunction with the more subtle and effective forms of biopolitics, what can be supplemented to Foucault's work is a form of ideology that Lefort calls "invisible ideology". In this form, that Lefort sees as currently prevailing in Western industrial societies, the possible contradictions of bourgeois ideology, as an ideology containing internal inconsistencies and incompatible representations in its attempt to present itself as a discourse on the social instead of a social discourse, are somewhat ironed out in that it is an ideology that attempts to *merge* with the social discourse. Yet, contrary to what Lefort understands as totalitarian ideology in which this merging is one of an affirmation of totality, the invisible ideology preserves the constant displacement and conflicts of bourgeois ideology in its concealment of the distance between the representation and the real. Its cohesion is drawn

¹⁶⁹ As Edkins explains: "In discussions of Kosovo, a key point of contention is, on the one hand, to what extent the NATO action produced the refugee or to what extent, on the other hand, it was a response to the refugee. This lack of clarity would be expected were the subject (the refugee) being produced *at the same time as* the order of power/knowledge by which the subject is to be governed (NATO). Extending that analysis using Agamben enables us to trace the involvement of sovereignty in the production of the refugee as subject. In this process, not only an order of governmentality but an order of sovereign power is born, together with the monopoly of legitimate violence as the means peculiar to that sovereign power." Jenny Edkins, "Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp", *Alternatives*, Vol.25, Nos.1-2 (2000), p.15.

through what Lefort calls the “between-us” (*entre-nous*).¹⁷⁰ In this, what is instrumental, are modern forms of communication: television, radio, and today, the internet.

It is only through these channels that this ideology is enabled since what is being spontaneously created is the illusion of an intimate social bond, “which abolishes a sense of distance, strangeness, imperceptibility, the signs of the outside, of adversity, of otherness.”¹⁷¹ Instead of oratory speeches, what is offered is a mimicking of live speech enabling the subject to feel as if they are in personal and live conversation with the speaker. What is further offered in the illusion of transparency and wholeness, and thus that “nothing is removed from the sphere of communication.”¹⁷² In contrast to bourgeois ideology, invisible ideology is one of the lower case. This is not an ideology of capital letters for not only does it need none, but their appearance could break the illusion of the intimate social bond. If one then applies this to the meaning of security, instead of the “Security” found in bourgeois ideology, we would find “security” as a pervasive discourse that saturates the quotidian. It is discourse on security where documentaries about possible catastrophes, a story about a family where both parents have been laid off, statistics on theft and vandalism, interviews with internet security “experts”, internet polls advertised on television asking opinions about genetically modified organisms, commercials for car financing in which the person has just lost their job, would all contribute to the social bond while simultaneously adding to the articulation of the subjective disposition

¹⁷⁰ Claude Lefort, “The Genesis of Ideology in Modern Societies”, in Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Societies: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*, John B. Thompson (ed.), Cambridge: MIT Press (1986), p.228.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.,p.228.

¹⁷² Ibid.,p.229

of the viewer. What should be noted is that political content is only partially explicit, in order for it to acquire political significance. As Lefort notes:

The effectiveness of the discourse such as that transmitted by radio and television lies in the fact that it is only partially manifested as political discourse - and it is precisely because of this that it acquires a general political significance. It is the things of everyday life, questions of science and culture, which support the representations of a realized democracy where speech seems to circulate without obstruction.¹⁷³

One could argue that these people *did* lose their jobs, that theft and vandalism *is* on the rise, that viruses on the internet *do* cause computer meltdowns, etc... Yet, this is not the point. It is the illusion of the social bond and the illusion of the transparency of the society as well as of the knowledge disseminated that is important to address.

A case in point, while making a final argument regarding security in relation to democracy. The end of the Fordist compromise, the interpretation of its crisis as a mere cyclical economic downturn,¹⁷⁴ and the rise of the neo-liberal orthodoxy premised upon a nineteenth century understanding of the division between the political and the economic,¹⁷⁵ in addition to the doctrine of the minimal state, has led to a steady erosion of the traditional functions of the state, and an erosion of its perceived legitimacy evidenced in the increasingly popular protests targeting all summits symbolically tied to world order institutions. As Robert Cox suggests, with regards to what he calls the "internationalising of the state":

Its common feature is to convert the state into an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy. The state becomes a transmission belt from the global to the national economy, where

¹⁷³ Ibid., p.227.

¹⁷⁴ See Alain Lipietz, "The Post-Fordist world: labour relations, international hierarchy and global ecology", *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol.4, No.1 (Spring 1997), pp.1-41.

¹⁷⁵ See Robert Cox, "Global Perestroika", *Socialist Register*, London: Merlin Press (1992), p.32.

heretofore it had acted as the bulwark defending domestic welfare from external disturbances.¹⁷⁶

Within this context, the State's security discourse becomes its central source of legitimacy. What can be argued here is that the security discourse becomes pervasive through the social. This is partially because of the gradual dissolution of liberal meaning to security, a discourse of social and individual security that can be seen as gradually losing its "social" referent. In this, the meaning to security associated to the individual becomes virtually indistinguishable from the State security discourse *qua* "freedom from threats" and a chain of equivalences can be created that courses through the social in a generalized discourse of security and threats. Within the context of post September 11th, this becomes a source of concern for Agamben:

What used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation. Security reasoning entails an essential risk. A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic.¹⁷⁷

However, it is much more than just the question of political legitimation of the State that is operating here. The neo-liberal discourse itself deploys a discourse of *insecurity* in its contribution to the articulation of late modern social order. In contrast to the liberal deployment of a meaning to security in its articulation of a social whole *vis-à-vis* the State addressed above, the neo-liberal deployment of a discourse of (in)security erodes collective understandings of being under the banners of rational efficiency and competitiveness from an economic logic

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., pp.30-31. For an excellent reading of the relation between 19th century neo-liberalism and the rise of fascism see Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press (1944).

¹⁷⁷ Giorgio Agamben, "Security and Terror", *Theory and Event*, Vol.5, No.4 (2002), par.3.
http://direct.press.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4agamben.html

operating at a sovereign distance from the social and predicated upon the division between the economic and the political.¹⁷⁸ In this, bare life is produced through individualization, through the production of docile bodies effected through the deployment of a discourse of (in)security at the level of the individual that finds its resonance in the meaning to security of the sovereign State under conditions of anarchy. As Pierre Bourdieu suggests in addressing the “reign of flexibility” of labour under the aegis of neo-liberalism:

In this way, a Darwinian world emerges - it is the struggle of all against all at all levels of the hierarchy, which finds support through everyone clinging to their job and organization under conditions of insecurity, suffering and stress. Without a doubt, the practical establishment of this world of struggle would not succeed so completely without the complicity of all of the *precarious arrangements* that produce insecurity and of the existence of a *reserve army of employees rendered docile by these social processes that make their situation precarious*, as well as the permanent threat of unemployment.¹⁷⁹

It is within this context, that one can address invisible ideology. Although it is “true” that a person lost their job, or that theft is on the rise, or that catastrophes do happen, it is taken as given, without apprehending its symbolic giving meaning (*mise en sens*) and staging (*mise en scène*). It is here that depoliticization and the evacuation of alterity are most revealed. The security discourse, through these examples, is seen as natural and inevitable - i.e. as having a singular meaning observed in the transparent world “out there” and “in here.” That increasing spheres of being-in-the-world are being securitized and (de)politicized, that we are all, in some form or another, at different times or always as *homines sacri*, is either apprehended as the

¹⁷⁸ On this, in relation to the depoliticization enabled by the division between the economic and the political in relation to multinationals, see Miguel de Larrinaga, “(Re)Politicizing the Discourse: Globalization Is a S(h)ell Game”, *Alternatives*, Vol.25, No.2 (Apr.-June 2000), pp. 145-182..

¹⁷⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, “The essence of neoliberalism”, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (March 1998), <http://www.en.monde-diplomatique.fr/1998/12/08bourdieu>

natural order of things or of some rational necessity. Yet invisible ideology also has its weaknesses, and its primary one is brought about by its success. As Claude Lefort explains:

The more the discourse on the social seeks to coincide with the social discourse, the more it seeks to control the uncontrollable movement of the institution, to take hold of the signs of the instituting moment, the more it runs the risk of losing the function that ideology has assumed hitherto: the legitimation of the established order, not only the legitimation of a system of ownership, but to the real as such. It creates the conditions for a contestation which [...] is aimed beyond the expressions of power and exploitation, at the reference points of socialization in the modern world, and brings to light the question of the Other, the question of Being.¹⁸⁰

This quote by Lefort can be read and, I believe, *should* be read as both a blessing and a warning. As a blessing, what it reveals is the possibility of revealing the cracks in invisible ideology. With regards to security, it reveals, to me, the possibility of disrupting a discourse that I see as totalizing, (de)politicizing and, as such, profoundly anti-democratic. In this sense, the position taken in this work is one *against* security. In accordance with the reading of the early Christian Pauline discourse in Chapter Three, this “against” should not be apprehended as offering a replacement, a self-same discourse that would provide a self-same alternative. This “against” is one that attempts to work the sovereign frame and the deployment of its security discourse, to incessantly reveal the cracks in the latter, to bring to light the fundamental indeterminacy that enables democracy. As a warning, one could again say that thinking the question of the Other, of thinking the question of Being, always already involves a risk. It is a risk that invokes, from the hubris of self-foundation, at best “superstition” or “conspiracy” and at worst “nihilism” and the “abyss”. Yet all thinking involves risk, whether one realizes it or not. Faced with our present security predicament, and the dire consequences of its unabated perpetuation, I believe it is a risk that must be taken.

¹⁸⁰ Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*, Cambridge: MIT Press (1986), p.236.

Conclusion

The sleep of reason produces monsters.

Francisco Jose de Goya

To cultivate appreciation of the diversity of life is, first, to fend off the drive to revenge against a world without intrinsic purpose and, second, to celebrate a plurality of partial, incomplete identities that can affirm themselves without denying their constructed, relational and paradoxical character. If, as Nietzsche suggests, goodness comes out of 'the abundance of life' (rather than a command, a design or the barrel of a gun), if it flows from those energies that exceed what it takes to establish and protect a (personal and/or collective) identity, the cultivation of self-forbearance and generosity in the strife and interdependence of social relations is the most important form goodness assumes.

William E. Connolly¹

Goya's quote above, a title from one of a series of prints entitled, *Los Caprichos*, published in 1799, reveals a certain ambiguity: is it a world without reason that produces monsters? Is it the sleep of reason itself that produces the monsters? The caption to the painting provides a clue: "Fantasy deserted by reason produces impossible monsters: united with it, fantasy is the mother of the arts and the source of their wonders." What Goya can be read as saying, therefore, is closer to the first rendition - i.e. that "fantasy", that which is ir-rational, without reason, produces monsters. Yet, for Goya, "fantasy" is also essential; without it, arts and its wonders would not exist. Goya was writing in post-French Revolution Spain and his comments should not be seen as a glorification of reason, but precisely as a criticism of placing *everything* under the judgement of Reason, a critique of French Enlightenment thinking as it was perceived from Spain before the Napoleonic invasion. Yet Goya's generosity towards reason cannot be reciprocated since by placing everything under the judgement of reason, Goya's "fantasy",

¹ William E. Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1993), p.195.

indeed his whole existence as an artist, is considered ir-rational. Within the context of the present work, it may also be deemed ir-rational in the court of reason. Yet, in being an engagement *with* rationality, it must contain at least some trace of rationality.

The second quote by Connolly is also somewhat ambiguous depending upon what you stand upon. From a position of absolute foundation, Connolly seems to be indicating, in “the drive to revenge against a world without intrinsic purpose”, a nihilism at the heart of modernity, a world of “anything goes”. Yet, simultaneously, he speaks of goodness, of a world where “anything” does *not* go. In essence, the argument is that to recognize nihilism at the heart of modernity does not automatically make you a nihilist just as to understand the need for “fantasy”, does not make you ir-rational. In fact, if we follow Lefort’s understanding of democracy as being enabled by, and simultaneously responding to, the fundamental indeterminacy at the heart of modernity, then one could say, as David Campbell suggests, that “nihilism is not something endorsed by specific theoretical projects but rather the condition of modern life that all theoretical projects seek to counter.”²

It is within this context that I would like to situate the present work. Accepting the fundamental indeterminacy at the heart of modernity, yet also accepting the impossibility of constituting any form of political project through the dream of pure indeterminacy - a project, whose transparency can only lead to totality - this thesis has posited the need to incessantly reveal the cracks in the discursive foundations of the modern security discourse and its complicity with sovereign order in relation to alterity. To do so, it has proposed a genealogy

² David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1998), p.197.

of the intimate complicity between the meaning(s) to security and the articulation of social order to better understand our present security predicament. After addressing the work's position *vis-à-vis* the discipline of International Relations in Chapter One, an undertaking which, simultaneously, disrupted the foundations of the self-image of the discipline, I turned in Chapter Two to elucidate the approach taken *vis-à-vis* the question of sovereignty as well as to provide the epistemological and ontological context for the first chapter. Simultaneously, these two chapters provided a preliminary understanding of the *how* and the *why* behind the predominant use of security within the discipline - i.e. a deployment of security to frame issues and problems while concomitantly eluding the framing's gaze. Security's complicity with sovereign thought and its role in the disciplining of the discipline were seen as being central to this deployment of security. Furthermore, Chapter Two developed an approach through which the complicity between security and social order could be apprehended by working and laying bare the operation of sovereignty. This approach was primarily based on a supplemented version of the concept of the *theologico-political* as used by Claude Lefort, engaging both the questions of the political and alterity. From this (un)framing and (un)grounding, a reading of the security discourse of Roman Imperial order and its disruption by the early Christian Pauline discourse against security was elaborated in Chapter Three. Primarily vehicled through Alain Badiou's reading of Saint Paul, this excursus revealed the possibility of reading the early Christian Pauline security discourse as one that disrupted that of the Roman Empire through an awareness of the contingency underlying the Christian subject's fidelity to the event of Resurrection. Chapter Four then moved on to consider the institutionalization of Christianity and the way in which the security discourse of Christendom articulated itself with regards to the dualistic foundation of

order. Through a reading inspired primarily by the work of Marcel Gauchet, this chapter subsequently addressed the shift from divine order to sovereign state in order to show how the deployment of security discourses was an essential constituent in this transition and in the new articulation of sovereign order in the classical age. In Chapter Five, the focus shifted to the transition into the modern age and the different articulations of the meaning(s) to security in the latter. In this, the work of Agamben, Foucault and Lefort were central in providing a framework to read the dynamics of modernity: the articulation of sovereign power and democracy within the context of the modern *episteme*, as well as the advent of biopolitics and its deployment with regards to them. In this, Lefort's understanding of ideology was also employed to supplement Foucaultian biopolitics. From this apprehension of the dynamics of modernity, the work moved to address the meaning(s) to security as they articulated themselves with regards to the liberal bourgeois order in the 18th and 19th centuries before turning to its articulation in strict military terms at the outset of the post-War world. Through a critical reading of Carl Schmitt, the post-War security discourse was addressed before turning to the recent calls for a redefinition of the concept with particular reference to the post-Cold War world. It was argued that without a concomitant shift in order, the redefinition of security would be unable to dissociate itself from the sovereign order as it was inextricably tied to the state of exception through which sovereign power has force of law. It was further argued that the breakdown of sovereign order's ability to maintain itself through its power in the impossibility of distinguishing between its binary markers and, thus, of the exception becoming the rule, is central to understanding the pervasiveness of a security discourse with a singular meaning in our present security predicament. In understanding how biopower and ideology

articulate themselves in this situation, it was finally argued that a stand against security, of disrupting the current articulation of order in a way similar to the early Christian Pauline discourse but within the context of the modern *episteme*, and an understanding of democracy as being enabled through indeterminacy.

As stated in the introduction, a work that attempts to apprehend two millennia in two hundred pages is one that can only touch the surface of the manifold of complexities involved. Furthermore, there are many issues that were simply neglected but deserve further study. For example, the role of gender in the complicity between the meaning(s) of security and social order is a crucial facet that was hardly touched upon. The influence of the European encounter with the new world with regards to the articulation of alterity and the constitution of knowledge is another issue that is central yet sadly omitted. Inextricably tied to it, the whole issue of colonialism and the exportation of forms of social order and meaning(s) to security is another area that needs exploration. Again, in relation to colonialism, the issue of capitalism should be investigated in much more detail beyond the meagre confines of bourgeois ideology. As well, an engagement with more of the security studies literature and, in particular, a deeper examination of the connections between this work and the multiplicity of important work coming out of critical and radical security studies literature could complement the work that has been done. A work of this sort is never finished, it is simply cut off. Furthermore, many ideas and investigations are sadly left on the cutting room floor. However, I hope that through this genealogical reading of the complicity between the meaning(s) to security and the articulation of social order *via* alterity I have provided a modest, yet coherent, contribution to understanding our present security predicament and its consequences for being- in-the-world.

I would like to put down a few final words, and a few opening ones, to address the political engagement of this project. In re-tracing the complicity between the meaning(s) of security and the articulation of social order with regards to alterity I have attempted to address and engage our present security predicament in late modernity. Although, as mentioned in the introduction to this work, the dissolution of the Cold War markers and the (re)configuration and deployment of new security markers points toward the impossibility of transcending modernity - a revolutionary political break with the past toward a new certain future - one can acknowledge its inescapability while isochronously trying to *out-live* it: to, as Michael Dillon asserts in his own political project on the subject of security, “*out-live* the modern politically.”³ This out-living should not be seen in terms of a temporal linearity, of a teleological end state, as some “thing” which would outlast or supplant the politics of modernity in a proximate or distant future. Rather, this out-living should be seen as a task of the present, an immediate task which is potentially interminable as a permanent feature of late modernity at its limit.⁴ Furthermore, and intimately related to the above, this out-living *must* concern itself with security and not simply within the strictures of the discipline of international relations. What is at stake here concerns, as was elaborated upon throughout this thesis, at a more fundamental and crucial level, what the *political* is and what it is th(ought) to be. As Dillon explains in apprehending modern politics as a security project:

³ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought*, London: Routledge (1996), p.1.

⁴ This palpable immediacy of out-living the modern politically is well illustrated by Dillon: “The need to engage in a contest for the political does not, therefore, arise somewhere else. Nor does it operate in some other time or place yet to come from out of the past or out of the future. It always already exists: here, now, for the future.” *Ibid.*, p. 140.

In pursuing this thought it follows that security turns-out to have a much wider register - has always and necessarily had a much wider register, something which modern international security studies have begun to register - than that merely of preserving our so-called basic values, or even our mortal bodies. That it has, in fact, always been concerned with securing the very grounds of what the political itself is; specifying what the essence of politics is thought to be. The reason is that the thought within which political thought occurs - metaphysics - and specifically its conception of truth, is itself a security project.⁵

It is precisely this “security project”, its enduring prevalence, as well as its manifestations within multiple registers of social and political life under the sign of security that are at issue here. Although the end of the Cold War has opened the horizons toward an understanding of security within the context of the theory/practice of international relations, the opportunities contained in the vertigo produced by the dissolution of the old markers of certainty of State, Power and Order and the breaching of the walls around the disciplinary citadel of Orthodoxy, are continually haunted by the spectre of a particular understanding of the political which remains, for the most part, hidden or occulted from the security discourse/discourse on security although in intimate complicity with it. It is a form of Sovereign knowledge/practice which, although historically constituted through manifold symbolic continuities and breaks, of contradictions and syntheses, of interpretations and reinterpretations, appears as natural, indeed inevitable, through the occultation of its own generative principles. It is the way in which this understanding of the political articulates itself which is crucial to an understanding of what security means and the danger and opportunities contained in any redefinition, rearticulation or resignification of the concept. As Rob Walker points out, “Security cannot be understood, or reconceptualized, or reconstructed without paying attention

⁵ Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought*, London: Routledge (1996), pp.12-13.

to the constitutive account of the political that has made the prevailing accounts of security seem so plausible.”⁶ Returning to Ken Booth’s words which inaugurated this thesis, our words may not be working within the context of what are considered to be the traditional disciplinary registers of State, Power and Order, but their continued iteration in the post-Cold War world may be performatively working in unintended ways with unintended consequences in different registers based upon the prevalence of a certain symbolic order, a particular understanding of the political, a legacy of the sedimentation through which security has been articulated into our late modern condition. In engaging this predicament, in being responsible before it, we must heed to the undecidable in every decision, for the out-living of the modern is intimately complicit with the promise of *democracy to-come*.⁷

⁶ R.B.J. Walker, “The Subject of Security”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1997), p.69.

⁷ As Derrida concisely explains: “Not the democracy of tomorrow, not a future democracy which will be present tomorrow but one whose concept is linked to the to-come [*à-venir*, cf. *avenir*, future], to the experience of a promise engaged, that is always an endless promise”. Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Literature*, London: Routledge (1992), p.38. Derrida’s notion of “democracy to-come” has been central to his recent trajectory of more directly political writings such as Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1992), Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, London: Routledge (1994) and Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, London: Verso 1997.

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